

STAT

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**MILITARY POWER
AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES**

A SELECTED LIST OF TITLES

Compiled by
Army Library
The Adjutant General's Office
Department of the Army

INTRODUCTION

This bibliographic examination of thought expressed in American and foreign literature is presented in order to aid the professional soldier in his many-sided tasks.

The problems facing the military today are of such magnitude and complexity that there is a need of recapitulating some of the fundamentals of military power and national objectives.

The question is often raised as to the relationship between military power and national objectives and the overall military and civilian policy in a democracy. This collection of materials abstracted by the research analysts of the Army Library endeavors to present the literature that points up some of the elements and the factors which affect these vital problems of national defense in the United States and Europe.

At this point it is fitting to state that this bibliography is not intended as a syllabus to a course of study or a textbook on military science. The main objective is to inform and arouse curiosity through a collection of diversified literature.

Accordingly, some of the selected items are neither definitive nor entirely authoritative, but were primarily included because certain parts and chapters contain provocative ideas and constructive, relevant information.

The materials in this bibliography deal with three main areas which are pertinent to the study of military power and national objectives, and are arranged in three main chapters. However, similar themes in many papers appear in one or more of these chapters because their authors have stressed not one but several aspects of military systems, defense problems, and national history.

For the most part, the materials are limited to general studies dealing with the United States, Great Britain, France, NATO, and the U. S. S. R. The rise and fall of military systems in Asia, such as those of Japan and Communist China, were not considered because of limitations of time and personnel, although it is recognized that such an examination would have added to the overall evaluation. Germany, on the other hand, was included for its historic value and for its developmental influence on military systems.


In general, only English language literature was included. However, because of unavailability of English language materials on France, some French language literature has been added.

Papers dealing with the countries of the British Commonwealth are listed under Great Britain.

This publication contains about 750 titles, selected from thousands appearing in periodical, book, and document literature, and are arranged in alphabetical order by title within major and subordinate subject groups.

A small number of materials has been included which is not in the holdings of the Army Library. The following symbols were used to precede such titles in order to indicate their location:

- lc Library of Congress
- mh Office, Chief of Military History, Army
- n Not available at time of listing
- o Office of the originating agency
- wc National War College



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MILITARY POWER AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

I. MILITARY SYSTEMS: SOME ELEMENTS

A. Military Policy

1. France

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT CRUISERS OR SUB-MARINES. Porte-avions, croiseurs anti-aériens ou sous-marins, by Camille Rougeron, in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, v. 11 (May 1955) 614-622. In French.

This discussion of the effects of thermonuclear bombs on surface ships concludes that the Navies' only chance of survival resides in the employment of submarines for both military and commercial purposes.

ATOMIC WARFARE AND THE CAPTURE OF TERRAIN: La guerre atomique et l'occupation du terrain, by Gen. P. Gérardot, in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, v. 11 (Apr 1955) 391-396. In French.

Since in modern warfare with atomic and thermonuclear weapons ground forces will no longer be able to win a decisive victory and exploit victory through occupation, France must depend primarily on the Air Force for national defense and must concentrate her military and technical effort on that arm.

2. Germany - Historical Examples

THE AXIS GRAND STRATEGY; BLUEPRINTS FOR THE TOTAL WAR, compiled and edited by Ladislav Farago. New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1942. 614 p.

"This book attempts to give comprehensive answers by com-

petent German spokesmen to the multitude of questions raised by what is predominantly a German war. . . . "The material was compiled from thousands of books, articles, and speeches prepared by influential leaders on Hitler's military, economic, and ideological staff, those basic elements which present a complete picture of the Nazi New Order."

MOLTKE--AN ESSAY, by D. N. P. Brunicard, in *Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal*, v. 11, no. 2 (Feb 1951) 56-60.

Brief biography of Helmuth Karl von Moltke. His significance lies in the creation of an army which won wars. The success of the Prussian army, and the organization of its General Staff as set up by Moltke caused it to be retained by Germany and to be copied elsewhere, notably in Russia. He is credited with recognizing the importance of railways in moving troops and supplies and the advantages of the telegraph as an instrument of command, largely as the result of his studies of the American Civil War. Characteristic of his innovations was his introduction of a standard procedure for intelligence, because of his passion for gathering geographic and topographic information about other countries.

3. Great Britain

LAND WARFARE OF THE FUTURE, THE GEORGE KNIGHT CLOWES MEMORIAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1956, by Capt. K. J. Macksey, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 72, no. 2 (July 1956) 161-172.

Views on the form of the land campaign of the future, and how the British Army should be organized to meet the conditions of future war in view of the possible varying commitments. Includes the study of: (1) historical precedent and contemporary development, (2) the land battle, and (3) organization.

MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT IN A NUCLEAR AGE, by John W. R. Taylor, in *Air Power*, v. 4, no. 3 (Spring 1957) 175-184.

The day of mass dog-fighting and huge bomber formations is a thing of the past. At present there are many reasons for believing that the transport command is far more important today than at any period in history. If Great Britain would take the lead of USAF Strategic Air Command, she would have an effective deterrent force on hand. The U. S. Army's Pentana concept is discussed as well as choice of vehicles for military air transport in a nuclear age.

THE NEW ARMY ACT, by Maj. D. M. R. Esson, in *Royal Engineers Journal*, v. 69, no. 4 (Dec 1955) 389-392.

Year to year changes in the provisions of the British Army Acts (which authorize establishment, maintenance, and disciplinary measures of the Army) since 1889 and a discussion of the latest provisions of the Army Act of 1955. An interesting feature of the Act is the provision that the Act shall be continued from year to year by "Order in Council" following an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, but that the continuation should not exceed five years.

ORGANIZATION FOR MODERN WAR, by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in *Aeroplane*, v. 89, no. 2317 (16 Dec 1955) 935-936.

A review and discussion of some points raised by Lord Montgomery on the nature of a future global war, the steps which Great Britain ought to take to prepare herself, and the organization needed for war in modern times. Questions on the advisability of placing the British Bomber Command under the US Strategic Air Command stem from the fear that in the complete absence (at present) of cooperation between these two groups, the striking power of US SAC might not be allocated to the destruction of those targets which are threatening the national existence of Great Britain.

THE PRICE OF LIBERTY IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE, by Lt. Col. P. M. Bennett, in *Royal Engineers Journal*, v. 69, no. 1 (Mar 1955) 51-68.

The present armored and highly mechanized British Army is not suited to atomic warfare nor to the existing state of cold war. The type of army required is an army composed of lightly equipped, mobile, small divisions. These divisions should be air transportable and part of them should be airborne. In the existing state of cold war it is an obvious requirement that an adequate home-based strategic reserve be formed as soon as possible; and the Army must increase its influence on the development, procurement, and operational control of transport aircraft.

THE UNCONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT, in *Economist*, (26 Feb. 1955), 727-729.

The progress in electronics and nuclear physics has ended military strategy as the world has known it, and it ended conventional air defense, vast movements of armies, and battles at sea. These facts were underlined in the British White Paper released by the Government in 1955. The document on Britain's defense and preparedness took a sober look at the national requirements in the era of hydrogen bombs and spelled out in overall terms their effects on the strategy and tactics of the British Army, Air Force, and Navy. Some of the changes that were forecast in the White Paper are reviewed.

UNITED KINGDOM'S DEFENCE EFFORT, in *An Cosantoir*, v. 16, no. 4 (Apr 1956) 163-170.

Shaping the British Army, Navy and Air Force to fit the requirements of the nuclear age.

WHAT SORT OF ARMY? by Lt. Col. L. H. Landon, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, v. 82, no. 3 (July 1955) 213-218.

To meet the needs of changed world conditions, Great Britain requires a small, highly disciplined, highly trained, fully equipped, war-strength professional regular army, stationed partly in Germany and being partly available as air transportable formations within easy reach of Western Europe. This Army must be ready for instant action, and must have its reserves of equipment, ammunition, and men within immediate reach. It must be ready to fight at any time with what it has with it, and without relying on mobilization, reinforcement, or immediate supply. The air transportable formations will constitute the strategic reserves in the hands of the Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Great Britain also needs: an air transport logistic corps - using helicopters and conventional aircraft - to supply this Regular Army and be able to operate from dispersed bases at considerable distance from the troops; a Civil Defense Army, under military discipline, with military training as well as Civil Defense training, in the United Kingdom; and a Colonial Service Army for peripheral wars - trained and equipped on conventional lines with conventional weapons. This could be partially a National Service Army with regular officers, partially an Army recruited in colonial territories, and the Gurkha Brigade.

4. NATO

FOR ATOMIC DEFENSE; THE TACTICS, THE WEAPONS, AND THE MEN, in *Newsweek*, v. 45, no. 1 (3 Jan 1955) 27-31.

Recently the NATO Council had authorized the military command to plan on the assumption that it would use atomic weapons if the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe. Evaluates the present capability of NATO Forces and US Armed Forces in Europe of striking at Soviet Forces with atomic weapons. Types of atomic weapons available; missions in which they can be used; tactical considerations in their use; manpower needed for these atomic weapons; and the strategic significance of the fact that these atomic weapons are available for defense and are ready on the firing line if the need for their use ever arises.

THE SHAPE OF WAR TO COME, by Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, in *Air Pictorial*, v. 15, no. 11 (Nov 1953) 322-324.

The free world can prevent another war if it shows to the would-be aggressor that real strength is available to deal with him. Such

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real strength can be obtained only in a strong bomber force, and the West must make the necessary provisions to obtain such a force. Passive defensive measures cannot prevent aggression. If Russia cannot be deterred from aggression and another war breaks out, the bomber force will be the only weapon that can decisively hurt the Soviet Union. Russia is open to air attack, but naval or land operations cannot defeat her. The West must recognize the fact that large fleets, armies, and weapons cannot be built and maintained indefinitely if the economy of the West is to remain unshattered. On the other hand, the war at sea, on land, and in the air must not be considered separately. The three must be united into one force, it does not mean that Britain should leave this element of military power to the US alone. Britain must strive to obtain such a force of her own in order to maintain her position as a great power in world political and military affairs.

5. United States

AIR POWER IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN WAR, by Adm. Arthur Radford, in *US Air Services*, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 1954) 7-10.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discusses the part played by air power in US national security. Air power may not win by itself alone, but no major war can be won without it. It is important to recognize the rapid increase in Soviet scientific, technological, and production skills; their capabilities are shown by the rapidity with which they developed their long-range jet bombers and atomic weapons. The US must make every effort to maintain a technological lead over the USSR.

AIRPOWER MAKES SEA MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in *U.S. Air Service*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 1954) 7-8.

The US Navy's Chief of Naval Operations states that technological developments in aircraft and submarines increase the importance of sea power in the present world situation, and that the US must keep pace with the expanding naval forces of the USSR. The shipbuilding program of the Soviets; excellent cruisers of the SVERDLOV class are being built, and the USSR efforts in this category exceed all of the cruiser building in the world. Russia is also building large and seaworthy destroyers that are the equal of those of the Western Powers.

ARMIES ARE HERE TO STAY, by James D. Atkinson, in *Army*, v. 7, no. 6 (Jan 1957) 49-52.

Warns against the dangers of exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons which leads to formalism and freezes thinking about warfare

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"into as rigid a mould as the Maginot Line mentality." Shows that nuclear weapons have not eliminated the need for armies. "Armies today - and in future - are not obsolete. Instead, they are in a period of flux. From this present period of change will emerge armies as different from their World War II prototypes as the World War II soldier was different from George Washington's Continentals. But whatever the form of the content, ARMIES will remain."

ARMS AND POLICY, 1939-1944, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York, Putnam's, 1945. 356 p.
Background, decisions, and lessons of World War II.

ARMS VIGILANCE FOR PEACE, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, in Ordnance, v. 39, no. 209 (Mar-Apr 1955) 716-719.
US military policy in the atomic age must attempt to foster a healthy and expanding national economy while maintaining sufficient military strength to win any war that must be forced upon us.

BRIEFING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, 1955. 197-352. (84th Congress, 1st Session. House Armed Services Committee. Paper No. 3.)

Statements and testimonies by the Secretaries of Defense, Air Force, Navy, and Army and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before a briefing of the House Armed Services Committee. The briefing concerned the military aspects of the international situation, the military policies and programs of the Department of Defense, and force levels which the US should maintain.

THE CASE FOR NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Lt. Col. Edward P. Wynne, in Air Force, v. 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 78 plus.
Study of the great wars in the past shows that as new weapons are developed and placed in the military arsenal, the older weapons are not scrapped. As the types of nuclear weapons increase and our nuclear combat potential expands, we must employ this analysis capability to keep a proper balance between the old and the new.

THE COLDEST COLD WAR, in Newsweek, v. 44, no. 20 (15 Nov 1954) 54-56.
The US and USSR programs of military construction and research

in the Arctic. The Soviets know more about the Arctic regions than the West does, and are publicizing their "new offensive on the Arctic..." Russian air bases and radar stations are being constructed all along their Arctic perimeter. Suggestions which have been made to extend the US military program in the Arctic, such as building more air bases and radar stations and developing an elite corps of special personnel for Arctic operations.

DEFENSE REPORT, by Dewey Short, in Reserve Officer, v. 30, no. 12 (Dec 1954) 9-11 plus.

Based on an address by Congressman Short before the US Marine Corps' Senior and Junior Amphibious Warfare Schools, Quantico, Va. Representative Short (House Armed Service Committee) explained the principles upon which US military policy is based in light of US foreign policy and emphasized that while nuclear weapons and other developments in weapons require the re-evaluation of tactical doctrines, they do not change the fundamental concept in which US military policy and national interests require the continuous maintenance of a military establishment in which the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have to accomplish their missions and functions.

THE EFFECT OF AIR POWER IN A LAND OFFENSIVE, by John C. Slessor, in South African Air Force Journal, v. 1, no. 3 (July 1949) 1-4.
Based on evidence from the break-through in Italy during World War II, air power cannot by itself defeat a highly organized and disciplined army, enforce a withdrawal by drying up the flow of essential supplies, prevent the movement of reserves to the battlefield, isolate the battlefield absolutely, or guarantee the immunity of back areas from hostile air attack. However, used as a weapon of pursuit, giving the enemy no respite or opportunity to build up stocks of fuel, ammunition and equipment, the impetus of the Army's advance over the Apennines and into the Po valley was immeasurably aided by air power in this connection.

MILITARY AVIATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE. Montgomery, Ala., Air University, Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 1954. 102 p. (Air Science 4, v. 4.)
Analysis of the principles of war in the light of modern weapons and air power capabilities now and in the immediate future. Recounting of those portions of the history of land, naval, and air warfare which illustrate the principles and dictate present alignment of the components of military might. Air-power, in its fullest meaning, is the only hope for deterring an attack or for meeting an aerial attack on at least equal terms, and air power must receive highest priority in military planning.

MILITARY FORCES AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES, by Maj. Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 7 (Oct 1955) 12-29.
Examines some of the capabilities of military force (among them: offensive war capability, defense capability, deterrent capability, commitment capability, military aid, organizational capabilities, administrative capability, guerrilla capability, and civil war capability) and some of its limitations; and suggests implications for military policy based upon these capabilities and limitations. The US can afford to develop and maintain the military forces, both conventional and otherwise, that reasonably contribute to the attainment of national objectives.

MILITARY NECESSITY VERSUS ECONOMY, by Capt. R. E. W. Harrison, in *American Society of Naval Engineers, Journal*, v. 67, no. 1 (Feb 1955) 75-79.

History is replete with the wreckage of nations which have made the fatal error of underestimating enemy potential. Therefore, it would be wise to evaluate (1) what the Armed Forces can achieve with their available resources, (2) what the Armed Forces should have in order to achieve certain objectives, and (3) what the Armed Forces can obtain if time and cost elements are considered. With these blueprints the case should be presented to Congress so that Congress can act in common with those who foresee "the day," the need for speed when that day comes, and above all, the need for maximum "elbow room" for change and rapid type expansion in the Armed Forces and their logistical supporters.

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, by Maj. Gen. Emory Upton. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1917. 494 p.
Deals with the military policies of all American military campaigns from the Revolutionary War through the Civil War.

THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WARFARE, by Edward Teller, in *Air Force*, v. 40, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 43-47.
"Is it proper now, or in the future, to use atomic weapons in war?" With a discussion of nuclear warfare in both defense and in offense.

A NAVY SECOND TO NONE, by George T. Davis. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1940. 508 p.
Development of modern American naval policy. With bibliography.

THE NEW DIMENSION, in *Time*, v. 63, no. 6 (8 Feb 1954) 18-25.
The decision of the JCS to base US strategy on atomic weapons

and long-range, strategic air power; and the Air Force as it emerges in its new role. USAF's functional ability to strike enemy air bases and war potential in all parts of the world; post-war development and capabilities of SAC; and SAC's heavy training requirements in all-weather flying, navigation, gunnery, radar deception, and bombing on target. The Air Force is still weak in fundamental doctrine and is lacking large numbers of officers educated in military schools. A serious problem is the short tenure of enlisted personnel as compared to the long training required for Air Force specialties. Illustrations of AF aircraft.

NEXT WAR: LONG OR SHORT, AND HOW READY IS U.S.? in *U.S. News and World Report*, v. 37, no. 22 (26 Nov 1954) 71-73.

The military policies of the US Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, indicate that he agrees with those military strategists who hold that the next war will be brief, that air power will be paramount, that the use of soldiers will be limited, and that the need for elaborate industrial mobilization will be reduced. However, questions are being raised in Congress as to whether Mr. Wilson's policies provide enough defense for the nation and whether US can be sure of a short war. Reduction in the Army budget since June 1953 as compared to the Navy and Air Force budget; some of Mr. Wilson's achievements since he became Secretary of Defense; and the relationship of mutual trust and close friendship between the President and Mr. Wilson which shows that the President knows what the Secretary is doing and is backing him.

THE ROLE OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES, by Brig. Gen. James Fergusson, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, v. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1954) 29-41.

Reviews the lessons learned about tactical air forces in World War II and Korea; and evaluates on the role, the employment, and the composition of tactical air forces in view of the "new look" military policy and the increase in sizes and types of nuclear weapons.

SEA POWER IN THE NEXT WAR, by A. E. Sokol, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 78, no. 5 (May 1952) 519-531.

Definition, nature, and function of sea power in warfare; role of sea power in World War II in foiling Germany's strategy based mainly on land and air operations; Korean War as a lesson of sea power's continued importance in any type of warfare; limitations of air power in general and in operations against a land power (such as the Soviet Union) in particular; the role of logistics in modern warfare; and the part to be played by the US naval forces in the next war. No arm of service can win a war individually because all of them are mutually supplementary, however, our best hope of winning a war against a country (strong on land and in the air) like Russia, is in exploiting to the utmost our "only

distinctive advantage" over her: our sea power. If we make our navy stronger by providing it with large aircraft carriers, and if we employ our sea power properly, it will give us the ultimate success and victory.

THE SECURITY OF THE NATION; A STUDY OF CURRENT PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. Washington, Association of the United States Army, 1957. 29 p.

Views on some of the more important national defense issues of the moment, and the Army's mission and contributing role in maintaining the security of the United States. Among the subjects discussed: current strategic concepts; mobility; and the Army's requirement for guided missiles. Appended: The Key West Agreement; Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1 October 1953); Memorandum of Understanding Relating to Army Organic Aviation (4 November 1952); and Memorandum from Secretary of Defense: Clarification of Roles and Missions (26 November 1956).

THE SINGLE-WEAPON FALLACY, by James D. Atkinson, in Army, v. 6, no. 11 (June 1956) 23-27.

Historical examples to show that in the past, defeat has always come to those who became obsessed with a single weapon or strategy. Fortunately, General Eisenhower's view of warfare holds that the US can and must afford a readiness for all the likely types of war. War is waged in three elements, but there is no separate land, air, or naval war. Unless all assets are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential power cannot be realized.

"SQUEEZE 'EM AN' BLAST 'EM" by Lt. Col. George B. Pickett, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 6 (Sept 1955) 56-60.

With the tempo of change in the atomic age we must change our thinking and consider tactics, technique, and strategy as a continuing "operational process" where process 1954 is not the same as process 1955 but is constantly being reviewed, revised, and adapted to keep pace with changes in weapons, national culture, political concepts, production means, and the many other variables that affect both the delivery and use of weapons on a battlefield and the willingness of the public to permit the use of those weapons.

STRATEGY, ANYONE? by Lt. Col. Anthony L. Wermuth, in Army, v. 6, no. 11 (June 1956) 28-29.

The capabilities of aircraft, tremendous as they are at the present time, cannot hope to do more than extend or complement the capa-

bilities of armies, and can never supplant them. There seems little logic in assigning a land-launched, unmanned weapon to any other force than the Army, no matter what the range of the weapon may be.

THE SYMINGTON SUBCOMMITTEE'S AIRPOWER FINDINGS, in Air Force, v. 40, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 41-45.

Findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the subcommittee on U. S. airpower forces in being, airpower forces for the future and for limited war, airpower preparedness and fiscal policy, and airpower preparedness and an informed public opinion.

TACTICS FOR ATOMIC WAR, by Col. George C. Reinhardt, in Ordnance, v. 38, no. 204 (May-June 1954) 936-938.

The appearance of atomic missiles as tactical weapons dictates revision of the conduct of tactical operations. Hence we must develop new type military organizations to be employed and to defend against nuclear weapons on the battlefield or we may be incapable of exploiting the scientific advantages we have gained. Recommended organizational changes: (1) increase the proportion of armored divisions to infantry divisions as fast as budgetary provisions will permit; (2) introduce changes in the infantry setup so that it approaches armored organization; (3) abolish the regiment, making infantry battalions as independent as their artillery and engineer counterparts; (4) squeeze some armored personnel carriers out of the budget for these battalions; and (5) unify the division's combat-logistics elements along the lines of armor's train command.

THE THREE WARS THAT FACE US, by Comdr. Albert T. Church, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 145-151.

Outlines three military situations - three wars - for which the US needs plans: (1) all-out nuclear war; (2) non-atomic global war; and (3) peripheral war characterized by successive hot spots in the cold war. The difficulty of determining the forces that will provide a reasonable security for each of the three possibilities.

TIME FOR DECISION, by Lt. Commander Allan P. Slaff, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 8 (Aug 1956) 809-813.

Points out that the Navy must face up to the facts that the guided missile is a distinct and important competitor of piloted naval aircraft and that some important and far reaching decisions regarding the requirements of naval operating forces of the future, must be made. These decisions will

not rule out the piloted aircraft and the aircraft carrier as a naval weapon, but they will force a shift in emphasis away from piloted aircraft and the aircraft carrier to the guided missile and the guided missile battleship.

U.S. AIR POWER TODAY, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 8, no. 4 (Fall 1956) 61-78.

A digest of the testimony by USAF commanders before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, which in the spring of 1956 undertook a review of American air power, especially the capability of USAF to deter aggression. The testimony revealed current key USAF professional opinion, on mission capability. Includes description of how Soviet gains swell USAF requirements.

A VITAL ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL STRENGTH, by Wilber M. Brucker, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 4 (July 1956) 3-7.

The military threat of aggression - by land, sea, and air - we face today is an inclusive one and our ability to cope with it depends upon the combined strength of the defense team, not on any one part of it.

WE MUST PUT WINGS ON THE INFANTRY, by John C. H. Lee, Jr., in Saturday Evening Post, v. 224, no. 46 (17 May 1952) 42-43 plus.

The numerical superiority of the USSR and her satellites can be overcome by the mobility of airborne troops. Activities of the Joint Airborne Troop Board in creating entire airborne armies as compared to the former concept of special parachute units. Tactical possibilities of vertical envelopment; the potentialities of airborne warfare demonstrated in Korea; effectiveness of helicopters, and other improvements in aerial supply. History of the Joint Airborne Troop Board and its present program of developing transport aircraft, lighter equipment, and mobility in logistics.

6. U.S.S.R.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN THE ARCTIC, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 8 (Nov 1954) 26-28. In English.

The Soviet leaders realize that the northwestern Arctic regions of the USSR present a vulnerable sector in the Russian defense system. Describes the various political and military measures that are being taken to strengthen this sector.

MILITARY RECORD OF ATOMIC HAPPENINGS, 1955/THEMES: "NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PLENTY"; 5 - THE PRESENT SITUATION. Knightsbridge, England, Aviation Studies Limited, Special Weapons Study Unit, 1955. 33 p.

US and Allied strategic capability in air, naval, and ground warfare, and Russian preparations. In part the conclusions state: "In the pattern of Russian preparations the build-up points to evolution of general purpose balanced forces. . . The Russian Army is the dynamic factor in any form of all-out struggle, and with over 100 divisions at the ready in Poland, East Germany and White Russia, the numerical superiority that could soon be brought to bear is sufficient to be decisive on all pre-atomic military calculations. The Reds believe that classic military doctrine of land campaigning is still as valid as it ever was. . ."

THE SOVIET TRIAL BY ARMS; JUNE TO DECEMBER 1941, by Raymond L. Garthoff, in Military Review, v. 33, no. 3 (June 1953) 23-31.

The major causes of Soviet military reverses in the second half of 1941, and the reasons behind German victories during the period. Hitler's plan for OPERATION BARBAROSSA; comparative strength of opposing forces; equipment used by the Soviets; Soviet ground and air losses, and German casualties; weather during the period; and the shortcomings of the Soviet military doctrine. The major factor in the early Soviet reverses was insufficient planning and training for defense. However, German surprise, obsolescent Soviet equipment, and general unpreparedness were also responsible for their early defeat on the ground and in the air.

THE THREAT: RUSSIA'S BOMBERS, by William Green, in RAF Flying Review, v. 10, no. 6 (Mar 1955) 17-21.

An analysis of Russia's latest bombers and their operational potential across the North Pole. Because the Soviets have established refueling stops on the islands of Severnaya Zemlya and Frans Joseph Land, as well as bases on the Taimyr peninsula and the New Siberian Islands, the new bombers of the Soviet Strategic Air Force (Aviatsiia Dal'nego Deistviia) can attack targets in North America despite the great distance involved. The possibility of using drifting ice floes as refueling points has also been investigated by the Russians and in-flight refueling techniques were perfected several years ago. Flying over the Arctic wastes at 50,000 feet and at high sub-sonic speeds, the chances of a proportion of the bombers reaching their targets in US are high. The question is no longer, "when will the Russians develop modern strategic bombers?" but "when will they possess them in sufficient numbers to constitute a serious threat." The conception of Russia as a land, possessing air forces solely for the purpose of tactical support will soon be outdated. Includes description of the capabilities and characteristics of Soviet Bombers Type 39 BADGER, Type 37 BISON, Type 31, and Type 35 BOSUN (designated so by NATO forces for identification purposes).

B. Military Doctrines And Operational Techniques

1. Evolution

THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE, by Herman Foertsch. New York, Oskar Piest, 1940. 273 p. (With an introduction by Maj. George Fielding Eliot.)

"Its (book's) greatest interest lies in its clear demonstration of the evolution of modern German military thought from the formalism of the nineteenth century, which still to some extent constrained the German officer corps during the World War (I). While steadily based on the timeless principles of war, the book sweeps away any idea of set rules in the application thereof to the variant exigencies of battle. It lays the greatest emphasis on the need for individual initiative on the part even of the private soldier, but more especially of the subordinate leader."

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES, by Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche. London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955. 222 p.

Evolution of tactics and techniques during the two World Wars; the importance of fire and movement; analytical review of the German "Blitzkrieg" and of the Allied counter-blitz in World War II; and how tactics and organization will be affected if tactical A-weapons are used in any future war. The general pattern of the forces required by the West is almost the opposite of the "New Look" strategy, because as long as Russia has the H-bomb and maintains large armies, we must stick to atomic weapons and maintain an army which is able to fight conventional as well as atomic-type wars, as circumstances may dictate.

CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, by Fred B. Waters. Fort Belvoir, Va., Engineer School, 1949. 25 p.

A brief review of the change that new weapons and concepts of war have effected on fundamental military doctrine.

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, by Col. Robert C. Cassibry, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 2 (May 1956) 22-34.

The Command and General Staff College is specifically charged with the development and revision of the tactical and logistical doctrine for

all of the combined arms and services, including tactical employment of atomic and future weapons. With chart showing the organization for development of doctrine:

THE HERITAGE OF DOUHET, by Bernard Brodie, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, v. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1953) 64-69 plus.

The influence exerted on air forces generally by the Italian air strategist, and evaluation of his doctrine in the light of World War II. Fundamentals of his basic theory of "command of the air"; soundness of some of his ideas; and instances from World War II which proved him wrong. The atomic bomb now gives his theories much support, and it is remarkable that he could create a framework of strategic thought that fits the atomic age.

A HISTORY OF MILITARY AFFAIRS IN WESTERN SOCIETY SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, ed. by Gordon B. Turner. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1953. 776 p.

A study to provide an understanding of the problems which a democratic society faces in preparing for and in waging total war. The principal developments in the art of war from the cabinet wars of the eighteenth century to the total war of the present; and the relationship between the nature of a military establishment and the political, social, and economic character of the society of which it is a part. Types of warfare and the evolution of strategy, tactics, weapons, and logistics are also considered, however, not in the purely military nature but in their broadest aspect. Emphasis is placed upon: the political and administrative problems incidental to raising and maintaining a large military establishment in a democratic society; proper employment of manpower in modern war; and the role of the military in the formulation of foreign policy in peace and war, among others. Some of the subjects examined are: the eighteenth century military system in Europe and America; the French Revolution; the American Civil War; Civil-Military relations during World War I; coalition and global warfare during World War II and joint operations and politico-military relations; various lessons learned from World War II; US contemporary problems of military defense; and civil and military elements of national security (including: national security and military policy; the political objectives of war; democratic control of military power; strategic implications of the North Atlantic Pact; the role of the military in formulating the Japanese Peace Treaty; the role of Sea Power in global warfare of the future; and the influence of Air Power upon history). Maps.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR, by Cyril Falls. London, Duckworth, 1953. 419 p.

Record of military events from the time of the Crimean War, with comments on practically every war, great and small, in the past hundred years.

LANDING OPERATIONS, by Alfred Vagts. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1946. 831 p.
"Strategy, psychology, tactics, politics, from antiquity to 1945."

MEN IN ARMS, by Richard A. Preston and others. New York, Praeger, 1956. 376 p.
General survey of the history of warfare, particularly the interrelation of military techniques and social organization.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, by Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 16-23.
New developments in firepower, mobility, and communications step up the potential of military operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, takes a look at the changes that are taking place in US Army's firepower, mobility, communications, tactical concepts, and organization to prepare it to the needs of future warfare.

THE NEW FACE OF WAR, by Hansen W. Baldwin, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 5 (May 1956) 153-158.
Changes in the art of war during the past 25 years and their meaning. New ways of using ground forces; modifications in naval tactics; progress in air tactics; and the strategy of US amidst the changes in the art of war.

PROPHET OF AIR POWER, by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, in Aeroplane, v. 90, no. 2331 (4 May 1956) 342-343.
Air power has exactly fulfilled the doctrine of Gen. Douhet written 35 years ago. Highlights of his doctrine and its effect on the development of air power in US and other countries.

REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR, by Brig. Gen. Beaufre, in Royal Armoured Corps Journal, v. 8, no. 4 (Oct 1954) 173-177.
The combination of heavy tanks, light tanks, and antiatomic mechanized infantry designed for all phases of combat as the three main trends in the evolution of French ideas in the field of armor.

THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE, by Liddell Hart. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947. 125 p.
"The future is moulded by the past. The best promise for the future lies in understanding, and applying, the lessons of the past. For that reason, in discussing the problems created by the current war, more light may come from tracing the whole course of the revolution of warfare than by dealing merely with the appearances of the moment. If we realize how the conditions of this war have come about, there may be some prospect of averting a more deadly recurrence."

A STUDY OF WAR, by Quincy Wright. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942. Vol. I, p. 1-678; Vol. II, p. 679-1552.
Volume I traces the history of warfare from hostilities among animals, through primitive and historic civilizations, to modern times. Volume II analyzes the causes of war and discusses the practical problem of preventing war.

TRADITION VERSUS PROGRESS, by Field Marshal Montgomery, in Air Force, v. 38, no. 11 (Nov 1955) 31-34 plus.
Because air power is the dominant factor in modern war, progress must give way to tradition in building-up an organization of the fighting forces for maximum strength within limits of economic possibilities. Air power must be released from its bondages and forged into one mighty weapon, and the air forces of the western alliance should be organized and controlled as one single mighty weapon. Present organization of tactical air forces and logistics should be recast completely; and the services should be brought more closely together even to the extent of combining them into one service.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD SEA POWER, ed. by E. B. Potter. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1955. 963 p.
A history of US and international sea power, developing six main themes: (1) the influence of sea power upon history, (2) the rationale of strategic decision, (3) the characteristics of successful leadership, (4) the development of naval weapons, (5) the evolution of naval tactics, and (6) the evolution of amphibious doctrine. Emphasis is placed on the problems posed in each period of history by new weapons and new conditions, and on the solutions worked out for each by the navies of the world. Among the chapters: the origins of Western sea power; the Seven Years' War; the American Revolution; the Trafalgar Campaign 1805; the American Civil War; naval developments of the late 19th Century; the rise of sea power in the Far East; the naval battles of World War I; doctrinal evolution between World Wars; US and Allied naval battles and campaigns of World War II; defeat of Germany and the dissolution of the Japanese Empire; naval operations in the Korean War; and the political and mili-

Airborne operations of Germans and Allies during World War II, illustrating that airborne troops almost invariably captured their objective, and that all the operations, no matter how well planned or carefully executed, took a large toll of airborne troops. Due to the high cost of maintaining such troops, only nations with great industries and huge reserves of manpower can use them. The troops will be employed for special missions, which are enumerated. Varied opinions by military experts on the value, future, and limitations of airborne troops are quoted.

THE INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN WAR AND OTHER ESSAYS, by J. Holland Rose. London, G. Bell and Sons, 1927. 204 p.

The first two essays contrast the prolonged deadlock in the North Sea and on the Western Front in 1914-18 with what was achieved by the weak, slow fleets and small professional armies of earlier times. The other essays deal with subjects bearing on national safety and expansion, the balance of power in the Mediterranean, the ultimate dependence of India on 'sea power', certain aspects of the careers of Napoleon and Nelson, the well-being of the fleet in 1805, British acquisition of Malta, and finally, the comparatively recent growth of the spirit of comradeship at sea.

MACHINE WARFARE, by J. F. C. Fuller. Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1943. 257 p.

MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF SUBMARINE FORCES. Missions et organisation des forces sous-marines, by Capt. A. Traonmilin, in *Revue Maritime*, no. 110 (June 1955) 720-738. In French.

Combat missions of submarines during the two-World Wars; various reconnaissance missions for which submarines can be used; special missions such as the landing of agents, commandos, and supplies; and the ideal theoretical submarine command organization. Submarine warfare can inflict heavy losses upon enemy shipping at the beginning of hostilities. However, the submarine is still unable to achieve systematic destruction of naval forces, transport troops, and conquer bases and territories. Therefore, submarine warfare must be integrated into the general conduct of operations together with surface and air forces. These conclusions will be subject to revision as soon as the employment of atomic energy gives submarines a speed and cruising range comparable to those of surface ships, adequate weapons against all types of enemy forces, and a substantial transportation capacity.

PARA-MILITARY WARFARE: THE NATION'S SECURITY PLANNING, by William R. Kintner, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 35, no. 3 (Mar 1951) 46-48.

Lenin, the master strategist of the Communist movement,

has described the revolutionary type of warfare, at which Communists have become so skilled, as a melange of war and politics. The fact that the Soviets treat para-military warfare as a prime weapon compels us to consider it in our own strategy. From a purely defensive point of view, the military should instruct officers and men in the techniques and instruments used by the Soviets in their para-military warfare. Psychological and guerrilla warfare methods employed before and during World War II should be studied since judgment in the right uses of irregular military groups (and in the reciprocal consequences of the employment of conventional military forces) can only be acquired from long acquaintance. The basic foundations for the conduct of para-military warfare must be laid now, by men who are familiar with the problems involved.

PERIPHERAL WARS, by Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 12 (Mar 1956) 44-47.

The politico-military histories of the Roman Empire, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union, Japan, and Great Britain show that containment, accompanied by little wars on the periphery of enemy held or dominated territory, is only a tactic and not a form of warfare. It is a delaying action which cannot win a decision.

PRIZE ESSAY, 1957. A PHILOSOPHY FOR NAVAL ATOMIC WARFARE; by Comdr. Malcolm W. Cagle, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 83, no. 3 (Mar 1957) 249-258.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Paul M. A. Linebarger. 2d ed. Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1954. 318 p.

Based on the experiences of the author who worked for five years both as civilian expert and as Army officer in American psychological warfare facilities - at every level from the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff planning phase down to the preparation of spot leaflets. Definition and history of psychological warfare; propaganda analysis and intelligence organization for psychological warfare; plans and planning; operations for civilians; operations against troops; and psychological warfare operations after World War II. Appended: military psywar operations 1950-53. With illustrations of the various types of propaganda.

THE SEA HERITAGE; A STUDY OF MARITIME WARFARE, by Adm. Frederic C. Dreyer. London, Museum Press, 1955. 472 p.

The first thirty-two chapters of this book cover the author's

career and experiences in the British Navy from 1891 through World War II. Then follows Addendum Chapter I, in which the author, starting with a brief review of the important events and developments in naval warfare up to the end of World War I, reflects on the various aspects of naval warfare during World War II - especially in the Pacific. Among the subjects discussed: the Battle of Jutland, 1916; rebuilding of British and US Navies, 1933-1945; the Merchant Navy in World War II; Pearl Harbor; and some of the highlights of naval operations in the Pacific. Photos and maps.

THE U.S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WAR: ITS THEORY, AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC. by Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951. 636 p.

A study of the Marine Corps' development of the doctrine of amphibious fighting in the period between the two World Wars, and of the application of the doctrine in the Pacific. The events of the amphibious attacks are described in detail, but the emphasis is always focussed on the theory of practice. The evolution of an amphibious doctrine is traced during the period 1901-1934, followed by a description and analysis of training methods during 1934-1942, and finally, the actual operations are traced, beginning with Guadalcanal and ending with Okinawa. Close examination of earlier amphibious landings indicates that the chief shortcomings were not in doctrine, but rather in the means for putting the existing doctrine into effect. Significant changes made in the original concept stemmed solely from technological innovations--the introduction of new amphibious equipment such as the amphibian tractor. Better techniques included the improvement in coordination of supporting arms, the evolution of close air support, and the perfection of naval gun-fire support. After World War II, the Marine Corps began again to experiment with novel devices and ideas to improve old techniques.

WAR - LIMITED OR UNLIMITED? by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in *Air Power*, v. 2, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 100-102.

Historical examples show that wars fought in the past for a limited objective have often been successful, whereas wars having an unlimited objective have seldom if ever succeeded in the sense of creating a world situation more favorable than if there had not been a war, and they have always caused wide-spread destruction and loss of life. Therefore, if we should become involved in a war against Russia, and our objective were the complete destruction of Russian power - possibly unconditional surrender - we should fail even if we gained the eventual victory, because such a victory would be worthless if in the course of the struggle we brought about the destruction of almost everything upon which our Western standards of living are based.

22

WHO SAID IMPOSSIBLE? by Col. George C. Reinhardt, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 1 (Jan 1955) 10-16.

Amphibious operations and future atomic warfare are not incompatible as some military writers have suggested; it may be that by combining the two types of warfare the US will discover the key to victory. Basic considerations of an amphibious operation which could employ atomic weapons of all types and, at the same time, be threatened from those tactics and logistics for such an operation would differ from those which have taken place, the mobility and flexibility of amphibious movement and landing will not be radically changed.

3. Strategy

a. General Aspects

THE ABC OF WAR, by Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley, in *Combat Forces Journal*, v. 3, no. 11 (June 1953) 36-41.

Modern definition of the "principles of war," namely: the principle of the objective, the principle of simplicity, unity of command, the principle of the offensive, the principle of maneuver, the principle of mass which is closely related to the principle of economy of force, surprise, and the principle of security. With historical examples to emphasize the importance of these principles.

THE ART OF WAR, by Arthur Birnie. London, T. Nelson, 1942. 268 p.

"... Amid all the changes in the material means employed by the soldier, despite continual improvements in weapons, organization, numbers, and transport, certain permanent principles of the military art stand out as applicable in every circumstance..." Specific cases showing the application of these principles throughout the history.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS, by Victor C. Muller. Rondebosch, University of Cape Town, 1951. 47 p.

International, English-language bibliography of books on strategy and tactics, held by the Central Library (Union Defence Force), S. A. Military College Library, State Library, Pretoria, and the Johannesburg Public Library. Arranged chronologically in three parts: Part I covers the period prior to World War I; Part II, the period between the two World Wars; and Part III, World War II and after.

23

o CERTAIN ASPECTS OF BATTLE THEORY, by G. Gamow. Chevy Chase, Md., Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 1953. (ORO-T-230.)

Classical Lanchester equations, which were written originally to cover the conflict between two stationary forces, are extended to cover the case of moving units and changing conditions of battle. This opens the possibility of evaluating the effectiveness of equipment and various tactics by "fighting" model battles on automatic analog computers with conditions and combinations varied through the feasible range. Hundreds of such model battles can be fought within a few hours.

CLAUSEWITZ AND DEMOCRACY'S MODERN WARS, by Lt. Col. Edward M. Collins, in *Military Affairs*, v. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1955) 15-20.

