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HRAF-60 Wash-7

A REGIONAL HANDBOOK
ON
THE INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION

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A REGIONAL HANDBOOK
ON
THE INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION

Compiled by

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University of Washington, Seattle

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PREFACE

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Preface

The topic of the present handbook is the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which now constitutes an integral part of Communist China. The establishment of the Autonomous Region preceded even the consolidation of the People's Republic of China; it has, since then, been changed and added to, and comprises at present a geographical area which is a novelty in Chinese history. Parts of the traditional Inner Mongolian provinces have been detached and incorporated into other provinces; territory which traditionally belonged to Manchuria has been added. The latest change, which took place in June 1956, was the addition of certain sections of former Ninghsia province. It cannot even be taken for granted that the present boundaries of the Region are final; a future addition of certain sections of Chinghai province is altogether possible. It has to be mentioned that the latest change took place at a time when most of the sections of this handbook had already been finished, so that it has not been taken into account throughout. Material pertaining to the Alashan and Edsingol Mongols will also be found in the Regional Handbook on Northwest China.

Reference is made to the prefaces of the General Handbook on China and of the other regional handbooks of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington with regard to the general approach and the working method employed in the compilation of this handbook. In the case of the Mongolian handbook we had the great privilege of having on hand extensive contributions of the Rev. Antoine Mostaert C.I.C.M., the foremost authority on the region. Robert Rupen, who worked on the handbook of the Mongolian People's Republic, has assisted us with much valuable criticism. Editorial work on most of the sections was done by Margery Anneberg.

Hellmut Wilhelm

November, 1956

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GENERAL CHARACTER OF SOCIETY

I. Introduction

Inner Mongolia has traditionally been an area of mixture and contact between two types of society, between two cultures. To the Chinese it has been an area of promises; promises of a new territory for agricultural exploitation and promise of increased trade. To the pastoral and nomadic peoples who have time and again inhabited the region, Inner Mongolia has also offered promises; promises of a base for the control of China, promises of control over trade passing through the region or near enough to it to be subject to raids, and promises of a ready supply of agricultural produce and luxury goods. For both Mongols, as the last nomadic group to establish itself in the region, and border Chinese, it has been a region which never entirely fulfilled its promises. The Mongols found that proximity to the Chinese gradually brought dependence upon them in many ways. A gradual erosion of traditional Mongol patterns led some Mongols in the area to adopt agriculture and Chinese habits. Some Mongol groups attempted to better their position vis-a-vis other Mongols by aiding the Chinese in pacifying the border. Throughout the period of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) one Mongol leader after another tried to establish a dominant position among the Mongols so that the promises of the region could be brought to fruition. The Chinese, on the other hand, unable to dominate the region completely and thus make it safe for the expansion of agriculture, penetrated the life of the nomads through trade, and carried their agriculture northeastward into the Manchurian border region.

The problem of the region, viewed historically, lies precisely in the fact of its inability to support only agriculture or only pastoral nomadism. It is a region which demands a mixed economy, a region which forces a mixed culture. Until the conquest of the Mongols by the Manchus, and the establishment of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1645-1911), the Mongols had an alternative to this demand. If they were unable to dominate the Chinese, they could withdraw into the steppe, obtaining their necessary sedentary goods by periodic raids. In contrast to the Chinese, the Mongol was mobile, and attachment to the region could be broken quickly and easily.

The Manchu conquest, however, struck at the heart of this mobility. It fixed the Mongols to certain territories, and in effect began the integration of the frontier into a cultural, sub-unit of China proper. The problem was no longer, "Who shall dominate the frontier?" It became, "How can nomad and farmer live together in the region?" The solution to this question is still being sought.

The Inner Mongolia of today is a zone in transition, a group of social units in flux, a "model area" which is cited by the Chinese Communist government as an example to all other "minority areas." It is a testing ground for techniques and concepts which are to be extended to other nationality regions if they prove satisfactory in this one. It may become, as a region, a vital economic and cultural gear in the total Chinese machine; it may, however, prove to be a region where the gears fail to mesh.

The constant failure of Chinese and Mongol to reach a lasting modus vivendi on other than local levels characterizes the last two hundred years in the region. Chinese pressure met Mongol intransigence or withdrawal; the region maintained a living dichotomy of government, religion and social organization. In the economic realm, despite the extremes of agriculture and pastoral nomadism, however, the lines of demarcation were shifting, becoming blurred. Mongols became farmers; Chinese moving farther out into the region varied their agricultural techniques, began to use more and more draft animals. The border gave rise to large Chinese trading organizations, and within the organizations, to men whose whole lives were devoted to understanding Mongol life and psychology. Such men brought to the Mongols goods which pastoral nomadism cannot produce, and eventually, many items which the nomads gave up producing. The border Mongols adopted the Chinese language, gradually accepted more and more of the local Chinese way of life, took on much of the national outlook of their Chinese neighbors. The Mongols who became farmers often sought to be accepted as Chinese; others held stubbornly to traditional Mongol economy and culture, dreaming of a day when they should be strong enough to re-establish an independent Mongol regime. Between these two extremes, local, class or individual interests led Mongols to align themselves with Chinese against Mongols, Chinese officials and Mongol nobility to join forces against Chinese and Mongol commoners, or Mongols to react as a group against Chinese.

The Manchus began the integration of the frontier, but not by intent. Manchu policy, throughout most of the dynasty, was directed toward maintaining division between the Chinese and the Mongols as groups, and between Mongols themselves. The Manchu court sought to centralize in itself the loyalties of the Mongols, leaving to the Mongol nobility the problem of governing on a local level. Among the Mongols of a particular area, territorial ties assumed a growing importance, and local differences became more pronounced. Within the largest political unit, the

League, disparate groups of Mongols were frequently joined together; thus even the League as a supra-local organization was weakened.

Initial Manchu policy toward the Chinese in the frontier region was aimed at control and maintenance of balance on the border. The Manchus realized that Chinese advance into the border region would create continuing disturbances, that the delicate balance of cleavages between Mongol groups might be tipped by joint opposition to the Chinese. Until their control of China was solidified, and until Mongol loyalties could be counted upon, the Manchus attempted to prohibit any Chinese movement into the steppe. They could not prevent a slow seepage of agriculturalists, however, and controls over merchants were ineffective, as the merchants rarely settled among the Mongols in any case. The process of linking Mongol and Chinese in the frontier continued through the exchange of commodities. Eventually, in the 1800's, Manchu control broke down completely, and Chinese settlement was not only permitted but encouraged. In fact, Mongol unity was no longer a great threat, and the Manchus recognized in law a development which had been continuing for some time.

There were reasons other than political, however, which kept the region dismembered and divided. Chinese immigration could not proceed rapidly in areas where the lines of communication were lacking. The border areas could be colonized, and the major routes traversed, but the Chinese farmer lacked the mobility to depart far from major transport routes, and the contact with "civilization" that they represented. While in the western parts of the region lack of arable land, problems of irrigation, and slow development of the lines of communication held migration close to the border, the Manchurian part of Inner Mongolia absorbed enough Chinese during the 1800's to fill the market requirements for both Mongol territories in Manchuria and export down the Liao Valley to the sea. It was not until the opening of Manchuria by the railways, in the early 1900's, that the tremendous influx of Chinese into the area overwhelmed the Mongols. Thus another contradiction within the Inner Mongolian region was set up—pressures on the Manchurian Mongols became most strong, and their already significant departure from Mongol norms (i.e., acceptance of agriculture, adoption of agriculture, dependence upon rent, et cetera) was increased. The Mongol-Chinese dichotomy, which once could unite, at least psychologically, all Mongols against the Chinese, became complicated by a trichotomy: agricultural Mongols versus nomadic Mongols, nomadic Mongols against Chinese settlers, and agricultural Mongols against Chinese settlers. This trichotomy was expressed differently in the different parts of the region, and

local problems assumed primary importance rather than the total problem of Chinese advance and concomitant Mongol deculturalization.

The lack of communications, prior to the late 1800's and the twentieth century, would have been of little importance in separating the mobile Mongol groups, however. But the Manchu insistance upon fixing the Mongols to certain territories reinforced this lack. Thus Mongol travel between widespread groups was curtailed; again the local interests were heightened. Over the period of the Manchu Dynasty, Mongol groups in Manchuria developed interests and patterns of behavior which divided them from Mongol groups in the western part of Inner Mongolia; traditional divisions between Mongols were reinforced; dialectical differences and differences of dress marked one Mongol off from another. Even within the same general area, such as in the Ordos, groups of one local unit (the banner) developed divergences of tradition from other banners. Along the border, where the settlement of the Mongols and the effects of Chinese contact had proceeded quite far, Mongol groups battled over territory suitable for agriculture rather than pasturage.

As a whole, then, the region was composed of many regions, of diverse cultures and of conflicting loyalties. Until the establishment of the Republic in 1912, integration of the various peoples and cultures of the region on a national level was negligible. Throughout the period of the warlords, the Nationalist government, the Japanese war and the Mengchiang period, conflicts whose roots were long in the past were accelerated; seeds which had been germinating for centuries began to sprout. Upon the essentially locally oriented Inner Mongolian people, Chinese, Mongol and "tribal" alike, burst national and international forces, from which there was no escape, and with which there must be compromise. The region was demanding its fulfillment as a region, demanding a solution to the age old question of dominance or mixture. The compromise which emerged rose in part from the Inner Mongol cultural sub-groups themselves; it began to take form under the Japanese-dominated Mengchiang government; and it solidified in the form of an imposed national pattern, the Chinese Communist envelopment. The Chinese Communists recognized the region for what it was—an appendage of the North China economy, and recognized the Mongols for what they were—a specialized part of the total Chinese pattern in the border. With the Communist incorporation, the tendencies within Inner Mongolia toward national integration were given a new direction, a direction which may release the potential of the region.

II. Socio-Cultural Segments in Inner Mongolia

A. Cultural-Geographic Groups

1. Mongol

a. Tümet and the Ordos

Within the territory today called the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Republic, five areas manifesting significant cultural differences may be distinguished. In the west (Suiyüan), the territories of the Ordos and the Tümet have seen centuries of encroachment by Chinese settlers. Mongols in the two regions have been hemmed in economically and in some cases, notably among the Tümet, have abandoned nomadic herding in favor of settled agriculture. In the Ordos region, nomadism has moved toward the center, to the less fertile sections, and has given way to Chinese or Mongol farming on the fringes.

These economic pressures have left their cultural mark. The Tümet, for the most part, have restricted the use of their language to the family and use Chinese in their outside contacts. In some cases, Mongolian has been completely forgotten. Chinese clothes and ceremonies, Chinese house types and food have become characteristic of Tümet life. The ultimate expression of this sinicization of the Tümets is the Tümet Mongol who leads the IMAR—Ulanfu, who does not speak Mongolian.

The Mongols of the Ordos have clung closely to their old ways of life. Perhaps a key characterization of this resistance to sinification is to be found in their historical relationship to Chingis Khan. It is among the Ordos that the Chingis Khan legend continues in its fullest flower; it is they who have guarded the imaginary tomb of the Khan (cf. section on Religion). Where the Tümets have lost their "Mongolness" in all but name and (until the incorporation of Suiyüan into the IMAR in 1954) political administration, the Ordos Mongols have retained much of the old social organization, the old beliefs in Lamaism, and the economic dependence upon herding. Yet elements of Chinese culture have crept in: the princes have adopted Chinese names, wear Chinese clothes, eat Chinese food and build their settled dwellings in Chinese style.

The Ordos has been a region of constant pressure for the Mongols. In the past, this pressure has been met with withdrawal or revolt. In only a few cases has revolt in the Ordos been directed against the Mongol ruling hierarchy; for the most part the ideal has been to reclaim from the Chinese what had formerly been Mongol possessions, and to assume again the position that befits the guardians of the tomb. But it is an area of indecision and vacillation as well. Despite the pressures of Chinese settlers and the loss of much former Mongol land, it was the princes of Suiyüan who eventually threw in their lot with the Nationalists against the Japanese-Mongol coalition led by Prince Te during the Sino-Japanese conflict. Old suspicions and rivalries undoubtedly played a part in this choice, but the more immediate reasons were opportunistic. The Suiyüan princes sought to seize on the weakness of the Chinese at that time, to wring concessions from the Kuomintang, and to ingratiate themselves in the favor of the Kuomintang officialdom, the assumed victors in the struggle. These princes submerged their memories of numerous rebuffs from the KMT officials, pushed aside the irritations caused to the ordinary herdsman by Chinese immigration on their lands, and opposed Prince Te. Nationalist promises of autonomy were taken more seriously than future hopes of independence.

b. Chahar

The Tümet and Ordos cases represent two Mongol reactions, withdrawal and acceptance, to a history of Chinese political domination and economic envelopment. Farther east, in the Chahar territory, these two reactions fused, and developed significant variations. Some Chahar Mongols retreated farther and farther north with their herds while Chinese advanced from the south as farmers, and from the cities of the south as traders. Here and there the Mongols were overtaken, settled down into a semi-nomadic existence, and gradually became influenced culturally by the Chinese. In southern Chahar, four settlement patterns developed under this contact situation: the village, the hamlet, the herding camp and the temple farm. Herding camps were, for the most part, temporary; they consisted of a few tents, and were established only when pasture around the village was insufficient. The old nomadic, shifting pattern was not completely overcome, however, by establishment of mud and timber dwellings. Even such constructions were often dismantled and a new location found, because of the superstitions about unlucky sites. Herding, combined with trade of animals and animal products, remained the dominant economy.

The old Chahar Mongol political structure had been modified by the Manchus shortly after 1638. The old Chahar nobility, particularly the ruling princes, were stripped of their power, and a Manchu appointee was placed over the administrative unit, the eight banners. A Mongol was appointed by the Manchus to take the place of the hereditary princes, gaining his place by seniority within the banner officialdom. A regular hierarchy of officials was established, ranging from the Mongol chief of the banner to the daruga, the leader of ten families of the banner. At times the ten families might be scattered in a number of villages, thus approximating what is today called the "administrative village."

Almost no Chahar Mongols farmed. Indeed, they scorned the ilies, but some had rented land to Chinese settlers, and drew from them crop shares or rent. As Chinese farmers also paid taxes to the Chinese administrations in the region, their Mongol landlords sometimes interceded in their behalf. Relationships between Chinese and Mongol were thus strengthened, and were further cemented by the willingness of the Mongols to defend the Chinese against bandits. By and large, a friendly modus vivendi was developed between the two, at times linking them against the Chinese provincial and local governments. Some Mongols in southern Chahar also participated in trade as active selling agents, rather than as passive recipients of the itinerant's wares. Milk products were sold by some to other Mongols; meat and skins of domestic animals were also sold locally to other Mongols, though not as a regular practice. Some entered the field of transportation, serving as carters for other people's goods. Money and livestock became the symbols of wealth, rather than livestock alone, as with the pure nomadic Mongols.

Within the Chahar communities, a high degree of social stratification grew up, based primarily upon political status. Among the clergy, the secular strata were paralleled, with high church officials finding more in common with the upper stratum of civil officialdom. While the old differentiation between inherited nobility and commoner still held true, its importance was almost negligible compared to the political status of the individual. In the realm of the family and extended kin relationships, however, the old patterns held sway.

Here, then, a balance between Chinese and Mongol cultures had been reached in some areas of life, with the basic socio-economic structure of the Mongols unshaken, though elaborated by inclusion of Chinese cultural features. But here the Mongols were, in effect, holding their own and even, to some extent, dominant.

c. Western Manchuria

A third area in the IMAR lies in the southeast, in former western Manchuria. This is the area where for centuries Mongols and Chinese farmers have been in closest contact. It is the area where Chinese colonization has come in waves, particularly from the late 1800's to the present. It is an area usually considered to harbor the most sinicized Mongols. The few who persist in herding have been pushed into the mountains; the rest have adopted agriculture *in toto* or have become semi-agricultural, semi-pastoral. The villages of the agricultural Mongols are scarcely distinguishable from the average village in North China below the Great Wall.

Farming techniques of Mongol and Chinese alike were the same in these villages. The crops paralleled those of North China. Farming implements were bought from the Chinese at village fairs, since no Mongol specialized in the making of iron ploughs and hoes. Trade at fairs was important as a means of supplementing home-produced commodities, although some villages were more self-sufficient than others. Here, as in all the Mongol regions, the itinerant Chinese trader was well known.

Patterns of life in these villages, however, differed. In some, the majority of the landlords were Mongols, while Chinese frequently were tenants or hired laborers. Hired farm labor was almost never Mongol. In one village, Gashaat, located in the present Naiman banner, the richest Mongol in the village had accepted Chinese values; he considered wealth to lie in land, gold and silver. In a Kharachin village of the same general region, the process of "de-Mongolization" had proceeded so far that a rich Mongol invested not only in land, but in shops and real estate in nearby villages and as far away as Peking. Where Mongols of Gashaat almost all possessed some land, poor Mongols of the Kharachin village worked for the monastery nearby, became soldiers, or traveling story-tellers, or left the village. The Kharachins had been among the first Inner Mongol groups to collaborate with the Manchus during their rise to power in the 1600's, and it was the Kharachins, in the late 1930's, who supplied many of the Mongol intellectuals who worked with the Chinese Nationalist government.

Traditional social organization had lost its hold among many Mongols in the area, but in the realm of intra-family relationships, much remained. Mongol-Chinese intermarriage (forbidden in 1801 by the Manchu Dynasty in an edict later relaxed) was resisted by informal sanctions. In those cases in which the breakdown of the traditional had proceeded the farthest, intermarriage of Chinese male and Mongol female did occur, but usually between a trader and a poor Mongol girl. By the time of World War II, however, many Mongol men were marrying Chinese women. Still, marriage of a Mongol girl to a Chinese man was resisted.

Two patterns of relationship between Chinese and Mongols may be characteristic of this area. Where social and economic dislocation of the Mongols had proceeded far, tension was pronounced. Mongols who had accepted most of the Chinese value system were frustrated at their inability to fulfill the statuses and roles demanded by that system. Though much that was Chinese had crept into Mongol life, differences were still felt, in language, attitudes, religion and costume.

The second pattern shows less tension. Here, the dislocation had not yet gone so far as to emphasize the weakness of the Mongols in the face of continued sinicization. The Mongols were economically equal, or almost so, to their Chinese competitors; they held to most of the traditional social organization, felt less need to compete on Chinese terms. Thus, in such areas, less conflict developed, and the Mongols continued to feel Mongol, not in contrast to Chinese but in relation to other Mongols.

d. The Barga region

In the far north and northwest of the region (the former Barga) cultural and ethnic mixture has introduced elements not to be found in other parts of the IMAR. This area, geographically almost entirely west of the Great Hsingan Mountains of Manchuria, includes urban peoples, forest tribes and steppe nomads. The urban group includes Chinese, Russians, Koreans, Dagurs and other Mongols. The forest peoples, primarily Tungus, have a culture built on hunting, and have recently been induced to enter lumbering activities. The steppe group is composed almost entirely of nomadic Mongols.

The Mongolian nomads of the district are a mixed group of Buryats, Dugars, and Eastern and Western Mongols. (Cf. Ethnic Groups Section). The various Mongol groups are almost entirely nomadic herders, maintaining their old social and economic organization with slight modifications. The Dagurs combine farming and herding. Dagurs living in the Buteha (Butkha) banner (in the eastern part of the region) have an economy based on farming, supplemented by logging and hunting, some herding, and a small amount of fishing.

The Dagurs, historically thought to have had a typical Mongolian type of stratified social organization, have lost almost all traces of it. Extended family and kinship ties remain important, but above the village level the administrative hierarchy was staffed by Chinese. There was no nobility. Each village was a self-contained unit, connected to another only by kinship ties. Within the village, some stratification existed, based on age, sex, and to some degree, wealth. Families tended to live in the same house until the size of the group demanded expansion. There was no priesthood, no organized church, the religion being personal and shamanistic.

Among the Buryats, kinship, particularly in its clan aspect, was important. Original customs were retained, paralleling the customs of Buryats in their homeland. Some slight differences among Buryats resulted from the two waves of migration which took place at different times and from different regions. The first wave to arrive were Lamaist (Tibetan Buddhists), herders and kin-oriented. The influence of Russian culture had been slight before their migration, and had affected only dress and perhaps some material elements of culture. In religion, social structure and economy the first migrants were unaffected. The second group differed from the first only in its longer exposure to Russian influences, with some effect on language, and in that it was Shamanist. These people, too, were herders, with a kin-based social organization.

In this mixed area, where Chinese and Russian farmers, herders and nomadic hunters all met, some interchange of material and non-material culture traits was inevitable. Chinese settlers were forced by the nature of the land to adopt extensive farming. Russians and Dagurs combined animal husbandry and agriculture. Hunters and herdsmen formed economic ties with urbanites and rural farmers. The Chinese were restricted by the Manchu and Nationalist governments from acquiring large amounts of land, and many turned to trade and small manufacture. While the higher levels of government were staffed by Chinese, the later during the Republic by some Dagurs, local officials were predominantly Mongol. Outside the cities, the influence of the central government was rarely felt until Japanese domination became effective. In the light of the persistence of traditional patterns in this district, and a relatively government-free existence combined with the mobility of the nomadic economy, it is significant, perhaps, that in this district successful movements for autonomy developed. Among the nomads bordering on Outer Mongolia, cultural ties with the Outer Mongols were strong—which may have been the reason that in Barga a persistent Pan-Mongolism appeared.

e. Silingol

The final cultural-geographic region in the IMAR stretches in a narrow band along the southern borders of Outer Mongolia. It is an area within which, without intensive development, only pastoral nomadism could sustain itself successfully. Here has remained the stronghold of traditional Mongolian culture, the least influence from Chinese cultural patterns. Within this area, the most "pure" Mongols were located in the banners of the Silingol League.

In 1919 a Russian observer noted this in the following words: ". . . the Southern Mongols of Silingol. . . are the same sort of nomads as the people of Khalkha. Traveling from Khalkha (Outer Mongolia) into the Silingol League, the difference in the manner of life is impossible to notice." (Baranov, Aimak Tsetsen Khan)

Ties there are to China, even in this "pure" region. Political bonds had been created during the Manchu Dynasty, and extended during the early days of the Republic. Economic ties were established through the Chinese trader, whose lifetime was spent moving throughout the banners, bringing the goods desired by his clients. Yet it was from these banners that the drive toward Mongol nationalism developed in the late 1930's, with Japanese support.

The leader of this drive was a noble, Prince Te, who dreamed of the former greatness of the Mongols, but who had learned much through his Chinese education. His was the grand vision of a united "Mongolia for the Mongols"; his aim was the introduction of modern industry and modern subjects in new schools, to blend the old with certain aspects of the new. Through this means, the Mongols were to be brought into the modern world without loss of their essential "Mongolness." In the early period of Japanese pressure on Inner Mongolia and North China, Prince Te sought guarantees from the Nationalist government of China that would secure for the Mongols the right to be Mongols. But the implication of Nationalist rebuffs and promises meant only one thing to the traditionalists—ultimate assimilation, loss of the Mongol way of life. Desperate, desiring to unite the Inner Mongols in a last stand against cultural submersion, Prince Te and his followers turned to the Japanese, who had ostensibly restored Mongolian control of West Manchuria. In this alliance, he was opposed by another group in the west, who chose to lead their people according to another Mongol tradition: temporary alliance with China in the hope of gaining concessions. These leaders, too, were traditionalists, hoping to gain eminence of position among the Mongol leaders by allying themselves with the victor.

Prince Te's group, assisted by the Japanese, established an "autonomous" area of Inner Mongolia, called Mengchiang. It was in Mengchiang that the pattern of the future began to show itself. The Mongol nomad, in effect, saw more clearly than the sinicized Mongol or the Chinese in the area the only solution to the age-old conflict. Combining with the semi-nomadic and sedentary Mongols of the area, with the Chinese farmers and traders, the Mongols like Prince Te, representing the nomads, succumbed to Japanese advice and the realities of the situation. All groups became incorporated as specialized segments of the larger totality within Mengchiang. While tradition was strong, and the social structure of each segment was not touched directly, the herding economy was given new "market-oriented" aims; attempts were made to reform the religion and simplify the religious hierarchy; new schools were introduced, with such subjects as world geography, Mongolian history, Mongolian language. The Mongols were encouraged to continue to be Mongols, but they were disabused of their sole claims to the area—henceforth, the ideal was to be "cooperation of all peoples" of the area for the good of the whole. The whole, in this case, was defined as Chinese, Mongol, Moslem, Japanese and Manchurians (i.e., peoples of Manchuria). Upon this pattern the Mongol and Chinese Communists built when they became the integrating authority in the region.

2. Chinese

a. Han Chinese of the Western IMAR

The Chinese in the IMAR are a more unified group than the Mongols, exhibiting less significant differences from a geographic viewpoint. It is also difficult to discern differences among the Chinese of the region because of lack of material. Tentatively, then, we can make only certain broad distinctions between Han Chinese of the Western IMAR, Han Chinese of the Eastern (Manchurian) IMAR, and Chinese Moslems. A finer distinction might be drawn between rural and urban Chinese, but there are actually little data to draw upon.

Han Chinese of the Western IMAR are mostly from Shansi, Shensi and Hopei. Whatever differences there are among them derive from their provinces of origin and their local contacts with different Mongol groups. Unlike the immigrants to Manchuria, the Chinese in the Western IMAR were frequently migratory. Immigration pushed to the limits of cultivable land in the arid regions, and one dry spell would force a retreat. Famines in the home provinces combined with favorable conditions outside of the Great Wall would bring a return to Inner Mongolia. This pendulum swing gradually came to a halt; some families and individuals settled down, backed by commercial developments in the border cities, and began to consider the area to be their home. Toward the end of the 1800's, all except the far north and northeastern parts of Inner Mongolia were politically and economically dominated by the Chinese.

If anything characterizes the Chinese settlers in the westernmost part of Inner Mongolia (i.e., the Backloop or Hou-t'ao), it is the dependence upon irrigation. Many irrigation projects were undertaken by private investors and landlords, and after the Revolution, by provincial warlords and the National government. The effect of such projects was to make Western IMAR a region of rapidly growing population, and thus a region of considerable instability.

Political instability was furthered by the existence of local governmental institutions outside of the normal political organization of the National and provincial governments. One such quasi-political organization was the Catholic Church (mentioned below) and another, the Lung-wang lao-she (Venerable Association of the Dragon King). This association was characteristic of North Chinese villages, and was brought by the immigrants into Inner Mongolia. Basically, the concern of the association was propitiating the Dragon King, ruler of rainfall and water in general. The temple of this association was frequently the seat of political administration under the Republic, but it had performed a role in political administration even during the Ch'ing Dynasty. It took care of everything pertaining to village government:

waterways and irrigation, crops, charity work, legal suits, schools, temple feasts and temple revenue. Real masters of a village were the members of the board of the association. In the absence of strong local governments and a strong central government in the region, such an association could function almost independently of the constituted political authorities, and frequently did. (Cf. Religion Section.)

Outside of the compact irrigated areas, such as the Hou-t'ao and around the eastern part of the Yellow River, farmers in Western Inner Mongolia lived in dispersed and isolated farmsteads. There were few large villages in any of the rural districts. This isolation, different from conditions within the Great Wall, brought about a loosening of interpersonal community ties between families. Community activity centered about periodic repair of the irrigation canals and use of a community mill established in a central place.

Other characteristics of Chinese in this area are also related to the circumstances of cultivation. In some parts of the area, fields are allowed to lie fallow for as much as a year at a time, a definite contrast to practices in North China. Fields are larger than within the Great Wall, and in many cases, migratory and temporary farm labor is employed in the harvest. The settlers farther in the north of the region, having a relatively free choice of land, sometimes chose foothills and the middle portions of hills, terracing them, rather than clustering on the flat lands which might be less rich.

Social mobility was perhaps somewhat easier in this frontier region than within North China proper. There was a greater possibility that a family might become landowners with a short time, despite a well developed absentee-landlord system which exploited many tenants. Such exploitation together with the dependence upon irrigation projects gave rise to another phenomenon of the border—the development of irrigation projects by the Catholic Church. With such development the Church made converts and built up a quasi-political organization, interceding for its adherents with the provincial and National governments, aiding its members with loans or animals, and concerning itself with the civil and economic affairs of Church members. (Cf. Social Structure, Religion.)

b. Han Chinese of the Eastern IMAR (Manchurian section)

Han Chinese in the eastern part of the region show significant differences from their counterparts in the west. The eastern area is an area of old Chinese settlement, and perhaps some of the differences which occur are traceable to the long term influence of frontier residence and mixture with Manchu population. Whatever the cause, the Han Chinese in Eastern IMAR have a more equalitarian outlook on life, and the family structure is less traditional. Authority was distributed within the family at annual family gatherings; one male member was designated to be manager of the family economy for the year and the job was held in rotation by male members. Women had a much larger voice in deciding important family matters. Both paternal aunt and maternal uncle were consulted on the marriage of children, and they might have the deciding voice. The maternal uncle was responsible for fatherless children, and it was the mother's family which took care of their welfare and education.

Han Chinese had also adopted certain amusements and values of the frontier; horse riding ability, physical strength, ability to shoot, were highly regarded by Chinese in the region. Hospitality was greatly valued, and homes in the country districts extended friendliness and hospitality to travelers and strangers whenever they needed a place to rest. Mutual trust was taken for granted.

Occupations, other than farming and trade, which set the Chinese of the Eastern IMAR off from their western cousins are hunting, logging, fishing, ginseng collecting and gold prospecting. In all, the Manchurian area offered more to the adventurous and the true frontiersman, and it seems to have bred a more adaptable individual. There are, probably, regional differences in the Eastern IMAR between Chinese, but little data exist upon which to base a discussion. In the far north, the Barga district, Chinese farmers were very few until recently, and most Chinese engaged in trade or the varied occupations mentioned above. In the southeast area, an area of long-term settlement, farming was the major occupation, and perhaps family organization and patterns of behavior were more traditionally Chinese. In the southeast area, a continuous influx of settlers from Shantung and Hopei might well have contributed to keeping the traditional forms more rigid, while farther north, there was less reinforcement of the traditional patterns. (For further data on Chinese in the Eastern IMAR, compare Northeast Handbook, Social Values and Patterns of Living.)

c. Moslem Chinese (Hui)

A third segment of the Chinese population of the IMAR which exhibits certain cultural peculiarities is the Moslem community. Located primarily in the cities, such as Kuei-sui (Hohehot), Pao-t'ou, Kalgan and so forth, the Moslems form tight religious communities centered about the mosque. The size of the community rarely reaches more than about two thousand households, the average being more in the hundred to three hundred range. Moslem life in the area is related to the mosque; families are tenants of a mosque and pay ground or house rent to it, as well as making other contributions. The mosque is the controling organ and the source of social control. Tenants cluster around the mosque, and a new community is formed when the size of the group grows too large to be within hearing range of the call to service from the mosque. A community has a council of elders, elected by the male members of the community. The elders manage the affairs of the mosque other than religious, and exercise strong indirect influence over the whole community through the moral and religious authority of the ministrant of the mosque (ahung or chiao-chang).

Characteristics of Inner Mongolian Moslem communities, which distinguish them from other Chinese Moslem groups, are as follows: the settlements are fairly recent, dating from the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty or more recently; mosques have, usually, only two major officials; mosques draw less revenue from real estate and more from monthly contributions of their tenants; the community is relatively homogenous, with little non-Moslem intermarriage; Islamic ritual is rather strictly observed. On this latter point, for example, there is no ancestor worship and the important yearly festivals of the Han Chinese, such as New Year's Day, midsummer and midautumn, are not observed. Matrimonial and burial customs differ from those of the Hans, and the family system and marriage allow the Moslems to ignore some of the traditional Chinese regulations in these social areas. (Cf. IMAR Religion, and Northwest Handbook, Family and Social Structure.)

B. Social Classes of Mongols and Chinese

1. Mongols

In addition to the differences to be seen between cultural-geographic regions, Mongol society historically has been stratified. An upper class, hereditary nobility, tracing its descent from Chingis Khan or one of his brothers, rested upon a lower stratum of commoner and freeman (Darkhan). Paralleling this secular division, and closely intertwined with it, were the ranks of the clergy. The nobility, in theory, held absolute power over those commoners within their control. It was the nobles who set the time for migration, the nobles who were responsible for collecting the taxes from their "constituents," the nobles who held the official positions. Through the nobles, whole banners were plunged deeper and deeper into debt vis-a-vis the Chinese merchants. The interests of the most sinicized nobles were far more personal than "Mongol," although here and there a noble eschewed personal privilege and attempted to better the lot of his people.

The children of nobles were those who obtained education and provided the modernized Mongol intelligentsia. Other nobles and their children assumed the highest ranks in the clergy, linking the secular and sacred realms. In time, a large group of nobles, too numerous to obtain official positions, not ambitious in regard to clerical orders, became a floating population, hardly distinguishable on an economic basis from the ordinary commoner. The nobility as a whole, however, maintained its traditional privileges, and the higher ranks found more in common with the higher ranks of clergy and Chinese officialdom than with the Mongol commoner.

In nomadic areas, there was less social distinction between noble and commoner than in the settled or semi-settled Mongol communities. The noble in a nomadic area might wear Chinese clothes and adopt a Chinese name, but he still lived in a yurt (though he might have a palace built in Chinese style), still owned herds and counted his wealth in numbers of animals, still enjoyed traditional Mongol foods and ceremonies. In the more sinicized areas, the nobility often abandoned the outward vestiges of "Mongolness," even to the extent, in completely settled areas, of counting his wealth in gold bullion and land. It has been pointed out that among the Chahar, where the traditional nobility had been eliminated during the early years of the Manchu Dynasty, the old noble/commoner distinctions had been superseded by an official/non-official dichotomy. For the most part, however, the old lines still held sway, and the demands of the nobility were suffered, sometimes unwillingly, because of their legitimacy in Mongol terms.

The clergy represented, in some degree, a class apart from all others. The upper ranks of the clergy had interests opposed in many ways to those of the nobility and the ordinary Mongol. The higher clergy was "monastery-centered", it was sedentary, oriented toward Tibet as the home of the religion, concerned with acquisition of stable wealth as well as herds. It was economically nonproductive to a much higher degree than all but the highest nobles, and engaged in economic activities, such as land exploitation, trade and usury to an extent most nobles could not achieve. Such activities put the clergy in an intermediate position between Chinese and Mongols.

The Church and the clergy maintained the Lamaist traditions of Mongol society, and by incorporation of Shamanistic observances and customs, much of the pre-Lamaist tradition. But the Church also served as a channel through which the Mongols might be drawn more and more into the economic and political web of Chinese culture. The Church, through its sedentary monastery, formed a nucleus for trade and administrative offices; its officials entered into trade relations with Chinese, rented land to Chinese farmers and merchants, sent some of its monks on trading expeditions, and frequently on a prolonged residence in Peking. In the final analysis, the upper clergy and the highest nobility had much in common; a high noble was often a "reincarnation," or an upper rank official in the monastic hierarchy. His relatives in the secular world were frequently rulers of banners or officials of leagues.

At the bottom was the commoner. Exploited by nobility and clergy, he sometimes found more in common with the Chinese farmer living next to him than he did with his own upper classes. Yet there was a tremendous cultural gap, crossed more often by the sedentarization of the Mongol than by the Mongolization of the Chinese.

Where the Mongol held his own ground economically and socially, firm ties sometimes developed between the two. A few times, in the history of Inner Mongolia, these ties proved more firm than those between Chinese and Chinese or Mongol and Mongol. Thus occasions are known where Mongol commoner and Chinese peasant rose against Mongol noble and Chinese landlord, seeking to escape from the pressures which both were exerting upon the lower classes. The cases are few, but they are significant and indicative of the possibilities of class interests surmounting traditional enmities.

2. Chinese

(For Traditional Chinese Classes, see China General, Social Structure.) Among Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia, traditional classes were somewhat fluid. The tenant farmer could look forward, in most parts of the region, to becoming a landowner within a fairly short time. The peasantry was not the only dominant class; merchants played a significant role. Where the Chinese peasant, for the most part, represented an economic and at times political threat to the Mongol herdsman or farmer, the merchant was, on the surface, a benefactor. Backed by a city-based organization, the itinerant merchant became an expert on the psychology of the Mongols, knowing when to refrain from demands for payment, at times aiding with loans, sometimes marrying a Mongol girl. Friendships were often close between the merchant and his clients. There were local differences, however. In the western part of Inner Mongolia, i.e., Suiyüan, the merchant was reputed to be a blood-sucker, ruining Mongols by dragging them deeper and deeper into debt, piling interest upon interest. In the eastern part of the region, the merchant treated his Mongol debtors on a sustained yield basis, never exhausting them but never allowing them to become completely free from his control. In the complex and multi-faceted culture of the border, the merchant sometimes played a dual role; as landlord vis-a-vis the Chinese tenant, and as capitalist in trade ventures or irrigation projects.

Chinese officials in Inner Mongolia formed a group apart. Their interests were sometimes oriented outside of the region, toward national affairs, and they often had little desire to better the region which they administered. Higher officials, however, might at times oppose the designs of middle officials, which were almost always exploitative. The middle officials sought personal gain; their aim being to exact more out of the province than was put into it. Because of the peculiarities of the border political administration, their exactions fell most heavily upon the Chinese peasant. In some cases, the officialdom sought to build up a regional base almost divorced from the Central government, and for this purpose would cooperate now with Chinese and now with Mongol nobility eager to make a deal. The officials were, withal, still Chinese, and despite the links with Mongol leaders, most often placed their weight behind Chinese in the area when the issue was a clear-cut Chinese-Mongol dispute.

Despite the importance of the Chinese merchant and the power of the Chinese officials, by far the greater number of Chinese in the region were farmers. Their way of life was affected by the area into which they moved, with an unwilling soil in most parts of the region. Where the soil was not fertile, some degree of cooperation in irrigation was necessary. In the eastern and northern parts of the region, intensive farming gave way to extensive; in the more remote parts, away from the cities and the areas of irrigation, dispersed farmhouses rather than concentrated villages were the rule. In those areas where the Chinese farmer lived side-by-side with the sedentary Mongol, much social intercourse was carried on, but on the whole, marriage remained within the group and did not cross lines. Politically, the Chinese were little concerned with the Mongol nobility and administration; they looked to the local and provincial governments under which they lived. In the eastern and northern parts of the region, some blending of minor cultural traits took place; in the west, the interpenetration of Chinese and Mongol customs was slow, and for the most part, it was the Mongol who became sinicized where the two were in day to day contact.

3. Mongol-Chinese differences

The differences between Mongol and Mongol, Chinese and Chinese filled the region with overlapping goals, values and loyalties. In general, there was no supra-local pattern for either Chinese or Mongol which could surmount these differences. In effect, Inner Mongolia was not one cultural region, but many; not one political region, but many; not one economic or geographical region, but many. Still, in all parts of the region one basic difference is discernable—that between Chinese and Mongols. At the bottom the difference was between values. The Mongols, even though sedentary, still felt pride in being Mongol. Mobility, herds, religion, traditional customs, were still the Mongol ideals. These ideals were reinforced by the constant pressure of economic competition posed by the Chinese farmer. But the loyalty to Mongol values could be overwhelmed by class and local loyalties, and for some Mongols, especially among the nobility and clergy, was replaced by loyalty to privilege. Thus for these individuals, loss of Mongolness meant loss of position, loss of prestige and a relatively luxurious existence. While culturally they remained Mongols, mentally and materially they tried to combine the best of both worlds; to be Mongol while living on the same scale as the rich Chinese. At the other end of the scale were the Mongols who had accepted all things Chinese as good and desirable, but were forced back into Mongolness because they were not accepted as equal to Chinese.

These lines of force expressed themselves in different ways. In Barga there were attempts at autonomy and union with Outer Mongolia. In Suiyüan, there was a withdrawal from the "Mongol for the Mongols" ideal during the Japanese war, and an alignment with the Chinese Nationalists. In the Hsingan region, particularly in southeastern, there was cooperation with the Japanese, who initially offered what the Chinese did not—equality and fulfillment of desires for integration, rather than absorption.

After the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, Inner Mongolia lost all semblance of over-all integration. During most of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the Manchus had managed to maintain a dichotomous and balanced structure in Inner Mongolia. In general, Mongols were screened off from Chinese, not physically but through such mechanisms as separate political organization, state-encouraged church, personal ties of noble to Manchu court, and restrictions on the Chinese settler. Toward the end of the dynasty, the system began to break down; local interests came to the fore, and it was apparent that the screening process had not stopped the cultural envelopment of many groups of Mongols. Although Chinese cultural and economic penetration had gone far into Mongol life, still one thing could hold all Mongols together—loyalty to the Manchu Dynasty. When the dynasty fell, the sectional differences, historical antagonisms, and degree of acceptance of Chinese values made themselves felt.

Throughout the period of the Republic, "the Mongols" had only nominal ties to the central government. On the whole, personal relationships between local and provincial officials and Mongol upper classes played a more prominent role in determining Sino-Mongolian relations. The Tibetan Buddhist (Lamaist) Church, which once played an integrating role, itself was rent by sectional differences. Local Mongol nobility found more in common with Chinese officialdom, in many cases, than with Mongol nobles from areas far removed. The people looked for leadership to the nobility, and most often followed their lead. If the leader was favorable to the Chinese, the commoner might grumble and protest, but he suffered and made the best of it.

Local attempts at re-integration of the Mongols on a basis of Pan-Mongolism were made, but they rarely reached beyond the provincial level. The old Mongol dynamic had been effectively blocked when the Manchus tied each group of Mongols to a particular territory. Over time, the territorial tie seems to have superseded the concept of wide-ranging conquest.

III. National Integration

A. The Republic and Mengchiang

The lack of region-wide integration in Inner Mongolia was no historical accident. It was the result of a deliberate policy adopted by the Manchus on their entry into China, and was perpetuated by the central government of China after the Revolution. The Manchus had tried to keep Mongols and Chinese apart, and had separated the Inner Mongols from one another politically and territorially, but had never tried to impose "Manchu" customs upon the Mongols. The Manchus were content to hold the commanding heights of Mongol social structure—the nobility and the clergy—and to undercut the basis of the Mongol threat by curtailing their mobility.

The government of the Republic embarked upon a more ambitious policy. Inner Mongols were to be convinced that they were essentially Chinese, and were encouraged to become Chinese. Mongol territory was carved up into new provinces, and the Mongols in each were blocked from direct access to the National government by provincial officials. A determined effort to attract and settle Chinese in Mongol lands was begun, with the Mongols having no alternative but to retreat farther into the less productive regions or to buy back what they had formerly owned. In some cases the Chinese officials, in collusion with Mongol princes, settled the disposition of the lands between themselves; the people were driven into revolt against both. During the late Manchu Dynasty, the system of expropriation in eastern Inner Mongolia reserved for each Mongol family two square li of land, and a proportion of temples. The remaining land was graded and expropriated, then sold. The prince of the banner received half the sale price—he was under no legal obligation to pass on this revenue to his followers. The Chinese who had previously made private arrangements with Mongols fared no better, in many cases. They were "allowed" to buy the land from the government at the rates which applied to virgin soil, and unless they complied, their claims were worthless.

New forms of expropriation were developed by provincial governors or warlords in Inner Mongolia during the early Republic. One of these was particularly used in Chahar, where soldiers were moved in as colonists. Initially, seeds, draft animals and agricultural implements were to be supplied by officials. The soldiers were to work half the day in the field and half the day at military drill. After three years, the soldiers were to be allowed to retire from the army and take up the land cultivated. Thus the control of the government was constantly present during the three years, and the rewards for faithful service were dangled before the soldiers like a carrot before a donkey. The primary purposes of this "soldier-colonist" scheme were two-fold; to relieve the central government of the financial burden of an excessive standing army, and to solidify government control of the frontier areas.

The traditional Chinese social structure was not to be disturbed in this scheme. Indeed, one might say that an attempt was made to reduce the fluidity of the border agriculturalists' class lines. Officers were to receive larger amounts of land than common soldiers, and were to become village leaders after demobilization. Ordinary soldiers received less land, and were destined to become the ordinary farmers. Under the government scheme, the village pattern of life was supported, rather than the "natural" growth which characterized large areas of Inner Mongolian farming life, i.e., scattered and isolated farms.

Mongols were not forgotten in the schemes of the colonizers. They were to have the option of becoming farmers themselves on the same terms as the soldier-colonists, or were to be granted special pastures in which to nomadize. If neither of these schemes appealed, a subsidy was to be granted. In effect, their area of free existence was further limited, and they were to be drawn into more dependence upon the government or upon Chinese cultural patterns.

In some areas these schemes remained in the paper stage, but colonization in general was encouraged and the Chinese settlers put down roots. The old patterns of life, however, common in China proper, suffered in the new environment. Regional differences developed, and regional loyalties took hold among the "old settlers." The tie to the central government was weak, from provincial or regional official down to the transplanted peasant. Extensive farming and the tenant farmer/absentee landlord system combined to weaken the traditional attitudes of the farmer to his land and accoutrements. Among migrant laborers (a phenomenon peculiar to Inner Mongolia agriculture in China) and among tenants, many had no local loyalties—their homes were in other provinces, and their hearts were there as well.

Added to these factors, which militated against integration even on the regional level, were the almost continuous periods of troop movement, banditry, and general upheaval to which residents in almost all parts of Inner Mongolia were subjected during the period of the Republic. At times, Chinese farmers found more protection from their Mongolian neighbors against bandits than from local, provincial or central government officials. Parts of the region were, at times, controlled in fact by bandits, either in defiance of all authority or in collusion with Chinese officialdom. Bandit groups of both Mongol and Chinese origin ranged the country, sometimes fighting one another, sometimes plundering individually the rich caravans passing through the region, again, Mongol attacking Chinese and Chinese striking at Mongol. In most cases, Mongols were driven to banditry in desperation over the occupation of their hereditary grazing lands. Chinese and half-Chinese bandits were most often criminals exiled from China, deserters from the armies, or mixed Chinese-Mongols who were accepted by neither group.

This general state of disorganization and localism had to reach an end. The end began with the encroachment of a new power from the East. The occupation of Manchuria by Japan, which brought the Mongols of Manchuria under her control, brought with it a plan of organization which drew the Mongols into a higher level of integration. From a relatively autonomous regional or local pattern of relationships, the Mongols were made part of the over-all governmental organization in Manchuria. Ostensibly, they were shaping a new and integrated Inner Mongolia, led by Mongols for the benefit of Mongols. In the early stages of this development, Mongols staffed all the governmental offices, from the top down to local levels. At the top in each level were Japanese advisers, "helping" the Mongol officials to fit their policies and plans into the over-all pattern of Japanese military expansion. Schools were established, in which Mongolian became the language of instruction. The monasteries were restricted in their activities, and the monks forced to take an elimination examination, failing which they were returned to secular occupations or the newly formed army. The army itself, while under Mongol leaders, was modeled on the invading Japanese army and advised by Japanese officers.

Economically, Eastern Inner Mongolia was exploited for the benefit of the Japanese. When the Japanese had extended their domination to major portions of North China and Western Inner Mongolia, the total pattern emerged. Inner Mongolia was to be treated as a region which was bound economically and politically with North China. All "races" resident in the region were to unite for the benefit of the region as a whole. The Mongols and Chinese were now to be considered partners with the Japanese (albeit junior partners) in the development of the region, rather than contenders for the region.

