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HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

(With facts and documents)

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Jan Alfred Regula

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HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition of my book was completely sold out within a period of a few weeks which attests best to its great usefulness and appropriateness. Despite the fact that the Communist Party of Poland has existed during the past 15 years, no one has as yet written its history. Even the communists themselves have not achieved this aim, so I have permitted myself to call this sketch or historical contribution the History of the Communist Party of Poland.

A series of reasons, frequently of a technical nature, have influenced certain insufficiencies and the small gaps which arose in connection with the research on this subject. The latter pertains to a conspiratorial movement with headquarters outside the borders of Poland. In my book I have attempted to present the reader with a picture of the events and documents about the communist movement in Poland from such a point of view so as to become understandable to all. Considerable difficulty arose here in connection with the fact that I had at my disposal mainly notes and the memoirs written by one of the political prisoners, who at one time had been a prominent communist activist, as well as materials reporting upon congresses, conferences, etc. The KPP has never issued even a superficial or objective outline of its activities.

This can be explained in the first place by the absolute lack of any tradition of its own in this movement, by the absence of autonomy not only in an organizational sense but also from the political and ideological points of view. The Communist Party of Poland always represented merely a reflection of the Communist International or

rather of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Finally, research into the activities of their party is not at all a pleasant matter for the communists, because these activities come down to a long series of defeats which were varied by frequently dirty in their methods, internal fights and quarrels. This pertains to all parties in the Comintern, apart from the Russian ones, but to the Communist Party of Poland in an extraordinary degree.

It is also necessary to admit that this is an exceptionally unpleasant history; the history of a movement which in Germany for instance during a number of years represented for some people an incarnation of all their ideals but for others was a horrible danger; a movement which fought bloody battles over Saxony, Hungary, Bavaria, Italy, Bulgaria, Estonia; a movement which spilled rivers of blood or else drowned in them itself and which produced a very interesting "scientific" as well as political and belles lettres literature; a movement which in Poland in the meantime was unable to accomplish anything.

The entire "combat and heroic" activity of the Communist Party of Poland is reduced to a few thoughtless acts of terrorism, several attempts to create disturbances, a few espionage cases, etc. The contribution by the KPP to the literary and scientific world of international communism was very insignificant. Let us also add the fact that there was completely no contact between the KPP and the core of Polish society, and this adds a peculiar coloration to the history of this party.

I know very well that a considerable part of the affairs dealing with the "great individuals" in the KPP, described by me, will represent interesting material not only for the average citizen of

the Polish Republic but will also be of interest to many members of the Communist Party of Poland and mainly those from among the working class who are not initiated into various party secrets.

A knowledge of these not too glorious KPP activities is, regardless of the foregoing, indispensable for each citizen who has an interest in politics. "Polish Communism" is nothing. It originated far beyond our borders and is maintained from there by means of an artificial existence. However it continues to lurk, together with international communism and its headquarters in the USSR, and lie in wait for each manifestation of weakness on the part of our state organism. Above all this is a movement with considerable potential capabilities of extending itself on our soil. These possibilities are due to the various economic and social difficulties, to the backwardness, and finally to the existence of a percentage of our population which has a very weak bond with our concept of the state and with European culture in general.

I am dedicating this work for the most part to those workers, peasants, or members of the intelligentsia who "are" communists or who consider themselves as such and serve the aims of the KPP but who essentially do not have an appropriate conception about the latter and derive their entire knowledge of communism from colored reports issued by the USSR and similar sources. I am recommending my book with special emphasis to all kinds of activists in the leftist camps who nevertheless take their stand on the basis of an independent Polish state, those camps which have commenced thinking about cooperation with the "Polish" agents of the WKPb [Wszechwiazkowa Komunistyczna Partia bolszewikow -- All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks] due to the crisis which they are currently undergoing.

The Author

Warsaw, August 1934

CHAPTER I

In the introduction I mentioned that the Communist Party of Poland does not possess any of its own traditions, especially Polish traditions. However this does not mean that it originated on 16 December 1918 out of thin air and that it did not have any famous or infamous predecessors. From its historical past the party has retained only those elements which are currently necessary for utilitarian reasons and primarily for the purpose of justifying the raison d'etat for the contemporary leadership as well as those elements which permit in one way or another of being adapted by the pure ideology of Leninist-Stalinist bolshevism.

In order to become acquainted more closely with the Communist Party of Poland it is unnecessary therefore to probe deeply into the history of the movement from which it grew up. It is sufficient to glance at the history of Polish Socialism superficially and at certain parts of the history of world communism. This will explain to us that Polish communism was not free of misunderstandings at the very beginning of its existence. On the other hand it will establish an interesting thesis that the contemporary movement of Polish communism represents in reality a colony of Russian Bolshevism.

The development of Polish socialism proceeded along different lines than that in western Europe. This difference resulted from the special political conditions in the country which was deprived of its own statehood, further from the differing economic and social structure of Poland, and finally from the special historical traditions. Our working class movement in the first place stood face to face not against a "class enemy" but versus an alien ruler in Poland who was also exploiting that movement from the materialistic

point of view. We should add here that Russian tsarism reacted with special brutality and lack of understanding toward any and all demands by the workers. For this reason the main problems occupying the world of labor in Poland during those times up until 1918 were related not to the class struggle but to the endeavor for national liberation, the struggle of the nation against the 3 occupants and in the first place against the most brutal among them, i.e., the occupant from Moscow. This may sound somewhat peculiar to Marxists at the present time, but several events in the period prior to 1918 indicate that the concept of freedom was stronger among the Polish workers than class postulates. A classic example of how appropriately political freedom was evaluated may be found in the policy of the Bolsheviks, those most consistent among all Marxists (who brought consistency ad absurdum), in the colonial countries and other areas occupied by the imperialist powers. There the struggle for national liberation is officially recognized as the principal goal by the communist doctrine, after the acquisition of which there will take place a reorganization of social relations. Such a policy was conducted by Stalin in China during the years 1925-27.

Polish Marxists up to the time that the Polish Socialist Party originated (1892) did not notice this obvious fact or even when seeing it did not understand its significance. We should reflect upon the large amount of popularity enjoyed by Marx and by Marxism in Poland which existed merely because Marx as well as Engels were enemies of tsarism, at the time the main reactionary force in Europe, and for this reason were strong supporters of Poland's independence from under the Russian yoke.

The basis for a phenomenon of this type lay in the quite slow

formation of the Polish nation as a unit cognizant of itself. Pressure and exploitation at that time fell primarily upon the physically laboring proletariat which represented a tremendous factor of opposition and struggle against the occupant of "Priwislinja." Besides the proletariat, the nobility was also very active in the role of the intelligentsia or semi-intelligentsia, breathing with a great hatred toward the oppressors. The milieu of the intellectuals and the nobility showed at the time a large degree of sympathy for the segments of common people, because the former were certain that the old Poland had fallen as a result of the degradation suffered by those segments. The old "democracy of the nobility" had already made the demand for the liberation and raising up of the peasant. Later it was Jozef Pilsudski and his collaborators, after becoming acquainted with western socialism, who recognized that the factory worker was occupying the vanguard of the people's masses as their most active part. This concept became the foundation stone of the Polish Socialist Party which arose in 1892.

Marxism came to Poland from Germany, France, Switzerland, and it was there that its peculiar anti Polish coloration originated which in turn was cultivated by a certain splinter of Polish and Jewish students who were studying at Russian universities during that time. Due to the horrible Russian oppression of tsarism, even the most radical events and theories had their followers. It is true that a large number among the Polish youth who accepted the beliefs of Marxism did so consciously or subconsciously with the idea that under the pressure of Socialism the tsarist system would collapse and with its fall would come freedom for Poland. Everything which led to this hoped for Polish freedom represented for this homeless-- in the meaning given this word by Zeromski -- youth and intelligentsia

something good and just. Many memoirs and documents from that period prove this contention beyond any doubt.

Polish Socialism at the end of the nineteenth century was on the best road for transforming itself into a patriotic and social movement recognizing the existence of social classes as well as their antagonisms in the light of objective facts, which were harmful and should be eliminated by means of reconstructing the economic system. The latter in turn must be the work not of some kind of abstract "proletariat" but of people with good will and from various social segments. This could only be accomplished within the framework of one's own national state. Simultaneously however as a parallel to socialism with a characteristic of national sentiment, there was established at the time in Poland a socialism of a different type which finally crystalized itself into the Communist Party of Poland. The latter represented a non-Polish, cosmopolitan socialism with a terroristic and revolutionary program for social reconstruction. It found warm support among the ghetto milieu as well as among a certain part of the Polish intelligentsia which was sensitive to the influence of Russian culture to the extent that it had found itself really excluded from Polish society.

The first attempts at creating socialist organizations in Poland bore a Polish imprint (the activities of Boleslaw Limanowski). However already in the initial socialist organization covering a broader area, there appeared the powerful influence of contemporary Russian socialism. This was the so-called Polish Socialist Party "Proletariat I." It was organized in 1882 and from the very beginning acquired definite Marxist characteristics with an internationalist ideology. These treated the Polish liberation movement negatively.

The leader of "Proletariat" Ludwik Warynski used to say: "There exists in the world a nation even more unfortunate than the Poles, and that is the nation of the proletarians." Despite this it was impossible to deny to many members of "Proletariat," even among the leadership, a certain degree of nationalistic feeling which may even be applicable to Warynski himself. These people considered that one of the achievements of the future international social revolution would be the reconstruction of Poland. This attitude was obtained from certain of Marx' writings.

"Proletariat I" accepted from contemporary Russian revolutionary movements the idea of individual terrorism which was treated as a medium for agitation similarly to the approach used by anarchists. From the very beginning of its existence "Proletariat I" found itself between the devil and the deep blue sea, i.e., between western European Marxism with an admixture of anarchism on the one hand and on the other hand the Russian "Narodnaya Volya," the large terrorist Blanqui (named after the French revolutionary of the nineteenth century who considered that a social revolution could be successful only with the assistance of conspiracies by selected revolutionaries and not by means of a broad mass movement) organization directed by Zhelabov and Zofia Perovskaya, Kibaltshits, and Vera Figner which through attempts to assassinate the Tsar and conspiracies wanted to make place for democracy in Russia. A very interesting attitude toward "Proletariat I" was expressed by Roza Luxemburg, according to whom the influence of the then current Russian socialism "Narodnaya Volya" acted upon "Proletariat I" in an anti-Marxist spirit by pushing the latter astray into the struggle for a Russian democratic state (read Pamięci Proletariatu [In Memory of the Proletariat]).

Three main figures of its leaders stood head over shoulders above all others in "Proletariat I," representing simultaneously the 3 political and tactical movements within this party.

The most powerful of all was indubitably Ludwik Warynski, a consistent Marxist for those times, but one who was so blinded by the mirage of a rapid victory for socialism on a world wide scale or at least throughout Europe that to him the case of Poland represented a small matter of secondary importance. He was a proponent of a mass movement and did not support a conspiracy by a small handful of terrorists. Warynski also adhered to the concept of an alliance between the workers and the peasants which was later submitted to a reanalysis by Lenin and which to date has been copied clumsily by the communists.

A second powerful figure in "Proletariat" was Stanislaw Kunicki, a martyr who was hanged in the Citadel after the large trial of the "Proletariat" in 1885. Kunicki represented the conspiratorial and terroristic movement and more than anybody else manifested a tendency toward close cooperation with the Russian "Narodnaya Volya." From him it was that the communists obtained the idea of collaboration with Russian revolutionaries which later brought about the complete subordination of the communist movement to the Soviet state.

The third among the leaders of "Proletariat" was Szymon Dickstein, one of the most talented theoreticians who was known under the party pseudonym of "Jan Mlot." His was a tragic figure, because he died a suicide in despondency after the collapse of the movement to which he had given his soul and due to the lack of reciprocity to his love for Jankowska who was also a member of "Proletariat." Dickstein represented the movement related to syndicalistic anarchism according

to which the main paths toward the liberation of the workers lead through economic and not political struggle. He serves as an example for contemporary communists as far as his lack of nationality is concerned which is so characteristic of the Jewish intelligentsia during those times as well as today.

Many of the "Proletariat" members later transferred to the independence camp, especially to the Polish Socialist Party; an insignificant number quantitatively to the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and later to the communists. To date there is still active in the Communist Party of Poland one of the more "representative" intellectuals from the ranks of the "Proletariat" party, Feliks Kon, a shallow Jewish Pole who screams, a man with strong principles versus the tsarist system but completely lacking in scruples vis a vis the Bolsheviks, especially during the period after 1919. Even this man was obtained by the communists after considerable difficulty. Feliks Kon after his return from Siberia where he had been sent as a deportee at first joined the PPS [Polska Partia Socjalistyczna -- Polish Socialist Party] but quickly broke away by participating in the so-called PPS-Lewica [Left Wing] splinter (1907-8) which took an anti-independence stand. With the outbreak of the world war Kon became a patriot for a short time and commenced propaganda for independence and supported the Legions, simultaneously combating the Bolshevik coup d'etat. Up until 1919 Kon took a stand together with the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks and it was only in 1920 that he made up his differences with the latter, when the Bolsheviks during their invasion of Poland with the Red Army nominated him commissar (minister) of education in the grotesque and temporary revolutionary government of Poland (Revkom) which was established at Bialystok. Today this man, Feliks Kon, plays

the part of a puppet, advertising his grey beard and dramatic talents in oratory which are avidly exploited by the communists.

We must add that Feliks Kon is perhaps alone among Polish communists in that he remembers the anniversaries of "Proletariat;" because in general the communists have forgotten "Proletariat I" and those first pioneers of socialism in Poland. The anniversary when its 4 leaders were executed: Kunicki, Bardowski (an interesting and noble personality, he was a Russian and an investigative judge at Kalisz who had become acclimatized in the country where he was located and was the father-in-law of Ludwik Warynski; he strongly emphasized the Polish character of his party), Pietrusinski, and Osowski (28 January 1886) is remembered today by socialists of all shades whereas the PPS (its so-called CKW [Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy -- Central Executive Committee]) possesses a strong cult of "Proletariat I" which is especially emphasized, while to the communists it is immaterial. This can be explained by the latter's zealous patriotism toward Russia. It would be tactless and perhaps even a heresy in the presence of the Russian proletariat, that vanguard of the world proletariat, to boast that Polish workers had a revolutionary and socialist party already at the time when the Russian workers' movement was still in its infancy. Therefore the communists have not mentioned one word about "Proletariat" during a period of years in order not to decrease the historical "contributions" of the Russian Bolsheviks to the Polish proletariat. What is more, and this sounds paradoxical, the communists with all of their talent for issuing publications (a strike of 100 workers in some small locality is sufficient for the purpose of immediately releasing a proclamation incorporating almost always the same phraseology) have not released a single public declaration about the "Proletariat."

We can discern from this that even in the evaluation of history the dependence of Polish communism upon Moscow manifests itself very strongly.

The fact that "Proletariat" was organized at a time when there was no workers' party in Russia at all (in Russia it was 1893 before the first tangible group of socialists and Marxists arose under the name "Osvobozhdenie Truda" in which V. Zasulich, P. Akselrod, Deits, Plekhanov and the younger activists Martov-Tsederbaum and Lenin collaborated) frequently gives trouble to communist quasi historians. They explain this by the allegedly earlier development of industry in the Kingdom Congress and the lack of such in Russia which is contrary to the writings of Lenin himself who proved that the development of industry in Russia dates back to the end of the eighteenth century. The foregoing historians, if they are ever forced to speak or to write about "Proletariat," write exclusively about its mistakes since only Bolshevism remains without error in this world. In general a tremendous percentage of communists in Poland literally know nothing concerning "Proletariat."

"Proletariat I" collapsed toward the end of 1885 under the blows of the Russian police. Several of its leaders died heroically through execution in the Citadel of Warsaw or like Warynski in the "stone sack" at Schlisselburg. Despite the fact that they did not fight for Poland's independence, many of them deserve honorable mention. During the period of terrible spiritual depression and servility, their death was the only voice in protest to the wild tyranny of Hurka. To the man Warynski we can apply the words of Zeromski from his book Rozs [The Rose]: "He is not ours ... his soul is proceeding along its own path, once along a beaten Polish

road, then along a wide Siberian highway ... he will remain to the end alone," alone at any rate and not in the company of the contemporary hirelings of Stalin.

After the fall of "Proletariat I" the history of the socialist ("communist") movement in Poland over the course of several years until 1887 does not abound with interesting moments. It broke forth into flame during the so-called "Proletariat II," an organization mostly of high school and university students, and in the Union of Polish Workers. Both were merely reflections of then contemporary Russian movements which were at that time becoming active. Polish revolutionaries vulgarly imitated Russians even to the point of adopting their external appearance by wearing long beards and hair as well as shirts without neckties.

"Proletariat II" was instrumental in the development of several scholars and publicists of unusual stature like the great sociologist and anthropologist Ludwik Kraswicki or the fine expert on the history of political doctrines Ludwik Kulczycki.

Not much better than "Proletariat I" do contemporary communists remember their second predecessor which was the Union of Polish Workers, existing from 1889 to 1892. This was an almost exclusively workers' organization, taking a stand against conspiracy and terror, but organizing economic campaigns which today represent the core of communist tactics. The Union of Polish Workers might have gone down into the pages of history as a glorious movement of Polish Communism were it not the fact that its ideology had many aspects in common with the Russian ideology of the so-called "economists" who boiled down the socialist program to that of a daily struggle by the worker for his livelihood and his political enlightenment, postponing direct

political struggle to a later period. These "economists" subsequently became, "unfortunately" for the Polish communists, the prototypes of the Mensheviks with whom Lenin fought a bitter struggle and incidentally developed himself into an excellent and devastating polemicist (the fact that the main creator of Russian "economism" Martynov [Pikker] today has an office in the editorial section of the Kommunisticheski Internatsional [Communist International] and denounces his former comrades, the Mensheviks, and praises Stalin brings no dishonor to Polish communists). For this reason "our" communists dislike any mention of the Union of Polish Workers. If 100 communists can be found in Poland who know something about this Union, this would be a miracle. Even such persons could have acquired their knowledge about the Union from the work of Perl-Res or else from Mazowiecki-Kulczycki.

The Union of Polish Workers provided the communists with 2 outstanding leaders in Juljan Marchlewski (Karski) and Adolf Warszawski (Warski), despite the fact that both of them finally became compromised due to their disagreement with pure Bolshevism regardless of the prominent parts they had played in the Communist movement. One of them was eliminated quietly, but the other went with considerable noise and screaming, Marchlewski and Warski have been erased from the memory of communists and from the history of the KPP.

Dr. Juljan Marchlewski (deceased in 1926) was quite an interesting type in the revolutionary movement. He was born into an impoverished but noble family, acquired a higher education, in his younger years worked as a common laborer-printer. From under his pen there came a serious work on the economic and social relations of the Poznan area. Lenin who knew how to evaluate the intellect of

people held Marchlewski in deep respect. A different value is represented by Adolf Warszawski (Warski) who, regardless of his education, always remained a coward with regard to the authorities in Moscow.

About 1892 the Union of Polish Workers established a branch at Wilno which was named the Union of Lithuanian Workers. This latter organization is of interest merely because of the fact that Feliks Dzierzynski, the greatest man Polish Communism ever produced, began his first activities in it. Numerous legends are circulating about this tyrant, and these stories fill the pages of cheap literature. Essentially he represented a typical Asiatic statesman, energetic, brutal, and incomparably above his cowardly associates in courage.

In 1893 the socialist circles in Warsaw, connected with Russian and German socialists and having support in the Union of Polish Workers, attempted to organize a party under the name Social Democracy of the Polish Kingdom. However due to the lack of any organizational talents among its leaders, the Russian police was able to break it up with ease. It was not until 1897 that the remnants from the Social Democracy of the Polish Kingdom united with the Union of Lithuanian Workers to establish the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (abbreviated as SDKPiL [Socjal-Demokracja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy] and hence the name "esdepapeloxy" or "esdecy;" also in use was the name "reds" which was later taken over by the communists).

In this manner the final party form of Polish Marxism was crystallized into the SDKPiL which functioned until 1918. SDKPiL arose from the remaining parts of "Proletariat II" and the Union of Polish Workers, and the fused group went through various stages. At first the workers inside of Poland, in order to differentiate themselves

from the leaders who were abroad and mostly in Geneva, named their organization the Polish Socialist Party. However when the Polish Socialist Party was established during this time (1892) at the Paris congress with its independence platform, the organization within Poland under strong pressure from its social democratic leaders changed its name to SDKP and subsequently added "iL." After several years of active operations, this party collapsed and disappeared for a period of 5 years from the political arena. The masses of Polish workers are then acquired by the Polish Socialist Party. In 1900 the SDKPiL is strengthened from the outside thanks to the assistance of the German social democrats, especially Fr. Mehring, Parvus (Helphand) and in part Kautsky. This of course breathed life into its activities. Around 1905 the SDKPiL achieved its greatest development on the background of the increasing revolutionary wave in Russia.

The most characteristic attribute of the SDKPiL was its anti independence stand and the strong tendency to collaborate with Russian social democracy. For these reasons each rise in the revolutionary wave in Russia during the years 1905, 1907, 1912, 1914, and 1917 contributed simultaneously to a growth in the influence and power of the SDKPiL. This party was active only within the area of the Russian occupation zone, taking the attitude that socialists should cooperate within the framework of German and Austrian social democracy and not establish their own Polish parties in the areas under Prussian and Austrian occupation. Due to the foregoing the SDKPiL enjoyed the sympathy of German social democracy and of the Second Socialist International which was dominated by the Germans.

The program of the SDKPiL was a simple duplication of the "international socialist" program and more accurately of German social democracy as elaborated by Kautsky (the so-called Erfurt Program of 1891). The radically international platform of the Polish "esdeks" excluded any kind of autonomous revision of this program. This platform included the important theory of a "limited incorporation of the Polish Kingdom into Russia," a theory drawn up by Roza Luxemburg (1872-1919) who was the main theoretician of the SDKPiL. She was born at Zamosc in a milieu situated completely outside of Polish or any other culture. Roza Luxemburg herself was a person with considerable knowledge although one sided, energetic, having a sharp pen and an exceptionally doctrinaire mind. Her influence in the international socialist movement was extensive, especially in the German social democracy where she was leader of the radically left wing for many years. Over a long period of time Roza Luxemburg conducted a Talmudic type of struggle against Lenin.

According to the theory of a "limited incorporation of the Polish Kingdom into Russia," the concept of Poland or of a Polish state remains merely an obsolete idea from the precapitalistic epoch. The modern Poland which is capitalistic has developed and can develop further only as a part of the occupying states. This is especially true with regard to the Congress Kingdom which is completely dependent upon eastern and mainly Russian markets for disposal of its industrial output. The annexation of the Congress Kingdom into Russia was a benefit for the economic life of Poland according to Roza Luxemburg. Therefore the socialist movement should once and for all reject the "pipedreams of the nobility" concerning the reconstruction of Poland and limit itself to the common struggle together with the entire proletariat of Russia toward the attainment of international

socialist postulates. In her attachment to the "unity and indivisibility of Empire," Rosa Luxemburg proceeded farther than the "endecy" and rejected any thought concerning autonomy for the Congress Kingdom within the limitations even of the then contemporary Grand Duchy of Finland.

The SDKPiL had a well functioning and qualified leadership group which comprised apart from Rosa Luxemburg also Leon Jogiches (pseudonym Jan Tyszka), the de facto dictator of the party with organizational talents and ambitions of a Stalin; Feliks Dzierzynski (pseudonym "Jozef"), the principal organizational force in the country, a party fanatic, an activist with a practical bent and using theory very little, extraordinarily courageous and willing to take risks, for many years a prisoner and deportee to Siberia; Julian Marchlewski (pseudonym Karski), theoretician and popularizer of Marx, a specialist on agrarian problems, who unfortunately from the Bolshevik point of view maintained during his entire life some independence in his attitudes. We should add that Marchlewski in such an anti-Polish party and in his active collaboration with the German and Russian revolutions could not rid himself of a certain Polish sentiment and a shade of Polish national pride, which can not be said of Dzierzynski for instance. The bloody work of the latter in the CHEKA [Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Sabotage and Acts Harmful to the National Economy in the USSR] and in the GPU [Main Political Administration] extracted everything that could be called Polish from that individual. Another person belonging to the leadership group was Adolf Warszawski (pseudonym Warski) who was the main editorial and publications force in the party and the most talented popularizer of Rosa Luxemburg's ideas as well as of "Tyxaka." Warski himself was possessed of little originality and productivity, but he was able to

maintain the greatest degree of humility and yet keep his honor and not sell himself spiritually. Then there was also Bronislaw Wesolowski (pseudonym "Smutny"), almost exclusively with party practical experience inside of the country, known for his honesty and considered to be the "party's conscience;" he died tragically in 1919 when he arrived in Poland as a delegate of the Russian-Soviet Red Cross. Considerable fame was achieved later by a man from Tarnow in the province of Galicja, Sobelsohn or Karol Radek, an individual with tremendous talent, an excellent publicist (Werner Sombart calls him the most gifted agitator of all times), a cunning diplomat knowing almost 20 languages and at the same time acquainted with literature, simultaneously however an individual lacking in scruples and a greedy climber careerwise; in the SDKPiL he was called "Kradek" [robber]. Karol Radek began his career in the PPS (as a member of the editorial staff for the publication Naprzod [Forward]). Finally among the leaders of the SDKPiL was one whose heroic death on the gallows of the Citadel in Warsaw added an aureole to that party in 1905, i.e., Marcin Kasprzak from Poznan province.

After the collapse of the revolution during the years 1905 to 1907, there took place considerable friction inside of the SDKPiL. In the year 1912 on the background of the struggle within the Warsaw party organization, this conflict was directed against the main board of the party which brought about a split. At the head of the splinter group (thus the name "rozłamowcy" [splinter members] were these men: Jozef Unszticht (pseudonym "Janowicz"), Karol Sobelsohn (pseudonym "Radek"), Jakob Firstenberg (pseudonym "Hanecki," who later became a high ranking economics official in the USSR), Mieczyslaw Warszawski (pseudonym "Bronski"), Henryk Stein-Kaminski (later called "Domski"), and others. The members of the splinter group

accused the supporters of the board led by Jogiches-Tyszka that by remaining abroad they had assumed dictatorial authority, that they had established party centralization to a much too great extent, and that in the quarrels among the Russian social democrats they had assumed a vacillating position and even supported the Mensheviks. A considerable role was played in the splitting up of the SDKPiL by the Bolsheviks who could not even accept minor manifestations of independent policy on the part of the SDKPiL, whereas complete dependence of the SDKPiL upon the Russian Bolsheviks again represented a source of continuous internal friction since each quarrel within the RSDRP [Rosyjska Socjal Demokratyczna Robotnicza Partia -- Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party] precipitated a corresponding action within the SDKPiL. These internal fights fill a considerable percentage of RSDRP history during the years 1898-1917.

The most significant of these was the split into "Bolsheviks" and "Mensheviks" (the latter being a splinter closest to European social democracy), dating back to the year 1903. This break was such that the leaders of the SDKPiL assumed a position which was essentially very unclear. Roza Luxemburg fought bitterly against Lenin and his stands on the nationality and agrarian problems as well as in the matter of party organization. The Mensheviks were always considered, however, in the SDKPiL as compromisers. In general during the course of various quarrels which took place in the RSDRP, it is often difficult to know what was happening. It remains a fact that the splinters of Russian social democracy which were fighting among themselves created breaches within the SDKPiL. In the year 1907-1908 a certain Trusewicz-Zaleski established in the latter a "Menshevik fraction" which later existed for some time as an independent organization under the name "Workers' Self Defense." Trusewicz himself

subsequently returned to the party and died in 1918 when he was editor of the Bolshevik newspaper Izvestia in Moscow. Much more significant was the break in 1912 precipitated by the spontaneous but closely connected with the Russian Bolsheviks splinter movement, the consequences of which are noted in the KPP even to this day. This breach is described most authoritatively by a member of the Political Bureau in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Bortnowski (pseudonym "Bronkowski"), in the following terms.

"During the period when the Bolshevik party at the beginning of a new revolutionary upsurge was expanding and finally purging its ranks, the Main Board of the SDKPiL was notable for the increase in its tendency toward compromise and even a tendency toward approaching Menshevism.

"However within the organizations inside of Poland, which were bound more closely with the movement, there were manifesting themselves under the direct influence of Lenin contrary tendencies which in part found their expression in the split of the SDKPiL during the year 1912. This break was supported by Lenin, and it brought the SDKPiL organizationally closer (the internal groups inside of Poland) to the Bolsheviks ... Lenin introduced representatives of the splinter organizations into the Bureau of the Socialist International.

"However this split, regardless of the influence and criticism of Lenin, did not even lead to any attempts at a revision of the Luxemburg ideology." (Nowy Przegląd [New Review], No 8/66, August 1933, pages 43-44).

The rearming of these quarrels during current times is of importance inasmuch as the contemporary leadership of 5 members in

the KPP Political Bureau (abbreviated as Politburo, a name adopted from the Bolsheviks, and de facto the supreme leadership of the KPP) includes 4 former members of the splinter from the SDKPiL, i.e., Julian Leszczynski (pseudonym "Lenski"), Bortnowski (pseudonym "Bronkowski"), Jan Paszyn (pseudonym "Czarny"), and Adam Slawinski. The possibility of proving oneself the oldest collaborator with the Russian Bolsheviks represents today the most authoritative and praiseworthy documentation, enabling a person to direct the communist party.

The split which took place in the SDKPiL during 1912 lasted until 1916, after which both fractions again united. At the end of 1918 after the establishment of an independent Polish state, the remnants of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania fused with the residue of the PPS -- Left Wing and created the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. This unification itself was to save the one group as well as the other from complete bankruptcy, because the fact that an independent and unified Poland had arisen became a natural although ignoble finale to the existence of these 2 parties which originated and existed only to struggle against the concept of independence. The question comes to mind however as to whether the fusion of these 2 parties really saved them from ruin. Ideologically certainly they were not saved, because of their ideologies not a single bit remained. Immediately after the establishment of the KPRP [Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski -- Communist Workers' Party of Poland] there was commenced the process of implanting upon Polish soil the Russian ideology of communism as well as the elimination of everything which remained in any contact whatsoever with Polish conditions and relations. Within parties of this type like the PPS -- Left Wing and the SDKPiL, all differences in program and ideology did not contradict the basic Russian and Polish ideological

unity of Marxism on the point of their relationship to bourgeois statehood. It is therefore not at all odd that after so much success achieved by Lenin in the form of the October Revolution, Polish Marxism placed itself without any qualifications whatsoever under the command of the Russian Bolsheviks and forgot about differences in platforms.

The SDKPiL is doubtlessly the closest and most direct predecessor of the KPP. From the former also originate our own communists of today. However in the course of time the "bolshevization" of the KPP led the Polish Communists to deny their ties with these famous forefathers. In order to characterize SDKPiL ideology, a term dishonorable in the eyes of the communists was thought up: "Luxemburgism." On the other hand this elimination of the SDKPiL from the traditions of the KPP was the work of the social democratic leader Warski, who in his later years transferred in fact but not pro forma under the protection of the PPS -- Left Wing. Warski began to rebuild the reputation of his old party already during the German occupation; and during the years 1922-23 he commenced denouncing Rosa Luxemburg on the count of Menshevism. Opinions regarding the SDKPiL were finally blackened completely by those same communists who had defended it during the years 1922-23 against the attacks by Warski. The signal to change tactics was issued by Stalin himself in the fall of 1931 in his lengthy "pastoral" letter attacking the "Trotskyite smuggling" in Bolshevik historiography (this "Trotskyite smuggling" really meant the somewhat objective historical methodology being applied at the time; Bolshevik mistakes were only mentioned slightly as were those of Stalin; however Trotsky was still placed within the group which had created the 1917 revolution, and this could not be tolerated by Stalin). In this connection Stalin also attacked

Luxemburgism from which the Trotskyites and other oppositionists actually take many arguments against Stalin (the work of Roza Luxemburg issued after her death by Paul Levy under the title Rewolucja rosyjska [The Russian Revolution] has been incorporated into the treasure chest of anticommunist publicists who are social reformers; in this work the author attacks the "worker-peasant front" as well as the slogan of national self determination which had been recognized by Lenin, or rather the juggling of this slogan, and the extermination by the Soviet government of other socialist parties). As a result of this letter the "Polish Communists" at once oversurpassed their "sultan" in railing against the SDKPiL to such an extent that finally a new order was issued by Moscow not to reject their past completely since it was possible to find in it certain things worthy of cultivation.

In general the entire process of eliminating the past from the KPP, as the communists call it "the conquest of ideological heritage of Luxemburgism in the KPP," should be treated somewhat more extensively since this will facilitate an understanding of the concepts and not too praiseworthy aspects as well as attributes of character possessed by the leaders of today's KPP. Out of the oceans of material written on this subject I have selected the matters which are most essential and most characteristic, and I shall permit myself to acquaint the reader with the contents of these.

I have already indicated that immediately after the establishment of the KPRP at the end of 1918, there commenced the process of implanting into its ranks of the Russian communist ideology and the eradication of everything which could have represented a historical foundation for the KPRP. The "Bolshevization" of the KPRP was begun

with such energy that at times voices were heard concerning the fear that a complete lack of traditions could be detrimental in the political life of Poland. The reservations enunciated at the third congress of the KPP during the spring of 1925 by one of the participants, Stanislaw Budzynski (pseudonyms "Tradycja" and "Ziemniak"), sound prophetic today; when speaking about the Bolshevization of the KPP he cautioned:

"But let us remember that we must implant the Bolshevik ungrafted tree upon the trunk of contemporary Polish (emphasis of the author) communism. Only then will we achieve the fruit of a communist victory in Poland. If however we shall plant the Bolshevik ungrafted trees directly into the soil, they will die without bearing any fruit." (emphasis by author) ("Report on the third KPP congress," page 117).

We must add to this speech that the Russian communists did all in their power to implant the "Bolshevik ungrafted trees" in the Polish soil. Of course as Budzynski foretold, they died. The communists should not wonder any more that their ignominious work has born no fruit.

During the first years of its existence the Communist Workers' Party of Poland attempted not to speak at all about its past. In secret its bankruptcy was understood. A certain amount of sentiment for the old SDKPiL was maintained only by its former members who took up residence in Russia, for the most part with positions in the Russian governmental administration. In 1923 they came upon the idea of celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the KPRP, counting back to the establishment of the SDKPiL. This project ended in a great fight. Here is what the old Polish social democrat Bobinski was bold enough to write:

"The Communist Workers' Party of Poland, established 10 years prior to the Russian Bolshevik party (1903), since the beginning of the former should be considered the year 1893, i.e., the date when the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania was created, is probably the oldest party in the Third International." (St. Bobinski, Kalendarz komunistyczny na rok 1922 [Communist Calendar for 1922], published in Moscow).

On the other hand at the same time the Bolsheviks who were celebrating their twenty-fifth anniversary do not count like Bobinski did from the establishment of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks in 1903 but from the year 1898, i.e., from the period when the first congress of this party took place. The preparation therefore to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the KPRP would be in competition with the Bolsheviks. The leadership of the KPRP at that time well understood that the honor of being first always belongs to the Russian proletariat and, through the medium of its chief Warski, replied negatively to the proposal of having such a jubilee. In his article Warski writes ironically:

"We could have done this (celebrated the 30 year jubilee) with more family pride in that the Polish branch of communism would have appeared older than the Russian if not by a few centuries then at least by 5 years. It would be possible even to extend oneself farther back with historical justification and consider the genesis of our origin to have been the social revolutionary party Proletariat." (Nowy Przegląd, No 8, June 1923, page 350 in the article by Warski entitled "Teachings of the Bolshevik Jubilee").

In continuation of this article Warski uses the full power of his literary talent to indicate that the past of the SDKPiL is not

at all the past of the KPRP. The principal reasoning behind his statement is as follows:

"It is as clear as the sun, because we had no interest in the problem of revolutionary authority, because we did not consider at all the role of the party and revolution, because we did not prepare ourselves for a dictatorship, because we were not a communist party as the Bolsheviks were, because spiritually we were engrossed in theory but in practice we were completely enveloped by the atmosphere of the Second International's left wing during the epoch of the unceasing development of capitalism.

"What a comical fanfare would thus surround our jubilee which would have as its aim to show the world that we are the oldest Communist Party, older than that of the Bolsheviks." (Ibid., page 361).

The position taken by the leadership of the KPRP and especially that of Warski, who was one of the creators as well as one of the chieftains in the SDKPiL, precipitated a veritable storm in Moscow among the Polish communists. Insulted were Dzierzynski, Unszlicht, Marchlewski, Leszczynski, Zaks, Bobinski, Dolecki, in brief the entire elite of "Polish" communism. The Moscow newspaper Trybuna Komunistyczna [Communist Tribune] began to attack Warski because of his renegade position. The high point in this struggle was attained at the third congress of the KPRP, after the political bankruptcy of the then current party leadership. The official reporter on Bolshevization, Skulski (real name was Stanislaw Martens), states that:

"The claim that SDKPiL traditions represent a serious obstacle on the path toward bolshevization of the party and that only the

young communist generation without any SDKPiL background is capable of bolshevizing the KPP -- this statement is erroneous.

"The entire past of the SDKPiL, its full experience in revolutionary battles, and its leading role at the head of the struggling proletariat made it the closest to the Russian bolsheviks; today the SDKPiL background represents the foundation and the guarantee of further transformation of the KPP into a truly bolshevik party." (Brochure entitled "Report from the Third congress of the KPP," pages 444 and 445).

Leliwa (the same Bobinski) participating in the discussion hastened to add:

"The attitude of the Russian bolsheviks toward the SDKPiL and the position of the latter vis a vis bolshevism were rather harmonious if not identical with our stand and has nothing to do with the renegade articles of Comrade Warski concerning our excellent bolshevik past" (Ibid., page 96).

We may well visualize the faces of other individuals who were praising the past of the SDKPiL after the mentioned letter from Stalin addressed to the editorial board of the Proletarjacka Rewolucja [Proletarian Revolution]; This same Skulski after reading Stalin's letter immediately discovered that the SDKPiL even in its philosophical world outlook deviated from Lenin. Bobinski quite shamelessly denounced the SDKPiL not only because of Menshevism but also accused it of Trotskyism. In the process of self castigation due to his luxemburgist past, he began writing such foolishness that even Trybuna Radziecka refused to print his statements.

The above mentioned letter from Stalin evoked a complete turn-over in the attitudes of the leaders and activists of the SDKPiL regarding their past. Suddenly people began to "admit" errors they had never committed, desiring to curry the favor of the Bolsheviks by such zealotry. Up to the year 1931 the "Polish" communists lived in the conviction that the SDKPiL was the Polish variation of bolshevism. Then unexpectedly Moscow issued its evaluation, and it was necessary to make a sudden turn of a full 180 degrees. Of course such violent jumps or *salto mortale* in the form of surprises concerning ideology and the tactics of communists in all countries of the world are frequent phenomena. An order from the Kremlin in Moscow is sufficient:

The KPP Central Committee adopted at that time a special resolution "in the matter of conquering the ideological heritage of luxemburgism within the KPP" and, as if to maintain an equilibrium, a second document incorporating theses from the program commission of the KPP KC [Komitet Centralny -- Central Committee] entitled "concerning the PPS -- Left Wing, as a Polish deviation from Menshevism." In order to maintain also here a zealous self criticism, the principal author of these theses was Jerzy Heryng (pseudonym "Ryng" or "Joz" or "Droznik") who was the son of the recently deceased Professor Zygaunt Heryng the former PPS leftist.

At a still later date there appeared a series of documents and other resolutions removing the SDKPiL from any honor or any affiliation with Bolshevism in a manner that evoked a bad aftertaste among many otherwise not particularly squeamish Bolsheviks. All of the documentation can not be cited here, but I must add at any rate that even Stalin in the course of some meeting dropped the remark

that the Polisy communists had lost all sense of decency in their self castigation. The leaders of the KPP caught this statement immediately and commenced a retreat to "Bolshevik positions indicated ahead of time." Documentation on this switch can be found in the corrections and changes in the proposal for a KPP platform as announced in Nowy Przegląd, No 7/65 for July of 1933 as well as in the article by Bronkowski entitled "Thirty Years of Bolshevism and the SDKPiL."

This new shift by the KPP leaders was based mainly on the fact that in parallel fashion side by side with the cursing of the Luxemburgist past in the SDKPiL, it was emphasized to the fullest extent that the Russian bolsheviks were the only infallible ones always and exclusively. Several positive aspects of the SDKPiL ideology and activity were recounted, especially in the practical sphere. But even Bronkowski underscores that:

"That which was often a result of influence by the all-Russian revolution and by its Bolshevik vanguard, that which was the expression of the revolutionary instinct on the part of the proletarian masses -- we tended to accept as the merit of the party."

(Nowy Przegląd, No 8/66, 1933, page 39).

This history reminds us completely of Mr. Pasek, who not liking Sobieski, attributed his victory as a "hetman" [general] to the piousness of King Michael. In the same manner the "Polish" communists have acted when, in order to cool off the former SDKPiL members happy over the switch, they stipulated that everything which was good in the SDKPiL was not the merit of the Polish communists but rather was the service of the "Bolshevik vanguard" and of the "revolutionary instinct of the masses."

The prewar PPS -- Left Wing (it is necessary to distinguish between the prewar PPS -- Left Wing and the PPS -- Left Wing which the communists created during the years 1926-1930 under the leadership of Andrzej Czuma, a former PPS member and secretary of the trade union for workers in the chemical industry, which represented a legal branch of the communists) has even less of a tradition than the KPP. This is a party whose memory nobody defends. All of its former members who are today communists or belong to the PPS express themselves about that organization in the most negative terms. There was no character in the tactics of that party and a lack of any clear and decisive line of action which to this very day takes its revenge. Nevertheless this party did play a certain part in the development of the KPP.

The PPS -- Left Wing originated from the split within the PPS in 1907, which took place as a result of the Central Workers' Committee struggle against the national independence movement of the combat organization in that party led by Jozef Pilsudski. The independence group (Revolutionary Fraction, hence the name "fracy") called this left wing compromisers or the moderate fraction. The latter was directed by Lewinson-Lapinski, Horwitz-Walecki, Feliks Kon, Maria Koszutska (Wera Kostrzewa), Bernard Szapiro-Besem, Dr. Sachs, the engineer Marian Ciszewski, Falski, and others. This party was always characterized by a considerable degree of turbidness in its program and by opportunism. It did include also patriotic elements but these were opportunistic and considered the struggle by Jozef Pilsudski as well as his drive toward independence as a mad venture. The majority of members in this party were of the Jewish intellectual type who had not been completely assimilated. In the history of the Polish workers' movement, the PPS - Left Wing was

unable to write even one page of glory. Only one of its leaders, Tadeusz Rechniewski (Karski), is deserving of memory due to the fact that he maintained Polishness among the workers in Wilno province and worked on the general education of the masses. The PPS - Left Wing attempted to cooperate with the Russian mensheviks, the most barren and weakest splinter from Russian socialism. This collaboration also induced it to work together with the "Bund" (General Union of Jewish Workers [Algemajner Jidyszer Arbeter Bund] abbreviated as "Bund" originated in Lithuania in 1897 by fusion of socialist circles formerly connected with the PPS but disillusioned with the latter under the influence of Jewish nationalism and ... russophilism; subsequently the "Bund" became a part of menshevism in Russia, but always with strong bolshevik overtones, whereas in the Congress Kingdom the influence was SDKPiL), and this move led to a not too famous combination during elections to the Duma in 1912. This resulted in the despatch of a delegate from Warsaw in the form of a certain Jagiello who originated from Plock (a representative on the level of the "ninny" or of the "man with the ear horn" who appeared in Polish comics several years ago). This block, it should be mentioned also, established a pretext for a loud antisemitic affair. In general the PPS - Left Wing attempted to combat the independence movement as much as it could, but for the benefit of the "fellow traveler" it never did give up the pseudo patriotic phraseology. In theory this group propagated collaboration with the Russian revolutionary movement but could not find a place for itself there. The past of the PPS was betrayed by the members of the PPS - Left Wing, but the glorious traditions of the former were not rejected by the latter. It is not surprising therefore that the PPS - Revolutionary Fraction as well as the SDKPiL hated the PPS - Left Wing. Finally it has come

to the situation today, where none of the former leaders in the PPS - Left Wing has the courage to defend his background.

After the reacquisition of independence by Poland, the PPS - Left Wing had no more work to do. The majority of its leaders and part of its membership transferred to the KPRP. Warski, as we know, also found himself in the latter. In the article which we have already cited about the jubilee for the party, he attempted to defend the past of the PPS - Left Wing by writing:

"The historical service rendered by the PPS - Left Wing was that while still within the bosom of the PPS, within the directly oppressive to the spirit, atmosphere of class conflict between socialism and the chauvinism of the Pilsudskis and the Wojciechowskis (this man was attacked by Warski only because he was President of Poland at the time), it launched an ideological and organizational struggle for the liberation of PPS workers from their bonds of nationalistic ideology and that it was able to split the PPS and by degree introduce the majority of its workers along a common path with the SDKPiL." (Ibid; page 354).

Later in the year 1926 a man close to the communists named Besen (B. Szapiro) attempted to rehabilitate the PPS - Left Wing in his biography of Rechniewski. The very fact that it was met with a sharp censure by the KPP after its publication by the communist book house "Ksiazka" is indicative of the irritation evoked by this work. Besen emphasized that Rechniewski was a supporter of Polish independence. A similar fiasco was met by another KPP historian Eugeniusz Przybyszewski who lived in Russia and used the pseudonym "Czeslaw Jasinski" while there, when he tried to whitewash that party. Various resolutions by the KPP always called upon the PPS - left

wingers to write a history (self criticism) of their former party. Among the latter only one announced such an effort. This was Max Horwitz (Henryk Walecki), one of the least sympathetic among its representatives and a typical "handeles" Jew, treacherous and hypocritical, he is today a high official in the Comintern on Balkan affairs. Of course prior to writing this book Horwitz would have his work completely "revised" and the tone of his writing would be maintained in such a style which would be most appropriate for the bolsheviks.

Apart from these two main ideological trends in the KPP, with time there began to manifest themselves still other events brought along with the extensive addition of members from other parties. During the years 1919-1922 the KPRP incorporated the majority of the "Bund," a part of the "Poalej-Sjon," the minor United Party of Socialists and Zionists also called "Ferajnigte," part of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, a large number of Belorussian socialist revolutionaries. During the years 1920-1921 the KPRP was even able to precipitate a serious split in the PPS. As far as the ideological influence of these acquisitions was concerned the minority parties introduced into the KPRP much of their nationalism; the Ukrainian groups apart from the latter also terroristic tendencies; the Poalej-Sjon on the other hand considerable intrigue and disrepute. An embodiment of these virtues is exemplified by Saul Amsterdam, known generally in the KPP under the pseudonym "Henrykowski," a member of the KC and a candidate for the KPP Politburo. The communists who entered from the PPS and from the "Liberation" movement do not enjoy a good reputation in the KPP. Frequently it is said that they betray Polish patriotism, which they have tried to suppress within themselves for years, and this

ends most often in tragedy down in the dungeons of the Comintern's capital city.

Much space will be devoted in the later chapters to the history of how the elements in the KPP that had been previously burdened with the ideological orientations of their former parties were eradicated.

CHAPTER II

The communist party originated from a fusion between the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania on the one hand and the PPS - Left Wing on the other which took place at the first so called unification congress on 16 December 1918 in Warsaw. The new party adopted the name "Communist Workers' Party of Poland" and later added the subtitle "Section of the Communist International." This name differed from those of the Russian, German, and other communist parties in the adjective "workers." As was subsequently explained by the leaders of the KPRP themselves, this adjective was inserted on purpose in order to distinguish the party from the Bolsheviks who appeared to be not very proletarian in view of their "peasant deviation." In general the Polish communists at the beginning thought of themselves as being better; they considered themselves to be on a higher level and as possessing more culture than the Bolsheviks. At any rate Roza Luxemburg also suggested the name "workers" for the German communists, placing the movement in western Europe on a superior plane to that of the semi Asiatic movement of the Bolsheviks.

Poland at the time had just been resurrected. In the East the revolutionary storm had eliminated from the earth's surface the greatest enemy of Poland - Moscow tsarism. On the ruins of the latter

there was growing a new and dangerous enemy who was elastic, young, and adventurous. This was Bolshevism in the name of which the proletarian revolution had designated a plan to conquer the entire world or at least the greater part of Europe. In these plans Poland was to become one of the first victims. Theoretically the Bolsheviki were alone among Russian political parties in their recognition of Polish independence, but they wanted to have relations only with a Poland under a communist system. In practice this would have been a Poland completely subservient to them and not a "bourgeois" country. The definition of a bourgeois country according to them is any state in which the communists-bolsheviks do not exercise power, i.e. each country independent of them. In general the Bolsheviki attempt to create the illusion as if Leninism to which they adhere did not negate the concept of nationality. In practice however this looks different. Sociologically speaking there can be only two ideas of nationality: the nation as an organism, directed by its own independent state; and the nation as an independent cultural organism, more or less exclusive. However both one and the other were completely eliminated by Leninism which can be proven by the views of Lenin himself as expressed in his polemic with the "Bund" on the "nationality problem" (published in Polish at Leipzig [Germany] in 1927 by "Stach Tradycja" [Budzynski] who was mentioned in the foregoing).

The year 1918 brought about the destruction of the great empires of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs. Revolutionary waves shook the foundations of the contemporary social order in the West. During this time in Poland the situation was no better. Generically Polish areas of the country like Upper Silesia, Pomerania, Warmia and Mazury were still in the possession of Germany. Polish industry in the course of wars which had taken place within the area of Poland

had been completely destroyed. Machinery was taken away by Russians or Germans. Agriculture had been pillaged successively by all of the occupants and then destroyed by four years of military action. A large number of men capable of creative work were in foreign armies or else abroad. The young Polish statehood was in the process of establishing itself as if from nothing. The only more permanent thing in existence at that time was the Polish army or rather the beginnings of an army, in the first place in the form of Jozef Pilsudski's legions and also other formations organized abroad. The latter were returning slowly, perhaps too slowly due to causes beyond their control, back to Poland. The freedom which had been a dream for so many generations now acted upon the Polish society like an intoxicant. For this reason not many persons understood the difficulties and dangers which had already arisen and represented a threat to independent Poland:

Already during the first month of Polish independence there was established the Communist Workers' Party of Poland. What was the program with which it commenced its activity and promised to make humanity "happy?" The first congress of the KPRP took place in an atmosphere of conviction that the social revolution was in full swing and that it would shortly break out in Poland. To this congress Poland and its independence did not exist. The party's political platform treated not only Poland but all national states arisen as a result of the European war as seasonal phenomena. The coming revolution would sweep up all of them from the surface of the earth, because:

"The era of direct struggle for a realization of the socialist system has opened, an era of social revolution Poland is entering this phase of social revolution....."

The pioneer and model for this revolution was of course Soviet Russia, so the first congress of the KPRP issued the slogan for incorporation of Poland into this center for building socialism and states:

"The proletariat of Poland rejects all political slogans like autonomy, self government, or self determination....."

In this manner the KPRP eliminated not only the slogan of independence for Poland but even the concept of autonomy, "admitted" for Poland (i.e. Congress Poland) by the SDKPiL, and self government (something between independence and autonomy) which had been kindly granted to Poland by the PPS - Left Wing. The KPRP even rejected, contrary to Lenin, the bolshevik "self determination" regardless of the fact that this would not have prejudged the fate of the country. In practice the latter idea means the "voluntary" integration with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with right of secession (and how!) upon demand.

The consequence of such a position was of course a decidedly antagonistic attitude toward the Polish statehood then under construction. The first congress of the KPRP attacked the Polish army with special sharpness:

"The proletariat will combat all attempts to create a bourgeois, counter revolutionary Polish army For the international camp of the social revolution, there is no problem of boundaries....."

The first congress of the KPRP took place, apart from the foregoing, in an atmosphere of assurance concerning an imminent communist revolution in the west. Participants of the congress were concentrating their eyes in the direction of Germany, where the

possibilities for revolution were being exaggerated to an extreme. According to the platform of the congress, revolution:

"Begun in a country more mature economically and based upon the experiences of the Russian revolution - the revolution in Germany is moving consistently toward a dictatorship of the proletariat."

This exaggeration manifests itself even more in the platform of the first KPRP congress which states that:

"All of the neutral countries have already been occupied with revolutionary fermentation."

Of course this "consistency" in the country that was "economically most mature" proceeded in a completely different direction than the communists had prophesied. However at the time they believed in it religiously and even swore upon it. At any rate this different line of development in Germany took place not without the fault and "experiences of the Russian revolution," which especially in Germany where Soviet Russia is relatively well known acted in a frightening manner. Of course the "fermentations" in such "neutral" countries like Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Denmark, etc. have remained unnoticed by anybody except the communists. These lie within the wild hallucinations of the communists similar to the revolutionary fermentation in the victorious countries of the "imperialist coalition," i.e. the Entente. It is interesting to note that the communists during this period overestimated the power of the latter, when they wrote ex.gr."

"With the final bending of the scales toward military victory on the side of the allies, the entire Polish bourgeoisie as well as the bourgeoisie of the whole (author's emphasis) world has found itself in their camp."

The naive Polish communists had never heard anything about the internal contradictions within the civilized world, called capitalism by the communists, which the foreign policy of bolshevik Russia knew how to exploit masterfully and thanks to which Russia was able to maintain itself on the surface.

A similar exaggeration and falsification designated the attitude of the first KPRP congress toward the Polish Socialist Party which, as is well known, participated actively in the reconstruction of the Polish state. The first congress of the KPRP claims that "social patriotism": "strives toward entanglement of the Polish people in an unending series of nationalistic wars with all of the bordering states, toward a subordination of the entire social life to the interests of rapacious Polish militarism;" whereas the peasant government of Jędrzej Moraczewski which had been established at Lublin was characterized as follows:

"It arose not on the basis of revolution by the masses of peasantry like the government of Kerensky in Russia or that of Ebert in Germany, but rather as the indirect result of revolution in adjacent countries. In consequence, it becomes to a greater degree (emphasis of author) than the others a cover for the rule of the bourgeoisie."

The most bitter enemy of the PPS, yet one not lacking in logic, could not write anything like the above about that party and still maintain a clean conscience. Making the cabinet of Moraczewski into a more bourgeois government than that of Ebert and Noske in Germany attests not so much the lack of honesty in the evaluation of political phenomena as it does the lack of common sense. As we will see later the communists changed their views radically in order to return to them again recently, although in a less exaggerated form.

The first congress of the KPRP issued several agitation directives to its party. Characteristic among these are the numerous phrases calling not upon the proletariat but upon the undefined "masses." We continue to read passages where this should be indicated to the masses, that the masses should be imbued, etc. In the first place naturally the congress issued the slogan: "The entire authority must pass into the hands of the urban and rural proletariat, organized into councils of workers' delegates." The worker-peasant alliance remains unmentioned. The peasants are treated by the congress as enemies. Land together with other means of production is to be converted into communal property, i.e. the property of the communist dictatorship. In general all of the slogans in the final analysis had as their goal the impeding of creative work by the young state organs of the resurrected Polish Republic, which is clearly indicated by a fragment of the resolution passed by the congress: "prepare and organize a direct struggle for political power as well as propagate among the masses the awareness that this fight will be ultimately decided by an armed battle between the forces of revolution and of counter revolution." (All quotations to this point come from a brochure entitled W sprawie partyjnych issued by the KPRP in 1922, pages 16-22).

It is not surprising therefore that the young Polish state, although at first it tolerated the KPRP, very soon was forced to begin fighting the communists to the point of delegating that party and applying prison sentences to members as declared enemies of Poland. It was also necessary to liquidate the councils of workers' delegates which had been captured by the communists to a considerable degree. This was done so that they could not break up the legislative Sejm which was being prepared in line with what had been accomplished

in Russia with regard to the constituent parliament there. In the Dabrowa Basin, where the largest concentration of the working proletariat was situated at that time, the communists were able to seize authority for a certain period in some of the districts of Sosnowiec. They manifested in this connection an unbelievable lack of administrative talent, even in the bolshevik meaning of the term. Rapid and decisive measures by state authorities eliminated the extravagances of depraved elements.

Politically speaking the first congress of the KPRP included a majority from the left wing of the PPS, whose leadership corps was located inside of Poland. Formally there existed a parity: half of the delegates represented the SDKPiL and half the PPS - Left Wing. Among the representatives were many who had been sent from Russia which was especially true of delegates in the former group. The new leadership that emerged was also selected on an equal basis. In this connection the SDKPiL demonstratively did not elect the most prominent man among them, Warski, who was even then considered to be oscillating in the direction of the left wing PPS. The majority of the still living SDKPiL activists "were working at the time in the Russian revolution," for the most part in the CHEKA under the leadership of Dzierzynski or in the organs combatting the remnants of culture and nationality possessed by Poles as well as the Catholic Church. This struggle was conducted primarily by the famous "Polish Commissariat" headed by Julian Leszczynski who is today the leader of communism in Poland. None of these communists had any influence upon the developments during the deliberations of the first KPRP congress.

Several months after the first congress, in April 1919, the communists kindly made some concessions in their political program vis a vis Poland; namely, in the proposal of a platform for the congress of councils which never took place they issued the slogan of a "Polish Republic of Workers' Delegates Councils," although they could not agree upon use of the adjective "Polish" at the first unification congress since in general they demanded a "Republic of Councils". There were to be "no" borders of course. This is still to date the main slogan of the communists with the subsequent addition after "Workers" of the term "Peasants and Soldiers."

As a matter of fact many of the moves made by the KPRP at this time were characterized by ordinary duplication of decisions established by German communism without reference to the differing political climate in Poland. Thus the Party Council of the KPRP (today it is called the plenum of the Central Committee) in February 1919 passed a resolution boycotting elections to the constituent Sejm, contrary to the directives of the Bolsheviks. In such a manner the communists are forcing themselves into an underground. Subsequently they motivated their unwise step in the following way: "a boycott of the Sejm by the KPRP in 1919 was justified since, although class warfare had not assumed with us a revolutionary pitch, there did exist the possibility of a direct transition to the authority of councils in Poland in view of the lack of any political organization on the part of the Polish bourgeoisie, in view of the rule by councils in neighboring Germany (?) and in Russia, and in view of the establishment of councils in Poland. In such a situation participation in elections to the Sejm by the KPRP would have amounted to a forejudgment as to the result of the struggle and an addition of authority to the Sejm rather than discrediting it." (Brochure entitled II Konferencja KPRP, 1921 page 20).

Later the communists condemned that boycott as a cardinal error which had resulted from the "infantile left wing disease," since it had deprived them of a tribune from which they could have freely voiced their subversive ideas. It seems to me that from the point of view of the Polish *raison d'etat*, or at least because of some aspects, it would have been better if the communists had found themselves in the first Sejm and assisted in the passing of the 17 March 1921 constitution. The Polish constitution would have probably turned out much more realistically and would have been much better adapted to Polish political conditions. The concept of freedom would not have been bandied around to the right and to the left, and the Sejm representatives would have become convinced who one of the main enemies of Poland was and whither the impotency of executive authority must lead.

The mentioned Party Council in February 1919 endowed Poland also with a whole series of prophecies, stating that:

"It is impossible to implement the reconstruction of economic life it is impossible to quiet down the storming mass of people it is impossible to build a strong state, etc., etc."

Of course all of these prophecies are being exploded. The method of materialism in approaching events, praised so much in the small world of the communists and which according to the Marxists is supposed to endow one with the capability of seeing into the future, is completely bankrupt which is attested to not only by facts and reality but also by the subsequent evaluations and resolutions passed by the communists themselves. The same Party Council makes judgment in advance regarding the friendship of the working class toward the USSR by writing that: "In Soviet Russia the Polish working

class sees its ally and strives not for a war against Russia but rather for the closest possible alliance." (Brochure W sprawach partyjnych, page 25).

Today if one sees in the USSR only an ally, then this represents heresy in the highest degree and perhaps even "social fascist counter revolution;" today Russia is not only an ally but also the fatherland of the proletariat.

During this period war in fact existed between Soviet Russia and Poland. Russia had placed everything on one card, desiring to win the war by means of revolution which would have been simultaneously the first step in the international revolution. The KPRP hence made haste to issue a declaration, which has hitherto never been equalled by any of the western European communist parties, to the effect that: "the armed assistance of the Russian proletariat, if it were necessary for the maturing Polish revolution, would not represent an invasion or an expression of imperialist tendencies and would have nothing in common with a striving toward any aggression under the slogan of national wars but would be simply (!) - the transformation into action of slogans dealing with the international solidarity of the revolutionary proletariat." (Ibid.).

A more classic example of high treason probably cannot be found. It means simply that one year in advance the KPRP was foretelling the offensive of the Red Army against Poland and declaring its support of the former but first neutralizing the criticism of world public opinion and the pangs of conscience on the part of those Polish workers who have had the misfortune of believing the hypocritical promises of the communists. One year later, when the hopes for an early revolution in Poland were dissolved (although the

communists claimed that in Germany victory of the proletarian revolution was inevitable during a short period of time), the communists lost all faith in their own strength and subsequently in their calculations based themselves exclusively upon the Russian Red Army. The first party conference, the deliberations of which took place in the month of April 1920 and thus at the time of the heaviest fighting in the Ukraine, provides a full expression of these changes. In a melancholy and falsifying manner, they declare that the Polish proletariat was not able to achieve a communist revolution only because:

"Food from America permitted the alleviation of hunger among the masses; the fear that this assistance would be lost slowed down the revolutionary impetus of the proletariat." (Ibid., page 10).

This represents the height of the materialistic approach to historical events! That geese saved Rome, we all know but here the principal force which enabled Poland to maintain its independent existence is -- lard from America. It is quite surprising that those talented sociologists did not pay any attention to the fact that "the most enlightened part of the proletariat" from a class point of view representing the core of today's KPP do not eat lard from the pig at all.

The mentioned conference provides a broad analysis of the then contemporary situation in Poland which differs from the evaluation by the unification congress:

"The far advanced decomposition of the capitalist economy in Poland brings about that its policies are not determined by the leading circles of the bourgeoisie, to whom the role of organizers in

production and in exchange had hitherto guaranteed obedience and authority among the segments of peasantry as well as poor urban dwellers, but rather by the elements of petit bourgeois intellectuals grouped around Pilsudski and acquiring support among the average well to do peasants by means of the agrarian reform mirage, democracy, and internal order." (Ibid., page 9).

Further along in this same resolution:

"During the time that large capital and the land owners were striving consciously toward a subordination of Polish policy to the interests of the allies, seeing in subservience to foreign capital a prerequisite to the reconstruction of capitalism in Poland, Pilsudski and his intelligentsia-military group were blinded as to the actual strength of Poland in their desire to make Polish policy independent from alien influence which resulted in directing Poland to play the part of an adventurous major power in an attempt to rule the East." (Ibid., page 10).

Disregarding the "insults" an example of which in communist jargon is the very phrase "petit bourgeois and intellectual elements," the KPRP admits here a matter of considerable significance for the entire history of contemporary Poland: the independence and great power politics of Marshall Pilsudski is differentiated from the policy of "foreign influence" represented by right wing elements. It is a different matter that several years later this analysis of "Pilsudskism" will be sharply repudiated by the Comintern. The affairs mentioned in this problem will also play a large part in the internal struggles of the KPP.

Next the party conference established that the defeat of Poland was a necessity, writing that:

"A tremendous offensive of Polish troops has begun toward Kiev. This period must end in a catastrophe of the state organization led by the bourgeoisie and the acquisition of power by the proletariat.

"The establishment of a bourgeois Ukraine forces (!) Russia and the Soviet Ukraine to a struggle for life and death. In this war the Polish bourgeoisie can not win." (Ibid. page 11).

During the spring of 1920 the KPRP tried to organize a one day general strike as a protest against the war with Russia. This strike was a complete failure. Later on in May and June of 1920 the communists instigated a series of local strikes of which the most important was the strike of workers in the public utilities at Warsaw. Finally the break came in the Polish offensive at Kiev and the march of the Red Army on Warsaw. At this time the communists manifested a considerable intensity in their work directed toward demoralization of the Polish armed forces and facilitating victory for the invaders. Most of the work in the KPRP during this period was based upon individual espionage and sabotage by its members. In territories occupied by the Red Army the KPRP immediately with the cooperation of Bolshevik authorities commenced the organization of revolutionary committees, the so called "rewkoms." It must be admitted that even here the authority of Polish communists was very small because native born Russian bolsheviks considered these achievements lacking in any administrative routine with no respect. In the Polish army the communists attempted to establish revolutionary committees which propogandized surrender to the enemy together with weapons. In brief they spread defeatism lack of faith and panic in the hope that by these methods advantageous conditions would be created for the enemy. Considerable assistance was shown at this

time to Bolshevik troops by the small town Jews from among whom most of the "rewkoms" recruited their membership. Apart from this a large percentage of these traitors was provided by the noncommunist Jewish parties like the "Bund" and the Poalej Sjon Left Wing. These parties due to their policy in 1920 to a large degree are responsible for the anti-Semitism which developed among the Polish intelligentsia in the ensuing years. The Polish peasant and worker, the Polish academic youth and from high schools, as well as working class youth manifested a complete immunity to these anti-Polish slogans of the communists. Enthusiasm and sacrifice in defense of the recently regained Fatherland, after almost 150 years of slavery, encompassed the whole nation. This explains why the invasion broke down at Warsaw. The communists in the KPRP once again calculated wrong in their underestimation of patriotic feelings within Polish society. We must also add that this was not the last time such a mistake was made. How moderate were the Polish authorities at this time in regard to the communists!

After the occupation of Bialystok by the Red Army, a Central Revolutionary Committee for Poland was established there under the leadership of Juljan Marchlewski and with the following members: Feliks Dzierzynski, Feliks Kon, Jozef Unszlicht and Jozef Prochniak (currently member of the KPP Central Committee) as well as these candidates for future "people's" commissars (ministers): Leszczynski, Bobinski, Heltman, Dolecki and others. This grotesque government was created at Bialystok essentially without any knowledge by the KPRP leadership inside of Poland. The latter was seriously broken up and found itself in concentration camps awaiting release by the Red Army. Nevertheless the invasion of 1920 and the creation of a Revolutionary

Committee at Bialystok was supported by the entire KPRP. It is interesting to note that the zealotness of this party for "red intervention" as a method of communist revolution simply represented at the time a unique phenomenon even within the international communist movement, where the Red Army's march upon Warsaw did not evoke admiration despite what is frequently thought of the matter. A little known but very expressive fact is that the communist fraction in the Reichstag announced in the Berlin newspaper Rothe Fahne [Red Banner] at the time when the Red Army was close to the borders of Germany that:

"The German working class does not desire any armed resistance from the Soviets, because it is able to carry out a revolution by itself." (Cited in the introductory article of Przeglad Komunistyczny [Communist Review], May 1921, page 10).

In the KPRP itself the leader of the left wing at the time, Donski, spoke out against the invasion by the Red Army. He wrote an article published by Rothe Fahne in which he condemned the crossing of Poland's ethnic borders and cautioned against the "making" of a revolution by means of occupation. He concluded on the basis of Marx that a revolution should result from developmental processes in each separate country. However the voice of Donski was isolated.

In Russia too there were communists who criticized the adventurous march upon Warsaw. Against the invasion were also professional activists and certain individuals from among the entourage of Trotsky who wanted to transfer to economic work as soon as possible. These also argued that by stopping the Red Army at the ethnic boundaries of Poland, it would be possible to obtain more favorable conditions of peace for Russia. Military "specialists" correctly

foresaw the impossibility of conquering the Polish army by military means. However these voices of caution remained unheard. Lenin at this point supported the position of the Comintern (Zinoviev, Radek), and Bukharin even formulated a scientific theory on how to make revolution with the aid of a revolutionary interventionist war ("red intervention").

Poland in the year 1920 was saved by the victory of its army which was recruited from among all segments of society. On the other hand, in no less a degree political factors contributed to this outcome. The Soviet Army which was sounding out hypocritical liberation slogans not only found no support among the working masses of Poland but was also met with the hatred, of the Polish working masses, which as the occupation army of the Moscow invaders it deserved. If there had not even been any strategic errors committed by the Red Army, it would still have lost due to the policy of the Bolsheviks and especially of their friends the communists in Poland. The communists as well as the Bolsheviks completely disregarded the powerful element which is a part of the Polish nation - its patriotism and the tremendous tie between the peasant and the soil. We must add also that the "Rewkom" at Bialystok was in possession of ready plans according to which all land was to be taken away from the peasantry and given to the communist state.