Application of Clausewitz' concepts of war to modern wars of democratic nations, with particular emphasis on the thesis that all wars are fought for political reasons and that the military point of view must be subordinated to the political. The records of World Wars I and II and the Korean War indicate: that political aims have been sublimated to emotional and military objectives; that democracies tend to make war in the form described by Clausewitz as "struggles of life and death from pure hatred"; and that recent wars, even if militarily successful, produce unsatisfactory political results. The need for military and political leaders to recognize the problem and to discover and apply measures to solve it.

THE CONDUCT OF WAR: A BRIEF STUDY OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AND FORMS, by Colmar, baron von der Goltz. Kansas City, Mo., Hudson-Kimberly, 1896. 217 p. (Translated from German by Joseph T. Dickman.)

DECISIVE BATTLE: CONTINUOUS FRONTS AND INTERVALS. Bataille décisive: fronts continus et intervalles, by Col. Ailleret, in *Revue Militaire d'Information*, no. 236 (10-25 July 1954) 25-28. In French.

Study of the pros and cons of defense by continuous and discontinuous fronts, especially in atomic warfare, concluding that discontinuous fronts are no better suited to this type of warfare than continuous fronts. The main problem is for strategists to decide whether or not atomic weapons permit the creation of continuous fronts, probably in very different forms from those of World War I. The solution of this problem will then provide the answer as to whether the defense of a nation should be adapted to a continuous defense system or to an initial decisive battle.

24

DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 36-41.

For the continued provision of the "great deterrent" a relatively small number of super-performance aircraft should suffice to ensure the possibility of delivering enough H-bombs to destroy the vital centers of any country. Thus a great strategic bombing force of the ordinary kind becomes obsolete and superfluous. Strategic "fire-brigade" forces of high mobility and highly trained skill are needed. They should be airborne, so that they can be quickly switched anywhere an outbreak occurs. They should be given ample tactical air support of a suitable kind and means of air supply wherever it can be advantageous. They should be organized in small composite combat teams of a handy and very flexible kind, so that they can grapple with guerrillas or strike against larger invading bodies. Light armored fighting vehicles of high cross-country maneuverability would be a valuable form of equipment - but not cumbersome 50-ton tanks. The helicopter should be developed to the fullest possible extent for such forces. With such a pattern the prospects of quenching the new communist strategy of "small aggressions" could be greatly increased.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR, by Gen. John E. Hull, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 9, no. 3 (Mar 1954) 3-7.

Basic considerations in planning and executing military strategy and operations: (1) formulating and adhering to a sound strategic concept; (2) understanding the objective; (3) anticipating the demands of the future; (4) authority underlying command; (5) perfecting the organization for war; (6) keeping continually informed; (7) considering the human element; and (8) comprehending the means. Comments on each of these fundamentals.

LAND POWER AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER, by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Army Combat Forces Journal*, v. 6, no. 6 (Jan 1956) 16-21.

The limitations of atomic weapons; the roles of land power in limited war, in larger conflicts, and in atomic war; and the necessity for our military planners to organize and maintain armed forces capable of fighting any kind of war anywhere. No matter what his instruments and weapons, it is man, "with his feet in the mud, sweating, and bleeding," who fights land wars with the objective of dispossessing other men from a particular area of earth, to control and dominate the battlefield - the land itself.

MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY; MILITARY THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI TO HITLER, by Edward M. Earle. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943. 553 p.

... It is the purpose of this book... to explain the manner in which the strategy of modern war has developed, in the conviction that a knowledge of the best military thought will enable Anglo-Saxon readers to comprehend the causes of war and the fundamental principles which govern the conduct of war.

25

MILITARY DECISION AND GAME THEORY, by O. G. Maywood, Jr., in Operations Research Society of America, Journal, v. 2, no. 4 (Nov 1954) 365-385.

The US military doctrine of decision (Estimate of the Situation) prescribes that a commander select the course of action which offers the greatest promise of success in view of the enemy's capabilities of opposing him. This article analyzes two battle decisions of World War II (one in the Pacific, the other in the European Theater), and develops an analogy between existing military doctrine and the 'theory of games' proposed by von Neumann. Current US doctrine is conservative. The techniques of game theory permit analysis of the risk involved if the commander deviates from current doctrine to base his decision on his estimate of what his enemy intends to do rather than on what his enemy is capable of doing. The idea of 'mixed strategies' presents more difficulties but may be useful, particularly for command decisions for small military organizations.

NAPOLÉON AND MODERN WAR; HIS MILITARY MAXIMS, revised and annotated by Conrad H. Lanza. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service, 1943. 158 p.

Comments on the 115 maxims used frequently by Napoleon.

THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE, by Cyril Falls. New York, Oxford University Press, 1941. 101 p.
Contents: The Doctrine of Total War, The Mechanized Attack, Tactics of Defense, Notes on Mountain War, and Immutable Realities. While author's aim is to throw light upon modern land warfare, the role of aircraft in cooperation with ground forces is also discussed, and there is a consideration of the influence of sea power upon armies in the field.

ON FUTURE WARFARE, by Col. J. F. C. Fuller. London, Sifton Praed, 1928. 390 p.

Applies lessons of World War I to future warfare.

ON MARITIME STRATEGY, by Capt. J. C. Wylie, Jr., in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 5 (May 1953) 467-477.

A maritime strategy is one in which the world's maritime communications systems are exploited as the main avenues by which strength may be applied to establish control over one's enemies; naval strategy is a less inclusive term. A theory of maritime strategy; historical example of its use by the British against Napoleon; some of the technological factors which complicate the use of this concept at

present; and our contemporary use of military power with respect to maritime strategy. In the struggle between East and West, we are placing our faith in a concept of strategy that is basically maritime.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR A CHART OF THE FUTURE, by Maj. Lamar McFadden Prosser, in Armor, v. 63, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 1954) 16-19.

In order to remain ahead in the art and science of war, we must take into account the probable effect of atomic weapons and integrate our basic ideas with our proved methods, add certain assumptions, and then develop new equipment, techniques, and tactics accordingly. The precepts on which any exploring into the future must be based are: (1) successful operations by large scale ground forces are not now possible unless something approaching parity in the air is assured; (2) technical developments and weapons of unusual destructiveness have increasingly forced ground troops to deploy, separate, and disperse; this dispersion can no longer be considered a passive defensive measure but is now a fundamental condition; (3) the capability of rapid movement must be built into every arm of the ground forces to make it possible to fight and move in a dispersed manner or to concentrate; (4) each unit of the ground force must be so designed as to permit the maximum flexibility in its employment; (5) commanders must be prepared to operate without definite detailed orders but in conformance with a general overall plan; and (6) dispersion, mobility, and flexibility must also apply to administrative and logistical organizations.

PRINCIPLES OF SEA POWER, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 967-985.

The former Chief of Naval Operations examines the pattern of sea power and the place of sea power in national policy and strategy and concludes that: "... until the seas dry up, man will be confronted with problems of achieving his own crossing and denying the crossing of his enemy, for nowhere in the future can be discerned any total substitute for the great highways of the seas."

PERIPHERAL STRATEGY - MAHAN'S DOCTRINE TODAY, by Capt. John D. Hayes, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 11 (Nov 1953) 1185-1193.

The strategy of Alfred Thayer Mahan is still sound and applicable today although new weapons and concepts must also be considered in strategic thinking. "Peripheral" should be substituted in the doctrine for "maritime" or "sea power" because it is more inclusive and more descriptive of the present world situation. The emphasis that has been placed on weapons in the post-World War II period tends to obscure the importance of sound principles underlying the use of weapons. How Mahan's doctrine can be applied to present US strategy.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by Marshal Ferdinand Foch. New York, Holt, 1920. 351 p. (Translated from French by Hilaire Belloc.)
"... Defines the principles of war; explains from what necessities they arise, to what results they lead; how, being unchangeable, they can be applied in practice, with the arms of today, to modern war, the new features of which have so profound an effect."

RE-EXAMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, by Maj. James A. Huston, in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 30-36.
Although the principles of war are still sound, it is doubtful whether they should be presented as unexceptionable principles, unalterable maxims, and established axioms. Exceptions, modifications, or improvements may be found for every one of them. No idea should be too fantastic or too unorthodox to be rejected without a fair hearing. Any military instruction which curbs the development of bold imagination should be modified. That includes presentations of the principles of war.

THE REMAKING OF MODERN ARMIES, by Liddell Hart. London, J. Murray, 1927. 315 p.
"The keynote of this book is MOBILITY - of movement, action, organization, and, not least, of thought. For mobility of thought implies originality in conception and surprise in execution, two essential qualities which have been the hallmark of the Great Captains, distinguishing the artists from the artisans of warfare..."

USA COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE KEEPS PACE WITH THE FUTURE, by Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, in *Military Review*, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 3-13.
The Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College describes how Leavenworth is orienting on the future while retaining the sound experience of the past to mold the minds of the Army's leaders in the direction of progress. With chart of the new organization of the College, and description of the 1957-58 curriculum.

WAR IN THREE DIMENSIONS, by E. J. Kingston-McCloughry. London, Jonathan Cape, 1949. 159 p.
The impact of air power upon the classical principles of war.

ARE THE LESSONS OF HISTORY NO LONGER VALID? by Arthur A. Ageon, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 78, no. 6 (June 1952) 624-633.

Examples of naval actions in World War II which illustrate the effectiveness of the principles of war of: correct objective, security, offensive action, concentration, mobility, surprise, economy of force, cooperation, and simplicity. These principles are still a guide for future military action, and the US should learn from history that control of the seas is necessary for our national security.

THE ART OF WAR, by Sun Tzu. Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1944. 99 p.

THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES, A.D. 378-1515, by Charles William Chadwick Oman, rev. and ed. by John Beeler. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1953. 176 p.

A revision of C. W. C. Oman's prize-winning essay published in 1885.

THE BATTLES THAT CHANGED HISTORY, by Fletcher Pratt. Garden City, N. Y., Hanover House, 1956. 348 p.
Review of sixteen actions showing their decisiveness on "sometimes-far-distant" results and policies rather than the importance of the immediate field.

THE DECISIVE WARS OF HISTORY, A STUDY IN STRATEGY, by B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Bell, 1929. 242 p.
A broad survey of war, with the historical effects in a comprehensive series of cases, and with the logistical or psychological moves which led up to them.

EISENHOWER'S OWN STORY OF THE WAR, by Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1946. 122 p.
The complete report by the Supreme European Commander

of the war in Europe, in which the following are presented: summary of operations in Northwest Europe; planning and preparation; the assault; establishment of the lodgement area; the break-through; the Battle of the Falaise - Argentan Pocket; the advance to the Seine; the build-up and the Allied navies; the advance from the Seine to the German border; consolidation on the frontier; the Ardennes counteroffensive; plans for the 1945 campaign; operations to reach the Rhine; crossing the Rhine; the envelopment of the Ruhr and the junction with the Russians; the final phase; and surrender. Maps are included of the important operations.

LESSONS FROM PANIPAT, by Gautam Sharma, in Fauji Akhbar, v. 28, no. 44 (11 Nov. 1950) 5-6 plus.

A study of three battles, the first of which occurred in 1526 and the last in 1761. It is shown that the principles of war have not changed basically in time and that forms of attack and defense have remained practically the same. Morale, then as now, is one of the most important factors in war and what cannot be achieved by mere numbers is secured by better training and discipline.

OPERATION OVERLORD; DESIGN AND REALITY, by Albert Norman, Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1952, 230 p.

History of the planning and preparation for the invasion of Western Europe, and of the staging of the operation from England in the Summer of 1944. The strategic problem and the controversies on it; command organization for the invasion; assault on the Normandy coast; fighting for the expansion of the beachhead; breakout and encirclement of the German forces in that area; and pursuit of the Germans to the Seine River.

ROOTS OF STRATEGY, ed. by Maj. Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 448 p.

A collection of military classics containing: THE ART OF WAR, by Sun Tzu, 500 B. C.; THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE ROMANS, by Vegetius, 390 A. D.; MY REVERIES ON THE ART OF WAR, by Marshal Maurice de Saxe, 1732; THE INSTRUCTION OF FREDERICK THE GREAT FOR HIS GENERALS, 1747; and THE MILITARY MAXIMS OF NAPOLEON.

SEA, LAND, AND AIR STRATEGY, by Sir George Aston, London, J. Murray, 1914, 308 p.
Lectures delivered at the Staff College at Camberley in the years 1904-07.

STRATEGY; THE INDIRECT APPROACH, by B. H. Liddell Hart, New York, Praeger, 1954, 420 p.

Strategy of the decisive wars from 490 B. C. to 1945; the great strategists from the Greeks to Hitler; and emphasis throughout this historical account that the essence of strategy is the "indirect approach." The true aim of a strategist is to seek an advantageous strategic situation, and this is best achieved by dislocating the enemy's balance and taking the "line of least expectation"; in contrast, to move directly on an opponent consolidates his physical and psychological balance and increases his power to resist. The strengths and weaknesses of some of the great generals in the light of this thesis. The strategy of Hitler; he gave a new depth to the "indirect approach" and was successful until his strategy and tactics degenerated into direct and expected moves. Criticism of Clausewitz; and comments on present Russian and US strategies.

WRONG TARGET. A STUDY OF THE USE OF STRATEGIC AIR POWER IN WORLD WAR II, by S. R. Shaw, in Ordnance, v. 35, no. 185, sec. 1 (Mar-Apr 1951) 471-478.

The Allied strategic air forces were not properly employed in the Second World War. The way in which they were employed violated five of the generally accepted principles of war: objective, mobility, mass, coordination, and economy of force. Proof of this is contained in the reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey. A fair and objective study of the facts and figures related in the reports of the survey show that the conclusions are supported by overwhelming evidence. The huge expenditure of planes, men, and gasoline in order to drop one and a half million tons of bombs on German industry was misdirected. Far from destroying the enemy's morale and reducing his war potential, it spurred him on to ever-higher levels of production. During the first half of 1944, attacks on aircraft plants were raised to twelve times the scale of the 1943 attacks and were directed primarily at assembly plants. Notwithstanding the heavy weight of these attacks, German aircraft production doubled from December 1943 to July 1944. It was the attack on transportation, however, that was the decisive blow which completely disorganized the German economy. The consequences of the breakdown in the transportation system were probably greater than any other single factor in the final collapse of the economy. Had a strategic pattern of attack been developed and applied immediately, more rapid economic results would undoubtedly have been secured. Using the available guided bombs, a monthly tonnage of only 1,300 tons would have resulted in complete interdiction of Japan's railroads. Thus, with or without atomic bombs, strategic air force wields great power, although its incorrect use causes waste or harmful results in the same measure as its power.

b. Germany - Historical Experience

BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMAN MILITARY LITERATURE, by Maj.

Gen. Heinrich Aschenbrandt. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953. 42 p. (MS #P-150.)

A former general describes briefly the major German works on military science written prior to World War I and in the period between the two World Wars. The development of German military literature, and its influence on the German Army. The basic ideas of such authors as Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and the elder Moltke. A brief bibliography lists only the German military writings that are considered to be classics in the field.

THE FATAL DECISIONS, ed. by Seymour Freidin and William Richardson. New York, William Sloane Associates, 1956. 302 p.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN, by the General of the Air Force, Werner Kreipe; THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW, by General Gunther Blumentritt; EL ALAMEIN, by General Fritz Bayerlein; STALINGRAD, by Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler; FRANCE, 1944, by Lt. General Bobo Zimmerman; THE ARDENNES, by General Hasso Von Manteuffel. An informed critique of failure in the boldest aggression of our times. Maps.

GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II, by Comdr. D. L. Kauffman, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 1 (Jan 1954) 1-12.

Historical background of German naval strategy, and some of the important plans and policies between 1937 and 1941 which influenced the outcome of World War II. Hitler's lack of appreciation of the importance of naval warfare; Admiral Raeder's background and excellent strategic concepts; and the failure of his plans from lack of ships and lack of cooperation from the German air arm. The German naval war plan as it was finally put into operation, and how it violated the principles of warfare. The proposed amphibious assault against England and its cancellation because Goering failed to win air supremacy over England. If German naval strategy had been more offensive, and if British imports had been selected as the objective, Great Britain might have been defeated.

THE GREAT ILLUSIONS OF 1939, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 10 (Jan 1957) 3-11.

The 1939 downfall of both France and Poland was not the result of a power imbalance, but can be directly attributed to reliance on outdated concepts in the face of Germany's effective armor employment. A review of the political and military factors which precipitated the 1939 defeats is presented.

GUIDE TO FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES, 1945-54. Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1954. 253 p.

A catalog and index to the manuscripts produced under the Foreign Military Studies Program of the Historical Division, USAREUR, and of predecessor commands since 1945. Most of the manuscripts were prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed Forces. Originally the mission of the Foreign Military Studies Program was only to obtain information on enemy operations in the European Theater for use in the preparation of an official history of the US Army in World War II. In 1946 the program was broadened to include the Mediterranean and Russian theaters. In 1947 emphasis was placed on preparation of operational studies for use by US Army planning and training agencies and service schools. Many of the more recent studies have analyzed the German military experiences for their useful lessons. The guide contains three indexes - by topic, by military unit, and by author. Most entries include a short statement describing the contents and usefulness of the study. Appended: glossary of abbreviations and foreign terms. Charts; illustrate scope, status, and size of the various manuscript series; give dates and physical locations of writing, translating, and administrative activity 1945-1954; list studies that have been or will be published as Department of the Army pamphlets; and list manuscripts published in the EUCOM-USAREUR Foreign Military Studies series.

HITLER AND THE GERMAN GENERALS, by Col. C. P. Stacey, in Canadian Army Journal, v. 7, no. 1 (Apr 1953) 45-50.

Commentary on military memoirs published since World War II by former German generals. These memoirs generally highlight the feud between Hitler and his generals and advance two theses: (1) the German General Staff, far from being responsible for the outbreak of World War II, was opposed to it; and (2) the military defeat of Germany was largely due to Hitler's amateur strategy and his disregard of professional advice. Special attention is called to General Heinz Guderian's PANZER LEADER as one of the best sources on the war in Russia.

HITLER'S DEFEAT IN RUSSIA, by Gen. Wladyslaw Anders. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953. 267 p.

An analytical study of the causes of Nazi catastrophe in Russia during World War II. The military and political reasons behind the defeat of German Armies, which, after easy victories elsewhere in Europe, came to a dead halt in Russia six months after they launched an all-out offensive on the Soviet Union. German and Soviet strategies in the various campaigns; strength and types of forces employed by both sides; German policies in the occupied regions of USSR; treatment of Soviet PW's; strength and operations of anti-Soviet Russian Army units which fought at the side of Germans; Soviet partisan warfare; extent of aid given by the West to the Soviets in military equipment; and the effects produced by West's bombing of the Reich on German military operations in Russia. Although there were other factors which contributed to German defeats and Russian vic-

tories; the main one can be found in the strategies of the High Command of both countries. It was not so much Stalin's skill as a strategist but Hitler's stupidity as the Supreme Commander of German Forces that ended in their overwhelming defeat. Includes a summary of the present strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union, in which the author points out that Russia's weaknesses are greater than her strengths and that they will bear fruit if capably exploited by Russia's opponents. Maps.

THROUGH RUSSIAN EYES, in *Navy*, v. 60, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 281-283 plus.

The article is based on a Soviet study of Germany's sea strategy of World War II. The study, *SOME ACCOUNTS OF CRUISER OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN FLEET FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR*, by Capt. L. M. Eremsev, reviews the staff doctrine of the Nazi Navy and the prewar planning of the German Fleet and examines the actions of the war in which the German cruisers were involved. An analogy is drawn between the German prewar and World War II naval programs and the program pursued by the Soviet Navy.

c. Great Britain

AIR POWER AND SEA POWER, by Air Marshal Robert Saundby, in *Air Pictorial*, v. 16, no. 2 (Feb 1954) 34-36.

Defines the present roles of sea and air power in the defense of Britain; and examines the contributions which sea and air power should make in safeguarding seaborne supplies and trade, and in denying the sea to an enemy. This ability to use the sea depends primarily on the capacity to gain and hold the mastery of the air, not only over the sea but over the whole theater of war - a task which belongs primarily to the bomber force. While air power is the first line of British defense, the Navy is still responsible for convoy escort and antisubmarine warfare. The Navy should control and operate all escort and antisubmarine vessels, all ship-borne aircraft, and the ships in which they are transported.

AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE ROYAL NAVY, by F/Lt. R. Brickwood, in *Air Power*, v. 1, no. 3 (Spring 1954) 289-292.

The destruction of the US Pacific Fleet of Pearl Harbor demonstrated that concentrated fleets are vulnerable to air attack and that only aircraft can give adequate protection from it. Atom bomb trials indicate that the conception of large fleets must end and naval strategy and tactics must be planned on the action of small units. Small and fast ships should be built for the British Navy.

AIR POWER AND THE FUTURE OF WAR, by Marshal Sir John Slessor, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 99, no. 595 (Aug 1954) 343-358.

The influence of the air weapon on the possibilities of a future war between the USSR and the West. It seems unlikely that any nation would begin a war that would lead to the destruction of both sides; but we must expect the Soviets to continue to cause local conflicts. If a total war does come, atomic air power will be employed immediately. Preparations which Great Britain should make for this eventuality.

THE CENTRAL BLUE, by Marshal John Slessor. London, Casell, 1956. 709 p.

Forty-year history of airpower as the author (Marshal of the RAF) has seen and helped direct it.

COMMONWEALTH AIR STRATEGY, by John W. R. Taylor, in *Flight*, v. 68, no. 2431 (26 Aug 1955) 313-316.

A review of commitments, forces, and deployment. The strategy depends principally upon the use of air power and hinges on the Western philosophy that the deterrent power of USAF SAC and RAF Bomber Command might avert a major war. That deterrent is also the only hope of winning the war, if it should start.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIR POLICY AND STRATEGY, by Capt. Norman Macmillan, in *Aeronautics*, v. 31, no. 2 (Sept 1954) 57-65.

The development of US and British air arms since World War I and a comparison of their present policies and strategies. British strategic policy does not exhibit a full recognition of air power, but is still overshadowed by the concept of a powerful navy based on battleships. Aerial operations against ships during World War II demonstrated that air power is superior to sea power; and no nation can expect to be strong in all arms. British air policy should be altered so that RAF can make full use of the mobility of the airplane.

GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by J. P. L. Thomas, in *Crowsnest*, v. 7, no. 6 (Apr 1955) 7-8.

The First Lord of the Admiralty states: "whatever the scope of a future war and whatever the nature of the weapons used, the task of the Navy will still be to control the seas, to assure the safe passage of supplies and to support the other armed forces." Air power at sea is not something which replaces the Navy, but is the instrument by which the

Navy today so largely exercises its sea power. The aircraft today is both the striking power of the Fleet (largely replacing the 15-inch gun of the battleship) and the eyes of the Fleet (largely replacing the cruiser in this respect). Dismissing nuclear war as improbable (mutually suicidal) he sees a continuation of uneasy peace punctured with military actions such as took place in Korea and Indochina. The fleet Britain needs today is one required to meet her world-wide commitments in support of the Commonwealth interests and trade in such local wars as may occur during the uneasy peace, and such ships and aircraft as are necessary to ensure that Britain can play her part in NATO as a deterrent to nuclear war and in retaliation if the deterrent fails.

THE HIGH LEVEL CONDUCT AND DIRECTION OF WORLD WAR II, by Lt. Gen. Ian Jacob, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 101, no. 603 (Aug 1956) 364-375.

The manner in which the war was conducted, the present and the future in light of our experience then, some of the principles that must underlie any successful organization for conducting war, how the British applied those principles in the past, nationally and internationally with the allies, and how they can be applied in the future.

THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY, by Adm. Herbert William Richmond. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953. 404 p. History of the principal strategy of naval warfare as planned by English ministers and kings from the times of the Tudors to the Spanish Wars, 1718, and 1725. Bibliography.

A NEW ORDER OF PRIORITIES, in *Economist* (26 Feb 1955) 723-724 plus.

These comments on the Defence White Paper relate to the strategy: to prepare for a fantastically destructive war of very short duration as the best means of ensuring that it will not happen; and to be prepared to fight peripheral limited wars over the next five or ten years until a new atomic situation emerges (e.g. the advent of a ballistic rocket). To meet this strategy Britain must establish a strict adherence to the order to obtain maximum security out of the resources available in Britain. It will be a costly matter, but Britain is a world power and she cannot avoid her responsibilities. Building a deterrent to a nuclear war is far better than fighting a conventional one.

POLICY AND WEAPONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by Michael Stewart. London, Fabian Society, 1955. 25 p. (Fabian Tract No. 296.)

The author is a member of Parliament and was Under-Secretary for War 1947-1951. Following a discussion of the effect of the H-bomb on warfare and the conduct of foreign policy, he outlines a plan for the defense of Britain and the role to be played by his country's Army, Navy, and Air Force.

POLICY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND PRINCIPLES, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 100, no. 600 (Nov 1955) 550-555.

Study of war, especially in Gt. Britain, since 19th century, and how the study of war influenced military policy, strategy, and principles.

PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT, by Ian Jacob, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 29, no. 2 (Jan 1951) 219-228.

Up to 1914, Britain's strength resided in her navy, in her economic resources, and in the ability to take as much or as little of a continental war as she chose. World War I saw the end of limited land engagements and the steady maintenance of sea power. After World War I, Britain's horizon in defense matters was forcibly widened beyond Continental Europe by the rise of Japan. World War II saw the proximity of the main defense center to the European mainland and its vulnerability to severe bombardment, and the difficulty of concentrating potential strength at a distance from the main center. Since World War II, British strategic thinking has again undergone a change due to the rise of the USSR, to constitutional changes within the Commonwealth, and to the advance of Asia to a position of primary importance. The United Kingdom, now carrying the main defense burden of the Empire, must now act in union with the other nations in the Atlantic Treaty, and its military policy must aim at security for the United Kingdom, maintenance of free communication throughout the world, the security of the Middle East and Africa, the destruction of Communism; and the contribution of force to secure respect for the decisions of the United Nations.

d. NATO

EAST VERSUS WEST, by Giffard Martel. London, Museum Press, 1952. 220 p.

The political and military aspects of the Cold War are discussed by a British General who is a specialist in armored warfare. The military lessons that should have been learned from World War II: Great Britain should concentrate on the development of its Air Force, naval

strength, and armored divisions. The Russian Armed Forces during World War II are judged from his experience as head of a military mission to the USSR during the war and from conferences with the Russian General Staff. Plans of the Western Powers to defend Europe against communist aggression, and the military forces necessary to implement them; and communism in China and Korea, and the part of Asia in world affairs of the future.

THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, by Drew Middleton. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. 313 p.

The progress made by the US and other NATO powers toward the defense of Europe, and the forces against which they would fight in a future emergency. Endurance and courage of the individual Russian soldier, and organization of the Russian Army. The armed forces now at the disposal of NATO; state of training and alertness of the US Seventh Army in Germany; attitudes and fighting capabilities of Great Britain and France; defense problems of the remainder of Europe; and possible courses of action if war breaks out.

DEFENSE OF THE WEST; SOME RIDDLES OF WAR AND PEACE, by Liddell Hart. London, Cassell, 1950. 390 p.

"... This book deals with the immediate problems of an effective 'Defense of the West' and some basic problems of the human search for security against aggression..."

DOES THE WEST POSSESS A DOCTRINE OF WAR? by Maj. Gen. Emile Wauty, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 93-102.

The present Western defense system is of nebulous character. There could result from it: a disassociation of the alliances, with each of the contracting parties assuming his liberty to act alone and to hasten to his destruction, a regroupment of the peoples of the Western World into at least two associations; or a decisive tightening of the existing bonds transposing to a worldwide scale what it has been possible to realize on the Atlantic level. The defense of Western civilization depends on all free nations agreeing instead of following individually their own particular and divergent interests. To provide rapid and effective intervention at whatever point of the globe this may be necessary would require: (1) an entirely clear, mutual understanding, not only of the interests of each country but also of the various national mentalities; (2) a *modus vivendi* in the form of a general program; (3) an exact and complete definition of the purposes of a strictly defensive and conservative alliance aiming at peace through general prosperity; (4) common pooling of economic and financial means for ameliorating the living conditions of the least favored elements of the free world; (5) determination and respect of the zones of interest of the principal signatories or

the exercise of an influence in common in certain sectors; (6) the defining of a stable strategy of policy accepted by all; (7) preparation and pursuit of a single military strategy on a world scale; (8) close coordination of ground, naval, and air forces permanently stationed in each of the large, essential strategic zones; and (9) the reconstitution of coordinated general reserves through an effort at economy in the utilization of means. (Translated and digested from REVUE GÉNÉRALE BELGE - Belgium - 15 Aug 1954.)

IF ATOMIC WAR BROKE OUT TOMORROW? in *Interavia*, v. 9, no. 8 (1954) 500-531.

A series of articles on various aspects of an atomic war between the USSR and the NATO countries. The vulnerability of cities and military units to the hydrogen bomb; the "atomic sensitivity" of the US and Western Europe; the organization, location, and equipment of the air forces available to NATO; the mission and capabilities of the USAF Strategic Air Command; the comparative performance of US and Soviet strategic bombers; strength and organization of the USSR Air Force and what is known of its strategic bombers; the facilities and operation of US-Canadian air defense; the possibility of atomic attack from submarines; the training provided for NATO pilots and air crews by Canada's RCAF Training Command; and the contributions to aeronautical research made by NATO's Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development.

A LOOK THROUGH A WINDOW AT WORLD WAR III, by Field Marshal Montgomery, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 99, no. 596 (Nov 1954) 507-523.

The strategy and organization which the NATO nations must prepare to win a future war against the East. The dominant factor in the next war will be air power, and command of the air weapon must be centralized on the highest level. The day of the large warship on the surface of the sea is over because of the range and weapons of modern aircraft. The Western Powers require: (1) bigger air forces; (2) smaller and more immediately-ready armies with great strategical and tactical mobility; (3) smaller navies; and (4) organization of the fighting services based on more atomic power and less manpower.

THE NAVY'S ROLE IN A LIMITED WAR: KOREA CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE VALUE OF SEA POWER TODAY, in *Crowsnest*, v. 8, no. 6 (Apr 1956) 25-26.

The question has been raised as to whether sea power would be equally effective in an atomic global war. First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Cilcennin has stated that whether we invest more heavily in a naval power for war purposes hinges in whether we envisage that a future

full-scale war would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear exchanges. After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things stand today, if the navies lose control of the seas the Western Alliance would have to go out of business."

N. A. T. O. AND ATOMIC STRATEGY, in *Interavia*, v. 9, no. 7 (1954) 415-446.

The entire issue is devoted to various aspects of air power in atomic warfare, and the preparations of the NATO nations for adequate defense in case of attack. Quotations from NATO's commanders and air force chiefs of several countries on the changes in air arms as a result of the adoption of nuclear weapons; the organization of NATO and SHAPE and the personnel who occupy the major commands in them; photographs and brief descriptions of military aircraft of the member countries; and the effects of nuclear weapons. Present and possible future methods of adapting airplanes and aircraft carriers to atomic warfare, such as permitting dispersal by eliminating airfields through the use of vertical take-off fighters and by designing double-decker carriers. Considerations in designing and producing "short-life aircraft" which could be constructed simply and quickly if nuclear weapons had destroyed the important aircraft factories of a country on the defensive.

OCEAN STRATEGY WITH AUSTRALIA AS A BASE, by Norman Macmillan, in *Aircraft*, v. 30, no. 8 (May 1952) 16-19 plus.

If there is a war with Russia it will be a global war and the free nations will have to pursue an ocean strategy to protect their shipping and life-lines of supply from Soviet submarines and aircraft. Actions in Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya reveal the communist strategy to gain control of the South Pacific and Indian Oceans and disrupt both the supply lines and sources of supply available to the Western Powers in the countries of South Pacific. The NATO powers would have to defend the Atlantic, while the US would have to defend the Pacific; and Australia, if provided with the means, could become a base in the battle against Soviet submarines operating in the Indian Ocean in an attempt to destroy the supply lines to Africa and Europe. Suggests that the US provide Australia with B-29's which are now kept in mothball storage, and that practical tests be made to determine whether or not the bomber would meet the requirements for patrol missions over the vast spaces of the Indian Ocean.

THE PERIPHERAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB. La stratégie périphérique devant la bombe atomique, by Gen. P. E. Jacquot. Paris, Gallimard, 1955? 230 p. In French.

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A French general questions the wisdom of peripheral defense by the Western Powers, presenting arguments to show that it would favor the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western defense should be organized: (1) the land powers should defend their own territories with resolution, using new forms of fortifications the weapons of which are remote-controlled; and (2) the maritime powers should provide a ready force organized as air brigades with mobile bases to conduct airborne operations behind the enemy lines.

REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR. Reflexions stratégiques sur la guerre d'Indochine, by Gen. L. M. Chassin, in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, v. 10 (Dec 1954) 507-522. In French.

The Indochinese War suggests general reflections on the grand strategy of the Western Powers. The principal of these reflections is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and Communist China). On the other hand, the atomic bomb increases the risk of local conflicts in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions: To survive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use. Above all, France must possess a modern offensive air force.

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New York, W. Morrow, 1954. 180 p.

Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against renewed German military domination; and how these aims might be achieved without giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears.

WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 3 (June 1956) 5-10.

The H-bomb is a weak deterrent to small aggression. Its primary drawback is that if it does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization.

WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? by Col. John E. Kelly, in *Army*, v. 7, no. 1 (Aug 1956) 31-34.

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full-scale war would last beyond the stages of all-out thermo-nuclear exchanges. After the first stunning blows would fall, the navies alone might remain undamaged and able to carry on the battle. "As things stand today, if the navies lose control of the seas the Western Alliance would have to go out of business."

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40

A French general questions the wisdom of peripheral defense by the Western Powers, presenting arguments to show that it would favor the aggressor, and makes the following suggestions on how Western defense should be organized: (1) the land powers should defend their own territories with resolution, using new forms of fortifications the weapons of which are remote-controlled; and (2) the maritime powers should provide a ready force organized as air brigades with mobile bases to conduct airborne operations behind the enemy lines.

REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR. Reflexions stratégiques sur la guerre d'Indochine, by Gen. L. M. Chassin, in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, v. 10 (Dec 1954) 507-522. In French.

The Indochinese War suggests general reflections on the grand strategy of the Western Powers. The principal of these reflections is that the atomic bomb reduces the risk of war. Therefore the high level policy of the West should be to avoid war and to await the development of disagreement in the enemy camp (between Russia and Communist China). On the other hand, the atomic bomb increases the risk of local conflicts in regions where the Western Powers still hold key positions. To survive, the latter must win such conflicts quickly, utilizing their scientific and technical superiority. If France wants to maintain her position among the great powers and preserve the French Union, she must not only possess the new weapons but must also adapt her army to their use. Above all, France must possess a modern offensive air force.

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST, by John Slessor. New York, W. Morrow, 1954. 180 p.

Suggestions on how to assure the security of Western Europe against Russian aggression through reliance on atomic air power; how to establish unity with freedom in Germany and how to safeguard against renewed German military domination; and how these aims might be achieved without giving reasonable grounds for Russian fears.

WESTERN DEFENSE PLANNING, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 3 (June 1956) 3-10.

The H-bomb is a weak deterrent to small aggression. Its primary drawback is that if it does not succeed as a deterrent, and if it is put into action, it automatically entails suicide for Western civilization.

WHAT WOULD THE WORLD BE WITHOUT NATO? by Col. John E. Kelly, in *Army*, v. 7, no. 1 (Aug 1956) 31-34.

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The author is Chief of Staff of the US Element of the Standing Group of NATO. He provides an answer to those who question the NATO's validity in the Atomic Age and who wonder if there is need for NATO in view of the so-called thermonuclear stalemate.

e. United States

AIR DOCTRINE: THEATER AIR OPERATIONS: Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1954. 27 p. (AFM 1-3.)

Stresses the unity of air action and the implicit coordination of theater air forces with other air forces directly engaged in attack against the heartland of an enemy nation. Presents the doctrine pertinent to the employment of air forces as an entity in a theater of operations and their role in accomplishing the theater mission. Written from the perspective of the entire theater and with the objective in mind of coordinating and correlating the employment of theater air forces with the employment of all other theater forces.

THE BRIDGES AT SINANJU AND YONGMIDONG, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1954) 15-34.

The new concept of occupation and control of enemy territory by air forces is illustrated by the air envelopment and neutralization by UN air forces of a critically sensitive and heavily defended communication corridor across the Chongchon in North Korea. This air action proved a mighty new instrument of military force and persuasive pressure available to theater commanders. It could be decisively employed in a combined air-ground offensive strategy where isolation of the battlefield is followed by ground offensive, or it could be employed in its new concept - as sole decisive pressure in the attainment of theater objectives.

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS, by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. New York, Longmans, 1956. 237 p.

Lists, describes, and approves six major decisions made between June 1944 and March 1945.

A FORMULA FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING, by Brig. Gen. Lloyd P. Hopwood, in Air University Quarterly Review, v. 8, no. 3 (Summer 1956) 21-33.

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Soviet imprecation of the free world may diminish, but the drive of the Reds for nuclear parity increases their potential menace to the Western alliance. As the United States thus experiences a period of quieter but unremitting tension, a confusion of many views obscures the available guide lines for a practicable US posture. To develop a sound military strategy capable of supporting national objectives, the author (Commandant, Air Command and Staff College), urges a return to the fundamentals of fact, reality, and logic.

MOBILE CONCEPT, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 9 (Dec 1954) 3-10.

Our present ground formations are based largely upon infantry forces supported by tanks, artillery, and air. The tempo and range of our operations are, therefore, geared in general to the infantry soldier. Since the important factor is relative mobility, it is obvious that if massed, mechanized, and tank forces are met, they will possess the superior mobility. The solution lies, therefore, in the creation and training of large, highly mobile formations based upon the characteristics inherent in armored formations of corps and, perhaps, field army size. We should have available sufficient armored divisions and corps headquarters to provide the training and nuclei around which large offensive ground formations can be built in time for a strategic offensive designed to bring any possible war forced upon us to a very rapid and successful conclusion.

THE NAVAL GENIUS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, by Dudley W. Knox. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932. 138 p.

Illustrates the fundamentals of the use of sea power and gives Washington full credit for his broad planning of grand strategy.

NEEDED - A MILITARY STRATEGY OF MOBILITY, by Edgar A. Parsons, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 12 (Dec 1956) 1263-1269.

The purpose of this article is to stimulate the development of a modern and satisfactory military strategy. The author stresses the concept that modern technology can be directed to insure our defense without millions of US casualties and without necessarily becoming committed to a war of indiscriminate thermonuclear bombardment. He outlines a strategy of mobility that can be so exploited as to make war unacceptable to an enemy. The article includes a discussion of the role to be played by guided missiles in such a strategy.

READINESS FOR THE LITTLE WAR; OPTIMUM INTEGRATED STRATEGY, in Military Review, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 14-26.

Small aggressions do not warrant big bombs. Our integrated strategy must include highly mobile military forces which are capable of supporting our national policy in all types of conflict short of general war.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, by J. C. Wylie, Jr., in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 78, no. 4 (Apr 1952) 351-361.

Evaluation of World War II strategic decisions and actions. Based on events in the Pacific area, the study is concerned with the Japanese decisions on whether or not to start the war, how to start it, the selection of strategy by which the Japanese planned to fight the war, and the effect of their limited concept of war on their strategic decision. The strategic use of submarines by the Japanese and Americans, the two-pronged spear across the Pacific employed by the US Armed Forces (Central Pacific Forces and Southwest Pacific Forces), and the distinction between sequential (or directive) and cumulative strategies are subjects of examination. Although all these topics were developed from war events in the Pacific, it is stressed that they are not limited in their applications either in time or place.

SEA POWER IN ITS RELATION TO THE WAR OF 1812, by Alfred T. Mahan. Boston, Little, Brown, 1905. 2 v.

STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1954. 11 p. (AFM 1-8.)

This manual, written from the viewpoint of global strategy, embraces the broad principles underlying the proper application of strategic air power and relates air operations to all other military actions. Task force characteristics, requirements, composition, and deployment. Target selection, effects on various target systems, and the dynamic nature of targets. Employment of strategic air forces, including control, interdependence, flexibility, compression, and readiness. Supporting functions and relationships to other forces.

STRATEGIC AIRBORNE NOT STRATEGIC AIR, by Arthur G. Volz, Jr., in *Armor*, v. 59, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1950) 38-39.

Since cities and industries actually form the basis of military power, the modern air force interpreters of Clausewitz have transferred the destruction of the enemy army into destruction of enemy economy. The radical form of this idea has appeared in the "destruction of the enemy industry by atomic bombing, without land fighting" school. However the question does not concern our capacity for destruction. The real problem facing American strategists today is whether or not such a program of destruction is desirable. In place of industrial destruction we ought to develop a strategy of industrial seizure and paralysis. In addition to replacing the function of the strategic air force, the strategic airborne force would also be the modern form of the second front. In this the strategic airborne forces would accomplish a dual mission which the strategic air force cannot accomplish. It would accompany its economic strangulation (not destruction) with a truly strategic envelopment in the third dimension.

STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION, by Henry A. Kissinger, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 35, no. 3 (Apr 1957) 379-394.

History demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as has superiority in resources. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic requirement of American security. Analyzes our military structure to see whether or not the U.S. possess a strategic doctrine, concluding that there is a lack of doctrinal agreement among the services. Another inhibiting factor in the development of strategic doctrine is the predominance of fiscal considerations in our defense planning. Strategic doctrine can no longer confine itself to the problem of providing the weapons for war; it must also relate them to the purpose of war.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE BASIC DOCTRINE. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1955. 10 p. (AFM 1-2.)