What were the forms of integration during the period of Japanese "forced fusion?" Politically, the traditional Mongol banners were maintained at the local level, but they were tied together with the Chinese areas, under a central government concerned with making each portion of the territory a segment of the greater whole. Under the direction of the unified government, industrial development, financial affairs, communication, education, military matters and public health were centralized. The importance of the high level integration was expressed thus, at the time of organization of the central authority for the region: "We expect to make this area a paradise for seven million people, having a common interest and welfare, having close cooperation and control over mutually important matters." (Mokō Taikan, "Mengchiang".)

That such a centralized organization, which planned to integrate all cultural groups, economic groups, classes and geographic areas into a unified whole was manipulated and erected for the benefit of the Japanese invaders is of little moment. Steps were taken, within the total Japanese plan, to implement some of the types of cooperation and integration proposed. Of most importance is the fact that for the first time since the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty, some form of over-all organization of the region was contemplated. The region was not only seen as a whole, but the people within it were, in principle, to be treated as co-equal groups, and as supplementary and necessary to one another if the region was to develop.

The life span of the unified government of the area was short. It had not been supported by all the people, either Mongolian or Chinese, but the seed had been sown. When the Japanese were finally driven from the area, some of the mechanism and some of the psychological preparation for further extension of the concept of a unified Inner Mongolia remained. In different parts of the region, local governments sprang up, but each was now imbued with the idea of regional unity, rather than separatism. A "Mongolia for the Mongols" idea still persisted, but alongside of this attitude existed the feeling that some compromise with the Chinese of the region must be found. Thus, some of the leaders of these local governments sought to attach themselves to the central power which could guarantee them that an attempt would be made to treat the region as a whole, at the very least as one province in a new China. Little propaganda was needed to make them listen to the proposals of the Chinese Communists. For the most part, the opposition to unity with the newly formed "Inner Mongolia Autonomy Association" was found in those who stood to lose privileges; high lamas, known anti-Communist Mongol nobility, Chinese landlords, pro-KMT Chinese officials, or soldiers such as Li Shou-hsin, who had been most prominent in the period of the Mengchiang.

A unification came, and with it Chinese Communism. Centralization and integration into the national pattern was intensified to a degree hitherto unknown in the region. The weight of the central government, the immediacy of its demands and rewards was felt at the lowest levels, penetrating even into the realm of the family. The development of the region into its present territorial form, and the extent of penetration of the centralization and national-integration was initially slow, but has speeded up with the solidification of control. The statement of the Chinese Communists that "Inner Mongolia is an integral part of the territory of China" is no idle boast.

B. National Integration of Local Levels under the Chinese People's Republic

National forms of organization, interaction and orientation have not been simply superimposed upon the region. Boundaries have been broken down and groups recombined into larger units. The basic dichotomy between Mongol nomads and Chinese remains, but overlapping governments, Chinese and Mongol, have been wiped out. On the national level, minorities are represented by pro-Communist minority members in the upper ranks of government; on the local level, minorities have their own areas or are joint participants in "coalitions." The national form of political activity and representation in People's Congresses and People's Governments has been introduced from the village or nomadic encampment to the level of the regional administration. National laws are enforced in the region, applying to Mongol and Chinese alike; although certain aspects of the laws are applied with restraint where they would dislocate too rapidly the traditional Mongol life. Thus the old Mongol nobility has been allowed to retain certain privileges, and has not been uniformly condemned, as were Chinese landlords. The land reform laws have been applied to all farmers, be they Mongol or Chinese, but there has been less pressure on the herders. State farms and state stock farms have been introduced, and an attempt has been made to collectivize both herding, farming and trade with more attention to agriculture. In carrying through these national measures, local Mongol and Chinese officials, volunteers and party workers have been urged to take part, and the principal is constantly emphasized that all work is for the mutual benefit of the participants and the nation.

In the realm of religion, special effort has been made to convince the lower ranks of the clergy that their interests are more similar to those of the lower ranks of society than to those of the upper clergy. Some monks have been drawn into local government; others have been "encouraged" to take up manual labor or return to secular life. On the national scene, Lamaism is promoted, famous temples are being restored as national monuments, and a few monks are being supported at state expense. There is an attempt to use lamas to propagate the new ideas, making them in effect arms of the state propaganda machinery. The economic activities of the church have been greatly restricted, and former religious fairs and celebrations have been made the occasion for showing propaganda films, organizing "drives" and emphasizing the relation of the people to the nation.

Education has become a serious concern of the state. Mongols are taught in Mongolian, Chinese in Chinese. Textbooks, while written in Mongolian or other minority languages in the Region, are approved at the national level, and emphasize national concerns. Special effort is made to bring minority students to "academies" in Peking and elsewhere for higher study, where they are further indoctrinated with the idea of "unity in diversity."

The local militia, Mongol and Chinese, is an integral part of the national army, and its chain of command parallels that of other parts of China. The Inner Mongolia branch of the People's Liberation Army was one of the first units from an autonomous area to be used outside of the borders of the area.

Associations in the Region are not unique. The national organizations of youth, women, trade unions, Communist Party, special committees for national campaigns, all are found in the Region. In all of these groups, wherever possible, Chinese, Mongol and other minority groups are joint participants.

Perhaps the most symptomatic of the incorporation of the Mongols and the diverse sub-cultures of the region into the national level of integration is in the encouragement of cultural patterns. Local folk art, dance, music and literary production are encouraged and are taken into the nation as a whole. Through touring troupes, films, mass media of communication such as newspapers, magazines, radio, books, the folk culture of different groups in China is "nationalized," made part of the knowledge of people in different parts of the country. Reciprocal exchanges of folk-dance teams between distant regions are common; films dramatizing the new developments in Inner Mongolia are shown to people in Sinkiang.

C. Summary

In brief, Inner Mongolia as a Region, and the groups within the region, are becoming specialized cultural sub-units of the national whole. Within this region the segments of Chinese and Mongol society which operated as local or regional units prior to the Communist conquest are becoming segments of the over-all Communist Chinese culture. The national pattern is extended over and across cultural and local boundaries, and a leveling process has begun which, if continued, will bring a larger area of shared behavior between Chinese and Mongol in the region.

The integration into the national pattern does not mean the

loss of all cultural identity, however. Economic specialization is still continuing, and while an attempt is made to settle the nomads, recognition of the national need for products that only nomadism can give in quantity is not lacking. The encouragement of local variations in the "esthetic" realm of traditional arts perpetuates differences, as does the encouragement of the languages of minorities. Among the Mongols in particular, only the clergy has been severely restricted. In their traditional statuses and roles, the nomadic social structure has been relatively untouched. The settling of the nomads, however, cannot fail to have a significant effect upon the social organization; in most areas where semi-sedentary or sedentary life has been adopted by Mongols, the adoption of Chinese family and inheritance patterns has been slow but sure. It is also of interest to note that sinification of the settled Mongols has been historically most rapid and thorough where the old nobility was destroyed or submerged.

The process of integration has not proceeded without resistance. Traditional antagonisms between Chinese and Mongol have persisted, and Chinese Communists have, in some instances, treated the Mongols as inferiors. The old dream of an Inner Mongolia under the complete domination of the Mongols persists. The increasing pressure upon the nomads to become at least semi-sedentary strikes hard at tradition. Among the Chinese in the region, there cannot but be a feeling that they are being treated more harshly than the nomadic Mongols and in some areas, that they are being sacrificed to the Mongols. Such a feeling must be generated by differential treatment in regard to such measures as collectivization and the glorification of Mongolian heroes.

Without objective data, one cannot state how deep is the present cleavage between Chinese and Mongol in the region. The Communist policy, which gives at least a section of both Chinese and Mongol peoples a chance to participate in patterns that are essentially alien to each, establishes a new socio-cultural segment in Inner Mongolia. The Mongol and the Chinese Communist have a value system, patterns of behavior, goals, statuses and roles which set them off from traditionalists of both groups. The extension of national patterns into Inner Mongolia, and the economic and political integration of the region into the nation as a whole have been carried out with much skill. Many former areas of conflict have, it is felt, been suppressed, if not eliminated. The policy of treating the area as a specialized region of China as a whole, rather than a series of regions which must be kept apart, is realistic. That it is considered an experimental region by the central Communist government is apparent from the frequency with which it is referred to in regard to conditions and practices instituted in other national autonomous regions.

Inner Mongolia is still diverse, still an area of fluidity. For those of any group in the area who accept the Communist goals and the new cultural patterns which are being instituted, there are many possibilities of advancing in status. New roles are open, in the Communist party, in the new industries, in the construction of lines of communication, in the various organs of state power. For those who hold the vision of a new type of society, there are few barriers. For the traditionalists, for the individual who rejects the new, whose anti-Chinese or anti-Mongol feeling is still strong, for those who long for the "good old days" of nomadism or uncontrolled trade or gentry status, the integration of the region into the national level is a straight-jacket, from which the only escape can be through outside agencies. From an objective standpoint, the changes will not be so rapid nor so thorough as they superficially appear to be. The national economy needs the products of the herdsman, and the nomad may become a husbandman, but he will remain and with him, many of the old traditions and cultural patterns. The incorporation of folk patterns of behavior into the national pattern will perpetuate these older patterns, even though the content is modified to fit the needs of the Communist government of the moment. For the Mongols of the region, there is every indication that the centuries-long process of final integration with China has come; if it persists and solidifies, the form may be unpalatable and detested, but it will leave a formidable block in the way of re-segmentation. If the Mongols are led to believe that they can accept the new goals, and find that in reality the acceptance will not really make them equal to Chinese, there may well be a reaction toward the traditional "Mongolness"; but it is safe to predict that the reaction will not be a reversion to the old social structure.

There is a combination of romanticism and pragmatism in Mongol culture, which may work to the advantage of the present regime. Glorification of the old heroes, together with a better present-day existence, may well appeal to the Mongols, despite the gradual loss of their nomadic way of life. The fact that large numbers of Mongols have adopted agriculture-plus-husbandry argues that the Mongol is not constitutionally incapable of this type of life; new areas of livelihood may be opened with the development of transportation and industry which would be more desirable than farming, and which in part might satisfy the tradition of Mongol mobility. Glorification of the "pioneering" aspects of activity in the border region might appeal to the Mongol tradition of hardihood, self-reliance, adventure. The individualism of the Mongol may be encouraged to show itself in "emulation" drives and "socialist competition." In short, the Mongol element in Inner Mongolia, given intelligent handling by the present regime, may well provide the drive necessary to make the region a cohesive unit.

The major threat to the stability of the region lies in the age-old conflict between Chinese and Mongol, between different cultures and aspirations. When the Manchus had conquered China, they imposed upon the Mongols territorial restrictions which crippled Mongol mobility. At approximately the same time, Lamaism brought into the region institutional and cultural forms which gave the Mongols a buffer against rapid sinicization. Both the Manchu political control and the Lamaist socio-religious institution arrived in Inner Mongolia at a time when old institutional forms were breaking down and a vacuum, in effect, existed. To some extent, the situation has repeated itself in the modern history of Inner Mongolia. Manchu political control was not satisfactorily replaced by the Chinese Republican government; Lamaism had developed numerous abuses and had been under attack by Mongol reformists and Japanese imperialists. If a new vacuum had not yet developed by the end of the Second World War, it was rapidly being created. The Communists thus appeared at a time analogous to that which the Manchus and Lamaism appeared, and the Communists offer, on the surface, an alternative to sinicization. Mongols are not being asked to become Chinese in all respects; they are, to some extent, being asked to become allies. The vacuum of social institutions is not being replaced by Chinese institutions alone, it is being filled by institutions which are new to both Chinese and Mongol alike. The Mongol has little alternative. He can preserve some aspects of his "Mongolness" by becoming a Communist and attempting to emphasize the preservation of Mongol customs where possible; in effect, by becoming an ally of the new conqueror. Historical parallels are dangerous, but should be suggested. Lamaism offered the Mongols the Tibetan language instead of Chinese; Communism offers Mongolian together with Chinese. Lamaism offered new gods and incorporated old gods into the theology; Communism offers new heroes, both Chinese and non-Chinese, and glorifies old Mongol heroes. Lamaism offered new statuses and roles to large numbers of Mongols, both noble and commoner; Communism offers new statuses and roles to all segments of the population, adding a new hierarchy to the old and modifying the old. In sum, Communism does in the secular realm many of the same sorts of things which Lamaism did in the religious and secular realms when it established itself in Inner Mongolia. The key difference, conceptually, is that Lamaism emphasized the difference between Mongol and Chinese, while Communism emphasizes unity of both within a new ideology.

Whether the period of enforced unity of a somewhat similar sort during the Japanese occupation has prepared the Mongols to accept this situation remains to be seen.

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HISTORICAL SETTING

I. Introduction

The history of Inner Mongolia as a political-geographical unit begins only with the conquest of China by the Manchus (1644-1912). Before that time, Inner Mongolia can be characterized as a zone of transition through which passed group after group on its way to conquer China, or back to its homeland after an unsuccessful attempt at conquest. This is not to say that the region itself has no history: far from it. But its history prior to the Manchus is the history of interaction between Chinese society on the one hand and nomadic peoples or non-Chinese empires on the other. At times, Inner Mongolia has been the edge of an empire established by non-Chinese peoples whose home base was in Outer Mongolia or Turkestan; at other times parts of Inner Mongolia have represented the unstable fringe of the Chinese Empire. In either case, the peoples of Inner Mongolia have shown tendencies to absorb Chinese culture with more rapidity and to a greater degree in certain parts of the region than in others.

As far back in the recorded history of China as one can go, there have been contacts and relations between the Chinese and the people inhabiting the region of Inner Mongolia. The interaction between inner China and this frontier zone forms an integral part of Chinese history, and is one of the most fascinating aspects of that subject. Occupants of the steppe have been to China a source of needed goods in peace and a threat in war. Raid, trade and tribute have been the age-old pattern of relationships between the two areas. In the course of these relations the nomadic peoples on the frontier have learned from the Chinese and have adapted what they have learned to the problems posed by their various conquests of China.

Historically, then, Inner Mongolia has been, as a region, a "builder of nations," but never a unified nation itself. It has provided the door through which conquering nomads could enter or leave China, but as a consequence, it exhibits the results of such relatively frequent passage.

When China was strong and her management of the "barbarians" adept, the Inner Mongolian region served as a buffer against pressures building up on the outlying steppes. Under those dynasties which had themselves originated in border areas, the region and its inhabitants became not only buffers, but were transformed into an extension of the control system of the dynasty. The border peoples, no longer pure steppe-nomads, were made the means of extending the influence of the dynasty ruling in China. Until the military, political and cultural influences of their border position resulted in alienating these groups from their more nomadic congeners, these "frontiersmen" could remain as a threat about to descend upon the Chinese and at the same time function as catalysts in relations between China and the "outlanders."

The border between Inner Mongolia and China lacks precise historical definition, for it changed according to the relative strength of China and the peoples beyond the frontier zone. The frontier zone was occupied by Chinese who had pushed into the territories of the nomads in search of land, by various nomadic peoples, and by sinified border peoples who had become settled and had adopted Chinese agriculture to some extent. Chinese, on the other hand, sometimes intermarried with the nomads or adopted their way of life, although it was more often the other way around. Much of the border population, however, was of mixed Chinese and Mongol or other stock.

During periods of border warfare, the border peoples would variously identify their interests with the Chinese or with the Mongolian side, depending upon the circumstances.

The most important areas of the Inner Mongolian region, in relation to China, have been the Ordos Plateau, located within the upper bend of the Yellow River, and the northeastern area along the Hsingan mountain range bordering on Manchuria.

Particularly pertinent to the history of Inner Mongolia are the periods of the Yüan, Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties (1280-1367, 1368-1643, 1644-1911) and the more recent experiences under the Republic and under Communist control. It was during these periods that the region took much of its present shape. The later phases of the Republican period in China, together with the present Communist phase, inject into the organization of the area a factor not present in earlier history, that of industrialization. It is possible that this factor will eventually modify the patterns of interaction between Chinese and non-Chinese in the region enough that one cannot, without intensive study, draw significant equatable patterns from earlier history. The history of earlier relations between the Inner Mongolian nomads and the Chinese is one of mutual inability to integrate. The presence of industrialization and the effective centralization of political power in China raise the probability of such an integration.

II. History of the Inner Mongolian Region

A. Earliest History to the Rise of the Yüan Dynasty

Toward the end of the Chou Dynasty, in the fourth and fifth

centuries B.C., the Chinese states began to expand into the territories of the nomads. Adopting the art of mounted archery from their opponents, the Chinese drove the nomads back out of the Ordos Plateau and beyond the Yin-shan Range, and finally occupied the stretch of southern Manchurian territory from about Mukden to a point west of the present city of Jehol. The nomads soon retook these territories, however, and repeated encounters with the northern tribes, particularly those known as the Hsiung-nu, led to the building of the Great Wall of China during the Ch'in period (B.C. 249-210 A.D.), a construction far surpassing the earlier walls which were its prototype.

The construction of these walls provided for the first time a defined frontier between the Chinese and the peoples to the north. Markets grew up along this frontier, at which Chinese peasants bartered their produce to the nomads in times of peace. This trade mechanism, in more or less the same form, persisted throughout Chinese history. The nomads dwelling along the borders came to expect it, and it soon became a concern of the Chinese state rather than merely a profitable enterprise for individuals.

During the Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.), the pattern of frontier relations became well established. Driven back by the Ch'in Dynasty, the nomads of the north formed a tribal union under the Hsiung-nu. This Hsiung-nu union gradually established an empire and by the beginning of the second century B.C. represented a significant threat to the stability of China. The trade through central Asia was continually threatened by the position of the Hsiung-nu. Thus a series of engagements and wars was entered upon by the Chinese which resulted in the withdrawal of the nomads to the north. The Chinese eventually broke the power of the Hsiung-nu, cleared the nomads from the Ordos, re-established themselves in northern Shansi and Shensi, and forced the main body of the Hsiung-nu far into present-day Outer Mongolia.

Until the year 439, the frontier was rent by the struggles of the Chinese and the nomads. Sixteen kingdoms were built up and destroyed in quick succession in north China, Inner Mongolia and southeast Manchuria by various branches of the Hsiung-nu, Hsien-pi, the Ch'iang of northeast Tibet, and the Chih from the west. Though non-Chinese in origin, some segments of each group after conquest or settlement gradually tended to accept more and more of Chinese culture. In fact, the group as a whole might resist complete assimilation, while the rulers proceeded to build up a typical "Chinese" court. If the people as a whole remained more tribal than "Chinese," while their ruling families lost their original ways and language, the tribal group might be the first to rise against their rulers. If both ruling families and the tribal people became sinified enough to lose their original identity, a new nomadic or semi-nomadic people fresh from the steppe would move in. Thus the former raiders, having established a kingdom, would become the raided.

The succession of kingdoms, empires and groups in north China and the Inner Mongolian region, looked at historically, takes on the nature of a play performed on a fixed stage. Group after group entered right or left, swept the center of the stage, were stopped at either side, pushed into the wings by another expanding group, and disappeared from the Inner Mongolian region.

In the fifth century A. D. the Toba and Juan-Juan successively occupied the Chahar steppes and the Jehol hills in the northern part of present-day Inner Mongolia, and by the middle of the fifth century, the rise of the Turks had displaced the strength of both these groups.

During the T'ang Dynasty (618-907), Turkic influence was felt strongly in China. The T'ang rose with the aid of Turkic cavalry, and in the early period of its development, the T'ang court was obliged to buy favor with the Turks through elaborate gifts.

Several campaigns were waged against the Turks in the seventh century, and the Turkish Uighurs, allied with the Chinese, helped to break the power of the eastern group of Turks. The western Turks remained a menace, however. In 895 the western Turks, or Shato, founded a short-lived dynasty based on Shansi, which spread out into a number of provinces in the next few decades. The Shato tried to rule as a foreign military elite over the Chinese subjects, but at the same time they took over the Chinese political structure and used those Chinese who knew how to operate the system. When their rule ended, some of the Shato upper class had become assimilated to the Chinese way of life. The portion of the Shato who remained "tribal" removed to the western part of Inner Mongolia and to Kokonor, where they remained as a minor ethnic element.

The next important foreign dynasty in north China was that of the Khitan, a league of tribes which had become the dominant power in the north and northeast. The Khitan, for the most part, were willing to live in peace with the Chinese after their invasion of the Sung empire in 1004. Once they had become comfortable and prosperous, however, Juchen tribes to the north of their dominions became active. The Sung allied with the Juchen to drive out the Khitan, with the result that Juchen themselves invaded the Yellow River basin and established their rule in north China. The Juchen firmly controlled the military, and eliminated Khitan and Chinese remnants from the empire's elite army.

Politically, the Juchen ruled as a group apart from the conquered, and socially they began at once to keep themselves distinguished from the Chinese. Although this policy was gradually relaxed among the Juchen nobility, the bulk of the ordinary people remained somewhat slow to fuse with the Chinese. Consciousness of the difference between the two groups was greater because of official attempts from time to time to outlaw the Chinese customs which had been adopted by upper-class Juchen. As a group, they tended to displace rather than fuse with the Chinese.

Decade after decade, century after century, the waves had been lapping at the Chinese beach. Large portions of that beach had been submerged in various periods to re-emerge later as the waves receded. But the tidal wave which inundated the whole country was yet to come. The Mongols were about to appear, having built up a formidable strength in the steppes during the later years of Juchen rule in north China. When the Mongols attacked China proper they had already conquered central Asia, had established a working relationship against the Juchen, and finally had broken the Juchen power by an alliance with the Chinese of the southern Sung Empire. They had built up a political league which was numerically stronger than those of the earlier alien peoples, and which had at its command the advantage of all the new technical advances and arts and crafts of western and central Asia and parts of Europe. The Mongol Empire may be looked at as the end product of a historical process which developed with a more frequent periodicity from about the eighth century A.D. When the Mongol Empire collapsed and was replaced by the Ming Dynasty, it was for China the end of a long era: The Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty, successor to the Ming, was in reality the continuation of a style of conquest-rule begun by the Shato, developed by the Juchen, and as such, different in kind from the style represented by the Mongols.

B. Yüan, Ming and Ch'ing Periods

The Mongol advance into China was relatively slow, but it penetrated farther than had any previous non-Chinese conquest. The Mongols of the thirteenth century under Chingis Khan were no longer pure nomads, but had long maintained relations with their sedentary neighbors, particularly the Chinese, and had adopted many of their ideas and ways. The Chinese element in the conquering Mongols was thus very strong. After subjecting all the major steppe peoples to his rule, Chingis proceeded to attack the various Chinese states in north China. With the aid of an alliance with the Khitan, which the Juchen had driven from north China, he laid waste the Juchen empire and captured the capital, Peking, in 1215. Leaving one of his commanders to finish the campaign, Chingis turned his attention to the conquest of various central Asian territories and empires. Before his death, Chingis Khan divided his empire among his sons, his wife and his closest followers. Since that time the Mongolian princes and rulers have traced their "white-boned" noble lineage to Chingis Khan. The memory of Chingis has survived strongly among the Mongols in folklore, songs and religion. He has come to be regarded as a sort of semi-divine being sent by Heaven, whose triumphs were arranged by Heaven, and who will someday rise again and lead his people to a new era of greatness. A cult of Chingis has survived in Inner Mongolia, centered about the tent containing his alleged remains and relics, which until recently were watched over by successive generations of a special guard. Every year the Mongol nobles traveled to the camp Ejin Khora, at which the remains were enshrined, for a great sacrificial feast.

Chingis granted the Mongolian home region to his youngest son, Tolui. The successor to Tolui was Ugedei Khan, who completed the conquest of the Juchen Empire with the aid of the southern Sung emperor. The Mongols next turned their attention to the conquest of China proper, which was not accomplished until 1279, and was directed by Khubilai, who had become Khan of the Mongolian home region in 1260. Khubilai now proclaimed the Yüan Dynasty, with Chingis as its founder, and he himself became the first Mongol emperor of China.

Khubilai adopted a policy of duality in consolidating Mongol rule over the vast regions of China. Mongol armies and their non-Chinese auxiliaries were separated from the Chinese, who were used as local militia and later as guards along the southern frontiers. The civil administration was organized to keep key positions in Mongol and non-Chinese hands. To insure Mongol pre-eminence, legislation contributing to separatism was established: The population of China was divided into four groups--Mongols, Central Asian auxiliaries (Uighurs, Turkish peoples of other groups, Tanguts, Russians and Bulgars), North Chinese and South Chinese. The non-Chinese groups were favored both economically and administratively; the Chinese were actively discriminated against or tolerated. South Chinese fared worse than those of the north and of the border areas. Chinese could carry no arms in the early period of the dynasty; they were at first forbidden to learn Mongolian or other foreign languages; intermarriage between south Chinese and non-Chinese was forbidden. Foreigners formed the mainstay of the dynasty, even after Chinese were again allowed to try for government office through the re-established examination system.

Despite the extreme measures to maintain barriers between the rulers and the ruled, many aspects of Chinese culture were adopted by the Mongols. Influence was not only from Chinese to Mongol, however, for the Yüan Dynasty left its mark on Chinese culture. The influx of foreigners and foreign trade made their impression, as did the Mongol encouragement of Buddhism and Taoism. Mongol encouragement of the theatre contributed to the development of Chinese opera. Indian, Tibetan and Nepalese influences were felt in the Tibetan Buddhist temples and religious sculpture; knotted carpets began to be made in north China for the Mongol patrons. Mongols, particularly the upper classes, developed a taste for Chinese food, but held to the drinking of mare's milk and to traditional foods. Socially, however, Chinese customs had little influence upon traditional marriage and kinship institutions of the Mongols. Howorth has characterized the Mongol position in China as "that of a huge encampment . . . they were strangers there, and failed to assimilate with the indigenes." This failure to become part of China and Chinese culture limited the duration of Mongol rule. Continued exploitation, even with indirect benefits to the ruled such as the improvement of the Grand Canal linking north and south China, and the system of post roads, raised irresistable pressures upon an unstable structure. No more than fifty years after the death of Khubilai Khan, revolts broke out which drove the Mongols back into the steppe.

The Mongols were not expelled from China as a unified group. Large numers remained in the service of the new Chinese dynasty, the Ming (1368-1643), and Mongol troops in some cases helped the Ming Chinese against the Mongol Yüan Dynasty. This division continued to militate against a united Mongol attempt to reconquer the throne, although numerous leaders attempted to recreate and occupy the position of ruler of all the Mongols. A major split occurred at this time, and the Mongols divided into two groups, the Eastern and the Western. After a brief period of dominance by the Western group, both were united for a time under Dayan Khan (1460?-1504? A. D.).

Dayan Khan divided the eastern tribes adhering to him into two sections: a right and a left wing, geographically distributed along the border of north China. The western Mongols, called Oirat, nomadized west of the Alashan range. But constant internecine warfare allowed no real stabilization of these groups, and the border situation was fluid. Chinese forces periodically sortied into the frontier regions of southwest Manchuria (Jehol, Liaotung) and, prior to Dayan Khan's consolidation, had even penetrated into north Manchuria and solidified Chinese control. Shifting alliances between Mongol tribes, or Chinese "protection" of one group of Mongols against the other, characterized Inner Mongolian political relations throughout the Ming period, and a gradual solidification of Inner Mongol groups began to take place. By 1546 the leadership of the right-wing Inner Mongol groups

(Ordos, Tumet and Yungsiyebü) was in the hands of Altan Khan, grandson of Dayan. Altan harassed the Chinese, fought the Oirats and made contact with the Tibetans, beginning the process which resulted in the ultimate conversion of the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism).

Altan Khan brought relief to the Chinese in 1569-70, concluding peace in return for trade concessions such as the establishment of horse markets. As the Mongols in western Inner Mongolia were now quiescent for the moment, acting as the guardians of the border, the Chinese could turn their attention to the eastern part of the region. Here the Mongol leaders continued to be intransigent. In addition, the Manchu power was rising in Manchuria, promising to force a decision in the future. The Ming attempted to negotiate with one of the most powerful Mongol leaders, Ligdan Khan of the Chahar, tempting him with a regular subsidy and trade. Ligdan was to provide the eastern buffer as Altan Khan provided the western. But Ligdan attempted to consolidate his position among neighboring Mongol groups, a move which drove many Mongols over to the Manchus. In 1626 Ligdan struck at the Manchus and was rebuffed. From 1626 to the end of 1627, Mongol allegiance to the Manchus vacillated. By 1634 the combined effect of Manchu strength and Ligdan's attacks secured the adherence of most of the Inner Mongol groups to the Manchu power. The final capitulation of the Chahar and of all the Mongols was symbolized by the delivery of the great seal of the Yüan Dynasty into the hands of the Manchu emperor. In 1636 the Manchu emperor was recognized by almost all the Inner Mongol groups, and in 1691 by the Khalkhas as well, they being established now in present-day Outer Mongolia.

The Manchu conquest of China and their alliances with the Mongols marked the end of the "corridor" aspect of Inner Mongolia. The Manchus demarcated Mongol territories, reorganized the Mongol tribes into administrative units attached to those territories, and in effect constituted Inner Mongolia as a region. Where the earlier Mongol division had been between east and west, under the Manchu reign, eastern, western and southern Mongols were distinguished. Ming policy on the frontier had been to pacify the nomads, governing through their traditional leaders where possible, and bribing or threatening various groups not under their direct control. The policy of divide and rule was used to its utmost, the primary aim being to prevent the union of the Mongols under a powerful and conquest-minded leader. The Manchus, establishing themselves as the Ch'ing Dynasty, faced the problem in a slightly different way. The policy of division was continued, but the groups were kept separate first by defining their territory, secondly by centralizing their administration under the court in Peking, thirdly by making

it necessary to confirm all Mongol officials in Peking, and finally by giving Mongol rulers a vested interest in the dynasty through marriage and subsidy. A powerful tool also existed in Tibetan Buddhism, which had entered Mongolia in the late fifteenth century. The establishment of large, fixed monasteries with an extensive hierarchy of functionaries aided the attempt of the Manchus to stabilize the Mongols. Through stabilization and incorporation (as of the Mongol forces incorporated into the military system), control of religious institutions and the nobility, subsidy and protection against various intransigent Mongols, the Manchus established a relationship with the Inner Mongols which lasted until the fall of the dynasty.

The banner system, by which the Manchus governed the Mongols, was devised prior to the conquest of China, and had been used by the Manchus themselves. The nomads were divided politically into two classes: the self-governing and the governed. The old self-governing tribes were broken up and reorganized into banners, each under the control of a hereditary chieftan called a jasak, taiji or tabunang. These banners were grouped into leagues, each under a captain-general and a deputy captain-general, who were selected by imperial appointment from among the leading jasaks. The leagues and banners were in turn placed under the control of the imperial government and its agents. Leagues and banners sometimes included sections of tribes which formerly had been a single unit, or, in many cases, a tribe was reconstituted as a banner. Banners and leagues were limited to definite territories and forbidden to nomadize beyond their limits. Finally, all nomadic administration was under the supreme direction of the Board of Foreign Dependencies in Peking.

Governed tribes were organized into banners, which were divided into squadrons and were under the direct control of the imperial agent nearest them, or under a functionary delegated to govern them.

In Inner Mongolia, as a consequence of the cooperation which most of the Inner Mongol groups had given at an early date, a relatively high degree of self-government was allowed. Only the Chahar and the Tumet Mongols were not allowed to be ruled directly by their hereditary princes. Responsibility was given to the league for command of the banner troops and for adjudication of disputes between banners which could not be solved by direct negotiation. The banners were responsible for maintenance of the imperial military post roads which extended through their territory. The princes of the banners were invested with their titles and rule by the imperial court, and were required to send annual tribute to the court. Periodically, banner princes were obligated to make an appearance at the court in Peking, where they were feted and presented with gifts.

Mongol and Tungusic groups (see China IMAR, Ethnic Groups) were enrolled in the original eight Manchu banners. Others who retained their mode of living as wandering tribes and hunters were placed under the control of military governors, and were required to appear periodically with tribute at the Bureau of Hunters.

Under the Ch'ing Dynasty, a relative equilibrium in Inner Mongolia was attained. The wide-ranging movements of conquest by nomads were halted; the last real attempt was by Galdan, the western Mongol leader who, for a time, challenged the might of the Manchus and the eastern Mongols and drove a long wedge into eastern Outer Mongolia. After Galdan's defeat by the K'ang-hsi emperor (r. d. 1662-1723), only minor upsurges troubled the dynasty. The relative stability introduced into Inner Mongolia by the Manchu territorial demarcations and the monastic system of Tibetan Buddhism gave a powerful impetus to the pacification of the frontier. Perhaps most important for the Manchu frontier policy was the integration of Mongols into the state apparatus as allies and honored dependents, together with the establishment of Lamaism after the old Mongol institutions had become disorganized.

Conditions were favorable for the growth of the Lamaist monastic institutions (see China IMAR, Religion). The Mongol princes' struggles for political leadership through military force were halted by the capitulation of the various Mongol groups to the Manchus in 1634-36, and the monastic system had time to consolidate its position. Superimposed upon the traditional Mongol administrative organization, the Manchu administrative structure protected the vested interests of the nobles. The monastic system did not represent a threat to the nobility, but was accepted by them as an ally. In Mongolia the monastic institution was not bound solely to the fixed locations of the monasteries, but could adapt its organization to the limited movement allowed to the nomads. Thus Lamaism formed a bridge between stability and mobility, but at the same time offered a new avenue of social and political mobility. Under the old Mongol pattern, politically or economically important positions had been limited strictly to the nobility or their dependents; the various ranks and positions of the monasteries increased the opportunties for social advancement to ordinary Mongols. The Mongol commoner who previously could anticipate only a life of herding, fighting or raiding now was able to rise to the equivalent of noble status, for the lowest rank of monk was equated socially with the lowest ranks of the nobility, and so on up through the hierarchy. Representing a non-Chinese cultural focus with its orientation toward Tibet, the monastic system functioned as an escape from the

prospect of absorption by Chinese culture.

Not until the mid-nineteenth century was the equilibrium of Inner Mongolia significantly disrupted. The turning points were the relaxation of Manchu regulations against Chinese colonization, the Western impact on China proper, and with the establishment of the Chinese Republic (1912-1949), a new frontier policy.

1. Chinese colonial pressure

During the three centuries of Manchu rule, a change gradually came over Inner Mongolia. Mongol aristocrats who had come into contact with the Chinese began to build cities in the Chinese manner, and brought in Chinese to serve them, to supply them with luxuries and to work in their fields. This resulted in a migration of Chinese artisans, merchants and farmers into Mongol country. At first this movement was seasonal and licensed by the government, but gradually the Chinese settled down and acquired land from the Mongol princes. Many of the Mongols, too, began to settle down as farmers, despite their natural dislike for sedentary life, and despite the policy of the Ch'ing government to preserve their traditional economy.

As agriculture became established among the Mongols, there came a change in the concept of land tenure, a change from collective ownership by the tribe to ownership by the prince and individual Mongols. Through foreclosure of mortgages, land gradually passed into the hands of the Chinese farmers, who thus gradually encroached upon the lands of both the agricultural and the pastoral Mongols. The change, at the same time, led to a widening of the social differences between the aristocrats and the lamas, on the one hand, who became wealthy landowners, and the commoners, on the other, who became impoverished and landless. Civil wars and natural catastrophes drove more Chinese into Mongolia, where they reproduced the agricultural pattern of China proper, gradually dominating the economy by their industry, and where many became prosperous as the standard of living of the Mongols deteriorated.

The policy of the Ch'ing government had been to preserve the economy of the Mongols, but by the second half of the nineteenth century, as the Ch'ing government weakened, this policy was abandoned. In the closing decade of the century, the government itself embarked on a policy of colonization, especially in the Ordos (Ho-t'ao) region and the lands of the Ikechon league (Suiyuan). The Chinese colonists, supported by the government, gradually became the privileged class. To make the situation worse, land commissioners came in and made fortunes for themselves at the expense of the Mongols. In 1901, there was a wholesale mortgaging of land by the Mongols who were unable to pay their assessed share of the indemnity for the Boxer Rebellion. The bulk of this land went into the hands of Chinese colonists in a second large-scale colonization scheme launched by the government in 1902-1908.

Chinese colonization in Mongol country increased after the establishment of the Republic in 1912. There were land booms in 1916-19 and in 1926-28. On the premise that the land belonged not to the Mongols but the Chinese nation as a whole, and that titles of possession could be granted only by the Chinese government, the Chinese enacted new land laws which deprived the Mongols of their land. Despite the efforts of the central government to introduce certain safeguards for the economic well-being and the culture of the Mongols, provincial officials and speculators continued to push hard against the Mongols.

In their advance against the less prepared and less organized Mongols, the Chinese made full use of the methods and means they had borrowed from the imperialists of Japan and of the West who were then encroaching upon China. The Chinese used modern weapons of warfare to overawe the Mongols and railways to facilitate their drive. The seizure and reclamation of land went hand in hand with railway building. The construction of the Peking-Mukden Railway into Manchuria and the Peking-Suiyuan Railway into western Inner Mongolia had been followed immediately by swarms of Chinese farmers who staked out lands within the jurisdiction of the Mongol leagues. In the north, the Chinese Eastern Railway crossed the Hsingan Mountains into areas occupied by the Barga tribes. The line pushing northwestward from T'ao-nan, as well as the Cheng-chia-t'un line, thrust into the land of the Jerim League. To further colonization, the Chinese launched the Great Hsingan Reclamation Project in 1929, employing the Reclamation Army as a spearhead to extend the line from T'ao-nan to Solun, and eventually by way of the southern Hsingan Mountains, to link with the Chinese Eastern Railway at Hailar. Although the higher authorities promised the Mongols they would be accorded favorable treatment and that the promotion of agriculture would not exclude their pastoral interests, the ruthlessness of the lower officials led to the eviction of many Mongols from their land. It was only in the fall of 1931, after forty miles of the railway had been built, that the Japanese seizure of Manchuria brought an end to the project.

By 1930, Chinese penetration into Inner Mongolia had reached its height. Colonization by Chinese farmers included as much as two-thirds of the land of the Jerim League, all the land of the Josotu League, half the land of the Jouda League, seventy per cent of the Chahar Mongol country, all the country of the Tumet near Huhehot (Kuei-sui), all the land of the Ordos west of Suiyuan, and forty per cent of the land of the Ulanchab League. (Lattimore, Mongols of Manchuria, p. 26. According to the Chung-hua Nien-chien, 1948, II, p. 1894; seven-eighths of the land of the Ulanjab and seven-ninths of the land of the Ikhchao Leagues were colonized.) Only the territory of the Silingol League in northern Chahar remained untouched by agriculture and colonization. Consequently, the leaders of Mongol resistance have been for the most part men from this league. Prince Te of the West Sunit Banner in this league was one of the most active leaders of the Mongol independence movement.

C. Inner Mongolia and the Republic--the Development of Nationalism

The increasing pressure of Chinese colonists into the lands of the Mongols (see China IMAR, Ethnic Groups), the lowering of the standard of living and the impoverishment of the people, the corruption and oppression of local officials, and the inability of the people to find redress, resulted in a growing animosity on the part of the Mongols against the Chinese. This situation was further aggravated by the change in the Chinese position to one of privilege and dominance, and the lowering of the Mongols to a subject people, a complete reversal of the situation of earlier times, when the Mongols employed the Chinese as farmers and artisans. The encroachment of the Chinese was not uniform around the Inner Mongolian perimeter, however, so the impetus for a united opposition in Inner Mongolia was lacking. Consequently, the Inner Mongols rose in local rebellions rather than in concerted revolt.

Early rebellions were actually aimed at the Mongol princes, rather than at the Manchu Dynasty or Chinese colonists, for it was the princes who, in many cases, disposed of Mongol lands to support their own interests. The Chinese backed the social authority of the princes, treating them as if they, rather than the tribes in general, owned the land. Many of the princes acquired grants of lands formerly belonging to the tribe, and so, as landlords, became wealthy and also dependent upon Chinese support. There were many princes, however, particularly those in the north such as the heads of the Silingol League, who resented capitulation to the Chinese and tried to rally the Mongols to resist Chinese encroachment.

An uprising in 1858 heralded the future, for it was during this time that the duguilang, or "round-robin," form of organization appeared in Inner Mongolia, a type of secret society that became extremely important in later struggles. The names of the members were written in a circle, to prevent the singling out of leaders. To insure maximum secrecy, only a few in each circle were in contact with members of other circles. The duguilang first appeared near Shensi, an old seat of Chinese secret societies, and may actually have been inspired by a secret organization of that region.

The real resistance movement of the Mongols, however, dates from the 1880's, when the Chinese began their "land reclamation" scheme in the Kuei-sui--Pao-t'ou region of Suiyuan. At that time, members of the Ushin Banner in the Ikechon League organized themselves into a duguilang society which met periodically to discuss problems such as ways to resist the tyranny of the princes and the expansion of the Chinese colonists. After peaceful means failed, the Mongols were sometimes driven to adopt violent methods. In 1891, Mongol settlers, evicted first from lands of the Jouda and Josotu Leagues and then from lands of the Jerim League, rose in rebellion in Jehol. This rebellion was inspired in part by a Chinese secret organization known as the Chin-t'an hui (Gold Pill Society).

The emergence of Mongol nationalism was spurred by two events in 1911-12, the establishment of the Chinese Republic and the acquisition of local autonomy by Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Republican government announced a policy of equality of races in China and was at first conciliatory toward the racial minorities. The Mongols had hoped that a weak China would reduce Chinese colonial pressure and also give them a voice in Chinese affairs. They were quickly disillusioned. When Inner Mongolia's status as an "outer dependency" was abolished, the Chinese also abolished the local autonomy which the Mongols had enjoyed under the Ch'ing government. The rising tide of nationalism in China, along with the fear of Russian and Japanese encroachment, moved the Chinese to reassert their power in the northern frontier. The area of what later became Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia were first made special districts in 1912, and provinces under the direct control of the central government in 1928.

With the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty and the declaration of Outer Mongolian independence, new struggles began in Inner Mongolia. In the far northern part of present-day Inner Mongolia, the Barga region declared its autonomy. The Barguts demanded the removal of Chinese officials, the withdrawal of all Chinese troops, and the cessation of Chinese colonization. A potential move for union with Outer Mongolia was prevented through the mediation of Russia, which at this time had concluded a secret agreement with Japan, recognizing Japanese influence in Manchuria in return for Japanese recognition of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese were persuaded to grant the Mongols sufficient autonomy in local affairs to placate them. In 1915 Russia again mediated between China and the Barguts, when their limited autonomy was threatened by the Chinese government, and the Barguts once more remained relatively free.

Another rebellion took place while China was in the throes of revolution in 1911-12, in the region around T'ao-nan, an area deeply affected by Chinese colonization and railroad construction. It involved two banners of the Khorchin tribe in the Jerim League, led by Prince Otai. Five columns, two of which were led by Inner Mongolian leaders, marched south from Outer Mongolia in an attempt to bring independence to Inner Mongolia, but the revolt proved abortive and the columns withdrew after looting several Chinese towns.

The land boom and the migration of hordes of Chinese colonists in the years from 1916 to 1919 drove the Mongols to rebel again in the Barga Plain where the Chinese Eastern Railway ran through, and in the region along the Mukden--Chang-chun--Harbin Railway. The rebels, most of whom were Mongolian farmers, were put down by the Chinese with modern weapons. In 1920 the national government cancelled the autonomy of Barga, moved it into the jurisdiction of Heilungkiang Province, and coerced the Barguts into "requesting" incorporation into the Chinese provincial system.

Again in 1928 the Barga Mongols revolted in the north while, simultaneously, one of the banners of the Khorchin tribe in the Jerim League, which found itself in the path of the Hsingan Reclamation Project, rose to defend their land from the local officials in charge of the project. In defiance of the orders of the Chinese government to safeguard the rights of the Mongols, these local officials were exploiting and evicting the Mongols from their land. Mongol resistance was put down by the reclamation troops until the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 ended the project.

The constant pressure of Chinese immigrants, official exploitation, and determination to absorb Inner Mongolia, along with the developments in the "free" Outer Mongolia, continued to build up an Inner Mongolian nationalism. Along the borders, those Mongol princes who had accepted Chinese encroachment and profited from it became increasingly differentiated from their subjects on a social plane. Mongol landlords developed, with aims sharply distinct from those of the ordinary Mongol herder or agricultural laborer. Within the clergy, the lower and middle lamas took secular employment in order to live, while the high lamas and Living Buddhas enjoyed a high standard of living from contributions. Forces were building up in Inner Mongolia on two lines, against the Chinese and for internal reform. Between 1911 and 1916, the anti-Chinese element predominated in the revolts led by Babojab in southern Mongolia. In 1917 Babojab joined with Manchu Prince Su in an attempt to restore the Manchu Empire, and died in this campaign. Leaders who followed were to learn from these early attempts. These relatively isolated uprisings, by men driven to desperation, taught the Inner Mongols that they could not stand alone. The lines within Inner Mongolian society began to be drawn more sharply between those who had privilege and position to lose by opposing the Chinese and those who could see no escape under the existing system. These lines were in themselves complex, however. Lack of opposition to the Chinese did not mean complete acceptance of encroachment by Chinese colonists, for at a certain point the losses outweighed the gains. Thus some of the princes and lamas who benefited least from the rental or sale of land to the Chinese held out for a cessation of colonization and for limited self-government.

Indications of the change of Chinese policy in regard to the border peoples, after the establishment of the Republic, may be seen in statements of Chinese leaders of the time. In 1921, Sun Yat-sen, who earlier had announced a policy of racial equality, urged the intensification of nationalism and the use of the Han Chinese as the center for assimilation of the border people. From this concept, the Kuomintang gradually evolved a policy of assimilation, the coersive aspects of which have been deprecated by its enemies as Great Hanism. In initiating this policy, the Chinese not only provided more schools for the Mongols, but also encouraged Mongol students to enter schools and colleges in China proper. Among the young Mongols who enrolled in the Mongolian and Tibetan Institute in Peking in 1924 was Ulanfu, who was destined to be a principal in the great drama later enacted in Inner Mongolia. In these schools, the Mongol youth not only acquired an education, which had been denied to their fathers, but they also became infected with the impatience and ultra-nationalism of the Chinese students, and having lent a ready ear to Nationalist propaganda denouncing "feudalism," they became fired by ideas of equality, self-determination and self-government.

The Chinese government at first paid no heed to the aspirations of the Mongol intellectuals, many of whom, unemployed upon leaving school, had no alternative but to join the revolutionary movement. Nor did the Chinese government pay great attention to the Mongol princes, aside from recognizing them as tribal rulers. While the Ch'ing government had given the Mongol princes privileges and subsidies, the government of the Chinese Republic halted the payment of subsidies, and, in contrast to the royal welcome which St. Petersburg and Moscow accorded the Outer Mongolian dignitaries, Peking and Nanking treated the Inner Mongolian princes with contempt. Thus there was resentment against the Chinese by both the Mongol aristocrats and the commoners.

In their dissatisfaction and despair, many thinking Mongols looked toward Outer Mongolia for guidance and inspiration. Under the aegis of Russia, Outer Mongolia acquired self-government in 1912, obtained Chinese consent to abstain from further colonization, thwarted a Chinese attempt in 1919 to reassert authority, and, after a revolution in 1924, established a "people's government." Although Outer Mongolia nominally recognized the sovereignty of China, it was actually independent. Thus, although revolutionary movements had taken place earlier in Inner Mongolia, it was Outer Mongolia that achieved independence first, a fact which profoundly impressed the intellectuals of Inner Mongolia. Following the abortive Putschs, many of the revolutionaries found asylum and employment in Outer Mongolia. They and other young Mongols gradually emerged as a coherent party.