There arises at this point the question as to why the Russian bolsheviks, who were directing the entire policy of the Polish "rewkom", did not conduct in relation to the peasants in Poland the same agrarian policy as they had done in the USSR. The latter included at first permission to pillage the land and divide it up, but then years later taking the land away under the pretext of kolkhozes

and sovkhoses. An answer was attempted by Zinoviev at the time he was still chairman of the Comintern in a speech to the second congress of the KPRP:

"It is not being concealed from you, Comrades, that during the Russo-Polish war according to the evaluation of the Russian central committee, Comrade Lenin and the executive of the Comintern - we committed an error in relation to the peasantry. We were unable to utilize the brief period in order to place the problem of confiscating land estates in a revolutionary manner. At that time we paid a heavy price for our doctrinaire approach of "Marxism."

"We worried about the fact that the large estates should not be pillaged, not understanding that the task of the moment was to set the fires of class hatred and start a war of the peasantry against the landed gentry." (Brochure Referat G. Zinowjewa na II Zjezdzie KPRP 1923 r. [Report by G. Zinoviev at the Second Congress of the KPRP in 1923], pages 4-5).

Laying the blame upon Marxist doctrinaire approaches looks quite artificial. It is true that the political commissar attached to the "Rwkom" at Bialystok was the bolshevik theoretician, who is now dead, the editor of the Moscow newspaper Izvestia Stepanov-Skvortsov. Next to the de facto commander in chief Tukhachevsky stood Trotsky himself, the war commissar (minister), who made direct decisions in all political matters on the so called western front (for the Poles it was the north eastern front). Those two can be included among "doctrinaire Marxists," but attached to the army of Budienny on the southern front was Stalin himself. Could the latter be counted with the Marxist doctrinaires? There is no doubt but that in the reasons mentioned by Zinoviev there was some truth. However there was very little of it.

In reality this matter camouflaged the entire Bolshevik agrarian program and its anti peasantry content. The true program is one of nationalization, i.e. transferring all of the land to the property of the state. Only because of tactics in 1917 Lenin, seeing that the peasants would not go along with such a program, assumed the platform of the Social Revolutionaries which called for a division of the land among the peasantry. He even added a radical formulation - "plunder what has been plundered." Of course those "robbing what had been stolen" did not expect that after a certain time everything in turn would be taken away for the communal and state agricultural enterprises, the so called sovkhoses and kolkhoses in which the peasant is not even hired labor but a feudal "serf." But even the Bolsheviks themselves understood well that a similar deception of the peasantry would be a risky operation, and therefore should be avoided. Wherever possible they decided to commence immediately with socialization of land.

It was in 1920 that the Bolsheviks "feeling out Europe" (an expression of Lenin: "proshchupyvav Evropu") attempted to implement this simplified agrarian program. Let us add that the Bolshevik ideas concerning the psychology of the peasant are also simplified. They thought that since industry in Poland was developed more, thus the proletariat would be more numerous and agriculture increasingly industrialized, so that the aspirations of the peasant in the area of stealing the "master's soil" would also be weaker than in Russia. It should be mentioned that despite beautiful words about international solidarity of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks treated conquered Polish lands like regular occupants. They stole food supplies and fodder for starved Russia, not mentioning the feeding of armies and the common theft by soldiers who won the general compassion

of their enemies due to a ragged and miserable condition. It was impossible to allow the peasantry a part in dividing the spoils, since it was necessary to gamble on the success of large farms directed by commissars. Broken up peasant farms would be so small that they would not contribute products in a measure like the large latifundia. I must assure the reader at this point that this is no hypothesis but the most realistic truth, taken from the most authoritative Soviet sources....

Apart from this major political reason, there were also the strategic errors committed by the military leadership of the Red Army over which the Polish high command was incomparably superior. During a war this is of decisive importance. We must also add here that in the course of the Bolshevik invasion there were still other important and yet unfavorable moments for the Russians, like: the paralysis of the KPRP which originated from the lack of good leadership and an erroneous policy of this party depending upon a victory of the Red Army. More reasons along this line were revealed by the representative of the so called "Razvedupra," i.e. the office attached to the Red Army's staff which directed the intelligence operations in other countries. He was the already mentioned Bronkowski-Bortniewski who writes in connection with the 10th anniversary of the Red Army invasion of Poland:

"However we were not able to manifest sufficient revolutionary activity always and everywhere. The unheard of terror and break up as a result of numerous arrests as well as dispersal due to general mobilization of our party organizations -- can not serve as the only explanation for insufficient activity in the struggle against the invasion of Kiev, in the struggle toward the defeat of the bourgeoisie.

In certain stages the certainty of victory by the Red Army, moving ahead at an unheard of rate of speed, created an atmosphere of passive awaiting instead of awakening to a most energetic fight." (Nowy Przegląd, No 4/34, July-August 1930, page 20).

The year 1920 for the KPRP itself was favorable to the extent that during that time the party was strengthened largely by the addition of new members from different socialist parties, which were mainly Jewish. The already discussed first party conference of the KPRP resolved to accept into the party the then contemporary left wing opposition in the PPS directed by Adam Landy and Tadeusz Zarski. These leaders however never did make any great career in the communist world. Adam Landy, who later worked in the party under the pseudonyms of "Witkowski" and "Gruby Karol", is today a low ranking official of the Profintern i.e. the Communist Trade Union International. He was removed from activity in the KPP because of right wing opportunism. Tadeusz Zarski, former representative to the Sejm of the Republic from the communist ticket, currently has been relieved of any influence within the KPP as a person suspected of treason and "provocation." As such he was located in Moscow where he is "studying." It must be mentioned objectively that Zarski really became the victim of internal friction and intrigues among the clique ruling the party. For a long period of time he was a very active revolutionary under the pseudonyms of "Oskar" and "Czerwiec." The resolution about the PPS at the time stated:

"The struggle against PPS ideology within the workers' movement, uncovering its imperialist and counter revolutionary character will represent one of the most urgent political tasks of the party."

Today during the period when the theory of so called "social fascism" is prevalent; such a modest goal as that above is considered by the KPP as the worst type of right wing opportunism. The PPS today is the main enemy of the working class, although as we will see in later chapters there is a considerable amount of prevarication in this theory.

After the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 which also became the defeat of the international communist vanguard, there began a period that lasted until the middle of 1924 and can be treated as one unit in KPP history since it involves the same problems. This was an era of misfortune and defeat for world communism. Already at the time of Tukhachevsky's march on Warsaw, the activity of the European "revolutionary proletariat" was ceasing. The year 1921 brought with it a decisive disaster for the communist party of Germany in the so called "March coup d'etat," when less than five percent of the workers answered its call by rising up against the Weimar Republic. This happened in a limited number of areas within central Germany (Thuringia, Mansfeld). Thus certain communist elements returned to the social democrats, like the old and closest collaborator of Roza Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht - Paul Levy. The mass transfer of socialists into the communist party during 1918-1920 (Cachin and Frossard in France, Smeral in Czechoslovakia, the majority of the so called "Independents" in Germany led by Adolf Hoffman who is today a Hitlerite, the Italian maximalists, the left wing social democrats in Sweden and Norway, et al.) ended. In 1924 an important switch in the opposite direction, i.e. from communism back to social democracy which was rebuilding anew its so called second International, took place. The revolution stopped being something close and began to die. Even the leadership of the communist

parties understood that the "hurrah" revolutionary policy of the years 1918-1920 did not correspond completely to the attitudes of the masses which had already undergone a change. Retention of the former policy would merely isolate the communist movement from the masses, reducing it to the dimensions of a minor although noisy sect. Simultaneously, and which was most dangerous according to the communists, this policy contributed to the rebirth of social democracy. Therefore the communist tactics vis a vis the latter underwent a change. During the entire period under discussion we hear the slogan and efforts at a "united front."

However, the united front possessed a more fundamental basis than the interests of the different communist parties, i.e. the interests of Soviet Russia. 1921 brought with it a collapse of communism in Russia itself which was so deep that the Bolsheviks later denied any positive qualities to that communism in the construction of socialism, calling it "war communism" (voyenkom). This "voyenkom" led to general hunger and revolts. Finally it was Lenin who released the slogan of state neo capitalism, but which was named "NEP" (New Economic Policy) so as to make it more difficult to understand what it was all about. The Soviets introduced a series of concessions to the peasantry and also to private trade. This period of the "NEP" in the entire gloomy history of sovietism represented an era of relative, very relative prosperity and freedom. Economic life was rebuilt to a considerable degree. On the other hand Russia would have been ruined had it not been for the assistance rendered by foreign capital which was granted a number of facilities ("concessions," etc.) by "NEP." This required again a different than hitherto treatment of foreign policy by the Soviets. They commenced a drive toward initiation of relations with various countries.

This was also a strongly adventurous period in Soviet foreign policy in which they provocatively attempted to play the Germans off against the French, etc. They supported the former but later had regrets. Nevertheless in connection with the large influence of the socialists in many governments, it was imperative that the communists have better relations with them. That the united front was primarily a Soviet diplomatic move was stated openly by the rapporteur of the Central Committee, Bienkowski (real name Brun), at the third KPRP conference in the summer of 1922 when he said: "of two evils: to talk with the second or second and a half Internationals; or to harm the interests of Russia, we have of course selected the first." (Brochure, Sprawozdanie z III Konferencji KPRP [Report on the Third KPRP Conference], page 16).

Furthermore, Bienkowski solemnly declares that the interests of Russia are identical with the interests of the international movement. It should be added that in 1922 there took place at Berlin a conference of the three Internationals: the remainder of the pre-war Second with Vandervelde, a small part of the communizing "Community of Labor" from Vienna in the form of the so called Second-and-a-half led by Otto Bauer, as well as the communist Third (Radek, Rakovsky). The KPRP at first spoke out against this conference, and Bienkowski justified this negative position at the third party conference with the following argument:

"However if for Russia this conference was essential, if this were a matter of life or death, then it would have been our duty to agree with holding it." (Ibid.)

Thus as we can see even the interests of world communism must be subordinated to the interests of Russia! This is the corner stone

of ideology in "Polish Communism" according to which if there occur contradictions between the interests of the workers' movement or communism and the state interests of contemporary Russia, then it is necessary to sacrifice the interests of the former for the benefit of the latter. No better corroboration to the thesis of this book can be desired.

How this Russian concept of state conquered the minds of the "Polish Communists" is best proven by the extraordinarily weak echo later on among them of "Trotskyism." Now and since 1928 the communists settle this problem in a much simpler manner by simply declaring that there are absolutely no contradictions between the workers' interests and those of the USSR and that there can be none! (This is the explanation for such nonsensical acts like communist support for Soviet dumping policies in the years 1930-1932 which policies have already collapsed today. It is clear that dumping brings harm primarily to the workers and the farmers of other countries). In this uncritical Soviet patriotism, the KPP indubitably ranks first.

In general the KPRP entered into this phase of communism with much smaller reserves than did the communist parties of Germany or France. The events of 1920 compromised it terribly in the eyes of the broad masses. The transfer of socialists to the communist party en masse occurred in Poland only among the Jews. It was during the years 1921-1922 that the KPRP was joined by a large splinter from the "Bund," the so called "Komunistyczny Bund" (Kombund) under the leadership of Aleksander Minc, Abe Flug, Grynberg, and others (today for the most part they are outside of the KPP, and many among them have become Trotskyites); next a part of the Poalej-Sjon-Left

Wing with Saul Amsterdam and Alfred Lampe; and finally integration with the KPRP was announced by the small "Ferajnitge" party which had developed in Warsaw and Czestochowa under Izaak Gordin, Izrael Geist, and Wigdor Fryszman (the last man later became disillusioned with communism and remained in the party against his will; subsequently he was a professor in one of the party schools located in Soviet Belorussia). There also began an influx into the KPRP of socialist elements among the Ukrainians: the USD [Ukrainscy Socjal Demokraci -- Ukrainian Social Democrats] led by Osip Krylyk-Wasilkiw, Stiepan Wolyniec, and Turjanski; today all of them have long ago broken with communism. These elements become connected with the new nationality program of the KPRP which recognizes the principle of "self determination including secession," inserted into the communist program on purpose in order to weaken Poland. After some time the Ukrainians attained organizational autonomy, constituting themselves in the fall of 1923 as the so called "Communist Party of the Western Ukraine." Later an analogous group called the "Communist Party of Western Belorussia" was established. Both actually represent autonomous districts within the KPP. In the PPS, after the above mentioned split in 1920, there were no more communist breaches. More noise than significance should be attributed to the transfer into the KPRP in 1921 by the Sejm representative and railroad worker Stanislaw Lancucki who today is disillusioned and forgotten as a subordinate official of the Soviets in Moscow. Another man who did the same thing was Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki, former secretary of the PPS central executive committee, known in communist circles under the pseudonyms "Konrad" and "Bratkowski." For a length of time Sochacki was a communist representative in the Sejm and a member of the KPP central committee as well as its delegate to the

Comintern in Moscow. Later he was moved into the shadows due to a lack of political confidence in him on the part of the leadership group. At the end of 1933 he was arrested by the GPU allegedly because he was in the service of Polish intelligence. Those who believe in the infallibility of the KPP central committee will not doubt this version.

In the socialist youth organizations a more important split was engineered by the communists only in the Union of Polish Socialist Youth (ZPMS) attached to the PPS, and this splinter group became the start of the Union of Communist Youth in Poland (today: Communist Union of Youth in Poland). The latter was founded by Maks Lapon (died in prison), Leon Toeplitz (arrested in May 1922 for communist agitation in the army and sentenced to six years in prison, he wrote a whining letter to President Wojciechowski and obtained an amnesty by renouncing communism), and Tadeusz Oppman. In the years 1923-1924 the communists were able to capture the majority of the socialist university student organization called "Union of Independent Socialist Youth" (ZNMS) which was renamed ZNMS "Zycie" [Life] and then lately in 1930 it was reorganized into the Organization of Socialist Youth "Zycie" (OMS "Zycie") and assumed a totally communist appearance. In the PPS itself for a number of years there was no communist tendency whatsoever. Communism did manifest itself strongly however in the Polish Peasant Party "Wyzwolenie" [Emancipation], especially since 1924 which will be discussed later.

The former activists in the above enumerated parties upon entering the KPP stayed together and established cliques which brought chaos into party life. Regardless of this situation, there was nothing comparable to the large schisms like those in Germany and France. This can be explained by the fact that in Poland the

party was not endowed with a mass character as well as by the specific psychology of its participants in conspiratorial work. Each departure from the party was considered to be treason, and activities on behalf of Polish security authorities (in the party jargon, called "defensywa") were treated by this milieu with extraordinary hatred (on the contrary, the attitude toward the GPU was one of enthusiasm). Of course no loyal citizen of the Polish Republic would notice anything shameful in the police service which was designed to maintain security and order in the state. This aversion toward state authority, it must be admitted unfortunately, was inculcated by the communists into a considerable part of the Polish proletariat. It is an interesting phenomenon that this "manifestation of class consciousness" in the form of hatred toward the administration occurs more strongly in areas where education is the lowest. By way of digression, in England the police service enjoys universal respect as it does also in Germany. In Russia before the war it had a shameful reputation, but currently in the USSR on the other hand it is treated by the communist society as an honorable service. Noncooperation with the GPU in the USSR by the average citizen is looked upon as a symptom of counterrevolution. Incitement against Polish security authorities is influenced considerably by the thetcoes which in general dislike institutions collaborating with the administration of justice and competing with various "dintojr's".

In February 1921 the second KPRP conference was convened, and it marks the beginning of a phase known as the "political NEP." During this period the KPRP attempted to adapt itself to the conditions of life in resurrected Poland contrary to its former prophesies. The second conference still harbored the illusion of a new war with Russia and success by the Red Army. The theses of the

conference indicate this hope concerning the international situation when they state that:

"A renewed attack by capital upon Russia may be the signal for a revolution in Europe. However inversely, the beginning of a revolution in Europe will (of this they are certain -- comment by the author) represent the signal for regiments of Russian proletarians to march westward in the name of international solidarity with the proletariat and the unity of revolution in the whole world." (Brochure, II Konferencja KPRP, page 6).

The first place is occupied however by the hope that: "The tension of nationalistic feeling, the ideology of defense of the fatherland which had darkened the class consciousness of the proletariat as long as the war lasted and stood as an obstacle in the path of class warfare, have lost considerably in their strength with the end of the war.

"The conclusion of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia will close the era of excited nationalism which also infects the working class." (Ibid., page 18).

In passing thus the communists admit that the Polish working class is imbued with patriotism, counting only on the hope that it will end. In their calculations the communists were mistaken (as usual) very badly because only one year later they were forced to make concessions on behalf of this patriotism, for a brief period of time it is true, which bordered upon treason to communism.

The second KPRP conference already, if it did not recognize by a formal act the Polish State, then at least it officially took into consideration the existence of the state and of its organs. The

conference resolved to change its negative attitude toward parliament and to participate in the approaching elections (1922) to the Sejm. This resolution was not passed without a struggle; 18 delegates to the conference voted in favor of participation, whereas 11 were against it. For the first time the left wing opposition made itself known in the party, and we will meet with it continuously later on. This minority was directed by Grzegorz Slusarski (pseudonyms "Grzech" and "Kowalski" from which comes the name "grzechism" for this left wing; in 1923 this man was removed from work in the KPRP for ultra leftist deviation and since that time has been a Soviet official abroad, most recently in Russia) and remained under the strong influence of ultra left wing splinters in the communist party of Germany, the so called KPD men (Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands [Communist Workers' Party of Germany]) who did not want to agree with the concept that a general ebbtide of the revolutionary communist wave was at its crest. Furthermore under the influence of the KAPD, the "grzechists" as we will see shortly manifested a larger degree of autonomy vis a vis the Soviet Union. The already mentioned action by Demski in 1920 was connected with the influence of this movement. The antipatriotic attitude of the KPP has introduced a situation where, if its members can come to some kind of a logical attitude toward Poland, this is done under the influence of some Germans or Frenchmen.

In 1921 the KPRP organized in the constituent Sejm a communist fraction by capturing two representatives: the above mentioned Lan-cucki and Dr. Tomasz Dabal. The latter is a true example of the prewar peasant demagogue from the province of Galicja. He began his political career in the Radical Peasant Party together with the famous priest Okon. In the fall of 1918 the two of them attempted to establish

a Soviet peasant republic at Tarnobrzeg, and later both entered the Sejm. Dabal quickly transferred to the KPRP, and even sooner received a six year prison sentence because of various disturbances at rallies in Warsaw. In 1923 he was sent to Russia on the basis of an exchange of prisoners and advanced there to become a high ranking official. For a long time he also worked in the Communist Peasant International (the so called Krestintern). Lately he has become a scholar and a Belorussian one at that.

It is difficult to speak of any policy on the part of this communist fraction, since it limited itself to demagogic noise. At any rate Dabal preferred to show off his erudition on the street (at times with a lantern) rather than in the Sejm.

However the communists have not yet lost all hope that Poland will be unable to repulse their storm internally on the background of the postwar crisis. During the entire year 1921 a continuation of the old tactics was experienced: the KPRP attempted to exploit the wave of strikes at the time the army was being demobilized, etc. Already in February of that year the communists took the initiative in the strike of railroad workers and in the general strike. Then came the strikes of city workers, in the chemical and metal industries, and by agricultural workers in the province of Poznan (summer of 1921). Finally no more support was forthcoming, and nobody responded to the KPRP called general strike of 2 December 1921. The party leadership quickly shifted to the ultra rightist tactics of an understanding with the socialists, tactics which had their origin in the third KPRP conference which took place in the summer of 1922 and in the second congress of that party which convened in the late summer of 1922.

This was a very stormy period. Poland was in the throes of an inflationary crisis which was constantly increasing until the peak was attained at the end of 1923. High prices and poverty in Poland assumed very extensive dimensions and on this basis disturbances arose. In Germany the communists were preparing themselves in the open for a revolution, and at certain points it appeared that the victory of German communists was already a fait accompli. In Soviet Russia under the influence of German developments, a decision was made by the Soviet government "for a revolutionary war" which was to aid the German revolution. This war in the first instance would have been directed against Poland should the Polish government refuse permission for transit across its territory of supplies, and what was more important ammunition and troops, to Germany. Poland of course was bound by international treaties and its own well-understood *raison d'etat*, so it naturally could not permit the foregoing. Preparations for this war, more dangerous than the one in 1920, were very obvious. At a rapid pace Soviet troops were being regrouped from East to West, and the anti-Polish campaign within the Soviet Union was taking on ever sharper forms. Inside Poland itself the Soviet army staff organized individuals excluded by the KPRP (formally expelled by the party in order to compromise them in case of detection) into diversionary bands and terrorist groups with the aim of demoralizing the rear areas of the Polish army, a weakening of the defensive capabilities by that army, and the development of a revolutionary attitude among the masses. The most dangerous of all at that time was the terrorist organization led by a former captain in the WP [Wojsko Polskie -- Polish Army] named Baginski. He was a man of strong character who believed in the Soviet paradise. In my opinion it was unfortunate that the later shooting by Muraszek did not permit Baginski and Wiczorkiewicz, both of whom had been accepted by the

Soviet government in an exchange arrangement, to see and taste this paradise. The aforementioned organization was able to succeed in several bombing attempts, the most famous of which was the tremendous explosion at the Citadel in Warsaw. Simultaneously Poland was living through a political crisis, a crisis of executive authority evoked by the growth in power of the Sejm. In the summer of 1922 a permanent cabinet crisis was begun; some of the governments last only a few days. Certain of the political parties commenced action toward saving the situation by means of seizing dictatorial powers. Prominent here were the national democrats. The PPS and the "Emancipation" group threatened that in the event of a coup d'etat by the rightists that a civil war would develop. Elections in November 1922 provided the Sejm with a membership even more at odds than the previous one. Also scandalous scenes took place in connection with the election of the first RP [Rzeczpospolita Polska -- Polish Republic] president. Finally in 1923 the national democrats in combination with the "Piast" group assumed authority, and this represented a more permanent government but one without any power or respect. The army also was weakened during this period by a series of personnel changes.

The task of the KPRP was concentrated upon the exploitation of internal strife then taking place in Poland, for their own communist ends. The point of departure for that party became the evaluation of conditions in Poland worked out already by the second party conference. In its view Poland had two paths to choose from: either subordination to the allies as a colony with a transformation of the internal system based upon the rule of a capitalistic dictatorship or else a politico-economic union with Soviet Russia. One can not dispute the logic of the communists when they did not call

this "union" colonial status, because Poland would have had less .
 autonomy than any colony. During this time such a path was chosen
 "voluntarily" (under the pressure of 400 artillery pieces) by Khiva
 and Bukhara in Asia to whom the Bolsheviks for diplomatic and politi-
 cal reasons guaranteed even the inviolability of their noncommunist,
 democratic system. During the years 1926-1927 these treaties were
 broken unceremoniously, and both "people's" republics were parcelled
 out among the neighboring Soviet republics. No other realistic pro-
 gram for Poland's future was seen by the communists. The path along
 which it was being led by Marshal Pilsudski has been defined by
 the second KPRP conference as being utopian and corresponding only
 to the interests of the middle class, i.e. the petit bourgeoisie.
 According to the conference this was a path independent of both
 west European capital and of Russian communism. From this the com-
 munist came to the conclusion that a program of federation, social
 democracy, agrarian reform, and labor legislation was something for
 the good of the workers. It should be noted that this program al-
 ready belonged to the past. Today the KPP screams that federalism
 is an expression of Polish imperialistic interests under orders of
 "world" imperialism, that social reforms represent "fascist labor
 legislation," etc. During the years 1922-1924, the communists had
 merely made themselves a part of the camp fighting for these
 "fascist" postulates.

The problem of collaboration with the camp of Polish democracy
 was made difficult for the KPRP by its unbelievable and habitual
 lack of understanding for relations in Poland. These people saw
 in Polish social, political, etc. life only a sector of the inter-
 national capitalist world which to them was everywhere uniform. The
 principal role in such pseudo scientific analyses was played by the

analysis of German conditions, because at this time the majority of the German proletariat was organized within the social democracy. It was thus clear that this same social class in Poland must be close to the PPS and therefore the first place was occupied by the problem of the "united front" with democracy which evolved for the KPRP into the idea of collaboration with the PPS. The entire system of work by Lenin, an example followed by the KPRP, can be brought down to the "scientific" formula of a struggle among revolutionary sects for power. All problems were analyzed by Lenin from the viewpoint of the fight for economic and political authority. One of the most important obstacles in this struggle, according to Lenin's teachings, is represented by the influence of the socialists upon the masses. Thus in order to break it, Lenin suggested the system of assuming socialist demands in the process of convincing the proletariat that only the dictatorship of the proletariat can implement these. In such circumstances the communist tactics amount to shameless deception. The communists allegedly fight for democracy and for "nationalistic" slogans as was done in Germany during the occupation of the Ruhr Basin, not to mention the colonies or Poland's nationalistic communism on its eastern borders. However the concept of a "united front" involved a serious difference among the communist activists during the period 1921-1924. For some of them this period was an actual but insincere effort at an understanding with the socialists, and the ideal of this movement was to be the inclusion within the various countries of Europe into socialist governments of various splinters. Others on the other hand understood it as a unified front with the masses and based upon camouflage of social democratic tendencies with a simultaneous and constant separation from the leaders of "social compromise." The third conference brought this

out into full relief. The original draft resolution as presented at the conference by the Central Committee indicates that:

"All approaches to the PPS are considered out of the question by the KPRP in the current situation. In Poland more than ever before, the tactics of a unified front must be the tactics of unity with the working masses themselves in the struggle regardless of the position taken by the leaders of social compromise." (Sprawozdanie z III Konferencji KPRP [Report on the Third Conference of the KPRP], page 22).

This draft excluded any kind of contact with persons of different faith which was not acceptable by the then current majority at the conference. Therefore the central committee finally withdrew itself from this "irreconcilable" position and suggested the formula: "the KPRP may in certain instances turn to the PPS," but it soon appeared that the right wing (led by Warski, Walecki, and Kostrzewa) had prepared a radically different resolution which was subsequently forced through by 26 votes "for" and nine "against" and four abstaining from the vote. The resolution at this point which was most disputed states that:

"The KPRP should turn to socialist parties and to class trade unions with the proposition of a united struggle." (Ibid., page 49).

Wera Kostrzewa, one of the best minds in the party who today is a subordinate official in the Soviet Gosplan [State Planning Administration], motivated this resolution as being in agreement with the right wing attitude of the German communists (Brandler, Thalheimer) which was being supported by Radek:

"In 1918-1919 the bourgeoisie itself was transferring governments to the social compromisers in order to combat the revolutionary wave.

"Today it is different. Today even a social compromising government would have to arise in conflict with the bourgeoisie and would have to lead as a consequence to the development of revolution and to a government by councils." (Ibid., page 29).

By means of this reasoning, as expressed by one of the participants at the third conference, the cunning Kostrzewa fooled many of the delegates. The latter spoke in favor of supporting or even ultimately participating in a coalition workers' government. Nevertheless this agitation "trick" by Kostrzewa was an expression of the deepest yearning by the right wing leadership group, a yearning for a Polish form of "Kerenskyism" without which the communists could not imagine any possibility of seizing authority.

In this proposition for a united front addressed to the PPS, as was done at a number of later times, there exists a concept characteristic for communist mentality: we will make an alliance, "we shall proceed for a time along the way together" (expression of Radek), but later we will finish off our allies. Among communist leaders there are also those who maintain good relations with the heads of the "social compromisers," but even those persons imbue their own rank and file with a simply comical hatred for everything which is not communist and in particular toward the socialists.

During the years 1922-1923 actually during the period of the warmest attitude of the KPRP toward the PPS, Jerzy Sochacki published the following four small volumes of "Facts and Documents:" PPS in the Service of Austrian and German Imperialism; PPS in the Government of Moraczewski; PPS in the Sejm and Outside the Sejm; PPS and the Workers' Councils, the last of which was merely a vulgar

pamphlet. Later Sochacki supplemented this work with a pamphlet history of the NPR (National Workers' Party of which he was a member as a youth). It is no wonder then that the PPS has been accepting communist proposals with aversion until recently.

The tactical retreat by the KPRP at the third conference in the matter of the unified front evolved not only from the desire to defend the state interests of the USSR, which in many essential matters plays the most important part. The communists also based themselves here upon the experiences of western European communist parties which had come to the conviction that the "hurrah" revolutionary policies, disregarding the attitudes of the masses, isolates the communist movement and transforms it into a meaningless and closed sect but, what is even worse from the communist viewpoint, it also contributes to the regeneration of social democracy. This also was the reason for the necessity to change the tactics in such a manner so as to permit the KPRP entrance into an understanding with socialist parties and trade unions for the purpose of exploding them from within and to draw the masses to its side.

The threat of isolation from the masses in Poland appeared before the communists in full when nobody acceded to their call for a general strike on 2 December 1922. The fiasco in the words of admission by the third conference was complete.

The plan for collaboration with Polish democracy forced the KPRP to a total change in its program in the agrarian and also nationality fields. Kostrzewa, a truly serious expert on the agricultural problem, thus formulated the position of the KPRP toward the farm program during the third conference:

"In a country with such a relatively small industrial population as Poland has, there can be no revolution without an agrarian revolution. What is an agrarian revolution? Let us speak clearly and call things by their name. An agrarian revolution is the taking possession of the land by the peasantry. At the cost of even the greatest efforts it is necessary to save (!) part of the land for socialization. For this reason these efforts must be concentrated at the place where they will be most fruitful. It is imperative that we have a realistic, not an utopian, attitude toward the perspectives of revolution." (Sprawozdanie z III Konferencji KPRP, page 76).

In the report by Kostrzewa two significant points are made. In the first place, without the support of the peasantry a communist revolution is impossible; to acquire the assistance of the peasants, it is either necessary to give them the land or else to permit them to steal it. In the second place, as Kostrzewa reveals the KPRP already at that time was uncertain whether it would be able to "socialize" the entire land at the moment of revolution, i.e. to appropriate it for the communist state. Thus the KPRP suggests a plan for concentration of all forces on sectors which are the most certain or else in those areas where the peasants are most antagonistically disposed toward communism (Poznan and Pomerania provinces did not then and still do not let them sleep peacefully.), so that there the land could be "saved" even at the "cost of the greatest efforts" which to the communist also in a dress and with such an innocent and lamentable voice as that of Kostrzewa means neither more nor less than punitive expeditions of Chekists [secret police] and a bloody slaughter of peasants defending their property. The true aims of the communists are betrayed by Kostrzewa furthermore.

when she states that: "We shall be able to socialize more land than in Russia" and "the socialization of land is in the future the only solution to the agrarian problem and the sole path to socialism."

It should be remembered that socialization according to Kostrzewa means the expropriation of land from the peasantry by the communist state and the transformation of the owners into hired laborers.

The discussion in the matter of agriculture was very hot.

The majority of the delegates were against the slogan "land for the peasants," and the motivation behind this opposition was quite significant. I shall cite only two of the more characteristic voices:

"If the revolution does take place in the West, there will be no force which can compel us to a division (of land). (Malinowski during the discussion, page 85).

A different delegate from the central party headquarters whose name was Goralski stated:

"If we break up the land, then it is clear that on seven morgi of land (this was the amount computed by Kostrzewa as the average farm in Poland - comment by author) the peasant will eat all and that nothing will remain for the cities. The division of the estates means a decrease in farm productivity. What will the towns have to eat? We must therefore exert all of our efforts in order that the estates, which are to feed the cities, will not be forfeited. We shall look for support among the agricultural proletariat which exists and which represents a strong and considerable element in the rural areas." (Ibid., page 89).

In view of the fact that the matter is so clear, any comment would be superfluous. I must add that the agrarian problem at the

third conference was strongly attacked by the left wingers, and Slusarczyk who is already known to us came out with the statement that one of the fundamental principles of the communist program was being sacrificed for the ragged peasants. In the end the conference did not settle the agrarian question but only opened it for discussion within the party and left the matter for the future congress to decide.

On the margin of the third conference I should like to add that the course taken by Warski and Kostrzewa captured the entire conference and assumed full control over the KPRP which remained until 1924 in the hands of the "3 W's," i.e. Warski, Walecki, and Wera (Kostrzewa). This was doubtless the most talented leadership which the KPRP ever had and remained independent to the highest degree possible under communism. Apart from the "3 W's" the leadership group also included Prochniak (Sewer who for a certain time was also a "W" from his pseudonym "Weber"); then the young and talented economist-mathematician Henryk Lauer (pseudonyms "Ernest," "Brand," and "Lapinski"), today a specialist on heavy industry and a high official in the Gosplan; as well as several less important figures.

During the period of this leadership the KPRP constantly released appeals for a unified front. This was rather a personal idea of the "3 W's" and remained very unpopular in the party, the position of which was formulated by "Junosza" in the political report of the Central Committee at the second conference. He too spoke out for a unified front, because "capitalism for the time being has saved itself with great difficulty but is secure: and "today the first place is occupied by slogans of a transitory nature, the struggle for minimum

existence." This same "Junosza" however cautioned against any direct approach to the PPS leadership. He also indicated that he was against participation in worker-peasant governments which had arisen by any other method than the Soviet one, i.e. through an armed uprising. It is possible, he said, at the very most to support such a government in a parliamentary fashion providing that there is no outlook for a dictatorship of the proletariat and only while such a government at least to a certain degree implements the demands of the workers. (This is typical of the communists in its Talmudist love for considering situations which are completely unrealistic, discussing matters without any practical purpose. At that time nobody was inviting communists into the government of Poland, and their entire fraction in the Sejm amounted to one man without any brains whose vote for or against a government had no meaning). It is characteristic that "Junosza" spoke against Comintern directives which at that time were ordering contacts everywhere with the "higher echelons" of social democracy. Today certainly such a courageous man can not be found in the KPP who would speak up with reservations as to the orders not only of the Comintern but even with regard to a thought expressed by the "infallible" Stalin.

The leader of the left wing opposition Slusarski read a vigorous coreport at the third conference in which he demanded no understanding whatsoever with the social compromisers. He declared that it was necessary to exert pressure upon the socialists and force them to fight through an independent mass movement directed by the communists. Slusarski also claimed it necessary to continue the splinter tactics in the trade unions (at this time the communists also precipitated a schism in the class trade unions at Warsaw and for a short time even had their own Labor Union Council which was

finally broken up by the police). He demanded that not even the least amount of support be given to the governments of "social compromisers." Apart from that, he castigated any kind of concessions from the old social democratic program on the agricultural and nationality questions, concessions which tended toward "catching peasants" and inciting the national minorities.

The change in the front as proposed by the party leadership, according to Slusarski, leads to a deviation from communism and was taking place under the influence of opportunistic elements which had penetrated the KPRP from other socialist parties as well as under the influence of USSR state policy. The government of the latter is always forced to seek compromises with its own internal enemy, the peasantry. Before I explain the course of Slusarski's thoughts, I can not refrain from indicating the unusual courage he displayed which involved a criticism of USSR politics. If somebody were to dare reveal such an attitude today, and we must remember that all KPP conferences and congresses take place on the territory of the USSR, he would be not only expelled from the party but also arrested on the spot and placed under the care of the GPU which would "liquidate" such a daredevil without any question once and for all. I assure you that there is no exaggeration in this whatsoever.

The Russian revolution, according to Slusarski, from its very beginning was dependent upon the support of the peasantry who always exerted their influence on its consolidation. The Soviet government was forced in view of the foregoing to make concessions on behalf of the peasants up to the time when the Russian revolution could be aided by the proletarian revolution in western Europe. When this latter did not occur, the Soviet government was compelled to make far

reaching allowances and established the "NEP" which granted concessions to foreign capital. Even "NEP" itself did not create the conditions for confidence in the Soviets among the capitalist states in western Europe. Thus as a consequence the USSR began trying to obtain recognition and to attract foreign capital in this manner. During this period the socialists had considerable influence upon the governments of the European states. It was necessary therefore to exploit this influence, to resume the broken contacts, and to obtain in this way support for the USSR. Such policy in Slusarki's opinion had an adverse effect upon the international revolutionary movement, and furthermore also upon the USSR due to the fact that communism on a world scale would become weakened which in turn would also debilitate Soviet Russia.

Apart from Slusarki, who stepped forth sharply against the KPRP leadership because of the idea to change tactics, the representatives of communist emigration in Russia also spoke out against the Central Committee. The latter group was comprised of former SDKPIL members and was headed by Marchlewski, Unszlicht, and Leszczynski. These individuals attacked the change in program on the agrarian and nationality problems. The result of this was that a long discussion took place at the third conference, and then the agrarian question was left without any solution but permitting an official party discussion to open concerning it. Unofficially however this discussion was begun through a series of articles by Kostrzewa, published in Nowy Przegląd during 1922.

The revolution which was so close not only did not occur but commenced to disappear. Lenin was the first to notice this, and it was he who announced the slogan to retreat. In communist language

this assumed the formula "to the masses" and inspired the KPRP leadership at that time (mainly Warski, Kostrzewa, Walecki, and Brand) to formulate new tactics, the tactics of the unified front with which the reader is already acquainted. The political situation in Poland was undergoing a slow crisis, and some of the communists were afraid that there might emerge a national democratic dictatorship. Marja Koszutska in one of her articles entitled "Against the Reaction," appearing in No 3/4 of Nowy Przegląd, expresses these fears but simultaneously flirts with the socialists who in the face of the danger from a "coup d'etat by the fascist national democrats" should find themselves in one block together with the communists. In this article Kostrzewa laments the fact that the working class is disorganized, broken up, and possessed by apathy as well as lethargy. Suggesting the concept of a united front, she writes as follows:

"Therefore if the matter involves the repulsing of a rule by the Korfanty's and the Dmowski's, all of the splinters from the working class must march in closed ranks, but the most revolutionary part must lead the masses further: to a struggle equally unmerciful with the concealed reaction, nurtured and protected on the bosom of the leftist block." (Article "Against the Reaction," No 3/4, Nowy Przegląd, 1922, page 63.)

Furthermore, Kostrzewa develops her tactical plan as follows:

"The destruction of harmony between the grand bourgeoisie and leaders of the petit bourgeoisie as well as workers' compromise will make the Belweder block ever more dependent upon the masses of workers and peasants, and will compel the former to take the latter into consideration. To incite in the latter the desire to impose their demands represents for us the most important political concept for current events."

And further: "the entire proletariat of towns and villages, all workers and poor peasants, must comprehend that it is not the person of a Pilsudski or a Witos -- as claimed by the fractionists and populists -- but only the awakening to achievement, constant preparedness, and the espousal of mass action which can guarantee the democratic attainments essential in a bourgeois state." (Ibid.).

A surprising novelty in these new communist tactics is not only the united front "with the workers' compromise" (PPS) but even with the entire "Belweder camp" and what is of more significance -- the struggle for a democracy "essential in a bourgeois state" in defense of which Warski also wrote an article entitled "Democracy at Attention," published in Nowy Przegląd. He states there that "it is impossible to avoid democracy, for a shorter or longer time, since it is an inescapable phase in transition to the proletarian revolution." Naturally this will evoke surprise among the readers in view of the fact that the communists have lowered themselves to the level of democracy from the sacramental dictatorship of the proletariat. Kostrzewa even attempts to designate the length of time necessary to remain in this position when she writes:

"Up until the general course of events will not have prepared the soil for a coup d'etat and until the slogans of a social revolution have not achieved victory in the workers' and peasant masses." (Ibid.).

From the utterances of KPRP leaders, we can see that the revolution already then had lost its footing in Poland, and its slogans were not being accepted by the masses. Warski himself stated at this time:

"And if during the year 1918-1919 our party had concentrated its mind upon the struggle for a dictatorship of the proletariat, then today for about two years now ever more frequently and louder we have been calling the masses to the struggle for freedom The fight for freedom is a democratic slogan, just as democratic as are all the other partial demands with which the revolutionary segment of the proletariat is currently entering into the electoral campaign." (Articles: "Democracy and Dictatorship" in Nowy Przegląd, No 5, October 1922, page 154).

Obviously these words of Warski would not have shamed any one of the so called "compromising" socialists. As we can see communist thinking in Poland began to operate along peculiarly individual lines, which was true not only in Poland at the time.

Several weeks later elections to the Sejm took place (November 1922). The KPRP participated under the cover name "Union of Urban and Rural Proletariat," a fictitious organization but one that functioned legally. The elections of 1922 indicated that the communists in Poland had a certain amount of strength, but it was impossible to consider them a genuine mass movement. They attained less than 130,000 votes, i.e., just one-eighth of what the PPS received. The communist vote amounted to 27,000 from Warsaw; about 15,000 from the Dabrowa Basin; very few votes from such working class centers as Lodz, Upper Silesia, the petroleum basin; and the rural areas gave even less. Only two communist representatives entered the Sejm: from the Dabrowa Basin, Stanislaw Lancucki, who made no showing in his own home town of Przemysl; and Stefan Krolkowski (pseudonyms "Bartoszewicz," "Ogródniczek," "Cyprjan") from Warsaw. The parliamentary activities of these 2 representatives was based upon the

propagation of a radical "hurrah" type of democratization which, if it were implemented, would have led to the liquidation of the state within a matter of weeks. Krolikowski's proposals for amendments to the penal code would have eliminated all the articles mentioning high treason and antistate activities (he did retain however the articles concerning espionage). Another proposal for amendments to the military service law scandalized the communists by recognizing the necessity for such but demanding that it be shortened to 6 months.

During the late summer of 1923 the second KPRP congress convened on Russian territory of course. It served to emphasize the policies of the "3 W's." This congress to a greater degree than the third conference had the character of a turning point. The resolutions of the congress were binding upon the KPRP for a whole year, after which they were declared opportunistic and changed. Of all KPRP congresses this one was best represented and elected under the most democratic conditions, because the later KPP congresses were simply nominated by the Central Committee. The most typical and least ceremonial naming of delegates took place at the third congress of 1925 and the sixth congress of 1932.

The second congress numbered 49 delegates with deciding votes. The intellectual level of deliberations was relatively high. The entire second congress debated in the luster of the coming German revolution which also placed its mark upon the discussions. The former hopes for revolution in Poland which had been muted and in part lost during the years 1921-1922 again began to return. During the congress the KPRP placed its stake not only upon the Red Army but also upon the armed "hundreds" (Zenturien) led by Brandler,

at the time leader of the German communists. On the basis of these hopes, resolutions were adopted in pompous and ostentatious form. The congress was honored by the presence of Comintern chairman and head of the Petrograd soviet, Zinoviev, who together with Stalin and Kameniev at that time had risen to the highest authority and importance in Russia. In a flaming speech of greeting, Zinoviev announced that: "the German revolution is inevitable, and in the nearest future there will probably take place events of a decisive nature. This will occur within a few months, perhaps even earlier, rather earlier than later." (Brochure entitled Referat G. Zinovieva [Report by G. Zinoviev], 1923, page 13).

Of course Zinoviev was able to prophesy so bravely, because the Kremlin had already set the dates and places for the revolution: first in Saxony, then in Hamburg and Berlin, and finally in all of Germany. How far the Soviet government and the Comintern were betting everything on the German revolution and how certain they were of victory is proven by Zinoviev's speech in the course of which he did not even maintain diplomatic appearances, i.e., the separation of the Soviet government from the Comintern which 2 organizations -- according to the naive statements by communists and soviet diplomats -- are alleged to represent units independent of one another. At the second KPRP congress Zinoviev promised aid to the German revolution not only from all communist parties in the world but also help from the USSR when he said:

"Especially the Russian communist party, our Soviet republic even if it wanted to (of course, it will always want to - author's comment) could not and would not be able to separate its destiny from the fate of the German revolution." (Ibid., page 16).

At this time in USSR governmental circles there were many wiser politicians among the so called economic activists who were opposed to any kind of military adventure for Russia. Zinoviev was aware of this very well and entered into a polemic with these concealed adversaries by hysterically shouting:

"If our party were to waver at such a moment (reference to the Russian party -- author's comment), if some would try to occupy a neutralist position, this would mean that the party was rotting, that our republic was proceeding along a path toward transformation into a middle class, bourgeois-democratic, peasant republic. We guarantee to you however with our heads that this will not happen and that the people who might advocate the above will find themselves on the other side of the barricade. I am not sure whether such people will be found among us, but I doubt that very much. If there might be any such overly smart "realistic" politicians who would say:

"We must engage in trade but not in revolution, our duty is to knock on doors for recognition de jure, etc., if such thermidorians (liquidators of the French revolution -- author's comment) were to appear -- they will be cut off from us mercilessly." (Ibid., page 17).

In saying this the poor man did not realize that such ideas of a "Thermidor" would penetrate for a certain time into the very top echelon of Soviet authority and that his accusations would be directed later eo ipso against Stalin which would have the effect that he himself would be removed by Stalin not only from active USSR politics but also deprived of the "leader" title regardless of numerous penitences. Therefore I believe Zinoviev was premature when he declared: "it is 100% certain that our party and the Union of Soviet

Republics will prove without delay ... that ... we waited, gathered our forces, retreated, maneuvered so that at the decisive moment everything in our possession could be thrown on the scale of the international proletarian revolution and the German revolution." (Ibid.).

In his declaration Zinoviev went too far and honestly said what he thought. He himself reflected upon the fact that he had said too much and therefore added later on:

"We should convince each worker socialist, PPS member, non party man that we are for peace." (Ibid., page 20).

Of course Zinoviev's speech was not lacking in the emphasis that the main enemy of the German revolution would be the Polish bourgeoisie (sic!). Foreseeing the sad end of this adventure he added:

"If the German revolution were to be defeated, this would decide not only the fate of Soviet Russia but also the destiny of the Polish workers (read: Communist Party of Poland - author's comment) and of many other units in the workers' army." (Ibid., page 22).

Ten years later these words of Zinoviev assumed a prophetic sound, but his fears at the time were heavily exaggerated regardless of everything as we have seen.

The second congress of the KPRP issued an extensive manifesto which to date represents the greatest oddity among communist documentation. It appears from this document that the KPRP, neither from here nor there, has become transformed into a zealous defender of

Polish independence. Not only does it base itself upon independence, but it begins auctioning "patriotism" with all Polish political movements. There is no doubt but that this sudden "patriotism" among the communists represented merely an agitational hook and a political maneuver. However it was not an isolated phenomenon.

During this period Karol Radek suggested that the German communists take the initiative in the so called "Schlageterism," i.e., going along in common with the national socialists (he was negotiating at the time with Count von Reventlov who later became a prominent Hitlerite) against France and Poland. He utilized as a pretext here the execution of a German spy and diversionist, Schlageter, who was shot by French occupation authorities in the Ruhr Basin. In the KPRP Radek's suggestions evoked considerable amazement and it must be admitted, although this does sound like a paradox, that a certain degree of national sentiment as well as understanding of Polish affairs was manifested in KPRP leadership circles. The result were such "patriotic" resolutions adopted by the second congress. If the KPRP had been operating under conditions of greater autonomy and independence from Moscow, there would have existed the possibility of a further development along lines of a more realistic attitude toward Poland. The consequence could have contributed to polonization of a section of the communist party. A similar evolution was undergone by considerable splinters from the communist parties of Norway (Labor Party), Sweden (Hoeglund), France (Frossard, currently a neosocialist), Czechoslovakia (Bubnik). In both Italy and Germany a considerable part of the communists, even from the leadership echelons, broke off from their parties and drowned in fascism. Unfortunately the paw of Moscow strangled at birth the weak movements of independent political thought which were germinating among the communists in Poland.

In the manifesto issued by the second congress of the KPRP, the contemporary ruling Chjeno-Piast [coalition of peasant parties] bloc in Poland was sharply attacked. On the other hand the PPS and the "Belweder" camp remained completely untouched in view of the fact that the proPolish position of the manifesto could not afford to castigate those groups which the communists still had illusions of approaching eventually. We read in this document which is still unique to this day that:

"The army should be cleansed of all democratic elements: these who spilled their blood with the conviction that they were fighting for the happiness of the fatherland and its people are today being exterminated like harmful bugs and are seeking a solution to their tragedy in mass suicides." (Uchwały II Zjazdu KPRP [Resolutions of the Second KPRP Congress], page 8).

As the readers have noticed already, the first KPRP congress announced the postulate that one of the most important tasks of the party was the struggle against the Polish army. However at the second congress the communists were defending the Polish army against the attacks of the national democrats. Let us not harbor any illusions as to the sincerity of these communist expressions. Basically the ultimate aim of the KPRP was at that time a further disintegration of the army but through other methods, namely by means of deepening the internal tensions which had been introduced into the army carelessly by politicians within the governing circles.

In a subsequent part of the manifesto the second congress castigates the corruption in government:

"Closed and stultified are all sources with reference to the state needs in regard to the interests of society.

"Today's rulers of Poland find the only solution in the call for assistance of foreign capital. They are prepared to sell the latter half of Poland and to mortgage customs, monopolies, railroads, forests and to sell themselves as well as the entire population into bondage.

"Poland ruled by Chjeno-Witos is proceeding into the slavery of an economic dictatorship, under the whip of control by international bankers.

"But not only does economic slavery threaten Poland at the present time. One must be blind not to see that today the game is for even greater stakes, that we are approaching events which will finally decide the destiny of Poland's existence as an independent state (emphasis by author)." (Pages 9-10 of the Resolutions).

The KPRP caring for the needs of the state, standing on guard over the independent existence of Poland as a state -- is this not a paradox to beat all paradoxes? The independence of Poland is also connected by the KPRP with a victory of the German revolution, warning that in case this revolution should fail then the consequences would be lamentable:

".... between a Russia of Nikolai Nikolaeviches and a Germany of the Junkers as well as the Prussian Hakata, there would be no place for an independent Poland. Polish independence would die in the ocean of workers' blood which would spill over central and eastern Europe." (page 68 of Resolutions).

These uninvited neophytes of Polish independence took the fate of the latter too much to heart. The Republic of Poland at that time already possessed enough power to defend itself from external enemies, whereas today in 1934 we can state boldly that we shall never be so

weak as to perish even in the event of such an unfavorable alliance as was described by the communists at their second congress. The Germans of the Prussian "hakata" variety and today's Hitlerite Germans are doubtless stronger than they have ever been, not without the fault of communists themselves. Despite this fact Poland has not perished but to the contrary is indisputably more powerful than it was 10 years ago. Poland's considerable significance in international politics remains unquestioned. However a moment of sincerity and the visualization of Poland's dilemma between Stalin's Russia and a Germany under Brandler or Thalmann would be sufficient for those "independence promoters" to comprehend, even for a brief moment, that Polish independence would be in a much worse situation. There is no doubt that in such conditions, we would be exposed to war in the East and in the West but not because of Poland's fault, the interests of which such a war would not serve. The communists in Germany would certainly reach with armed force to seize Polish Upper Silesia and Pomerania. They have announced this openly, and it is a known fact that the "Spartakists" (German communists) in Upper Silesia numerous times at the turn of 1918-1919 organized armed sorties into the area of the Dabrowa Basin.

The KPRP at that time in contrast to the contemporary KPP should be granted one admission. In a special resolution the second congress recognized the Polish character of Upper Silesia (there was never any doubt as to Pomerania) and declared:

"The mortal enemy of the Polish people in Upper Silesia were the German factory owner and the German estate owner." (page 66 of the Resolutions).

This was the case during the second KPRP congress and is probably still the case. The KPRP wanted to offer the German revolution at that time only coal and military aid by "shock troops from Upper Silesia" as the insurrectionists were called. These latter are hated viciously by the communists today. Currently the KPP would give all of Upper Silesia and Pomerania to the Germans, since they are claimed to be "German provinces." As we will later see the Soviet government was forced to restrain the KPP in this giving away of Polish areas, because the former changed its policies vis a vis Germany in the meanwhile as was also the case somewhat in relation to Poland. As we know already from the preceding pages, contradictions between the policies of the KPP and the Soviet government do "not exist" and cannot exist.

Within the peculiar concept of patriotism as espoused by the KPRP however we do find a series of contradictions. The communists declare that:

"The only guarantee of its (Poland's) independence is the victory of the revolution in Europe and the worker-peasant alliance between Poland and the neighboring brother republics." (page 12 of Resolutions).

In the meanwhile at the second congress already, those guaranteeing Poland's independence in such an extraordinary set of circumstances also greeted the following confession by Zinoviev with prolonged applause:

"We distinguish between just and unjust wars, regardless of whether they are defensive or aggressive. Applicable here is a criterion of a social nature, and we are interested in ascertaining: who, what class, and why is it entering into a conflict?"

"Let us imagine for instance that a German proletarian republic -- in order to secure itself against an attack by the Polish bourgeoisie tomorrow -- first goes to war ... Such a war from the viewpoint of pure strategy would be aggressive, in actual fact (?) however it would really (!) be defensive (emphasis by the author)." (page 21 of the brochure Referat G. Zinovieva).

Such a fate then was to meet Poland after victory by the communist revolution in Germany. This would have happened even if Poland had not intervened at all in the internal affairs of the Germans. It is also known from other sources that Soviet Russia was prepared to aid the Germany governed by Stresemann in the event of a conflict with Poland. The Polish communists who applauded Zinoviev's speech attested their friendship from which may God protect us.

In general the Russian bolsheviks at this time had high hopes that a German revolution would take place. Germany was being represented as a tremendous reservoir of industrial production which was incomparably superior to Russian production and the domination of which would mean standing at the threshold of world control. Countries like Poland with its weaker industry were not even considered, so that a Russian bolshevik politician or else a Polish communist thinking in the revolutionary categories of Russian imperialism looked upon Poland only as a bridge between Russia and Germany. The entire activity of "Kremlin" bolshevism can be narrowed down to guaranteeing this bridge regardless of means. Of course in addition to this tendency others were also manifested. Currently however the Comintern announces the uncompromising concept of annexing Poland by the USSR under various pretexts.

In its resolution on the political situation, the second congress declared:

"If intervention by counterrevolution occurs then a revolutionary war will break out, a war for life or death in the course of which the Union of Soviet Republics will be compelled to throw all of its power into the scales, because in obtaining the victory of the German revolution it will also be defending its own existence."
(page 18 of Uchwaly II Zjazdu).

Let us visualize a completely realistic picture. In Germany the communist revolution has broken out. France for instance feeling herself threatened by this occurrence and thinking of her own national interests (breach of the Versailles Treaty attacks upon Alsace or Lorraine, etc.) intervenes with arms or even by means of economic sanctions. Poland in evaluating the unfavorable military situation assumes a neutral position. The Soviet army under the pretext that Poland has not fulfilled its ultimatum concerning the passage of troops and war equipment for Germany marches into Poland and buries "once and for all" that country's independence. Such is the essential meaning of the political resolutions adopted by the second congress of "Polish Communists" who were at the same time announcing a guarantee (a most zealous one at that) of Poland's independence.

In a separate resolution on the political situation within Poland the second congress developed the already known evaluation of forces struggling in Polish society, dividing that society into the following: "a camp of capitalism directed by the national democratic staff" and "the camp of Pilsudski" which attracted groups of democratic ideologists from among the petit bourgeoisie, the peasantry, a part of the working class and the working intelligentsia.

as well as certain of the bourgeois land owning circles -- in brief almost the entire nation was in the camp of Marshal Pilsudski according to the communists. Simultaneously that same resolution ascertained the "victory of the national democrats" and the "bankruptcy of Pilsudski" according to the communists. Simultaneously that same resolution ascertained the "victory of the national democrats" and the "bankruptcy of Pilsudski" which concluded that especially favorable conditions were arising for the revolutionary movement, because the masses can be aroused with ease to combat the "national democratic reactionaries." Starting out with this evaluation of forces we also have in the political resolution which was designated for internal party usage (in contrast to the manifesto which was to be used for the broad masses) the concept of flirting with elements of the intelligentsia and with patriotically disposed peasants as well as workers. The intelligentsia was approached probably for the first time since the establishment of the KPRP in the following manner: "that if it desires to serve Poland (certainly yes, without any qualifications -- author's comment) and not its oppressors and profiteers, there is no other future for it than in alliance with the workers and peasants, in decisive participation in the revolutionary struggle." (page 12 of the Resolutions).

However the manifesto indicates that the intelligentsia must become subordinate to the leadership of the proletariat (read: the communist party). God forbid that anybody should think the intelligentsia represents that segment of the nation which can direct it. Thus in the mentioned resolution, we find such a reservation:

"Rule by the bourgeoisie in Poland comprises a lethal danger to its independence. Permanent independence can be guaranteed to

the state and to the Polish nation only by means of a victorious revolution."

And a little farther:

"At this historical moment the revolutionary proletariat of Poland must enter upon the arena of world events not only as an element representing the interests of its own class but as the spokesman and leader of the whole nation." (page 25 of Resolutions).

Communists in the role of spokesman and leader for the entire nation would become very similar to the "nationalism" of the national democrats which was castigated so much by them. And where is the class conflict theory continuously propounded by them? Since when does a "whole nation" exist with its own interests in the eyes of the Marxists and Leninists? I know that they would find it difficult to answer these questions, and thus I shall answer them myself for the reader. The KPRP wanting to attain something tangible was forced to reject its unrealistic ideological principles. Since this was done only partially and inconsistently as well as hypocritically, not only did the KPRP win nothing but it suffered an ignominious defeat. Together with the loss at that time by the KPRP, the creators of the political resolutions at the second congress from the Warski-Kostrzewa group were completely beaten. Somewhat later they were removed and went into exile to live on bread begged from Moscow.

In the area of the united front the second KPRP congress proceeded farther in its directives than did the resolutions of the third conference. During the pre-congress period the party was quite solidly prepared from this point of view. A series of articles by its leaders, especially by the "3 W's," had their effect. In practice however it was a little worse. The KPRP central committee in April

1923 sent an open letter to the PPS central executive committee and to the leadership of the other socialist parties operating in Poland as well as to the central commission of the class trade unions (influenced by the PPS) in the matter of establishing a united workers' front. Also included were concrete proposals for the organization of May 1st demonstrations together. The united front had as its aim the beginning of a struggle for so called partial demands (the 8 hour labor day, stopping high prices and unemployment, elimination of taxes and transferring them to the propertied classes, as well as the fight against "national democratic" fascism). The concealed basis of these communist proposals was the suggestion to fight against war, directed mainly toward France, and in the defense of the Soviets. In order to commence this campaign the communists proposed to launch a so called "week of struggle with militarism and fascism" even prior to 1 May 1923.

The communists initiated this affair at the time in the form of an open letter. Tactically speaking this was a maneuver of a united front from above. In order to be successful the maneuver should be arranged so that the other side could not fathom its true meaning. However the PPS at that time was well acquainted with all of the deceitful moves by the KPRP and for this reason the newspaper Robotnik [Worker] on 18 April 1923 carried a negative reply to the offer by the "gentlemen communists." We read in this response among other things:

"The fight of the communists against 'militarism' represents the work of those who admire Soviet rapacious and aggressive militarism."

There is not the slightest doubt but that the PPS was 100% right. Everybody who has seen through the machinations of the Soviets

and of their Polish agents, concealed in the KPP; will agree certainly with the PPS position.

In the contemporary KPP historiography the second congress is of significance only insofar as it "provided the party with Leninist slogans for the peasant and nationality problems. In the agrarian question, after a less energetic discussion than had taken place at the third conference, the congress resolved:

"We demand the expropriation of all land estates without compensation and their transfer to agricultural committees elected by all of the peasants and workers with the exception of the village rich. Where there is no land hunger the agricultural committees will be able to maintain exemplary managed or industrialized estates in their entirety or in part for the purpose of conducting a communal economy on them." (page 25 of the Resolutions).

Significant in this resolution is the slogan: "land for the peasants without compensation," which was closely linked with the German revolution expected to break out momentarily by the communists (and as a consequence also the Polish revolt). It aimed at obtaining support from the peasants as allies in the revolutionary struggle. On the other hand this same German revolution exerted its influence because of the insertion into the resolution of reservations concerning the establishment of individual "agricultural committees" for the distribution of land, which was to be elected by all of the workers -- meaning also factory workers from the cities -- but excluding the "village rich" (a designation completely arbitrary as was shown by the Russian revolution); and also by addition of the formula: "where there is no hunger for land," which again was to be determined by the communist party of course in a spirit most advantageous to that party.

This deceptive resolution together with other statements by communist leaders to the effect that when the revolution occurs in the West "there will be no power which can force us to divide the land" testifies that the "Polish" communists in maneuvering with slogans outdid the Russians especially in the matter of creating illusions among the peasantry. The latter, as has been shown in practice, is essentially the most formidable enemy of communism. This crafty play on words and the slyness of contemporary communism is difficult to unmask, especially in an environment of rural people. However a confrontation of communist words with their actions in practice provides us with a picture of limitless hypocrisy.

In the nationality question the old slogan of Polish patriots was announced at the second KPRP congress: "for your freedom and ours" but inserting a content which was completely different. As far as the Polish patriots were concerned, the matter pertained to the liberation of Poland and the other nations oppressed by Russia from under the tsarist yoke. The communists on the contrary desired to drive the Republic of Poland and other nations into Russian slavery, now repainted red. In the congress resolution this sounds understandably somewhat more delicate:

"In the struggle for the freedom of oppressed nations, the party decisively supports the principle of self determination of peoples regarding their own destiny as well as their right to secede from a state which has annexed them by force.

"The Polish proletariat in the interests of its own liberation from political and social bondage must openly and without any subterfuge support the striving of nations enslaved by the bourgeoisie for complete national liberation as well as combat national oppression in any form." (pages 25-26 of the Resolutions).

The slogans promulgated by the second KPRP congress and the latter's generosity for other nations are similar to the lavishness of Zagloba vis a vis the Swedish king. Which nations were annexed with force by Poland? Perhaps the communists consider the Treaty of Riga in 1921 between the USSR and the Republic of Poland as an expression of force? Or perhaps the return of indubitably Polish lands, not only on the basis of historical tradition but also possessing absolute majorities with regard to national components, in Upper Silesia and Pomerania and also Eastern Galicja? (It is a different matter that Soviet scholarly publications frequently falsify the nationality statistics of these territories, repeating also German lies. Thus for instance on the large ethnographic map of Europe in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, Pomerania appears as a German area and Wilno as being inhabited by Belorussians (why not Estonians?)). The communists themselves do not doubt the justice in having these lands return to the Polish Republic, but their aim is different -- the "unification into one nation of the Ukrainian, and Belorussian populations with the Soviet Ukraine and with Soviet Belorussia" (pages 62-63 of the Resolutions). Anybody who knows anything about the matter realizes that they are thinking of extending their domination over Poland's eastern territories and annexing them by Soviet Russia. During the debates on this problem at the second congress, Marchlewski cried out from a Polish heart when he could no longer listen to such idiotic talk: "Do you want to make the Boryslaw-Drohobycz Basin into the Ukraine when the workers there are in their majority Poles?"

In this same resolution which so generously gives up the eastern areas of Poland (the situation had not yet matured for a distribution of the western territories) the KPRP attempted to play

on the patriotism of the workers and peasants, preposterously telling them that by subtracting from Poland areas inhabited in part by Ukrainians and Belorussians as well as the integration of these provinces by the USSR -- the workers and peasants would "liberate themselves" (?). Remembering however that at the time of the deliberations by the second congress there were being undertaken feverish preparations for a war against Poland in order to "aid the German revolution," the KPRP issued an appeal to national feelings:

"Each drop of blood spilled by a worker and peasant in a war against revolutionary Germany or revolutionary Russia will represent a crime against the most vital interests of the Polish nation." (page 61).

As can be seen this odd system of KPRP machiavellianism is able to collaborate and defend the most distant ideologies, from the logical point of view. The patriotism of the Polish worker in 1920 was a misfortune to the KPRP, because it broke down the bolshevik multitude. However in 1923 this patriotism was evoked in the name of "the most vital interests of the Polish nation." The example followed came from above. Cooperation by the Comintern with such movements as Ghandism and others in general was not isolated. In Japan for instance during a certain period the Comintern entered into a liaison with the remnants of the old medieval conservatism which was revolting against modern statehood. One of these "bolsheviks," Count Goto, expressed himself to the effect that the moral ideals of bolshevism closely parallel the moral ideals of the old Japanese knighthood. To the communists it is completely immaterial whether they use in their agitation phraseology from radical socialism, patriotism, a "League to Defend Human and Citizenship Rights," or finally strong reaction.

Among the other resolutions passed by the second congress, certain of these should be emphasized in the matter of trade unions which are on an incomparably higher level than the current KPP position. This proves that the KPRP was not far from common sense. It should be admitted that trade union affairs were directed in the KPRP by serious individuals who were well acquainted with their field and, what is more important, they were genuine workers. These included Adam Krupa, today director of a metals factory in the Moscow region; Wacław Sobon; Karol Wojcik (today outside of the party); Ulman alias Urban (now director of a large bakery in Moscow); Adam Leskiewicz; Jan Paszyn; Władysław Lis, known under his assumed name as Proszynski; and others. Currently however the majority of these has been removed from party work for one reason or another.

The second congress also emphasized strongly the concept of unity in trade unions and their possible independence from political parties. For this reason certain trade union elements later supported the communists. Within the unions the congress resolution urged a sharp but respectful criticism of the trade union bureaucracy. In order to increase communist influence, it recommends the establishment of "red fractions." The most interesting are the tactical directives in this resolution:

"All types of economic action should be organized and directed by trade union authorities.

"As a rule so called "wild" strikes, i.e., local and unorganized ones, should be opposed if all other means of pressure upon compromising union authorities have not been exhausted." (author's emphasis).

Such directives are today considered by the communists as being the worst and most shameful type of counterrevolution. But even at

that time there was fear of objections by the Comintern, so the authors of the resolution prudently added:

"It is necessary to organize strikes even (!) over the heads of compromising union leaders, if these have been prepared by means of a broader campaign of pressure upon the trade union authorities, if to the broad masses the necessity for a strike is clear and the compromising union leaders openly are sabotaging this indispensable action."

From the viewpoint of communist orthodoxy, the waiting for results from "pressure upon union authorities" also represents opportunism. However it cries for the vengeance of the Kremlin to a lesser degree than does the resolution fragment ordering opposition to the outbreak of so called "wild" strikes. I must also add one more flower to this selection in the form of an uplifting tactical resolution.

"When making demands of an economic nature during the struggle, communists should take into consideration beforehand the relationship of forces and the possibility of having their demands implemented."
(Quotations from Uchwaly II Zjazdu, page 71 -- emphasis by author).

Today such directives would be considered as "revisionism," "betrayal," and even "fascism" in the KPP. The current communist tactics vis a vis the trade unions are based upon fomenting strikes independently of the possibility or impossibility of implementing demands. In general these demands represent only means for the mobilization of the masses against the state, because the communists recognize the essential medium of struggle against the "bourgeoisie" only in revolution by way of an armed insurrection. The communist "economic action" is based merely upon the imbuing of the masses with the consciousness of demands which are impossible to realize. In the final analysis

this policy leads, as we will see, to a rejection of the trade union concept and to attempts at "independent" and absolute direction of the economic struggle for the proletariat by groups of communists. It is a different matter that a similar policy has always aroused an aversion on the part of the more sensible communists -- trade union members who for the most part are in constant quarrel with the party leadership.

The second KPRP congress elected a central committee of a very uniform ideological coloration. The leadership found itself in the hands of the Warski, Kostrzewa, etc. group. The Comintern had complete confidence in the "3 W's," which was expressed at the time the former held its fourth congress (in the fall of 1923) in the deliberations of its "Polish Commission" under the chairmanship of Radek. At this commission meeting very sharp criticism was leveled against the leadership of the "3 W's" by the internal opposition with Slusarski at its head as well as by the Soviet-Polish communists under the direction of Lenski. The delegates to the second congress returned home not only with false passports arranged by Moscow but also with the guarantee by the Soviet government and the Comintern that they would receive assistance very soon to implement a revolution. When making this promise, they were certain that the hour had struck for introducing a communist social system into Poland. How ignominiously this time as well as many times later were "our" communists disillusioned in their hopes and deceived. Life went on in a completely different manner than they had imagined it would.

During the time being discussed the entire communist world remained under the impression of the defeat sustained by German communism in the fall of 1923. The sole "hope" of the Comintern, the USSR government and of the KPRP -- the German revolution -- was a failure. What was worse, this occurred due to the fault of the German communists themselves and of the, fallible for once, Comintern. Such German communists like Brandler, the current "leader" Heckert, and Bottcher entered the social democratic government of Zeigner in Saxony instead of arming themselves and fighting against the Reichswehr [German army] in the name of revolution. They took an oath of allegiance to the Weimar constitution, cancelled the general strike, and left to its fate or rather to the Schupo [Schutzpolizei -- uniformed German police] the Hamburg vanguard which was fighting on the barricades. (A picture of this fighting by communists during the Hamburg insurrection is given by Colonel Stefan Rowecki in his interesting work entitled Walki uliczne [Street Fighting]).