Basic doctrine of the US Air Force for employing the nation's air forces during all forms of international conflict. The various instruments of national policy in an international conflict; and the forces which comprise the military instrument of national policy. Characteristics of air forces and principles for their employment. Employment of air forces in peace and war; and timely provision of adequate air power as the paramount consideration for the security and well-being of the US.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE 1941-1942, by Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953. 454 p.

History of plans affecting the missions and dispositions of the US Army during the early part of World War II. The volume deals briefly with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to the Fall of 1938, when the planners first explicitly took into account the possibility that the US might be drawn into a world-wide war between two coalitions. From the Fall of 1938 it follows the story of plans as they directly concerned the Army until the beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II, conveniently marked by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the role of the US Army in strategic planning changed. These developments will be the subject of further treatment in subsequent volumes. Appendixes show: (a) outline plan for the invasion of Western Europe; (b) War Department draft of instructions for London Conference; (c) monthly distribution of total Army strength in Continental United States and overseas from November 1941 through December 1942; (d) geographic distribution of Army strength in overseas theaters in December 1942; (e) shipment of divisions in 1942; (f) dead-weight tonnage of vessels under Army control in Pacific and Atlantic areas from November 1941 through December 1942; (g) US Army overseas deployment in October 1941; (h) areas of strategic responsibility and US Army overseas deployment in April 1942; and (i) US Army overseas deployment and theater boundaries in December 1942.

WHY THE H-BOMB WIPES OFF THE "NEW LOOK," by B. H. Liddell Hart, in *World*, v. 1, no. 15 (1 June 1954) 12-14.

Contents that the "new look" policy of massive retaliation was obsolete when it appeared. Flexible defense is the answer to the communists' new strategy of infiltration.

f. U.S.S.R.

COMMUNISM AND AIR POWER; A SURVEY OF POSSIBLE COMMUNIST AIR STRATEGIES, by Stefan T. Possony, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, v. 7, no. 3 (Winter 1954-55) 43-54 plus.

Three patterns of atomic war which may be considered by the Soviet Union: (1) an atomic blitz, inevitably provoking massive atomic retaliation and ending in mutual suicide for the nations involved; (2) the lulling of the West into disarmament, followed by an atomic blitz to finish off the West's weakened retaliatory capability and ending in victory for the Soviet Union; and (3) a series of local atomic wars, in which possession of the initiative would enable the Soviet Union to attrite the West's retaliatory capacity to a point where global atomic war could be launched without excessive risk to the Soviet Union.

JOHN BLOCH -- A NEGLECTED PROPHET, by Adolph G. Rosen-garten, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 27-39.

Attaching greater importance to the common man and to the rise of the modern industrial state, John Bloch (advisor to the Russian Czar), contradicted orthodox military doctrine in forecasting the course and consequences of World War I (in his work *THE FUTURE WAR IN ITS TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS*, published in 1898). This article resurrects the book and indicates the military and political significance of it during the era in which it was written, and the lessons which it provides for doctrines and policies of today.

A MILITARY FORECAST, by Air Marshal Douglas Colyer, in *Forces Magazine* (Mar 1955) 13-14.

Interpretation of the probable pattern of Soviet military action in the opening stage of a future war. The possibility that the cold war may develop into a hot war by a series of almost imperceptible stages; the role of the Soviet Navy's submarine, fast destroyer, and cruiser fleets and of the Army and Air Force; and the beginning of a Western global strategy for defense against communist aggression.

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SOVIET BID FOR THE SEA, by Rear Adm. E. M. Eller, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 81, no. 6 (June 1955) 619-627.

The Soviet Union is the world's second strongest seapower with the most modern navy afloat. It is constantly growing, and will someday challenge the US directly in a contest for the control of the seas. Applying the lessons of World War II the Soviet Union is avoiding the naval mistakes of Germany and Japan and is building the type of fleet and merchant marine to give it logistical support that will be able to carry out any of the operations of modern naval combat. Admiral Eller evaluates the role and the place of the Soviet Navy in USSR's strategy for world conquest; its growth since 1930 while the rest of the world paid no heed; and the challenge and threat it presents to US where public opinion fails to comprehend that the destiny and security of America are inseparable from the sea and a strong Navy capable of protecting it.

THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF TAKES STOCK; CHANGES IN MILITARY DOCTRINE, in *World Today*, v. 11, no. 11 (Nov 1955) 492-502.

The adjustment of Soviet military doctrine to the new situation created by the Soviet Union's changed position in the world and by the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Analysis of the four components of the old doctrine: party dogma, military ideology, military science, and military art. Changes which have taken place in the important principles of encirclement, relative strength, and surprise aggression. Instructions which have been issued to the Armed Forces to conform with the changed meaning of these principles.

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, by Raymond L. Garthoff. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1953. 587 p.

This study is a contribution to the research program conducted for USAF by the Rand Corporation. The pattern of this doctrine and some interpretations of its basis. The relation between Soviet military doctrine and Soviet political doctrine and strategy. An analysis of the current basic Soviet principles of war: Examination of the operational, tactical, and organizational field doctrine of the various combat arms of the Soviet armed forces. The missions of land power, airpower, and sea power in Soviet doctrine and the doctrine for implementing these missions. Appendix includes: organization of the Soviet armed forces; and a bibliography.

SOVIET MILITARY THINKING SINCE STALIN, by N. Galay, in *Army*, v. 7, no. 2 (Sept 1956) 59-61.

In their diagnosis of Stalin's "constant factors," (of Soviet military theory) Soviet military theoreticians accept Western thought though twisting it to fit the dogmas of Marx and Lenin.

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SUVOROV, by Brig. Gen. C. Mc. I. Delf, in Army Quarterly, v. 69, no. 1 (Oct 1954) 94-100.

The personal characteristics and generalship of the Russian general, and his strategy and tactics in fighting the French Revolutionary armies in Italy in 1799. His campaign demonstrated Russian capabilities and qualities which are still applicable - a disregard for logistics, an Asiatic unconcern for human life, and hardihood and fortitude of the individual soldier and his fanatical devotion to his leader.

SUVOROV; A RUSSIAN TRADITION, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in Marine Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 8 (Aug 1953) 40-47.

The career of and the command principles employed by this Russian general. His methods of training and commanding men; the modern concepts of his operations in the eighteenth century; and brief description of some of his campaigns. Excerpts from his work THE SCIENCE OF VICTORY.

4. Tactics

a. General Aspects

CONSEQUENCES OF PROGRESS IN ARMAMENT. Conséquences des progrès de l'armement, by Gen. Audet, in Revue de Défense Nationale, v. 10 (Oct 1954) 255-275. In French.

A French Army general's concept of how future military operations will be governed by the use of atomic weapons and the development of mobility, particularly the type of mobility provided by aircraft.

DECISION IN THE FACE OF DEFEAT, by Col. Alexander D. Surles, Jr., in Military Review, v. 34, no. 12 (Mar 1955) 24-34.

Problems commanders will face in any future war, and historical examples to justify the requirement of a new doctrine. Inherent in this new doctrine must be more dispersion, more flexibility, additional and alternate channels of communication, greater decentralization of responsibility and initiative, a more streamlined organization, and less concern with the loss of real estate, as such. A sounder discipline is essential - a discipline which must be based on the increased effectiveness of our junior leaders, and an improved system of training must be evolved

which recognizes and includes the chaos and confusion of combat, the loneliness of the battlefield, and the increasing requirement for junior leaders to act without comforting directives from above.

FIRST BLUEPRINT FOR ATOMIC WAR, in U. S. News and World Report, v. 38, no. 8 (25 Feb 1955) 24-28 plus.

The new concept of Allied tactics in Europe. Under this concept, NATO Forces will meet a Russian attack by using combined ground-air operations on the threshold of East Europe and seize the initiative with atomic firepower. The old concept of retreating behind the Rhine, then fighting back, is out. If the Russians choose war, their armies will be hit at the Iron Curtain. NATO's war plans; availability of manpower, planes, guns, and missiles to support the new strategy and tactics; and how manpower and weapons are to be used in case of a Russian attack.

GRAND TACTICS IN MODERN WAR, by Maj. Gen. B. T. Wilson, in Army Quarterly, v. 69, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 185-193.

Historical examples, especially from World War II, of the application of grand tactics which are defined as the art of stringing battles together and of fighting them to the best advantage. Such tactics are attributed to Moltke, Guderian, Montgomery, Rommel, and others.

GROUND DEFENSE IN THE ATOMIC ERA, in Tairiku Mondai (Mar 1956) 12-20. Translated from Japanese.

Stenographic record of a round-table conference held recently by the Asiatic Mainland Research Society. It was noted that the introduction of missiles into warfare is resulting in new tactics and requiring alteration in the organization of ground units.

IMPACT OF ATOMIC WARFARE ON AIRBORNE OPERATIONS, by Lt. Col. Norman E. Martin, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 25-31.

An appraisal of the effect of atomic weapons, employed both offensively and defensively, on airborne operations. The impact of atomic warfare on the following three principal phases of an airborne operation: marshalling, movement to the objective area, and operations in the airhead. The greatest threat to an airborne operation, from the standpoint of enemy atomic capabilities, occurs after the airborne force has been delivered into the airhead, and not during the marshalling or movement phases.

IMPACT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON DEFENSE, by Lt. Col. Lewis C. Taynton, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 6 (Sept 1956) 49-57.
The threat of an atomic attack against defensive positions places additional emphasis on greater dispersion, passive protective measures, the employment of mobile reserves, and on active security measures.

IMPACT OF MISSILES ON TACTICAL DOCTRINE, by Gen. W. G. Wyman, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 11, no. 12 (Dec 1956) 114-124.
The doctrine to guide an Army equipped with guided missiles and nuclear warheads must match in scope and flexibility the war-making means now provided by atomic missiles. Of equal and vital importance, this new doctrine must consider the threat established by the enemy's possession of a similar missile capability."

INFANTRY IN MODERN BATTLE; ITS ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING, by Gen. Richard N. Gale, in *Canadian Army Journal*, v. 9, no. 1 (Jan 1955) 52-53.

How use of atomic weapons will affect the conduct of battle. Concealment, discipline, cover, and sensible dispersion will be necessary. Air superiority is not indispensable, but available air resources should be put to skillful, economic, and worthwhile use. Scientific developments must be related to the generally accepted order of battle and equipment of divisions. Correct handling of tanks and tank-infantry cooperation should dominate tactical thought. Tactically, all resources must be exploited along with skillful use of ground, surprise, and use of cover, darkness, mist or fog, and smoke. Simple tactical exercises without troops should be worked out to stimulate thought and develop technique, later to be used with troops on battalion scale.

THE MISSIONS OF TACTICAL AVIATION IN ATOMIC WARFARE. Les missions de l'aviation tactique en guerre atomique, by Camille Rougeron, in *Forces Aériennes Françaises*, no. 103 (Apr 1955) 617-631. In French.

The effects of atomic and thermonuclear bombs and radioactivity; the role of aircraft in direct support concentrated about fifty kilometers behind the front and with the mission of covering the sector with hundreds of radioactive craters; and responsible for indirect support by means of strategic bombing with thermonuclear bombs delivered by guided missiles and heavy fighter-bombers.

"POINT OF NO RETURN" by Maj. F. Le G. Whitting, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, v. 82, no. 2 (Apr 1955) 81-84.
Characteristics and effects of the atomic bomb; deployment of infantry and armor on a wide front in atomic war; factors affecting artillery in defense; present artillery weapons in the light of atomic warfare; recommended changes in the organization of infantry and armored divisions; and deployment of the artillery, incorporating recommended organizational changes.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF AIR SUPPORT. Reflexions sur la notion d'appui aérien, by Lt. Col. J. L. Lecerf, in *Revue de Défense Nationale*, v. 10 (Oct 1954) 286-297. In French.

In view of recent progress in armament and the evolution of tactical operations, the concept of air support under French doctrine has recently been changed from "support of an army" to "participation in a joint battle." This provides a clearer distinction between the two types of action (autonomous and joint) which the French Air Force can implement within the scope of a given mission involving all armed forces.

THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, by Arthur Stanley Riggs, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec 1950) 1345-1359.

A brief review of Drake's part in English history in which the thinking and action of this sailor, tactician, and father of amphibious warfare are reviewed. Considered not from the historical point of view, but as patterns of thought and action applicable in the future as they were in the past.

TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN A FUTURE WAR, by Group Capt. E. W. Pinto, in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 1 (Apr 1955) 89-95.

Conclusions drawn from World War II experiences with respect to the employment of tactical airpower in the following missions: (1) gaining and maintaining air superiority in the theater of operations; (2) interdiction of the battle area to deny movement of enemy troops and supplies; (3) provision of close air support to the land forces in the battle area; and (4) air reconnaissance (strategic reconnaissance for both ground and air force needs, tactical reconnaissance mainly for the ground forces, and artillery reconnaissance). The integrated organization of the tactical air force (which will hold good in any future war) with its own command and coequal with the ground forces has demonstrated the strength and versatility of air power.

THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF TROOPS, by Gen. Blumentritt, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 5 (Aug 1954) 8-23.

"To enable the modern student to understand current military developments and to sense future trends, it is essential that we have a thorough knowledge of history and understand the evolution of formations." This study is based upon recollections of the author's experience as a teacher of tactics at the Berlin Kriegsakademie from 1933 to 1935. He reviews the battle formations of the Greeks, Romans, during the Middle Ages and the early modern times, in the eighteenth century armies, and during both World Wars.

THE TEAM OF MOBILE WARFARE: ARMOR AND AIRBORNE, by Capt. Everett C. Royal, in *Armor*, v. 64, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1955) 4-6.

Armor and airborne forces are complementary forces which, if united as an operational team under one commander, form one of the most effective combinations it is possible to devise, because they possess the highly desirable characteristics of mobility, firepower, and shock action. More combined arms training by these two forces is absolutely necessary.

A VERIFICATION OF LANCHESTER'S LAW, by J. H. Engel, in *Operations Research Society of America, Journal*, v. 2, no. 2 (May 1954) 163-171.

A mathematical technique for verifying the applicability of a certain type of generalized Lanchester equations. The law states that the strength of a combat force is proportional to the square of the number of combatants entering a battle. The technique is applied in an analysis of the battle for Iwo Jima, and it is found that the equations did describe the situation. Such analyses will increase in value when repeated often enough to permit general conclusions to be drawn.

WARFARE TODAY: HOW MODERN BATTLES ARE PLANNED AND FOUGHT ON LAND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR, ed. by Adm. Sir Reginald Bacon and others. London, Odhams Press, 1944. 256 p.

Contents: Features of modern war; the war on land; development of armoured forces; the attack of armoured forces; defense against armoured attack; how air power affects land warfare; fighter defense; fighter offense; bomber offense; air power at sea; fleet air arm; sea warfare-offense; sea warfare defense; combined operations; airborne attack.

b. Germany - Historical Examples

DEFEAT OF THE LUFTWAFFE: FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES, by Gen. Adolf Galland, in *Air University Quarterly Review*, v. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1953) 18-36.

A former general of the German Air Force discusses the factors responsible for the decline and poor showing of the Luftwaffe during the later stages of World War II - factors which stemmed from: (1) deficiencies of organization and training; (2) internal influences, such as Hitler's stoppage order for research and development, the lack of a clear operational plan for the offensive against England, technical inadequacies, the lack of night fighter aircraft, and others; and (3) the effects of Allied strategic air attacks.

GAS ATTACK AT YPRES; A STUDY IN MILITARY HISTORY, by Rudolph Hanslian, Edgewood Arsenal, Md., Chemical Warfare School, 1940. 55 p. (Pamphlet No. 8.)

Account by a German authority of the first chemical warfare success in military history. Preparations for the attack, analysis of the military action, and French and British reactions as noted in their official reports. Eye-witness testimony and conclusions.

HOW HITLER BROKE THROUGH IN THE WEST, by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 12 (Mar 1957) 52-62.

"The course of the world in our time was changed, with far-reaching effects on the future of all peoples, when Hitler's forces broke through the defense of the West in May 1940." The author feels that it was one of the most sweeping victories in modern history and although Germany was defeated in the end, it remains doubtful whether the consequences of the breakdown in West's defenses can ever be redeemed.

SWORD OF SILK, by Capt. Boyd T. Bashore, in *Infantry School Quarterly*, v. 46, no. 4 (Oct 1956) 56-69; v. 47, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 64-76.

A two part article based on tape recorded interviews with German General Kurt Student on how the Germans developed and employed strategic airborne warfare, how Hitler failed to grasp its significance, and how we profited from German experience and soon outstripped them.

c. United States

ADAPTABILITY: INDEX TO SURVIVABILITY, by Gen. W. G. Wyman, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 12, no. 6 (June 1957) 2-11.

The Army's program for tactical employment of mobile forces on the atomic battlefield is an important transitional step, keeping the Army abreast of evolutionary changes in technology and materiel. Charts show organization of mobile forces.

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS. Washington, Department of the Air Force, 1954. 17 p. (AFM 1-4.)

Provides the basis for an understanding of the manner in which the air defense of the US is operated. Functions of air defense; and its utilization of basic Air Force units, Army and Navy forces, and civilians. Planning, command and organization, and training for air defense. Types of operations for air defense; and procedures and methods of air defense operations.

ATOMIC DEFENSE RECONSIDERED, by Lt. Col. Seymour L. Goldberg, in *Infantry School Quarterly*, v. 47, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 41-49.

Another concept for defense against atomic weapons is presented: linear defensive positions in great depth with dispersion at all echelons consistent with the mission as the answer to defense on the atomic battlefield.

BATTLE REPORT; THE WAR IN KOREA, by Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle, and Frank A. Manson. New York, Rinehart, 1952. 520 p.

History compiled from official records and accounts by combat correspondents, of US Navy and Marine Corps actions in Korea from the outbreak of war through the evacuation at Hungnam. The beginning of hostilities; Navy activity around the Fusan perimeter; employment of carrier-based planes; the preparation and execution of the Inchon landing; the push to the Yalu River; and the hard-fought "advance in another direction" that ended in evacuation.

CAVALRY, AND I DON'T MEAN HORSES, by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, in *Harper's*, v. 208, no. 1247 (Apr 1954) 54-60.

The success of future warfare will depend on how well a nation's forces are prepared for operations based on the concepts of mobility, shock, and firepower. General Walker's forces were defeated in Korea in June 1950 because the factors of mobility, surprise, and firepower were not at his disposal against the attacking North Koreans. Experiences of World War II also indicate that whenever these factors were present in combat they spelled the difference between victory or defeat. The advent of atomic warfare puts a special premium on top rate mobility and firepower in ground combat. The US Army is getting bogged down with heavy equipment; there-

fore, US military preparedness should be directed toward the classic concept of cavalry, whereby infantry, armor, and air will become a team to give the US mobility and momentum over its potential adversaries, and to get there "fastest with the mostest" and not "lastest with the leastest."

CAVALRY OF THE SKY; THE STORY OF U. S. MARINE COMBAT HELICOPTERS, by Lynn Montross. New York, Harper, 1954. 270 p.

The development of Marine helicopter combat tactics and techniques since 1947, and employment of combat helicopters in Marine operations in Korea. Appended: US Marine Corps helicopter units and commanding officers, and glossary of military and aeronautical terms. Bibliography, photos, maps, sketches, charts, and diagrams.

DEVELOPING TOMORROWS ARMY TODAY, by Brig. Gen. Frederick W. Gibb, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 12, no. 6 (June 1957) 24-33.

At the US Army Combat Development Experimentation Center, Fort Ord, Calif., new concepts, organization, and doctrine are subjected to exhaustive tests to keep pace with advances in technology.

LESSONS FROM KOREA, by Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, in *Cosantoir*, *The Irish Defence Journal*, v. 11, no. 1 (Jan 1951) 2-7.

In the Korean war, two main experiences of World Wars I and II have been reaffirmed: (1) occupation of territory in an initial phase of war does not pay if the territory occupied is only a fraction of that belonging to a world-wide belligerent coalition; and (2) manpower is indispensable, and lack of manpower inevitably induces the nation affected to replace manpower by technique. Analogies are drawn between the Korean campaigns and battles in World Wars I and II indicating the necessity for choosing a battlefield which by its lines of defense allows shortage of manpower to be made up by naval superiority, or, if manpower is absolutely inadequate for a defensive battle, for avoiding engagement and withdrawing in time in order to commence a war of maneuver in which mobile and armored divisions have already scored successes.

NOTES ON DEFENSE, by Maj. Melbourne C. Chandler, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 11 (Feb 1955) 38-49.

Because the ideal conditions in defense have been overemphasized in US training, the military student has a tendency to visualize all defense under ideal conditions with an almost flankless front. It is not the intent of the author to propose changes in US Army's doctrine of

defense, but rather to indicate those fundamentals requiring greater emphasis when conducting a defense in the future. To this end he discusses: defense in depth; organization of the defense area; factors determining the size of units needed for the defense of an area; conduct of the defense; artillery positions in defense areas and planning of artillery fires during the conduct of the defense; defense against armored attacks; rear area security and reserves; and the role of mobility and speed in the defense of the future. Active and aggressive defense aimed at killing the enemy rather than merely stopping or repelling him must be emphasized.

A SEMINAR ON MOBILITY IN WARFARE, by 2nd Lt. David Drew Gilpatrick, in *Armor*, v. 64, no. 4 (July-Aug 1955) 14-17.

To assist US Military Academy cadets in developing a sound professional base, a group of officers at the Military Academy recently conducted a seminar at which the following areas were discussed: (a) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of cavalry (armor), infantry, artillery, signal, and engineers; (b) the development and progress of mobility in the employment of the tactical air-ground team; (c) the development and requirements for staff action in mobile warfare, and more specifically, the development of the mission-type order; and (d) possible characteristics of the war of the future. The mechanics of the seminar, which are described, can be readily adapted to units in the field. Such a seminar can be held at company, battalion, or combat command level. A book bibliography is appended to assist anyone interested in setting up a similar study group.

TOMORROW'S INFANTRY TODAY, by Brig. Gen. Carl F. Fritzsche, in *Army Combat Forces Journal*, v. 5, no. 9 (Apr 1955) 20-24.

Tactics of atomic war developed at the Infantry School are based on the concepts of dispersion, mobility, and protection. The concept of dispersion requires independent and semi-independent operations by single battalions and rapid concentration, when needed, near the enemy, which in turn requires emphasis on communications and improvement of existing security means. The concept of mobility requires modern types of ground vehicles as well as development of air mobility through use of assault transports, helicopters, and parachutes. The concept of protection places greater emphasis on movement and maneuver at night. The new doctrine of mobile defense is that of an offensive defense deploying battalion-size units of combined arms in positions of depth as strong-points or grouped on islands of resistance. Studies conducted by the Infantry School in fire-support coordination and improved assault techniques.

US AIR FORCE BASIC DATA. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General Staff College, 1954. 65 p. (ST 31-35-1.)
Organization and operation of theater air forces at all levels of

command. Limited to a general summary of the principles, doctrine, tactics, and techniques of the combat phase of tactical air operations as they affect surface operations. Appended: charts showing organization of USAF and major commands; World War II Army comments on the effects of tactical air support; joint Army-Air Force agreement on air control teams; new terminology used in joint air-ground operations; numbers of aircraft assigned to various types of units (war strength); standardization factors for use in map maneuvers; guide to aircraft employment; ground target damage assessment chart; tactical air missions chart; and procedures for obtaining offensive air support and tactical air reconnaissance.

d. U.S.S.R.

IRON CURTAIN STRATEGY, in *East and West*, no. 4 (1955) 16-19.

The concept of double envelopment (obkhat) is a favored movement in the Soviet strategic doctrine. It will, in all probability, be applied when the Soviet General Staff decides upon the "H" hour. It is an axiom of Soviet strategy that successful land operations must be carried out on the largest possible territory with sufficient reserve of area in the rear to fall back upon in case they are attacked or for maneuvering in preparation for their own offensive of counter-offensive operations. In this light examines military and political aspects of the central part of the East-West Front in Europe where the Soviets on their side have an immense territory of more than 9 million square miles, and the Western Powers are badly squeezed into a narrow strip of ground of just over 300,000 square miles between the Iron Curtain and the Atlantic.

OPERATIONS IN THE TAIGA, by Lt. Col. Raymond L. V. Pearson, in *Military Review*, v. 37, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 40-52.

Whether future wars are nuclear or nonnuclear, big or little, or fought in the forest, jungle, mountain, or plain area, our ground forces must be equipped and trained to utilize climatic and terrain conditions. The lessons of the Finnish-Russian wars of 1939 and 1944 are evaluated.

SOVIET ARMORED PRINCIPLES, by Maj. M. F. Vassilief, in *An Cosantoir*, v. 15, no. 10 (Oct 1955) 469-477.

Experiences of World War II show that the Soviet Command massed tanks together in the decisive direction instead of dispersing them along a whole front. Beginning with Stalingrad, the High Command put into effect new forms of attack operations, with groups of tanks in formation of many successive echelons oriented in the direction of the decisive blow. This enabled penetrations of up to 300 miles at rates of fifteen to twenty miles in twenty-four hours. Organizational structure of a present Soviet tank corps. (Translated from Russian by Capt. D. N. Brumicardi.)

A SURVEY OF SOVIET ARMOR, by Michael S. Davison, in Armor, v. 60, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1951) 34-40.

The following conclusions are drawn after surveying tactics (pre-war concepts, World War II - offense, World War II - defense, operations at night, and operations in winter), organization, training, and qualities of the Soviet soldier: offensive operations of Soviet armor are characterized by deliberation with emphasis on detailed planning and careful rehearsals; the motivating factor of the offense is the massive infantry assault, saturated with tanks and given violent artillery and air support; the continuity of the attack is maintained by around-the-clock operations; the conduct of the defense is marked by great tenacity and by the employment of reserves in coordinated counterattack rather than in piece-meal commitment; the organization appears to be flexible, adapted to the mission and the material available; training is intensive and realistic and an eye on terrain and climate; the Soviet soldier is a very capable fighting man with a strong sense of patriotism; and armor is an essential component of the Soviet combined arms team. Its employment is tactically sound and its material is of a high order.

5. Logistics

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE FUTURE OF MILITARY AIR LOGISTICS, in Interavia, v. 11, no. 4 (Apr 1956) 263-266.

The four-jet transport formula which has just established itself in the world civil market will also profoundly change military air logistics and modify all the plans of the military staffs whose responsibilities have expanded to an intercontinental scale. In fact, since both the load capacities and the cruising speeds of the new four-jet transports are more than twice as high as present figures, their advent will enable the number of aircraft now required to move a given load over long distances to be divided by five.

GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY: 1940-1943, by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1955. 780 p.

SS

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MISSILE ERA, in Army, v. 7, no. 4 (Nov 1956) 22.

"... Our war power really is the means we have times its mobility. You can have everything in the world you might need to win a war but if you can't get it there, you get second prize, which means you have lost..." (Partial transcript of a radio broadcast by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin on "Survival in the Air Age" over MBS during which he described the strategic and tactical implications of the missile era.)

"THE INFLUENCE OF LOGISTICS ON MILITARY STRATEGY" ADAPTED FROM LECTURES TO THE CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE, by Maj. Gen. G. S. Hatton, in Army Quarterly, v. 72, no. 2 (July 1956) 173-181.

With historical examples, the influence of maritime and air power, and in the atomic age.

LOGISTICS IN WORLD WAR II; A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY, by Robert Greenhalgh Albion, in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 97-102.

A survey of published works (official and unofficial US and British histories) dealing with the various aspects of logistics in World War II.

A NEW FIELD FOR LOGISTICS RESEARCH, by Rear Adm. Bern Anderson, in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, v. 1, no. 2 (June 1954) 79-81.

An intensive study of the German logistics system during the Italian campaign would be a fruitful field of research. The German troop movements and concentrations were made quickly and effectively, and they must have been backed by a smoothly functioning supply and administration system. The major moves made by German units to demonstrate their rapidity. The German supply organization, planning factors, and requirements could be studied with profit.

PRACTICAL AIDS TO LOGISTIC PLANNING, by Herbert A. Jordan, in Military Review, v. 32, no. 3 (June 1952) 34-48.

Principles, short cuts, and time savers which were applied successfully in the past and which may serve as a guide in developing similar aids to meet the requirements of a particular planning staff.

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TEN YEARS AGO... THE PREPARATION OF THE LANDING OPERATIONS. Voici dix ans... La préparation du débarquement, by Georges Blond, in Miroir de l'Histoire, v. 5, no. 53 (1954) 666-680. In French.

The preparations for Allied landing operations in France in 1944, including: the construction of "prefabricated ports," the designation of "blockships" destined to be sunk along the French coast to offer protection for the small landing operations, the construction of the invasion fleet, operation PLUTO (pipe-line-under-the-ocean), and the organization of the troop transports.

b. United States

ARMS FOR OUR ALLIES, by Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Colby, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 211 (July-Aug 1955) 49-53.

An account of the Offshore Procurement Program which in addition to providing guns and ammunition for the NATO armies, has aided European economic recovery and helped reestablish a dispersed munitions-production base abroad.

KOREA AND LOGISTICS, by James A. Huston, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 11 (Feb 1957) 18-32.

United States support in the conflict in Korea was one of the greatest logistical efforts in our history. The lessons learned and the procedures developed there should prove of tremendous value in the future. (This article is taken from a study on "Logistical Support for the Conflict in Korea," written by Dr. Huston for the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.)

KOREA: THE MILITARY LESSON, by Eric Larrabee, in Harper's Magazine, no. 1206 (Nov 1950) 51-57.

The ability of Communist armies to "live off the country," largely eliminating the lines of supply and communication which our air power intends to destroy, accounts for the failure of the North Koreans to collapse under our air attacks. If we are to be successful in countering Communist aggression wherever it occurs, we must change our basic philosophy concerning the mountains of supplies necessary to support a field army. We can no longer "afford the largesse that put ten tons of supply behind every man in the European theater; we are simply not that rich." Reducing the non-essential supplies will allow a reduction in the presently wasted manpower needed to handle these supplies in rear areas.

The author advocates a reduction in the size of our infantry division and the extension of airborne planning. He warns that we must overcome our present disadvantages of an unwieldy Army and overtaxed supply program if we are to successfully counter future Soviet moves in the Korean pattern.

LOGISTICAL MUSCLES BY MISSILES, by Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, in Army, v. 6, no. 10 (May 1956) 28-29.

Predicts that in the future - "perhaps in less than ten years" the Army will have a family of guided missiles carrying supplies to units in combat. How such guided missile supply ships will be used, and the impact they will have on ground warfare.

LOGISTICS AND WORLD WAR II ARMY STRATEGY, by Col. H. F. Sykes, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 47-54.

Explores the interplay between the grand strategic and logistic decisions of the US Army during World War II and concludes that the projection of military requirements must be on the broadest possible basis and must allow for flexibility and alternative courses of action. The idea that a single set of requirements tied to a single strategic plan furnishes a proper basis for wartime production should be shunned. What is needed is a pattern of production which can support many courses of action while precisely fitted to no one of them.

LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY. PLANNING FOR BOTH MUST BE INTEGRATED AND CONCURRENT, by F. S. Low, in Ordnance, v. 35, no. 184 (Jan-Feb 1951) 302-304.

Discussion of the close relationship between strategy and logistics as demonstrated by the instance of the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II. In surveying Korean logistics, the author concludes that "we reacted surprisingly well militarily in the Korean operation" because we had learned the basic necessity for relating strategy to logistics. Strategic plans for future warfare will not be able to contemplate any major operations during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of an emergency unless the necessary supplies are on hand at the start, or the production cycle is well started.

LOGISTICS AND THE SUPERWEAPONS, by Maj. Thomas J. McDonald, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 8 (Nov 1955) 39-46.

Fighting forces are no better than the logistical system that supports them, and logistical planning must be oriented accordingly. However, changes in organization for sake of change must be avoided. The

author asks what course must the strategic commander and his logistician take in planning during a cold war to prepare for both nonnuclear and limited nuclear war, or possibly thermonuclear war, and then proposes a new approach to logistics based on: (1) careful screening of our equipment needs, (2) full use of all applicable developments in the field of communications, (3) more airlift for the support of ground force operations, (4) radical improvements in the overland capabilities of land transport, and (5) logistical reorganization designed to exploit all the possibilities which exist from the most modern to the most primitive, because both may be required.

MODERN ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM, by Joseph A. Bourdow, in Army, v. 6, no. 12 (July 1956) 33-35.

How data processing and computers are used by the US Army in PROJECT MASS (Modern Army Supply System) which was designed as a test operation of the Army logistical system and its capabilities to support the mobile, flexible field Army that is coming. MASS begins on 1 July 1956 with the Seventh Army in the role of a guinea pig. Photo of a computer and a transceiver which exemplify the electronic equipment that will keep MASS going at full speed.

A "NEW LOOK" FOR ARMY LOGISTICS, by Lt. Col. Prentiss B. Reed, Jr., in Military Review, v. 35, no. 3 (June 1955) 37-44.

The factors to be considered if the US logistical system consisting of the vast technological-industrial complex is to survive in atomic warfare. We must analyze the Zone of Interior logistical structure for over-concentrations, single-facility operations, and excessively unified controls of operations, and initiate an immediate program to correct these conditions in the ZI Field plant; steps must be taken to eliminate the dangerous vulnerability of the logistical structure of our existing overseas commands and bases; the new and forceful reasons for restoring a military character to logistical operations must be clearly conveyed to the officer corps, and the training of our young officers must restore major emphasis on developing the desire to seek and carry responsibility; US must never again become involved in a theater of operations as it did in Korea, on an unplanned, shoestring basis, conceived in terms of the preatomic World War II logistical scheme of operations; and the greatest single lesson in logistics in Korea was that it demonstrated that the logistical operations there were the last of the World War II type.

REFLECTIONS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, by Lt. Col. Daniel A. Raymond, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 5 (Aug 1955) 31-43.

Assesses the US Army implementation of the MDAP in one country and derives therefrom such "lessons" as may be of benefit in future

endeavors of this nature. A long-range program, consistent with the needs of the countries involved, is required for maximum effectiveness. It is concerned with the introduction of US military equipment and supply, its employment and maintenance with training and schooling - especially as it pertains to the employment, care, and maintenance of the American equipment furnished.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY, by Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 3-12.

Our deterrent capability for heading off local wars and our ability to win a general war depends in large measure on strategic mobility. The Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, defines the meaning of strategic mobility as "getting there" and describes how airlift and sealift enhance the Army's capability for modern warfare.

C. Defense Establishments And Military Organizations

1. General Aspects

THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF PRUSSIA AND FRANCE, AND RECENT CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR, by Lt. Col. C. C. Chesney and Henry Reeve. London, Longmans, 1870. 258 p.

Contents: RECENT CHANGES IN THE ART OF WAR, p. 1; MILITARY GROWTH OF PRUSSIA, p. 58; MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE, p. 126; RIFLED ORDNANCE IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, p. 170; and FRENCH LAW ON THE RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMY, p. 247.

THE OLD EUROPEAN ARMY, by W. F. Jackson Knight, in Forces Magazine (Mar 1955) 8-10.

Characteristics of the Roman Army which secured peace and order in the vast territory of the Roman Empire and contributed to the longest period of peace mankind had ever experienced in historical times. Emphasis on the legions, or the regular branch of the Army and its standard of excellence in regard to organization, operational capability, training, discipline, and esprit de corps.

a. Great Britain

THE CASE FOR A ROYAL UNITED SERVICE, by T. D. Calnan, in Royal Air Force Quarterly, v. 3, no. 1 (Jan 1951) 15-22.

The defects and limitations of the present organization of the British Armed Forces are examined, and the effectiveness of the organization in peace and war, together with the employment and efficiency of the forces themselves are analyzed. Based on this analysis, a reorganization is proposed which is said to result in a thoroughly efficient national organization for the control and coordination of the Armed Forces, so as to make their employment effective in war, and to make their administration and training more efficient and economical in peace.

[THE QUEEN'S AIR FORCES] in Flight, v. 63, no. 2314 (29 May 1953) 93 p. (Coronation issue.)

Description and photographs on: mission, organization, personnel, and aircraft of the various RAF commands; histories, present status, and aircraft of the Air Forces of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, and India; British and Commonwealth naval air arms; and a chronological list of highlights in British Aviation since 1926.

b. NATO

ALLIED NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Adm. Earl Mountbatten, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 598 (May 1955) 171-186.

Steps leading to the formation of the Allied Forces, Mediterranean Command (AFMED) on 15 March 1953. Organization and responsibilities of air and naval forces of France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, UK, and US. All-over strategy, chain of command, and division of responsibilities. Map.

c. United States

AMERICAN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, by Timothy W. Stanley. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1956. 202 p.

"... Tells the story of the most significant developments in the national security structure during the past ten years... It carefully analyzes the policies and operations of the National Security Council and the role of the Department of Defense as the instrument of unification of the services..."

THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN PERMANENT JOINT BOARD OF DEFENCE, 1940-1945, by Col. C. P. Stacey, in International Journal, v. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1954) 107-124.

The Board was an experiment in international organization and an innovation in both Canadian and American external policy. Founded fourteen years ago, it developed through the years into an important element of Canadian-American relations and in the defensive organization of the West. Events that led to the formation of the Board, and its organization, mission, and achievements during World War II. Includes a list of the Board's recommendations during the period August 1940 through September 1944.

CHANGES INSIDE THE PENTAGON, by H. Struve Hensel, in Harvard Business Review, v. 32, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 1954) 98-108.

The organizational philosophy behind the recent changes in the Department of Defense. Decentralization of operations; civilian control and military decisions; powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and management of the Joint Staff, among others.

COMMAND AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, by Lt. Col. Kyle F. Davis, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 11 (Feb 1955) 24-33.

If future commanders are to know the proper acceptance of responsibility and application of authority, the principles of command and other degrees of authority must be established. Neither the US statutes nor US Army regulations define the elements of "command." The lack of adequate definition has not constituted a serious problem in subdepartmental levels, but it continues to be a handicap at national level and places an unnecessary burden upon the leaders of the US defense establishment. For instance, the National Security Act of 1947 failed to establish clearly the Secretary of Defense as head of the Department of Defense with complete authority over its activities. Failure to state that the Secretary of Defense was a commander subordinate to the President, or a deputy commander to the President, precluded the establishment of a clearly defined chain of command and severely affected the efficiency of the entire Military Establishment. Reviews the 1949 findings of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, the 1953 findings of the Rockefeller Committee, and the President's Reorganization Plan Number 6, which he prepared and presented to Congress following the Rockefeller report. The need for definition remains, because somehow

these studies have translated into words the concept they wished to establish. The author, in his search for adequate means of describing the relationships that exist and should exist at all levels of command and authority, presents his definitions for: command, direction, control, staff supervision, and coordination.

DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFICATION, by Dudley W. Knox, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec 1950) 1309-1315.

A cardinal problem that now confronts us in the development of true unification consists of the chasm separating Army and Navy concepts of organization, administration, and operations. From the outset the Navy had unity within itself. However, the Army has never had true unification, being an organization of loosely knit, semi-independent Corps. Another conflicting concept is that of overseas air bases. The Air Force contends that long-range airplanes diminish the need of advanced air bases, whereas the Navy supports the use of the carrier. This brings up the controversy of the carrier versus such airplanes as the B-36. These and other concepts require clarification in many minds to the end that more genuine unification of thinking among the Armed Services may be achieved.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES. Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Command and General Staff School, 1923. 58 p.
"The pamphlet presents a brief outline of the general organization of the land forces of the United States, including a theater of war. It presents in considerably more detail the projected war organization of tactical formations, the functions of commanders and staffs, and the system of administration."

NAVAL PREPAREDNESS, by Vice Adm. F. S. Low, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 211 (July-Aug 1955) 34-36.

The US Navy is keeping abreast of the enormous technological advances in armament and equipment in order to increase its striking power and mobility and maintain control of the seas for national defense. Reorganization of the Department of Defense following the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee. The organizational concept of the Navy. Photographs.

PENTAGON REORGANIZATION: PHASE THREE, by John R. Probert, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 1 (Jan 1955) 51-62.

The proposals for reorganization of the US Department of Defense made by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 6, the changes

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made by implementation of the Plan, and the changes during the last year which make up the third and last phase of the reorganization. The Department of Defense has become more like the other executive departments of the Government, and authority and responsibility have been more precisely located in the Secretary of Defense. Though the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has received the responsibility to manage the Joint Staff and to approve the selection and tenure of the Joint Staff, the members have lost power, but they have not been submerged or subordinated. Plans are to be formulated for the approval of the Secretary, and any individual member can appeal to Congress any decision of the Joint Chiefs.

REPORT OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. Washington, 1953. 25 p. (US Senate, 83d Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Armed Services, Committee Print.)

The Committee investigated the basic organization and procedures of the Department of Defense, especially the position of the Secretary of Defense and his relationships with his principal civilian and military officials, and recommended: (1) clarification of the authority of the Secretary of Defense; (2) clarification of the command channels within the Department; (3) increase in the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the top military planning and advisory group; (4) abolishment of a number of statutory boards which have proved too unwieldy and rigid and which could be administered by Assistant Secretaries; and (5) authority for the Secretary of Defense to safeguard the promotional prospects of officers who serve in his office.

d. U.S.S.R.

HANDBOOK ON THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE ARMIES. PART I: THE SOVIET ARMY. Washington, Department of the Army, 1953. 172 p. (DA Pamphlet No. 30-50-1.)

