

CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 30

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C.I.G. ■24 April 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPPOLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS,

Director.

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter of any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
 - a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;
 - b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;
 - c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

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4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. _____ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

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a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.


b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

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10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

8 May 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
[REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Secretary

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1. The actions on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board after informal consideration are shown in Enclosure "A" hereto.

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2. The comments on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in Enclosure "B" hereto.

3. The amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in paragraph 2 of Enclosure "B" are submitted herewith for consideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946

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JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

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ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON C.I.G.

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence:

Approved, subject to the following minor amendment:

Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all-Departments of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the ~~agencies~~ agency concerned.

The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable devise for clearance of such personnel.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS:

Approved without change.

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper.

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the Enclosure - after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of one representative each of the State Department, Military

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Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence:

Approved without change.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1946

Dear Admiral Souers:

I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

It is believed that there are many persons in government employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 MAY 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: C.I.G. Policy on Security Clearance of Personnel.

The following recommendations are submitted in connection with comments received from the Department of State, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding suggested amendments to C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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1. The Chief of Naval Intelligence recommends that paragraph 7, page 3, be amended to provide for a review of all reports of investigations by a screening committee to consist of one representative each from the State Department; Military Intelligence Division, G-2; Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2 and then the final review by the Security Officer of the Central Intelligence Group. Paragraph 7 in its original form provides for the review of investigative reports by the Security Officer of C.I.G. It is believed that the proposed additional review by a screening committee is neither necessary nor desirable because:

a. Review of the investigative reports by the Security Officer, C.I.G. will accomplish the primary purpose of the provision in question, which is to permit of extraction from the reports of certain pertinent information desired for C.I.G. files. It is for the further purpose of enabling the Security Officer to familiarize himself with the contents of the reports so that he will be in a position to brief the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the acceptability of nominees to the C.I.G.

b. The only reports in which all the departments have an interest are those in which a nominee fails to meet the requirements of the directive and an exception is requested. Paragraph 13 of C.I.G. [REDACTED] provides that exceptions may be granted on the basis of unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Thus, the reports of investigations will be available to all departments in such cases.

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c. It is believed that the requirements set up in C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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for the investigation and clearance of individuals for assignment to the C.I.G. will permit each department to make the proper determination as to an individual's eligibility and that a review of investigative reports of one department by the other departments would result in delaying the clearance and would serve no useful purpose. It is recommended that the suggested amendment, paragraph 7, not be concurred in and further, that paragraph 7 be retained in its present form.

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2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of State suggests that paragraph 13 be amended to require only the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the department nominating the person for duty with the Central Intelligence Group in order to effect an exception to any of the provisions of C.I.G. Paragraph 13 in its original form required the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group to effect exceptions. This provision is a saving clause that permits exceptions in cases where extenuating circumstances may make it desirable to utilize an individual's services even though the individual does not meet with the set standards. It is believed that all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group are entitled to knowledge of any exceptions being made on individuals nominated for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. It is, therefore, recommended that the suggested amendment to paragraph 13 not be concurred in and further that the provision in question be retained in its original form.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation suggests that the provision that a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, there being no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, be accepted as a basis for clearance may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group. It is stated that there are many persons who have been in government employment for a period of ten (10) years or more and have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty are concerned but who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. It is believed that there is a security danger unless an adequate check is made to determine the existence of any derogatory information that may have developed subsequent to the date of any existent investigative report or during the entire period of the individual's government employment. To provide for an adequate check, it is recommended that there be incorporated in paragraph 9 a final sentence worded as follows:

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- 3 -

"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

4. As a result of further careful consideration of this directive, it is recommended that two other minor changes be effected which, it is believed, will clarify the intent of two particular provisions thereof. The suggested changes are as follows:


a. Page 4, paragraph 8 a (2) include after "Federal Bureau of Investigation" the words in parentheses "(to include fingerprint files)."

b. Page 5, paragraph 11, change lines 1 and 2 to read "All military and civilian personnel assigned to or attached for duty with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative."

The change suggested in a. above is believed necessary to insure that all agencies will request the F.B.I. to effect a fingerprint check as well as the usual records check. The change recommended in b. above is considered necessary to clearly indicate that the provisions of C.I.G. apply only to the personnel actually assigned to or attached for duty with the C.I.G.

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Captain, USN
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

8 May 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Reference: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Secretary

25X1A

1. The actions on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board after informal consideration are shown in Enclosure "A" hereto.

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2. The comments on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in Enclosure "B" hereto.

3. The amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in paragraph 2 of Enclosure "B" are submitted herewith for consideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

25X1A

ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON C.I.G.