It is difficult at this place to conduct an accurate analysis of reasons for the German communist defeat of 1923. Later on the Comintern attributed it to a false application of united front tactics with the highest echelons of social democracy as well as to betrayal by the latter, although it should be noted that the latter was not at all proceeding toward revolution. There is no doubt but that the main reason for the defeat, in reality without any struggle since Hamburg was an exception, lay in the aversion of the German proletariat toward bolshevik experiments which did not completely correspond to its nature. An above average role was also played here by the element of nationalism and the respect for the state by the German worker. Even the communist worker understood that the

communist revolution at the time when the Ruhr Basin was being occupied by France would have meant a division of Germany and thus represented a betrayal of national interests. Finally the communists themselves had no confidence in their own combat readiness and mass support. Similar circumstances also influenced the failure of the Hitler coup d'etat in Munich.

It will not be irrelevant to add that the defeat of the German revolution also spelled out the defeat of many masterfully worked out philosophical theories of the German communist elite. To Lenin the fall of capitalism and the social revolution must be the result of conscious activity by the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e., its revolutionary party. On the other hand the Marxist historical materialism in Germany was based on the theory of fatalism according to which capitalism of its own accord, on the basis of its peculiar laws of development, was proceeding toward a catastrophe. The result would be a "Zusammenbruch" of the bourgeois system, eo ipso, leading to the proletarian revolution. Parenthetically speaking this concept is possible in theory and doubtlessly arose on the soil of western Europe. Essentially if the further existence of the current system were to appear practically impossible and if the elements governing today had no solution for the limitless crisis affecting humanity and caused by the fatalistic development of capitalism, there would remain as the only deliverance a change in this system with ingenuity but without sudden shocks. We can not present an exhaustive treatment of these theories or of their justification at this time, but it is worthwhile to emphasize that a certain fatalism in the approach to problems and politics in general which is contrary to the fighting spirit of Russian bolshevism evolves from this theory of the German communist elite. (An exhaustive development of these

theories is found in the work of the former KPP central committee member Dr. H. Grossman, who later became a professor at Frankfurt University, entitled *Zusammenbruchs Theorie* [Theory of Collapse]. This book consists of a collection of mystical speculations on the topic of capitalism's fall through its own development).

In other countries communists fared no better at this time. During the early summer of 1923, they assisted in the grand coalition of petit bourgeois and socialist parties of Bulgaria which overthrew the peasant class government of Stambulinski. However when they in turn attacked their "allies," the bourgeois government of Cankonea crushed them with a great amount of ruthlessness. Even at the end of 1924 the Comintern attempted to save its honor by fomenting a coup d'etat in little Estonia through the efforts of shock troops especially sent there from Russia, but this also ended in failure.

In Poland during this period the communists were unable to undertake any serious armed action. Great hopes were raised by the bloody events which took place on 6 November 1923 at Krakow, where as a result of the unfortunate policies conducted by the national democratic and peasant "Piast" government there took place a lamentable clash between the workers and the army with fatalities on both sides. However the KPRP did not play any part in this fighting, and there was no possibility of resuscitating the fire of revolution from this unfortunate Krakow revolt. A large amount of guilt for the Krakow disturbance should be attributed to the specific quasicommunism in Krakow which thrived on PPS soil and was grouped around the person of Dr. Drobner at that time (the so called Party of Independent Socialists in Poland, since 1924 known as the Independent Socialist Labor Party or NSPP which oscillated in the direction of the KPP but until 1938 belonged to the Second Socialist International). Similarly in the

great strikes of 1923 (general strike in Upper Silesia, postal employees, railroad workers) the KPRP did not manifest any substantial influence. It was not until December 1923 that Warski in Nowy Przegląd analyzed the events at Krakow as the "first instance in Poland of comradeship, the first attempt at an alliance by two classes." He considered the soldiers who permitted themselves to be disarmed as representatives of the peasant class (nota bene, these were mostly Ukrainians):

"It may be concluded from this that Poland, with the general strike and the armed uprising at Krakow, is entering into a new phase of revolutionary fighting which together with the struggle of German workers may develop relatively quickly into a victorious revolution of the proletariat in Central Europe." (Nowy Przegląd, December 1923 in article entitled "From Mass Strikes to Armed Uprising.")

Even at this time the communists led by Warski did not understand or else did not want to comprehend that the fighting in 1923 represented the last convulsions of the "heroic" adventurism by the Comintern.

The "shameful" part, in the words of the communists, played by the socialists, who neither in Germany nor in Poland supported the revolution, caused even Warski to change his tactics and to retreat from the position of the "united front."

In this same article Warski writes:

"The attempts at an interparty understanding, for the purpose of attaining a united front for the struggle of communists, PPS, and nonparty members, etc. -- this is the fundamental principle of the united front tactics in the transitional period."

"When the communist party will attain a majority in the working class, and this goal is also served by the united front as are all (sic!) tactics in general, then the unity in the front of two or more parties against the bourgeoisie may appear to be unnecessary and perhaps even harmful to the matter of revolution.

"The Comintern as well as its individual sections approached the tactics of a united front under the slogan: together with the leaders of social compromise if they desire, or without them and regardless of them and against them if they do not so desire." (Emphasis by the author.) (page 499 of the article).

And further on it is made entirely clear that:

"In Poland however approaching the PPS leaders with a demand for a united front against the bourgeoisie could even at the present time represent a useful instrument for agitation of a revolution. But on the basis of experiences in former struggles and with the change in the situation toward (!) a revolution, it appears that as class conflict sharpens the appeal to these leaders will become impossible and unnecessary as they are unmasked by their own rank and file as well as by the broad masses".

Leaving at one side the pious hope of Warski for a development of the situation in the direction of revolution, we have here a clear prophesy of a change in tactics and a swing in the rudder to the left which will be implemented by those who are to replace Warski in the party leadership.

The second among the leaders in the "3 W's" group, Walecki, was seized by a fit of madness and threatened the PPS in a manner typical of a deserter from that party.

"It is necessary to state today with more emphasis than ever before that the path toward the proletarian revolution leads over the corpses of the "socialist" leadership; there can be none and there will be no revolution until the current socialist parties have been excluded from the working class, until their paralyzing and lethal influence have been destroyed, until the great majority of the working class has rallied under the banner of a ruthless struggle, i.e., communism." (Nowy Przegląd, December 1923, page 458 in the article entitled "PPS and Its Opposition.")

The above cited quotations from articles by Warski and Walecki characterize this very interesting aspect of KPRP policy beginning with 1924 -- the wild hatred for socialism. It flows for the most part from two sources: in the first place come purely party-competitive considerations. PPS was the most significant competitor in the fight for influence among the workers' masses, although in Poland as well as in a number of other countries this had changed to the disadvantage of both socialists and communists. According to Lenin and Bukharin also the most dangerous enemy is always the one closest, the one which covers up the principal enemy. The principal enemy for the KPP was the Polish State and Polish society (the nation as a whole). The communists in general or at least their leadership element can not be counted in this whole, since they themselves reject such a proposition. The PPS even during periods of thoughtless opposition, not anti government so much as anti state (voting in the Sejm against the draft of army recruits, anti militaristic actions by the OMTUR [Organizacja Młodzieży Towarzystwa Uniwersytetów Robotniczych -- Youth Organization of the Society for Workers' Universities] with slogans about the defense of the USSR), belonged to this state and

national whole and wanted to belong there. The old guard PPS with its patriotism and tradition of independence struggle represents for the international and subversive communist movement a hard nut to crack. Let us add that the violent hatred on the part of many rank and file communists for PPS members is merely a cover for hatred toward an alien nation. At times even social antagonism manifests itself: the PPS is recruited from among more enlightened workers who are stabilized and connected by a multitude of bonds with the professional intelligentsia; the communists, apart from the Dabrowa Basin, always prey upon the large city rabble, the "lumpenproletariat", various half educated individuals from petit bourgeois Jewish families (today the main foundations of the KPP), and similar elements having no conception regarding the physical labor of the Polish worker and treating the real proletariat even with antagonism. (Party activists from the PPS certainly know a series of events at interparty conferences or professional workers' meetings with the KPP, when the latter was represented by Jewesses in the 15 to 20 age group. I could mention many such examples.) Because the socialists are fighting on the same territory as the communists, and essentially for related slogans, there arises this mad hatred of the communists against the socialists and this bitter wrangling which frequently evokes compassion.

At the end of 1923 Europe as well as Poland entered into a period of economic and political stability. This was simultaneously an era of tremendous rise in the influence of the social democrats upon governments. In January 1924 the government of MacDonald came into power in England and somewhat later in France also the government of the leftist coalition under Herriot which was supported by the socialists. Later still the socialists assumed authority in Sweden and in Denmark. This stabilization was also advantageous to the USSR,

because London and Paris receive Soviet envoys. However the Comintern attained nothing, since this was a phase of its rapid degeneration into a sect. At the same time the "hurrah" left wing moves to the fore of the Comintern.

During this period a tremendous blow was felt by the entire world of communism: on 25 January 1924 Vladimir Ilich Lenin died at the palace in Gorki near Moscow. The death of this greatest communist leader undoubtedly hastened the process of disintegration of the Comintern from the most authoritative factor in the USSR to the role of a subordinate governmental branch. The hands of many Comintern leaders headed by Kamenev (Rosenfeld) were stretched out for the mantle of the deceased, but it was attained finally by a man almost unknown within the circles of international communism, Rykov. This decadence on the part of the Comintern is closely connected with its radical centralization where the individual communist parties became merely sections of the center. The practice of internal denunciation also grew to unbelievable proportions.

An ideological crisis was begun in the KPRP at this time. Its forerunner was the discussion between Donski and Brand in Nowy Przegląd during November 1923, a debate which uncovered an advanced amount of internal friction. Donski who was active at the time in Germany together with the communist left wing of Thalman, Ruth Fischer, Maslow, Katz, etc. ruthlessly attacked not only KPRP tactics but also the Comintern. He called the maneuvers of a united front from above deceiving the masses, since he only recognized a united front from below. It is of interest to note that he agreed at the time with support for socialist governments and even entering them (!), since these originate on the basis of general elections by the masses. (Again we have a Talmudist, because social democracy

recognizes only one method of creating a government, the democratic method in accord with the binding constitution). Furthermore Donski indicated that the tactics applied by the Russian bolsheviks, possessing full authority, may be just and advantageous for them but pernicious for communists who are just fighting for power:

"If the bolsheviks thus recommend to their west European comrades the tactics of maneuvering, then this results from their own five year experience transferred mistakenly to the soil of parties not in possession of political power. These directives are seized upon very willingly by our own neo Mensheviks who exploit this 'maneuvering' as an escape from consistent revolutionary action" (emphasis of author). (page 425).

Donski applied the term neo-Mensheviks to Brandler and Thalmann in Germany as well as to Warski and Kostrzewa in Poland. Understanding that maneuvers might provide certain immediate advantages, Donski very judiciously cautioned the KPRP:

"The tactics of maneuvering will at times broaden the influence of the party, but it does make the latter less realistic; in case of a switch to a revolutionary path, the party may suddenly find itself abandoned by the masses which it had not prepared for the revolutionary struggle." (page 432).

Essentially the example of the German communists applies here. Due to maneuvering they had been able to attract six million votes at parliamentary elections, but when any hotter events developed up to the beginning of 1933 they found themselves deserted by the masses. This supports to a large extent the apprehensions of Donski. With regard to the Comintern, Donski permits himself a considerable degree of independence:

"Under the influence of these tactics (united front) the Communist International begins to transform into a reformist group." (page 432).

And he places the matter in sharp focus:

"Either a demagoguery for unity or else revolutionary agitation." (page 428).

E. Brand very caustically took issue with Dowski in the course of this polemic. At first the former cautioned that one should not forget the power of the socialists:

"In Europe ... especially in Germany, we must be prepared that at the time of a general revolutionization among the masses ... social democracy will not have been broken up at all nor relieved of its influence and that during the first phase of the dictatorship there will exist a coalition socialist and communist government." (page 441).

This reply by Brand, who was at the time secretary of the KPRP central committee, was significant inasmuch as it expressed the so called "theory of two stages" on the basis of which subsequently there were to take place Homeric struggles within the ranks of the communist party.

Apart from this Brand repeated the well known arguments in support of the united front tactics in the spirit of the Comintern leaders.

In March 1924 the KPRP central committee convened in its entire composition (so called plenum) in order to discuss the situation arising after the 1923 defeat, the struggle with the left wing

opposition, and preparation for the fifth congress of the Communist International which was to spell the end for that particular central committee. The plenum was characterized by a "hurrah" leftism and considered as most dangerous for the KPRP "rightist opportunism," the loss of revolutionary vigilance, and adaptation to legal activity which under the prevailing political conditions in Poland meant the death of communism. This compilation of phraseology was to provide a cover for the central committee against the coming blow. We read in the resolution of the plenum:

"The source of these dangers (opportunistic) is above all the slowing down of the revolution's tempo. Difficulties arise for the communist party when from day to day the perspective of seizing power is being postponed, when the stormy waves of mass revolutionary struggles subside, when in the life and practice of the party -- aiming at the attainment of a majority among the masses and not wanting to lose contact with them -- there begins daily friction concerning minor and partial demands. There appears the threat that the slogans of revolution and dictatorship by communism will stand in an ever more distant relationship to daily reality."

Furthermore the central committee sadly continues:

"After the battles in the fall, the bourgeoisie in Germany as well as in Poland became politically strengthened ... In both of these countries, which together with the Union of Republics are decisive with regard to the social revolution in Europe, the bourgeoisie also increased its power economically since it was able to take certain steps in the direction of improving finances and stabilizing the currency.

"August and October in Germany, November in Poland have proven that our parties were not yet prepared to direct the great battles, that especially the idea of armed conflict as the only means for overthrowing the bourgeoisie had not yet been impressed upon the masses by the party. The need to prepare for the latter had not penetrated into the party ranks." (Brochure entitled Plenarne posiedzenie KC KPRP [Plenary Meeting of the KPRP Central Committee], March 1924, pages 4-5).

These lamentations appear odd and unhappy after the blustering prophecies by the party council in 1919 concerning the "impossibility of implementing the economic and political program by the Polish bourgeoisie ..."

Later on the self criticizing plenum emphasized the lack of skill in maneuvering, the unattainable illustration of which is of course the bolsheviks. It drew attention to the mistakes in the application of the united front "at any price," even at the cost of its own ideological appearance. The plenum also repeated the phraseology of the left wing that it was not necessary to write letters but that the masses should have been mobilized, etc. Basing itself on the resolutions of the second congress, the plenum permits for a discussion within the framework of the party on the following topic: how should these resolutions be implemented. Simultaneously the central committee already at that time realized that these resolutions would not last the test of life.

Right after the German debacle the "opposition 4" set up abroad published some theses strongly attacking the central committee. These four included Domski, Zofia Osinska (nee Unslicht, the sister of a GPU collegium member who later became chief of the USSR air force),

as well as Juljan Leszczynski (pseudonym "Lenski"), and an official from the Soviet commissariat for external affairs and foreign trade Danowski (Adamski). The latter two had been specially designated by the Comintern for the purpose of creating opposition within the KPRP. The central committee tried to fight these people. They were castigated in a special resolution as disorganizers, introducing confusion into the ranks of the KPRP and also accused of breaking party discipline by sending "in secret from the central committee an emissary into Poland for the establishment of a fraction which simultaneously without the knowledge of the directing party echelons spread its theses throughout the country and in the whole International." However upon orders of the Comintern, the German party from which Brandler had been thrown out aided the opposition 4. Also assistance was rendered by the French party which was dominated by the left wing after the expulsion of Souvarine (Liwszyc). The KPRP central committee removed the "4" from work "on any of the responsible levels of the KPRP" until the time its members submitted to party discipline and proved by action that they renounce their fractional work. However this resolution by the central committee remained only on paper, because only four months later that same "4" took over power from Warski in the party and relegated to the shadows the membership of the central committee. It then became the directing kernel in the new central committee. Of course as usual also in this case Moscow decided -- that is the characteristic attribute of KPRP "independence."

CHAPTER III

The turning or rather overturning moment for the KPRP was the fifth Comintern congress in the summer (July-August) of 1924. This was a time deemed very inopportune for such a respectable institution. Already in the spring of 1924 Zinoviev was forced to announce that the "revolutionary wave," which had been growing in 1923, had broken even more than the wave during 1918-1920 and that it was retreating violently. The economic stabilization of European states slowly had begun to take form. A certain degree of equilibrium was also taking place in the political life of the world. If the contemporary stabilization at that time were threatened by anything and this can also be applied today, it was not a communist revolution under any circumstances but rather a more revolutionary nationalistic movement manifesting itself in various countries under different forms. This was popularly called fascism by the communists. Apart from Italy which possesses the classical form of fascism, this movement was only beginning in other areas. The main goal of this movement was the conquest of the communist pestilence from Moscow in one's own country and the elimination of hypertrophy from postwar capitalism with the assistance of a strengthened state authority. The birth of this movement evoked a paroxysm of fear among the communists. Many of the more serious communist activists began to prophesy the end of communism at the time these nationalistic movements were arising in the states of western Europe. It was here therefore where it was originating that the communists attempted to strangle fascism at birth. On the other hand official Comintern circles were unable to draw conclusions from this danger that was threatening them. They continued to act inconsiderately toward the national interests of the proletariat,

blindly subordinating the latter to the interests of Russia. Then also the Comintern was of the opinion that fascism would liquidate itself by unflinching hatred toward the concepts of socialism and ultimately communism. In reality it appeared that all of these movements included from the very beginning side by side with "reactionary" elements also groups striving toward basic reforms in the socio-economic systems. Under certain conditions fascism assumed the characteristics of national socialism.

The most significant content in the deliberations of the fifth congress was represented by the attitude of the communists in the West toward the new configuration in Russia. During the first half of 1924 there took place a rapid collapse of the influence exerted by Trotsky who represented the movement of subordinating Russia's interests to those of the Comintern. We have already written about the adventurous and provocative politics of this movement in 1923. When the process of stabilization became obvious, Trotsky began supporting an understanding between the Comintern and the left wing splinters of social democracy which were dissatisfied with the fact that party authorities were commencing to establish purely "bourgeois" governments. Simultaneously within the territory of Russia a huge campaign in favor of Trotsky was developing. In this campaign however Trotsky was opposed by the new Soviet bureaucracy headed by Stalin with the backing of Kamenev and Radek.

The fifth Comintern congress in analyzing the European situation saw a victory for fascism in the short lived dictatorship of General Seekt in Germany. For the purpose of defining the political conditions in Europe a new terminology was established --

the era of democratic pacifism or in bolshevik phraseology the era of "democratic pacifist deceit." However this new phase disappeared from Comintern documentation within half a year. Evaluating the situation from the viewpoint of USSR interests, on the one hand the Comintern was afraid of victories at the polls by socialists and left wing petit bourgeois parties because these represented substantial competition for communism and on the other hand the governments which were being established as a result of these elections: the Labor Party in England, the leftist coalition in France, etc. aroused in Moscow justifiable hopes that with their support peaceful conditions with the USSR can be created. In this manner it would be possible to remove or at least postpone armed intervention against the proletarian state. The bolsheviks at this very time launched a sharp campaign throughout Europe to combat the alleged military preparations by the west European states against the USSR. The noise about an anti Soviet war provided the Soviets with the possibility of better being able to hold down the Russian people as well as the other oppressed nationalities. It also served the communist parties as a stimulus on behalf of USSR defense.

The growth in power of social democracy in western Europe provided the fifth Comintern congress with a pretext to establish an odd theory according to which the bourgeoisie had seized upon clever maneuvers and was tacking between social democracy and fascism, giving power first to the former and next to the latter in order to maintain its rule. Fascism and socialism were equated on the same level in the form of a "popular cover for dictatorship by the bourgeoisie." Apart from this the Comintern defined the social democrats as the "third party of the bourgeoisie"

(taken from conditions in England), although previously they had been considered a "rightist" workers' party.

Furthermore the Comintern did not exaggerate at all the perspectives for revolution. The economic report by the principal Comintern economist, the Hungarian Jew Varga, foresaw two possibilities: either the stabilization of capitalism or the collapse of the capitalist economy. A similar double prediction is to be found in the political report given by Zinoviev: either an accelerated development of the revolutionary elements or a restraint on them.

The political resolutions of the fifth congress attach considerable weight to the continually predicted changes in democratic and fascist governments, from which ultimately must arise a weakening of the capitalistic system in various states. From this the authors of the resolutions conclude for them an illusory result that "along this path will proceed an increase in the power of the proletarian revolution up to the point of final victory." (Nowy Przegląd, July 1924, page 600). The phase then in existence was designated as a "period between two waves of revolution." During that time the main front was in the struggle toward strengthening the communist movement internally; combatting opportunistic deviations inside the party, i.e., all manifestations of independence on the part of the latter; and externally the fight against social democracy, i.e., against all independent movements of European workers. The primary task evolved slowly into the slogan of combatting all attempts at a coup d'etat against the USSR.

The fifth congress radically changed the tactics of the united front. The new formulations for this constantly changing tactic were the following:

"The tactics of the united front have been and will remain the tactics of a strategic revolutionary maneuver by the communist vanguard, surrounded on all sides by enemies in its fight primarily against the treacherous leaders of counterrevolutionary social democracy; under no circumstances has this meant the tactics of an alliance with these leaders." (Ibid., page 603).

Further on there is this an even clearer formula:

"The tactics of the united front have been and will remain the tactics of a gradual attraction to our side of social democratic workers and the better part of the non party workers. Under no circumstances can it be the tactics of lowering our goals to the level of consciousness on the part of the latter." (Ibid., page 603).

Thus of these tactics only a phrase remained with which the tactics of a mad struggle are defined. The united front with the masses became a synonym for diversionary fighting, the penetration of communist agents into socialist organizations where they rally around themselves sympathizers of communism. Subsequent directives by the KPP in 1929-1930 order the sending into the PPS, etc., besides the mentioned diversionary agents also regular intelligence operatives who are to inform the KPP concerning the situation in different parties. Of course in such circumstances the communist parties and the socialists reached a stage very quickly where even personal relationships between individuals in these two camps became impossible. The fifth Comintern congress also excluded all understandings with social democracy of a platform nature by announcing that the communists considered a worker-peasant government as synonymous or as a pseudonym for the slogans of a proletarian dictatorship.

From the fifth congress also dates the heavy shift in the emphasis of Comintern efforts toward the Far East, mainly China and India. Previously since 1920 these had been active primarily in the Near East: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan; and manifesting extraordinary opportunism vis a vis the most fanatical splinters of Mohammedanism. In Arabia for instance the bolsheviks entered into an alliance with the wild sect of Wahabits which was fighting in the name of Islam all manifestations of European culture with the exception of military technology. The Comintern also supported the famous Abd-El-Krim in Morocco by supplying his troops with military equipment and expert leaders. One of the latter, the deputy commander in chief to Abd-El-Krim, was the Soviet general Jodlowaki -- a Pole from Warsaw. He later had the misfortune of falling into the hands of the Polish security police in Warsaw while fulfilling a "mission" there. Comintern agents were usually Russian Mohammedans and reached as far as the Sudan. This shift in the center of Comintern activities proceeded on a parallel with a similar switch in the policies of the Soviet government. The role of the Comintern as an agency of this Soviet government is especially conspicuous here.

The fifth congress devoted a special resolution to the nationality problem in Poland, in which we read among others:

"The congress... ascertains the need for unification slogans to cover the areas torn from Ukrainian territory by imperialism and their fusion into a worker-peasant Soviet republic; the slogans should be announced by the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania." (Rezolucje V Kongresu Miedzynarodowki Komunistycznej [Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International], Vol II, page 5).

And further on:

"The congress approves the slogan issued by the KPRP concerning union of the areas torn from Belorussia into a workers-peasant soviet republic of Belorussia. "... the KPRP should also release slogans on the rights of the Lithuanian population to self determination including secession from the Polish state." (Ibid., page 7).

At any rate the generosity of the Comintern at the expense of Poland was still limited at that time in favor of the Soviets. There was yet no mention of detaching Upper Silesia:

"The fifth congress calls to the special attention of the communist parties in Poland and Germany the necessity for uniting and also intensifying their work in Upper Silesia for the purpose of winning the entire Upper Silesian proletariat in both states. Both brotherly parties should conduct a united struggle against oppression of nationalities in all of its forms: in their agitation and propaganda they should take into consideration the language conditions among German and Polish workers." (Ibid. page 7).

Of tremendous significance were the organizational reforms introduced by the fifth congress. To the "21 Conditions" [See Note] required of all communist parties belonging to the Comintern, the congress added a twenty-second condition: the bolshevization of parties, i.e., the complete acceptance by them of the All-Union Communist Party statute with its radical centralism and the appointment of all authorities by higher echelons. The principle was also introduced that each party member must have a designated assignment. Such work takes up so much time for certain communists that of necessity a large percentage of them must be supported

by the party. This system, it should be noted, provides the communist party with plenary authority over its individual members. The latter receive in return the honor of becoming small wheels in a large machine which is to rebuild the world. To attain this honor, on the other hand, the party activists must pay the price of complete subordination to the machine even in their private life.

((Note] The second Comintern congress meeting in July 1922 at Petrograd passes a resolution including the "21 Conditions" which were obligatory upon each party joining the Communist International. These conditions signify a complete subordination to the dictatorship of Moscow. This dictatorship even comprises personnel matters also. The Twentieth point in the "Conditions" requires communist parties to transfer two-thirds of the directing positions to comrades who had been communists already prior to the second Comintern congress. The fourteenth point links the matter of communism closely to the state interests of Russia, ordering support for the Soviet republics which at that time bore the name "Russian Socialist Federated Republic of Soviets" (it was not until 1923 that the name changed to "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"), boycotting of ammunition transports for enemies (this was during the period of war with Poland). The fourth point orders subversive propaganda in the army. A total of nine points (1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 21) orders the communist parties to assume the most ruthless attitude toward the social compromisers. Special emphasis is also placed upon the destruction of "reformist" trade unions. These conditions were met with strong disapproval. Part of the German Communists

headed by Levy immediately broke with the Comintern. They were followed by part of the Italians (Serrati) and French (Frossard). These conditions also decided the "right wing" of the Bund (Ehrlich and Alter) to sever connections with the Comintern. It was only in the KPRP that not a single voice in protest could be heard).

Not entering upon a detailed analysis of the individual canons which had been achieved by the ideas of the men who created this new religion, we can establish one thing: namely that the communists aim at the indoctrination of a "knight" for the new religion, somehow outside the framework of the world which has spawned him and in which he lives. This represents the essential characteristic of contemporary communism in the area of indoctrinating mankind. Today's communist thus loathes not merely the "bourgeois" system, not the exploitation of the workers but simply the entire current "bourgeois" world, its culture, its science, its literature, and even the forms of its daily life not to mention such attributes like religion, morality, etc. In practice however the communist sectarians lead a kind of life which the average "bourgeois" would be ashamed of, i.e., they conduct various unethical business deals and simultaneously propound fantastic theories about a revolutionary ascetism. Railing against those who live like the "bourgeois" on the one hand, they themselves draw as much as they can from the party treasury on the other. Cases of financial embezzlement are known. It is also well known that communists have arranged themselves very comfortably with party funds. Some of them have built villas, and still others thanks to manipulations with party cash have transformed themselves into real bourgeois. At this point, I could enumerate several treasurers of the KPP central committee who did so.

The aforementioned organizational reforms resolved by the fifth congress, especially the one concerning bolshevization as well as centralization, were met with a none too warm reception by the western communists. The communist parties of Sweden, Norway, and part of the English communists left the Comintern entirely. On the other hand in Poland bolshevization was connected with a palace coup d'etat when the whole leadership of the communist party was removed and replaced by others. The congress itself also had been appropriately prepared for its role. Several Polish communists, who were antagonistically disposed toward the right wing KPRP leadership, entered into the composition of the Russian delegation. These were among others Unslicht, Dzierzynski, and Dolecki. One of the members of the French delegation was Lenski as well as another "Pole" and former member of the SDKPiL, a Jew from Czestochowa under the pseudonym of "Duret." The German delegation was accompanied by Gustaw Reicher, a Jew from Lodz known under the cover name of "Rwal;" Domaki; and Osinska (nee Unslicht), who belonged to the left wing "4." A Pole also found himself in the Czechoslovak delegation. He was the anti-right winger, deputy to the Sejm at Prague, Karol Sliwka, one of the most servile communist party bureaucrats from the point of view of Moscow. This was true even though the Czechoslovak communist party in general manifested a certain degree of autonomy. (This party also was cleansed by the fifth congress which removed its leadership and appointed a new one comprising mostly refugees from Hungary. This new leadership brought about a terrible disgrace: it squandered party funds, got its members drunk, and finally a section of the party headed by Bubnik fled to the social democrats). Finally the 3 largest delegations, the Russian, German, and French, were insistent in advance upon removal of the KPRP leaders although the Russian delegation would have been sufficient.

The KPRP delegation itself was quite numerous with 10 coming from inside of Poland, 4 representing the Politburo abroad, and in addition 4 from the Union of Communist Youth. This last group had arrived in Moscow to participate in the congress of the Communist Youth International, the so-called KIM (Komunisticheski Internatsional Molodezhy). Under pressure of public opinion at the congress that delegation, initially uniform, was broken up into a group from inside of Poland led by Krajewski (real name Wladyslaw Stein; brother of Dowski and son in law of Warski, also known under the pseudonyms "Wierny" and "Bronislaw") and Skulski (Stanislaw Martens), former political commissar of the Bashkir division in the Red Army; as well as the foreign section, i.e., the "3 W's" and Prochniak. The group from inside of Poland arrived at a common line with the left wing 4 of Lenski and Dowski which had organized itself against the leadership.

At the very beginning of the congress the main rapporteur, Zinoviev who was at the time chairman of the Comintern, launched an attack upon the KPRP central committee for its hypocritical attitude toward the executive committee of the Communist International on the so called Russian and German questions. This hypocrisy was allegedly based upon secret support for the Trotsky opposition in Russia and the dismissed Brandler leadership in Germany. After levelling this criticism Zinoviev demanded a correction of certain erroneous moves by the KPRP central committee, stating that "it is necessary to correct the mistakes made by the highest echelons in the Polish central committee" (brochure entitled Sprawa polska na V Kongresie Kominternu [The Polish Question at the Fifth Comintern Congress], page 9). This mildness on the part of Zinoviev however exasperated the "French" delegate Lenski who said:

"Comrade Zinoviev is mistaken when he thinks that it is sufficient to somewhat (ein wenig) repair the errors by the leaders of the Polish communist party. They must be radically extirpated; it is necessary to create within the party a healthy bolshevik core and a revolutionary leadership." (Ibid., pages 12-13).

Apart from this Lenski cited several examples of opportunism like the motion by deputy Krolikowski in the Sejm for a shortening of military service to six months, which according to the communists meant recognition of the Polish army. He also provided this very interesting illustration:

"In the name of maintaining organizational unity with bourgeois free thinkers, representatives of left wing workers ('our comrades') who had a majority at the congress of free thinkers (i.e., Polish atheists -- author's comment), permitted the former to maintain control over the entire apparatus for stupefying the workers." (Ibid., page 11).

A considerable part of these "bourgeois" thinkers (J. Landau, David Jablonski, Wronski-Jaskiewicz, the prominent PPS member Kreslawski-Cynarski) did not differ on this point in their loud and aggressive atheism. Despite this fact their program was considered to be an "apparatus for stupefying the workers," [See Note] and in disregard of their will to cooperate with the communists. Their entire activity has gone and still proceeds to the advantage of the latter.

[(Note) In April 1925 the communists led by Jan Hempel assumed control over the Society of Free Thinkers and in this connection removed all of the more important individuals like the

expert linguist Professor Baudouin de Courteney, Romuald Minkiewicz, Lubelski, et al. This society was dissolved in 1928 by Polish authorities. The PPS members, who had been previously removed by the communists, soon thereafter established a Polish Union of Free Thought which always praised everything in the Soviet Union. Despite this fact, the KPP always combatted this group and even incited minor splits within it several times.)

Among the Polish delegates who strongly supported Lenski's thesis were "Rwal," and especially the ZMK [Związek Młodzieży Komunistycznej -- Union of Communist Youth] delegate "Goraki" (Konstanty Graesser, pseudonym "Alek," a student from Lodz) who broke all records in his groveling vis a vis the Comintern. Krajewski and "Grzegorzewski" (real name Franciszek Grzelaszczak who also used the pseudonym "Marcin") comprised a type of center. They attacked the "3 W's" but did not decide upon clear support for the left wing "4." The KPRP leadership remained as quiet as mice. Not one of them spoke up at the plenum. They preferred to be silent. Finally the congress passed a special paragraph in the political resolution, approving the resolutions made by the second KPRP congress but with the following notation:

"However in its practical work, especially during the period of mass struggle in October, the party leaders did not manifest true revolutionary activeness. On the Russian and German problems the Polish central committee supported the right wing and attempted to strangle any criticism emanating from the left within its own ranks." (Ibid., page 15).

Such a statement possessed the power of a judgment upon the political activity of the central committee. However this

was not the end of the matter. The congress established a special "Polish Commission" under the chairmanship of Stalin himself. It should be mentioned that this was the first step by the latter into Comintern territory, since up to that time he had stayed inside of the Russian communist party, leaving Comintern activities to those bolsheviks who were more acquainted with foreign countries about which Stalin was completely ignorant. The composition of the Commission, apart from Stalin, included: Molotov as the deputy chairman (currently premier of the Soviet government); then the ministers of police Dzierzynski and Unslicht; a representative of the military commissariat Podvoisky; the economist Milyutin; and finally the later secretary of the Comintern, the Lithuanian Jew Pyatnitsky; and the former Ukrainian official and lawyer Manuilsky (today secretary general of the Comintern). Representatives of various other nationalities were also invited: from the Soviet Ukraine -- Skrypnik (subsequently commissar for education who committed suicide in 1933) and Shumsky, who is in a Soviet prison today for Ukrainian nationalism. The secretary of the commission was the Lithuanianized Pole, Mickiewicz-Kapsukas (sic!). Germany was represented by the following: Thalmann, currently held in prison by Hitler; the hysterical jewess from Vienna, Ruth Fischer, later removed from the German communist leadership; as well as the already mentioned Gustaw Reicher. From the other parties, two persons each entered this commission: from Czechoslovakia among others the deputy Slivka; and one representative each from the communist parties of England, Italy, America, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. These were minor figures included within the commission only for the purpose of camouflaging its Russian character.

The deliberations of the commission, discussing KPRP affairs, lasted all of three days. Their course was so interesting that it deserves a more extensive summary. Lenski stepped forward as the principal accuser from the left wing "4" by denouncing Warski as an enemy of bolshevism. He cited examples among others to the effect that together with Walecki in 1918 Warski "drove a knife into the back of the struggling proletariat," because they had opposed the murder of hostages held by the Russian secret police (the latter of course is much more noble, because it was based upon firing a bullet into the rear of a head rather than driving a knife into the back.); that Kostrzewa was active against the "red terror" as a system (the same position was taken by Rosa Luxemburg and a number of French communists. The servile attitude of the KPRP toward Russian secret police terror was unique. It is also worth remembering that apart from Latvians this terror was directed by former members of the SDKPiL: Dzierzynski, Unszlicht, Mozynski, Bulinski); that they were reformists; and that they overestimated the importance of bourgeois democracy.

We discover from the words of Lenski what the true nature of the attack against the central committee represented:

"The most important reason however for our speech against the policies of the rightist leaders are the Russian and German problems." (Page 18 in the brochure entitled Sprawa polska, etc. [The Polish Question, etc.].

Accompanied by a sly smile of approval from the "wonderful" Georgian, Stalin, Lenski called out with emphasis:

"The KPRP must cease being a barrier between the Leninism of Russia and the West." (Ibid., page 19).

Of course Stalin must have recognized and been satisfied with this paraphrasing by the party of the diplomatic formula taken from the position of the commissariat for foreign affairs, which was advertised at Warsaw in 1923 by Mr. Wigdor Kopp.

In order that the reader may become acquainted with the terrible mistakes committed by the old KPRP leadership with regard to the Russian and German problems, I would like to cite several longer quotations from some of the documents. In December 1923 the Politburo of the central committee of the KPRP was bold enough to write the following statement to the Politburo of the Russian communist party's central committee, i.e., to Stalin:

"The central point of the current crisis within the Russian communist party are the differences in approach between the majority of the Russian communist party and Comrade Trotsky. We recognize that these differences are linked with the complicated problems of constructing socialism and we do not have the possibility of judging these differences in the field of economic policy. One thing is certain however: the name of Comrade Trotsky is connected unbreakably with the victorious October revolution, with the Red Army, with communism and with world revolution not only for our party but for the entire International and for the whole revolutionary proletariat of the entire world.

"We will not permit of the possibility that Comrade Trotsky could find himself outside of the leadership within the Russian communist party and the International. However we are disquieted by the thought that these quarrels may proceed beyond the limits of the concrete problems under dispute, and certain public statements by responsible party leaders provide us with cause for the worst fears." (Ibid., page 19).

In January of 1924 the Polish members of the Comintern executive handed in a declaration through Kostrzewa pertaining to the problem of the crisis in the communist party of Germany, in which we read:

"There is no doubt but that the so-called right wing, the errors and negligence of which have been submitted to such extensive and in part justified criticism, represents the oldest and the most experienced and tested core of the party. For a long time now the left wing has been demagogically and anarchistically baiting this leadership of the party's old guard in a manner sharply contrary to the spirit of bolshevism.

"Under such circumstances we consider the accusation of opportunism against Radek, one of the most worthy among the leaders of the Communist International, not only as unjustified but also as harmful in the highest degree to the authority of all leaders within the Communist International." (Ibid., page 19).

These are the most characteristic fragments from documents on the basis of which the KPRP leadership was forced to join the "stupid ones." The KPRP leaders, although they had been accused by Zinoviev of pursuing "diplomacy," appeared to be poor diplomats who were not aware of the fact that the days of Trotsky had already been counted and that the Comintern had been captured by Stalin's clique to the extent that the smallest criticism of his moves resulted in at least an expulsion from office. Somewhat later such a "heresy" ended up in the GPU. It must be mentioned here that Radek's opportunism was clearly brought out by the second congress of the Russian communist party, which however was apparently not noticed by the KPRP central committee.

The majority of the Polish delegation was represented at the commission by the already mentioned Bashkir official Skulski who explained that his group always had held reservations with regard to the policies of the "3 W's" (Warski, Wera, Walecki) but that it was afraid to oppose them because the KPRP lacked leaders.

"And it was necessary to bring out the Russian discussion and the German problem in order to see that we can not go along together any longer." (Ibid., page 19).

Skulski similarly to Lenski denounced Kostrzewa, that in a secret session of the Polish delegation she had stated:

"The attitude of the Russian Politburo toward Trotsky, as well as the position of the Comintern in the German question, these are tremendous historical errors and catastrophes." (Ibid., page 20).

On the other hand Skulski opposed the proposal by Lenski that the "3 W's" be removed from party leadership. It is sufficient, he stated, to support the central committee majority with the "political authority of the Comintern" as well as the opening of a discussion in the party.

Within the framework of these accusations, Warski's defense was lamentable. His speech was not distinguished by any courage. Much more courage was shown during the discussion, as we shall see, by the woman Kostrzewa. The mentioned letter in December from the Politburo was explained by Warski as follows:

"We were directed exclusively by the fear that an excessive sharpening of the discussion within the Russian party could lead

to the establishment of groups and fractions fighting one another, i.e., to a relaxation of the united leadership directing the Russian and the world revolutions. In this fear there was nothing of opportunism; it is worthy of a revolutionary." (Ibid., page 21).

In his naivete Warski cited the resolution passed by the central committee of the Russian communist party also in December 1923 which states that "it can not imagine the highest leadership echelons within the party and state without Trotsky," thinking that this resolution would help him. Finally however he conceded his error which allegedly existed in the fact that he had not come out clearly against Trotsky.

In sequence Warski then took up denunciations. He accused Domski and Lenski of antibolshevism, citing their attitudes in the nationality and agrarian questions. He accused Lenski of harboring a tendency toward staffing the directorial positions in the party with members who had belonged to the SDKPiL "regardless of whether they had anything in their heads or whether the latter were empty" (page 22). In order to support his claims, that not only he was guilty, Warski cited the following spicy story:

"Or take a man currently on this commission, Comrade Piotrowaki, who by coincidence met with another man also present here -- Comrade Krajewski. The former not doubting of course his own "bolshevism" began enlightening others about the tactics of the united front, that they composed a humbug thought up especially for the policies of Chicherin prior to the Geneva conference." (Ibid., page 23).

It should be mentioned that the above Piotrowski was not just a nonentity. At one time he had held membership on the KPRP central committee and was a left winger. During the time of the deliberations at the fifth congress, he occupied the post of secretary to Chicherin who was people's commissar of foreign affairs in the USSR. Due to this position therefore he could have known more concerning the secret tactics of bolshevism than did many other prominent non-Russian communists. He was not aware, the poor man, that Krajewski being the son-in-law of Warski would go to his father-in-law and, regardless of political differences, tell the latter this diplomatic secret. This event allegedly became the reason for Piotrowski's dismissal from his work as secretary in the commissariat of foreign affairs. Later however he became Soviet envoy to Estonia, Persia, and finally Austria. To us who are not acquainted with all of the secret affairs, this reciprocal denunciation of Polish communists before their Russian masters is quite interesting.

The next to speak was Kostrzewa whose voice was the strongest and most courageous of all. She called attention to the fact that the basis for the conflict were the agitations by the clique of former SDKPiL-ists who wanted a split and desired to seize power in the KPRP. She defended herself against the accusation that she had supported Trotsky by citing as proof a letter of the KPRP central committee's Politburo dated in January 1924 in which we read as follows:

"Trotsky, although he may not even notice it, can play the role of a leader for classes alien to us and for tendencies hostile to us. The danger becomes greater due to the fact that Trotsky is

the only man in Russia today who can become the subject of "idolization" by the masses. (Of course, such a statement would not appeal to Stalin -- author's comment). Together with Lenin's death, perhaps there is the need to find such a man. This results from the Russian tradition and the spirit of the epoch (not foolish at all -- author's comment). The eyes of the masses will be focused upon Trotsky. In the party however he can not be what Lenin was and hence the conflict. But these dangers will not be removed through a permanent struggle against Trotsky." (Ibid., page 29).

Further on Kostrzewa defended the dismissed German leadership under Brandlor, stating with extraordinary courage in view of the circumstances that "they committed mistakes together with the entire Comintern leadership" (page 30). She also complained regarding the unusual attacks by the left wing against the rightists and cautioned, "steps taken in such an atmosphere may represent clearly a crime against our party."

The strongest points however were made in her second speech which she gave in reply to Stalin. With a tragically dramatic look on her face, this truly exceptional KPP activist and a woman at that, stated, "Because of our enunciation and critical evaluation of certain decisions taken by the executive, Comrade Zinoviev told us a long time ago we will crush your bones if you try to speak out against us! Yes, Comrades, you may do so easily! You know this well that the fight against you under given conditions is impossible. If you were to place the matters at issue upon the sharp edge of a knife, if you were to tell the workers in Poland that they should choose us or you, then what do you think? What would we do at such a time? We would have nothing else to do but tell them that they should proceed with... (?) you!" (Ibid., page 60).

The servility of the "Polish" communists toward Moscow could go no further. Subsequently Kostrzewa stated.

"Therefore if you, because of the difference in opinion revealed here, will take an attitude of war toward us -- there can be no question of either a struggle or of defeat or victory. Such is your special prerogative and the resulting special responsibility which burdens you.

"The tremendous authority which the Russian comrades exercise represents a strong advantage for us all. But it would be dangerous if it were conceived of erroneously, if it were to kill all independence in thought." (Ibid., page 61).

At the end of her speech, she added

"The most fatal manifestation however is that under the influence of external pressure there has arisen in our delegation a panic to such an extent, comrades, where our members have lost their equilibrium and that they have lost their patriotism and feeling of honor with regard to the party, without which a party member is not worth even a cent." (Ibid., pages 61-62).

It is not surprising therefore that after such a portion of bitter words addressed to the Russian bolsheviks and members of the Polish delegation, the fate of Kostrzewa and her colleagues was prejudged and their party careers finished.

Walecki also attempted to follow the tone set by Kostrzewa, but this party warhorse was lacking in character. He threw a few sarcastic remarks in the direction of the majority in the Polish delegation as follows,

"You, comrades, are admitting of sins which you have never even committed." (Ibid., page 40).

Or else Walecki knew how to castigate the majority of the delegation, accusing it of having lost its head, that it underwent a panic, that it had become the victim of congress' cretinism, etc.

The speech by Stalin was also quite interesting. The author of the brochure entitled Sprawa polska na V Kongresie Kominternu [The Polish Question at the Fifth Comintern Congress] comments on this speech as follows,

"The culmination point for the commission was Stalin's speech. Clearly, distinctly, lucidly he formulated the essence of the conflict between the leaders of the Polish right wing and the International, portraying the political bankruptcy of the party leadership, indicating the path to be taken by a truly bolshevist party for the party itself as well as for the leadership. Stalin's speech was a nail driven into the casket of the right wing theoreticians who, to everybody's surprise, participated in applauding the speaker." (Ibid., page 6).

In reality this was a brutal display not without a certain amount of simple diplomacy. In his speech Stalin treated his listeners roughly, sharply rebuking them and teaching,

"The Russian problem is of decisive significance for the entire revolutionary movement in the West as well as in the East. Why? Because Soviet authority in Russia is the foundation, the mainstay, and the refuge (?) for the revolutionary movement of the whole world.

"A weakening of Soviet authority means the weakening of the revolutionary movement in the entire world." (Ibid., pages 53-54).

Thus the secretary general of the All-Union Communist Party openly admitted the union between Soviet authority and the Comintern (revolutionary movement). We should add to Stalin's speech that he was right on the point where he stated that Soviet authority in Russia represents a refuge for the revolutionary movement, not so much for the movement as for its "heroes" fleeing to the USSR from their responsibility vis a vis the penal code of other states.

Subsequently also Stalin accused the KPRP central committee that it had provided support to the opportunistic wing of the Russian communist party, i.e., to Trotsky. In the German matter, Stalin stated,

"After the Russian problem, it has the most importance. In the first place because among all of the countries in Europe, the Germans are the closest to revolution; and in the second place because a victory for revolution in Germany would mean its victory in all of Europe. Germany will mark the beginning of the revolutionary shock in Europe. Only the Germans can assume the initiative in the matter, and the victory of revolution in Germany is a total guarantee for victory of the international revolution." (Ibid., page 54).

These prophecies by Stalin appeared completely false later on, but during the time they were spoken, they really represented a "nail driven into the casket of the right wing theoreticians," who nota bene were unable to foresee any better the development of events in Germany and supported Brandler's group which was destined to bungle this hoped for German revolution.

In the further course of his speech, Stalin appeared as the adherent of the strong arm method which he himself had tried

out so well in his own party work. He sneered at the "soft" methods of fighting against the opposition and taught Kostrzowa that "history does not know of any struggle which would not cost some victims." He ridiculed the KPRP central committee, saying,

"This is not a party leadership but rather a mockery of any leadership." (Ibid., page 56).

In the conclusions which Stalin made, he came out against a division of party members into former SDKPIL adherents and former PPS left wingers, because in his opinion such a distinction could lead the party to ruin. In the first place, according to Stalin, it is necessary to achieve a "complete victory over the opportunistic wing," in the second place, he places himself in a position against cutting off the "head of the central committee" on the spot but hypocritically, like the half baked orthodox priest that he was, Stalin added,

"In general one must take into consideration that a surgical operation undertaken without great need leaves a bad taste in the party." (Ibid., page 57).

When saying the foregoing, Stalin already had in his pocket a suggestion for "removal of the top" in the KPRP. However he passed a true test in slyness and hypocrisy. He had decided to eliminate Waraki, although not burying him altogether. Stalin had noticed at the fifth congress that Waraki could come in handy in the future. If the latter were to be eliminated, this would not represent a life time gift to the "leftist 4". Anticipating various kinds of reservations with regard to the new leadership, Stalin said,

"Doubts have been brought up here in connection with the theoretical knowledge and party experience of the new leaders... I believe that these circumstances should not be decisive... It is quite possible that at first matters will not run smoothly for the new leaders, but this involves no misfortune. They will stumble once and a second time, but then they will learn how to direct the revolutionary movement. Never do prepared leaders fall from heaven."

Stalin did not add that it is better for Moscow to have even such leaders in the KPRP who possess doubtful knowledge and experience, because then they are more dependent upon the Kremlin oligarchy and are subordinate to the latter. We should mention that the triumphant left wing was not completely 100% comprised of elements Moscow could rely upon. Apart from one of its most servile adherents, Lenski, there was also Domski-Stein. This man had an independent mind with considerable ambition and the skill to influence the party intellectuals, regardless of the chimeric and absurd doctrinaire approach. We have already noted his "unacceptable" behavior during the Soviet offensive of 1920. Therefore when handing the KPRP to Domski, Stalin retained the "S W's" in Moscow from where they could always be held in readiness to return to their old importance.

In his last words at the commission meetings, Lenski spoke out for a rapid change in KPRP leadership and justified his demand by mentioning the danger of party demoralization which could arise as a result of lengthy discussions and the danger of relaxing the conditions of conspiracy required by the KPRP in the course of its illegal activities.

As a result of the deliberations by the commission, the Russian delegation submitted a resolution which sharply condemned the activities of the KPRP central committee. The following charges are found in this resolution: (1) that the central committee leadership was revolutionary only in words and that the policies of the "3 W's" deprived the party of any combat capability, (2) that the "3 W's" led the party into error and represented the tool of rightist elements in the Comintern, especially in the Russian communist party as well as the communist party of Germany, and (3) that a catastrophic situation had developed in the party.

Taking the Russian suggestions under consideration, the commission voted to: (1) send a letter to the KPRP; (2) call a special party conference, (3) to eliminate the right wing leaders Waraki, Kostrzewa, Walecki, and Prochniak from the Politburo abroad and, together with Brand, retain them in Moscow, (4) transfer the entire leadership to Poland and have it evolve from among the majority on the delegation and the members of the left wing 4, (5) rescind the decisions taken at the March central committee plenum against the "4."

This resolution was later approved by the executive committee of the Communist International. It is interesting to note that the following Polish delegates spoke against the removal of the right wing leaders: Stefanski (real name Danieluk, Aleksander, a cooperative worker from the Dabrowa Basin, member of the KPP central committee as well as the secretariat of the central committee in the communist party of Western Belorussia, pseudonyms "Olek" and "Edmund") and Kazimierz Cichocki (together with his wife who was a prominent Ukrainian communist, Olga nee Jachimowicz first

married to Grosser, and also Krolikowski -- were the principal heroes in the large communist trial which took place in 1923 at the district court at Lwow because a communist meeting was discovered inside the St. Jur cathedral), pseudonyms "Teofil," "Hrabia," and "Stanislaw" who was also a member of the central committee and a former chairman in the Soviet governments of Lithuania and Belorussia. The reservations of these two activists were not taken into any consideration, and they did not help the right wing leaders at all.

The subsequently released open letter by the Comintern was announced in August 1924, and it also condemns sharply the "3 W's." We read in this letter, "the group... was able to give the party only bolshevik slogans in its program but was unable, as was later discovered, and did not want to bring up the party in a bolshevik spirit of revolutionary tactics."

Next the Comintern drops the largest bomb among the right wing leaders,

"That was not enough: the group of Warski, Kostrzewa, and Walecki transferred its anti bolshevik tendencies to the soil of the Union of Socialist Republics and was tempted to strike a blow from behind at the bolshevik central committee during the difficult time when Lenin had just died as well as [to support] the opportunistic attempts by the Russian opposition to weaken the foundations of the Russian communist party."

We can see that the Comintern treated the KPRP openly as subordinate to the USSR, having duties of citizenship vis a vis the latter. The sin of the "3 W's" was based upon the fact that they had transgressed the principles of citizenship loyalty with regard to their government.

Further in its letter the Comintern called for a violent revolution, stating,

"The party... should prepare it (working class) from the organizational and technical aspects of an armed struggle toward the dictatorship of the proletariat." (page 75 of this same brochure).

The documents cited by the author officially and authentically explain to the reader how far enmeshed are the interests of the USSR in the Comintern and how conscientiously the Comintern guards these interests. If there are ever any accusations that the USSR authorities are involved in the internal affairs of Poland or of any other state, the bolsheviks brazenly reply that they carry no responsibility for the Comintern because this is an institution completely independent of the USSR. On the other hand in the "Polish Commission" described above, a large group of policemen and diplomats as well as a staff officer from the USSR red army sat as members. These individuals played an above average part in the USSR government. Despite this fact the bolsheviks naively explain that these are truly Soviet citizens, but in their capacity as private individuals have complete freedom of belonging to any organizations they want to. Of course it is impossible to cover up the truth of the matter with such evasive denials.

After completion of the fifth congress of the Comintern, a new KPRP leadership was evolved. The central committee included Juljan Lezczynski (pseudonym "Lencki"), Domski and Osinska from the former "4"; Skulski, Krajewski, Leon Purman (a Jew from Wloclawek, formerly a member of PPS left wing who used "Brunon" and "Mann" as pseudonyms and a few months ago ended his life by suicide in Moscow

as a result of disillusionment with KPP methods) and Grzegorzewski. This whole leadership officiated in Warsaw. However before it was able to accomplish anything tangible, the mainstay of the central committee Juljan Leszczynski (thanks to "first rate" party conspiracy) fell into the hands of the police in the Dabrowa Basin when he was staying with a communist known to the police who was named Ostrzyglo. It was not until the fall of 1925 that Leszczynski, taking advantage of distracted attention by his guard, fled the Warsaw district court building. With the assistance of certain elements he was able to escape via Danzig to Russia.

The new leadership had as its aim the preparation of the third KPRP congress. The preparatory work for this congress lasted in general quite briefly. The ideological level of the preparations was quite low. District conferences and borough meetings limited their entire discussion to insulting the "3 W's," Trotsky, Radek, and Brandler as opportunist renegades. The new men of "providence" were praised as being bolsheviks without blemish. The Russian bolsheviks with Zinoviev and Stalin at their head were praised obviously the loudest and most warmly. Of the Polish leaders, Donski obtained the largest number of warm words. Of the Germans, Maslow and Ruth Fischer -- later ultra leftist renegades -- were praised the most. Considerable popularity among the foreign communists was exercised by the Italian communist Bordiga, who really was an exceptional person with a large amount of individuality but with a prominent anarchist-Blanquist slant which subsequently forced him to sever all ties with bolshevism. Donski wrote about Bordiga in the magazine Nowy Przegląd:

"The leader of the left wing in the Italian communist party - Bordiga - is doubtlessly one of the most prominent figures in the International." (page 680).

The older party members simply did not comprehend what was happening. Just the day before leaders who had been idolized now appeared to be renegades, whereas the antibolsheviks who had been denounced by the party as fractionists now represented the "bolshevik core.". However the fluctuation of communist party members has been so great that it has reached proportions unknown in any other party. Thus there are very few of these old members, and their voice means little. At any rate the change in leadership took place without the knowledge of the party masses. Even the leaders themselves admit this, about which Domski wrote triumphantly in Nowy Przegląd on page 718:

"The party has changed for the time being only in its directorial circles. In order to change it down to its foundations quite a bit of work will still be necessary. The change in the KPRP came from outside and came unexpectedly.

"The leaders of the Polish right wing came to the congress with their banner waving and still leading a disciplined delegation from inside of Poland, with the aureole of victors who have just trampled down the hydra of opposition. They left the congress in isolation, beaten and compromised, having lost everything not excluding their honor."

The new leaders under the slogan of "bolshevization" were able to destroy all democracy within the party. In general they were accepted quite benevolently by the party, but wherever they met with opposition the latter was broken ruthlessly. Under such circumstances there took place elections of delegates to the third congress. I shall cite one authentic example of these elections.

A young Jewess, the daughter of a wealthy businessman, who herself had not lived in Poland for five years but had stayed in the USSR and politically supported the left wingers, was sent to Poland during the electoral campaign with the designation of a delegate from the KPRP district committee of the Dabrowa Basin even though she had never been there in her life. This delegate went to the Basin, spoke there with two or three persons, took part in one meeting of the district committee, and as an "elected" delegate proceeded to the USSR and the third congress from which she never again returned to Poland. This is a glaring but not at all exceptional example of "electing" delegates to communist congresses, which in the words of the communists themselves gather the "flower of the Polish proletariat." The communists certainly insult the Polish worker by making such claims, because they identify the latter with various half baked Jews who usually sat at these congresses.

During the period from the spring of 1924 the masses of the less "important" party members did not have the time to take up these matters, since they were again occupied with a great antistate action which is worthy of notice because the initiative was completely that of the Soviets. The KPRP fulfilled in this regard merely the functions of an assistant.

At this time the Soviet envoy in Paris was Rakovsky who, due to his education, was able to develop extensive connections within a short period of time. With their aid he also launched a fabricated action against Poland under the name "Protest Against the White Terror in Poland," which was allegedly being perpetrated against the communists. About 100 persons from the political and scientific world of France, at times very prominent (the excellent

psychologist Charles Richet, the no less great writer Romain Rolland, another writer George Duhamel, further E. Herriot, Senator de Mouzie, etc.) individuals with nothing in common with bolshevism or even with socialism, protested against the extraordinary tortures in Polish prisons, etc. It is interesting to note that not one of the French socialists signed these peculiar documents. The latter being internationally active simply knew the Polish conditions better and were ashamed to sign a paper including so many lies. The role of the KPRP in this matter was brought down to the propagation of this document inside of Poland. Simultaneously the party began making noise on its own initiative regarding a certain Engel, a member of the Lodz organization of the Communist Youth Union, who was executed for killing a subordinate police official. This judgment really did evoke considerable public opinion, since it was the first instance of applying the death penalty for the murder of a government official. The Ukrainians and certain Jewish elements preyed upon this propaganda. Its connection with contemporary, at that time, Soviet policy becomes apparent. In 1923 Bulgarian communists were really being suppressed ruthlessly by the Balkan raison d'etat. Neither the Soviets nor the Comintern developed even in part the propaganda which was exerted a year later against Poland and at the same time against Rumania. It was simply necessary to incite public opinion in France against the states in Eastern Europe which represented part of the "French bloc."

In regard to the internal matters of the KPRP during that period of time, the political platform of the new central committee published in the August 1924 issue of Nowy Przegląd should be noted.

It includes 11 points, and a twelfth ordering a discussion in the party about the remaining ones. The platform does not take into consideration the social democratic concepts of Domski in the agrarian and nationality problems. To make this platform more concrete, the following tasks should be enumerated: (1) a united front only from below against the electoral blocs with the PPS or other parties; the worker-peasant government is only a synonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat; (2) attainment of a majority among the workers -- this goal is to be served by the fight for partial demands like combatting unemployment, extension of social security, control of factory committees over productivity (today the Comintern has decided that this slogan is opportunistic and fascistic); these actions were to be supported by street demonstrations with a combat character and by implanting among the workers the necessity for armed struggle; (3) strengthening of disruptive work in the army among recruits and railroad employees; (4) strengthening of the movement toward control over the class trade unions with a simultaneous step against the leaving of the unions -- "forcing the bureaucratic institutions to execute the part of the workers" (later denounced as a right wing slogan in Germany: "Zwingt die Bossen" [Force the bosses]); when this is unsuccessful, set the factory committees against the trade unions and announce the slogan of a workers' congress as the "initial stage along the path toward the establishment of councils of workers' delegates;" (5) enunciation of the slogan "land to the peasants" which can obtain strength against the agrarian reform; subordinate the peasant movement to the proletariat. Apart from this the last point also demands the extraction of the Trade Union of Agricultural Laborers from the hands of the PPS as well as a struggle "against the religious terror of the Catholic Church." [See Note].

([Note] It is worth while to cite here the statement by two delegates at the third KPP congress: "The peasants told me once in our circle -- 'We have confidence in you, but tell us how your socialism will look in practice. What will you do with the family, with religion, etc.?' Such questions are posed in the villages. These are matters which must be explained very skillfully. We can not denounce the peasant for saying his prayers from the start. It is necessary to bring him up by degree and with knowledge" (Report on the Third KPP Congress, page 55). Another delegate stated: "We must also go to church at times and then leave together with the masses and speak to them. We know that in rural areas this is the best opportunity for a mass meeting." (Ibid., page 567).)

The sixth point calls for support of minority movements (i.e., disturbances) in the eastern territories and demands the annexation of these areas to the neighboring Soviet republics. It provides full equality of rights for the Jews and the Germans; it calls for a fight against Jewish separatism inside of the party (the matter pertains here to the establishment of conditions for cooperation between Polish and Jewish workers, which was being opposed by Polish workers and which the KPP camouflaged as the struggle against Jewish separatism). The seventh point demands an intensification in work among the Polish emigration in France and in Germany. The eighth point -- reconstruction of the KPRP on the basis of factory circles. The ninth point -- combatting the right wing and attraction of the ultra leftist workers (in the KPP of Warsaw city, for the most part in the Praga suburb, there existed at that time a left wing workers' opposition with syndicalist overtones led by Karol Wojcik), conduct the fight also against the "centerist" elements striving toward a compromise with the rightist leaders (the center at that time

included: Krajewski-Stein, Cichowski, Paszyn, and others). The tenth point calls for a return to "ideological" liaison between the KPP and the Russian communist party and indicates that the "historical past and the current activity of the Russian communist party represent the best school of Leninism, in line with which the broad party circles and especially the youth should be educated." The eleventh point recommends a coordination of announcements with the communist party of Germany and includes praise of the victorious German left wing.

Upper Silesia is not made clear in the political platform. On the one hand it is seen as an "anti-German forward base of Polish imperialism," whereas on the other hand as an "area for launching an attack by German fascism."

This platform is supplemented by Skulski's article appearing in Nowy Przegląd for January 1925. The author of this article several months later, next to Domski, became the main party leader. Already at this time the impression was made that his article represented an expose by the future "premier" of the KPRP. (After the fifth congress Skulski-Martens found himself in the eastern areas of the country where he was engaged in subversive activities but finally fell into the hands of Polish security authorities on the border between Poland and Russia. He was placed in prison at Stolpce, but when the communists at Minsk heard of this, they sent a diversionary band to make an attack on the prison and take the Bashkir dignitary to Minsk). In his article, he writes:

"Today in the present stage of ebttide in the revolutionary wave (and this is the case, so it is not allowed to either delude or hoodwink the party and its adherents), the tactics of the united front cease to be an instrument of the current day.

"The worker-peasant government, as a tactical slogan, represents one of the fruits of opportunistic comprehension of the united front tactics.

"The communists can only be held responsible for a government, the banner of which will remain the social revolution, a government of the proletarian dictatorship, a communist government... Such a government and no other is our slogan in the struggle for authority." (Ibid., pages 716 and 717).

In these words we have the basic foundation for the later policy of the ultra leftist leadership. Skulski attacked the resolutions of the second congress as being opportunistic. Some of the resolutions, he states, still may qualify themselves for repair. Others must be discarded, as ex. gr. in the resolution on nationality the part concerning "the stake on the wholeness of the nation" and in the Polish part the "typical Schlageterism of Radek," in the agrarian resolution "the stake on the entirety of the rural areas (which was so strong that Robotnik [Worker, PPS newspaper] in the fall of 1923 sneered at the fact that the communists had taken over the program of the PSL [Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe -- Polish Peasant Party] "Piast." Peasant communism (NPPCH [Narodowa Partia Chlopska -- National Peasant Party]) from its very beginning set the "village poor" against the "kulaks.") and the "disrespect shown for the role of the agricultural proletariat" (Nowy Przegląd, page 714).

In March 1925 the third congress of the KPRP convened again in Russia within the vicinity of Minsk, Soviet Belorussia. During that time there was a story to the effect that the third KPRP congress had met in Vienna, and some of the more scholarly writers on communism accepted this version as the truth. (We see this error

in the work of Adam Strapinski entitled Wywrotowe Partje Polityczne [Subversive Political Parties], Warsaw, 1933). With the use of electoral methods which we have already noted, it was possible to foresee the uniformity of the delegates at the congress toward the resolutions, although there was no lack of democratic gestures like for instance when the members of the central committee were deprived of decisive votes which was a novelty. However this peculiar democracy had its purpose, because it deprived the members of the old central committee of any influence (even though they were still formally central committee members), but permitted all of the new leadership to vote decisively since they had received mandates as district delegates. As far as party derivation is concerned on the part of the delegates, of the 59 present there were 26 former SDKPiL members who had links with Poland for the most part in the past since at this time they were in the majority residents of Moscow, next 4 ex PPS left wingers, 7 former PPS members, 6 members of the Russian communist party, 5 former Ukrainian social democrats, 2 former "PCK" members, 1 from the former "Ferajnigte," 1 from the PPSK [Polska Partja Socjal-Demokratyczne -- Polish Social Democratic Party] which was the prewar PPS in the province of Galicja, 1 from the Belorussian Revolutionary Organization, 1 from the Peasant Party, 1 Menshevik, and only 3 KPP members who had never belonged to any other party before. We can see how poorly represented were the party masses but how strong was the representation of Soviet officials and former members of minority parties. In general the congress was larger numerically than the former one. It included 31 delegates with decisive voting power, 18 with advisory capacity, as well as 10 visitors.

The congress was honored by the presence of bolshevik dignitaries. Representing the central committee of the Russian communist

party was Bukharin who gave a speech on Trotskyism and Leninism. Sent by the Comintern as participant in the congress Zinoviev (the official report on the congress denied that he was present stating that he merely sent a letter of considerable length which is not true) as well as Manuilsky who spoke on the problems of nationality.

The congress was greeted by Bukharin who recalled the unfortunate year 1920 as follows:

"Poland arose and became a young chauvinistic state which shortly became known as the Red Army marched upon Warsaw and broke its bayonets on this chauvinism."

He stated further that:

"I am of the inflexible conviction, dear Comrades, that we will meet not only at peaceful conferences at which we will discuss the theoretical problems but also in the field of direct combat where you, our best friends, and we, your brothers in battle, together will achieve on that day what so many of our mutual friends have died for." (Report on the Third Congress, pages 12-13).

The second rapporteur sent by the Comintern was Zinoviev who spoke on the international situation. He too began with sad memories of five years before:

"Poland belongs to those countries in which we can not afford a defeat. In Poland we must win the struggle at once... Once already there was a misfire, so we can not take any risk the next time." (Ibid., page 294).

In comparison with the second congress, Zinoviev strongly moderated his tone when he stated:

"There is taking place a consolidation of the bourgeoisie -- this can not be denied. The bourgeoisie has introduced order into its currency, in a whole series of countries we see an increase in the economy. We now know that the crisis was not as great as we had been led to believe. The conclusion is that the tempo of development for the revolution has become slower..., fascism represents an episode of longer duration, not merely a small shock brigade but the symptom designating an entire epoch. This is as clear as the morning which succeeds the night." (Ibid., page 282).

The speech by Zinoviev at the third congress is quite different from the one which he had made at the second congress of the KPRP. At the latter Zinoviev roared in a revolutionary manner, prophesying any day the outbreak of the German revolution and subsequently of the Polish revolution. Here on the other hand he admits that the tempo of revolutionary development has appeared to be slower.

The third bolshevik leader, the sly and false Ukrainian Manuilsky speaks about Poland in the following terms:

"The real part played by contemporary Poland is that of a barrier making impossible the penetration of revolutionary ideas to the West...

"For this reason right now the entire international proletariat must have as its aim the crushing of capitalist and bourgeois Poland and transforming her into a workers-peasant as well as a soviet Poland." (Ibid., page 492).

In order to evaluate Manuilsky's report, we shall return to it in connection with our discussion of the nationality problem.

At this point I must add that all of the speeches by Kremlin leaders were accepted by the congress with applause and joyful cries by the "Polish Communists."

The political report by Milaszewicz (Domski) also exudes pessimism when it formulates the political situation in Poland:

"There was a time when the Polish bourgeois state was considered to be a temporary phenomenon, a seasonal state. And we were unable to reject this illusion but thought ourselves to be between the Russian and German revolutions which would crush bourgeois Poland as a result of pressure by the proletariat.

"The bourgeoisie was able to solve its problems at that time and even defend itself from direct elimination. The sharpest stage in the revolutionary crisis was liquidated with the help of the PPS which provided the bourgeoisie with the Moraczewski government... Today we have as a fact a reconstructed agriculture and industry, especially the mining one." (Ibid., pages 297-299).