The military system; military doctrine; organization of the field forces; personnel and training; logistics; weapons; equipment; uniforms, insignia, decorations, and awards; the Red Navy; the Red Air Force; and the quasi-military organizations of the Soviet Union. Charts, diagrams, photos, and other illustrations.

THE SOVIET ARMY, ed. by B. H. Liddell Hart. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956. 480 p.

"... The aim of this book is to provide a reliable account, and

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comprehensive picture, of the Soviet Army in all its aspects - by drawing on and piecing together the knowledge of a wide range of experts in various countries who have made a special study, or have had direct experience, of particular aspects and organs of this Army."

THE SOVIET ARMY; ITS SOLDIERS AND TACTICS. Fort Lee, Va., Quartermaster School, 1954. 24 p. (Student Workbook 151, 46.)

A synopsis of the pamphlets of the SOVIET ARMY series from which the most pertinent and significant facts have been extracted. For more complete details reference should be made to the pamphlets and to the MANUAL OF CURRENT SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS, prepared by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Third Army. Characteristics of the Soviet soldier; training in the Soviet Army; weapons and logistics; organization of small and medium infantry units; offensive and defensive doctrine; execution of the attack and conduct of defense; and employment of tactics in special operations (assault of a fortified area, and combat in cities and towns). Appended: a list of Soviet military quotations (e. g. "Artillery is the God of War"). Photos of various Soviet weapons, organizational charts of Soviet units, and illustrations showing the layout of Soviet antitank obstacles.

THE RED ARMY TODAY, by Col. Louis B. Ely. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1953. 272 p.

Organization, tactics, and personnel of the Soviet Army, based chiefly on up-to-date information from soldiers who left Russia to take up life in the Western world. With chapters discussing: Soviet infantry; armor; artillery and its weapons; cavalry commands and Cossacks; rear services and engineers; air support and airborne forces; Soviet partisan capabilities, including partisan tactics in World War II; the people who make the Army; quality and combat ability of the Red Army; comparison of the Soviet Army with the armies of the Western powers; strength and potential of the European satellites; Soviet Army capabilities and possible objectives; and current trends with respect to capabilities of Soviet officers, equipment, techniques, and tactics. Appendixes on: how the Soviet division compares with Western divisions; Red Army organization and weapons; recommended collateral reading; and illustrations of Soviet uniforms and insignia.

SOVIET IMPERIALISM, by G. A. Tokaev. London, Gerald Duckworth, 1954. 73 p.

Political strategy and tactics of the Soviet Union; Soviet military-political and military-philosophical doctrine; and organization and strength of Soviet Armed Forces. The author, formerly an engineer colonel of the Soviet Army, assisted for nearly fifteen years in the formulation and practical application of most of the fundamental military and military-technical

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doctrines of the USSR. Since 1940 Col. Tokaev occupied a series of increasingly important technical posts in Soviet aircraft production, and in 1948 was serving in Berlin as Soviet expert on jet and rocket problems. He and his family crossed over to the West in 1948. The military aspects of the book include information (mostly of fragmentary nature) on: Soviet military science, artillery, armor, paratroops, mechanized troops, current types of Soviet aircraft, guided missiles and atomic weapons; Soviet Navy, stockpiling of supplies, equipment research, standardization, staff and military education, and morale and welfare of the Soviet Forces.

2. Evolution

a. General Aspects

THE ARMED HORDE, 1793-1939; A STUDY OF THE RISE, SURVIVAL AND DECLINE OF THE MASS ARMY, by Hoffman Nickerson. New York, Putnam's, 1942. 427 p.

"This book traces the origin, survival, culmination and recent decline of the mass army recruited by universal, compulsory service which, with its corollaries of unlimited taxation and governmental control over the governed, has so evilly transformed warfare during the last hundred and fifty years..."

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, by Capt. Ambrosio P. Pena, in Military Historical Review, v. 2, no. 2 (Dec 1954) 13-17 plus.

Although history does not record just when and how the first form of military organization originated, it is known that formation of armies followed closely the progress of nations. A well-gear'd military organization is often the yardstick of the degree of progress of a nation. The basis for military organization during the early developmental stages of society; formation of armies among the nations of ancient world; the early tactical set-up; degeneration of the military art following the fall of the Roman Empire; rebirth of military art with the era of Renaissance at the turn of the fourteenth century; employment of mercenaries by the ancient armies; and the impetus given to military arts and sciences in the twentieth century.

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b. France

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS UNTIL 1940. Le génie jusqu'en 1940, by Col. de Lesquen, in *Revue Historique de L'Armée*, v. 11, no. 4 (Nov 1955) 67-88. In French.

History and various stages of evolution of the French Corps of Engineers from its establishment through the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, World War I, and the 1939-1940 campaign of World War II.

THE FOREIGN LEGION. La légion étrangère, by Philippe de Brussac. Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1955. In French.

History of the Legion from its creation in 1792 through the many campaigns fought by its members up to the end of the Indochinese Revolutionary War, including also particulars on the Legion's structure, its renowned esprit de corps, and the recruitment and training of its members.

NAVAL AVIATION 1915-1954. Aeronavale 1915-1954, by Capt. Vulliez. Paris, Amiot-Dumont, 1955? In French.

Evolution and activities of French naval aviation from the battles of Dunkirk in 1915, through the French Campaign of 1940, the Syrian raids, and the Indochinese War, to the collapse of Dien Bien Phu.

c. Germany - Historical Examples

PANZER DIVISIONS, by R. M. Ogorkiewicz, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 70, no. 1 (Apr 1955) 44-52.

Review of the development of German armored units, with particular reference to: (1) the original armored division which was created in 1935; (2) changes prior to 1940; (3) light divisions which evolved in 1937; (4) the 1940 reorganization; (5) German armored divisions in the Russian and North African campaigns of 1941-42; (6) the 1943 and 1944 divisions; (7) armored infantry divisions; and (8) trends in organization and employment during the latter part of World War II.

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d. Great Britain

ARMoured FORMATIONS, by Lt. Col. C. Paddock, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 74, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 63-68.

Traces the development of armored formations in Britain from World War I to the present.

ARMS AND THE MEN, by Ian Hay. London, 1950. 330 p. (Gt. Brit. H. M. Govt., The Second World War, 1939-1945 series.)

One of eight volumes of a popular history of World War II. This volume tells the story of the part played by the British Army during the war, giving the internal history of events - the growth and development of the citizen Army, the changes brought about in its composition, training, leadership, and administration by the introduction of total mechanized warfare. Also discussed is the revolution effected during these years in certain army traditions. The early chapters deal with the inception and growth of the Army from the time of the New Model, including the sweeping reforms of Cardwell and Haldane.

GOOD-BYE TO BOOT AND SADDLE, OR THE TRAGIC PASSING OF BRITISH CAVALRY, by E. G. French. London, Hutchinson, 1951. 283 p.

History of the British cavalry and its regiments, from Eighteenth Century to September 1939, when the last two regiments were abolished. The traditions, life, uniforms, and some of the battles they fought and won. The concluding chapter questions the wisdom of the abolition, because there are tactical situations in modern warfare, where cavalry, and not armor and aircraft, can affect the decisive results.

THE GROWTH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, by Capt. Norman Macmillan, in *Aeronautics*, v. 28, no. 6 (July 1953) 60-62 plus.

Traces the growth of the RAF as a fighting service from its inception in 1918 to its present size which, in peacetime, is limited by the current high cost of air materiel. With a comparative table showing rise in cost of British fighters and bombers since 1914, and a listing of past and present Marshals of the Royal Air Force.

THE THIRD SERVICE; THE STORY BEHIND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte. London,

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Thames and Hudson, 1955. 274 p.

The development of the RAF emphasizing forces behind the scenes that affected policies, and individuals who influenced these policies. Operations of the Royal Flying Corps (the predecessor of RAF), the Royal Naval Air Service, and RAF.

e. United States

AIRPOWER'S HOLLOW SHELL, by Gill Robb Wilson, in Air Force, v. 38, no. 11 (Nov 1955) 21.

Although the military air establishment of the US is excellent, there is no hard core or foundation behind it. There is a lack of: air concepts, aviation education, and of interest in air power. How we solve these problems is going to make or break the power of the Free World and the exercise of democratic government in a period as short as twenty-five years.

THE ARMY'S PREPARATION FOR ATOMIC WARFARE, by Lt. Col. Jack J. Wagstaff, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (May 1955) 3-6.

Steps taken by the US Army to develop atomic capabilities (atomic guns, guided missiles, the teaching of atomic tactics, and certain technical and scientific schools for the further education of qualified atomic technicians and scientists) in keeping with the "new look" strategy. However, since it seems possible that there will never be an atomic war, the Army must also be ready to fulfill its mission by conventional means and to do so with a minimum of reconversions, rearming, retraining, and re-tooling. We will not have two separate armies, one for atomic warfare and a second to fulfill conventional requirements.

HISTORY AND ROLE OF ARMOR. Fort Knox, Ky., Armored School, 1955. 41 p.

Background of armor, its capabilities, and its current role in the present US Army. Early history; use and development during World War I; development and role, 1919-1939; armor in World War II and Korea; armor developments, World War II to the present; and armor in the type field army. Photos of various tanks 1918-1953.

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HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION, by Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1949. 345 p.

The story of the development of Naval Aviation to its present advanced state, illuminating the means by which we have retained control of the world's seas over which must pass the raw materials of our industrial strength.

MILITARY AVIATION - THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, by Owen J. Remington, in Army Information Digest, v. 8, no. 9 (Sept 1953) 9-39.

Role played by the US Armed Forces in developing aviation in the past fifty years. US Army's early interest in accomplishments of initial aircraft of Professor S. P. Langley and Wright brothers; specifications of the first military airplane contracted by the Army Air Service in 1908; establishment of the first US military aviation school; Navy's initial experiments with flights from the deck of a battleship in 1910; first participation of airplanes in a maneuver with US Army ground troops in 1912; adoption of the Lewis machine gun as a standard weapon for US military aircraft; impact of World War I on airplane development, and activities of the American Air Service against the German Air Force; historic flights and speed records in the post-World War I era; growth of commercial uses of aircraft; passage of legislation and establishment of aeronautical agencies which contributed to the growth and development of US civil and military aviation; impact of World War II on further growth of military aviation, and the emergence of new tactical and strategic concepts in the use of military aircraft; progress of research and development and design of aircraft after World War II and the fruition of the effort in the performance of American military aircraft over Korea.

SEAPOWERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, by Donald W. Mitchell, in Current History, v. 26, no. 152 (May 1954) 271-276.

Development of the US Navy during the past 160 years, and its role in future warfare. As long as transportation is vital to war, and until the time when air transport replaces sea transport for bulk cargoes, command of the sea by naval forces will remain of vital importance. The US Navy stands ready to maintain command of the sea, but it also realizes that it will be challenged in the future by new conditions and by improved or new weapons (Mines, submarines, land-based aircraft). How the US Navy in recognition of the challenge is preparing itself for the conditions of future warfare and is utilizing naval air power to strengthen US in offense and defense.

f. U.S.S.R.

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THE BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN SEAPOWER, by Comdr. Anthony Courtney, in *International Affairs*, v. 30, no. 1 (Jan 1954) 13-23.

History of the Russian Navy and naval operations since the early eighteenth century when the Baltic fleet was built by Peter the Great. The destruction of Russian naval ships in the Russo-Japanese war, and the absence of a fleet from 1921 to 1934. The development of an ocean going fleet since 1934, and the expansion of this program since 1945 including quantity production of modern submarines. The development of the Northern Sea Route which links the Northern and Pacific fleets some months of the year, and the construction of the Volga-Don canal which solves the problem of internal communication. Lack of seamanship has been evident in the Russian Navy throughout its history.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL AND MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATION, by Ramsay D. Potts, Jr., in *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals*, v. 299 (May 1955) 38-47.

Evolution of Soviet air power during the years between World War I and the political purge in the thirties, the period of 1938-45, including the climatic experiences of World War II, and the period after 1945; Soviet progress in the field of aircraft engines; Soviet doctrine on the use of air power; Soviet aeronautical designers and engineers (Ilyushin, Gurevich, Lavochkin, and Yakovlev); and progress in Soviet aeronautical engineering training.

THE GROWTH OF THE RED ARMY, by D. Fedotoff White. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. 486 p.

"... A study of the organizational growth of the armed forces of the Soviets, of the component groups within them, and of the conflicts and conflict situations among these groups."

SOVIET AIR POWER, by Richard E. Stockwell. New York, Pageant Press, 1957. 238 p.

"The author traces the amazing progress of Soviet military airpower from its crude beginnings to its present position of eminence in the world, and in the process points out the tremendous strides that the USSR has made in production, both industrially and education-wise."

3. Command And Staff

a. General Aspects

GENERALSHIP AND THE ART OF COMMAND IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, by Gen. Richard N. Gale, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 101, no. 603 (Aug 1956) 376-386.

THE MILITARY STAFF. ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT, by J. D. Hittle. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1949. 286 p.

A historical survey of the staff organizations and functions of the Armies of France, Germany, Great Britain, United States, and USSR.

NAPOLEON'S METHODS OF COMMAND, by Maj. E. W. Sheppard, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 69, no. 1 (Oct 1954) 85-89.

The problems of military leadership and command in Napoleon's time and his methods of overcoming difficulties. He was the first to combine the advantages of the new divisional system with those of the close-order warfare of former times. His primary principle was unity of command; only one army under one commander was employed in a theater of operations. His methods of keeping in close and constant touch with his divisional and corps commanders, and his employment of a staff of aides for this purpose when units were widely scattered. Command in Napoleon's style can be exercised best in armies of limited size; it was under such conditions that Montgomery and Rommel made their reputations in North Africa.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBINED MILITARY EFFORT, by Elisha O. Peckham, in *Military Review*, v. 30, no. 8 (Nov 1950) 46-50.

Study of the problems of a defensive coalition of free and independent nations, among them being the selection of common objectives, unity of command, and the employment of available forces. Specifically discussed are the purpose of combined command and its problems; possible procedure; the Western Union; and command in a combined theater.

PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP, by Maj. John H. Burns, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 32-58.

A study of the qualities of mass leadership, of the human as a soldier, the psychological nature of man, and the role of leadership in military organizations. Some of the conclusions: man's conduct is

governed by instinct, not reason; differences in national psychology are due mainly to national tradition and culture - not race; the making of the human into a soldier depends on utilizing to the fullest extent the herd instinct of man; a soldier is a herd-conscious individual, impregnated with certain soldierly ideals - not a warrior fond of fighting; leaders derive their power from acceptance by the herd as leaders and judges of herd conduct, and the primary duty of the military leader is to inculcate proper ideals of military conduct; leadership and generalship are two different qualities and leadership is more important to winning battles than generalship; small group leadership calls for a different technique than that of a mass leader; mass leaders are not likely to develop under our present military system, and there is a strong suspicion that they do not flower under any military system.

b. Germany - Historical Examples

THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, by Brig. Gen. James Edmonds, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 99, no. 593 (Feb 1954) 54-57. Brief comments on the history and operations of the General Staff and the types of work it did well and badly. The German General Staff has been over-rated; its officers could plan but could not improvise. However, it did achieve the careful selection of the right man and did achieve his proper placement regardless of rank.

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY; A LESSON IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION, by Carey Brewer, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 82, no. 2 (Feb 1956) 157-166. Descriptive analysis of the German Army General Staff system. The survey deals with those factors primarily responsible for the German failure to achieve the desired balance in the use of the three services, as well as with those factors which tended to strengthen the internal staff system. Intended as an illustration of the inadequacy of a single-service supreme general staff for the direction of multi-service forces. Historical development; characteristics prior to 1914; and the German General Staff during World Wars I and II.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF, 1657-1945, by Walter Goerlitz. New York, Praeger, 1953. 508 p. (Translated by Brian Battershaw.) History of the General Staff, tracing its origins to the armies of Frederick the Great and sketching its development throughout the history until that "apocalyptic" moment in the ruins of the Reichskanzlei when Germany was at last left without an army of any kind through which it might operate.

c. United States

ELIHU ROOT AND THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION, by Richard W. Leopold. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1954. 222 p. The reorganization of the Army and of the General Staff which he effected as Secretary of War (1899-1904), as the subject of a brief chapter.

THE GENERAL STAFF, by Harry M. DeWitt, rev. ed. N.P., 1953. 10 p.

Definition and various concepts of the General Staff; features of the German General Staff system; establishment of the General Staff Corps in the US Army in 1903; the War Department reorganization of 9 March 1942 as the most drastic and fundamental change since the establishment of the General Staff in 1903; reorganization of 14 May 1946 which substantially returned the Army to the form of organization in effect prior to the 1942 reorganization; creation and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; authority of the Secretary of Defense; and the possibilities of a General Staff System for the US Armed Forces. Our present educational system with an Armed Forces War College, Industrial College, and Staff College provides an adequate foundation, facilities, and framework for a General Staff System, but the application is lacking.

THE GENERAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY, by Gen. W. B. Palmer, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 4 (Apr 1957) 2-13.

Recent changes simplify and clarify lines of responsibility in the General Staff of the US Army. The Vice Chief of Staff traces the background and significance of these changes. Organizational charts.

HOW DO WE 'GET THE WORD'? by George C. Reinhardt, in Military Review, v. 32, no. 5 (Aug 1952) 31-36.

The US Army's tactical and logistical chains of command and the organizational inconsistency which creates logistical complications. Doubts if the newly created Logistical Command can unify and direct (and have its service troops fight whenever necessary) the increasingly complicated logistical operations which are basically complicated because of organizational deficiencies of the Army. Concludes that in logistical operations there is need for unity of command as supported by Clausewitz's doctrine, and that dilution of command through numerous headquarters' echelons adversely affects the unity of command.

INVITATION TO THINK, by Gen. Willard G. Wyman, in Infantry School Quarterly, v. 46, no. 4 (Oct 1956) 8-15.

The General extends an invitation "to the officers and men who will fight our battles to push back the false horizons imposed by past victories and futuristic fantasy and see clearly what must be done in the Army now to win our future battles. . . an invitation to contribute to the evolution in doctrine, organization and technique necessitated by our atomic age." Today the Army needs constructive ideas, and the General presents some areas where the imagination "of every thinking soldier" can add to the strength and support of the Army.

LINCOLN AND HIS GENERALS, by T. Harry Williams. New York, Knopf, 1952, 363 p.
"Lincoln as a director of war and his place in the high command and his influence in developing a modern command system for this nation."

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GENERAL STAFF, by Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson. Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 608 p.
Contents: INTRODUCTION, p. 1; SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT, p. 10; THE GENERAL STAFF EMERGES, p. 39; THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE - 1904-1916, p. 73; THE TEST OF WORLD WAR I - 1916-1919, p. 187; CONSOLIDATING THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT AFTER WORLD WAR I, p. 274; DEFECTS IN WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AT THE OUTSET OF WORLD WAR II, p. 314; THE WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION OF MARCH 9, 1942, p. 335; WAR DEPARTMENT AND ARMY DEVELOPMENTS DURING WORLD WAR II, p. 397; THE GENERAL STAFF DURING WORLD WAR II, p. 465; and WHAT OF THE FUTURE? p. 569.

ORIGINS OF THE NAVY'S WAR STAFF, by Comdr. Neville T. Kirk, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 18, no. 5 (May 1955) 615.
Brief details on the events and personalities of the period 1800-1900 which influenced the creation of the Naval War College, Naval War Board, and the General Board which provided the US Navy with a general staff.

PREWAR MILITARY PLANS AND PREPARATIONS, 1939-41, by Maurice Matloff, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 7 (July 1953) 741-748.
Weaknesses in the US military establishment and in war plans prior to World War II. How the plans were then formulated; organization of the US Army's planning section; details of some of the plans that had

been prepared; and expansion of the US Armed Forces between 1939 and 1941. The failure to keep pace with strategic planning emphasizes the need for current strategic estimates of the situation.

SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF OR SUPER-STAFF? by Lt. Col. Earl W. Edwards, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 3-7.
The relationship between the chief of staff and his secretariat; and the advantages and disadvantages of the secretariat system, at unit level. Under the present practices, recommendations which have been developed, approved, and forwarded by a senior staff officer are often influenced in the process of review by relatively junior officers of the secretariat who have less experience, but who must brief the chief of staff on the subject in question. The close relationship between the chief of staff and the officers of his secretariat places them in a position not only of briefing the chief of staff but of advising him as well. When such advice is accepted the secretariat in effect becomes the super-staff of the chief of staff. As a solution suggests: greater decentralization from the chief of staff to his assistant chiefs of staff in order that they may act for him on most matters within their own spheres of responsibility; and the adoption of the practice whereby, when it is necessary for the chief of staff to be briefed on a given subject, he is briefed by the chief of the staff division responsible for the problem.

SOLDIERS AND SCHOLARS; MILITARY EDUCATION AND NATIONAL POLICY, by John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957. 530 p.
" . . . A forthright analysis of military responsibility today, the growth of education for policy roles, the form and content of that education, and its relation to the over-all duties of the armed forces."

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? by Col. Patrick D. Mulcahy, in Army, v. 7, no. 3 (Oct 1956) 19-23.
The Army's future lies in the foresight and zeal with which its officer corps stands up to the challenges of the times. The author first describes the challenges of the times then shows how the challenges are to be overcome.

YOUR PLACE IN POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY, by Lt. Col. Jack J. Wagstaff, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 8 (Nov 1955) 47-50.
Training in the politico-military field should start the day an officer is commissioned and should continue until the day he retires. The factors that made politico-military policy an important Army responsibility that is here to stay, and how an officer can prepare himself to help the Army carry out this responsibility.

d. U. S. S. R.

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, in Tairiku Mondai, (1 Feb 1954) 35-38. Translated from Japanese.

The prerogative of the Supreme Command; functions of the State Committee for Defense; machinery for appointing the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces; functions of the Minister of Defense; relationship of land, sea, and air forces; mission of the General Staff Headquarters, Political General Headquarters, Navy General Headquarters, and of the Army General Headquarters. (The above information is deduced from various data available to the writer.)

DUAL COMMAND IN THE RED ARMY, 1918-1942, by Littleton B. Atkinson. Montgomery, Ala., Air University, 1950. 67 p. (Air University Documentary Research Study.)

The Soviet military system, while conforming in the main to the traditional organizational pattern, nevertheless contains unique features which are intimately connected with the relationship of the Communist Party to the military forces and to Soviet policy in general. Prominent among these singular institutions and relationships is the system of dual command in the Red Army. Origin and initial development of this dual command; transition to a modified duality; decline and renaissance of full duality of command; and fluctuation of the command principle, 1940-1942.

THE MARSHALS MOVE UP, in Business Week, no. 1329 (19 Feb 1955) 130-136.

Biographical sketches of Marshals Nikolai Bulganin and Georgi Zhukov, the new Soviet premier and defense minister respectively. The political emergence of these military leaders is a break from Stalin's system of balancing the conflicting interests of the party and the Red Army and a potential threat to the Communist Party's control over the Army.

PARTY AND POLITICAL ORGANS IN THE SOVIET ARMY, by I. Dmitriev. New York, East European Fund, 1953. 59 p. (Research Program on the USSR. Mimeographed Series No. 36.)

Experience has convinced the Soviet Government that the responsibility for loyalty in the Red Army cannot be delegated to the military commanders. The political commissar system is the result of this conviction. The author, who was an artillery officer in the Red Army for

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more than twenty years, explains the mechanics of political indoctrination during 1928-1949 in the light of political shifts in Soviet foreign policy. Party-political organs of the Red Army; recruitment and training of political officers; political organization within units, political indoctrination of enlisted personnel and officers; shifts in political subjects of the indoctrination program 1948-1949 and 1949-1950 to emphasize the growing rift between USSR and the West; and reactions of military personnel to political indoctrination.

POLITICAL CONTROLS IN THE SOVIET ARMY, ed. by Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York, Research Program on the USSR, 1954. 93 p.

A study based on reports by former Soviet officers. Deals with the organization of political controls in the Soviet Armed Forces; political indoctrination of the Soviet troops; and the function of the Special Sections in the Soviet Armed Forces, which are part of the overall police network directed by the Ministry of Interior (MVD). Despite inherent weaknesses the control system in the Soviet Armed Forces continues to do its job. The conflicts and resentment which the Soviet system breeds are not sufficient in themselves to constitute an effective challenge of the loyalty of the Soviet military personnel to the regime. The system of political controls in the Armed Forces of USSR must not be underestimated.

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION IN THE SOVIET POSTWAR ARMY. New York, East European Fund, 1953. 29 p. (Research Program on the USSR. Mimeographed Series No. 30.)

Organization and methods of political indoctrination within the units of Soviet Army of Occupation in Germany during 1949-1951. Training in political matters of unit deputy-commanders prior to their assignment to units; role of the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization) in Army political propaganda; relationship between political officers and non-political enlisted and officer personnel of the Army; and subjects of political indoctrination program. The anonymous author served as a captain in the Red Army of Occupation in Eastern Germany, and in 1951 attended the Communist Party school for the training of political officers. He defected to the West late in 1951.

SECURITY CONTROL IN THE SOVIET ARMY, by Lt. Benson Lee Grayson, in Antiaircraft Journal, v. 97, no. 4 (July-Aug 1954) 15-17.

The methods and organization used by the Communist Party to ensure its control of the Soviet Army. Operations of the Main Political Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense; functions of the political officers assigned to Army units from the top down to company level; and the political indoctrination given to troops. The network of informers used by the political officers to spy on their fellow soldiers. That such a system of control is necessary indicates weaknesses in Soviet solidarity which could be exploited by an enemy in time of war.

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4. Strength And Composition

a. General Aspects

THE BERTRAND STEWART PRIZE ESSAY, 1956, by Capt. R. L. C. Dixon, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 73, no. 2 (Jan 1957) 162-182.

"In a nuclear war, the army must be organized into light, mobile, hard-hitting divisions." A discussion of a suitable organization to meet conditions of a future war. Definition of total and limited wars, the roles of armies in such wars, some of the problems of nuclear battle, defense, defense and attack in nuclear war, and the organization of fighting formations for defense and offense.

NAVAL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, by Anthony E. Sokol, in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 3 (June 1955) 26-36.

Although European military integration in the form of the EDC has failed to materialize, the need for closer cooperation among West European nations is just as urgent as ever. The problem is being recognized and is receiving the attention of statesmen and military leaders. However, while a great deal of interest has been centered on the unification of continental armies, little consideration has been given to the naval side of the problem. The reasons why there is need for naval forces in the West's defense strategy against the Soviet Union; the political and military problems of naval integration; the strength of the navies of Western strategy, and would be militarily effective and politically acceptable. Tables show present Allied and Soviet naval strength; and the distribution of Allied naval units under the proposed integration plan.

b. France

FRENCH MECHANIZED FORMATIONS, by R. M. Ogorkiewicz, in *Army Quarterly*, v. 73, no. 1 (Oct 1956) 33-38.

In response to the challenge of the nuclear age the French Army has come forward with a number of new ideas from weapons to the organization of tactical formations. One of the new ideas is in the field of armored forces where the French have gone for the Division Légère Mécanique to the Division Mécanique Rapide and which is discussed.

c. Germany - Historical Examples

mh INTEGRATED ARMORED ARMY, by Franz Halder and Hermann Burkart Mueller-Hillebrand. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950. 67 p. (MS # P-053.)
Vehicles and weapons of German armored units, organization of the troops, and combat tactics; comparison of the capabilities of medium and heavy tanks; supply of the armored division; headquarters organization of the armored corps and army; and technical aspects of tank design and performance. The organizations and equipment of an armored division, an armored regiment, and other units are outlined in appendixes.

d. Great Britain

THE ARMY OF TODAY - AND OF TOMORROW, by Anthony Head, in *Services and Territorial Magazine*, v. 31, no. 197 (Apr-May 1952) 8-12.
Extracts of the principal comments on present trends in the British Army compiled from the debate on the Army budget in Parliament. The location of Army garrisons throughout the world. Comments on motorized and other equipment now being delivered. The problem of training Territorials for a more extensive period, and the relationship of longer training to maximum industrial output. The development of the Territorial Army since the close of World War II.

THE BRITISH ARMY, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., Command and General Staff College, 1954. 12 p. (702/5.)

Organization and direction of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, with particular stress on the Army.

THE BRITISH ARMY IS BEING EQUIPPED TO MEET ANY THREAT OF ATOMIC WARFARE, in *United Services and Empire Review* (Oct 1954) 1-5 plus.

Recent conferences held by the War Office revealed that organizational changes are to take place within the British Army in order to bring it in line with the requirement of atomic warfare. Some details on manpower, transport, weapons, organization of units for rapid concentration and dispersion, and increased training of troops.

THE FACTS ABOUT THE HOME GUARD, by Brig. C. P. R. Johnston, in Territorial and Home Guard Magazine, v. 24, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 21-22.

Mission, organization, service conditions, mustering, and training of the British Home Guard. The Guard was reformed and reinstated as part of the British Armed Forces in 1951. Its roles are: (1) defense against airborne and seaborne raids; (2) protection of key points; and (3) assistance to civil defense. The Home Guard is needed in peace both as a framework on which to expand to full war strength, and to perform the defensive tasks allotted in time of mobilization.

A FUTURE FOR THE COLONIAL FORCES, by Lt. Col. C. Nixon, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 98, no. 590 (May 1953) 261-268.

Present structure of the British colonial forces, with suggestions on how better preparations can be made in peacetime for the fullest use of these forces in war.

LIGHT DIVISIONS AND HEAVY BRIGADES, by Maj. A. J. I. Poynder, in Army Quarterly, v. 74, no. 1 (Apr 1957) 69-81.

Considers the present organization of the British Army and suggests how it may be adapted to give a higher standard of mobility, flexibility, and striking power. Factors affecting the organization of the Army today; present organization, changes in the fighting arms, and disadvantages of the armored and new infantry divisions; and proposed solution considering reorganization of the infantry division and changes in the fighting arms as a whole.

NEW LOOK FOR NATO'S DIVISIONS? in Economist, v. 177, no. 5853 (29 Oct 1955) 393-394.

The concepts of modern warfare suggest a reorganization of the British combat units. A proposal calls for a division consisting of three self-contained brigade groups each with its own infantry, tanks, and supporting fire power. Such a formation should have both strong defensive power and the ability to deliver massive and sustained attacks when opportunity offers. Its tactics will largely be governed by the power of supporting atomic weapons, and the need to avoid offering targets for the enemy's atomic weapons and making them concentrate to offer suitable targets.

PERMANENT INTEGRATION OF COMMONWEALTH FORCES, by Lt. Col. R. L. Clutterbuck, in Army Quarterly, v. 68, no. 2 (July 1954) 161-173.

The problems involved in integrating Commonwealth military units with those of the British Armed Forces and the difficulties of creating efficient composite forces for the defense of Europe. Incidents from World War II in which Commonwealth commanders were faced with a choice between obeying their governments or their tactical commanding officers; reasons for the smooth functioning of the Commonwealth Division in Korea, the chief of which was a common political aim; and the impracticability of integrating Commonwealth forces with others while there is a diversity of political policies.

e. NATO

NATO, in Air Intelligence Training Bulletin, v. 6, no. 10 (Oct 1954) 2-69.

The entire issue is devoted to the history and present functioning of NATO, the military strength of the member nations and of the USSR, and various political, economic, and military aspects of all of the NATO nations except the US. The troop strength of the NATO forces is approximately 3,100,000 men, and the 5,800 aircraft include 2,400 fighter and fighter-bomber jets. Improvements in the quality and efficiency of the USSR Armed Forces and their equipment: there are 4,750,000 men under arms, the Soviet Army numbers 175 divisions, and the Red Air Force has about 20,000 aircraft of all types including 9,000 jet fighters.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; ITS DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE. Washington, Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, 1952. 50 p. (Department of State Publication 4630, General Foreign Policy Series 75.)

Background, origin, and text of the North Atlantic Treaty; the purposes and organization of NATO; its accomplishments to date; the problems of the future; and America's interest in the Organization.

f. United States

THE AIR FORCE, by Arnold Brophy. New York, Gilbert Press, 1956. 362 p.
The story of today's U.S. Air Force, of its organization and combined offensive and defensive capabilities. The author brings into

focus why a strong USAF - with the ability to deliver nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons to any spot in the world in a matter of hours - is essential to preserve the nation's freedom.

wc THE ARMOR OF ORGANIZATION, by Alvin Brown. New York, Hibbert Printing Co., 1953. 597 p.

Critical review of the present organization of the armed forces; the historical developments that led up to the obvious deficiencies, such as lack of delegation of responsibilities and the neglect of a functional organization. Based on the principles of administration, a new organization is proposed in some detail.

THE DESIGNING OF NEW DIVISIONS FOR OUR ARMY, by Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, in Armor, v. 64, no. 3 (May-June 1955) 22-25.

Aspects of the future divisional structure and of training to be stressed in streamlining division organization; and some of the many things to be accomplished after the composition of the new divisions has been determined, such as: (1) revision of the composition of the type field army; (2) establishment of command and support relationships in the corps and army; (3) development of new TO&E's; (4) reexamination of existing development programs to determine validity of items and existing essential military characteristics; (5) examination of existing procurement programs; (6) preparation of new staff data tables; (7) modification of the service schools' curricula; (8) preparation of new field manuals and school texts; (9) preparation of new problems at service schools; (10) reorganization of Active Army, National Guard, and Reserve components; and (11) preparation of new training programs, schedules, and subject schedules.

THE NAVY'S ROLE IN THE ATOMIC AGE, by Lt. J. G. Arthur Widder, in Reserve Officer, v. 31, no. 12 (Dec 1955) 10-11 plus.

Comments on the impact of the changes brought about by nuclear development on the organization, mission, and weapon systems of the U. S. Navy.

WHY FIVE? by Lt. Col. Grat. B. Hankins and others, in Infantry School Quarterly, v. 47, no. 2 (Apr 1957) 7-12.

Discussion and explanation of the new revamping of all divisions in the U. S. Army using the Pentomic concept and a pentagonal structure.

g. U.S.S.R.

THE ARCTIC DIVISIONS OF THE USSR, in Tairiku Mondai, (1 Mar 1954) 11-14. Translated from Japanese.

General description of the weather, terrain, transportation, and population of the Arctic regions of the Soviet Union, and the mission and strength in men and weapons of the Red Army's Arctic Divisions.

BRITAIN APPRAISES SOVIET NAVY RISE, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 11 (Nov 1954) 1295.

A recent appreciation by the British Admiralty of the present and future Soviet Navy. Within the next two or three years the USSR will possess 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, 500 motor torpedo boats, 1,000 minesweepers, and at least 4,000 naval aircraft. The Soviet Navy's appropriations have probably been at least \$33,600,000,000 since 1945. A cruiser of the SVERDLOV class can be built in about two and one-half years and a submarine in about six months.

A GLANCE AT SOVIET AIR CAPABILITIES, in Naval Aviation News (Oct 1954) 13-15.

The attack capabilities of the USSR Air Force and the performance possibilities of Soviet planes now in service. The USSR now has air bases from which they could launch attacks by conventional light bombers on Allied shipping in the English Channel, the North Sea, and upon every port in northwestern Europe.

THE RISE OF RUSSIAN SEA POWER, by Col. J. D. Hittle, in Marine Corps Gazette, v. 39, no. 8 (Aug 1955) 20-27.

Comparison of the present and planned strength of the Soviet Navy with that of the U. S. and U. K. A survey of the salient features of Russian naval history to provide the basis for a better understanding of the nature and role of the fast growing Russian Navy that is even now posing a new and growing threat to the security of the Free World.

RUSSIA FORGING TRANS-POLAR STRIKING FORCE, in Aviation Age, v. 22, no. 3 (Sept 1954) 16-23.

Soviet Union views the polar regions as the main avenue for aerial warfare in the event of World War III. The strength of the Soviet long-range bomber striking force; the airbase structure; and types of

equipment in use. With map showing airbase structure in northern USSR supporting the growing Soviet trans-polar strategic bombing force. A list (eighty-five locations) of Soviet ground facilities and airborne units located in the Arctic and Northern Pacific coastal areas is appended.

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, in Officers' Call (Jan 1956) 20 p. (DA Pamphlet No. 355-22.)

A brief survey of the Soviet military forces, touching upon their development, organization and composition, strength, morale, tactical doctrines, and training techniques.

SOVIET ARMoured FORMATIONS, by R. M. Ogorkiewicz, in Army Quarterly, v. 71, no. 1 (Oct 1955) 33-39.

Development of Soviet armored formations and Soviet armor concept since the early 1930's; and organization and evaluation of present Soviet armored forces. Postwar armored formations represent one third of the Soviet Field forces and are their most effective, versatile, and mobile striking units. The division is the basic armored formation, and there are two types; the tank division with relative high proportion of tanks, and the mechanized division with preponderance of infantry. Both are closely integrated, self-contained formations of tanks and infantry with considerable fighting force.

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES, by N. Galai, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 5 (Aug 1954) 3-8. In English.

Postwar development of the Soviet Navy and its present strength in: battleships, armored coast guard vessels, light and heavy cruisers, big submarines, big oceangoing and coastal destroyers, escorts, minesweepers and patrol vessels, minesweeping boats, motor torpedo boats, picket boats and submarine chasers, landing craft, and ice breakers. Lack of aircraft carriers precludes the use of Soviet surface naval forces in long-range operations. They may not operate beyond the range of Soviet fighter protection, that is approximately 250 miles from their coastline.

THE SOVIET NAVY, by Hanson W. Baldwin, in Foreign Affairs, v. 33, no. 4 (July 1955) 587-604.

A brief review of the Tsarist and later Soviet naval history. The present strength of the Soviet Navy is estimated to be: three obsolete battleships; about 24 cruisers, of which about half was built after World War II; 110 to 130 destroyers; and perhaps 350 to 370 submarines. All

Soviet naval aviation consisting of about 3000 to 4000 planes is landbased and aircraft are under the operational command of each fleet commander. Between 750,000 and 850,000 men of whom about 200,000 are the "hard core" service these ships and aircraft. The organization of the Soviet Navy is influenced both by Marxism and geography. The operational forces are divided into four principal fleet commands: Northern or Arctic; Baltic; Black; and Pacific or Far Eastern. Each of these has its own subordinate fleet air arm. Location of naval bases and their relation to the industrial centers; strategic concepts pertinent to each of the commands and all over capabilities.

TANK FORCES IN THE SOVIET ARMY, by N. Galai, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 7 (Oct 1954) 3-15. In English.

The importance placed by the Soviet Army on tanks and mechanized formations during World War II, and the post-war structure of the Soviet land forces of which one-third are armored divisions, contradict the official Soviet doctrine which defines infantry as the basic branch of the Soviet forces and states that the mission of all other branches (artillery, tanks, and air force) is to support the infantry. Evaluates this discrepancy between the official doctrine and actual practices and describes the strength and development of Soviet tank forces during World War II and since then. Examines: composition of the Soviet Army in divisions in April 1945; tank corps, summer 1944; mechanized corps, summer 1944; tank division, 1951; and mechanized division, 1951. The Red Army's tank forces are the best of all the branches of the Soviet land forces and constitute their real striking force. If a war broke out, the opponents of the USSR would meet Soviet tank forces much better in quality than during the last war and considerably greater in number.

5. Missions

a. United States

THE AIR FORCE AND GUIDED MISSILES, by Brig. Gen. E. P. Mechling, in Ordnance, v. 37, no. 197 (Mar-Apr 1953) 789-790.

Pilotless aircraft and guided aircraft rockets as a normal extension and a refinement of the aircraft the USAF has been developing for years. In the same sense, the transition of Air Force air offense, air defense, reconnaissance, or other types of organizations from piloted to pilotless aircraft will be a continuation of the process that, through the years, has supplanted obsolescent aircraft with up-to-date models and has been responsible for the ever-growing effectiveness of Air Force units in meeting the problems of defense.

THE ARMY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEMOCRACY, by Lt. Col. Coleman W. Thacher, in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 1 (Apr 1955) 25-31.

The Army is no longer a force that can be kept solely for the purpose of fighting wars, as has been done in the past. It has a greater, more complex mission based upon political and economic considerations in addition to the military requirements. It represents land power as an essential element of our national strength. In its cold war mission, the Army has become just as characteristic a part of the American way of life as the other elements of our national power. Like them, its greatest importance is to be realized in the political and economic fields as contrasted to its purely military role.

ARMY AVIATION, by Lt. Col. George L. Morelock, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 35, no. 10 (Jan 1956) 53-64.

The evolution of Army aviation; its functions: (1) aerial observation, including limited aerial photography; (2) control of armed forces; (3) command, liaison, and courier missions; (4) aerial wire laying; (5) transportation of Army supplies, equipment, personnel, and small units within the combat zone; (6) aeromedical evacuation within the combat zone; and (7) artillery and topographic survey. Types of aircraft used by Army aviation. Photographs.

THE ARMY IN THE ATOMIC AGE, in *Officers' Call* (Jan 1955) 9 p. (DA Pamphlet No. 355-21.)

A discussion of the Army's role as an instrument of national security in the atomic age. Current army views on the weapons, tactics and techniques, organization, and support that will be required to insure success in modern war.

THE ARMY'S CHANGING ROLE, by John K. Mahon, in *Current History*, v. 26, no. 153 (May 1954) 262-270.

