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12 August 1947

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NOTED BY: [Signature]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY


Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The Ad Hoc Committee, established by the Intelligence Advisory Board at its 14th meeting to prepare recommendations to the IAB for the establishment of procedures for the IAB, has drafted the attached recommendations, which are circulated herewith for consideration of the IAB at its next meeting.

2. These recommendations are fully concurred in by the Committee with the following exceptions:

- a. The G-2 representative does not concur in the inclusion of paragraph 4.
- b. The A-2 representative reserves opinion on the inclusion of paragraph 4.

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Secretary, N.I.A.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD PROCEDURES

1. All recommendations envisaged by paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 (Section 102 d of the National Security Act of 1947) will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board in writing, accompanied by copies of such papers or statements as the Director of Central Intelligence may contemplate accompanying the recommendations upon presentation to the National Intelligence Authority (NSC). These recommendations will have attached a voting slip providing opportunity for:

- a Concurrence or non-concurrence;
- b Comment;
- c Request for an IAB meeting.

Voting slips will be acted upon and returned to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after receipt. If any Intelligence Advisory Board member so requests, an Intelligence Advisory Board meeting shall be called by the Director of Central Intelligence. If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the submission of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working days after the submission for any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC).

2. The Secretary, NIA, shall circulate to the IAB members any recommendations, proposed directives, papers, etc., which an IAB member may originate for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board. Each shall be accompanied by a voting slip

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providing opportunity for:

- a Concurrence or non-concurrence;
- b Comment;
- c Request for an IAB meeting.

3. Any recommendation two or more IAB members believe should be submitted to the NIA (NSC) will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence in such form as to set forth his recommendation and the comments of the IAB members.

4. All implementations envisaged by paragraph 3 of NIA Directive No. 5 will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board in writing, accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for:

- a Concurrence or non-concurrence;
- b Comment;
- c Request for an IAB meeting.

Written comment by any IAB member, after consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence, will be filed by the Secretary, NIA, with the file copy of the related implementation. Oral comments will be fully spread on the minutes of the IAB meeting, if held. Any implementation modified by the Director of Central Intelligence as the result of IAB advisory opinion will be distributed by the Secretary, NIA, to the IAB. The decision to hold subsequent IAB meetings, or otherwise to delay the issuance of any proposed implementation, rests with the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. Unless otherwise directed by the NIA, the Secretary, NIA, shall circulate to the IAB copies of all agenda, minutes, decisions, and directives approved or issued by, or in the name of, the NIA.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

13 May 1947

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Memorandum by the Secretary

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Pursuant to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence the enclosed alternative proposal to C.I.G. [REDACTED] is circulated herewith for consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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[REDACTED]
Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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[REDACTED]

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD PROCEDURES

THE PROBLEM

To establish procedure for the Intelligence Advisory Board.

FACTS

Although certain basic policies are established by the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and by subsequent N.I.A. Directives, no procedure has been formally agreed upon for the accomplishment of the mission of the I.A.B.

DISCUSSION

In accordance with N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, all recommendations to the N.I.A., initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence and related to the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as related to the national security, are referred to the I.A.B. for concurrence or comment before submission to the N.I.A.

At its 9th meeting, the N.I.A. established the procedure it desired for the implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 5, paragraph 3.

The I.A.B. has itself agreed upon an acceptable procedure for implementation of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 6, which relates to intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group.

all Recommendations requested of the Director of Central Intelligence by the N.I.A. are not considered as falling into the pattern provided in N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3. Nor is it considered that it was the intent of the President or of the N.I.A. that all reports, papers, and statements prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for presentation to the N.I.A. be first submitted to the I.A.B. for advisory opinion. The Director of Central Intelligence as a member of the N.I.A. can not correctly make the I.A.B., which was created solely for the purpose of advising him, privy to all matters before the N.I.A. Similarly as the agent of the N.I.A. he can not make the I.A.B. privy to all of his relations with the N.I.A.

Since it is not the current practice of the N.I.A. to formalize agenda in advance of its meetings, it is impossible for

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the Secretary, N.I.A., to undertake to supply N.I.A. agenda to the I.A.B. At such time as the N.I.A. may formalize such agenda, distribution thereof will necessarily be determined by the N.I.A. and not by the Director of Central Intelligence or the I.A.B.

After careful consideration, it is believed that no procedure should be established which requires the I.A.B.-D.C.I.-N.I.A. channel for the presentation of opinions by an Intelligence Chief to his respective departmental head. No such procedure appears contemplated by the President's letter nor subsequent N.I.A. Directives. This opinion is further borne out by the absence of any provision requiring the submission to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence of any recommendation, paper, etc. originated elsewhere than with him. Thus it would appear that any recommendation originated by a member of the I.A.B., even though it may receive concurrence of all other I.A.B. members, can not properly be submitted to the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence unless it is accepted by him as a recommendation from him. Any such recommendation would apparently have to be submitted individually by each I.A.B. member to his respective N.I.A. member.

CONCLUSION

It is concluded that a formalization of I.A.B. procedures is appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board adopt the following procedures for its consideration of recommendations properly coming before it for advisory opinion:

1. All recommendations ~~envisaged by paragraph 3b~~ *S-A2* of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 will be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B. in writing, accompanied by copies of such papers or statement with which the Director of Central Intelligence may contemplate accompanying the recommendations upon presentation to the N.I.A. These recommendations will have attached a voting slip providing

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opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment;
(c) request for an I.A.B. meeting to express oral
advisory opinion. Voting slips will be returned
to the Secretary, N.I.A., within ~~one calendar week~~^{seven working days}
after receipt. If any I.A.B. member so requests,
an I.A.B. meeting shall be promptly called by the
Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of
Central Intelligence shall be ~~the sole~~^{determining} judge of
the advisability of referring any proposed recommen-
dation to a special study group or for otherwise
delaying the submission of the recommendation to
the N.I.A. If he considers (such reference or other)
delay inadvisable, he shall give I.A.B. members one
~~calendar week~~^{seven working days} for the submission of any desired
statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which
will accompany the recommendation to the N.I.A.

2. All implementations envisaged by N.I.A.
Directive No. 5, paragraph 3, will be submitted by
the Director of Central Intelligence to the I.A.B.
in writing, accompanied by a voting slip providing
opportunity for (a) ~~comment~~^{comment}, and (b) calling of a
meeting. Written comment by any I.A.B. member,
after consideration by the Director of Central
Intelligence, will be filed by the Secretary, N.I.A.,
with the file copy of the related implementation.
Oral comment will be fully spread on the minutes of
the I.A.B. meeting, if held. Any implementation
modified by the Director of Central Intelligence
as the result of I.A.B. advisory opinions will be
distributed by the Secretary, N.I.A., to the I.A.B.
The decision to hold subsequent I.A.B. meetings or
otherwise to delay the issuance of any proposed im-
plementation rests with the Director of Central
Intelligence.

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3. The Secretary, N.I.A. shall circulate to I.A.B. members (all proper) recommendations, proposed directives, papers, etc., which any I.A.B. member may originate for consideration by the Director of Central Intelligence and the I.A.B. Each shall be accompanied by a voting slip providing opportunity for (a) concurrence; (b) comment; (c) request for meeting.

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4. Unless otherwise directed by the N.I.A., the Secretary, N.I.A., shall circulate to the I.A.B. copies of all ^{agendas} minutes, decisions, and directives approved by or issued by or in the name of the N.I.A.

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COPY NO. _____

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C.I.C. [REDACTED]

12 March 1947

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Memorandum by the Secretary

Pursuant to a request by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed paper, which is to be placed on the agenda of the Intelligence Advisory Board, is circulated herewith.

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[REDACTED]
Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

THE PROBLEM

To establish procedure for the Intelligence Advisory Board in considering matters submitted to the National Intelligence Authority for action.

FACTS

N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, requires that all recommendations be referred to the Intelligence Advisory Board for concurrence or comment prior to submission to the National Intelligence Authority. However, no procedure has been established to accomplish this action by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

DISCUSSION

It is believed that the requirements of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 3, can be satisfactorily met by formal or informal procedure, depending upon the importance of the particular matter under consideration. If members of the Intelligence Advisory Board were furnished copies of the agenda for the N.I.A. meeting, together with copies of papers or a statement of the problems up for consideration, they could then, with respect to each item, express their concurrence, submit comments, or request a formal meeting to discuss the matter. Such procedure would insure that the secretaries had the views of the heads of their own intelligence agencies when acting on all matters presented to them.

CONCLUSION

It is concluded that a procedure should be established for the Intelligence Advisory Board in considering matters being submitted to the National Intelligence Authority for action.

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RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the following procedure be adopted for securing the concurrence or comments of the Intelligence Advisory Board on all matters being submitted to the National Intelligence Authority:

- (a) The agenda for the National Intelligence Authority meeting be referred by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Intelligence Advisory Board, together with copies of all papers to be considered or a statement of subjects to be discussed.
- (b) Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board informally express concurrence or submit comments on all items on the agenda to the Director of Central Intelligence for submission by him to the National Intelligence Authority.
- (c) In case of important matters on the agenda any member of the Intelligence Advisory Board may request a formal meeting of that committee for the purpose of discussing such subject prior to its submission to the National Intelligence Authority.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED] 1947 7)3 January 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPCOORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTIONMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. In accordance with the decision made at the 11th meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board on 26 November 1946 there has been prepared by the Central Intelligence Group the attached draft of over-all policies and objectives for the coordination of the production of intelligence.

2. It was also the decision of the Intelligence Advisory Board at the above-mentioned meeting that this paper should be submitted to the ad hoc committee appointed by it at that time for consideration.

3. It is, therefore, requested that your representative to the ad hoc committee inform the Secretary, M.I.A., as to the earliest practicable date he will be prepared to discuss the attached paper.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lt. General., U.S.A.
Director of Central Intelligence

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ENCLOSURE "A"

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PROPOSED M.I.A. DIRECTIVE

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

1. The following over-all policies and objectives are established for the coordination of the production of intelligence.

2. In order that all facilities of the Government may be utilized to their capacity and the responsibilities of each agency may be defined in accordance with its mission and capabilities, the whole field of intelligence production is divided into the following four categories, and responsibilities are allocated as indicated:

a. Factual Intelligence.

(1) Factual intelligence is that intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a more or less continuing or static nature and general interest which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.

(2) Factual intelligence shall be compiled in National Intelligence Digests covering foreign countries, areas, or special subjects as appropriate.

(3) These Digests shall be in the form of intelligence encyclopedias recording all available factual data in such form as shall best meet the specific requirements of the individual agencies in the development of their staff intelligence.

(4) The editing, publication, maintenance and dissemination of these Digests shall be the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence.

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(5) The initial production of chapters or sections of the National Intelligence Digests shall be charged to those departments or agencies of the Government which, by agreement with the Director of Central Intelligence, are best qualified to assume the production responsibility by reason of their intelligence requirements and production capabilities.

(6) Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to these Digests shall include agencies other than those represented on the Intelligence Advisory Board.

(7) The Director of Central Intelligence shall make such collection requests as are necessary for the proper development and maintenance of the Digests.

b. Current Intelligence.

(1) Current intelligence is that spot information or intelligence of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs and which is used by them without the delays necessary for complete evaluation or interpretation.

(2) The Central Intelligence Group and the several departments shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own requirements or inter-agency responsibilities.

c. Staff Intelligence.

(1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the process of full evaluation and interpretation designed to meet the specific requirements of the department or agency concerned. It is prepared without responsibility to any other agency or organization and is based only on that current factual or staff intelligence available to it.

(2) Each agency shall produce such staff intelligence as may be necessary to meet the requirements of its particular department.

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(3) Upon request the staff intelligence of an agency shall be supplied to other agencies for use in the development of the latter's own staff intelligence.

d. National Policy and Strategic Intelligence.

(1) National policy and strategic intelligence is that staff intelligence prepared in the interest of the national security by the Director of Central Intelligence for the President, and the State, War and Navy Departments and, as appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security.

(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall receive promptly from the intelligence agencies all current and staff intelligence produced by them. This intelligence will be used in the production of national policy and strategic intelligence.

3. The research facilities maintained by each agency shall be adequate to accomplish efficiently and promptly, on behalf of all intelligence agencies, the intelligence production tasks allocated to them under the foregoing provisions. Such additional research facilities as may be required by each agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be maintained only to the extent necessary to satisfy each agency's individual needs after giving full cognizance to the facilities of the other agencies.

4. Implementation. Assumption of responsibilities, as allocated herein, shall be effected progressively and as rapidly as possible under coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED F.I.A. DIRECTIVE

OVER-ALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION
OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

1. The following over-all policies and objectives are hereby established for the coordination of intelligence relating to foreign industrial establishments:

a. Intelligence concerning foreign industrial establishments is required for the assessment of economic war potential, development of target systems for bombing, and conduct of economic warfare; for the preparation of surveys of regional economy, promotion of trade, tariff analysis, negotiation of commercial treaties; and for the study of numerous other problems concerned with the national security.

b. The Joint Army-Navy Air Intelligence Division (JAN-AID) has assembled, evaluated, analyzed, and transferred to business machine cards much intelligence relating to foreign industrial establishments for use in studies of the strategic vulnerability of foreign countries.

c. Much additional useful information on industrial establishments in foreign countries is believed to exist in the files of other Government agencies, private firms, libraries, and other sources in the United States. In each case, however, the data are filed and utilized in accordance with particular requirements. In no one place is it possible to find all the desired information on foreign industrial establishments (collected, evaluated, and) assembled in accessible form. Consequently, it is possible neither to make full use of data that are available nor to indicate additional data which must be obtained.

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d. To correct this condition, the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate a project to collect, evaluate, and assemble in useful form and maintain readily accessible to interested Government agencies, all ^{intelligence} information on foreign industrial establishments which is or may become available.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

OVER-ALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION
OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. To implement the over-all policies and objectives established by the National Intelligence Authority in N.I.A. Directive No. ____ for the interdepartmental coordination of intelligence ^{activities} relating to foreign industrial establishments, the following program is announced:

a. A Project Coordinator and necessary assistants to coordinate the work shall be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. A Liaison Officer acceptable to the Central Intelligence Group shall be designated by each participating agency to:

- (1) Advise with the Project Coordinator.
- (2) Assure ready availability of information in the files of his agency.
- (3) Be responsible that proper personnel from his agency's research staff be assigned the project.

c. Industrial experts to direct research groups and to assume responsibility for the evaluation and assembly of material shall be borrowed from the Government agencies or hired by C.I.G. from private industry as required.

d. Research groups, composed of analysts made available by the participating agencies, shall search ^{as provided by the agency's Liaison Officer} agency files as necessary and aid the industrial experts in the evaluation, assembly, and preparation of

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material for permanent record. The number of analysts loaned by each agency shall be proportionate to the availability of its personnel and its need for the resulting intelligence. While actually engaged with project work, analysts shall be under the direction of the Project Coordinator.

c. The resulting intelligence shall be turned over to the Project Coordinator, who shall arrange for it to be recorded in a central file, reproduced, and distributed to the participating agencies.

f. All requests of a participating agency for information or intelligence relating to foreign industrial establishments shall be coordinated with C.I.G.

2. It is contemplated that a central unit will be established in C.I.G. to record intelligence of the type produced by this project. Pending its activation, JAAID has agreed to utilize its facilities for this purpose.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence will issue such instructions as are necessary to assure security of information handled in connection with this project.

4. Agencies participating in this project include, in addition to those represented by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of International Trade (Department of Commerce), United States Bureau of Mines (Department of the Interior), and the United States Tariff Commission.