Very characteristic is the fear manifested by Domski already in March 1925 against... May 1926, although he hopes it will not be:

"Typical of the increase in the power of the bourgeoisie of Poland is the fact that it knows how to take care of the Pilsudskyites, that military group which seized power during the war and which was able to prolong the war against the Soviet Union toward its end contrary to the will of the bourgeoisie. Today Pilsudski has been removed from authority, the military group is falling apart into cliques fighting among themselves, and the attempts by Pilsudski to return to the army leadership have little chance of success. The majority in the "Piast" right wing would doubtlessly give Pilsudski in military affairs the same power which he possessed before. In the

PPS itself it is difficult to say whether the majority consists of Pilsudski or of Sikorski supporters. At least the editorial office of Robotnik remains in the hands of Sikorskiites." (Ibid., page 300).

These elaborations by Dowski represented as if emanations from the resolutions of the fifth Comintern congress which had prophesied that by means of internal friction "in the bourgeois camp" -- there would "proceed a growth in the strength of the proletarian revolution." For this reason the internal situation in Poland as evaluated by Dowski and dressed up in pseudoscientific garb represented an axis around which the policy of the communist party was to revolve. Unfortunately at this time Dowski made an error in his prophesy, not expecting that Polish society was capable of any healthy responses or that in critical moments it was able to spark as much strength as was necessary for the interests of the Fatherland.

In general Dowski built a number of monuments to phraseology at the third congress. One of these was the establishment of the theory concerning social fascism. This sounded foolish at that time, but became much more dangerous later and especially after 1928. This enlightened statesman even then said that:

"During periods of relative consolidation, when the beginnings of 'Black Hundred' fascism is not opportune, the role of fascists is assumed by elements dressed up in the clothes of socialism -- the social fascists. Thus it is that the part of fascists is played in our workers' movement by PPS." (Ibid., page 298).

Opponents of the thesis concerning the political consolidation of Poland were at that time the dignitary from Kharkov, commissar from the Soviet Ukraine, Skrypnik, who took part in the congress

as a left winger (the specific characteristic of all oppositions) and Warski. Skrypnik stated at the time:

"A state which has in its body such splinters as the eastern provinces, Danzig, the corridor... can not consolidate itself."
(Ibid., page 333).

At this congress the KPRP for the first time spoke about the possibility of peaceful relations between the USSR and Poland. The logic of one of the delegates is interesting as a characterization of not honest Soviet patriotism but rather of adventurous and unethical business like the Soviet chauvinism of these "Poles:"

"But can the Polish government arrive at this understanding with the Soviet Union? I do not think so. First of all because the KPRP is too strong. It is more convenient for the Polish government to isolate us as an alien element connected with the Soviet Union, to use us a bolshevist scarecrow. This state of affairs would have to submit to change after an agreement between Poland and the USSR. Ideological armament against the KPP is considered by the Polish bourgeoisie as much more important than Russian markets."

(Speech by a prominent district delegate with the pseudonym "Szczuka," pages 323-324).

The megalomania of the communists assumed such proportions that it reached its peak here. Shortly thereafter reality showed that in connection with the development of Polish-Russian relations the KPP played no part at all. The Polish government naturally could not take into consideration a party, the role of which was similar to that of the proverbial frog during the shoeing of a horse. On the other hand the Soviet government understood very well that the state and political interests of the USSR should be placed above all

sentiments and dogmas concerning solidarity. The short sighted policy and ignorance of tactics by the master, Russia, contributed to the disappointment of the KPP and placed the party later in an impasse.

A description corresponding to reality of the situation for Polish communism at that time is provided in the discussion by delegate "Sandecki" who was really Saul Amsterdam alias "Henrykowski:"

"Our liabilities exceed our assets." (Ibid., page 63).

The perspectives painted by the third KPRP congress are no less hazy than the perspectives of the fifth Comintern congress. They cover up the true picture of the situation with numerous phrases concerning the "armed uprising" that was to take place very soon and "placing the communist banner on top of the Belweder palace," etc. Such a state of affairs we find in the congress resolutions, destined primarily for the broad party masses which knew little about the essence of matters. The party leaders at this time already felt subconsciously that the revolution being prepared by them had lost. Nevertheless they did not have the courage to admit this and thus continued to issue nonsense.

The main political aim of the third congress was the final defeat of the right wing leaders, i.e., the "S W's" or to be more specific the formal acceptance of their dethronement implemented by the Comintern. This task was executed by the congress very conscientiously. The old leaders were greeted with disdainful silence. Nobody applauded them as had been done at the second congress. Some of the delegates had their doubts as to the justice of the whole matter as well as the manner in which it had been solved by the "Polish Commission" of the Comintern, since the latter

had treated the generally valued and hitherto respected leaders of the revolutionary movement without any ceremony. All of the people however understood their impotence vis a vis the "tremendous authority" of the Comintern and the beginnings of Stalin's infallibility. Even dissatisfied voices ended in servile phraseology. For instance:

"I believe that such a handling of the matter was not correct... but it is good as it is, and we must proceed further." (delegate Bialkowski -- Jan Paszyn, page 110).

Thus spoke a member of the center. The left wingers were howling with delight and similarly to the way they had done in the "Polish Commission" they now again began to denounce the overthrown leaders as renegades, reformers, accusing them of committed and uncommitted sins, dragging out into the daylight their official and private correspondence in order to prove that the rightists had not been and were not then bolsheviks. Among others Domaki quoted from a letter by Kostrzewa, written in February 1924, in the matter of the attitude of the bolsheviks toward the Communist Party of Germany:

"Regardless of everything that has been written in the theses concerning the proximity of a revolution in Germany, Zinoviev and the 'Trojka' (At that time in Soviet Russia, actual authority was exercised by 3 men, i.e., the communist party's secretary general Stalin, the chairman of the Comintern Zinoviev, and the deputy premier Kameniev) apparently do not at all believe that it will be possible during the next few months. For this reason I believe that during the current period the party leadership may get along without any people who have had any more extensive authority or

experience in the final analysis. They count on their (Brandler and others) loyalty, knowing that the latter will work for the party conscientiously any way, and when the appropriate moment comes they will again be raised up to the top."

Of course when Kostrzewa was writing about the communist party of Germany, she was thinking about herself and her friends. To a considerable degree she hit the nail on the head, because shortly we will see how "at the appropriate moment they will again be raised to the top" -- in order to be pushed later into an even deeper hole. In general the "leaders" manifested tremendous humility and tried to explain their mistakes. Even Kostrzewa this time behaved more submissively than she had at the "Polish Commission" although with greater honor than her comrades in misfortune. To the accusation of an antagonistic attitude toward the bolsheviks, she said:

"I am far from the concept of emancipation for the International from the influence of the Russian communist party, from the tendency of treating the Russian party -- that first ranking party in the Comintern -- like the proverbial hen which had hatched ducklings and was forced to accept the fact that when large enough they would swim away without her on the broad waters and begin a separate and alien life." (page 136 of the Sprawozdanie [Report]).

There was no fear of this! The Russian hen was able to arrange things so cleverly that no duckling from Poland, Germany, or elsewhere would swim away very far from the trough with Russian rubles.

Some of the participants in the congress began coming to the conclusion that it was not only the anathematized leaders but

the entire Comintern together with the whole KPRP that had been in error. Nobody was brave enough to speak about the Comintern out loud, but as far as the KPRP was concerned Leon Purman who participated in the congress under the pseudonym "Mann" stated openly:

"Such is the structure of the bolshevik party that if the leaders assume an opportunistic line, then this line will break the party right down to the bottom." (page 151).

A very justified comment. Such is the fate of all political parties which are based upon absolute centralization. It is a shame that Comrade Purman did not add that such a party could just as well idolize from top to bottom an idiotic doctrinairism, when the leadership is comprised of individuals who are appointed by the favor of an alien ruler and who are not linked with the interests of the party masses.

The final liquidation of the right wingers was made more difficult by the ultra leftist diversion at the congress of a central committee member named "Stefanski" (Danieluk) as well as a delegate from the Union of Communist Youth -- "Bernard" (Maks Lapon). The two of them began to quarrel about words and terms employed in the resolutions, demanding elimination of the slogan "united front" and of the slogan "worker-peasant government" as remnants of the right wing opportunistic tactics. Domski and Skulski, although later they openly supported the same things as these ultra leftists, sharply attacked "Stefanski" and "Bernard" to the extent of accusing them of making the fight against the right wing more difficult for the Comintern.

The resolutions against the right wing were adopted unanimously. As could also be foreseen the dismissed leaders came out before the end of the congress with declarations admitting their errors, especially in the Russian and German problems, and subordinating themselves to the resolutions of the congress. Such contrition was accepted by the congress which replied with a decision that Warski and Prochniak could be utilized in party work. However with regard to the others, nothing was changed. In such a manner, Kostrzewa and Walecki found themselves in Soviet exile. To a certain extent this took place because of their party derivation. The former social democrats inspired some sentiment, whereas the former PPS left wingers were honestly hated. Looking at the matter practically, the entire group of 4 right wing leaders was dismissed from any work for as long as the left wing maintained its authority in the party.

A lively discussion at the third congress was evoked by the so-called Belorussian affair. We have already mentioned the diversionary-partisan movement in Poland's eastern provinces, inspired from Minsk. The culmination point in its strength was the summer of 1924. The main source of this movement was to be found on the other side of the Polish border, from where adventurous military elements imbued with Belorussian chauvinism and communism were sending trained diversionary bands into Polish territory. The aim was to undermine the Polish state which was then in the process of consolidating itself or as the communists would say to "drive in splinters." The communists in general supported this diversion and simultaneously exaggerated its size in terms of a broad "liberation" movement by the Belorussian masses. The KPRP was faced with a question.

Should it press for a great insurrection or maintain a moderate development? Strongest in favor of such an adventure was the majority among the KPZB [Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Bialorusi -- Communist Party of Western Belorussia], whereas the KPZU [Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy -- Communist Party of the Western Ukraine] was against this. The latter in connection with military and GPU [Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravleniye -- Main Political Administration, i.e., since 1923 the name for the secret police] circles in Kharkov was planning an uprising in the Wolyn province. Opposed to this adventure was almost the entire KPRP central committee, except for Skulski who was closely tied in with Red Army circles from his past. At the lower levels of the KPRP, in that part which should have the most to say in the party, the Belorussian diversion evoked an aversion due to its anti-Polish setting. At the third congress it appeared that the Moscow government, and thus also the Comintern, was against such an adventure.

The matter of the attitude of the KPRP central committee toward the Belorussian insurrection was reported by Purman at the third congress and later by Skulski. It should be noted that the latter had changed his benevolent attitude toward the whole affair because of pressure from Moscow. In his report Purman proved to the congress the treacherous relationship of the Comintern to its agents in the Nowogrodek area. It is not necessary, he said, to chart one's "course toward an insurrection," because "due to the situation in Poland and international conditions it would be isolated and suppressed" (so why incite it?).

Purman reminded his listeners that the economic and political consolidation of Poland, the antagonistic attitude toward

bolshevism by the peasants, the "lack of understanding" by the Polish workers for the essence of such an uprising (although the Polish workers understood very well that this was to be a vulgar Soviet provocation and not a liberation movement by the Belorussian masses). Further on Purman indicated that the USSR is unprepared to provide any armed assistance to such a war in Poland's eastern provinces, whereas:

"The peasants (of Belorussia) are counting upon the assistance of the USSR; they believe that if they attack, red armies will aid them." (Ibid., page 208).

Even clearer were the statements made by Soviet officials. Skrypnik, whose opinions were authoritative, said:

"I must state with complete certainty that it would be harmful to count upon the help of the Red Army for the revolution in Poland." (Ibid., page 337).

Manuilsky in his report on nationality made this matter totally plain. He categorically opposed the insurrection in so called Western Belorussia because of the following reasons:

(1) The uprising would not obtain the support of the peasantry and thus would be lacking in any possibility for success. Victory can only be attained when the Polish "cavalry man" from rural areas not only will oppose shooting at the insurrectionists but will also turn his weapons against his oppressors."

(2) "The Polish worker who has not yet rid himself of nationalistic superstitions will not look upon the uprising in the eastern provinces as a peasant movement but as a movement attempting to destroy Polish statehood" (essentially this was its goal and no other -- comment by author).

(3) "Providing assistance would mean a new war for the USSR, a war which the Russian workers and peasants would not agree upon at the present time" (bolshevik diplomatic language -- author's comment).

Manuilsky also mentioned the "unsatisfactory international situation," i.e., the defeats in Estonia, Bulgaria, etc. (Report, page 496).

Regardless of the foregoing, illiterates from Polesie were being incited further on. The KPP central committee thought up a slogan to boycott state taxes, understanding that of necessity it could serve to fan the "insurrectionist" sentiments or else to neutralize them. The KPZU which was opposed to an uprising felt that it could be used only for the first aim and for this reason fought sharply against the slogan and continually quarreled at the congress with the KPP central committee. At any rate the "anti-insurrectionist" position of the KPP was not fundamental. It only arose from the situation, in the words of Purman, as follows:

"Simultaneously we decided that if the uprising were to be inescapable, then the party would lead it regardless of everything, although we had no illusions that we could give it enough assistance for victory. If the international situation were to require this of us, then without consideration for the relationship of forces, we would issue the slogan." (Ibid., page 208).

This is truly an important admission! In the name of the central committee, Purman stated that, disregarding the party's weakness and certain defeat, the Polish communists would announce

the slogan of revolution in the eastern provinces providing that the "international situation" required it, i.e., speaking openly if Moscow were to make such a decision in its own interests. We can see that the entire Belorussian uprising was based upon requirements of the actual Soviet *raison d'etat*. Communist tactics of the coup d'etat were thus revealed in their entirety. It is not necessary to have any illusions that common sense prevailed within the KPRP. Manuilsky later explained that the rejection of the insurrectionist adventure is but a matter of tactics which is binding "during the current time" and not a basic matter.

Warski spoke up in a very revolutionary tone during the debate on the uprising:

"If we would desire to have this splinter in the body of the bourgeois state weakening and disorganizing our enemy, then we must support the struggle of the Belorussian people." (Ibid., page 335).

We must admit that Warski found himself in this revolutionary position even during the period of preparation prior to the third congress. In one of his articles published in Nowy Przegląd and subsequently in the Russian bolshevik press, he attacked the new central committee for its counter revolutionary attitude toward the "Belorussian uprising." He cited in this article one of the appeals written by Domski in which the latter called the movement in the eastern provinces "banditism, anarchy, a partisan struggle" etc. Warski's article made a tremendous impression. The comrades saw in the content of Warski's denunciation a manifestation of insufficient Soviet patriotism. Therefore many of his friends turned away from him, saying that the old man had gone too far.

An explanation of the misunderstandings which had arisen in the central committee was undertaken at the congress by "Borowski" (Wladyslaw Stein) who stated:

"The divergence between us and Skulski was based upon the difference in evaluating the developmental tempo of events. Skulski thought that we were standing almost directly before an insurrection in Belorussia; the rest of the central committee, on the other hand, held the position and still holds it that in the words of Lenin -- the foetus must be delivered. It is impermissible to permit the isolation and defeat of the uprising in Belorussia." (Ibid., page 344).

Again we see that the matter of insurrection in Poland's eastern provinces remains only a matter of time until conditions, about which Manuilsky spoke, are ripe. In the meanwhile the communists have decided to work on the "maturation of these conditions" which should be understood as meaning that they have received an order from Moscow to await a time that is more opportune. Objectively one should note that despite the "hurrah" revolutionary zeal of the third congress, in the so-called Belorussian affair, that body assumed an exceptional attitude of common sense against the insurrection or to use the communist jargon even a counter-revolutionary position.

Misunderstandings and friction which were evoked in the KPRP by the Belorussian affair were echoed to a certain extent also in the Communist Party of Western Belorussia. At the time the third congress was deliberating, there began at Minsk one of the tragedies of the Belorussian people. Nationalistic Belorussian elements broke with the KPZB under the leadership of a

central committee secretariat member in this party, Guryn, who was prominent as a Soviet-Belorussian activist having been sent to Poland from Minsk. He was later murdered by the bolsheviks after being accused as usual of betraying the party and of collaborating with Polish security authorities. This splinter group at first wielded large influence. It was able to seize the entire party property, the printing press, the city organizations, etc., but the "orthodox" communists were able to take everything back thanks to the betrayal of one of the splinter members Lohynowicz-Korczyk who is beholden for his later career in the communist movement (a position on the central committee) because of the fact that he betrayed his friends in the splinter group.

The only true ally of the rebelling elements in the KPZB was Waraki. At the end of 1924 he had already written a sharp article in the Nowy Przegląd as well as in the bolshevik press, which has been mentioned, against Domski and others for their incorrect attitude toward the Belorussian movement in the eastern provinces. In his article, it should be admitted, Waraki incited the Belorussian communists to break party discipline vis a vis the central committee and to organize a "bolshevik rebellion" in the name of bolshevism and revolution. When the secession of the nationalistic Belorussian elements from the KPZB became a fait accompli, the leadership of the KPRP attacked Waraki for morally supporting Guryn and his group. Excerpts from his article were publicized at this time:

"If the central committee not only does not issue any directives or advice but considers the entire movement as 'anarchy,' a 'civil war,' 'banditry,' 'savagery,' what then are the other comrades to do? Are they to break the iron discipline with regard

to the central committee or vis a vis bolshevism and the revolution?

"... Should the party maintain in regard to the central committee the duty of bolshevik discipline or the duty of bolshevik rebellion?"

Of course Warski angrily rejected these accusations and treated them as insinuations. Finally it was Manuilsky who had to teach everybody about the genuine "axis in tactics concerning the nationality matter:"

"In Poland we have an essential task to perform in the matter of nationality. In the first place we should try to relax pressure on the minority groups of the contemporary Polish state, not permitting the latter to solidify and acquire a balance. But simultaneously we should do this in such a manner as not to repel the broad masses of the Polish population from us." (Ibid., page 493).

adding that:

"The nationalistic superstitions of the workers and peasants can not disappear quickly as after the touch of a magical wand."

The ideology of Luxemburgism, which is considered as the greatest obstacle in conducting a correct nationality policy, is also castigated here. Simultaneously on the other hand Manuilsky let slip that the battle of Warsaw did not eliminate from bolshevik minds the Bukharin theory of "red intervention:"

"On purpose I am passing over in silence the problem as to whether a nation which has overthrown the yoke of land owners and capitalists in its own country has the right to carry on its bayonets liberation of the workers in another country. A discussion on this

topic which some time ago developed in the German and Polish parties (a pin prick against Dowski -- comment by author) is not opportune at the moment. I think that the great French revolution, which carried national liberation on bayonets beyond the borders of France, did not commit any historical sin." (Ibid., page 494).

"I pass over in silence" says Manuilsky, but at the same time he cites the example of the French revolution which is to represent an encouragement for making revolution with the strength of the Red Army. This purposeful evasion led to an undiplomatic slip of the tongue, Mr. Manuilsky, especially in the following:

"We communists not only consider this to be a right but even as a sacred duty to place our bayonets in the service of the European working masses under appropriate circumstances.

"Regardless of the foregoing and looking beyond ourselves at the march upon Warsaw, we should admit clearly that the reason for the defeat of the proletarian revolution which was proceeding toward the West in the summer of 1920 was the nationalistic attitude of the Polish peasantry. Oppressed for hundreds of years and deceived by Catholic priests, the Polish peasant saw in the Red Army only the traditional Muscovite who had been strangling him for many, many years. The proletarian revolution was defeated by the Polish peasant. This is today an indisputable historical fact." (Ibid.).

These words are worth remembering! The communists in the KPP frequently designate the year 1920 as the accomplishment of the armed bourgeoisie supported by French capital, until here one of the highest Soviet officials states openly that the proletarian

revolution was defeated by the Polish peasant. In view of this "indisputable historical fact," the Kremlin masters had nothing else to do but to convince the Polish peasant that the Red Army should not be equated with the Muscovites. When this is accomplished (it appears that this will take a very long time), these "non-Muscovites" will be able to enter Poland without any obstacles. Manuilsky most certainly does not know Polish rural areas or else he would realize that the Polish peasant possesses enough of a national consciousness to comprehend very well the blessings that would be brought by the communists.

Apart from the Belorussian affair for the first time in the history of the KPRP the third congress strongly took up the German problem. As an explanation it should be added that the Comintern, and primarily the Soviet government, always treated Germany and its communist party differently than it did Poland and the latter's decoration -- the KPP. Poland in the view of the Comintern was always a weak state, a seasonal phenomenon, so it was unnecessary to take into consideration very much even the attitude of its proletariat. Revolution would be brought to Poland only on Red Army bayonets which would suppress everything. In a completely different way did the Comintern evaluate Germany. It saw there the most powerful conglomeration of the proletariat in the whole world, a country which was the birthplace of socialism and in which the communist revolution would represent a supplement to the Russian revolution. For this reason the Comintern aimed only to train a certain number of diversionists in Poland who would play their part in case of an invasion. In Germany, on the other hand, the Comintern always took into consideration the complex psychology of the worker. At first the Comintern was mistaken in its approach to the psychology of the German worker,

but the year 1923 convinced the former that a "Marxist" from a steel mill at Essen is very much different from a Polish "Marxist" at Muranowo. That was the beginning of speculation by the Comintern regarding imperialistic propensities of the Marxist in the country of Marx. Communism is being advertised to the latter as a banner under which he will recover the "stolen" provinces like Poznan, Upper Silesia, Strasburg and then will overthrow the hated Treaty of Versailles.

The KPRP of course could not take this into consideration on its own initiative, so it was necessary to make it into an order. Manuilsky thus sharply attacked Waraki for stating that there was no German problem in Poland:

"... Polish nationalism has not been completely eradicated, even from the ranks of the old central committee." (Ibid., page 498).

The "Polish" communists, with their inborn lack of comprehension for these matters, did not need much urging to accept the position of Manuilsky. However several delegates were found who would not allow themselves to be convinced by the "delicate admonitions" of Manuilsky. In the course of the discussion, Dowski stated openly:

"The German separatist movement is above all a movement by properties classes which were yearning for the good old times when they were exploiting and oppressing the peasant and the worker in Poland." (Ibid., page 510).

Bravo, Mr. Dowski! Even Marx himself could not have said this better. It is a shame however that Dowski had forgotten how the anti-Polish struggle in Upper Silesia during 1918-1919 was being directed, apart from the junkers and factory owners, also by the social democrats Hoersing and Heines (shot in June 1934 because

of participation in a conspiracy against Hitler) who were allied with the communists. This last man several years later was killed by his own comrades, when he was already one of the leaders of the German proletariat of the national socialist (Hitlerite) variety.

The matter was brought out even stronger by Tadeusz Zarski ("Czerwiec"):

"The promotion in Polish Silesia of the self determination slogan, as desired by Manuilsky, would represent nonsense. It could only have the meaning that we were standing for the defense of the German bourgeoisie and its interests." (page 516).

The communists themselves came out with similar reservations at this time. What can be said therefore concerning the resolution passed on the self determination of Upper Silesia with the right of secession from Poland today, when power in Germany is exercised by the Hitlerites? Today the matter is no longer one of "nonsense" or of "standing in defense of the German bourgeoisie" but clearly a crime of these Moscow agents who are fanatical in their hatred of Poland, in this case even more "Muscovite" than their masters in the Kremlin.

One of the delegates from Silesia, Gornicki, who was of course a local worker, declared at the congress:

"If we were to come to Upper Silesia with the principle of self determination, we would only make a terrible uproar." (page 552 in speech by Gornicki).

This prophesy by Gornicki came true. After the resolution concerning self determination not only did a "terrible uproar"

arise in Upper Silesia and the rapid downfall of the communist movement which had been strong in that area at one time, but in all of Poland there began to be heard voices of protest among communists. In Warsaw itself the talk among the workers was that in the KPP this work was being done by the Jewish comrades on the central committee's Politburo who can permit themselves to provide not only Upper Silesia but also Warsaw with self determination, with the right of secession and annexation by the USSR.

It is characteristic that the corrupt Walecki (Horwitz), wanting to curry favor with the Russian autocrats (this was the period of the closest collaboration between Moscow and the Reichswehr staff -- the era of Rapallo), in defending the polishness of Upper Silesia declared in an undertone:

"We can not defend such a horrible monstrosity as the Danzig corridor, not the rapaciousness of the Polish State in relation to Danzig itself dictated by the interests of the imperialistic Polish bourgeoisie." (page 52a).

Finally the congress repeated the nationality resolution of the second KPEP congress, endowing it merely with a larger amount of "practicality" by cleansing it from all Polish national sentiment.

Considerable attention was payed by the congress to the so-called "bolshevization of the party." The theoretical foundations for the bolshevization were based upon the ideas of Lenin according to which the sole motivating power in history which could provide the world with a new and perfect system could not be a political party in the European sense, i.e., a conglomeration of human beings with these or other views but it must be a union of "professional

revolutionaries." However already Lenin understood the impossibility of introducing the new system through violence by means of a handful of men dedicated to this concept, and so he took the position that revolution must become a mass movement. From this there arose the necessity of organizing a sect of revolutionaries in a way which would enable it to attract the broad masses of the proletariat at the appropriate time. Concretely this revolutionary party mysticism manifests itself in the system of organizational directives, with 3 basic ones leading the rest: a party member may only be an individual performing in it a designated task (from which comes the idea that the Leninist party does not have any grey party mass but is a union of ideologists at the top and of agitators, technicians, party spies, etc. at the bottom); next all party authorities are nominated by their superior levels; and finally the basic unit in the party's structure is the so-called "cell," i.e., a group of persons functioning within a given area. These 3 points do not include a fourth one which is less precisely formulated but just as essential and basic as the other 3: the postulate of excluding from the "bolshhevik party" all "fractional" elements having any independence of attitude on the part of individual members. From the practical point of view this entire process of bolshevization can be brought down to the largest and closest dependence of the KPRP upon its masters in Moscow. Let us add that bolshevization is strictly connected with the so-called left wing course with an emphasis in all communist work upon a complete lack of liaison with any kind of "socio-opportunistic" splinter.

The resolution by the third KPRP congress concerning bolshevization remained to a certain extent the program of this party and simultaneously its statute until the time of the sixth KPP congress, i.e., to the end of 1932.

The change in party name also is linked with bolshevization. The third congress resolved to change the name of the party by removing the adjective "workers" and thus obtained the name: "Communist Party of Poland," which has lasted to date. Discarding the expression "workers" had as its aim the emphasis that it was striving to embrace not only the workers but also the peasants (as if this were not being done previously). De facto this had as its goal the erasing of the distinction which had made it vary from the Russian communist party. (In February 1930 at the second KZMP congress, the name of the Union of Communist Youth in Poland was also changed for this same reason to the "Communist Youth Union of Poland" (KZMP).)

The third KPP congress in full maintained its agricultural program. The attempts by "Ziemniak" (Budzynski) to force through the old social democratic slogans for nationalization of land were unsuccessful. Dowski spoke out against Budzynski in a very characteristic manner:

"It would be a tactical error to introduce currently into our program slogans for nationalization of land, as is desired by certain of the comrades.

At the present time this would only arouse distrust among the rural masses. The slogan of dividing the soil as private property must be propounded without any reservations." (page 310).

Again we hear the expressions "currently" and "at the present time." Actually in his love for the peasants, Dowski went further than did the right wingers by solving the agrarian problem through dividing the land "as private property" and "without any

reservations." Of course these were slogans of a propagandistic nature, because we have already heard at another place the assurance that when the communists seized power, there would be "no power which could force them to divide the soil." The speaker himself in this matter, Tomasz Dabal, declared at the congress:

"Our program is immutable -- the collective cultivation of the land... To achieve this goal, we will have to proceed along a line which is not straight." (page 552).

Dabal, as we already have seen, was known in Poland as a peasant demagogue. He knew very well what he was saying, that the Polish peasant must be approached along a crooked line. There arises merely the question: will the Polish peasant comprehend this bolshevik dishonesty?

As far as the activity of the KPP in the trade unions was concerned, at the third congress the tendency developed to counter these trade unions with "factory committees" as units which would be easier to control by the communists. We have already mentioned the manifestations of this tendency in the functioning of the KPP during 1924. Later it appeared that the committees were much more resilient to communism than were the trade unions. These entire tactics contributed merely to a tremendous weakening of the trade union movement directed by PPS members as a class. The ultra left wing character of the congress also manifested itself in certain tendencies of the shock troop variety which can be seen for instance in the words of Domski:

"... we must prepare the masses both organizationally and technologically for the implementation of an armed insurrection.

"We must establish centers for workers' troops... In order to defend demonstrations, to disarm the police, to eliminate provocateurs a type of self defense must be trained in the preparation of further combat." (Page 312).

The congress concluded with the election of a new leadership which corresponded to the "new relationship of forces." As a matter of fact in the central committee evolved by the Comintern, only the imprisoned Lenski and the "tired" Krajewski were replaced by Zaraki and Cichowski. In essence the whole party was directed by the triumvirate of Domski, Skulski, and Purman.

The chairman of the congress, Unszlicht, in conclusion voiced the hope that:

"At the next congress of our party, we will be able to demand more from our central committee than at present, because our fourth congress will be provided with a better and richer heritage than was obtained by the current one from the second congress." (page 609).

Unfortunately the words of Unszlicht were not fulfilled. The central committee elected at the third congress did not last until the fourth congress. Its entire term of office expired after 6 months, not because of the Polish police but rather due to Moscow which placed its heavy paw on it with no less power than was exerted upon the previous right wing central committee.

CHAPTER IV.

After the period of relative stability in 1924, the period from the middle of 1925 to May 1926 represented almost a throwback

to the times of 1921-1923. The political and economic situation was shaping itself very unfavorably for Poland. The cost of foreign exchange to the "sanacja" government was a heavy burden upon society and it could not guarantee stability to the zloty, the oscillation of which to a large extent undermined confidence in Polish currency. Unemployment was increasing at a frightening pace and registered alarming figures at a time when conditions of the market on a world wide basis and in Europe were quite good. In October 1925 it passed the 200,000 mark, and at the beginning of 1926 the figure approached 350,000. Simultaneously with the falling of the zloty, the government of Wladyslaw Grabski fell. Then there began the flowering of rule by the Sejm. Dissatisfaction with the lack of order in the state had embraced everybody, and the conviction developed that such a condition could not last. The political parties continued to treat the Sejm as their stock exchange. They also started to work out individually solutions after which must come a civil war with the other parties. The national democrats (the so-called National People's Union) was almost openly preparing itself to assume power, counting upon the assistance of the "Piast" [peasant party] headed by Witos. The army manifested a lack of consolidation.

Under such circumstances the communists were endowed with a grateful field of endeavor. The diversionary movement in the eastern provinces had been broken, it is true. Its last stage was the attempt at an insurrection in Wolyn province, the deadline for which had already been set. However the police destroyed the staff of the diversionists. On the other hand there began the era of flowering for the peasant national-bolshevist movement taking on more moderate forms which were also legal. Organisationally

this was incorporated into the Worker-Peasant Union (Selrob) in eastern Galicja and Wolyn provinces, whereas there was in the area of KPZE operations the Belorussian Peasant-Worker "Hromada" (colloquially known as "Hromada"). There also developed a party with an internationalist character, the so-called "Independent Peasant Party" which originated from a split within the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) "Liberation" and the secession from the latter of several Sejm deputies. This party was active mostly in the northern part of the eastern provinces and in central Poland, especially in Lublin province. In the Sejm it numbered only 6 deputies. 4 Ukrainian socialists, who obtained their seats in 1922 within the Bloc of National Minorities, transferred at the end of 1924 to the communist fraction in the Sejm. Selrob and "Hromada" also established their own Sejm fractions from the splinters of this bloc. Under such conditions the area of parliament acquired significance for the communists. In the course of 1925 Krolkowski is relieved and Lancucki is also eliminated from the Sejm and the KPP but by state authorities which send him to prison for creating disturbances. Their places are occupied at Wiejska Street by Warski and Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki.

After so many tribulations, at the fifth Comintern congress and at the third congress of his own party, Warski humbly responded to the first appeal that he represent the KPP in the Sejm. In his new position, he actually gave considerable services to his masters. Under his direction the communists became a serious element in the Sejm. Their bloc included 23 deputies: 6 from the KPP, 7 from the NPCCh, 6 from "Hromada," and 4 from Selrob. This group, not entirely harmonious, was led by the chairman of the communist fraction in the Sejm, Warski, the only person who

could talk not only with Holowacz and Prystupa in his own fraction but even with Niedzialkowski himself. The whole activity of this group was very prominently antistate and contributed to a large degree to disgracing the group in the eyes of the Sejm at that time. The height of triumph was attained by Warski in the spring of 1926 when he initiated the excursion by Polish parliamentarians to the Soviet Union. The communist fraction was not invited to attend for obvious reasons. On the other hand, members of the NPCCh with Wojewodzki and Fiderkiewicz, and what was of more importance a few members of the noncommunist peasant parties like the leader of the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe) Bryl and several of the "Liberationists" went on the trip. The delegation of "Polish Communists" appeared in front of Zinoviev and Stalin who greeted the group with cordiality and respect. This must have inspired jealousy within each communist who going to Moscow never knows whether or not he will meet with some unpleasantness while there. The entire group returned to Poland dazzled. Russia had been undergoing the period of "smyczka" (union), i.e., a friendly policy toward the peasants. Unfortunately the report by Bryl in Warsaw (at Swiss Valley) was demolished by the enemies of communism. The asking of a few questions at a rally could have had more importance for these happy individuals who had seen Zinoviev, Dzierzynski, and Unszlicht. This did not take place however.

Through the medium of the KPP club at the Sejm, it was possible to obtain certain influence also outside of Wiejska Street. The communizing Independent Socialist Labor Party came within its orbit. Despite the debatable strength of the latter, this of some significance for the communists: in the first place NSPP [Niezalezna

Socjalistyczna Partja Pracy -- Independent Socialist Labor Party] thanks to its legality could represent a cover for a series of KPP units (for instance the Warsaw Committee on Unemployment in 1926) as well as the ZMK [Zwiazok Mlodziezy Komunistycznej -- Union of Communist Youth]. What was of more importance however was the fact that the communists with the assistance of the NSPP were able to penetrate the Union of Lathe Operators and Metal Workers, which at one time had been influenced by the NPR [Niezalezna Partja Robotnicza? -- Independent Workers' Party] and later since 1924 was dominated by the syndicalists. Through this medium, the KPP was able to precipitate in August 1925 a general strike of Warsaw metal workers which was connected with a large number of street fights mainly provoked by ZMK elements.

Simultaneously the KPP commenced an attempt at terroristic activities. Under the leadership of the hysterical woman "Zoska Osinska" (nee Unslicht) a "central shock troop" was established, the principal aim of which was the "liquidation of provocateurs," i.e., in practice the secret murder of anybody who would dare leave the party's ranks or else provide the police with information. The other tasks of this shock troop included also the establishment of a "self defense," designated for disarming policemen. Wladyslaw Hubner became leader of the shock brigade. He had formerly been a member of the PPS before the war but then underwent special training in Russia. The first concrete task given this "idealistic" man was the killing of a police official, a certain Cechnowski, who had rendered outstanding service in the discovery of the terrorist gang headed by Baginski-Wieczorkiewicz. Cechnowski had the misfortune of having been a "renegade communist" who a few years earlier had even been a member of the KPP committee in Warsaw.

Hubner's plans misfired because of his two assistants, members of the ZMK. They were both common and not too courageous bums from Wola, Kniewski and Rutkowski. When they were standing on watch to finger Cechnowski, another police agent asked to see their papers. It was then that the 2 began shooting blindly without any provocation, killing and wounding several innocent pedestrians. A chase which was organized on the spot led to the arrest of the two terrorists and their trial before a court. The severe judgment under martial law, sentencing them to death, finished the plans of the KPP central committee at that time. The communists had hoped that by armed demonstrations they would be able to incite the proletariat to revolutionary struggle. Thus ended the communist-terrorist activity of the KPP for the time being.

During this period a new crisis took place within the KPP, this time of an ultra leftist nature, caused to a considerable degree by the changes in leadership. During the month of May in 1925 the Warsaw security authorities uncovered the so-called "bureau" of the central committee, i.e., a meeting of the most important "district activists" with the central committee's Secretariat. Among others arrested at this time were the following Politburo members belonging to the highest directing group within the central committee: Leon Purman and Franciszek Grzelszczak. Full authority over the KPP now found its way into the hands of the ultra left wing 3, i.e., Domski, Skulski, and Osinska. "Hurrah" leftist direction of the party now began which several months later had to be liquidated by the Comintern itself.

Immediately following the third KPP congress, the Comintern executive warned the KPP about the necessity of fighting not only

against the right wing but also against the ultra leftists. At the same time Bordiga was removed from leadership of the Italian communist party which nota bene was completely disorganized. The KPP central committee did not pay any attention to this but instead passed a resolution which was described by the Comintern as "ultra leftist" and antiComintern.

What was the actual transgression of the central committee this time? It is difficult for one not initiated into the secrets of the communist Talmud to understand all of these internal quarrels among the communists. The specific terminology of the communists themselves increases the difficulty of finding one's bearings. Adhering eternally to their scientific formulas, the communists see in each difference between 2 comrades -- not to mention 2 cliques -- a world wide manifestation if not one having cosmic significance. Basically the key helping to unravel all of these altercations is the following: the attitude of the Russian bolsheviks toward a given matter and the relationship of a given group or communist movement toward the Russian bolsheviks. This principle is decisive. All others represent a bluff, masquerade, or secondary factors. The so-called ultra left wing crisis, about which I shall speak, is an even clearer illustration of this than was the preceding right wing crisis.

The political situation of 1925 was evaluated by the Comintern as representing "a partial stabilization of capitalism" connected with a growth in reactionary or fascist tendencies throughout all of Europe. It also found, nota bene rightly so, the "danger" of a decrease in communist influence. This evaluation resulted in the necessity for undertaking a revision of communist tactics proclaimed

by the fifth Comintern congress in favor of so-called "revolutionary maneuvering" tactics which were imposed upon the communist parties of Europe. In the first place this pertained to Germany, France, and England.

During the spring of 1925 elections of a new president took place, after the death of the socialist president Ebert. These elections indicated a strong shift in German public opinion to the right. The communists estimated this in a primitive manner and not corresponding with reality as a growth of monarchist sentiment and striving for a restoration of the Hohenzollerns. Four candidates fought the battle to occupy the chair left by Ebert: the united rightists under Hindenburg, the center (Catholic party) with Marx, the socialist Braun (premier of the Prussian government), and the communist Thalman who is currently Hitler's prisoner. It should be mentioned that in Germany the president is elected by a plebiscite. During the second more precise balloting the communists maintained their separate candidate although they knew well that this would aid the victory of Hindenburg. They did this in accord with the resolutions of the fifth Comintern congress as well as of their own party congress, which had denounced all electoral blocs and ordered the preservation of independence and separateness of the communist appearance. Then suddenly Moscow ordered the withdrawal of the communist candidate at the second balloting and support of Braun, because (1) he would have a chance of being elected; (2) the workers' masses would be convinced that communists were seriously fighting against monarchism; and (3) the "Rapallo" foreign policy of Germany (oriented toward Russia) would undergo a strengthening since the social democrats were supporting the foreign policy of Rathenau. This last motive was the most important.

However the communist party of Germany did not agree to this, as a result of which the social democrats withdrew their candidate and gave their votes to the clerical candidate Marx who was unpopular in social democratic circles. A very large number of voters did not go to the polls, and Hindenburg was elected. The communists were in troubled waters. The left wing part of the German communist party leadership continued to defend its position, repeating continually that "there can be no agreements with the betrayers of the working class -- the social democrats etc." (they had been taught this for several years) and charging the Comintern with opportunism. Moscow initiated repressions with regard to the obstinate ones. The left wing part of the central committee headed by Scholem, Katz, and Rosenberg was removed from the leadership. Another group with Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and Thalmann (parenthetically speaking, apart from Thalmann, all of these in both groups were Jews) admitted its errors and remained to direct the party. It began to fix the mistake by entering into an agreement with the social democratic parliamentary fraction. The KPP central committee of course came to the assistance of the left wing, attacking Ruth Fischer's group and even the Comintern for opportunistic tactics.

A similar situation developed at the same time in France during the elections to municipal councils. However the French leadership although also left wing was more obedient. At the order of Moscow it withdrew its candidates from the districts where there was danger of a nationalist (Poincare, Tardieu) victory, and as a result the French communists gave their votes for socialist candidates. The latter reciprocated in districts where communists candidates had greater chances of winning. Here again the KPP central committee intruded by issuing in June 1925 a special resolution against the

pernicious opportunism of the French communist party. This was of course an indirect attack upon Moscow, connected with a very poor idea as to the latter's national interests.

In England an Anglo-Soviet committee was established with membership consisting of representatives from English trade unions and Soviet labor unions. The English communists stopped all fight against the "social traitors" and the "leaders of world social compromise." This bloc represented a typical example of united front tactics from "above." At that time the Soviets were very interested in maintaining good relations with the "compromisers." The latter in case of a victory by the Labour Party [See Note] would occupy a decisive position within the government of England. The KPP central committee was able to maintain silence in this matter, despite the fact that this was the tactics of a united front from above. The reason for this silence was clear: the KPP central committee understood that the interests of Soviet Russia, which could not be endangered under any circumstances, were at stake. It did not however glean USSR interests in the German and French affairs and subsequently had to pay dearly for this lack of foresight.

([Note] This took place finally in the summer of 1929. The first government of MacDonald had already collapsed in the fall of 1924. The reason for this was the interception by the English police of a letter from Zinoviev to the central committee of the British communist party ordering the latter to commence agitation in the army and fleet. This letter evoked indignation on the part of English public opinion. The conservatives went to the polls under the slogan of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviets and achieved a tremendous victory. These relations were really severed for almost 6 years, i.e., up to 1930.)

Next the KPP central committee attacked the communist party of Bulgaria because of opportunism which had committed some kind of a sin from the viewpoint of communist dogma. It is difficult to ascertain on the basis of communist documentation what this mistake was all about. Apparently some part was played by the dynamiting by the Bulgarian communists in April 1925 of the cathedral at Sophia which was denied by the Bulgarian communist party. The KPP central committee evaluated the position of the Bulgarian communists in the Sophia crime as being opportunistic and attacked the communist party of Bulgaria in its June resolution.

The attitude of the KPP central committee with regard to the foregoing matters was ultra leftist in the eyes of the Comintern. Therefore immediately after announcement of the June resolution by the KPP central committee, the Comintern responded with its own statement denouncing that resolution as antibolshevik. However the Comintern statement never reached the Polish communist party, because its central committee concealed it. Moscow immediately ordered two of the most prominent of the central committee leaders, i.e., Domaski and Skulski, to appear and abused them in what was again called a "Polish Commission."

Unfortunately despite considerable efforts it was impossible to find a protocol for the sessions of this Commission. Even the communists themselves know very little about it. It is no secret however among the most prominent party members that at the Commission meeting Stalin, Zinoviev, Dzierszynski, and Manuilsky railed against the "Polish leaders" calling them the worst fools and treating them like youngsters. Zinoviev, who screamed the most at this Commission, almost called Domaski a provocateur. It finally ended

with Dowski's removal from the leadership and exile in Moscow. Later he was sent somewhere near the Volga from where he emerged as an historian of literature several years later. Skulski humbled himself before the Commission and returned to Poland but with a black mark on his record, i.e., in the form of a resolution sharply condemning the antibolshevik policies of the KPP central committee (his own) and with the order to call an immediate conference on the basis of the special letter from the Comintern denouncing the ultra leftist leadership. Skulski was relieved by the police of the unpleasant mission of liquidating his own policies, because soon after his return to Poland he was arrested together with the secretary of the KPZE central committee "Artur" (Lazar Aronsztam alias Czerniak, currently a Soviet general at Smolensk) and jailed at Mokotow prison in Warsaw, where he stayed during the entire "storm" (allegedly delighted). He finally returned to the USSR in the 1928 exchange of political prisoners and again emerged at the top of the KPP.

This new political turnover took place entirely apart from the will or consciousness of the KPP masses. The majority of the latter simply did not know about it. Despite this fact, it did possess considerable significance since with the fall of Dowski the second relatively independent phase within the KPP, as the product of communist thought in Poland, was ended. From that time on, almost every single thought was eradicated unless it were a translation from Soviet publications.

In December of 1925 the fourth KPP conference met at Moscow. It is clear that there was no question of elections to it. Some 27 delegates from only 8 out of a total of 16 KPP districts were convened: Poznan, Krakow, Kielce, Czestochowa, Pomorz, Plock,

Piotrkow, Radom had no representation. (The large contraction in KPP work during 1925 is explained to a considerable extent by the energetic action of the Warsaw police which was able to arrest many prominent party members in April and May). Besides the foregoing, there were also 11 delegates with advisory votes.

At this conference Waraski again came to the surface. In Nowy Przegląd he defined the bankruptcy of all KPP authorities very well:

"The right wing leadership group, having lost its authority in the party, was broken up at the fifth Comintern congress and ceased to exist after falling apart. The ultra leftist leadership group went bankrupt soon after the third congress and was scattered almost on the doorstep of the fourth party conference. The KPP remained without any kind of leadership group. However without a leadership group, there can be no party."

Therefore within the party complete chaos reigned. Waraski was delighted with the bankruptcy of his enemies and stated:

"However the party could not defeat the ultra leftist crisis, because suddenly and unexpectedly it fell on the party's head just prior to the conference." (Nowy Przegląd, 1926, pages 775-776).

It must be admitted that this crisis really did take the party by surprise and led to chaos which strongly influenced also the fourth conference. In each matter, the Comintern representative was consulted (i.e., the Russians) so as not to fall into a new heresy. In the meanwhile the Kremlin masters only had time enough in this instance to nominate the new KPP leadership, leaving other Polish affairs in its hands. This was a very troublesome period

in Soviet history. The peasant in Russia began to raise his head and by means of economic pressure (nondelivery of grain to the state) tried to dictate a series of conditions. Stalin who was the cleverest of all Soviet statesmen began to flirt with the peasantry which tactics brought him into conflict with Zinoviev and Kameniev. The latter had the support of the Russian communist party organizations with the largest numbers of workers: that of Leningrad in total, parts of those in Moscow, Kharkov, Baku, as well as a considerable portion of the Communist Youth Union. Apart from this Trotsky had again commenced an attack against the Stalinist clique, wanting to assume power by himself. This struggle also influenced the fate of the KPP: the ultra left wing led by Donski openly supported the Zinoviev group. Therefore Stalin was compelled to remove it from control over the KPP as soon as possible, since the KPP was one of the most important sections of the Comintern. In the introduction to the resolutions of the fourth conference, this was of course explained differently:

"Haste in convening the conference was necessitated primarily because our party had lived through an ultra leftist crisis after the third congress which led to a conflict between the party leadership and the Comintern."

(Uchwały IV Konferencji KPP [Resolutions of the Fourth KPP Conference]).

The same thing was stated later in the Comintern resolution of March 1926:

"The KPP during this period went through a series of heavy crises. The ultra leftist mistakes of the leadership almost ruined the party." (Nowy Przegląd, 1926, page 904).

The political resolution of the fourth conference mercilessly denounced the attempts by Domski to achieve independence of the Comintern. Concerning the ultra left wing crisis, this resolution reads as follows:

"At the time when the executive of the Communist International, in order to bring the communist parties closer to the broad proletarian masses and attain their confidence, launched a struggle against the ultra leftist tendencies within its individual sections -- the KPP central committee under the influence of Domski began fighting this policy of the executive. Comrade Domski after the third congress did not break away in fact from the position of the ultra leftists, expressing itself in opposition to 'Russian communism': in the name of 'Western communism'; in an antiBolshevik tendency; in revolutionary phraseology; in pseudorevolutionary broken off from any contact with tangible conditions in the struggle of the proletariat; in the approach to communist party tasks; as well as in combatting the tactics of the Communist International, the tactics of a united front, and revolutionary maneuvering. Comrade Domski exploited his post in the party for the purpose of strengthening the stand of the ultra leftists internationally and primarily in Germany." (pages 9-10 of the Resolutions).

Domski's sin was based on the fact that he had dared to fathom these matters with his own mind, although judgment on them had already been passed by the Comintern. Of course nothing could ever come of this. A concrete description of this mistake has been formulated as follows:

"The June resolution of the central committee, for which responsibility should be assumed first of all by Comrade Domski,

accused the International as well as its most important sections (the communist parties of Germany, France, and Bulgaria) of an alleged turn to the right. This was an ultra leftist fractional attack upon the Communist International and its leadership. It was directed against the concrete maneuvers in policy which had been applied in Germany and France as a necessity, resulting from the international situation (partial stabilization of capitalism, the monarchist danger in Germany, the threat of a right wing reaction in France, etc.)." (page 10 of Resolutions).

It will be of interest to many readers how a resolution adopted by an entire central committee of a party unanimously can be treated as a fractional attack. The Comintern fundamentally, like the First International (Marx and Bakunin, 1864-1872) but in contrast to the socialist internationals, does not consider itself to be a union of different autonomous national or state parties but rather as a single international party with sections in different countries (thus on each appeal issued by the KPP immediately under the heading "Communist Party of Poland" appeared the inscription in parentheses "Section of the Communist International"). In practice this came down to the fact that the entire International represented one Russian party, officially bearing the name All-Union Communist Party (WKP), which only externally manifests itself as the Comintern (Communist International) but really is merely the central office for WKP foreign branches. An attack by any one of the sections against the party at the center, even though it should have the approval of the entire given section, is still considered logically enough as a fractional attack.

The resolution by the fourth conference enumerated a whole litany of errors committed by the ultra leftist line which had expressed themselves in:

(1) "an erroneous concept of party autonomy" in separation from the masses which threatened to transform it into a closed sect;

(2) "propagandization," i.e., a lack of knowing how to connect the struggle with the experience of the masses;

(3) a mechanical contrasting of the united front tactics at the bottom with the same tactics from above, a lack of differentiation between the masses and the leaders of social democracy, the theory of a "single reactionary mass" according to which everybody besides the communists is in the counter revolutionary camp (the bolsheviks themselves thought up this theory in 1918; "who is not with us is against us" -- it appears most brutally in the writings of Dzierzynski as a motive for terrorism);

(4) accepting from the fifth Comintern congress only the ultra leftist slogan: "a united front solely from below;"

(5) the most shameful error -- "lack of confidence in the leadership of the Communist International and in the guiding role of the Russian communist party."

This resolution represents a kind of abbreviated diplomatic textbook on communism -- "Leninism." The first obvious impression is that there is no difference between the "ultra leftists" and the official version of Leninism ideologically but merely in tactics. This however is sufficient since for Leninism tactical and organizational problems, primarily the relationship toward the central headquarters of the movement (i.e., the USSR), are of fundamental significance.

An interesting development later took place in the communist world in connection with the already mentioned theory of "a single

reactionary mass." Today in 1934 the Marxist analysis of the capitalist world, based upon the foregoing theory, appears to be an anomaly deprived of any logic. According to this theory in the contemporary world there are no longer any competitive struggles between the capitalists or among the individual bourgeois states, because the development of capitalism has led to the rule over the world by a "unified finance capital" which is the capitalism of the large world banks closely connected with world-wide trusts and cartels. To this international capitalism are subordinate all of the states in the world. It has swept away the old political system of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois democracy, and substituted its own "international fascism." At the tail of the latter is located the old enemy of revolution, "social compromise" which has been transformed into "social fascism." The characteristic of this whole world is planning: planned economic life, planned exploitation of the factory worker (rationalization of work), planned political systems (the fascist hierarchy), planned political life itself in which all of the "bourgeois" parties serve a single goal, i.e., by fulfilling the same role on different sectors, they attract various parts of the working masses away from the influence of the latter's champion -- the communist parties and the USSR. This complete and "horrible machine" of the bourgeoisie serves world finance capital and world imperialism, which again has designated for each of the states a certain definite role. Poland was given the "honorable" part of provoking a war against the USSR, since the former represents the "vanguard of the world bourgeoisie on the anticommunist front." The representatives of finance capital have indicated similar roles for the individual political movements in Poland. Thus Marshal Pilsudski plays the part of fascist

leader, whereas the national democrats have a different role (the fascist reserve intended to replace "pilsudakiism"), still another is the PPS Revolutionary Fraction. Then we see the "hypocritical role of the democratic opposition" played by the PPS, and finally the left wing of the social democracy has obtained a definite part -- that of an enemy of communism. If we should add to this the ever growing militarism, the authority of the police, and the "ever sharper terror," it must appear odd how the Communist Party of Poland has been able to maintain itself to date against this concentration of enemies.

Of course a similar conception of the world, as if it were a puppet spectacle, does not remain the exclusive possession of the communists in Poland but of world communism in general. (As a matter of fact, this is "developed" or rather parodied by Bukharin from a concept of W. Sombart about "organized capitalism" or "connected" ("super capitalism")). However on Polish soil this is looked upon most favorably by those circles. The source of these delusions and their mechanism for this spectacle, imagined by the communists, is located in the lack of independence by the individual communist parties. The latter of necessity must accept such a spiritual nourishment as is provided for them through the medium of the Comintern of the WKP. The WKP in defending its fatherland, the "fatherland of the proletariat and of all prosperity and progress," establishes unusual theories according to which the duty of each communist party is to support this oasis of socialism in every way possible, including armed combat against its own state.

Returning to the fourth conference, I want to emphasize that the KPP central committee also received a sharp rebuke because it:

had applied organizational and political sanctions against the KPZU central committee. The latter had been an exception among all of the organizations subordinate to the KPP in speaking out against the June resolution by the ultra left wing. For a certain period of time the Ukrainians were praised for their comprehension of bolshevik interests. Later we will see how these unbending bolsheviks came to be "counterrevolutionaries of the worst type."

The fourth conference also denounced the terrorist aspects of the ultra leftists. Of course in the resolutions this is mentioned very cautiously and vaguely:

"A great error and danger threatening the party with breaking away from the masses were the deviations in the field of combatting the provocateurs. These mistakes were based upon the propagation of illusions to the effect that individual acts of personal terrorism represent an "active struggle against provocation arousing the masses from their passivity" and able to substitute the plague of provocation in place of the struggle by these masses." (page 13 of Resolutions).

The position of the KPP with regard to terror deserves of special explanation. That party accepted to a certain degree in its heritage from the SDKPiL an aversion to this method of combat. On the other hand the bolsheviks in Russia had a propensity toward it already beginning with 1905. (Dzierzynski and Stalin themselves started out as unusual fighters using these methods). In postwar Poland terror found good soil for development in the KPP and ZMK due to the aggressive traditions of the entire socialist movement, traditions which would often degenerate due to the low cultural and political level on the part of some of the proletariat in general.

Today externally the KPP does not recognize terror but only "self defense." These are of course merely verbal gymnastics. Until 1930 incidents of communist secret executions were quite frequently multiplying although of a sporadic character. It was only at the end of 1930 that we observe a return to the gangland attitudes from the period of Zoska Unszlicht. Circular letters from the KPP at that time openly praise "self defense," the elimination of provocateurs and spies." A separate division of this terror is represented by "economic terror" in the trade unions which often assumed threatening proportions as for instance in the Warsaw ghetto. Political elements even of a subversive nature are found very seldom here. It was in essence criminal or so-called "wet work." Communist groups would force small entrepreneurs to discharge workers who happened to be inconvenient for the KPP and replace them with their own proteges (at times this protection costs money). They would compel the payment of charges for ransom and initiate strikes in competitive enterprises in return for compensation. However the KPP circulars glorify this entire work. Communist terror frequently is directed against the representatives of other workers' parties which in turn provokes acts of bloody revenge. Such was the background in the murder of the Warsaw communist Wiktor Bialy (1924) who was later made into a party martyr by his comrades in the communist movement.

Among those who execute party verdicts there are at times idealists, or fanatics, but often the latter are implemented by psychopaths (e.g., Luksemburg, the murderer of the prominent "Bundist" activist Najerman in December 1931) or by common criminals. Not infrequently, a party judgment has as its basis a private grudge. In general it is often hard to distinguish the motivation for murders

by communist activists, because the KPP itself is corroded with the poison of mutual accusations concerning provocation. Acts of personal vengeance on this background occur frequently, whereas the atmosphere of reciprocal suspicion has attained dimensions hitherto unknown in any other political party. Today the settling of party accounts within the KPP has achieved considerable improvement. A man suspected of "provocation," i.e., apostasy to the party, is lured deceitfully to the USSR and then handed over to the GPU which takes care of him "in its own way." Many among those sent to the USSR, for the most part accused unjustly, are shot or at best deported to Siberia. We could cite numerous concrete instances of such deportations.

Coming back to the fourth conference, it should be noted that its deliberations had as their purpose the final burial of the left wing since the rightists ("3 W's") had been overthrown previously. The resolutions by the conference indicate that:

"The fourth conference ascertains that at the given moment the whole party must be concentrated primarily upon fighting against ultra leftist deviations which threaten the party with breaking away from the masses." (page 19 of Resolutions).

The evaluation of the political situation in Poland, as presented by this conference, attests the complete lack of any insight by KPP authorities. These leaders had lost their political compass and repeated foolishly the formula of Zinoviev: "that Poland from a vassal of France had become a vassal of England." It should be mentioned that Zinoviev boasted that his thesis was based upon detailed information from Soviet intelligence. The communist wise men in the KPP attempted to substantiate this

espionage information "theoretically" and endow it with Marxist scientific form. The Locarno Pact was estimated as isolating Poland internationally and as an indication of an early attack against her by Germany. It is true that there were some individuals among the communists who expressed an opinion that in case of an attack by Germany upon Poland, the communists should defend the latter's borders just like the Parisian communards fought in defense of Paris against the Prussians in 1871. However these honest persons were officially denounced by the party as being national bolshevist. Their stand of course was completely at variance with USSR policy at that time which was allied with Germany.

After the Locarno Pact the communists were convinced that "all bourgeois and petit bourgeois parties were enveloped with a pessimism and a lack of faith in Poland's future" (page 19 of Resolutions). The master Warski was even of the impression that the KPP, similarly as it had done at the second congress, should take a stand as the guarantor of Polish independence. Again revolution is mentioned "which alone can secure genuine independence for Poland" (page 21 of Resolutions), even though this independence was deprived of any independent character. We read in the resolution that:

"The worker-communist differs from any other worker by his attitude toward the current Polish state. These masses understand the independence of Poland in a bourgeois manner... The worker in the PPS and the NRP wants to defend that independence, the rule and the entire Polish state which is... along the lines of the bourgeois concept: My country right or wrong, it is my country (as the Englishmen say).

"For the KPP there can be no defense of Poland without a revolution by the proletariat... neither can there be any guarantee of state independence for the Polish nation without... assurance (for the eastern and southeastern provinces -- author's comment) of self determination including the right of secession by means of revolution in Poland, which means the annexation of those areas to the fatherland of Soviet republics.

"Any concessions by the KPP on this basis to Polish nationalism would represent a voluntary compromise with the bourgeoisie, not permissible for the communists." (pages 27-28 of the Resolutions).

The independence of Poland, as formulated by the communists at their fourth conference, was supposed to be an "independence" under Russian occupation and even connected with a partition of Poland by means of annexing the eastern provinces, Wolyn, and Eastern Galicja! (One of the participants at the fourth conference, Tradycja (Stanislaw Budzynski), when he proposed the slogan of autonomy for so-called western Belorussia, was screamed down and denounced. Later the poor man had to explain himself). The concept of independence was polemized there only for the purpose of making it more difficult to comprehend the essential aims of the Comintern. This did not prevent Warski however from boasting later in the press and in the Sejm that the KPP was the defender of Poland's independence. But even the resolution of the fourth conference in connection with this unusually conceived of independence after a few years, when the left wing will again attain control, will be thrown into the wastepaper basket as being a national bolshevik idea. Bother with independence! will be the words of Lenski (and rightly so -- of course with "such" independence).

When designating the tactical party line for the immediate period of time, the fourth conference proceeded from the assumption that:

"The situation in Poland of the nobility and bourgeoisie is a catastrophe but does not as yet represent an immediate revolutionary one." (page 31 of Resolutions).

For this reason the tactical indications are quite cautious:

"... the hopeless crisis in industry, the lack of work, and the wild price spiral at the present moment represent the central link which the party must seize upon in order not to break away from the masses and in order to stand at their head."

The most important party task becomes the fight against the PPS:

"Announcing the slogan: 'Down with the government in which capitalists, landowners, and PPS leaders sit' (while these latter are ministers) or under the slogan: Down with the government of capitalists and landowners, supported by the PPS" (if the latter are outside of the government) and countering with a slogan for a worker-peasant government, the party should very cautiously investigate the situation ever anew and closely observe the relations and changes among the working classes, watch each movement by enemy classes and parties, investigate their reciprocal relationships in order that when the current crisis will begin to change into an immediate revolutionary situation, the party will be able to immediately realize itself and place before the masses new demands which are connected with the direct organization of the revolution."
(page 38 of Resolutions).

New hopes for a rapid communist revolution were resurrected however, and the calculations of the conference had their basis in the approaching struggle between the "rightist" (national democratic) and "leftist" (Pilsudskite) wings of fascism. The bankrupt leader of the communist left wing, Dowski, proposed that "in case there should come an armed clash between the two groups striving toward a dictatorship, the communists should not be afraid to support the Sulejowek elements," which he had railed against at the third KPP congress. He thought that in such a manner it would be possible to continue and sharpen the struggle within Polish society, and later to enter upon the arena as the proverbial "third" force which wins. However the fourth conference rejected this proposal in great anger, considering that the KPP should act as an independent force from the very start. We shall see later what actually happened.

The fourth conference liquidating all ultra left deviations also reviewed the position taken by the third congress regarding trade unions. This subject was reported on at the fourth conference by Adam Landy, using the pseudonym "Witkowski." (Adam Landy was arrested several times for subversive activities by security authorities in Warsaw, but each time unknown powers interceded, so that he was always released on bail during the investigation. Upon release he would return to subversive work). At his suggestion a line was accepted toward unity in the trade unions, liquidation of communist ones and their integration into general class unions, in order to base subversive work in them not only upon the "red fractions" but upon the "broad leftist opposition." From the latter we have today's "trade union left wing" which is unable to develop into a mass scope but does weigh down upon many class unions like an anchor, contributing harm of course by its unforeseeable action (continuous appeal for strikes) to the workers organized into these unions.

In the agrarian field the fourth conference prepared only a few new slogans like: "the worker is unemployed because the peasant has no land;" "the worker is unemployed because the rule by the nobility and bourgeoisie closes access to markets for Polish industry" [See Note]; "the peasant will not obtain any land without the help of workers, and the worker will remain unemployed until the peasant acquires land, until he raises himself from his poverty and becomes the recipient of urban industrial products" (pages 23, 65 and 66 of Resolutions). Such a fundamental problem as the price of agricultural commodities, [the raising of] which would enable the peasant to reach a higher level of consumption, is completely alien to the communists. Their entire agricultural policy can be brought down to slogans that are purely agitational and are the expression of the Leninist concept for a "worker-peasant alliance," i.e., an idea which actually represents a series of swindles vis a vis the peasants.

((Note] What is this? According to Marx and Lenin, the entire content of bourgeois life can be boiled down to the struggle for markets: by this phenomenon are explained imperialism, wars, colonial expeditions, and other types of humbug for the poor nation. The KPP probably wants to say that the Polish nobility and bourgeoisie are incapable of fulfilling their class mission, and thus it is better to slaughter them and substitute KPP members. The great majority of the latter, because of their race, manifests prominent commercial talents.)

Most difficult for the fourth conference was the evolution of a new party leadership. All of the old and new leaders had compromised themselves in the eyes of the Comintern. The one exception was Lenski who, during the entire time of ideological

gymnastics, was confined in prison and was thus unable to travel "astray with the Domskites" as the ultra leftists were called. There was fear of accepting the old right wing leaders back, since:

"... there existed the clear apprehension that as a result of simple bankruptcy by the ultra left, the right would return to the leadership similarly to the way in which the bankruptcy of the right led to an ultra leftist leadership." (Nowy Przegląd, page 775).

Thus wrote Warski. Under such circumstances, various members of the center group obnoxiously pushed themselves as candidates for central committee membership. They had not participated either in the left or right, or else in both directions simultaneously. In this connection, claims were laid at the conference by Tadeusz Zaraki ("Osakar," "Czerwiec"). Warski wrote with irony about these centerists:

"It is true that several of the members from the former central committee wanted to fill this emptiness with words. They differed from the ultra leftist group in that they also had participated most actively in the rightist deviations and that they had also taken a most active part in the deviations of the ultra leftist group. Due to the foregoing they were in a more fortunate position than others in that they could reject not one but both of these movements. However they were in error when thinking that a mere verbal denunciation of such manifold capabilities would suffice for them to enter into the role of the new leadership group and to pass out to the right and to the left patents for bolshevism." (Nowy Przegląd, page 777).

In the end, as usual in the KPP, the leadership was designated after lengthy deliberations by the WKP Politburo. Its core represented a kind of coalition with the following as members: Warski and Prochniak from the former right wing, Lenski and Bogucki (a completely russified Pole from Bialystok, at one time an official in Soviet Belorussia, and currently a Soviet bureaucrat in a subordinate position) from the left wing, Stefanski from the ultra leftists, Jan Paszyn ("Czarny") and Krajewski from the center, as well as Wasilkiw-Krylyk from the KPZU and Korczyk-Lohynowicz from the KPZB. The sole criterion in making up this odd combination was the attitude of its members to Russian affairs, i.e., the absolute support for the group of Stalin and Bukharin against Zinoviev and Trotsky. That this unharmonized company would commence to quarrel in connection with the first more important party matter, Moscow did not particularly care. The main thing was that the KPP central committee should support Stalin's position in the USSR.

The fourth party conference transferred leadership (Politburo) headquarters to Danzig. Between the fifth congress and the fourth conference, the Politburo had resided in Warsaw.

CHAPTER V

During the first months of 1926, KPP activity became more lively despite the unharmonized leadership. This was a disadvantageous moment for Poland. The tremendous wave of discontent inside of the country began to raise the KPP. During the first quarter in that year many localities reported serious disturbances because of unemployment, etc. The leadership role in these was frequently assumed by the KPP as was the case in Ostrowiec and Kalisz (where it was directed by a few independent socialists completely dependent upon the KPP). In certain intellectual circles communism started to become fashionable. In Warsaw student rallies called by the communists were able to attract several hundred sympathizers each. However the communists had already begun at that time to fear the power within the mentioned wave of discontent. The new party leadership, without any unity internally, attempted to obtain bearings in the situation. Despite its talent for seeing into the future, it was unable to prophesy what would happen. In its political evaluations, the central committee accepted for the most part the theory improvised at the fourth conference concerning the 2 fascisms: rightist (national democrats) and leftist (Pilsudskism).

"Two matters designate today's social and political movement in Poland's development: the bankruptcy of the Sejm and of the coalition government as well as the rapid growth of fascism."
(page 856).

Thus wrote Lenski in Nowy Przegląd for March 1926. However he had hopes that the threat of fascism was not so great, because:

"Polish fascism is characterized by a lack of that uniformity possessed by Italian fascism at the time when it was marching to power ..."

"If Pilsudski is followed, apart from the broad circles of officers, by the segments of petit bourgeoisie, peasantry, and working intelligentsia who still do not see the solution through a revolution and want to substitute in place of the revolution a well rehearsed coup d'etat, then in back of the national democratic generals is the band of landowners and capitalists desiring (each participant in his own way) to throw all of the "sanacja" burdens upon the shoulders not only of the working class and the poor peasantry but also upon almost the entire peasant class and the petit bourgeoisie." (Ibid., page 858).

It would appear from the foregoing that leftist fascism would be perhaps preferable to that of the right wing. However as Lenski adds, Pilsudski would provide merely "a few thousand jobs," "an agrarian reform on paper," "a democracy at attention," "support of the bourgeoisie less decidedly than the national democrats," and finally a "change from the French horse to an English one." The leaders of the KPP would not accept the idea that Poland could attain an autonomous and independent policy, constantly raving about Poland's dependence upon an anti-Soviet bloc led by either France or England. This false thesis by the communist leaders had more than once led them to cardinal errors in their evaluation of Polish reality and foreign policy. It has come down today where the communists do not comprehend the foreign policy of their own country, the USSR. In secret they castigate once Radek then again Stalin, but so quietly that nobody in Moscow can hear these criticisms.

In the end Lenski finished this completely foolish talk with a very peculiar conclusion:

"We do not care at the moment to establish which camp has more of a chance to attain power, in what manner it will approach this goal, and whether there might be a compromise between the two. Different roads may lead to Rome, if the revolution does not upset plans." (Ibid., page 859).