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence:

Approved, subject to the following minor amendment:

Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all-Departments of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the agencies agency concerned.

The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable device for clearance of such personnel.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS:

Approved without change.

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper.

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the Enclosure - after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of one representative each of the State Department, Military

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Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence:

Approved without change.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1946

Dear Admiral Souers:


I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

It is believed that there are many persons in government employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER



23 April, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

STATINTL

Subject: C.I.G. [redacted]

1. It is requested that the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board return the attached memorandum to the Secretary by 1630, Monday, 29 April 1946, after making appropriate entry in the space provided.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

STATINTL

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
Subject: C.I.G. [redacted]

- 1. The subject paper is
 - a. Approved without change _____
 - b. Approved, subject to the minor amendments set out below X
 - c. Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper _____
- 2. Suggestions or amendments *.....

Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the ~~unanimous~~ concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and ~~all Departments of the Department~~ nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the ~~agencies~~ agency concerned.

The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents (including citizens of such countries as Canada or Great Britain) and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable device for clearance of such personnel.

STATINTL


(Signature)
Special Assistant to the Secretary

May 1, 1946

(Date)

Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.

* Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require security classification of this paper.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

STATINTL

Subject: C.I.G. [redacted]

1. The subject paper is
 - a. Approved without change
 - b. Approved, subject to the minor amendments set out below
 - c. Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper
2. Suggestions or amendments *.....

X

Hoyt S. Vandenberg

(Signature)
 HOYT S. VANDENBERG
 LIEUT. GENERAL, GSC
 A. C. of S., G-2

APR 26 1946 .

(Date)

Return to: Room 4254
 New War Dept. Bldg.

* Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require security classification of this paper.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Subject: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

STATINTL

1. The subject paper is
 - a. Approved without change
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 - c. Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper
2. Suggestions or amendments *.....

✓ *[Signature]*

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the enclosure - after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of one representative each of the State Department, Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff - 2 (A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

Thos. B. Inglis

(Signature)
THOS. B. INGLIS
Chief of Naval Intelligence

3 MAY 1946
(Date)

Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.

* Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require security classification of this paper.

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Subject: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

STATINTL

1. The subject paper is
 - a. Approved without change _____
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 - c. Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper _____
2. Suggestions or amendments *.....

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(Signature)
JOHN A. SAMFORD
Brig. General, U. S. Army
Deputy, Assistant Chief of Air Staff - 2

(Date)
29 APR 1946

Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.

* Inclusion of suggestions or amendments may require security classification of this paper.



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

STATINTL

April 29, 1946

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers
Director
Central Intelligence Group
Room 4253
New War Department Building
21st and Virginia Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Souers:

I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

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Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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APR 25 3 44 PM '46

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a "Proposed Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with the Central Intelligence Group". This proposal has been referred for concurrence or comment to the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board from the State, War, and Navy Departments, since they will be responsible for conducting the investigations prescribed therein.

Before issuing this policy, however, I would greatly appreciate any comments or suggestions which you might have concerning it, either from a general viewpoint or as regards the specific provisions with reference to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Sincerely,

"SIGNED"

SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Director

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Enclosure:
C.I.G. [redacted] Copy No. 21

JSLay:IH

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23 April, 1946

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Subject: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

1. It is requested that the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board return the attached memorandum to the Secretary by 1630, Monday, 29 April 1946, after making appropriate entry in the space provided.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Subject: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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 - a. Approved without change _____
 - b. Approved, subject to the minor amendments set out below _____
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(Signature)

(Date)

Return to: Room 4254
New War Dept. Bldg.

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COPY NO. 22

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C.I.G. ■

24 April 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
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SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
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1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter of any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

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CIG [REDACTED]

- 2 -

Enclosure

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4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. _____ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

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a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.

b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

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10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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COPY NO. _____

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C.I.G. ■

23 April 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS,

Director.

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ENCLOSURE ~~1/10~~

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

~~Minimum standards for clearance of personnel~~

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the

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standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. _____ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence ^{Group} file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to ^{the Central Intelligence Group} ~~C.I.G.~~ will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

- a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:
- (1) Department of State.
 - (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
 - (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
 - (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
 - (6) Credit agencies.
- b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:
- (1) Birth.
 - (2) Citizenship.

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(3) Education.