5. Necessary implementing directives and operating instructions shall be issued by the Project Coordinator.

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Enclosure "B"

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10 April 1947

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

b. Minutes of 11th I.A.B. Meeting

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. There is enclosed herewith the report of the Committee appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board at that Board's 11th meeting to consider the document situation.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence will make his comments on the recommendations of the above-mentioned Committee to the Intelligence Advisory Board at its next meeting.

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Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

21 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed memorandum has been submitted to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff for study and recommendation, and is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

21 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON U.S.S.R.

Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed memorandum has been assigned to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff for study and recommendation, and is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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E N C L O S U R E

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE PROBLEM

To arrange for the production of a comprehensive political-psychological study on the U.S.S.R.

FACTS

No political-psychological study on the U.S.S.R. is now available.

Dr. Ladislav Farago, who was associated with the U. S. Navy in the Psychological Warfare Group during World War II, and is the author of "German Psychological Warfare" and "Axis Grand Strategy", as well as a comprehensive compendium on Japanese Psychology, has informed a representative of the Navy Department of his willingness to undertake a comprehensive political-psychological study on the U.S.S.R. Dr. Farago states that he can complete such a study in manuscript form about 1 February 1947, and that his fee therefor will be nominal.

DISCUSSION

Psychological warfare, although new, is now a proven weapon. In future wars it can be expected to play an even greater role than it did in World War II. It is submitted that the experience gained through operations in the late conflict can best be exploited and the interest of psychologists in this field sustained by a study of the problem here presented. Upon the outbreak of hostilities such a study would be an urgent requirement. It would have immediate present value in connection with planning in this field. Since this subject is of mutual concern to the State, War and Navy Departments, it is believed that C.I.C. is the proper agency to arrange for the proposed study.

CONCLUSION

A comprehensive political-psychological study on the U.S.S.R. should be made as soon as practicable.

Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040028-0

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RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That C.I.G. negotiate a contract with a suitable psychologist, such as Dr. Ladislav Farago, for the preparation of a comprehensive political-psychological study on the U.S.S.R.

(b) That the contract should provide for payment of the fee only upon delivery of the study manuscript to the Government, together with all rights thereto.

(c) That the fee for the proposed study be paid out of moneys already made available to the C.I.G. by the State, War and Navy Departments.

(d) That ICAPS be assigned this problem for study and recommendation.

(e) That this problem be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

(SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

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30 October 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINAMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The proposed N.I.A. Directive enclosed herewith was prepared at the suggestion of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff round table discussion. The appropriate representatives of the I.A.B. submitted their own agencies' suggestions for these requirements, collaborated in their synthesis, and unanimously approved this final draft, with which I fully concur.

2. C.I.G. proposes to prepare, as soon as practicable, similar National Intelligence Requirements on other areas, Korea and the Middle East having been agreed upon as the next areas to be covered.

3. It is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence Authority pursuant to Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1:

a. Approve the attached proposed N.I.A. Directive, "National Intelligence Requirements--China".

b. Agree to limit distribution of this Directive, classified "TOP SECRET", to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies of the I.A.B. in Washington, to those theater or overseas area commanders selected by the War and Navy Departments, and to those chiefs of missions designated by the State Department.

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HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA

Approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Acting for the National Intelligence Authority Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the ^{current} essential ^{elements} of national intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence ^{requirements} from which those ^{current} essential ^{elements} may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as "National Intelligence ^{Requirements} Requirements" and will form the broad basis [for coordinated directives by all agencies for the production of intelligence.]

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the implementation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circumstances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed quarterly.

Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

Part I - ^{Current} Essential ~~Elements~~ of National Intelligence

Part II - National Intelligence Requirements

3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements, the Central Intelligence Group will immediately undertake to coordinate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will recommend, in three months from date of publication, any changes in this

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directive or in methods and procedures which have been evolved and which should be applied as standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence Requirements.

I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Essential Elements of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

2. The following Essential Elements of National Intelligence for the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central Intelligence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist C.I.G. in producing national intelligence on that area.

3. What are the developments in the China area* to show increased activity by the U.S.S.R. to:

- a. Split off territory from China?
- b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
- c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
- d. Discredit U. S. Forces and aims in China?

4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:

- a. Cessation of hostilities?
- b. Coalition?
- c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.S.R., U.S.?
- d. Economic and agrarian development?

* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced as a guide to the intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the ^{current} Essential Elements of National Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of ^{current} intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be properly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.

2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to, U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity, democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade. Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects, as individual items, analytic reports, etc., during the three months from date of issue:

a. Trends of policy of the ^{Chinese} National Government with respect to:

(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor.

(2) Industrialization including the integration into China proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enterprise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in China, and Chinese foreign trade.

b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reorganization of their armies and control by the National Government, relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.

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c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleavage between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National Government, contiguous territories, the U.S., and domestic Chinese issues.

d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, including details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpiling; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction or improvement in all communications networks.

e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Manchuria, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.

f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes which are influenced or reached by it.

g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R., and U.S.A.

h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.

i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light metals.

j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

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
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k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.

l. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorganization.


m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and Chinese Communists.

n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the reestablishment of American business and foreign trade.

c. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new constitution and when it will come into effect; 

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to implement; (3) actual (as against purely ^{public} chauvinistic) position of the Chinese government regarding the return of Hongkong to China.

p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern Manchuria.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

16 December 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

References: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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1. Pursuant to the instructions of the Intelligence Advisory Board at its 11th meeting on 26 November 1946 the ad hoc committee designated at that time has met and considered amendments to C.I.G. [REDACTED]

2. Accordingly the Draft N.I.A. Directive in Enclosure "A," concurred in by the ad hoc committee, is submitted herewith.

3. It is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence Authority pursuant to paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, approve the Draft N.I.A. Directive in Enclosure "A."

HOYT S. VANDEBEEK
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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ENCLOSURE "A"

DRAFT

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the National Intelligence Authority for the inter-departmental coordination of collection activities so that measures may be taken promptly to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas collecting and reporting services:

a. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of agency responsibility for collection in the field. —→

b. The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service mission shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities within his area, and for the proper implementation of the requirements and responsibilities of the respective agencies.

c. All collection facilities will be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments.

d. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of intelligence information and intelligence to meet the recognized secondary need of each department for intelligence usually prepared or obtained by other departments. At present this Directive is interpreted to apply only to those departments represented by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

e. Common sense shall be applied in the implementation of these established over-all policies and objectives

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to insure the full utilization of individual initiative and favorable contacts by collecting agents.

f. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to Washington of all intelligence material of possible usefulness to their departments and to the effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

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Enclosure "A"

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

21 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

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References: C.I.G. [REDACTED] and C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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1. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, in C.I.G. [REDACTED] suggested that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) make a tentative report on the basic delineation of responsibilities for collecting foreign intelligence information. The Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, in C.I.G. [REDACTED] submitted a proposed agreement which contained a statement of principles on the same subject.

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2. Accordingly, the draft N.I.A. directive in Enclosure "A", prepared by ICAPS in the light of C.I.G. [REDACTED] and C.I.G. [REDACTED] is submitted herewith for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board. The draft C.I.G. directive in Enclosure "B" contains a tentative proposal to implement the over-all policies and objectives in Enclosure "A".

3. It is therefore recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence Authority pursuant to paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, approve the draft N.I.A. directive in Enclosure "A".

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HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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CONFIDENTIALENCLOSURE "A"D R A F TPROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVECOORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

1. The following over-all policies and objectives are established by the National Intelligence Authority for the interdepartmental coordination of collection activities so that measures may be taken promptly to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas collecting and reporting services:

a. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of agency responsibility.

b. There shall be an intelligence coordinator for each foreign area as well as a coordinator in the person of the Director of Central Intelligence in Washington to insure proper implementation of the coordinated collection program.

c. Unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap shall be discontinued so that all collection facilities may be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments.

d. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of information and intelligence to meet the recognized secondary need of each department for intelligence in categories other than its own in the development of its departmental intelligence.

e. Common sense shall be applied in the implementation of these established over-all policies and objectives to insure the full utilization of individual initiative and favorable contacts by collecting agents.

f. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all intelligence representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to Washington of all intelligence material of possible usefulness to the effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,

1. To implement the over-all policies and objectives established by the National Intelligence Authority for the interdepartmental coordination of collection activities, the following program is announced:

2. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AGENCY INTERDEPENDENCE.

a. By mutual agreement the over-all field of departmental intelligence collection responsibility shall be allocated along the following lines:

Political	State Department
Cultural	State Department
3 Sociological	State Department
Economic	State Department
International	State Department
Military (Army, Army Air Force, and Separate Air Force)	War Department
Naval (Navy, Navy Air, or Fleet Air Arms)	Navy Department
Scientific	Each agency in accordance with its respective interests

b. The allocations of departmental responsibility in 2-a above shall by mutual agreement be further broken down as follows:

(1) State

- (a) Political
- (b) Economic
 - (i) Commercial
 - (ii) Industrial
 - (iii) Raw materials
 - (iv) Agricultural
 As related to the civilian economy
- (c) Sociological
- (d) Cultural

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- (e) Communications (Commercial, Civilian)
- (f) Transport (Civilian road, rail, air, water)
- (g) Scientific-Technical (Civilian).
- (2) War Department
 - (a) Foreign service ground forces (including establishment; service organization serving both air and ground jointly, and higher headquarters controlling or directing both ground and air forces).
 - (b) Economic (Military) (includes over-all war potential studies).
 - (c) Scientific and Technical (Military).
 - (d) Communications (ground military, both electrical and physical).
 - (e) Manpower, morale, health and medicine (as applied to ground and common service forces and over-all war potential).
 - (f) Transport (military land service).
 - (g) Terrain and geographic.
- (3) Navy Department
 - (a) Foreign navies and naval operations.
 - (b) Foreign naval shore, sea and air establishments.
 - (c) Naval economics (includes studies of harbors, port facilities, raw materials and manufacturing facilities as applied to naval matters; importance and vulnerability of targets).
 - (d) Manpower and naval health and medicine (as applied to naval war potentials).
 - (e) Communications (naval).
 - (f) Scientific and Technical (Naval).
 - (g) Transport (naval).
 - (h) Hydrography and meteorology (as it affects naval operations).
- (4) Army Air Force
 - (a) Foreign Air Forces (including establishment; ground organizations designed for or allocated to its service and support).
 - (b) Economics (as applied to air capabilities and vulnerabilities only).

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- (c) Manpower, morale, health and medicine (as applied to air capabilities and vulnerabilities).
- (d) Scientific and Technical (Air)
- (e) Communications (including military airways and airways communications and aids to air navigation (ground communications facilities and equipment of types which are organic to the U. S. Army Air Forces); and civil facilities suitable for military use).
- (f) Meteorology.

c. In preparing reports under this allocation, reporting agents shall constantly bear in mind the fact that one or more agencies other than the agency of responsibility may have a secondary interest in any category; and they shall take full cognizance of such interest as it may be expressed either in any basic interagency collection guide or in special agency collection directives.

d. Intelligence reports, regardless of source, shall be routed direct to the agency having responsibility in this category.

e. There shall be a free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of information and intelligence. No agency shall attempt to maintain complete file or research facilities in categories not of its responsibility, but shall request and receive from the agency having responsibility in the category those intelligence reports necessary to the development of its own departmental intelligence.

3. DESIGNATION AND DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR.

a. Each foreign area shall have an intelligence coordinator who shall supervise and direct the activities of intelligence personnel within his area to the end that the intelligence objectives of the Government as a whole and the collection directives of the respective intelligence agencies shall be most efficiently and expeditiously accomplished. The responsibility for this program shall rest with:

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(1) The Chief of a U. S. Diplomatic Mission where such exists and no U. S. commander has a military responsibility within the area.

(2) The Senior U. S. Military Commander (Army or Navy) where no Diplomatic Mission exists for the area.

(3) Both the Chief of Mission and the Senior U. S. Military Commander where both have jurisdiction in the area. In such cases each intelligence coordinator will be responsible only for the activities of the personnel under his administrative control. Over-all intelligence coordination will be furnished by a designee of the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the I.A.B.

(4) An intelligence coordinator designated by the Director of Central Intelligence through the appropriate I.A.B. member agency in cases not covered by the above. U. S. Territories and Possessions fall under this category in so far as they constitute sources of foreign intelligence.

b. To implement this program each intelligence coordinator shall:

(1) Maintain a local coordinated intelligence file in all categories.

(2) Insure that all subjects in the above allocated categories are being covered by intelligence reports and that the responsibility for such reports delegated to departmental field representatives so far as possible are in accordance with the appropriate departmental responsibility.

(3) Insure that whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post or the appropriate representative is unable for any reason to carry out his mission, reporting on the categories of those departmental responsibilities is delegated to the extent possible to other members of the staff. When such delegation is other than temporary the coordinator

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will advise his parent agency of his action and the reasons therefor.

c. To assist the coordinator in his over-all responsibility:

(1) All standing field collection instructions will be reviewed by the initiating agency and in coordination with the Central Intelligence Group be replaced when appropriate by a basic interagency collection guide and index to insure that all reports designed to supply basic intelligence data shall meet the requirements of the several agencies as to format and content.

(2) National collection directives based on research requirements corresponding to current essentials of national intelligence shall be issued and revised on a continuing basis and shall supplement interagency collection directives.

(3) All intelligence agency collection directives related to policies established in N.I.A. Directives as distinct from national interagency collection directives such as those reflecting the National Intelligence Requirements shall be coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence before or concurrently with issuance.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COLLECTING AGENTS

a. Field representatives of each intelligence agency will be directed by their agency to:

(1) Cooperate in the coordination measures prescribed by the intelligence coordinator.

(2) Promptly enter into the local intelligence file copies of all source material and intelligence reports prepared by them and falling within their departmental categories.

(3) Bring to the attention of the appropriate representative and enter into the local intelligence file any other intelligence data of interest to the latter which may come to the former's attention.

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(4) Collect information and prepare intelligence reports other than within their own categories when specifically directed by their agency or by the intelligence coordinator.

(5) Promptly forward to their home offices intelligence reports reflecting the source materials which have been collected and entered into the local intelligence file from any source and which fall within their departmental categories.

(6) Make available to the intelligence coordinator and to the other field representatives all collection directives and instructions which are received from their parent agencies.

b. Nothing in this directive shall be interpreted as authorizing the suppression or substantive change of any intelligence report by any responsible officer without the concurrence of the officer preparing the report. Intelligence material which may have no significance to field representatives in a single area or which may appear to be at complete variance with the over-all trend may have great significance and form a definite part of a picture being developed by the individual intelligence agency or by the Central Intelligence Group. However, any dissenting opinion or commentary will be incorporated in the report before its submission.

c. To insure the greatest interchangeability of reports:

(1) The various report forms now in use by the respective intelligence agencies will as far as practicable be standardized to insure their greatest usefulness to all the agencies.

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(2) All reports prepared will bear, in addition to that information required by the respective agencies, the following:

(a) Name of collector and name of reporter.

(b) File index number of each member agency.

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(c) Local field distribution.

(d) Recommended Washington distribution.

d. Each agency receiving information from the field will ultimately be responsible only for the distribution within its own department and to the C.I.G. The C.I.G. will ultimately be responsible for all interagency distribution.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

28 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PROPOSED AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS

Memorandum by the Secretary

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The enclosed draft agreement, received by the Central Intelligence Group from the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, is circulated herewith to the Intelligence Advisory Board for information in connection with C.I.G. [REDACTED]

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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AN AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF
THE WAR DEPARTMENT, NAVY DEPARTMENT, AND STATE DEPARTMENT

Prepared by the Intelligence Division,
War Department General Staff

1. In order to coordinate the intelligence activities of the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department and thus save manpower without loss of national intelligence efficiency, it is essential:

a. That there be a minimum of overlap in the intelligence functions of the three departments.

b. That there be a free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of information and intelligence.