There is a probability that atomic power coupled with air power has changed the basic role of the land armies. Until there is an unchallenged answer to this question armies must train to perform their age-old task of fighting and overcoming the enemy and occupying his territory to destroy his power. This mission of US Army remains unchanged even if new weapons have revised the methods of warfare. In the light of these facts and claims of the exponents of air power that the Army's strength should be reduced, reviews the development of US Army from the early days of the country, to show that the national climate in which the Army must operate has always influenced its growth and strength, and that peace and war were always the yardsticks by which the funds given to the Army were measured. During peace in the past the Army's usefulness was constantly under attack, but its usefulness and right to train for war in time of peace is better recognized now than ever before. It is unlikely that it will be reduced in strength as much as the protagonists of air power predict.

ARMY'S ROLE IN GUIDED MISSILES, by Maj. Gen. H. N. Toftoy, in *Missiles and Rockets*, v. 1, no. 2 (Nov 1956) 36-39.

Present-day developments and future plans of the Army's guided weapons program.

BIRDS, BULLETS AND MISSILES, in *Armor*, v. 65, no. 3 (May-June 1956) 2-23.

An editorial on the US Army's readiness to fulfill its mission to the Nation in the new age of missiles. States that the Army is ready, because it has experience in the missile field, as well as the necessary missiles to succeed in any type of warfare.

COMMAND STRUCTURE IN EUROPE, by Frank Walter, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 9, no. 9 (Sept 1954) 19-22.

History, mission, and organizational structure of the US European Command, established in August 1952. The overall mission of the command is to exercise joint authority and control over all US forces within its area of responsibility. It supports the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and is the senior US military representative for all joint matters in the fields of international negotiations, procurement, construction, communications, and politico-military matters. The Commander-in-Chief, US European Command, also holds the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, for NATO.

CONARC - ORGANIZATION WITH A MISSION, by Lt. Col. John G. Blair, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 10, no. 10 (Oct 1955) 14-17.

Mission, objectives, organization, and training and development duties of the US Army's Continental Army Command. CONARC is relied upon to accomplish the ground defense of US, to carry on training activities necessary to maintain a global Army, and to pursue the research and testing programs which insure that the US Army is truly modern in concept, training, and equipment.

HARNESS THE REVOLUTION, by Maj. John H. Cushman, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 13-18.

In order to integrate the revolutionary means of war, which are now emerging, into a superlative weapons system for ground warfare, the Army must apply objectivity, imagination, and courageous leadership. An appraisal of the US Army's role in the nation's security; the problems that face it and must be solved if the role is to be fulfilled; and the goals it must set for itself to utilize to its advantage the new weapons which are revolutionizing ground warfare. The Army's survival depends on its ability to adapt itself to changing conditions. If it fails it will be destroyed. The time is short.

MISSILES - KEY TO FUTURE STRENGTH, by James H. Douglas, in Air Force, v. 39, no. 9 (Sept 1956) 97-98.
Stresses the broad impact that the development and employment of missiles will have on the capability of the Air Force to achieve military objectives in support of US national policy.

NATIONAL POLICY AND THE ARMY, by Thornton Page, in Army, v. 6, no. 11 (June 1956) 30-33 plus.
Review of past military thinking, particularly the factors that have been considered most vital to victory, with the conclusion that history confirms the important and necessary role of the Army to control peoples and to hold ground; and requirements of the future US Army as regards size, nature, activities, and support requirements.

SEA POWER FOR FREEDOM, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 212 (Sept-Oct 1955) 215.

The US Navy's task in the alliance between the US and the Western Powers is to keep the sea lanes of the world open. This task calls for a powerful sea-air arm in being, equipped to fight in the expanded arena of ocean warfare that includes operations in the air as well as on and under the surface of the seas. An enormous array of ships and armament is required to carry out the task. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, newly appointed Chief of Naval Operations, is well qualified to guide the Navy's ceaseless quest for superior weapons and is an ideal choice to direct all naval operations. With a biographical sketch of Adm. Burke's naval career.

6. Manpower

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT. HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, ON H. R. 5426, AN ACT RELATING TO THE RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 26-29, 1952. Washington, 1952. 347 p.

Mission of the Subcommittee was to consider this bill which aimed at creating an effective Reserve structure of the US Armed Forces.

Testimony by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey and members of the Department of Defense; expressions of opinion on the controversial parts of the proposed legislation by members of organizations representing veterans, labor, farmers, professional societies, and other varied interests.

CONDITIONS IN THE BRITISH AND COMMUNIST ARMIES COMPARED, in United Services and Empire Review (Apr 1951) 2-3 plus.
Factors of pay, allowances, living conditions, military discipline, officer-enlisted relationships, etc. in the Russian, Chinese Communist, and British Armies are assessed, concluding that, while the Communists have a formidable number of men available, they are no match, man for man, with the better-educated, better equipped, and more resourceful Westerners.

HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY: 1776-1945, by Lt. Col. George G. Lewis and Capt. John Mewha. Washington, Department of the Army, 1955. 278 p. (DA Pamphlet No. 20-213.)

This study is primarily a treatment of the use of prisoner of war labor by the United States Army. It also provides a comprehensive treatment of the employment of prisoners of war by private employers in the United States.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, by Brig. Gen. Charles H. Anderson. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1955. 21 p. (L 55-40.)

The process of determining the US military force levels, and the interaction of factors affecting these decisions. The importance attached to these factors changes from time to time with resultant changes in the military strengths of the services. Brief data on the reserve programs and the broad objectives which an acceptable reserve program must achieve.

RESERVE FORCES ACT OF 1955, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 2 (Feb 1955) 1-72.

This special issue on the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 contains articles by Army representatives and some leading American citizens on: the provisions of the act; Army implementation; and the impacts of the mandatory training provisions on young men and on American life.

THE RESERVES OF THE ARMED FORCES: A HISTORICAL SYM-
POSIUM, in *Military Affairs*, v. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1953) 1-36.
Papers presented at the joint session of American Military
Institute and the American Historical Association, Washington, D. C.,
30 December 1952. The objectives of the session: bringing out the
historical facts of the development of US Reserve Forces; evaluating
their role in America's life; and stimulating further investigation on what
the US military policy should be to provide the Armed Forces with ade-
quate numbers of trained personnel for use in an emergency. The papers
deal with: early and post-World War II history of the development of
Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserves; impetus given to US Reserve
Program by the war in Korea; quantitative proportion of Reserves in the
Armed Forces; role of the citizen-soldier in defending America since
the days of the Militia; the reasons for long-standing popular hostility in
America to an established citizen army; and US legislation for the
Reserve Program.

SOLIDARITY IS THE KEY TO THE MASS ARMY, by Capt. Roger W.
Little, in *Army Combat Forces Journal*, v. 5, no. 7 (Feb 1955) 27-31.

The importance of solidarity as the root of esprit, discipline,
and morale. Solidarity is the tendency of the members of a group to act
together toward their own ideals. Where it does not exist, there can be
no discipline. The mass soldier of the modern army responds best to
rules that he helps make. The standards to which he will conform are
those of the small group in which he feels at home. The problem of
solidarity is to unite that small group with the larger components of
military organization.

TOWARD A LONG-RANGE MANPOWER POLICY, by Omar N.
Bradley, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 6, no. 3 (Mar 1951) 11-15.

The overall situation and its related military problems require
the formulation and adoption of a manpower policy that can be sustained for
many years, especially if a full mobilization is called for. It must be
within our national means and consistent with the attitudes of the American
people toward their own defense. Our basic strength consists of two main
elements: our military power, and the tremendous industrial power we
can mobilize, both of which require trained manpower. Our specific mili-
tary objectives require a force of 3 1/2 million, 1 1/2 to 2 million to be
provided through selective or universal service, and also require the
adoption of a system to provide trained men for our reserve components.
The problem of meeting these requirements can be solved partly by the
use of as many men with limited physical qualifications as possible. The
best solution for keeping National Guard and Reserve units composed of
completely trained men at all times is to have every man who completes
his active service serve a term of duty with the National Guard or Reserve.

b. Procurement

HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
ARMY: 1775-1945, by Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1st Lt. Merton
G. Henry, Washington, Department of the Army, 1955. 721 p. (DA
Pamphlet No. 20-212.)

The objective of this monograph is to provide a comprehensive
record of military mobilizations in the United States for the use of General
Staff officers and students in the Army school system. It deals essentially
with the manpower aspects of military mobilization.

1 AUGUST 1914: FRANCE MOBILIZES. 1er Août 1914: La France
mobilise, by Pierre Dominique, in *Miroir de l'Histoire*, no. 55 (Aug 1954)
140-150. In French.

The reaction of the people of Paris to the events immediately
preceding the outbreak of World War I.

SELECTIVE SERVICE AND SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER, by Maj. Gen.
Lewis B. Hershey, in *Armed Forces Chemical Journal*, v. 10, no. 1 (Jan-
Feb 1956) 6-8 plus.

This discussion of the influence of the Selective Service System
upon the problem of technical manpower requirements outside the Armed
Forces concludes that, while the System supports completely the idea that
"specialized" personnel should be trained and utilized, this should be
brought about in some better way than by implanting the idea that some
civilian activity is going to become an exemption from or something in
lieu of military service.

c. Training And Education

APPLICATIONS OF TELEVISION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS, by
Capt. H. C. Oppenheimer, in *Society of Motion Picture and Television
Engineers, Journal*, v. 63, no. 4 (Oct 1954) 150-152.

The exploratory exercises and conclusions of the US Army
Signal Corps Mobile Television System since it was launched in February
1953. The primary uses of television are: (1) training and education;
(2) as a tactical aid; and (3) as a technical tool for viewing objects which
are inaccessible or dangerous such as radioactive substances. The study

on TV use in training indicated that it is especially useful as a medium for instruction for troops in the lower I.Q. groups. Some of the tactical applications explored are: adjustment of artillery fire; briefing of tactical commanders; reconnaissance; and observation and control of amphibious landings and river crossings.

mh THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY HISTORY, by Waldemar Erfurth. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1947. 26 p. (MS # P-041d.)

High educational level, and devotion to military history of the German General Staff prior to World War I; decline of these interests between wars; and efforts from 1933 to 1939 to increase the general and special knowledge of officers, primarily in the fields of military history and military science. Organization and functions of the institutions and service branches created for this purpose. Objectives and scope of the REVIEW OF MILITARY SCIENCE which was published to fill the need for a journal treating the practical problems of modern warfare. Hitler's animosity to the General Staff, and his appointment of a military historian; and the decline and collapse of these activities under the latter's regime.

FRENCH MILITARY SCHOOLS UNTIL 1914. Les écoles militaires françaises jusqu'en 1914, by Maj. P. Chalmin, in Revue Historique de L'Armée, v. 10, no. 2 (1954) 129-166. In French.

History: (a) under the "old regime" (prior to 1789), (b) under the French Revolution and the Empire, and (c) during the 19th century.

GORDON SHEPARD FIRST PRIZE ESSAY, 1953-54. ["The increasing complexity of modern weapons is demanding an even greater degree of specialization than in the past. Discuss the effect of this trend on the training of officers in the G. D. Branch and suggest how the opposing requirements of specialization and wide experience can best be resolved,"] by Wing Comdr. W. G. Lawrence, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 597 (Feb 1955) 90-103.

To meet the requirements of modern warfare all RAF career officers, including flying or regular duty officers, should be both specialists and capable of executing general duties according to their rank. To achieve this aim, initial training of career officers in both specialist and general duties should go on simultaneously until the officer receives his commission. Thereafter emphasis should be placed on specialization. Short service officers should be trained and employed as specialists.

THE IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION OF THE ARMY. Du rôle idéologique de l'armée, by Gen. L. M. Chassin, in Revue Militaire d'Information, no. 239 (10 Oct 1954) 13-19. In French.

Communist propaganda has exerted a detrimental influence upon the morale and patriotism of French youth. To raise the value of the French Army as a fighting force, the Army should subject its young soldiers to ideological training after the pattern of communist nations by simply adapting communist methods to Western mentality. Such a training program should include: (a) civic topics based on a study of the principal political systems on either side of the Iron Curtain, and (b) a patriotic program, based on the study of history, with emphasis on the historical consequences resulting from the principal civic systems.

KNOW YOUR DARK HORSE, by Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hoy, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 2 (May 1955) 40-43.

Our soldiers must be fully aware that in case of any future war with the Soviets, they will be facing a daring, ruthless, and cunning foe. As a result of indoctrination, training, and increased effectiveness since World War II, all indications lead to the conclusion that the Soviets are capable of employing chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, making effective use of jets and bombers and utilizing masses of men, tanks, and firepower. They possess the technical know-how to produce radar, atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and guided missiles. It is in this light that we should gear our training. We still have a short lead in technical know-how, but we cannot become complacent - we must continue to lead.

THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING, by Maj. Mark M. Boatner, III, in Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 5, no. 7 (Feb 1955) 32-33.

US Army training programs are good in theory and poor in practice. When training is closely controlled from topside, and there is insistence on sticking to formulas and rules, subordinate leaders get little opportunity to use the initiative which is the soul of good instruction. A French method of developing leadership and training initiative on the part of their junior officers is recommended. The French run their people through the more or less conventional basic and unit training, but after this, at regular intervals, the platoon leader is turned loose with his platoon and left completely to his own devices. Adoption of this method by the US Army would afford our platoon leaders an opportunity to bridge the gap between close training supervision and the complete lack of supervision on the battlefield.

A SENNELAGER IN BRITAIN? by T. A. Gibson, in Army Quarterly, v. 61, no. 2 (Jan 1951) 242-246.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 is cited as an example of mere bravery in the field proving hopelessly inadequate against modern

methods of war, due to the lack of field training. The Northwest Frontier of India had been Gt. Britain's proving ground in the past, where young officers developed initiative and responsibility, and saw operations perhaps on a brigade scale. The only area offering like opportunities today is Western Germany, where units can go through battalion, brigade and divisional exercises with most beneficial results. Should the occupation force be withdrawn, some desolate region of Gt. Britain must be found where all arms of the Service can exercise together, in order that they remain tuned up to the latest developments of warfare.

TELEVISION IN ARMY TRAINING; EVALUATION OF TELEVISION IN ARMY BASIC TRAINING, by Joseph H. Kanner and others. Washington, George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, 1954. 61 p. (HumRRO Technical Report 14.)

A study conducted for the purpose of obtaining basic information on: the comparative teaching effectiveness between television and the Army's regular basic training instruction, and the relative effectiveness of kinescope recordings and regular instruction. The basic comparisons between television and regular instruction under matched conditions indicated that television instruction was at least as effective as regular instruction and more effective for lower-aptitude groups. The comparison between kinescopes and regular instruction under matched conditions indicated that kinescope instruction was as effective as regular instruction. Prepared under contract with the Department of the Army.

WHAT DOES THE SOVIET OFFICER READ? by Walter Darnell Jacobs, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 11 (Feb 1957) 37-43. .
The periodical press is a basic weapon in the Soviet's effort to assure that their soldiery has a professional competency and a high level of knowledge of the enemy, his equipment, tactics, and his capabilities. Types of publications published for this purpose by the Soviet Government and the nature of their contents:

D. Weapons And Weapons Systems: Trends And Their Employment

1. General Aspects:

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT: PART 1. GUNS FOR FIGHTERS, PART 2. MISSILES AND PROJECTILES, in *Flight*, v. 67, no. 2401 (28 Jan 1955) 105-110 and 114-122 plus.

Survey of air armament development in US, Great Britain, Switzerland, France and Canada, including gun turrets, air-to-air rocket projectiles, air-to-air guided missiles, air-to-surface rocket projectiles, guided-anti-tank missiles, air-to-under-water missiles, unguided bombs, guided bombs, "special weapons," torpedoes, sea mines, depth charges, napalm, and anti-personnel darts. Photographs.

ARMAMENT AND HISTORY, by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller. New York, Scribner's, 1945. 207 p.

"A study of the influence of armament on history from the dawn of classical warfare to the Second World War."

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS, by S/L N. W. Emmott, in *Roundel*, v. 6, no. 9 (Oct 1954) 13-19.

This RCAF Staff College thesis traces briefly the development of weapons and war from primitive times to the present. Research and development should be devoted in the future largely to increasing the range of the weapons with which the services may be called upon to fight. Among the other characteristics of weapons, long range is the characteristic which has most often been decisive in combat. It provides the most effective basis for development and the best principle upon which to base tactical and strategical operations.

FANTASTIC VERSUS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; UNUSUAL ARMS MAY WEAKEN DEFENSE BY MAKING NORMAL WARFARE SEEM USELESS, by J. F. C. Fuller, in *Ordnance*, v. 36, no. 192 (May-June 1952) 914-917.

History of warfare shows that novel weapons alone cannot win wars. They must be employed together with conventional weapons. Claims have always been made that one weapon or another will quickly end a war, as it is claimed now for atomic or other novel weapons. Korea is another proof that such claims can be only harmful. While atomic weapons will have their place in future warfare, it must be realized that total war will have to be fought in three ways: regular, irregular, and revolutionary. In the regular campaigns atomic weapons can be used, but in guerrilla and other aspects of war they cannot be used.

WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR WAR, by Capt. H. R. Footitt, in *Aircraft, Canada*, v. 18, no. 6 (June 1956) 22-23 plus.
The weapons system concept in the air power system; and some aspects of the role played by aircraft and missiles (or a combination of both) in the weapons system.

a. United States

ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE NAVY, by Rear Adm. George C. Wright, in Ordnance, v. 39, no. 206 (Sept-Oct 1954) 224-225.
The impact of nuclear power on the propulsion of ships; and the Navy's nuclear-power program. Two types of submarine nuclear power plants are in the advanced development stage. One is the submarine thermal reactor which will be installed in the NAUTILUS. The other is an entirely different kind of submarine nuclear power plant now being developed for the SEA WOLF. Both are described. Plans for ultimate adaptation of nuclear power to larger ships; and possibilities of application of nuclear power plants for other naval vessels.

AN ATOMIC NAVY - WHEN, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 39, no. 14 (30 Sept 1955) 40 plus.
A forecast of the trends and changes that are in sight for US sea power. Atomic propulsion for surface ships, subs, and planes; new atomic weapons for use at sea; and what these new trends and changes will mean to the capabilities and striking power of the US Navy. Includes a chart showing the Navy that Russia will have within two years in terms of submarines, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, battleships, patrol vessels, and naval aircraft.

AUSA [ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY] SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, in ARMY, v. 7, no. 5 (Dec 1956) 20-78.
Some speeches in which among other subjects discussed: Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor spoke on the problem of long-range target acquisition and the protection of our own missile sites; Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman - on firepower for the missile age army and why the Army needs missile weapons; Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris - on the Army's mission and the role of missiles; and Dr. W. Von Braun - on the control of outer space as a means of security on earth.

IDEAS AND WEAPONS: EXPLOITATION OF THE AERIAL WEAPON BY THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR I, by I. B. Holley, Jr. New Haven, Yale, 1953. 234 p. (Yale Historical Publications.)
Study in the relationship of technological advance, military doctrine, and the development of weapons.

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: PLANNING MUNITIONS FOR WAR, by Constance McLaughlin Green and others. Washington, US Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955. 542 p. (US Army in World War II, The Technical Services.)

This volume (26th in the series on US Army's history in World War II) tells the story of the behind-the-scenes work of designing and developing the US Army's fighting equipment for World War II. It is the first of three projected volumes on the Ordnance Corps. (The second volume in the Ordnance series will cover procurement and distribution and the third will record Ordnance activities overseas.) The place of the Ordnance Department within the military framework and its task in World War II; the Ordnance Department's history from the American Revolution through 1940; the Department's financial problems prior to World War II; training of military and civilian personnel before and during World War II; research and development before and during World War II; the search for greater mobility and fire power (launchers and fire control, and ammunition); development of better mines, armor plate, and body armor; development of ground-to-air weapons for antiaircraft defense; development of weapons for air-to-air combat and air-to-ground attacks; development of bombs and explosives; the program for conservation of materials; and some of the research and development problems which remained unresolved as the War came to its end. Bibliographical note. Tables, charts, and illustrations.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, in Army Information Digest, v. 12, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 40-48.

The pattern of the future is foreshadowed by Army progress in research and development. A review of both the Army's requirements and advances in weaponry, vehicles and aircraft, and communications are made (by the Office, Chief of Research and Development), as well as the Army's programs in basic research which are of long-range significance to national defense.

WEAPONS: HAS COMPLEXITY GONE TOO FAR? in Fortune, v. 45, no. 4 (Apr 1952) 91-93.

Debate among US military personnel on the trends for research and development programs raises the question: can military leaders distinguish between complexities which dissipate our strength and those which fortify it? The tremendous increase in the cost of modern weapons can strain the national economy and unwise emphasis on "gadgets" and provision for contingencies may waste money and effort. Unnecessary complexity should be distinguished from indispensable complexity.

b. U. S. S. R.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (AND RELATED ASPECTS) IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. Washington, Department of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Army Library, 1956. 2 vols. (Special Bibliography No. 8.)

This bibliographic study consists of two parts. Part "A" covers USSR and other Communist nations; Part "B" covers Western powers and other free nations of the world. The two parts include more than 1,600 abstracted titles on: strengths and organization of armed forces; weapons; vessels, vehicles, and aircraft; industry and industrial trends; and many other specific items of R&D interest. The bibliography is descriptive of the trends and does not delve into the technical aspects.

THE SOVIETS CLOSE THE GAP, by Col. T. C. Mataxis, in Infantry School Quarterly, v. 47, no. 1 (Jan 1957) 19-28.
Current Soviet developments in weapons and tactics and how they surpass capabilities originally credited them.

2. Conventional

AFTER THE JET - WHAT? by Capt. Norman Macmillan, in Aircraft, Australia, v. 34, no. 6 (Mar 1956) 33-34 plus.

Some thoughts on the strategic implication inherent in the factor that turbojet aircraft have a ceiling limitation of 65,000 feet. At that height, a crossover to some other source of power becomes essential if greater height or greater speed, or both are desired. The offensive and defensive implications of this factor in future aerial warfare; how these problems are likely to be resolved; and the role to be played by missiles in the solution of defensive and offensive aerial warfare of the future.

THE CARRIER STORY: A SAGA OF SEAPOWER, by Charles P. Roane, in Bureau of Ships Journal, v. 1, no. 4 (Aug 1952) 2-8.

History of aircraft carriers in the US Navy. The beginnings of the Navy's air arm prior to World War II; design and construction data of the early carriers; their development to keep pace with the improvements in airplanes; and intensification of the carrier-building program prior to World War II. Characteristics of the three super-carriers launched between 1945 and 1947 which can accommodate 17-ton attack bombers. Modernization features added to the Essex-class carriers since 1947, and capabilities of the USS FORRESTAL which is now being built.

HOW IMPENETRABLE IS THE IRON CURTAIN? in Interavia, v. 10, no. 5 (1955) 324-330.

The flying equipment of the Russian Air Force, and the organization and production of the Russian aircraft industry.

A NEW LOOK FOR THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES, by Lt. Col. Irving Heymont, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 10 (Jan 1957) 54-62.

The Soviets are not putting all their eggs in an atomic basket. Developments in ground forces now in being have given the Soviet Army the means to achieve greater firepower, maneuverability, and mobility. Includes photos of various Soviet weapons.

SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND THE THERMONUCLEAR BOMB. Le navire, l'avion et la bombe thermonucléaire, by Camille Rougeron, in Forces Aériennes Françaises, v. 9, no. 99 (Dec 1954) 989-1014. In French.

The advantages of aircraft and submarines over surface naval craft with respect to vulnerability in H-bomb warfare.

THE TEN AGES OF TANK, by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, in Armor, v. 61, no. 3 (May-June 1952) 10-18.

Developmental aspects of armor for the past 30 years, and the changing tactical concepts which emerged with each stage of its development. With photographs of US and various foreign tanks.

3. Nuclear

ANALYSIS OF AN ATOMIC BATTLE. Analyse d'une bataille atomique, by Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche, in Revue de Défense Nationale, v. 11 (Mar 1955) 272-289. In French.

What the course and outcome of the French Campaign in 1940 might have been if the two opposing forces had been equipped with present-day armament and if both Allies and Germans had used atomic weapons.

THE ATOMIC REVOLUTION IN WARFARE, by Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 10, no. 8 (Oct 1954) 315-317.

Critical analysis of the tactical applications of nuclear weapons. Traces the three revolutions in warfare caused by the invention of the atomic bomb: (1) the period of atomic scarcity when only the most vital targets were worth an atomic bomb; (2) the era of atomic plenty when the Army and Navy claimed atomic weapons and regarded them as powerful explosives which could be applied to conventional battle patterns; and (3) the era of the thermonuclear bomb which spells the end of ground warfare. In a thermonuclear war against air attack, defensive and offensive, along with other defensive weapons against air attack, is the critical element, and there is small place for armies and navies. However, unless atomic weapons are released for war or an agreement is reached to prevent use of them, our Armed Forces will be half-atomic and half-conventional and will make our survival, individually and nationally, a matter of chance.

FIGHTING FORMATIONS OF THE FUTURE, by Maj. A. F. J. G. Jackson, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 100, no. 598 (May 1955) 229-235.

Characteristics of atomic weapons. The impact of tactical atomic weapons on concepts of warfare. The effects on the theater of operations, on defensive and offensive battles, and on organization and administration of ground units.

FOR ATOMIC DEFENSE; THE TACTICS, THE WEAPONS, AND THE MEN, in Newsweek, v. 45, no. 1 (3 Jan 1955) 27-31.

Recently the NATO Council had authorized the military command to plan on the assumption that it would use atomic weapons if the Soviet Union would attack Western Europe. Evaluates the present capability of NATO Forces and US Armed Forces in Europe of striking at Soviet Forces with atomic weapons. Types of atomic weapons available; missions in which they can be used; tactical considerations in their use; manpower needed for these atomic weapons; and the strategic significance of the fact that these atomic weapons are available for defense and are ready on the firing line if the need for their use ever arises.

GLOBALITY AND LAND FORCES, by Lt. Col. Anthony L. Wermuth, in Military Review, v. 35, no. 7 (Oct 1955) 3-11.

The possible totality which characterizes future war as envisioned today is linked directly to the results of the nuclear explosion and its power to destroy. Whether delivered by gun, airplane, missile, submarine, or satchel, it is the nuclear explosion, not the form of delivery, which is responsible for totality of destruction. The capability of deliver-

ing nuclear explosions is not nor will it be the exclusive capability of air forces. The airplane's special strength is its ability to carry not only weapons but fighting men farther and faster in a shorter time than by any other means. To whatever extent it is capable of aiding the fighting man to gain control of land and people, either with weapons or with transportation or with both, the airplane contributes its maximum effect to total military power.

THE IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY, in American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, v. 290 (Nov 1953) 1-133.

A series of papers on the military, political, economic and sociological implications of nuclear weapons. Such topics are discussed as: the advantages and limitations of superiority in nuclear weapons; international control of atomic energy; and the economic consequences of atomic attack. What general categories of targets on our continent and in Europe should be most heavily defended, and how? How costly would such a defense be, and how necessary since fear of retaliation reduces the probability of attack? The economic aspects of nuclear power. Who should control atomic energy production? The problem of secrecy. The impact of the bomb on science and scientists. The human values in the atomic age.

THE IMPACT OF LONG-THRUST ATOMIC WEAPONS, by Col. Bradford Butler, Jr., in Army, v. 7, no. 8 (Mar 1957) 27-29.

Strategic fire power promises to make artillery the true king of battle.

NOTES ON THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, by George C. Reinhardt, in Military Review, v. 32, no. 6 (Sept 1952) 28-37.

Potentialities of tactical atomic weapons upon armies and their subordinate units in the field, demonstrating that the development of tactical doctrine and procedures for the employment of these weapons must not lag behind the swift technological progress which creates them. Considerations of offense with atomic weapons as compared with the classical concept of "fire and movement"; and the possibilities presented by defensive use of these weapons. Tactical atomic warfare is a challenge to both American leadership and science which, if boldly met, will neutralize an aggressor's reliance upon a reckless expenditure of lives to achieve victory in land warfare.

TACTICAL ARITHMETIC OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. Knights-bridge, Eng., Aviation Studies, 1955. 35 p. (Military Record of Atomic Happenings. 1955 Theme: Nuclear Weapons in Plenty, v. 4, Rept. WS, 010/55 Sept 1955.)

The effect of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack by Russian forces on certain areas of Europe. The strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on extensive evaluation of Soviet inventories and either observed or known Red deployments. Mathematical calculations to determine the number of Atomic and H-bombs necessary to neutralize the Soviets.

4. Guided Missiles, Rockets, And Satellites

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

DEFENCE AGAINST THE ICBM, by I. J. Billington and others, in Aeroplane, v. 91, no. 2356 (26 Oct 1956) 629-632; no. 2357 (2 Nov 1956) 662-665.

The authors show that "... it is possible to devise an anti-missile missile capable of reaching and destroying an ICBM with the developments likely to be achieved in the near future, namely, advances in radar and electronic methods, application of electronic computers and the extension of 'automation' to air-defense networks, and new materials capable of withstanding the effects of high speed and very high temperature."

GUIDED MISSILES AND PILOTED AIRCRAFT, by Flt. Lt. C. Krizek, in Air Power, v. 3, no. 4 (July 1956) 287-290.

The effects of the guided missile on the technical, military, and political aspects of warfare. Points out that the advent of the missile has not and will not make the use of aircraft in warfare obsolete.

GUIDED MISSILES IN MODERN WARFARE, THE POTENTIALITIES OF A NEW WEAPON, by Nels A. Parson, Jr., in Ordnance, v. 35, no. 185, sec. 1 (Mar-Apr 1951) 403-405.

The three basic types of missiles: surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air, and how these will affect land, sea, and air warfare.

GUIDED MISSILES, ROCKETS, AND ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES (INCLUDING PROJECT VANGUARD), A SELECTED LIST OF TITLES. Washington, Department of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Army Library, 1957. 153 p. (Special Bibliography No. 11.)

An annotated bibliography of about 1000 titles dealing with various aspects of U.S. and foreign guided missiles, rockets, and artificial satellites.

THE IMPACT OF GUIDED MISSILES ON GROUND WARFARE, by Nels A. Parson, Jr., in Military Review, v. 32, no. 5 (Aug 1952) 16-22.

If the Germans would have had guided missiles to fire at Allied Forces on D-day at Normandy or in Portsmouth-Southampton area would have been so great that the now famous operation of World War II would have been suspended. There will be many other ground targets in future warfare upon which guided missiles will be used tactically. Discussed are: surface-to-surface missiles, and levels and techniques of their employment; and guided missiles logistics. The guided missiles will have the following direct effect upon ground warfare: (1) an increase in the depth of the combat zone; (2) increased dispersion of troops and materiel; (3) regardless of weather conditions, a greater continuity of ground action; (4) until effective countermeasures are developed the guided missile will give the defender an advantage over the attacker; and (5) the cost of war will increase.

THE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE WILL CHANGE TACTICS BUT NOT STRATEGY, by Interavia Study Group, in Interavia, v. 11, no. 6 (June 1956) 408-412.

Whether we are dealing with intercontinental missiles or with long-range aircraft, general strategy remains unchanged. The attacker must seek to destroy the means of defense by surprising them at their bases, unless he is sure of being able to stop them in the air. The introduction of long-range missiles would merely modify certain tactical aspects of this general strategy which has been rendered virtually unchangeable by the existence of nuclear explosives.

ROCKETS - THEIR FUTURE IN MILITARY AVIATION, by A. V. Cleaver, in Aircraft, Canada, v. 29, no. 4 (Jan 1951) 12-14 plus.

The first large-scale application of rocketry was a military one. Congreve's rockets were an important weapon in the Napoleonic Wars; while the British used them to bombard Fort McHenry. The progress which the Germans made between 1935 and 1945 in the technical field of rocket propulsion raised it to a vital branch of applied science. Since the war the Allies have attempted to catch up in rocketry with the Germans. On a long-term basis, there seems little doubt that guided missiles will eventually take over most of the duties, both offensive and defensive, of present piloted military aircraft.

ROLE OF GUIDED MISSILES IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS, by V. N. Bhardwaj, in *Military Review*, v. 36, no. 5 (Aug 1954) 80-85.
 General trends in the development of guided missiles; and their potentialities in the tactical role. Types of guided missiles; and their capabilities as compared with artillery and aircraft. Tactical use in offense, defense, and interception; limitations; suitable targets; level of employment; and operational control. Guided missiles can be used very effectively in the tactical role mainly as a supporting weapon with specialized missions.

SATELLITES AS WEAPONS, in *Interavia*, v. 11, no. 12 (Dec 1956) 967.
 Remarks made by Werner von Braun, Development Operations Chief of the US Army Ballistic Missile Agency, on the suitability of the manned satellite vehicle to serve as a key element in a guided weapons system, with which practically point on the earth could be attacked.

WOOMERA EXPANSION, in *Aircraft Australia*, v. 34, no. 9 (June 1956) 46-47.
 The United Kingdom has proposed a program of expanded activity at Woomera, and Australia has accepted the British proposals. Describes what this agreement means in terms of guided missile development and testing, in light of reports that Britain has already developed "a guided missile capable of great range and height and capable of carrying an atomic warhead."

THE WORLD'S GUIDED WEAPONS, in *Aeronautics*, v. 32, no. 6 (July 1955) 28-38.
 World progress in missiles, and accompanying effects on strategy: characteristics of nuclear weapons; strategic defense of the West; air defense; the present state of guided-weapon development; and some reasons for its slow progress. Tables include the following data: (1) main constituents in the USA; (2) general survey of missile guidance; (3) relationship of 1942-45 German missile types with postwar developments; (4) surface-to-air missiles; (5) air-to-air missiles; (6) air-to-surface missiles; and (7) surface-to-surface missiles.

b. United States

ARMY MISSILES. Washington, Department of the Army, 28 August 1956. 3 p. (AR 525-30.)
 This regulation establishes basic Army policy for the integration

of guided and rocket missiles into the Army weapons system. Presented are: general policy, concept of employment, requirements for Army missiles, and Command responsibilities.

THE ARMY'S MISSILES, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 11, no. 12. 124 p.

This special issue of the DIGEST deals with: Army's missile program; missiles developed and under development; the training of men who handle missiles; the Commands equipped with missiles; and impact of missiles on the conduct of warfare. Contributing articles: THE ROLE OF MISSILES IN ARMY WEAPONS SYSTEMS, by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; ARMY MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, by Maj. Gen. H. H. Toftoy, Commanding General, Redstone Arsenal; MISSILES ON THE FIRING LINE, by Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations; MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, by Maj. Gen. J. P. Daley, Director, Special Weapons, Office of the Chief of Research and Development; ARMY BALLISTIC MISSILE AGENCY, by Maj. Gen. J. B. Medaris, Commanding General, Army Ballistic Missile Agency; NIKE AND CORPORAL TRAINING, by Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood, Commanding General, Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center, and Commandant, Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School; HONEST JOHN TRAINING, by Brig. Gen. Paul A. Gavan, Assistant Commandant, Artillery and Guided Missile School; ORDNANCE TRAINING IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD, by Col. H. S. Newhall, Commandant, Ordnance Guided Missile School; MISSILE CAREERS, by CWO C. E. Driskill, Jr., Instructor, Guided Missile Department, Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School; MISSILES GUARD THE VITAL CENTERS, by Lt. Gen. S. R. Mickelsen, Commanding General, Army Antiaircraft Command; FIELD ARTILLERY MISSILES, by Maj. Gen. Thomas E. De Shazo, Commanding General, Artillery and Guided Missile Center; THE IMPACT OF MISSILES ON LOGISTICS, by Brig. Gen. Richard D. Meyer, Chief Plans and Programs Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; and IMPACT OF MISSILES ON TACTICAL DOCTRINE, by Gen. W. G. Wyman, Commanding General, Continental Army Command.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE, by Kenneth W. Gatland. London, Illiffe, 1954. 292 p. (A FLIGHT Publication.)

The evolution of guided missiles up to the present time, and their possible future development. Guided missiles as the new powerful antiaircraft weapon, and missile research concerned with defense against jet bombers. New models of ground-launched missiles and air-to-air rocket projectiles carried by parent aircraft. The supersonic rocket as an offensive weapon, which may challenge the bomber as a means of delivering explosives over a long range, and the problems of defense against it. The possibility of rockets carrying atomic explosives; employment of rockets for high altitude research; and the extension of rocket flight beyond the atmosphere of the earth, and experiments with space-flight in the US, which may later enable the design and building of man-carrying rockets. With table of significant powered missiles summarizing all available information.

GUIDED MISSILES IN WAR AND PEACE, by Nels A. Parson, Jr. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956. 161 p. This book has been reviewed by the Department of Defense and has been officially released for open publication. A study of the impact of guided missiles on military operations. Employment of guided missiles in aerial, naval, and land combat. Includes description of the various guided missiles of the US Armed Forces.

GUIDED WEAPONS AND AIR POWER, by S/L R. I. Gray, in Air Power, v. 1, no. 1 (Oct 1953) 19-23. Effects of the use of guided missiles on the structure of the Services, particularly of the air forces, with respect to strategy and tactics, air power, organization, and personnel requirements; and future trends.

HOW MISSILES ARE PHASED INTO AIR FORCE OPERATIONS, by Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, in Air Force, v. 39, no. 9 (Sept 1956) 125-126.

The deployment of missiles, their introduction into combat units, and the continuing requirement for operational testing of missile units.

HOW THE AIR FORCE WILL USE ITS MISSILES, by Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, in Air Force, v. 39, no. 9 (Sept 1956) 98-100 plus. The basis for establishing a guided missile force; the integration of missiles into the US Air Force; and the Air Force approach to the utilization of guided missiles.

KEY TO SURVIVAL: MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, by Brig. Gen. Don R. Ostrander, in Missiles and Rockets, v. 1, no. 3 (Dec 1956) 58-60. Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapons Systems, Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command, describes USAF's organization for missile research and development, the role of ARDC in missile research and development, and some of the USAF's objectives in the missile field.

MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, by Maj. Gen. J.-P. Daley, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 12 (Dec 1956) 45-51. Objectives, facilities and resources of the Army's missile research and development program.

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MISSILES. SPECIAL ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUE, in American Aviation, v. 18, no. 11 (25 Oct 1954) 27-152.

The missile research and development budget of the US Defense Department and the use made of the money. Lists missile test ranges and facilities. Names and functions of top missile men and Guided Missiles Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group. The role of the missile and the problems of "instantaneous relation." Manufacturers, types, designations, and structural and performance characteristics of US missiles, and the participation of the US aircraft industry in the program. Missile technology: engine and powerplant, electronic components, structures and materials, and guidance systems.

ROCKETS CHANGE MODERN ARMY DOCTRINE, by Maj. Gen. J. B. Medaris, in Missiles and Rockets, v. 2, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 50-51.

The Commanding General, Army Ballistic Missile Agency appraises some of the immediate potentialities of rocket weapons systems and the punch they provide for the US Army. He also notes that the Russians have not ignored rocket and guided missile development in the modernization of their military forces.

THE ROLE OF MISSILES IN ARMY WEAPONS SYSTEMS, by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, in Army Information Digest, v. 11, no. 12 (Dec 1956) 6-8.

Concepts of employment, requirements for Army missiles, and command responsibilities.

THE ROLE OF THE MISSILE, in American Aviation, v. 18 (25 Oct 1954) 40-42.

Role of the guided missile in future warfare; photos of US Army, Navy, and Air Force missiles.

c. U.S.S.R.

RUSSIA'S GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM, in Missiles and Rockets, v. 2, no. 2 (Feb 1957) 33-41.

The scope of Russia's guided missile program and description of some of the missiles and rockets developed. The article includes: illustrated comparison of some typical USSR and USA ballistic missiles; table of characteristics of Russia's ballistic and long-range aerodynamic

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missiles and rocket weapons; table of basic data on Russian research missiles and flight test vehicle; table of Russian intermediate-range and upper-air vehicles; and a map of USSR showing the location of missile launching bases, missile plants, missile schools, missile test centers, antiaircraft rocket plants, missile development centers, and missile engine development centers.

VAST MISSILE PROGRAM PUSHED BY SOVIETS, in Aviation Age, v. 20, no. 2 (Aug 1953) 24-26.
Soviet missile development and production, and a description of locations of Soviet missile centers and installations. Improvements made by Soviets on German V-1, V-2, A-9, and A-10 rockets; improvements in explosives for rocket warheads; general data on experimental missiles M-1 and M-100; and some information on the administrative set-up of the Soviet missiles program. With a map showing guided missile installations in the Soviet Union and satellites; a detail map of the most important guided missile installations in European part of USSR; and sketches of experimental missiles M-1 and M-100.

II. NATIONAL DEFENSE: SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND RUSSIA; THEIR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, 1941-1946, ed. by William Hardy McNeill. London, Oxford University Press, 1953. 819 p.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR WAR. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1953. 32 p. (R 165.)

An outline of steps required in an analysis of the economic potential for war of any given country. Among these are: (1) summation of all those human and material resources which can be utilized by a nation to further its productive strength; and (2) an estimation of the integrated effects of the economic, political, psychological, social, and military factors.

WAR AND NATIONAL POLICY, A SYLLABUS, ed. by Grayson Kirk and Richard P. Stebbins. New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1942. 131p.

A. General Aspects

1. France

THE FRANCE OF TODAY, by Capt. Thomas O. Waage, in Air Intelligence Training Bulletin, v. 6, no. 11 (Nov 1954) 27-32.

Today France is a soft spot in the Western alliance against the threat of communist aggression and subversion. She is also the source of friction between the other members of the democratic community. Evaluates France's internal, economic, and political problems, and her foreign policies (Indochina, North Africa, EDC) that weakened her internally and externally, and the possibilities that something can be done to restore her position to the strength which was counted upon by her Western Allies.