(4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question

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as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence ^{Group} file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

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11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence ^{Group} activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Enclosure *WAF*

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ADMIRAL SOUERS:

For your approval ✓
For your signature _____
For your information _____

	Prepared by	Coordinated With
Deputy Director, CIG		✓
Asst. to the Director		
Secretary, NIA	✓	
Chief of Operational Services		✓
Chief, Central Planning Staff	✓	
Chief, Central Reports Staff		✓
Administrative Officer		✓

REMARKS: *Recommended discussion at your meeting with the Council tomorrow.*

J.S.L.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Souers

SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

ENCLOSURE: Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,
N.I.A., on 15 April)

1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-
tions were raised with reference to the enclosure:

a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,
or with the C.I.G.?

b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of
Central Intelligence?

c. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments
of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-
ceptions as he sees fit?

2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-
gardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should
be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnish-
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that
investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable
length of time (90 to 120 days in the case of War). Placing the re-
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the
departments would have the following effects:

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- 2 -

a. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be required.

b. Security checks would be expedited.

c. Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the ultimate responsibility resides in any case.

3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for investigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concurrence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to conduct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.

4. With reference to 1-c, one viewpoint was that the Director should be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in exceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified material from all departments.

5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-a of the proposed directive should be re-worded as follows:

"of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."



JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF

ROUTING SLIP

No. _____

Date 4/22/46

Enclosure: _____

Draft Directive re Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

From:	To:	For:
<input type="checkbox"/> Planning Chief	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>07X</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Note
<input type="checkbox"/> Deputy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Note and Return Information
<input type="checkbox"/> Policy & Rev.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommend routing or reference
<input type="checkbox"/> Inf.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Necessary Action
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Comment
<input type="checkbox"/> Support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommendation
<input type="checkbox"/> Steno	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare CIG Action
<input type="checkbox"/> Secy, NIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>2</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Review
<input type="checkbox"/> Reports Staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Suspense File
<input type="checkbox"/> Adm. Officer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Dispatch
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> File
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
		Deadline:

Remarks: *For submission to the Secretariat*

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*(Red. Secretariat)
15 April 1946*

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

11 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of Personnel for
Duties with Central Intelligence Group.

1. The Acting Administrative Officer, C.I.G., prepared a draft letter dated 21 March, subject, "Clearance of Personnel", which was designed to clarify procedures for security clearance of personnel assigned for duties with Central Intelligence. At the Staff meeting of 26 March the proposed letter was referred to the Planning Staff for consideration.

2. The Planning Staff has prepared a draft of proposed action by C.I.G. It consists of a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the members of the Advisory Board, forwarding a draft directive making provision for uniform clearance standards in the Departments furnishing personnel to the C.I.G.

3. The security officers of the War, Navy and State Departments, and the Army Air Forces have concurred informally in the proposed directive.

4. Action recommended:

That the memorandum be approved and dispatched to the Advisory Board.

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Captain, USN
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff

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DRAFT

TO: Mr. Alfred McCormack
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, USN
Brig. General George C. McDonald, USA

SUBJECT: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central Intelligence Group.

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.

2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.

3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. Inclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members of the Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and that each member of the Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Director

Incl: Draft of Directive.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. _____

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
 - a. of excellent character who are native born citizens of the United States;
 - b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;
 - c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.
4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040008-2

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. ___ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence file.
7. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 8, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
 - a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:
 - (1) Department of State.
 - (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
 - (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
 - (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
 - (6) Credit Agencies
 - b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:
 - (1) Birth.
 - (2) Citizenship.
 - (3) Education.
 - (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

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c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

8. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

9. The investigations required by paragraph 7 will be completed by the respective departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

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10. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

11. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

12. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrences will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the Agencies concerned.

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7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to C.I.G. will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

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22 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Souers

SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of
personnel for Duties with C.I.G.

ENCLOSURE: Memo for Director of Central Intelligence from
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff, same sub-
ject, dated 11 April (received by Secretary,
N.I.A., on 15 April)

1. At the C.I.G. Council meeting this morning the following ques-
tions were raised with reference to the enclosure:

a. Should the responsibility for security clearance rest with
the departments, as provided in paragraph 6 of the proposed directive,
or with the C.I.G.?

b. Is it necessary that the proposed directive be approved by
the I.A.B., or should it be issued individually by the Director of
Central Intelligence?

c. Should exceptions require concurrence by member departments
of C.I.G., as provided in paragraph 12 of the proposed directive, or
should the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to make ex-
ceptions as he sees fit?

2. With reference to 1-a above, it was agreed that in any case re-
sponsibility for the security of C.I.G. rests with the Director, re-
gardless of the arrangements for investigation and clearance of indi-
viduals. Central Planning Staff feels that security clearance should
be done by the departments as part of their responsibility for furnish-
ing C.I.G. personnel, since the individuals are employees of the various
departments. It was pointed out, however, that the proposed directive
does not provide for mandatory review by C.I.G. It was also stated that
investigation and clearance by the departments might take a considerable
length of time (90 to 120 days in the case of War). Placing the re-
sponsibility for investigation and clearance in C.I.G. rather than the
departments would have the following effects:

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a. A larger security office in C.I.G. probably would be required.

b. Security checks would be expedited.

c. Final clearance would be performed in C.I.G. where the ultimate responsibility resides in any case.