2. The following principles are therefore agreed to:

a. Primary responsibility

Certain subjects are of primary interest to each of the three departments. Such subjects shall be allocated to each agency respectively and shall be considered the subjects of primary responsibility for that agency. Each agency may retain all intelligence functions relating to the USSR and the satellite nations until such time as it may seem advisable to allocate responsibilities as for other areas.

b. Research, evaluation and analysis

Each agency shall be responsible for research, evaluation and analysis of those subjects for which it has primary responsibility.

c. Collection

Field collection shall follow the line of primary responsibility to prevent duplication of effort. Common sense application should be applied to take advantage of individual

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initiative and favorable contacts. The principle should never be applied in the sense of regimentation. Matters of principle will be coordinated between departments in Washington. Coordination of collection effort within the scope of enunciated principles will be the function of the Chief of Mission. Reports regardless of source will be routed direct to the agency of primary responsibility.

d. Estimates

Each agency is responsible for the production of estimates and other projects for its own department. Agencies will, therefore, provide information and intelligence on their respective subjects of primary responsibility to the other agencies as their needs require.

e. Direct communication

Each agency may call on another agency for information and intelligence on those subjects for which that agency has primary responsibility.

f. Who's who

Each agency shall collect information and maintain files on personalities within their subjects of primary responsibility. A central master file shall be maintained for common reference.

g. Strategic Intelligence Digest

Each agency shall contribute and keep current chapters of a digest of factual information on each country of the world. Chapter responsibility shall be the same as the subjects of primary responsibility. The form of such digest shall follow generally the Strategic Intelligence Digest form now in preparation by the Intelligence Division, War Department.

h. Supervision

To insure the coordination of the Intelligence agencies and maintain the highest standards of intelligence production, a central agency shall maintain necessary supervision of inter-departmental cooperation and production.

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25 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR REPORTING AND COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
AND INTELLIGENCE

Memorandum by the Secretary, N.I.A.

As requested, the enclosed memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence is circulated for consideration at an early meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

In the meantime, the Enclosure has been referred to the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff (ICAPS) for action as suggested in paragraph 5 thereof.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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E N C L O S U R E

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Washington

October 18, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Subject: Responsibilities of the Department of State for Reporting and Collection of Information and Intelligence

1. The Department of State is increasingly anxious to eliminate duplication of effort, in the field, with respect to collecting and reporting intelligence information. The duplication seems to stem from a failure to define and to distinguish basic departmental responsibilities.

2. Current meetings under the sponsorship of your Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff have explored this problem. It has been touched upon in meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Since volume of information is a major need of all Departments and since duplication of collecting effort to that extent reduces the flow, it is essential that measures be taken promptly to effect sound, efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas reporting and collection services.

3. As a prerequisite to any such measures the Departments and the CIG must agree upon basic delineation of responsibilities. To that end, the Department of State proposes that it assume complete responsibility for the overt procurement of information and intelligence in foreign areas on all political, economic, social and cultural matters. It also proposes that it assume the responsibility for scientific information and intelligence with such exceptions as fall within the naval and military fields.

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4. It should be noted that "complete responsibility" does not connote "complete activity". Obviously circumstances will produce variations in capabilities at the separate collecting points, and it is to be expected that each Department will want to assist other Departments wherever possible.

5. The Department of State requests that this proposal be placed on the agenda for an early meeting of the IAB. Meanwhile it is suggested that the subject be referred to ICAPS in connection with its interdepartmental meetings on collection, and that ICAPS be asked to make a tentative report, if possible, before the IAB meeting takes place.

/s/
William A. Eddy
Special Assistant for
Research and Intelligence

cc to: Gen. Chamberlin - ID, WDGS
Adm. Inglis - ONI
Gen. McDonald - A-2

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

25 October 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPPLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCEMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. Attached hereto is a draft of a "Plan for Coordination of Biographic Intelligence". This plan, with which I concur fully, has the approval of your representatives who collaborated with the Central Intelligence Group in its preparation. The plan is now circulated for your consideration and action at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. During the discussions, C.I.G. and certain of your representatives felt that the plan should have included definite provisions for the establishment within C.I.G. of a central biographic reference file which would contain basic factual data on all individuals upon whom supporting files are maintained by the departments. They also felt that these reference files should be maintained on business machine cards in such a way that any information desired and available within the Government records could be readily located. At present there is no such service, nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files.

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3. However, inasmuch as complete agreement on this point could not be reached, and since many mechanical and organizational problems must be resolved before C.I.G. would be in a position to establish such a system and operate it efficiently, it is recommended that:

- a. The attached plan be approved; and

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b. The establishment within the Central Intelligence Group of a central biographic reference file, maintained on business machine cards, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, be approved.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieut. General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. Under the provisions of N.I.A. Directive No. 5 which charges the Director of Central Intelligence with acting for the National Intelligence Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security, the following plan for coordination of Foreign Biographic Intelligence is announced.

2. Categories of Biographic Personalities.

a. Allocation of primary responsibilities for reporting Biographic Data, producing Biographic Intelligence, and maintaining comprehensive supporting files on various categories of personalities is made to the intelligence agencies represented on the I.A.B., in Tabular form below:

<u>Categories of Personalities</u>	<u>Intelligence Agencies of Primary Responsibility</u>
Political	State Dept.
Cultural	State Dept.
Sociological	State Dept.
Economic	State Dept.
International	State Dept.
Military (Army, Army Air Force and Separate Air Force)	War Dept.
Naval (Navy, Navy Air, or Fleet Air Arms)	Navy Dept.
Scientific	Each agency as jointly agreed or in accordance with categories above.

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b. The allocation of responsibility within the various categories above is based upon insuring complete coverage of important individuals and minimizing unwarranted duplication of effort. However, in special instances where a personality in another category becomes of particular interest to any intelligence agency, nothing in this directive prevents or restricts such agency from reporting and maintaining a biographic file on that individual, so long as the departmental agency holding primary responsibility is duly informed, and is furnished with the data necessary for its own file.

c. Each intelligence agency has the responsibility to produce and evaluate responsible Biographic Intelligence on personalities within its own categories of primary responsibility for the other agencies requesting and authorized to receive same, or if desired, to make available the appropriate source material. In this connection, agencies will circulate to one another and to CIG a list of qualified and security approved personnel authorized to engage in direct liaison.

3. Coordination at foreign posts:

a. The chief of mission, or his delegated staff officer, of each embassy, legation, or foreign post is charged with the overall responsibility for the coordination of biographic intelligence in his geographical area. To effect this coordination he will:

(1) Maintain a local coordinated biographic file on all important personalities.

(2) Insure that all personalities in the above categories are being covered by biographic reports, and that the responsibility for such reports is delegated to departmental field representatives so far as possible in accordance with the appropriate departmental primary responsibility listed above.

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(3) Insure that whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post, reporting on the appropriate categories of foreign personalities of such agencies is delegated to the extent possible to other members of the staff.

b. Field representatives of each intelligence agency will be directed by their departmental agency to:

(1) Cooperate in the coordination measures for biographic intelligence prescribed by the chief of mission.

(2) Promptly enter into the local biographic file all source material and copies of biographic data reports on personalities within their own departmental categories of primary responsibility.

(3) Enter in the local biographic file and bring to the attention of the appropriate representative any other biographic data or material, of interest to the latter, which comes to their attention.

(4) Collect information and report on personalities other than within their own categories of primary responsibility when directed by the chief of mission due to the non-representation at the post of the departmental agency of primary responsibility.

(5) Promptly forward to their home office biographic reports reflecting the source materials which have been collected and entered in the local Biographic File from any source and which fall into their departmental agency categories of primary interest. (Whenever the activities of personalities reported upon places or appears to place them in more than one category of primary responsibility, each interested field representative will forward to his home office his own estimate of the personality together with a reference to the report prepared by the other interested field representatives.)

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(6) Call to the attention of and make available to the chief of mission and to the other field representatives all directives and instructions on the subject of biographic intelligence which are received from their home office.

(7) Promptly forward to home offices other than their own biographic reports on personalities other than of their own interest for whom responsibility has been delegated to them by the chief of mission.

4. Standardization and use of biographic reporting forms:

a. For the present one form, to be called the Summary Report Form, will be standardized and this to the extent that it contains the basic factual data on the top as shown in the Enclosure (Appendix hereto), and is not over 8" wide and approximately 13" long.

5. a. The Director of Central Intelligence will undertake to exploit for the benefit of CIG and the departmental agencies sources of biographic information from government agencies not represented on the IAB and will maintain such other biographic files within CIG as he deems necessary to comply with the President's directive.

b. The Central Intelligence Group will act as a clearing house for foreign biographic intelligence received from its own sources or from agencies of the government other than those represented on the IAB and will pass on the appropriate intelligence to the agency holding primary responsibility therefor.

6. a. The Director of Central Intelligence will take the necessary measures to ascertain gaps in coverage of biographic intelligence and to undertake remedial action therefor.

7. a. Departmental intelligence agencies will immediately issue such directives to the field as will insure that this plan may come into operation not later than 1 January 1947.

A P P E N D I X

(Classification)

SUMMARY REPORT FORM

Name _____

Biographic Data

Country _____

Date Prepared _____

Distribution _____

Name _____
(Surname) (First) (Middle)

Variants and Aliases _____

General Occupation _____ Country of Nationality _____

Date of Birth _____ Birthplace _____

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

25 October 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPPLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCEMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. Attached hereto is a draft of a "Plan for Coordination of Biographic Intelligence". This plan, with which I concur fully, has the approval of your representatives who collaborated with the Central Intelligence Group in its preparation. The plan is now circulated for your consideration and action at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. During the discussions, C.I.G. and certain of your representatives felt that the plan should have included definite provisions for the establishment within C.I.G. of a central biographic reference file which would contain basic factual data on all individuals upon whom supporting files are maintained by the departments. They also felt that these reference files should be maintained on business machine cards in such a way that any information desired and available within the Government records could be readily located. At present there is no such service, ~~nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files.~~

3. However, inasmuch as complete agreement on this point could not be reached, and since many mechanical and organizational problems must be resolved before C.I.G. would be in a position to establish such a system and operate it efficiently, it is recommended that:

- a. The attached plan be approved; and

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S E C R E T

b. The establishment within the Central Intelligence Group of a central biographic reference ^{index} ~~file~~, maintained on business machine cards, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, be approved.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieut. General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. Under the provisions of N.I.A. Directive No. 5 which charges the Director of Central Intelligence with acting for the National Intelligence Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security, the following plan for coordination of Foreign Biographic Intelligence is announced.

2. Categories of Biographic Personalities.

a. Allocation of primary responsibilities for reporting Biographic Data, producing Biographic Intelligence, and maintaining comprehensive supporting files on various categories of personalities is made to the intelligence agencies represented on the I.A.B., in Tabular form below:

<u>Categories of Personalities</u>	<u>Intelligence Agencies of Primary Responsibility</u>
Political	State Dept.
Cultural	State Dept.
Sociological	State Dept.
Economic	State Dept.
International	State Dept.
Military (Army, Army Air Force and Separate Air Force)	War Dept.
Naval (Navy, Navy Air, or Fleet Air Arms)	Navy Dept.
Scientific	Each agency as jointly agreed or in accordance with categories above.

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b. The allocation of responsibility within the various categories above is based upon insuring complete coverage of important individuals and minimizing unwarranted duplication of effort. However, in special instances where a personality in another category becomes of particular interest to any intelligence agency, nothing in this directive prevents or restricts such agency from reporting and maintaining a biographic file on that individual, so long as the departmental agency holding primary responsibility is duly informed, and is furnished with the data necessary for its own file.

c. Each intelligence agency has the responsibility to produce and evaluate ~~responsible~~ Biographic Intelligence on personalities within its own categories of primary responsibility for the other agencies requesting and authorized to receive same, or if desired, to make available the appropriate source material. In this connection, agencies will circulate to one another and to CIG a list of qualified and security approved personnel authorized to engage in direct liaison.

3. Coordination at foreign posts:

a. The chief of mission, ~~or his delegated staff officer,~~ ^{has} of each embassy, legation, or foreign post ~~is charged with~~ ^{collection of} the overall responsibility for the ~~coordination~~ of biographic intelligence in his geographical area. To effect this coordination he will:

(1) Maintain a local coordinated biographic file on all important personalities.

(2) Insure that all personalities in the above categories are being covered by biographic reports, and that the responsibility for such reports is delegated to departmental field representatives so far as possible in accordance with the appropriate departmental primary responsibility listed above.

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For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040028-0

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(3) Insure that whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post, reporting on the appropriate categories of foreign personalities of such agencies is delegated to the extent possible to other members of the staff.

b. Field representatives of each intelligence agency will be directed by their departmental agency to:

(1) Cooperate in the coordination measures for biographic intelligence prescribed by the chief of mission.

(2) Promptly enter into the local biographic file all source material and copies of biographic data reports on personalities within their own departmental categories of primary responsibility.

(3) Enter in the local biographic file and bring to the attention of the appropriate representative any other biographic data or material, of interest to the latter, which comes to their attention.

(4) Collect information and report on personalities other than within their own categories of primary responsibility when directed by the chief of mission due to the non-representation at the post of the departmental agency of primary responsibility.

(5) Promptly forward to their home office biographic reports reflecting the source materials which have been collected and entered in the local Biographic File from any source and which fall into their departmental agency categories of primary interest. (Whenever the activities of personalities reported upon places or appears to place them in more than one category of primary responsibility, each interested field representative will forward to his home office his own estimate of the personality together with a reference to the report prepared by the other interested field representatives.)

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S E C R E T

(6) Call to the attention of and make available to the chief of mission and to the other field representatives all directives and instructions on the subject of biographic intelligence which are received from their home office.

(7) Promptly forward to home offices other than their own biographic reports on personalities other than of their own interest for whom responsibility has been delegated to them by the chief of mission.

4. Standardization and use of biographic reporting forms:

a. For the present one form, to be called the Summary Report Form, will be standardized and this to the extent that it contains the basic factual data on the top as shown in the Enclosure (Appendix hereto), and is not over 8" wide and approximately 13" long.

5. a. The Director of Central Intelligence will undertake to exploit for the benefit of CIG and the departmental agencies sources of biographic information from government agencies not represented on the IAB and will maintain such other biographic files within CIG as he deems necessary to comply with the President's directive.

b. The Central Intelligence Group will act as a clearing house for foreign biographic intelligence received from its own sources or from agencies of the government other than those represented on the IAB and will pass on the appropriate intelligence to the agency holding primary responsibility therefor.

6. a. The Director of Central Intelligence will take the necessary measures to ascertain gaps in coverage of biographic intelligence and to undertake remedial action therefor.

7. a. Departmental intelligence agencies will immediately issue such directives to the field as will insure that this plan

A P P E N D I X

(Classification)

SUMMARY REPORT FORM

Name _____

Biographic Data

Country _____

Date Prepared _____

Distribution _____

Name _____
(Surname) (First) (Middle)

Variants and Aliases _____

General Occupation _____ Country of Nationality _____

Date of Birth _____ Birthplace _____

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

26 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED
BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

References: a. Par. 6, N.I.A. Directive No. 1
b. C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. It is considered that the procedure recommended in reference b above, to formalize the implementation of reference a, may delay presentation of estimates requiring urgent action.
2. To meet this requirement and to avoid possible initial disagreements at the Intelligence Advisory Board level, it is recommended that:
 - a. A suitable representative of each I.A.B. member be attached to the Office of Research and Evaluation, C.I.G., to assist in the final analysis and preparation of intelligence estimates.
 - b. These representatives remain assigned to their I.A.B. agencies and be authorized to concur for, or present the conflicting views of, the I.A.B. members they represent on any intelligence estimate prepared by C.I.G.
 - c. Each estimate prepared in which there is not a complete agreement have appended by O.R.E. the dissenting opinion prepared by the representative of the dissenting I.A.B. member.
3. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.