Instead of looking into the eyes of reality and instead of undertaking at least some kind of a serious analysis, Lenski covers up the entire picture of actual conditions in Poland with the magical word "revolution" but disregards the fact that neither he himself nor his generation will see this revolution.

On the very day before the May coup d'etat, despite certain organizational attainments, one could note with special clarity how completely alien was the KPP not only with regard to the whole Polish society but even to the masses of its own adherents. The leadership of the KPP was and still is hounding Marshal Pilsudski in its mad hatred. To them he is the personification of the prewar struggle for independence as well as the struggle for permanence by the Poland of today -- "imperialism" as it is called in their jargon. However a large number of communists not belonging to the Politburo and not having good positions with the Gosplan in Moscow or the "Wniesztorz" in Warsaw (like Surawicz, Heimanowna, Okret, and others) saw in Marshal Pilsudski the leader of the world of labor in Poland. Under the influence of this attitude toward Marshal Pilsudski, the secretary of the KPP Lublin OK [Okregowy Komitet -- District Committee] with the pseudonym "Bartek," whose real name was Kazimierz Lepa and who was a student and the son of a Warsaw shoe maker, proposed nothing less than the enunciation of a central tactical slogan: "Long live a worker-peasant government headed by Pilsudski." [See Note]. Consternation developed at communist headquarters,

the more so because voices of this type were being heard more frequently among the communist masses. In this matter Warski spoke up and presented a thesis called "Pilsudskiism" which was approved unanimously by the Politburo in April 1926. This thesis represents the most important document with regard to the position of the KPP immediately prior to the May coup d'etat. At the beginning Warski attempted to deal slightly with the importance of Marshal Pilsudski, heaping abuse upon him like "megalomaniac," "apart from army affairs nothing interests him," etc. Suddenly however, he added:

((Note). This concept was very popular among intellectual and student circles close to communism and loosely connected with the KPP or the ZMK as well as in the communist branches like the NPCh. Many of its adherents later joined the state camp (Tadeusz Warynski, member of the Independent Socialist Labor Party's central committee). One of the KPP leaders Jerzy Ryng (Heryng) flirted not only with Marshal Pilsudski but even with former President Wojciechowski, whom he called the Polish ... "Wilson," in the legal communist press (Kultura Robotnicza [Workers' Culture]).)

"The name of Pilsudski becomes ever more the banner of leftist opposition parties.

"Pilsudski again is attaining considerable popularity among the peasants and even among a large part of the workers."

Warski indicated that among the left wing parties which represented the opposition in the Sejm (the PPS alliance with the Chjeno-Piast peasant group had collapsed), there existed the fear that "Pilsudskiism" would be a form of "Kerenskyism." The theses also include an interesting conversation with Niedzialkowski:

"For example during the crisis within the coalition (at the end of March) Sejm deputy Niedzialkowski from the PPS asked Warski directly how the communists would react to a possible dictatorship by Pilsudski. In this connection he, Niedzialkowski, spoke out against dictatorship."

In his theses Warski propounds that the proposal of announcing the slogan of a worker-peasant government led by Pilsudski is not justified, because such a project would not destroy the current illusions but would rather deepen them and demoralize the entire KPP. As far as the tactics of the latter were concerned, the theses only repeat the same ideas prevalent at the end of 1923:

"... we support the struggle of democratic elements and do not exclude Pilsudskism, providing that they actively combat fascism in defense of democratic-republican institutions and worker-peasant demands. We must ascertain in public that we are not only prepared to refrain from interfering but will even support any leftist-democratic government which will take up the struggle for the above demands."

The final conclusions are quite optimistic:

"At any rate we believe that we are living through an episode at the present time, the essence of which is based upon the struggle between Pilsudski and the generals opposing him, between the masses supporting Pilsudskism and fascism, between the radical as well as democratic petit bourgeoisie and the nobility with the bourgeoisie.

In this struggle we, as the third and independent camp, having in view our general aims must attempt to increase the pressure of the masses upon their leaders toward a real struggle against fascism for the power to implement the demands of the worker and peasant masses. This will be the best way of unmasking these leaders."

From the viewpoint of Leninist theory this was probably the most heretical document ever issued by the KPP. During the era of "capitalism's collapse" and the "social revolution," the communists were declaring their support for a government of "democratic deceit," standing in defense of democratic-republican institutions which according to Lenin are merely organs of the bourgeois dictatorship. The communists expected that a petit bourgeois government would arise, which again according to bolshevik historiography is completely impossible. Even if it were to arise, it would still only represent a cover for the bourgeois dictatorship. In the meanwhile the KPP expected that it would take up the "struggle for worker-peasant demands" and the "active combatting of fascism." There is not a word about the artificial theory of "two fascisms" in this document, since this title is attached to national democracy exclusively, whereas "Pilsudskism" is equated with the "radical democratic petit bourgeoisie."

It should be explained here in any event that both "petit bourgeoisie" and "fascism" are words in the communist jargon with an insulting connotation. However, of the two "fascism" is the more juicy affront. Among the Marxists it is understood in terms of social reaction with an antagonistic attitude toward the worker.

Looking at the matter organizationally during the first half of 1926 the KPP possessed an extensive and relatively serious basis for influence and not at all only upon the most ignorant masses of the proletariat which can be said of subsequent years and even concerning the present time. In early 1926 communist influence reached into circles which could provide it with much more than voting for this or that number and noise in the streets. A large part of the semicomunized masses was controlled within legal organizations. There developed a relatively important press, not orthodox communist it is

true, but always in contact with the communists. These advantages to the communists during this period were the result of penetration by various radical organizations which were multiplying and oriented toward the so called "Polish communism." This movement had quite a broad envelopment. However due to a chaotic nature it was never capable of crystalizing itself into any form other than nonsensical attempts at a peculiar syndicalist framework or else some kind of a bolshevizing organization for "national independence" (Tadeusz Wieniawa Dlugoszowski) or else for a change some kind of an "honest socialist party" without any parliamentary dishonesty and also without falling into the embrace of Moscow 100% (Dr. Kruk and Dr. Drobner). This sui generis "Polish communism," as it was called frequently by its adherents, represented rather an expression of anti-parliamentarianism, certain liberal concepts, and peasant mania. Nevertheless a large number of its supporters did not lose their sense of Polish statehood. An illustration of this can be found in the speech by the former Sejm deputy Sylwester Wojewodzki, known only to active party officials, as presented in April 1925 at one of the communist social gatherings: "You are international communists, we are Polish ones. We are allies and brothers, but our concepts do not correspond with one another completely." Regardless of everything this movement was grist for the communist mill. Many of the people who seriously approached the building of a political program on the basis of Zeromski's novel Przedwiosnie [Just Before Spring], upon contact with the Marxists were forced to become their political tools. In this manner a crowd of various romanticists, ultra democrats, etc., found itself within the orbit of KPP influence.

The coup d'etat which took place on 12-15 May 1926 however proved the complete organizational weakness of the KPP and the entire

nonsense of all communist evaluations as well as analyses. We will not take up here the history of the May coup nor its appraisal, because numerous historical works will be devoted to this. We are interested in the problem how the KPP stood with regard to the coup and the influence of the latter upon that party's fate. In replying to this, I shall mention briefly that the KPP attitude toward the coup was exactly what could be expected from its complete moral and physical incapacity. Later as it appeared, regardless of all other ideas on the extreme left and extreme right, the May coup delivered communism a lethal blow in Poland. The KPP was paralyzed for many years, perhaps forever. These deadly results of the coup vis a vis communism are striking in view of the fact that the coup was not at all concerned with the slogan of fighting communism or socialism as was true of so many other coups during the years 1922-1926: Italian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian; that communism in Poland was never approached with violence including blood letting as took place in so many other states. Neither shall we take up the methods by which the coup organizing the coup d'etat paralyzed the communists and disoriented them. It is a fact that the communists themselves prefer not to speak about these matters, although as a rule they are very loquacious. They know in this case that they were led astray.

The KPP documents on the May coup are a black page in the party's history which to date has not been erased by any communist wisdom.

As we have already seen the KPP for a long time had been carefully observing the internal friction in Polish society and attempting to exploit it for its own purposes. The May coup d'etat when it broke out appeared to all communists as the culmination point

of this friction and the beginning of a long lasting civil war. This appeared even more true because prior to May 1926 Polish society had been quarreling and broken up into camps mutually fighting against one another. The KPP not feeling itself strong enough for independent action by force of arms (there could be no hope of armed assistance from Moscow, since the bolsheviks had enough of their own worries and did not believe in the success of such a venture) wanted to pull the chestnuts out of the fire with somebody else's hands. This was the party's first error, an error which arose from an exaggerated evaluation of the anarchy in Poland. For a long time the communists thought that they would be a "tertius gaudens" who at the opportune time would provide the decisive blow against both sides as well as Poland as a whole.

During the coup d'etat itself the communists' main task was to show that they existed. In this connection they decided to support actively the camp that had begun the struggle. Although the leader of that camp was also the leader of "Polish imperialism," he was also the standard bearer of the left wing parties.

Unfortunately for the KPP but fortunately for Poland, the May fighting lasted briefly. In this struggle the practical role of the KPP was brought down to zero. It was only later that the communists themselves together with the assistance of Radek created legends about the crowds of communists who had fought on the Warsaw "barricades" and even occupied the Belweder palace where they placed the communist banner (sic!). In reality the participation of the "organized revolutionary proletariat" presented itself grotesquely. Fewer than 100 youngsters (the communists themselves claimed 200) whom the party sent into the streets in order to aid the "revolutionary troops of

Pilsudski" were locked up on time in the Warsaw citadel where they waited the call to arms and from which they were released to their homes after the new authorities had restored complete order. The security authorities (an extraordinary affair in the history of all coups) functioned without interruption and were able to completely paralyze the efforts of the communists, bringing the latter into total passiveness and wonderful isolation.

At any rate on paper the KPP supported the coup and, as the communists would say, out of both sides of the mouth -- even though nobody had invited them. Proof of such "support" which was completely irrelevant, are the appeals and writings during this period which were edited by Warski and parroted the resolutions on "patriotism" issued by the second congress. These appeals include the slogans: "the place of the revolutionary worker in this struggle is within the ranks of opponents to the fascist government," "material and moral support for Pilsudski's troops" in defense of (among other things) Poland's threatened independence, "let us defend red Warsaw!" In order to strengthen communist hearts, the following was added: "our aims go farther than those of Pilsudski."

On 14 May 1926 the KPP approached the left wing parties led by the PPS for the purpose of establishing a joint combat committee. PPS, PSL "Liberation," and the Peasant Party issued a common declaration with a general political content in which they clearly rejected any cooperation not only with the KPP but also with the Independent Peasant Party (NPCh). In this manner the KPP still remained outside of the arena of Polish political life.

When on 17 May 1926 the KPP central committee met (not in the building of the Ministerial Council as some had expected but as of old

in Danzig), everybody realized that something had gone wrong. Especially disconcerting was the fact that no decree announcing an amnesty for political prisoners as well as legalizing KPP activity had appeared. The leaders began to debate whether they had acted correctly in "supporting" the coup d'etat. However finally the central committee passed a unanimous resolution to the effect that the party line had been correct but that only some of the formulations had included errors. The entire "support" was brought down to these "formulations," so this resolution represents de facto admission of error. The attitude of its own masses was still weighing down upon the vanguard, so the central committee resolved to participate in the National Assembly (in the first National Assembly the sole communist deputy Lancucki did not participate in protest that his comrade, also a Sejm deputy Krolkowski, was being held in prison) and in the presidential elections with votes going to Marshal Pilsudski together with an appropriate declaration. Doubtlessly this was a moment when the KPP could have become a Polish communist party, since the masses were urging it in that direction. However regardless of how much the communists talk and write about the "masses," they are not the decisive element in politics, and this latter factor showed itself at that time in all of its magnificence.

The May coup d'etat was accepted in Moscow very unfavorably, and a storm arose over the news that the KPP had supported the "worst enemy of the Soviets." After deliberations in the WKP Politburo and in the Cominter, the old custom of establishing a "Polish Commission" was again invoked (any time something bad occurs in the KPP, Moscow forms a "Polish Commission") under the formal chairmanship of Zinoviev but in fact directed by Bukharin and Manuilsky. This group forbid the communist fraction by telegram to vote for Marshal Pilsudski, because

"if the resolution were to be implemented, this would mean the complete bankruptcy of communist policy." The chairman of the parliamentary fraction Warski tried to persuade the commission that the "masses will not understand us, if we vote against Pilsudski." A second telegram is sent by the Comintern and the direct intervention by the Soviet envoy to Warsaw, Voikov, connected with the threat of "organizational consequences" -- because "voting for Pilsudski will be considered the breaking of party discipline."

Under the pressure of such threats the communist parliamentary fraction finally submitted and proposed at the last moment the candidacy of the imprisoned former Sejm deputy Lancucki. However its branches in the Sejm like the NPCh, "Hromada," and Selrob did not subordinate themselves to the order but voted for Pilsudski. It was only after Marshal Pilsudski had renounced the presidency and proposed the candidacy of Professor Ignacy Moscicki that the whole communist block voted solidly for Dr. Fiderkiewicz of the NPCh. Such was the manner in which Moscow reversed the central committee resolution of the KPP, saving the latter from political bankruptcy. But even as late as 31 May 1926 the communist leaders had to run after "their" masses to Theater Square and participate in a demonstration together with the PPS in honor of Marshal Pilsudski (this manifestation was certainly the largest workers' manifestation in Warsaw since 1905; it assembled up to 100,000 persons). Then on 1 June 1926 already the central committee issued a special resolution against this demonstration.

The bolsheviks were frightened by the situation as it had been created and openly condemned KPP tactics. On 8 June 1926 at a party meeting in Tiflis, Stalin spoke and evaluated the events in Poland as follows:

"In reality there is taking place in Poland currently a struggle between 2 fractions of the bourgeoisie, a struggle which has as its aim the strengthening and stabilization of the bourgeois state and not the defense of interests of workers, peasants, and oppressed nationalities ...

"Undoubtedly the workers and peasants relate to Pilsudski's struggle their own hopes for a basic improvement in their conditions. There is no doubt that for this reason the highest echelons of the workers' and peasant classes support in one way or the other the fight of Pilsudski who is the representative of the petit bourgeoisie and the petit nobility against the Poznan inhabitants who represent the large capitalists and landowners, but it is also doubtless that the hopes of certain segments among the Polish working masses will be exploited currently not in the cause of revolution but toward strengthening the state and the bourgeois order ...

"How could it happen that the revolutionary discontent on the part of many workers and peasants in Poland came to be grist for Pilsudski's mill and not for the communist party of Poland? This happened among other reasons because the Polish communist party is extremely weak and due to the fact that it weakened itself even more during the struggle as a result of the erroneous position vis a vis Pilsudski's troops. For this reason it could not stand at the head of the masses which were prepared for revolution.

"I must admit that our Polish comrades committed in this case a grave error." (Nowy Przegląd, August-September 1926, pages 1116-1117).

Even prior to Stalin, the KPP was attacked in the Moscow Pravda (central organ of the WKP, edited at that time by Bukharin) by the

leader of the German communists Thalmann. In his article he equated Pilsudski with "militarism," and "English orientation," "bonapartism," etc. Subsequently Thalmann conducted a deep analogy with the events during 1917 in Russia, when the struggle took place between Kerensky and General Kornilov, teaching the KPP that the latter should have done exactly as the bolsheviks did at the time: combat Kornilov (i.e., the Chjeno-Piast peasant movement) and not support in this connection Kerensky, i.e., Pilsudski either (could this be plagiarism of the analogy made by Niedzialkowski?). Thalmann called upon the KPP to "make up its mistakes" and to direct the Polish masses:

"... along the road of struggle against the fascists as well as against the Pilsudskites." (Ibid., page 1118).

At this same time Bukharin, the de facto director of the Comintern, came out with a speech in which he also provided an analogy along the lines of Kerensky-Kornilov:

"The party understood that it could not remain neutral, i.e., it comprehended that it should come out against the counterrevolutionary government. However it did not understand that the spirit of this entire maneuver was to capture as many weapons as possible, occupy the most important positions, but not lose its own perspective for even one second. Basing itself upon captured positions, it was necessary to direct the struggle at any moment against the side with which it had fought together a moment before...

"This basic attitude is just, as far as not permitting neutrality is concerned, but is completely erroneous and monstrously unjust in connection with the support especially of "Pilsudski's revolutionary troops" as a designation for further actions by the party

along that line... One of the Polish comrades even proceeded so far that when the PPS began to organize a "fronde" against Pilsudski, he wrote that this "fronde" reminded him of "dwarfs intending to attack a giant" (Bukharin was thinking of Adolf Warski's words, appearing in Trybuna Robotnicza, organ of the communist parliamentary fraction in 1926).

"Under the circumstances in which Poland found and still finds herself, it is necessary to realize that supporting Pilsudski -- who is growing into a Mussolini -- the line on which such support was based is ruinous for the communist party of Poland." (pages 1118-1119).

One month later in July 1926 the same Bukharin described the policy of the new Polish government as being "in support of English policy against the USSR, and an attempt for a compromise with Germany," and finally:

"... we have in front of us a peculiar fascist coup d'etat. It differs from other coups by fascists in that the Pilsudskites to a considerably larger degree obtained support among the masses of workers and peasants." (Ibid., page 1120).

These quotations are probably sufficient to prove that the theory of a "fascist" character of the government after May was not at all born within the KPP and even less so among its masses but was rather accepted by the KPP upon orders from Moscow (starting with 1930 it was also accepted by the leftist splinters from the PPS (deputies Zaremba and Drobner) as well as by all Jewish socialist parties; primacy was maintained by Nowe Pismo [New Periodical], a Bundist organ for the more radical socialists). Even in Moscow the theory did not originate at once, because on 8 June 1926 Stalin had described

the coup as one supported by the petit bourgeoisie and the petit nobility but directed against fascism. The communists themselves did not conceal that the sources of dissatisfaction in Moscow with regard to KPP tactics should be sought after in the fear of an anti-Soviet foreign policy by Marshal Pilsudski. Brand and Kostrzewa admit this in their theses:

"In view of the fact that every political coup d'etat in Poland touches upon the interests of Russia in one way or another, the party must always take this into consideration when it is evaluating the character of various parties and changing governments as well as when it is estimating the strength of revolution and the possibility of a revolutionary coup in Poland ...

"The omission of external factors caused the forgetting of the dangers threatening Soviet Russia in connection with assumption of power by Pilsudski." (page 1121).

The most sensible conclusion from this would be that the KPP should support a government of the national democrats, since the latter were oriented more toward Russia (see the articles by Dmowski, Kozicki, and others). The Soviets had no fear from their side. Such is the logic in the policy of the "Polish" "workers" party if approached consistently and looked upon exclusively from the viewpoint of interests in a foreign country.

Finally the signal came from Moscow. A great error has been committed, and its revision should be undertaken. This dates the beginning of a three-year discussion on the "revision of the May error." This debate weakened the KPP tremendously. Internal fights, which arose in the party on the background of erroneous KPP tactics as well as appraisals of the May coup d'etat, precipitated not only

a party split but above all influenced the loss of positions among workers and various legal branches that had been attained with such difficulty. If the May coup had not accomplished anything else apart from causing the fractional struggles within the KPP, this alone would merit its passing into history as a blessed page for Poland. Starting with the May coup d'etat dates the systematic contraction in KPP ranks which resulted in having the party degenerate in size to that of a sect with little significance.

It is impossible to present here in full the written or spoken thoughts, theses, and antitheses established during the discussion of the May error. Oceans of paper and of words have been devoted to this matter. Various groups and cliques accused one another mutually of matters and faults perpetrated and also things not even committed. Insults were bandied about in a manner unknown to any other Polish political party, and a special jargon was created and used by those quarreling.

Before we commence recreating the most important moments which will enable the reader to obtain his bearings in the labyrinth of communist thought, let us first present the organizational status of the KPP after the May coup d'etat.

The growth in communist influence among the masses, which was characteristic of the transition between 1925-1926, lasted for some time yet. This even provided the rightist politicians with cause for alarm, in view of the fact that communism was developing under the post May government. The main basis for the growth of communist influence, increasing their megalomania, was the impasse of the PPS which convulsively was holding on to the pre-May type of parliamentarianism then being liquidated. Immediately following the coup, in

June 1926, a split occurred in the western Galicja PPS organization. It was produced by Andrzej Czuma and Jozef Rosenzweig-Rozycki which became crystalized in a separate organization called "PPS-Lewica" [Polish Socialist Party -- Left Wing] with an almost completely communist character. This split also extended into former Congress Poland. After establishing liaison with the official KPP, in the latter case (mission fulfilled in the KPP by Saul Amsterdam) it assumed a 100% communist character. In many localities like for instance Zaglebie Dabrowskie, in Warsaw, etc., the local conspiratorial KPP organizations simply legalized themselves as the PPS-Lewica. At certain times that party attracted up to several thousand members. Apart from this, during the entire 3 years of fractional struggle the activities of the KPP itself were weakened considerably.

Immediately following the May coup, Warski began publishing a legal press organ of the communist parliamentary fraction called Trybuna [Tribune]. The party also attempted to conduct a campaign for an amnesty of political prisoners, establishing the so called "Interparty Secretariat in the Struggle for Amnesty of Political Prisoners" to which access was announced by the KPP branches in the Sejm as well as by the Independent Socialist Labor Party and the Poalej-Sjon-Lewica. The Interparty Secretariat was able to issue several single editions of an ephemeris, but besides that nothing was ever done.

The peasant communist parties developed a lively activity at times passing into terrorism, propaganda to boycott taxes, etc., which in the spring of 1927 led to the necessity for delegating the NPCh and the "Hromada." Selrob was able to maintain itself longer, but in 1928 it experienced a large split which will be returned to later on.

Between its fourth conference and June 1926 the KPP presented itself quite uniformly, at least from the outside, passing over the minor treacheries by various groups and cliques in the leading echelons. The May error had been committed as a group, regardless of the political backgrounds of the individual members in the central committee "coalition." The crisis which evolved on this basis was much deeper than the previous crises for this very reason. Above all, this new crisis differed fundamentally from the previous ones because it grew up on the background of Polish affairs and did not represent a reflection of struggles within the WKP and the Comintern.

Simultaneously with the Polish coup d'etat of May, a big revolution was starting in the USSR which was not comprehended by the communists themselves. This was the beginning of the great "thermidor" mentioned with such disdain by Zinoviev in 1923. It was based upon an approach by the Soviets to the economic forms of a normal state. The situation of the Comintern was changing constantly to its disadvantage. From the center of gigantic power it was deteriorating into a cheap agency for foreign propaganda, directed by lower ranking USSR officials. Apart from the Russian members of the Comintern (members of the individual communist parties) the positions of the others during the years 1919-1924, it must be admitted, were quite honorable -- renouncing their own fatherlands, they became members of a great commune and had certain small rights to decide its fate. We have seen the KPRP central committee resolution of 1923 which expressed the opinion (naturally merely an opinion) as to how the ministerial posts should be filled in the USSR. Beginning with the year 1926, all of that belongs to the past. The revolution had spawned a bureaucracy headed by Stalin which considered itself to be the sole master in its own fatherland but its comrades in other

countries to be common agents. The extensive governmental crisis in the Soviet during 1925-1926 was the last in which communists from the Comintern participated. From that time on there have been other crises, corresponding to cabinet crises in European countries (Bukharin, Tomsky, Syrtsov), but the Comintern motto in their connection has become: "malchat, ne razsuzhdat".

In Poland the situation of the communists was terrible. Instead of a communist coup d'etat or at least a radical and petit bourgeois Kerenskyism, which "as a consequence would have to bring about a government by councils," there occurred a coup that was fascist in the eyes of the communists. The conditions of the coup d'etat could not have been explained even by Marx himself, because it took place "in spite of the bourgeoisie" and with the "assistance" of the communists. A solution to this crisis like the others which had been handled by the method of mechanically changing leaders, was impossible for the simple reason that the supply of "sinless" leaders had already been exhausted. In addition all party wings had become compromised one after the other and now again all of them together with their leaders, so that it was necessary to pass through a cleansing fire of internal strife for something to crystallize from this chaos. The decisive factor, Moscow, although it considered the entire leadership to be bankrupt politically, this time did not want to enter the picture and conduct a third "surgical operation" in the course of 2 years for fear that the patient would not live through it. On the other hand these politically bankrupt individuals had one good characteristic: the whole KPP central committee without exception supported Stalin. The latter was at the point of starting the final fight against the united opposition of Zinoviev and Trotsky which was to last a year, so he did not want to create new enemies even if they were pitiful.

The first indication of the long lasting struggle within the KPP was revealed at the KPP central committee Politburo meeting of 12-13 June 1926. Three approaches accompanied the 3 proposals for theses. The first was prepared by a group of editors and communist activists later known as the "petit bourgeois 4," because they considered the coup to have been the work of the petit bourgeoisie. This group comprised Nerski (Bernard Zaks who also used the pseudonym "Stach Nerwow"), Sanocki (Witold Tomorowicz also known under the aliases "Andrzej" and "Slon"), Jerzy Heryng (pseudonyms "Ryng," "Droznik," and "Jerzy"), and finally the principal theoretician of the group -- Fiedler (Efroim Truskier also known under the aliases of "Winkler" and "Dzek") who incorporated the ideas of the group into a book published by the Warsaw communist publishing company called "Ksiazka" (the location of "Ksiazka" was on Hoza Street in Warsaw, but it does not exist today). All four belonged to the best educated persons within the KPP. The following organizational districts supported them: Warsaw and the three Basins which include the district committees for Dabrowa Basin, Upper Silesia, and Krakow (a more detailed picture of the party's organizational structure can be found by the reader in Adam Strapinski's book entitled Wywrotowe Partje Polityczne [Subversive Political Parties] published by the Institute for Scientific Research on Communism, Warsaw, 1933).

Warski spoke out violently against these "4" and accused them of rendering more difficult the unmasking of the fascist character of the dictatorship. In his own theses, Warski countered with a majority of the Politburo (thus the later name for his supporters as "majority" members). The theses designate the May coup d'etat as being fomented by grand capitalism (?) and fascism. They condemn the party tactics during the May days as having been opportunistic.

Much space is devoted in these theses to polemics with the "petit bourgeois four:"

"If the content of Pilsudski's coup had really been a petit bourgeois one, i.e., a coup by the masses of peasantry and workers (are the workers also petit bourgeois, Mr. Warski? -- author's comment), then this would have meant that the party had not committed any error in the May days. A compromise with the peasants and workers' masses, still remaining under the influence of the petit bourgeoisie, is fully permissible for the party." (point 3 in the theses, Nowy Przegląd, August-September, 1926, page 1097).

However this thesis was attacked by Lenski again who considered it to be an extension of the "May error," because even if this had been a petit bourgeois coup d'etat it should not have been supported. The party should have operated independently from the very beginning. An even greater uproar was evoked by the second (ninth in the general numeration) thesis of the "majority:"

"Parliamentary democracy is an expression of petit bourgeois interests by the working masses.. (Pilsudski demolished parliamentary democracy and is its opponent). This was understood by the petit bourgeois leaders of the PPS who ever more clearly are beginning to limit themselves and counteract Pilsudski in defense of parliamentary democracy ... This change represents the prophesy of a revolt which will develop among the petit bourgeois masses along with the inescapable revelation of the capitalist character in Pilsudski's dictatorship. The petit bourgeois compromise parties will attempt to lead this revolt in order to keep it under control and not permit it to develop into the dimensions of a revolution by the workers and peasants. The KPP must head this revolt." (Ibid.).

Now finally everything has been explained concerning what Warski was about. His enunciations prior to the coup d'etat can be scrutinized between the lines. It appears that this clever man comprehended the basic difference existing between "Pilsudskiism" directing the May coup and the party elements which supported the coup. When it was clear that the combination, where "Keronsky-Pilsudski" was supposed to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the communists, did not work -- the thought occurred to place their money on a second horse which was traveling in the same harness but which had stumbled along the way: the PPS. Incidentally when one reads the latest (especially since 1932) discussions and resolutions of the PPS, one has the impression that there are many among its leaders who would want to push this formerly famous party along the line of Warski's 1926 intentions. It should be mentioned notably that the theses of Warski include a residue of KPRP leadership attitudes from the years 1922-1923, only that the vanguard of "radical patriotic petit bourgeoisie" appears not in the form of "Pilsudskiism" any more or "POW [Polska Organizacja Bojowa -- Polish Fighting Organization, the prototype of the "Legions" commanded by Pilsudski in World War I] members" but rather of the PPS and later in the future of the "bloc of leftist and center parties," the so called "Centrolew."

This position found sharp opponents, headed by Lenski. These "minority members" (since they represented a minority on the Politburo at that time -- also a pitiful copying of Russian communists in its reflection of the 1903 split into "bolsheviks" and "mensheviks") found the source for the "May error" in the opportunistic right wing ideology of the KPP and not merely (as Warski did) in a mistaken evaluation of the situation (a petit bourgeois rather than

a fascist coup). The theses of Lenski emphasize more strongly than would be expected from a Soviet official the "anti-Soviet character of the Pilsudski dictatorship."

The "petit bourgeois 4" was later dissolved and announced its access to the "minority" group.

The meeting of the KPP Politburo held in June commenced the long lasting period of fractional struggle within the party. The relationship of forces within the Politburo amounted to 5 : 3, whereas at the central committee plenum it was 12 : 4 or 11 : 5.

In order to explain these at times odd scholastic quarrels, frequently degenerating into ordinary equilibration of words, it is necessary to add that both fractions struggling against each other shared not only the same ideal of social life but also were imbued with the same hatred toward "fascism" and the post-May government. However in connection with the peculiar mentality of these Marxists, any kind of difference in formulation even with regard to a single word assumes tremendous significance. When observing these quarrels, the impression is obtained at times that these persons are sincere in their hope to find an appropriate "formulation" for the essence of the evil fascist government under Pilsudski. If this formulation is announced at the right time, then this entire "dictatorship" weighing upon the "proletariat" will collapse without the aid of a human hand as it once happened to the walls of Jericho.

The struggle between the "majority" and the "minority" is in some ways also a current topic. Its results have split the KPP to this very day. Therefore it will be pertinent to list the names of the most important activists in both fractions. I would like to

caution that I am listing only the names of those communists enumerated either in the course of their discussions and in publications giving an example of these quarrels or else found in various There can be no possible legal-judicial consequences from placing these names in my work.

In the "majority" we meet first of all our old friends from the KPRP leadership during the years 1922-1924 organized around the "3 W's," i.e., (1) Warski; (2) Kostrzewa; (3) Brand (Henryk Lauer); (4) Stefanski (real name Aleksander Danieluk); (5) Prochniak; together with other right wingers of that period like (6) Bartoszewicz (Stefan Krolikowski, pseudonym "Cyprjan"); (7) Krajewski; (8) Cichowski ("Teofil" or "Hrabia"); (9) Rylski (true name Ignacy Lubieniecki, who later was removed from active party work in the KPP because of various party heresies; he was ordered to write a brochure about conspiracy inside the KPP but never did so; subsequently he was in China attached to a Soviet commercial installation); (10) Jerzy Sochacki (in one of the Robotnik articles, Mr. Zaremba made a mistake in including Sochacki among the enemies of Warski); (11) Bogucki; (12) Stanislaw Huberman (pseudonym "Wrzos" and brother of the well known violinist); (13) Solski (Ksawery Nasberg); (14) Witkowski (Adam Landy, pseudonyms "Karol" and "Gruby"); as well as from the KPZU: (15) Wasilkiw; (16) Turjanski; and from the KPZB: (17) Maksymowski (Abram Rozensztajn, pseudonym "Robert"); (18) Jurko (true name Pruzanski, pseudonym Anatol Olszewski). Later the "majority" was also joined by Leon Purman. Among the Soviet emigres this fraction was supported by (19) Lapinski (Lewinson); (20) Walecki; and (21) Feliks Kon. It also had considerable influence among intellectual circles in the KPP inside of Poland. Among others it was supported by (22) Jan Hempel; (23) Stanislaw Ryszard Sztande; and by others.

The second fraction, the so called "minority" (which designated itself as the left wing and considered its opposite as a right wing), included: (1) Lenski (Juljan Leszczynski); (2) Czarny (Jan Paszyn, also known under the pseudonyms of "Czarnilewski" and "Ignac"); (3) Henrykowski (Saul Amsterdam who also used the pseudonyms "Dunski" and "Dunajewski"); (4) Tadeusz Zarski (pseudonyms "Oskar" and "Czerwicz"); the entire group of 4: (5) Fiedler; (6) Nerski; (7) Ryng; (8) Sanocki; (9) Spis (Juljan Brun with pseudonyms "Bronowicz" and "Antonowicz"); (10) Josif (Aron Lewirtowski); (11) Marjusz (Izrael Geist); (12) Karolski (pseudonym "Szachne"); (13) Ort (Mieczyslaw Bernstein, who for a long time was the central committee treasurer and who used the pseudonyms "Ben" and "Redens"); (14) Stanislaw Burzynski (an activist from the union of hatmakers in Warsaw and leader of the left wing at congresses of class trade unions who later became a Sejm deputy for the communists, he was also known under the pseudonyms "Bur" and "Gruszka"); from the KPZB: (15) Adam Slawinski; (16) Jozef Lohynowicz (pseudonyms "Korczyk" and "Siemion"); from the ZMK: (17) Mietek (Jozek Mutzenmacher, known under the alias of "Redyko"); (18) Alfred Lampe (pseudonyms "Nowak" and "Marek"); (19) Anatol (Matys, alias "Jacek"). Subsequently after the exchange of political prisoners between Poland and the USSR during 1928, the "minority" was joined by: (20) Grzegorzewski; (21) Skulski; and (22) Rwal (Gustaw Reicher). In the USSR the "minority" was supported strongly by: Unslicht, Bortnowski, Bronski-Warszawski, and Budzynski. In general the "minority" included a majority of the Jewish element.

As far as the influence of these fractions in the field was concerned, at the beginning the situation looked more or less as follows: the "majority" had under its control Lodz, the Dabrowa Basin,

Piotrkow, Poznan, Lublin, Eastern Galicja, and Wolyn (KPZU) as well as a number of smaller districts. The "minority" on the other hand had control over Warsaw, Suburban Warsaw, Upper Silesia, the Eastern Provinces (KPZB outside of Bialystok), certain of the smaller districts, as well as almost the entire youth organization, i.e., the ZMK. The influence of the fractions vacillated.

We have already mentioned the new "Polish Commission" set up by the Comintern in June 1926. Zinoviev, formally its chairman, attempted to introduce yet another change in the KPP. For this purpose he called Donski (Stein-Kaminski) to whom he wanted to give authority. However the importance of Zinoviev in the WKP had undergone a considerable weakening, and for this reason came the resolution by the WKP Politburo: leave the authority in the hands of the same central committee but adding to the leadership in the form of editors - Kostrzewa and Brand, just previously condemned as "ultra rightists." The "rightists" obtained this favor due to the wildest possible paroxysm of hatred and contempt for Poland as well as servility regarding the USSR which has ever been seen in the KPP. Brand and Kostrzewa announced their own theses in which we read that "contemporary Poland arose and is developing as a result of international deals and machinations." On the other hand these politicians -- wise, although serving Moscow, are able to write factually about the political and economic stabilization of Poland:

"One of the conditions for this was the liquidation of parliamentarism in its postwar form and the establishment of a strong authority. The Chjeno-Piast group also strove toward the same thing but could not implement its goal, since it was hated by the broad masses. In addition, it wanted to realize the plan against Pilsudski and his organization by means of completely pushing out and liquidating him. On the other hand Pilsudski could undertake this attempt due to

his popularity among the broad masses and the hopes which connected him with the masses. Simultaneously Pilsudski came to power as the executor of that "sanacja" plan for Poland which, under given circumstances, has the largest chance of being supported by foreign capital." (page 1122).

According to them Poland was signing an alliance with England and proceeding toward an agreement with Germany, all of which would benefit Polish economic life. On the other hand, the authors of the theses also scrutinized them from the viewpoint of the "Narkomindel" [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in USSR]:

"In case a deal is made, this will mean a golden rain of loans but at the price of giving up economic independence, the operation of industry at the cost of destroying its greater part; this means that Poland is placing itself under the command of England as an active member of the anti Soviet front." (Ibid.).

These thoughts about a golden rain of loans and the operation of industry were developed by Brand in a work entitled Gospodarcze tło przewrotu majowego [Economic Background of the May Coup d'Etat] which was published legally in Poland similarly to the work of Fiedler. Brand foresees with a great degree of sharpness the strong development of industry in Poland. Within the KPP however and in the "Polish Commission" then deliberating, these concepts evoked considerable opposition. The communists in their Leninist theory concerning the "period of capitalist collapse" consider it almost impossible to make any progress in the economic life of Poland or elsewhere under the present system. Even if such progress is too visible, it should not be admitted since this would impair the "revolutionary perspectives." In this connection the prophecies of Fiedler are even more terrible.

According to these the chemical industry and in general the entire industry will become ruined due to German competition. As a result when in Poland such objects as Gdynia, Moscice, etc., were established, people having the foregoing mentality began to deny them any actual economic value and treated them like "military bases against the USSR." Radek himself did not help these individuals when he voiced his delight over Gdynia as a port having economic significance.

Finally the "Polish Commission" resolved a full analysis of the situation in Poland, pointing out erroneous tactics to the KPP. In passing it also noted that Poland did not have a strong communist party. The principal points in the analysis of the situation in Poland were taken by this document from the theses of Brand and Kostrzewa. The new Polish governments are supported by England in its capacity as a country "expressing anti-Soviet policy." The foundation for the coup d'etat was the bankruptcy in the foreign policy of the Chjeno-Piast group, which took place after Locarno. The post May governments are defined in the analysis in terms of "Polish fascism" and "attempts at saving the state from ruin;" parliamentarianism is evaluated as being bankrupt:

"His (Pilsudski's) 'above partiness' was most appropriate for the period when the old political parties were deteriorating. He was the figure that momentarily attracted the Lodz unemployed laborer as well as the Belorussian peasant or the urban petit bourgeoisie ruined because of the economic chaos. For this reason in his approach Pilsudski based himself, apart from legionary-fascist elements, also upon the population segments which could have comprised an army for the worker-peasant revolution if there had been a strong communist party in existence."

As we can see this contains many repetitions from the resolutions at the fourth conference. The "Polish Commission" also recognized that the foregoing conference had already defined the "correct tactics against fascism." This pertains to the theory of the 2 fascisms in Poland, scrapped today by the communists, but taken out and freshened up by the 23rd PPS congress which deliberated in Warsaw during February 1934. This congress also saw in Poland 2 types of fascisms. In its resolutions (point 5, we read as follows:

"Sanacja" represents a Polish variation of fascism. Its front is antiworker and antipeasant....

"Besides the ruling fascism which is satiated with jobs, positions, influence and decorations - there preys upon Poland the FASCISM OF NATIONAL DEMOCRACY which is hungry and rapacious..." (Resolutions by the XXIII PPS Congress).

The "Polish Commission" while indicating the errors of the KPP during the May coup d'etat writes that the party leadership had in front of it a correct road but forgot about it and fell into the whirlpool of fascism:

"However later the leadership (KPP) itself completely forgot this correct road. When in May it was faced with the fascist approach, it lost its head under the impression of the great animation on the part of the masses. The central committee saw fascism but did not recognize it, not believing its own eyes..."

"It seemed that fascism was not fascism but something completely different ... The party allowed itself to be carried away by the petit bourgeois element and itself fell into the current of fascism." (Nowy Przegląd, page 996).

A constructive illustration of applying these same "correct tactics vis a vis fascism" was provided a few years later by the communist party of Germany. Over a period of several years, its "analysis" of the German situation could be brought down to the pasting of a "fascist" label on all successive governments: Muller-Francken (social democrat), Braun, Bruening, General Schleicher. Finally when the government of Hitler came to power, the wise men of communist Zion announced on the day before their last wild defeat that "the difference is merely in quantity and not in quality." They had forgotten that one of the bases in the logic of Hegel and Marx is the principle: "quantity transforms itself into quality."

The Comintern also took up in its analysis the role of the petit bourgeoisie which later on was discussed ad infinitum in the KPP during the course of 3 years. The Comintern contrasted its "left wing" position with the generally more objective concepts of the "3 W's," etc., as follows:

"The party leadership thought approximately like this: this is a petit bourgeois revolutionary movement and we should support it. In this regard the party did not understand at all either the role of the petit bourgeoisie under the present conditions in Poland or the role of the communist party in the movement of petit bourgeois masses.

"The petit bourgeois movement under contemporary circumstances does not have the significance of an independent political factor but is compelled to submit to the leadership of another class which has decisive importance within the arena of class struggle. The problem can be approached only from the side of who directs the movement of petit bourgeois masses - the grand bourgeoisie or the proletariat. There is no third possibility." (Ibid., page 997).

It is necessary to explain that the name petit bourgeoisie in the communist jargon designates all social segments except for the capitalists and the workers. This encompasses the small shop owners and artisans as well as the entire working intelligentsia, office workers, peasants (except for the village poor), the wealthier segments of the working class, etc.

It is interesting to note that side by side with this radically Marxist and antagonistic attitude toward the petit bourgeoisie, we also find in the Comintern letter such pure "4 Group" ideas as:

"The dictatorship of Pilsudski had to be changed into the dictatorship of grand capital." (page 997).

"Pilsudskism ... becomes typical fascism." (page 1001).

Since it was becoming fascism, this means that in the beginning it was not that. We find similar ideas in the mentioned enunciations by Stalin and in part by Bukharin immediately following the coup. It is characteristic for the courage of the KPP central committee, and above all of Warski, that when violently attacking the "petit bourgeois 4" he did not mention even in a single word that their errors were shared by communists on the highest echelons. Both the Comintern and Stalin are infallible as well as almighty, so they can make mistakes whenever they have the desire to do so and when the interests of the USSR require it. On the other hand, their subordinates are not permitted to err in line with the principle: what the governor can do, you can not. If they should commit a blunder, they are given a collective whipping for the "monstrous May error" to use the pompous language of Bukharin:

"We should not forget that all prominent representatives of various party wings within the current central committee are guilty of these mistakes." (Nowy Przegląd, page 999).

The Comintern selected the theory of "agrarianization" of Poland from the theses of Kostrzewa and with hitherto unheard of brazenness writes:

"The fate of Poland -- if this were to be dependent upon her current ruling clique -- would be the same as the fate of Latvia, Estonia and other countries which as the result of "independent" existence have changed into typical agricultural states, into semi-agrarian appendages of capitalist powers." (Ibid.).

And later also a pyramidal, demagogic conclusion:

"The KPP should prove to the masses that it is the only party free of external influence which is fighting for true independence in Poland against her transformation into a kind of colony of Anglo-American capital." (page 1001).

If we are to operate in the style of Bukharin, the only definition of this argument can be as follows: an abominable slyness of these Asiatics, surpassing any hitherto known examples of cleverness. There sit in the Kremlin next to Bukharin and Manuilsky certain "people's commissars" and teach their agents in the KPP as follows: prove to the masses that Pilsudski and the present government are traitors to the interests of Poland, whereas you -- our hirelings -- are the only people in Poland "free from external influence" and defenders of Poland's independence. At any rate, they do not lack facetiousness! It is sad in this entire matter that the masses of Polish workers (although today these masses can be counted on one's fingers) do not comprehend any of these Moscow machinations and serve Moscow in this dishonorable work.

Apart from the sharp order to liquidate the "May error," the Comintern also commanded that the KPP begin a campaign against

the alleged anti-Soviet war. There was probably never any other Moscow order which the KPP executed with more vigour. The slogan, "away with a war against the USSR" has filled all communist publications during the past 8 years. The communists are fighting this danger of an invasion of their fatherland (and their cash register) not only with words but also with actions by pasting the slogan on walls, fences, etc., and sometimes even streetcar wires with the aid of red cloth. In this antiwar campaign the KPP was also supposed to use the Pharisee slogan: "against placing Poland's independence as a sacrifice to the scheming artifices of English imperialism."

It will not be amiss to explain here the genesis of this slogan. During the summer of 1926 Moscow was on the threshold of its great imperialist war on a scale that made the march on Warsaw a minor clash -- the war in China. This was a gigantic undertaking and, if it had been successful, it really would have incited the entire world against the Soviets. The number of Stalin's subjects would have been increased by some 300 million people who are brave, patient, hard working, and accustomed to the worst possible living conditions and on the other hand to submissiveness and loyalty vis a vis every tyrant. It was in 1926 that the tremendous march of Chinese nations (Kuomintang) allied with the Soviets took place toward the north. All of the satrapies in central China fell in sequence as the result of this pressure. All of this broke down very quickly however, and there began a struggle between Chinese patriots and communists who considered the USSR their ally for a certain period of time. In the meanwhile the western sections of the Comintern were given assignments in these grandiose plans, thus also the KPP, one sector of which was being implemented along the Blue River and another -- noisily -- on Bank Square in Warsaw. The civil

war in China from 1926 to 1929 was essentially an Anglo-Soviet war (due to the interest of those states in China), and that was the reason for the slogan "against placing Polish independence as a sacrifice to the scheming artifices of English imperialism."

Apart from the slogan to defend the USSR, the Comintern ordered the KPP to place emphasis upon the slogan: "down with the fascist government of Pilsudski." The irony of fate decided that the party which according to that same Comintern letter was:

"... the most abominable and cynical with regard to its hatred of communism, the party of the Second International (talking about the PPS -- author's comment)," (Ibid., page 1002) after several years began to use this very same slogan which, as we have shown, had its origins in the fears of Moscow diplomacy and never was in the interests of PPS policy.

The leaders of both communist fractions returned to Poland with this pastoral letter, i.e., to Zoppoty, in order to continue their unmerciful struggle among themselves. Each side claimed adherence to the communist position. On the other hand, both fractions announced that they would sharply combat the rightist deviation, with the only significant difference in that each considered the other to be a rightist.

In September 1926 a KPP central committee plenum convened at which internal fighting immediately took place with a genuine picture of a "belli omnium contra omnes". What was the actual reason for this struggle? To the average noncommunist the essence of this fight was something incomprehensible. No matters of fundamental significance were at its basis. The social ideal of both sides was the same: one as well as the other was 100% perfect in praise and servility

to Moscow; both claimed as their foundation the same canons in writing, although each side interpreted them differently. Whenever one fraction would say anything, it was immediately countered by the other in the light of "underevaluation" or "over estimation" of the problem which resulted in a right wing error or for a change an ultra leftist one. Quotations from Marx and Lenin were widely applied here. KPP documents during this period represent scholastic dissertations in a Byzantine style. It is impossible even to summarize this ocean of talk and writing, so we shall attempt to select merely the more important items. Every appeal, whether emanating from the central committee or from a lower party echelon dominated by the "minority," had to include at least 2 dozen slogans from the iron repertoire of bolshevism. Otherwise the lack of even one of these would cause the other side immediately to send a complaint to Moscow including all of the principal sins: opportunism, antibolshevism, rightist deviation, yielding to social fascist influence, remnants of the Luxemburgist ideology, fractional activity, antagonistic attitude toward the Comintern, etc. At times one of the sides would be guilty of an omission in an appeal, but the other side would cleverly stay silent until after the appeal had been published and then raise an alarm: "you see now where the real rightist danger is located!," etc., etc. Such contentions lasted 3 solid years. The part played by Moscow vacillated between ameliorating and then again inspiring these disputes depending upon its interests. Moscow's judgment was overly wise: "in the last analysis, comrades, all of you are equally good bolsheviks since you all support us against the counterrevolutionary Trotskyites and other opponents of our dictatorship."

Returning to the deliberations of the KPP central committee plenum of September 1926, we must emphasize that this plenary session

actually did not resolve anything. The first problem which evoked differences at the plenum was the evaluation of the historical role played by the petit bourgeoisie. The "majority" claimed stubbornly that during the years 1918-1926 Poland was ruled by the petit bourgeoisie and that the May coup d'etat introduced the dictatorship of large capital and land owners. On the other hand the "minority" together with the later fused "petit bourgeois 4" violently attacked not only this analysis of the post May government but primarily the fundamental thesis of Koszewska which nota bene was connected with a series of her concepts from the years 1921-1923:

"The war time and post war crisis of capitalism and new revolutionary shocks to the capitalist world lead the petit bourgeoisie for the third time now (the first, during the Great French Revolution; and the second in 1848) into the historical arena as an independent political force."

In response to this heavy accusation, the "majority" at first attempted not to react at all. However finally it did move toward a counter attack with regard to the "minority" and claimed that the latter's erroneous formulation pertained to the past. On the other hand the supporters of the "minority" still maintained the position that the May coup d'etat essentially was a petit bourgeois one and thus through such an evaluation cover up for fascism and prevent its unmasking, believing in the independence of the petit bourgeoisie. In stating this the "majority" based itself upon the theses of the "petit bourgeois 4."

When the party activists took this problem to the party circles and local committees, it was presented much "simpler." The "minority" backers reported as follows: "look at that Koszewska (here

a dirty word was inserted) instead of talking about you, comrades, the proletariat, gives this humbug concerning the petit bourgeoisie and its independence" to which the party members replied: "down with Kostrzewa, down with the right wing!" and voted in favor of the theses enunciated by the "minority." On the other hand, when the other side or "majority" found itself within a party circle, it stated: "we are unmasking the fascist character of the dictatorship, whereas those oppositionists (and again a juicy expression) defend this dictatorship by claiming that it is not fascist but "petit bourgeois" which the deluded listeners respond to with: "down with the opposition! long live the central committee!" etc.

This controversy about the petit bourgeoisie immediately resulted in another one concerning the role of democracy and the significance of the Sejm. The "majority" claimed that parliament was an organ created at one time to fulfill the part of a buffer between the classes or as a body for class compromise. When such a compromise became impossible, the "artillery of Pilsudski" not only destroyed the Sejm's authority but also parliamentary democracy which is buried under the ruins. The "minority" replied that a parliamentary democracy represents one of the forms of class rule by the bourgeoisie over the working masses. If there was talk about compromises, then the Sejm was not an organ but only an area in which compromises took place between the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie (interesting is the relation between this odd scholasticism and that of the so called "revolutionary Marxist" school (left wing socialism) which is becoming ever more fashionable especially among the young intellectuals; the problem whether the Sejm is an organ or an area is also raised by the great noncommunist theoretician of Marxism, Max Adler). The "majority" accused the "minority" in this connection that the latter now wanted to defend the "fascist Sejm" since it had written

in one of its proposals. "in defense of democratic institutions acquired during the previous period."

There further arose the difference in opinion as to designating the essence of fascism. At first the quarrel pertained to who was first in recognizing fascism. It was only later that the "minority" fenced with the theory, not their own of course but that of Bukharin finally agreed upon at the sixth Comintern congress (summer of 1928), according to which fascism is a social and political system characteristic in the period of capitalist decline. Its properties include: radical concentration of industrial life under the dictatorship of finance capital and a military police political dictatorship. During such a period all political movements become tools which are assigned places in the life of society by some mythical capitalistic and financial center. All social life is regulated according to a uniform economic and political plan. This is simply the theory of so called super capitalism (organized or connected capitalism) thought up by the economist Werner Sombart, but in the minds of the communists it has been transformed into mythology.

The "majority" in the meanwhile treated "fascism" as a phenomenon peculiar to capitalist countries which were more backward. This was a concept also held for several years by the leaders of the Second International and by certain "bourgeois" liberal theoreticians (e.g., the Frenchman, Delaisi). [See Note].

([Note]. The social democrats in general treat various types of "fascism" and especially the Italian and German ones as the product of petit bourgeois elements which were morally wrecked by the war and by the crisis of capitalism. It is only in the course of development in this movement that the latter commence to serve capital. Thus also teaches, among others, Max Adler.)

Further the dispute raged around the possibility of economic stabilization for Poland. The "majority" as we have seen from the argumentation of Brand and Kostrzewa considered these possibilities to be broad, claiming merely that they would provide nothing for the worker, that they would not take place by means of industrial rationalization as in Germany but by means of an increased exploitation of the worker. The "minority" on the other hand stated that:

"The attempt to stabilize capitalism in Poland will be broken due to internal contradictions... must be broken finally by the revolutionary forces which it will precipitate.

"The stabilization policy of the bourgeoisie, based upon increased exploitation, low wages, high taxes, shutting off access to the land for the peasants with little or no land at all, must lead to a collapse of the internal market."

The "minority" had the good fortune of first seizing upon Stalin's concept of "rotten stabilization" connected with the theory of the already mentioned Varga concerning so called "permanent unemployment." According to this idea the rationalization of labor and technological development bring the capitalist system to the point at which it is capable of employing (and thus feeding) only a certain part of the working masses. This theory, after being made primitive as far as it could, became more understandable and more convenient for all communists. It made possible the wildest type of demagoguery directed against each attempt to improve factory labor methods and to increase productivity.

As a matter of fact in this dispute also it is difficult to find anything essential. Both sides in the quarrel were characterized by one thing: the total disbelief that conditions could improve in

Poland. For communists any kind of economic situation in Poland was bad. They see genuine economic stabilization only in Russia, even during the period of 1921 when hunger was decimating the population.

In connection with the problem concerning the role of the petit bourgeoisie and the role of the Sejm, there also was brought up the question of attitude toward opposition parties in the Sejm which meant the PPS and the peasant parties. This matter was treated by the "majority" in such a manner that the democratic opposition would revolt against fascism and that this revolt should be exploited by the KPP in order to go along "part of the way." The "minority" on the other hand considered all opposition parties, especially the leftist ones, as the greatest support for the fascist dictatorship.

Even later there were added differences, incomprehensible to the average party member, on the basis of united front tactics. The "minority" accused the "majority" of striving toward a united front from above with the PPS which the latter were not even dreaming about at that time. The "majority" on the other hand denounced the "minority" for opportunistic united front tactics because of its slogan on defending democratic achievements. Finally it was only the split within the PPS during 1928 that crystallized these matters even more, but in the meanwhile the entire party was involved in empty talk.

In general the "majority" represented the party's intellectual elite. However the "minority" enjoyed an absolute advantage first of all due to its closer contact with Moscow. It was for a good reason that the latter was headed by Lenski. On the other hand the character and stature of the "majority" had the worst record because of its use of cheap tricks and insinuations: thus for instance it impugned the "minority" with the position assumed by the "petit bourgeois" which

was being fought bitterly by the "minority" and which had been renounced even by its creators. Meanwhile this group of "four" represented actually the only intellectual force within the "minority." It is another matter that apart from the "4," the sole other support for the "minority" came from the swindlers and speculators like Amsterdam, Karolski, Geist who were not popular within the party. An exception were the more serious minded and talented individuals like Bernstein and above all Juljan Brun (Bronowicz-Spis). The star in this group, as far as the worker element was concerned, was only Jan Paszyn who attained great popularity among Warsaw communists.

The "minority" also claimed the advantage over the "majority" in various kinds of intrigue and a strongly emphasized orientation toward Moscow. The leader of the "minority" Lenski, prior to saying anything, always attempted to sniff out the smells in the anterooms of Stalin and Molotov. A considerable sharpening in the struggle between these 2 factions was evoked by the "minority" announcement dated 11 October 1926 in which it demanded an immediate change in KPP leadership, since the latter was incapable of correcting the May error. The central committee violently attacked the "minority" members for this statement, but they did not care due to a guarantee of impunity by Moscow. It should be mentioned here that it was in the interest of Moscow at that time to have both sides fighting among themselves because there was nothing better to do in a situation where effective revolutionary work was out of the question. In quarreling among themselves, both factions were forced to contend for the kindness and considerations of Moscow which made them even more dependent upon the Comintern and the Russian communist party.

In general the "minority" found itself in a fortunate situation because, as the opposition, it was the criticizing and attacking side.

One of the most successful moves by the "majority" against the "minority" was the attack upon the most prominent among the "minority" adherents, Juljan Brun-Bronowicz. This really talented literary theoretician even prior to the May coup d'etat when he was in prison wrote a work based upon the Zeromski novel Przedwiosnie [See Note], entitled Stefana Zeromskiego tragedja pomylek [Stefan Zeromski's Tragedy of Errors], at first printed as a serial in the literary magazine Skamandra and later published as a whole by "Ksiazka". This work was genuinely courageous and original, although it was closely connected with the philosophy of Stanislaw Brzozowski. From the communist viewpoint however it is full of extraordinary heresy approaching "national bolshevism" if not even "fascism." We read there for instance as follows: "The historical raison d'etat of the Soviet system is the national character of the bolshevik revolution,"; "the revolution expropriated not so much the native bourgeoisie as it did the foreigners," (because there was little native bourgeoisie in Russia) and the Soviet state is the "political superstructure for Soviet state capitalism." The All-Union Communist Party is described by Brun in the following manner: "It will be closest to the essence of the matter if we say that this is a lay monastic order with harsh rules and an iron discipline." At another place he calls the bolsheviks a "closed brotherhood." Who is to be called to power in Soviet Russia, according to the author, is decided by the "fanaticism of ideology based upon harsh, barbarian power." The west is contrasted by the author with the east, and the proletariat is designated by him as the segment most national within the state. "The elite from among the youth in the intelligentsia, working class, and peasantry provided moral strength for the Legions and the POW."

(Note]. This novel at one time (1924) caused a lot of argument in the intellectual communist spheres which were looking for support of their ideology in it. It was especially advertised by Jan Hempel. Certain rightist circles also thought they could see bolshevism in the book which was most unjust.)

After the appearance of this work during an entire year nobody among the communists criticized it. The literary critic Andrzej Stawar tried to do so. He was an exceptionally dogmatic exponent of the bolshevist "Marxist" philosophy of literature, but the communists would not print his critique. It was only in the fire of fractional conflict that the "majority" launched its attack upon the work of Brun in the form of a central committee resolution and an article by Walecki which denounced the author's ideas as national bolshevist. At first Brun and the whole "minority" tried to defend themselves by the statement that the entire book was merely a "joke" designated to entice toward communism the radical, patriotic group of intellectuals. However later they admitted that Brun's book was a "great mistake," expressing a nationalist bolshevik deviation. After admitting this error the creators of the resolutions at the second congress and in part at the fourth conference of the KPP, resolutions which were almost nationalist bolshevik, had a serious argument in their own defense and a trump card in their struggle against the "minority."

The worst aspect of these disputes for the KPP was the fact that Moscow did not strive to liquidate them. The leader of the "minority" himself, Lenski, wrote about this as follows:

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"Our quarrel at the present time does not exist contrary to the Comintern line. We have proceeded too far ahead of the other parties. They have disputes, but we have only sharp clashes which

do not permit of delay." (Brochure entitled Zbior artykulow i materialow dyskusyjnych [Collection of Articles and Discussion Materials], 1927, page 190).

It is not contrary to the Comintern line, i.e., it does not collide with the interests of Russia. The fighting "chieftains" (in party vernacular "kacyk" means a member of the central committee from the abbreviation KC [Komitet Centralny -- central committee]) regardless of internal strife in the KPP constantly and unitedly supported Stalin in his struggle within the WKP. In Poland they conscientiously voiced the slogan about defense of the USSR, and that was sufficient for the time being. Nobody required any more extensive revolutionary activity from them, because the Comintern had postponed the revolution in Europe and was concentrating upon China.

Despite the pitiful conditions within the KPP, the latter's influence did not decrease during the period under discussion but rather was doubtlessly at its apogee. This in part can be explained by the activities of the already mentioned organizations subordinate to the KPP which were less involved in disputes. At any rate with the beginning of 1927 the communists achieved a series of local victories in elections to municipal councils at Pruszkow, Brzesk on the Bug River, etc. Most important was the large success at Warsaw in May of the same year. The communist ticket was invalidated, but despite this fact it received approximately 70,000 votes. In comparison with the 1923 national elections, this meant over doubling the number of votes. This took place at the cost of Jewish parties and to a lesser extent at the cost of the national democrats. The PPS actually did not lose any strength in this triumph of its opponents, since it maintained the same number of votes it had received 4 years before. It is another

matter that this large "revolutionary" mass did not manifest more than a minimum of activity. One month after this great electoral success when the KPP and ZMP organized a great patriotic pro Soviet manifestation in connection with the funeral of the USSR envoy Voikov, who had been killed by a Russian emigre in Warsaw named Koverda, it appeared that the communist masses amounted to a few hundred youngsters and mostly Jewish at that.

Somewhat earlier, in March 1927, the dissolution and liquidation of the NPCh by state administrative authorities took place in complete quiet and without arousing any sensation. [See Note]. Several weeks later the fourth KPP congress convened.

([Note]. The remainder of the peasant communists later found themselves in a communizing organization called the "Union of Peasant Leftists 'Self Help,'" the leader of which was the Sejm deputy Stanislaw Wojtowicz. In general this was a weak organization limited in its influence to part of Lublin province and the province of Kielce. As time went on its attitude toward communism and the KPP became tighter, especially during the period of attempts at activating the Peasant International under the wings of the communists. The first organizational congress of the latter took place in 1930 at Berlin. During 1931 the ZLCh "Samopomoc" [Zwiazek Lewicy Chlopskiej "Samopomoc" -- Union of Peasant Leftists "Self Help"] was dissolved, and its leader Stanislaw Wojtowicz fled to Russia where after several years of life in the "country of most progress" he became disillusioned with communism).

This congress proves completely that for the KPP dependence upon the USSR became an absolute necessity for existence. Without the fatherly hand of Moscow, it would not even be capable of organizing

a party congress. The fourth congress deliberated in Moscow. In comparison with other party congresses, it was exceptional in that its sessions lasted a total of almost 4 months, i.e., from May to August. To date the protocols of this congress have not been publicized in the party press, even in the highly censored versions available for the third and fifth congresses. It is to be expected that these protocols will never be published. The washing of dirty linen was too extensive at the congress. Commotions and brawls were a frequent phenomenon, and fighting was natural. During the entire 4 months an absolute social boycott existed between the 2 factions. The "majority" had an advantage of 4 to 5 votes and at first attempted to dominate the "minority," especially in connection with elections to the presidium and the mandates commission. In response the "minority" threatened a split and that it would leave the congress in a body. The tactics of the "minority" again incensed the "majority," etc., ad infinitum. Mutual clashes, insinuations, and calumnies attained such an extent and such tension that one of the delegates from Upper Silesia, Ludwik Szabatowski, died of a heart attack during a speech. Reciprocal calumnies attained a degree never before seen even among the communists. For instance the emigres who supported the "minority," like Unszlicht and Krasny-Rotbard, began spreading the information that before the war Warski had been a provocateur and betrayed his comrades to the tsarist secret police (this was an echo of the great fight between the "administrators" and the "splinterers" in the SDKPiL during 1913; the former at that time accused Unszlicht of provocation). It is easy to imagine the storm which arose as a result: courts, commissions, verdicts, rehabilitations, etc. took up so much time that the deliberations themselves could proceed only with difficulty. The leader of the "majority" fraction Iostrzewa was calling for an immediate defeat of the oppositionists, i.e.,

the "minority," and threatened that they would be burned out with red hot iron like a boil from a healthy body.

Finally some measure of order was brought about through Comintern representatives headed by Bukharin who established a parity in the congress presidium and reserved for themselves the privilege of final decision in all basic matters under dispute.

In order to explain the tremendous indifference of Moscow with regard to these quarrels and the latter's tolerance of the extraordinary chaos which had dominated the congress, we must add that at the time a situation had developed in Moscow which could have precipitated a civil war at any time. This was a time of most acute state crisis in the USSR. The united opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev was preparing itself for an armed struggle to seize power on the tenth anniversary of the revolution (7 November 1927, i.e., 25 October according to the Russian calendar and hence the adjective "oktyabr;" this is an annual holiday for communists all over the world). A large part in this conspiracy was played by the provocation of Stalin. Externally the position of bolshevism was also fatal. The defeat in China could not be concealed any longer, and the attempts at precipitating a revolt against the former allies were unsuccessful. At the end of the summer in 1927 the Kuomintang began to persecute the communists openly. Under such circumstances the Soviets just did not have the time to regulate the internal affairs of the KPP, the more so in view of the fact that the most prominent members of the Comintern (except for Bukharin) found themselves at odds with their own government (Zinoviev and Radek) leaving the International in confusion. During a period of 4 years, i.e., from the middle of 1924 to the fall of 1928, the Comintern did not hold a single congress although 5 of these meetings had convened

during the previous 5 and 1/2 years. A contributing factor was the fear of Stalin with respect to the influence of the opposition upon the western communists. This expectation was not realized, because all of Trotsky's adherents dropped him immediately after his fall in Russia. [See Note].

([Note]. Only in France and in Germany, beginning with 1927, small groups of "Trotskyites" were being organized. In Germany at times there were a total of 5 different communist groups. Certain of these later fused into one with Hitlerism. In Poland a weak movement of independent Trotskyite groups started only in 1932).

Finally, also, the most powerful authority in the USSR -- the GPU -- no longer manifested so much interest in KPP affairs. Dzierzynski [a Pole] was dead. Unszlicht had transferred to the air force. The successors of these 2, also Poles but completely russified, Mezynski and Henryk Jagoda (a druggist's helper from Lodz) were completely alien to the KPP.

Returning to the fourth KPP congress, I should add that the principal struggle which took place at this meeting had as its aim the acquisition of authority in the party. Disputes concerning commas, words, and sentences only made the atmosphere more acute, but they were nevertheless merely a cover for concealed aims. In the end, as usual, the central committee membership was decided by the Comintern which issued a judgment worthy of Solomon: 8 members from the "majority," 7 from the "minority," plus 2 arbiters from the Comintern itself. These arbiters were called "Mania" and "Kasia," i.e., Manuilsky and Kuusinen, the latter being a russified Finn and one of the Comintern secretaries.

Due to its greater zealotry in praising Moscow, the "minority" was appropriately compensated by raising its status on the central committee from 5 to 7 members. The "majority" on the contrary decreased but was able to maintain a slight advantage in the central committee. The total leaderships of both factions, with the exception of Warski whose place was occupied by Kostrzewa, were again elected to the central committee. Within the "minority" fraction at the congress, there were visible also sharp clashes among the internal cliques. The source of these here was also a desire for power. This friction however was carefully hidden.

The congress itself was incapable of working out any resolutions. Finally all of the resolutions were edited by Comintern workers, and then both sides eagerly accepted them without much thought as to whether there were any contradictions in regard to attitudes being voiced hitherto. It is sufficient to cite only the most characteristic of the congress resolutions. Thus in the introduction:

"... the May coup d'etat represents a heavy defeat for the proletariat..." (mimeographed copy of Uchwaly IV. Zjazdu [Resolutions of the Fourth Congress], published by the KPP central committee).

Next we find an attack against the policy of high prices for agricultural products, applied for a certain period of time by the post May government. Then the order to begin a ruthless struggle with the "greatest enemy" of the proletariat -- Strzelec ["Sharp Shooter,"] in its capacity as a "fascist guard." The main goal of the party however was the fight against war and the defense of the USSR. Further we find the following type of statement in the resolutions:

"... the vicious fractional struggle has done considerable harm to the party... although theoretically the party has grown taller by a head... a consolidation is necessary for both sides on the basis of real attitudes... the political line of one as well as the other was in general justified... the majority correctly designated the fact of stabilization in Poland, whereas the minority did not appreciate this stabilization... the majority committed an error by uncritically supporting the 'sick top of the KPZU'..." (page 2 of Resolutions).

However more than any other the resolution concerning fascism merits being distinguished:

"Polish fascism does not represent a phenomenon separate from world imperialism. The early period of capitalism, the characteristic economic property of which was the principle of free competition, is corresponded to politically by the development of parliamentary democracy as a form of bourgeois rule. On the other hand during the epoch of imperialism the unheard of concentration of capital and authority in a few hands, the colossal acuteness of contradictions among bourgeois states and between the bourgeoisie and the working class will inevitably lead to control by political reactionaries. During the period of war and revolution in countries where the economic and political crises disorganize the legal apparatus of the bourgeois dictatorship, where the revolutionary movement of the masses can not be stopped with the aid of ordinary means at the disposal of the bourgeois state, where due to the exceptional acuteness of the class struggle these means already can not guarantee the exploitation of the working masses, where a rapid loosening of social bonds and a declassification of petit bourgeois segments takes place on the basis of the general crisis -- fascism appears on the scene as a

radical and at the same time specific form of capitalist reaction. In its current stage of development fascism is victorious in the weakest links of the chain including capitalist states, but it is not in the least a property of backward countries." (page 15 of Resolutions).