3. It was believed that the answer to 1-b above depends on the answer to 1-a. If the departments are to be responsible for investigation and clearance, it appears appropriate to obtain the concurrence of the I.A.B. to the proposed directive. If C.I.G. is to conduct the investigation and clearance, the directive might be issued by the Director without reference to the I.A.B.

4. With reference to 1-c, one viewpoint was that the Director should be authorized to grant exceptions without further concurrences and their resultant delay. The other viewpoint was that the security representatives of the permanent I.A.B. members should concur in exceptions since C.I.G. personnel will be handling highly classified material from all departments.

5. The C.I.G. Council agreed that paragraph 3-a of the proposed directive should be re-worded as follows:

"of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power."

"SIGNED"

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING
21st and VIRGINIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.


19 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary, NIA

REFERENCE; Draft Directive
Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duty with CIG

1. Reference Directive has been received and is recommended for approval subject to the comments set forth below.
2. It is understood that paragraph 3a will be re-written to read in substance as follows: "of excellent character who are native born citizens of the United States and who have no next of kin by blood or marriage subject to a foreign power."
3. It should be noted that under the proposed directive the Administrative Division will not be in a position to assume responsibility for prompt security clearances. The speed with which these clearances are obtained rests wholly with the interested department.

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Colonel, CAC
Administrative Officer

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19 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary, NIA

REFERENCE; Draft Directive
Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duty with CIG

1. Reference Directive has been received and is recommended for approval subject to the comments set forth below.
2. It is understood that paragraph 3a will be re-written to read in substance as follows: "of excellent character who are native born citizens of the United States and who have no next of kin by blood or marriage subject to a foreign power."
3. It should be noted that under the proposed directive the Administrative Division will not be in a position to assume responsibility for prompt security clearances. The speed with which these clearances are obtained rests wholly with the interested department.

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"SIGNED"

Colonel, CAC
Administrative Officer

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FROM	OFFICE	TO
	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP	
	Director of Central Intelligence	
	Deputy Director, CIG	
	Assistant to the Director	
	Secretary, NIA	
	Chief of Operational Services	
	Chief, Central Planning Staff	
	Chief, Central Reports Staff	
	Administrative Officer	

ACTION _____ DIRECT REPLY _____

RECOMMENDATION _____ COMMENT _____

SIGNATURE _____ FILE _____

INFORMATION _____ NOTE _____


RETURN _____ MAIL _____

PREPARATION OF REPLY _____

REMARKS: For consideration at Monday's Council Meeting.

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11 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central Intelligence Group.

1. The Acting Administrative Officer, C.I.G., prepared a draft letter dated 21 March, subject, "Clearance of Personnel", which was designed to clarify procedures for security clearance of personnel assigned for duties with Central Intelligence. At the Staff meeting of 26 March the proposed letter was referred to the Planning Staff for consideration.

2. The Planning Staff has prepared a draft of proposed action by C.I.G. It consists of a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the members of the Advisory Board, forwarding a draft directive making provision for uniform clearance standards in the Departments furnishing personnel to the C.I.G.

3. The security officers of the War, Navy and State Departments, and the Army Air Forces have concurred informally in the proposed directive.

b. Action recommended:

That the memorandum be approved and dispatched to the Advisory Board.

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Captain, USN
Acting Chief, Central Planning Staff

Return to C.I.G.

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DRAFT

TO: Mr. Alfred McCormack
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, USN
Brig. General George C. McDonald, USA

SUBJECT: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with Central Intelligence Group.

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.

2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.

3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. Inclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members of the Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and that each member of the Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

SIDNEY S. SOWERS
Director

Incl: Draft of Directive.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. ___

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."
2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter or any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
 - a. of excellent character who are native born citizens of the United States;
 - b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;
 - c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.
4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

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5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.
6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. ____ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence File.
7. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 6, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
 - a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:
 - (1) Department of State.
 - (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
 - (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
 - (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
 - (6) Credit Agencies
 - b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:
 - (1) Birth.
 - (2) Citizenship.
 - (3) Education.
 - (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

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c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

8. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

9. The investigations required by paragraph 7 will be completed by the respective departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

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10. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

11. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

12. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrences will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the Agencies concerned.

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