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4. A proposed draft of C.I.G. instructions to effect this procedure is enclosed herewith.

5. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the enclosed draft C.I.G. Administrative Order.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6, N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will ^{designate} ~~furnish~~ a ^{suitable} ~~personal~~ representative to ^{O.R.E.} ~~remain assigned to~~ his office and attached to the Central Intelligence Group for duty in the Projects Branch of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Research and Evaluation:
2. These representatives will assist in the final development and preparation of intelligence estimates ^(C.I.G.) and will, for their chief's either concur ^{will} ~~therein~~ or present dissenting opinions. ^{as directed by his IAB member}
3. Each intelligence estimate prepared by O.R.E. will include a statement that I.A.B. members have concurred, or will have any dissenting opinions appended as a part of the estimate.
4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If dissenting opinions cannot be prepared in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement to the effect that specified member agencies will submit dissenting opinions at a later date.
5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.

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14 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed memorandum is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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E N C L O S U R E

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED
BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Intelligence

THE PROBLEM

To establish a procedure for considering intelligence estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Group.

FACTS

N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 2, directs the Central Intelligence Group to furnish intelligence estimates to the President, the State, War and Navy Departments, etc.

N.I.A. Directive No. 1, paragraph 6, directs that intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency.

The Central Intelligence Group on 23 July 1946 produced an intelligence report entitled ORE-1.

There is no indication in ORE-1 as to what approval or concurrence it had by the intelligence agencies having functions relating to the national security prior to its dissemination.

DISCUSSION

Intelligence reports produced by the Central Intelligence Group are likely to be an important segment of factors entering into a vital estimate or decision. Consequently it is essential that such reports have the concurrence or comment of the principal intelligence agencies of the government having functions relating to the national security. Such agencies at present are represented by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. It is submitted that the best method of accomplishing the above is by a vote system similar to that used by the Joint Intelligence Committee in approving intelligence estimates.

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CONCLUSIONS

(a) That intelligence estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Group should have the concurrence or comment of the principal intelligence agencies having functions relating to the national security as represented at present by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

(b) That the procedure for considering intelligence estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Group should be a vote system similar to that used by the Joint Intelligence Committee for such purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That the procedure for considering intelligence estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Group should be a vote system similar to that used by the Joint Intelligence Committee for such purpose.

(b) That this paper be placed on the agenda for consideration at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

18 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the memorandum in Enclosure "A", together with subsequent correspondence in Enclosures "B" and "C", are circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Op-32X Washington 25, D.C.

22 August 1946

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence
To: Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between C.I.G.
and the J.C.S.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Proposed Draft to accomplish above
Subject.

1. It is requested that Enclosure (A) be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. A copy of Enclosure (A) has been forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee with the request that it be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS

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Enclosure "A"

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a procedure for more effective handling of papers of the Central Intelligence Group by the Intelligence Advisory Board and to establish a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Group are all considering problems connected with intelligence. There is an established channel between the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for securing consideration of papers in which both have an interest (J.C.S. 1224/4 and 1224/5). There is no such channel between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Group. Recently the Central Intelligence Group prepared and secured action on N.I.A. 6 without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are also considering papers in this field, namely, J.C.S. 1664 and 1664/1.

DISCUSSION

3. N.I.A. 6 and C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED] are papers that deal with subjects in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an interest. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the operation of intelligence activities, it is expected that it will be preparing more papers on subjects of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The methods of handling such papers in the various agencies of the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are not known. Even though they are submitted to the highest military command within each agency, it is submitted that there should be some procedure for securing action

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Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those papers that deal with matters in which they have an interest. The permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are the same as the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. To have the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee act as the staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board in preparing action on Central Intelligence Group papers would result in securing joint action on these papers. Furthermore, when papers relating to matters of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board the permanent members thereof could forward their recommended action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment. This could be done via the established channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Such procedure would assure coordination between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could be followed even though additional members were invited to sit when dealing with matters within their province. Such additional members could be invited to appoint ad hoc members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the field of static intelligence their assistance may be needed in connection with problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee. When this situation occurs the above-mentioned channel could be used for securing such service.

CONCLUSION

4. It is concluded that there is at present a need for establishing a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which need will increase as the Central Intelligence Group expands its functions or activities. It is further concluded that such channel should be through the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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- 4 - Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. a. That the Joint Intelligence Staff be designated as the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

b. That additional members of the Intelligence Advisory Board be invited to appoint ad hoc members to the Intelligence Advisory Staff.

c. That all Central Intelligence Group papers requiring consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board be forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee. ✓

d. That the Intelligence Advisory Staff (including ad hoc members when appropriate) be made responsible for securing final action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on papers presented by the Director of Central Intelligence. ✓

e. That when appropriate the Joint Intelligence Committee (permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board) forward their recommended action on papers of the Central Intelligence Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment.

f. That when appropriate in connection with current problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee, they should request the assistance of the Central Intelligence Group.

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CIG [REDACTED]

- 5 - Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

4 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Channel between C.I.G.
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REFERENCE: a. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Intelligence to
Director of Central Intelligence, same subject,
dated 22 August 1946, No. Or-32X.

b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1.

It is fully agreed that the present undetermined relationship between the C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires early and comprehensive consideration.

It is not considered, however, that the proposal contained in the reference memorandum is appropriate since, pursuant to N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Central Intelligence Group is constituted as a cooperative interdepartmental activity in which the interests of the State, War and Navy Departments are adequately and equitably represented. In addition, a full time staff for the Intelligence Advisory Board is not considered desirable since it implies that the I.A.B. must act unanimously as a body, whereas N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides that, if any member of the I.A.B. does not concur in a recommendation, it may nevertheless be submitted to the N.I.A. for decision.

It is, therefore, requested that, instead of pressing for the adoption by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Board of the recommendations contained in the reference memorandum, the Chief of Naval Intelligence sponsor a recommendation that each of those bodies concur that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem with recommendations for solution.

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Enclosure "B"

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The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. is being directed to assemble such material as may be currently available to it in preparation for such a joint study in all of its aspects.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence.

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Enclosure "B"

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE "C"

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

11 September 1946

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence.
To: Director of Central Intelligence,
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between CIG and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Reference: (a) DCI Memo re above Subject, dated 4 Sept. 1945.

1. The second paragraph of reference (a) is not fully understood. A "full time staff for I.A.B." was not suggested in my proposal; the Joint Intelligence Staff would act as such only part time and in addition to their present duties. My purpose is to provide a direct link, on the working level, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority. Present representation on C.I.G. is not questioned. Nor was any implication intended that unanimous action of the I.A.B. is required. It has always been understood that split opinions of the I.A.B. must be referred to N.I.A. for decision.

2. Your recommendation that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem and make recommendations for solution has merit. However, it is not desired to delay to that extent the discussion of this problem before the I.A.B. and the Joint Intelligence Committee. The present paper does not call for a vote on the proposed solution but for discussion of the problem. At that time it was expected that any member of the I.A.B. (including the Director of Central Intelligence) would present any other solution which he preferred over that proposed. If the first discussion of this problem is before the Joint Intelligence Committee I would be

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Enclosure "C"

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pleased to recommend to them that you be invited to attend and present your views. Or, if you prefer, I would be pleased to present to the Joint Intelligence Committee your views and preferred solution.

3. The Joint Intelligence Staff has already formally circulated my suggestion to the Joint Intelligence Committee. I prefer to let my suggestion to the I.A.B. stand and again request that it be included on the agenda for the next meeting of the I.A.B.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS.

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Enclosure "C"

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COPY NO. 15

C.I.G. [REDACTED]

19 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

Pursuant to a request by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed paper is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE

WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Intelligence

THE PROBLEM

1. To insure that war plans of the War and Navy Departments include provision for the Central Intelligence Group.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

2. The Navy Department is now engaged in the preparation of war plans which include plans for the mobilization of personnel. It is presumed that the War Department is similarly engaged. So far as is known no such plans are being prepared by the Central Intelligence Group. The war plans of the War and Navy Departments should take note of the regular and reserve officers assigned mobilization billets in the Central Intelligence Group and should include everyforeseeable requirement regarding the procuring and training of Army and Navy personnel.

CONCLUSION

3. It is concluded that the War and Navy Departments should be informed regarding the personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group for full mobilization or war as follows:

- a. The military personnel to be retained by C.I.G.
- b. Planned expansion, if any, that requires assignment of additional regular personnel or the procurement and training of reserve personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. a. That the Central Intelligence Group make a study of their requirements for full mobilization of war.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

b. That such study include the personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group from the War and Navy Departments as follows:

- (1) Regular officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (2) Regular officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (1) above).
- (3) Reserve officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (4) Reserve officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (3) above).
- (5) Training requirements for (4) above.
- (6) Retired officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (7) Retired officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (6) above).
- (8) Training requirements for (7) above.
- (9) Enlisted personnel requirements, including training for same.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

4 November 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD
OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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References: a. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
b. Minutes, I.A.B. 8th Meeting, Item 3

Memorandum by the Secretary

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1. Pursuant to discussion at the 8th meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board, a committee representing the Director of Central Intelligence and the I.A.B. members was appointed to conduct the study proposed in C.I.G. [REDACTED]

2. The enclosed memorandum by this committee is circulated herewith for consideration at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPReferences: a. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
b. Minutes, I.A.B. 8th Meeting, Item 3Memorandum by the Special Committee
Appointed to Study the Above Problem

1. On 8 October 1946 the personal representatives of the I.A.B. members met with representatives of the C.I.G. as a Committee to undertake the preparation of the study requested by the Office of Naval Intelligence "to determine the practicability of the performance by C.I.G. of elements of common concern in the field of static intelligence."

2. C.I.G. offered the broad outlines of a plan, suggested by the O.N.I. proposal, which it believed would:

- a. Assure to each agency the untrammelled conduct of its departmental intelligence;
- b. Assure to each agency the maintenance by C.I.G. of those intelligence activities of common concern;
- c. Assure to each agency the exchange between agencies of those intelligence reports prepared by one agency for its own primary operational use but having a secondary value to other agencies.

3. In the general discussion which followed, the O.N.I. representative made certain concrete proposals with respect to centralization of foreign intelligence functions in C.I.G., including the offer to transfer O.N.I. personnel engaged in Strategic Intelligence to C.I.G. provided other agencies participated in like manner. These proposals were unacceptable to the M.I.D. representative, who explained that the Military Intelligence Division could not subscribe to a plan at present by which it would lose direct control over any intelligence functions which were related to its staff and command problems.

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4. The representative of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 stated that final determination of specific functions to be centralized should be a matter of evolution, possible of accomplishment by unilateral proposals to or from, and agreements with, C.I.G. As an example, he continued, the Air Force has recently undertaken production of Air Order of Battle as an overload, and that A-2 might, following this principle, approach C.I.G. with a suggestion that Air Order of Battle be developed by C.I.G. There is nothing, he stressed, in the production of Air Order of Battle as a whole that needs to be related intimately to the staff and command problems of the Air Force.

5. The State Department representative felt that the proposal seemed to have a much broader scope than he had before understood. He emphasized the State Department's inescapable responsibilities, particularly in respect to political and economic intelligence, and then suggested that individual elements of the general problem were already being carefully studied by inter-departmental groups sponsored by ICAPS. He wondered if the present discussion might begin with a consideration of the type of study now being produced under the direction of JANIS.

6. In the opinion of the committee, the discussion disclosed such fundamentally divergent views on such basic problems as fields of primary responsibility and general areas of common concern, that a further approach to the problem as presented by O.N.I. is not now feasible.

7. The discussion disclosed, however, that all agencies believed that positive results in some fields can be obtained through the current series of interdepartmental round table discussions, and that the development of bilateral agreements between C.I.G. and the individual agencies should be adequate initial implementation of those provisions of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 which require the C.I.G. to perform

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Enclosure

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for the benefit of the participating intelligence agencies such services of common concern as the N.I.A. determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

8. It is therefore the Committee's recommendation to the I.A.B. that it be relieved of the charge to continue the study proposed by O.N.I. and approved by the I.A.B.

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Mr. Donald Edgar, C.I.G.
Brig. Gen. J. A. Samford, U.S.A.
Col. E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Capt. R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
Col. F. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
Mr. A. S. Buford, State
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S E C R E T

COPY NO. _____

C.I.G. [REDACTED]17 September 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPMemorandum by the Secretary

As requested in a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, the enclosed report by the Chief of Naval Intelligence is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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SECRETENCLOSUREASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPMemorandum by the Chief of Naval IntelligenceTHE PROBLEM

To examine the practicability of further merger of static intelligence functions of the State, War and Navy Departments through assignment of same to the Central Intelligence Group.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

Prior to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group the War and Navy Departments were engaged in the study of the problem of the susceptibility of the field of static intelligence to joint effort. The War and Navy Departments each completed a study which indicated in this field there were elements (organizational units, functions or activities) that were susceptible of joint effort. These separate studies now require further joint study in order to determine the practicability of such joint enterprises. At present they indicate that any such joint enterprises should be housed together. Now that the Central Intelligence Group has been established, the War and Navy Departments are reluctant to proceed with this study pending a determination of the practicability of the Central Intelligence Group performing those functions that are susceptible of joint effort. The performance of such functions by the Central Intelligence Group is authorized by paragraph 3 c. of the President's letter of 22 January 1946. Also, it is believed that the Central Intelligence Group could meet the requirement of housing such activities together. There may be some difficulty in sorting available material and establishing suitable libraries. Those elements that are considered susceptible of joint effort are as follows: political,

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economic, sociological, topographic and technical. It is believed that the performance of these functions by the Central Intelligence Group would necessitate their participation in the preparation of JANIS studies as well as any intelligence studies made for the Joint War Planners. Merging of the political field in the Central Intelligence Group will necessitate some arrangements for briefing of the intelligence agencies of the various Departments concerned in accordance with their own requirements.

CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that:

- a. Paragraph 3 c. of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 authorized the Central Intelligence Group to perform for the benefit of the intelligence agencies such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determined could be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
- b. In the field of static intelligence certain elements (organizational units, functions or activities) performed by the State, War and Navy Departments are susceptible of joint effort.
- c. The Central Intelligence Group could meet the requirement of housing such activities together.
- d. There may be some difficulty in sorting available material and establishing suitable libraries.
- e. Performance of such functions by the Central Intelligence Group would necessitate their participation in JANIS studies as well as in the preparation of intelligence studies for the Joint War Planners.
- f. Merging of the political field in the Central Intelligence Group will necessitate some arrangements for briefing of the intelligence agencies of the various Departments concerned in accordance with their own requirements.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended as follows:

a. That a study be made to determine the practicability of the performance by the Central Intelligence Group of such elements (organization units, functions or activities) of common concern in the field of static intelligence as follows: political, economic, sociological, topographic and technical.

b. That this paper be presented to the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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Enclosure

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

27 August 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCERNS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH CONNECTIONS ABROAD AS SOURCES OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

Reference: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Secretary, N.I.A.

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1. At the 7th meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board the enclosed revision of Appendix "A" to C.I.G. [REDACTED] was concurred in by all members of the Board except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who undertook to present the Enclosure to the Director of the F.B.I. for further consideration.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed that:

a. If the Director of the F.B.I. concurred in the Enclosure, it would be issued forthwith as a directive.

b. If the Director of the F.B.I. did not concur in the Enclosure, the Intelligence Advisory Board would meet again to discuss submitting this matter to the National Intelligence Authority for decision.

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3. The Enclosure is therefore circulated for further consideration by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and for the information of the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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COPY NO. 21

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

17 July 1946

SECRET [REDACTED], C.F.S.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PROVISION FOR COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Note by the Secretary

The enclosed memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, transmitted concurrently with approval of C.I.G. [REDACTED] is circulated herewith for information and guidance.