The primitiveness and mechanical aspects of this conception are striking. The "economic materialism" of Marx, one sided in its very foundation, here approaches a complete negation of any psychological or ideological characteristics which all social movements possess. Such magical slogans like "concentration of capital" evoke social, ideological, and political results not by means of reacting upon human psychology (as is the case among wiser Marxists in the West) but do so directly. [See Note]. "Economic materialism" becomes essentially a magical world outlook. However this simple formula devised by Ryng (currently the theoretical head of the entire KPP and editor of the party program) was seized upon from the view of Bukharin himself.

([Note]. It is interesting that the ideas of some mystical connection between the "economic principle of free competition" and parliamentary democracy are to be found also in the views of Dmowski. It is obvious that inclination toward a simplified "materialism" does not relate itself to a politico-social position but to a certain intellectual bent.)

Only one matter had to be settled by the fourth congress without parity or superfluous amelioration. Already at the start of 1927 there had arisen in the Soviet Ukraine a nationalistic Ukrainian movement under the leadership of Schumsky and the well known writer Chwylowy (in 1934 the latter ended his life in suicide) which was

oriented toward "western culture" as well as against the Muscovites in the "proletarian" edition, represented in the first place by Maksim Gorky. [See Note]. The leadership of the KPZU with Wasilkiw, Maksymowicz, and Turjansky gave its support to this so called "Shumskyism." The 3 mentioned individuals simultaneously constituted one of the strongest elements within the "majority" fraction. Therefore the congress decided that the "majority" had committed an error by uncritically supporting the "sick top of the KPZU." It should be added in connection with this matter that the "majority" had seriously stumbled, because, as we shall later see, right at the beginning of 1928 there took place a split within the KPZU with almost the entire KPZU central committee breaking off from the Comintern and the KPP. After this split the "majority" lost in the eyes of Moscow, and its position in the KPP was entirely shaken. Since it had supported the splinter group in the KPZU, it found itself in collision with the most vital interests of the Russian state. The breaking away from under the influence of the Comintern by elements functioning within an area in which the USSR had certain hopes was of course a very important matter.

([Note]. According to Gorky of all cultures only the Russian included certain elements which could serve as the basis for the proletarian culture then under construction. This concept in which chauvinism is connected with the "vagabond" attitude of the Lumpenproletariat actually even contradicts the statements of Lenin in this matter. It is characteristic that the KPP literary theoreticians never spoke out even one word against Gorky.)

Among the resolutions passed by the fourth congress, the one on self determination by Upper Silesia including even secession from Poland merits some attention. Nobody was opposed to the resolution

at the congress this time. It should be remembered that this particular resolution, as indeed all others, had been edited by Russian dignitaries.

Despite many reminders at the congress with regard to the liquidation of fractional fighting, these struggles continued after the adjournment of the congress. Their culmination point was even achieved one year later. The fractions existed as before and kept on biting at each other which pushed the KPP to the very bottom of its crisis. On the background of these sad difficulties, the success of an extensive political campaign should be noted. This was conducted at the beginning of 1928 in connection with the Sejm elections. In this electoral campaign the KPP participated under the assumed name of "Worker-Peasant Unity." The central electoral committee filed a state list with this designation and obtained number thirteen. The balloting on 4 March 1928 indicated that the communists together with their branches acquired 829,416 votes in a total of 11,758,094 persons casting a ballot.

Directly following this "triumph," extensively publicized by the communists, there took place in the KPP one split after another. Even prior to the elections the "Shumskyites" engineered a break within the KPZU which we have already mentioned and which was adhered to by an absolute majority, i.e., nine-tenths of the KPZU central committee membership together with the secretaries and members of the district committees, genuine Ukrainians, and with the majority of party members who were also Ukrainians. This splinter group attacked the russification policy of the Soviets in the Ukraine, their church policy (regulated exclusively by the denominational interests of atheism), the dictatorship by the Comintern and the KPP. There remained left in the KPZU almost all Jews (at the end of 1922 the Communist Party

of Eastern Galicia included among its membership: 30% Ukrainians, up to 10% Poles, and a mere 60% Jews; later however the percentage of Ukrainians increased). This split also spread to the KPZU branch, "Selrob." In this latter group the splinterers found sympathy and protection within a part of the central committee of the KPP branch, "PPS-Lewica," mainly in the person of Andrzej Czuma. The splinterers attempted to create their own party, but this organization dried up and almost disappeared due to lack of funds, since Moscow and Kharkov had stopped sending money. Naturally the Ukrainian secessionists were called a "branch of Polish fascism," "counter revolutionaries," and even a "defensywa" organization by the Comintern. Such a fate meets everybody who leaves the KPP, even though such a break should have the most idealistic foundation.

Somewhat later there occurred on this same background as in the KPZU also a split within the KPZB. The majority of activists within the former "Hromada" and the Society for a Belorussian School, led by Luckiewicz and Ostrowski, broke away. Relations were also severed with the KPP by a part of the former NPCh under the leadership of ex-Sejm deputy Szapiel. These secessionists were also later called agents of Polish intelligence.

The day of 1 May 1928 is remembered by the large brawl in Warsaw which had political consequences. The communists organized an attack upon the PPS procession at Theater Square in the course of which the communist goons began to shoot at the "social fascists." A struggle developed as a result of which several persons were killed and approximately 200 wounded. Such first of May clashes made impossible for a long time any relations between the KPP and the PPS. On the other hand inside of the KPP, the "minorities" intensified the acuteness of this situation because of their inexorable hatred for the PPS.

In the summer of 1928 the KPP organization in Warsaw underwent a split. The KPP and ZMP committees in Warsaw refused obedience to the "majority" dominated central committee to which the latter reacted by dissolving the rebellious organs and creating new ones, utilizing for this purpose its advantage of one in the central committee and on the secretariat inside of Poland. Both the "majority" as well as the "minority" released appeals against each other with mutual recriminations and accusations of splinter activities and even of service to fascism and Polish intelligence. Finally the adherents of both fractions started street fights among themselves.

Fortunately at that very time the sixth Comintern congress convened at Moscow. Upon hearing the news about the split in the KPP it gave plenipotentiary authority to its executive (executive committee) to reestablish order in the KPP (even though this executive already possessed such plenipotentiary authority). This executive on the spot annulled the resolutions of the KPP central committee's secretariat pertaining to the matter of the Warsaw committee and ordered the withdrawal from the leadership (i.e., condemnation to compulsory residence in the USSR) of those most implicated in the split: Rylski from the "majority" and Henrykowski from the "minority." Next it dissolved the newly appointed leadership of the KPP Warsaw organization, and finally it nominated 3 new members (commissars) of the central committee from outside of the KPP: the russianized Latvian, Knorin (in the KPP he used the pseudonyms "Sokolik" and "Sokolnicki"), with assignment to the Politburo; the Russian, Poddubny (probably a cover name), with assignment to the central committee's secretariat; and the Russian, Popov (alias "Lowicki"), with assignment to the KPZU central committee. Parity was established in the leadership by such methods, with a Russian cock on the scales. But

even this was of no avail. The tension of fractional struggle was so strong that these Comintern commissars were also drawn into the vortex: Kaoria held with the "minority," Popov and Poddubny with the "majority." In the final analysis however these 3 men were under orders of the Comintern executive committee and plenipotentiaries of the Russian communist party's Politburo, so they did whatever this last agency commanded.

The sixth Comintern congress following its old tradition again evolved a Polish Commission which edited and announced a new open letter to all KPP members. This letter begins with the teaching:

"The entire current domestic and foreign policy of Poland is subordinated to the preparation of war against the USSR." (!) as well as with the appeal that the KPP defend the "independence of Lithuania" (why not of Paraguay which actually was invaded within a short period of time?), because Poland was preparing against the latter and:

"... occupation of Lithuania by Poland as a preparatory measure for war against the USSR." (These are all diplomatic maneuvers of the Narkomindel which were discarded after signing of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact.)

Only then does the letter come to the point:

"Despite the resolutions by the fourth KPP congress concerning the dissolution of fractions and the cessation of fractional struggles, despite the many demands by the executive committee of the Communist International that fractional disputes stop -- this fighting continues. Recently it has attained hitherto unseen dimensions and has provided sad results which are a comfort only to the enemies

of the working class. Various mutual accusations and reciprocal recriminations were commenced, also incitement against the communist fraction in the Sejm... in fact 2 leadership centers have arisen."

(Nowy Przegląd, November-December 1928, page 8).

Its dictatorial regulations pertaining to KPP organization is justified as follows:

"These regulations were dictated by the necessity of saving the KPP from collapse due to political and organizational deterioration." (Ibid., page 9).

And then further on:

"One group as well as the other conducted an impermissible fractional struggle. For this reason the executive committee of the Communist International considers that, under the circumstances which have been created, neither one of these groups can independently lead the party out of the blind alley in which it has found itself." (Ibid., page 12).

The latter also criticizes both groups strongly for:

"... the dangerous deficiency based upon the underestimation of the war threat against the USSR."

In addition each fraction had its own register of sins. First of all, the "majority" underestimated the national opportunistic errors of Wasilkiw and Turjansky. The transfer of Wasilkiw and Turjansky to the camp of counterrevolution was also completely unexpected by the larger part of the party for this reason (page 10). They also uncritically supported without any reservations the brochure by Brand (published legally under the title Momenty gospodarcze w przewrocie majowym [Economic Elements in the May Coup d'Etat], 1927) that did not appreciate the tendencies of Polish fascism toward industrial

expansion eastward which in turn resulted from the overestimation of the developmental capacities by the internal market in Poland. This also meant the undervaluation at that time of a basic element in the war against the USSR. Finally the letter accused the "majority" of fearing revolutionary self-criticism and escapism from admitting its own errors.

On the other hand the mistakes of the "minority" were based upon: proposals in one of the draft resolutions concerning Sejm elections to "establish a united front from above with the PPS and other compromising parties which at that time (refers to the Sejm elections of 1938) already were branches of Polish fascism"; the announcement in the eastern provinces of the concept regarding the "entire Belorussian village" against the alleged minority repression in the Wilno area. According to the communist Talmud this again was a heresy, because it did not differentiate the poor peasants from the rich or the moderately wealthy. In the end the "minority" was to weaken the struggle against "Polish fascism" in the eastern provinces which contributed to a withdrawal of the Belorussian intelligentsia from the revolutionary movement (Nowy Przegląd, pages 10-11).

At the end of the letter we read a new appeal for liquidation of fractional conflict "at any price" and the clear threat that the Comintern will expell anybody from the party for a continuation of fighting. These threats did not help much however. The disputes were so great that even the sharp intervention by the Comintern could not stop them. In December 1928 the KPP central committee issued a commentary on the letter of the "Polish Commission" in which we read:

"The logic in the 2 years of fractional struggle, the strength of fractional solidarity and fractional bonds is so powerful that almost the entire party active (i.e., officials and party functionaries -- author's comment) is divided into 2 camps by this fight and cannot imagine any other way of defeating fractionalism and attaining party unity than through the victory of its fraction." (Ibid., page 17).

We can see thus that even 6 months after the Comintern letter, fractional struggle had not been eliminated. Despite all official statements, neither of the fractions dissolved itself. The culmination point of the crisis had been passed however, and the tension of the disputes began to subside slowly. A fashionable word at the time was party consolidation and in this connection a race was started: who would consolidate the KPP better and how? Naturally, each of the sides "consolidated" according to its own calculations. On the other hand the theme consolidation introduced new divergencies. In the final analysis the foundation for all of these disputes was the unceremonious drive toward the "chieftains" trough. While these quarrels did not contravene the "Comintern line," their solution by the latter did not take place but even this was changed very soon.

The sixth Comintern congress which hitherto represents one of the last congresses of the Communist International (there were no other congresses up to August 1934) designated the new communist strategy. If the ideology of international communism from the years 1917-1928 represented the ideology of a revolutionary sect which was ruling over Russia and striving for control over the remaining countries, then the sixth congress provided the Comintern with the ideology of this sect's highest echelon which had been transformed into the top level of the Russian state bureaucracy. The utopia of world revolution was substituted by a new utopia, created over a period of 11 years, the utopia of

socialist construction in the USSR which was becoming thanks to this utopia "the only wonderful fatherland of the world proletariat."

In the field of theory the sixth congress erased all of Marxist sociology (not ideology however, since the latter only underwent some vulgarisation). According to Marx or communist ideology from the years 1917-1928, the victory of socialism was to represent the work of the despotic dictatorship in Russia which is transforming that country into the most modern industrial state, ruled by a communist ideology and constructing not only new forms of economic life but also a new and higher culture, etc. Against this world of all socialist magnificence stands the dying capitalist world.

The new communist tactics worked out at the sixth congress were based upon a close subordination to Russia of all western sections of the Comintern, not only ideologically and organizationally but also from the intellectual point of view. The foundations of these new tactics lay in the sad experiences of the revolutionary movement in western Europe. The only successful attempt, in Russia, had arisen as a result of war. The communists of other countries -- to use the jargon -- "the proletariat" was lacking in strength necessary to make a revolution, but the international bourgeoisie organized through fascism (i.e., all of the states except the USSR) and was preparing a war against the Soviets. This new "imperialist war" must become the point of departure for a new revolution, a repetition on a large and global scale of the 1917 Russian revolution. With the use of appropriate communist tactics the workers and peasants armed as soldiers will turn their weapons against their own capitalist fatherlands and introduce a revolution with the aid of the Red Army. Preparations must be made for this historical moment by means of an antimilitaristic campaign (not pacifism! -- the communist hates only the bourgeois armies, but his attitude toward the

Soviet army is one of pietism) [See Note] and one of defeatism, simultaneously imbuing the "masses of the proletariat" that "their only fatherland is the USSR." Of course this chauvinistic militarism does not bathe the use for its own interest of the hated "bourgeois" and "petit bourgeois" pacifism, especially in countries that have a strong tradition of abhorrence to war among the masses. In Poland due to the weakness of pacifism in the masses and the exceptional servile Muscovitophile attitude of the "revolutionary elite," this "patriotism" very quickly assumed the most vulgar forms of a cult of Soviet armed might -- mainly among the inhabitants of Warsaw's northern suburb. It came to the point where the ZMP translated into the Polish jargon a considerable part of the Red Army repertoire and used it as a song book for the workers' movement.

([Note]. Beginning with 1924 it was traditional for individual units of the Red Army to become the patrons of various local communist organizations in other countries, especially youth groups. Such a patronage usually took on the form of sending monetary subsidies. As a token of appreciation for care, the local communist organization would forward gifts to the Red Army. For instance the Warsaw committee of the ZMK at one time presented a Red Army regiment with a machine gun purchased from membership dues.)

However the Comintern should be defended against Sejm deputy Czapinski who in one of his articles published by Robotnik came to the logical conclusion from the entire simplified military strategy of the Comintern that "the Comintern favors war." These matters were not that simple, and logic often fails when investigating the tactics of the Comintern and of the Soviets. The essence of the Comintern's military strategy, which was created by Bukharin, was based on the fact that the Soviet government strongly feared an interventionist war.

more so from the west than from the east, and certain English and German plans (here we may recall the plans of Deterding and Reichberg) seemed to corroborate these fears. Not believing, as was already noted by Kostrzewa in 1924, that there was any possibility of a quick revolution in the west the Soviet government at least wanted to secure diversionary cadres among its branches in the event of this imaginary war, i.e., Comintern sections which again had to be disoriented and were thus given a military strategy in an appropriate "Marxist" and "revolutionary" sauce. This method belongs to the "iron politics of the Soviets." Parenthetically speaking the reasons for establishing the first "piatiletka" in the USSR should be sought elsewhere than in fears of war. At the congress, the "piatiletka" was presented as an action toward implementation of socialist construction with the order to conduct the most vigorous propaganda in its behalf.

The sixth congress designated also a special annual "Day for Struggle against War with the USSR." This day occurs on 1 August.

Returning to the disputes within the KPP, an incident should be mentioned when these finally collided with the "Comintern line." Toward the end of 1928 the year long struggle began between the group Stalin-Molotov-Kaganovich and the right wing of Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky which ended in the defeat of the latter. The question there dealt with the "tempo of the piatiletka." The right wing wanted to slow down the tempo with the slogan: "first food and clothing, first bricks, and only then build new factories and machines!" On the other hand the ruling Stalinist group (sitting in the WKP general secretariat) in its constant fear of intervention, supported the course for a "rapid tempo" -- development of a heavy industry, primarily for war, even at the cost of hunger and poverty on the part of the broadest working masses and especially the peasantry. The latter were the greatest enemy of communism, which in

view of the approaching war had to be liquidated as soon as possible by means of a fiscal policy and by eliminating the peasant from ownership of land (kolkhozes and sovkhozes). The passive resistance of the peasantry was suppressed by Stalin through cruel penal expeditions and mass resettlement. Equally brutal was his suppression of the party opposition by handing over the most recalcitrant of his opponents to the GPU, or at best to the central control commission (something like a party court) which expelled opponents of the "general line," i.e., the course taken by Stalin. This in turn meant deprivation of all positions including the loss of a bread card, living quarters, etc.

Bukharin who lost both in the party and in the government was forced to leave the Comintern also, his place being occupied by the "leftist" Molotov. The latter remained leader of the Comintern until the time he formally assumed the position of USSR premier. Elimination of "rightists" was commenced in all foreign communist parties. In the KPP however, all members supported the WKP general line regardless of their particular fraction. On the other hand, unfortunately at certain times in the past Bukharin had sided with the "majority" whereas Molotov had favored the "minority," luckily for the latter. This detail, seemingly of little significance, was completely sufficient to have the "majority" condemned by the Comintern at any suitable moment which actually took place shortly thereafter. Even the pro-Stalinist articles by Krolkowski ("Bartoszewicz"), Brand, and Kostrzewa appearing in Nowy Przegląd regularly were of no avail. Their fate had been sealed in Moscow.

The direct cause for the new inquests within the KPP was created by the internal conditions of Poland. During the fall of 1928 a split occurred in the PPS into adherents of central executive committee policy

(thus the name "cekawisci" [CKW-Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy] whereas the communists called them "zulawszczyki" and the splinterers who were renewing the traditions of the old Revolutionary Fraction whose name they assumed (thus "fracy" and also "jaworowszczyzy" or "moraczewszczyzy" [from names of leaders, Jaworski and Moraczewski]). This break could be felt from the time of the election, but the communists were surprised and completely disoriented since the development did not fit into their schemat which did not foresee that "social fascism" could be split up by "fascism." The first attempt at applying an appropriate communist theory that could explain this phenomenon was conducted by one of the corner stones of the "majority" -- Stefanski in Nowy Przegląd for November-December 1928 in an article entitled "From Social Fascism to Fascism."

Stefanski promulgated the thesis, nota bene not without justification, that fascism was striving to become a monopolistic party and thus must liquidate all other parties including even those which serve it. The PPS in the meanwhile was defending as much as it could "democratic appearances," becoming an obstacle to integral fascism which in the eyes of Stefanski was: BBWR [Bezpartyjny Blok Wspolpracy z Rzadem -- Non-Party Block for Cooperation with the Government]. The former Revolutionary Fraction of the PPS was considered by Stefanski to be simply a branch of the BBWR.

The evaluation of this split as conducted by Stefanski evoked an immediate explosion of protest among the "minority." The greatest amount of irritation was caused by his thesis concerning the "double edged role of social democracy:"

"The fact that the masses gave their votes to the PPS, treating seriously the opposition of the PPS to the government, believing honestly

in the social democratic slogans of the PPS -- was justly considered by fascism to be a phenomenon of growth in revolutionary ferment on the basis of which the radical democratic and oppositionist phraseology of the PPS will increasingly manifest its "double edge," especially when communism is acquiring an ever more decisive influence among the working class which represents the hegemony over revolutionary forces." (Nowy Przegląd, November-December 1928, page 127).

The article by Stefanski inevitably is full of various unchecked axioms in the manner of that "growing ferment among the masses," "the increase in communism," etc. Striking also is the false analysis of the Sejm elections, based upon a lack of facts. Nevertheless the article is objectively justified in stating that the PPS would assume an oppositionist stand toward the government, and this provided Stefanski with the foundation for establishing his "theory of the double edge."

This simple theory was based upon logical thinking. Since the PPS had commenced a struggle against the government with the use of radical slogans, that fight to a certain extent aided the revolutionary movement.

Naturally the theory of the "double edge" became an insult almost for the entire KPP and was condemned on the spot as being anti-Leninist. Even after the greatest intellectual effort, it is still hard to understand why the theory should include any danger for communism. Stefanski in his article ascertains a simple matter and an obvious fact which, with a little logic, even from the communist viewpoint can not be refuted. It is comprehensible to all that if the PPS had become opposed to the government, if the former negated many of the latter's regulations and openly manifested opposition to others, then this was a picture of struggle against the government and not collaboration or merely a critical attitude. In the meanwhile the communists had imagined that the principal

raison d'etat of the PPS was represented by the fight against communism (in reality it is exactly the opposite: 60% of KPP energy is channeled into combatting the PPS; every communist newspaper abounds in attacks upon the latter party, whereas Robotnik often does not carry a single item about the communists for weeks). Even when the PPS announced oppositionist and radical slogans, this was considered a maneuver attracting the masses away from the revolutionary movement. According to Stefanski the "PPS oppositionist phraseology" only incidentally strikes at "fascism," i.e., at the government. Other communists judged that this represented a cleverly planned maneuver needed by fascism.

There appears here an extraordinary wisdom in this "raison d'etat" of communist policy. It is necessary to be deprived of all political realism in order to arrive at a similar evaluation of the role played by opposition political parties. According to the estimate of the KPP all political parties apart from itself belong to the "fascist camp." These parties are linked together by some kind of a mystical bond. Even if this were true, the attack upon Stefanski's theory must attest communists' madness, because they themselves -- in a different place -- claimed friction in the fascist camp.

At any rate the "theory of the double edge" was only an indirect reason for Stefanski's fall. The essential cause could be found in the reshuffling of Kremlin dignitaries and in the changes of Comintern orientation.

In January 1929 the fifth central committee plenum convened within the KPP. Its composition was that which had been finally established at the sixth Comintern congress. The plenum took up mainly the split in the PPS and tactics with regard to the labor unions. It should be added here that the break within the PPS precipitated a split also in the class

trade unions. The "fracy" began to establish separate unions which led to chaos, in some ways strengthening the KPP's position. In this connection a great dispute arose between "minority" members: Fiedler (Efroim Truskier) announced the thesis that the PPS was ridding itself of democratic illusions and was increasingly transferring to fascist positions. [See Note]. Lenski countered Fiedler's thesis by stating that the PPS had been democratic only as long as the bourgeoisie had been the same; it became fascist automatically however, when the bourgeoisie assumed that form. The more elastic mind of Fiedler could not swallow such a simplified thesis, so he was expelled from the "minority" fraction on the spot and declared a "helper" of the right wing. This was the first open clash among the "minority," which considerably weakened its internal coherence and external prestige. Fortunately however it took place at a time when the "minority" was already in the end stretch along the road to power.

([Note]. This is completely absurd. Of all the parties in the Second International only the socialist party of France was characterized by a tendency toward revision of social democratic attitudes on integral parliamentarism. This is the so-called "leftist fascism" (neosocialists). Analogous attempts are found in England.

Large splinters from social democracy (France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany) have lately revived the communist concept of a proletarian dictatorship but in a milder form. It is not to be excluded that a neosocialist movement might develop within the PPS. For the time being however no such germination is visible, although a considerable splinter of the party (Drobner, Chodynaki, Hryniewicz) is looking in the direction of communism.)

This dispute contributed largely to the fact that the "majority" entered the plenum defensively, and the resolution of the fifth plenum

represents a majority-minority-Fiedler composite. The split in the PPS was looked upon as a stage in "Pilsudski's plan" aiming at the establishment of a single party. The resolution divided parties into "openly fascist" ones and "concealed fascist" ones. The PPS belonged to the latter category which is needed by fascism "as a weapon in the struggle against communism." It is more dangerous to communism than are other parties specifically because it is a "concealed fascist" party and similar humbug. On the other hand in union tactics the fifth plenum made a tremendous somersault to the left. In view of the division into Revolutionary Fraction and CKW unions, the KPP issued the slogan of creating a third type of "independent" trade unions.

It never came to a decisive solution of the main dispute at the plenum. The entire struggle between the "majority" and the "minority" was something of an accompaniment. Immediately following the completed plenum Manuilsky, who at that time was officiating in Berlin as secretary of the WEB [West Europaische Buro der Komintern -- West European Bureau of the Comintern], published an article about the German "right wing" headed by Brandler which had just been expelled from the communist party of Germany. This article in passing touched upon Kostrzewa and her friends, because they had defended the rightist views upon stabilization. This was the first indication that the Comintern was planning a change in KPP leadership.

In April 1929 the central committee's secretariat inside of Poland which in the meanwhile had become dominated by the "minority" passed the following resolution:

"The secretariat considers politically unjustified the thesis about 'double edged radical-democratic and oppositionist phraseology by the PPS,' formulated in the article of Comrade Stejanski and reported

upon in the party, because it contributes to the propagation of illusions with regard to the alleged struggle by the PPS against fascism, and, in this connection, decides to forbid the reporting of this thesis within the party."

Apart from this the secretariat appealed to the central committee's Politburo with the request that the latter take up this matter. The "majority" advantage in the Politburo already belonged to the past. Besides Kostrzewa and Prochniak that body also included the creator of the new thesis, Stefanski, but the voting was weighted in favor of the "minority" with Lenski, "Czarny," and Korczyk plus the Moscow cock on the scales in the persons of the "minority" protectors, Sokolik and Knorin.

Simultaneously with the economic crisis within the capitalist world, there began also in the KPP a leadership crisis. For those among the active who would break their necks in this connection, it would also represent an economic and fiscal crisis.

CHAPTER VI

The economic crisis whose first manifestations appeared in 1929 awakened new hopes among the communists. From the very beginning it was endowed with the character not of a periodic crisis which has accompanied the capitalist economy since its first day but rather of a structural crisis reaching to the deepest foundations of the economic system. The communists announced that only they are able to lead the world out of its catastrophe and by no other road than by revolution and with the assistance of the proletarian dictatorship as well as through the application of a planned economy based on the Russian example. Other attempts to eliminate the crisis, like a bloodless reconstruction of economic life by means of social solidarity, concepts of national economy, complex plans and economic programs of the social democrats, etc., were ridiculed by the communists.

However if the communist parties are to implement their revolutionary "exit from the crisis," they must consolidate themselves internally and liquidate their own fractional tensions. Continuation of these disputes is considered to be a betrayal of the revolution, making impossible the exploitation of the crisis for their aims. In the KPP ruin and deterioration dominated however. Conditions favorable to consolidation usually "matured" only when the fractional strife would collide with the interests of the WKP and the Comintern.

The first half of 1929 was influenced heavily by several events. The USSR had become involved in a new phase of the Chinese civil war. Thanks to the work of the Comintern there occurred a weakening of the Chinese nationalist government at Nanking (Chiang-

kai-Shek) which enabled Tsan-she-Liang to assume power.. The latter was the son of the Mukden satrap, Chiang-tso-Lin, who had commenced a war against the Soviet Union with regard to the eastern Chinese railroad. This war ended with a Soviet victory due to superior military equipment and better organization. For the communists it served as a basis to continue their noisy agitation along the line that the "anti Soviet war had already started."

In Berlin on 1 May 1929 the communists, contrary to police restrictions, organized a large street manifestation. The minister of internal affairs, a Marxist named Grzesinski, as well as the president of the Berlin city police, Zorgiebel, who was also a Marxist prepared a bloodbath for the communists. This action was crowned by the storming of the famous Berlin district of Neukoln, inhabited by the "Lumpenproletariat." A few days later the labor party government assumed power in England and did not immediately resume relations with the Soviets. The socialist policeman in Berlin and the social diplomat in Berlin fired the hatred of the communists toward the social democrats to such an extent that from that time on during several years the theory of "social fascism coalescing into fascism" was being composed.

In Poland during this period it was relatively quiet, and there were even few strikes. The only local and noisy one having more of a general significance was the long lasting strike at the Warsaw spinning mill "Wola" in which the communists played a certain role, mainly through the PPS-Lewica.

During June and July of that year, there took place the final act in the crumbling of KPP branches. The majority in the central committee of the PPS-Lewica broke away from the communists,

and all of the founders as well as most important party activists left. The PPS-Lewica fell apart. Part of the units with Andrzej Czuma at their head transferred to the old Revolutionary Fraction of the PPS. Albin Rozenzweig-Rozycki and the organization at Pruszkow (Berent) went to the independent socialists of Dr. Kruk. Several minute splinters joined the PPS itself. The completely communized organizations from the former Congress Kingdom of Poland constituted themselves into a party under the old name, representing a simple branch of the KPP (in February 1932 it was dissolved by authorities). The break down of this legal KPP position was accompanied by large denunciations of the communist party active. Apart from a whole crowd of minor agitators, the following also found their way into prison: Witold Tomorowicz, Mieczyslaw Bernstein, and Kasimierz Cichowski. This last man was at the time secretary of the communist fraction in the Sejm.

In June 1929 the sixth plenum of the KPP central committee was convened and introduced a fundamental shift in the struggle against the right wing. This plenum:

"...made an amendment correcting the previous January plenum which, in connection with a basically justified characterization of the PPS and the BBS, failed to indicate that the PPS during this period was the greatest threat to the working class." (Nowy Przegląd, May-July 1929, pages 5-6).

We have thus a "correction" toward the left. On the other hand in the area of work within the trade union movement, it was necessary to make a correction toward the right:

"... in these resolutions (fifth plenum) an error was committed based upon the general course of creating new unions. Not ceasing with

a just indication of the need for maintaining revolutionary unions where the Central Commission excludes and breaks them, not retreating from the establishment of new unions where the Central Commission unions (i.e., those under PPS influence -- author's comment) have lose their power among the masses -- the January plenum and the (trade union) meeting issued statements of the type that 'the organization of a revolutionary union is the only means to defend the working class against the offensive of capital, fascism, and war,' i.e., a certain union fetishism in a revolutionary garb.

"... the withdrawal from Central Commission unions which still possess influence among the masses represents following the line of least resistance, a deviation in the political content of our union tactics, the essence of which is based upon the struggle for the masses concentrated in the trade unions or remaining under the influence of these unions and not in fleeing from the unions."
(Ibid., page 8.)

The class trade unions always have and still do provide considerable support for the PPS and its strength, for which the KPP shows a strong appetite. In order to tear the unions away from under the influence of the PPS, the communists constantly modify their trade union tactics desiring to attain such forms which would guarantee to them legalized subversive activities in the union movement. An interesting characteristic can be noted here. The trade unions in the struggle between the PPS and the KPP do not become institutions caring for an improvement in the living conditions of the organized workers but merely tools in a political struggle for strictly party aims. The sixth plenum steered a course toward an "independent and leading role during economic campaigns based upon the Union Left," i.e., upon the organization of strikes outside of

the trade unions by communists representing themselves under the vague name of the "Union Left." These were groups of communists and their sympathizers within the area of individual enterprises, substituting for the old "red fractions" which had comprised an integral part of the class trade unions. In general communist tactics are characterized by a frantic search after forms of "economic struggle" outside of the framework of the trade union movement. We read this in the resolutions of the sixth plenum:

"During the period when the majority among the working masses remains outside of the trade unions and the union leadership stays in the hands of the social fascists, the basic means for attracting the masses to the strike method of warfare must be through general workers' organs of the united front which combine into a single unit the organized and the unorganized like: factory committees, combat committees, etc. functioning in the closest contact with the Union Left." (Resolutions of Sixth Plenum KPP Central Committee, page 26).

However the value of these forms appeared to be very problematical, even from the communist point of view. They have enabled the communists at times, especially during the past few years, to provoke strikes without any reason in the various enterprises. These were frequently connected with terror but remained unsuccessful in larger strike actions, and only the latter type could be of any political significance. The Central Commission of Trade Unions was the sole organization which had the power to call a large strike, and it was completely dominated by the PPS. Therefore one of the main aims of this entire work by the "Leftist Union" was the concentration of pressure upon this Central Commission and its unions.

During recent years the union members -- CKWists have been occupied with the struggle against "fascist legislation" and have been bowing increasingly to this pressure, although this does not prevent the communists from insulting the former continuously. Zulawski, Stanczyk, and Szczerkowski will always be called "traitors," "social fascists," "strike breakers," etc.

The sixth plenum saw in Poland also a "political crisis" in addition to the economic one. In reality this was the beginning of the great struggle toward reforming the constitution. What can one do however when the gentlemen from the central committee's Politburo understand these matters like the proverbial chicken knows pepper. Let us forgive them the "growth in Poland of an immediate revolutionary situation," because that is their daily diet. But how can we explain that at a moment when the PPS was clearly moving away from work with the government, the sixth plenum saw a "further coalescing of social fascism with the fascist apparatus" (i.e., with the state; let us remember that during this period one of the principal PPS complaints against the "rule by dictatorship" was the elimination of its members from offices) which was to have expressed itself in the participation of the PPS in Labor Courts as well as in various consultative as well as arbitration organs of the government (page 13). However the largest danger along the path to victory by the KPP was represented by:

"The democratic illusions among the masses will represent the greatest obstacle to the victory of the proletarian dictatorship." (page 14 in Resolutions of Sixth Plenum).

The old "right wing" leadership thought, to a certain extent justifiably, that the democratic-parliamentary system very easily

could assume the degenerate forms of "Kerenskyism" and become the "first stage in the dictatorship of the proletariat." In the meanwhile the "left wingers," and "minority members" feared like fire all ideas which would stop the penetration of superstitions concerning the "essence of fascism" and the "only fatherland of the proletariat," etc. They were also afraid of the very concept of democracy and under the influence of this fear attributed to the masses, who were completely alien to the communists, some kind of "democratic illusions" not comprehending that today in countries like Poland the masses desire strong governments which can secure internal order for the state as well as peace and power externally.

The sixth plenum not only took care of the theory concerning the "double edge of PPS phraseology" by Stefanski but also settled accounts with Kostrzewa herself. At this plenum Kostrzewa had been arguing that revolutionary elements are (or may be), apart from the proletariat as well as the peasantry and the national minorities, also "friction within the bourgeois camp between the grand and the petit bourgeoisie." This evoked a storm and her concept, which nota bene appears quite reasonable, was declared to be a "return to the theory about the independent role of the petit bourgeoisie," and it was condemned. Kostrzewa was talking about the old communist *raison d'etat* according to which it is necessary to exploit internal struggles within the camp of the enemy (the bourgeoisie). This truth was voiced by the entire KPP and will be announced also in the future, but for the time being it provided a pretext to take care of Kostrzewa. The commentary upon the sixth plenum's resolutions mentions this very clearly:

"Therefore the plenum did not limit itself to a verbal denunciation of rightist errors but accomplished certain organizational moves

in order to conduct a consistent and just party line and to guarantee the elastic functioning of the party leadership." (Nowy Przegląd, May-July 1929, page 7).

Next there took place new organizational and political changes in the party. Stefanski and Kostrzewa were removed from the Politburo, retaining among the former "majority" only Prochniak. Wrzos-Huberman was also dropped from the secretariat inside of Poland. Krajewski was deprived of all influence in effect. Brand had been eliminated from the editorial center even before. All of the purged were sent to Moscow. The shaping of a new leadership was not easy for the "minority." Many of the latter's most talented workers had found themselves during this period "on vacation" in prison. Among these were Witold Tomorowicz and Jan Paszyn. Therefore the small group of leaders included Alfred Lampe ("Marek"), one of the cheapest creatures among the former PCK members and the noisy "Oskar" -- Tadeusz Zarski -- who was a Sejm deputy at the time. The latter in the spring of 1930 was arrested for inspiring disturbances near Lodz and shooting at the police. Henrykowski (Saul Amsterdam) also returned to favor and violently began pushing for authority. The former "majority" again manifested its traditional lack of character. A group of so-called "consolidators" with Purman and Sochacki as leaders broke away from it and announced its subordination to the new leadership by entering its ranks. The "consolidators" began so zealously to unmask and denounce their former fractional comrades of all kinds of heresy and "anti-party" activities that they aroused a distaste even among the slovenly circle of former "minority" members. They finally aroused suspicions which later led to the accusation against Sochacki of provocation, i.e., collaboration with police authorities.

This denunciation was the basis upon which Sochacki found himself in Moscow confronted by the GPU which sentenced him. He who desires to do so may believe in his guilt!

The new leadership once again issued a declaration that it would not tolerate fractional methods and the conservation of already demolished fractional differences. This time in fact, due to the immediate support of Moscow, the leadership was able to make an end to internal disputes. However the "masterful" implementation of this consolidation again became the point of departure for a new struggle between groups and cliques, fighting that was carefully concealed from the party and even to a certain degree from the Comintern too. For this reason ^{all} communist publications, even the strictly confidential ones, include only very weak echoes of these fights inside of the victorious former "minority."

The leaders of the former "minority" began to renounce their fractional past, commencing for the purpose of maintaining appearances of objectivity a struggle "on two fronts," i.e., against the right and against the left. Its first manifestation was the sharp attack upon Fiedler at the plenum, although this man had been removed from the "minority" fraction 6 months previously. Kostrzewa in anticipation of an attack voted together with the former "majority" in support of the resolution at the plenum, disagreeing only with the contention that the former "majority" represented a "variation of the international right wing." Beyond that she expressed even a readiness to combat the errors of the rightists as well as the attitudes "ascribed to her which never had been and were not at the time her attitudes." The Politburo rejected Kostrzewa's declaration, considering it to be a maneuver making "consolidation" more difficult.

During the fall of 1928 a plenary session of the Comintern (that body often appears in communist literature in the form of the abbreviation IKKW [Isполнителны Komitet Komunisticheskogo Internatsionala -- Executive Committee of the Communist International]) was convened at which Molotov once again sharply attacked the "right wing leaders" of the KPP for their erroneous attitudes toward "social fascism" and praised their ejection. Not many of those eliminated dared to voice any opposition. A larger scandal which created a loud echo in the communist world was caused by "Bartoszewicz" (Krolkowski). In his letter to Kostrzewa intercepted by the KPP central committee (perhaps by the GPU?) he announced that he would "not retreat despite the consequences of insubordination to the new change in the party." Lenski described this letter with anger as proof of the "transformation from a rightist deviation into an open revolt against decisions of the plenum" (Nowy Przegląd, No. 4/29, page 19). On the lower party echelons and in the district committees, as a result of orders by the central committees resolutions were being passed demanding the exclusion of "Bartoszewicz" from the party. However the WKP did not grant its permission, since the man was its member, regardless of the request by the Polish central committee. This represents an interesting sidelight upon the dignity and respect of the "Polish" communists vis a vis the Russian ones. A member of the WKP could allow himself even the greatest amount of insubordination against the KPP central committee, and this is forgiven him providing that he maintains his loyalty to the authorities of his own party. At any rate it was useful to keep "Bartoszewicz" in readiness just in case of some new crisis within the KPP.

A certain opposition to the new leadership was also shown by a considerable part of the so-called central and middle active, i.e.,

members of central sections and district committees. Their opposition was manifested in the form of voting in favor of the resolutions by the sixth plenum but with the simultaneous enunciation of reservations as to some of the points, especially with regard to the designation of the Kostrzewa group as the "Polish variation of the international right wing." The central committee was of the opinion that the "platform of reservations" amounted to a pretext for the mobilization of the forces belonging to the "rightist fraction" and appealed this matter to the Comintern. In October of 1929 the political secretariat of executive committee in the Communist International, which apart from the Political Commission or rather the Political Bureau of the WKP represents the most important organ within the Comintern, especially took up KPP affairs under the chairmanship of Molotov. The resolution passed at this time praised the KPP for considerable progress in its work. The group of Kostrzewa was described as the "Polish variation of the right wing." Simultaneously the resolution of the Political Secretariat ascertained that: "The basic cadres of the former 'majority' are leaving their old fraction and consolidating themselves with supporters of the former 'minority' around these resolutions" (i.e., resolutions by the Comintern and the sixth plenum). This declaration simultaneously became an order, and from that moment whoever did not subordinate himself to the resolutions or even spoke out with any kind of reservations was mercilessly removed from all leadership work within the KPP and deported to the USSR.

In order to emphasize complete support for the new KPP leadership, the Political Secretariat of the Comintern indicated:

"It is necessary to exploit fully all party strength which honestly stands upon the position taken by the Comintern and the sixth

KPP central committee plenum, regardless of its former fractional grouping." (Nowy Przegląd, November-December 1929, page 17).

The last resolution subsequently became a defensive shield for the victorious fraction of the former "minority" at the time it began its wild dictatorship within the party. The central committee started a party cleansing along the entire line, removing from their positions many paid functionaries. When we know that the party employs about 200 fully paid party officials, besides a large group of partially compensated workers [See Note], we will understand that there is something to fight over. This is even more true when one takes into consideration that 95% of the so-called "party active" is recruited from among people who are declassé, materialistically demoralized, and lacking any permanent bases for existence. These are mostly half baked intellectuals, the sons and daughters of bankrupt merchants, workers who do not want to be employed even when jobs are available, and in small part the unemployed who have been deprived of work due to the crisis or because of their subversive activities.

(Note). The KPP includes apart from salaried functionaries also "semifunctionaries" who receive half of a salary. The "funk," i.e., the functionary is paid on an average from 200 to 450 zlotys per month [before World War II, one zloty equaled 20 cents U.S.] clear besides various types of extras. The "semi-funk" received between 100 and 150 zlotys. There are also "assistants" in the districts who are paid monthly sums of 30 to 75 zlotys.)

The critical part of the resolution passed by the Political Secretariat discusses the organizational weakness of the KPP and sets before the latter the following task:

"... overcoming the large disproportion between the influence of the party and the organizational framework of this influence... special attention should be paid to the great organizational weakness of Upper Silesia which plays a considerable part in the preparation for war against the USSR." (Ibid., page 18).

Only one man, Prochniak, voted against the resolution of the Political Secretariat within the KPP central committee, and he:

"... considers impossible any defense of his position contrary to the resolution of the Communist International, ... looks upon the organization of opposition against this resolution as being impossible, accepts it for implementation." (Nowy Przegląd, January-February 1930, page 112).

Thus I do not agree but, since any kind of a struggle against Moscow is impossible, I would not find enough courage to withstand the shower of insults which awaits "traitors," "renegades," "provocateurs" and therefore accept everything for implementation. Such slavish declarations a la Prochniak or like the tragic speech by Kostrzewa at the "Polish Commission" of 1924 or the "official" declarations of Lenski reveal the whole depth of the KPP sell out to Moscow. It is another thing that such a Prochniak or Warski, whenever a man is found with enough courage to decisively break with Moscow and when attacks commence against him, will support his beating. [See Note].

[Note]. When in the summer of 1929 a part of the PPS-Lewica broke away from the KPP, the socialists (and especially Sejm deputy Zaremba) in their Warsaw weekly Pobudka [Reveille] were not ashamed of participating in attacks upon the uncommunized part of PPS-Lewica

although they knew full well that the communists in the PPS-Lewica fought against the CKW of the PPS by means worthy of an Azef ^{well} known Russian agent provocateur and terrorist⁷).

After removal of the right wing leaders from the top echelon, the "renewed" central committee commenced the process of "ideological deepening of communist theory." One of the fruits of this deepening was the theory of J. Ryng concerning "Polish imperialism" which included such absurd statements as the following: "Polish imperialism" had already risen during the prewar period, when Poland did not even exist! The philosophy of Plekhanov and Lenin denied the existence of spirits without bodies. This apparently pertained only to the spirits of known religions like Christianity, Mohammedanism, etc. The spirits and apparitions of Comintern mythology can exist without bodies. The author of this concept (formerly a university professor!) used Lenin as a source. According to the latter the period of imperialism began at the start of the twentieth century. Unfortunately Ryng forgot about one of the premises established by this prophet, and one that was extraordinarily logical, that imperialism is not possible without an imperium (a state) which implements and represents this new "phase of capitalism." As a result of sharp criticism by Warski, the left wing leadership renounced this absurd theory and laid the entire blame for its origin upon the author, i.e., Ryng who was ordered to conduct a "self criticism." However the idea of Warski that "Polish imperialism had existed only since 1926" did not maintain itself either. The communists in general assumed the attitude that Polish imperialism arose together with the resurrection of the Polish state. It would seem that the communists overestimated Poland in this connection.

In February 1930 the seventh plenum of the KPP central committee met in order to fight some more against the right wing. In this instance the attack is made by naming Krajewski, Prochniak, Wrzos, and even Lapinski (true name Lewinson) although the last man was only a spiritual adherent to the rightist group, not participating in any practical work of the KPP. Kostrzewa boycotted this plenum completely under the pretext of illness. The opposition of her satellites was described in Nowy Przegląd as follows:

"Coming out at the plenum in the role of an opposition, the right wing group was isolated in the central committee and removed from any type of collaboration; it played the part of observer and minor critic. The opposition was unable to introduce a single amendment, did not move one resolution, could not formulate any criticism from which the party would have benefitted."

Later it makes this suggestion:

"... the party must break the right wing group completely, ideologically as well as organizationally."

Using this advantage the "minority" reciprocated in return for the old Comintern position in the matter of fractional struggle within the KPP and wrote:

"In connection with disputed problems in the ideological struggle which was continuing prior to the sixth plenum and which can not be considered in terms of a minor squabble lacking in essential qualities..."

The central committee then set forth these tasks:

"Only the capitulation and complete disarmament of the group under Comrade Kostrzewa can guarantee the party against the creation of a right wing fraction and the resumption of fractional conflict."

"Only unconditional surrender can provide an end to the deteriorating attempts at disorganizing party work, the propagation of lack of faith in the party, and the spreading of panic in party ranks." (Nowy Przegląd, January-February 1930, pages 10-11).

The seventh plenum deliberated during the flowering of the "udarnichestvo" (shock workers or more accurately records in labor productivity) campaign in Russia as well as "socialist competition" ("sots-sorevnovatelstvo"), the essence of which was based upon such a squeezing of sweat and blood out of the workers as the west has not seen in at least 50 years. In general the entire first piatiletka was based upon "Taylorism" [Taylor was the father of some of these labor methods in the west] in its worst variation. The influence of this campaign upon the foreign communist parties was such that they began to copy the terminology from the Pharaonic-Mongolian economy. The seventh plenum for instance appealed for the copying in KPP organizational work of methods from Soviet construction. Of course such appeals usually remained on paper, because paid agents are not so quick to do much work. During this period, communist literature took different technological terms like "transmission," etc.

This plenum saw the further deterioration in the new clique ruling the KPP. A new left wing opposition began to group itself around the person of Fiedler (the "Fiedlerites") which was led by Karolski, an old and obtuse social democratic fanatic from the party's Jewish section. This opposition demanded a sharpening in the fractional struggle, criticized the leadership and accused it of conducting a "sexless" consolidation with the aid of "pasting," that it had introduced a "party bureaucracy," etc. As a result this caused a new struggle which the KPP could not afford. All previous conflicts had

led it into such a marasmus that during the sharpest fighting between the "Centrolew" and the government, that party could accomplish nothing because of "consolidation."

During the summer of 1930 a "Polish Commission" was again convened by the Comintern for the purpose of completing the leadership and preparing for the fifth party congress. A member of the KPP central committee Politburo Sokolik-Knorin stated at this meeting:

"In the summer of 1928, the period of the most acute fractional struggle, we had the start of a retreat in the party from the organizational standpoint. Therefore it is clear that the continuation of fractional strife even for 6 months more would lead the party to catastrophe." (Nowy Przegląd, October-November 1930, page 86).

During the months of June and July 1930 the KPP central committee was repeatedly forced to issue sharp enunciations against fractional fighting. We read in these declarations:

"An imperative condition for implementation by the party of its tasks is the continued struggle on 2 fronts: against deviation and right wing opportunism as the main danger as well as against all manifestations of "left wing" sectarianism and brawlers." (Nowy Przegląd, May-June 1930, page 102.)

Thus the compromising language, as denounced by "Fiedlerites:"

"To assimilate entirely all of those who have left the right wing, integrate them with party work, to conquer any group vestiges -- such should be the direction of consolidation policy currently in our party organizations." (Ibid., page 103).

Right wing elements at this time exploited all political and organizational adversities in the party for their own purposes. They pointed out errors and party deficiencies, thus evoking an atmosphere of panic and organizational laxity. The central committee again charged the right wing with "spreading a lack of confidence in the party's strength and in the leadership:"

"This detriment (also a word from the bolshevik arsenal -- 'vreditelstvo' -- which is used frequently whenever anything goes wrong; it is then charged to an 'uncovered' 'vreditel' ... author's comment) by the right wing must and will be finally liquidated by an effort of the whole party.

"On the other hand grist for the right wing mill was provided by elements leaning 'leftwards' in the category of Comrade Kar(olski), the ultra leftist tendencies of whom were indicated by the seventh plenum." (Nowy Przegląd, July-August 1930, page 3).

It was in such an atmosphere that the preparatory campaign for the fifth KPP congress was launched. The "electoral" order advised as follows: select former "minority" members, possibly many workers so that there will be something to boast about, and such former "majority" adherents who have not only capitulated but are prepared to speak out against their past leaders and to unmask the latter for their "opportunism" vis a vis "social fascism" and for their underhanded fractional work against the new leadership. This order was implemented conscientiously, and in the meanwhile the new leaders were making up the composition of the central committee in Moscow.

The fifth KPP congress took place during the month of August 1930 near Leningrad. In differentiation from the fourth congress,

it lasted very briefly, "July" 2 weeks. The approaching Sejm electoral campaign influenced a shortening of the usual garrulity. As usual a considerable number of former SDKPiL members participated in the congress.

In the political resolutions of the fifth congress, similarly to the resolutions of the third congress, we find the forecast of a "decay in stabilization and in the fascist dictatorship" as well as a general flow of the revolutionary wave in urban and rural areas. The congress also focused an alert attention upon the "acute tensions and internal strife within the fascist camp, weakening the fascist dictatorship." The "fascist camp" in the communist jargon includes all political parties besides the KPP. Thus if the PPS or the National [Democratic] Party is fighting against the government camp, official KPP circles ascertain this fact. However when one of the party theoreticians is able to create some kind of a "double edge theory," they can not agree upon its acceptance. Truly this long lasting work in the KPP must finally cause a disappearance of all logic. Lenski in his commentary on the resolutions of the fifth congress also expressed the "double edge theory," explaining the noisy affair of the arrested "Centrolew" deputies for their part in the congress at Krakow as follows:

"Attempting to secure for the governmental bloc in the Sejm an absolute majority, Pilsudski decided to crush the opposition and withdraw a part of its leadership from circulation."

Further:

"... the greatest danger to our party is today the overevaluation of internal strife in the fascist camp according to the right

wing opportunistic line of Comrades Warski and Kostrzewa, and the fixation upon a third democratic force between fascism and communism."

After a moment he added what represented the essence of Stefanski's and Kostrzewa's theory, so harshly condemned in a completely unreasonable manner:

"... our party should not only observe the friction within the fascist camp but also actively exploit it with a view toward strengthening the struggle against the fascist dictatorship." (Nowy Przegląd, September-October 1930 in the article entitled "At the Turning Point.")

Stefanski and Kostrzewa could have written identical words. However they understood the "active exploitation" as being a pretended and perverse "support" for one of the fighting sides. On the other hand the integral communists a la Lenski bring their hatred of Poland and everything connected with the latter to such a pitch that they simply lose their value as a Comintern tool in the struggle against Poland. A small example: the mentioned Krakow congress of "Centrolew" passed a resolution which is known but not very praiseworthy concerning the "annulment of responsibility for loans and agreements not ratified by the Sejm." The fifth congress evaluated this resolution, which should have made every person who was antagonistically disposed toward Poland very happy, as follows:

"The national democrats as well as the 'Centrolew' are struggling for the confidence of monopolistic capital within Poland and outside the country, for participation in fascist governments, and for a strengthening by these means of the bases in the fascist dictatorship."

(Brochure entitled V Zjazd KPP, uchwały, rezolucje, materiały
[Fifth KPP Congress, Resolutions, Decisions, and Materials], page 25).

The entire political life of Poland is approached by the KPP from only one point of view: from its attitude toward the USSR and in a manner which would endanger the correspondent of some Soviet publication in Moscow to unpleasant consequences due to unrealistic reporting. Instead of information which would make some sense the KPP flattered the bolsheviks with the following:

"In the matter of war against the USSR, there exists among them (the parties) a community of interest basically. The difference in opinions between the sanacja and the national democrats as well as in part with the 'Centrolew' fundamentally can be brought down to the question not of whether to fight but when and how to fight against the state of the proletarian dictatorship, how to create a broad national front, how to destroy the revolutionary movement, how to secure the rear areas within Poland, how to prepare and conduct a war against the Soviets (this was written after the appearance of the famous articles by Dmowski denouncing anti Soviet policy as the creation of Jewish masonry!!)... the national democratic concept has in mind a future bourgeois Russia which would be implicated in Far Eastern affairs, pushed away from the Baltic Sea would not threaten Poland to the extent of Germany with its 'Drang nach Osten' at the cost of Poland. Whereas the basis of the Pilsudskite military plan is the partition of the USSR, covered by the pretence of independence for the Ukraine and Belorussia, and the extension of Polish occupation eastward (program of federation)..." (pages 26-27 of the Resolutions).

During the fifth congress, the Kremlin was certain that the "anti-Soviet war" would break out before the USSR could complete

its piatiletka, i.e., prior to the end of 1932. The congress was assured of this by WKP and Comintern representatives, and since they were so sure it had to be believed. In fear of this war, it was resolved:

"The center of all party tasks has been established by the congress as being the struggle against anti-Soviet war preparations, the open provocation of war by Polish fascism and its partners, in the defense of the socialist fatherland of the USSR. The matter of popularizing the great achievements of the five year plan, especially the progress in collectivization, found an accurate expression in all congress resolutions."

In continuation the resolution contrasts with "iron" consistency typical of the communists the 2 worlds of capitalism and sovietism (socialism). Peace can never reign between these 2 worlds. The entire development of the capitalist world is treated as military preparation for war against the Soviets:

"Most threatened by the immediate influence of the tremendous progress in socialist construction and nationality policy within the Soviet Union is the Polish bourgeoisie. The growing class hatred of the latter toward the state of the proletarian dictatorship... is solidly connected with the acute economic crisis and the necessity for eastward expansion. For this reason the Pilsudski-Slawek government was first in assuming a positive attitude toward the proposal (by Aristide Briand) for a pan-Europe." (page 15 of the Resolutions).

These fears of a war, as far as the Soviets were concerned, had their justification. During the years 1930-1931 the piatiletka really placed the USSR at the threshold of decay in the stabilization

and dictatorship of the proletariat. Dissatisfaction by the peasantry began to transform itself into revolts, bloodily suppressed by the GPU. The asiatic "Taylorism" led to strikes in the USSR, where they are prohibited. Due to the latter in 1931 hundreds of textile workers at Ivanovo near Voznesensk were killed by GPU bullets. Food difficulties which had been ameliorated during the NEP period again commenced to take on the form of open hunger. "Planning" in industry transformed itself into complete anarchy, when one plan after another was impossible to implement (the GPU had to assist here by organizing trials from time to time in which it was "proven" that several of those who created these plans were agents of foreign countries, working out "sabotage plans" on purpose). The WKP was in a serious crisis. An opposition group arose in the persons of Syrtsov (former RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] premier) and Lominadze, secretary of the national party committee for Transcaucasia (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaizhan) -- until recently confidants of Stalin. It is no wonder that it was feared this situation would be exploited by the "capitalist west" for an armed attack upon the Soviets. On the other hand the ruling circles in the USSR were cognizant of the fact that such a strike could not be survived by bolshevism. Up to their ears in scientific formulas, it was difficult for the communists to imagine the bourgeoisie being naive enough not to exploit the USSR's weakness. The communists for instance would never be so naive.

Under the influence of these apprehensions the WKP Politburo changed the 5 year plan, concentrating in 2 directions: (a) the postponement of everything else in favor of developing the war industry together with auxiliary industries; (b) liquidation of independent (at least in theory) peasant farms by means of so-called "collectivization" at a frantic pace completely unforeseen by the plan, i.e.,

simple expropriation and serf labor. This brought about an even more serious food crisis. The danger in this situation was increased by the news from abroad in newspapers that the "bourgeoisie" understood very well the internal situation of the Soviets. On this basis the fear arose within the ruling circles of the USSR that the capitalist world would not permit the Soviets to finish their armament plans which had been commenced on a large scale. These expectations again provided the basis for the suggested date of the "anti-Soviet war" as being prior to the end of the 5-year plan (piatiletka).

The directives worked out for the KPP included the intensification in the tempo of its antiwar campaign, a development of its influence and organizational network in centers having significance during a war, like Warsaw, Upper Silesia, Radom (mainly within its area), etc., in the metal industry and in railroading. The Comintern especially emphasized the strengthening of subversive work in the Polish army. For this reason the fifth congress resolved:

"To conquer (?) the army, this should be done not only with the help of agitation from the outside and subversive work internally but also with the aid of organized reaction by the workers in the street as well as the revolutionary peasantry upon the masses of soldiers." (page 45 of the Resolutions).

Communist propaganda is not to be merely the propagandizing of communism but rather of the Russian state:

"In contrast to the attitude toward the bourgeois-fascist army, the significance of the Red Army should be popularized as the army of the workers and peasants, standing on guard over socialist construction, the army of the international proletarian revolution." (Ibid., page 46).

In general the main point of emphasis in the political tasks of the fifth congress comprised the innocent looking communist phrase "defense of the USSR," and almost all of the resolutions were subordinated to this. Certain of the resolutions remind us of 1920, since the fifth congress did not attempt to conceal KPP striving toward a complete liquidation of Poland and its annexation by the USSR:

"The proletarian revolution will tear Poland out of the system of capitalist states (read: independent -- author's comment) and will incorporate it into the system of Soviet Socialist Republics." (Ibid., page 31).

As we can see the KPP permitted itself a very important admission. The fate of Poland and its independence has already been prejudged simply by integration with the USSR. It is indeed fortunate that all of this took place only in the form of resolutions which represent food only for hoodwinked communists. For us it is worthy of noting only inasmuch as such traitors possess the audacity of demanding that state authorities treat them better than common spies and other criminal elements in Poland.

Apart from this resolution we also find another "jewel" which strongly emphasizes the slogan of "self determination up to secession for Upper Silesia." The principle of self determination is also supposed to apply to territories inhabited by mixed populations:

"The principle of self determination also pertains to the areas of Pomerania which are mixed from the nationality point of view." (Nowy Przegląd, September-October 1930, page 24).

Somebody very wisely compared this communist "self determination for Pomerania" with the "self determination of the Moscow province," which had been ridiculed by Lenin. If the congress resolutions were to be implemented, they would lead to such absurd conditions as the world has never seen. Is not the city of Lodz "mixed as to nationality" or the northern parts of Warsaw? They too therefore should be endowed with "self determination!"

The representatives of the Comintern and with them the congress participants loudly grumbled about "falling behind events," "the unusually dangerous disproportion between the attitudes of the masses and organizational weakness as well as the small degree of activeness by the party," "the tremendous weakness of the mass transmissions, especially of the revolutionary trade unions," etc.

The economic crisis which was then being felt by Poland was a desired element for the communists. The congress expected quite a bit from the results of this crisis. The congress resolutions paint an exaggerated picture of the "dimensions in this catastrophic crisis within the textile industry" and are happy that "every second worker has been in part of completely relieved of work." They also predicted obviously a further sharpening of the crisis. For these "historical materialists" the "economic crisis was being transformed into a general political crisis." They prophesied the darkest possible forecast in Poland, just so they could say in time of misfortune: "did we not foresee this?" When in Poland again the economic and political situation was improving, then the communists either denied this or if that was impossible then they found some kind of a theory to prove that only evil can come from this favorable market condition. Therefore as a result of these congress resolutions, over a period of 4 years

we have been constantly reading in KPP documents that the political crisis was growing, intensifying, reaching a higher level, transforming itself into a more dangerous stage, etc. There is a lack of reality manifested at each step.

In general a characteristic attribute of KPP members' and their mentality is the establishment of legends and the exaggeration of minor facts to the proportions of world wide significance if not a cosmic one. They are able for instance to attract a senator from the BBWR parliamentary club who at one time had been a "Liberationist." Among themselves they will admit that this man, Boguszewski, came to their side because he was lacking in sense. However immediately they announce in all of their publications that this is the start of a "split within the BBWR." Or else at some demonstration on the corner of Dzikigas and Nowolipki streets in Warsaw, about 100 Jewish youngsters are assembled. Then the communists will immediately write (and will submit such a report to the Comintern) that "thousands among the Warsaw proletariat have demonstrated aggressively under the banner of the KPP!" Although these revolutionaries flee in a panic at the sight of a policeman's cap.

Out of the analysis of the crisis, which was made by the fifth congress, the party tactics can be seen as striving toward "leadership over daily fighting" in order to acquire the confidence of the masses. The attitude toward the "social fascists" remains negative. Since the end of 1929 the PPS and with the latter also the peasant parties began to lead their supporters into the streets for various demonstrations against the government. This contributed to the great hope on the part of the communists that the PPS would do some of the communist work. The fifth congress however cautioned against such illusions:

"The expectation that social fascism will lead the broad masses into the streets and fight; and that we will then follow this movement and take the leadership into our own hands, still to this very day is prevalent within our party cadres." (page 25 of Resolutions).

The principal motivations in this warning were probably due to the apprehensions concerning party competition which threatened the KPP from the side of the PPS. In the antigovernment and anti-state struggle of the communists, the latter wanted to maintain a monopoly and always march at the head of any movement. Meanwhile due to their blindness they did not notice that the activities of opposition parties, at the moment that they passed beyond the framework of legality, essentially represented grist for their mill. It is a different problem, which should be remembered, that in the event of a communist victory the first victims of its terror would be in Poland the PPS members who would be liquidated most ruthlessly. I assure the reader that these are not hypotheses but rather the most authentic of plans and intentions by KPP leaders. The fate which met the Russian socialists after the revolution may testify best in this connection.

The fifth KPP congress resolved to apply a "united front from below in the factories" and ordered a "deepening and an organizational grasp by the communists over the ferment arising in the social fascist parties" (page 37). But the most space in the congress resolutions is taken up by the imagined anti-Soviet war. The pro-war attitudes among the communists are denounced, because these indicate "passive waiting for a war" and the constant expectation of the Red Army.

The fifth congress also saw the resurrection of strong terroristic tendencies. The congress resolutions obligated the KPP to

apply sabotage actions in case of war on an individual as well as on a mass basis. The congress ordered the preparation for an armed insurrection, the organization of "self defense" terms, i.e., guerrilla units, etc:

"The task of these teams is today not only the defense of speakers, deputies, and meetings from the raids of police and fascist goons as well as social fascist groups, but is also supposed to organize mass counterattacks against police units and strong arm squads which are to be disarmed by the masses, the introduction of obstacles making police attacks more difficult, etc" (Ibid., page 45).

The fifth congress also accepted a detailed program of "partial demands" for the rural areas, mainly worked out by the rapporteur on village work "Skrzynski" (Franciszek Malinowski, pseudonym "Zagora" who for many years was secretary of the KPP central agricultural section and later became secretary in the more important districts) and by Spis-Brun. It does not include anything significant, and the main slogans remain: "Land without remuneration for the peasants and agricultural laborers!"; "Not a cent for taxes to the fascist government!" Apart from this, there was also an advertisement for "socialist construction in the Soviet rural areas" and many strong words like "war," "poverty," "occupation," etc. A special section was devoted to the struggle against religion which orders: "intensification of the fight against the priesthood on the basis of combating material exploitation and moral oppression of the peasant masses by the priests. Raise this action through a systematic campaign of education (?) and enlightenment to the level of anti-religious action." (Ibid., page 108).

Nationality problems were reported upon by Sochacki. At first he made the wonderful discovery that Poland was not a colony but an independent imperialist country (of course subordinate to hierarchical international imperialism). Next the KPP apparently achieved not only a political but also a geographic discovery, because without the assistance of Comrade Sochacki (who is today rotting in a Soviet dungeon) nobody knew that Poland was in possession of colonies. This prominent scholar ascertained:

"The colonial exploitation of the Ukraine and Western Belorussia by Polish imperialism."

However the resolution on the nationality question does not include anything new besides the foregoing. Later in his commentary on the problem, Bratkowski-Sochacki touched upon the famous "arson campaign" organized during the harvesting period in 1930 within the area of eastern Galicja by the Ukrainian Military Organization (or the Ukrainian Organization of Nationalists). In the opinion of Sochacki, which has been binding upon the KPP to this very day:

"It would represent a basic error to identify the broad wave of arson and sabotage... with the activities of the Ukrainian Military Organization."

Thus it would be a mistake to admit the truth established by documentation and to corroborate what is not doubtful in the least. Attorneys who have appeared in trials as defense counsels for cases of sabotage in eastern Galicja should ransom Sochacki from the hands of Henryk Jagoda and pay for his weight in gold. The entire sabotage and arson campaign in eastern Galicja was evaluated by Sochacki as follows:

"The mass setting of fires to land estate and church buildings... the property of settlers and kulaks, the mass attacks upon the Polish occupational administration, the resistance to penal expeditions of the police and the military -- represent manifestations of revolutionary struggle by the working peasantry and the broad masses of the Ukrainian petit bourgeoisie against Polish imperialism." (Nowy Przegląd, September-October 1930, page 34).

As I have already mentioned to this date the foregoing is still the official KPP position regarding the sabotage campaign in eastern Galicja. The abominable work done by the Ruthenians within the area of eastern Galicja is attributed by the communist party to the "revolutionary struggle of the peasantry," considering that only communists possess a monopoly over the title "foreign agent" and that only a communist can be an arsonist and a murderer. It was only later, long after the fifth KPP congress that the communist party comprehended it had missed the "heroic arson campaign" altogether. At the very end of this action the communists made an attempt to link themselves to this "mass movement" and to the standard fabrication of the fairy tale about "pacification," trying to create a new movement in the Ruthenian villages against state authority. When security authorities and judicial organs began to counteract this detrimental activity of the KPZU energetically, the communists again began to scream about the "Luck horrors."

At this point I shall allow myself a digression in order to explain the Luck affair and to demolish the legend which has been created around the matter by the KPP, with the prominent assistance of the PPS. I have no intention of defending the position of Polish authorities in this matter, because the court case established the

guilt of the accused communists during the Luck trial. Neither will I debate whether, providing that Polish investigating authorities permitted some deviation from regulations, the latter could be judged by individuals who ruthlessly kill their own comrades either by murder or else with the aid of USSR security organs (although party betrayal does not come under the USSR penal code). I know only that to Polish police authorities the barbarian methods, applied by the GPU and which are well known to the more prominent communists at the very least from numerous stories by "Stefan" (Zbikowski) and Bronkowski, are completely alien. I would like to throw some light on the Luck affair merely from the political point of view, especially from the side unknown to the general public.

In the fall of 1930 security authorities arrested a number of activists in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine which had been attempting to foment armed resistance in eastern Galicja to state authorities with the aid of a combat organization especially established for this purpose under the name "Union of Revolutionary Sharp Shooters" (Sojuz Rewolucyjnych Strilciw). Among the communists arrested at that time were many who began to reveal party secrets as a result of disillusionment with the whole KPZU activity (the most prominent among these was Ozjasz Schechter, pseudonym "Jerzy"), i.e., in party jargon denounced their comrades, both those at liberty and those under arrest, to the authorities. Most of this was done by communists in leadership positions. At first the KPP as well as the KPZU were not much aware of this since it had happened in prison. However as the denunciations began to grow, general suspicion was soon directed towards "provocation" by many of the prisoners. Part of the arrested communists, after an initial loss of faith, desired

rehabilitation in the eyes of the party and began to send secret letters from prison with imaginary stories about beatings, rapes, etc. Of course the communists on the outside believed this and started a violent campaign in Poland and abroad.

Every communist who admitted too much under investigation tells horrors on the witness stand about beatings, etc, in order to become rehabilitated by the party. Nobody places too much credence in this bluff however. In this instance concerning the alleged tortures in the investigating office at Luck, there was specific significance attached to the matter. The idea was to make a contrast to the noisy trial of deputies from "Centrolew" or else the "cowards from Brzesc" by means of the "heroes from Luck." Only later when the reconstructed central committee commenced a detailed party investigation, it appeared that these "heroes" were in reality complete cowards. The party court suspended most of the prisoners at Luck in their membership rights, giving as its reason that these persons had behaved under investigation in a manner "not worthy of revolutionaries" and in addition "lied to the party" by providing untrue versions of "torture," etc.