The pronouncements of the Canton "leftists," the internal struggles of the Kuomintang, and the radical program of the Canton Commune (December, 1927) had as much of an impact in Inner Mongolia as it did in China. There were, however, no definitely documented leftist movements in Inner Mongolia until about 1923. At that time the National Revival Club was organized by the "progressive" young Mongols, many of whom were influenced by the development of an "independent" Outer Mongolia under Soviet influence. There are indications that at least two tendencies among the politically aroused Inner Mongols existed from 1923 to 1925. One tendency was linked to Pan-Mongolism, supporting the union of Inner and Outer Mongolia and probably urging reforms in Inner Mongolia similar to those being carried on in Outer Mongolia. It is possible that this tendency was expressed in the form of a small Communist organization, but whether this group operated in Inner Mongolia or from an Outer Mongolian base is not certain. This organization, if organized it was, voiced Pan-Mongolian sentiments at the first General Khural of the Outer Mongolian People's Republic in November, 1924. At this meeting, Fumintai, a representative from Inner Mongolia of the "Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Party," expressed the desire of the Inner Mongols for the assistance of Outer Mongolia in freeing them from Chinese oppression. This sentiment was echoed by a representative from the Ordos.

The other tendency was perhaps stronger at that time. This tendency was represented by those who sought for aid in the radical group of the Kuomintang. As it happened, the situation developed in their direction.

In 1925, when Pai Yün-t'i, Merse, Ulanfu and others organized the National Revival Club into the Mongolian People's

Party of Inner Mongolia, it was with the blessing of the dominant warlord of the area, Feng Yü-hsiang, and the Communist Party of China, at that time cooperating with the Kuomintang. This group allied itself with the fortunes of the Chinese revolution and the Kuomintang, at least with one section, the "left" Kuomintang, and its subsequent history was intimately linked with them. At the first Congress of the Mongolian People's Party of Inner Mongolia, Feng Yü-hsiang, representatives of the Outer Mongolian government and the Canton Communists joined in congratulations to the new movement. The party was active from its inception. One of its aims was organized resistance to Chinese administration, and it played a part in the Hsingan uprising in 1928.

Another of its aims was abolition of the authority of the princes, and in 1930 it went so far in doing away with the power and prerogatives of the princes that the head of the Jerim League had to wire the Nationalist government for help.

A third aim was the achievement of independence from Chinese rule and union with Outer Mongolia. In this they met determined resistance from the majority of the princes. Union with Outer Mongolia, the princes feared, would mean not only extension of Russian influence, but also the danger of being overshadowed by the government of Outer Mongolia. The clamor for union with Outer Mongolia continued, especially from among the more articulate of the Mongol leaders, and their machinations to achieve this end were a constant factor in Inner Mongolian politics, despite the geographical barriers and differences in social structure and ideologies of the people that had to be overcome. (Not only are Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia separated by the Gobi Desert and by tribal history, but Owen Lattimore suggested that, in addition, there was a psychological barrier to unification. In the past, the various unifications of Mongolia had been preceded by bitter internecine warfare, leading eventually to the emergence of a leader who would not only unify Mongolia but also lead the Mongols to victorious conquests. Consequently, the average Mongol could not think of Mongol unification except as a result of a war between Inner and Outer Mongolia to determine the right to leadership [*Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 54-56].) Inner Mongolia was not only economically dependent upon China, but its population was predominantly Chinese.

Not all the young Mongols entertained so extreme an objective. Many of them sought to attain a closer one, which was to secure a large degree of self-government within the federative framework of China. Even these men were divided in their views. Some believed in rallying around such aristocratic leaders as Prince Te (Demchuk Dondub) of the West Sunit in the Silingol League, and in organizing their autonomous government

with the assistance and prestige of the princes, while others believed that a new regime could be achieved only by the overthrow of feudalism.

The revolutionaries, however, represented only a small percentage of the population. The majority of the Mongols asked only equality and a fair deal from the Chinese, and many of the princes opposed the revolutionary movement and were uncertain with regard to the autonomous movement. Prince Yün (Yondan Wangchuk) of the Ulanchap League, for example, became interested in the autonomous movement of Prince Te in the hope of gaining control of the opium traffic which passed through his domain, and which would net him an income of three million dollars a year.

The princes of leagues having large Chinese populations, like Prince Sha (Shakdorjab) of the Ikechon League, or princes of banners threatened by Japanese expansion, such as Prince So (Sonam Rahtan) of the Ujumchin Right Banner of the Silingol League, opposed the autonomous movement of Prince Te and turned to the Chinese government for help.

An explanation of the divergence of opinion with regard to Pan-Mongolism may possibly be found in the confused political situation of the time. Russian policy was attemtping to maintain a hand among the two major groups of the Kuomintang, represented by Wang Ch'ing-wei (the left KMT) and the Chiang K'ai-shek group, not yet identified as the "right." In Outer Mongolia, Soviet policy followed the line of Pan-Mongolism until late 1925. It is possible that the pro-Pan-Mongolia delegates to the Outer Mongolia Congress represented a dual Communist policy for Inner Mongolia, where the Soviet Union was supporting the warlord Feng Yü-hsiang against the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin. It is also possible that the two divergent tendencies in Inner Mongolia had a more local basis. The Inner Mongolian Left Kuomintang (Mongolian People's Party) was organized primarily by students of the Mongolian and Tibetan Institute at Peking, and had its center within the domain of Feng Yü-hsiang, while Fumintai of the "Eastern Bureau" may possibly have represented the strong Pan-Mongolism of Barga, and the Ordos representative may have had little contact with the Mongolian People's Party organizers, as his region was under the dominion of the warlord Yen Hsi-shan.

Soviet policy shifted away from Pan-Mongolism at the end of 1925, becoming open in 1927-28, and the shift was convenient in terms of uniting the Inner Mongolian nationalists. The line which the Mongolian People's Party adopted at its 1925 convention called for opposition to imperialism, full implementation of the Kuomintang constitutional provision for equality, an end to warlordism, internal reform in the Inner Mongolian banner and princely system, and full self-determination of nationalities with China, a reflection of the Krakhta platform adopted in Outer Mongolia in 1921. It was clearly a revolutionary line, linked to the accomplishment of a revolution in China. There are indications in the manifesto of the Congress that an autonomous government of Inner Mongolia was contemplated, which would be federated to the Chinese Republic rather than made part of the provincial system. The manifesto stated, "The land controlled by the princes and chieftains shall be handed over to a popularly elected organ," and "the popularly elected organ shall look after the protection of the interests of the country, and all the tyrannical administration now practiced in Mongolia shall be abolished (for 'tyrannical administration' read 'Chinese provincial and warlord rule')." Further: "Colleges, middle schools and primary schools for common people as well as various technical schools shall be established at state expense. . ." and a "People's Sanitation Office and various kinds of charity organs shall be established." Most conclusive, perhaps, for the argument that an autonomous government was contemplated, is the following: "When the Chinese break down imperialism and establish a real democratic government by uprooting the cruel military clans, we people in Inner Mongolia shall establish a similar democratic government." It is not said that the similar government would be an integral part of the Chinese government.

Clearly, the program was directed at the old princely system in Inner Mongolia and at domination by Chinese warlords and provincial authorities. To support the struggle for this program, Pai Yün-t'i and Ch'uan Yung-chang planned the organization of a volunteer corps of Inner Mongolia. A brigade was to be set up in each of the Special Administrative Areas of Suiyuan, Jehol and Chahar (established in 1914). It is interesting to note that Communist sources at present credit this organization to Ulanfu, current chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Republic. It is possible that Ulanfu was active in the convention and perhaps also in the organization of the Suiyuan brigade, but he does not appear to have been so prominent as Pai Yün-t'i and others. Pai Yün-t'i organized an officers' training school at Pao-t'ou and became its president, and the movement began to prepare for an encounter with the forces of the northern warlord, Chang Tso-lin.

Unfortunately for the Mongols, the movement was linked to the fortunes of two unreliable forces: the power of Feng Yü-hsiang to defeat Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, and the triumph of the left Kuomintang within China. The intricacies and maneuvers of the Chinese Communist Party within the left Kuomintang and with the bloc headed by Chiang K'ai-shek cannot be detailed here; it can be said only that they offered no alternative course for the Inner Mongols. When Feng's forces were defeated, it meant the temporary eclipse of the Inner Mongolian left Kuomintang. Pai Yün-t'i, Ulanfu and other party leaders fled to Urga, from whence perhaps Ulanfu went to Moscow. It is said in a recent Russian source that Ulanfu "emigrated for training," but no details are given. Feng Yü-hsiang himself retired to Russia in 1926, where he was feted and "educated."

In September 1926, Feng Yü-hsiang returned and reassumed command of his forces in northwest China. It is possible that at this time the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang began to reconstitute itself and emerge from hiding or underground activity. By June, 1927, Feng had decided to join forces with the Kuomintang and helped bring about a rapprochement between the left Kuomintang and the forces of Chiang K'ai-shek. This meant turning upon his erstwhile followers among the Communists, and probably resulted in the "purging" from the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang of Communists (or more probably, of Communists who were reluctant to follow this current line of cooperation with the left Kuomintang and Feng) and those suspected of being Communists. It is possible that at this time Batochir (Li Yu-chih), commander of the People's Revolutionary Army of Inner Mongolia, and Tou Sun-nien, called by Communists a "prominent Inner Mongolian revolutionary," were killed. During this time, some of the left Kuomintang leaders of Inner Mongolia, among them Pai Yün-t'i, must have left Urga (Ulan Bater) and returned to Inner Mongolia, perhaps arriving soon after Feng returned from Moscow. In any case, Pai Yün-t'i was on hand in 1928 to be elected to the Kuomintang Central Political Committee and to the National Commission of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. At least a portion of the Mongolian troops which he helped mobilize behind Feng Yü-hsiang continued in Feng's service and aided the left Kuomintang forces in their northern campaign.

On the face of it, the Inner Mongolian movement was now thoroughly tied to events in China. The Communists were struggling to keep a foothold within the left Kuomintang, Feng's armies and the left Kuomintang of China proper were engaging Chang Tso-lin's Manchurian forces in an attempt to master the north, and the forces of Chiang, both military and political, were preparing to push for complete dominance of the party and the government. Events moved rapidly. The Communists were expelled from both the right and left Kuomintang, Chang Tso-lin was defeated, and Chiang gained the upper hand and came to an understanding with Feng Yü-hsiang. From this time the Inner Mongolian nationalists were to attempt to wrest concessions from a government committed to an "assimilation" policy.

After the successful conquest of Peking by the Kuomintang and the purge of Communists from both wings of the party, the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang was reorganized. For a brief time, until mid-1929, the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang was represented in the Chinese party by delegates who were willing to plead futilely for a cessation of Chinese colonization in Inner Mongolia, limited self-government, and adherence to the idea of "equality" of nationalities inscribed in the constitution. Their effectiveness was nil against a government committed to carving Inner Mongolia into regular Chinese provinces and supporting colonization. Between August 5, 1928, and October 17 of that year, Inner Mongolia formally ceased to exist, and was replaced by the new provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Jehol and Ninghsia. These provinces formalized the former "Special Administrative Areas" established in 1914.

The reorganization of the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang did not eliminate some of the early founders of the party who might still have hoped for a shift in policy toward their earlier aspirations. Prior to the organization of the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang (held in March 1929), the party reorganization had not been entirely carried out in Inner Mongolia, and the left Kuomintang continued to exist, possibly with the continued blessing of Feng Yü-hsiang. Despite the selection of half the delegates to this Congress by the "regular" (now Chiang-dominated) Kuomintang, Pai Yün-t'i and Enkhe Bator, both identified with the left Kuomintang, attended and were elected to posts in the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee, respectively. This "hand-picking" of delegates led ultimately to a new breach with the left Kuomintang, headed by Wang Ch'ing-wei and supported by Feng Yü-hsiang, and the Kuomintang proper, under Chiang K'ai-shek and his adherents. This break came to a head when Feng began a drive, in May 1929, for control of Shantung, supported by Yen Hsi-shan. Chiang K'ai-shek's Kuomintang met in June, expelled Feng from the Central Executive Committee, and perhaps anticipating renewed help to Feng from the Mongols, enacted a resolution which called for the "treatment of and assistance of Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and the Moslems, with the object of their achieving autonomy in order to fulfill the promise of the Kuomintang to place all races in China on an equal footing."

On October 3, 1929, the Central Executive Committee of the Nanking Kuomintang ordered the arrest of the leaders of the reorganizationists (left Kuomintang) still on the committee. Among them was Pai Yün-t'i. Inner Mongol revolutionary activity, at least that of the Communists, was illegal, but was still being carried on. In the Ordos, possibly encouraged by the hostilities between the left Kuomintang and Nanking, a partisan force was assembling under the leadership of Uljei Jargal, and it is possible that this group had hoped to win concessions by offering aid to the Feng-Yen forces at a critical time. The policy of the Communist Party at this time was to establish independent soviets and to participate in military struggles with an eye to turning them against all sections of the Kuomintang and the warlords. Whether the forces of Uljei Jargal were Communists or remnants of the previous Inner Mongolian Kuomintang Mongol troops is open to question. By October 11, the battle lines were drawn: the Nanking government ordered troops into the field against Yen and Feng, and requested the Japanese, who had troops in Shantung, to refrain from withdrawing them. By March, 1930, Yen Hsi-shan's troops had taken Peking. Wang Ch'ing-wei was pursuaded to go north to participate in the establishment of a national government under the Yen-Feng auspices. It is perhaps during this period, when the direction of the Chinese Revolution was once more to be decisively determined, that Ulanfu returned from Russia or Outer Mongolia to help build up Inner Mongol Communist and nationalist sentiment and organization. There is no evidence, however, that he worked with or against the reorganizationists (left Kuomintang), or came into contact with Pai Yün-t'i, who certainly was associated with the new Peking developments.

This whole upsurge was again to be short-lived. The person considered essential to making the establishment of the Peking government successful was offstage in Manchuria--the young marshal, Chang Hsüeh-liang, son and successor of Chang Tso-lin. Chang had not committed his troops on either side, but in September, 1931, Yen Hsi-shan's troops sustained a major defeat, followed by Yen's retirement from the struggle. Chang quickly declared himself against further war, occupied Peking, and called for submission of the Nanking regime. The "right" was firmly in control.

The status quo was virtually restored, marked merely by the official retirement of Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, and the installation of Chang Hsüeh-liang as the dominant warlord in the Chahar-Jehol region. For the nationalistic Inner Mongols, this spelled the real end of an era, and henceforth their struggle was to be disorganized and local until a new power arose to "help" them. This was not long in coming, in the form of increasing Japanese interest in the area. The small and relatively impotent Inner Mongol Communist movement was committed to join forces with the Chinese Communist Party. While promoting nationalism, they were forced by the line of the party to attempt to direct it toward collaboration, as they had in the past, in a "new" Chinese Revolution. To the Mongol leaders, who had put their faith in understanding and help from the Kuomintang revolution, this line must have sounded hollow. To those who had followed Feng Yü-hsiang, it could have had little appeal, since amnesty and restoration to a semblance of their former positions awaited them in the new, unified Chinese Kuomintang and government. For the most part, the firm Mongol nationalists looked around for a way out, in some cases submitting in order to postpone the inevitable conflict with Chinese encroachment. To others, Japan offered an illusion of new and real autonomy.

1. Nationalist policy and the rise of Mengchiang

In 1930 the Nanking government called a Mongolian Affairs Conference, at which about two hundred delegates were expected. Only fifty actually came, mostly from eastern Inner Mongolia, a center of Mongol nationalism and a region strongly influenced by contact with Japan and by Chinese colonization. From the outset, therefore, the conference faced the charge of not being representative of all Inner Mongolia.

The declared aim of the conference was to "deliberate and formulate measures to facilitate enforcement of various administrative policies for Mongolia during the period of political tutelage," and also to "determine a number of practical reconstruction schemes and other improvements which will prove beneficial to the general Mongol public." The policy of the central government was ostensibly to improve the political, economic and social position of the Mongols under the direction of the central government, without altering the provincial structure or giving the Mongols a separate autonomous regime. It was proposed that certain internal reforms, such as the abolition of slavery and nationalization of Lamaist temples, be introduced, as well as the improvement of transportation, livestock, health and education. On paper the plan offered promise, and might have had much appeal if it had not been for the delay in implementing it. During this period of delay, the example of Outer Mongolia and the increasing Japanese propaganda for an "autonomous" Inner Mongolia built up nationalistic pressures. The Chinese government attempted to counter these forces with propaganda through the establishment of newspapers, a singularly inept method for a highly illiterate group. Meanwhile, feeling for Mongolian autonomy grew steadily. In May, 1931, Mongolian students of the Tibetan and Mongolian Institute in Peking demonstrated for self-determination.

The Japanese had been studying the culture and history of Inner Mongolia for years. Japanese policy in the penetration of Inner Mongolia proceeded on two levels, the secular and the religious. On the secular level, the key policy was to utilize the desire of the Mongols for autonomy and to convince the Mongols that it was the Japanese who would deliver them from extermination by the Chinese. Through this policy, Japan hoped to make the Mongols into the kind of allies they had been to the Manchus.

As a showcase example to the Inner Mongols of the Manchurian border, the Japanese set aside Hsingan, largest of the Manchurian provinces, with four subdivisions ostensibly under autonomous Mongol rule. However, the autonomy proved to be only racial and cultural, for political control was kept firmly in the hands of the central government at Chang-chun, and no provincial capital was established. At first, however, an effort was made to establish Mongols in even the higher posts, with Japanese advisors. Initially, therefore, it appeared as though the Mongol dream was to be realized through Japanese aid, and dissatisfaction with Chinese policy increased.

The Nanking government was obviously disturbed by these developments. It dispatched a commission to Inner Mongolia to explain its position to the Mongol leaders and solicit support. The commission was to emphasize the doctrine of racial unity between Chinese and Mongols and attempt to calm the fears and and anger of the Mongols over Chinese economic and population pressures. As a token of its concern, the central government voted money toward the building of a Mongolian school in Peking and the preparing of Mongolian-Chinese textbooks, which would emphasize the friendship between the two peoples. There seems to have been little real understanding or consideration of the burning question of autonomy, however. It was this blindness which ultimately threw Prince Te, the leader of the Inner Mongols, into the Japanese camp.

Te was a prince of the West Sunit Banner of the Silingol League, one of the few sections of Inner Mongolia where sinification had made little headway. This league was particularly open to currents from both the Hsingan "autonomous" regions of Manchukuo and from Outer Mongolia, on both of which it bordered. Prince Te felt that the time had come to place Inner Mongolia on the road to development, and in his view this could be done by the unification of the region under the Mongols, the improvement of its economic and educational status, and by political autonomy. Political autonomy was considered the necessary precondition to all other advancements, and once gained, Inner Mongolia, as a province of China, could deal with the central government on an equal basis with the other provinces.

Te was aware of the importance of force, and by 1933 he had built an army consisting of about five thousand men, led by Mongol officers, many of whom had studied at Chinese and Japanese military acadamies. It was from this base that Te began to drive for autonomy. His support was first found in the Silingol League. Soon, however, his influence spread, supported by the revolutionary "Young Mongols." Reluctance was encountered in the princes whose positions and income were closely tied to China and the Chinese in Inner Mongolia. Among those in opposition was the privileged group of higher lamas. Prince Te saw the need for reform in both the secular and clerical structures. He took strong measures toward reform, forbidding young men to enter the monastic order and diverting them into military service. In Hsingan, the Japanese were pursuing similar policies, in addition to eliminating from the ranks of the lamas those who could not pass tests on religious knowledge.

The Japanese Hsingan policy, however, was beginning to show up in its true light as exploitation. To win over the Mongols, the Japanese had halted Chinese colonization in Mongol lands, but then proceeded to organize immigration companies, the largest of which was the Manchuria Colonial Development Co., which, in coordination with the Manchurian Colonization Society, launched a twenty-five year Japanese immigration plan. Much of the land in the Mongol leagues was nationalized and turned over to Japanese livestock-farming immigrants. The railway from Tao-nan to Solun, begun by the Chinese, was pushed forward to Wen-wh'uan (A-erh-shan), spur lines were built leading out from the Chinese Eastern Railway into the timber lands of the Hsingan Mountains, and in the south, the Cheng-chia-t'un--Tung-liao line, as well as the line into Jehol, opened up lands in the Jerim and Josotu Leagues to agriculture and industry.

With Inner Mongolia strategically located between China and Japanese-dominated Manchukuo, the Mongol leaders found themselves in a superb bargaining position, courted by emissaries of both sides. Nanking announced its willingness to abstain from further colonization, but the Mongols wanted to deal directly with the central government and not through the provincial authorities. Manchukuo waited for the Mongols to involve themselves in an uprising against the Chinese, when they would have to come begging for support to Manchukuo.

Prince Te and his followers still hoped that Inner Mongolia would remain part of the Chinese realm. They were beginning, however, to be pressed to a decision. By the spring of 1933, the Japanese began a drive into Inner Mongolia. The important town of Dolonnor in Chahar Province was occupied, and a base built up for the penetration into the rest of the region. In May, 1933, the Japanese welcomed some of the Inner Mongols of Chahar into the city of Hsinking, Manchukuo, where they pledged their loyalty to the restored Manchu emperor, Pu-yi. This action seemed to justify the Japanese belief that the old loyalty to the Manchu dynasty could be awakened among the Mongols.

Enmity between Chinese and Mongols continued to build up. Bandits along the borders were active and widespread, and the Chinese provincial authorities refused to allow the Mongols arms with which to defend themselves. The promises of the 1930 conferences had not been implemented, and the process of Japanese "nibbling" was pressing the Mongols in an ever tighter vise. Even the differences between the nobility and the more "radical" Mongols were being put in abeyance in the struggle for autonomy. In mid-1933, Prince Te called a conference of princes at the temple in Pai-ling-miao in Suiyuan to discuss the advance toward autonomy. Only his close followers took part, however, for the twelve northern Chahar banners had declared themselves against Prince Te, as did a few others which were under Japanese influence. The conference declared itself firmly for a Mongolian Inner Mongolia, and telegraphed the central government in Nanking demanding full autonomy. The increased Japanese activity in the north and the obvious unrest of the Mongols promised to develop in dangerous ways. The Nanking government sought to save the situation by dispatching a delegation under Huang Shao-hsiung, newly appointed chief commissioner for Inner Mongolia. At the same time, a high member of the Tibetan-Mongolian Affairs Committee was sent around to the Mongol princes in an attempt to clarify the position of the central government, and if possible, to gain support for it. Prince Te and his followers met with Huang at Pai-ling-miao in October, 1933, to attempt a solution.

At this meeting, Huang attempted to convince Prince Te that the establishment of Inner Mongolian autonomy was precisely in the interests of Japanese policy, and that if Te would change his demands, there would be no difficulties between the Chinese and the Mongols. But the situation had gone beyond the power of mere promises to halt its development. So strong was the concern of Nanking that it attempted to put pressure on Te through the agency of the Panchen Lama, one of the highest authorities in the Lamaist Church. Prince Te countered by agreeing to install the Panchen as the official head of the proposed autonomous regime. On October 20, 1933, the Political Council of Inner Mongolia was formed. Prince Te reiterated the desire of the Mongols for adherence to China, but emphasized that full autonomy in internal affairs must soon be forthcoming. It was not to be. At the meeting with Huang in October and November, an alternative plan was proposed, which succeeded in splitting off from the movement a group of princes more willing to compromise and save their positions. This plan called for maintenance of the existing provincial structure, the end of Chinese immigration, and local autonomy for the Mongols. There would be two autonomous Mongol districts, North Chahar and North Suiyuan, within the existing Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, and these would be allowed to form an "Autonomous Mongolian Council." Prince Te was not convinced. Before the council ended, he made an impassioned speech in which he sounded a warning note to Chinese and Mongols alike:

> "In earlier times the Mongols were a free folk in one land. They were not defeated and oppressed. When in 1911 the Chinese Revolution broke out and the Manchus were driven from the throne, the Mongols entered the new Chinese Republic as one of the five peoples under the five-striped flag. Their friendship belonged to the Republic, but their land, their people, their cattle, belonged to them and no other. . .
>
> Chinese farmers came and took our land. They drove the Mongols far into the sandy wastes. . . Still the Mongols said nothing and remained within the Republic, for they were true adherents. During the last twenty years the Chinese have taken more and more Mongolian land. The land, however, became a nest of Chinese bandits, who fell upon the settlements, stole the cattle and killed the people.
>
> In the East, however, another power grabbed a piece of Inner Mongolia, and in the North a strange power infiltrated and stole Outer Mongolia. . . Few Mongols are left behind in a diminished Inner Mongolia. Now a point has been reached when we can do nothing other than to help ourselves.
>
> The Mongols can sleep no more. . .
>
> We, however, desire only that we be allowed to maintain Mongolia as one land and the Mongols as one people. Mongolia shall form a buffer-state between China and the neighboring states to the north and east.
>
> Mongols and Chinese can help each other!". . .(CWR, Nov. 1933: see Heissig, 125.)

Nanking saw only the acceptance of its plan by part of the Mongols, and felt the crisis was overcome. Prince Te, however, held a meeting in December, 1933, with other "irreconcilables," to discuss ways of combatting the plan. The Japanese were also active. They had stabilized their control over eastern Inner Mongolia, established Jehol as a new Manchurian province, and set up the Bureau for the Mongolian People in Dolonnor, from which Japanese propaganda flowed. They studied the history, culture and religion of the Mongols, and impressed upon those they encountered the image of "progress" in Hsingan-Mongolia, under the benevolent guidance of Japan and control of the Mongols. In contrast, the national government of China was procrastinating, still talking about limited local autonomy under the provinces, and proposing a Chinese high commissioner to control the nominally self-governing Inner Mongol Council. Still more irritating to the Mongols was the proposal that this high commissioner have the power over trade, appointment to official positions, and final voice in decisions of the council.

Still the Mongols attempted to work within the limitations of

Chinese hegemony. In April, 1934, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Political Council was established with Prince Yün as president, Prince So as vice-president, Prince Te as chief secretary and Pai Yün-t'i as central representative.

The apparent acquiescence of the national government to Mongol desires was hastened by the increasingly influential Japanese propaganda. In March, 1934, Pu-yi had been crowned Manchu emperor in Manchuria, a move designed to re-awaken the loyalty of the Mongols to the Ch'ing throne. The granting of partial autonomy to the Mongols, together with a small subsidy and the right to collect taxes and form a government, seemed to the Nanking government to have countered Japan's moves. Had the leaders of the movement been willing to drop their dream of real autonomy and accept the government subsidy as a pacifier, the Chinese government could have rested content. But they were facing not merely a group of discontented princes; they were attempting to hold back a tide with nets.

The national government was being brought to a critical decision in its Mongolian policy. On the one hand, it attempted to wring concessions from provincial governments by backing the Mongols; on the other hand it temporized with the Mongols, hoping to find a way to avoid the ultimate commitment to actual autonomy. Such a balance could not last long, and it was broken by controversies through 1935.

The first point at dispute was over the power of the Mongol government to exact taxes on the opium caravans which passed through their realm en route to Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi. Yen quickly asserted his authority and sent Chinese troops to prevent such action. However, the Mongols gained the support of the Chahar officials, who had been bilked by diversion of the trade to Shansi. A compromise was reached. Chahar was to receive a part of the opium and the taxes realized would be divided among Suiyuan, the Mongols, and Chahar. But the Mongol share was to be collected by Suiyuan and refunded to them. Thus the Mongols still depended for income upon the central and provincial governments. Even this settlement, crippling as it was to the Mongols' hopes of a source of governmental income, was worrisome to Nanking. The skill of Prince Te's government at setting two Chinese provinces against each other suggested that the Mongols would not be easy to control if they once formed a really solidified unit. Nanking, therefore, began to look for means of splitting the unity of the Mongols, and found it in the princes of the Ulanchab and Ordos Leagues. A test of strength came when the council discharged one of the officials of the Mongol Council, Prince Shih. The Mongol advocates of Chinese control objected, appealed to Nanking for a decision, and were supported by the troops of Fu Tso-yi. Later in the year, in September, a close aid of Prince Te's was killed in Peking, and still later, Fu Tso-yi sent Chinese troops to "supervise" the Mongol revenue office at Pai-ling-miao.

In the northeast, the Barga Mongols revolted, asking union with the Mongolian People's Republic, a reflection of the persistent Pan-Mongolism of this region. The Japanese put down the revolt rapidly, claiming it was Communist-inspired.

A decision was at hand. Prince Te faced further Japanese penetration when the southern part of Chahar was occupied by Japan. In February, 1936, Nanking formally recognized the Suiyuan-Ordos clique of princes as the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council. Still officially proclaiming that this would fulfill the desire of the Ulanchab, Ordos and Tumet Mongols for autonomy, Nanking placed Yen Hsi-shan in the council as advisor. The majority of the Mongol officials themselves were picked by the provincial government. A "Mongol" militia under Fu Tso-yi, organized in 1935, was attached to the council.

Prince Te had no alternative. In April, Te called a Mongolian Congress of his remaining supporters, and agreed to establish, under Japanese auspices, the Te-hua (Chapser) Military Government. This government was committed to cooperation with Japan, and was supported by the Mongolian and Japanese troops of Li Shou-hsin. A collision between the eastern and western "autonomous" movements was inevitable. Fu Tso-yi's forces, nominally under the control of the Suiyuan Mongol Political Council, probed at territory in Suiyuan officially still under the regime of Prince Te. In the autumn of 1936, a group of Prince Te's lama supporters, attracted by the announced Japanese policy of revival and establishment of a Mongol National Church, attempted to seize control of the Urat Banner headquarters then under Prince Shih. Prince Shih was supported by Fu Tso-yi's troops, who attacked the lama-soldiers and massacred them. Prince Te and Li Shou-hsin moved to the attack. The military government was moved to Shang-tu, near the border of Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces, and the Mongol troops poised for control of the west. A drive was made against Fu Tso-yi, but the Mongols were overwhelmed by superior force and driven back, when a temporary hiatus occurred as a result of the Sian Incident (December, 1936, when Chiang K'ai-shek was captured by the troops of Chang Hsüeh-liang). Mongol forces were pulled back and an emergency meeting was held at Te-hua by Prince Te, Li Shou-hsin, and various banner heads. An attempt was made to swing Chinese support behind the Japanese and Prince Te's forces, painting them as "anti-Communist," and sympathizing with Chiang as the victim of the Communists. It was not long before there could be no turning back for Prince Te.

The Marco Polo bridge encounter on July 7, 1937, marked the official outbreak of the war between Japan and China. The last few months of 1937 saw numerous governments established in north China and Inner Mongolia. In August, Japanese forces moved down to Kalgan from Jehol and Manchukuo and established the Autonomous Government of Ch'a-nan (south Chahar), on September 4. On September 13, the Japanese occupied Ta-tung in Shansi and on October 15, established the Autonomous Government of Pu-pei, controlling thirteen hsien in north Shansi Province. The Mongolian troops drove westward, recapturing Pai-ling-miao and portions of northern Suiyuan, finally occupying the city of Suiyuan. In mid-October, a "Society to Maintain the Public Peace in Suiyuan" had been formed, and on October 26, it declared its support for Japan and the Mongolian Military Government. The declaration showed the direction the anticipated government was to take, and foreshadowed the future policy of the Chinese Communist Party toward Inner Mongolia. Significant in this statement was the wish for cooperation among the inhabitants of Suiyuan, Chinese, Mongolian and Moslem alike. The old principle of Mongolia for the Mongols, which had sustained Prince Te's movements prior to Japanese influence, was abandoned. The next day, October 27, a Constituent Assembly was called to lay the groundwork for a new government.

If the slogans displayed on the banners at the convention did not convince Mongol participants that their dream had taken a new direction, the speech of Prince Te must have. The slogans called for unity among the races and proclaimed their everlasting friendship. They confirmed the equality of all peoples in the Mongolian regions and urged all to love one another. Prince Te echoed these sentiments, having come, perhaps, to a realization that Inner Mongolia was not viable as a unit independent of either north China or Outer Mongolia. He said: "Now we have called this convention to decide the policy of a new government, taking into consideration all ideas of the people. We wish to begin anew with the people, to make a plan to benefit the people and to maintain the peace of the East. We open this convention today with local chiefs, military leaders, representatives of the Mongolian and Chinese people. . . I sincerely hope that all members will . . . make proper decisions, paying attention to the problems of anti-Communism and the spirit of cooperation of all races, and trying to usher in a new era of light and an everlasting foundation for the whole people of Mongolia."

The new government was headed by Prince Yün as president, Prince Te as vice-president, Li Shou-hsin as minister of war, and Tokto, chief secretary. A Military Department was organized with Yondan Wangchuk made head of the department; Jakdorjab, chief of the Ikechon League and assistant head; Li

Shou-hsin, vice-commander of the Mongolian Army; Jotbajab, chief of the Chahar League; Babdorje, vice-chief of the Ulanchab League; Rimchin Wangdu, vice-chief of the Silingol League; Wu Ho-ting, chief of staff of the Military Department; and Jirgalan, chief treasurer of the Military Department. A month after the elections, Prince Yün died, and Prince Te became president of the Autonomous Government of the Mongolian Federation.

The jurisdiction of the new government extended over part of Suiyuan and the major part of Chahar Province. A Mongol noble, Prince Te traced his descent from Chingis Khan, the symbol of Mongol nationalism. When the new government adopted a new calendar the Chingis Khan era was restored, and October 28, 1937, was taken as October 28, 732 C.K.E. The name of Kuei-hua-cheng was changed back to the old Mongol name, Kukuhoto, shortened by the Japanese to Hou-ho, and it was made the capital of the Federated Government. Preparations began for the modernization of the region with Japanese help.

For the first time in modern history, Inner Mongolia was to be treated as an integrated economic unit, with the pastoral herding economy supplemented by agriculture and small industry. The area was to operate as a part of the larger whole of North China. Political recognition of this fact was not long in coming. In November, 1937, the Federated Mengchiang Commission was organized in Kalgan to supervise matters relating to major industries, banking, and communications affecting the areas under the three autonomous governments of Chin-pei (formerly Pu-pei), Ch'a-nan and Mongolia. On September 1, 1939, the commission passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a joint Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia. This became commonly known as the Mengchiang Federation, and was established with Prince Te as president, and the chairman of the Chin-pei and Ch'a-nan governments as vice-president. (See map. For structure of the Mengchiang government, see China IMAR, Structure of Government.)

Prince Te had not lost the vision of a united Mongolia, extending over the realm from Hsingan to Sinkiang and from the Chinese border to Buriat Mongolia in the north. Perhaps he felt that the Japanese, their position finally secured, would be more benevolent than the Chinese. Policy in Mengchiang, however, followed the pattern of that for the Hsingan Provinces, and more and more closely its economy was exploited to fill the needs of Japan. Many of the developments prompted by Japan are strikingly reproduced in the present Chinese Communist development of the area. Improvement of transportation, establishment of light industry, exploitation of mineral resources, enlargement of mass propaganda media such as radio, newspapers and libraries, and above all, an emphasis on the integration of the agricultural, industrial and pastoral activities of the region. In a certain sense, the Japanese prepared the Inner Mongols for partial acceptance of the Chinese Communist program.

In the regions outside of Mengchiang, the Nationalists and the Communists still held sway. In the Shen-Kan-Ning border region, under Communist control, the policy was to win over Mongol soldiers, and special treatment was given to those taken in combat. In Yenan a nationalities school had been established to train Mongols for later work in Inner Mongolia when the war should be won. Communist Mongols, at least a few trained either in Outer Mongolia or in Russia, were active in organizing partisans in Chahar and Suiyuan. A Communist source (Dylykov) names as leaders of these groups Bolinga in Chahar, Yün Chi-hsien and Chi Shih-fu in Suiyuan, and Ulanfu, acting in cooperation with the Eighth Route Army. Dylykov also mentions partisans operating in Jehol who were led by the Chinese Communist Party and later became part of the People's Revolutionary Army. The major area of partisan activity, however, was in the west, where close liaison with the Eighth Route Army was possible. Uprisings occurred in Muu-Mingan Banner, resulting in the death of its jasak, Rinchin Khorlo. It is said by Dylykov that the reaction to the manner of his death at Japanese hands aroused other banners of the Ulanchab League. In the Urat (Ölöt) Banner of this league, a partisan group was organized by the prince of the Western Urat, Chi Chin-p'in. Eastern Urat partisans were organized and led by the commoner Pa Yün-yin. Presumably during the cooperation of these Mongol partisan groups with the Chinese Communists and Chinese partisans, the future pattern of "mutual aid" between the groups was formed.

D. Evolution of Communist Control and Establishment of the IMAR

The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asian war and the capitulation of Japan after Hiroshima left a somewhat chaotic situation in Inner Mongolia. Soviet and Outer Mongolian troops advanced from the north into the area during 1945, against little resistance. In Silingol, a former commander of the Japanese-sponsored Mongol army returned from Ulan Bator (whence he and two hundred of his men had gone when the Russian forces withdrew) and established himself in western Sunit. He was soon in control of the whole Silingol League in north Chahar. In the west, Kuei-sui and Pao-t'ou were held by the Mongol troops of Mengchiang, until General Fu Tso-yi could retake them. The Chinese Communists pushed from Jehol into Chahar, and until late in 1946, occupied Kalgan and the southern part of the Chahar plateau. With the situation in flux, Nationalist policy operated to rebuff the Mongols and throw them into the arms of the

Communists.

In all probability, the Mongols would have been willing to aid the Nationalists against the Communists if given the arms and a substantial promise of autonomy. In Suiyuan, the Nationalists soon revealed their stubborn refusal to compromise their old principle of assimilation. Once firmly established in Suiyuan, Fu Tso-yi stripped the Mongol troops of their arms and began sending them back to their homes, leaving them with no defense against the Communists. Attempts to achieve unified local autonomy in Inner Mongolia under Nationalist control were discouraged. Prince Te, living in Nanking after fleeing the Soviet and Mongol troops, tried repeatedly to secure a promise of autonomy for the Mongols. Chiang K'ai-shek replied only that the Mongolian question would be discussed after the defeat of the Communists. The 1946 National Assembly at Peking would not write proposals by the Mongols for home rule into the new constitution then being drawn up. UNRRA aid to the Mongols in Nationalist-controlled regions was diverted, the allies of the Nationalists obtaining a major share, and it was not until 1948, when the United States decided to work directly through the provincially controlled Mongol Self-Government Committee in Suiyuan, that the situation improved.

The Communists were proceeding along a much more fruitful path. In most areas which had been quickly occupied and evacuated by Russian and Outer Mongolian forces, government had gone into local hands. Before departing, those forces had methodically stripped the country, several thousand people had been taken as disciples and hostages, and many Lamaist monasteries destroyed and lamas killed. The situation called for immediate unified political measures, which began even during the occupation. At Shang-tu, north of Kalgan, a Provisional Mongolian Republic was established, but soon expired when the Soviet-Chinese Communist negotiations granted the Chinese Communist Party control of Inner Mongolia. With the occupation of Kalgan by the Chinese Communist Party, an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association was established, and Ulanfu, a Mongol member of the CCP Central Committee and long-time Communist who had studied in Moscow, was made head of this government. A meeting was held between personnel of the Provisional Mongolian Republic and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association. Some of the Provisional Mongolian Republic officials were killed in Kalgan upon arrival, some joined the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association, and others fled to Peking or to the west. However, two other independent governments had to be absorbed before Inner Mongolia was secure for the Communists.

In Barga (Hulunbuir, northwest Manchuria), the governor of the province during the Japanese occupation remained and established the Hulunbuir Interim Mongolian Government. He printed stable currency, administered justice, and secured the return of livestock removed from Barga by troops of the Mongolian People's Republic. The president of this government, a Dagur, estimated the balance of forces, saw the coming Communist domination, and allowed the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Association to absorb his government in the latter part of 1946.

The third government had been formed in a small village close to Wang-yeh-miao in the central Hsingan Mountains of Manchuria. The personnel of this Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government were again those of the former Japanese-dominated government. After its formation, the government looked about for support. Delegates were sent to the Mongolian People's Republic, to the Soviet army authorities in Manchuria, to the Chinese Nationalists, and to the Chinese Communist Party to discover the attitudes of these governments toward autonomy. The Mongolian People's Republic was sympathetic but did not want to become involved in Inner Mongolia. The Soviet military authorities refused to become immediately involved, but offered future aid. The delegates to the Nationalists attempted to see Chiang K'ai-shek personally. They not only failed to see him, but they were met with scorn, insult and lack of interest at each attempt to discuss the problem with Nationalist officials. The Communists welcomed them, and in exchange for their promise to cooperate with Ulanfu, encouraged them to establish an autonomous government.

Late in March, 1946, an eastern delegation met the representatives of the west at Ch'eng-te in Jehol and worked out the arrangements for a merger. A statement issued on the last day of the conference, April 3, denounced the Kuomintang and proclaimed a program abolishing the rights and privileges of the nobility and aiming at building a "democratic" and "autonomous" government. Shortly afterward, the regime at Wang-yeh-miao was formally dissolved, and its personnel joined the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association, a move that was followed by the Mongol regime at Hailar.

In the new, enlarged Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association, the Communist Mongolian leaders of the west appeared to have gained the upper hand. Ulanfu remained president of the association, while Poyenmandu accepted a secondary position as vice-president.

In the meantime, the Communist-inspired autonomous movement of the Mongols was coming under heavy pressure from the Chinese Nationalist forces from the east and south. The Nationalist government promised the Mongol leagues which had supported them during the war--such as the Ikechon and Ulanchab Leagues in Suiyuan and the Edsingol and Alashan Mongols in Ninghsia--equality, autonomy, participation in the central government and preservation of the culture, religion and languages, promises which were reaffirmed by the constitution of 1947. The Nationalists gave them financial assistance and food and clothing for famine relief. Not only did men in the Ikhchao and Ulanchab Leagues serve in the army of Fu Tso-i, but arms were also given to anti-Communist Mongols in the Jaoda and Jerim Leagues in Jehol and Manchuria, and in October, 1946, following the breakdown of the truce talks between the Nationalists and the Communists, Kalgan was recaptured by the Nationalists, while a column from Manchuria was pushing into Jehol.

It was, therefore, fortunate for Ulanfu and his followers that they had brought the eastern Mongol regimes under control, and that the strongest Communist armies, under Lin Piao, held sway over large areas of Manchuria. With the loss of Suiyuan and Jehol to the Nationalists, they withdrew to Wang-yeh-miao (Ulanhot), where on May 1, 1947, the People's Government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was formally inaugurated.

The leaders of the new government were Ulanfu, chairman; Hafengga (formerly with the Eastern Mongolia Autonomous Government, a Jerim League Mongol), vice-chairman; Pengsk (also of the Jerim League); Temurbagan, former chairman of the Hsingan provincial government, and Namchi Sereng (Wang Ts'ai-t'ien), also from the Jerim League (see China IMAR, Structure of Government).

E. Communist Utilization of Mongolian Heroes

The Communists have ostensibly given respect to the hero-worship of the Mongolians for Chingis Khan by erecting a temple in his honor in Ulanhot, and a tomb near Ejin Khora in which they have enshrined his remains and relics, formerly shrouded in secrecy and zealously guarded in a desert tent. While playing up the tomb, however, they have managed to bring the cult of Chingis into the open, thus dispelling some of the Mongolians' preoccupation with his memory. While other popular heroes of more recent date also remain in the popular imagination, principally Babojab, Li Shou-hsin, Prince Te and Pai Yün-t'i, the Communists have not allowed such nationalistic sentiments to run unchanneled. They have accordingly restored several "approved" popular heroes, namely Ligdan Khan, who led the resistance against a Manchu invasion of Inner Mongolia in the early Ch'ing period, Galdan, who organized a similar resistance against the Ch'ing invasion of Outer Mongolia, and Koda Meirin, who led a rebellion against the oppressions of Chang Tso-lin in 1928. In addition, they have greatly played up the Communist martyr Li Yü-chih, a Mongolian who was put to death by Pai Yün-ti after the victory of the right wing of the Kuomintang and the reorganization of the party in Inner Mongolia. The restoration of Ligdan and Galdan is part of the Communists' attempt to divorce the Mongolians from any identification with the conquest dynasty of the Manchus. Under the guise of bolstering Mongolian self-esteem by publicizing some of their national heroes, it is clear that their intentions are to divert the Mongolians' attention from others who have become nationalist or anti-Chinese symbols.

CHRONOLOGY

1206	Chingis Khan becomes Great Khan of all Mongolia
1227	Death of Chingis Khan
1234	Conquest of North China by the Mongols and overthrow of the Chin dynasty
1260	Khubilai Khan ascends throne
1264	Proclamation of the Yüan dynasty.
1294	Death of Khubilai Khan
1368	Expulsion of Mongols from China and establishment of the Ming dynasty
1449	Oirats under Esen defeat Chinese in battle of T'u-mu (Inner Mongolia)
1454	Formation of the Oirat (W. Mongol) state. Oirat Khan Esen declared Khan of all Mongolia.
1455	Death of Esen.
1550	Increase of the power of the Mongols on China's border, under the leadership of Altan Khan. Attacks on Chinese border cities.
1560-73	Contact with and penetration of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) of the Yellow Sect into Mongolia. Conversion of Altan Khan.
1577	Grand Lama of Tibet travels in Inner Mongolia; granted title of "Dalai Lama" by Altan Khan.
1578-1583	Conversion of majority of Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism.
1586	Buddhism declared the official religion of the Mongols.
1628	Beginning of the struggle of the Chahar leader, Ligdan Khan, against the rising Manchu power.
1634	Death of Ligdan Khan and defeat of the Chahars.
1636	Assembly of Southern Mongol princes and submission to the Manchus. Division of Mongolia into Inner and Outer.
1653	Establishment of the border between Inner Mongolia and Khalkha (Outer Mongolia).
1640	Formation of alliance between the Western Mongols (Oirats) and the Khalkas. Promulgation of the "Mongol-Oirat" Law Code.
1644	Overthrow of the Ming dynasty and establishment of the Ch'ing by the Manchus.
1667	Attempt of the Bargut prince Gantimur to bring Barga into union with Russia.
1668	Beginning of the harassment of Khalkha by the Western Mongol Khan Galdan.
1676	First invasion of Khalkha Mongolia by Galdan.
1688	Second invasion of Khalkha by Galdan;Kalkha princes aided by Manchus.