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JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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E N C L O S U R E

July 12, 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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Subject: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

1. C.I.G. [REDACTED] has been approved by the Department of State without change, but subject to the explanation of the capabilities of the Department given herein.

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2. As noted in paragraph 8 of the Discussion (Enclosure "B") accompanying C.I.G. [REDACTED] the Department of State possesses neither the funds nor the personnel required to implement fully the mission assigned in paragraph 1 of the proposed C.I.G. directive. The Department will, however, undertake the coverage of the foreign language press in the United States for foreign intelligence information in the following manner:

a. The Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination (OCD) will maintain subscriptions to and files of domestic foreign language papers and periodicals which are deemed representative of the more important foreign nationality groups in the United States.

b. OCD will disseminate the domestic foreign language papers and periodicals, as received, to the appropriate intelligence research divisions of the Department on a continuing basis for examination and return to OCD for filing.

c. The Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities (SPF) will consider requests from elements of the Department of State, and from other departments entitled to make such requests, for projects related to foreign intelligence information derived from such papers and periodicals, and will assign approved projects to the appropriate research divisions for preparation.

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[REDACTED] (Signed)

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Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Research and Intelligence

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

8 July 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPPROVISION FOR COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS
IN THE UNITED STATESMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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1. In accordance with C.I.G. Directive No. [REDACTED] the Central Planning Staff conducted a survey to determine if coverage of the foreign language press in the United States is desirable for intelligence purposes, what personnel are available for the work, and which agency or agencies should be responsible for such a project.

2. As a result of this survey the Director of Central Intelligence concludes that:

a. The Department of State has a primary need for a comprehensive coverage of the foreign language press in the United States.

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b. The Department of State should develop this source to the extent determined by its needs and capabilities.

c. Competent personnel appear to be available.

d. This collection effort and the distribution of its results should be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that it serves the interests of all agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination.

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3. No action by N.I.A. appears to be necessary.

4. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft C.I.G. Directive (Enclosure "A") for issue.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

PROVISION FOR COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the Unanimous Concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

Pursuant to paragraph 3.a. of the President's letter of 22 January 1946, which gives the Director of Central Intelligence authority to make full use of the staffs and facilities of the intelligence agencies of the Departments subject to N.I.A. coordination, the following policies and procedures, relating to the coverage of the foreign language press in the United States, are announced:

1. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, to the extent of his capabilities, will develop the coverage of the foreign language press in the United States in order to meet his own and other departmental needs for foreign intelligence information from this source.

2. The intelligence information collection effort involved in the performance of the mission assigned in paragraph 1, above, and the distribution of the information collected will be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that it serves the interests of the intelligence agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

Note: The term "foreign language press" as used in this discussion refers to newspapers, magazines and pamphlets published in a foreign language in the United States. It is not to be confused with material printed in a foreign language but published abroad.

25X1A 1. By memorandum of 20 February 1946 (1), Mr. Alfred McCormack, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence take under advisement the matter of determining what coverage of the foreign language press in the United States is desirable for intelligence information purposes and how the coverage should be obtained. This matter falls logically under the provisions of paragraph 4.b., N.I.A. Directive No. 2. Accordingly, C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED] ordered a survey of the subject.

25X1A 2. The matter was discussed with representatives of the State Department, MID, ONI, A-2 and FBI. In addition the matter was discussed with Mr. Harry T. Smith of the New York TIMES and Mr. Jacob Landau of the Overseas News Agency in New York City, both of whom follow the foreign language press in the United States.

3. Before the war the foreign language press was little exploited as a source of foreign intelligence information, although some use was made of it as a check on subversive activities of foreign groups in this country. The F.B.I. in the discharge of its mission related to internal security, collected information on foreign language newspapers as to editorship, financial backing, influence, etc.

4. During the war the foreign language press became of considerable interest to several government agencies. The F.B.I. intensified its coverage of this source for information on foreign groups and individuals. MID, ONI and A-2 searched


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magazines and newspapers published in foreign languages for any information of value. This coverage was undertaken to avoid overlooking any source which might yield any information of intelligence value concerning countries blacked out due to enemy control. The State Department during this period made little use of information gleaned from foreign language newspapers and magazines.

5. The only agency to engage in a comprehensive coverage of the foreign language press was the Foreign Nationalities Branch, OSS. This coverage was performed in connection with research into origins, political and economic developments and psychological reactions of foreign groups in the United States as the basis for reports on the composition and activities of such groups. In addition to their own reading and analysis of foreign press material,



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6. Organized coverage of the foreign language press in the United States, for government agencies, ceased with deactivation of the Foreign Nationalities Branch, OSS, in the fall of 1945. Certain officers of the Department of State read some of the foreign language publications produced in the United States to the extent required by its obligation to search out subversive tendencies among foreign language groups in the United States. The Overseas News Agency continues to cover the foreign language press in the United States in order to provide a news service to its private subscribers, but states that it does so at a considerable financial loss and is preparing to abandon this service. Mr. Harry T. Smith, of the New York TIMES, reads daily and weekly publications in some seven foreign

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Enclosure "B"

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languages, in addition to his normal duties as a proof-reader, but this is purely to furnish possible bases for news stories in the TIMES. No distribution of the products of these various efforts is made to government agencies.

7. The F.B.I. is satisfied with its present coverage as a check on subversive activities, and MID, ONI, and A-2 are of the opinion that the value of this source of intelligence information does not warrant their contributing personnel, funds or facilities to achieve comprehensive coverage.

8. Information of the type obtainable from the foreign language press in the United States is required primarily by the State Department as follows:

- a. By research personnel as background material for intelligence studies;
- b. By geographic divisions for analysis of influence of foreign pressures on foreign language groups in the United States;
- c. By the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs as a means of measuring the effectiveness of its foreign language propaganda.

The Department of State would welcome the re-establishment of a comprehensive coverage of the foreign language press in the United States, but does not possess the funds required to support such coverage.

9. A small portion (apparently eight or ten persons) of the now scattered Foreign Nationalities Branch of OSS, is still in Washington and could, no doubt, be engaged by the department if the need and funds to support it exist.

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Enclosure "B"

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

C.I.G. [REDACTED]

20 June 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPFUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

References: a. Minutes, I.A.B. 2nd Meeting, Item 4
 b. Minutes, I.A.B. 3rd Meeting, Item 1
 c. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
 d. Minutes, I.A.B. 5th Meeting, Item 1

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The former and the present Directors of Central Intelligence are in agreement that the initial organizing and planning stages of the Central Intelligence Group have been completed, and that the time has arrived to request that the National Intelligence Authority authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake certain operations and functions of vital importance to the national intelligence mission. The enclosed report to the National Intelligence Authority is designed to obtain that authority.

2. Attention is invited to the fact that the provisions of paragraph 2 of Appendix "A" hereto have been previously discussed in reference b. The provisions of paragraph 4 a of Appendix "A" hereto were briefly discussed in reference a. Paragraph 4 b is intended to serve in lieu of the revision of C.I.G. [REDACTED] agreed in reference d. Paragraph 3 of Appendix "A" hereto has not been previously discussed by the Intelligence Advisory Board, although its concept has been incorporated in approved papers on specific problems involving the coordination of intelligence activities.

3. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the Enclosure for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority.

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HOYT S. VANDENBERG
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Director of Central
 Intelligence

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

References: a. President's letter of 22 January 1946

b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1

c. N.I.A. Directive No. 2

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority, contained, in paragraph 3 thereof, a general description of the functions envisaged for the Director of Central Intelligence. N.I.A. Directive No. 1, containing the basic policies and procedures governing the Central Intelligence Group, further clarified the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly as regards his relationship with the National Intelligence Authority and the Intelligence Advisory Board. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 contained an initial personnel authorization for the Central Intelligence Group, providing only the minimum necessary for the tasks of organizing, surveying pressing problems, and meeting initial requirements. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 also instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to submit his recommendations for augmentation of the Central Intelligence Group as soon as practicable. Pursuant to those instructions, this report proposes a redefinition of the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence which will give him the necessary authority to augment the Central Intelligence Group so that he may effectively perform his assigned missions.

2. A draft N.I.A. directive, redefining the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, is contained in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto). Discussion of the provisions of this draft directive is contained in Enclosure "B" (Appendix "B" hereto).

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3. The former Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, has concurred in the recommendations contained herein. This report also has the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case.

4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto).

APPENDIX "A"

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946 designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence are hereby redefined as follows:

1. Paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 defined the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence as follows:

"3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.

"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the Intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."

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2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3 a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such basic research and analysis of intelligence and counter-intelligence information as may in his opinion be required to produce the necessary strategic and national policy intelligence. This will include the centralization of research and analysis activities of common intelligence interest to more than one agency when, in the opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence, such activities can be more efficiently performed centrally. Under such procedure, existing organizations of the State, War and Navy Departments, including their funds, personnel and facilities, performing those functions, will be integrated into the Central Intelligence Group as a central service to all intelligence agencies subject to N.I A. coordination.

3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3 b of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the executive agent of this Authority in coordinating and supervising all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security in accordance with the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority.

4. Pursuant to paragraph 3 c of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern which this Authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally:

a. Conduct of all Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.

b. Conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security.

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5. To the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities, the State, War and Navy Departments will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, the necessary funds, personnel, facilities and other assistance required for the performance of the functions authorized herein. At the earliest practicable date, the Director of Central Intelligence will submit for approval by this Authority any supplemental budget required to perform the functions authorized herein, in addition to the appropriations available for this purpose in the State, War and Navy Departments.

6. Where the performance of functions authorized herein requires the liquidation, transfer or integration of funds, personnel or facilities for existing activities of the State, War and Navy Departments, the liquidation, transfer or integration will be accomplished at the earliest practicable date by mutual agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the official now responsible for such activities so as to involve a minimum of interruption in the performance of these functions.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

Discussion by paragraphs of the provisions of the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto) follows:

Paragraph 2: Paragraph 3-a of the President's letter makes the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence relating to the national security, making full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments. This means that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the accuracy, adequacy and timeliness of intelligence required for the national security. To discharge his vital responsibilities, the Director of Central Intelligence should not be required to rely solely upon evaluated intelligence from the various Departments. He should also have the authority, when he deems it necessary in the interests of national security, to undertake within the Central Intelligence Group basic research and analysis of original and unevaluated intelligence and counter-intelligence information from all available sources. This authority is especially necessary to ensure adequate coverage, from a national viewpoint, of those fields which are of common intelligence interest to more than one agency, such as economics, science, biography, geography, sociology, etc. In many of those fields the national security requires that basic research and analysis activities be centralized so as to serve the intelligence agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination.

Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3-b of the President's letter charges the Director of Central Intelligence with planning

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for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security and recommending over-all policies and objectives to the National Intelligence Authority. No provision is made in the President's letter for an executive agent of the National Intelligence Authority who will be responsible for coordinating and supervising intelligence activities related to the national security so as to ensure that policies are properly implemented and objectives are successfully accomplished. Such coordination and supervision is considered a necessary step in the effective execution of the national intelligence program. It is therefore recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be specifically charged with this responsibility.

Paragraph 4-a: It is considered that the conduct of all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security can be more efficiently accomplished centrally by the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:

A. Conduct of this type of operation by the executive departments would almost certainly embarrass these departments in the conduct of their official overt activities.

B. Such operations must be centrally controlled to ensure that they serve the national interest rather than the interests of any single department or agency, and that they do not conflict with overt intelligence activities.

C. Since such operations require maximum security they should be performed by a single closely controlled central agency.

D. The danger of competition and confusion between agents of different agencies necessitates the use of a single agency. Moreover, the interdependency and interrelationship between geographical areas and foreign countries makes it imperative that there be one agency with world coverage. This does not, of course, preclude the use of specialized departmental personnel under rigid central control.

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E. The difficult and specialized administrative problems involved in such operations make a single central agency more efficient and economical.

Paragraph 4-b: It is recommended that the conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security be centrally operated under the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:

A. The present organization carrying on this function under War Department direction should be liquidated because its reports are circulated too generally and its personnel have not been adequately screened for security.

B. This function is of value to the State, War, Navy and other Government departments. It should therefore be centrally directed to serve the needs of all these departments.

C. The Department of State appears to have the greatest interest, but the War Department is the only agency which has included funds for this function in its 1947 budget. The Department of State, however, has stated that it is not practicable for that Department to assume responsibility for this operation. The War Department considers that under no circumstances should it engage on a continuing basis in this predominantly nonmilitary intelligence function. The same viewpoint applies to the Navy Department. It therefore appears that this function is a service of common concern which can be accomplished more efficiently centrally.

Paragraph 5: The primary source of funds, personnel and facilities required by the Director of Central Intelligence to discharge the functions proposed in this report,

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should be those which can be made available by the State, War and Navy Departments. Since, however, some of these functions have not been performed by any department, or have not been performed on the adequate scale now contemplated, the Director of Central Intelligence should be authorized to submit for N.I.A. approval any supplemental budget required pursuant to this directive.

Paragraph 6: This paragraph is intended to ensure that the transition of any activities from departmental to central direction or operations be accomplished with a minimum of interruption in the performance of those functions.

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COPY NO. 19

26 June 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CORRECTION TO C.I.G. [REDACTED]

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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
Based upon informal discussions of C.I.G., [REDACTED] it is considered desirable that the proposed N.I.A. Directive in Appendix "A" thereto be amended as shown in the attached revision.

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It is therefore requested that the revised pages 4, 5, and 6 be substituted in each copy of C.I.G. [REDACTED] and the superseded pages destroyed by burning.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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SOUTHERN BRANCH, C.F.S.

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Noted:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPPROVISION FOR COORDINATING THE
ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONSMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. By letter to the Director of Central Intelligence dated 4 March 1946, Mr. Alfred McCormack stated:-

"During the war there was in existence an Inter-departmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications, to which the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S. contributed a secretariat. This arrangement has been continued with the transfer of the R and A Branch to the Department of State. Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, has proposed that such a committee be put on a permanent basis as a part of the inter-departmental structure of the Central Intelligence Group. The Department of State supports the principle of inter-departmental coordination of the procurement of library materials-----"

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2. The problem posed by this letter was discussed with Dr. Luther B. Evans, Librarian of Congress, and with other persons concerned, by a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. After consideration of all testimony, the enclosed and appended papers have been prepared as a basis for action in this matter.

4. It is therefore recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the Enclosure for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Director

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROVISION FOR COORDINATING THE
ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. It has been suggested by the Librarian of Congress that an Inter-departmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications, such as that which existed during the war, should be established on a permanent basis. The Department of State supports the principle embodied in this suggestion.

2. The matter was laid before the Director by letter of Mr. Alfred McCormack, dated 4 March, 1946.

3. After consideration of all evidence assembled in the case, the Director of Central Intelligence concludes that:-

a. The continuation, on a permanent basis, of an inter-departmental committee to coordinate the acquisition of foreign publications for the use of government agencies in necessary in the interest of economy and efficiency.

b. The materials collected as a result of the committee's activities will contain much information needed for the production of intelligence related to the national security. Therefore, the N.I.A. should assume responsibility in the matter.

c. The organization of the committee on a permanent basis, should be arranged for by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Department of State should administer the Committee and continue to furnish the Secretariat. Since the Committee will deal largely with matters of library techniques, the Librarian

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of Congress would be an appropriate chairman; and he has, in fact, expressed his willingness to accept such position.

Discussion upon which these conclusions are based in contained in Enclosure "B" (Appendix "B" hereto).

4. The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive has been prepared to provide the means for carrying out the recommendations based upon the above conclusions. It has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Librarian of Congress and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case.

5. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto).