However on the outside for the consumption of public opinion in Poland and abroad, it would not have been wise to withdraw these accusations. The KPZU even sent a directive to prison ordering the defendants to withdraw their confessions in court, explaining that they had been extracted during investigation through beating. The most compromised among the defendants were told to admit at the trial that they were not KPZU members but only sympathizers or supporters of the Soviet Ukraine which they did. The trial, according to the KPZU central committee, was to be transformed into a manifestation

against Poland. What was the most unpleasant in this connection is the fact that the manifestation found protectors among many of the PPS activists.

The entire Luck affair, as I indicated, was to assume a position in contrast to the Brzesc case. The trial of the "Centrolew" resulted in sending many of its leaders to the fortress-prison at Brzesc, and this was considered a clever fascist maneuver by the KPP which should be unmasked. At the beginning of 1932 the KPP issued a special brochure devoted to this matter under the title Oblicze wodzow PPS i ich wspolnikow z "Centrolewu" na procesie brzeskim [The Countenance of PPS Leaders and Their Partners in the "Centrolew" at the Brzesc Trial]. This publication calls the trial of the deputies from the "Centrolew" a comedy which had been thought up in order to distract the attention of the masses from the revolutionary struggle. This brochure actually represents a libel of the accused at the Brzesc trial. It is only odd that such a vulgar communist play could entice the gentlemen from the PPS for whom the communists were not fishing with an unbaited line.

Returning to the fifth KPP congress, it should be added that the hidden aim of the latter was the final defeat of the right wing group. This group was being horribly insulted not only by the former "minority" but also, along the lines of the preelectoral directives, by the former "majority." Kostrzewa, Brand, Bartoszewicz, and Warski at least found it in themselves to boycott the congress. The last man in the group on the day prior to the congress wrote a memorial to the Comintern about conditions in the KPP. He defended in this connection the ideas of Kostrzewa, especially her theory about fascism. Warski also was not able to "estimate properly" Polish imperialism,

and even did not recognize its existence or the Lenski-Ryng theory about the "peak in the development of Polish capitalism." The central committee was accused of standing upon the position taken by the denounced brochure of Fiedler. The most important part of the memorial included the description of the new leadership as a collection of uneducated phrase makers, ultra left wingers, and petit bourgeois cliques. Of course the KPP did not publicize this memorial, although several resolutions and many articles have referred to it.

In reply to Warski's accusations, the central committee wrote:

"The central committee denounces the views included in Warski's memorial as being the most mature expression of a right wing deviation within the KPP and as contrary to the positions of the party and of the International with regard to fundamental problems of the Polish revolution.

The platform of Comrade Warski, similarly to the announcement by Bartoszewicz, consequently leads to new attempts at starting a fractional struggle and a renegade attitude." (Nowy Przegląd, October 1930, page 89).

The opposition group comprising Prochniak, Stefanski, Krajewski, and Wrzos (Huberman) spoke out at the beginning of the congress. However after the verbal beating it received from representatives of the Comintern and from the "whole" congress, one after another these men began to beat their breasts on the congress tribune and admit their errors. Stefanski at the outset behaved courageously and stated that the speeches at the congress:

"...made me decide... placing the matter by the congress: either to capitulate or to remain on false positions, to accept such a state of affairs and accept it in the sense of capitulation.

"Recognizing the justness of the resolutions passed by the Communist International and the central committee, and thus also recognizing as just the political qualifications of our hitherto position... I recognize as justified the indications toward an ideological union between the individual errors of our group... and the mistakes of the rightists in other sections of the Communist International."

In response to cries of "instead of about us, speak for yourself" Stefanski said:

"If you will permit me to speak about the past, Comrades, let this capitulation be a group act." (pages 159 and 161 in Resolutions).

Stefanski was followed on the congress tribune by Prochniak who stated helplessly:

"... the capitulation by Comrade Stefanski expressed the capitulation of us all...

"... we are all entering upon unconditional surrender and disarm ourselves in front of the party without any restrictions...

"... these errors were the expression of a pressure alien to proletarian ideology, and an expression of pressure by an alien class." (pages 161 and 162 of the Resolutions).

During this atonement Prochniak probably remembered his own transgression, i.e., the formula expressed at the seventh central committee plenum concerning the "approach to the problem of rule by the PPS." [See Note 7].

(/Note/ The movement controlling communism came to the point where it denies that the PPS has ever striven for authority, even of the fascist kind. If we even accept the stupid formula that the PPS represent fascist hirelings, then can not a hireling attempt to seize rule from his master? Did not many of Warski's pupils try to bury their teacher's party career? This is where a mythological approach to history leads.)

Immediately following the congress Prochniak made a clean breast of his conscience and found yet other mortal sins. The most important of these was described by Nowy Przegląd as follows:

"The most glaring proof of fractionalism however was the declaration which I sent to the Polish Commission of the sixth congress, where I stated that the majority does not take upon itself responsibility for the decisions of this commission. This unheard of step in the direction of disorganization lighted up the entire danger in the situation as if it were lightning; a group standing at the head of one of the most important sections in the Communist International was promising to throw off the responsibility for the decisions of that same International with which it did not agree... a catastrophic political error in this action which could have... led to incalculable results." (Nowy Przegląd, February 1931, page 56).

The youngest among these leaders of the "right wing" but one who was extremely clever, Wrzos (Gwiazdowski, i.e., Huberman), stated with sham naivete:

"If I say that I am disarming completely, this does not mean that I have rearmed anew; it means rather that I must arm myself even more than before in order to struggle against the right wing threat." (page 163 in the Resolutions).

The last member of the right wing 4, Krajewski who was erudite of a sort in the Marxist Talmud, made penitence without any dignity:

"Here at the congress after the speeches by the comrades delegates I have brought to my senses the entire magnitude to which these dangerous errors have been brought from the false views with regard to the PPS that I have enunciated in association with other comrades. Since the matter of attitude toward the PPS represents a cardinal affair in the revolution, all vagueness and all vacillations in this area slow down and paralyze the revolutionary struggle." (Ibid., page 164).

Only in response to a provocative interruption did he have the courage to say:

"In the matter of the revision conducted by Ryng with regard to the economics of the Polish Kingdom, I wish to state that I am standing on this same position (but then quickly added)... the party line I consider to be absolutely correct." (Ibid., page 165).

Regardless of this penitence and self whipping, not one of these sinners obtained absolution:

"The congress considers the statements by the bankrupt right wing opposition in the central committee -- Comrades Prochniak, Stefanski, Gwiazdowski, and Krajewski -- which were made under pressure by the congress, to be insufficient... only the active struggle by these 4 men against the right wing concepts, only a fundamental revision and self criticism of their own errors, a consistent uncovering of the origins for these errors, breaking of all bonds with the leaders of the right wing group -- comrades Warski, Kostrzewa and Lapinski -- that is a genuine liquidation of their own group as well

as of the maneuvering to date against the party, will represent proof that these comrades have transferred to the party line and have completely disarmed themselves vis a vis the party." (Ibid., page 8).

The attitude of the congress toward these persons, respectable at any rate in terms of age and intelligence, was quite disreputable. They were told to "break all bonds" including social ones with their former leaders who were still members of the party. Let us add here that Krajewski, in order to subordinate himself to the resolutions, would have to renounce his father-in-law Warski. Relations in this mafia, as we can see, were not such as to make anybody envious.

The fifth congress also fought against one more heretic and a man who was in the deep underground. A declared right winger, Mirek Wojtkiewicz (Miroslaw Zdziarski), known in Poland because of his escape in 1926 from the investigative prison on Dzielna Street, wrote in an article published by the Comintern's press organ Komunisticheski Internatsional ("Communist International" is published in several languages; in Poland it is mostly read in the German edition called Rundschau which is printed at Basel), No 21, criticism of the tactics of the KPP just prior to the fifth congress with regard to the trade union movement as well as the tactics of the "renovated" leadership:

"The zig zags of our trade union work in Poland which is lacking in any bolshevik backbone... results from passivity and 'khvostism' (bolshevik word meaning 'dragging after the tail;' in Russian the word 'khvost' means 'tail') on the part of our Polish comrades. Their tactics look approximately as follows: there was a great strike movement -- they cried that a breakthrough was necessary -- therefore we

go for broke. They drew up the reins tighter, so we squatted down. That which comes into our hands of its own accord, we take, even though we may not be able to hold it. However if something new should occur -- period -- there are no fools around -- again the time will come to bend." (Nowy Przegląd, July-August 1930, page 31).

He also ridiculed the "committee mania" in the KPP, i.e., the various committees for fighting, campaigns, etc and expressed the view that work should be done not only in PPS unions but also in all others; christian democratic, national radical party, etc. He signed this article cautiously with the pseudonym of "Galma," and it took the KPP central committee some time to find out who he was.

The director of that branch in KPP trade union policy at the time, "A.D." (Henrykowski alias; real name Saul Amsterdamski) replied to "Galma" by describing his article as a "fractionist attack" as well as a "libel," etc.

At the congress Zdziarski was present, since he was employed then by the Profintern (trade union international), and he was asked to identify that certain "Galma." In reply Zdziarski at first stated that he supported "Galma's" article but then later he criticized it and assured the congress that he did not know the identity of its author. Hence the congress:

"This congress does not believe that Comrade Mirek is unaware of who authored the article signed by "Galma." The congress has decided to transfer the matter of Galma's article to the Control Commission of the Comintern." (page 167 of the Resolutions).

The privileges of the Control Commission are very extensive. This is actually a kind of party court which adjudicates all disputes and heresies within the party and has final jurisdiction. This commission has the power to expell from the party which means the loss of all means to a livelihood in the USSR. Therefore very quickly Zdziarski sent a letter to the Control Commission in which he justified his behavior as well as he could:

"... I have come to the conclusion that the article was a mistake which opinion I voiced in my second speech and in the special statement... however I still did not admit the authorship of the article which was erroneous and inconsistent on my part... My obstinacy in not admitting the authorship can be only explained by the exceptionally antagonistic atmosphere at the congress which was expressed in the continuous interruptions as well as insulting cries directed toward me (which, as an old revolutionary, I considered unjustified). I lost control over myself... I admit in full my error and accept as correct the criticism of the article, as it was conducted by the congress." (pages 167 and 168 of Resolutions).

In this manner Zdziarski was able to salvage the life giving party identification booklet as a member of the WKP.

At the fifth congress misfortune also met Zdziarski's comrade at the time of his flight from "Fawiak", Leon Purman. The latter had been brave enough to criticize certain organizational moves by the leadership clique which were contrary to the official "consolidation" course as well as to have his own opinion in some of the matters of secondary importance. This was sufficient to make Purman into a "mediator" with regard to the right wing and to eliminate him from the leadership once and for all. It must be noted here that he

was one of the few politicians within the KPP having considerable organizational talent. In the Warsaw KPP organization where he had working initially, he had the reputation of a fearless revolutionary. Later during the Spanish revolution, he lived in Madrid and directed the disturbances in that city. In 1934 Purman ended his life in suicide at Moscow, having been forced to do so because of intrigue within the party.

The fifth congress also resolved that:

"... the antiparty position of Comrade Bartoszewicz can not be reconciled with membership in the KPP as well as in another section of the Communist International." (page 8 in the Resolutions.)

The Comintern would not honor this resolution, and the WKP did not expell Bartoszewicz from its ranks as we have already mentioned previously. It was also explained why the WKP and the Comintern left Bartoszewicz-Krolikowski alone for the time being.

The fifth congress had already announced that during its deliberations there had begun the "period of rapid maturation of elements in the revolutionary situation inside of Poland." For these reasons the congress elected a central committee free of right wingers. Only Prochniak remained on the central committee, and he was held in high esteem by the WKP perhaps because he was the only living Pole who had the honor of being a student of Lenin in the latter's prewar party school near Paris. The new Politburo was even more uniform: Lenski, Bronkowski, Slawinski, Burzynski and Bratkowski-Sochacki; as well as candidates Henrykowski, Marek (Alfred Lampe), Korczyk from the KPZB, and Horenko from the KPZU. Bronkowski and Slawinski had been "detailed" from the WKP at Lenski's request,

whereas in fact Bronkowski-Bortnowski represented the Red Army's fourth department of the general staff, i.e., military intelligence. Slawinski reported to the GPU or civilian and political intelligence. The person of Burzynski in the Politburo indicated the infusion of new blood into party work from workers' circles, because the fetish of the worker is obligatory upon communists. The selection of Sochacki meant proof of "consolidation." Internal friction and struggle for hegemony within this leadership group, although hidden and camouflaged, took place during the entire course of its existence.

Finally the time arrived for elections, in which the "formidable disproportion" between KPP strength in the imaginary world of the "revolutionary waves in urban and rural areas" and "fascism" on the one hand and its actual "decay in stabilization" on the other would be put to the test. The KPP organization in Warsaw had not been especially strong since 1930. The more valuable workers had left it long ago, and even trade unionists deserted it. The core of the Warsaw committee was represented by Jews. This status of deterioration was explained by the communists as being due to heavy police action and repressions which is untrue to the extent that among arrested Warsaw communists the percentage of Polish workers was very low. It is no secret that even during the years 1925-1927 the KPP exerted considerable influence among Warsaw's workers. The process of rejection by the workers of communism was taking place in all the industrial centers like Upper Silesia and Radom (really within its vicinity including Ostrowiec, Starachowice, Skarzysko). In western Galicja, in Greater Poland, and in Pomerania communism after some temporary gains during the PPS-Lewica period completely died out. On the other hand in smaller centers of former Congress Poland, it was based in 90% upon the Jews. Slower unfortunately was the deterioration

of communist influence in the Dabrowa Basin and in Lodz, although in the year 1930-1931 a strong break through occurred also there. It is not difficult to see that the "revolutionary class consciousness" remains in direct proportion to the percentage of illiterates among the masses. As far as Lodz is concerned, the political situation there baffles a more accurate analysis or evaluation. After the great war socialism and communism were both completely eliminated by the NPR. Then suddenly in the fall of 1928 it appeared that Lodz was a PPS fortress. During the years 1928-1930 a huge red balloon of communism was blown up but then broke, and finally in June 1934 the "revolutionary masses" of this Polish Manchester transferred under the protective wing of the National Democrats. But even during the period of its extensive influence the KPP organization at Lodz as well as its legal cover organization, the PPS-Lewica, were both in the prime of their decay. Characteristic for the communism in Lodz was the large part played in it on the one hand by sons and daughters of wealthy Jewish families (Ejger, Tajch, Jachweta, Bernard Cukier-Kolski, Jaszunski, and others) and on the other by the dregs of society.

The communists explain the deterioration in their influence by police repressions. In reality however the process of crumbling in the KPP represents a consequence of deepening of state consciousness and political culture on the part of the Polish worker. Then again a fundamental role was played by the sensible policy of administrative authorities, among whom the tendency toward slowing down the sometimes inhuman capitalist exploitation was very strong. A large part was also fulfilled by the trade unions which cooperated with the government, and the rest was taken care of by the internal degeneration of communism.

The final testimony of bankruptcy was received by the communists at the Sejm elections in November 1930. The communist party sustained a clear cut defeat not only in Warsaw but also in its own dominium the Dabrowa Basin. This is admitted by the communists themselves who write that in Warsaw:

"... there probably took place in certain districts a drop in Polish workers' votes;"

A certain drop, i.e., from 70,000 in 1928 the party lost 30,000 votes which went to the BBWR. In the old stronghold the Dabrowa Basin which had even been under the control of the SDKPIL the drop was from 60,000 in 1928 to some 20 thousand in 1930. In the border provinces and eastern Galicja a heavy loss was also taken which the communists admitted. Only the city of Lodz saved their honor, because they received 53,000 votes. However we have seen a moment ago what this sui generis Lodz communism had transformed itself into after several years. In Upper Silesia the communists obtained approximately 25,000 votes, considering this achievement to be a tremendous success. The defeat in eastern Galicja is described by them in Nowy Przegląd for November-December 1930 (pages 8-9):

"... in the Western Ukraine we are paying to a considerable extent for our passiveness vis a vis the revolutionary movement of the peasant masses and pacification."

The central committee attempted to explain this defeat, which could have been forecast by anybody except a communist, by means of government terror:

"... the sanacja in the elections was able... to attain a larger, even though only temporary, efficiency in its fascist apparatus; strengthen

the hegemony of the sanacja within the fascist camp; increase the discipline within its own ranks." (page 7 in Resolutions of the Second Plenum of the KPP Central Committee).

In connection with the poor electoral showing, dissatisfaction began to spread within the ranks of the KPP. Especially in the leadership of the Warsaw organization, disputes arose on this basis. Finally the Warsaw committee announced the opinion that the election showed a weakening of communist influence and a defeat on a national scale. Due to this assertion, the entire Warsaw committee was relieved of its mandates. The latter was also accused of having contributed to the defeat in the capital city because it had fought only against the PPS and left the BBWR alone.

Up to the moment of the election, the communists on the basis of their scientific data were concluding that the entire proletariat if not communist then at worst was going along with social fascist illusions and "fermenting" against the treacherous leaders, of course. Then suddenly it was necessary to ascertain that the masses of the proletariat had found themselves under the influence of "fascism." Part of the communist activists became desperate and hit upon the unbelievable idea that the transfer of a section in the proletariat from social fascism to fascism (in this case to the BBWR) meant that it was revolting in the communist sense. I have no publication at hand which would expound this "theory" and I could be suspected of thinking it up. However I can cite the tremendous noise it made 2 years later in Germany. There the communists were simply happy that the masses were passing from the bourgeois parties and from the petit bourgeoisie to Hitlerism.

In January 1931 the second plenum of the KPP central committee (the second plenum following the fifth KPP congress; the numeration of plenums starts over again after each congress, regardless of any changes in composition) was convened, and again the "anti-Soviet war" was debated because: "... the threat of an invasion by imperialists upon the Soviet Union is a reality today." (Resolutions of Second Plenum, page 5).

The central committee even at that time guaranteed that this war would begin in 1931, based upon the testimony of Professor Ramzin (a hero of the "Luck" type, a tool of the GPU who was allegedly the leader of a mythical party which had been reportedly organized by French imperialists; the true motive behind this cheap provocation has already been indicated in connection with the first piatiletka) at the rehearsed Moscow trial of the so-called "industrial party." In the minds of the plenum members already then an "anti-Soviet bloc led by France" was arising, the most important member of which was to be Poland. When the Polish "jump" from the back of the English horse to the French one occurred, the central committee did not notice due to the fact that it was occupied at that time with unmasking its own comrades who were right wingers.

The sixth Comintern congress, which deliberated during the summer of 1928, had already worked out detailed instructions concerning the "struggle against war and the tasks of communists" in the event of war. These instructions were drawn up with the direct participation of the Soviet general staff. On the basis of this model the second plenum passed a broad resolution on the "tasks and preparations of the party in case of war." This resolution was worked out by Bronkowski and still another officer from the Red Army's fourth

department in the general staff (the fourth department corresponds to Poland's second department of the army general staff) who had been assigned to the KPP central committee. He was a Pole, General Stefan Zbikowski, formerly director of the special military school in Moscow for KPP members [See Note]. This resolution openly states that all KPP tasks in the workers' movement are auxiliary actions with regard to basic military and diversionary aims.

([Note]. Apart from the regular party schools, among which the highest is the University of the Western Nations at Moscow with a Polish section as well as others from different communist parties, the USSR has also a number of purely military schools which are directed by Soviet staff officers. The latter teach the principles of street fighting, military strategy and tactics, fortification technology, the preparation of explosive materials, radio, etc.).

"The brave and broad application of the mass strike weapon provides the party and the working class with the capability of attaining higher forms of struggle against war." (Resolutions of the Second Plenum, page 32).

However the KPP does not suggest desertion, as do the anarchists and radical pacifists, which represents at least a certain chimeric as well as ideological position. In the event of mobilization the communists are ordered to report for duty with the army in order to subvert Poland's defensive strength from the inside. Only in certain of the areas like the eastern border territories do the communists urge a mass boycott of mobilization and escape into the forests:

"Under such circumstances the party will take into its hands control over this movement, organize on the basis of opposition against mobilization a mass struggle which includes also partisan warfare.

The rejection of the general boycott slogan does not mean in any event a passive attitude by the party toward military mobilization. The party organizes because of this mobilization a mass action against war, disorganizes the mobilization, and prepares those mobilized for active struggle against war as well as within the ranks of the army, to pass with arms to the side of the Red Army." (page 33 or Resolutions).

The "workers' movement" is still to officiate but that is all: demonstrations; rallies; speeches by women, girls, children and invalids must be subordinated strictly to staff requirements:

"A special effort must be directed toward stopping of munition transports, toward organization of a boycott in the matter of unloading and loading military supplies at forts and railroad centers." (Ibid.).

The directives of the second plenum ordered the establishment of auxiliary organizations and units, standing in reserve apart from the party, as well as pushing women forward into leadership positions so that in the event of mobilization the party would not find itself without any apparatus. From that time on also military sections attached to KPP organizations have been separated in fact from the rest of the party, so that they can be better protected from contraction by Polish authorities. At any rate they function under the immediate command of Soviet general staff intelligence.

All organizational matters in the second plenum were treated from the viewpoint of war preparations. Thus for instance the resolution about party weakness in eastern Galicja states that the matter no longer concerns "manifestations of the revolutionary struggle

among the peasantry, etc." but their role in partisan warfare in the event of invasion by the Red Army:

"The heavy experience of the KPZU which was unable, in a situation that objectively favored it, to direct the elemental revolutionary movement of peasant masses represents a dangerous warning in case of war.

"Apart from the tasks which face the entire party, the KPZU and the KPZB already at the present time should prepare themselves for an organization of partisan struggle during the war." (Resolutions by the Second Plenum, page 16).

Of course if a war should break out, not even half of these abominable directives will be executed. Poland is not and will not be in the future a Russia under Nicholas II. The efficiency of the former in administration and in armed forces is recognized by the communists themselves. Also very few generic Poles would permit themselves to be pulled into such shameful work. However it will be beneficial for Polish society to remember that in time of war a vehement internal enemy will be lying in wait. At such a time, for diversion in the rear, a handful of traitors suffices rather than a "mass movement." A war between Poland and any of its neighbors currently is out of the question, and may this always be true! But there are no guarantees that the situation at present will not change, the more so because a few politicians and political movements can not acquiesce to an independent Poland within the entirety of her borders in the east as well as west. In this connection the propagation in an unconscious, uneducated, and an environment which has as well only a weak grasp of the Polish concept of statehood -- of illusions concerning "tomorrow's war," "revolution," etc -- gives rise to

tendencies and ideas which are dangerous if not to the existence of the state then to its internal order. When in 1932 the war, predicted so many times by the communists, did not take place then party members in the lower echelons became nervous wrecks. In the province of Wolyn criminal diversionary acts were begun which fortunately could be quickly liquidated by security authorities. This was the result of continuous appeals by the KPP central committee to prepare for partisan warfare.

The second plenum actually had little time for political matters. For the first time a "self criticism" was conducted at a plenum regarding the activities of the KPP and the KPZU in eastern Galicja, mainly about the participation of these parties in the events which occurred there in the fall of 1930. The plenum stated that the party: "did not fulfill its tasks... its efforts were commenced too late," and that in communist ranks there appeared a "lack of comprehension for the elemental forms of peasant struggle." Then the plenum ascertained that "the indications of a revolutionary crisis have been growing at an accelerated rate." In the area of tactical directives we find a sincere confession of the true aim behind the communist proposed united front:

"With the aid of patiently applied tactics of the united front from below, it is necessary to strengthen the decomposition within the social fascist, peasant fascist, and national fascist parties and to hasten the process of transition on the part of the masses following them into the revolutionary camp." (page 16).

As far as internal accounts were concerned, the second plenum was faced with a novelty. Up to 1929 disputes within the KPP as well as within the WKP, from which the former copy their examples 100%,

had occurred almost without exception among the "top level" leaders. The lower ranks on the other hand were forced to listen and to implement orders or as the term is used "attitudes." Therefore political life died out among the latter completely. Any kind of a manifestation of intellectual independence immediately was met with organizational repressions by the leadership which knew how to operate with such expressions as "brawling," "detriment," "panic-mongering," "agent-provocateur," etc. Suddenly there was created in Warsaw an opposition group, demanding intraparty democracy, return of the old leadership, as well as a fight against corruption on the part of the functionaries. It was headed by a party functionary under the pseudonym of "Pietrek" (Piotr Maur, a worker and graduate of the KPP military school at Moscow and later a member of the central military section in the KPP) who was able to attract up to 20 and subsequently almost 100 workers. As far as Polish workers' organizations in Warsaw go, this was quite sizable. Of course the "Pietrkovites" were thrown out of the party en masse as "renegades" and "provocateurs." The fact that this group arose in Warsaw was exploited at the second plenum as a pretext for an attack against the right wingers:

"The plenum states that the position of Warski, Kostrzewa, and Bartoszewicz has led to the formation of a group of renegades in Warsaw who have been acting to the advantage of the fascists. This group, playing the part of strikebreakers in the revolution and attempting to break up the Warsaw organization, functions under the banner of Warski, Kostrzewa, and Bartoszewicz; demands their return to leadership in the party; and rejects the fifth congress' resolutions." (page 23.)

Thus once again the perspective arose in front of the "3 W's" that they might assume the leadership of some kind of a Polish movement, because the workers themselves were calling for them. The bankrupt right wingers did not exploit this however but left the simpletons who believed in them to shift for themselves. The group of "Pietrkovites" soon broke up. Its ideology had become a mixture of Trotskyism, communism with a national flavor in an anti-Semitic sauce, and quasi anarchism. It made itself known once again during the great streetcar strike in Warsaw in the fall of 1931, at which time it attempted to apply terror by throwing several petards under the streetcars. The KPP claimed credit for these "heroic" roguish acts. Later the party was able to attract part of the "Pietrkovites" back into the fold through bribery of the leader himself, "Pietrek" (even though he had been called a provocateur before), with a position in one of the army automotive plants in the USSR where he was sent.

In the organizational area the second plenum issued the slogan: "double the number of party members." Several months later the central committee announced triumphantly that this slogan of the second plenum had been overfulfilled, since from October 1931 the number of party members (in comparison with the organizational status as reported at the fifth congress) had increased by 107%, from 3,300 to 6,800 and together with the KPZU as well as the KPZB from 6,000 to 12,000. The KZMP [Komunistyczny Związek Młodzieży Polskiej — Communist Union of Polish Youth] in October 1931 was claimed to have 9,400 members. The figures which are used by the KPP have always been characterized by the same kind of showiness as their reports concerning events. Any way they are patterned upon Soviet reports and statistics, wherein lie many falsehoods.

In reality the KPP together with both branches in the border areas at this time could not have numbered more than 8,000 active members, with the KZMP having an additional 6,000.

Very interesting is the percentile composition of the communist party. In a brochure issued by the KPP central committee in February 1932, including the resolutions of the second plenum, we find some statistics which indicate that the party composition included only 10% of workers from large industry; just 3% of agricultural laborers; a total of 28% from the peasantry (with a majority of Ukrainians and Belorussians); whereas the remaining 59% comprised trash, with about four fifths of this being Jews. In the KZMP the percentage of Jews was even higher. In the Lodz industrial area among the 340 KPP members, there were only 50 textile workers (out of over 110,000 such workers). The Dabrowa Basin had 42% of its party recruited from the miners. These are supposed to be communist "fortresses." In other centers like for instance at Warsaw, the KPP and KZMP organizations had an absolute majority of Jews in them -- not to mention the smaller provincial organizations in former Congress Poland and in Galicja (in the latter very insignificant), where the organizational core consists of the sons of Jewish merchants, not infrequently the pupils of various "jeszybotow", unsuccessful rabbinical students, etc. The KPP almost did not extend into the Poznan and Pomerania provinces at all. Organizational work in those provinces was based upon loose contacts. At any rate as a foreign agent the KPP presented itself quite well. However as a mass organization, which it pretended to be, the strength of the party was decidedly too small.

In the spring of 1931 the eleventh plenum of the Comintern

was convened. Its resolutions included Poland within the group of 4 countries in which the revolution was developing and rapidly growing. The foregoing countries were allegedly Germany, Poland, Spain, and China. The KPP rapporteur, Lenski, again ascertained an "accelerated development in the precursors of the revolutionary crisis," expressing itself among others in the events which occurred within eastern Galicja in connection with the demonstrations by unemployed and other imagined or twisted facts. Although it had arisen due to a long lasting crisis, the wave of strikes had not yet reached Poland. Despite this fact Lenski's assistant, Henrykowski who was generally known throughout the KPP as a "fraud," tried to prove that strikes in Poland were already "not too visible."

Only in May 1931 did the strike movement in Poland become more active. First there was the partial strike of miners in the Dabrowa Basin and then in June the streetcar operators in Warsaw. This latter action involved a considerable role on the part of the communist trade union together with its loud chairman, Stefan Ostrowski. Regardless of services rendered to the party, he was also suspected of provocation, i.e., collaboration with security authorities. At this time there arose spontaneously among the workers a new form of strike, actually a variety of the acute Italian strike connected with occupation of the factory in the apprehension that it might be closed. This was the so-called "Hortensjada," named after the glass mill "Hortensja" located at Piotrkow where this technique was first applied. Among such kinds of action, the most tragic was the one in the underground areas of the "Klimontow" mine within the Dabrowa Basin (1933) which the owners wanted to flood. This strike found sympathy among almost all of Polish public opinion. The communists began to prey upon

this type of a strike. Later they were followed by the "Zarembovites" (from the name of their leader, Zaremba) in the left wing of the PPS which frequently flirted with the communists. In these circles the "Hortensjada" was called the "Polish strike." Actually this form had been applied earlier, especially in countries with a developed anarchosyndicalism. The famous "occupation of factories" in Italy during 1921 was nothing less than a "Hortensjada" on a large scale. As a result however strikes of this kind in Poland played a large role only in the new phase of intra-party quarrels.

It was in the spring of 1931 that one of these fights broke out within the KPP leadership. Very little information about it became available on the outside, even though formally the dispute lasted until the end of 1932. In actual fact it still exists in various forms to date. Acute friction and mutual intrigue developed between Slawinski and Bronkowski. To a certain extent, the generally known competition between civilian and military intelligence services was in operation here. Slawinski as well as Bronkowski were acquainted with Poland only from distant prewar times and knew contemporary Poland only on the basis of party or espionage reports or else verbal information from their confidants in the KPP. Naturally both of the disputants were immediately backed up by appropriate intraparty cliques which had corresponding supporters on the leadership, central, and district echelons within Poland as well as within the leadership abroad, i.e., the Politburo. During this period of time, 3 groups became crystallized: the Lenski-Bronkowski-Henrykowski clique versus the Slawinski-Marek clique as well as the third small clique of "lodsermensen" leaning toward the left with Ewal and Albert (Wigdor Szapiro) at its head. The threads of these cheap intrigues

could be traced to the Comintern, of course, which body in general supported the group in control and had a decisive position within the party -- in this case the Lenski-Bronkowski-Henrykowski clique, the ambassador of which at the Comintern was Knorin. However also the Slawinski-Marek clique had support in the person of a Comintern representative, Manuilsky. This group also had the advantage among the party active inside of Poland. The third group, comprised of dissatisfied intellectuals, strove for greater authority within the party. It is difficult to find any kind of political criteria as a source for these disputes. The principal basis of the struggle was the fight for power in the party and the desire to control the trough by the people within a clique and its supporters. Naturally the disputes among these cliques were colored by appropriate political differences. The point which caused these differences was the matter of strikes, already mentioned previously.

All of this friction exploded at the third plenum of the KPP central committee held in Berlin during June 1931, in connection with the debate over strike tactics. Two local strikes which had been fairly successful, and the KPP considers as successful anything which will bring even a temporary advantage in its agitation although the workers themselves might lose out, were sufficient as a basis for Lenski and his group to claim that the political situation of Poland had experienced a "breakthrough in the direction of revolution" (despite the fact that 6 months before a "revolutionary situation" had already been announced). Thus it was necessary to effectuate a general strike in the whole country which, accompanied by appropriate KPP tactics, would become the introduction to the "final struggle for power." This unrealistic concept was sharply opposed by Marek who stated that it was necessary to begin with a solid swing in the

wave of strikes. Then by means of a general strike period within the individual branches of industry and the different centers to approach the target of a national strike which would not immediately have a political character. The generally sound thesis of Marek was described by Lenski as being a "theory of levels" and thus a variation of "opportunism."

At first the majority on the central committee gave its support to Marek, but an indication of anger by Moscow "was increasing at an accelerated rate" so this ended with a compromise resolution. Only later did the KPP apply rather the tactics of Marek, but from time to time the "Lenskiites" proclaimed general strikes which were not supported by anybody or else by a small handful of workers. This did not prevent of course the ruling clique from developing a censure movement against the "Marekites" which campaign was supported noisily by the fawning clique of "lodermenschon" and other fanatical "body guards" of the ruling group.

The third plenum took place in an atmosphere that was very different from that of the second plenum. This was the period following the famous shift "to the right" by Stalin which was based upon the slowing down in collectivization tempo, etc. It should be mentioned that this saved the USSR from catastrophe. A stop was hence ordered to all talk about a war, a partisan movement, etc., and even the main nationality slogan of the KPP was modified in the spirit of current interests on the part of the Narkomindel /People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the USSR/. From "self determination to secession in Poland for the Ukraine and Western Belorussia as well as incorporation into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia," the words "incorporation into" were deleted. Only in the

form of propaganda and not through mass agitation, the communists were to explain that the sole rational solution for this problem after the revolution would be the unification of Ukrainian and Belorussian territories under Soviet authority. In this manner formally the entire responsibility for this slogan was placed upon the Comintern, organizing internal strife within Poland, and eliminating the Russian government as such. In this regard the collectivization of agriculture, connected with the oppression of nationalities within the USSR [Ukrainska Socjalistyczna Republika Rad -- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] and the BSRR [Bialoruska Socjalistyczna Republika Rad -- Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic], evoked a tremendous wave of dissatisfaction among the masses of Polish peasantry in the eastern territories. In order to attract the latter to communism, it was dangerous to present the perspective of Soviet occupation and of "Kolkhozes." At any rate communism among the national minorities after 1930 began to contract violently. Only with the Jews did the anticommunist reaction come later. In addition since the KPP had announced "self determination" without any restrictions for the Lithuanians, Upper Silesia, and Pomerania there was no sense in placing emphasis upon what would happen to the so-called "Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia" after their secession from Poland. Theoretically, even according to the teachings of Lenin, the "self determination" of a nation and at the same time the dissolution of this self determination in advance by a decision to annex it by the Soviet republics would be visibly absurd. This inconsistency however was cultivated by the KPP between 1923 and 1931. At any rate the full text of this resolution indicates that the matter pertains only to verbal tricks:

"Our fundamental slogan, mobilizing the broadest possible masses of the people, is the Leninist slogan of struggle for the rights of nations to self determination even up to secession." We must explain to the masses that the slogan of self determination including secession means: (a) a decisive fight against Polish imperialism, versus occupation, and for national liberation; (b) free and not compulsory self establishment of a nation deprived of its state existence; (c) implementing this slogan under current circumstances is only possible along the path of a common struggle by oppressed nations together with the proletariat and the working peasantry of all Poland, under hegemony of the proletariat and leadership of the communist party, toward overthrowing the bourgeoisie." (Brochure entitled III Plenum KC KPP /Third Plenum of the KPP Central Committee/, page 21).

And immediately:

"Our party will propagate the unification of the Western Ukraine and of Western Belorussia with the USRR and the BSRR." (page 22).

It appears from this resolution that in connection with the "self determination" of Lwow for instance only the Ukrainians would decide in their capacity as an "oppressed nation," even though they represented a small minority in that city; at Katowice, the Germans; at Wilno, the almost nonexistent Lithuanians; etc. In practice the KPP visualizes this whole self determination in the following manner: the communists will make the revolution, and their congress will decide everything, but ultimately it will be a Moscow decree.

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and tactical slogan in this line became: "through daily struggle to decisive battles for power." A number of slogans were also announced with the aim of contributing to a more acute political situation in Poland, like: confiscation of food supplies, arbitrary use of forests and pastures, attacks upon prisons and release of arrested individuals, disarming of "fascist hoodlums," organization of the drive to arms by leading sections of the proletariat and peasantry (what kind of arms? spelled with a capital or a small "a"?), the construction of barricades, cutting telegraphic lines, disarming the police, etc. (page 13 of Resolutions). In practice these appeals led to merely a few attempts at destroying grocery stores in Warsaw during the Christmas holidays in 1932 as well as to efforts at organizing the so-called "day of hunger" which was based upon demonstrations by the unemployed. Both actions were unsuccessful.

The source of these anarchist and bandit like ideas was to be found, apart from the increase in the friskiness of the intellectual circles among the Lumpenproletariat, also in the hopes for a revolution in Germany. The third KPP plenum as well as the eleventh plenum of the Comintern executive approached the revolution in Poland in strict connection with the German revolution. This was actually a period of serious struggle by the communist party of Germany against the radical propaganda of nationalistic Hitlerism (a fight with a result as yet unknown). Hence at the third plenum the "attitude" arose toward the "closest possible collaboration between the KPP and the communist party of Germany:"

"The revolution of the proletariat in Germany, breaking the fundamental link in the European capitalist system, will hasten the

revolution in Poland similarly to the manner in which the Polish proletarian revolution, smashing one of the main links in the Versailles system and a base for an attack upon the USSR, would accelerate victory of a German proletarian revolution." (Ibid., page 14).

In this connection the Comintern intensified its attack against the Treaty of Versailles. Immediately following the third plenum communist parties in Germany, France, England, Poland, and in Czechoslovakia issued a common manifesto entitled "Down with the Murderous Treaty of Versailles!" It is interesting to note that the KPP in this manifesto was "ceding" lightly the western territories of Poland to the Germans, whereas the communist party of Germany could strengthen the hearts of its members. Thus the French, Polish, etc. "masses" were expressing their readiness to help the Germans in regaining lands "robbed" by France (for a certain time the French communists were in a "united front" with the clerical "autonomists" from Alsace, well known agents of Berlin), Poland, Denmark, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania as well as their preparedness to back German demands for an "anschluss" with Austria and Danzig.

In the program of struggle for "social and national liberation" announced by the central committee of the German communist party, there is no mention made of any self determination for territories which were returned to their own countries as a result of the great war. We find there only the demand for their return to Germany. It should be noted that in nationalistic agitation the German communists were even stronger verbally than were the German national socialists (Hitlerites). That such a large difference existed between the tactics of the KPP and of the German communist party should not be too surprising, since at the time this was to the advantage of

Russia which was of decisive significance. Subsequently when Hitler had come to power in Germany, the USSR and with it the Comintern changed their political orientation in Europe. The KPP then found itself in considerable difficulty.

Immediately following the third plenum, a dispute concerning the "general strike" started in Nowy Przegląd. This struggle was hard to discern for the layman who did not know much about communist affairs. The leaders were fighting with regard to primacy in the matter of noticing "manifestations" of this strike. When Lenski emphasized that:

"The general strike in Warsaw has become an actual problem for the current day. Hence a general strike in the center of the fascist dictatorship may easily develop into a national strike." (Nowy Przegląd, August 1931, page 14).

Which brought back to memory his own words written following the fifth congress:

"Just so we do not miss the opportunity, so we strike iron while it is hot. The dynamics of transforming partial strikes into a general strike depend not only upon the objective development of events but also upon the subjective role played by our party."

Then his opponent, Marek, considering the matter more realistically and writing about the strike of Warsaw streetcar operators, emphasized:

"When we speak about the tendency of broadening a strike, transforming it into a general strike in a given center, we do not have in mind an automatic process. Doubtlessly the fact of the strike itself incites the workers to struggle, but in order to transform

this elevated atmosphere into action, it is necessary to have an organized, conscious and strained effort."

And further on:

"This struggle may explode at first along a narrow sector. At the appropriate moment, we must announce the slogan of a general strike for workers in a given branch of production or in a given center." (Ibid., page 18).

Terror also does not allow them to sleep. During this period there took place in the eastern territories of Poland a bomb attack upon the railroad station at Podbrodzie in connection with which a train engineer was killed. At first the KPP press organ inside of the country, Czerwony Sztandar [Red Banner] (printed illegally) announced that this was a "provocation by Polish authorities," as is usual whenever something occurs for which the communists do not care to assume responsibility. The KPP central committee became incensed however at this (analogy with Donski and the cathedral at Sophia, Bulgaria in 1925), but provided at the same time a fundamental expression of the communist attitude toward terror in a resolution which stated that:

"The party is against individual terrorist attacks by comrades without the knowledge and acquiescence of the party leadership... unjust and providing an erroneous perspective is the statement that 'individual terror under conditions of growth in the broad revolutionary movement is possessed of the objective character of acts by provocateurs.' This becomes more unjustified as a result of the fact that this statement is placed within the context of an armed insurrection. We reject individual terror which is to change the struggle

of the masses. However terrorist acts in connection with the revolutionary struggle by the masses, passing into an armed insurrection, may become a purposeful and supplementary means in the fight. Under such circumstances the armed struggle by the masses and simultaneous acts of terrorism or else attacks upon strategic objects represent a contribution to victory. For this reason we may not reject, and even less castigate, such acts as provocation." (Nowy Przegląd, August 1931, page 80).

In order that there remain no doubts regarding the positive attitude taken by the KPP toward acts of terrorism, a member of the central editorial office Rwał places the dot above the "i" by writing:

"The bloody fighting against the police by unemployed and striking peasants, attempts at building barricades during demonstrations, the cutting of telegraphic and telephonic wires, killing or disarming of spies and policemen -- such are the new and more acute forms of mass struggle which are being spread to more and more centers throughout the country.

"The method of active resistance applied not in isolation from tangible mass action but remaining in close connection with it will condition the masses to decisive steps, train leaders for armed conflict, facilitate the acquisition of necessary weapons by the masses, make easier a transition to appropriate forms of defense and to the correct types of attack under favorable conditions." (Nowy Przegląd, September-October 1931, page 24).

Toward the end of 1931 an extensive but behind the scenes scandal was evoked because of the loquaciousness of Stefan Zbikowski, an officer in the Soviet Army with the rank of general. This expert

on Soviet strategy, knowing well the secret plans of his staff, published in the second issue of the periodical Zolnierz Rewolucji [Soldier of the Revolution] [See Note] an article signed with an "S" and entitled "Problems of Military Strategy in the Defense of the Soviet Union." We consider it to be simply our duty to cite longer extracts from this article for the purpose of making our readers acquainted with the plans of Poland's neighbor to the east. The international situation since that time, during a period of almost 3 years, has changed considerably. However this does not mean that the matters discussed here have lost on timeliness. This document will always be important, equal to the famous memorial by Hugenberg with the plan for an invasion of the USSR. In general only the details have assumed a certain modification in Soviet and Comintern policy, whereas the general line has remained without any change. Let us therefore allow Comrade General Zbikowski to speak:

(Note). This was a KPP publication issued until 1932 in Germany under the editorship of Bronkowski, Zbikowski, Rwal, and Albert which was especially devoted to work in the army and to the theoretical discussion of problems concerning "armed insurrection" and similar military-diversionary actions, directed and financed in fact by the fourth department of the Red Army's general staff. It was printed in a very small number of copies and belonged to the most secret of communist publications).

"The masses of workers and peasants must actively oppose the Polish bourgeoisie in case of war, collaborating with the Red Army which is the organized and conscious army of the international revolution... Hence where conditions will be appropriate, in the event of mass resistance against mobilization on the part of the population,

it will be necessary to organize a partisan movement in the rear of the Polish troops. In industry and transportation, strikes should be fomented. The general aim of these actions is active support for the Red Army, the general strike, and armed insurrection for a transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war.

"From where does the main threat of a strike endanger the USSR? From the east or from the west? Tremendous areas in the east (Asia) consist of deserts and mountains; the distance of bases for attack, which could be utilized in Manchuria or north-western India, from the powers that are most antagonistic toward the USSR (apart from Japan) as well as from USSR centers of life do not support the probability of an attack from the east. The principal strike therefore will probably take place in Europe. Three main launching bases from Europe are the following: (1) the Baltic Sea and its coasts; (2) Poland with Rumania; and (3) the Black Sea and its coasts... We must... take into consideration which of these three bases will represent the principal danger as being the most profitable for the imperialists, namely in terms of (1) the shortest route to USSR centers of life; (2) having the best foundation in human materiel; and (3) situated the closest to the main capitalist powers which are fighting the USSR. We see that all bases correspond to the first and third conditions. However only Poland is appropriate for all criteria.

In a war against the USSR these states (within the three enumerated bases) will be the loci for mass and regular transport of the means in military technology and ammunition from other European states. From this viewpoint the location of Poland is not at all favorable, without an understanding with Germany."

As can be seen, this will interest not only a Pole but also a German. The author of the article quotes with satisfaction the brotherly organ of the German communist party entitled Oktober (issued for the same purposes as Zolnierz Rewolucyjny) which forecasts that the German communists in the event of a war against the USSR, in connection with probable German neutrality [See Note], are ready to provide active assistance on behalf of the Red Army:

[Note]. As we see, this makes sense. There is not a word concerning the universal anti-Soviet bloc including England, Tibet, Poland, Germany, Lithuania, and Japan. The differences are visible here in the attitudes of a Red Army staff officer and a demagogue from the KPP central committee).

"Even the partisan activities along the Polish border from the side of Upper Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia should be utilized in order to tie down forces and to assist in the subversion of the white armies.

"...the base along the Baltic possesses the advantage for the enemy that, based upon Estonia and Finland, he can take relatively the shortest route and strike at such an industrial and political center as Leningrad. The occupation of Leningrad would mean the immediate establishment of a bourgeois government in Russia with a capital at this city. The conclusion from the foregoing is that the strategic conditions of USSR defense may require an immediate offensive by red armies in the direction of Estonia and Finland for the purpose of forestalling a possible offensive by the enemy from the Baltic and Murmansk toward Leningrad.

"Here we meet with a problem of first rate importance: whether the Red Army should await on Soviet territory for the general attack

by the interventionist armies, e.g., the Polish army, or should it cross its borders and fight the decisive battles with the bourgeois army within the ethnographic territory of Poland. This question must be explained carefully among others in order to escape the serious error which was committed by Donski in 1920, who spoke out against a crossing of Poland's ethnographic borders by the Red Army. Many working class youths in 1920 allowed themselves to be attracted by the hypocritical slogans of the Polish bourgeoisie and its hirelings in the PPS, so that many of them joined Polish regiments in defense of their bourgeois 'fatherland' against the 'invasion' by the Red Army... The USSR being forced into a war by the capitalist states will apply such a strategy as will be the most purposeful, taking into consideration that the interventionist war is a class war and as such is subordinate to the laws of a class war: its success at the very beginning already mobilizes the masses, each new success hastens victory and paralyzes the forces of the opponent. Success in every struggle means occupation of area, movement, advancing forward. On the contrary, passivity and waiting will paralyze one's own forces.

"Forced into war by the imperialists, the USSR will have to strive toward ending it as soon as possible through breaking up or destroying armies of the enemy, through occupying his territory and means of supplying his army. The latter can be attained only by the method of attack. Specifically if the offensive will permit the defeat of enemy forces, before they are able to concentrate and to develop for a strike.

"There exist adherents to the strategy of defense who indicate the vast areas of Russia. Frequently the idea is heard that:

"We can retreat to the Urals, wear the opponent down, and then defeat him." This is a completely false strategy for these reasons: (1) the Red Army is sufficiently strong for an offensive; (2) modern warfare is based upon technology, whereas retreat in depth would place the industrial centers in the hands of the enemy; (3) a war against the USSR, a class war and retreat will allow the mobilization of the Soviet government's class enemies upon the territory of the Union itself, not to speak of the inevitable depression of the masses being exploited in capitalist states.

"An insufficient industrial as well as technological development of the border states in the west may weaken considerably the first attack by the white armies and represent an advantage for an offensive by the Red Army in its subsequent defeat of armies belonging to possible opponents. Such an offensive may be conducted by the Red Army in the direction of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia by taking care of these adversaries or in the direction of Bessarabia and Czerniowce by attaining the Carpathian Mountain line without difficulty and in this manner shortening considerably its front.

"The advantage of an offensive in the direction of Poland is indicated for the USSR and the Red Army by the benevolent attitude of the populations in the Ukraine and Western Belorussia, oppressed in an unheard of manner by the Polish occupation authorities. A victorious offensive in Poland will place the Red Army closer to the revolutionary worker and peasant of Germany which will threaten the capitalist existence in Europe.

"... the total framework of conditions in a revolutionary war results in a strategy of the offense, a strike at the weakest point of the opponent in which simultaneously assistance by the population

will be the most probable and fruitful. In this latter instance the Red Army offensive should be accompanied by a simultaneous strike on the part of revolutionary forces in the rear of the white armies.

"The military theses of the sixth Comintern congress state:

(1) that the proletariat should not only fight actively for the defeat of the government in its own country but also for the victory of the Soviet state; (2) that in view of the foregoing, its tactics in the selection of various means for the struggle not only should be designated by the interests of class warfare in one's own country but also by the interests of the Red Army at the front.

"... an armed insurrection... during the war of intervention, especially in proximity of the front or of areas working directly for the war effort, such an uprising will be of tremendous significance and even more so if it is coordinated with Red Army operations at the front.

"In view of the above fact, the organization of such an insurrection should not wait until the conditions for an uprising are ripe sufficiently in the whole country. The same pertains to the general strike or to partial strikes. Even a short lived and partial strike in transportation, even if unsuccessful and broken, will be of considerable significance should it have taken place during the transport of ammunition or troops.

In continuation the author of this article emphasizes the importance of partisan warfare during a conflict:

"... the guerrilla movement is of importance as an action mobilizing the population for armed struggle against the white armies, harrasing the rear, severing connections, destruction of

means for communication, attacks upon staffs of technical and economic troops which are located at one side and less well protected...

"... from this we draw the conclusion that a partisan movement in the rear of white armies is more effective as collaboration with the Red Army than direct crossing over to the Red Army by armed revolutionaries."

Regardless of this stipulation Zbikowski also propagates strongly the crossing of lines with weapons in hand to the Red Army. Apart from the foregoing he describes professionally and militarily the geography of Poland and the possible strategic plans of the Polish general staff as well as the course of mobilization:

"In order to conduct a total mobilization, Poland will need considerable time -- about 3 to 4 weeks. During this period (communists) may take steps to oppose war by actively resisting the transportation of troops, the collection of war material, organizing antiwar strikes, etc."

He also teaches us in detail how to prepare for this treasonable work, by drawing attention to the strategic objectives which the KPP must render incapable of use. At the end of the article we find out that the entire phraseology and dialectics of "evaluation," "analyses," "resolutions" represent merely a smokescreen for professionally well thought out plans and tasks of a military-imperialist nature by the USSR:

"The problem of military strategy and tactics, including within this area also the preparation for an armed insurrection, coincides with the problem of USSR defense and the struggle against war."

(Zolnierz Rewolucji, November 1931, pages 32-43).

In Moscow this article by Stefan Zbikowski evoked a veritable storm. His elaboration threatened to precipitate a scandal greater than the famous "Zinoviev letter" of 1924 in England. The KPP central committee was immediately ordered to confiscate the mentioned number of Zolnierz Rewolucji, a few copies of which had already been sent out to the confidential party active, and take it out of circulation. No discussion of Zbikowski's article was permitted in the party press, and therefore it hardly reached Poland at all, i.e., the broader organizational circles of the KPP.

Naturally the epilogue to this whole matter subsequently found its way to the Comintern's control commission. Zbikowski as well as Lenski and Bronkowski had to explain why they allowed the publication of USSR military secrets. At this time a Talmudic question also arose. Would the "revolutionary masses" under the influence of such articles passively await the approach of the Red Army, instead of making a revolution themselves? Within the leadership circles of the KPP where this matter was known, there was not a single voice in protest, because the affair was being taken care of by Soviet military authorities. Apparently the sovnrakom (the USSR council of peoples' commissars) must have valued Zbikowski professionally since, even for such an accidental leak to the "bourgeoisie" of the secrets of Red imperialism, he was not greatly penalized.

Just at the time that this article appeared, the communists in Poland were again being supported by the PPS in raising an outcry against the new prison regulations which equalized their rights with those of others in jail. It would have been completely logical to apply against these "comrades" or subordinates to General Zbikowski in Warsaw not the Polish penal code but the one binding in "their"

state since 1934, i.e., the decree on "penalties for betrayal of the fatherland." If the latter does not foresee a grey prison uniform for spies and diversionaries, it is only because in the other world neither the Russian nor the Polish jail system are binding.

At the end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932 the KPP lived in a period of dry quarrels and intrigues by cliques. In the course of political discussions, strikes, "new stages," "phases," "rises in the revolutionary wave," "hastening of the development in the elements of the revolutionary crisis," etc, were talked about. An important phase in the hastening of the development in elements of the revolutionary crisis by the KPP was the introduction at this time into Poland of martial law. Under the influence of this, the dynamics of the automatic process in which people were leaving the KPP assumed a tendency of broadening itself into a general decomposition. The leadership was able to control the situation somewhat. During this period cases of communists transferring into legal workers' parties, mainly the PPS and the Bund [see Note] multiplied.

[Note]. This phenomenon would have been advantageous, if the mentioned parties had strongly emphasized the differences between their programs and ideologies from those of communism, as had been done by the PPS in past years. At present however this is frequently a purely mechanical process. A communist transferring into the PPS remains a communist, often even speaking in the same jargon. The Jews for instance justify their "shameful" act to themselves and to KPP members by claiming that they have joined the social fascists in order to convert them).

In March 1932 the KPP was affected like a bolt from the blue

by the general strike announced for the sixteenth of that month under the leadership of the PPS. This action was directed against the law on unification (of social security). Again actual conditions of life played a trick upon the educated members of the KPP. During the period of fascism, which represents a form of imperialism or the newest phase in the development of capitalism, etc., the "social fascists" must break every strike. It becomes an "impossibility" thus for the PPS to proclaim and conduct a strike which is to be a general one at that. The secretariat of the KPP central committee inside of Poland hence issued an appeal in which it pretended to be unaware of what was happening and stated that: "the leaders of the PPS, pretending that it was they who had proclaimed the general strike, did all in their power not to permit the strike to break out (Who was it then that proclaimed it? Perhaps the sanacja? -- comment by author)."

Such a position taken by the central committee's secretariat angered Lenski. According to him, this would not convince either the PPS members or the members of the communist party (exactly so!). Lenski inserted his comments into Nowy Przegląd for May 1932 on pages 10-11. It is an explanation of this fact contrary to nature which also can never convince anybody:

"... the new maneuvers by the PPS possess a typically preventative character. These are maneuvers which attempt to prevent the growth of the proletarian revolution. Such was the character of the one day general strike called by the PPS for all of Poland. This fact signals a change in the tactical attitude of the PPS.

"Proclamation by the PPS of a general strike for 16 March was a maneuver on a large scale. It surprised our party to a certain extent." (Nowy Przegląd, May 1932, pages 10-11).

Lenski continues by castigating the "right wing" error:

"The PPS plays the part of a factor setting loose the revolutionary masses, a factor making it easier for us -- since it is a legal factor -- to conduct the masses." (Ibid., page 10):

Unfortunately it is true with this "making easier." From the viewpoint of politicking, somebody may be happy about the fact that the PPS is playing tricks upon the KPP due to its competition. However looking further there is no doubt but that since 1932 the deepening policy of the PPS is preparing the soil for its own grave through its opposition to the government "on principle," strike mania, acceptance of communist formulas including the "defense of the USSR against an imperialist war" (slogan announced by the OMTUR in 1933 in connection with the International Day of Youth). The danger of this process to the state is weakened only by the fact that since this time the masses have been moving away from the KPP central committee and from the PPS central executive committee. This drawing aside by the proletariat from a handful of communist handlers precipitates in the latter an even greater hatred for the PPS. Lenski is of the opinion that: "a greater part in our agitation should be played by slogans which create a line of division between the camps of communism... and social fascism... -- slogans of the proletarian dictatorship; slogans of a government by councils of workers, peasants, and soldiers' delegates; an armed insurrection, as the only path toward the overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship; and defense of the USSR." (Ibid., page 13).

We will still talk about this matter in connection with the period following January 1933. During that time the process of contracting the boundaries of communism and certain splinters from socialism had only begun. Its relative slowness brought Lenski to a passion:

"It is necessary to establish once and for all in the consciousness of the entire party that the united front from below consists of a common struggle together with the low ranking workers in the PPS, the "Bund," etc under the leadership of the communists... However this does not mean that a PPS delegate (in a factory), implementing the position of his party, can also become our ally. Only such a delegate, who acts contrary to the directives received from above, may create with us a united front from below. Of such there are few." (Ibid., page 16).

At the same time however Lenski cautions against too much brawling:

"All empty words about a general strike will lower the authority of the party among the masses and facilitate the social fascists in undermining the confidence in our party by these masses." (Ibid., page 15).

That this was of no avail we shall see in 1933, when these "empty words" "assumed a tendency" toward a chronic mania.

The shaking of the uniformity in party leadership, which has already been mentioned, as well as the "new" situation, i.e., "PPS maneuvers on a large scale," influenced the KPP leadership to quickly call the sixth party congress. The preelection campaign for this congress consisted of a thrifty elimination of "Marekites" from positions of authority within the party and their replacement by "Lenskites" who were ordered to conduct appropriate "elections," i.e., simply to nominate delegates that would be best for them.

Still before the congress there was convened in the summer of 1932 the twelfth plenum of the Comintern executive, mainly devoted

to the "preparation" of a revolution in Germany. It is true that a revolution was being prepared in that country but a revolution by Hitler. Of this the communists seemed completely unaware. Therefore the twelfth plenum announced triumphantly the "end of capitalist stabilization," although that stabilization had been completed back in 1929 and passed on into a crisis which the world had never seen before. Apart from this the Comintern really had nothing to say. It continued to repeat old prophecies about the establishment of a new era of wars and revolutions, etc. In general the insane combinations concerning some kind of a "unified" capitalist world contrasted with the USSR have been replaced by the ancient Marxist speculations about the internal contradictions of capitalism:

"On the basis of the tremendous acuteness in contradictions between imperialist states and internal class contradictions in the capitalist world, on the background of a revolutionary rise, there is taking place a transition into a new series of large and violent clashes between classes and states as well as into a new era of revolutions and wars in capitalist countries and in those with an accelerated maturation within the weaker links of the revolutionary crisis (Germany, Poland, the Balkan states) in view of the end of relative stabilization by capitalism."

The sixth KPP congress itself occurred in October 1932 in Soviet Belorussia. The majority of "Lenskiites" was guaranteed in advance. Otherwise the congress was characterized by more of an official Soviet flavor than previous congresses. In addition to the regular representatives of the Comintern, the WKP, and the German Communist Party, a completely official delegation of Soviet authorities made its appearance: the chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars

for the BSRR, i.e., the premier of the Belorussian government, Goloded; the secretary of the communist party's central committee in Belorussia, a Caucasian named Gikallo; as well as the political director (politruk) on the staff of the "western front" army at Smolensk, General Aronsztam (at one time secretary of the KPZB central committee, using the pseudonyms "Artur" and "Czerńiak"). The first 2 acted as hosts to the congress and gave anti-Polish speeches. We should add that this happened at a time when the Soviet government was courting Poland, in its fear of Japanese advances in Manchuria as well as due to the forecast of a victory by Hitler.

The point of departure for the political resolutions at the sixth congress was the already quoted resolution by the Comintern's twelfth plenum. The congress itself actually repeated the prayer after its mother:

"... the key point in the maturation of the European revolutionary crisis is Germany... Poland is directly approaching the revolutionary crisis... with accelerated indications of elements in the revolutionary crisis." (Brochure entitled VI Zjazd KPP [The Sixth KPP Congress], page 3).

The sixth congress revealed with somewhat greater openness the weak places in KPP development, for no particular reason since it would have taken up less space to enumerate the "strong" ones:

"The tempo in the decomposition of social fascism and peasant fascism does not correspond to the general development of the revolutionary movement -- the tempo in acquiring majorities in such centers as Warsaw, Lodz, Upper Silesia is too slow and must be accelerated considerably." (pages 8-9 of Resolutions).

Next the congress ascertained the organizational weakness among the unemployed, in rural areas (statements for instance that no communists were present during the peasant disturbances at Lesko in Galicja), among the national minorities, as well as among employed workers principally in metal factories and on railroads. In relation to the villages the congress accused local organizations of having taken too much to heart the action of boycotting taxes (if a peasant does not pay his tax because he has no money, the communists right away announce this as their success) of neglecting and even of stopping altogether the "struggle for land" which represents for the KPP the "principal link in the fight within rural areas." The congress expressed special indignation at the lack of skill in exploiting by local communists of various types of struggle in the case of village disturbances:

"With complete decisiveness we must eradicate from our active a certain type of nobleman's disdain and unwilling attitude toward the elemental forms of struggle in the rural areas like for instance: arson, boycott of charges at markets, etc.

"Starting from the foundation that the slogans accepted by the fifth congress, in the matter of the struggle for land (land for peasants and agricultural laborers) in practice have weakened the mobilization of the peasant masses by the party, the congress resolves to revert to the old sounding of this slogan of 'land for the peasants without redemption' which must be connected as closely as possible with the slogan of a workers and peasant government. It does not change the attitude of the party toward guaranteeing the interests of the agricultural laborers in regard to the division of land." (Ibid., page 13).

The second part of this resolution was enriched by the addition of a certain "novelty." The basic slogan in the matter of land was modified in such a way that the communists "do not give" land to the agricultural laborers but only to the peasants. The agricultural laborers are to represent material for the future "sovkhozes" or "bread factories" which are to make the dictatorship of the proletariat independent of the peasantry. The latter, as is known from the example of Russia, provides a tremendous resistance to the collectivization of agriculture. The sixth congress adopted this resolution unanimously, since the central committee itself proposed it. However several weeks later, it was changed by the Comintern which eliminated the revision of the resolution passed by the fifth congress and emphasized even stronger the participation of farm labor in the future division of the land. Thus appears the independence of the KPP.

Considerable time was devoted by the sixth congress to the problem of "Trotskyites:"

"... a strengthening of the struggle against Trotskyism, growing in Poland on the soil of the Kostrzewite ideology and being conserved by the undestroyed remnants of the right wing group." (Ibid., page 17).

During the year 1932 a group did actually arise within the Jewish part of the KPP, including former communist Bundists Aleksander Minc and Abe Flug as well as the prominent Jewish writer (in Yiddish) Deutscher (Krakowski) as leaders, which openly admitted its adherence to Trotsky. It was expelled from the KPP. This movement had and still does not have any importance. Its entire activity is limited to the publication of several brochures by Trotsky in Polish and a few press publications (primarily in Yiddish). Apart from this,

the group provoked some brawls in the Jewish neighborhood of Warsaw between the supporters of Stalin and those of Trotsky. Later the movement broke into two parts, i.e., the pure Trotskyites and the so-called "Abists" (from the name of Abe Flug) who finally became adherents of Warski and Kostrzewa.

Regardless of the insignificance of this fronde, the KPP was forced to throw its entire power against it. It was necessary to show the bolsheviks that while Stalin fought in Russia against the "vanguard of the counter revolution" as he called the Trotskyites, the KPP was courageously supporting him. Furthermore the attack upon Minc, etc., detracted the attention of the broader party masses from the more serious friction between cliques in the KPP. The fight against Trotskyism also helped to throw more mud at the right wing leaders: at the third congress, they got it for Guryn; at the fifth, for "Pietrek"; and now writes Lenski in his commentary on the resolutions of the sixth congress:

"There is no doubt but that the antiparty and renegade activity of this group, which actually is a branch of social fascism, aids Polish intelligence in its struggle against the KPP. The moral and political responsibility for this group must be assumed by Warski and Kostrzewa who have still to capitulate to the party." (Nowy Przegląd, November-December 1932, page 9).

The struggle between Lenski and Marek concerning strike tactics was concluded with a complete victory by the former. Marek was even forced to do penance; i.e., conduct a self criticism of his attitudes. At all party congresses of the KPP, such penitents must be available, because otherwise it would be quite boring. Merely revolutionary phrases and Leninist-Stalinist formulas are insufficient. The main

intriguer against Marek, his old comrade from the PPS Henrykowski, could write in triumph:

"The sixth congress of our party condemned the opportunistic waverings which manifested themselves in some of the party links with regard to the matter of the general strike." (Nowy Przegląd, November-December, 1932, page 26).

The sixth congress also steered "a course toward a national and general strike" so as to "lead the masses to a general political strike" under the leadership of the communist party:

"A systematic popularization of this strike should be connected with the propaganda of an armed insurrection... It should be remembered simultaneously that the revolutionary general strike under conditions of a revolutionary crisis will place in front of the masses the task of a direct struggle for authority and in front of the party the organization of forces on behalf of the armed uprising." (Resolutions of the Sixth Congress, page 15).

However the most important work of the sixth congress was the adoption of a draft program for the KPP. This program gives the impression simply of some executive ordinance to the Comintern Program of 1928 (adopted by the sixth Comintern congress) and similar enunciations. One immediately sees what I have indicated many times, that this "Polish" political movement does not even attempt to attach itself to any kind of Polish political traditions. From the SDKPiL, the KPP has only taken: "the former's constant brotherhood in arms with the Russian revolution, its unconquerable antagonism in attitude toward all manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism..." (Projekt programu KPP /Draft of a KPP Program/, -- brochure released in July 1932, page 3).

Only those principles which "brought the SDKPiL closer to bolshevism." The "Menshevik inheritance of the PPS-Lewica" is "rejected" by the KPP (Ibid., pages 3-4), whereas the latter bases its program on the principles of "Leninism which is Marxism."

This entire elaboration by Ryng comprises a 32 page salad from enunciations by Bukharin and Varga. Its originality comprises possibly the uninteresting style. Apart from that, the author castigates in a vulgar manner "counterrevolutionary social democracy" (pages 8-9) without taking the least amount of trouble to picture the various streams within the movement. The PPS and the "Bund" are placed together in the same cauldron, with an addition of Trotskyism. The attitude toward Poland remains negative:

"... The Polish bourgeoisie comprises a fortified camp and world border fortress (?? - probably 'of world?') of imperialism against the USSR." (Ibid., page 11).

Further the former professor at a higher institution repeats the old nonsense about the allegation that:

"The Polish state arose... as a bulwark for the Entente imperialism against the proletarian revolution, as a link in the imperialist system of Versailles..." (Ibid., page 11).

The intellectual elite of the KPP does not know that this "Entente imperialism" during the years 1918-1920 frequently just ignored the interests of its "bulwark" and that this "bulwark" was forced to fight with tooth and nail against the will of the Entente in order to obtain a number of its interests. It does know, on the other hand, that, "the Polish bourgeoisie rules on the basis of imperialist conquest... over Upper Silesia and the 'corridor,'

oppresses 'free' Danzig (sic! -- page 13 -- this Polish yoke will probably be removed by Mr. Forster! -- comment by the author)."

It is striking in this program that the social and economic content actually does not provide anything new or original. The long litany of demands filling out chapter 3 could be found in almost unchanged form within the program of any socialist party or even many of the splinters from "fascism." We have thus the slogan of nationalization for all large scale industrial enterprises, means of communication, banks, and wholesale trade as well as all foreign trade. Not a word is mentioned concerning the "nationalization" of minor industry and commerce, conducted with such happy results by the Russian revolution during the years 1917-1921. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" will rest upon the "all sided support for consumers' cooperatives"(page 20). It would thus appear that revolutionary communism is more opportunistic than that of certain radical Hitlerites with their fantastic plans for socialization of the entire trade in food. Of course the sincerity of these communists forecasts, which are calculated to seduce the small merchant and artisan, can be checked only in the light of the very rich experience of communist policy in the Soviet with regard to the "petit bourgeoisie." The KPP in guaranteeing to this "petit bourgeoisie" a certain freedom in commodity turnover is also trying to catch the working intelligentsia (page 23) "which only in the construction of socialism can find a full application of its forces and talents." Of course the KPP will exert its control over the latter. It is prophesied even that "use will be made of the experience and knowledge of the emigres from the bourgeoisie (this probably refers to Comrade Henrykowski) and from among the land estate owners," of course also under "strict control." Only in the passages pertaining to the peasantry does the Asiatic

socage of "socialism" come forth glaringly in the form of Asiatic double talk. Thus a promise is made to "give the peasants the confiscated land" (page 19) in order to forecast later again the "transition of... the broad peasant masses from the lower (cooperatives) to higher (kolkhozes) forms of land management." At any rate the greater part of the large land estates is to be transferred under the "administration of organs of the proletarian dictatorship" (page 19).