1689	Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk; regulation of trade, boundaries, and status of Barga.
1691	Assembly of Dolon Nor; submission of Khalkha princes to the Manchus. Establishment of the Li Fan Yüan (Board of Foreign Dependencies) to handle Mongolian Affairs.
1696	Submission of Oirats to Manchus; death of Galdan Khan; localization of Oirats in Dzungaria (Northern Sinkiang).
1719	Prohibition of Mongol-Chinese intermarriage.
1727	Treaty of Khiakhta between China and Russia regulating trade through Mongolia.
1761	Prohibition of mortgage of Mongol lands and importation of arms into Mongolia.
1787	Repeal of Mongol-Chinese Intermarriage prohibition.
1789	First publication of the Mongolian Law Code by the Manchus ("Regulations of the Board of Foreign Dependencies" Li Fan Yüan).
1793	Separation of Mongolian Church hierarchy and nobility by Manchu decree.
1801	Re-enactment of law forbidding intermarriage between Chinese and Mongols.
1808	Chinese immigration into Mongolia forbidden.
1815	Second publication of Mongolian law code.
1823) 1824) 1826)	New Regulations forbidding Chinese immigration into Mongolia.
1850	Outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in China.
1858	"Duguilon" uprising by Ordos Mongols.
1878	Repeal of law forbidding Chinese colonization of Mongol lands.
1900-1916	Mongol uprisings in Inner Mongolia of "duguilon" type, under leaders such as Uljei Jargal in the western part and Babojab in eastern Inner Mongolia.
1901	Encouragement of Chinese colonization in Inner Mongolia.
1905	Birth of Ulanfu.
1907	Secret Russo-Japanese Convention, recognizing "special interests" of Russia in Outer Mongolia and of Japan in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia.
1911	Beginnings of Chinese Revolution. Autonomy movement of the princes of Barga.
1911 (Dec.)	Outer Mongolian princes and Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu (head of the Outer Mongolian Lamaist church) declare independence of Outer Mongolia; Khutukhtu named Emperor of Mongolia.

1912 (Feb.)	Abdication of Manchus; proclamation of Chinese Republic.
1915	Tripartite pact of Kiakhta, between China, Russia and Outer Mongolia, recognizing autonomy of Outer Mongolia within the Chinese Republic.
1914 (Jan.)	Establishment of "special administrative areas" of Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia.
1917	October Revolution in Russia, beginnings of establishment of Soviet power.
1920	Abolition of the autonomy of Barga by the Chinese Government.
1921	Establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. Creation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.
1923	Formation of the "National Revival Club" in Inner Mongolia by "progressive" young Mongols.
1924	Existence of an "Eastern Bureau of the Mongolian People's Party" noted by Fumintai, representative from Inner Mongolia at the First Great Khural of the Outer Mongolian People's Republic.
1925	Ulanfu enters the student movement in Peking. First session of the People's Revolutionary Party in Kalgan. Establishment of a central party school in Kalgan. Formation of a People's Revolutionary Army of Inner Mongolia by Pai YUn-t'i, Ulanfu, and others.
1927-1928	Pai YUn-t'i, Ulanfu, and other leaders flee to Outer Mongolia. Pai returns and enters KMT.
1929	People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia goes underground. Partisan activity in Suiyuan. Uprising in the Ordos under Uljei Jargal.
1929 or 1930	Ulanfu probably returns to Inner Mongolia from Outer Mongolia or Russia.
1930	Mongolian Affairs Conference called by Nationalist Government. Resolutions passed proposing drastic reforms in Inner Mongolia.
1931 (May)	Mongolian students in Peking demonstrate for self-determination.
1932(Sept.)	Japanese begin occupation of Inner Mongolia and Northeast China.
1932	Establishment of the "autonomous" Hsingan Province for the Mongols in Manchuria under the control of the Japanese. Intensive propaganda aimed at Inner Mongolia, urging Inner Mongol opposition to China.
1933	Occupation of the province of Jehol by the Japanese.
1933	Prince Te calls First Pai-ling-miao conference of Mongol princes.

1933(Oct.)	Conference of Prince Te and Chinese emissaries at Pai-ling-miao to discuss autonomy for Inner Mongolia.
1933(Oct. 20)	Formation of the Political Council of Inner Mongolia under the Chinese Government.
1933 (Nov.)	Attempt by Chinese to split the Inner Mongols into eastern and western "autonomous" groups.
1933 (Dec.)	Meeting of Prince Te and followers to combat the plan of the Chinese Government.
1934(Apr.)	Establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Political Council by Prince Te, Prince Yun, and others.
1935	Japanese occupy Chahar. Activity against the Japanese by Mongol forces under Bolinga in Chahar.
1935	Barga Mongols revolt and request incorporation into the Mongolian People's Republic. Revolt quelled by Japanese forces.
1936 (Feb.)	Nanking government (Chinese Nationalists) recognize Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, under control of Yen Hsi-shan and Mongolian officials picked by the Suiyuan Provincial Government.
1936 (Apr.)	Prince Te and followers call Mongolian Congress and establish Te-hua Military Government with Japanese support.
1937(July)	Marco Polo Bridge incident and official declaration of war between China and Japan.
1937(Oct.)	Autonomous Government of the Mongolian Federation formed with Prince YUn as president.
1937 (Nov.)	Prince YUn dies, and is succeeded by Prince Te.
1937 (Nov.)	Federated Mengchiang Commission established in Kalgan, integrating North China "autonomous" governments and the Mongolian government.
1939 (Sept.)	Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia (Mengchiang Government) established. Prince Te elected president.
1940-1941	Partisan activity of Mongols directed by Communists of the Eighth Route Army and the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region in Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar.
1945	Ulanfu elected alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
1945 (Aug., Sept.)	Entrance of Soviet Russian and Outer Mongolian troops into Northeastern China and Inner Mongolia.
1945 (Oct., Dec?)	Establishment of Barga Mongolian Interim Government by former governor, Poyenmantu, a Dagur.
1945	Formation of the "Wang-yeh-miao Government" (Eastern Mongolia Autonomous Govt.) by Hafengga

1945(cont.)	and Temubagen, in eastern Inner Mongolia.
1946	Establishment of the Provisional Mongolian Republic at Shang-tu. Superseded by Inner Mongolian Autonomy Association under Ulanfu after occupation of Kalgan by Chinese Communists.
1946 (Oct.)	Absorption of Hulunbuir (Barga) Interim Mongolian Government by the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Association.
1946(Apr. - May)	Absorption of the Wang-yeh-miao Government by the Inner Mongolian Autonomy Association. Provisional committee organized for establishment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region government.
1946 (July)	Formation of Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Inner Mongolia. Election of Ulanfu as chairman of the committee.
1946 (Oct.)	Formation of the Inner Mongolian People's Army. Ulanfu appointed Commander.
1947(May 1)	Formal establishment of the "People's Government of the Inner Mongolia Region" under chairmanship of Ulanfu.
1948 (Jan.)	Incorporation of the Hulunbuir (Barga) Autonomous Region into the Inner Mongolia region.
1949	Two Mongol banners from dissolved Liao-pei province incorporated.
1950	Capital of IMAR moved to Kalgan (outside of Region's existing boundaries).
1950 (Aug.)	Incorporation of three counties in Chahar Province into the IMAR.
1951 (Apr.)	Inner Mongolian currency replaced by national currency. Regional banks become branches of Central People's Bank of China.
1952 (July)	Ulanfu named governor of Suiyuan province. Capital of the IMAR moved to Kuei-sui in Suiyuan.
1953	Chahar province dissolved. Three counties incorporated into Inner Mongolia region.
1954 (Jan.- Mar.)	Suiyuan incorporated into the IMAR.
1955	Jehol province dissolved. Aokhan and Onniut Banner, and part of Kharachin Banner incorporated into the IMAR.
1956 (June)	Alashan and Edsingol Mongols of Ninghsia incorporated into the IMAR.

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  - 8. Copper

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

I. Population

A. Population and Area of Inner Mongolia

1. Changes in population and are in the Republican period.

The area and population of Inner Mongolia have varied from time to time according to changes in its political status in relation to China. In 1914, three special administrative areas were organized in Inner Mongolia as provisional provinces. These were Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan; Ninghsia in the far west, where the Alashan and Olöt Banner Mongols live, was put under the administration of Kansu province. In 1928, when the country was unified under the Nationalist regime, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia were organized as regular provinces. No census had then been taken in Inner Mongolia; its population was variously estimated at six to seven millions.

In 1919 a postal survey estimated the population of Inner Mongolia to be distributed as follows:

Province	Area (sq. mi.)	Population	Approximate density
Jehol	53,000	3,818,000	71/sq. mi.
Chahar	70,000	1,900,000	27/sq. mi.
Suiyuan	100,000	825,000	8/sq. mi.
Ninghsia	110,000	200,000	-2/sq. mi.
TOTAL	330,000	6,743,000	ca. 20/sq. mi.

Ninghsia, however, had never been considered politically a part of Inner Mongolia, and only a part of Jehol province is now included in Inner Mongolia. In 1933 the Mongol population of Inner Mongolia was estimated at 1,500,000 (Skatchkov, 1933).

In 1934, under the Japanese occupation, the Hsingan Autonomous Mongolian Province was formed with its capital outside the province at Ch'ang-chun, known then as Hsin-ching, the "new capital" of the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo. The Hsingan province at first covered the territory of the Jerim and Jouda Leagues; in 1949, however, the western part of the Nonni Valley and the Barga district were added to it, covering most of the uncolonized Mongol territory in Manchuria. It was divided into four subdivisions, namely:

a. Northern: Barga (Hulunbuir)
b. Eastern : Western part of the Nonni Valley
c. Southern: Jerim League of northwestern Liaoning province.
d. Western ; Jouda League of northern Jehol province.

The whole Hsingan Autonomous Mongolian Province was about 100,000 square miles (about 166,666 square kilometers), about half the size of France, with a population estimated variously from 900,000, excluding Jehol (Lattimore, 1934) to two million, including Jehol (Heissig, 1944).

2. Population figures and changes in area since 1947.

On May 1, 1947, an Autonomous People's Democratic Government of Inner Mongolia was established, with its capital at Ulanhoto (Wang-yeh-miao). In 1950 the capital was moved to Kalgan, capital of Chahar province, and by July, 1952, to Kuei-sui, capital of Suiyuan province, an administrative center situated outside its administered territory. In 1950 the Ulanchab Autonomous area was formed in northern Suiyuan, and in 1951 the Ikechou Autonomous area was established in the Ordos region in southern Suiyuan province.

The following table shows the population and area of the IMAR and its related neighboring provinces in 1951 (Atlas of the Chinese People's Republic, Shanghai, 1951). (See Table I.)

On November 15, 1952, when the Chinese Communist government decided to abolish the province of Chahar, thirteen hsien (counties) and one municipality of the Ta-t'ung Basin, which had been taken from Shansi, were given back to Shansi; and sixteen hsien, two provisional county seats, and two municipalities, mainly from the intermountain regions between Kalgan and Nan-k'ou, which had been taken from Hopei province, were returned to the province of Hopei, together with the southern section of the central Chahar pastureland. The rest of Chahar, including the northern section of the Chahar pastures and the whole of Silingol League, were incorporated into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

On March 6, 1954, the province of Suiyuan was incorporated in its entirety into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. On July 18, 1955, the province of Jehol was abolished and its territory and people were divided among Liaoning, Hopei, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region; and in June, 1956, the Alashan and Edsingol banners of Ninghsia were added to it. These last two territorial changes outdate the 1953 census and make the exact number of the population of the IMAR even more uncertain.

Prior to the 1953 census, the results of which were made public on November 1, 1954, giving a total of 6.1 million for the IMAR (cf. Clubb, pp. 4, 39), the figures on the population and area of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region were more than confusing. The People's Handbook of the People's Republic of China (1953), the Atlas of the People's Republic of China (1953) and Ovidienko, Inner Mongolia (1954) all give the figure of 2.3 million for the population of the IMAR. However, they give differing figures for the area. The People's Handbook gives 700,000 sq. km. and excludes southern Chahar and Suiyuan, while Ovidienko includes Suiyuan and gives the area as 1,000,000 sq. km. While Ovdienko reports the area of IMAR as 1,000,000 sq. km. with a population of 2.3 to 2.5 million, he mentions that Suiyuan has an area of 330,000 sq. km. and a population of 2,360,000 (1951). Ovdienko, 1954, pp. 158-66.) Had he included the population of Suiyuan in his estimate of the IMAR, the total would have been close to six million, as the 1953 census indicated.

Similar inconsistent figures on the population and area of the IMAR were often repeated even by some official reports. At the promulgation of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1952), Lin Chung reported: "The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China was formed from lands that were formerly part of Heilungkiang, Liaosi, Jehol, and Chahar provinces. Its total area is 231,000 square miles [roughly 521,000 sq. km.] Its population is 2,400,000 and consists not only of Mongols but also of a large number of Hans" (Lin Chung, "Inner Mongolia Today - China's First Autonomous Region." China Reconstructs, No. 2, Mar. - Apr. 1952).

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported in 1955 that "The Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia has an area covering 1.1 million sq. km. with a population of 6.1 million." (FBIS Daily Report, N. 87, 1955.)

B. The Present Population, Its Distribution and Density

1. General Distribution

The 1953 Census gave a population figure of 6,100,104 for the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Of this figure only a small fraction was made up by minor nationalities such as Tungusic groups, Koreans and Russians. The bulk was composed of Mongols and Chinese (including Chinese Moslems). As with the addition of Suiyuan province, the Chinese component of the population rose sharply, the ratio between Mongols and Chinese was one to five. No exact population figures are available for the parts of Jehol and Kansu which have been added to the IMAR since then. The best possible estimate would put the figure at roughly one million, of which 300,000 are Mongols and 700,000 Chinese. The present ratio between Mongols and Chinese would thus be 1.3 to 5.7, which makes the Mongols a distinct minority in their own autonomous area.

The population is not evenly distributed throughout the region. A large part of the population is concentrated in the agricultural southern belt, south of the Yin-shan escarpment of the Mongolian plateau and southeast of the Great Hsingan Mountains, particularly in plains of Kuei-sui north of the Ordos in the Southwest and Feng-chen upland south of Chining in the central, and the riverine plain of the upper and Liao River in the southeastern part of the region. A considerable number of the population is concentrat in the upper Liao-ho Valley, in the vicinity of Tung-liao, Kailu, and Wang-yeh-miao or Ulanhot. These are the most densely populated areas. The population thins only towards the north and northwest and west especially north of the Ta-ching-Yinshan escarpment. One finds a similar gradual decline from southeast towards the northwest in the Ordos plateau within the Yellow River bend.

In the Barga district lying in the northeast part of the region that formerly belonged to western Heilungkiang Province, most of the population is concentrated along the valleys of the Khaula, Derbula, and Gana Rivers, three tributaries of the Argun of the upper reaches of the Amur River and in the economically developed belt along the Chinese Eastern Railway line. To the east of the Ilkhuri Mountains (lying to the north of the Great Hsingan Range), the population is concentrated mainly in the agricultural places of Butkha or Chalantun and Moridao banners.

In Suiyuan, one finds a fairly thickly populated belt stretching from the Feng-chen upland westward through the Kueisui plain to the irrigated land of Houtao lying south of the Taching-Yinshan Mountain Range, but north of the Yellow River, right across the central part of the province. The Ordos plateau to the south and the Ulanchab League area on the Mongolian plateau to the north are only sparsely populated. The least peopled area is along the border near the Gobi desert in the interior and in the northwest portion of the Ordos plateau close to the Kuku-puchi sand dunes.

2. Regional Distribution

The Jouda-Chahar Sub-region occupies the whole territory of all the nine banners of Jouda of the former Liaosi province and eight banners of the Chahar League in former central Chahar province. The sub-region is bordered by the Jerim League on the east, by Jehol on the southeast and by Hopei province in the southwest, by the province of Suiyuan on the west, and by the Silingol Sub-region on the northwest. The geographical and climatic conditions of the Jouda-Chahar subdistrict are not suitable to extensive farming but it is considered a semi-agricultural and semi-cattle-breeding country. So it is fairly populated. It has about 165,000 sq. km. of area with a population of about 584,000 (250,000) persons, an average of less than four (two) people per sq. km.

The over all population of the Jouda-Chahar sub-region was 250,000 in 1951. Most of them are concentrated in Shara Muren (West Liaoho) River Valley, in the vicinity of Lin-hsi, Lin-tung and Tapanshan where the population density is up to twenty persons per sq. km. In the northwest part of the sub-district, that is in the Chahar League, the population density ranges from one to ten persons per square kilometer.

In Chahar, the more densely populated area is in the eight-banner district of the Chahar Mongols south of Tung-pu-lien-ho banners (eastern united banners), or East Urianghai in the central part of former Chahar Province now under the name of Chahar League.

The Silingol sub-district, covering the League area in former North Chahar Province is rather thinly peopled. The least populated area is along the northwestern border of the region close to the Gobi Desert. The Silingol sub-district has 400,000 sq. km. of various types of steppes. It is inhabited primarily by Mongol nomads and is one of the most thinly populated areas of Inner Mongolia, with an average population density less than one person per sq. km. There is not a single town or even a large settlement in Silingol. The largest population center of the Silingol sub-district is the administrative center, Pei-tzu-miao (Bandida-sume), north of Dolonor, situated on the Silingol River. In 1951 there were 5,000 people living in Pei-tzu-miao; the population of all the five Silingol banners was 100,000 in 1951.

The Hulunbuir sub-region, is the western part of the Huna League, and was established in 1949 including the West Nonni Valley on the east and west of the Ilkhuri (North Hsingan) Mountains in former western Heilungkiang Province. It is about 253,000 sq. km. in area and has a population of over 132,477 persons, a density of less than one person per sq. km. Barga forms the largest part of the sub-region, occupying the northwestern slopes of the Great Hsingan Mountain and northeastern portion of the Gobi Desert.

The sub-district is inhabited by a number of national groups small in number but most varied in ethnic composition, i.e., Buriat-Mongols, Chinese, Solons, Daurs, Oronchons, Koreans and Russians. Taking the sub-region as a whole, it is a cattle-breeding-agricultural region. Dairying and timbering industries are also well-developed. The rivers, particularly the Argun and its tributaries of the Gana, Khaula, Derbula, Mankta, Bystraia, Keiler (Hailar), and Imin Gol and the lakes of Dalai Nor and Buir Nor are the sources of fish supplies. In the Ilikhuri Mountains the valley slopes are rich in timber and fur bearing animal resources.

According to the data of 1940 the population of the Hulunbuir sub-region was 132,477 persons. Most are distributed along the Chinese Eastern Railway. The inhabitants are predominantly Chinese. While the average population density is less than one person per sq. km., it is up to about ten persons per sq. km. along the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The population of the Solun, Hsin (New) Bargu, and Ch'en (Old) Bargu banners are considerably below the rest of the sub-region. The inhabitants of the three banners are predominantly Mongols, known as the Barga Mongols. They are essentially pastoralists, breeding cattle, raising sheep, and horses, cows and camels come next in importance.

The least populated is the "Taiga" or forest belt in the northwest part of the sub-district. There live the Tungusic-Manchurian Evenki group of people in small numbers.

The timber industry is fairly well developed and plays an important role in the economy of the sub-region. Almost thirty percent of the Huna League sub-district is covered with forests. Lumber is exploited on a wide scale along the Hailar River and its tributaries and along the Imin Gol and its tributaries of Yadoru (Iadoru) and Sandoru.

The Nun-chiang (Nonni Valley) Sub-region is located in the eastern part of the Huna League. It covers the eastern slopes of the north Great Hsingan Mountains and refers to the western Nonni Valley only. It is about 198,000 sq. km. in area with a population of 1,6.0,378, averaging 8.1 persons per sq. km. It is rich in forests and abundant in fish and game because of the presence of numerous rivers and streams. The Nonni River and its tributaries could also be used for hydroelectric developments. Large tracts of fertile valley plains are also suitable for extensive farming and pasturing.

The population of the Nun-chiang sub-region consists of Chinese, Mongols, Solons, and other Tungusic-Manchurian elements. The Chinese predominate. The majority of the population is concentrated in the southern banners of Buteha and Moridawa close to the Chinese Eastern Railway Line and in places which are suitable for farming.

The Jerim-Hsingan sub-region is about 198,000 sq. km. in area. It is bordered by Liaoning province on the east and southeast, by the Silingol region on the northwest, and by the Jouda-Chahar sub-region on the southwest. In the Jerim-Hsingan sub-region are concentrated more than 1.2 million people- mostly agricultural settlers - Chinese and Mongols. The land is mostly cultivated. The population density averages nearly seven persons per sq. km. It is one of the most densely populated areas of Inner Mongolia, and predominantly Chinese. Its importance in agriculture is next only to that of the Kuei-sui-Houtao plain of the Suiyuan sub-region.

The population of the sub-region was 1,312,848 persons in 1951, out of which 480,897 lived in the Hsingan League and 831,951 in the Jerim League. Ninety percent of the population are Chinese, and the Mongols make up the remaining ten percent. The most densely populated areas are the eastern and southeastern banners. The population is also unevenly distributed. It ranges from one to ten persons per sq. km. While the population density of the sub-region averages less than seven persons per sq. km., it amounts to forty persons per sq. km. in the vicinity of Tung-liao city.

The Suiyuan sub-region. According to 1951 data the overall population of Suiyuan was estimated at 2,360,000, giving an average population density of seven persons per sq. km. The overall number of Mongols living in Suiyuan is over 200,000 persons. According to this estimate the ratio between Chinese and Mongols would be ten to one in the province of Suiyuan, which is nearly twice as high as the average of the whole Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Thus the suppression of Suiyuan province and its incorporation into the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia supports strongly the speculation that such a change actually has rather strengthened China's control of Inner Mongolia than otherwise.

The Chinese are concentrated in the Kueisui-Hou-tao plain stretching across the central lowland belt between the plateaux of the Ordos occupied by the Mongols of the Ikhechao League and those in the south of the Ulanchap League living on the Mongolian Plateau north of the Ta-ching Range. The plain is fertile though alkali concentration after watering forms a problem to cultivation, since three-fifths of it has been under irrigation with a total irrigation canal length of 625 km. (ca. 420 miles). The Mongols are scattered over the semi-arid steppe land of the dry plateaux where desert prevails.

The Josotu sub-region covers the Liao-ho river basin, a southern upper reach of the Liao River in former Northern Jehol province. It includes the three banners of the Josotu League. They are, namely, Ongiut in the north, the Aokhan in the southeast and the Karachin in the southwest. It has a total area of about 68,400 sq. km. with a population of roughly 979,805, and an average density of nearly fifteen persons per sq. km. The Mongols number about 300,000, forming a third of the total. The rest are Chinese. The Chinese agricultural settlers are mainly distributed in the east and southeastern portion of the sub-region, while the Mongols are mainly semi-sedentary, scattered in the west and northwest.

Distribution of Population According to Sub-regions

Sub-region	Area, sq.km.	Population	Av. Density per sq.km.
Jouda-Chahar	165,000	584,400	3 - 4
Jerim-Hsingan	198,000	1,312,848	6 - 7
Hulunbuir	253,000	132,477	0.5
Nun-chiang	198,000	1,610,378	7.8
Silingol	400,000	100,000	0.25
Suiyuan	330,000	2,360,000	7.0
Josotu	68,400	979,805	14 - 15
TOTAL	1,612,400	7,079,908	4.4

3. Population

Urban population is restricted to a few towns of importance. They are shown in Table II.

C. Population Trends of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia

1. Possible causes for decline

Population statistics for the Mongols in'Inner Mongolia have not been satisfactorily worked out for the past. Scattered estimates for more recent periods, and undocumented estimates for earlier periods give us a suspicion that there has been a steady decline for some areas and relative stability for others. Lack of comparability prohibits the use of some data, even where available. Table III gives some idea of the variability. It has been suggested that where the population remained relatively stable, or as in some areas, shows an increase from earlier times,. the adoption of agriculture by the Mongols was responsible. While our figures are inadequate for definite statements on this point, what little data we have seems to bear out this supposition.

Reasons for the decline of Mongol population are more difficult to find. Many authors have attributed the declining population to the adoption of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) by the Mongols. Theoretically, since the monks were supposed to be celibate, the fact that between forty and sixty percent of the total male population were in the clergy would have had a noticeable effect. But this celibacy was to a great extent theoretical; the wide spread of syphilis in the Mongol population has, with reason, been attributed to the activities of the monks. Another basic cause of the declining population is probably to be found in the increasing sedentarization of the Mongols without the adoption of better sanitation (see China IMAR, Health and Sanitation; Social Structure).

In Inner Mongolia venereal disease was so prevalent, that on the basis of the statistics and data of the Inner Mongolia venereal disease center in 1950, the venereal patients in the pastoral areas in Hulunbuir League constituted forty-four percent of the total population. A Communist news report on this problem (Peking Kuang ming jih pao, Apr. 29, 1955) gave 300,000 as the population of the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, and made an estimate, on the basis of this of about 150,000 venereal patients.

Other diseases with a high mortality rate were plague, tetanus, and puerperal fever, the last two being prevalent among pregnant women and infants. In 1947-1948 in one of the banners of the Silingol League, of 101 babies born, only two were alive. As a result of venereal and endemic diseases, the Mongol population of Inner Mongolia dropped year by year.

In 1927 the population of the Old Barga Banner was 7,000, but in 1950, it was only 4,000. The census charts of Solon Banner showed that.there were fewer children than persons of middle age. The population of many pastoral areas in the Ikechou League was similarly reversed from normal; there were fewer people in the lower age groups than in the upper.

2. Effects of Public health measures

Since the founding of the IMAR, living conditions of the people are reported to have improved. Certain efforts have been made by the government to solve the physical problems. The government took action first to prevent and care for contagious diseases of all kinds, and attached special importance to venereal and endemic diseases. In 1949-50 the central government also dispatched anti-epidemic teams to work in Inner Mongolia. After several years of medical efforts, the spread of these diseases is reported to have been put under control. In 1950-53 physical examinations were reported to have been carried out among 150,000 pastoral Mongols, and medical treatment given to 93,838 persons in nineteen pastoral banners and five leagues (Peking Kuang ming jih-pao April 29, 1955). Many patients who had not been able to work for years were said to have been restored to health, and many women who had been barren had begun to conceive and give birth. The checking of disease also results in an increase of labor power in Inner Mongolia. The population of twelve banners in the Huna, Silingol, and Chahar Leagues in the northeastern part of Inner Mongolia was reported to have increased by 7,000 in 1953 over 1952. In 1952-53 in the Old Barga Banner of the Hulunbuir League, 193 persons were added to the population. In the western part of Inner Mongolia, the population has also increased markedly. The same source reported that in the Ta-la-te-hou banner in the Yellow River Bend Administrative District, there were 6,435 more persons in 1954 than in 1950. and of these 4,815 were babies under two weeks.

From 1952 health work was also carried out among infants and women in Inner Mongolia, and midwives were trained in new childbirth methods. Before 1947 in Tu-ch'uan hsien in the Huna League, thirty-seven percent of the infants born died of tetanus. With the new childbirth method promoted in 1953, it was reported that only 1.5 percent of the infants in the same hsien died of tetanus. In the Old Bargut Banner of the Huna League in 1937, only four out of 109 infants were born dead.

The most striking improvement in epidemic control has been in bubonic plague. In 1947, the death toll from the plague in Inner Mongolia was said to have been more than 13,000, while in 1950 there were only twenty-three cases and seventeen deaths. In 1951, no cases of plague were reported (Lin Chung, in China Reconstructs, No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1952).

II. Mineral Resources

A. Introduction

The Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia has not yet been properly surveyed for its mineral wealth. Of the numerous minerals that have been discovered and exploited in various degrees, coal, iron, salt, and soda are the most important. Others of less importance include asbestos, mica, pyrite, sulfur, graphite, fluorspar, petroleum and oil shale, high-alumina shale, and copper. Among the precious minerals are gold, silver, some quartz crystals, and beryl.

On account of the vast expanses of inland drainage west of the Great Hsingan Mountains and north of the Ta-ch'ing-Yinshan (mountain) Ranges in the North, and in the interior of the Ordos Plateau in the Southwest, gypsum, salt, and natural soda are widely distributed, particularly in the "tsaidams" or dry lake basins. Important iron ore deposits and fairly good coking coking coal are located in the sub-region of Suiyuan, while brown coal, petroleum, and oil shale are located in the sub-regions of Hulunbuir, Nun-chiang, and possibly the region of former Jehol province. Gold, silver, pyrite and sulfur, fluorspar, precious stones and quartz crystal are scattered throughout the Ilkhuri and Great Hsingan Mountains. The rest of the non-metallic minerals, asbestos, mica, graphite, etc., are distributed throughout the Ta-ch'ing-Yinshan Ranges. In addition, copper has also been discovered in the Hsingan and Ta-ch'ing Ranges and high-alumina shale in the Jehol Hills. Fire clay is widely distributed in the lake basins throughout the whole region.

B. Principal Minerals:

1. Coal

The coal deposits of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region fall into two major groups, both in their formation and distribution. Those found in the northeastern part of the region, particularly in the vicinity of Chalainor and Yalu (Chalantun) in the Huna League, are mainly of lignite or brown coal of Tertiary formation, with a low ash content but high in moisture. This makes it desirable as a steam coal for the engines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and its branches in the Huna League territory. The coal fields of the Ta-ch'ing Mountains in the southwestern part of the IMAR region are chiefly bituminous and anthracite of Lower Jurassic formation.

There is also a great deal of coal in the Hsingan, Silingol, and Jouda Leagues. Most of it is poor-quality brown coal of tertiary formation.

The coal deposits of the Ta-ch'ing Mountains like those of Ta-t'ung in Shansi, belong to the "Peking Grid" coal fields, which lie in the longitudinal troughs of the intermountain region within the Ta-ch'ing-Yin Shan and Nan-K'ou Ranges. They are mainly of Lower Jurassic (Lias) formation, and so are distinct from the main Shansi coal fields of the Permo-Carboniferous age, although the lower coal measures of the Ta-t'ung field belong to the latter. Of the "Peking Grid" series, the Ta-t'ung and the Ta-ch'ing Shan fields are the largest and most important. Since the districts lying within the Ta-t'ung Basin, which had been taken from the province of Shansi and added to Chahar by the Chinese Communist Government in late 1949 were abolished, we shall not treat the Ta-t'ung coal field in detail here, although it is by far the most important one and the most closely related to the economic development of Inner Mongolia.

a. The Ta-ch'ing Shan fields.

Coal deposits are found in many places along the Ta-ch'ing Shan Range, which runs down the center of Suiyuan. A number of small coal fields occur in the transversal valleys or short ravines of the Ta-ch'ing Shan Range, containing bituminous coal similar to that of Lower Jurassic age in the Ta-t'ung fields, in horizontal beds that are easy to work. The coal found in the eastern part is chiefly anthracite. Conditions of occurrence are shown in Table IV.

Before World War II, the actual output from the native mines was estimated at about 150,000 tons a year. Since the war, new deposits have been found in the vicinity of Ku-yang and Wu-ch'uan in the interior of the Ta-ch'ing Shan Range. Beyond the Ta-ch'ing Shan Range in Suiyuan lignite is widely scattered over the plateau. The known reserves and amount of production must have increased many fold, since the Communist government has established an iron and steel plant in Pao-t'ou instead of Ta-t'ung, making it one of the few heavy industrial centers of North China. The largest amount of mined coal is in Saratsi and Ku-yang in the vicinity of Pao-t'ou, where large deposits of iron ore are also reported to have been discovered. Wan-chia-k'ou and Shih-k'uai-k'ou are the two producing centers for iron ore in the area.

Moreover, the Ta-t'ung and Ta-ch'ing Shan coal fields lie in the borderland between the densely populated agricultural regions of North China and the vast livestock belt, a rich producer of pastoral raw materials of all kinds. Their favorable geographical location will render them of paramount importance in the future economic development of Inner Mongolia. The operation of these coal fields has resulted in the industrialization of such towns in the area as Kukuhoto (Kuei-sui), Feng-chan, and Pao-t'ou and in the establishment of industries such as the manufacture of woolen goods, rugs, carpets, and leather products.

The two comparatively large coal fields have each found a natural market in Inner Mongolia. Their geographical locations have determined the position of markets on each side of the Feng-chen central watershed. The Ta-ch'ing Shan coal finds its market around Kukuhoto and Pao-t'ou and other towns of the densely populated Kuei-sui Plain in Suiyuan, while the Ta-t'ung coal, apart from supporting the local demand in northern Shensi, finds its market around Kalgan (now in Hopei province), as well as in the leagues of Chahar and Silingol. Besides its use as a fuel for industrial purposes, coal is increasingly taking the place of the dried cattle dung used by the natives.

b. The Chalainor and Cha-lan-t'un fields.

Brown coal of Tertiary formation is widely distributed all over the plateau, especially in the Hulunbuir basin. The largest and best-known lignite deposits are located in the vicinity of Chalainor, and in the western part of the sub-region of Hulunbuir, and Yalu (Cha-lan-t'un) in the Nun-chiang subdistrict. The former deposit extends from Chalainor north of Lake Hulun, and westward to Manchouli on the frontier along the Chinese Eastern Railway. Chalinor and Cha-lan-t'un are the western and eastern coal-producing centers, respectively, in the Huna League. The former was discovered in 1901 and put into operation in 1902. According to the latest estimates, the coal reserves of Chalainor nine miles north of Lake Hulun (Dalai Nor) are calculated at thirty-nine billion tons, with an annual production of 139,000 tons. The coal of Chalainor has seams close to thirty feet thick and is not of high grade. Nevertheless, it has been mined extensively for some forty years because of its closeness to the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is the main consumer of the coal.

The Lubin (Manchouli) or Tsagan Ula coal deposits are located to the northeast of the town of Manchouli in the locality of Tsagan Ula. The Tsagan Ula coal reserves are estimated at twenty-seven million tons with an annual production of 12,000 tons. The area of the Tsagan Ula coal field is equal to eight square kilometers. The quality of the Tsagan Ula coal is even lower than that of the Chalainor deposit.

In the Great Hsingan Mountains brown coal deposits are found in the vicinity of Yalu (Cha-lan-t'un), Ulanhoto (Wang-yeh-miao) and also along the Gan and Busi river valleys. The Busi coal has a reserve estimated at over five million metric tons. The coal reserves of other deposits in the Great Hsingan Mountains have not yet been sufficiently surveyed to be estimated. (See Table V.)

In addition, it has been reported that in the IMAR, after two years of prospecting in the Cho-tzu Mountains, detailed information has been collected on some rich reserves of coking coal of good quality and easy access. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, No. 102, 1955). As to the locality of Cho-tzu Shan and its actual reserves no information is available. Judging from its quality it must be one of the coal fields of the Ta-ch'ing Mountains north of the Kuei-sui Plain.

c. Related Ta-t'ung fields.

The Ta-t'ung coal fields are the most important of the "Peking Grid" reserves. Mainly of lower Jurassic formation, they differ from the main Shansi coal fields of the Permocarboniferous are, although the lower coal measures of the Ta't'ung fields belong to the latter. The total reserves of Ta-t'ung have been estimated at 354 million tons, but have been considerably increased by recent discoveries. It is reported that the amount may even have been doubled. The Ta-t'ung coal is largely good coking bituminous. The whole Ta-t'ung Basin, which was detached from Shansi and incorporated in Chahar in December, 1949, was returned to the province of Shansi in November, 1953, when Chahar province was abolished.

The distribution and production of coal reserves in the provinces out of which the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was mainly formed is shown in the following table (Table VI). (C.C.Pai: Geological Survey of China, Special Report 7, December, 1945. Cited by U.S.Dept. of Interior, Foreign Mineral Survey, Mineral Resources of China, Vol. 2, No. 7, January, 1948).

2. Iron Ore.

It has been reported that huge iron ore deposits have been discovered in Inner Mongolia, but no information about their distribution and reserves has been given. However, up to the present Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, No. 87, 1955) the known iron ore deposits have been confined to two major fields: the Ta-ch'ing ores in the central mountain belt, mainly in the MuuMingan Banner of the Ulanchab League of the sub-region of Suiyuan in the Southwest, and the Great Hsingan ores, mainly in the district of Hulun (Hailar) in the Northeast.

a. The Ta-ch'ing Shan ores.

The Ta-ch'ing reserves are concentrated in Pai-yün Ob near Pai-ling-miao, about 200 kilometers northwest of Kukuhoto (Kuei-sui), with an estimated reserve of 34 million metric tons. Large deposits of iron ore are also found in the districts of Ku-yang, Wu-ch'uan, and Pao-t'ou, north of the Kuei-sui Plain. The proximity of the coal and iron deposits in the Ta-ch'ing Mountains has encouraged the development of metallurgical industries at Pao-t'ou under the Communist regime. Its future is promising if the mines are linked by rail with Pao-t'ou, the present terminus of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway.

b. The Great Hsingan ores.

Two iron ore deposits have been discovered in the Great Hsingan Mountains. One field is located on the right bank of the Khaul River at the mouth of the Hailar River in the Lubin (Manchouli) district of the Huna League on the western side of the northern Great Hsingan Range. Another is located at a place to the west of Ulanhoto (Wang-yeh-miao) in the territory of the Hsingan League on the eastern slope of the central Great Hsingan Range. No data is available about their reserves and production.

3. Related Suan-lung ores.

It should be noted that in the neighborhood of the Peking Grid coal fields there is one of the most important iron ore fields of North China, the Suan-lung field, located in the Lung-yen Mountains in the district of Suan-hua. The Suan-lung ore, a non-phosphoric hematite, is of good grade and extends over a considerable area in the hills around Suan-hua, south of Kalgan. The iron content of the ore is over fifty percent, and the ore can be obtained by open quarrying. The reserve has been estimated at 92 million metric tons, which has been increased by further recent discoveries. During World War II, the Japanese established a new metallurgical plant near the station of Suan-hua on the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, besides restoring the furnace at Shih-ching Shan in the Western Hills of Peking. Both used the Suan-lung ores, but the former plant was badly damaged by the Communists during their engagements with the Nationalist troops immediately after the War.

The reserves of iron ore and their distribution in the provinces now included in the IMAR are shown in the following table(Table VII).

3. Salt and Soda

The inland drainage of the Mongolian Plateau is characterized by the irregular occurrence of a large number of salt lakes. Most of them are spread throughout the drier basins close to the Gobi and the deserts in southwestern Hulunbuir Basin, in the territories of the Silingol, Ulanchab and Ikechou Leagues. The lakes are scattered in the enclosed depression, some large and some small. The smaller ones are from ten to twenty meters wide and the large ones extending from one to several kilometers in width. They vary according to seasonal changes in the amount of water received. Sometimes several lakes unite to form a large one and sometimes a large one breaks up into several small ones, e.g., Dalai Lake, to the northwest of the Hulunbuir Basin sometimes becomes two, the East Dalai and West Dalai Lakes, when the water level lowers during the dry season, and are marked on Russian maps as Tsdzun and Barun, respectively. Hulun Lake (Chalai Nor) and Buir Nor (Lake) now connected by the Ushun River, once were one big lake in the Hulunbuir Basin. Incidentally, the names of Dalai and Hulun (Chalai) Lakes have sometimes been confused in recent writings. Moreover, another lake also named Dalai or Talai Nor (Tali or Dali in Chinese) is located in central eastern Chahar. This often causes confusion also. Most of them have bitter or salty water. In summer some of these lakes turn into swamps which are impossible to cross. Many of them get their water from melting snow or from rain and are often surrounded by marshes. Most of them are inaccessible on account of the surrounding marshes and of no use to the people or animals.

Hulun Lake (Chalai Nor), in the western part of the Hulunbuir Basin, is one of the few large lakes of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. This lake is sixty kilometers long and twenty kilometers wide. The area of the lake occupies 1,063 square kilometers. The Kerulun River enters the lake in the southwest, and from the south it receives the Oronchon River. The water of the lake is pure and slightly salty. The area of the lake varies considerably from time to time. In 1903 the length of the lake was twenty kilometers, with a width of ten kilometers. It has an average depth of one meter, though in some places the depth reaches nine meters. Before winter sets in most of the fish from Hulun Lake migrate into Buir Nor in the south via the Oronchon-Ushun River. There are many small islands in Hulun Lake when its water level is lowered.

Buir Nor is located in the southern part of the Hulunbuir Basin. It covers an area of 610 square kilometers. It is 44.5 kilometers long and twenty kilometers wide. It is a fresh water lake, and outflows via the Ushun-Oronchon River into Hulun Lake. The Khalkhin River empties into Buir Nor in the northeast. The average depth of the lake is nine meters. The southern shore of the lake is sandy and covered with scattered shrubs and some grass. Its eastern shore is flat and open, covered with steppe-type vegetation. The western shore is sandy and overgrown with grass which provides good pasture ground for cattle. Buir Nor is abundant in fish. Surplus water is carried into Hulun Lake by the Ushun-Oronchon River which is up to seventy meters wide and 1.5 to two meters deep. Because of the abundance of fish in Hulun and Buir Lakes, an extensive fishing industry has been developed in recent years. They supply most of the fish consumed throughout the territory of the Hulunbuir sub-region.

Owing to evaporation, the water of most of the lakes of the IMAR has become extensively saline and some have even become dry lakes, the beds covered with a thick deposit of salt and natural soda. As a result, the whole region is extraordinarily rich in salt and soda; as are also Chinghai (Koko Nor), Ninghsia (now part of Kansu), and Sinkiang . In these provinces, and in the IMAR, salt is so wadely distributed that it is almost impossible for the government to collect salt taxes, which form one of the principal sources of the national revenue of China. So far, there has been comparatively little exploitation of this abundant supply.

a. Important salt-producing lakes.

1. Dalai (Tali) Nor, located on the border between the Chahar and Jouda Leagues; circumference about forty miles.

2. Damus Nor, in the central part of Silingol League; circumference about forty miles. It has a salt morass in its eastern part with a layer of fine salt varying from one and one-half to three or four feet in thickness.

3. Salt Lake, in the Sunit Banner in southwestern Silingol League; about one mile around, having a layer of salt several feet thick. In addition, there are few other lakes densely impregnated with salt in the territory of the Silingol League.

4. Daikha Nor and Kir Nor (Hulu-hai), located on the Feng-chen upland in the eatsern part of the Suiyuan sub-region. They are both over fifty miles around and highly impregnated with salt.

5. Dabasun (Ta-yeh Hai-tzu), situated in the north-western part of the Ordos Plateau. Lake Dabasun is about eight miles long and 1.5 to 2 miles wide, having a salt morass to the east of it.

Mongolian salt has been one of the chief local trade commodities since very early times. It can be classified into five groups according to quality, color, and place of production.

1. Or salt, produced mainly from Dubasun Lake in northwestern Ordos that comes from the Rear Banner of the Right Wing is fine and white and red in color. It supplies the demands of the western part of the Suiyuan sub-region and the Central Banner of the Right Wing, in the Ikechou League.

2. Su salt, white and fine, comes from the Sunit Banner area of the western part of the Silingol sub-region. It is used chiefly for local consumption.

3. Su salt, commonly known as green salt, comes from Damus Nor in the Ujumuchin area of the northeastern part of the Silingol sub-region. There is a salt flat 21 square miles in area (7 by 3 miles), one of the richest deposits in the IMAR. Its large-grained

salt, of unusually high sodium chloride content, needs no processing before use. Fifty years ago, according to Chinese records, 200,000 cartloads of salt, of 600 pounds each, were taken from Ujumuchin each year. The present annual output is on a high level, and the deposit shows no sign whatsoever of exhaustion. As recently as 1947, 2,000 cartloads were used to build a defense wall against bandits, and still stands. The Silingol League has 60 other salt flats besides the one at Ujumuchin which the local people call "The Mother." The salt is of fine quality with a green tinge. It is marketed throughout all of eastern Outer Mongolia, the territory of the Hsingan League, and locally in the eastern part of the Silingol sub-region.

4. Hulun salt is produced from several lakes of the Hulunbuir sub-region. Fine table salt has been extracted mainly from the salt-soda lakes of Bain Nor and Bain Tsgan Nor; both are located to the northeast of Buir Nor. To the north-west of Hailar stretches a long row of small salt lakes: Khalka Nor, Panza Nor, Sabta Nor, Khara Nor, and Dari Nor, etc. People living around those lakes obtain their table salt by simply digging down three feet. More than 8,000 tons of salt and soda are produced from the Hulunbuir sub-region each year.

5. Daikha-Kir salt is produced from Daikha Nor and Kir Nor in the Feng-chen uplands. Over two and a half million catties (1.3 lb. equals one catty) of salt are produced from Daikha Nor alone each year. It finds a ready market in the eastern part of the Suiyuan sub-region and the Ta-t'ung Basin of northern Shansi.

b. Important soda-producing centers.

There are many lakes and dry lake basins in the IMAR which provide basic sodium salt. The sub-regions of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Hulunbuir are the three leading producers of soda.

1. The Suiyuan soda comes largely from flats in the Ordos Plateau and the district of T'ao-lin (Lat. 41.16 Long. 112.43), Wu-ch'uan (Lat. 41.07 Long. 111.25), and Ku-yang (Lat 41.08 Long. 110.10). Annual production in this region is about 29,000 tons.

2. Chahar soda comes largely from Dolon Nor; Barun Nor of the eastern part of the Chahar League; Tze-yün Lake, in the Sunit Banner of the Silingol League; and lakes in Tung-pu-liang-ha Banner, and amounts to over 1,500 tons a year with a record of 8,000 tons in 1925.

3. Hulunbuir soda production amounts to over 8,000 tons a year with a record of 16,200 tons in 1930. The basic deposits of natural soda in the Hulunbuir region are located in the vicinity of Ganchur Ssu, north of Buir Nor; in Chasun Nor (Khudi Nor);

Dun-Khara Khu Chirtu Lake; Sikhara Khuchirtu Lake; and some other smaller lakes. The reserves of soda deposits in the Hulunbuir region are enormous.

Although the exploitation of salt and soda in the IMAR is yet small, comparatively, the existence of such extensive resources in a livestock belt like Inner Mongolia will prove a vital factor in various branches of industrial development. It can be used for preserving purposes in the meat trade and as a cleaning substance in the curing of skins and hides as well as a basic source of materials of various chemical industries. Moreover, among the salt and soda lakes are some which are potassium and nitrate-bearing, forming a valuable source of chemical fertilizer.

C. Precious Minerals

1. Gold

Gold-bearing rock is located mainly in the areas of Hulunbuir and the Nonni River Valley, especially in the vicinity of the three rivers of Gan, Derbula, and Khaul, and at Khiramutu and Khiralin in the Argun river basin.

Most of the gold comes from placer workings. Practically all the streams tributary to the Amur are gold-bearing. They have been worked by primitive methods, largely by Russians, Koreans, and Chinese, for many years and have produced a fair amount of gold each year, although no exact figures are available. If hydraulic equipment is introduced, such as dredges and drag lines, and once they are opened for exploitation by modern means, they should be productive for many years. The Japanese installed some god dredges, and in 1938 it was reported that ten or so gold dredges were working in the Nun-chiang district alone.

2. Silver

Silver and lead deposits are found in the vicinity of the Derbula River. Some other brown silver and lead deposits are located in the Berai, Khaul, Honnui, and Onur river valleys. No information about their reserves or production is available.

3. Quartz Crystal and Beryl

Four deposits of quartz crystal and beryl have been found in the sub-region of Suiyuan. They occur in geodes in pegmatite veins. The quartz has been used for the making of eyeglass lenses and the beryl crystals for jewelry.

Rich deposits of beryl crystals, which occur in quartz veins, have been reported in the Hsingan Mountains, especially along the upper reaches of the Moin, Khalkin, and Derbula Rivers and their tributaries in the territory of the Huna League (former western Heilungkiang province).

The four deposits of quartz crystals in the sub-region of Suiyuan are shown in Table VIII.