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

PROVISION FOR COORDINATING THE
ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

Paragraph 1 of the letter from the President, dated 22 January 1946, designated this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating the Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. Since the mass of foreign publications required by the various Federal agencies, as references useful in the conduct of their business, contains matter of value as intelligence information related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to the acquisition of foreign publications, are announced:

1. A permanent Inter-departmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications is hereby established as a subordinate agency of the National Intelligence Authority. The Department of State will administer the committee and furnish the Secretariat therefor.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the Librarian of Congress to accept the Chairmanship of the Committee and will send invitations for membership on the Committee to representatives of all Federal agencies interested in the acquisition of foreign publications for the conduct of their business.

3. The Committee will have duties and responsibilities as follows:-

a. To coordinate cooperative acquisition as between and among the several departments and agencies. The scope of this coordination shall include the establishment of agreed policies

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and procedures for the maintenance of comprehensive collections of library materials, in appropriate locations, the rapid interchange and loan of such materials, and the distribution of bibliographical information. These coordinating responsibilities are distinct from and therefore will not interfere with the usual responsibilities of individual agencies for the maintenance of working collections of library materials necessary to the transaction of their business.

b. To originate recommendations to the several departments and agencies concerning the development of their libraries within a framework of over-all Federal acquisitions, such recommendations to be designed to make available to this Government, with minimum duplication, all foreign library materials necessary to the conduct of the public business.

c. To originate recommendations to the Department of State on matters of broad policy connected with the procurement of foreign library materials through the Foreign Service, in so far as they pertain to servicing the acquisitions needs of the Federal Establishment as a whole.

d. To review requisitions on the State Department procurement facilities whenever it is necessary to determine whether said requisitions are consistent with the Committee's comprehensive acquisitions program.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence will designate a representative to act with the Committee as the Vice-Chairman and to be responsible for ensuring that the Committee's activities make adequate provision for the securing of intelligence information

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Immediately prior to and during the war, the Coordinator of Information and later the Office of Strategic Services furnished the Secretariat of an Interdepartmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications. That Secretariat was taken over, under proper authority, by the State Department, as a part of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S., and still functions under the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.

2. The primary concern of such parts of this existing and continuing Committee as are within the departments whose heads constitute the N.I.A., is foreign publications having possible intelligence information value in connection with the intelligence mission concerned with the national security.

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3. Other Federal agencies, not primarily concerned with intelligence bearing on the national security, are also interested in the acquisition of foreign publications. Some twenty-one (21) Federal agencies have shown an interest in the matter and manifested that interest by sending representatives to meetings held in the office of the Librarian of Congress on 7 September and 25 October 1945. These meetings considered the coordination of the procurement effort but had neither formal authority nor power to act.

4. The procurement of desired foreign publications for the interested agencies is accomplished in large measure by the State Department through its missions abroad. Payment for publications is made to State by the agency for which publications are procured.

5. Certain Foreign Service Officers (eleven at last report) are about to go out to the most important foreign publishing centers

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with the sole duty of organizing the acquisition service and preparing bibliographical indices of available publications.

6. The Librarian of Congress, Dr. Luther B. Evans, feels that the problem of coordinating the Acquisition of Foreign Publications is a technical library matter. The Director of Central Intelligence concurs substantially in that view, although important matters of policy are also involved.

7. Dr. Evans submitted to the Secretary of State, on 26 October 1945, an outline of the coordinating committee which he feels can govern properly the acquisition of foreign publications. The results of Dr. Evans' study are incorporated in the recommendations made herewith.

8. The interest of N.I.A. in the problem is due to its continuing responsibility for coordinating the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the national security, and the fact that some of the publications acquired will have value in that connection. Therefore, this is an undertaking which can be most efficiently initiated and organized by N.I.A. action.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

29 April 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPDEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S.S.R.Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. By informal arrangement under the coordination of the C.I.G., M.I.S. has sponsored the organization of a Planning Committee, with representation of the C.I.G., State Department, M.I.S., O.N.I., and A-2, to formulate a plan to utilize the facilities of all interested Government agencies for the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. It was agreed that C.I.G. would take over formal sponsorship of the project at the earliest possible moment, but that meanwhile active work on it would be started.

2. The Planning Committee has drawn up a plan for Development of Intelligence on the U.S.S.R. which has been approved informally by each of you. The plan provides that after such approval, formal action will be arranged for as deemed advisable by C.I.G.

3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary formal directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. A draft of a formal directive is enclosed. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the draft be approved and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for any additional implementation required by his Department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS,

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PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S.S.R.

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. There is an urgent need to develop the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. By informal agreement, a Planning Committee, composed of a coordinator from the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.) and representatives from the State Department, Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), has been formed and has drawn up a plan to coordinate and improve the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. This plan has been approved informally by all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board and is now in operation.

2. The purpose of this Directive is to formalize the temporary agreement and establish it as a project under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence. The mission of the project is to develop and pool the appropriate resources of all agencies of the United States Government in order to insure the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and its peripheral areas in the minimum time.

3. A Planning Committee is established to devise ways and means for carrying out the mission. This Committee will consist of a coordinator, furnished by the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one representative each of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence;

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the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.; the Chief of Naval Intelligence; and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2. The coordinator will act in a supervisory capacity. The Planning Committee will select a chairman and a secretary from among its representatives. The chairman of the Committee will consult the coordinator whenever necessary to secure assistance of the Central Intelligence Group on problems confronting the Committee. When appropriate, the coordinator will meet with the Committee. In case of disagreement within the Planning Committee, the matter will be submitted by the coordinator to the Director of Central Intelligence for decision.

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4. a. A Working Committee is established to carry out the policies and plans prepared by the Planning Committee. It will be composed of ^{as necessary & available} ~~(the necessary)~~ personnel from the State Department, G-2, O.N.I. and A-2. The secretary of the Planning Committee will be the chairman of the Working Committee and will supervise the staff of the Working Committee. The chairman of the Committee will consult the C.I.G. coordinator on the Planning Committee whenever necessary to secure assistance of the Central Intelligence Group on problems confronting the Committee. When appropriate, the C.I.G. coordinator will meet with the Committee.

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b. The Working Committee will establish and coordinate a system to compile a digest of all types of factual strategic intelligence on the U.S.S.R. This digest shall be known as Strategic Intelligence Digest (S.I.D.). Facilities of the member agencies will be utilized to the maximum extent. The Committee will establish its own methods of operation.

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c. Copies of S.I.D. will be distributed to member agencies and the C.I.G. only. Strategic Intelligence Estimates (S.I.E.), based on the S.I.D., will be prepared by member agencies individually as required to meet their

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own needs and also whenever requested by the Director of Central Intelligence. All estimates prepared by member agencies will be furnished the C.I.G. Whenever the national interest requires it, estimates will be prepared by the C.I.G.

d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S., will provide office space and other necessary facilities for the Working Committee in the Pentagon Building.

5. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will furnish the name of his representative on the Planning Committee to the Director of Central Intelligence. These representatives will be responsible for furnishing the lists of personnel authorized to work in or help the Working Committee.

6. a. The classification of this project shall be TOP SECRET. The greatest care will be taken to maintain the security of the existence of the operation.

b. Access to Government agencies other than those participating in the project will be arranged by C.I.G. Representation on the Working Committee from additional Government agencies will be approved first by the Planning Committee.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

8 May 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Reference: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The actions on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board after informal consideration are shown in Enclosure "A" hereto.

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2. The comments on C.I.G. [REDACTED] of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are contained in the letter in Enclosure "B" hereto.

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3. The amendments in Enclosure "A" and the suggestion in paragraph 2 of Enclosure "B" are submitted herewith for consideration at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

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ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
in Charge of Research and Intelligence:

Approved, subject to the following minor amendment:

Paragraph 13 to read: Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all-Departments of the Department nominating the personnel for duty with the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the respective Security Liaison Officers of the Central Intelligence Group and the agencies agency concerned.

The amendment recommended in paragraph 1 is necessary to enable competent, highly qualified and experienced personnel of the Department of State to serve on assignment to the Central Intelligence Group and does not exclude such personnel because they happened to have been born abroad of American parents, or of foreign parents [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and came to the United States as children. It is believed that an arbitrary exclusion of such persons is unrealistic and undesirable. The amendment recommended provides a workable device for clearance of such personnel.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS:

Approved without change.

Chief of Naval Intelligence:

Disapproved. Request meeting of I.A.B. to consider paper.

Proposed amendments:

Page 3, paragraph 7, line 2 of the Enclosure - after "by" insert "a screening committee consisting of one representative each of the State Department, Military

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Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), and then by". After "C.I.G.," change comma to a period; delete "and" and capitalize "final".

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence:

Approved without change.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

LETTER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1946

Dear Admiral Souers:

I have reviewed the draft of a proposed CIG directive concerning "policy on clearance of personnel for duties with Central Intelligence Group", enclosed with your letter of April 25, 1946.

The minimum investigation of CIG personnel as set forth in the directive would appear to be satisfactory from the standpoint of determination of an individual's qualifications in the light of the personnel standards from the security standpoint set up in the directive. I would like to suggest that the provision that a minimum of 10 years honorable government service where there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to discretion may constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group may make possible the entry of unsatisfactory persons into the employment of the Central Intelligence Group.

It is believed that there are many persons in government employment for a period of ten years or more and who have what appears to be unblemished records insofar as integrity and loyalty is concerned who do not make satisfactory employees for the Central Intelligence Group from the security standpoint. I would like to suggest that consideration be given to eliminating this provision and that an investigation be required of all persons, or that they must have undergone a satisfactory previous security investigation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER

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C.I.G. ■

24 April 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL
FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946 charges the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in connection with their activities.
2. The Central Intelligence Group should establish standards and requirements with regard to clearance of personnel for duties with the C.I.G. to assure the highest degree of security to its operations.
3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.
4. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for establishing uniform clearance standards and procedures. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

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SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.

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E N C L O S U R E

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PROPOSED C.I.G. DIRECTIVE

POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR
DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, referring to functions of the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

2. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group require constant handling of classified matter whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. It is imperative that the highest degree of security be maintained to prevent either unauthorized disclosures of classified matter of any activity which would impede or impair the objectives sought to be accomplished by the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. The accomplishment of the security objective requires that personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:

a. of excellent character who are native-born citizens of the United States and who have no member of the immediate family or next of kin thereof subject to a foreign power;

b. whose loyalty, integrity, discretion and trustworthiness are unquestioned;

c. whose financial status and habits are such as to render unlikely their succumbing to any temptation arising from these sources.

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4. To assure the assignment to the Central Intelligence Group of only those persons who meet the foregoing standards the following policy will apply to investigations and clearance of such individuals.

5. All military and civilian personnel now performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group, or who are to be assigned thereto, will be investigated to determine their qualifications with respect to the standards set forth in paragraph 3 above, and individuals qualifying thereunder will be cleared to handle TOP SECRET information and be considered eligible for duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

6. It is the responsibility of each department required to furnish personnel for duties with the Central Intelligence Group to investigate and effect proper clearance for each individual furnished by their service. Clearance shall include a certification to the Central Intelligence Group to the effect that the individual has been investigated pursuant to provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. _____ and is eligible for duty assignment thereto. Certification of clearance will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file.

7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., and final decision as to acceptability of an individual for assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. Investigation will be conducted to the extent necessary to enable a proper determination of an individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3. However, except for those individuals covered by the provisions of paragraph 9, the minimum investigation of personnel as required under the provisions of paragraph 6 will consist of:

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a. Records check of the appropriate office of each of the following:

- (1) Department of State.
- (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (3) Military Intelligence Division, War Department.
- (4) Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
- (5) Police Department in each city of employment and residence.
- (6) Credit agencies.

b. Verification of individuals' Personal History Statement with respect to:

- (1) Birth.
- (2) Citizenship.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Employment for past fifteen years.

c. Character investigation by interviews with personal references of the individual and with a minimum of three other persons who have knowledge of his activities over a period of time sufficient to enable a determination as to his character and integrity.

9. Where there has been a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation by the War or Navy Department, Department of State, or other Government agency, or where there are other available records of a minimum of ten years honorable Government service and there is no subsequent information creating a suspicion of disloyalty or question as to integrity, the information derived therefrom may, at the option of the Department concerned, constitute the basis for clearance of an individual for duties with the Central Intelligence Group. It is the responsibility of the Department executing the clearance certificate to assure that the information adequately establishes the individual's eligibility in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3.

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10. The investigations required by paragraph 8 will be completed by the respective Departments prior to the assignment of the personnel to the Central Intelligence Group whenever possible. However, in cases of personnel already assigned or where the exigencies of the service are such that in the future it is necessary to assign personnel without prior complete investigation, the Department responsible for the assignment will, on the basis of a satisfactory preliminary investigation, furnish an express authorization in writing permitting such individual to have access to classified information pending completion of the full investigation. The authorization will state the reasons for such action and will be retained permanently in the Central Intelligence Group file. The approval of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative is a prerequisite to such an individual's performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group. The required investigation will then be expedited and clearance effected pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6.

11. All military and civilian personnel performing duties with the Central Intelligence Group will be required to execute a declaration of secrecy which will be administered by the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

12. Upon termination of duties with the Central Intelligence Group all military and civilian personnel will be given an exit interview designed to impress upon them their obligation with regard to maintaining the security of all matters pertaining to Central Intelligence Group activities and provisions of the laws and statutes which apply.

13. Any exceptions to the foregoing provisions shall require the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and all member Departments of the Central Intelligence Group. Such concurrence will be obtained through the Security Liaison Officers of the agencies concerned.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

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12 April 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PROPOSED SURVEY OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE
STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD (J.I.S.P.B.)

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. By memorandum of 12 March 1946 to the Director of Central Intelligence (Enclosure "B"), Mr. McCormack suggested that the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board be brought under the Director of Central Intelligence for policy supervision, and that the Central Intelligence Group undertake a study of the program of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies with a view to making recommendations for the future planning and direction of the program.

2. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

3. The J.I.S.P.B. is a subordinate agency of the Joint Intelligence Committee. In view of this and the fact that the members of J.I.C. and the Intelligence Advisory Board are identical, the accompanying proposed directive (Enclosure "A") is referred to the Intelligence Advisory Board for concurrence or comment. If all members of the Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary.

4. It is recommended that Enclosure "A" be approved and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his Department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO.

PROPOSED SURVEY OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE
STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD (J.I.S.P.B.)

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence
Advisory Board

1. At the suggestion of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, and in conformity with paragraph 3-b of the President's letter of 22 January 1946, the Central Intelligence Group will conduct a survey of the work of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board, in order to make recommendations for its most effective contribution to a coordinated program of intelligence related to the national security.

2. The purpose and scope of the survey will be:

a. To study the organization and function of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board in relation to the coordination of the intelligence program in order to determine whether any change in the supervision and control of the J.I.S.P.B. is advisable and, if so, how the interests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be properly safeguarded.

b. To study the function of JANIS (Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies) and its relationship to the coordinated intelligence program in order to determine:

(1) How the planning and production of JANIS should be conducted to provide for the most effective contribution to the national intelligence mission, and

(2) What Governmental agencies should participate in the preparation of JANIS.

c. To make recommendations on a and b above.

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3. The Central Planning Staff, C.I.G., will conduct the survey. It will be authorized to call for personnel indicated in paragraph 4 below, for consultation and to give such oral or written reports as may be required for the purposes of this survey. It will also coordinate with the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee, as required.

4. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a representative to arrange details with the Intelligence Branch, Central Planning Staff, including the designation of personnel authorized to give information for the purposes of this survey. The designation of appropriate contact personnel in other Federal agencies will be arranged for as necessary.

5. The Central Planning Staff will submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence, who will then submit appropriate recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority, after concurrence or comment by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Subject: Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board.