All of this actually would not represent a basis for the KPP's existence in its own current character. We find these bases in regard to the "nationality problem":

"... in relationship to the western Ukraine and western Belorussia as well as the Lithuanian territories (this general form seems to indicate that Professor Ryng himself does not know very well where he should look for these areas -- comment by the author) the victory of the proletarian revolution in Poland means... a complete realization of the right to self determination and including secession from the Polish state... The population of Wilno will decide of its own accord concerning its adherence to a state. The victorious proletarian revolution will remove all obstacles in the path of unification... by the nations of the Ukraine and Belorussia."

Why the KPP did not simply announce the slogan of incorporation for these territories into the USSR and the BSRR, we have already explained. The same position was taken by the draft program in the case of Upper Silesia and the "Pomeranian corridor." On the other hand vis a vis Danzig a slogan was propounded which temporarily even the Hitlerites did not care to push:

"In relation to Danzig, the KPP struggles against the yoke of Poland and of the League of Nations... recognizes the right of the Danzig population, by force separated from Germany, to once again reunite with Germany." (Ibid., pages 21-22).

Each word represents a greater dishonor and vileness with regard to the Polish fatherland! If we were to allow these traitors to implement their program, then in a short period of time there would not be in all of Poland a single piece of land in Polish hands. All of the territory would be given away to neighbors: the eastern provinces to Russia, similarly with eastern Galicja; Wilno to Lithuania; Upper Silesia and Pomerania together with the Poznan area to Germany; and finally deprived of the eastern provinces, eastern Galicja, Upper Silesia, Pomerania and some kind of mystical "Lithuanian territories," Poland would have remained a part of the USSR since it is the "socialist fatherland of the world proletariat" (Ibid., page 16).

The litany of benefits under which the citizens of Russia are simply groaning also takes up a large part of the KPP program.

The motivation as to why Poland must surrender her independence looks quite peculiar:

"Especially strong bonds of common interest and comradeship in arms connect the Polish proletariat with that of the USSR. Over a period of several decades the Polish worker together with the Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Georgian, etc., workers fought side by side against tsarism..." (Ibid., page 16).

Does the Professor really not comprehend that all of those Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians and other "aliens" fought shoulder to

shoulder for the purpose of breaking away from the framework of a state based upon a complete stamping out of the nationality principle, a state -- a gigantic International -- united through the despotism of a few individuals. Even the Professor is not brave enough to place the matter clearly but provides Poland with the illusion of some kind of a Khiva-Bokhara "independence:"

"The Polish Soviet Republic will enter into a brotherly alliance with the Soviet Union and with every nation which has been liberated from capitalism." (Ibid., page 22).

However this is a very odd alliance, based upon: "the principle of centralisation of military and economic forces." (Ibid.).

Down with such independence! Let us repeat after Comrade Lenski. A horse and saddle as well as the salary of a "semifunk" to the man who can explain the difference between this "alliance" and the "alliances" between various maharajahs and England.

A series of insults thrown at all of the political camps in Poland including the anarchists completes this program; all of them are being "integrated with the uniform front of counterrevolutionary forces." We are also informed that:

"The most important transmissions between Polish fascism and the masses... are... the 'pre-May' parties, the so-called opposition parties." (Ibid., pages 27-28).

However this program also underwent certain changes subsequently in connection with the events in Germany. Immediately following the sixth KPP congress the courting of German chauvinism attained its culmination point. At the end of 1932 the Polish and German communist

parties established a common "Polish-German Workers' Committee" which denounced the "bourgeoisie and the fascist government of Pilsudski:"

"... regarding preparation of the soil for the military occupation of Danzig... the conquest of East Prussia and the western part of Upper Silesia." (Nowy Przegląd, January-February 1933, page 110).

This "Committee" announced for 29 January 1933 a "congress of the working masses from both parts of Upper Silesia" to be held at Gliwice, a "congress to fight against the nationalistic adventure." The delegation from "Poland" was not very imposing: 52 delegates from a total of 349 odd. The German communists headed by Neubauer were castigating Hitlerism, etc., but without betraying the least desire to cede even the smallest piece of German soil to anybody. On the other hand all "Polish" speakers repeated the theme about "self determination for Upper Silesia and including secession." In the welcoming speech by the KPP central committee we find such posies:

"After 11 years of Polish occupation in Upper Silesia... the KPP states that the victorious Polish proletariat... will eliminate all of the decisions made by the Versailles Treaty with regard to Upper Silesia and to the Pomeranian Corridor and will guarantee to the population of these territories the right to self determination up to and including secession from Poland." (Ibid., page 112).

It is characteristic however that even in July 1933 the KPP central committee, when working out changes in the draft program, did not change these points at all. The changes incorporated were

secondary ones, like "the dynamic factors of capitalism were brought out more," etc. A part of the program was devoted to "ideologies antagonistic toward communism" which were supplemented with various insults against the Trotskyites. The section castigating the pre-war SDKPiL, especially the PPS-Lewica, was developed. It is apparent here that the entire role of tradition for these parties in the life of the KPP depends upon the allegation that it became the source of "opportunistic deviations... representing its main ideological source" (Nowy Przegląd, July 1933, page 43). It is truly difficult to ascertain the basis upon which the communists extracted any experience from their shameful defeat in Germany.

In the central committee selected by the sixth congress, the majority consisted of activists who were loyal to Lenski. The real party leadership, the Politburo, changed very little. Only Bratkowski (Sochacki; this was the beginning of his liquidation) and Marek were eliminated as "hidden" oppositionists, although both remained on the central committee. The following sat in the Politburo: Lenski, Bronkowski, Burzynski, Slawinski and Bielawski (Jan Paszyn) who had been released to the USSR just prior to the congress in the course of an exchange of political prisoners. Politburo candidates were Henrykowski, Prochniak, Korczyk, and Horenko. Among the Politburo membership, only Slawinski made trouble for Lenski. Paszyn was unreliable because in his heart he supported Marek, although he did not come out clearly and state which side he was on.

In connection with the situation in Germany at that time, the position taken by the KPP reaches the height of knavery with regard to Poland's western territories. The resolutions of the sixth congress stress more heavily the slogan of "breaking away from Poland" by

Upper Silesia and Pomerania. The appeal issued by the KPP central committee immediately following the congress "to the people of Upper Silesia" may be compared only with the already discussed article by Zbikowski:

"The robbers' Treaty of Versailles, forced upon the German people by the victorious coalition in the imperialist war among the greatest imperialist robbers of the Entente -- tore Upper Silesia in half, placed Danzig under the yoke of imperialist Poland, created the Polish Corridor which artificially separates East Prussia from Germany... Polish imperialism threatens the military occupation of Danzig in order to annex East Prussia and the western part of Upper Silesia.

"The KPP announces currently, after eleven years of Polish occupation (?) in Upper Silesia, to the Upper Silesian people, to the entire nations of Poland and Germany, to the nations of the whole world that:

"The victorious Polish proletariat, after overthrowing the rule by the imperialist Polish bourgeoisie, will eliminate all of the decisions of the Versailles Treaty with regard to Upper Silesia and the Pomeranian Corridor, will guarantee to the population of these areas the right to self determination which includes secession from Poland."

It appears that if the Polish worker has not completely turned away from these paid traitors and slanderers of Poland, it is only because documents like the foregoing only rarely come to him and their content is not always known to him.

Several weeks later the "revolutionary situation" in Germany was solved in a manner that ushered in a new stage of the history and decomposition of the Comintern and the KPP.

CHAPTER VII

The events which took place in January 1933 and enabled the leader of the national socialists in Germany, Hitler, to assume power introduced a new and black period not only for German communism but also for international communism in general. We are not able to discuss all occurrences here, because this would extend the framework of this book. We must only emphasize that the defeat of the German Communist Party was a defeat also for the entire Comintern and in the first place for the communist party of Poland. I have indicated several times that nobody among the communist elite very much expected a "Polish revolution" or even took it seriously. It was always looked upon as being a Russian occupation or as an episode in the German revolution. Now even that "German revolution" showed itself to be an inflated balloon which broke like a soap bubble. The defeat of the German communists was smashing and unexpected. The Comintern was taken by surprise and for a certain time completely disoriented. In addition the defeat of the German communist party also represented a tremendous loss to the KPP, not only ideologically and politically but also organizationally. The Politburo and its central editorial office had their headquarters in Berlin, Nowy Przegląd was printed at Gliwice, and generally it was anticipated that any German regime and even more so an anti-Polish one like that of Hitler would grant them cordial hospitality. In the meanwhile after the coup d'etat in Germany something horrible happened. The communists were being persecuted. Hence as quickly as possible the entire Politburo as well as all KPP branches residing in Germany had to close down their operations and flee in all directions: some to Czechoslovakia, others to Danzig (although they did not remain there very long), still others to Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, and yet others to Constantinople.

The principal confidant of the Moscow center, Lenski, was arrested by the Berlin police and held there for a month. However Soviet influence in Germany was still of some importance, especially in military circles, and so the Russians were able to save the great revolutionary from prison. He was flown by airplane from out of the German borders to Danzig, where he found a sanctuary with one of the diplomats.

The main problem of communism now becomes the question of a "united front" between the socialists and communists. Prior to Hitler's access to power the Second International and the social democracy in Germany had first approached the Comintern with this proposal but the latter responded with mockery. It was only after the defeat that the Comintern ordered its sections to approach the "social fascist" parties with the proposition of a common struggle against the enemy who was recognized of course as an opponent on a world wide scale. It was naturally too late, and the work toward a united front which is still going on to date can be summarized in the quarrels and reciprocal accusations of fault regarding the control of Germany by fascism.

The KPP was compelled to copy the Comintern proposals on the spot and direct them to the PPS, the "Bund," etc., demanding in addition the announcement of a one day strike against the new social security legislation as well as a common struggle against Polish fascism. We shall see that all of this represented a vulgar type of humbug. In the meanwhile the KPP wanted to justify itself in the eyes of the masses with regard to the defeat without precedent which communism had sustained in Germany and on the accurate implementation of orders from Moscow.

After setting up the scattered leadership, Lenski began the "campaign of explanation." He stated that:

"The unification phraseology of the social democratic swindlers assumed unheard of dimensions, disorienting the masses of workers and slowing down the decomposition within the ranks of social democracy." (Nowy Przegląd, May-June 1933, page 3).

Further on he explains that the Comintern had to maneuver:

"The social fascist united front comedy was broken against the clear, concrete, and understandable by each worker (in reality even prominent central committee members did not comprehend this -- author's comment) proposals by the Communist International which suggested to its sections approaching the broad masses with 'yet another attempt to create through the medium of the social democratic parties a united front in the struggle with the social democratic workers' masses.'" (Ibid., page 4).

The whole fault for the German debacle, according to Lenski, should be laid at the door of the social democrats of course. The "bright" mind of Lenski saw yet another danger to the Polish proletariat -- the chauvinistic phraseology of Hitlerism, prior to attainment of power, had aroused in Poland understandable apprehensions that its victory in Germany would become the signal for an immediate attack upon Polish territories. Let us add that in the environment with which 80% of Lenski's people have contact, the triumph of Hitler in Germany made a shocking impression. Under this influence, the pro-Polish attitudes in the ghetto increased tremendously. Lenski's prophecies as usual were wrong:

"With the assumption of power by Hitler, the Polish-German antagonism flared up again being systematically incited by Polish imperialists stretching out their paws for Danzig.

"The international proletariat is an unappeased enemy of the Versailles Treaty, based upon pillage and oppression of nations." (Ibid., page 7).

The slogan of the KPP in the event of war remains the same: "the principal enemy is inside of one's own country." Truly this insane position of the communists evokes only the feeling of pity!

In the tactics of a united front to date, there has taken place only the change of theoretically allowing for local agreements between KPP and PPS organizations for the purpose of concrete strike or antigovernment campaigns and also "against the social fascist leaders." Social democracy continues to play the "role of the most important social support for the bourgeoisie in the working class." Their lambs are encouraged with the following by the communists:

"... despite the bloody terror we stand in front of a new revolutionary rise in Germany." (Ibid., page 15).

The communists were faced with this revolutionary rise already in May 1933. They are still standing there, and it seems that they will remain in this position for a very long time. In the meanwhile the Comintern back in March 1933 had been providing itself with encouragement like a man about to be hanged:

"The establishment of a fascist dictatorship, which destroys all illusions among the democratic masses, relieves these masses

from the influence of social democracy and hastens the development of Germany toward the proletarian revolution."

Logically it would appear from this that the victory of Hitlerism and analogous movements would represent a triumph for the working class and communism and that the communists should cry out: "Long live the fascist dictatorship of Hitler!"

During this time new trouble came along for the KPP in the form of an improvement of political relations between Poland and the Soviets. Here we have pure comedy! At times the KPP pretends that it knows nothing about the matter, then again it will talk as if it were in a delirious fever. The Soviets themselves strove toward this improvement, to whom it is doubtlessly more necessary than to Poland. In the meanwhile the KPP presents this as Polish "blackmail" and a demonstration vis a vis the western imperialists in order to "bargain" for better conditions within "the anti-Soviet bloc." The communist leaders in Poland were simply frightened that in the near future nobody would want their services. This is how they interpret the treaty, defining an aggressor, which was signed at London during the unsuccessful economic conference:

"The signing by the Polish government of the so-called eastern pact or eight power pact does not signify at all a break in the anti-Soviet imperialist policy and in the plans for a counterrevolutionary invasion of the USSR. The 'Eastern Pact' represents a huge success for the unbending policy of peace on the part of the Soviet government, which rejects the new division of the world by the great imperialist hoodlums under the slogan of Versailles Treaty revision."
(Nowy Przegląd, July 1933, page 8).

After the brutal language of the Hugenberg memorial and after the "4 Power Pact," the KPP on orders from Moscow had to accept the Versailles Treaty and temporarily shelve the "self determination for Pomerania." On the other hand during the Sejm debate concerning the nonaggression treaty with the USSR, a newcomer to the parliament from the KPP, deputy Chil Rozenberg, on 18 January 1933 stated:

"... this treaty, under the camouflage of which Polish imperialism will be preparing itself ever more intensively for an anti Soviet war... In the action by the government there is visible the influence of the international staffs of imperialism, which are striving toward a hastening of the war." (Nowy Przegląd, No 1-2, 1933, page 115).

During the summer of 1933 a noisy antigovernment agitation by certain of the handlers in the Peasant Party led in many counties in Galicja (Ropczyce, Lancut) to the well known peasant disturbances against tax payments. The KPP had its organization units within these areas and could participate in the demonstrations, regardless of their primitive-reactionary character which precipitated very harsh action. The "Lenskiites," who ran the party at this time, already imagined an "armed insurrection," "an agrarian revolution," "hundreds of thousands of fighting peasants," etc. The leadership situated abroad attempted to mitigate these hopes somewhat and called for caution and not to overestimate the situation. The "excellent" specialist on agricultural affairs, Henrykowski, a typical small time Jewish businessman from Galicja with the diploma of a doctor in laws who was acquainted with rural areas probably from visits to his father in law (a "bourgeois" owner of a tannery near the town of Wloclawek), proclaimed, "The insurrectionist movement among the

peasantry in Galicja signals the approach of an agrarian revolution."
 (Nowy Przegląd, July 1933, page 14).

The rural strife caused a change in the KPP position in the matter of prices for agricultural commodities. This part of its program testifies most eloquently to the fact that its only goal is the attraction of supporters. To that time the communists were a purely workers' party; they demanded the lowest possible prices. However upon seeing that the demagogic Peasant Party movement was calling for an increase in prices for agrarian products, assuming at times antisocial and "revolutionary" forms so dear to the communists even when they are directed against the working class (attempts at food strikes based upon nondelivery of products to the towns, which took place in September of 1932 and in 1933), the KPP begins to take over the Peasant Party's program. At times it is simply difficult to understand what the communists are about:

"Unmasking the general slogan of the Peasant Party for raising the price of grain as a kulak and land owner slogan, showing the masses that this means premiums for the government as well as reductions in tariff and taxes for the land owners and kulaks -- we should support with all methods and organize the struggle of the poor and middle peasants against robbery by capitalist land owning sharks who use the technique of lowering prices for grain as well as buying up as cheaply as possible cattle and dairy products."
 (Ibid., page 20).

In general the hopes of the KPP in the peasant area were growing. The leaders in the KPP began to boast that any day a huge split would take place within the Peasant Party in favor of the communists. They even enumerated it seems without any foundation

a group of Sejm deputies headed by Wrona, Pac, and Mochniej who allegedly were going to join them and establish a new party along the lines of the old Independent Peasant Party.

In reality however the influence of the KPP in rural areas was continuously growing smaller. During this very time a new crisis par excellence took place in the peasant branches of the communist party, i.e., within the KPZU and the KPZB, which represents a continuation of the tragedy between Ukrainian and bolshevik communists. Tension was increasing in the Soviet Ukraine under the rule of its new dictator Postyshev who had been sent from Moscow on purpose to conduct the russification course. The prominent writer Chvylovy and the education commissar Skrypnyk ended their lives by suicide because of this. Shumsky, Maksymovich, and the entire mass of communist emigrees -- Ruthenians from Poland -- were jailed. This was the final blow for the KPZU, and it became discredited in the eyes of the Ukrainian masses.

A further stage in the liquidation of what was left in communist Ukrainian independence (KPZU) took place in the years 1933-1934. This period saw various changes in the international situation: assumption of power by Hitler; the difficult internal conditions of the Soviet Ukraine; and the concomitant hunger. All of this evoked a strong movement in the Ukrainian nationalist camp. The KPZU on the other hand found itself in an unpleasant situation, since the foregoing activity directed itself against Poland as well as against the USSR. The bolshevik terror in the Soviet Ukraine during this period was possibly greater in dimensions than the one conducted by Dzierzynski. Any kind of independence in the views of party members was ruthlessly persecuted. The imaginary suspicions by official circles at Kharkov

with regard to many hitherto prominent activists in the communist movement went so far that as a result a number of them found themselves in Soviet prisons. Under the accusation of right wing opportunistic deviation and nationalism, these members of the KPZU Politburo were arrested: Baraba, Kosar as well as other prominent communists like Bej, Lvivskij-Rozenberg, Chaba, Jarema, etc. Naturally they were thrown into prison on the spot and called traitors and provocateurs.

Considerable data about the opposition of Baraba and Kosar is provided in an article by W. Stasiak (real name Berek Berman, a Russian Jew originally who settled in Warsaw. He entered the communist movement in the eastern provinces of Poland in 1930) entitled "Purge the KPZU of Nationalist Agents" which appeared in Nowy Przegląd, No 1, January-February 1934. The arguments of this "felon" from Walicow (name of the street in Warsaw where Berman lived) make an odd impression. On the one hand he preys upon the dissatisfaction of the peasantry in eastern Galicja due to the crisis, etc, directing that feeling against Poland. On the other hand he froths at the mouth against those who would fight against Poland without support from Kharkov. In order to reconcile this contradiction he utilizes the maneuver which could be called "refined" were it not lacking in sense. He convinces his comrades that the Ukrainian terrorists in the UWO [Ukrainska Wojskowa Organizacja -- Ukrainian Military Organization] and in the UON [Ukrainska Organizacja Niepodleglosciowa -- Ukrainian Independence Organization], who were destroying land estate buildings and railroad installations and who had murdered Tadeusz Holowka as well as former cabinet minister Pieracki, were the allies of the "Polish bourgeoisie."

The sixth KPP congress already had spoken out about the imaginary "servile role of the UON vis a vis Polish imperialism." Now Stasiak pathetically calls out that by "belonging to the UOW, one can not in fact struggle against the Polish occupation!" (Ibid., page 67).

Of course the arrested Ukrainians in Russia were accused of connections with God only knows whom. Some were suspected of liaison with the UOW, others with Hitler, and still others simply with Polish intelligence. It is too bad that Russian imagination did not go so far as to link them with Trotsky. As a result, a new "crisis" arose within the KPZU which indicates the whole decomposition of "Ukrainian" communism.

Somewhat later an even worse fate was meted out to the Belorussian communists. In Soviet Belorussia, at Minsk, things were taking place which would surprise many people unacquainted with the Cheka methods of the Moscow rulers. All former deputies from "Hromada" and also from "Zmahanja," such "martyrs from Polish fascist prisons" like: Rak-Michajlowski, Miotla, Woloszyn, Dworczanin, Bursewicz, Wolyniec, Gawrylik, Kochanowicz and others -- previously the most zealous of communists -- were placed in GPU prisons as "provocateurs" and "agents of the 'defensywa' as well as the Second Section [Polish intelligence]," "national fascists." This entire group had represented the radical Moscowophile wing of the Belorussian leftists, serving Moscow most zealously in the latter's annexationist plans with regard to the eastern provinces of Poland.

However these hirelings of Moscow finally became inconvenient for the master. The foreign policy of the Soviets also played a

part here, since it was aiming during this period toward entering into normal relations with European states. An inducement in this direction was probably the uncertain political situation in the Far East. Simultaneously Moscow decided to introduce some order into its own internal conditions, especially in the republics bordering upon the territories of Poland. Dworczanin and others were Belorussians, and there was a possibility that national feelings might be aroused in them at the sight of the unprecedented destruction of the peasantry and indigenous culture of Belorussia. The news of their arrest evoked considerable surprise among the Belorussians. How could it happen that individuals hitherto without any blemish and devoted in spirit to communism suddenly change into zealous workers on behalf of Polish intelligence? We do not care in the least to defend those arrested, since they themselves chose the road which sooner or later was bound to lead them into the dungeons of the GPU. A stay there will represent a deserved penance for the harm they did against Poland. Nevertheless it should be stated objectively that the voices which were heard in the Belorussian press (even though the loyalty of the latter with regard to the Polish state is doubtful) are completely just.

In the second number of the periodical Rodnyj Kraj [Native Country] dated 25 January 1934 we find a lead article which it is hard to declare unjustified:

"What is currently taking place in Soviet Belorussia evokes general indignation among all conscious Belorussians, evokes a cry of anger and protest as well as condemnation of the red hangmen of the Belorussian people. Soviet authorities who in 1920 already decisively launched an attack against the Belorussian intelligentsia

are today sending to prison or deporting to Solowki [forced labor camp on islands in the Arctic Ocean]... about 200 representatives of Belorussia science, university professors headed by Piczeta... again they have prepared a new 'letting of Belorussian blood.' This time also the victims of this violence are those... who through their naive belief in the benevolence of the communist party toward the Belorussian liberation movement have played a very negative role among us... almost all deputies in the Polish Sejm from the 'Zmahanje' club and almost all leaders of the 'Hromada'... were arrested at Minsk and placed on trial... but the accusations against them evoke a tremendous contempt for the accusers, whose sole arguments are conscious and limitless lies."

In order to counter these voices of protest, the Comintern issued in the Polish and Belorussian languages a dirty brochure, entitled Wykrycie bandy prowokatorow Luckiewicz-Dworczanina - zwyciestwem ruchu narodowo-wyzwolenczego (sic!) na Bialorusi Zachodniej [Discovery of the Gang of Provocateurs Led by Luckiewicz and Dworczanin, a Victory of the National Liberation Movement in Western Belorussia]. Never in the past had the Comintern fabricated such a string of falsehoods, included even in the title itself. The Belorussian communists are accused of maintaining contact with the so-called "Polonophiles" like Luckiewicz who were fought very brutally by the former. The Comintern itself had to write:

"Many persons will think this odd and impossible: how could Woloszyn and Miotla, Gawrylik and Dworczanin who had stood at the head of the national liberation movement so many years, who had made such revolutionary speeches in the Sejm and at rallies calling... for a struggle against the Polish government... how could these men find themselves leading a counterrevolutionary movement?" (Wykrycie bandy, etc, page 7).

We also can repeat this question, substituting only in place of the "national liberation" movement the words "the Moscowophile diversion." However the Comintern and the GPU conducted an "investigation" at Minsk as a result of which the above mentioned brochure was supplemented with "personal depositions" by Dworczanin, etc., "admitting" that "they were preparing themselves to overthrow Soviet authority and to reintroduce the rule of large land owners and also capitalists in Soviet Belorussia." Anyone who has even the smallest amount of logic will not believe in these confessions. Even if the accused had been forced to confess with the aid of the known GPU methods, they could not have thought up such a fantasy. Dworczanin allegedly stated:

"We intended to introduce a bourgeois constitution which would have given all rights and privileges to the bourgeoisie, land owners, as well as kulaks. We also aimed at introducing a capitalist system in the cities and also in the rural areas... We wanted to ... eliminate the 7 to 8 hour working day... to establish a bourgeois army and police..." (Wykrycie bandy, etc, pages 4-5).

The same style is adhered to by the confessions of Kochanowicz, one of the most comical characters in the Sejm during the years 1922-1928 who is known for the stealing of food (a cutlet) from the buffet at the main railroad station in Warsaw (while inebriated of course) in April 1925. This man is reported to have told GPU authorities:

"From the very beginning of its existence, the Belorussian parliamentary club -- supported the Polish government." (Ibid., page 6).

Bursewicz, the former secretary general of "Hromada," allegedly even dreamed of an anti-Soviet war:

"In 1930... at Wilno it was decided that until the time of a war between Poland and the USSR which was to have broken out in the fall of 1933 or during the spring of 1934... etc." (Ibid., page 24).

It is no wonder that one of the Belorussian periodicals at Wilno called Bialoruskaja Krynica compared this wild trial to the trial of witches. Not without justification this periodical in an article entitled "The Politics of Judas" (No 4 dated 21 January 1934) writes as follows:

"This brochure (Wykrycie prowokatorskie, etc.) is truly terrible in its cynicism, falsehood, and limitless knavery. The matter pertains to the fact that the bolsheviks have recently jailed many Belorussians... It is necessary to justify in some way this horrible fact and cover it with something. Therefore the Soviets have thought up the idea of accusing the arrestees of collaboration with Polish intelligence for the purpose of fooling the Belorussian peasants and workers... the contents of this 'famous' brochure reveal the true face of Soviet policy with regard to the Belorussians."

It would appear that these latest moves by the Moscow rulers in the so-called BSRR and USRR not only indicate the true face of Moscow communism, which is striving to russify these territories by means of destroying the Belorussian and Ukrainian intelligentsia including the part most devoted to the Soviets, but simultaneously are dealing Ukrainian and Belorussian communism a death blow. Some of these leaders will end their "careers" most assuredly in the same Solowki as did Maksym Zelezniak, who also tried to "liberate" the Ukraine from under the "Polish yoke" in alliance with Russia

but finished in prison. These activists are no longer needed by Moscow. The KPZE can be directed by "Belorussians" with names ending in "man," "berg," and "stein," who will also become Australians if the need arises for them to do so.

During the entire year, the KPP was degenerating morally and politically. The mud which was being thrown around during the internal struggle became insufficient as a means. It was decided to swim also in the blood of their own people, which led the communists to secret murders here and there and which the party later attempted to pin on the police.

In the summer of 1933 a new oppositional workers' group was founded in Warsaw. It was more substantial and larger than that of the "Pietrkovites," since it numbered several hundred persons, headed by the former fireman Alykow who was known under the pseudonym of "Mirek" (thus the name "Mirkovites"). This group, apart from the postulates bringing it close to the "Trotskyites" like the struggle against party bueraucracy and against the comical theory of social fascism, also spoke out against "self determination for Upper Silesia and Pomerania" which attests its Polish character. Part of this group joined the PPS at the beginning of 1934, whereas the remainder continued to function as a "Workers' Opposition" within the KPP. How much conditions within the KPP deprave its members is shown by the fact that when these hitherto uncompromised elements joined the PPS they were immediately accused by the communist party of having been engaged in "intelligence work" [for the Polish authorities]. There was an increasing number of such minor secessions from the KPP. Lenski also whined that:

"The weakness of political life in the cells causes dissatisfaction which is not even reported by our district committees

in time. Therefore small opposition groups (not only Trotskyites) "explode" often unexpectedly and take the district leadership by surprise. This is happening in Warsaw and in the Dabrowa Basin within the party as well as youth organizations." (Nowy Przegląd, August 1933, page 47).

The defeat in Germany, lack of success in subversive actions in Poland, the peaceful policies of the Polish government, as well as the manifestations here and there of a slow improvement in the economic life of Poland evoked within KPP ranks an apathy and in some areas also disillusionment. The "dreams of power" did not come true. It was becoming increasingly obvious even to the communists that the revolutionary wave was not growing but was decreasing. The theses, evaluations, and resolutions of the KPP central committee and of the Comintern were considered to be empty phrases. Regardless of the foregoing, the agitational wind mill continued to grind away.

During this time the communists published at Lodz a legal periodical called Kronika [The Chronicle] which was interesting enough for us to become acquainted with. It contained the very same barking at everything that took place in Poland and at the hated PPS, the same praise of Soviet conditions as in the illegal communist press. The objectivity with which that press organ informed its readers is indicated by the fact that during the period of closer relations between the USSR and Poland, not a single word is mentioned about this in the Kronika. Only in number 4 dated 5 August 1933 is the Polish government denounced for the benefit of its employers:

"... representing his Fuhrer, Rausching (German envoy to Warsaw -- comment by author) paid a call on the Polish government in Warsaw... etc" (Ibid., page 1).

Apart from the foregoing we read about the never ending chronicle of Chinese affairs, the constant assurances that the defeat of the German communist party represented some kind of a wild misunderstanding which would disappear at any moment under the stroke of the imaginary proletarian revolution.

In general the entire communist press was filled with nonsense having one of 2 characteristic properties -- a market place type of advertisement for the Soviets and insults for the PPS as well as for anybody who dared to strive toward an improvement of the worker's life and social conditions without the permission and subsidy of the Comintern. When one opens the publication Ze Swiata [From the World] immediately attacks upon the PPS stand out. Much space is also devoted to the German chronicle (these were the times of von Papen's government) which is maintained along the lines of the famous staff communiques from the Great War. For instance in number 12 dated 18 July 1932, 6 months prior to the defeat of communism in Germany the like of which had never been seen in the history of revolutionary movements since the sixteenth century, a certain Hugo Obst stated:

"The working population of Germany... has opposed (the Hitlerites) with a closed and uniform front of all workers... throughout the whole of Germany barricades have arisen. The helplessness of the police is shown by the fact... etc. The world of labor has passed into the offensive in the struggle against fascism." (Ze Swiata, No 12, page 2).

And one month later:

"The votes given for the vanguard are increasing... The anti-fascist camp has emerged more consolidated... its forces have grown and are expanding in the battle being fought." (Ze Swiata, No 14, page 1).

We will refrain from citing any other articles appearing in these publications, because none of them has any value but merely attests the nihilism of communist ideology. At the end of 1932, the periodical Ze Swiata was closed down by the Polish authorities.

Toward the latter part of 1933 Moscow saw the meeting of the Comintern's executive committee in its thirteenth plenary session. The course it took represented a genuine picture of sterility, but the revolutionary perspective squeaks on:

"The extraordinary tension of the internal class contradictions within the capitalist countries as well as the international antagonisms prove such a maturity in the objective manifestations of a revolutionary crisis that at the present time the world is directly approaching a new tour of revolution and wars." (Brochure entitled XIII Plenum Komitetu Wykonawczego M.K. /Thirteenth Plenum of Executive Committee, Communist International⁷, page 8).

The resolutions ascertain over the preceding year in many countries an increase in the production for several branches of industry, especially in ferrous and nonferrous industry ("ferrous" means the iron and steel industry; "nonferrous" -- copper, tin, etc; these are awkward translations from Russian technological terminology), in the chemical and textile industry. However this situation is explained exclusively in terms of "military" and "armaments" needs. The Comintern also established the stoppage and deterioration in other branches of industry like machine construction, building, the production of many objects for everyday use. The final conclusion was that there would take place "an even greater sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism." Simultaneously the resolution prophesied in 2 directions:

"The objective tendencies of the accelerated maturation in the revolutionary crisis... do not indicate in the least that the revolutionary development is proceeding upward spontaneously and without obstacles... The development of revolution is simultaneously made more difficult and hastened because of the fascist insanity of the bourgeoisie." (Ibid.).

We thus see that it is both "bad" as well as "good" on the basis of the foregoing. This represents the well known formula of Marxist dialectics, with the assistance of which it is possible to explain everything and -- nothing.

The resolution by the thirteenth plenum also saw a growth in the revolutionary forces of Japan (??) and an increase in the "revolutionary hatred of the proletariat" in Germany (probably against the fellow countrymen of Comrades Lampe and Henrykowski), where a "new revolutionary rise" was taking place. In addition the Comintern sees the latter in general throughout all of the countries temporarily at odds with Russia. With regard to Poland, this resolution maintained some reserve:

"In Poland the mass strikes by workers are accompanied by extensive revolutionary movements in the Polish rural areas..."

"The accelerated growth in the revolutionary crisis," etc. in connection with Poland disappeared somewhere. At any rate in the whole world: "a breakthrough can take place at any moment which will indicate a transformation of the economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis." (Ibid., page 14).

Of course the anti-Soviet war continued to rage in this prophesy:

"The international situation is characteristic of a world war." (Ibid.).

The forces in this war were now Japan, Germany, and England; whereas in Italy and Poland intrigues were being carried on against the USSR. Germany (the policies of the Polish government which were striving toward the pacification of neighborly relations with the USSR and with Germany simultaneously can not be comprehended even by such an expert as Saul Amsterdam) in addition:

"The fascist government of Germany, the principal war monger in Europe, is provoking confusion in Danzig... Europe has become a powder keg which can be blown up at any time." (Ibid., page 17).

Regardless of the preceding, "the right of self determination up to secession" is still binding for Upper Silesia and Pomerania, only for Pomerania it has disappeared somewhere. Apparently the Polish management of Gdynia had made such a good impression upon Radek during his visit to the Baltic Sea that he ordered it to be left there. At the same time the KPP was to protest against the proposed annexation of these territories by the "hangman's Third Reich of fascism" (page 20). Therefore this is to be "self determination" in a negative sense and even absurd from the viewpoint of the economic and political development as well as existence for such a small area.

As usual the central place in the resolution was taken up by an appeal to a "sacrificing defense of the USSR."

It seems not to undergo any doubt that this resolution must have passed through the WKP Politburo's censorship which functions in conjunction with the Narkomindel. Some of the naive politicians

in Poland like to discuss the divergencies in opinions or differences between the policy of the Soviet government and that of the Comintern or the KPP. It is actually the "legalistic" tone of this resolution passed by the thirteenth plenum which indicates best that there can be no disparity whatsoever. Each sharpening or blunting in the course taken by Narkomindel policy shapes also Comintern policy, since the latter is its tool. At the very most this tool does not always function with precision due to the fact that it comprises the least valuable forces within Soviet bureaucracy. It is no use even talking about the KPP, since it must act in accordance with the Comintern's political line as well as with that of the Soviet government.

Also the attitude of the thirteenth plenum toward social democracy seemed to have become milder. The phrase "social fascism" is no longer used. At any rate the old curse is repeated:

"Attaining power fascism pushes out, breaks up, and decomposes (e.g., Poland) or liquidates (Germany, Italy) other bourgeois parties (this was at one time a heresy in the eyes of the KPP 'minority' and especially among the 'Lenskiites' — author's comment). Such a striving of fascism toward a political monopoly sharpens the quarrels and conflicts within the ranks of the ruling classes which strife emerges from the internal contradictions of the fascist bourgeoisie.

"The social democrats continue to play the role of the main social support for the bourgeoisie also in countries with an open fascist dictatorship, fighting against unity of the revolutionary proletariat and against the USSR.

"On the basis of acute antagonisms between imperialist countries, the international organization of social democracy falls apart. We have a crisis of the Second International." (Ibid., pages 8-9).

The individual sections are furthermore ordered to expand their influence within industrial enterprises and trade unions as well as their agitation applied to the "level of the masses" (i.e., through cynical demagoguery), "but not at the price of losing their ideological appearance" -- in brief, universal prevarication.

The characteristics of the resolutions passed by the thirteenth plenum of the Comintern included a lack of confidence in what was being preached, a camouflaged despondency as to the essential perspectives of communism, and automation in revolutionary work.

In the KPP during the transition between 1933 and 1934, the tactics of Lenski with regard to the general strike reached their culmination point.

The party announced a general strike for 20 December 1933, but nobody answered this appeal. The same proclamation was renewed for 24 January 1934 with the same result. Apparently this was repeated 2 or 3 times more, always without success. Cause for the latter was placed upon the social fascists every time, since they did not wish to support these communist efforts. When the PPS on the other hand proclaimed a strike as a sign of solidarity with the Austrian socialist insurrectionists, the communists simply boycotted it. Parenthetically speaking, the position of the KPP and that of the Comintern was just as ignominious with regard to the events in Austria in general from the proletarian point of view.

During this period a certain breakthrough was attained in the USSR which was important for the KPP's history, not by its influence upon the latter but rather due to its complete lack of influence. USSR foreign policy was changing very much. Soviet imperialism, surrounded by Japanese imperialism and the dictatorship of Hitler, became an impossibility. At the time Russia, temporarily at least, indicated an interest in world peace. In its internal life however the USSR felt the manifestation of certain noble elements, creative economic and cultural work. Even legal and political rights underwent a certain, nota bene, very slow, improvement and amelioration. At the same time these elements were becoming fused with the intrusion of overtones of national pride in bolshevik ideology, an attachment not to world revolution "in the clouds" any longer but to the tangible Russian fatherland on the ground.

There should be no illusions however that this evolution in Russia had any influence upon the KPP. At the very most the leaders in the latter are quietly raging at the "only fatherland of the proletariat" which is slowly isolating itself and not paying much attention to its dependencies. KPP policy since the thirteenth plenum of the Comintern has been proceeding along 2 lines: making it more difficult for Poland to reconstruct its economic life by a chaotically justified workers' struggle for better living standards as well as by attempts at penetrating the noncommunist workers' camps.

In January 1934 the second plenum of the KPP central committee was convened. Its resolutions represent merely an echo of the Comintern executive committee's thirteenth plenum:

"Expressing complete solidarity with the political resolution of the thirteenth plenum, held by the executive of the Communist International, the plenary session of the KPP central committee places on all of its organizations the duty of thoroughly discussing and applying that resolution in daily party work." (Uchwały II Plenum KC KPP /Resolutions by the Second Plenum of the KPP Central Committee7, January 1934, page 1).

This document bearing the bombastical subtitle of "Toward a Raising of the Struggle and of Party Work to a Higher Level" is proof of the definitive sterility in communist political thought. This plenum actually repeats once again the "evaluation" made by its predecessor, since: "it completely corroborates the just evaluation of the situation and of the directives included in the June resolution of the plenum." (Ibid.).

In continuation we find the already known estimate about the "changes in the foreign policy of the Pilsudski government" as "maneuvers... representing an attempt to disorient the masses and dull their preparedness for the threat of an anti-Soviet war." (Ibid., page 5).

Once again the slogan is repeated:

"... self determination for Upper Silesia and the Pomeranian Corridor... in the struggle... against Polish imperialism which has annexed these territories by force as well as against German imperialism which desires to annex them also by force into fascist Germany." (Ibid., page 23).

The second plenum issued the slogan to "increase all of our activities to such a level, so that the masses will see in the party

a force proceeding toward power." Any kind of cooperation with the PPS is out of the question. Of course the plenum accuses the party of insufficient and not tangible enough unmasking of the "crafty maneuvers by social fascism" (page 18), ordering the "unmasking" especially of the "left wing phraseology," i.e., the phrases of the radical splinter from the PPS. Actually this same plenum had to admit the impotence of the KPP which the chapters of this book have discussed in connection with the party since 1926:

"... the weakness of internal political life in the party and in the KZMP; the considerable fluidity of our organizations... the weakness of party organizations... in Poland's rural areas, as well as among the peasant revolutionary active... the weakness of the work in the armed forces." (Ibid., pages 20-24).

An expressive testimonial to the moral degeneration of the KPP is the separate resolution on "conspiracy." It appears that there is a necessity for an absolute prohibition of conducting "any kind of correspondence indicating the type of life led by a functionary or party activist." This manner of living must look nice, if the betrayal of it would threaten the party dangerously were it to come out into the open. Simultaneously the "spreading of false, discretionary, unverified information concerning the matter of provocation and agents provocateurs" approaches such horrible dimensions that the directorial leadership must announce that such action is their monopoly. If we find out that this mutual accusation in the KPP of "provocation" has attained an unheard of extent, then it is difficult in general to say who among current KPP leaders are still not "provocateurs." It appears lately, according to the KPP central committee communique, that besides Sochacki also another

"agent of the Polish intelligence service" (Tadeusz Zarski) had been a member of the central committee. His wife, Zofja Maciejewska, allegedly collaborated with him as did also reportedly the left wing activist, Aleksander Ostrowski, well known in Warsaw. It is impossible to enumerate all of those suspected by the KPP of provocation, i.e., collaboration with security authorities, because the list of these naive agents who permit themselves to be "unmasked" so easily would be too long. In the latest issues of Nowy Przegląd (March-April, May-June) for 1934 we no longer find any articles by Ryng. Perhaps this writer has again become a "provocateur," because at one time he had been a "persona non grata" as a "Markovite." We also know that the former KPP central committee member Wacław Wroblewski was held in prison at Moscow almost a whole year, until his death, under the charge of espionage. There in Moscow everything is possible.

Coming back to the second plenum, I must add that it spent considerable time on the matter of the strike and tactics in unions. The entire work of the KPP became concentrated in the preying upon economic strife, in connection with an "obstinate implementation of the course in the direction of the general protest strike." The introductory step is to be a "mass action in favor of a one day general strike against compulsory arbitration and the liquidation of social security legislation" until the introduction of a "revolutionary general strike" (pages 25-26).

During the entire year of 1934 the activities of the KPP revolved primarily around the "united front" or rather about the exploitation of this slogan for its own, strictly party aims. Communist methods of seeking such an approach only contribute to a

greater amount of irritation in relations with the PPS. Naturally as ever the source for such an attitude in KPP tactics lay not at all within the relations and events inside of Poland. This was a period of very deep changes in the foreign policy of the Soviets, a period of securing their rear against the Japanese danger as well as in further perspective — versus the Germans. Here again the complete dependence of the KPP and other communist parties upon the speculations of the Narkomindel becomes obvious. Efforts toward a united front are conducted seriously only in those countries where a pacification of relations between the communists and the socialists could have an influence upon the foreign policy of the given country, i.e., where the socialists have a voice in the MSZ [Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych — Ministry of Foreign Affairs], primarily in France. The tactics of that communist party must evoke a terrifying feeling in every ideological communist.

That party simply put away "until later" the entire communist ideology and spasmodically seized upon the "decaying" (and it really was rotten) parliamentary democracy of Paris. In an agreement at the end of June 1934 with the socialists, the communist party of France even renounced such a valuable weapon as the right to public criticism of the "social fascists."

The communists also in Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Italy approached the socialists with proposals for entering into similar agreements. They were unsuccessful however. Only on a local scale in Switzerland (at Geneva) as well as in less important Greece did it come to a close understanding.

That this entire "united front" has been established merely to defend Soviet interests is unmasked by the joint appeal issued

by the communist parties of France, Germany, Great Britain (existing mostly on paper), and Poland during July 1934. With reference to the social democrats, it assumes a tone of vulgar courtesy:

"Disregarding the fact that at the beginning of the imperialist war (this is what Soviet historiography calls the Great War of 1914-1918) you took up a position on the side of your own fighting bourgeoisie, disregarding the fact that you supported the imperialist peace treaties... disregarding the fact that because of your policies you broke up the workers' movement, we propose to you on the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of war -- on August first -- organize... together with us a common demonstration..."

Among the 6 slogans announced in connection with these joint demonstrations, there are 4 directly related to Soviet policy in the Far East. Namely:

"Not a single train or ship transporting ammunition and weapons for Japan and fascist Germany... defense of the USSR... defense of the revolutionary-democratic Chinese Soviet Republic [See Note]... defense of China."

[Note]. This is a reference to several provinces in south China (Kiangsi, etc) which were under the control of the communists. The communists call this military despotism a "democratic republic" probably in order to have it more difficult to fathom.)

The appeal calls for the defense of the revolutionary Kiangsi government not only by workers, etc, but also by artisans. It seems that the condition of Russia in Asia is so terrible that it will soon have to beg the wealthier merchants for succour.

In Poland the influence of the PPS in the MSZ did not equal that of Blum [French socialist leader] at the Quai d'Orsay, so the action for a united front actually bypassed Poland. Although it has been proposed several times by the KPP during the past few months, this merely camouflaged a desire to penetrate PPS territory and to explode the latter from within.

During April-June 1934 a tremendous panic occurred throughout the whole socialist-communist milieu at the appearance on the political scene of a secession from the National [Democratic] Party, the so-called Radical National Camp and several related groups. Between the Warsaw ONR [Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny -- Radical National Camp] and the PPS in the suburb of Wola, fighting soon commenced. Simultaneously the entire Jewish environment, from which 90% of the KPP "active" is recruited, as well as various neophytes who played a considerable role in the PPS intelligentsia began to pressure their parties for an understanding to combat native Polish "Hitlerism" the power of which was in general strongly exaggerated in these circles. The communists however once again showed that matters not related with USSR policy and Kiangsi were of little interest to them. When the most important scarecrow of communism, the ONR, disappeared from the political scene, a new flood of insults began in the direction of its abortive allies -- the PPS. Thus the mentioned joint appeal issued by the communist parties of France, Germany, Poland went one way and the KPP the other. The latter decided upon changing the nature of its 1 August 1934 manifestation into noise against the PPS:

"On 1 August we will close our ranks into a revolutionary and unified front of struggle against those who strive to break

the united front, the leaders of the PPS." (Czerwony Sztandar
 [See Note], No 2, July-August 1934, page 1).

(Note). This is the press organ of the KPP central committee which is more popular than Nowy Przegląd and represents a continuation of the old publication issued under the same name before the war by the SDKPiL. At the end of 1918 it was being published legally, but after the outlawing of the KPP it was printed conspiratorially and since that time has come out irregularly.)

The PPS is further called the "main support of the bourgeoisie" (Ibid., page 2), the "principal auxiliary force of the fascist dictatorship," the "central leader in fascist maneuvers," which occupies the position of a united front with fascism. "Without the destruction of this main support of the bourgeoisie and of fascism, the proletariat can not fulfill its tasks."

Most of the insults were heaped upon the already mentioned Bundist publication entitled Nowe Pismo which zealously fanned upon communist attitudes. The Czerwony Sztandar defined the latter's editors simply as "left wing demagogues," "radicals" applying "demagogic approaches" (the holy truth!), etc. At the same time this aversion toward demagoguery and demagogues did not prevent the KPP from sending the latter continuously letters proposing an "understanding," knowing in advance that nothing would come of them.

On 12 June 1934 the KPP central committee suggested to the central executive committee of the PPS a joint campaign for the purpose of freeing the leader of the German communist party, Thalman (imprisoned by the Hitlerites; nota bene the PPS could influence this matter about as much as the final judgment). The PPS conditioned the

acceptance of this proposal upon KPP guarantees that in the course of this campaign it would cease its propaganda against the PPS. Such a guarantee was provided to the socialists but by the French Communists. In Poland a pacification of socialist-communist relations is not in the interests of the Narkomindel, so the matter ended with an insulting communique issued by the KPP central committee.

This did not prevent the KPP from sending the PPS a new proposal several weeks later, at the end of August, for joint action toward liberating Thalmann and against an "imperialist war." The result was the same. On the other hand the KPP central committee prepared a vulgar libel in the form of a communique which announced cynically that the former communist Sejm deputy Tadeusz Zarski had conducted his "provocateurial" work: "... with the direct and personal participation... of PPS activists... Bronislaw Ziemiecki... Kwapinski... Zygmunt Zaremba... the provocateurial role played by Zarski, similarly to that of Sochacki, was well known for a long time by a number of PPS leaders."

This entire comedy of efforts toward a united front unmasks in the first place the depths of baseness to which revolutionary ideology had dropped in its role as servant to the imperialist deals of the USSR. The PPS, despite its chimerical and at times clearly communizing tendencies, was completely justified in not desiring to find itself within the orbit of the mentioned deals. On the background of the united front proposals, the words of Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski assume added significance. They were printed in Robotnik, No 301, dated 4 November 1923:

"There is between you (referring to communists -- author's comment) and us the fundamental difference that we represent a Polish

workers' movement, its needs and strivings, its peculiar properties; with you, Gentlemen, one can never know where the ideological activist ends and where the agent of the Russian government begins. Years ago as the 'social democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania' you fought against the independence struggle with the greatest rage. After the acquisition of independence by Poland, you opposed her ruthlessly, you led Russian-cossack regiments into your own country. On the other hand, we, as our program states, 'stand on the basis of the Polish Republic.' We will not allow Poland to be either downtrodden or to be torn to pieces by her neighbors."

The holy truth! It is only a shame that not all in the PPS remember this well today! This "forgetfulness" is currently being exploited by the communists who surround the socialists with the entire Georgian courting apparatus. Because the PPS today has no influence upon Polish policy, it is insulted as much as possible. Were this party to direct Poland's foreign policy, then we would see the changed facial expressions of all these Lenskis, Mareks, Amsterdams, Bermans, etc.

During the second half of 1934 an event occurred which, if the comintern had really been an ideological institution, would have caused a total break with the USSR government as well as a scandal. The USSR, in which manifestations of various change could be observed over the past few years, finally became one of the sectors of "international fascism" by joining the League of Nations with a lot of noise. Since all communist theoreticians had been proving very conclusively for a long time that the only task of the League of Nations was the organization of an anti-Soviet war, it would appear that the leadership of this imperialist united

front against the only fatherland of the proletariat had been seized by that sole proletarian fatherland.

The fact that the USSR joined the League of Nations should not however lead one to conclude any change in the relationship of Russia toward the European states. It was therefore justified for many western European circles to accept the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations with considerable reserve, the best expression of which was provided by the Swiss diplomat Mr. Motta who represented one of the states against the accession to the League by the USSR:

"... a considerable part of the Swiss population has assumed a decidedly antagonistic attitude toward this candidacy, and the government completely shares these views of public opinion... a government whose doctrine and state practice is militant communism can not, under any circumstances, adhere to the conditions necessary for acceptance by the League of Nations... Soviet communism has as its aim the producing of a world revolution and, if it were to denounce this, it would be simultaneously denouncing itself. Due to the fact however that everything attests that the Soviets remain true to their fundamental concept, they must represent a threat and a danger to all nations of the world... The Soviet state, the communist party, and the Third International -- comprise a unity both morally as well as organizationally.

"... the risk which may emerge to the world and its culture from accepting the Soviets will not be equalized by any kind of essential services in the cause of peace, since the latter is not included within the future plans of communism. On the basis of the foregoing reasons, Switzerland can not sacrifice its high ideals

for temporary, opportunistic goals of politics... Today's course in Soviet policy, allegedly benevolent toward the League of Nations, is merely a maneuver and results from the Far Eastern disturbances."

That the essence of change in the attitude of USSR policy lay in the bankruptcy of its imperialistic policy in eastern Asia, not some kind of a basic revision in its program mystique, can not be doubted. Such a thesis was shared even by a majority of the delegates at the League of Nations.

It is also certain that the Comintern must be prepared for a new period of ill treatment, again in the interest of its "fatherland." The first such manifestation was the postponement of the seventh congress, already designated for the second part of September 1934 to convene at Moscow. The next will represent bolshevik opportunism by the Muscovites who will act in this spirit directly upon the policies of their individual communist parties in the west.

Simultaneously, regardless of the degree to which the "entry of the USSR into the family of civilized nations" represents a maneuver, it indicates the bankruptcy of still another Marxist myth of Moscow. Until approximately the years 1923-1924, the latter used polemically the myth of a "world" revolution, more accurately a European one. This myth broke down as a result of omitting the minor circumstance that the French, English, and Polish workers are possessed of nationalistic feeling as well as a completely different concept about the ideals of every day life than are the Asiatic types inhabiting the areas near the Volga River. Later came the fascinating and powerful myth about a "storm over Asia," a revolution by human masses numbering into the millions

between the Amur River and Ceylon. And that legend also had to be replaced finally with the myth of "socialist construction in a single country." Six years of this construction definitively proved that just as it is impossible to have a union of socialist Soviet republics extending from pole to pole with its capital in Moscow, it is also impossible for a state to exist hermetically sealed from the rest of the world, even if it were almost as large as the world and capable of functioning without normal political and economic relations with anybody. But in this connection by renouncing also this last myth, communism (in the words of Mr. Motta) is renouncing itself, or else all of its attempts toward normalizing relations with the civilized world will truly be just clever maneuvers.

The prominent Polish expert on international relations, Leon Chrzanowski, is fully justified in writing:

"Not questioning the peaceful intentions of the Soviets, we can not insult their ideology -- and this ideology is decidedly antibourgeois -- the ideology of social revolution is of course an acknowledgment of a program by the Soviets. A child or perhaps an arrogant person could believe or insinuate that the Soviets had denied their own program -- the destruction of existing state systems (emphasis of the author). (Swiat /World/, No 38, 1934, page 9).

CHAPTER VIII

The fifteenth anniversary of KPP existence (end of 1933) reverberated with an oddly quiet echo in party publications. Only a Politburo member of the KPP central committee, Bronkowski who is already known to us, had just this much to say about the whole "laudable" period of fifteen years:

"The 15 years our party has existed represents 15 years of struggle toward attainment of the ideal of the bolshevik party, the party of Lenin and Stalin, the WKP.

"... this was a struggle first of all against Polish nationalism, so deeply imbued in the masses...

"... 15 years of struggle by the KPP comprised a struggle in defense of the Soviet Union, the fatherland of the international proletariat whose boundaries must be defended primarily by the Polish proletariat." (Nowy Przegląd, No 1 (69), January-February 1934 in the article "Fifteen Years of KPP Struggle").

We see thus that Bronkowski realizes full well that the KPP has had no independent history nor any autonomous program. I could end my book at this point, since the above quotation represents an approbation by a prominent KPP activist for the fundamental thesis of my work. However I should like to add a few words concerning the future possibilities for the development of communism in Poland.

This communism does not for the time being present a dangerous threat to the Polish state in the sense of the possibility that it might precipitate a general armed insurrection (revolution) and the acquisition of state power. This conclusion appears none the less vividly from my analysis of this book than it does from the actual

sociopolitical situation within Poland. However contemporary conditions, during a period of history marked by mostly violent and continuous changes in social and political organisms, may undergo a change. A correct policy therefore must be directed not only toward fighting against currently threatening dangers but also must take into consideration those potential dangers which could become threats in the future.

We know that the KPP announces its road to power in the state as leading through the technique of setting into motion a great mass movement in urban and rural areas. This is to be attained by exploiting popular discontent which may arise as a consequence of this or another government policy or again because of certain deficiencies in the system. This dissatisfaction can assume the form of strikes, the struggle by unemployed for bread and work, the fighting by peasants for land and against taxation burdens, and finally various conspiracies by national minorities. The culmination point in these disturbances was to be an armed insurrection under the direction of the KPP or else under the leadership of councils with workers', peasant, and soldiers' deputies (soviets), called into being on the day before the uprising by the communist party.

Such a generalized definition of the road to power is acceptable to all KPP leaders and almost to the entire party. However when the matter comes down to a more concrete formulation of the direct stages that are to precede the revolution, various concepts and "strategic plans" exist within the KPP's leadership circles. Among these plans the most interesting to us are 4 which have become precise and are adhered to by important supporters within the communist party.

Certain of the concepts enumerated here are based upon documentary corroboration, although incomplete, in the history of the KPP. Others however are merely the subject of debate in the closest possible group of people from the KPP leadership. These plans by the directing circles of the communist party are not written or spoken about for obvious reasons which brings any possible discussion down to generalized phraseology, the more so that the final word in this area has not been spoken yet by the Comintern or the WKP(b) Politburo.

One of the most important and influential plans of the KPP up to the fall of 1923 was the concept of war, the essence of which was based upon bringing a revolution to Poland on the bayonets of the Soviet Red Army. Today, although the international situation has radically changed, the foregoing idea has not been finally jettisoned in the KPP but has assumed a different coloration. It is based upon the conviction (even though its adherents unwillingly admit to this openly) that the KPP (the "Polish working class") can not make a revolution with its own forces, the more so now when independent Poland has become strongly grounded internally and also externally. The excellently equipped Soviet army, according to this view, will save the KPP from all of its troubles. The armed uprising, partisan warfare, general strikes play merely an auxiliary and secondary role just as they do in the strategy of the Red Army. The plan for a revolutionary war has numerous supporters primarily among the KPP emigres in Russia and among the Soviet generals of Polish extraction who are relatively many (Lagwa, Kochanski, Zbi-kowski, Jodlowski, and others). Its main proponent is Jozef Unszlicht, chief of the USSR air force, the communist candidate for premier in

Poland or at the very least for political commissar over the armed forces. In the leadership of the KPP (Politburo) these views are shared by Adam Slawinski. It is a public secret in the KPP that this concept was developed more broadly in 1933 at one of the social parties given by Unszlicht. Slawinski and Kochanski, both in a very much inebriated status (this happens to Slawinski quite often), praised the significance of the first 5 year plan for the mechanization and equipment of the Red Army (I have already explained that this was really the actual content of the whole "plan"), became enthusiastic over the efficiency in the various types of weapons, talked a lot about the combat effectiveness of the air units, but finally with sorrow came to the conclusion that the soldiers in the Polish army are resistant to communist agitation.

The foregoing concept expresses the idea of "red intervention" in its most brutal form. Apart from it in the ravings of the KPP there also appears a similar thought but with calculations upon a revolution coming from the west. This manifested itself with special force in the years 1923-1924, when the communist revolution in Germany looked to be a matter of days. To an extraordinary degree this specific "western orientation" was shared in the KPP by Stein-Kaminski-Domski, Grzech-Kowalski, Czarny-Paszyn, and in general by elements connected with the left wing of German communism. During the stormy period immediately following the war, this concept was not void of bases. However subsequently the "German revolution" began to "approach" continually with 7 league steps, was approaching, approaching, until finally in 1930 it disappeared somewhere.

Undoubtedly a communist coup d'etat in Germany, and even its attempt, would have very serious consequences for Poland. We have

already cited documents stating that such a coup would precipitate an immediate attempt to "give a hand by the USSR proletariat to the proletariat of Germany." Fortunately however at the present time such a revolution represents a forlorn hope, not only because Hitler has scattered the communist party but also due to the fact that in the course of this route the complete decay of this German communism was indicated. The latter had been surrounded for so many years by the KPP with an aureole of exceptional "heroism" and was praised by the entire group of Old Testament writers. A considerable part of the communist "masses" simply joined the Nazi storm troopers, and it was followed by a part of the leaders of such stature as Adolf Hoffman. During the trial for setting fire to the Reichstag, a whole series of higher party functionaries, former parliamentary deputies, etc., gave the impression of being the most miserable cowards. If communism and its activists look like that in Germany, then communism in England as well as in other countries and even in France was never treated by the communists themselves as a phenomenon of world importance.

So much about ideas and possibilities of forcing communism upon Poland by means of external force. It can not be denied however that the KPP does possess the concept of destroying Poland from the inside. The very multiplicity of these plans testifies that there is something lacking in each one separately and in all of them together. From among the adventurous ideas of "Polish" communists I would like to cite the idea of the so-called "first stage," i.e., Polish "Kerenskyism."

This concept represented the ideological foundation in the theory of revolution propounded by the old right wing group of

Warski-Kostrzewa. It has found considerable discussion in KPP documents, especially for the period 1926-1929. Its basic assumption lies in the belief that a broad movement of the masses and a victorious insurrection can take place only under conditions of democratic freedom but not under circumstances of conspiratorial activity to which the KPP is condemned today. Such democratic freedom can be provided to the communists in Poland only by governments of "social compromisers" (the PPS or the "Centrolew"), whereas the rising of such is possible only through a spontaneous revolt of the masses not necessarily even directed by the communists. There was also a period in the KPP during which it was considered that the communist party would enter into a coalition with such a government. Later this idea was dropped in the conviction that the communist party would obtain greater benefits if it were to maintain itself in the role of an opposition. It would strive toward achieving support among the workers' councils that should be organized eventually and in the workers' militia, with the assistance of which the transition into an armed insurrection could be made at the opportune time.

This is striking in its mechanical repetition of the principal examples from Russia in 1917. Although it had been defeated politically in 1924 and in 1929, this concept still lives on to date and finds supporters among the KPP leaders who see in it the sole realistic perspective for revolution in Poland. Camouflaged adherents of this plan are the intellectuals within the KPP leadership like Heryng, Spis, Brun, Marek-Lampe, and others. According to them, the current KPP is made up exclusively of cadres or the framework of the great mass party in the future which can develop only under conditions of work, at least quasi legally. These activists are

opposed to the KPP's conspiratorial quality. Similarly to many of the activists in the middle echelons, they are in favor of an understanding with the left wing of the PPS as a temporary ally. It is necessary to add that various Polish Trotskyites and other oppositionists of various coloration, who have broken away from the KPP, are very close to this very concept.

Among the other revolutionary plans, we should enumerate also the idea of the general strike. Officially in the KPP today the Lenski course rules. He is the highest party leader and creator of the plan by which Poland has been approaching ever closer toward a revolutionary crisis since 1930. The revolution would arrive on the crest of a strike wave which would attain its peak during a general political strike directed by the communists. This could begin for example in connection with a protest against the unification legislation or some other ordinance of the government which would be capable of moving the masses. Only in the course of a general strike would the party announce on the agenda the postulate of creating workers' councils and proclaim the armed insurrection. The general strike in this most schematic and least realistic concept would present a strategic lift with the assistance of which the illegal party (not very popular among the masses) would be able to attract the masses in its support toward revolution. A zealous propagandist for this idea is a central committee member, Saul Amsterdam. This whole plan, currently called the "general party line," has suffered considerably during the last 2 years in connection with the lack of success by the KPP in its continually misfiring strikes. Nevertheless the KPP central committee holds on to it tenaciously.

In the revolutionary plans of the KPP, also included is the idea of conspiracy, although we find no mention of this in official KPP documents. This also has numerous supporters, headed by the director of the organizational and military branch of the central committee Bronkowski-Bortnowski. Others include Gustaw Reicher (Rwal) and in part Skulski-Martens. In the revolutionary orientation of these conspirators, the prospects for war are too far removed, the prospects for the "first stage" unrealistic, and the general strike insufficient to provoke a revolution. For this last matter it is imperative to prepare, within the framework of a mass movement, a well organized conspiracy which under an appropriate set of circumstances, e.g., weakening of governmental authority, larger failures of internal policy or foreign policy which precipitate dissatisfaction among the masses must strike at the most sensitive places or objects of state administration (government buildings, telegraph, radio, institutions of public service, barracks) which in turn will represent the beginning of a mass revolution. In order to implement this concept, the strike does not represent an imperative factor as it did in Russia during November 1917.

This idea is dominated by the opinion that the activities of such a conspiracy may only take place within a "revolutionary situation." However if we take into consideration that the moment when such a condition begins is designated by the central committee according to its own outlook and that already according to the sixth KPP congress (October 1932) the political situation in Poland "is on the threshold of a revolutionary crisis," then such a conspiracy may always make an attempt at a desperate step in order to seize authority which has been eluding the communists ever more.

It will not be off the subject if we add that the concept of the conspiracy has been worked out relatively less than other ideas. It mobilizes around itself the adventurous elements within the KPP. In the more demoralized centers of the communist party, in the districts, the idea draws a much louder echo than among the more serious minded elements. Its adherents within the leading party circles officially agree with the "general party line." A man like Bronkowski for instance, apart from Lenski, is the most important person on the Politburo. Nonetheless such mad thoughts are there even today, and it is necessary to pay close attention to them, since the attempt itself at their implementation would be simply dangerous to the order and peacefulness of Poland.

Thus the main outlines of the KPP plans reveal the manner by which it intends to obtain authority in Poland. The entire party comprises several or perhaps between 10 and 20 thousand (it is better to estimate the number in this last figure) individuals, for the most part fanatics and simultaneously degenerates and hysterical persons, dreaming of gaining power by means of a bloody coup d'etat and the incorporation of Poland into the so-called Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although the KPP does not represent a power, it must be watched continuously and carefully, since in the event of disadvantageous conditions in Poland (it is doubtful whether such a situation will arise) it is possible that a coordinated functioning of all plans I have described will be put into effect.

Looking at the matter from a practical point of view, this is quite unlikely to happen. Above all the current political conditions do not favor the "red intervention" at all, especially from

the west. The majority within the KPP has long ago given up its dreams about a "Polish Kerenskyism," although a kind of an echo of this concept are the attempts at exploiting disturbances within various socialist parties. It should be noted that the PPS does not sin in naivete and is conducting vis a vis the KPP a struggle which is infinitely more realistic than that of many socialist parties in the west.

Acquaintance with these subversive concepts of the KPP and a close observation of their further development represent important tasks for those authorities and groups in Polish society which desire to stand guard over the Polish fatherland and its culture and which are not afraid to look this potential danger straight in the eyes. A considerable influence here would be a thorough knowledge of daily work by the KPP in the field which, even though it does not endanger the existence of the state, still does create much harm as well as disturbance.

The forces which the KPP has at its disposal are growing weaker. Its methods of functioning, implementing the peculiar Russian *raison d'etat* and completely alien to the socio-political life of Poland, finally had to bring about an isolation of the communist movement from the Polish environment which was justified in its abhorrence of the Comintern as well as its branch -- the KPP.

Of course the KPP may exist a long time yet, even so long as the Soviet-Russian imperialism does not expire, by strengthening the latter with people, slogans, and money. Various complications in the social economy of the world and of Poland may attract more than one person to communism as an ideal, especially among

so-called progressive-radical circles which do not comprehend at all how KPP work actually looks in practice and essentially what its goals are.

Today we can observe manifestations of decreasing communist influence among the Polish proletariat, especially in that part which considers dependence upon the influence of external elements or so-called "foreign branches" to be an insult to national honor. The communist movement should not be disregarded completely however, because it may be dangerous at certain times.

In concluding this book, I would like to cite the words of a former communist in Germany, Maks Wendland, who after several years spent in the Donets Basin of the USSR wrote in a letter to his wife: "Real freedom in Russia is in possession only of those who lie in their graves!"

My Reply to the Communists.

The central organ of the KPP, Nowy Przegląd, No 4 (72) for July-August 1934, now being printed in Czechoslovakia, took brief notice of my book and indicated that it would return later to the same topic. Apparently due to the appearance of Historja KPP the communist environment was seized with such fear that it must first cool off in order to sweat out a little theory which would "appropriately explain" its ideological defeat. Proceeding as usual along the path of self praise, the editors of Nowy Przegląd (behind which is hidden most probably the KPP chief of security, "Albert") state:

"... that the KPP is the only party in Poland which has received an extensive book from its enemies, proving how far our

party is being observed by the leading staff of the bourgeoisie."
 (Nowy Przegląd, No 4, July-August, 1934, page 75).

Even if it were true that the "KPP is the only party, etc." this does not prove in the least that it has focused the attention of the "leading staff of the bourgeoisie" upon itself. My work has appeared merely because of the fact that the KPP has not written its own history to date as is done by other political parties. I also want to show Polish society that the KPP is an illegal party, and one harmful to the state organism of Poland, which closely guards its secrets and even its history.

In this connection I must tell you, gentlemen from the KPP, that your affairs have not preoccupied any "leading staff of the bourgeoisie" but merely an humble man who has fathomed you to the very bottom and from a citizen's point of view decided to throw light upon your treacherous manipulations which are harmful to Poland and to the working masses.

Anybody who is at least somewhat conversant with Polish political literature sees that the gentlemen communists frequently avoid the truth. In the year 1933-1934 we have had an extraordinary production in the field of historiography dealing with various political movements. I might indicate as an example the exhaustive work by Pobog-Malinowski concerning the beginnings of National Democracy or Haecker's Historja ruchu socjalistycznego w bylej Galicji [History of the Socialist Movement in Former Galicja]. The communists also use as an excuse the allegation that the illegality of the KPP prevents them from writing their heroic history. This is a poor excuse. During a time when the PPS was undergoing the

most savage persecution, a responsible member of that party Res-
Perl issued a very extensive history of the PPS. Similarly a
man like Feliks Kon could write his history of the revolutionary
movement in Russia during the period of Stolypin. Could the rule
of Stalin be less propitious for such a kind of scholarly work?

I am also acquainted with the most important reason for
the irritation by the KPP's chief of security. It is no longer
possible to maintain the legend about the 5 years of "uniformity
in the leadership headed by Comrade Lenski." This can no longer
be upheld in view of the facts and documents, a part of which have
been printed in my book, as well as in view of many new and very
interesting events which I shall permit myself to publish in the
future.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that the communists
will not frighten me away from a thorough study of their concepts
and methods of work through their use of various words in the com-
munist jargon. I shall continue to inform not only the general
public in the Republic of Poland but also members of the communist
party who are becoming ever more disillusioned with regard to the
limitless hypocrisy of the Moscow hirelings.

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