D. Other Minerals

1. Asbestos

Rich deposits of asbestos have been reported in the Ta-ch'ing and Lang Shan Ranges in Suiyuan and the Jehol Hills. Some of them were developed during the Japanese occupation and a production of 750 tons in Suiyuan was reported in 1944. The distribution of the chief asbestos deposits are as follows (See Table IX.)

Probably none of the Jehol asbestos deposits have been included in the IMAR. The deposits of Chao-yang and Ma-chia-tzu may have been added to the province of Liaoning, and the other three possibly to Hopei after the triple partition of Jehol province between the IMAR, Liaoning, and Hopei in 1955.

2. Mica

Mica deposits have been discovered and exploited in Suiyuan near Kuei-sui and Ku-yang in the Ta-ch'ing Mountains, and also near Feng-chen, Chi-ning, and Hsing-ho. A total estimated reserve of 250,000 metric tons has been given for the deposits in these five districts. They are distributed as follows:

Name of Deposit	County(hsien)	Lat. & Long.
Hung-sha-pa	Feng-chen	40.45 - 113.10
Kuan-tsun	Feng-chen	40.51 - 113.10
Ta-ch'ing-shan	Hsing-ho	40.52 - 113.58
Pa-su-mu	Chi-ning	40.59 - 112.50
San-cha-k'ou	Chi-ning	50.57 - 112.55
Kuei-sui	Kuei-sui	40.47 - 111.37
	Ku-yang	41.08 - 110.10

3. Pyrite and Sulfur

Some deposits of pyrite and sulfur have been discovered and worked at Wu-ta-lien-chin in Pei-an (Lat. 48 Long. 126) district and in the vicinity of Aigun (Lat. 49.59 Long 127.21). Both are distributed in the Little Hsingan Mountains to the east of the Nonni River.

4. Graphite

Graphite deposits are found in both the Great Hsingan and the Ta-ching Mountains. The graphite deposit to the west of Nian-tzu Shan in the territory of the Huna League has been mined lately. Two graphite deposits are located at Hsing-ho (Lat. 40.52 Long. 113.58) and near Kuei-sui (Lat. 40.47 Long. 111.35) in Suiyuan.

5. Fluorspar (fluorite)

Large deposits of fluorspar have been discovered in gneiss and granite to the west of Dragotsen village and at Nun-chiang in the Huna League. Some deposits contain ninety percent pure calcium fluorite and are located at Ma-hu-ying (3,480 tons in 1944) and Yu-shu-fu (3,000 tons in 1944), both in Lung-hua hsien (Lat. 41.32 Long. 117.38) and in the Kharachin Banner (Lat. 41.51 Long. 118.26)(580 tons in 1944) of former Jehol province. The two Lung-hua deposits were probably added to Hopei province after the partition of Jehol in 1955, and the one in Kharachin Banner has probably gone to Liaoning.

6. Petroleum and Oil Shale

It was reported that oil had been found by the Japanese during the war near Chalai Nor (Lake Hulun), and that drilling reached 1,000 feet in 1941, but no oil was found. No further information is available. However, large deposits of bituminous shale have been found in Hulunbuir. Its reserves of oil shale are said to be tremendous, but its nephrite content is low, thus no oil has been extracted. In addition, the Japanese clained to have found another oil field in the Jurassic-age coal fields near Fu-hsin in the former Jehol province. However, this field was probably given to Liaoning after the partition of Jehol in 1955.

7. High-Alumina Shale

Some high-alumina shale has been discovered at Sung-shu-tai and Wu-tao-ling in the former province of Jehol. They may have been given to the province of Hopei after the partition of Jehol.

8. Copper

Copper has been reported abundant both in the Hsingan and Ta-ch'ing-Yin Shan mountains, but no details are available about its reserves, production, or distribution. However, some copper deposits have been reported at P'ing-ch'üan, Ko-erh-yen in Chin-piao, and Shih-tzu-lu in Ch'eng-te in the Jehol Hills. These copper deposits may have been allocated to the provinces of Hopei and Liaoning after the partition of Jehol in 1955.

TABLE I. Population and area of the IMAR and its related neighboring provinces in 1951.

Political Division	Population	Area in sq. km.	Density	Leagues, banners, etc.
IMAR	2,351,565	700,000	3.3	6 leagues, 32 banners, 7 hsien, 3 municipalities
Chahar	3,881,363	76,000	55.0	no banners
Suiyuan	2,255,896	330,000	6.7	17 banners
Liaosi	7,391,492	56,000	148.0	no banners
Jehol	4,899,021	114,000	44.4	4 banners
Heilungkiang	5,521,581	282,000	19.7	2 banners
Ninghsia	715,656	275,000	2.5	2 banners

(Jen-min shou-tse, "Peoples Handbook," of 1951 gave the population of the IMAR as 2,238,625.)

TABLE II. Population of chief urban centers.

Name of Town	Geographical Significance	Population
Ulanhoto (Wang-yeh-miao)	First capital of the IMAR, largest administrative center of the Hsingan League.	35,000 (Mostly Mongols)
Tung-liao	Largest administrative center of the Jerim League, important railway station.	40,000 (Mostly Chinese)
Dolonor	A religious center and important trading post situated on the left bank of Si-he, a tributary of the Shang-tu Fiver on the eastern border of the Chahar League.	30,000
Man-chou-li or Lu-pin	Frontier town on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Largest population center of the Hulunbuir district; industrial center.	over 12,000
Hailar or Hu-lun	Administrative center of the Huna League, also one of the largest commercial-industrial centers of Inner Mongolia, next only to Kuei-sui and Pao-t'ou. Important station of the Chinese Eastern Railway.	40,000(1953)
Kan-chu-miao (Ganchur)	A religious center with the largest lamasery and marketing town in northeastern IMAR. A fair takes place between August and September.	

TABLE II. (Continued)

	Geographical Significance	Population
Po-ke-tu (Bukhedu)	Large railway station, largest commercial and industrial center of the Nonni River area.	over 10,000
Cha-lan-tun	Industrial and education center (saw-mills, flax-processing, dairying, and factories).	5,000
Kuei-sui (Kukuhoto)	Twin-city of Kwei-hua (old) and Suiyuan(new). Thirty-six sq.km. in extent, largest city of IMAR. Present capital of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Originally chief religious center of all Mongolia before the Head Lama moved to Urga (Ulan Bator), capital of Outer Mongolia. Now a transit and administrative center of Inner Mongolia. Eighty percent of its population live in the old city. But administrative institutes concentrate in the new city.	100,000 (1951)
Pao-t'ou	Railroad terminal and river port navigable via Hwangho, the Yellow River up to Lanchow and Sining, capitals of Kansu and Chinghai provinces respectively. So an important commercial and industrial center of IMAR.	

TABLE III.

	Early Ch'ing	1929-32	1934	1939	1947-49	
Ikechou(Ordos)	206,500 (Com. Manch) April 1939	120,000	77,000	93,133	80,000	
	400,000(Comm.-KMJP) SCMP, May 19 '55					
Silingol	Late Ching	1912-	1929-32	1934	1935	1939
	84,000(Comm. KMJP)	93,800	66,218	52,000	36,000 Comm.	36,800
	Early Ching					
	86,250 (Con. Man)					
Tümet(Kuei-hua)	Early Ching-	1929-32		1934	1939	
	45,000	60,436		60,400	60,433	

TABLE IV.

Coal	Locality	Distance from the mine to the opening of the valley	Probable reserve in million tons
Anthracite	Chu-erh-k'ou	10 li (3.3 mi.)	
	Ta-hsi-k'ou	15 li (5 mi.)	650
	Wan-chia-k'ou	40 li (33.3 mi.)	
Bituminous	Shui-chien-k'ou	30 li (10 mi.)	
	Pa-tu-k'ou	25-45 li (8.3-15 mi.)	1,300
	Wu-tang-k'ou	60 li (20 mi.)(to Pao-t'ou)	
		Total	1,950
Lignite	The plateau beyond the Ta-ch'ing Shan Range		22
		Grand Total	1,972

TABLE V. Chalainor-Cha-lan-t'un Coal Fields

Coal	Locality	Approx. Annual Prod. (1000 tons)	Est. Reserve, million tons
Lignite	Chalainor	139	39,000
Lignite	Manchouli (Tsaganula(	12	27
Lignite	Busi		5

TABLE VI. Coal reserves in million metric tons estimated in 1945 and production in 1000 tons in 1944.

Provinces	Anthracite	Bituminous	Lignite	Total	Rank	Production	Rank
Chahar	17	487		504	20	9,300	4
Heilungkiang		5,000	3,980	8,980	4	3,047	8
Jehol		4,714		4,714	7	5,359	7
Suiyuan	58	396	22	476	21	115	21

TABLE VII. Iron Ore Reserves in Million Metric Tons (1945) Production in Metric Tons (1942)
(Ref. C. C. Pai: Geological Survey of China, Special Report 7, December, 1945) (Cited by U.S. Dept. of Interior, Foreign Minerals Survey, Vol. 2, No. 7, Minerals of China)

Province	Proved	Estimated	Total	Rank	Production	Rank
Chahar	91,645	2,000	93,645	3	923,376	5
Heilungkiang		500	500	28	25,000	
Jehol	11,340		11,340	19		
Suiyuan	700	5,000	5,700	23		

TABLE VIII. Quartz crystal deposits in Suiyuan.

Name of Deposit	Location	Remarks	Latitude & Longitude
Huang-hua-ko-tung	T'ao-lin	Good quality, large reserve, with beryl.	41.09 - 112.39
Sai-lin-hu-tung	Ku-yang	Large reserve, with beryl	41.18 - 110.33
Kan-kou-tzu	Wu-ch'uan	Large reserve, with beryl.	41.27 - 111.58
Hsiao-ta-ching-shan	Hsing-ho	Large reserve, with beryl.	41.08 - 113.53

TABLE IX. Distribution of chief asbestos deposits.

Location	County	Remarks	Latitude & Longitude
Suiyuan Sub-region.			
N. & S. of Wu-yüan	Wu-yüan	worked in 1944	41.07 - 108.28
Near Lin-ho	Lin-ho	worked in 1944	40.49 - 107.30
Near Tai-liang in Ural Shan	Urat Banner	worked in 1944	40.54 - 109.28
Pan-k'ou	Wu-ch'uan	small operation	40.53 - 110.54
Liu-chou-wan	Wu-ch'uan	300 tons (1944)	40.51 - 110.49
Shao-pu-kai	Ku-yang	150 tons (1944)	40.58 - 110.26
Shih-hui-yao-tzu	Sa-la-ch'i(Saratsi)	small operation	40.48 - 110.46
Sha-pa-tzu	Pao-t'ou	300 tons (1944) (best deposit)	40.49 - 109.48
Jehol			
Two mi. NE of Chaoyang	Chao-yang	worked in 1943	41.34 - 120.26
Ma-chia-tzu	Sui-tung	133 tons in 1944	42.28 - 120.43
Kao-shou-tai	Ch'eng-te	Possibly given to Hopei(1953).	
Sung-shu-tai		Possibly given to Hopei(1953).	
Wu-tao-ling	P'ing-ch'üan	Possibly given to Hopei(1953).	40.56 - 110.04

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ETHNIC GROUPS

I. Introduction

If we equate an ethnic group with a race, we are forced to say that there is only one "ethnic group" in the whole Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, excluding the very small Russian population in Manchuria. The inhabitants of the IMAR, from the northern tip of Manchuria to the western edge of Suiyuan, are Mongoloid peoples of the group called, in some classifications, Asiatic Mongoloid. There are wide variations in physical type and appearance within this group, however, because of the continual intermixture throughout history of Chinese, Turkic, Mongolian and Tunguso-Manchurian populations within the area. The predominant physical characteristics of the Mongoloid peoples in this area are the typical Mongoloid fold in the eyelid; straight black hair; a relatively flat nose bridge; high cheekbones, and a skin tone ranging from deep brown to a yellowish tan or sallow color.

These physical traits common to Mongoloids are not, however, the only ones found among the people of the IMAR. Red or brown hair, wavy hair, blue eyes, straight, high nose bridges, tall individuals and skin verging upon the characteristic Caucasoid coloration are also found. Because of the checkered racial history of the area, as well as the extreme lack of physical anthropological studies here, one cannot be categorical about equating racial types with ethnic groups. In defining our ethnic groups for the IMAR, we are forced to fall back upon consideration of cultural and historical aspects of the lives of the people. Habits of living, language, historical unity and political divisions provide us with a few distinguishable groups. Excepting recent immigrant populations, we may regard these groups as highly mixed "Manchurian" types, finding among all of them Chinese, Mongolian, Tunguso-Manchurian and European physical characteristics.

Incorporated in the area are the following more important ethnic groups: Chinese (mostly from North China); Mongols of both the eastern and western branches; Russians; Manchus (highly mixed with Chinese); Tunguso-Manchurians of various kinds; Koreans, and Chinese Mohammedans (to be distinguished culturally in some respects from the Chinese proper). All these groups have subdivisions. By number, the most significant groups are the Chinese and the Mongols; all the rest comprise no more than five per cent of the population of the IMAR.

II. Recent Immigrants

A. The Koreans

Among the groups singled out as ethnic units in the IMAR, the Koreans, Russians and some Chinese may be considered recent immigrants. The Chinese will be discussed later. The Koreans actually living in the IMAR are a very minor group, most of whom settled there before the Japanese occupation began in 1931. The largest concentrations of Koreans are to be found in the central and northwestern sections of the eastern part of the IMAR, specifically in the Ayung and Khorchin Banners. This group numbered only 5,400 in 1953. For the most part, the Koreans are rice farmers, although some have settled in cities and pursue various handicraft occupations.

B. The Russians

Russians have been entering this region as colonists ever since the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the present IMAR. They are concentrated mainly in Hulunbuir. Among the Russian peoples who moved into the region as the influence of the old Russian Empire penetrated eastward, and who are still in Hulunbuir, are the so-called White Russians or Slavs, the Turko-Tatars, Jews, Poles and so on. All of these live in Hailar, Manchouli, and other towns along the railways. Besides these there is another group of White Russians, the descendants of Cossack immigrants who escaped from Siberia at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917. They moved into the San-ho region of Barga, where they took up herding, dairying and agriculture, growing wheat and potatoes and oats for livestock fodder. Some Russians in this area hire Buryats to herd for them. There were about five thousand Russians living in the village of San-ho in Barga in 1935.

With the development of Russian commercial and industrial interests in Manchuria, more Russians have come in to populate the cities and engage in forestry, fur trading, et cetera. There has been some intermarriage with the surrounding peoples. The Russian population is still concentrated mainly along the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russian settlers in the agricultural and lumbering districts have introduced agricultural techniques, Russian sleds, some Russian-type houses and clothing, and certain Russian crops. Russian influence on the material life of the non-European peoples surrounding them has been felt mostly by the Dagurs, who have adopted some of the aspects of agriculture and living noted above. The Russian language is still in use, but it has been corrupted with localisms and words taken over from neighboring languages. With the Russians came the Greek Orthodox Church and church buildings, but the religion apparently has had little effect on the peoples surrounding the immigrants, and has been practiced primarily by the Russians themselves. The Russian population of Hulunbuir probably numbers between seven thousand and ten thousand.

III. The Chinese in the IMAR

A. General Characteristics

The movement of Chinese into Inner Mongolia has been an age-old process, occurring in waves corresponding to some extent to the strength of China vis-a-vis the Mongolian border. Movements into different portions of Inner Mongolia have not occurred evenly on all fronts nor with the same strength. One can best deal with the subject by treating first the Chinese immigrations into the Manchurian and southeastern portion of Inner Mongolia and following with the immigration into the western sections.

B. The Chinese in the Eastern (Manchurian) IMAR

During the later years of the Manchu Dynasty there was a slow seepage of Chinese settlers into southern Manchuria, despite efforts by the regime to prohibit such a movement. The valleys of the Liao and Sungari Rivers were settled in part by Chinese, mostly from Shantung, at the beginning of the Tao-kuang reign (1821-1851). For the next thirty years, until the end of the reign, large tracts north of Harbin were opened. The period of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) drove many others into Manchuria, access to which was becoming freer. In 1878 the official policy was changed, and immigration was allowed into the three eastern provinces, continuing practically unabated until the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.

Much of the early migration was more in the form of seasonal labor movements than colonization. Families were left in Shantung or Hopei (Chihli) during March, April and May, and the immigrants returned during December and January. The annual number of immigrants prior to 1925 never exceeded five hundred thousand a year, but in 1926 the total rose to six hundred thousand, and to more than a million in 1927-28. Returning groups made up between forty-five and sixty per cent of the immigrants, so the actual volume of settlement was quite low in comparison with the movement of people. Between 1925 and 1930 the settlement continued at the 1927-28 rate under government encouragement, and there was probably an increase of about two million permanent Chinese settlers. Thus the annual increase up to the Japanese occupation and the establishment of Manchukuo was probably more than four hundred thousand Chinese.

In physical type the Chinese born in these regions differ less noticeably from the Mongols than from the Chinese born in the homeland (Imamura, Vol. LVM, 657, July, 1942).

1. Origins

The most significant number of immigrants prior to the start of the Sino-Japanese conflict came from Shantung and Hopei (Chihli). To some extent this movement was aided and perhaps channeled toward Manchuria by the relative ease of travel from Shantung by both land and sea. In some cases the settlers were shopkeepers, deported criminals, or garrisoned soldiers, but the bulk of the immigrant population was land-hungry farmers.

Coming from one of the more culturally conservative regions of North China, the immigrants brought with them their old way of life practically intact. No great changes occurred in the social organization which would make the new "Manchurians" as a whole distinct from their counterparts remaining in Shantung and Hopei. In fact, this colonizing movement has been aptly termed a transplantation of the entire Chinese social complex into new soil.

While similarities abound between the immigrants' old home and their new settlements in Manchuria, there is an observable tendency to adjust to local conditions. The tightly organized Chinese community with its family organization and traditional culture persists, but contact with the diverse groups of non-Chinese inhabitants of Manchurian Inner Mongolia has in some cases resulted in a loosening of the social structure and in intermarriage. Many regions permit extensive, large-scale agriculture in contrast to the intensive agriculture practiced in China proper. The pioneer character of the settlements promotes more mutual aid, although the aid comes through organizations in China proper, i.e., the provincial associations, guilds, clans and so forth. Throughout the whole region of Manchuria, the Chinese employ a more extensive use of draft animals.

The Chinese have been little affected by contact with non-Chinese groups. The process has, in fact, moved in other directions, whereby Mongols, Tungusic peoples and Manchus have become more Chinese in culture. The exchange has, however, left some marks on the Chinese: those in contact with the Mongols now eat milk and cheese; those who would, in Shantung or Hopei, be wheat growers, now raise paddy rice. But on the whole the Chinese immigrants have clung closely to the older forms of Chinese life.

2. Present-day characteristics

The Chinese population in the eastern (Manchurian) portion of the IMAR is concentrated in the Liao River Valley, in the vicinity of the municipalities of T'ung-liao and Kai-lu, and along the line of the Ssu-p'ing—T'ung-liao—Chin-chou Railway. Large numbers of Chinese are found in the towns, occupied in trade, handicrafts and industry. Small groups of Chinese and even isolated farmsteads can be found in other areas of the eastern part of the IMAR.

Chinese agriculture in this area is characterized by irrigation and extensive farming. The raising of cattle, mules, pigs and poultry occurs concurrently and is being developed.

The residences of the Chinese farmers in the IMAR are of the low, one-storied North China type, made of clay, mud bricks or earth. The houses are grouped in villages or settlements consisting of from thirty to fifty farms, sometimes the whole being surrounded by a fence. Individual houses are almost always surrounded by walls of clay or kaoliang stems.

The exact number of Chinese in the eastern part of the IMAR is not stated in available sources. Most recent estimates of the total Chinese population of the IMAR give a proportion of five Chinese to one Mongol. We may estimate a total Chinese population of about five million on this basis, with about half living in the eastern (mainly southeastern) areas of the region.

C. The Chinese in the Western Section of the IMAR

In contrast to the eastern part of the IMAR, which offers much in the way of soil, climate and communications to the prospective Chinese immigrant, the western portion of the region presented a less attractive front until quite recent times. Only certain areas outside the Great Wall were favorable to agriculture. From early years, Chinese immigration to these areas depended upon the comparative weakness of the non-Chinese inhabitants. The advance of the Chinese into the areas around Kuei-hua, Pao-t'ou and P'ing-ti-ch'üan was slow, characterized by the reclamation of lands long in dispute between the nomads and the settlers. Until the construction of railways, settlers farmed mostly subsistence crops, licorice, linseed, rapeseed, and in the late nineteenth century, opium. Itinerant traders appear to have been the spearhead of immigration during the late nineteenth century.

With the development of railway transportation along the northern borders of China proper, and with interest shown by the officials of the Republic, colonization began to take on larger proportions. Today the line of Chinese penetration lies slightly north of the railway from P'ing-ti-ch'üan (Chi'ning) to Pao-t'ou, and continues along the edge of the plateau up to Dolonor. This line of demarcation tends to place the most arable land outside the Mongolian limits of the IMAR.

1. Cultural characteristics

The settlers in the area north of Kalgan came for the most part from the Hopei-Shantung region, which supplied immigrants to Manchuria and the eastern area of the IMAR. In the western area (Suiyuan), the bulk of the immigrants came from northern Shansi. Like the Chinese of the eastern region, they are a physically diverse group, but because of previous contact with

Turkic and Tibetan groups, they vary in type from the mixtures shown in the eastern population. This variation is not only in physique, but also in social customs. The social ties seem to be looser here than in China proper, but this may be due more to the rigor of marginal farming than to contact with the Mongols. Filial piety, a traditional Chinese value, seems to be weak in this region, perhaps because of the relative youth of the immigrants, whose average age is thirty years.

As in the eastern regions, the Chinese along this frontier eat milk and cheese, a habit probably adopted from the Mongols. Agricultural implements, crops and planting methods are similar in the forward region to those practiced in northern Shansi and Shensi. The most important subsistence crops are millet, oats, wheat and kaoliang. Irrigation is found in the Hou-t'ao and Yellow River Bend Administrative Districts, and rice has been raised in the Hou-t'ao area since the war. The bulk of the farming outside of this section is dry.

The typical dwelling is the mud hut, built of sun-dried brick or pounded earth, with a mud roof laid over a mattress of reeds or brush, supported on willow poles. The raised platform (k'ang) which serves as bed and heater is found here as well as in the eastern part of the IMAR. Houses are grouped together and surrounded by a wall for protection.

Farms are somewhat larger than the average in China proper, but in the irrigated areas they rapidly approach the more "typical" few acres in other parts of the country. Irrigation in this area requires constant attention, because of the rapid silting in the ditches, especially in the Ordos and surrounding areas.

Detailed statistics for the western part of the IMAR are difficult to obtain. There are three major trade centers, with concentrations of Shansi and Moslem traders, along the line of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway: Kuei-hua (Kukuhoto), Pao-t'ou, and Chi-ning (P'ing-ti-ch'üan). With current attempts to develop trade and industry in this region, it is possible that more centers capable of supporting a larger population will develop.

D. The Chinese Moslems

The majority of the Moslems (Hui) in the IMAR are located in the western district around Kuei-hua, Pao-t'ou, Toketo and Chi-ning, as well as in other places along the line of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, between Pao-t'ou and Kalgan. The total number of Chinese Moslems in the IMAR would be unimportant were it not for the fact that they are considered by the present government to be a distinct ethnic group. Their role in trade, hotel-keeping and other commercial and urban enterprises is also large in proportion to their number.

It is difficult to find statistical data specifically on the Chinese Moslems of the IMAR. From various sets of figures for the eastern and western portions of the region, we can make a rough estimate of approximately forty thousand Moslems. The figure of 7,030 is fairly accurate for the eastern part of the IMAR, i.e., that portion included in the four Hsingan provinces in 1939.

Moslems in the western part of the IMAR seem to have originated from groups which settled in North China as early as Ming times, rather than from the Moslem population of Kansu and Ninghsia, or farther west. The Moslems of the eastern part of the IMAR derive primarily from previous Chinese immigrants to Suiyuan.

In the towns, the Moslem Chinese and the Han Chinese are to some extent interdependent in their economic life, and are very similar to each other in dress, appearance and language, although the Moslem sprinkles his speech with sinicized Persian words. The Moslems, however, tend to live in a group centered around the mosque, within hearing of the voice of the muezzin who calls them to prayer. If the size of the community expands beyond this spatial limit, the community splits and a new mosque and community are established. Village communities are more isolated and exclusively Moslem, but also follow the above pattern.

Moslems marry within their local groups more than other Chinese, and are forbidden to marry non-Moslems. This does not unduly limit the number of available marriage partners, however, because non-Moslems can be admitted to the community by conversion or adoption.

Other aspects of Moslem life which distinguish the Hui from the Han in the IMAR have been differences in matrimonial and burial customs, certain differences in family systems, the absence of ancestor worship, and non-participation in the important New Year's Day, Midsummer and Midautumn festivals (See China IMAR, Religion).

IV. The Mongols

A. Population and Group Location

The Mongol population of the IMAR is probably a little more than a million, including that of Suiyuan. The major portion is concentrated in the eastern part of the IMAR and in the Chahar-Silingol district. Prior to the addition of Suiyuan to the IMAR in January, 1954, the official figure for the Mongolian population had been placed at 800,000. Thus the inclusion of Suiyuan, while raising the Chinese population by 3,400,000, added only 200,000 more Mongols to the IMAR's jurisdiction (See China IMAR, Size and Geographical Distribution of Population).

The Mongols are divided into different tribes speaking languages of the same group and exhibiting local variations in clothing, customs, house types, et cetera. The Buryats, Ölöts (Oirats), Ordos and Dagurs each speak a language which may pose problems to a Mongolian from another tribe, but there is sufficient knowledge of the common Khalkha language that no great barrier to mutual intercourse is raised. (See China IMAR, Languages.) As Khalkha is the language of the majority of Outer Mongols, there is no linguistic border between the IMAR and the Mongolian People's Republic.

In the IMAR, the largest group of Mongols is included under the designation of Eastern Mongols, southern branch. This is the group most closely related to the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia, historically, ethnically and linguistically.

Many segments of other Inner Mongol tribes were regrouped as separate units under the Manchu organization, and allotted territory independent from their mother unit. Thus the Jalait, the Dörbet and the Arukhorchin (possibly excluded at present from the IMAR) were originally part of the Khorchin tribe. The Eastern Tumet (Monggoljin) are an offshoot of the Tumets of Suiyuan. To trace the connections and splintering of the different groups would serve little purpose here; it is sufficient merely to mark their inclusion in the group of Eastern Mongols.

Included in the IMAR are small groups of Western Mongols, or Ölöts. A segment of this large division is found in the former Barga district, the present Huna League of Northwest Manchuria. This group is known as the Ölöt, a corrupted form of the word Oirat. Originally the Oirats lived in the northwestern part of Sinkiang, known as Dsungaria; they were direct descendents of the Oirats of the time of Chingis Khan. The Ölöts (Oirats) of the IMAR descend from a group of captives of the Manchus, who placed them in the Barga region along the upper Imen River during the time of Ch'ien-lung. There are no data available on the extent to which they have preserved their individuality. The Ölöt population of Barga as of 1935 was four hundred to five hundred people. Others of this group may be found scattered in the extreme western portion of Suiyuan.

Finally, representatives of the Northern Mongols, or Buryats, are to be found in the IMAR, and also in the Barga region. Culturally and linguistically, the Buryats are set off from the other Mongols. The Bargu-Buryats derive from the Buryats of Baikal and northern Outer Mongolia, one group settling in the Barga district as early as 1690 and a second group from Baikal arriving after the Russian Revolution.

During the attempts at collectivization in Outer Mongolia in 1930-32, many Khalkhas fled to Inner Mongolia and became incorporated into various leagues and banners. According to Zenrin Kyokai, page 62, these displaced Outer Mongols were regrouped as follows:

Leagues	Banners	Number
Silingol	East and West Khuchin	1,500
	East and West Abaganar	600
	East and West Sunit	2,000
	Others	700
Ulanchab	Dürbön Khukhet	3,200
	Khalkha, Right Wing	200
	Others	3,600
Ikechou		8,000
	Total	19,800

B. Physical Type

The Mongols as a group are generally round-headed (brachycephalic), ranging toward the North Chinese long-headed type in the southern regions and toward more round-headedness among the Buryats. Their faces are rectangular, neither long and narrow like the faces of the North Chinese, nor round like those of certain of the Tungusic peoples. There are some whose faces are more round than square, but a long, narrow face is quite unusual. They are of medium-short stature, having short limbs but a long trunk, and rarely exceed five feet six inches, although tall individuals are known. The Khalkha are generally taller than the Ölöt. Facial characteristics include slanting, narrow eyes, the classic "Mongolian" eye-fold, flat nose and high cheek-bones except where there has been considerable mixture. Their hair is coarse, straight, and black, and eyes vary from black to golden brown. Facial hair is sparse, and there is almost no body hair. Their skin is of a reddish cast and yellowish tints are uncommon; when sunburned they are very dark, but sheltered skin, as under the arms, is milk white.

C. Cultural Characteristics

No scientific studies have been conducted to determine what characterizes a Mongol in other than physical terms. There are certainly variations in costume, behavior, attitudes and economy, depending upon the location, contact with Chinese or other surrounding groups, acceptance of agriculture, and historical background. Travelers and missionaries have reported that the Mongols appear to be lazy, but this could be a judgement based upon a different standard of values from those the Mongols themselves apply. The Chinese have frequently considered Mongols simple, as they are easy to cheat in trade; many foreigners report them to be clumsy in movement, except on horseback, but give no standard for comparison. Most reports seem to agree that they are honest. As detailed a description as can be made of Mongol cultural characteristics will be presented in other chapters of this handbook.

A distinction which is most significant is that between the nomadic Mongols and the sedentary group. Nomadic Mongols, occupying themselves exclusively with the raising of livestock, live mostly in the western and southwestern parts of the region. Their characteristic house type is the yurt,' a collapsible, portable felt-covered tent. In the nomadic regions, the yurts serve as living quarters, storehouses, offices, itinerant schools, medical stations, et cetera. While there has not yet been a concerted attempt to force the nomadic Mongols to adopt agriculture and settle in one spot, they are "encouraged" to do so. Their nomadism is by no means unrestrained, being confined to specific areas within which they are free to move. The size of the areas varies with the section of Inner Mongolia in which they live, covering much larger territories in the western parts of the region and in Silingol.

The sedentary group may be divided into semi-sedentary and sedentary. The semi-settled Mongols occupy themselves mainly with cattle raising, but conduct secondary farming activities. Their livestock is mainly cattle and horses, and their cultivated crops are primarily millet, kaoliang and wheat.

The completely sedentary Mongols have adopted to a large degree the characteristic way of life of the Chinese. These Mongols live in yurt-like houses made of clay or, in some regions, Chinese style mud houses. Windows are covered with translucent paper. Occasionally a typical Chinese wall will be built around a clay version of a yurt. The Mongol village closely resembles the Chinese village, and farm techniques have been taken over entirely from the Chinese. One finds the most sinified Mongols in the southeastern parts of the IMAR, in colonized areas, and among the Tumet of Suiyuan.

D. The Buryats

Two groups of Buryat peoples occupy an important place in the ethnic composition of Inner Mongolia. These are the Old and New Barga or, as they are sometimes called, especially in the Russian literature, the Chipchin and the Bargu-Buryat. The latter may also be referred to as the New Bargu-Buryat, and both groups are not infrequently called Bargut.

Originally these Buryats settled in Khalkha, maintaining their shamanistic beliefs and practices at a time when the Khalkha had already become Lamaists. This religious distinction and the difference in language caused the Khalkha to look upon the Buryats as pagans and foreigners.

Late in the seventeenth century a first wave of these Buryats left what is now Outer Mongolia to escape Khalkha oppression, crossed the Great Hsingan Range to Tsitsihar and appeared before the Manchurian officials, who accepted them as subjects. Near the end of the seventeenth century Manchurian authorities made an attempt to convert the Buryat and other nomadic tribes in the Tsitsihar region to a peaceful, sedentary life by training them to be farmers. To accomplish this purpose they assigned the nomads to regiments from which military-farming settlements were formed. The majority of the Buryat, however, refused to conform to the new way of life and continued their raids and depredations upon the Manchurian and Chinese settlements. Finally, in 1732, the Manchurian government was compelled to resettle most of the Buryat and the still nomadic elements of the Solon and Dagur to the west of the Great Hsingan Range in eastern Hulunbuir. These Buryats are called the Chipchin.

In 1735, the oppression of the Khalkha called forth a new wave of Buryat emigration from Outer Mongolia. This group settled in the western part of Hulunbuir, now Barga, and are known as the Bargu-Buryat, or New Barga.

The two Buryat groups in Barga are still pastoral nomads, but have abandoned their shamanistic faith for Lamaism. Those of the Buryat who remained behind in the Tsitsihar region are settled farmers and Lamaists.

A much later movement of Buryat and Tungusic peoples from Transbaikalia into Barga occurred during the Russian Revolution in 1919-1920. These people established themselves both to the north and the south of Hailar in such numbers that the Hailar government was compelled to allot them definite areas for their pastures. Certain unused lands of the diminishing Ölöt Khoshun were chosen for this purpose, and here the new arrivals began to live their own Transbaikal way of life, which was different from that of the local Mongols.

First, instead of restricting their animals to pasture feed, the Buryat or Tungus laid up stocks of hay for winter feeding, thereby transgressing an ancient prohibition of the steppe which forbade the cultivation of the soil and cutting of hay.

Second, the new immigrants were Russian orthodox in religious faith, bore Russian names, and displayed icons in their yurts. Nevertheless, they held the shaman in great respect, and there were shamanistic objects side by side with Russian orthodox images in the yurts of the Buryat and Tungus (Kormayov, 1928, p. 47).

The Buryats tend to be more conservative in their social organization than other Mongol groups, and retain clan organization to a much greater degree (See China IMAR, Social Structure). They have long been culturally separate from their nearest neighbors, the Khalkha, and under Russian influence, earned the dislike of the Khalkha.

Recent statistics on Buryat population in the IMAR are difficult to obtain. The most recent figure available to us is six thousand in 1939.

E. The Dagurs

Transbaikalia, especially the upper reaches of the Shilka and the Argun, was the early home of the Dagurs, and even today this region is sometimes called Dauria. In the seventeenth century, however, these people were living on the Upper Amur, where they were attacked by Russian forces, and as a consequence, requested the protection of the Manchurian government. The Manchus, having accepted the Dagurs as subjects, moved them to Butekha on the Nonni, where part of them still live. In 1732 the Manchu government, having failed in an attempt to make farmers of all the Dagurs, resettled the recalcitrant ones, together with groups of Solons and Barguts, in Barga.

These western Dagurs, living in the Barga area, are livestock breeders, while those to the east of the Hsingan Mountains have long been subjected to the influence of Chinese culture and live as settled farmers and market gardeners. Many Dagurs are engaged in forestry and transportation. Dagurs have been considered by many authors to be among the most progressive of Manchurian tribal groups, and were active in the administration of the so-called North Hsingan Province under the Japanese.

In physical type the Dagurs are of upper-medium height, of stocky build, and dolicocephalic, with broad, oval faces, and black, somewhat slanting eyes. The Dagurs living in Barga, however, are now closer to the Mongolian type in appearance.

The Dagur language is Mongolian, with an admixture of Tungusic, Manchu and a few Chinese words, the presence of which reflects their contacts with other peoples since their exodus from Transbaikalia. The Dagurs consider themselves Mongols, although many authorities believe they are Evenki, a branch of the Tungus (cf. Languages, A.1.e.).

Tibetan Buddhism is the most significant religious institution among the Dagurs, but shamanism is still practiced by some, particularly in the treatment of illness.

The Dagur population has been estimated at about three hundred thousand, but it is not known whether this includes Dagurs living outside the IMAR. This figure is probably unreliable, for it is repeated in a German source (based upon Japanese material) for 1939, and in a Russian source published in 1955. If the figure is accepted as approximately correct for 1939, as it may be, then certainly some change must have taken place in sixteen years.

V. Minority Groups of the IMAR

A. The Oronchon (Olunchun)

The name Oronchon is used to designate several Tungusic

tribes confined to Heilungkiang Province and to Barga, and is probably derived from a Tungusic word for reindeer. The Oronchon call themselves Khonkoro, a name which is applied in general by other groups to the inhabitants of the settlements scattered to the northwest of the right bank of the Nonni River. The Solon also call themselves Khonkoro.

The Oronchon consist of four principal groups, which may or may not be included in the present organization of the Oronchon Autonomous Banner. As they are traditionally nomadic hunters, some of them may move back and forth across the Heilungkiang border. The first group lives in the Hailar region near the Solon and is composed of 220 families scattered along the valleys of the Hailar, Gan and Derboul Rivers.

The second group, of about a hundred families, lives on the upper reaches of the Nonni in the vicinity of Mergen. Most of them are, or were, outside the borders of the autonomous banner.

The third group, living in the region of the Houmar River, consists of about 430 families. The Houmar peoples are also known as the Manegirs. Part of them were formerly in Heilungkiang, and may still be there.

The fourth group, known as the Birar, inhabits the valleys of the Siun and Korfin Rivers, affluents of the Heilungkiang, southeast of the Houmar territory. Their southern neighbors are the Goldi. The Birar, who number approximately two hundred families, are sometimes known as Kiler and Kileng, names which are also sometimes applied by the Chinese to the Kilimis who inhabit the lower course of the Sakhalin. These groups are still in Heilungkiang.

The Oronchon were formerly reindeer herders and hunters, but partly due to an epidemic which destroyed some of their herds, and partly to the influence of neighboring peoples, the majority of them have given up the reindeer and now use horses. Hunting is still their chief occupation, though now the People's Government is also employing them in forest production and fire prevention, and is making efforts to settle them in farming areas. In 1954, more than 210 hsien (counties) in both the IMAR and Heilungkiang were said to be under cultivation by the Oronchon.

The Oronchon are described as slender and small in stature, with large heads flattened in back; broad, flat faces with prominent cheek bones, somewhat thick lips and narrow, slanting eyes, black or hazel in color; thick black hair on the head, little body hair and sparse beards and mustaches. The hands and feet are sometimes so slender that an Oronchon has the appearance of an immature youth.

In the Oronchon household the father is the head of the family and provides the means of sustenance. The mother supervises or performs the household tasks, and in the absence of the husband, does a man's work. The dwelling is a conical hut, the framework of which is constructed of poles covered in the summer with strips of birch bark and in winter with animal skins sewed together. The fire, as in the Mongol yurt, is in the middle of the hut. Beds are made of hide. Oronchon garments are made of animal skins and resemble those of the Tungus, although they occasionally wear cloth garments also.

In 1951 the Oronchon were formed into a new administrative unit, located in the northeastern part of the Great Hsingan Mountains, in Heilungkiang. This was called the Autonomous Oronchon Banner, subdivided into four somon: The Dubkhui, Gankhui, Tokiamin and Nomin. Cooperatives and mutual aid teams were organized for agriculture and hunting, and for the cooperative marketing of Oronchon goods in Hailar. A primary school was established and is said to be attended by four-fifths of all school-age children in the Banner. Instruction in the school is given in the Oronchon language, although some students attend Mongolian language schools. Some Oronchon have been sent to study at the Central Institute for National Minorities in Peking. The Chinese government has established a medical center and deputed twenty-three doctors and assistants to attend to health in the banner.

The population as of 1955 in the territory of the autonomous banner was stated to be 798, with a figure of 2,000 for all Oronchons in Heilungkiang and the IMAR. A report for 1952 listed a total population of only one thousand. Scattered groups of Oronchons live outside the autonomous banner in the IMAR, and about 150 live in Suiyuan Province.

B. The Solon

The Solon are derived from a very ancient Tungusic tribe, the Jurchen, who are also ancestors of the Manchus. According to Chinese sources, the Solon were living in what is now Heilungkiang Province in the first century A.D. (known then as Mo-ho). In the seventeenth century they were leading a nomadic life along the banks of the Amur River, where they were exposed to the encroachment and attack of the early Russian settlers. In 1654 they sought the aid and protection of the Manchus, who received them as subjects and resettled them on the Nonni River in Butekha.

At the end of the seventeenth century, the Manchus, in an attempt to make settled farmers of the nomadic peoples of the Butekha region, assigned the Solon and other tribes to regiments from which were formed the military-farming settlements. Some of the Solon, however, as well as members of other tribes, refused to adopt a sedentary life, and continued to raid and plunder the settled population. As a consequence, the Manchu government moved the non-conforming groups to Barga in 1732, supplied them with livestock, and permitted them to continue their traditional pattern of existence.

The Solon are now living in the upper part of the basin of the Nonni, along its left tributaries, and on the right bank of the Amur, and in Barga along the western slopes of the Great Hsingan Range up to the Khalkin Gol River, and in the vicinity of Ganjur. This territory is divided among the Solon, Ayung, Moridaia and Butekha Banners.

In Barga, the Solon are pastoral nomads and hunters. In the Nonni River Valley they are farmers. Those living farther to the north in the Amur basin are presumably hunters, but no information has yet been found to indicate whether they use domestic animals or cultivate the soil. The Solon living in the Barga steppe are engaged in transportation, together with Chinese and Dagurs.

Physically, the Solon are characterized by oval-shaped heads, round faces, broad foreheads, straight, narrow black eyes, prominent cheek bones, flat noses, broad mouth with thick lips, stiff black hair, sparse beards and mustaches, and medium-tall, slender bodies.

The majority of the Solon are shamanists, though Lamaists occur as exceptions (See China IMAR, Religion). The Solon language is a Tungusic dialect containing many Chinese and Mongolian elements (See China IMAR, Languages).

C. The Yakuts

In the extreme northern portion of Barga, west of the Great Hsingan Range and north of the Bystraya River, live the Yakut, northern neighbors of the Oronchon. The Yakut, though similar to the Oronchon in the general features of their culture, are an entirely unrelated people and differ from the latter in physical type, religion and language. Scientific physical data on this group are not available, however.

This Yakut group, which in 1928 totaled about 250 persons, has its origin in the migration of two tribes, the Solongan (Ainak) and Buldoto (Nakagir), who left their native Yakutsk region in the early or middle part of the nineteenth century. The present size of the group is reported by the Chinese to be 138 persons, as of April 1955.

The Yakut, like the Oronchon, are reindeer herders, hunters and fishermen. The typical dwelling for both groups is a framework of poles covered with birch bark or animal skins. The flesh of wild game, reindeer meat and milk, animal fat and butter, and some cereal products, usually buckwheat, are the chief articles of diet for both groups. The Yakut dress, however, is characterized by a comparatively heavier reliance upon the use of animal skins than among the Oronchon, who wear cloth garments more frequently. Some of the Yakuts, moreover, were formerly members of the Russian Orthodox Church, which they supported with yearly donations, and where they solemnized weddings, births and deaths. After the closing of the border, however, they discontinued their donations and observance of church rites.

The Yakut speak a dialect that is Turkic in grammar and syntax, and their vocabulary is composed of thirty per cent Turkish, thirty per cent Mongol and forty per cent words of unknown origin. In consonance with the policy of establishing alphabets for unwritten languages, the People's Government of China is probably attempting to devise such an alphabet for the Yakut.

Under the present regime, even this small group is being reached by modern Chinese political and social influence. In April 1955, the People's Government reported that a delegation spent a week with the Yakut, bringing a film projection unit and a medical team. Before leaving, it also reported that the People's Government has provided the Yakut with houses, a clinic, a primary school and a supply-and-marketing cooperative. They are included in the Ergun Banner of the Huna League, and have not yet been reported to have an autonomous government.

D. The Manchus

The Manchus are descendants of one of several nomadic hunting and fishing tribes who lived in ancient times in the forests along the valleys of the rivers of northeastern Manchuria. These peoples, who were of Tungusic origin, kept domestic animals: reindeer, which were later largely replaced by horses, and pigs, the economic importance of which was reflected in their use in shamanistic religious rites. The agriculture they practiced apparently developed independently of that which the Manchus later adopted from the Chinese. The Manchus themselves originated from the Juchen tribe which, when it first appeared in historical records, had already developed far beyond the hunting and fishing society of the northern forests. Through their contacts with the steppe peoples they had become skilled horsemen and archers, and from the Chinese they had learned a more complex type of agriculture and accepted life in walled towns. They retained their tribal organization, however, and their kinship system and shamanist religion.

After ruling China for nearly three centuries, the majority of the Manchus had all but lost the peculiar characteristics which had distinguished them earlier as an ethnic unit, and had become thoroughly amalgamated with the Chinese population. Today, although official figures show more than two million Manchus living in China, it is only in the remote regions of northern Heilungkiang Province and in Barga, where insignificant numbers of them live, that Manchu speech, writing and social organization are preserved to any extent.

The Manchu physical type has also become so diluted in the process of assimilation as to be almost indistinguishable from the Chinese. Observations made in recent years, for example, attribute to the Manchu most of the physical characteristics which are generally typical of all Mongoloids: light brown or yellow skin, straight, coarse hair on the head, sparse facial hair and almost no body hair, prominent malar bones and a relatively small stature (ca. 163 cm. average). The head and forehead are generally large, and their faces are described as either long or round. The head hair is often described as brown, however, rather than black, and the eyes are usually set horizontally rather than obliquely, and are brown or occasionally hazel in color.

There is no information at present available to us on the religion or economy of those Manchus who have retained their own language. It is generally assumed that even this small group has adopted the Chinese economy and other aspects of Chinese culture, though perhaps they have retained shamanism as their religion.

The most recent estimate (1939) of the Manchu population, confined strictly to those Manchus claiming retention of language and "Manchuness," was 300,000 for the whole of Manchuria. According to the 1955 official census figures, the entire population of individuals called Manchus, including those almost indistinguishable from the Chinese, numbers 2,418,931.

Additional Readings

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LANGUAGES

I. Linguistic Classification and General Characteristics
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LANGUAGES

I. Linguistic Classification and General Characteristics

All Mongolian dialects spoken in the IMAR belong to the Eastern Branch of Mongolian languages. Mongolian dialects were spoken in these former banners and leagues:

BANNERS	LEAGUES
Kharachin	Josotu League
Tumet	
Tangut-Khalkha	
Dörbet	Jerim League
Gorlos	
Jalait	
Khorchit	
Aru Khorchin	Jouda League
Aokhan	
Barin	
Chokhor-Khalkha	
Jarut	
Keshikten	
Onniut	
Abaga	Silingol League and Chahar Territory
Abaganar	
Khuchin	
Sunit	
Ujumchin	
Dörbön Khukhet	Ulanchab League
MuuMingan	
Urat (three banners)	
Khalkha Right	
Dalat	Ikechou League (Urdus) Ordos
Jasak	
Jungar	
Khangin	
Otok	
Wang	

The usual linguistic classification of the Mongolian languages and dialects is shown on the following table:

Mongolian Languages*

Eastern Branch

1) Dagur
   - a) Hailar dialect
   - b) Tsitsikhar dialect

2) Monguor
   - a) Shera Yögur
   - b) Aragwa
   - c) Santa

3) Khalkha
   - a) Urat
   - b) Tumet
   - c) Kharachin
   - d) Chahar
   - e) Khuchin Bargu

4) Urdus

5) Buryat
   - a) Alar
   - b) Bokhan
   - c) Unga
   - d) Ekhirit
   - e) Barguzin
   - f) Nižne-Udinsk
   - g) Tsongōl
   - h) Sartūl
   - i) Aga
   - j) Khori
   - k) Bargu or Shine-Bargu

Western Branch

1) Mongol

2) Oirat
   - a) Dörbet
   - b) Torgut
   - c) Bayit
   - d) Uriankha
   - e) Zakhachin
   - f) Mingat "
   - g) Dambi-Olet
   - h) Khoshut

3) Kalmuck
   - a) Sart-Kalmuck
   - b) Buzawa
   - c) Torgut
   - d) Dörbet

* Terms written and underlined are considered languages; others are considered dialects.