WAR MEMOIRS; THE APPEAL OF 1940-1942. Mémoires de guerre; l'appel 1940-1942, by Gen. Charles de Gaulle. Paris, Plon, 1954. 681 p. In French.

(a) Gen. de Gaulle's unsuccessful efforts, prior to World War II, to modernize the French Army by increasing its mobility through the inclusion of a major number of tank units; (b) the happenings in French military and political circles which preceded and led to the French armistice; and (c) Gen. de Gaulle's activities in behalf of Free France.

2. Great Britain

THE ELEMENTS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, by A. G. Boycott. Aldershot, London, Gale & Polden, 1938. 444 p.

"A study of the geographical features, material resources, communications, and organization of the British Empire."

3. United States

ARMS AND MEN: A STUDY OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, by Walter Millis. New York, Putnam, 1956. 382 p.
 . . . It presents not only the details of campaigns and careers of our military leaders, it also traces the developments in weapons, in strategic theories, in diplomacy and internal policy and in the growing responsibility of the United States upon the world stage, which led to the present situation. . . ."

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY. Washington, Department of the Army, The Adjutant General's Office, Army Library, 1956. 218 p. (Special Bibliography No. 7.)
 A bibliographic study including about 1,000 selected, unclassified periodical articles, books, studies, etc. The study encompasses the strategy and objectives, military and foreign policy, military doctrines, Armed Forces capabilities, etc. of U.S.S.R. and Satellites, Communist China and other Communist Nations of Asia, U.S., Great Britain and British Commonwealth, West Germany, most NATO and SEATO nations, some countries of the Middle East, and several neutral countries. Also included is material on modern warfare and future trends and international measures for peace and disarmament.

4. U.S.S.R.

THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENCE, by Jules Menken. London, Ampersand, 1955. 100 p.
 Among the chapters: The Soviet Economy and Preparation for War; The Soviet Industrial Base; The Soviet Manpower Base; The Soviet Atomic and Nuclear effort; The Soviet Armed Forces; Satellite Armed Strength; Chinese Communist Strength; and Rearmament of the West. Tables.

HOW WEAK IS RUSSIA, by Brig. Gen. C. H. Dewhurst, in U. S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 18 (29 Oct 1954) 62-69 plus.
 Excerpts from the book **CLOSE CONTACT** on: certain aspects of Russia's economic weaknesses; the weaknesses of her Armed Forces, of her allies, and of her intelligence reporting; the disappearance of revolutionary fervor; the strange death of Stalin and the demise of Beria; Russia's inferiority complex; social life; Soviet propaganda and its effectiveness; deficiencies of Western propaganda; how the Russians prevent desertion; Soviet vs. Western security; and the Russian Press.

SOVIET POWER AND POLICY, by George B. De Huszar and others. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1955. 598 p.

Basic data on USSR's geography, population, industry, agriculture, economic planning, transportation, political and administrative structure, ideology, education, police apparatus, and trade and foreign policy; and outline of the military potential and preparedness of the Soviet Union, the strength of its Armed Forces, and the extent of Soviet atomic bomb development; and information regarding Soviet expansion in Eurasia, both aims and methods of operation in western and eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East, SE Asia, and NE Asia. With a chapter on the respective strategic positions of US and USSR today, the former in the role of a world policeman protecting its allies and the latter bent on destruction of US as the ultimate objective of its strategy. Bibliography.

THE SOVIET STATE, in Officers' Call, v. 4, no. 2 (1952) 1-14.
 The structure of the USSR, the Kremlin's iron control over its people, and the total mobilization of Russia's vast human and material resources as the main supports of Soviet aggression and conquest.

SOVIET WORLD OUTLOOK; A HANDBOOK OF COMMUNIST STATEMENTS, rev. ed. Washington, US Department of State, Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, 1954? 434 p.

This volume was prepared for the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence of the US Information Agency. It presents a representative picture of communist doctrine, particularly as formulated by leading communists of the Soviet Union on: capitalism, capitalist encirclement, colonialism, communism, communist part, democracy, dictatorship of the proletariat, equality, freedom-liberty, nationalism, religion, revolution, socialism, state, tactics and strategy, trade unions, war, place of Red Armed Forces in the USSR, duties of the citizens of the USSR, culture, economy of the Soviet Union, foreign policy, government, linguistics, press, science, and the revolutionary movement in the Far East.

THE SOVIET'S WAR POTENTIAL, by A. E. Sokol, in Military Review, v. 33, no. 9 (Dec 1953) 44-60.

A general assessment of USSR's strengths and weaknesses and ability to wage war. The study does not evaluate political and military strategy and is concerned mainly with: USSR's geography, climate, and size of the country as military factors; Soviet transportation, agriculture, industrial capacity, and availability of skilled technicians; strength of the Soviet Armed Forces; and role of the satellites in the USSR's war potential. Despite the various weaknesses Russia is capable of conducting a large scale war and directing her war effort to a victorious end. However, her weaknesses preclude an involvement in a long war and she will strive for

a quick decision. To deny her such a quick decision US must help her Allies to strengthen their defenses. If the initial Soviet steamroller is slowed down and delayed until help arrives from US, and the war lasts for more than a year, Russia's weaknesses (transportation, industry, lack of oil, unreliability of satellites, and exposure of Soviet soldiers to superior conditions of the West) would begin to work in favor of US and Allies.

VIGILANCE -- YES; FEAR -- NO! by C. Langdon White, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 12 (Mar 1957) 3-16.
Is the Soviet Union really strong and great or merely noisy - a master in the technique of propaganda and the waging of a war of nerves? It would be foolish for us to overestimate or underestimate the Russians. The author presents a geopolitical appraisal which analyzes and balances the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR vis-à-vis the United States, concluding that the Soviet Union is not in the same league with the US at the present time and that the Iron Curtain conceals numerous glaring weaknesses. War in the near future does not appear imminent.

B. Strategic

1. National Policy And Aspirations

a. General Aspects

THE ANZUS PACT AND PACIFIC SECURITY, by E. D. L. Killen, in Far Eastern Survey, v. 21, no. 14 (8 Oct 1952) 137-141.
Significance, limitations, and potentialities of the Pacific Defense Council, for which a machinery was set up by the foreign policy heads of US, Australia, and New Zealand in August 1952. The difference in attitude towards Japan and the Pacific Security Treaty on the part of US and that of Australia and New Zealand was the first major difficulty of the Council. Reasons why membership was not extended to other Pacific nations for the time being, are explained; and the Council's limitations as compared to NATO. Achievements attained so far: establishment of machinery for an enlarged Pacific Council; closer military and political liaison between the three signatory powers; and possibilities for a proper limitation of Japanese rearmament and shipbuilding by inclusion of Japan in the Council.

THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR, by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, in Ordnance, v. 41, no. 221 (Mar-Apr 1957) 772-775.
We should learn from history that the basis of modern military might is industrial power backed by science and technology and that victory on the "inner front" is today as important as military conquest in big battles. This concept is discussed in the light of lessons of the past. It is also, however, stressed that it is unwise to prepare for the "wrong war" as has been done in the past and which has in many cases proved costly.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR, by Col. Frank J. Sackton, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 8 (Nov 1954) 52-62.
The impact of atomic energy on the art of war. The existence of atomic weapons makes possible the complete destruction of nations, and since this destructive capability is available to both great power blocs, it is reasonable to assume that a stalemate in their use will exist as long as both blocs maintain rationality, or until some time in the distant future when a complete defense against these weapons has been developed by either side. The possibility of limited war, such as the Korean conflict, calls for re-evaluation of the organization of modern military forces and study in the tactical employment of atomic weapons so that military victory can be achieved promptly on the battlefield. Victory will come to the side which can best grasp the significance of the changing nature of war, and plan for attainment of maximum benefits from the diplomatic, strategic, and tactical arts.

DESIGN FOR WAR, A STUDY OF SECRET POWER POLITICS 1937-1941, by Frederic R. Sanborn. New York, Devin-Adair, 1951. 607 p.
The statements which Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Churchill, and others made publicly as contrasted with the decisions they made secretly. A narration of the secret moves that led to World War II, in which it is shown that in 1941 the Japanese were ready to accept American demands if they could save face. The story of the Chinese intrigues that influenced Secretary Hull to abandon the last attempt to keep peace.

FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER, ed. by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1945. 774 p.
Selected readings on the foundations of national power. Part I deals with certain fundamental conditions and factors which have shaped the course of international relations through the centuries. Parts II, III, and IV present the pattern of international relations and the major political forces at work in each of three great geographical regions or realms. Part V deals with two specific problems of the day - the terms of peace for the enemy states and the bases of a workable international organization to keep the peace and provide security, and a sense of security, for all nations.

THE H-BOMB: MASSIVE RETALIATION OR GRADUATED DETERRENCE? by Rear Adm. Anthony Buzzard and others, in International Affairs, v. 32, no. 2 (Apr 1956) 148-165.

A clear distinction should be established between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, so that atomic weapons can be used tactically without provoking the strategic use of hydrogen weapons.

HOW WAR BECAME ABSURD, in Harper's, v. 211, no. 1265 (Oct 1955) 33-46.

In this collection of three articles, Bernard Brodie in STRATEGY HITS A DEAD END points out the futility of future wars in the light of the present know-how of nuclear weapons. Richard S. Meryman in THE GUARDIANS describes the life and duties of a bomber crew of the Strategic Air Command, whose mission is "massive retaliation." THE NOISELESS WEAPON by Hans Thirring sketches briefly the future war fought with radioisotopes.

INFLUENCE OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE USSR ON MODERN WARFARE, by N. Galai, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin, (Munich), spec. ed., (Mar 1954) 20-28. In English.

Discussions of the nature of warfare in a particular epoch are usually limited to the technical and economic aspects of the war. Little attention is paid to the social setting against which wars take place because they are considered less significant in influencing the outcome of war. However, in both World Wars and in postwar military conflicts the social factor has become more and more evident. Armies of the same country and nationality have fought against each other in Spain, Norway, Russia, France, Korea, and Indochina. Communism as a doctrine promotes the stability of this new social phenomenon in modern warfare. However, it also occurs within the political and military sphere of influence of the USSR. The West must develop strategy, operational techniques, and tactics in order to exploit the advantages available in the social aspects of modern war, as well as to be able to meet its dangers as the tool of Soviet military planners whose (Bulgannin) doctrine states that: future war cannot be decided without the occupation of the enemy's territory; the victor will physically destroy the government of the vanquished and will create a new representative stratum acceptable to the victor; in the event of war the whole continent will be engulfed by USSR because the neutralizing influence of the German Army in the last war is no longer present; social regrouping going on in the World will result in the inevitable participation of several colonial countries in a third world conflict; and there will be no neutral nations, even if some do not participate in military actions, because neutrality will be impossible economically, and at the end of the war they will be drawn into the economic sphere of the victor.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS; FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln. New York, Macmillan, 1954. 719 p.

Fundamental elements and foundational principles which underlie the policies and actions of nations in their relationships to each other. Basic factors affecting national policy and international politics. The shaping of national policy under the American presidential form of government, in the parliamentary democracy, in the Soviet Union, and in other forms of government. The projection of national policy into international politics; and establishment of international organizations and regional pacts in quest of collective security.

MAHAN - HISTORIAN WITH A PURPOSE, by Francis Duncan, in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, no. 5 (May 1957) 498-503.

It was from history that Alfred Thayer Mahan derived the percepts of sea power, and it was by historical examples and analogies set forth in his books that he endeavored to teach what he firmly believed were the eternal lessons of warfare. His name is still one for military men to remember.

MAHAN ON SEA POWER, by William E. Livezey. Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1947. 334 p.

An analytical, critical, evaluative, and, so far as possible, impartial treatment of one of the most important figures of recent times. Mahan's influence upon the naval programs and policies of Great Britain and Germany and, to a lesser extent upon Japan and France.

MAHAN - THE LIFE AND WORK OF CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, U. S. N., by William D. Puleston. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939. 380 p.

MAHAN'S "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY" in All Hands, no. 422 (Apr 1952) 59-63.

Abridgement of the section of Mahan's book which deals with the influence of seapower upon the American Revolution. The alliance with France and subsequently with Spain brought to the Americans what they needed most: a sea power to counterbalance that of England. Control of the seas, in the hands of the French, brought about the successful end of the Revolutionary War at an early date.

MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ed. by William W. Kaufmann. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956. 274 p. With following chapters: THE REQUIREMENTS OF DETERRENCE, by William W. Kaufmann; STRATEGIC DOCTRINES FOR NUCLEAR WAR, by Roger Hilsman; PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE FOR THE UNITED STATES, by Klaus Knorr; LIMITED WARFARE, by William W. Kaufmann; MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by Klaus Knorr; COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES, by Roger Hilsman; NATO AND THE NEW GERMAN ARMY, by Gordon A. Craig; and FORCE AND FOREIGN POLICY, by William W. Kaufmann. Significant excerpts from the book appear in ARMY, v. 6, no. 10 (May 1956) 50-56.

THE NEW AIR SITUATION, by Charles J. V. Murphy, in *Fortune*, v. 52, no. 3 (Sept 1955) 86-87 plus.

While Soviet diplomats pursue their new policy of peace-and-smiles, the Soviet Air Force continues to grow in strength. Red air power is whittling away at the US air lead. The question of how much more is required to protect the US margin is occupying the thinking of planners in Washington. "A new air-power debate has split Mr. Wilson's Pentagon and the technical advisory staff of the National Security Council as no other issue has succeeded in doing..." The evolving pattern of Soviet air weapons system and the strategy behind it; Soviet aircraft, their capabilities, and their effect on US estimates of comparative air strengths of both countries; the causes of the "air-power debate" among the US planners; the budgetary problems of the US Department of Defense in light of the Administration's policies as it faces a national election in 1956; and what is being done at present and likely to be done in the future to meet the growing challenge of Soviet air power.

ON WAR, by Karl von Clausewitz. Washington, Combat Forces Press, 1953. 641 p. (Translated from German by O. J. Matthijs Tolles.) A systematic and comprehensive examination of war and its conduct.

OPERATION WORLD PEACE, by Eugene E. Wilson, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 81, no. 6 (June 1955) 652-657.

Mahan's principles of war, revealed through his study of the influence of seapower upon history, are equally applicable on land as well as in the air; they also lend themselves to the solution of related problems in politics and economics. Reviews the impact of Mahan's doctrine upon air policy, suggests an analogy in the problem of controlling the new weapons of destruction, and points the way to applying the processes of Mahan's fundamental thinking to the problem of world peace.

THE POLICY AND STRATEGY OF AIR-NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Pierre Gallois, in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v. 12, no. 6 (June 1956) 202-207.

As they are affected by (1) political factors including risk factor, stake factor, and public opinion factor, and (2) the military factors.

THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN RECENT HISTORY: THE IMPACT OF AIR POWER ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, 1933-1940, by Herbert S. Dinerstein; THE ROLE OF AIR POWER SINCE WORLD WAR II, by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith; SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD MODERN AIR POWER, by Raymond L. Garthoff, in *Military Affairs*, v. 19, no. 2 (Summer 1955) 65-80.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939-1946; THE WORLD IN MARCH 1939, ed. by Arnold Toynbee and Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin. London, Oxford University Press, 1952. 546 p.

International relations and the political posture of the aggressor nations in March 1939; the night of 14 March is considered the beginning of World War II because of the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. The economic and geopolitical status of the USSR, Germany, and Japan; and the comparative strengths of the powerful nations of the world in that year. Maps and statistics.

b. France

THE HELL OF DIEN BIEN PHU. *L'enfer de Dien Bien Phu*, by Jean Renald. Paris, Flammarion, 1955. 222 p. In French. Events which preceded and accompanied the capture of Dien Bien Phu by the Vietminh forces.

LESSONS FROM SUEZ, by Maj. George Fielding Eliot, in *Ordnance*, v. 41, no. 221 (Mar-Apr 1957) 787-790.

The Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt was, in concept and plan, an almost classic example of "limited" (i. e., nonnuclear) use of force in a localized operation. In execution, it proved to be an almost classic example of how such an operation, once determined upon, ought not to be conducted. True national preparedness lies in maintaining military forces capable of fighting limited local wars as well as all-out nuclear conflicts, constantly ready to operate with speed, surprise, and global mobility.

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TO DIE FOR GERMANY. Mourir pour l'Allemagne, by E. N. Dzelepy. Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1955. 128 p. In French. Reviews the policy pursued by the West vis-à-vis Germany since 1947. Even though the West German rulers are convinced of the non-existence of any Soviet threat, they insist on rearmament through which they hope to recover the Eastern territories which they lost as a result of aggression in 1941. Now, the question arises as to whether the Western nations, allied with Federal Germany, will support German territorial claims which will inevitably lead to another World War, or whether the Bonn Government will try for an agreement with the USSR. In either case, it behooves France to oppose German rearmament.

c. Germany - Historical Examples

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND, by Col. Donovan P. Yeuell, Jr., in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 11 (Nov 1955) 1205-1215.

Review of events leading to the German occupation of the Rhineland in defiance of international agreements. The Rhineland coup is a valuable lesson in power politics. Viewed as a technique in international relations, the Nazi demarche deserves to be called a thorough success. The inferences to be drawn are that irresolution invites disaster, that bold threats must be met firmly, and that a nation must recognize and act against dangers to its survival before those dangers get out of control.

GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1939-1941, by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954. 218 p.

German foreign policy and diplomatic activities during the period of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, and their effects on German military decisions and strategy. Reasons for not invading England; and the events and opinions that led to Germany's attack on Russia.

GERMANY PREPARES FOR WAR; A NAZI THEORY OF "NATIONAL DEFENSE," by Ewald Banse. New York, Harcourt, 1934. 357 p.
"... Professor Banse teaches the youth of Germany that war is a principle of regeneration in which a people may find true glory; that in the waging of war not the means but the end has to be considered, and that the infection of drinking water with typhoid bacillus and the dissemination of plague through artificially-infested rats is as justifiable an instrument of war as the cannon."

OPERATION BARBAROSSA, by Helmuth Greiner. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, n. d. 126 p. (MS #C-065 i.)

Germany's preparations for the attack on Russia (OPERATION BARBAROSSA) during the year prior to the assault. The author was responsible for the War Diary of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command Headquarters, and the material is based on drafts of entries in the Diary, notes of conferences between Hitler and the High Command, copies of Hitler's directives, and OKH orders. Hitler's original conception of the operation, and the various changes of plans up to the final order for the attack. Diplomatic maneuvers with Italy and Japan. Proposed strategy to be employed, and assembly of the German forces.

d. Great Britain

BRITAIN IN WORLD STRATEGY, by Anthony Eden, in Foreign Affairs, v. 29, no. 3 (Apr 1951) 341-350.

The crucial aim of Britain's strategy is the maintenance of the lines of communication of the British Commonwealth, involving the maintenance of free movement on the oceans, the defense of Gt. Britain primarily from air attack, defense of the land frontiers of the Commonwealth, and maintenance of internal security. The rate of British taxation is regarded as the chief factor limiting her contribution to the defense of Western Europe, since she now has the highest level of taxation in the world. Cooperation between Britain and America is regarded as vital to the survival of both countries and to the survival of the ideal of democratic government in the struggle with Communism.

BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP TO EUROPE, by Chester Wilmot, in International Affairs, v. 29, no. 4 (Oct 1953) 409-413.

British strategic considerations in Europe which are based on the emergence of USSR as a world power: (1) her role as an element in the balance of power which has replaced her previous role of arbiter; (2) her need for a strong Western Europe as a bulwark against the USSR on the continent and as a counter-weight to the US within NATO; and (3) the necessity of maintaining substantial military forces in Europe in peacetime not only to protect her Atlantic seaboard but also of supporting her European neighbors upon whom she is now militarily dependent. In determining her military policy in relation to Europe, Britain must always consider the wider conflict, and she must strive to maintain both her strength and her independence.

THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE, by Liddell Hart. London, Faber and Faber, 1932. 311 p.

"... The book, further, forms a study of present British methods and means of war, set against a larger background and seeking a longer horizon - to foresee the probable or, at least, the reasonable trend of the future."

CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH; A HANDBOOK ON METHODS AND PRACTICE, by Heather J. Harvey. London, Oxford University Press, 1952. 411 p.

The meaning of "Commonwealth" and its membership; the legal aspects of its formation; machinery for consultation and cooperation among member nations, and between the Commonwealth and other nations; principles and policies for collective defense of the Commonwealth, and the collective policies for the control of atomic energy; the Commonwealth and UNO and NATO; and other information on how the Commonwealth machinery functions in peacetime and in war. Reproduction of the Statute of Westminster is appended.

REARMAMENT: THE NAVY'S PART, by A. D. Nicholl, in Navy, v. 57, no. 5 (May 1952) 103-105 plus.

The British Defense Program which was begun in 1951 and is now expected to be completed in four years instead of three. The main basis of Britain's effort is, with the Atlantic Pact allies, to build defenses strong enough to prevent Western Europe from being overrun. Summarizes, in addition to naval progress, activities of: the Army, Navy, and civil defense.

WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, by Capt. W. Carter, in Air Power, v. 4, no. 3 (Spring 1957) 195-203.

The human factor, new weapons and national policies, the shape of major war, Britain's defense policy, and the composition and disposition of Britain's forces.

e. NATO

HALF-CENTURY OF CONFLICT, by Chester V. Easum. New York, Harper, 1952. 929 p.

An American view point of the political history of the world from pre-Sarajevo events which resulted in World War I and through World War II and the conflict in Korea. Appended: the Fourteen Points and the League Covenant; the Atlantic Charter; 1942 Declaration by United Nations; Yalta Protocol; Charter of the UN; and NATO. With 20 maps and bibliography.

POLICY FOR THE WEST, by Barbara Ward. New York, W. W. Norton, 1951. 317 p.

The policy of containment of Communism may make formidable demands on Western resources and patience. Time, in the military sense, will be on the side of the democracies only if they fulfill speedily and surely the implications of military containment. More and more resources must be devoted to preparedness, even at the risk of inflation. An expanding economy is necessary, involving maintenance of full employment, a balanced trade, and continued economic aid to backward countries. Policies of economic cooperation, friendship, and mutual support, together with further activities toward the formation of some sort of federation must be undertaken, and faith in democracy must more than match Communist fanaticism.

POWER AND POLICY; US FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER IN THE HYDROGEN AGE, by Thomas K. Finletter. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1954. 408 p.

The foreign and military policies of the US, their interrelationships, efforts by the Western Powers to halt the expansion of communism, and the possibility of atomic disarmament and an "enforced peace." By 1956 the USSR will have an atomic-air capability superior to that of the US; the US strategy and military forces required to make a Soviet attack unprofitable; NATO's part in US military policy; and the unsuccessful search for world peace since the end of World War II. Outlines a plan for atomic disarmament and military control by NATO which might be used as a basis for discussion.

f. United States

ALWAYS THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Max Miller. New York, Dutton, 1952. 256 p.

The activities and routine duties of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean whose mission is that of keeping the sea free from aggression, and at the same time serving as the US representative of good

will to the countries along the shores of the Mediterranean. Impressions of countries visited; and relations between fleetmen and the peoples of the Mediterranean.

ALWAYS THE SEA, by Adm. Robert B. Carney, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 5 (May 1955) 497-503.

"If the historians of the future ever have the tragic tasks of writing the story of World War III, I am confident that they will then add another favorable endorsement to Mahan's conclusions." The Chief of Naval Operations shows how US became a beneficiary in the past, is reaping the advantages at present, and will profit in the future, from the application of Alfred Thayer Mahan's principles on sea power. The addition of two new dimensions - air and sub-surface - have not affected the soundness of Mahan's conclusions. This was demonstrated in World War II and is being demonstrated at present in the cold war. Allied control of the seas made the NATO and the Manila Pact a reality, and Allied strategy will continue to be inextricably tied to freedom of movements of the sea. The Soviet Union has realized that its major stumbling block to expansion has been its sea impotency. Soviet expansionist movement has a significant pattern of weakness. Not one single conquest was made by Russia in the whole of Africa, in the entire Western Hemisphere, nor in any part of the Far East which is separated from the Asiatic mainland from water which is controlled by Allied sea power. Determined to overcome this stumbling block, Russia is now building all types of surface ships, more submarines than the rest of the world put together, and is practicing amphibious landings in an obvious effort to compete for the mastery of the sea. It would be the greatest blunder if US by relying too much on warfare with new weapons weakens the advantages inherent in its sea power.

AMERICA'S MOMENT OF TRUTH, by Comdr. Ralph E. Williams, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 81, no. 3 (Mar 1955) 245-255.

Problems and issues resulting from the present, unprecedented situation in which the US and her potential enemy are capable of destroying each other in a nuclear war. Deterrence of atomic, all-out war and maintenance of strong strategic air forces as the first objective in this situation. The almost equal importance of maintaining surface forces to deal with limited war operations; and the problem of balancing expenditures between the two complete and largely separated war strategies. Political and moral factors as the fundamental issues in the present world situation; and the overall importance of remaining faithful and honest to our traditions and ethics in order to preserve the values of our society.

THE ATOMIC CHALLENGE, by Brig. Gen. William F. Train, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 8 (Nov 1956) 4-14.

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If we accept atomic weapons as the greatest challenge in centuries of military operations we can make this force the basis for the preservation of peace, or for victory in any possible war of the future.

DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ed. by Herbert L. Marx, Jr. New York, H. W. Wilson, 1955. 192 p. (The Reference Shelf, v. 26, no. 6.)

Collection of magazine articles dealing with the "new look" in US military policy and its background: the change-over to a Republican administration, the emergence of the US and the USSR as the two dominant powers of the world, and the development of new weapons of destruction. Also, the system of alliances built up by the US and friendly nations since World War II.

INFLUENCES OF MILITARY ALLIANCES ON STRATEGY, by George Fielding Elliot, in Information Service for Officers, v. 4, no. 10 (June 1952) 1-22.

Historical examples of alliances and how they affected national strategies. Background of the American attitude toward "entanglements," and our present position in world affairs which is based upon defensive military cooperation with other nations. We are once more faced with a determined bid for world domination, and must take the initiative in marshalling the forces of resistance.

INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITMENTS, in Army Information Digest, v. 8, no. 4 (Apr 1951) 29-37.

Review of the extent to which America has abandoned her traditional isolationism, and has accepted her responsibilities as the most powerful nation in the world, as exemplified in the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), The North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

LIMITED WAR; THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY, by Robert Endicott Osgood. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. 315 p.

This book deals with a problem that goes to the very heart of American foreign policy. How can the United States protect and promote effectively its interests on the international scene without running the risk of an all-out atomic war? How is it possible to conduct foreign policy in the shadow of the atomic deterrent without making of that deterrent a reality? Discussed are: the theory of limited war; the American approach

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to war; the communist approach to war; the lessons of history regarding limited and total war; and American strategy and policy of containment before, during, and after the Korean War.

THE LIMITS OF A POLICY OF POWER, by William H. Hessler, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 76, no. 12 (Dec 1950) 1321-1327.

American foreign policy as now pursued by the National Security Council is a policy of power. This means primarily the deployment of economic power in many parts of the world to aid and strengthen various nations, and the employment of military power in various forms at various places to underscore and validate diplomatic policy. It also means the maintenance of reserves of military strength for the conduct of actual hostilities, if that becomes necessary. However, there still are limits on the use of power in world affairs. There are areas in which American power can be used effectively and efficiently, but there are also areas in which our power cannot be deployed advantageously. American power can be exercised safely and effectively only when the following three factors are initially favorable: political, economic, and strategic. The commitments already made to date by the United States are surveyed and our contributions are evaluated in the light of the advantages gained by us in making such commitments. It is pointed out that we face the temptation to spread the umbrella of American power over steadily greater areas where people are searching for security, but we must accept the sobering dictates of geography. These enable us to gauge the limits to which our power may be deployed with advantage to our national security.

"MASSIVE RETALIATION" - ITS TRUE MEANING, by Robert Murphy, in U.S. News and World Report, v. 37, no. 10 (3 Sept 1954) 120-123.

How the US policy of "massive retaliation" fits into the US defense concept, and the reason this policy was not applied in Korea and Indochina.

MILITARY POLICY AND DEFENSE OF THE "GREY AREAS" by Henry A. Kissinger, in Foreign Affairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Apr 1955) 416-428.

Urges improvement in our capacity to fight local wars not only in consideration of national strategy but as our best chance to preserve peace. The risks involved in an all-or-nothing military policy are so fearful that if we follow it our resolution will weaken and leave the initiative to the other side. A military policy which cannot offer the uncommitted nations protection against Sino-Soviet occupation will defeat our attempts to rally them to our side and in time will even demoralize the NATO alliance.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE FACILITIES ACT AMENDMENTS. HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION ON H. R. 2107 (S. 795). Washington, 1955. 59 p.

An act to amend the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 to provide for additional facilities necessary for the administration and training of units of the reserve components of the armed forces of the US.

NATIONAL POLICY AND THE TRANSOCEANIC NAVY, by Samuel P. Huntington, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 5 (May 1954) 483-493.

The present international situation requires a new strategic concept for the US Navy's mission and a revolution in naval thought and operations. Mahan's doctrine which assumed war between naval powers must be discarded and attention must be focused on inland objectives for the Navy. The Mediterranean area has replaced the Pacific as the locality of most interest to the US Navy, because it is from there that naval power can be projected over much of Western Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East; in the event of a war with Russia, the Mediterranean would be the base from which to launch attacks against the Ukraine and the oil fields in the Caucasus.

NUCLEAR PLENTY AND LIMITED WAR, by James E. King, Jr., in Foreign Affairs, v. 35, no. 2 (Jan 1957) 238-256.

Examines the belief of nuclear deterrence and the attendant economic "rationale." Inquires into the prospects of warfare in the nuclear age, and, with emphasis upon the requirements of our (U.S.) defense, compares various suggestions for its limitation. The thesis is developed that the best way to limit war is to eliminate the employment of nuclear weapons, and that a defense policy aimed at making this kind of limitation possible is in the best interest of the U.S.

OMINOUS GAIN FOR THE REDS, in Business Week, no. 1343 (28 May 1955) 26-27.

Comments on recent disclosures that Russia's air power is catching up with US lead. Sees repercussions in US domestic policies, defense production programming, and international diplomacy, and a change in tactics of US Strategic Air Command because of the new planes available in Russia. Photo of the Soviet four-jet intercontinental bomber BISON that represents an ominous gain for the Reds in their race with US for air supremacy.

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POLICY: MATRIX OF STRATEGY, by Col. George C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 80, no. 2 (Feb 1954) 144-155.

National policy should provide the basis of strategy and thus determine the character of military operations through which strategy is expressed. The US has been dangerously dilatory in formulating a policy which can be employed as a foundation for effective global strategic planning. Illustrations from the military history of the US and other countries showing the relationship between national policy and strategy. US policy now should be of the type which could establish a new balance of power for Eurasia in time of peace; American military strategy should be oriented toward the same objective.

A PROGRAM FOR MUTUAL SECURITY, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Quartermaster Review, v. 35, no. 2 (Sept-Oct 1955) 4-5 plus.

In a message to Congress on a program for mutual security, President Eisenhower pointed out that the other free nations need the US, and the US needs them, if all are to be secure. The necessary expenditures to equip and maintain US armed forces of air and land and sea at strategic points beyond our borders are never called aid. Also the necessary expenditures to enable other free nations associated with us to equip and maintain vital armed forces at these same strategic points beyond our borders should not be considered as aid. These are defense alliance expenditures clearly safeguarding in the most desirable manner, and at times in the only possible way, the security of the US and other free nations. With a map and explanatory listing of US collective defense arrangements, comprising: North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty, the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) Treaty, the Philippine Treaty, the Japanese Treaty, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Treaty, the Southeast Asia Treaty, and the Republic of China (Formosa) Treaty.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE; AN INTRODUCTION TO IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA AND THE TECHNIQUES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, by Bela Szunyogh. New York, William Frederick Press, 1955. 432 p.

Psychological principles of propaganda; problems and principles of controlling the masses; and the language of propaganda; protective measures; and justification and organization of psychological warfare. A concluding chapter explains the failures and backwardness of the West in psychological warfare as against the power and success of communist propaganda.

SEA POWER OF TOMORROW, by George H. Miller, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 78, no. 9 (Sept 1952) 958-968.
The importance of sea power to the US as demonstrated by the

lessons of history. Control of world-wide sea communications provides the freedom of action essential to success in a global war; to secure that control should be our initial objective. Control of the seas is also the power to deny to others any hope of victory over the US.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE, by T. F. Walkowicz, in American Academy of Political and Social Science Annals, v. 299 (May 1955) 118-127.

Review of Soviet and US strategic nuclear potentials, concluding that US mobile air-atomic strength can be the equivalent of nineteenth-century British naval power. It could make a kind of global Monroe Doctrine, countering Soviet military aggression against the free world, a political possibility. American troops now stationed in forty-nine countries of the world can be withdrawn to a major extent and stationed in this country, leaving a ring of dispersed and lightly manned standby bases around the Soviet periphery. The US can recover from its present awkward position of over-commitment of available surface forces around the world. Local national forces in Europe and Asia can carry out their share of the containment of Soviet power, backed by US air-atomic power which is committed to destroy communist-inspired forces of aggression and some of which is based in countries allied with the US as solid evidence of our commitment.

TO CHOOSE PEACE OR WAR, by Samuel P. Huntington, in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 83, no. 4 (Apr 1957) 359-369.

Is there a place for preventive war in American policy? After reviewing the various aspects of the debate over American military policy that has focused upon two alternatives of "massive retaliation" and "limited warfare" shows that there is a great difference between preventive total war and preventive limited war, because the former is an act of suicide but the latter is a necessary component of a limited war policy. "The true alternative to defensive total war - 'massive retaliation' - is not just defensive limited war but defensive limited war plus preventive limited war. The continued identification of preventive war with total war only serves to bind and rigidify American policy. A policy designed to deter and contain aggression cannot restrict itself merely to fighting limited wars when the enemy upsets the balance of power. It must maintain the flexibility to take whatever action is necessary to avoid future disruptions of the balance of power. The United States cannot exclude the possibility of making a positive decision to go to war if that is necessary for the security of the country. American policy must remain free, as Washington wisely stated in his Farewell Address, 'to choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall counsel'."

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, THE WAR DEPARTMENT, CHIEF OF STAFF: PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS, by Mark Skinner Watson. Washington, 1950. 551 p. (U.S. Dept. of the Army, Historical Div.)

Prewar sentiment and its effect on the Army; the General Staff - its origins and powers; foreign policy and the armed forces; rearming begins - a confusion of aims; rearming gets under way; troop-training problems of 1940; officer selection, promotion, and rejection; the movement toward air autonomy; aid to Britain versus rearming of America; the victory program; coordination with Britain; darkening clouds in the Far East; the Nation's outlying defenses in 1941; and the war reaches America.

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by Raymond F. Mikesell. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1952. 341 p. (Economics Handbook Series.)

An analysis of US domestic and foreign economic interests, and of political and security motives which formulate US economic policies. Covers the period 1919-1950 and surveys among others the economic aspects of: World War II, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Program, and the US policy of global defense.

UNITED STATES MILITARY AID AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY (1945-1955), by Donovan Paul Yeuell, Jr. Washington, Georgetown University, 1955. 222 p. (Unpublished M. A. thesis.)

Examines the employment and effectiveness of military assistance in support of major foreign policy objectives of US during 1945-1955, and the course of the Military Assistance Program in selected regions of the world in relation to the national security aspects of US foreign policy. The political, economic, and psychological impacts of military aid on the recipients are touched upon when necessary to keep the subject in perspective. The basis for military assistance; cooperation and containment during 1945-1950 as applied to China, Greece, and Turkey; NATO and rearmament 1950-1953; involvement in Asia 1950-1955; and military assistance as a strategic tool. Military aid has not approached its full potential because of deficiencies in the formulation and pursuit of broad American foreign policy objectives and inadequacies in the strategic capabilities of the Free World. Appended: synopsis of major legislation concerning military aid; charts of the Military Assistance Program covering the period 1950-1954; and charts of the Mutual Security Program, including military aid, for FY 1955. Bibliography.

WAR AS A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS, by Col. Vincent J. Esposito, in *Military Affairs*, v. 18, no. 1 (Spring 1954) 19-26.
The philosophy of Clausewitz concerning the relationship between war and politics. Excerpts from ON WAR expressing his ideas, and

the influence they have had on military history and the national strategy of a number of nations. The significance of this theory in American history, and its importance to the US today. Our policy of preserving peace and attaining political aims through peaceful means is not accepted by the communist world; Clausewitz's theory that war is a continuation of politics is a fundamental in communist doctrine.

(1) Historical Examples

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY; ITS DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1775, by Maj. C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon. Harrisburg, Pa. Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 512 p.

Chronological treatment of the development of military policy at political level, emphasizing the fact that results on the battlefield are largely determined by what prior governmental policy has provided in manpower and weapons.

THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB, by Louis Morton, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 35, no. 2 (Jan 1957) 334-352.

Background to the decision to use the bomb on Japan in World War II; and military considerations in arriving at the decision.

THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER, by Dudley W. Knox. New York, Army and Navy Journal, Inc., 1922. 140 p.

Study of naval disarmament as it affected the United States Navy.

F. D. R. AND NAVAL LIMITATION, by Lt. Col. George V. Fagan, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 81, no. 4 (Apr 1955) 411-418.

For almost two decades naval limitation was the defense policy of US. Pacifism, isolationism, and penny-pinching became the watchwords of the 1920's and early 1930's. Preparedness went by default. Morale in the fleet sank while naval officers dutifully carried out the policies of the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. It was Franklin D. Roosevelt who saved the US Navy and put it back on its feet. The circumstances which produced naval limitation and disarmament; US foreign policy beginning with the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 and ending in March, 1933 when following his inauguration FDR fundamentally revised US foreign policy; and benefits gained by US from the rejuvenated Navy as the nation entered World War II.

HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY. VOL. I. COLONIAL PERIOD - WORLD WAR I, by Lt. Col. Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1st Lt. Merton G. Henry. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953. 606 p. Brief accounts of early mobilization programs limited to basic lessons of interest to the military planner. The formation of the General Staff in 1903; and early planning of the Army which culminated in the National Defense Act of 1916. Development of mobilization procedures and machinery during World War I, and efforts made to effect coordination between the services and the nation's economy. Influence of propaganda and censorship on mobilization.

HISTORY OF PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, by John C. Sparrow. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951. 525 p. A general background to US military demobilization from pre-Civil War days through World War II; planning and execution of demobilization in World War II; policies formulated and problems encountered; effects of World War II demobilization on national policy and security, and on military effectiveness of the US Armed Forces; and factors which contributed to a rapid demobilization, including the role played by the communists to exploit for political purposes the public sentiment for demobilization. Concludes that the US history proves "an utter void in the coordination of demobilization of the US Army with national objectives and security," and that in World War II our demobilization policies were not soundly based. With tables, charts, glossary of abbreviations, bibliographical note, and chronology of events pertinent to World War II demobilization. (The work does not cover questions related to materiel demobilization.)

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY ON RESERVE FORCES, 1775-1957, by Eilene Galloway. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957. 441-498. (Prepared at the request of Hon. Overton Brooks, Chairman, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.) "... The evolution of the militia from early colonial days is traced through successive stages of Federal-State relationships to the modern concept of the National Guard of the United States. The main thesis of the study concerns the problem of maintaining standing armed forces which can be augmented by trained Reserves in time of war. A detailed history of this subject, developed in all its aspects, would require years of research resulting in several volumes. This particular study is an outline of those developments which appear to be most important in forming a background for present-day congressional consideration of military manpower problems."

TOWARD A NEW ORDER OF SEA POWER; AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY AND THE WORLD SCENE, 1918-1922, by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940. 332 p.

The changing role of sea power, especially American sea power, both in the world order which "crashed to ruin" in August 1914, and during the years of political "chaos and uncertainty" which followed the armistice of November 1918.

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THE AIMS OF THE SOVIET UNION, by Lt. Col. M. L. Crosthwait, in *Military Review*, v. 34, no. 10 (Jan 1955) 19-24.

An attempt to view Soviet policy through Russian eyes. The long-term aims and objectives of the Soviet Union; and the methods and means by which they can be accomplished in view of the fact that cold war has reached a stalemate and that hot war cannot be started by either side because the antagonists cannot be sure of quick and easy victory. A radical change in policy that would embrace a period of planned peace, an increased industrial might, and an elevation in Russia's standard of living is in the interest of Soviet long-range aims to destroy the capitalist world and establish a World Union of Soviet Republics with Moscow at its head.

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION, by Sidney Lens. Boston, Beacon Press, 1952. 272 p.

Explains the motives of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Stalinist-Communist movement in the outside world since then, in order to find an answer to the paradox whereby, in the face of Soviet tyranny, proven slave labor, absolute denial of individual freedom, and other hardships of the communist way of life, many intelligent people throughout the world join the movement from which they will gain nothing for themselves, and to which they contribute their money, time, labors, and talents. Describes the life of the Soviet sector of Berlin as an example of life behind the Iron Curtain, and in Titoist Yugoslavia which is a Communist State despite its differences with Moscow, and the political repercussions in Asia and the rest of the world due to communism's conquest of China. The communist movement continues to spread because it always appeals to great causes of the underprivileged, and gives millions of idealistic people a feeling of belonging to a great crusade for a better world. Soviet falsifications are so skillfully administered and presented that the "crusaders" are unable to see or believe in the daily brutality of Soviet life. Lack of any other dynamic movement in the world today (which the US and American people could give the world and in the process destroy Stalinism without a war) gives the communist the opportunity to win converts and spread communism from land to land by default.

