

25 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDM&S

SUBJECT : MSAG Suggestion to Expand CIA Displays

REFERENCES : a. MSAG's 7 November 1973 memorandum
b. C/FAC's 22 January 1974 memorandum (m+s 74-0254)
c. Assistant to the Director's 28 January (m+s 74-0303)
1974 memorandum

1. You may already have responded to the MSAG's suggestion on expanding CIA displays after receipt of references b. and c. If not, I offer the following additional comments.

2. The Smithsonian Institution has facilities for temporary shows (lasting 1-3 months) and for permanent display. While most of the exhibition areas are too large, it is very likely the Institution would be pleased to set aside a small exhibit area for CIA, and this facility would seem to be the most suitable for providing CIA visibility to visitors to the Capital area.

3. Most of the FAC-sponsored displays at Headquarters Building are gathered either from commercial exhibition sources or consist of an aggregate of items belonging to employees, and for this reason would not be suitable. The late 1973 display on the history of spying involved primarily personal belongings of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer and a few selected items on loan from New York State and therefore, from a practical standpoint, would also be unsuitable for inclusion.

4. There are certain "canned" exhibits which could be displayed in a small area, specifically the Cuban Missile Crisis display, the Berlin Tunnel display, and OMS' award-winning drug display. These (which can be recreated), together with a continuous side showing of the Need to Know film and a display of certain selected CIA publications, to include the Middle East Atlas and the China Atlas (both published and sold to the public by GPO), would be suitable for a composite showing of "What Intelligence Can Do." (NOTE: The DDM&S' 10 January 1974 memorandum to the DCI, "Dissemination of CIA Product to the Public"--apparently not yet acted upon by the Director--lists CIA publications currently disseminated to the public, a collection of which could be displayed.)

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5. The Chief of the CIA History Staff, having taken over the responsibility for the Intelligence Museum Commission program, is at this time calling for identification of items suitable for inclusion in an "intelligence museum" should one ever be established. On his inventory may be unclassified items of interest to the public which might be included in a composite display.
6. If Agency management wished to pursue this, perhaps the Smithsonian could be contacted about a "trial" 3-month exhibit (for the summer of 1974, for instance). If public interest warranted, the exhibit could then be made permanent, with alterations as circumstances dictate.
7. Any exhibit of this nature would be strictly an Agency public relations matter, however, and the FAC by its charter would not become involved. The FAC in fact simply does not have the resources to undertake such a project, all members of the Committee doing FAC work in addition to their regular duties.
8. It should be emphasized that any exhibit--particularly one of this importance, despite the size--is a time consuming task, requiring extensive planning time as well as installation time. Re-creating the displays mentioned herein would require support from NPIC, OMS, OBG, OS and OL at a minimum. With our present day manpower and resource restrictions, would the various offices involved have the required resources? I have the impression that most offices are absorbing additional duties with fewer people, and a project such as this could be a "luxury" we cannot at this time afford. In addition to the Agency manpower resource problems, consideration would have to be given as to payment of shipping costs, cost of equipment for showing film, display equipment, etc., and printing and visual aids costs.
9. I should add that I was advised by Mr. Pforzheimer that the Smithsonian approached Mr. Colby (informally and prior to the time he became Director, I gathered) about obtaining and displaying the Cuban Missile Crisis display. According to Mr. Pforzheimer, Mr. Colby's deliberate decision at that time was negative.
10. Insofar as "traveling" exhibits are concerned, the logistics aspects of crating, shipment, insurance, etc., generally involves more cost than warranted, with the problems outweighing the benefits. (At the time Admiral Raborn was Director, I am told a traveling exhibit to

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universities of various NPIC products was examined, with the determination that the cost would far exceed the "value" of the exhibit.) The award-winning drug display has been shown to various local high schools and to NSA, and it could be re-created. While it would seem appropriate to be included in a semi-permanent or permanent display on "what intelligence can do", I agree with Mr. Thuermer about not expanding it as a "traveling exhibit" given today's less critical drug problem on the campus.

11. Mr. Thuermer's comments are certainly very thoughtful, positive and constructive. He does not, however, address himself to the resource problem of who will have the time to plan and coordinate any such expansion of CIA displays, or even a small composite display at the Smithsonian. This would appear to be a very large and real problem in connection with MSAG's suggestion as well. Should the Smithsonian Institution be interested, a one-site display there would provide the most visibility to the general public with the least logistical complications.

12. One note of caution: If Mr. Colby as DCI were to "sponsor" any exhibit at the Smithsonian, care would have to be taken about CIA as one part of the Intelligence Community. The IC Staff might wish to have input from other intelligence organizations included in any "What Intelligence Can Do" type of display.

RECOMMENDATION:

With DDM&S concurrence, the MSAG suggestion merits getting the Director's reaction to it.

a. Should the Director feel the time is right for CIA's public image, and should the Smithsonian Institution be approached regarding the possibility of a composite intelligence exhibit (with, I suspect, positive interest on its part), Mr. Thuermer, in his position as Assistant to the Director and with his existing contacts at the Smithsonian, would be the most appropriate representative of the Agency to approach it.

b. If an intelligence display were to be exhibited at the Smithsonian, I would recommend that manpower resources be made available on a full time basis for the time required to collect and install the display, with the Institution's professional staff being used to the maximum extent possible for advice on exhibit space and design.

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c. Should the Director feel the time is not right for such a public relations effort on the part of CIA, I recommend the suggestion and the comments thereon be forwarded to Chief, History Staff for consideration at a later, more propitious date.



DDM&S Plans Staff

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