All these dialects are phonetically, morphologically, and syntactically almost the same as Khalkha-Mongolian of Outer Mongolia; i.e., they are agglutinative, which means that as a rule the stem is unchangeable and that conjugation and declension are expressed by means of suffixes attached to the stems, e.g.,

Urdus: Ǧol "the river"

Ģolīn "of the river"
Ģolťu "on the river or to the river"
Ģolīg "the river" (accusative)
Ģolās "from the river"
Ģolār "by means of the river"
Ģollā "with the river"

For this reason the Mongolian words can be broken down easily, e.g., Written Mongolian:

ala-	"to kill"
ala-gda-	"to be killed"
ala-gda-gul-	"to cause one to be killed"
ala-bai-	"he, she, it killed" (past tense)

The Mongolian languages of the IMAR show the same vocalic harmony as Khalkha Mongolian, i.e., in one and the same word there are only front vowels (e, ö, and ü / or their phonological variants) or back vowels (a, o, and u), while the vowel i is neutral.

These dialects cannot express the grammatical gender of notions. Special terms signify gender, e.g.: erektei emchi "the male physician," emektei emchi "the female physician," ere takiya "male chicken,the cock," and eme takiya "the female chicken, the hen."

At the beginning of words there appear no consonantal groups, only single consonants. Therefore, a term like "French" (fr-cluster) becomes Farancha Ulus "the French people" (the cluster is separated and a hybrid vowel is inserted, a phonetic phenomenon which appears in Turkic and Tungusic languages also).

The Mongols of the IMAR can converse with almost all Mongolian tribes of Outer Mongolia, for Khalkha-Mongolian is the lingua franca of the Mongolian world. Only the Dagur Mongols and the Monguor cannot communicate with other Mongolian tribes.

The Tumet Banner Mongols are believed to have forgotten their own language during the last two generations; they speak Chinese and have become very much Sinified, even living in Chinese-style houses instead of tents. There are about 12,000 Tumet Mongols.

There are about 500,000 Silingol League Mongols in Chahar whose language and culture have hardly been influenced by outside contact, although they have been ruled by both the Japanese and Chinese. The same is true for the Abaga, Abaganar, Sunit, Urat, and Dörbet Mongols. The Urdus (Ordos) Mongols have best preserved their own language, which reflects an old stage of Eastern Mongolian. All these dialects have in common the complete contraction of groups like Common Mongolian *aγa, *ege, *igi, *uγu, etcetera, which have become long vowels: e.g., the written Mongolian saγa- "to milk a cow," has become sā- id in Urdus Mongolian; the written Mongolian emegel "saddle," has become emēl in Urdus; and the written Mongolian čigig has become tsīg in Urdus.

It might be methodically justifiable to refer to these dialects as Chahar, Kharchin, Gorlos, Tumet, Sunit, Urdus, etcetera, but in reality the speakers of these banners and leagues call their own tongue simply Mongolian. Only when asked further would a Mongol answer that he was a Mongol from the Chahar territory, or the Urdus territory. The slight phonetic differences within the Mongolian dialects of the IMAR will be described below.

A. Difference between the Dialect of the Ikechou League and Khalkha-Mongolian

The dialect spoken in the Ikechou League is mostly referred to as Urdus (Ordos), which has been well explored. A peculiar phonetic feature of the Urdus-Mongolian dialect is that the initial voiceless consonants of Common Mongolian, which are represented in the Written Mongolian (or Classical Mongolian), have changed to voiced ones in all cases where the non-first syllable starts with a voiceless consonant. These common Mongolian consonants are:

*q- which in Urdus becomes g̬-
*k- which in Urdus becomes g-
*t- which in Urdus becomes d-
*c- which in Urdus becomes ǰ-

Written Mongolian quča- "to bark" becomes g̬u'tš'a- (gutsha-) in Urdus-Mongolian.

Written Mongolian časun "snow" becomes ǰasu (dzhasu) in Urdus-Mongolian.

Written Mongolian köke "blue" becomes gȯγ'γö in Urdus-Mongolian.

Written Mongolian toqo- "to saddle" becomes doγo- in Urdus-Mongolian.

Another characteristic feature is that Urdus-Mongolian shows the affricates tš and dž (tsh and dzh) in all positions and not only before Common Mongolian *i as in Khalkha-Mongolian, e.g.

Common Mongolian čida- "to be able"	Urdus-Mongolian tšida-, Khalkha-Mongolian tšaddă-, id.
Common Mongolian čaγaγan "white"	Urdus-Mongolian tšagāŋ, Khalkha-Mongolian tsagāŋ, id.
Common Mongolian ǰaǰil- "to chew"	Urdus-Mongolian džadžil-, Khalkha-Mongolian dzádžil- id.
Common Mongolian ǰiruγa	Urdus-Mongolian džirō, Khalkha-

"ambler"	džorō, id.

Urdus-Mongolian became a very important dialect since it helped in verifying the vowels of the second syllables of Written Mongolian words. The Common Mongolian vowel *o of the first syllable remains o in Urdus-Mongolian only if the vowel of the second syllable in Common Mongolian has been an *a: e.g., the Common Mongolian qola "far," becomes χolo, id. in Urdus-Mongolian. On the other hand, this Common Mongolian *o of the first syllable becomes an u in Urdus-Mongolian only when the vowel of the second syllable in Common Mongolian was an *u: e.g., odun "star," becomes udu, id. in Urdus-Mongolian.

In summarizing the main phonetic differences between written Mongolian and Urdus-Mongolian (which, besides Monguor, is the only Mongolian dialect of the IMAR that is well explored) the following five phonetic laws should be listed:

1) Common Mongolian

*č and *ǰ remain *tš and *dž in all positions

Written Mongolian	Urdus
ǰuluɣa < *diluɣa "sinciput"	džulō "fontanelle"
ǰasa- < *di̇asa- "to repair"	džasa- id.
čirai "face"	tšarā̄

2) Common Mongolian consonants *p, *t, *q and the affricative *c are changed in Urdus to the corresponding soft consonants, if the second syllable begins with a hard, voiceless consonant:

Written Mongolian	Urdus
quča- "to bark"	gutša-
küčün "strength"	gɯtši
toɣta- "to stop, to establish"	dogto-

3) Written Mongolian *u of the second syllable remains *u in Urdus if the vowel of the first syllable in Written Mongolian is an *o. We can also say that if in the Urdus word an *u appears in the first as well as the second syllable, then in the fist syllable of the corresponding Written Mongolian word it must be an *o. This rule is important for the exact vocalization of Mongolian written words:

Written Mongolian	Urdus
modun	mudu "tree"
odun	udu "star"
dobtul-	dubtul- "to run"
tosun	dusu "pil"
orɣu-	urgu- "to flee"
songɣu-	suŋgu- "to choose"

4) Written Mongolian *a of the second syllable after an *o of the first syllable always corresponds to Urdus *o:

Written M ongolian	Urdus
qola	χolo "far"
olan	olon "many"
qota	goto "town, corral"
qongqa	χoŋχo̲ "bell"
qormai̯	χormö "the lower part of a dress"

5) Analagous to the previous rules, Written Mongolian *o before the following *u in the second syllable becomes *ɯ in Urdus:

Written Mongolian	Urdus
mörgü	mɯrgu- "to bow"
mönggü	mɯŋgɯ "silver"
öndür	ɯndɯr "high"
ödün	ɯdɯ "feather"

However, Written Mongolian *o was preserved if an *e follows in the second syllable:

Written Mongolian	Urdus
möltel- "to detach"	möltöl-
möngke "eternal"	mönχö
mören "river"	morön

B. The Dialects of the Josotu League and the Chahar Territory

The Mongolian dialect spoken in Chahar territory shows more or less the same phonological features as Urdus-Mongolian, i.e., the voiceless initial consonants were transformed to voiced ones under the same conditions as in Urdus-Mongolian. Again, Chahar-Mongolian has preserved tš and dž (tsh and dzh) in all positions, while Khalkha-Mongolian shows these affricates only before *i. The Mongolian dialect spoken in the Josotu territory shows some peculiar phonetic features, i.e., the Kharchin Banner people have preserved the Common Mongolian affricates *č and *ǰ only before *i as in Khalkha-Mongolian, but have transformed them before other vowels into the retroflexive affricates, ṭṣ and ḍẓ (the tongue is set towards the hard palatum), e.g., Written Mongolian časun "snow" becomes ṭṣassa in Kharchin-Mongolian, but Written Mongolian čisun "blood" remains tšus. Another characteristic phonetic feature of the Charchin-Mongolian dialect is that the initial Common Mongolian *u has developed under certain conditions into the dipthongs wa-, wä-, or u̯a-; e.g., Written Mongolian γurban "three" becomes gwarab id. in Kharchin-Mongolian (Urdus: g̭urwa, Khalkha: g̭urwă~g̭urăb id.), and Written Mongolian qurdun "quick" becomes χwaradṇ id. in Kharchin-Mongolian. In Kharchin-Mongolian the Common Mongolian group *uγu becomes a long ū; e.g., Written Mongolian buruγu "wrong" becomes burū "incorrect" in Kharchin-Mongolian, but the Common Mongolian group *aγu becomes a long ō in Kharchin-Mongolian. E.g.: Written Mongolian aγuški "lungs" becomes ōšᵏχi id. in Kharchin-Mongolian. The Mongolian dialects spoken in the Jouda and Jerim Leagues are very much the same as Khalkha-Mongolian, with the prominent exception that the Common Mongolian *č- has developed into š or s (or to their palatalisised correspondents ś̌ and ś), e.g., Written Mongolian čilaγun "stone" becomes in Dörbet-Mongolian, Gorlos-Mongolian, and Josotu-Mongolian šolū or šulūn, respectively; and Written Mongolian čaγan "white" becomes sag̭ān id. in Dörbet Beise-Mongolian and sagan id. in Jalait.

In order to clarify the position of the Common Mongolian, Written Mongolian, and Modern Mongolian languages and dialects (Urdus-Mongolian, Chahar-Mongolian, etcetera), the following historical classification, dealing at the same time with the further development of the various phonemes, should be added:

II. Historical Classification of Mongolian Languages and Dialects

1. Pre-Mongolian: to be understood as a connecting link between Common Mongolian and primitive Mongolian Turkic. Perhaps the Shih-wei and Tung-hu mentioned in Chinese sources spoke a Pre-Mongolian language.

2. Common Mongolian: phonetically and morphologically described as the next stage, and the immediate forerunner of the Old Mongolian language upon which the so-called Written Mongolian language is based. Common Mongolian language has several very characteristic traits, whose presence, further development, and omission are extremely important for the historical classification of the Mongolian languages and dialects.

a) The vowel system of the primitive Mongolian-Turkic language is still retained in its entirety: *a, *ï, *o, *u (back) *e, *i, *ö, and *ü (front), with the limitation that *ï occurs only after the velars *q and *γ and after the prepalatals *k and *g have been distinguished; in all other position *ï becomes *i. A further characteristic of this language period is that *ï>*i palatalizes a preceding *t or *d into *č and *ǰ. There is no substantiation for this within the Mongolian dialects; frequently only Turkology can furnish this type of proof. For example, "stone" in Written Mongolian is čilaγun, and in Turkic, taš. The development must have been from *tïlaγun to>*tilaγun to čilaγun, for *tïl- or *til- has the same root as Turkic taš, which goes back to *tiša>*taša>taš; the final Common Turkic *-š- appears in Mongolian as *-l-. Therefore the equation of Written Mongolian *til- with Turkic taš is completely proved. Other examples:

Common Mongolian	Written Mongolian	Turkic Languages
*tïnar	činar "existence, inner disposition"	Turkic: tyn "soul life, breath"
*tïŋna-	čiŋna- "to listen to"	Kirghiz: tyŋda- id.
*tïrdaji-	čir-da-ji- "to be thin, dry"	Osmanlı: tyryl "weak"
*tïrtig	čirčig "incorrect, insignificant"	Teleut: tyrtyq id.
*titi-	čiči- "to cut through"	Taranchi: tit-, osm. dit- id.
*titire-	čičire- "to tremble, shiver"	Turkic: titırä- id.
*tïgïraγ-	cigira "durable, firm, strong"	Middle Turkic: tyγraq "strong"
*tig	čig "straight, steep, erect"	Chagatai: tik "straight, steep, upright"
*tïkï-	čiki-če- "to crowd, to bend with force"	Osmanli: tyqyš- "to be crammed full"

The transition of *ti / *ti to ci can be explained through the strong aspiration of Common Mongolian *t.

b) The Common Mongolian language has the combinations (aggregates) aγa, aγu, oγu, egü, ıγa, ija, ije, &c. which were blended in later language periods into long vowels, namely into long ā, ū, ǖ, etcetera.

c) One of the most important characteristics of the Common Mongolian language must have been the initial *p or *φ (a bilabial fricative), which likewise cannot be reconstructed by an internal Mongolistic medium, since it is only traceable in the Middle Mongolian language to *h. It has completely disappeared in the Modern Mongolian languages (with the exception of Monguor, where Common Mongolian *p is preserved as *f), but has been preserved in other Altaic languages, for example, in Manchu as *f, and in Tungusic languages such as Olča and Goldi, where it becomes *p, as it also does in Korean.

Common Mongolian	
*paluqa/ɸaluqa	Written Mongolian aluqa "hammer" Goldi palu, palɔa; Manchu folγo, folχo.
*pulaγan /*ɸulaγan	Written Mongolian ulaγan "red" Manchu fulgijan Korean pulgïn.
*podun/*ɸodun	Written Mongolian odun "star" Middle Mongolian hodun Monguor fōdi.

A further characteristic of the Common Mongolian languages was that *i and *e of the first syllable were preserved. *I became *a under the influence of a following *a only in a later language period. For example: miqan "meat" became maχa in Khalkha. Likewise, *e became *ö under the influence of a following *ü: ebül "winter" became öwöl in Khalkha. This phenomenon is called i-breaking.

3. Old Mongolian: the next phase of development of the Mongolian languages. In its consonantal and vocalic system, it corresponded to the Common Mongolian language, with the exception of *p or *ɸ, and *ï, which have disappeared. Perhaps there were several Old Mongolian dialects; in any case, one of these dialects must have furnished the basis for the next language period, that of Written Mongolian.

4. Written Mongolian: appeared in approximately the twelfth century. With respect to its consonantal and vocalic system, it is based completely upon the Old Mongolian language.

We divide the Written Mongolian language into three periods: Pre-Classical; Classical, which reached its high point under the Chinese emperors K'ang-hsi (1662-1722) and Ch'ien-lung (1736-1796); and Post-Classical, which is characterized by the sudden appearance of the colloquial language in the Written Mongolian.

5. Middle Mongolian: stands in development between Old Mongolian and Modern Mongolian, originating between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Middle Mongolian language period ended in approximately the sixteenth century and has been preserved for us in several important sources: the Secret History (Mongolian: Moŋγolun niuča tobča'an; Chinese: Yuan-ch'ao pi-shi); the documents of the Quadratschrift; and Moslem sources as Muqaddimat al-Adab, which contains a rich Mongolian glossary, etcetera. Some of the modern Mongolian languages for example, Dagur, Mogol, and Monguor have preserved Middle Mongolian traits in their languages. The most important characteristics of the Middle Mongolian language period are:

a) Initial *p or *ɸ of the Common Mongolian language has develped into *h. For example:

Common Mongolian	Middle Mongolian	
*pon/*ɸon	hon	"year"
*püsün/*ɸüsün	hüsün	"hair"
*püker/*ɸüker	hüker	"ox"

b) The combinations *aγu, *egü, etcetera of Written Mongolian have develped into *a'u, *e'u (with hiatus), etcetera. For example:

Written Mongolian		Middle Mongolian	
adaγusun	"herd of cattle, horse"	ada'usun	id.
baγu-	"to encamp"	ba'u-	id.
böge	"Schaman"	bö'e	id.
bögesün	"louse"	bö'esün	id.
degere	"above, over"	de'ere	id.

6. Modern Mongolian: includes several languages and dialects, which will be treated further in a more detailed manner. The most important characteristics of the Modern Mongolian languages are:

a) The Common Mongolian combinations *aγa, *ege, *igi, *uγu, *ügü, *iγa, *ige, *iγu, *igü, *aγu, *egü, *oγa, *uγa, *üge, preserved in Old Mongolian, have lost the intervocalic gutteral, and are contracted to a long vowel. For example:

Common Mongolian	Written Mongolian	Modern Languages		
*saγa-	saγa-	Dagur	sā-	"to milk
		Urdus	-"-	
		Khalkha	-"-	
		Kalmuck	-"-	
		Buryat	ha-	
*deβel	degel/debel	Mongour	diēr	"coat, fur coat"
		Urdus	dēl	
		Khalkha	dēl	
		Buryat	de̯gĕl	
		Kalmuck	dewḷ	
*čĭγīqan	čigiqan	Buryat Alar	šiχăn	"furuncle"
*buruγ u	buruγu	Urdus	bu̯rū	
		Dagur	borō	"incorrect"
		Kalmuck	burū	
*küβün	kümün	Mongour	k'un	
		Dagur	k'ɯor k'ɯn	"person, man"
		Urdus	k'ɯn	
		Buryat	χɯŋ	
		Kalmuck	kün or kümṇ	

Common Mongolian	Written Mongolian	Modern Languages		
*niβa-	niγa- "to glue, paste"	Urdus	nā-	
		Khalkha	"	
		Kalmuck	"	
		Turkish	yapïš-	"to stick at"
*ǰige	ǰige	Dagur	džē	"Nephew"
		Urdus	džē	
		Khalkha	džē	
		Buryat	zē	
		Kalmuck	zē	

b) A further characteristic of the Modern Mongolian languages is the so-called i-breaking, i.e. *i of the first syllable is changed into another vowel if the following vowel (of the second syllable) is other than *i.

Written Mongolian		Khalkha
sibaγun	"bird"	šuwū (n.) id.
ǰiran	"60"	dzara(n)
imaγan	"goat"	jamā
mingγan	"1000"	mⁱanga(n)

3) A third characteristic of the Modern Mongolian languages is that the Common Mongolian initial *p or *φ has completely disappeared. It appears as *p > *f before *ā, *o, *u and *u, and as *p > * χ fevore *a, *ẹ, and *ē in Monguor; as * χ in the Tsitsikhar dialect of the Dagur language; and as *h in Shera-Yogur.

Common Mongolian		Monguor
*φödün	"feather"	fōDı
*φuγuta	"sack"	fuDa
*φünir	"smell"	funir
*φoqar	"short"	χuguor

III. Special Mongolian Languages

A. Bargu Buryat

Bargu Buryat, spoken by about 6-7,000 persons, differs considerably from the other languages of the Westn Branch. The Bargu Buryats are also called Shine Bargu (New Bargu), in contrast to the Khuchin Bargu (Old Bargu or Chipchin Bargu).

1. Phonetic peculiarities

Bargu Buryat is a regular Buryat dialect, i.e., the initial Mongolian *č- regularly becomes *š- before *i, as in the Written Mongolian čilaγun "stone," which becomes šulūŋ in Bargu Buryat; the initial Mongolian *ǰ- before *i becomes dž -, as in the Written Mongolian ǰiruγa "ambler," which becomes dž͝orō in Bargu Buryat; the initial Mongolian *c- before any vowel except *i, becomes s-, as in the Written Mongolian čaγan "white," which becomes sagāŋ id. in Bargu Buryat; the initial Mongolian *j- before vowels other than *i, becomes z-, as in the Written Mongolian ǰaqa "border," which becomes zaχa id. in Bargu Buryat; the initial Mongolian *s- regularly becomes h, as in the Written. Mongolian sara "moon, month." which becomes hara id. in Bargu Buryat; and the Written Mongolian *g before *i becomes y, as in the Written Mongolian ergi- "to turn," which becomes eryĕ- id. in Bargu Buryat. Another characteristic feature, which also holds true for all modern Mongolian languages, is the contraction of groups (syllables) into long vowels, e.g. čil-aγu-n > šulūŋ. These are the most characteristic features of the Bargu Buryat dialect.

2. Morphology

In its morphology, Bargu Buryat has conjugations with personal endings which cannot be found among other Mongolian languages, e.g. yabanab "I go," yabanaš "thou goest." Bargu Buryat also has an ablative suffix, -āha, while all the other Buryat dialects have -hā, with the exception of Barguzin Buryat, which has -haṇ.

B. Dagur

1. Phonetic peculiarities

Dagur is a completely independent Mongolian language, which differs greatly from other Mongolian languages (there is no communication possible between the Dagurs and the Mongols of the Eastern and Western language units) and is subdivided into the Tsitsikhar and Hailar dialects. The language of the Dagurs is remarkable because it has preserved some of the features of the Middle Mongolian languages of the Middle Ages. For example, the Tsitsikhar dialect has preserved a χ sound which originated from the Common Mongolian *p: e.g., Common Mongolian *pulaγan "red," Written Mongolian ula an id, Tsitskhar Dagur ula id.

Furthermore, Dagur has transformed the groups (syllables) *aγu, *egu, *ige, etcetera, into dipthongs; e.g., Written Mongolian aγula "mountain," Dagur au̯la id.; and Written Mongolian ǰige "grandchild," Dagur džẹ̄ "nephew."

Dagur does not differentiate between *ö and *ü, which both become ɯ: e.g., Written Mongolian mörgü- "to honor, to pray, to kneel down, to worship," and Dagur mɯrgɯ- id.

Another peculiar feature of Dagur is the preservation of the Common Mongolian *e as a labialized ẹ in positions where the *e becomes a rounded vowel in other Mongolian languages: e.g., Written Mongolian ebüsün "grass, hay," Dagur ẹɯs id.

A further distinctive feature is the transition of the Common Mongolian intervocalic *-b- to a non-syllabic u̯: e.g., Written Mongolian tabun "five," Dagur tʻau̯n id. In Dagur the vowels *o and *u of Common Mongolian have become o before the vowel *u (of Common Mongolian) of the second syllable, or oa̯ and woa̯ (the latter at the beginnings of words) before the vowel *a (of Common Mongolian) of the second syllable: e.g. Written Mongolian odun "star," Dagur oddo id; Written Mongolian usun "water," Dagur os id; and Written Mongolian dunda "middle," Dagur doand "in the middle." These are the most significant phonetic features which differentiate Dagur from the other Mongolian languages.

2. Morphology

In morphology, only the spoken Mongolian language has preserved the inclusive and exclusive pronouns of the first person plural and a complete conjugation of the auxiliary verb *a- "to be".

The influence of the neighboring Tungusic languages on Dagur can be seen in its plural suffix -sɯl, and especially in the large number of Tungusic words in its vocabulary; this may be one of the reasons why for a long time it was considered to be a Tungusic dialect.

IV. Non-Mongolian Languages of the IMAR

The most widely-used language in the IMAR is Chinese, since the Chinese population considerably outnumbers the Mongols. Thus there are about six million Chinese speakers to about one million speakers of Mongolian languages. The Chinese dialects spoken in the IMAR vary according to the origin of the Chinese settlers. The two most solidly Chinese-populated regions, southern Suiyuan and southern Chahar, constitute concentrations of emigrants from northern Shansi and Hopei respectively. Even though some of these settlements are quite old, as a rule the settlers have kept strictly to the dialects of their area of extraction. Unfortunately, only one locality of the IMAR, Kuei-hua, has been linguistically explored for the Chinese dialect. The results of this exploration are summarized here.

The dialect of Kuei-hua belongs to the northwestern Mandarin type, and it shows a clear resemblance to that of northern Shansi. The following is an approximate phonemic presentation:

Initials:

Gutteral:	k-	kh-	x-		ŋ-	
Dentals:	t-	th-				
	ts-	tsh-	s-	z-	n-	l-
Retroflex:	tṣ-	tṣh-	ṣ-	ẓ-		
Palatal:	tś-	tsh-	ś-	j-	ñ-	(Ij-)
Labial:	p-	ph-	f-	v-	m-	

Finals:

/i/ i, /u/u, y, /ũ/ uõ, yõe, /ue/ ue, ye
/e/ ɛ , /eu/ ɛu, ieu /a/ a, /ã/ ã, /ẽ/ ẽ, iæ̃,
/e/ e, /ei/ ʅ , ei /eu/ o, /ɛŋ/ eŋ, /o/ ɔ ,
/iẽ/ iẽ, /ieŋ/ iɛŋ, /iə/iə, /ieu/ io, /ue/ uɛ , /ua/ua,
/uã/ uã, /uei/ ui, /ueŋ/ uoŋ, yeŋ, /uo/ uɔ.

The structure of syllables is as follows:

1) syllables ər and u.
2) syllables initial final.

Simple Statement

1) Finals -i, -iẽ, -ieŋ, -iə , -iəu are attached only to the t-, th-, p-, ph-, m- and palatal initials (tsi, tshi, si are pronounced with vowel -ʅ).
2) After ŋ - there is no -u, -ũ, -uə .
3) Finals -ue, -ua, -uã, -uəi, -uo are attached only to k-, kh-, x- (with few exceptions).
4) Final -ẽ is attached only to retroflexive and palatal initials.
5) After labial (p-, ph-, f-, v-, m-) there is no -eu.
6) After f- and v- there is no -əu nor -uə .
7) After retroflex (tṣ-, tṣh-, ṣ-, ẓ-) there is no -u, -ũ, -uə, -e, nor -a.
8) After palatal (t́s-, t́sh-, ś-, j-, ñ-, l̃-) there is no -ə , -əi, -əu, -əŋ , -o, nor -e.

It must be pointed out, though, that other Chinese dialects, especially Shantung, are also represented in the IMAR, partly due to the fact that a certain amount of immigration from Shantung into southern Suiyuan has taken place, but particularly due to the fact that the eastern parts of the IMAR have been mostly settled from Liaoning and Heilungkiang by people who originally came from Shantung. The Chinese national language, which is identical with the dialect of Peking, is of course understood widely throughout the IMAR.

Very few traces of Mongolian idioms are found in the language of the Chinese settlers in the IMAR. Place names and other geographical names occasionally show Mongol an influence, but otherwise the dialects have been kept rather pure. A special position in this respect is held by some of the most foreward settlers, the muleteers and carriage drivers, as well as the merchants who are in constant contact with Mongolian speaking people. They mix a number of Mongolian terms with their Chinese, and most of them speak Mongolian as a second language.

Many Mongols, particularly settled Mongols in southern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, and along the southeastern frontier of the IMAR, have widely taken to speaking Chinese. This is true for the urban population as well as for rural settlers. As a rule, these Mongols have adopted the Chinese dialect of their surroundings; in addition, educated Mongols and those who have gone through the Chinese school system speak the Peking dialect.

The remaining languages spoken in the IMAR are Korean (see China Northwest, Languages), of which there are about 40,000 speakers; Solon, about 700 speakers; and Oronchon, about 300 speakers. Russian is spoken by Russian advisers who work on the state farm organized in the former Arun Banner, and in other advisory capacities. There were also some White Russian merchants in urban centers and settlers around Hailar. Since Russian has been introduced into the Chinese school system as the first foreign language, it is to be assumed that the knowledge of this language will spread also among the Chinese and Mongols of the IMAR.

English, the first foreign language of the educated in China proper, is much less prevalent in the IMAR due to the fact that few students returned from Anglo-Saxon countries have ventured into these remote regions, and middle school education was less common in the provinces which now constitute the IMAR. The attempt of the Japanese during the Mengchiang period to replace English with Japanese has left no traces.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE

I. Chinese and Sino-Mongolian Social Structure in Inner Mongolia

A. Historical Background

Inner Mongolia has from very early times been a region in which the agrarian Chinese met the northern peoples in struggles of aggression and defence. The nomadic peoples coveted the foodstuffs and fine fabrics produced by the agriculturists and tried to seize these things whenever opportunity availed. The Chinese, on the other hand, fought and pushed the invaders as far north as they could in order to protect themselves from these border raids. Most of the fighting took place in the regions now comprising Inner Mongolia, for whenever this area was controlled by the nomads, China was in danger of being submerged partially or wholly by nomadic conquest.

However, the Chinese and the nomads also met in the peaceful exchange of Chinese foodstuffs, fabrics, and tea, for the nomads' horses, wool, and cow hides. These business transactions took place mostly in the trading posts of Inner Mongolia. Whenever such trade was flourishing, fighting decreased, and when the Chinese government, for political or strategic reasons tried to suppress it, antagonism increased.

Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Chinese who lived in the region of the present Inner Mongolia did so mostly on a temporary basis. Those who went as soldiers or as camp followers of the expedition armies stayed only as long as the Chinese armies or military establishments were maintained. When the armies were evacuated, the people also had to withdraw, or else be subjected to severe persecution from the nomads. The Chinese who went to trade with the Mongols always left their homes and families inside the Great Wall. After they had made their fortunes, or after a certain period, they left Inner Mongolia and returned to their native places; these people never considered the regions outside the Great Wall their homeland. They took up very little, if any, of the ways of the Mongols, and gave very little to them. Before the nineteenth century, no Chinese social structure was established in these regions.

As a result of a number of bad famines in the nineteenth century, great flocks of peasants from Shantung, Honan, and Chihli migrated with their families to Manchuria, and from there, some went on to the eastern parts of Inner Mongolia. Those from the famine areas of Shansi and Shensi went to the present provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, especially to the area now called the Back Loop (Hou-t'ao), the land between the Yellow River to the south and the Yin Mountains to the north.

The peasants who went to Manchuria took root and settled down, and made a promising start. Those who had gone to the territories belonging to the Mongols, however, were driven by persecution and natural hardships to return to their home provinces. When another famine occurred, or when they knew that conditions north of the Yellow River or outside of the Great Wall were improving, they went back again. But again they would have to flee the "new land" and seek safety by returning home. They went back and forth many times before finally settling down in Inner Mongolia. Because of these back-and-forth movements, they were called the "migrant peasants."

The colonists migrated to the northern regions closest to their home provinces, so the Chinese social structure in Manchuria and the eastern parts of Inner Mongolia resembles that of Shantung, Honan, and Hopei, while that in the present Chahar and Suiyuan can largely be identified with the social structure of Shansi, Shensi, and the northwestern part of Hopei. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the conditions of the Chinese in Inner Mongolia had improved a great deal. Numerous permanent homesteads had finally been established, and the homesteaders meant to settle down. The main reason for the improvement was that the number of Chinese who migrated to Inner Mongolia, especially to those parts adjacent to provinces inside the Great Wall, had increased enormously despite all the hardships; thus toward the end of the last century, except for the far northern and northeastern parts, Inner Mongolia was politically and economically dominated by the Chinese. The Mongols were also greatly outnumbered by the Chinese, especially in the cities. Except in the most isolated places, the Mongols were not numerically strong enough to make depradations on the Chinese, and in the countryside, the Chinese land tillers lived in villages for protection.

After many years the Mongol banner chiefs succumbed to the profits available from leasing their land to the Chinese. Since these profits were often greater than those they could obtain from animal husbandry, many nobles and banner chiefs rented banner lands to Chinese merchants or land reclaimers, and they themselves became the rent collectors. This reduced the area of pasture land; as a result Mongols became land cultivators in ever-increasing numbers toward the beginning of the present century. When a Mongol was forced to change from a herder to a land tiller he generally lived peacefully with his Chinese neighbors, and took on many facets of the Chinese way of life.

The living conditions of the Chinese in Inner Mongolia were also improved by the great land reclamation movement, which took place in the period from the 1880's to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. Chinese grain dealers realized that by growing grain on the land in Inner Mongolia they could make much greater profits than by importing it from the South. They also saw that the land between the Yellow River and the Yin Mountains would be extremely fertile if irrigated, and that it would be easy to open irrigation canals connecting the new and old courses of the Yellow River and other streams. Consequently, they leased land from the Mongol banner chiefs, dug canals, and contracted peasants from Shansi, Shensi, and Hopei provinces. They made great profits, and more grain merchants did the same thing. Later many Shansi bankers invested large amounts of money in land reclamation in the same areas. Thus was brought about a unique situation for a Chinese agrarian region, in which irrigation projects were the enterprises of private individuals, and a non-gentry group made up primarily of businessmen became the proprietors of large landed estates.

Many individual adventurers were also attracted by the great potentialities of the area, and among them Wang T'ung-ch'un was widely known for his great success. Wang was a man with a keen interest in and knowledge of water and land reclamation. He himself built many canals, reclaimed much land, and owned many large farms. At the peak of his career he was the master of a great agricultural empire in the Back Loop and he also helped many other investors build irrigation systems and reclaim land. He was so respected and loved by the pioneer farmers that a shrine was built for him after he died in 1935.

In 1903, when the farming business was showing great prosperity and the land investors were harvesting handsome profits, the Chinese government took over the land reclamation and made it a public affair. A Manchu name Ku Yi was appointed Land Development Director of the whole southern and southwestern section of Inner Mongolia. Ku used both persuasion and force to make the Mongol princes register all their cultivatable lands. He also employed Wang T'ung-ch'un as chief engineer in charge of the building of irrigation canals. Great numbers of peasants from the North China provinces were attracted to the area, and many homesteads and farm villages were established. In a few years agricultural development in places where water was available showed great promise, and the reclamation movement has been in progress ever since.

B. Types of Social Structure

Permanent Chinese residents in Inner Mongolia have been settled mainly in the cities, in the Chinese and Sino-Mongol rural areas, and the Catholic mission establishments. In addition, a transient population of Chinese existed in the lamaseries, the religious-political centers of the Mongols. The religious communities were also commercial centers, especially during the great fairs, and sometimes an many as a thousand or so Chinese traders or visitors would be temporarily quartered at a lamasery.

In the few cities, such as Kalgan, Kuei-sui, and Pao-t'ou, there live Chinese, Mongols, and Moslems. The Chinese are in the majority, however, and dominate every aspect of public life. The cities resemble very much those of the North China provinces, the Mongols and Moslems live separately in their quarters as minority groups, and neither exert any significant social or cultural influence on the society.

The farm villages and rural districts inhabited purely by Chinese settlers bear a great similarity to those of the provonces of Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, and Shantung, from whence the settlers originally came. These people brought with them their old patterns of living to the frontier with only a few physical modifications. The Chinese have been homesteading in Inner Mongolia for only two or three generations. When they first came from the regions to the south of the Great Wall, they arrived either in groups or as individuals. Some groups were fortunate enough to find sufficient cultivatable land to be able to stay together, and they soon formed into traditional Chinese farm villages. But in most cases a family would secure a piece of land, build a mud hut on it, and live in isolation. Widely dispersed farm homes and small hamlets are in great number; there are comparatively few large rural villages. In recent years, the county governments have organized the homesteads, hamlets, and villages into administrative villages, one of which may have a jurisdiction of twenty or thirty square li. Homes with a distance of five or six li between them may still belong to the same "village," but it is merely a rural administrative unit, not an integrated community.

Although horses are used in transportation, people seldom travel to visit each other. Social ties are few and loose. Before the Communist efforts at cooperativization, it was only when the irrigation canals had to be repaired and the use of water regulated that all the farm families in the same district were organized and community cooperation occurred. When the farming season is over and the cold winter prevents travelling, community relations are disrupted for the time being. If, however, families wish to visit each other, it is not impossible because one can reach a home five li away in only a few minutes on horseback. Besides the repairing of the irrigation systems, there was another public enterprise around which the isolated homesteaders had the opportunity to meet each other. Few

farm homes in Inner Mongolia had their own grindstones, and to meet the need, community mills were established, centrally-located in the rural districts. All the farm families of a district would bring their grain to the same grinding station, and there get to know each other and exchange community news and gossip.

Because of their physical and social isolation, the people of the dispersed farm homes always welcome visitors, whether acquaintances or strangers. The hospitality is warm and genuine; even if the visitor is a stranger, he is taken to the innermost chambers of the house and allowed to meet all of the family, including the young women. The few large villages in a district are usually the market towns or marketing places that serve the farm population surrounding them. In each village of this type there are a few stores stocked with most of the daily necessities which cannot be produced on the farms. These village stores function to a great extent like the stores in the North China market towns, and have the same economic and social significance.

The make-up of the top social strata among the Chinese in Inner Mongolia was very different from that in China proper. There have been very few scholars of the traditional type, who held academic degrees by passing the government examinations. Gentry in the traditional sense was almost entirely absent. Therefore, the members of the upper class in the cities and county seats were mostly successful business people, military men, and a few retired government officials. In addition, the landlords in the countryside and the cities were not of the same type as in the Chinese provinces. They were neither gentry members or families of government officials, but mostly business people who had gone into commercial grain farming, leasing land from the princes, building irrigation systems, and then renting the land to tenant farmers. For this reason, the relations between the landlords and their tenants were of a business nature and not of the traditional socio-economic type found in China (see China General, Social Structure).

Some of the villages or rural districts are inhabited both by Chinese farmers and by Mongols who have turned to cultivating the land. The Mongolian farmers live and work very much like their Chinese neighbors. They no longer live in tents, but in houses like those of the Chinese. These are differentiated from the Chinese only by a piece of paper inscribed with some Tibetan characters and posted on the front door, or by a small banner decorated with the figure of a horse, which is hung from the roof of the house or the top of a wall. Inside a Mongol home there is always a small Buddhist shrine, which is absent from the Chinese homes. Such Sinicized Mongols living and farming side by side with Chinese farmers get on harmoniously.

They speak Chinese and follow the Chinese agrarian traditions. They also eat similar food and wear like clothing. No racial discrimination is made in marriage, so they are often also related to the Chinese. It is said that the Sinicized Mongols have even acquired the same national and ethical concepts as the Chinese.

Politically, however, the Mongolian villages until recently were not under the same administration as the Chinese villagers. The Mongolian villagers were still under the control of the banner chiefs, and for this reason, though they lived in the same village or the same rural district with the Chinese farmers, they were not obligated to pay taxes or labor service to the Chinese authorities. Their taxes were paid instead to the Mongolian authorities, who had political and legal jurisdiction over them. This overlapping administrative pattern continued throughout republican times, but was abolished with the incorporation of Suiyuan into the IMAR. It is believed that this dual administration may have been a chief reason why even the most Sinicized Mongols continued to hold loyalty toward their own princes and their own people rather than toward the Chinese. Recognizing that in the past such separate authority created misunderstandings and antagonisms between the two groups, the Communist government has adopted a policy of rationalizing the administrative structure. Where an overwhelming majority of Han Chinese are coresident with Mongols, the Mongols are no longer organized under banners, but are included with the Chinese in a "democratic-coalition" government. Where the Chinese are a minority in a banner area, they are subject to the banner government, and the formerly co-existent hsien government is abolished.

When partly Sinicized or semi-agricultural Mongolian families live in areas where Chinese families are in the majority, some of them live in the traditional tents, others live in houses of the Chinese type, and still others may have a Chinese house and one or two tents alongside. These partly Sinicized Mongols may engage in both farming and grazing as a livelihood.

Using land tenure as a basis for classification, the agricultural people of Inner Mongolia, both Chinese and Sinicized Mongols, could be placed into four groups before the present Communist regime: the landlords at the top, then the owner-cultivators, the tenants, and the farm laborers at the bottom. Most of the landlords were absent from their land and lived in the county seats or large towns, where they were the gentlemen of the society. They were the county leaders and had an important role in local politics. Each big landlord had an agent on his land, who maintained a permanent office at a strategic point on the land and handled all the leasing and rent collecting. The agent had one or more assistants who dealt directly with the tenants or farm laborers, who were dependent upon them for land and for securing favors from the agent. It is said that in the early days the agent's office could even interfere with the farm people's civil and legal affairs. In practice, the peasants who cultivated the landlord's land were virtual subjects of the agent's office, which functioned like a rural government. This situation was largely corrected in the 1930's when the National Government and the provincial governments of Chahar and Suiyuan reorganized the system. All the political power of the land agent's office was abrogated, and the tenants thereafter went to the government in political and legal matters.

The early agrarian conditions in Inner Mongolia could not have been altogether bad, however, since most of the owner-cultivators were originally tenants themselves, and must have been able to make savings in order to purchase their land from the landlords. Thus the landlords' exploitation either was not uniform or not as bad as reported. The owner-cultivators and their families were as a rule very diligent workers and lived very frugally, although they had a self-sufficient and reasonably comfortable life. They were the most promising element among the farming people of Inner Mongolia.

There were two types of tenant farmers: one type settled in a certain locality and leased land from the landlord's agent, and the other consisted of migrant workers. The settled tenants often formed a village or a hamlet, helping each other as much as possible and maintaining good social relations. Their relations with the landlord were also comparatively better than those of the migrants, and many of them later became owner-cultivators. The other type of tenants shifted from one place to another in order to find better or more profitable land to cultivate. If they learned that a certain section had been flooded, they would move on to that area the next year, because after a flood the land would be extremely fertile. Another characteristic of this type of tenant was that they also kept herds grazing whenever and wherever conditions permitted. They were mostly semi-agrarian Mongols.

The farm laborers were in most cases single persons with no permanent homes. The annual laborers had room and board with their employers, and their employment was on a yearly basis. In fact, however, a satisfactory farm laborer would usually be employed by the same family for many years. Higher wages were paid to those having more experience and some special skill. Such laborers were employed as foremen, and a number of less experienced farm hands were put under their charge. As a rule, they did not work in the fields, their chief duties being to arrange the work for the less experienced laborers, to keep the farm buildings repaired and the irrigation system in good shape, and to see that the seeds were good. Some of these more experienced laborers had families and their living conditions were often comparable with those of the owner-cultivators. The ordinary annual laborers were paid less, and they not only worked in the fields but also in the farmyards. The day laborers were the poorest of the peasants, and were employed only during the busy seasons. They were hired in the morning, discharged in the evening, and next morning went out again to look for another job.'

The other type of agrarian society in Inner Mongolia was that established by the Catholic Church. Professor Li Yung-fang of Yenching University travelled in Suiyuan in 1936 to study the religious organizations in that part of the country, and later he published his report in Yü-kung (The Chinese Historical Geography). The following paragraphs are based on his section on the Catholic Church.

The Catholic Church in Suiyuan was strongest around Shan-pa. The earliest Catholic church in this district was built in the thirteenth year of Kwang-hsü (1888), and was located in San-sheng-kung. After three or four years another was built in a place called Hwang-yang-mu-t'ou, and one was also built in Yu-lung a few years later. In the year 1901, the Catholic church in Ta-fa-kung was burned and destroyed by the Mongols, and thirty-two Church members were killed in the incident. For this destruction the Mongols compensated the Catholic Church with a considerable amount of money, which was used to build the Hwang-tu-la-hai irrigation canal and to establish a number of churches along the canal. The Catholic churches also operated several registered lower primary schools and one registered complete primary school. The total number of pupils in 1936 was over 280.

In Lin-ho County there were over ten thousand Catholics, who comprised one-tenth of the population. The cultivable land in these two districts amounts to several thousand ching (one ching equals 100 mou and one mou equals one-sixth of an acre). Each year over two thousand ching were actually cultivated, and of this the Catholics had over nine hundred ching, or about one-half.

Much credit for the prosperity of the Catholics in these districts is due to Li Kao, who until his death in 1935 was manager of the irrigation system connected with the Hwang-t'u-la-hai Canal. More important, however, was the strong and stable organization of the Catholics. In each of the churches there was one priest who was charged solely with the civil and economic affairs of the church members. Regardless of outside political, social, or natural changes in the districts (before the Communist regime), the Catholic Church's program proceeded as usual, or at least was not disrupted. The Church provided welfare for its needy, and a priest would sometimes intervene in a member's behalf in a political or legal affair. Occasionally the priests even helped the Church members in fighting against bandits. Thus the relationship between the Catholic Church and its members was considerably different from that between the government and the local people, as well as from that between the tenants and landlords. Consequently, the Catholic Churches became organizations which were almost independent of the Chinese Government, and centers of a social coherence entirely unknown to other parts of Inner Mongolia.

II. Traditional Mongolian Society

A. Relations between Nobles and Commoners

In the traditional Mongolian society, two social classes could be distinguished; the nobles, or taiji, and the commoners, or kharachi. Since the latter all depended on a taiji, they were also called albatu, i.e., people who owe to their lord all that is implied by the word "alba" (personal and military service, performance of statute-labor, etcetera).

The clan name of the taiji is Borjigit, the same as that from which the family of Chingis Khan derived. All taiji descend from either Chingis or one of his brothers. The taiji who are descended from Chingis are the most numerous; one finds them among the Khalkha and a few other banners such as the Ordos, the Tümet of Kuei-hua, the Sunit, the Barin, the Ujumuchin and the Keshikten. The taiji who descend from Khasar, brother of Chingis, are those of the Alashan, the Khorchin, the Dörbet, the Urat, the MuuMingan, etcetera. Among the taiji of Khalkha a few are descendents of Belgütei, half-brother of Chingis.

The geneological tables of the taiji are kept in the yamen of each banner, and also in the capital in the archives of the bureau which controls the administration of Mongolia and Tibet. For the taiji descendants of Chingis the geneological tables go back only as far as Dayan Khan (1464-1543).

The status of taiji carried with it several privileges. The taiji were exempt from taxes and duties, statute-labor, military service, and they could be judged only by their equals. It was from among the taiji that the jasak or chiefs of banners were selected; their official position was usually hereditary, and the title of minister (tusalakchi) was only accessible to the taiji. There were also certain honorary titles given only to nobles. A taiji was entitled to wear a button of lapis lazuli on top of his ceremonial hat. The wife of a taiji enjoyed the privilege of wearing a ceremonial hat covered with a yellow material in the summer. She also had the right to wear the külmek, or long coat of precious material with flowing sleeves, which buttoned under the chin. She could also wear the long sleeveless jacket called uuji. The wife of a taiji was addressed by her albatu with the title of khatun (lady) and her daughter was called abahai (princess).

Any Mongol who was not a noble was a dependent of the taiji to whom he was a serf. Any taiji had under him a certain number of families as his albatu, of which he was the lord. When a taiji died, his sons divided amongst themselves the serf families owned by their father. Among these families those in the personal service of their taiji were called khamjilga (aids), and a taiji sometimes had four, eight, or sixteen khamjilga.

A word should be said here about the kobuut, a term which today means "slaves of the lowest rank." In Mongolian society of earlier times there was a class of people who were subjects of the commoners, or kharachi. This group was termed kobuut. Among the Ordos, a proverb gives the definition of the kobuut as "serfs of serfs and slaves of slaves," but it is by no means sure that such a class of people still exists. The term kobuut seems to be rather a souvenir of an order of things which no longer exists.