ON THE NATURE OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM, by Harry R. Rudin and David J. Dallin, in Yale Review, v. 42, no. 3 (Mar 1953) 333-350.

A short survey which stresses the continuity of Russian imperialism under the communist regime and the innovations under the Soviets. While the Tsarist policy did not extend beyond the neighboring territories, the Soviets are convinced that they will accomplish the domination of the entire Western world in a matter of a few decades. The philosophy of civil war on a global basis has been inherited from the preceding era, but the objectives and forms of domination over the satellites differ from the methods of the old Russia.

PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC WARFARE AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, by N. Galay, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 2, no. 4 (Apr 1955) 3-10. In English.

Soviet proposals for the total prohibition of the military use of atomic energy and destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons are based on the organic weakness of the Soviets in adapting their armed forces to the atomic era. The advent of the atomic era deprives the Soviets of the source of their former might and an instrument of aggression - mass land armies with conventional weapons and equipment. The Soviet Union is well behind US in tactical atomic weapons; it is more difficult for the Soviet Army than the West to adapt itself organizationally and tactically to atomic combat; these problems are apparent to the Soviet military leaders and compel them to strive for the complete abolition of all atomic weapons.

PROFITS FOR MOSCOW; SATELLITES PUT TO WORK FOR RED CHINA, in U. S. News and World Report, v. 41, no. 2 (13 July 1956) 116-117.

Soviet Russia is robbing the European satellites to build up Red China. In addition, Russia as the middle man, banker and broker is reaping the profits, and Soviet industry is free of the burden of industrializing China, free to modernize and expand its own industrial plants in a race to catch up with US lead. Information on installations, machinery, equipment, and services received by Communist China from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.

RUSSIA AND THE TURKISH STRAITS, by M. H. Williams, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 78, no. 5 (May 1952) 479-485.

Historic and political background of the "Straits Question": provisions of the Montreux Convention - 1936; Soviet claims for control; the position of the United Kingdom and US on the question of international control; the strategic importance of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles to Russia and Western Powers; and the objectives of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION AND EXPLORATION IN THE PACIFIC, by A. E. Sokol, in American Slavic and East European Review, v. 11, no. 2 (Apr 1952) 85-105.

The known facts of Russian activity in the Pacific from the seventeenth century to the sale of Alaska in 1867, and designed to serve as a background for judging any future Soviet territorial claims such as the rights to the Antarctic which were voiced at the 1949 meeting of the All-Union Geographic Society of the USSR. The discoveries and explorations are related to: (1) expansion in Siberia, the Aleutians, and Japan; (2) the central Pacific, especially the Marshall, Caroline, and Marquesas Islands; and (3) the Antarctic region.

RUSSIA'S NEW KIND OF WAR, by Bern Anderson, in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 76, no. 11 (Nov 1950) 1171-1181.

A brief survey of developments which helped change and form the conduct of warfare and employment of new instruments and which in turn brought on international law to help keep the conduct of war within controllable bounds. However, Russia's new type of warfare is such that international law cannot bear any force upon it. The author examines the guiding force of the Russian political alignment and the origin and nature of communism showing that Russia's new kind of warfare has developed as a result and part of it. He suggests what should be done to counteract such a war.

RUSSIA'S POLAR BASES, in RAF Flying Review, v. 10, no. 2 (Nov 1954) 17-18.

Soviet air activities within the Arctic Circle since 1937 to the present; the military significance of these activities; estimated strength of the Soviet Strategic Air Force (ADD - Aviatsiia Dal'nego Deistviia under the command of Major-General P. Kapitza who prior to 1934 worked closely with Lord Rutherford on atomic research); and location of Soviet Arctic bases. The vastness of the polar regions no longer affords the American continent the protection it once had. US and Canada are taking steps to meet the danger, but it will be some time before North America's backdoor has the complete protection now considered essential. With polar map showing location of Soviet bases.

THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF MARE CLAUSUM AND POLICIES IN BLACK AND BALTIC SEAS, by Kazimierz Grzybowski, in Journal of Central European Affairs, v. 14, no. 4 (Jan 1955) 339-353.

Soviet interpretation of a closed sea as one that is enclosed by the territories of two or a limited number of states and is the exclusive concern of littoral states. Soviet efforts since 1917 to gain an independent position in the Black Sea Straits and area; and her recent demands for a special and privileged position in the Baltic.

SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE ANTARCTIC, by M. Martens, in *Institute for the Study of History and Culture of USSR, Bulletin (Munich)*, v. 2, no. 9 (Sept 1955) 19-25. In English.

On 22 August 1955 the Soviets announced their decision to send in November 1955 a large-scale expedition to carry out geographical research on the Antarctic Continent and the seas of the Southern Polar Basin. Supposedly the Soviet expedition was to be sent in connection with the International Geophysical Year, whose program will be carried out by the joint efforts of scholars in many countries from 1 July 1957 to the end of 1958. In view of the fact that the Soviets will have almost a two-year lead over the West, and that the Antarctic research program for the International Geophysical Year was not to be agreed upon and confirmed until September 1955, the Soviet attempts to link their haste to the International Geophysical Year, sound rather absurd. The reasons behind the Soviet haste to gain a foothold in the Antarctic ahead of the West; background to Soviet claims in the Antarctic; extent of Soviet research and its military and strategic aspects; USSR's diplomatic campaign over its territorial rights in the Antarctic; and the basis of Soviet claims in the Antarctic. In implementing its plans in the Antarctic the USSR has in effect openly embarked upon a policy of expansion. Soviet legal scholars have begun to discuss the principle of "effective occupation" of these territories which have not yet been annexed. The Soviet standpoint, that Antarctica was discovered by Russians and is therefore Russian, could lead to serious international complications. References.

SOVIET IMPERIALISM: ITS ORIGINS AND TACTICS, by Waldemar Gurian and others. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

Symposium on: a comparison between Soviet imperialism and Tsarist imperialism; the Ukrainian problem; the status of Russian Moslems before and after the Revolution; Soviet cultural imperialism in Poland; aims, techniques, and achievements of Tsarist and Soviet diplomacy in China; and the image of Russia as portrayed in Soviet propaganda. To counteract Soviet propaganda, Americans are urged to do all they can to prevent the Kremlin from achieving success in its current effort to convince the peoples of the Soviet Union and the World that America has replaced Hitler as the arch-enemy of the Russians and all other peoples. Furthermore, it would be wise not to oppose the struggle of the minorities in the USSR to achieve their full sovereignty after the downfall of Bolshevism.

THE SOVIET TAKEOVER OF EASTERN EUROPE. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1954. 8 pts.

A study of the methods by which the Soviets achieved the absorption of the countries of Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. The study was undertaken in an effort to determine whether there is a blueprint for the strategy and tactics of communist aggression. Examined are six key areas involved in the Soviet takeover process: the

politics of takeover; propaganda, education, and the Church; agriculture and collectivization; the Communist Party; and the Police and the Army. The study deals with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Latvia, as well as Greece and Yugoslavia where the Soviet takeover was attempted but failed. A separate chapter is devoted to the economic aspects of the Soviet takeover in Eastern Europe. Examination of the satellite armies (Chapter 6) is limited to: description of personnel policies and organizational changes which took place since the Soviet takeover, and to Russian control and influence.

A STUDY OF BOLSHEVISM, by Nathan Leites. Washington, 1952. 770 p. (Ditto Process.)

Its doctrinal, political, operational, ethical, moral, and emotional forms, based on: official and unofficial Soviet publications; statements, pronouncements, and letters; and resolutions of the Bolshevik Party, among other materials. Also Bolshevik attitude toward agreements; Bolshevik concept of enemies; violence as a tool of communism; the doctrine of propaganda; and the Bolshevik methods of political retreat and advance.

TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES OVER THE SEAS; THE ODYSSEY OF ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKI, by Lt. Comdr. Charles Moran, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 18, no. 5 (May 1955) 555-582.

The story of the Russian Baltic Fleet and its Commander Admiral Zinoviev Petrovich Rozhdestvenskii in the Russo-Japanese War. Composition of the Baltic Fleet as it left Libau in October 1904 for its 20,000 mile journey to the Far East around the Cape of Good Hope; the strategy that prompted the Russians to send the Baltic Fleet on such a long journey; quality of the Fleet's units and personnel; the ordeal of the journey; the events that led the Russians to fire at their own ships; the condition of the Fleet as it arrived in the Far East; Rozhdestvenskii in battle and as a prisoner of war; and critique of the Russian strategy that led to the Fleet's defeat by Japanese Navy in May 1905 in Tsushima Straits. Viewed in retrospect, US outspoken partiality toward Japan in the Russo-Japanese War seems a little naive. It completely ignored the fact that in the past Czarist Russia had been the best friend of US in Europe and that sooner or later US was bound to clash with Japan. The cheers that greeted the news of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur have long since been drowned out by US indignation at the "infamous" attack on Pearl Harbor. As for Rozhdestvenskii he can be considered as one of the ablest admirals in naval history. He was given the command of a fleet, inferior in ships, armament, and personnel to that of the Japanese Navy under Admiral Togo. At home his superiors did not understand naval strategy and paid no heed to his counsel. The Fleet exhausted itself on the way to the Far East. After Rozhdestvenskii was wounded in battle there was no capable officer to replace him. The new Commander chose to surrender although the crews of the Russian Fleet were ready to fight on.

WORLD WAR III, RUSSIAN STYLE, in *U. S. News and World Report*, v. 39, no. 23 (2 Dec 1955) 19-25.

A continent-to-continent report of the cold war waged for ten years by the Soviet Union against the West and how the battles are going at present. Since 1939 the Soviet Union has extended her dominance over 740 million people and five million square miles in seventeen countries. During the same period nations of the West have given up control over 693 million people and six million square miles of territory in twenty-three countries. The weapons used by the Soviets in this war are propaganda in all forms, trade, and infiltration.

2. Foreign Policy

a. United States

AMERICAN CRISIS DIPLOMACY; THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1918-1952, by Richard Warner Van Alstyne. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952. 165 p.

Historical background of US foreign policy. Security problems in the Pacific from 1918 to December 1941; naval disarmament in the 1920's; the isolationism of the 1930's; and naval rearmament under Roosevelt. American diplomacy prior to the outbreak of World War II, and international conferences during the war. Development of the UN, its machinery and operation; and the present foreign problems with which we are faced throughout the world.

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE, by Willard L. Thorp, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 35, no. 2 (Jan 1957) 271-282.

If our basic concern is to make it possible for the underdeveloped countries to maintain their independence, we must be concerned not only about political ties but also about economic independence. Surveys Soviet economic policy toward the rest of the world as well as the American policy from about 1937 to the present.

BACKDOOR TO WAR; THE ROOSEVELT FOREIGN POLICY 1933-1941, by Charles Callan Tansill. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1952. 690 p.

History of US foreign policy prior to World War II. Background of world affairs following World War I, policies and actions of US Secretaries of State, Roosevelt's attitudes, and the consequences of American diplomacy.

DANGER SPOTS IN THE PATTERN OF AMERICAN SECURITY, by Raymond Dennett, in *World Politics*, v. 4, no. 4 (July 1952) 447-467.

US postwar commitments in the international field, and their influence upon our future foreign policy. The US systems of alliances in Western Europe, North Pacific, and southeast Asia do not guarantee long-range security, because either economic conditions or nationalism may force member nations to break away from the alliance in the future. There is also danger in the incompatibility of our policy which promises national independence to colonial peoples and at the same time courts the friendship of "mother countries" who depend on their colonies economically, and who are urged by us to rearm in order that security would become the realistic backbone of such alliances. Outlines the necessary adjustments which the US will have to make in its foreign policy by 1954-1956 when the plans for the development of adequate military forces in Western Europe to deter Soviet aggression are accomplished, and the threat which is forcing nations to join the alliances at the present will be largely diminished.

THE INFLUENCE OF FORCE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS, by Capt. W. D. Puleston. New York, Van Nostrand, 1955. 254 p.

Examines the policies and tactics of all major participants in World War II and finds that their records are full of blunders. The blunders of US resulted in needless loss of American lives. As for the future, the author is of the opinion that one blunder the US cannot afford is that of permitting a potential enemy to strike the first blow as Japan did at Pearl Harbor, and gives the reasons why the US must strike first. The major policy mistakes made by the US and other countries prior to and during World War II; the "suicidal" policy of the US today; and how to avoid future mistakes. Captain Puleston does not advocate preventive war. He proposes that "in order to make atomic retaliation effective as a deterrent to aggression, we must decide now and prepare to strike first whenever we have positive evidence that an attack is being mounted against the United States." Bibliography.

MODERN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, by Edward O. Guerrant. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1954. 318 p.

Major aspects of US foreign policy from the years just prior to the turn of the present century when various groups of American citizens envisioned US as future world power, and until 1954, after US had attained a position of world leadership. The work is largely a collection of documents and materials written or spoken by those who formed US policy, or by those whose comments are highly relevant to a better understanding of US actions. American expansionism at the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century; US policy in Far East, 1898-1914; Latin-American policy, 1898-1914; neutrality, 1914-1917; policy in World War I and postwar diplomacy; isolationism; policy, 1936-1939, during Hitler's rise to power; policy from German invasion of Poland to Pearl Harbor; Latin American policy, 1933-1954; World War II policies; and postwar policy from 1945 through the present. Bibliography.

NEW WEAPONS FOR A NEW DIPLOMACY, by Charles E. Martin and others. Los Angeles, University of Southern California, Institute of World Affairs, 1953. 234 p.

The proceedings of the Institute's twenty-ninth session contain among others the following papers and reports: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF POWER, by Tracy E. Streyer; PROSPECTS FOR A BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Norman A. Grabner; THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CONFLICT, by Norbert N. Einstein; POLITICAL WARFARE, by Denis W. Brogan; INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DIPLOMACY, by Herbert S. Little; THE IMPACT OF MODERN WEAPONS ON DIPLOMACY, by Ernst B. Haas; OBSERVABLE WEAKNESSES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME, by Theodore Hsi-En Chen; PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: A WEAPONS SYSTEM, by Vernon McKenzie; MILITARY REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Henry S. Aurand; and ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF FORCE, by Bernard Brodie. Also round table discussions pertaining to: the use of negotiation in the "Cold War" and for the security of Western Hemisphere, Western Europe and the Pacific; the American economy and the foreign aid program; the economic conflict with the Soviet bloc; and the military and psychological struggle for Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

RECENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY; BASIC DOCUMENTS 1941-1951, by Francis O. Wilcox and Thorsten V. Kalijarvi. New York, Appleton, 1952. 927 p.

Documents on: Moscow conference 13-30 October 1943; Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam; the six meetings (1945-1949) of Council of Foreign Ministers; United Nations; the inter-American regional system; defeated and occupied areas; China, Greece, India and Pakistan, Indonesia, Palestine, Philippines, Spain, and the Turkish Straits; war criminals; former Japanese mandated islands; international control of atomic energy, and regulation and reduction of armaments; human rights; and foreign aid and reconstruction, among others.

SECURITY FOR THE FREE WORLD, by George H. Olmsted, in *Armor*, v. 61, no. 3 (May-June 1952) 20-23.

American foreign policy during the last five years, and the steps taken by the US to promote economic, political, and military conditions in the free countries of the world in the face of a growing threat of Soviet aggression. Organization and functions of the Military Defense Assistance Program; statistics on military equipment shipped from the US to various countries under MDAP; and training of foreign military personnel in US Army, Navy, and Air Force service schools.

SEVEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPED HISTORY, by Sumner Welles. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951. 236 p.

How a number of decisions, in which President Roosevelt shared, played an important part in determining the history of the decade, 1940-1950. The decisions discussed are: the recognition of the Vichy Government; the Far Eastern Policy before Pearl Harbor; saving New World unity; the postponement of political and territorial decisions until after the War; Far Eastern policy from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima; the creation of the United Nations before the War's end; and the policy for today.

THE SIBERIAN FIASCO, by Clarence A. Manning. New York, Library Publishers, 1952. 210 p.

History of US intervention in Siberia 1918-1920 which was intended to aid the antibolsheviks of that area to secure self-government. The Russian Revolution and its effect on Siberia; foreign relations of Western Powers with the Soviets; events leading up to the landing of American troops; and military and diplomatic events until the victory of the Bolsheviks and withdrawal of the US forces.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1955, by William Reitzel and others. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1956. 535 p.

Analyzes the "official purposes and actions of the United States in its foreign policies and relations" during this period in order to try to recapture the key decisions that were made and the grounds on which one course of action rather than another was chosen.

THE UNITED STATES IN A CHAOTIC WORLD, by Allan Nevins. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950. 252 p. (Chronicles of America Series, v. 55.)

US foreign policy from 1918 to 1933 described against the background of world affairs. Losing the peace after World War I, and the ineffectual League of Nations; attempts to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy; the problems imposed on diplomacy by the depression; the solidification of American isolationism; the fall of Manchuria to Japan; and US relations with Latin America. Critical bibliographical note.

b. U.S.S.R.

HOW "NEW" IS THE KREMLIN'S NEW LINE? by Philip E. Mosely, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 33, no. 3 (Apr 1955) 376-386.

This review of Soviet foreign policy in the two years since Stalin's death concludes that there has not been the slightest evidence of any substantial change in Soviet objectives and methods. For Khrushchev, as for Malenkov, "coexistence" is a temporary tactic, and episode within an all-embracing inescapable struggle between hostile and irreconcilable systems of power. Quarrels within the secretive circle of the Soviet dictatorship are concerned with persons and with tactics: at home a little more butter or a few more guns, a slight relaxing or tightening of the girths of their hard-pressed people; abroad, a few forced smiles or a slightly fiercer brandishing of Soviet armed might.

RUSSIAN POLICY SINCE 1945, by Alvary Gascoigne, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 100, no. 597 (Feb 1955) 24-35.

Analysis by a former British ambassador to Moscow of Stalin's and Malenkov's internal policy and their policy toward the satellites, China and the rest of Asia, and toward the West. While the Soviets do not look to a world war as a means of reaching their goal of world domination they use other means for sabotaging Western regimes from the inside, for splitting up Western unity, and for reducing each country to a state of ripeness for communist domination. The Western World must remain alert and on the defensive and must preserve the closest possible unity.

SOVIET POLITICAL TREATIES, AND VIOLATIONS; STAFF STUDY FOR THE SUB-COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. Washington, 1955. 63 p. (Senate Document No. 85.)

Nearly 1,000 treaties and written agreements entered into by the Russians since 1917 were examined by the staff of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Detailed findings of that staff study show how Russia violated nearly every agreement. In a foreword to the report of the study by Senator Eastland of Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the fact was brought out that the communists are also violating the Korean armistice and the recently concluded Austrian peace treaty. The fundamental issue that faces the peoples of the world in connection with any current effort to arrive at a workable agreement with communism is - how the free world can make sure that Russia respects her part of the agreement she signs. Until an answer to this question can be found, it is useless to sign new agreements with the Soviet Union. See also WILL RUSSIA HONOR ANY NEW AGREEMENTS? by James O. Eastland, in *US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, v. 39, no. 6 (5 Aug 1955) 88-90.

C. Political

1. Geopolitics

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE, by Col. George C. Reinhardt. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 236 p.

Advocates an American strategy for making all-out war less likely and restoring the initiative to the free world, based on creating a new multipower balance of power in Eurasia. The program involves the establishment of four main contact belts between ourselves and Soviet power involving the assured defense of Europe, the stabilization of an Asian sector against further Chinese Communist aggression, and the establishment of a mobile American strategic reserve in North America and the Middle East. Outlines the steps of the program and the organizational and procedural changes of the US Government which would be needed to achieve the program under US and President Eisenhower's leadership.

GEOGRAPHY AND NATIONAL POWER. Annapolis, Md., United States Naval Institute, 1953. 100 p.

A study of the major geographic facts and principles which contribute to a nation's development, power, and policies. Geographical position, physiography, area, manpower, and natural resources as elements of national power, and how these elements contribute to national strength or weakness, both political and military, of US, Latin America, the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, Europe, the Soviet Union, Near and Middle East, and Far East.

GEOPOLITICS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY, by Robert W. Schmidt. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air University, 1954. 33 p. (Documentary research study.)

Listing and brief discussion of the most significant English language books and magazine articles on geopolitics.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES, I, by Joseph S. Roucek, in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, v. 14, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 185-192.

At the end of both World Wars, US was the most powerful nation on earth, in terms of prestige, power, and ability to exert that power on the international scale. It failed to remain so. Its policies led it to suffer considerable military reverses in Korea, and allowed its enemies to maneuver it into a deadly dangerous situation in which it finds itself today. Geopolitically, the decision to limit the Korean War to a "police action" and to concentrate on the defense of Europe meant that the US considers the western

end of the Eurasian axis more important than the eastern one. Evaluates the course of American diplomacy, and the functioning complexities of US foreign policy which do not always coincide with the best interests of the nation.

GLOBAL MOBILITY, by Maj. George Fielding Eliot, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 212 (Sept-Oct 1955) 216-218.

The military power which diverts the course of Soviet policy from external conquest to internal consolidation is located in North America, a continent, which has no physical contact with the communist world. The power flows outward across the seas and through the air to support the free nations around the vast communist perimeter by means of a developed system of global mobility. In this generation the Russians will not acquire global mobility or adopt a doctrine of mobile strategy. As long as the US maintains a reasonable level of armed power and keeps that power globally mobile, no Kremlin boss can consider war with the United States unless he is also thinking of political suicide.

GLOBAL STRATEGIC VIEWS, by Stephen B. Jones, in Geographical Review, v. 45, no. 4 (Oct 1955) 492-508.

An examination of Mahan's, Mackinder's, Spykman's, and Seversky's views of global politics and strategy.

GLOBAL STRATEGY, by E. J. Kingston McCloughry. New York, Praeger, 1957.

"After a review of the evolution of war and the transition from classical to modern strategy, the author discusses the military aspects of the world's geographical zones and defines their relative strategic importance. He advocates principles and a methodology of solving Allied strategic problems and conflicts to make the West master of the strategic situation."

HOW STRONG IS RUSSIA? A GEOGRAPHIC APPRAISAL, by George B. Cressey. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1954. 146 p.

An evaluation of people, land, climate, resources, and space in the USSR as they bear on economic development and political prospects. Vegetation patterns, land usability, industrial developments, sources of power, metal resources, pioneering in Siberia, urban growth, description of major Soviet cities, major projects affecting economy, and the geographic aspects of Soviet foreign policy. A summary evaluates Russia's assets and shortcomings, concluding that the best rating which she can ever hope to achieve under any form of government is no more

than an "A minus," and that the permanent assets of the Atlantic Powers should always exceed the limitations of continental Eurasia. Illustrated. With a list of selected references.

IMPERIAL MILITARY GEOGRAPHY, by David H. Cole. London, S. Praed, 1953. 323 p.

"The geographical background of the defense problems of the British Commonwealth.

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS. Montgomery, Ala., Air University, Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 1953. 123 p. (Air Science 1, Volume IV.)

Geographic, demographic, and economic factors in world power; political, military, and moral factors in world power; self-determinism and nationalism of nations; military strength of anti-Soviet and neutral powers in Europe; military strength of USSR and her satellites; purpose and structure of the League of Nations and the UN; organization of NATO; regional security structures and organizations; and US foreign policy and US acceptance of world leadership. Bibliography.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF WORLD POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. Montgomery, Ala., Air University, Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 1954. 290 p. (Air Science 4, v. 3.)

Collection of readings pertinent to the military study of international relationships under the impact of maturing air power. In three parts: the impact of air power; the framework of international politics; and factors influencing the power of states, such as geography, population pressures, science and technology, world economy, and transportation and communications.

POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY, by James P. Baxter, in Naval War College Review, v. 8, no. 1 (Sept 1953) 43-60.

Aspects of global politics that have a bearing on US strategy. The fear that many Europeans have of the US turning again to isolationism; and the equal uncertainty in the minds of others that we may turn the cold war to a hot one. Some European statesmen do not share our enthusiasm for European integration. Russian ambition for world domination has not changed, and we must take advantage of opportunities of driving wedges between the USSR and her satellites.

POLITICAL WARFARE; A GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE, by John Scott. New York, John Day, 1955. 256 p.

It is no longer enough for generals and diplomats to have an intellectual grasp of political warfare. In the world where the stakes are as tremendous as freedom versus slavery, it is imperative that many more Americans understand what is meant by political warfare. To this end the author communicates the basic understanding of political warfare, and explains: the nature of war; types and media of political warfare; present battlefields of political warfare (e.g. French North Africa); role of intelligence in political warfare; Soviet potential and Soviet political intentions, Soviet experience in political warfare (the Party, counterespionage, political warfare strategy); and American political warfare efforts (notably the failure of US to understand and exploit the uprising in Eastern Germany on 17 June 1953). Bibliography.

RECOMMENDED BACKGROUND READING ON GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL AREAS OF THE WORLD FOR ARMY ATTACHES AND OTHERS. Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, 1952. 131 p.

An annotated bibliography listing references under names of countries. The subject content of the books is indicated by a code designating political history, economics, sociology, geography, history, foreign relations, and military organization and history.

2. Domestic Politics

GOVERNMENTS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE, by James T. Shotwell. New York, Macmillan, 1952. 881 p.

The evolution and present functioning of the system of government in France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and the USSR. Histories of the chief political parties, and problems and policies of each nation.

HITLER AND THE GERMAN GENERALS; 1934-1938, by Hildegard Boeninger, in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, v. 14, no. 1 (Apr 1954) 19-37.

How Hitler succeeded in winning over the German Army and then bringing it under his domination, and the motives that led the German Generals to accept his domination. Background of the relationship of Army to State in Germany; Hitler's blood purge of 30 June 1934; the story behind the ordinance which directed all military personnel to take the oath of personal allegiance to Hitler (an unconstitutional act in itself);

the Generals' position on the question of reintroduction of conscription in Germany in 1935; and the reoccupation by German Army of the demilitarized Rhineland zone in 1936; and the downfall of Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch following their disagreement with Hitler's projected aggressions. The German generals, fearful that any determined action on their part against Hitler would impair the special interests of the Wehrmacht, closed their eyes to Hitler's murders and defamation of their fellow officers. When the Commander-in-Chief of the three branches of Wehrmacht, General von Fritsch, was defamed and removed from command on the fabricated charge of homosexuality, the Army accepted a fatal blow from which it could not recover.

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED, by Merle Fainsod. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1953. 575 p.

The organization of the Communist Party in Russia and how it operates to rule the people. Historical background of the forces and factors that produced the Bolshevik revolution; the Party and its changing role in theory and practice; other instruments of rule - the hierarchy of Soviets, the bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces; the impact of the Soviet pattern of controls of industry and agriculture, and the tensions which they produce; and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet political system.

IN THE BALANCE, by Winston S. Churchill. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952. 456 p.

His speeches on domestic and foreign affairs delivered during 1949 and 1950 in England, elsewhere in Europe, and in the US.

THE MILITARY AS AN ELEMENT OF SOVIET STATE POWER, by Col. William R. Kintner, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 81, no. 7 (July 1955) 771-783.

The emergence of the Red Army as a political power and of collective leadership on the top in the Soviet Union. The tensions and difficulties which have arisen from this situation; and speculations on the outcome of the leadership crisis and the use the West will make of the present emergency.

MILITARY POLICY AND DEMOCRACY, by Herman M. Somers, in *Current History*, v. 26, no. 153 (May 1954) 295-301.

The decision to maintain in peacetime a large standing military establishment (at home and in overseas bases) on an indefinite basis

has affected the political life, traditions, and institutions of the American people. Effects on the Executive Branch of the Government and on the relations between the Congress and the President; secrecy's effect on the political process of democracy in general and on science and education in particular; and the connection between the growth of military size and political demagoguery as expressions of fear, distrust, and suspicion. A nation unaccustomed to a large military establishment cannot suddenly assume the responsibility for a permanent state of high level mobilization without endangering the balance of its political institutions. If US is to have military strength without militarism and with democracy, a conscious adjustment of the American political life must be made.

THE SOVIET UNION AFTER STALIN, by Helene and Pierre Lazareff. London, Odhams Press, 1955. 254 p.

Life and internal conditions in the Soviet Union. Among the authors' observations: "... The fact is that these people, though sincerely desiring peace, are at the same time militarist and chauvinist almost beyond belief. Nowhere else have we seen so many men in uniform or such marked respect shown by civilians to the military, or witnessed such enthusiasm at military parades." "... Red Star also published articles, under the signature of General B. Olisov, stating that victory in a new war would not be decided by atomic weapons, but only by soldiers on the battlefields. 'The true possibilities of atomic weapons' wrote the General, 'have been greatly exaggerated by the enemies of peace who seek to intimidate public opinion through fear of atomic warfare. There are new effective means of defence against atomic bombs. Well-prepared and well-trained troops can, in spite of atomic weapons, achieve successful military operations'."

WHITHER THE RED ARMY? by C. W. Boldyreff, in *World Affairs*, v. 116, no. 3 (Fall 1953) 78-80.

The Soviet Army as a powerful tool for aggression and as an instrument which has been looked upon and treated with distrust by the political leaders since 1930. The Army's rise in political power during the recent shake-up in which Marshal Zhukov inherited the political power previously held by Beria. The Soviet Army is becoming more and more an army of the people. While it could bring war to the West, it also has potentialities for leading a revolt of liberation provided it is psychologically prepared and assured that the West will cooperate. We must restore the Soviet people's confidence in the West and at the same time spare no effort to explain to the populations of the occupied countries that the Red Army could become their greatest ally in the battle for freedom.

3. Civil-Military Aspects

a. United States

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER, by Louis Smith. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. 370 p.

THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY, by Arthur A. Ekirch. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. 340 p.

The tradition of antimilitarism with its emphasis upon civil as against military authority, is accepted as an essential element of American freedom and democracy. Traces the rise and decline of the antimilitarist tradition throughout the American history and re-examines its implications for the future.

CIVILIAN-MILITARY BALANCE, by Townsend Hoopes, in *Yale Review*, v. 43, no. 2 (Dec 1953) 218-234.

Because of the political and military situation in the world, the influence and responsibilities of the US military authorities in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy have grown tremendously. This growing military activity has rendered civilian control precarious and at the same time has exposed the integrity of the military profession to the perils of partisan politics. In recognition of this situation, President Eisenhower in transmitting to Congress his plan for reorganization of the Defense Department stated: "Basic decisions relating to the military forces must be made by politically accountable civilian officials. Conversely, professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political arena to become the prey of partisan politics." The reorganization plan which became effective on August 1 promises a significant shift of power in the Pentagon from military to civilian control. Background of the problem of civilian-military balance in light of US obligations and commitments in the world; steps which have been taken and the agencies created to coordinate the US political-military effort and at the same time preserve the concept of civilian control over military; and the needed qualifications for civilians if competent civilian control over the armed forces is to be fulfilled.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICAN LIFE, by Jerome G. Kerwin. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948. 181 p.

The essays included in this volume identify the change in conditions which has caused a much greater pervasiveness of the military in American life and at the same time raise the question of how our cherished freedoms can be preserved by the safeguarding of the predominance of civilian power.

CIVIL-NAVAL POLITICS IN WORLD WAR I, by Warner R. Schilling, in World Politics, v. 7, no. 4 (July 1955) 572-591.

The relationships between the foreign policies of the US and the Navy Department during World War I. An examination of these and the various factors affecting them in the past may provide some insight into present and future problems of civil-military relations.

CIVILIANS, SOLDIERS, AND AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY, by William T. R. Fox, in World Politics, v. 7, no. 3 (Apr 1955) 402-418.

The necessity of adjusting military means to the industrial potential on the one hand, and to foreign policy objectives on the other. Factors which hinder the integration of civilian and military considerations in national policy, such as limited investigation of processes for such integration and lack of adjustment in the legislative branch of the Government; including the President's relation with Congress. The perspective of policy makers, both civilian and military, must be broadened to take account of each others' special concerns, responsibilities, and competence. They must learn to work together to make peacetime preparations for war.

CONGRESS AND THE ARMY, in Officers' Call, v. 5, no. 2 (1953) 1-14.

Principles and procedures of relationship between the US Congress and the Army. The Army organizationally is a part of the Executive branch of the US Government. However, its needs and policies are determined through coordination between the Legislative and Executive branches of the Government. Constitutional basis of Congressional powers regarding the military forces of US; President's responsibilities in presenting legislative proposals for Congressional consideration; Constitutional basis of Congressional committees; Army's organization for liaison with the Congress; procedures for military personnel when summoned or requested to appear before Congress; and individual conduct of officers in their official and personal relationships with Congress. With chart showing organization for Congress-Army relationship.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, by Ernest R. May, in Political Science Quarterly, v. 70, no. 2 (June 1955) 161-180.

The fifty years of growth and experimentation which led to the establishment in 1947 of the National Security Council as a regular, legally established, cabinet-level agency for the coordination of political and military views on foreign policy. The inadequacies which still remain to be ironed out in regard to functions, relations with Congress, and in relation to public opinion; and the likelihood that the National Security Council will be a permanent feature of American government.

THE PLACE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE MAKING OF NATIONAL STRATEGY, by Joseph C. Harsch, in Information Service for Officers, v. 4, no. 10 (June 1952) 25-45.

Civilians require the thinking of the armed forces in planning the maximum possible achievement of our national purposes; but the interests of the US would not be advanced if any single point of view involved in the making of national strategy were to get out of balance. We have not worked out a perfect system under which all the different experts, operating on the problem of national strategy, make their contributions in the proper balance at the right times. The military role should not be dominant any more than the political or economic factors.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder. New York, Doubleday, 1954. 84 p.

The increased importance of the Military Establishment in influencing foreign policy since the end of World War II; and the problems involved in striking a balance between military and political objectives. The major functions, situations, and relationships in which the military are involved; units in the Military Establishment which are concerned with foreign policy; and a critical survey of the military's views. The conditions under which the proper contribution of the military could be preserved without subverting the principle of civilian supremacy and other values.

THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE, by Samuel P. Huntington. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press Harvard, 1957. 534 p.

"A searching analysis of the tensions in American society caused by military professionalism and the demands of national security."

WAR, POLITICS, AND THE MILITARY, by William R. Kintner, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 77, no. 2 (Feb 1951) 129-133.

The armed forces can no longer attempt to insulate themselves from political implications and should plan their operations accordingly. The American Armed Forces today are taking steps to train more of their officers to meet the dual role of a modern military leader, but they must broaden the scope of their instruction so that the bulk of their commanders and staff officers will know the political consequences of the military actions they take. Further discussion includes the political face of war; the relation of politics and strategy; and the political capabilities of the armed forces.

b. Others

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON MILITARY JUDGEMENT, by Gen. Richard N. Gale, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 99, no. 593 (Feb 1954) 36-46.

Although the final judgement between military and political factors rests with the government, the military man must know the political aims. The interrelationship between strategy and politics, and the importance of never allowing military judgement to be influenced by political expediency. Military appreciations must take into consideration political factors, but a military plan must stand on its own merits as a military plan.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE MILITARY MIND: THE CASE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, 1911-1914, by John C. Cairns, in Journal of Modern History, v. 25, no. 3 (Sept 1953) 273-285.

The role of the army in the making of a democratic nation's foreign policy is illustrated by a study of French military thought and the course of international politics from 1911 to 1914, that is, from the eve of the Moroccan crisis to the outbreak of World War I. During that period the ambition of the French Army and the political calculations of the French Government flowed together in a common policy on international affairs.

THE NEMESIS OF POWER; THE GERMAN ARMY IN POLITICS 1918-1945, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett. London, Macmillan, 1953. 829 p.

A study of how the German Army survived the defeat of World War I, and how subsequently it proceeded to dominate the political life of the German Republic and lead it into World War II and another defeat. Although the realities of politics dictate the present policies of the West regarding German rearmament, the Allies must not forget the lessons of the past. After World War I German rearmament was carried out secretly. At present it is being carried out openly with the blessing of the Allies. A strong German Army may again influence the policies of the German Republic and lead it into another war. Appended are: text of German Draft Basic Law proposed by Popitz, Jessen, and Von Hassell in 1942; documents of the 'Free Germany' Committee in Moscow, 1943; documents of the Putsch of July 20, 1944, and list of victims; and tables illustrating the organization of the German high command 1919-1945. Chronological list of important political and military events in Germany, September 1918-May 1945 (Unconditional Surrender of German Forces); photographs of German generals; and bibliography.

THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, 1640-1945, by Gordon A. Craig. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1955. 536 p.
The role of the army in German history.

D. Economic

1. General Aspects

lc AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION: WORLD WARS I AND II, by L. C. Hunter. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1955. 22 p. (L55-6.)

The review of American experience in economic mobilization covers the following topics: (1) long range trends in national wealth and the cost of war; (2) industrial and technological foundations of modern war; (3) first experience in industrial mobilization - World War I; (4) planning for industrial mobilization between wars; (5) mobilization of the American economy - World War II; and (6) wartime achievements - stabilization and production.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR WAR, by Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, in Ordnance, v. 39, no. 209 (Mar-Apr 1955) 729-732.

Explanation of the new social science of equating or striking a balance between national security and economic interest; and evaluation of this theory as applied to current international relations, "cold wars," and atomic threats. Charts.

ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY; MANAGING AMERICA'S RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE, by George A. Lincoln. 2nd ed. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1954. 643 p.

A text compiled by a group of professors at the US Military Academy on the economic aspects of preparing and maintaining an adequate defense for the US. The problems involved in US national security; resources available in manpower, materials, and industries; defense finance and stabilization; and international economic aspects.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1954. 17 v.

This is a revised edition of the correspondence study course offered by the College and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and consists of: v. 1 - Introduction to Economic Mobilization; v. 2 - Basic Economics; v. 3 - Public Support, Morale, Security [Civil Defense]; v. 4 - Principles of Administration; v. 5 - Manpower; v. 6 - Material Resources; v. 7 - Raw Materials; v. 8 - Energy Resources; v. 9 - Technological Progress; v. 10 - Public Utilities Services; v. 11 - Requirements; v. 12 - Procurement; v. 13 - Production; v. 14 - Distribution Logistics; v. 15 - Economic Intelligence and Economic Warfare; v. 16 - United States Economic Foreign Policy; and v. 17 - Foreign Aid.

FISCAL POLICY IN A DEFENSE ECONOMY, by Roy Blough, in *National Taxes Journal*, v. 3, no. 4 (Dec 1950) 273-282.

Major problems posed in a defense economy are (1) achieving adequate production of materiel for arming and expanding the Armed Forces and for civil defense, (2) increasing the total productive power of the whole economy, and (3) promoting equality of sacrifice and at the same time giving sufficient incentives to get the job done. A sound fiscal policy can contribute to the solution of these problems particularly in regard to controlling inflation and in distributing the defense burden equally through imposition of taxes or through other less desirable means. The defense effort should produce no great private gain, and the primary reliance for increased production must be placed on willing personal effort.

HOW STRONG IS RUSSIA? by T. Zavalani. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. 244 p.

Soviet economic system from 1928 when the first five-year plan came into being through the present. Production methods under planned economy, treatment of labor, and the effects of government ownership of all the means of production and distribution on the country as a whole and on the life of the Russian people. The Soviet economic system should serve as an example to free countries in warning them of the dangers inherent in planned economy. Only a free economic system can contribute to a healthy growth of a nation and its people. The Soviet economy as the basis of the communist way of life produced tyranny, slave labor, and false statistics, but very little in the way of goods that the people need and want. Includes a brief reference to the Soviet armament industry. With a bibliography.

INDUSTRIAL LIFE IN RUSSIA TODAY, by F. J. Erroll, in *Geographical Magazine*, v. 27, no. 11 (Mar 1955) 585-598.

The author, an MP and director of several British engineering companies, visited Russia with the British Parliamentary Delegation in

October 1954 and was allowed to see Soviet industrial establishments of his own choice. Thus he saw two machine-tool factories, a gold mine, automobile factories, a power station, diesel-engine works, two heavy equipment factories, and an aircraft factory making jet-engined bombers. His impressions and observations, and the conversations he had with various Russians, concluding that there is no doubt of Russia's industrial achievement, of which she is entitled to be proud, but which has grown up under the shadow of the policeman. The Soviet system could not grow voluntarily in any country where there is a long tradition of liberty among persons and independence among institutions.

NATO: THE ECONOMICS OF AN ALLIANCE, by Ronald S. Ritchie. Toronto, Ryerson, 1956. 147 p. (Canadian Institute of International Affairs.) The economic aspects of the NATO alliance: the economic base, burden sharing, and the prospects for the future.

RUSSIAN INDUSTRY: AN INELEGANT AND SINGLE-MINDED GIANT, in *Business Week*, no. 1326 (29 Jan 1955) 144-148 plus.

Russian industry has one dominant goal: to increase output. Nothing else matters. A Soviet product is designed and built so that it does its basic job - seldom more. Extra margins of safety are neglected. The idea is to get the product built as quickly and cheaply as possible. The nature, problems, and the potential future of Russian industry. Photos.

RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY, by Harry Schwartz. 2d ed. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1954. 682 p.

The ideological background of Soviet economy; natural resources; organization and operation of Soviet industry and agriculture; transportation and communication facilities; trade, housing, and services; the Soviet financial system; and foreign economic relations. Tables and charts. Maps showing: surface configuration of the USSR; natural regions of the USSR; population density in the USSR and major cities; Soviet afforestation plans announced in 1948; Soviet hydroelectric and irrigation projects announced in 1950; the Soviet railroad system in 1950; and railroad construction program of fifth five-year plan.