1. Various problems in connection with the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies were discussed at a recent meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It was apparent that the Army and Navy intelligence organizations may not be in a position to meet the requirements of the Joint Staff Planners, because of limitations of personnel, and that it may become necessary to review those requirements in the light of overall intelligence requirements, in order to determine priorities.

2. These and other considerations suggest that the various JANIS problems should be reviewed by the Central Intelligence Group.

3. As the participants in J.I.S.P.B. now include agencies other than the Armed Services, its activities appear to fall within the scope of the National Intelligence Authority, and it is believed that coordination of its work would be more effective if performed under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. It is therefore recommended that the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board be brought under the Director of Central Intelligence for policy supervision; that the Director of Central Intelligence designate a director of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board; and that the Central Intelligence Group undertake a study of the future of JANIS, with a view to making recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence or to the National Intelligence Authority, as may be appropriate, for a schedule of JANIS papers, a prospectus of their content, determination of what agencies shall participate in the preparation of such papers and allocation of responsibility to such agencies.

5. Attached for information of your Planning Staff is a memorandum prepared by Lieut. Edward L. Ullman, Executive Secretary of J.I.S.P.B., entitled "The Future of JANIS".*

/s/ ALFRED McCORMACK

Alfred McCormack

* Available for reference in C.I.G.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040028-0

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S E C R E TCOPY NO. 25

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]23 March 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTERIM SURVEY OF THE COLLECTION OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN CHINAMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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1. By letter of 16 February 1946, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. WDGS, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence an Intelligence Plan for Post-War China prepared by Headquarters, USFOT. It was suggested that the Director consider the Plan and initiate any action deemed appropriate. A survey as indicated in the subject should be conducted.

2. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

3. A draft directive making necessary provisions for the survey is enclosed. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the draft be approved and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Director

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S E C R E TC.I.G. [REDACTED]

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E N C L O S U R E

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO.

D R A F T

INTERIM SURVEY OF THE COLLECTION OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN CHINA

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence
Advisory Board

1. By letter of 16 February 1946, Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence an Intelligence Plan for Post-War China prepared by Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater*. The Plan was referred to the Director "for consideration and any action considered appropriate."

2. The need for coordination of collecting activity is not peculiar to the China Theater. The issues raised in the Plan submitted typify broad collecting problems which the National Intelligence Authority must consider on a world-wide basis. Until these general collecting problems have been duly dealt with, the solution of the problems posed in the Plan may be incomplete. However, a study should be made to determine whether interim action is necessary in this case. The Central Intelligence Group will conduct a survey based upon the following outline:

a. The survey will include an examination of all facilities for the collection of intelligence information in China, in order to determine on an interim basis:

- (1) What facilities are available;
- (2) Which available facilities should be employed;

* Available for reference in C.I.G.

S E C R E T

C.I.G. [REDACTED]

- 2 -

Enclosure

S E C R E T

(3) What agency (or agencies) should direct, control, and coordinate the effort;

(4) What distribution should be made of the Intelligence information collected.

3. The Central Planning Staff, C.I.G., will conduct the survey. It will be authorized to call for personnel indicated in paragraph 4, below, to appear and give such oral or written reports as may be required for the purposes of this survey.

4. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a representative to arrange details with the Information Branch, Central Planning Staff, and to furnish the C.I.G. a list of personnel authorized to give information for purposes of the survey. The designation of appropriate contact personnel in other Federal agencies will be arranged for as necessary.

5. The Central Planning Staff will submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. He will then submit appropriate recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority, after concurrence or comment by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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- 3 -

Enclosure

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

19 March 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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SURVEY OF COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. By memorandum of 20 February to the Director of Central Intelligence (Enclosure "B"), Mr. McCormack suggested that the Director take under advisement the matter of determining what coverage of the Foreign Language Press in the United States is desirable for intelligence purposes, and how the coverage should be obtained.

2. The Central Intelligence Group should conduct a survey of the matter and prepare a report, with recommendations, for the approval of the National Intelligence Authority.

3. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

4. Enclosed is a draft directive (Enclosure "A"), making necessary provisions for the survey. If all members of the Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the directive in Enclosure "A" be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his department.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO. _____

SURVEY OF COVERAGE OF THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS
IN THE UNITED STATES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the
Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. By memorandum of 20 February 1946, Mr. McCormack (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence) suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence take under advisement the matter of determining what coverage of the Foreign Language Press in the United States is desirable for intelligence purposes and how the coverage should be obtained. This matter falls logically under the provisions of Paragraph 4-b, N.I.A. Directive No. 2. The following paragraphs outline the provisions which will govern this survey.

2. The survey will include an examination of all facilities for covering the Foreign Language Press in the United States in order to determine:

- a. The extent of coverage by existing facilities;
- b. The adequacy of the existing coverage;
- c. The extent of duplication of effort in the current coverage;
- d. The availability of trained, competent personnel;
- e. The suitability of the present material produced by existing facilities;
- f. The suitability of present dissemination of material processed by existing facilities.

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- 2 -

Enclosure "A":

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3. The survey will include, finally, an examination of the question as to whether the desired end will be served better if the effort be distributed, or if it be centralized; and if centralized, what agency of the Government should be charged with it.

4. The Central Planning Staff, C.I.G., will conduct the survey. It will be authorized to call for personnel indicated in paragraph 5, below, to appear and give such oral or written reports as may be required for purposes of this survey.

5. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a representative to arrange details with the Information Branch, Central Planning Staff, and to furnish the C.I.G. a list of personnel authorized to give information for purposes of the survey. The designation of appropriate contact personnel in other Federal agencies will be arranged for as necessary.

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6. The Central Planning Staff will submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. He will then submit appropriate recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority, after concurrence or comment by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL SOUERS

SUBJECT: Intelligence from Foreign Language Press in the
United States.

1. There are more than 1,000 foreign language newspapers and magazines in the United States. They serve a large minority of the population, since according to the 1940 census there were then 11,500,000 persons of foreign birth and some 23,000,000 of foreign parentage in this country, and 22,000,000 persons reported some language other than English as their mother tongue.

2. The foreign language papers in this country are an important source of both foreign and domestic intelligence. They receive information from correspondents abroad and by mail from individuals abroad, and from foreign personalities who come to this country. They frequently carry information not available in the English language press. They are particularly a source of information about personalities and political movements in foreign countries in advance of the time when such policies and movements attract enough attention to get into the English language press or into other usual sources of information.

3. The foreign language papers reflect political attitudes and controversies in foreign countries, especially the attitudes of opposition groups, who sometimes have their principal base and their principal medium of expression in the United States.

4. Attitudes of foreign language groups in the United States have to be taken into account in the conduct of foreign relations, in that powerful minorities in the United States can influence public opinion and thereby limit the freedom of the government in dealing with foreign problems. Foreign issues are sometimes matters of violent agitation in this country, as witness the steady stream of pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet propaganda that is carried on by Polish, Lithuanian, Slovakian, Rumanian, Hungarian, Croatian and Serb newspapers in this country.

5. In the conduct of our information program for foreign countries, it is important to know the issues that are being debated in the corresponding foreign language press in this country.

6. Just prior to and during the war various government agencies concerned themselves with the foreign language press. The Department of Justice had a unit which read the publications from primarily the security standpoint. The counter-intelligence units of the Armed Forces did something along the same line. But the only attempt at comprehensive coverage

(not, however, including Asiatic language papers) was the work of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of OSS, which began in 1941. In addition to reading and reporting upon the European foreign language papers of European and Near East nationality groups in this country, it also maintained contact with foreign individuals in the United States and with the leaders of foreign nationality groups and movements here.

7. The annual budget of the Foreign Nationalities Branch, which was located in New York City, ran from \$250,000 to \$300,000, of which \$1,000 per month was paid to the Overseas News Agency for a reading and translating service. By the fall of 1945, when the Foreign Nationalities Branch passed into the Interim Research and Intelligence Service in the State Department, most of the actual reading of the foreign language papers was done by Overseas News Agency, and the staff of the Branch spent its time writing reports based upon those readings and keeping in touch with foreign language personalities.

8. Shortly after the Interim Research and Intelligence Service was set up, the Foreign Nationalities Branch had to be liquidated for lack of funds.

9. A number of people in various Departments of the Government, as well as some private individuals, have either written or come to see me, urging that coverage of the foreign language press be resumed. The Coordinating Committee of the Department of State has been studying the problem recently, from the angle of the Office of International and Cultural Affairs, which conducts the short-wave broadcasting to foreign countries. The Army and Navy have an interest in this matter from the standpoint of domestic intelligence, and they and the State Department are interested in it as a source of foreign intelligence.

10. It is believed that the matter deserves the attention of the National Intelligence Authority, and it is therefore suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence take the matter under advisement with a view to recommending:

a. What coverage of the foreign language press in the United States it is desirable to maintain for intelligence purposes?

b. By what means can such coverage best be obtained?
and

c. What agency or agencies can best do the job, and, if more than one agency can participate, how should the work be divided between them?

/s/
Alfred McCormack
Special Assistant
to the Secretary

cc: General Vandenberg
Admiral Inglis
General McDonald

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

15 March 1946CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPSURVEY OF FACILITIES FOR COLLECTING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE METHODSMemorandum by the Director of Central IntelligenceReferences: a. C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED]
b. N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 2

1. By C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED] an ad hoc committee was established to study the facilities, resources, and operations of the Strategic Services Unit, and to submit recommendations. Pursuant to paragraph 4-b of N.I.A. Directive No. 2, it is now necessary to initiate a broad survey of all existing facilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods. This long-range project should receive high priority. The Central Planning Staff does not yet have sufficient personnel to conduct the survey, but the necessary personnel were included in the personnel requisition for the Central Planning Staff submitted to the four permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board on 26 February.

2. A directive making necessary provisions for the survey should be published without delay. Conduct of the survey should begin as soon as sufficient personnel are provided.

3. The proper Intelligence Advisory Board for this survey includes the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has been invited to sit as a member and has accepted, in addition to the permanent members.

4. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which the necessary directive can be published and carried

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out by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without action by the National Intelligence Authority.

5. Enclosed is a draft directive, making necessary provisions for the survey. If all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is recommended that the enclosed directive be approved, and that each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his agency.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Director

1 Encl.

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO.

SURVEY OF FACILITIES FOR COLLECTING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE METHODS

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence
of the Intelligence Advisory Board

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References: a. C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED]
b. N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 2

1. By C.I.G. TOP SECRET Directive No. 1, dated 19 February 1946, an ad hoc committee was established to make a study of the facilities, resources, and operations of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and submit recommendations. Pursuant to paragraph 4-b, N.I.A. Directive No. 2, it is now necessary to initiate a broad survey of all existing Government facilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods. This memorandum states the provisions which will govern this survey.

2. Intelligence Advisory Board. In addition to the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a member for the purposes of this survey.

3. a. The scope of this survey will include all clandestine methods for collecting foreign intelligence information, except the intercept of electric communications.

b. The objectives will be:

(1) To secure sound descriptions of methods used now or during the war, including details of training, administration, finance, communications, control and all other details required for complete understanding.

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- (2) To produce uniform terminology.
- (3) To secure correct estimates of the productivity and efficiency of the various methods.
- (4) To appraise the availability of trained and qualified personnel.
- (5) To appraise the facilities of separate departments or permanent agencies for conducting various phases of clandestine operations, either separately or jointly.
- (6) To determine whether particular phases of clandestine operations may be performed more efficiently as central services.
- (7) To prepare recommendations for submission to the National Intelligence Authority.

4. a. The Central Planning Staff, C.I.G., will conduct the survey. It will be authorized to call for personnel indicated in paragraph 5, below, to appear and give such oral or written reports as may be required for purposes of the survey. It will also have full access to the studies and recommendations of the committee established to survey SSU activities, and will be authorized to secure additional pertinent information from members of that committee.

b. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will appoint a representative to serve as an expert consultant with the Central Planning Staff for the purposes of this survey.

5. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a representative to arrange details with the Central Planning Staff, including furnishing the C.I.G. a list of personnel authorized to give information for purposes of the survey. This list will include available persons who are now familiar, or who during the war have been familiar, with the actual operating details of the clandestine methods used. These personnel will be

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Enclosure

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instructed that they are to furnish all information which the Central Planning Staff requires for purposes of the survey. They will be authorized to make suggestions and express opinions, carefully distinguishing between personal views and official views of departments or agencies. They will also be authorized to suggest the names of additional personnel who may be able to throw light on the matters considered.

6. The Central Planning Staff will submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. He will then submit appropriate recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority, after concurrence or comment by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

13 March 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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N.I.A. VIEWS ON PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER "DIRECTING THE
COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE COORDINATION
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. By letter of 27 February, the Bureau of the Budget requested a statement of the views of the National Intelligence Authority with respect to a proposed Executive Order "Directing the Cooperation of Government Agencies in the Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States." Copies of the letter and proposed Executive Order are enclosed.

2. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to reply to the Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, presenting the views of the N.I.A. as follows:

"The National Intelligence Authority has considered the proposed Executive Order 'Directing the Cooperation of Government Agencies in the Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States' enclosed in your letter of 27 February 1946. In carrying out the President's Directive of 22 January the National Intelligence Authority has so far encountered no impediment which would constitute a basis for recommending that the Directive should be superseded by an Executive Order. However, the N.I.A. offers no objection to the issuance of such an Executive Order, provided that its effect will be merely to confirm and formalize the status of the N.I.A. as a cooperative interdepartmental activity, rather than a new or independent agency requiring legislation for its existence.

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"If such an Executive Order is to be issued, it should be made clear that the operation of the N.I.A. is in no sense an interim matter but is intended to be permanent. In this connection, the question is raised whether the phrase 'including Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (55 Stat. 838)' should be specifically mentioned in the statement of authority upon which the Executive Order will rest. If the phrase is not necessary the N.I.A. feels that it should be omitted, since it appears to imply that some further action may be necessary upon the expiration of the first War Powers Act."

Enclosure:

As noted in para. 1 above.

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E N C L O S U R E

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Washington, 25, D.C.

February 27, 1946.

My dear Admiral Seucers:

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget will appreciate having at the earliest practicable date the views of the National Intelligence Authority with respect to the proposed Executive Order "Directing the Cooperation of Government Agencies in the Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States", copy enclosed.

Very truly yours,

/s/ F. J. BAILEY
Assistant Director,
Legislative Reference.

The Honorable,
The Director of Central
Intelligence,
National Intelligence Authority,
Rm. 5105, New War Building,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures.

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YOFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Feb. 18, 1946

Through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am presenting herewith a proposed Executive order, prepared in this Department, entitled "Directing the Cooperation of Government Agencies in the Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States."

As you know, paragraph 8 of your directive issued to the State, War and Navy Departments on January 22, 1946, states:

"Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority."

The proposed order will have the effect of bringing to the attention of the various Federal agencies affected by the directive, particularly those referred to in paragraph 8 thereof, the responsibilities imposed upon them by the passage which I have quoted. Publication of the directive in an Executive order, with the resultant circulation thereof through the medium of the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, will furnish a ready means of reference to it. It would also appear desirable at this time to lend added formality to the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The attached draft of an Executive order has my approval as to form and legality, and I recommend its issuance.

Respectfully yours,

Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040028-0
/s/ J. Howard McGrath
Acting Attorney General

A N N E X

EXECUTIVE ORDER

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DIRECTING THE COOPERATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
IN THE COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

WHEREAS it is in the interests of national security and the more effective exercise and more efficient administration of Federal foreign intelligence activities of the United States that the planning and development of all Federal foreign intelligence activities be coordinated:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (55 Stat. 838), and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

I

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy shall hereafter operate the intelligence activities of their departments pursuant to the terms of the following directive, issued to them by me on January 22, 1946:

"1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together with another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.