It is rather difficult to define precisely the relationship which existed in recent times between the taiji and their albatu, since these relationships were not exactly the same everywhere, and also because, as we shall see later, the administration established by the Manchus at the time of the incorporation of Mongolia into their empire in the seventeenth century had the effect of deeply modifying these relations. In theory, a noble was the absolute master of his serfs and could dispose of them as he pleased. The taiji have been heard to quote an alliterative proverb about their albatu, the sense of which is, "I am the one who is master of his dark head and who holds his warm heart in the palm of my hand." When describing the relationship between a taiji and his albatu, the Mongols readily quote the following passage from folk literature, spoken by a noble to his serf: "When a noble and his serf are still alive, the life of one is bound to that of the other; after death, the soul of one is joined to that of the other. You and I are people attached to one another by the feet and tied to one another by the neck. There is no way of staying far from each other. We are like people of the same house." It is even claimed that if a noble is condemned to death for a crime, one of his serfs ought to substitute himself for him and die in his place. However, this absolute power over his albatu which the taiji apparently once exercised, and this intimate relationship between noble and serf have long been only a memory in reality.

In the seventeenth century, when Mongolia became incorporated into the Manchu empire, a new administration, copied from that of the Manchus, was introduced among the Mongols. The different tribes were organized into banners, each of them having its own delimited territory, and at the head of each of these banners, was placed a chief called a jasak, chosen from among the nobles and appointed by the emperor. The individuals belonging to the same banner were distributed among a certain number of sumu (arrows), each headed by a jangi under the authority of the jasak. This new organization deeply modified the regime that Mongolia had known until then. It did not abolish the system of taiji-albatu, but the bonds which united the taiji to their albatu were automatically loosened by the fact that all the individuals, even the taiji, had come to depend upon the chief of the banner and had been incorporated into a sumu, whose commander had authority over the noble as well as the serf. The power of the taiji over their serfs thus was considerably restrained by the establishment of Manchu domination in Mongolia. What little power remained amounted to about the following: if the taiji was rich and, above all, if he had a high position in the banner, he would expect his serfs to help him, and to cultivate the soil for his profit. He would give them his young horses to be trained, and require that the wives and daughters of his serfs take care of and watch his sheep and goats, milk his cows and ewes, make the butter and cheese, and do his sewing, etcetera. Though the serfs are not obliged to dwell in proximity to their taiji, those who regularly have to perform duties for their master, establish themselves not far from his habitation, which they call yeke ger (the big tent). Since not all the nobles are rich and influential, many serfs escape these duties. Even the rich and influential nobles take care not to be indiscriminately exacting from all their serfs. It is especially the poor who are forced to serve their lord, but most often these services do not go unrewarded. Despite the Ordos Mongols' proverb, which says, "The worst of the woods is the one used to make the threshold of the door; the worst of the meats is the lung; the worst of men is the taiji," one can say that in general the nobles, especially the princely chiefs of banners, are respected and even liked by their serfs. An Ordos folk song says: "The Taiji are the descendants of the Lord (Chingis), and the commoners are his "white soldiers."

The jasak, or princely chiefs of banners, being nobles, also had their own serfs. Their aides-de-camp (kiya) are usually chosen from among these serfs. There were some jasaks who had a few serf families as household servants, and these families relieved one another in the performance of that office. The serfs of the jasaks enjoyed the privileges of exemption from ordinary contributions and from the requisition of riding animals.

An institution dating from ancient times is that of inji. When the daughter of a jasak is married, her father gives her as a dowry one or a few families chosen from his own serfs, or at least a young slave-servant, who is the daughter of one of his serfs, who will be especially attached to the personal service of the new bride. The father of this young lady ordinarily receives a horse as payment for having given his daughter. This slave-servant, given as dowry to a princess is generally well-treated. When she reaches the age of marriage, her mistress looks for a husband for her. The children born from such a marriage automatically become the dependents of the princess.

If a noble should incur a penalty and he is insolvent, his serfs are obliged to make payment for him.

At the death of a taiji, his serfs go into mourning. This mourning lasts forty-nine days, during which one does not wear any beautiful garments, one does not shave, men do not wear any honorary buttons and women do not wear the head ornament one does not celebrate any wedding, one does not gallop or ride a saddled horse, etcetera. It is noteworthy that the duration of mourning for a taiji is the same as for a father or mother.

It sometimes happened that a Chinese desired to enlist in a Mongolian banner, and as the population of most banners was not very large, the Mongolian administration generally welcomed him with pleasure. However, the enlistment was considered as definite only after the individual had been incorporated into a sumu, and after he had found a taiji willing to receive him as albatu. These Chinese, who by enrollment in a banner became the subjects of a jasak and serfs of a taiji were always men who were familiar with Mongolian life. They spoke the language more or less well, often having come to Mongolia in their youth and served as servants in Mongolian families. After their enrollment they took a Mongolian name and a Mongolian wife, and had the same rights and duties as the native-born Mongol.

The Ordos Mongols had the following proverb: "If a stallion has not even three mares, castrate him; if a noble over three generations has no serfs, remove his title of taiji." In fact, a noble was not often deprived of his title of taiji because he lacked serfs. Custom permitted a noble owning a certain number of serf families to cede one to a taiji who had none. The transfer of a serf family to its buyer was an occasion for celebration. The transfer was not made as a gift; the noble who ceded the family was entitled to a certain amount of money and a gift, usually a head of cattle. The object of the transaction, the serf family, also found it advantageous, receiving from its new lord a gift of a few head of cattle.

It should be noted that as a reward for extraordinary service rendered to the jasak or to the banner, a serf could receive the honorary title of taiji, but such a case rarely occurred.

Sometimes a serf would receive the title of darkhan from the jasak of his banner. This title, granted only as a reward for services rendered, conferred the exemption from taxes, requisitions, and statute-labor, either for life or for a certain number of years.

The time is long past when the Mongols lived as a clan-society. In the larger feudal groups which were established under the Yüan and later under the Ming dynasties, the Mongolian clans continued to exist in a modified form. With the incorporation of Mongolia into the Manchu empire, the clan system virtually ended. Little of this organization remains today, only the names of the clans (omok) and the custom of exogamy, which is not observed rigorously by the commoners, although it remains strictly obligatory for the nobles.

At the time of the Manchu conquest, the Mongols were called by their proper names, to which they added the name of the clan to which they belonged. One said: "Mr. so-and-so of such-and-such a clan." This manner of distinguishing the individual had been practiced since the time when clan rule flourished. The division of Mongolia into banners, in which the totality of the Mongolian population was re-grouped without any distinction of clans, naturally led the people to distinguish individuals by the banner to which they belonged rather than by the clan into which they had been born. Instead of saying: "So-and-so from such-and-such clan," one began saying "So-and-so from such-and-such a banner." The effect of this new manner of distinguishing individuals was soon felt: the names of clans began to disappear from everyday use.

At the present time one always designates individuals by their personal name. In order to distinguish those having the same personal name, a few methods are in use: the personal name is preceded by the name of the banner to which he belongs, or by the name of the place where he lives, or by his title if he is an official, etcetera. The individuals are never distinguished by the name of their clan. The names of the clan are also banished from official acts. In these latter, an individual is always designated as follows: "Mr. So-and-so (personal name) belonging to the sumu of so-and-so (name of the officer at the head of a sumu)." However, the names of clans stay alive. A Mongol generally knows his own clan-name, although he ordinarily knows but a small number of other clan-names, and occasionally one may meet an individual who ignores his own omok. The name of the clan continues to play a leading role in the life of the nobles, however. In fact, the taiji, whose clan name is Borjigit, mentioned previously, cannot marry another Borjigit. They must choose their wives from those whose clan-name is different from their own; in other words, a Borjigit must marry either a Manchurian princess or a Mongol woman of the commoner class. A Borjigit girl must also be given to a non-Borjigit. However, those Mongols who are not nobles rarely observe the rule of marrying outside their clan, (see China IMAR Family).

The clan names still play a role in the choice of a Chinese name. Mongols who live near the Chinese border, particularly those having business relations with the Chinese, sometimes take a Chinese family name. In fact, they consider the hsing or Chinese family name to be the equivalent of the omok. The use of the Chinese name is restricted to relations with the Chinese, however, and a Mongol who has taken a Chinese name continues to use his Mongolian personal name among other Mongols.

The choice of a Chinese family name is made in several ways, one of which is the following. The person who wants to take a Chinese family name chooses among the latter the one whose meaning is approximately the same as that of his own clan-name. Thus a Mongol whose clan-name is Sharanut "the yellows," will take the name of Huang "yellow": one whose clan-name is Aktachin "the riders," will take the name of Ma "horse." But it is evidently impossible, for most of the Mongolian clan names to find a Chinese family name which would bring to mind even vaguely their meanings. Furthermore, the significance of quite a number of clan names is unknown. In either of these cases, a Mongol choosing a Chinese family name does not worry about its equivalence with his clan-name, but lets himself be guided by other considerations which are not always easy to understand at first. For instance, among the Ordos, the taiji of the Otok Banner have taken the Chinese family name Pao "parcel," while those of the six other banners have chosen Ch'i "wonderful." At first sight the choice is surprising, because all the taiji of the Ordos are descendants of Chingis and therefore have the same clan-name, i.e., Borjigit. However the taiji of Otok chose Pao because they wanted to render the first syllable of the clan-name Borjigit. The other taiji of Ordos banners chose the Chinese family name Ch'i because it was reminiscent of the first syllable of the name Kiyut, which an ancient Mongolian chronicle and the official history of the Yuan dynasty both claim to have been the name of the family of Chingis Khan.

B. Relations between Jasaks and Subjects

Just as it was impossible for a Mongol of servile status to become the albatu of another taiji, it was also not permissible for him to leave his own banner to become the subject of another jasak. Moreover, he could not transfer to another sumu but continued to be a life-long dependent of the sumu into which he was born. When he died, he could not even leave his goods to someone belonging to another sumu.

The albatu had more liberty in regard to residence. He had an effective right to wander with his cattle or to reside anywhere within the extent of his banner. Strictly speaking, he was forbidden to settle outside the limits of his banner's territory, and the jasak had the right to recall subjects who established residence outside the territory. In recent times, the jasaks did not always exercise their right, especially since Chinese colonization had made such progress that in certain banners there were hardly any virgin areas left which could be used as pasture grounds. The result was that a part, sometimes a considerable portion, of the population of certain banners were no longer on the territory of its own banner, but lived dispersed on the land of a neighboring banner.

Another advantage enjoyed by the Mongol as long as he remained established on the territory of his own banner, was that he could cultivate the earth wherever he desired without any charge being levied. Exception was made of the lands called "prohibited" i.e., those lands in the immediate vicinity of temples, obo, and other places of worship. The freedom to settle as one pleased and to cultivate the earth in any suitable place are alluded to in the following Mongolian proverb: "Cultivate the earth wherever there is a place for the mold-board of your plough; abide wherever there is a place for the felt-carpets over the lattice of your tent."

In actual fact, the land of the banner was the property of the jasak who could dispose of it as he pleased. He was not allowed by the Chinese government to dispose of it through regular sale, but could rent it for an annual payment in silver to the Chinese colonists, who then cultivated it. There is hardly any need to say that this right of the chief of the banner to cede land to the Chinese was disastrous to many Mongols who still practised herding. In this way great expanses of land which most often constituted the best pasturage of the banner were lost to Chinese colonists.

Sometimes the jasak also made a gift of land to one of his subjects as a reward for a service rendered. Such land was called shang shara, and could be cultivated to the profit of the owner.

The shang was the palace of the jasak and was composed of a few brick buildings in Chinese style and a few Mongol tents. An officer called demchi was in charge of the administration of the jasak's household. The servants were subjects of the jasak who came in turn to the palace to serve. These services were not remunerated. They consisted of taking care of the kitchen, carrying water, looking after the fire, and obtaining firewood or collecting argal (dried dung used for fuel). Personal service to the jasak was rendered by his aides-de-camp, who were chosen from among his personal serfs (tus albatu). As a distinguishing mark they wore a dress hat to which a blue feather was attached. As personal serfs of the jasak they were exempted from ordinary taxes and from requisitions of saddle-horses. At the head of the aides-de-camp was the jiksaaliin daruga (commander of the guard of honor). He was commonly called baitandaa (from the Manchurian). This officer usually shared the confidence of the jasak and was sometimes deputed by him to handle important missions.

Another important officer among the attendants of the jasak was the ailthal (reporter), who kept him informed on current affairs.

The wife of the jasak was attended by a few ladies of rank, and a certain number of serfs' wives were in charge of the domestic labor.

All the servants of the shang, men and women, remained in their positions for two consecutive months. After these two months, others came to replace them.

A few words should be said concerning the Great Seal of the Banner. It was inscribed in Manchurian and Mongolian with "Seal of the jasak of such-and-such banner." This seal was the same received by the first jasak of the banner from the Manchu Emperor at the time the banner was founded. The Mongols considered it a sacred object; it always remained in the immediate vicinity of the jasak, and a lamp burned night and day before the casket containing it. When the jasak undertook a journey into the interior of his banner lands, he took the seal with him; it was carried on a horse which a rider led by hand. When the prince spent the night somewhere on the way, the seal rested in a little tent guarded by an officer.

The Great Seal was affixed only to important decrees and important official correspondence. On acts and letters of less importance, the small seal of the yamen was used.

If the prince absented himself from his banner for a long time, or if he died, the Great Seal was entrusted to his first minister.

When the jasak of the banner died, his subjects went into mourning for one-hundred days. Otherwise, the mourning requirements for a banner chief were the same as those for other nobles.

C. Other Cohesive Factors

The structural features of Mongolian society which are imposed by kinship, class, wealth, and position are modified by factors which effect a strong social unity, despite the lack of large towns or cities and the dispersal of the population over a vast area. Although the camps and tents of the nomads are widely scattered, the steppe country is in no sense a "trackless wilderness," for it is criss-crossed by well-defined routes of travel which also serve as lines of communication. The Mongols love to visit. They spend a great deal of time on the road, stop to chat with other travellers, and drop in at every tent along the way to exchange bits of news which are passed on to other neighbors or travellers. News travels very rapidly over this network and a relatively close contact is maintained among families distributed over a wide area. This system of communications is an important factor in achieving an integration of society in the nomadic areas.

In a pastoral nomadic economy the water supply assumes a special significance for man and his domestic animals. The available water, as well as the extent and quality of pasture, limits the size of flocks and herds, and affects the growth and distribution of the human population. In the arid Mongolian plateau country, wells and springs are usually far apart and are used in common by the families in the vicinity, as well as by travellers and passing caravans. The vast herds of livestock which assemble around the watering places are tended by men, women, and children from neighboring families, who make these meetings an occasion for visiting and general sociability. Here also gather the caravans whose carts and animals add to the variety of the scene, and whose drivers and attendants bring news from distant places and enliven the conversation. Occasional passing travellers stop to water their mounts, listen to the local gossip, and pass on interesting bits of information. Thus the desert wells and water-holes serve as important centers of social intercourse in Mongolian life.

Religious observances and the social activities which accompany them have long been popular with the Mongols in both the agricultural and pastoral regions. These ceremonial occasions range from family gatherings to huge fairs such as that at Kanchu in the Huna League, where every year in mid-September tens of thousands of persons assemble. On the family level the services are more purely religious in character, but the larger observances are almost always followed or accompanied by festivities and entertainment. In southern Chahar, for example, where the Mongols live in villages, there are two important observances, one of which involves the whole banner, and the other a larger administrative unit. Both of these festivals combine religious and social activities. One is associated with a temple, and the other is a village affair. Large tents or pavilions are set up, and men, women and children, dressed in their best, come to participate in the ceremonies and enjoy the games and contests, and the eating and drinking which follow.

In the pastoral regions the Lamaist temples often initiate and conduct festivals, perhaps on religious holidays, but as purely social affairs. These are sometimes held in the vicinity of an obo, and at other times near the temple itself. Horse racing, archery, and wrestling contests are held, and prizes are awarded to the winners. Mongolian families throng to these gatherings, often from great distances, set up their tents, and stay for the duration of the festival. Some of these monastery festivals developed into fairs, such as that mentioned above in the Huna League, and the strategically-located monasteries became permanent major commercial centers. Chinese merchants and craftsmen drifted in and settled there, and the Mongols brought great flocks and herds of animals as gifts to the church, and exchanged the products of herding for the manufactures of the Chinese.

The social role of religious institutions in the western and southern parts of Inner Mongolia, where Tibetan Buddhism is strong, has no counterpart in the Dagur region of the Northeast, where the people lead a sedentary village life and shamanism is the religion. Here religious observances are on a small scale, some even being restricted to one or the other sex, and there are no fairs or festivals associated with any of them. Social gatherings on all occasions, moreover, are usually small and based almost solely on kinship.

Another feature of Mongolian life which tends to strengthen the bonds of social unity in a localized sense is found in the widespread custom of performing reciprocal acts and engaging in cooperative work projects. In the agricultural regions a wedding or funeral in a family is the occasion for visiting by representatives of all the other families in the village. At the New Year, also, at least one person from each house visits all the other houses. There are local religious services, too, in which the whole community participates without regard to other social affiliations. Exchange of services is commonly practiced in both the pastoral and agricultural districts. Members of unrelated families frequently assist each other on projects such as moving a house, repairing houses and fences, milking, making felt, tanning hides, and making rope. Livestock is often herded in common, tended by members of several different families, together or in turn. In their manner of performing cooperative projects and exchanging services the Dagurs again show some deviation from the typical Mongolian pattern. The Dagurs do engage in community projects, but these are almost always within the village and the workers are all kinsmen. There is little intervillage exchange or cooperation, even between relatives.

D. Changes in Mongol Society Under the Communists

The social practices described are known to have been generally in effect before the Communist domination of Inner Mongolia and the creation of the IMAR. That the new government recognizes the value of such practices to the Mongols and their utility to the state is apparent in its encouragement of at least the superficial forms of many such native customs.

Ulanfu himself, in an address given in 1953, urged that attention be given to holding fairs in the villages. Some, at least, of the great fairs are also being continued with government approval and support, and many of the religious festivals have been supplanted by or integrated with official national holidays (see China IMAR, Propaganda). Native contests such as horse racing and wrestling, and the folk arts--singing and dancing--are apparently encouraged; and new games, particularly basketball and volleyball, have been introduced. Mongolian teams now participate in tournaments, competing with teams from their own region and with other nationalities.

The cooperative societies, superficially at least, are taking the place of the community work projects; though the spontaneity of social contacts engendered by the old system is probably lacking in the new.

The old customs of travelling, visiting, and meeting at watering places are deeply rooted in Mongolian life, especially in the pastoral regions, and these habits will not be easily broken. Yet the new regime looks forward to the day when all the Mongols will give up their nomadic life for a sedentary existence, lose their love for mobility, and abandon the cultural traits associated with it. The native system of communications along which news is passed by word of mouth has been supplemented by radio diffusion stations set up at forty-seven locations in the IMAR. Through this medium herdsmen in remote districts can hear news, music, educational programs, and official propaganda. Government film projection teams are also very active in the region. They tour the villages, the pastoral and hunting communities, and show films dubbed in with Mongolian speech. In 1954 these teams were said to have given 3,900 showing to audiences totaling nearly three million persons in Inner Mongolia.

Unquestionably the native customs which maintained social unity in the Mongolian world were changing and would have changed further even without Communist interference, but apparently the new government hopes to divert the traditional forms of social integration into channels which can be controlled and utilized by the State to create a Mongolian nationalism in harmony with state political and economic plans.

The consolidation of the Chinese Communist control of

Inner Mongolia through the agency of the Inner Mongolian People's Government has meant a considerable change in the society of the region. The previously discussed Catholic social structure has been all but abolished with land reform and redistribution. New types of organized units have replaced such local structures: the experimental livestock farms, agricultural-producer cooperatives, herding cooperatives, etcetera. The introduction of industry into some of the cities of Inner Mongolia has brought with it trade unions and a formalized "working class." Associations such as the National Democratic Youth League (now the Young Communist League), the Women's Democratic Federation, and specialized "drive" committees have penetrated far into the grasslands. In addition to the old class structure of the nomadic Mongols, a new elite has begun to develop, composed of Communist party members and lesser functionaries.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain data on the existing class structure in Inner Mongolia. The nomadic Mongols, under the "go slow" policy adopted for minority regions, were for a period lasting until at least 1950-1951, subjected to little "reform." A policy of "no struggle, no redistribution and no differentiation of class status" was in effect. Since that time, attacks have been made on the prerogatives of the hereditary nobility; in all probability they were directed against their right to exact labor and taxes. In addition, there has been some redistribution of livestock. In the semi-nomadic and sedentary Mongol areas, the same policy of land redistribution which was applied to the Chinese was carried over to the Mongols with no differentiation. Theoretically, landlords were eliminated and land redistributed. Reclamation was banned in semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas, apparently until late in 1955, when the call went out again for youth to participate in land reclamation programs.

It is safe to say, on the basis of the limited data available, that whatever of the old social structure in Inner Mongolia still remains, it is to be found least radically altered among nomadic Mongols. But even this group cannot long withstand the forces which are attempting to reshape their society.

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Additional Readings

FAMILY

I. The Mongolian Family

A. Introduction

The forms and functions of the Mongolian family are not uniform throughout Inner Mongolia, but a close analysis reveals an underlying pattern to both family and kinship structure as a whole, which is characteristic of all Mongol groups, nomadic, semi-pastoral and agricultural. These basic family traits have been traced to an older stratum of the culture, an ancestral group from which the Mongols and some other northern Asiatic peoples have descended. The variations found today in the family from group to group, and from region to region have developed through internal change or have been imposed upon the basic structure by external influences, e.g., changes in environment or contacts with other groups. Yet the fundamental features of family structure have persisted over long periods of time and through a wide range of political and economic conditions, a fact which implies a mixture of conservatism and flexibility in this element of Mongolian culture.

The family has never been an exceptionally strong integrating force in Mongolian society. Its weakness became evident with the breakdown of clan organization under the Manchu administration. The clan formerly supplied a framework in which families were interrelated as are individuals within the family. The system assigned a specific social role to each individual, prescribed certain aspects of his behavior, demanded of him the performance of certain obligations, and gave him in return the security of belonging to a large group. The family, then as now, was the basic social and economic unit, but the break up of families and the departure of married sons did not weaken or rupture kinship ties, for the larger unit, the clan, still held its members together.

As the clan system disintegrated, lineage ties remained in effect, but lineages had no authority structure and were not territorially defined. The Manchu administrative system replaced clan authority with banner authority and established a territorial basis for the new units, but failed to integrate political with kinship unity. Thus the family remained as the only formal functioning social unit. Its ties with other families were attenuated or broken, and its power to hold its own members was greatly weakened. Married sons who left the parental household were no longer linked to it by strong kinship bonds. After two or three generations even the paternal lineage lost much of its significance.

Although the family is not a strong cohesive force in Mongolian society, its very weakness in this respect emphasizes its importance as a socializing, reproducing and economic unit. Lacking the means to maintain a continuity of kinship and the opportunity to place its members in a larger formal social aggregation, it must supply the major share of social and economic training and prepare the individual to assume a place in the society. The Mongolian family has accepted this responsibility and has adapted itself to new environments and economic systems, clinging, meanwhile to a core of basic elements which are as old as Mongolian culture.

B. Composition of the Household

The typical Mongolian household is the patrilocal extended family; i.e., the married sons and their wives and unmarried children live in the same small parental community. Housing arrangements vary somewhat with the individual and according to locality. In the purely nomadic regions each nuclear family customarily lives in its own tent. Families are usually small and commonly husband and wife are the only adult members. Only rarely does such a dwelling include one or more grandparents, the widowed father or mother of husband or wife. Sometimes when the father is too poor to provide the means to set up a separate household for more than one son, the other sons may be sent to a lamasery, and under such conditions the household may include one or more unmarried women who are unable to find husbands and are living with parents, brothers, or in-laws. Thus a typical pastoral family, with two or three unmarried children will ordinarily not exceed six or seven individuals, and the household may consist of only one tent or a group of them. In the areas subject to strong Chinese cultural and economic influence, however, both houses and tents are used and occupied the year round, and it is not unusual to find several generations living together in the same group of dwellings, or for several related couples of the same generation to form a single household.

Ideally, after marriage, the young couple live by themselves, occupying either a tent or house in the same encampment or village or when the parental house is large enough and has several rooms, one of them is given to the newlyweds. Sooner or later, however, for one reason or another, the sons move, with their wives and families to live by themselves, each couple becomes independent from the father and forms a new family. Traditionally the youngest son is supposed to remain with his parents and assume direction of the household when the father reaches an advanced age, in practice, however, this obligation falls upon whichever son remains at home to take care of the parents. Thus the group of tents (or tents and houses) constitutes an extended family and economic unit. Such a settlement usually includes some blood relatives but is not always limited to them, for married couples may leave the parental encampment and set up their tents with friends in another.

The independent family is known as an örehe, a group of family members all of whom share a common family property. This was the unit which was subject to taxation and levies. One referred to his own extended family as manai ger or minii ger (our family or my family), and after he had become independent from the father's family he would refer to it as aabin ger (father's family). Households of any relative would be called ger, modified with appropriate terms to express the specific relationship.

Kin groupings

In earlier periods of their history, before the seventeenth century, the Mongols were divided into lineages with descent reckoned in the paternal line. The lineages, in turn, were grouped into clans, each of which traced descent to a common ancestor. All the nobility belonged to a single clan which allegedly descended from Chingis Khan. The clans were exogamic, i.e., an individual was required to marry outside his clan. The banner organization imposed by the Manchu government led to the extinction of the old system, however, and now few traces of clan organization remain, although a Mongol is likely to know the name of his own clan. In the nomadic and semi-pastoral regions there is still a hereditary nobility which, though hardly a privileged group, is recognized by everyone as a distinct class. These nobles are all members of Chingis' clan, the Borjigit, and they alone of all the Mongols still practice clan exogamy.

The lineage or törel, on the other hand, is still recognized and serves chiefly as a mechanism for regulating marriage, although its extent in this respect is generally limited to patrilineal kinsmen who are separated by not more than five degrees of collateral relationship (see section on Marriage below). Traditionally, patrilineal descent was symbolized by an inherited surname or omok which may be related to an earlier belief in descent from a common ancestor. The omok is no long used except for keeping census records, but all persons who belong to the same torel are recognized as having the same surname. Persons having the same surname do not necessarily belong to the same torel, however.

Membership in a törel may be acquired by other means than birth. An individual may be adopted into a lineage, or as sometimes happens, he may become a member of a new lineage when an old one splits in two or is fused with another.

C. Spatial Distribution and Mobility

Ordinarily the dwelling unit of a household is occupied only by members of the nuclear family (father, mother and unmarried children), living in the same tent, room or house. It is not considered desirable for two couples to live together. Occupants of a tent live in one un-partitioned apartment and have little privacy. The rear, opposite the door is the place reserved for the master of the household and for the guest whom he wishes especially to honor. Here also are the two low frames which serve as beds for the master and his wife. Other members of the family occupy the side of the tent, to the right as one enters, and sleep here on skins or felt carpets which are laid on the floor at night. On the same side of the tent, near the door is heaped up the dried dung used as fuel, and further back on shelves along the wall at the right are the household utensils and jugs and bowls for storing food, water and kumis. Here also is a low table for family use. Sometimes the box for dung fuel is kept outside the tent and sometimes also the kitchen equipment is stored on a wooden platform built just outside the door.

The left side of the tent as one faces the rear is reserved for guests. Near the door on this side are hung the lead-reins and halters, the bridles and the hobbles. Further back are a small low table for the use of guests, a few trunks and the little altar with the picture of a divinity (güngürwas). The fireplace with its iron support (tulga) for the pot is in the center of the tent under the roof-opening.

In the agricultural regions of Inner Mongolia, the traditional pattern of occupancy and interior arrangement has been modified in various ways. Here it is not uncommon for the tent to be placed on a raised platform of packed earth, or pitched as it is on the steppe and simply not moved. Both tents and Chinese style earthen houses are often used in the same household establishment, which will then consist of a cluster of buildings, some occupied by the family and others used as guest houses, servants' quarters or outbuildings. Occasionally the tents will be occupied by members of the family only during the summer months. In this type of establishment different rooms or tents would be used for specific purposes such as kitchen, storerooms, guest rooms, family living quarters, etcetera, and the interior arrangement would not, of course, be the same as that described for the tent.

Movements of families or households with their dwellings within the encampment or from one encampment or village to another are rather common even in the agricultural districts. It is easy for dissatisfied members to move away from the parental camp or village to another community, or to join with others to form a new one. Fluctuations in the quality of the pasture or superstitions about "lucky" or "unlucky" sites cause some of these movements; and in the south the pressure of Chinese colonization has forced a certain amount of Mongolian migration northward. In these movements from or within the sedentary villages even houses are dismantled to the extent that timbers are removed to be used again at a new site.

These local shifts of households within a community or to a new locale are not necessarily related to the seasonal movements which are generally typical of a pastoral economy. The latter may involve seasonal change of residence for the whole community, or, as in the semi-agricultural areas, some families or members of families may live in mobile herding camps during the summer grazing season and return to live in the village during the winter.

In view of the easy mobility of the Mongolian family or household, it is obvious that kinship groups are not in any sense local groups. Members of a törel may be widely scattered, and a village or community usually consists of families representing several different surnames. It is possible that when the banner system was functioning, the restrictions it imposed on movements of families may have enforced a general localization of kinship groups.

D. Order

In general the authority structure of the typical Mongolian family varies little from the pastoral to the agricultural regions. The highest authority rests with the parents, who have approximately equal rights, but it is the father (or sometimes one of the brothers) who is the responsible head. He enjoys a privileged position in the household and conducts all commercial transactions outside the family. Only when he has reached an extremely old age does he relinquish the authority to the youngest son or to the one who has remained with him. Discipline of the male children is usually in the hands of the father, but when there are two or more sons, the elder brother may assume some of these responsibilities.

The mother or senior woman of the house is in charge of the details of the household, and her rights are well-defined by custom. A proverb says "The husband is master of his wife and can order her, but it is the wife who directs the household." (Mostaert) She is responsible for milking the animals and controls and apportions the food supply. She disciplines and supervises the training of her daughters until they are married when the new wife goes to live with her husband's family and becomes subject to the authority of her mother-in-law. Older sisters may take over some of the mother's responsibilities in training the younger girls. A second wife in a polygynous marriage owes respect and obedience to the first.

When a married couple leaves the parental home, receives a share of the common goods and sets up a new household, they become independent of both parents and in-laws.

Formal and informal terms of address are used in conversations between kinsmen depending on differences in age and generation, i.e., persons of greater age or ascending generation are addressed with formal terms, and those of lesser age or of descending generation with informal or intimate terms. Person of the same generation who are close in age normally use the intimate terms reciprocally, but with the attainment of greater age and higher status they tend to use the formal terms reciprocally. Husband and wife usually address each other in familiar terms unless the husband is an official, when his wife would address him formally, while he still addresses her in familiar terms.

Kin terms are of two kinds: those used for primary relatives and those used for courteous address. The latter are used only for persons of greater age in the same generation or for persons of higher generation, though they are not used above the first ascending generation. Husband and wife never use personal names but address each other by terms of reference or words of affection. The latter are not used in public. Joking in public between man and wife is permissible, and a wife can travel unescorted, though at the risk of being attacked. Extra-marital relations for both husband and wife are not uncommon and are not censured by anyone as long as they are carried on discreetly.

Children use respectful terms to address both father and mother, never the parents' names, and sometimes use a more specific term for father to distinguish him from grandfather or fathers's elder brother whose kinship designations are the same. Parents call children by their personal names or simply use "boy" or "girl."

Relations between children and parents and between siblings vary with sex, age and social status. In general all children are expected to be reserved and respectful to their parents, but small children are allowed greater freedom. After the age of fifteen, however, joking in the presence of parents is frowned upon, and smoking in the presence of the parents is forbidden before marriage.

A son's relationship with his father is respectful and formal. Discussion of personal matters can be initiated only by the father and the son performs certain courtesies for him such as holding his horse or lighting his pipe. With the mother the son can be less reserved, and he can even discuss personal matters with her.

Daughters are usually very close to their mothers and are less reserved with both parents than are the sons.

Younger siblings address elder siblings with honorific terms, and where there are several siblings of the same sex, qualifying terms are used to distinguish between them. Elder siblings usually address the younger siblings by their personal names, or sometimes in an affectionate or joking manner. A younger sibling never addresses an elder sibling by name. The close relationship which prevails between siblings in their early years gives way to one of reserve when they reach puberty and after marriage. The change is less pronounced in relations between sisters, who are always on more intimate terms with each other than are the boys. Mutual avoidance of the sexes develops somewhat after the age of fifteen, and the children tend to associate more with members of their own sex than with those of the opposite sex.

The same pattern of the use of formal and intimate terms of address extends to relations with all other recognized kin. The same rules of relative age, generation or social standing determine the form of address, and only the terms themselves are different.

E. Family Solidarity

Despite the use of terms which reflect a feeling of relationship between members of a family or larger kin group, the ties which connect kinsmen even in the family proper are rather loose. In the past kin ties were probably far more important than they are today. Two factors have contributed, however, to the breaking down of the larger kin groups and the weakening of the family structure. In the first place the Manchu government fixed territorial limits to the wanderings of the nomadic peoples and imposed a civil administration which weakened kin authority. Then, perhaps as a result of the limitation of their opportunities for expansion, more Mongolian sons entered the Buddhist church as lamas. These lamas were subject to the authority of the church, not of the kin group, and in many cases the families from which they had come also had some intimate connection with the church.

The closestties are, of course, those between members of the nuclear family. Relations between husband and wife are good, though as has been pointed out, extra-marital sexual relations are not uncommon. The relationship between parents and child is usually an affectionate one. Mongols are loving parents, and their influence upon the children is great. They seldom punish the children severely or use harsh words in their presence, and the children in turn are usually unspoiled and obedient. (Poppe) The relationship between siblings is also close and affectionate, although the sisters tend to be more intimate with each other than are the brothers. However, a wife will turn to her brothers for help in time of need, and if widowed she can return permanently to her own home. Beyond the immediate family the closest ties are those between grandparents and grandchildren, between cousins, and between in-laws.

Even the family bonds are being continually stretched and broken, however. Daughters normally marry into another kinship group and move away from the family household; married sons and their families, who may at first live with or close to the parents, usually move away after a time to live by themselves, perhaps in another community. Other sons may leave to become lamas. Under the Communist regime the disintegration of the family is proceeding even more rapidly. Education of the children is now almost entirely in the hands of the state, and the parents in many places attend special evening classes where they are taught advanced methods of herding, sanitation and child care, but are also greatly indoctrinated with Communist ideas.

F. Continuity

1. Marriage

Marriage among the Mongols was formerly a family matter arranged by the parents or household, and the negotiations and ceremonies were supervised or conducted by the clans or kinship groups of both parties. Informal child engagements were common, and sometimes even unborn children were engaged. Preferably, a girl's husband should come from either an official or a wealthy family, or lacking these qualifications, he should be a good worker, skillful in the crafts and routine chores of the herdsman. Industry and proficiency in household tasks were the qualities most desired in a prospective wife. Wealth of the bride's family was of minor importance, since the bridegroom's family provided the newlyweds with most of the material items necessary to set up a new household. Marriage was early, usually at from fifteen to seventeen years of age, but it was even better to get the approval of a living Buddha.

When a father wished to give a wife to his son, he would never address himself directly to the girl's parents, but would first find one or two intermediaries, who would then obtain the consent of the girl's father and arrange all financial matters. The ceremony itself lasted for several days and was accompanied by much feasting and general festivity. The actual wedding was performed by a special speaker, a layman; lamas were excluded from the ceremony.

The old pattern of marriage by arrangement of the families has generally broken down in recent years, at least insofar as the selection of the spouse is concerned. Young people normally choose their own mates and then perhaps ask for the consent of parents or senior relatives. Consequently marriage is not usually undertaken at such an early age as formerly, and husbands are now generally older than wives.

Marriage with the lineage (törel) is commonly avoided, but closeness of relationship and association are actually the determining factors, rather than mere membership in the lineage. For example, a son would not marry his mother's brother's daughter, even though she belonged to a different lineage, if she lived close enough to his own family so that there was continual social contact between them. Nor would he marry a first or even a second cousin of his father's (and his own) lineage, even though they lived far apart. Beyond this degree of relationship, however, there are practically no restrictions on choice of a mate, though it is felt that marriage should be as far away as possible from the standpoint of locality as well as kinship.

The Borjigit, or noble descendants of Chingis, are an important exception to this general relaxation of kinship rules. As has been mentioned, they still preserve their clan name and membership and observe the rules of exogamy. A Borjigit man must marry a non-Borjigit, and a Borjigit woman must marry a commoner. During the Manchu dynasty Borjigit males could and did marry Manchu princesses without violating this rule. Daughters of the nobility could marry commoners without weakening the prestige of the Borjigit, for women could not inherit family property or carry the family name. Sons born to a Borjigit woman and a Mongol commoner, however, could be brought up in the wife's father's family and given his name.

2. Polygamy

Most Mongolian marriages are monogamous. Polygyny occurs and is, in fact, theoretically desirable, but few families are wealthy enough to be able to afford it. Polygyny is usually resorted to only when the first wife is sterile or perhaps when she has not produced a son. A second wife always owes obedience to the first, and the children of the second wife have the same rights as those of the first.

3. Other forms of marriage

Forms of marriage other than the normal one are sometimes practiced to provide for unusual or abnormal conditions in the family. If the parents have no sons or have a daughter whom they wish to keep at home, they may give her to a son-in-law who will live with them and work for them. Such a son-in-law (küchin kürgen) usually comes from a family too poor to obtain a wife for the son by any other means. In some cases the küchin kürgen may not be expected to reside permanently with his wife's family, but may leave after the marriage, taking his compensation, and be free to marry again. Sons born of this marriage would belong to the lineage of the wife's father and would inherit his property. E-tu Zen Sun mentions "live-in son-in-law who takes care of parents' old age. Children belong to wife's (paternal) family (p. 191)

Another type of relationship in which the son-in-law is taken into the family is the üre kürgen (son-in-law son); in this case the adopted son-in-law remains near his adoptive parents until their deaths and takes care of their funerals. Such sons-in-law are usually Chinese. (Mostaert). The inheritance pattern followed in this arrangement is not clear.

Sometimes when the parents wish to keep a daughter at home or are unable to find her a husband due to physical or mental defects, they have recourse to a fictitious marriage in which the daughter is married to some part of the household equipment, the door frame, or a shelf. Children born to a woman married in this way are free of any social stigma and will inherit from the paternal grandfather in the usual manner.

4. Divorce

Separation and divorce of married couples are not uncommon. Separation may occur when man and wife are temperamentally incompatible or as the result of parental disapproval of the daughter-in-law. Such separations frequently end in divorce. A husband can repudiate a wife without having recourse to civil authorities, but divorce is not easy. If possible it is referred to the middlemen who arranged the marriage, and these in turn take the matter up with the families. Only if the families are unable to settle it is it taken before the banner officials.

When a woman is repudiated she returns to her family and her husband gives her a jolik bodo (head of cattle as ransom). If it is the woman who repudiates or deserts her husband, the family of the wife must remit a jolik bodo to the husband. In some cases the husband's family may also demand the return of the cattle given by them to the bride's father (Isono).

After a divorce the sons usually stay with the father and the daughters with the mother. In case of adultery, however, the guilty party, husband or wife, has no claim on the sons. (Vreeland, p. 167).

A woman who has been divorced or widowed can be given in marriage a second time by her parents. If she has adult sons, however, she rarely marries again. A widow is usually given in marriage by the family of her late husband. When a younger brother dies, his oldest brother may marry the widow and adopt the children, but a younger brother would not marry the widow of an elder brother.

The new Marriage Law which is now being implemented in Communist China may soon be applied to the national minorities. Since the conditions which the law aims to change do not, for the most part, exist in the Mongolian marriage system, it seems doubtful that the new regulations will seriously affect the Mongolian institution.

5. Maintaining the family line

As may be seen from the inheritance pattern in the various arrangements for marriage and divorce, continuation of the family line, even though it may be reckoned for only a few generations, is one of the primary objectives of the system. Sons inherit their father's lineage and property, and pass both on to their sons. After a divorce the sons follow the father, while the daughters, who always marry into another lineage anyhow, follow the mother. If a younger brother dies, the eldest son may marry the widow of the younger brother, thus insuring the children's membership in the paternal family line. Even children born of a hired son-in-law (küchin kürgen) are considered to be members of the girl's father's family and are entitled to inherit his property.

6. Forming new households

Marriage usually leads to the formation of a new household which may or may not be in the parental community. It is preferable for the married couple to have its own tent, or its own room in a house. Two couples never would live permanently in the same room or tent. Economic conditions, the need for pasture and living room, often compel the newlyweds to find a new location for their home. The primary reason for the break-up of families, however, is quarreling. Frequently ill-feeling arises between brothers or wives of brothers, or for one reason or another good understanding with the parents becomes impossible, and the sons move away to live by themselves or with friends in another community. Consequently a community or settlement commonly includes families of several different lineages.

7. Ancestors and ancestry

The Mongols have little interest in their genealogy and rarely know the names of ancestors beyond the grandparents. Nevertheless ancestry, real or presumed, plays an important role in determination of kinship, though the common ancestor may not be identified. "All persons who did believe themselves to be descended patrilineally from a common ancestor, however remote, and irrespective of whether or not the relationship between them could be traced, considered themselves as belonging to a common descent group known as a törel." (Vreeland, p. 152). The törel (discussed above under Kin Groupings) is the patrilineal kinship organization which is the basis of the whole Mongolian kinship system. Everyone belongs to a törel, membership in which is symbolized by a common surname. Possession of a common surname alone does not, however, necessarily indicate membership in the same törel. Mutual belief in a common ancestry is essential. To this extent, then antecedents are important to the Mongols, even though individuals may have no particular interest in the identity of their ancestors.

G. The Family as a Social Unit

Mongolian society, like any other human social group, imposes certain patterns which limit or prescribe the manner in which its necessary functions are performed. Although the Mongolian family may have less influence upon the individual than is the case in some other societies, it is nevertheless the unit which moulds him to fit the patterns and trains him to perform these basic functions. Sex, reproduction, the economic activities necessary to maintain the society, and enculturation or integration of the individual into the social structure are such functions; and in Mongolian society it is the family which regulates them.

1. Sex

Extra-marital relations are not officially sanctioned in Mongolian society, but under certain conditions they are at least condoned and sometimes approved. Conjugal faithfulness is not highly regarded, and it is not unusual for a wife to have a lover with the knowledge of her husband, who may be quite unconcerned about the matter. A young married woman, who has no children, may however, desert her husband for a lover. A proverb says, "It is easier to keep a tiger than to keep a young woman." (Mostaert). In some parts of the country it is customary for a husband to offer his wife to a guest who is staying overnight. Although it seems unlikely that unfaithfulness never evokes feelings of jealousy in either spouse nevertheless observers agree that extra-marital relations are relatively common, and unfaithfulness is not usually considered grounds for divorce.

2. Reproduction

Mongolian families are normally small -- two or three children -- but this fact does not imply a lack of desire for children. Pastoral nomadism, under the best conditions, does not favor large families, and the restrictions on movement of families which were imposed by the banner system limited still more the opportunities for expansion and encouraged parents to send their sons to lamaseries. Due to poor health and sanitation and the high incidence of venereal diseases, especially syphilis, the infant mortality rate has been very high, and this factor has also helped to limit the size of the family. Nevertheless the Mongols greatly desire children and are very fond of them. Barrenness (which is assumed to be the fault of the wife) is considered grounds for divorce, and inability of the wife to produce children, or sons, is the usual reason for taking a second wife.

Theoretically sons are more desirable than daughters, since males maintain the family line and inherit the wealth. Moreover the fact that a husband some times resorts to polygyny when his first wife cannot give him a son, would seem to indicate that such a preference exists. Actually, however, girls are desirable as economic assets, since the marriage of a daughter brings wealth to her parents. No social stigma is attached to children born outside of marriage nor to their parents. Nor is there any indication that having or not having children in any way affects the social status of a family.

3. Production and maintenance

The family is the basic productive unit in the Mongolian economy. This is true even though several families may live together in a community and pasture their herds in common or engage in other kinds of voluntary cooperation with each other. The economy of the regions more remote from Chinese influence is based almost exclusively on herding and is oriented primarily toward home consumption, though there is some trade between Mongols in meat, hides and other animal products. Cash and crop-rents from Chinese farmers who cultivate Mongolian lands may constitute an additional source of outside income in regions suitable for agriculture. Hunting is of minor importance in the economy and is considered as a sport of the wealthy or a livelihood for the very poor. Vegetables are grown by some families where conditions are suitable; vegetable gardening and agriculture in general are of greater importance in the Chinese border regions or in any areas where pasturage has become restricted as the result of Chinese colonization.

Where conditions require the seasonal movement of flocks to distant pastures (otor) each family usually has its customary sites which are recognized by others. Each family also has a customary place to cut hay, right to which is based on continuous use. Livestock, except for the larger herds, are usually pastured in common during the daytime and sometimes sheep and goats are put into a common enclosure at night. All animals are branded, however, and recognized as the private property of one or another family.

The basic industry of a Mongolian household centers chiefly around subsistence activities, i.e., the preparation of animal products for consumption and/or preservation, or for further manufacture. Normally these tasks are performed routinely by the family, but some jobs may be carried on cooperatively when they assume something of the character of a social event, as in felt-making. Few Mongolian families make felt now in the southern part of the region. The sheep are shorn by Chinese shearers who either carry the wool away to town where they manufacture felt to sell back to the Mongols, or make the felt for the family in the Mongol's own home. Here in these southern regions the construction and repair of sod houses has generally replaced felt-making.

4. Distribution and inheritance of property

Notwithstanding their cooperative activities and their common use of pasture lands, the Mongols have a strict sense of personal ownership of property. Personal ownership in this instance, however, usually means family, and not individual ownership. Livestock is the most important form of wealth and is more desirable than money. Everyone has a little cash, but that which accumulates above current needs is usually converted to livestock. The head of the family holds this wealth, livestock, buildings and tents, tools and utensils, supplies of food, etcetera, in trust and administers it for the benefit of his household and his heirs. Patrilineal inheritance, moreover, further modifies the extent of personal ownership. A woman cannot inherit the family property, though she is entitled to own goods her parents have given her during their lifetime.

In the pastoral regions of Inner Mongolia there is little or no concept of land ownership. Family or communal rights to the use of land for certain purposes are well established and generally recognized, but neither the family nor the community has the right to sell or rent the land. This old system of land use has broken down to some extent, however, in the vicinity of Chinese and Mongolian agricultural settlements. Here continuous use of the same restricted piece of land year after year and at all seasons of the year by the same family has tended to develop a sense of private ownership of the land. Mongols even buy and sell land here, although it is said that what seems to be sale of land is actually conceived to be a long term rental. (Namio).

5. Division of labor

In the performance of the many arduous and sometimes strenuous tasks which are required to maintain a Mongolian household, the sexes contribute approximately equal shares of labor. It is often asserted that women work harder than men, and this is probably true of many families, but in general the men do more of the work which requires greater strength, while the women are probably more continuously employed.

By western European standards, at any rate, the Mongolian woman leads a very hard life. In addition to performing what might be considered routine household chores, i.e., caring for the children, preparing the meals, setting up and cleaning the tent, etcetera, she also draws the water, collects the fuel, herds cattle and sheep, and milks all the animals and makes the milk products, washes and dresses the meat, does the sewing and embroidery, makes rope and thread, and performs midwifery.