RUSSIA'S TRANSPORT NETWORK, by S/L J. F. L. Long, in *Air Power*, v. 2, no. 2 (Jan 1955) 107-114.

Evolution and present status of Russia's means of transportation: railroad system, inland waterways, coastal shipping, and highway and air transportation. With a map showing USSR waterways, civilian air routes, and hydroelectric power stations.

THE SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1956-1960, by Harry Schwartz, in Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 2, no. 4 (Apr 1955) 54-62. In English.

It is expected that 1956 will mark the beginning of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the Economic Development of the Soviet Union. Although the text of this new plan or of its directives have not been revealed by the Soviet Government, there is enough information available, in the author's opinion, to allow a discussion in broad outline of the likely principal features of the Sixth Plan. Its main characteristics; and the probable specific goals in industry, transportation, agriculture, housing, foreign trade, and Soviet economic commitments with the communist bloc of nations. Offers the following tentative conclusions on the perspectives for Soviet economic development over the next five years: the military-economic power of the Soviet Union as represented by heavy industry and the products of heavy industry is likely to increase sharply; agriculture and consumer goods production are unlikely to improve at a rate either satisfactory to Soviet consumers or at a rate likely to be proportional to the probable increase in the volume of purchasing power in the hands of consumers, causing a continued morale problem and an inflationary threat of no mean proportion; in terms of the regime's stability, agriculture will be the key sector, and success of the virgin lands and corn programs would probably permit Khrushchev to become openly Stalin's successor; however, their failure would probably not only undermine Khrushchev's personal position but throw the country into a major crisis with incalculable consequences.

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH, by Calvin B. Hoover, in Foreign Affairs, v. 35, no. 2 (Jan 1957) 257-270.
The rates of economic growth projected in the Sixth Five-Year Plan.

TRANSPORTATION AS A STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET UNION, by Otto Wien, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 1 (Apr 1956) 75-89.
Translated and digested from an article in WEHRKUNDE (July 1955).

TRANSPORTATION BEYOND THE URALS AND IN CENTRAL ASIA, by A. Lebed, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 1, no. 9 (Dec 1954) 3-14. In English.
Central Asia and the area beyond the Urals are acquiring increased economic and strategic importance in the USSR. However, the success of present and future plans for developing these regions depends on transportation. Presents data on railways, highways, and waterways in these regions, and concludes that Central Asia and the regions beyond the Urals, once linked to the central regions of the USSR by a weak com-

munications network, are now an integral part of the economic and military complex of the USSR. With maps showing the transportation routes, waterway systems, and the main railways of Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia.

TRANSPORTATION IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Raymond Estep. Maxwell Field, Ala., Air University, 1951. 58 p. (Air University Documentary Research Study.)

Climatic and geographic factors influencing the development of Russian transportation; the railway system (including rolling stock and equipment); inland navigation; coastal shipping; roads and highways; and civil aviation. Maps and photos. References.

2. Human Resources

IMPACT OF WAR ON FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 1939-1945, by Gladys M. Kammerer. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1951. 372 p.

The military record of the United States in World War II was due in no small measure to the high levels of effectiveness attained by the administrative management of the Federal government. The move for administrative reform launched in the thirties bore fruit in many of the changes instituted in 1939-1940 which helped set the stage for building a sound organization. The concentration of authority and responsibility for civilian recruitment in the Civil Service Commission during the defense period made that agency the focal point for pressures both for deterioration and improvement of the service. For personnel administration, the war furnished both a prolonged crisis and an unparalleled opportunity. These changes and developments are organized and discussed under the following headings: centralization of the responsibility for recruitment; a new aggressive approach to recruitment; application of this approach to particular occupational groups; the deterioration in standards for selection; the new emphasis on loyalty; development of training policies and organization and training programs; increased mobility within the service; intensification of pressures for higher pay - statutory adjustments - The Classification Act and Wage Administration; controls on Federal employment; broadening employee relations programs; administrative changes and reorganization of the Civil Service Commission; and an evaluation of wartime personnel administration.

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN SOVIET AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY, by Walter Galenson. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955. 273 p.

Traces the development of labor productivity in a number of Soviet industries since 1928; compares productivity in these industries with their counterparts in US; and arrives at some general conclusions on comparative labor productivity in Soviet and American industry. Among the industries studied: coal, iron ore, crude oil and natural gas, iron and steel, machinery, cotton textile manufacturing, shoe manufacturing, and beet sugar processing. Even if Soviet productivity rose at six percent per annum for twenty years, and if US productivity continued at the rate of two percent, there would still be a difference between the levels in the two countries at the end of twenty years. Bibliography, and statistical tables.

1c MANPOWER; AN ANNOTATED READING LIST. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1955. 32 p. (R 181.)

The compilation provides a list of selected and current literature dealing with the mobilization of US manpower. The broad fields considered in this selection: population, demography, human engineering, scientific management, industrial relations, and civil defense.

A MANPOWER PROGRAM FOR FULL MOBILIZATION, DEVELOPED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR MANAGEMENT MANPOWER POLICY COMMITTEE. Washington, US Office of Defense Mobilization and US Dept. of Labor, 1954. 19 p.

The program has the following objectives: (1) to create an informed understanding of the elements of a voluntary manpower mobilization program; (2) to develop national policies and programs which will facilitate solution of manpower problems at establishment, community, state, and regional levels; and (3) to promote the joint participation of labor management, and government in carrying out such a program.

3. National Resources

OIL IS EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM, by Burton B. Biggs, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 78, no. 5 (May 1952) 503-509.

Facts and figures on: US oil reserves; production and consumption (in its various forms); demand and supply for civilian and military needs during World War II and at the present; and the conclusion that the delicate balance now existing between supply and demand, as far as the military are concerned, calls for careful future planning rather than optimism which is expressed in many quarters. With statistical

tables showing the effect of the Iranian oil crisis on the US demand and supply, and the principal petroleum products required by the military services and the effect of these requirements on civilian uses.

PIVOT OF HISTORY, by O. Edmund Clubb, in Military Review, v. 36, no. 11 (Feb 1957) 3-11.

At a time when the United States is within sight of depletion of some of her most essential minerals, the Soviet Union is just beginning the exploitation of Asia - a rich new continent now in metamorphosis. Discussed are the importance of Soviet Asia as the controlling area of the Eurasian heartland, and the ambitious plans of Soviet leaders.

RECENT SOURCE MATERIAL [ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS], A SELECTED LIST, in Central Asian Review, v. 3, no. 2 (1955) 175-183.

A bibliography of materials on Central Asia appearing in Soviet publications between September 1954 and March 1955. The bibliography is divided into sections on agriculture, industry, communications, ethnography, geography, history, geology, and other subjects.

REPORT ON RUSSIA, in World Oil, v. 141, no. 3 (15 Aug 1955) 135-147.

An analysis of the petroleum situation in the Soviet Union and the capabilities of the Red petroleum industry to supply the needs of the Soviet Armed Forces on a sustaining basis in case of a global conflict. Estimates of: the petroleum requirements of the Armed Forces of USSR; Russian oil reserves; and capacity of Russia's oil fields. Behind Russia's tremendous fighting force lies its oil weakness, and this weakness rules out any but the most foolhardy attempt to wage an aggressive war. Also information on: oil exports by the Soviet Union, and the attempts by the nations of the Red bloc to accelerate their search for petroleum.

4. Mobilization Capability

a. United States

AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN WAR, by Bernard M. Baruch. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1941. 498 p.

ARE WE READY? by Col. Hans G. Jepson, in *Ordinance*, v. 40, no. 213 (Nov-Dec 1955) 431-434.

It is believed that the Nation's preparedness can be determined from an analysis of a small group of factors representing its political, economic, moral, industrial, and military strength. A war-readiness formula is developed on the basis of eighteen representative factors.

THE DEFENSE MATERIALS SYSTEM, by Arthur U. Sufrin, in *Military Engineering*, v. 47, no. 319 (Sept-Oct 1955) 337-338.

Development and operation of the Defense Materials System (DMS) in the Department of Commerce to permit rapid and orderly expansion of military production and construction programs. It is one more vital step which the Government and private industry have taken in the effort to maintain preparedness for modern warfare.

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION PLANNING BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS, PART I, by Harry B. Yoshpe, in *Military Affairs*, v. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951) 199-204.

Revolutionary nature of economic mobilization introduced by World War I as a part of modern warfare. General recognition of the fact that the mobilization task is no longer principally that of raising armed forces, but rather than of maximizing the nation's total productive output and diverting a sufficient part of it into war channels. Lessons of World War I in planning for economic mobilization; the planning between World Wars; and a critical appraisal of that planning.

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION STUDIES; ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND NATIONAL SECURITY (TO JULY 1950), by Louis C. Hunter. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1952. 95 p. (R151: Economic Mobilization Studies.)

Historical review of the origins and early accomplishments of the US organization for national security with respect to planning for the logistical support of the Armed Forces. The experience and conditions which led to the reorganization of this planning responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947. The responsibility was transferred from the military establishment to independent agency in recognition of the requirements in an age of total warfare. The last two chapters lead us to the outbreak of the Korean War and deal also with interagency relationships and discuss and appraise the various measures, policies, and organizations.

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GEARING INDUSTRY TO NATIONAL DEFENSE, by J. Lewis Powell, in *Military Engineer*, v. 46, no. 314 (Nov-Dec 1954) 432-433.

The problems involved in planning for industrial mobilization in a future emergency and some of the planning which has been accomplished. The effectiveness of the Armed Forces may depend on how fast industry can convert from peace to war production. The Department of Defense Preferential Planning List which is a compilation of items for which planning should be accomplished first; and the benefits to an industrial firm of being listed in the Alphabetical Register of Planned Wartime Suppliers. Techniques that would assist US industry in continuing production after an atomic attack are: plant dispersal, planning duplicate tentative production schedules for an item by two or more firms, and planning with numerous secondary sources for critical items.

THE INTERDEPENDENCY OF LOGISTIC AND STRATEGIC PLANNING, by Capt. S. E. Ruehlow, in *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, v. 1, no. 4 (Dec 1954) 237-257.

Discusses: (1) the interrelationship of logistic and strategic planning and the progress that has been achieved in integrating such planning since World War II; (2) the development of logistic planning based on World War II experience and post-war developments; (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Defense Mobilization programs for mobilization planning; (4) the determination of military and civilian requirements; (5) the testing of strategic war plans for feasibility; and (6) the resultant courses of action which may be indicated. With conclusions, graphs, and a bibliography.

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY (1950-1960). PROBLEMS AND ISSUES, prep. by Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Washington, 1950. 245 p. (US Senate, 81st Congress, 2d Session, document no. 204; L. C. Public Affairs Bulletin no. 81.)

Appraises those elements of the preparedness program which are primarily civilian and economic in character, and in all covers: nature and scope of mobilization planning; controversial concepts about mobilization planning; controversial organizational patterns; stand-by legislation; controversial policy alternatives involving national attitudes; actual defense measures involving the appropriations of public funds; background of mobilization; and general history of mobilization planning in World War I and through peace planning up to Pearl Harbor. Further, World War II experiences are drawn upon in the study.

THE NAVY AND THE INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II, by Robert H. Connery. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951. 527 p.

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The success of the Navy's material program depended upon a great many individuals and a great many offices in the Department. The primary concern here being the formation of procurement policies and the coordination of the operation as a whole, this account describes the operations of the various agencies attached to the Office of the Under Secretary, while James Forrestal held that post. Complete accounts of the parts played by the various material bureaus in the war effort are related. In a broad sense, this is a case study of the techniques of executive control in a military department, but it gives particular attention to the administrative problems of material procurement in war time. Consequently, the events that are recorded tell the story of the Navy's material program from the planning stages of 1920-42 through the war years to V-J Day and after, depicting the relations between the Navy's material program and the industrial mobilization agencies as a whole.

PLANNING - A KEY TO SURVIVAL, by Paul A. Longo, in Armed Forces Chemical Journal, v. 9, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 1955) 14-15.

Cycle and scope of industrial mobilization planning encompassing the strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the responsibilities of intervening agencies, and the contributions made by American industry to the planning effort.

"SHADOW PLANTS" - OUR SECRET WEAPON, by Vernon Pozer, in Collier's, v. 135, no. 11 (27 May 1955) 34-35.

Under a plan of the Army Ordnance Corps, fully-equipped war-production factories throughout US are standing by ready for any emergency. The plan called "Operation Ready" is a unique conception in stockpiling. Instead of moth-balling mountains of weapons, munitions, and equipment, the plan provides for factories which are ready to produce the equipment as the need arises. It prevents the nation from finding itself in a precarious industrial position. The plan was devised and is being supervised by Brig. Gen. John B. Medaris, Chief of Ordnance's Industrial Division. Some details of "Operation Ready," and a personality sketch of General Medaris.

STOCKPILING "KNOW-HOW" by J. Lewis Powell, in Ordnance, v. 40, no. 212 (Sept-Oct 1955) 244-247.

The rapidity of obsolescence and the complexity of modern technological developments mean that industrial "know-how" and military logistics have to be constantly balanced for national defense. This is achieved through the revised industrial mobilization planning program which differs from previous industrial mobilization studies in three important respects: (1) it focuses planning time and effort on the more important critical military items that are "hard to make" and "hard to get" during wartime; (2) it emphasizes making fewer plans but making them more realistic and practical; and (3) by getting industry participation,

"production know-how" is being fabricated into future war production schedules of critical military items. How this revised planning program operates.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL; A CHRONICLE OF ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II, by Eliot Janeway. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951. 382 p.

Shows how the US won World War II even before the offensive was carried to the enemy, by winning it as a war of production on the home front; and how Franklin D. Roosevelt manipulated domestic politics to achieve this objective. With a bibliographic note.

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE MOBILIZATION; PART I, in Federal Bar Journal, v. 13, no. 1 (Sept 1952) 1-69.

A series of articles on the legal and administrative aspects of US economic mobilization. The titles are: THE ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE MOBILIZATION, by Rodolfo A. Correa; PRODUCTION UNDER THE CONTROLLED MATERIALS PLAN, by Peter H. Kaskell; VOLUNTARY COOPERATIVE ACTION BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT UNDER THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, by George R. Lunn, Jr.; CONSTRUCTION CONTROLS IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL PRODUCTION AUTHORITY, by Richardson Bronson; THE CONTROL OF EXPORTS, by Nathan Ostroff; and ENFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL PRODUCTION AUTHORITY'S ORDERS AND REGULATIONS, by Robert H. Winn.

b. Others

THE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. Les armes atomiques et la défense nationale, by Col. E. J. Debau, in Revue de Défense Nationale, v. 11 (July 1955) 3-7. In French.

Since it has been decided in France to give priority to atomic installations for industrial purposes, provision should be made for the rapid conversion of this new industry to meet wartime requirements, and French military engineers should be permitted to familiarize themselves with the technical progress made by the large companies now engaged in atomic work. Furthermore, France's nuclear weapons should exist at least in the form of prototypes so as to prevent any unnecessary delay in initiating wartime production of such weapons.

HITLER'S ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION, by Lt. Col. James R. Dorman, Jr., in Military Review, v. 33, no. 8 (Nov 1953) 46-57.

The importance of economic preparation to the objectives pursued in a war. Without a large-scale productive effort a nation cannot conduct large-scale military operations. Germany's economy, while she was preparing for the conquest of Europe, was geared to the concept of short decisive conflicts on a single front at a time. Hitler considered that such decisive conflicts could be won by initial quantity of arms and that a sustained economic effort was unnecessary. When in 1942 Germany realized that her undefeated enemies were capable of conducting a prolonged war, she began to mobilize her industry for a sustained military effort. However, it was too late; industry could not catch up with all the military requirements of all German forces in the various theaters of operations. Some of the details of the German economic mobilization in World War II, and the reasons why it failed to achieve the sought after results.

IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION, by G. A. Vvedensky, in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Bulletin (Munich), v. 2, no. 5 (May 1955) 28-33. In English.

During the last two years the Soviet iron and steel industry has shown a marked tendency to lag. In March 1955 the Soviet Government and press began exhorting the workers in the iron and steel industry to produce more in 1955 because it became evident that the tasks set at the 19th Party Congress for the basic forms of heavy industry in 1955 would not satisfy the essential requirements of the Soviet Union. The effects on Soviet heavy industry brought about by the lag in production and the growth in requirements for iron and steel. There is little doubt that the Soviet Government will take drastic steps to rectify the situation in the iron and steel industry because the development of heavy industry and consequently of Russia's war potential is being undermined. Table showing production of pig iron, steel, and rolled metal in USSR 1913-1960.

1c LESSONS FROM EUROPEAN WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE IN INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION, by Leo Cherne. Washington, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1954. 19 p. (L54-132.)

Reviews some of the destruction afflicted by the Allies on German industry, and effectiveness of prolonged bombings on the economic system. Allied aerial attacks upon Germany in terms of economic paralysis were less effective than originally anticipated, and only weakening of morale and breaking of the German will to fight led to the collapse of the latter. Compares present industrial concentration of the US with that of the USSR and introduces the factor of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. Stresses the lack of civil-defense preparedness in the US.

THE RACE WE ARE LOSING TO RUSSIA, by Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in Saturday Evening Post, v. 228, no. 44 (28 Apr 1956) 25 plus. How USSR is outpacing the US in war industries.

5. Science And Technology

a. General Aspects

ENGINEERING AND SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER IN THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET RUSSIA. Washington, 84th Congress, 2d Session, 1956. 85 p. (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.) Availability of engineers and scientists; supply of engineers and scientists; and enrollment at the educational establishments and institutions. With tables and charts by subject and country. (The following countries of Western Europe are covered: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Irish Republic, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.)

FOUNDATION FOR AIR POWER, by Group Capt. H. R. Footitt, in Aircraft, Canada, v. 17, no. 5 (May 1955) 12-14 plus.

Winston Churchill's statement, "The mistakes of years cannot be remedied in hours," is also applicable to research and development. The research and development foundation for air power must be carefully planned and carried out. It cannot be continually remodeled by see-saw changes in basic policy. Ten years may elapse before the real results or the lack of them begin to show in the state of a nation's air power. Describes the price paid by Canada, USA, and Great Britain in the past because their research and development policies were inconsistent, or because the decisions made, seriously delayed the progress of aeronautical research; and outlines the fundamental requirements for sound planning in research and development for air power.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCE OF WAR, by Col. J. F. C. Fuller. London, Hutchinson, 1925. 335 p.

Stresses the scientific aspects of war.

GEOPHYSICS AND WARFARE, by Helmut E. Landsberg. Washington, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), Research and Development Coordinating Committee on General Sciences, 1954. 68 p. (CGS 202/1, RDB 142/1 rev.)

The role of geophysical sciences in relation to modern total war; advances made in applying these sciences to the military machine; and the need for long-term research and development activities in this area. The following sciences are considered: meteorology; oceanography; hydrology; terrestrial magnetism and electricity; geodesy and cartography; seismology; volcanology; soil mechanics; and geology.

SCIENCE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, by Llewellyn Woodward, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 4 (Apr 1956) 118-124.

The effects of applied science on the methods by which states conduct their relations with one another; the influence of current scientific theory upon the aims of statesmen; effect of war on science; the dilemma of maintaining peace in the face of the availability of present weapons of destruction and some of the things the scientists (who through their inventions presented this generation with problems for which there is at present no adequate political solution) can do to increase their own understanding of the political dilemmas of the world.

SCIENCE IN WAR, by Dr. R. Cockburn, in Royal United Service Institution Journal, v. 101, no. 601 (Feb 1956) 23-35.

The strategy of defense and the problems associated with the forward planning of research and development since military strategy is becoming dependent on scientific developments more than is generally realized. The machinery of defense science, the new strategy, the logic of retaliation, and the momentum of research.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE, by Jules Moch, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 12, no. 4 (Apr 1956) 112-112.

The repercussions of science on internal and external affairs of nations and its future role in human progress. Among the subjects discussed: effect of technology on politics; scientific research and national independence; relations of science to war and to diplomacy in the periods of peace; and science and the means of military offense and defense.

b. United States

THE AMERICAN SCIENTIST: 1955, by Lee A. DeBridg, in Yale Review, v. 45, no. 1 (Sept 1955) 1-16.

The role of the scientist in *postwar America*, and problems connected with military support of basic and applied science; Neglect of basic science not directly concerned with military problems; confusion regarding the difference between open science and secret technology; and security measures. Government ineptness in encouraging science, and reasons why the Government cannot attract the best young scientists.

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AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP, by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., in Aeronautical Engineering Review, v. 15, no. 4 (Apr 1956) 38-41 plus.

The deterrence of total war and the integrity of the free world depend upon America's capacity to maintain a position of great relative technological strength in both economic and military measures and in the countermeasures of the cold war. In view of the Soviet's steady growth in technological strength, a seven-point program is suggested to give direction and velocity to our technological advance and maximum incentive to private initiative.

NEW COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPT FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG MISSILE ENGINEERS, by Arthur W. Steinfeldt, in Missiles and Rockets, v. 1, no. 1 (Oct 1956) 110-114.

Recognition and response to the need for better means of communication within the missile industry resulted in a series of technical forums undertaken by the Special Defense Projects Department of the General Electric Company. Successes attained by these forums.

PROBLEMS FACING THE ROCKET INDUSTRY RELATING TO MILITARY PLANNING, by H. B. Horne, in American Rocket Society Journal, no. 82 (Sept 1950) 107-118 and others.

Problems of development, production, and economics, standardization of propellants, empiricism in design, the need for a subcontractor group, the need for a one-shot liquid-rocket engine, the fact that the Government is the only customer, and the need for military-industry team-play.

SCIENCE AND NATIONAL POWER, by J. Carlton Ward, Jr., in Armed Forces Chemical Journal, v. 9, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1955) 10-14 plus.

Lecture delivered at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on the accomplishments of science and technological development, and their effects on the position of the US relative to USSR. Charts.

SCIENCE IN MODERN WARFARE, by Charles E. Loucks, in Armed Forces Chemical Journal, v. 5, no. 4 (Apr 1952) 21-24.

The relationship between efficient military power and pure and applied science is under discussion. National security for the US requires a well trained and equipped defense force capable of rapid expansion, and prepared plans for converting technical abilities and industrial potential from a peace to a war basis. The chemical warfare mission of the Chemical Corps: the development of toxic materials as military weapons and protection against them.

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c. U. S. S. R.

AERONAUTICAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE U. S. S. R., by J. W. Rizika, in Technology Review, v. 57, no. 1 (Nov 1954) 23-26.

The development of aeronautical engineering and research in the Soviet Union from World War I to the present, biographical sketches of the leading Russian aircraft designers, and the assistance obtained from postwar German acquisitions. The principal plants for aircraft production and research; the aircraft engineers and designs obtained from Germany, notably the personnel and facilities of the rocket research center at Peenemunde; and the present Soviet technological status. Aeronautical technology has progressed at a rate far in excess of normal expectations, and has closed the gap that once existed between the USSR and the Western Powers.

RED AVIATION PROGRESS CHALLENGES U. S. AIRPOWER SUPREMACY, by Anthony Vandyk, in American Aviation, v. 19, no. 1 (6 June 1955) 21-24.

The Soviet Union has trained its aviation technicians along standards comparable with those of their western counterparts; Soviet research and development work has been highly efficient in exploiting and improving captured German designs; in the past ten years USSR has become independent in most fields of aeronautical engineering and no longer has to lean on stolen or copied western designs produced with the assistance of western technicians; simplicity of Soviet designs and the full utilization of the mass production potential make it possible for the Russian aircraft industry to approach the capacity of US. Means by which such progress was made by USSR; Soviet facilities for aircraft research and development; aircraft engine development and the types of new engines developed; and some of the other trends in Soviet military research and development.

RUSSIA GAINS OVER U. S. IN EDUCATING SCIENTISTS, in U. S. News and World Report, v. 39, no. 12 (16 Sept 1955) 94-98 plus.

An interview with Homer L. Dodge, president emeritus of Norwich University, and Norton T. Dodge, his son, who is a graduate student in Russian studies at Harvard. Both, recently back from the Soviet Union where they studied the educational system, visited Russian classrooms and talked to Soviet educators. During the interview they presented a qualitative and quantitative appraisal of the various aspects of education in USSR, and the facilities available.

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RUSSIA THREATENS U. S. ENGINEERING LEADERSHIP! by Nicholas DeWitt, in Aviation Age, v. 23, no. 2 (Feb 1955) 16-21.

Comparison of the status and training of the engineers of the US and the Soviet Union. Soviet engineering enrollment is about one third larger than that of the US; students specializing in machine building, shipbuilding, or aviation engineering compose fifteen percent of all engineering students; and aeronautical engineering training is conducted in institutions set up explicitly for this purpose. An engineering student pays nominal or no fees, and upon graduation is assigned to a job he cannot leave at will. The majority of the estimated 510,000 engineers employed in 1953 were graduates of basically sound training programs, and the attrition rate is low.

WHITE OUTLINES SOVIET TECHNICAL GAINS, in Aviation Week, v. 62, no. 22 (30 May 1955) 16-18.

Statement made by General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff USAF, during his Armed Forces Day speech in Pittsburgh, in which he made an exposition of the relative positions of American and Russian technologies as applied to development of airpower and atomic weapons. After discussing the extent of Soviet technological maturity, aircraft production progress, and bomber threat to US, the General concluded: "Despite the improving strength of the Communists, our prospects for the future look bright. We can fail to win the technological battle only if we fail to recognize its importance. Unless we keep up our day-to-day strength we will have no shield to assure our future developments..."

E. Sociological

THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR, by Raymond Aron. New York, Doubleday, 1954. 379 p.

Sociological study of World Wars I and II and the Cold War. The effect of modern warfare on cultures and people.

FORCES FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET SOCIETY, by Robert C. Tucker. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1956. 54 p. (USAF Project Rand Research Memorandum RM-1636.)

Some tentative conclusions of recent research on trends of Soviet society and leadership since the death of Stalin.

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FROM ARROW TO ATOM BOMB; THE PSYCHOLOGICAL HISTORY OF WAR, by Stanton A. Coblenz. New York, Beechurst Press, 1953. 539 p.

The mind of man through the wars since history began in an effort to discover why wars are caused and, accordingly, how they may be controlled. The motives behind armed conflict, and the incentives, deterrents, and habits of mind which change peace into war. Suggests that, because most decisions concerning war rest with a small number of top leaders, only graduates of specialized training in statecraft be qualified for high government positions.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY, by Stanislaw Andrzejewski. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. 195 p.

Sociological aspects of warfare and the relations between military organization and social structure in various countries throughout history.

THE NEW MAN IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY, by Raymond A. Bauer. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952. 229 p. (Russian Research Center Studies.)

The internal logic of Soviet society is revealed through a study of Soviet conception of man, the pattern of social change in the Soviet Union, and the relationship of psychology to society and ideology to action. With a bibliography.

STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE AMERICAN SOLDIER," ed. by Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1950. 255 p. (Continuities in social research.)

During World War II, the Army, faced with many practical problems that could be solved by the use of social research techniques, established a Research Branch which investigated problems of morale, soldier preferences, etc., to provide information that would allow sensible decisions on practical issues involved in army life. This present symposium evaluates critically the work of the Research Branch as reported in the American Soldier, reporting on the research techniques used, and on the social theory underlying those techniques. The essays included are: primary groups in The American Army; reference group theory in "The American Soldier"; The American Soldier and the sociology of military organization; problems of survey analysis; some afterthoughts of a contributor to The American Soldier; and the soldier and the public.

WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION; THE HISTORIAN'S PERSPECTIVE, ed. by Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran. New York, Columbia University Press, 1941. 333 p.

A selection of papers presented at the 1939-40 meetings of the American Historical Association, with emphasis on the theme of modern war.

THE WAR POTENTIAL OF NATIONS, by Klaus Knorr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956. 310 p.

This study of the theory of war potential goes beyond the categories of economic and military potential to include such components as "the will to fight" and "administrative capacity."

WARFARE; THE RELATION OF WAR TO SOCIETY, by Ludvig Renn. London, Faber and Faber, [1939]. 276 p.

III. NATIONAL HISTORIES

A. General Aspects

FRIEDRICH DER EINZIGE, by Maj. F. O. Cetre, in Forces Magazine (Sept 1955) 29-31.

The military genius and indomitable spirit of Frederick the Great of Prussia, 1712-86, which made possible the development of modern Germany. His peacetime achievements. Frederick the Great left his country one of the great powers of Europe, with a greatly enlarged territory, the best army in Europe, good civil organization, and sound economy.

HIDDEN THREADS OF HISTORY; WILSON THROUGH ROOSEVELT, by Louis B. Wehle. New York, Macmillan, 1953. 300 p.

History of US policies, domestic and foreign, in peace and in war during the past thirty-five years, and some of the personalities who influenced and guided those policies. Unpreparedness of Washington to enter World War I despite US declaration of war on Germany on 6 April

1917; policies formulated following the declaration regarding the Armed Forces, production, and labor. Post-World War I US policies on trade with Europe; entrance of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the national scene; his pre-inauguration policies; his policies in the early stages of presidency, during his second term, and in the period prior to World War II. Post-World War II reconstruction in Europe under Churchill-Roosevelt agreements, and how US policy was directed and applied to the reconstruction problem.

THE MIND OF MODERN RUSSIA, ed. by Hans Kohn. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1955. 298 p.

Revolutions change regimes, but national traditions remain to influence the new rulers. To understand the Soviet Union as it is ruled from the Kremlin today, one must understand the political and social thought of the Tsardom of Muscovy which had its origin in the very same Kremlin, and the Russian Empire which Peter the Great founded. Russia of today tries to answer the pressing new problems which post-Petrinian Russia had to face - Russia's relationship to Europe and her progressive Westernization. The work offers to the students of modern history, of political theory, and of international relations some source material for the knowledge and understanding of the national traditions which have formed the Russian character and Russian history and how the Russian political and cultural maturity developed during the century from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the First World War which was the brightest page in Russia's millenary history. Sources and selective bibliography.

POLAND, RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN 1941-1945, by R. Umiastowski. London, Hollis and Carter, 1946. 544 p.

A history of the absorption of Poland by the USSR since the German invasion of Russia in 1941. Diplomatic relations, political figures, foreign policies, and Russian-Polish treaties. Russian treatment of Polish citizens interned in labor camps in 1939, and the formation for propaganda purposes of the Polish Corps of the Red Army. Russian-Polish relationships during World War II; the changed attitude as Russian armies advanced toward Germany in 1944-45; and the occupation of Poland by the USSR. Stalin's victories at Teheran and Yalta.

SINCE 1900. A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN OUR TIMES, by Oscar T. Barck and Nelson M. Blake. New York, Macmillan, 1947. 863 p.

A comprehensive study of the recent social and cultural trends, the steady expansion of the functions of government to deal with the complex problems of a new age, and the increasing involvement of the United States in global politics.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE, by Chester Wilmot. New York, Harper, 1952. 766 p.

History of World War II in Europe based on Allied and enemy documents. West European, Mediterranean, and Russian Campaigns. Hitler, Stalin, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and other political and military personalities of the war; their strategy, actions, and the consequences. With an account of various battles accompanied by maps.

SUMMING-UP ON RUSSIA, by Stephen Graham. London, Ernest Benn, 1951. 224 p.

The sociological, political, and economic evolution in the Soviet Union since 1917, and the accomplishments of the Revolution and what it has done for Russia as a country, and for its people.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1939-1946; HITLER'S EUROPE, ed. by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee. London, Oxford University Press, 1954. 730 p.

The political structure and administration of Germany during World War II, and the economic policies and controls in the Reich and occupied countries. Political and economic developments in Italy, Vichy France, and other countries in Eastern and Western Europe, and the Free French Movement between 1940-1942.

B. Military Heritage

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON HISTORY, by J. F. C. Fuller. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954-1956. 3 vols.

Volume I, 602 p., covers the period from the earliest times to the Battle of Lepanto; Volume II, 561 p., the period from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo; Volume III, 666 p., the period from the American Civil War to the end of World War II.

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FIFTEEN DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WORLD, by Edward S. Creasy. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 471 p. Marathon, 490 B. C.; Syracuse, 413 B. C.; Arbela, 331 B. C.; Metaurus, 207 B. C.; Arminius, A. D. 9; Chalons, 451; Tours, 732; Hastings, 1066; Orleans, 1429; Spanish Armada, 1588; Blenheim, 1704; Pultowa, 1709; Saratoga, 1777; Valmy, 1792; and Waterloo, 1815 (the last great battle known to the author who died in 1872). Maps.

MARLBOROUGH AND THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, by Lt. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson. Ottawa, Army Headquarters, Directorate of Military Training, 1955. 168 p.
History of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) up to the dismissal of the Duke of Marlborough as commander in chief in 1711. The art of war in Marlborough's days, and Marlborough's military talents.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD, VOL. III, by Maj. Gen. Fuller. New York, Funk and Wagnalls, 1957.
History from the Seven Days Battle, 1862 to the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 1944.

OUTLINES OF THE WORLD'S MILITARY HISTORY, by Brig. Gen. William A. Mitchell. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service, 1940. 752 p.
Number of military events, extending from the beginning of authentic history to the end of World War I, selected to illustrate certain military principles.

2. United States

AMERICA AND WAR, by Marion O. French. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Company, 1947. 544 p.
"In chronological order this history records events and presents the perspective of those who led the nation. It is a strategic study of the chains of cause and effect created by their decisions and acts."

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY. Harrisburg, Pa., Military Service Publishing Co., 1953. 229 p.

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The history of the major campaigns fought by US troops from the Revolutionary War through World War II. The application of the principles of war in these engagements; and the origin and development of tactical doctrine and military organization.

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, 1607-1953. Washington, Department of the Army, 1956. 510 p. (ROTCM 145-20.)
"The purposes of this text are to show, in a general way, the origin and growth of the United States Army and its great accomplishments in both peace and war; to teach the principles of war and illustrate their application by examples drawn from American military history; and to bring out the attributes and contributions of American military leaders. Woven into the text is a record of the coordination or lack of coordination of the foreign and military policies of the United States and the basic causes that have led to the various wars in which the Army has participated."

AMERICAN SEA POWER SINCE 1775, by Allan Westcott and others. New York, Lippincott, 1947. 609 p.
An operational history of the U. S. Navy, covering its work in peace and war, from the beginnings to the present, in protection and promotion of our national interests.

THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, by Col. R. Ernest Dupuy. New York, Hawthorn Books, 1956. 318 p.
A popular version of the U. S. Army's history.

DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE U. S. A., by J. F. C. Fuller. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1942. 416 p.
History of American battles written as a continuous story, each battle chapter being linked to the next by a synopsis covering the intervening period.

THE EXPLOITATION OF HISTORY BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY, by Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, in Military Review, v. 34, no. 9 (Dec 1954) 11-13.

Historical examples are studied in military schools and colleges of the US Army to determine lessons learned and to relate present doctrine including modern developments - to a particular situation. Another method followed is that of teaching the principles involved in whatever subject is

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under consideration and then illustrating the principles by using historical examples. The various schools also use historical combat examples in instructional material which they prepare and distribute. These historical examples are carefully selected in order to acquaint officers with the traditions and achievements of the US Army and the gradual evolution of weapons, tactics, and military doctrine. Emphasis is constantly placed on specific trends and events and their over-all effect and influence on present doctrine and military thinking.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND; THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1775-1955, by Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett. Washington, Department of Defense, Office of Public Information, 1955. 49 p.

The place of the Army in US history, and its influence upon the various aspects of American life during: 1607-1775 and the Colonial Wars; 1775-1873 and the Revolutionary War; 1783-1815 and the War of 1812; 1815-1848 and the Mexican War; 1848-1865 and the Civil War; 1865-1891 and Reconstruction and Indian Wars; 1891-1901 and Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection; 1901-1918 and World War I; 1919-1945 and World War II; and 1945-1954 and the Korean War. The accomplishments of the US Army in both war and peace have been outstanding. Aside from its military tasks it has also made important contributions in education, exploration, relief, domestic order, government, diplomacy, engineering, sanitation, medicine, transportation, communications, and aviation. It has always been imbued with the spirit of the people from which it springs. Since 1775, it has been the servant of the people, toiling and sacrificing for the common good. With a table of Army casualties in major wars. For the same text (plus illustrations) see **UNITED STATES ARMY; PROTECTOR OF OUR LIBERTIES**, by Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, in *Army Information Digest*, v. 10, no. 6 (June 1955) 36 p.

HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN NAVY, by Donald W. Mitchell. New York, Knopf, 1946. 477 p.
History from 1883 through Pearl Harbor.

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, by William Addelman Gance. New York, Appleton, 1928. 609 p.
A chronological story beginning with 2 July 1775 and ending with 1923, which records "... the homely and the heroic service of the soldier in the sweat of peace as well as in the ruck of war."

A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, by Dudley W. Knox. New York, Putnam's, 1948. 704 p.

"As a whole the history has been written with several primary purposes, as follows: (a) to present a connected and accurate narrative of all important naval events in American history in readily understandable form; (b) to indicate the close relationship that has existed between naval affairs and the political, economic, military and other broad aspects of the national life during peace as well as war; and (c) to make available such a record of naval activities as will adequately inform the student and the general reader of the national value of the Navy's work, and will also serve as a source of inspiration to the Navy itself, whose current morale necessarily includes tradition as an important component."

MILITARY HERITAGE OF AMERICA, by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956. 794 p.

Military history from the American point of view, highlighting the major campaigns and battles against a background of the political situation.

OUT OF THE PAST... by Col. William Marshall Slayden II, in *Armor*, v. 64, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1955) 34-38.

The situation in the spring of 1862 when Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, executed a decisive military maneuver against Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac. By skillful use of all means at his command, Maj. Gen. Jackson accomplished superior mobility on the battlefield and provided take advantage of McClellan's faulty position and drive his superior force from the field. With similar vision in planning for new, light, mobile equipment and boldness in execution, Allied Forces of the future, dispersed as they must be to avoid being atomic targets and positioned so as to gain the most profitable military posture, may be concentrated swiftly and effectively to provide the margin of strength at a critical time and place to counter any massive strike by the Soviet forces. Because of recent heavy tank development, mobility has been lost through the addition of excessive weight. The future of armor and the success of our arms in an atomic war depend almost entirely upon the relative superior mobility which can be attained by our forces. In fact, our success will be in direct proportion to the ability of our military leaders of today to plan boldly for new equipment to restore to armor relative superior mobility on the battlefield.

BAG, TAG AND BOBTAIL; THE STORY OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 1775-1783, by Lynn Montross. New York, Harper, 1952. 519 p.
Its role and strategy in the American Revolution, and the human side of the conflict showing the daily life and struggles of the soldiers and of the people who stood behind them. Description of various battles with accompanying maps; bibliography; and a list of names of the generals of the Continental Army.

THE RISE OF AMERICAN NAVAL POWER, 1776-1918, by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1942. 404 p.
The historic pattern of conditions, institutions, events, ideas, motives, and personalities which have shaped the course of American naval development. The problem of naval defense, the historic debate over the nature and scope of the Navy's functions in peace and war, the successive arguments as to size and kind of navy, the strategic and political implications of advances in naval architecture and terminology, evolution of ideas to principles of naval strategy and warfare, etc.

THIS IS YOUR NAVY; AN INFORMAL HISTORY, by Theodore Roscoe. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute, 1950. 737 p.
The story of the US Navy in all its aspects: defeats, failures, victories, and lasting achievements, and the role it played first in the making of the United States and then protecting and defending them. Also the growth and heritage from the Revolutionary War through World War II.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WAR AND PEACE, by Oliver Lyman Spaulding. New York, Putnam's, 1937. 541 p.
A history of the United States Army as an institution and an account of its contributions to the security and upbuilding of the nation. The author makes clear the invaluable services it has rendered in peace as well as in war. In the long intervals between wars he shows the Army as the spearhead of our advance into the unknown West. He brings to light the all-but-forgotten epic of the Army's century-long struggle to pacify the Indians and open communications for the settlers. He also tells the story of the little known but invaluable series of Army explorations carried on from Mexico to the shores of the Polar Sea.

3. U. S. S. R.

ALEKSANDR VASIL'EVICH SUVOROV. Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo "Iskusstvo," 1952. 127 p. In Russian.
Reproductions of drawings, paintings, and sculptures devoted to the life, military career, and battles and campaigns of General Suvorov (1730-1800). Includes a short biography by Lt. Gen. A. V. Sukhomlin in which the influence of Suvorov on the development of Russian military art is described. In 1942 the Soviet Government in recognition of Suvorov's contribution to Russia's military history and the art of commandship, introduced the Order of Suvorov. Among the illustrations - posters of the Red Army during World War II showing General Suvorov as the spirit of the attack and victory, leading Red troops into battle.

DEATH OF AN ARMY, by Col. Virgil Ney, in *Army Combat Forces Journal*, v. 6, no. 3 (Oct 1955) 38-42.

The causes of dissolution of the Imperial Russian Army in 1917, conditions which resulted in desertion, surrender, mutiny, murder of officers, and which led to the overthrow of the Imperial Government and establishment of the Bolshevik regime; the military lesson of the collapse of discipline in the Imperial Army; and the Bolshevik propaganda and rumors directed at the soldiers with the objective of breaking down their spirit and will to fight.

RUSSIAN ARMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE: 1799, 1814, 1917, by John A. Lukacs, in *American Slavic and East European Review*, v. 13, no. 3 (Oct 1954) 319-337.

The events that led to: Russian invasion (with British participation) of Holland in 1799; Russian military operations in France 1813-1818 and subsequent occupation (as part of the quadripartite occupation); and participation of Russian units on the Western Front 1915-1917.