"2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist

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the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

"3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.

"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

"c Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

"4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive.

"5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your Departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available

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to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.

"6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

"7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

"8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential directives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request pursuant to regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.

"9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.

"10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods."

II

To the extent consistent with law and Presidential directives, all Federal agencies of the executive branch are hereby directed to take all steps necessary to assure cooperation in the coordination of foreign intelligence activities of the United States and to effectuate fully the purpose of the above-

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

4 June 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND
PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

References: a. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
b. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
c. Minutes I.A.B. 4th Meeting, Item 2

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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1. The enclosed memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State is submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Board for consideration in connection with the references.

2. In the light of the enclosure, it is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the enclosure to C.I.G. [REDACTED] for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority.

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SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Director

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E N C L O S U R E

May 27, 1946


MEMORANDUM FOR: REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: The Practicability of State Department
Operation of FBIS (Foreign Broadcast
Intelligence Service)

As a result of the discussion during the meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board on May 9, 1946, and a subsequent conference with representatives of the Central Planning Staff of CIG and G-2, the Department has made a careful study of the practicability of its taking over the operation of FBIS from the War Department. The Department concludes:

- a. That it is not practicable for it to assume responsibility for the operation of FBIS.
- b. That it concurs with the Director of Central Intelligence in the view that the War Department should properly continue to have responsibility for the operation of FBIS, at least during fiscal 1947.
- c. That a comprehensive program for the relocation of the facilities used by FBIS should be undertaken to improve the coverage of broadcast intelligence.
- d. That direction of the monitoring effort should be assumed by the Director of Central Intelligence, and that the Department is prepared to collaborate closely with the Director in that connection.
- e. That the service provided by FBIS is of great value, and that the Department will be ready to support budget requests for FBIS.

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(Signed) 

(Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State)

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Enclosure

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

8 May 1946

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND
PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

Reference: C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Secretary

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1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, has disapproved C.I.G. [REDACTED] with the following comments:

a. It is agreed that performing the function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers is necessary, and that the present organization performing this function should be liquidated and supplanted by a new organization better adapted to serve the needs of authorized intelligence agencies. However, it is not agreed that the required monitoring system can be performed most efficiently by the War Department.

b. The State Department is the primary user of the monitored material, although the War and Navy Departments also have an interest. A Central Intelligence Group function is the operation of intelligence services when such services are provided the several intelligence agencies. Thus, it appears that operation of this monitoring system is a CIG responsibility. In lieu of CIG, the alternative is that the State Department perform the service. Under no circumstances should the War Department engage in a continuing basis in this predominately nonmilitary intelligence function.

2. The above action and comments are submitted for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board at its meeting at 1430 on Thursday, 9 May 1946.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

26 April 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND
PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

References: a. C.I.G. [REDACTED]
b. C.I.G. [REDACTED]

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. Pursuant to the provisions of C.I.G. Directive No. 2, an ad hoc committee conducted a study of the function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers and submitted a report to the Director of Central Intelligence, with copies to the Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. After consideration of this report and further study by the Central Intelligence Group, the enclosed report to the National Intelligence Authority has been prepared as a basis for action on this matter.
3. It is therefore recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the Enclosure for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
Director.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND
PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. During the war, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted a foreign broadcast intelligence service (FBIS), which monitored press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers. The FCC was in process of liquidating this agency when its functions were taken over by the War Department on an interim basis on 30 December 1945. The War Department requested that the Director of Central Intelligence assume responsibility for the proper disposition of the former FBIS function. An ad hoc committee was appointed by C.I.G. action to make this study. Their report has been submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. After consideration of all evidence submitted in the case, the Director of Central Intelligence concludes that:

a. the function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers is necessary;

b. the present organization performing this function under control of the War Department should be liquidated and supplanted by a new organization better adapted to serve the needs of authorized intelligence agencies;

c. the operation of the required monitoring system can be most efficiently performed by the War Department under directives as to collection and distribution to be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Discussion upon which these conclusions are based is contained

Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP81-00728R000100040028-0
in Enclosure "B" (Appendix "B" hereto).

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3. The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive has been prepared to provide the means for carrying out the recommendations based upon the above conclusions. It has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a member for consideration of this matter.

4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A" (Appendix "A" hereto).

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

PROVISION FOR MONITORING PRESS AND
PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the letter from the President, dated 22 January 1946, which designated this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating the federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to the function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers are announced:

1. The function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers is an essential means of collecting intelligence information required by the intelligence agencies of the State, War, Navy, and other governmental departments. It will be operated by the War Department so as to carry out collecting and distributing missions assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. The present organization carrying on this function under the control and direction of the War Department will be liquidated. Concurrently with the liquidation, a new foreign broadcast monitoring service will be organized and operated by the War Department so as to serve, with a minimum of interruption, the intelligence agencies subject to our coordination. This service will be given a new name by the War Department.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for the assignment of appropriate collecting and distributing missions to the War Department official charged with the operation of this

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service. These missions will be such as to meet the needs of the intelligence agencies subject to our coordination.

4. The State and Navy Departments will give to the War Department such assistance and the use of such facilities, within their respective capabilities, as may be necessary properly to fulfill the mission herein assigned.

5. The War Department will take the necessary budgetary action to carry out the program herein initiated.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The function of monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers is an overt means of obtaining intelligence information of use to the intelligence agencies of State, War and Navy Departments.

2. This function was originally undertaken by FBIS under the FCC early in 1941 as a result of recommendations made by the Defence communications Board.

3. The FBIS was organized functionally into: an office of the Director which gave general supervision to the service; a Monitoring Division responsible for preparing the monitoring schedule for all FBIS stations and of providing excerpts from programs monitored near Washington; a Publications Division responsible for preparing and issuing reports on incoming broadcasts for rapid distribution to government agencies requesting them and for maintaining a central background file; an Administrative Services Division responsible for mimeographing, collating, and distributing the processed reports; and a field organization responsible for operating field stations located at strategic points for interception of foreign broadcasts not monitored in the Washington area. In addition, the field organization has maintained offices located at London and Cairo which have had access to similar material monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation and the British Ministry of Information respectively. Changes in these arrangements with the British may require a revision or expansion of U.S. coverage in Europe and the Middle East.

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4. The War Department was informed in December 1945 that the FCC was in process of liquidating the FBIS. The War Department thereupon expanded its monitoring program to meet the need arising from this liquidation. The War Department employed former FBIS personnel, effective 30 December 1945, and has since acquired by transfer all FBIS facilities, including those held by lease or contract. The War Department arranged for the renegotiation of outstanding leases and contracts.

5. The function of monitoring foreign press and propaganda broadcasts should be continued since it is of value to the intelligence agencies of the State, War, Navy, and other government departments. Based upon a survey, the Department of State appears to have the greatest use for the product of such monitoring. The necessary budget arrangements to maintain this function should be made for the Fiscal Year 1947. The War Department is the only agency now prepared to undertake this budget problem and it has included the necessary funds in its budget requirements.

6. It appears that the present organization carrying on the former functions of the FBIS under War Department direction should be liquidated for the following reasons:

a. Its reports are circulated too generally to organizations and individuals, including foreign agencies. In order that proper intelligence direction may be given to its activities, its product should be restricted to authorized intelligence agencies of the Federal government.

b. The personnel of the organization have not been screened for security. Adequate screening is essential, since disclosure of the direction given to the activities of the organization would be detrimental to this Nation's interests and security.

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7. The present organization should be supplanted by a new organization capable of performing the monitoring function required by authorized intelligence agencies of the Federal government.

8. Central direction of the monitoring effort should be given in order to insure that the specific needs of all proper recipients are considered. This direction can be given by the Director of Central Intelligence, advised by a committee including a coordinator from the Central Intelligence Group and members from A-2, G-2, State, and ONI.

9. Under such central direction, any of the three departments concerned could operate the monitoring, editing and distributing of the press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

a. However, certain preliminary steps would be required before State or Navy could undertake the operation, including:

- (1) Provision for the necessary administration and supply;
- (2) Transfer of the budget from War Department to the department which would take over the operation;
- (3) Arrangements for the necessary communication facilities between the field and Washington;
- (4) Screening of personnel for security purposes, including any members of the present organization who may be re-employed in the new organization.

b. Continued operation by the War Department would require only screening of the personnel.

10. Operation by the Central Intelligence Group (as distinguished from central direction of effort) would require that the same steps outlined under 9 a., above, be taken, with particular emphasis on arrangements for administration and supply.

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11. Paragraph 3 c, of the President's letter of January 22 requires the Director of Central Intelligence to perform, for the benefit of intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments, "such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." It appears clear that direction of monitoring effort for the benefit of these intelligence agencies can be accomplished more efficiently centrally. However, with regard to efficiency of actual operation, little evidence can be found to justify a conclusion that operation by the Central Intelligence Group would be more efficient than operation by one of the departments. In any event, the evidence is not strong enough to justify the establishment of the required overhead facilities in the Central Intelligence Group, duplicating those already existing in other agencies. The following comments on relative efficiency also apply:

a. Lack of organic communication facilities militates against efficient and economical operation by the State Department.

b. Lack of direct staff control of monitoring facilities by ONI militates against efficient operation by the Navy Department.

c. Lack of organic communication facilities and established overhead facilities militates against efficient and economical operation by the Central Intelligence Group. Moreover, it appears that the C.I.G. is not legally authorized to assume the contractual obligations involved.

d. Considering that the War Department has none of the lacks specified in a to c above, it is believed that operation of the function by the War Department would be somewhat more efficient and economical than by any other agency.

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C.I.G. [REDACTED]

25 February 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SURVEY OF THE FUNCTION OF MONITORING PRESS
AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. During the war the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted a Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service (FBIS) which monitored press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

2. The FCC was in the process of liquidating this agency when its functions were taken over by the War Department on an interim basis on 30 December 1945. The War Department has requested that the Director of Central Intelligence assume responsibility for the proper disposition of former FBIS functions with a view to determining the most appropriate Government agency to monitor foreign propaganda broadcasts on a continuing basis and make the necessary recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority (Enclosure "B").

3. It appears that this study should be undertaken as a matter of urgency. The Central Intelligence Group is prepared to furnish the steering member of an interdepartmental committee, and believes that such a committee should be organized at once to make the necessary study.

4. Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides a procedure by which such a committee can be created by unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, without reference to the National Intelligence Authority.

5. The memorandum in Enclosure "A" is designed to establish the proposed committee and give it the necessary directive. If all members of the Advisory Board concur in the draft without substantial change, a meeting will not be necessary. It is

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recommended that Enclosure "A" be approved, and that each member of the Advisory Board arrange for necessary implementation by his Department,

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

C.I.G. DIRECTIVE NO.

SURVEY OF THE FUNCTION OF MONITORING PRESS
AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence
of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. a. During the war the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted a Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) which monitored press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers. The FCC was in process of liquidating this agency when its functions were taken over by the War Department on an interim basis on 30 December 1945.

b. The product of the FBIS was valuable to the State Department, to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and undoubtedly to other departments and agencies.

c. Since the interim arrangements will cease at the end of the fiscal year 1946, it is essential that the ultimate disposition of former FBIS functions be determined at an early date.

2. By unanimous approval of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board an ad hoc committee is hereby established to consist of five members, one representing the Director of Central Intelligence and one representing each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. This committee will promptly make a detailed study of facilities, resources and operations for monitoring foreign press and propaganda broadcasts, and will determine whether this service is of continuing value to existing Federal agencies. Its report will include recommendations as to:

a. Which resources, facilities, and operating functions should be continued in the national interest.

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b. What disposition should be made of preserved resources and facilities and what assignments should be made of responsibility for conducting the preserved operating functions.

c. What budgetary arrangements should be made.

3. The committee will submit a report of findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence, who will then prepare suitable recommendations to be submitted to the National Intelligence Authority after obtaining the concurrence or comment of the Intelligence Advisory Board. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be invited to sit as a member of the Intelligence Advisory Board for consideration of these recommendations.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

12 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS:

Subject: Monitoring of Foreign Propaganda Broadcasts.

1. During December 1945 the War Department was informed that the Federal Communications Commission was in process of liquidating its Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) which monitored press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers. Although systematic coverage of foreign propaganda broadcasts was believed primarily the concern of the State Department, it was also valuable as an auxiliary activity to the intelligence functions of the War and Navy Departments. Other government agencies were served by the product of the FBIS. Therefore, as an interim measure only, pending any program the State Department might initiate, the War Department expanded its monitoring program to meet the need arising from the liquidation of FBIS (Tab "A").

2. The War Department, with the approval of the Federal Communications Commission (Tab "B"), accordingly employed former FBIS personnel and placed them on the War Department payroll effective 30 December 1945; and all FBIS facilities, including those held by lease or contract, were acquired by the War Department on loan or by transfer. The War Department arranged for the renegotiation of outstanding leases and contracts, which now constitute a charge against its current operating expenses. Pending detailed arrangements, it acquired by loan fixed facilities and equipment owned by Federal Communications Commission necessary to continued FBIS operations. See Tab "C" for the functional organization of FBIS.

3. It is inappropriate and outside of the scope of its responsibilities for the War Department to continue monitoring foreign press and propaganda broadcasts beyond the fiscal year 1946

(June 30, 1946). Another government agency should be prepared to

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continue the FBIS function after that date. It is therefore proposed that the Director of Central Intelligence assume responsibility for the proper disposition of the FBIS and its related Central Intelligence functions and make the necessary recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority with a view to determining the most appropriate government agency to monitor foreign propaganda broadcasts on a continuing basis. It is recommended that the War and Navy Departments be informed as early as practicable as to the ultimate disposition of FBIS.

/s/ HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, GSC
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

3 Incls:
1. Tab "A"
2. Tab "B"
3. Tab "C"

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Enclosure "B"

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TAB "A" TO ENCLOSURE "B"

21 December 1945

Honorable Paul Porter
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Porter:

The War Department is advised that the Federal Communications Commission is liquidating the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), which monitors and digests propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.

Systematic coverage of foreign propaganda broadcasts is believed primarily the concern of the State Department. It also is valuable to the War and Navy Departments. In the circumstances of these times it is an essential source of intelligence. As an interim measure, pending any program the State Department may initiate, the War Department plans to expand its monitoring program to meet the need arising from the liquidation of the FBIS.

It is proposed that all FBIS personnel, without change of grade or duties or accrued leave, be transferred to the War Department prior to 31 December 1945 and that the Commission hold the personnel together by continuing operations pending an orderly determination and transfer of those essential to continued operations.

It is considered important that agreement in principle to the necessary transfers be reached immediately in order to avoid loss of continuity and of experienced personnel. A mutually satisfactory settlement of the details can readily be made by representatives of the War Department and of the Commission. The G-2 Division will represent the War Department in this matter.

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- 7 - Tab "A" to Enclosure "B"

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Your acceptance of these proposals is requested. It will facilitate War Department plans to expand its monitoring program in the national interest.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

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- 8 - Tab "A" to Enclosure "B"

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TAB "B" TO ENCLOSURE "B"

December 27, 1945

Honorable Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Secretary Patterson:

This will acknowledge your letter of 21 December 1945 proposing a transfer to the War Department of the Commission personnel who have been engaged in the monitoring of foreign shortwave broadcasts and further proposing the loan to the War Department of all Federal Communications Commission facilities which have been employed in that activity.

25X1A The Commission accepts the proposals made in your letter and steps are being taken immediately to effectuate the arrangements which you suggest. To this end representatives of the War Department and representatives of the Commission met this morning for the purpose of making detailed plans.

The Commission is pleased that the War Department has found it possible to carry on this important activity.

By Direction of the Commission

/s/ PAUL A. PORTER

Chairman

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- 9 - Tab "B" to Enclosure "B"

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