Men generally care for and train the horses, do the slaughtering and set bones for animals and humans. Old or infirm men may also herd sheep, and in areas where such services are required, men cut the hay, assist in house construction and repair and do some carpenter work. In former days Mongol craftsmen made jewelry and ornaments of silver and fashioned tools, utensils and implements of iron, but these items are all made by the Chinese now. The frame work for a yurt or a whole yurt, complete with felt, may also be bought in the Chinese markets.

Boys sometimes herd sheep and, when they are old enough, assist the father in his work. Girls are trained by the mother to share her labors, and after marriage they acquire additional skill under the guidance of the mother-in-law.

The sexual division of labor is more rigid and formalized than in Outer Mongolia where some tasks are performed readily by either sex. Most men in Inner Mongolia, for example, would consider it almost indecent to sew, milk or perform midwifery.

6. Occupations outside the family

Some jobs, particularly those which might be termed arts or crafts, and professions, are performed by specialists who work for the whole community. This is often true of tanners, and leatherworkers, silversmiths, ironsmiths, woodcarvers, bone-setters, veterinarians, midwives, and to a certain extent, butchers. These specialists are members of the community who derive the major share of their income from their own herds. Another occupation which falls into this category is that of the scribe. Formerly there were no public schools in Inner Mongolia and few literate Mongols. Those who knew how to read and write sometimes taught the sons of wealthy families, and at other times lived in the yamen where they did the clerical work. With the exception of midwives these specialists are always men.

In addition to these occupations which are generally performed outside the framework of the family, there are several classes of voluntary (and one of involuntary) service which individuals or sometimes families may undertake for other families. Only one, the bool or bondsman is hereditary, and persons in this status, though free of civil obligation, are entirely dependent on the will of their masters. The others are gocag, always men, who serve a three-month tour of duty to discharge civil obligations; jarci hün, either man or woman domestic servant; saalnai ail or milking family who serve a wealthy family primarily to herd and milk the animals; and hölisnei hün or true hired man, who is taken on for a specific job. One other extra-familial profession or occupation should be mentioned. That is the priest or lama. Formerly most families, depending somewhat upon their economic condition, sent one or more of their sons to a lamasery to serve the church.

Exchange of goods and services

Families who do not have servants or hired men exchange services with each other when additional help is necessary or for purely social reasons, as in felt-making. Families in a community help each other at weddings and funerals, lend each other animals or exchange food. As has been mentioned, families frequently herd their livestock in common. All such voluntary cooperation is carried on primarily on the basis of friendship and without regard to kinship ties.

The Mongolian family produces, processes or collects many of the necessities of life within the framework of its own economy, but it is far from independent of outside sources. Mention has already been made of the barter and sale of animal products between Mongolian families, and of the production of goods and performance of certain services by specialists in the community. Beyond these supplementary, purely local sources the family is dependent in varying degrees upon the goods and services of Chinese merchants and artisans. The Mongols buy grain and flour, tea, tobacco, metal tools and utensils, earthenware dishes, cloth and sewing equipment. The leather boots which are worn by men and women in the winter are made by the Chinese, as are some other articles of apparel and personal adornment. Those who live in proximity to Chinese settlements, especially in the southern part of Inner Mongolia, may eat pork , eggs, potatoes and vegetables which they obtain from the Chinese.

This trade between Mongols and Chinese was carried on in the past by two groups of Chinese tradesmen: the buyers, who purchased the Mongols' animals and animal products for which they paid in gold or paper currency; and the merchants, who set up permanent shops in the agricultural sections or temporary tents in the pastoral areas to which the Mongols came to buy their needs. There were also the fairs, both the temporary ones at festivals and the permanent ones at monasteries, where the Mongols bought goods from the Chinese; and in or near the sedentary agricultural regions Mongol herdsmen and farmers patronized the village markets. Most of this commerce has probably been taken over by the State Trading companies which have been established in both pastoral and agricultural areas by the Communist Government.

8. Socialization of the individual

The Mongolian family formerly provided the major share of the individual's training from infancy through young adulthood and sometimes even after marriage. The child's frequent contacts outside the immediate family were limited to those with close relatives or friends in his own small community. General education, with few exceptions, was all supplied by the parents, grandparents, or older brothers or sisters, or in the case of a married girl, by the mother-in-law. Only rarely were there small, community-supported schools. The only other teachers were the lamas and the scribes, who fitted their pupils for specific professions. Family training, then was an important part of the individual's social training. There were other factors, however, which also made significant contributions to the socializing process, such as fairs, religious gatherings, meetings at wells or water holes, and community work projects. (See section on Social Structure, IMAR Handbook).

During the Republican period and under the Japanese dominated autonomous government schools for Mongols were opened in many parts of the region, and many of today's Mongol intellectuals received their first formal education in those schools. Since the establishment of the IMAR under the Chinese Communist government, schools have taken over much of the training of children, and it is probable that the influence of the family on the individual, and on the society, has diminished proportionately. In addition to the primary schools which, it is asserted, are attended by eighty percent of the working people's children, there are secondary schools, adult schools and institutions of higher learning. Thus the child's whole formative period, which was spent traditionally in a family environment, is now dedicated to education and indoctrination in government institutions.

It is not only in the field of education, nor is it solely in the early years of life that state influence has replaced family training. Industry, reclamation projects, transportation and government work all offer alternatives to the old way of life. State trading companies, cooperatives, mutual aid organizations, and other economic innovations attempt to revolutionize the economics of both farmers and herdsmen and consequently tend to supplant the family as a production unit.

9. Family religious services

Of the many religious ceremonies which are observed in a Mongolian community, some are public in nature, attended by representatives of all families, while others are held privately by individual families or kin groups. Since we are not concerned with the society as a whole in this section, the public services will not be discussed here.

In addition to the religious cairns or oboo which are associated with the banner, there are other such shrines which belong to kin groups or törel. Members of the törel held religious services at their oboo immediately after the banner oboo services on the first of the New Year and in the fifth month. These ceremonies are conducted by the man with the highest political status, and there is no compulsion to attend.

Once or twice a month each family holds a private service or jisaa which is conducted in the home by a lama. This service is comparable to regular family church attendance in a Christian community. Certain days are selected for the ceremony, and a particular lama usually conducts all the services. The same lama also serves the family as "pastor" on occasion of birth, illness or death. The family also holds two other important religious ceremonies each year at which lamas and invited friends from the community attend. The first, known as dallag, is a service of thanksgiving, held in the seventh or eighth month when food is plentiful. The second, galun dähalag, is a fire-worship ceremony at which sacrifices of parts of a sheep and of wine are offered to the family fire. This service is held just before the New Year.

Another religious observance, while a family affair, is held only by wealthy families who permit the poorer families to participate by making contributions of goods and services. This ceremony, known as doincet, is held in the eighth month and is performed by lamas either in the family temple or in a larger institution.

II. The Chinese Family in Inner Mongolia

The Chinese in Inner Mongolia may be divided into two general classes for the purpose of our analysis of family structure: 1) The frontier Chinese. This group includes merchants, traders, artisans, tenant farmers, fugitive criminals, itinerant laborers and other destitute and desperate people who turned to Inner Mongolia either as a refuge or as a land of opportunity. 2) The settled colonials. These are wealthier, more stable families than the first group. They have either settled on better lands than the other group, have lived in Inner Mongolia for a longer time, or came originally from an economically superior class who migrated with the intention of establishing a permanent home in the new land.

Those in the first group, except for the tenant farmers, who have families, almost always leave them back in China proper where they live the normal Chinese family life of their home region. Occasionally some of these men, especially the merchants and traders, will take Mongolian wives. The type of family structure resulting from such marriages depends upon the choice of husband and wife. The traders often spend their whole lives in the steppe country and live a life as mobile as a nomadic herder. If these men marry Mongolian women, it is easy and convenient for them to make a complete transition to the Mongolian way of life. If they are liked by the Mongols they may even be adopted into a banner. Under such circumstances the family would probably be similar to any Mongolian family of the same social and economic status. It is not unusual for a trader or a renegade Chinese to marry a Mongolian woman of bad reputation, a social outcast. Such couples are usually ostracized from both societies and preserve little of the kinship structure of either in their family organization.

The itinerant laborers are normally temporary residents in Inner Mongolia. Usually they leave their families behind in China, and the prolonged absence of the husband doubtless has a disturbing effect on family life at home.

The tenant farmers are usually permanent residents, men from overpopulated areas of famine stricken regions, who come to Inner Mongolia with scanty resources in hopes of bettering their condition. These men often bring their families with them or send for them when they have sufficient means. In the far west, especially in the Ordos region, where there are tens of thousands of such settlers, they live very like the poor peasants in China. Family organization, authority structure and rules of inheritance are identical. If conditions permit, the colonists even build compounds and live as joint families. Due to the extreme poverty of most of these people, however, most dwellings are single family houses inhabited by a nuclear family.

In the irrigated lands of the border country the tenant farmers are wholly dependent for their livelihood upon wealthy landowners who have the means to build and maintain irrigation projects. Tenants on such projects feel no deep, emotional attachment to the land or to the farming business as do farmers who live in the long-settled portions of China. Ancestry has not the slightest significance in relation to the land.

Chinese tenants on banner lands in southern Chahar live in villages together with Mongol farmers. Here the Chinese family is often of the extended type, also found in China proper, and the members of the family live in a compound which consists of several dwelling units with some facilities used in common. Here also the attachment to ancestral lands is lacking.

Southern and eastern Inner Mongolia and western Manchuria are occupied by Chinese whose families have lived on the land for many generations. Here the family organization has acquired the same stability and depth as its counterpart in China, but the structure of authority and responsibility and pattern of inheritance differ strikingly from those in China proper. In the Manchurian family the authority of the elder males was often subordinate to that of a capable son or grandson, and the inheritance of authority did not pass from father to son, but was determined by agreement among the adult members of the family. The establishment was run somewhat like a cooperative project in which all competent members had a voice.

Another interesting feature of family organization in this region is the supremacy of maternal over paternal authority in some areas of decision and responsibility and the equality of the two lines in others. For example, in marriage, it is the paternal aunt and maternal uncle, not the parents, who must give their consent. Fatherless or orphaned children are taken into the family of the maternal uncle, and thus are reared by the mother's, instead of the father's family as in China. Both mother's and father's family, however, have an equal voice in making important decisions in regard to family property or inheritance.

Patterns of occupancy in this northern region are the same as those in China proper with minor exceptions. Several generations of the same family live together in a large house or group of houses and participate jointly in operation of the family economy.

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SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. Introduction

II. Social values, ethical ideas, taboos, customs, and standards of etiquette

- A. Social value
- B. Ethical ideas
- C. Taboos
- D. Customs
- E. Standards of etiquette

III. Patterns of Living

- A. Dwellings
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IV. The Chinese in Inner Mongolia

I. Introduction

The Mongols of the IMAR are divided into various tribes each having its own customs, clothing, and women's headdress. A significant distinction in patterns of living is found between the nomaidc Mongols and the sedentary group. The former retain their own culture and occupy themselves with cattle raising, moving tents and animals seasonally within their own territories. The latter occupy themselves with farming, as well as with cattle, sheep, and goat raising. There are some Mongols who have completely converted from a nomadic life to farming and have adopted to a large degree the characteristic way of life of the Chinese. This means that they live in villages resembling those of the Chinese farming areas. The nomads ar are scattered in the northwest, and southwest in the Ordos plateau, and in parts of the northeast region. The sedentary Mongols live near the southeastern parts of the IMAR and in the Chinese colonized areas.

The Han Chinese, who make up five-sixths of the population in the IMAR, are divided into two occupational groups: the farmers, who had crossed over the Great Wall from North China, and the businessmen, who travel throughout the region and carry on trade between the Mongols and the Chinese in China Proper. As the Han Chinese farmers are more or less settled, they live in mud huts and, except for acquiring Mongolian food habits such as eating sheep milk and cheese, they cling closely to their own cultural traditions. The Han Chinese businessmen are largely from Shansi; they live in cities such as Tolun (Dolon-nor), Changpei, Ku-yuan, and Pao t'ou.

The Chinese Moslems settled in the southwestern region; some are traders and others are camel drivers who follow the caravans of the region. Economically the Han Chinese and the Chinese Mohammedans appear to be interdependent on each other's trade and business, however they differ greatly in social customs and family traditions.

Little is known about the Mohammedan Mongols. In the Ordos area there was a small community of Mohammedan Mongols who had settled in the upper part of the Yellow River. They worked as drivers of ox carts or as boatmen. Although the Mongols are faithful followers of Lamaism, a few of them were converted to the Moslem faith. A well-preserved Mohammedan mosque was found among the ruins of Etsin Gol, the once flourishing Tangut town within the territory of the Ordos Mongols.

II. Social Values, Ethical Ideas, Taboos, Customs, and Standards of Etiquette

A. Social Values

Some of the traditions deemed valuable by the Mongols are somewhat similar to those of the Chinese. Respect attributed to elderly persons from the younger generation was the rule in traditional China and was also true with the Mongols. Respect for the clergy was also imperative, for the clergy class was regarded as men of God and the educated moks also served as teachers. In China the student was obliged to pay due respect to his teacher and this was also required of the young Mongols. A young man who was disrespectful to elderly persons or the clergy was looked upon with disfavor.

Authority was highly respected in Inner Mongolia. Children learned to oby their parents and were trained to obey and respect their teachers. The emphasis on obedience to authority was especially pronounced when the authority was in a position to either reward or punish the child. In this connection it should be pointed out that in this country legal punishment was always looked upon as justified. For instance, even when a man murdered or killed for a good cause, he would take punishment without protest.

Trustworthiness, honesty, and courage: Early missionaries and travelers have described the Mongols as a people who were trustworthy and honest besides being brave. Mongols would risk their life to accomplsih a task for a good purpose. They would also keep their word: a man of honor is highly praised in the Mongolian society. Although the people are rather conservative and cling to their own way of doing things, they value sincere frindship and would reciprocate with confidence. A breech of confidence would bring shame and condemnation.

The Law of the Setppe: Many of the old traditions and moral codes are still being practiced and maintained. The law of the steppe has not been altered significantly since Chingis Khan's time and is still strictly observed by all people. A person who offends against the written and unwritten laws of the desert is considered as a faithless wretch embodying all humanity's worst qualities. Punishment regarding the stealing of animals is particularly severe. Protection of women's rights and the welfare of children has also been written into law. A few examples are listed below to show the value and function of the desert justice.

Theft is considered a great shame and persons, especially young persons, who steal are severely punished. to impress upon them their misdeed and that it does not pay to steal. One type of punishment is hard labor. Another is confinement in a cage-like structure in which the prisoner is forced to wear a large wooden collar. He is not deprived of proper food and rest, though. Once a man has been condemned as a thief, it takes him a long time to recover his good name.

The stealing of a horse or a camel is a great offense. According to Chingis Khan's Yassa, "The man who is taken with with a stolen horse or camel shall return the stolen animal to its rightful owner and also pay a fine to him of nine animals of the same kind as that stolen. If he cannot pay this fine, he shall give his children in place of the animals, and, if he have no children, the criminal shall be slaughtered like a sheep, that is to say his legs shall be bound together and then his belly ripped opend and his heart squeezed by the slaughterer's hand till the criminal die."

Contempt for the camel thief is so great that any stolen provisions, precious though they are in the desert, would not be touched by anyone. Articles which had come in contact with the thief were smashed or torn to pieces and scattered in the sand, for stolen goods were considered defiled.

2. Concerning hospitality: The Mongols are noted for their hospitality. The lack of lodging facilities for travelers in the wilderness may be the reason why the people open their tents to welcome those who wish to stop for a night's rest. Moreover, it is their age-old tradition, for many of Chingis Khan's maxims still hold good upon the steppes today. In the old book of law it says, "When a traveler passes people who are eating he shall have the right to unsaddle and eat with them without asking leave, and none shall hinder him." The Yassa enjoined the people to show respect to the old and to the beggar. Rich or poor, the host would share his tent and food upon request, and travelers were welcomed by all households. Any Mongol who refused admittance or gave a cold welcome was immediately known as "not a man but a dog." A host who did not offer tea without money would soon earn the same reputation.

3. Many writers have made reference to the inferior position of women and children in Inner and Outer Mongolia, yet this is not completely true. Mongolian children and women have long been under the legal protection first formulated in the Tsachin Bickik, the Oirat Mongol code of 1640. This stipulated that "Children born out of wedlock shall be regarded as true children and receive their share of the inheritance with their father's other children." With regard to women, the code stated that it was a criminal offense to "tear the hair from a woman's head or the tassel from her cap."

> "When the mistress of the tent takes up the place proper to her alone, to the right of the entrance, between the hearth and her Lord's place, no one may touch her, but she may unhindered revile the stranger, yes even throw wood and other objects at him. But if the woman's wrath should drive her from her place in the tent or she should step outside her tent, she loses her privileged position and may be punished for her outrages." (Tsachin Bickik of 1640)

The stipulation of the old Mongolian Laws and the other virtues discussed are still kept and practiced by people in Mongolia to a great extent. The people value justice for which the other virutes such as obedience, trustworthiness, and honesty had sprung. Both the Manchu rulers and the Chinese National Government tried to promulgate new laws based upon the nomad's law in order to integrate and harmonize the judicial systems of the Mongols and the Han Chinese, but the principles of justice introduced by the Chinese never struck deep roots among the Mongols. Up to date, they continue to judge the worth of their fellows according to the traditional moral conception of their forefathers. It is not known in what way the Mongols have preserved these values under the rule of the Communists.

B. Ethical Ideas

Justice and reason serve as the foundations for which the whole ethical ideas are based and developed. Abiding by reason is strictly observed by the well-to-do Mongols. In Mongolia it is right to agree, providing the atreement carry reason, justice, and humility. When a man injures the feelings of another, he can make amends by offering his snuff bottle to the offended person as a token of apology.

It is generally believed that Mongolian women have a low moral standard, but this is not universally true. The old law, Yassa, which punished adultery within the tribe, is still observed by the people. The Oirat Mongol Code of 1640, the Tsachin Bickik, introduced a more humane spirit among the nomads whose severe code had earlier received its imprints from the stern Yassa of Chingis Khan. The former protected a woman only if she were a mother. Because of the high infant mortality rate caused by low standards of health and sanitation, the paucity of children in the tents is not an uncommon phenomena. For this reason, if and when a childless mother accepted a traveler's advances in her tent, she was not punished by the law. Some sources even state that, "the childless married woman may not deny a traveler a place in bed by her side." However, a man was punished by law if he had illegal sexual relations with an unmarried girl.

C. Taboos.

Many taboos were practied among the nomads. The violation of taboos, it was believed, would bring great disaster and harm to persons or propery. The people were strongly fatalistic and believed in special gods in a heaven from which they ruled over man's destiny. For this reason, they largely relied upon the power of priests to solve problems and doubts.

The nomads believed in lucky days and in lucky articles. Lamas were consulted for lucky days on which to start a journey or for which to plan a wedding. Mongols in the far west carried nine (the number nine and its multiples were considered as lucky numbers) coins (old coins with a hole in them, similar to coins used in traditional China). Whenever in doubt, the herder would consult his coins by shaking them in the hollow of his clasped hands and then laying them out on his palm.

Certain days of the month were considered as lucky while others were not. For instance a sheep or other kind of animal should not be bought on the seventh, eighth, ninth, seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth, or also the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth day of the month. During unlucky days Mongols would not allow anything to leave their tents.

Other taboos known to outsiders are rules on the road and in the tent. While traveling on the road , if one came into sight of some sacred cairn, one refered to it as the "Hairhen' but not by its name which would have been disrespectful. In the tent one was forbidden to kick the tullek or the grate used for cooking. While sitting, ones legs were supposed to point toward the door, when sleeping it was mandatory to place ones head near the family shring.

D. Custom

Mongolian women did not bind their feet, for all women did every kind of hard work except hunting. It was necessary for the Mongolian girl to ride a horse, and most of the women were excellent riders.

To the Mongols, fire was holy. No one was allowed to step over the fire which was placed between the two tent poles. When a new fire had been lit, a sacrifice had to be made to it by throwing a little tea or food on it as an offering. As the hearth was holy, so were the iron fire grate and tongs. They were to be used strictly for the fire, never for any other purpose, for the Mongols believed that they would then cause headaches in all those who slept in the tent.

In asking a favor, one had to be willing to reciprocate in advance. According to custom, a present was usually given prior to the request. If the request was not granted, or if the person was unwilling or unable to meet the request, the present was returned.

Regardless of wealth, if a Mongol could entertain, he was obliged to supply his guests with roast or boiled mutton. The rich, roast mutton still constitutes the main dish. Instead of a piece of meat, a whole sheep was slaughtered for this purpose. When serving, the rump and tail were offered to the guest of honor; he was then supposed to cut off portions of meat and pass them around. Millet boiled in mutton soup was also served.

The custom of setting the rump and attached tail before an honored guest served as a symbol of having slain a fat sheep as the tail was proof of having slain a sheep just for the occasion.

According to the traditional Mongolian marriage custom, the groom was supposed to carry off his bride by force. Certain rituals and ceremonies were performed, and both the families of the bridegroom and the bride made preparations many days ahead. Friends and relatives of the two families dressed in their best to attend the ceremonies and feasts and all stayed with their host and hostess in their nearby respective tents.

Mongolians married young, boys at between fourteen and sixteen, and girls betwen thirteen and fifteen. The wedding ceremony was dignified, somewhat similar to the old-style Chinese wedding ceremony. According to custom, the bride was not supposed to know that her wedding was taking place. Actually she knew all about it and even assisted in make her trousseau.

In the family camp of the bride, extra tents were set up for workmen and guests. Carpets, boots, garments, cushions, were sewed, and the silversmith was engaged to make the silver head ornaments. Food and wine was bouth in cart loads from the nearest Chinese town and an ox and several sheep were slaughtered. Everyone was taken up in the preparations.

The close relatives of the family were the first arrivals; they were all ladies who came to assist the bride. Their robes of all colors shone beneath the beads hanging down from their headdresses over which were worn the great fur caps which were identical to those of the men.

On the wedding day both families arose at dawn. In wealthy families a cavalcade of horsemen dressed in their best attire;

their silver ornaments jingling as they rode. These horsemen and an elderly master of ceremonies prepared themselves for the carryin-away ceremony. South of the family camp, the traditional offerings were dedicated to the heavenly powers. Then the young bridegroom came forward, accompanied by his older and younger foster brothers and by four women from the bride's family. Two of the women fastened some ancient weapons (usually a knife and a sword) of the tribe to the groom's waist and the other two women greased the weapons with fat and splashed them with wine from the sacrificial table. Then the master of ceremonies performed an ancient ritual. Another ritual followed while the groom waited, mounted in his saddle, ready to leave for the bride's home. On this journey he was accompanied by the master of ceremonies, by his foster brothers, and by a dozen or so of his best friends, all riding their best horses.

In the camp of the bride, a receiving ceremony was performed upon the arrival of the groom's party. Lart quantities of wine were consumed. At this moment, the bride (dressed in her new matron's ornaments) was supposed to have discovered what all the preparations meant. She wept vigorously, and all the women and relatives assembled in her tent wept over the girl who was supposed to be carried away. Then the father of the bride commanded a young man to carry her off under his arm, holding her as though she were a bundle of grass, but taking care not to bump her head ornaments. Assisted by two other men, the bride was hoisted into the saddle of a horse. The bride took no care to balance herself or to keep her seat, all this was left to the attendants.

The horse which carried the bride was then led a step or two in a direction determined by the year of her birth. She was then taken down from the saddle and put into a covered Chinese-style wagon in which her mother rode along with her. The bride lay sobbing, buryng her head in her mother's lap.

It should be pointed out that the carrying away of the bride by the bridegroom;s party was a very old Mongolian custom. Now the content of that tradition is still the same, but the form has changed. Now, the bride is first carried away and put in the saddle, and later she rides in the wagon.

After the bridal party has arrived at the groom's camp another ceremony is performed. First the new couple advances to the sacrificial table and the master of ceremonies invokes the blessings of heaven and of the ancestors of the two clans. on the impending union. Then permission is granted, following certain formalities, for the bride to enter the tent of her parents-in-law and to curtsy to them. While she is being led to the bridal tent, the guests outside watch the handing over of the bride's dowry which consisted of embroidered boots, hats, dresses, and clocks for festivals and for work if the family was well-to-do, and only of a few animals and articles of clothing in the case of an ordinary family. The number of everything, including new herds of horses, sheep, and other animals which were also a part of the dowry, was a multiple of the mystic figure nine.

Upon the completion of all the rituals and ceremonies, the guests were invited to the wedding feast. Wine was served, and each person had a position in the guest tent. Sacrifices were made to the tent fire and altar. Then toasts to guests began following the sacrifices, after which the roasted whole sheep was brought on the scene. Music, songs, and drinking continued until dawn. In wealthy families feasting lasted for about a week. There were more feasts, ceremonies and visits at intervals for several months to follow.

E. Standards of Etiquette

Mongolian etiquette resembled, in many respect, Chinese traditional etiquette. This was especially true of salutations. (see Social Values, China General) Mongols were not allowed to utter the names of their fathers or of their rulers which were taboo. Younger people always used the modified Chinese word "Ta" in addressing a person instead of the word "Chi" which was informal. Women always addressed elders and guests with "Ta." These terms were similar to "thee" and "thou" in english usage.

Upon meeting strangers and friends, it was customary to exchange snuff bottles before exchanging greetings. This was followed by the customary questions about health and the prosperity of animals. Upon meeting a traveling friend, the host of the tent would ask where the party was going and how their cattle or camel fared on the journey.

It was customary for a traveler to ride or walk up to the tent from the front. A short distance from the tent, he customarily stopped and shouted "nohai" (dog) in order to warn the people in the tent to come out and restrain the dogs. Horsemen usually remained in the saddle, and foot travelers could keep the dogs away with the aid of sticks. Care had to be taken to observe the universal custom of leaving sticks or whips outside the tent door. This was never violated by Mongols. A Mongolian child who brought sticks into the tent or played with them inside, would be severely punished. The idea behind this was that anyone who came into a tent carrying a whip or stick, insulted the inhabitants by conducting himself as if he had come to whip or beat them like dogs.

Upon entering through the low doorway, one said "mendu" (health) to the people inside and proceeded to sit down on the left side of the fireplace which was in the center of the tent. If asked to move higher, it was the guest's privilege to accept or refuse the honor. Hats were place at the back of the tent. It was a rule never to place anything near the door. It was considered very rude if, upon entering a tent, one pointed ones feet toward the back of the tent.

In formal visits, the ceremonial interchange of snuff bottles was essential. The visitor first offered his to the host and then to the other people in the tent, and then he received theirs in return. If the guest did not have a snuff bottle, the Mongolian host would offer his to the visitor. The bottle was to be received in the palm of the right hand and carried deferentially toward the nose. The stopper was raised only a little, and after a sniff the bottle was handed respectfully back to its owner. While receiving and returning the bottle, inquiries were made about the host host''s and ones own health. For people who did not speak the language, a few nods or a smile could be taken as an equivalent for the customary phrases of politeness.

Like the Chinese, the Mongols always served tea to visitors. There were certain customs regarding the handling of a tea cup. The cup was always to be received with both hands. The visitor was expected to drink the tea immediately and to hand back the cup with both hands to have it refilled several times. When he had had enough, he indicated this or said that the cup should not be filled. Refreshments were served, as a rule not to be eat, but merely tasted as a formality.

A strict pattern of etiquette was observed regarding the camp fire or hearth. In the evenings there was usually pleasant companionship around the fire. Certain rules had to be observed such as not throwing nails, hair, or other "unclean"things in the fire. A breach o this rule would destroy the peaceful atmosphere of the gathering, for fire, to the Mongols, was the dwelling place of a divinity. One was forbidden to insult the divinity of the hearth, and the fire place had to be kept clean.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the southeastern corner of the hearth was the place for the chief woman of the tent to exercise her authority. From there she looked after the fire and discharged all her duties as housewife and hostess. However, she was not allowed to pass the northwestern corner of the tent which was the location of the Lamaist altar. She could never pass in front of the altar, but she could approach it from the side.

III. Patterns of Living

A. Dwelling

Pertaining to farmers of the Great Plain: Mongols who take on farming dwell in houses in villages. Some also live in yurts with mud walls. The houses in the Chinese willages are like Chinese houses; they are mud huts, consisting of only two rooms. The roofs of these mud huts are flat and made with trunks of small willow trees, three and four inches in diameter. They are laid across the top of the walls and a mattress of twigs is piled on until it is strong enough to support the weight of a thick layer of mud. This is then smoothed and the surface slopes slightly for drainage. The flat top is used as a platform for owners to spread grain, millet or pepper to dry.

The inside of the house is very simple with mud walls and hard mud ground. There is seldom any window to be found. The clumsy wooden door has no hinges; it is fitted into sockets on one side at the top and bottom. The door opens into the first room which is used as storage, tool shed, kitchen and living quarters. The second room, reached through a door in a partition, is mostly occupied by a raised mud platform, the k'ang, which serves as the bed for the whole family. In winter, the k'ang is heated from underneath by an outside stove to keep it warm. The bedding consists of cheap cotton quilts or sheepskin. The house stands alone in a little yard where a few chickens and pigs or two are kept. Patties of cow dung are plastered in rows against the walls to dry for fuel.

Han Chinese and Mongolian businessmen live in towns. Their dwellings are similar to farm houses in shape, but built of better materials. Most homes are of one-story with walls around them. Families in town also keep chickens and pigs in their yards, besides the cow-dung patties heaped up against the walls. Well-to-do people live more comfortably with furniture and interior decorations. Unlike the rich Mongols who use rugs in their tents, a few city dwellers have rugs on their floors.

Pertaining to Nomads: Contrary to the notion that Mongols wander about, they have a fixed and definite place of abode. They do not wander all year round, and they never move their tents except twice a year when they shift from their winter encampment to their summer encampment and vice versa. For the summer they establish their camp in the meadow, and for the winter at the foot of a mountain. Sometimes a heavy snowfall or a drought compels them to shift their quarters and cattle from place to place.

The dome-shaped tents are usually called "yurts: by western writers and "ger" by Mongolians. The walls of a tent consist of lattice work made of crossed wooden laths which support the circular roof. In the center of the roof there is an opening through which the smoke from the tent fire escapes. This skylight which can be easily opened and closed, and is used for ventilation. The wooden framework of the roof and the tent walls is covered with heavy felt and lashed down by ropes. The tents are sturdy shelters yet can be easily taken down to move from place to place. There is always a round fire pit in the center of the floor and a household shrine in the back of the tent with a table containing offering bowls.

Many tents have wooden doors with slabs. The threshhold is high. In wealthy homes a felt flap hangs down over the entrance. Sheets of felt matting are used to cover the pounded earth. Wealthy Mongols have winter and summer tents. The walls of summer tents are made of mats. The materials for building the tents are manufactured by the Chinese.

The master of the tent has a plce reserved for him in the rear of the tent facing the door. The members of the family occupy the right side of the tent near the entrance. The fire, the sacred place for the hearth is in the center of the tent. In some tents a little low table for family use is placed between the seats of the master and the family members. On the opposite side there is also a low table reserved for guests. It is the custom to seat the guests near the entrance at the left side of the tent. Against the right wall of the tent, shelves are built for hanging or storing utensils and dried meats. Roasted millet, butter, dried milk products, milking utensils, water jars are stored either in a chest or on the shelves. Dried dung used as fuel is heaped on the right side near the door. Along the lower part of the tent wall on the left are hung the horse reins, halters, bridles, and hobbles. Usually at the upper left stands a wooden chest on which butter lamps and offering bowls are placed. Picture of divinities are also hung there.

There are no beds. In some tents the master and his wife sleep on low tables. Members of the family and overnight guests sleep on sheep skins or felt carpets laid on the floor at night. Rolls of felt and skins for bedding are pushed back against the wall during the daytime.

It is interesting to note that the construction of Mongolian tents has religious significance. To Mongols who are steeped in the old traditions, the roof of the tent is the sky, and the hole in the center of the roof is the sun, or the eye of heaven through which comes light. In the morning when the tea kettle is put on the hearth iron, the vapor goes up in the smoke to Burkhan (God).

The Mongols believed that the floor directly under the smoke hole represents the plan of the universe. Traditionally a small square is marked off by narrow boards around the central hearth as the "earth" which Mongols believe to be square. This is so arranged that it contains the five elements of old Asiatic tradition: fire, metal, wood, earth, and water. Hence, there is always a fire pit in every tent and the fire almost never ceases burning in the metal grate. A wooden frame encloses the area around the hearth, and water is present in the kettle. The fire, the frame, and the grate are all sacred, so the space enclosed by the frame is strictly taboo and nothing is allowed to be placed there. The four posts of the grate are most sacred; nothing can be hung on them and no one can lean against them.

Lama Temples: Lama Temples in the area are well built with impressive, rich interior decorations. Temples served as places of worship as well as the headquarters and residences of the chief lamas. They also served as schools where some of the young Mongols received their education from the educated lamas. In the old Mongol cities there are temples with blue roofs, and in new cities there are high walls surrounding the temples. The temples are mostly a horizontal line of one-story box-like building with a massive square structure in the center. All construction is white except a red stripe painted around the upper portion.

Lamaseries and royal palaces are the only permanent buildings in this region. The lama temples are both Tibetan and Chinese in architecture, but the royal palaces are purely Chinese in design, with red and blue decorations. The Mongols have a yearning for the living room with domed ceilings in their conception of a residence. In the temple ground there are many yurts where lamas live all the time.

B. Clothing and Costume

Old Mongolian clothing and costume very much resembles that worn by the Chinese of the Ch'ing dynasty. For ordinary wear, both sexes had long loose gowns or robes spreading wide below the waist with or without a sash (bu'se). Men of wealth were dressed in the traditional long, tight-fitting coats of black satin and long-legged riding boots. These boots were actually leather slippers which they wore like galoshes over their soft heelless boots. When the men were in the tent, the leather boots were slipped off, and only the inner soft boots were worn.

Mongolian men wear ornaments on a sash around the waist. A case (hotoga-in-hai) attached to the sash hangs on the left. It contains an eating knife and sometimes a pair of chopsticks. A leather bag containing fire-striking steel (genu) is hung behind the hips. The flint for fire-making (even today fire is made by striking flint against steel) is carried in a space between the boot and the sock. Smoking pipe (ghansa) is also placed here. The stem of the pipe is made of wood, the tobacco container and the mouthpiece are largely made of jade. A bag is also attached to the waist on the left side of the sash. In this are carried valuables and snuff bottles (holok).

The hat of a person of position was somewhat similar to the official hat of Manchu officers. The ornament and the feather attached to the hat determined the rank and nobility. Some caps are trimmed with fox skin while others are muslin turbans wound around embroidered skull caps. Mongols like to cling to their old traditions and customs. The style of clothing, particularly ceremonial costumes, of both sexes have not changed much. However, the traditional feather attached to hats have gradually disappeared and been replaced by a skull cap without knots. Modern Mongols even wear wetsern style felt hats.

The daily dress of men resembles that of the Chinese and is made of either cotton or felt. Trousers are made of cotton. Flat-sole boots are standard foot wear. Usually the Mongols do not wear stockings. Ceremonial costumes are usually lined with brocade silk facing of dark color and topped by waist coats for informal occasions and jackets with long sleeves (ma kua) with high collars for formal occasions. The plain loose long gown is the women's daily wear. The sleeves are wide and can be slipped off easily for nursing children. The women wear long trousers but no top under garments. For dressed-up occasions, the women put on either embroidered silk long gowns of bright colors with a rich brocade silk sleeved jacket or wrist coat. Embroidered flat sole boots complete the outfit.

The layman wears dark blue robe with a red sash, a brown felt hat and cloth boots. Some of the cloth boots are more ornate than the leather boots; they are beautifully worked with lucky symbols sewed in patches of dark leather. Nearly every man carries snuff bottles in his belt purse.

Farmers of the Great Plain: The dress of the people of the great plain is quite different from that of people in other parts of Inner Mongolia. Chinese women all wear dark trousers. Older women wear dark jackets while the young unmarried girls wear brightly colored jackets. Most girls wear red jackets with wide pants. Nursing mothers do not wear jackets; they wear a upper garment cut in the shape of a very narrow bib which extends from the neck to the grousers between the breats, leaving the latter exposed.

Men, the farmers wear white cloth pants usually without the upper garments in warm weather The adolescent boy's clothing is similar to that of his father's. Younger children, both boys and girls, do not wear anything all summer long. In colder weather, they wrap themselves in long gowns or robes. Only the landlords and the rich wear garments of silk and furs, cut in the fashion of those of China in the 1920's. Men are clothed in the traditional long gown. A short jacket (ma kua) tops the gown for formal occasions. Women largely wear short jackets and pants. When they are dressed up a skirt takes the place of pants. Recently younger girls occasionally wear ch'i-p'ao, the straight long gown, like their Chinese sisters.

Eastern Mongolians: The dress for both sexes is much alike as far as the shape is concerned. The main difference is that the man uses a belt to gird himself while the women allow their long garments to hang loose from shoulder to heels. The outer garments of both sexes is a roomy long coat with wide sleeves so there is ample room for dressing and undressing with ease.

For ordinary people the coat serves as a blanket as well as a covering for sleeping. Since this is the case, there is no need to take much time in dressing. On rising in the morning, women button up their coats at once and go about house duties while men usually sit leisurely close to the fire and smoke. Both sexes have under-garments which are seldom washed.

The long robes which women wear are cumbersome and hardly fit to work in. In general the women appear dirty and untidy. In milking and cooking the coat is dragged about on the muddy ground.

The dress of the poor is very wretched. Men and women wrap themselves in rags. Rich Mongols dress impressively, especially their ceremonial garments. Rich men and women of position have beautiful colored silk robes, usually red, purple, lined with finest lamb's skin. Massive silver ornaments are hung on their belts. They like to wear expensive fur caps. Sometimes the cap is worth as much as all the rest of their clothes put together. But a man's true wealth and position is seen from his snuff bottle, which custom requires him to hand to others upon being introduced, and by which one can judge his social status. These snuff bottles come from Peking; they are made of fine glass, jade, and other semi-precious stones. The valuable ones are made of beautiful stone skillfully hollowed out, or carved,, or painted with a fine finish. Women usually do not carry snuff bottles, but on ceremonial occasions they also produce them from boxes. Women's bottles are uniformly smaller in size and are made of thin, flat stones. These bottles scarcely have any capacity as they are used only to perform the ceremony of exchange. The empty bottle is handed back with due ceremony and dignity.

Ceremonial dress: Men also wear gay and elaborate costumes for ceremonial occasions. The well-to-do man wears a blue serge robe with a sleeveless jacket of purple silk edged in gold brocade. Traditionally, officials of the banner would sometimes wear Chinese official uniforms. The hat jewel worn by a man determines his rank, i.e. a second-degree noble is entitled to a blue hat-jewel. The hat of a Mongolian second-degree official is of white straw sloping up to a saphire-studded spike and a pendant peadock feather. The ceremonial costumes of the Mongols are in the traditional style with the exception of horse-cuffed sleeves and the feathered hats.

When a woman is dressed up for a formal occasion, it is shown in her hair ornaments and head dress rather than in her costume. Besides the hairdresses, women from rich families also pay due attention to their colorful, embroidered dresses and rich fur caps worn over the head ornament. Caps must be worn on wedding ceremonies, formal introductions, and the meeting of old friends after long separation.

Women's head dress: The hair ornaments are heavy and cumbersome. Silver or gold pieces of various shapes and strings of red coral beads hang from the head to the waist. In order to fit these ornaments properly to the head, the Mongolian women spend much time and effort in dressing their hair, which once done, is allowed to stand undistrubed for a month or so. A kind of glue is smeared on the hair to make it look neat and the pendants are hung around the head. For more important occasions, a curtain of color beads are superimposed on the head. While a man's position is indicated by his snuff bottle, the woman's position is shown by her head dresses. In spite of their untidy habits, young Mongolian women are often beautiful and they always look best in their ornaments.

Women's headdresses differ according to the banner or tribe to which they belong.

1. Otok Mongol women are usually poorly dressed in dirty colored robes and scuffed boots. They bind soiled pieces of toweling around their heads, but underneath it, there is usually a very distinctive looking headdress. In addition to plates of silver, they have heavy silver coronets, bound with kerchiefs of sheer silk. From each side of the coronets, three strings of jeweled pendants are hung, together with large earflaps and a flaring neckpiece, all covered with row upon row of large spherical corals, setting off smaller plaques of silver set with turquoise.

Married women wear their hair in many small braids all joining together to form two large ones that frame their face. Each of the large braids is encased in a cylinder of dark leather, ending in flat diamond shaped corals set in silver. There is a large leather knob covered by a silver plate, rounded in the front and suqred in the back, at the top of each cylinder where it rests against the shoulders. These plates are coral-studded.

The contrast of bright jewels with their untidy, dirty clothing and appearances is a common phenomena among Mongolian women.

2. Ordos Mongols: since the older women have less hair, they shave their head leaving only a small island of long hair on top that is braided to form a flat skull cap. A black top is carefully fitted around the flat skull cap from which two heavy braids made of false hair are hung complete with the leather braid casings and the large silver plaques set with coral. The braid casings, called "shirwilk," are characteristics of the Otok Banner's headdress. Many of the older Mongol women in the Ordos do this. The younger ones always have braids of their own hair.

This kind of headdress is put on for formal occasions. When they want to be more comfortable in the informal surroundings of their tents, they merely unfasten the "shirwilk" ornaments. For dressed occasions, women also wear massive coral crowns which they call a "daroluk."

The Otok women wear their headdresses at all possible occasions to show off their wealth, but the women of the Ordos Banner are a little more reserved about wearing them.

3. Khalkha Mongols: The hair style of married women of this banner is elaborate. They dress their hair in imitation of cow horns and their dresses also have high shoulders in imitation of a cow's projecting hindquarters. This style was worn by women as late as 1938. The fashion is derived from the legendary origin of the Khalkha Mongols. "The cow which gave milk to the first Khalkha Mongol also instilled in him a love of the nomadic life and of cattle breeding."

4. Others: The festive crown of married women of Dalat Banner is somewhat similar to the "daroluk" of the Otok Banner but a little plainer. The Oirat festival headdresses are comparatively plain though much more tasteful.

It is interesting to note that only married women wear fancy headdresses to makr the maturity of womanhood. Young girls' hair ornaments are much simpler and they also dress their hair differently. It is their custom that widows must leave off all their jewelry.

The costumes of the Lamas: Mongolian Lamas dress very differently from a layman. The red or yellow robes they wear designate their affiliation with either the red or the yellow sects. The Lamas are clad in loose gowns with shawl-collars. This collars is low and the part of the garment close to the neck is cut slantwise toward the right arm pit and fastened with a button. There are usually one or two buttons below the collar at the right and two ;buttons on the side. Traditionally, the long narrow sleeves have horse cuffs turning up but now the horse cuffs are not in fashion. The rosary which they carry in their hand serves as a kind of ornament.

Rich Lamas have elaborate and elegant rich-colored robes while the poor ones dress in drab costumes. Most of the Mongolian Lamas are clad in shabby robes of saffron and crimson, bound at the waist by twisted shashes of faded purple cloth. Some wear crushed felt hats while others are bare-headed. But most of them wear high leather Mongol boots .

The Lama chiefs are the best-dressed men in Mongolia. Their gowns are made of rich brocade heavy silk and lined with light-weight silk. For dressed up occasions, an undergarment of silk is worn which has sleeves slightly longer than the outer gown in order to show that there is an inner garment. For less formal occasions, the Lamas wear their rich-looking gowns of various colors with sashes. Waist coats or jackets of c contrasting or dark colors either with sleeves or without are worn over the long gown. It is not necessary to wear hats for informal visits or entertaining, but the ceremonial hat is required for very formal gatherings. Instead of the short jacket, an overcoat of gold or silver brocade is worn and it opens in the front below the collar. The two separate pieces of the outer gown are fastened by buttons. The ceremonial hat of the lamas has a wide fringe and is shaped like a cone at the top. The hat ornament on top in the center indicates the rank and station of the wearer. Fancy boots are still in fashion.

C. Food and Dietary Habits.

The Mongols are largely meat eaters and they are fond of all kinds of meat. Mutton is one of the principal staples of the diet in Inner Mongolia, but they also consume beef, and the poor also eat horse meat and camel's flesh. The staple food of the ordinary people is cheese, sour cream, and dried milk products. Besides milk and milk products, millet, buck wheat flour, and oatmeal are common. Rich people use wheat flour, but rice is only seen occasionally at great temple festivals. Mutton is always on hand in the tents of the rich in winter, but not of the poor. Sometimes mutton and potatoes, a rare luxury in this region, are served to guests.

The staple diet of the Han Chinese farmers and of the poor in this region consists of mainly millet, coarse flour, and salted vegetables. Although they raise wheat, vegetables (in some parts) and soy beans, they cannot afford to eat any. Such crops go to the landlords or are sold to the wealthy Mongols. Sledom do they have meat. Pigs and chickens are raised by farmers, but they are only eaten at festivals and at New Years. Unlike the Mongols, pork is the principal meat for the Han Chinese except the Mohammedans.

The nomadic people have several meals a day. For breakfast they have roasted millet which is called hole bata in Mongolian. It is eaten with tea of sheep's milk which is called sutai chai. They eat several times between breakfast and the evening meal. Food for between meals is largely tea and cream (ulem) or milk dumpling (milk curd). In the evening, mutton boiled in water serves as the main dish. The soup from boiling the meat is mixed with flour and eaten. Most of them like to use wild garlic as seasoning. If the family is poor and if they cannot afford meat, then flour is used as a substitute for meat. The flour is made into dumplings and boiled in goat's or sheep's milk. Seasoning is done only with salt and sometimes it is mixed with tea.

According to recent investigations, the nomads eat less mutton year after year, but more grain bought from the Chinese. For a family of four, they eat on the average one head of sheep every month. Nevertheless, mutton is still their most important food.

Inhabitants of the Kalgan area in southern Chahar are largely Han Chinese. Since the area is suitable for farming, they produce a limited quantity of vegetables and poultry products. Pork is the principal meat although not everyone can afford it. Staple food for ordinary people consists of wheat flour, oat flour, sorghum meal, millet and vermicelli. Comparatively, the area produces a variety of food, but few can afford to have a balanced diet.

The Mongols in Chahar and Suiyuan retain their own habit of eating. They live on plain roasted millet, noodles, milk products such as urum (cream) and cheese, mutton and small amounts of beef. They are not in the habit of eating pork, poultry and vegetables.

Greater varieties of vegetables are available in market towns and in most villages. These include bean sprouts, cabbage, carrots, radishes, onions and beans. Oatmeal, wheat flour and soybean curd make up the ordinary diet. Oatmeal is steamed, cut into stripes and served in a bowl of soup which is a saline solution with a little chopped onions, little bits of finely minced meat seasoned with soybean sauce. This and the fried wheat flour pancakes make a regular meal in Chahar. In Chinese areas, there is more pork and poultry meat than either beef or mutton. These are less available in the northern areas.

The regular diet of the people in Suiyuan is somewhat similar to that of the people of Kalgan. They use less oatmeal and more millet. Meat is limited. In many parts of the west, people live entirely on millet and salted vegetables.

Poor Han Chinese and poor Mongols in these areas live on plain millet which they use a great deal and make into a gruel. With the millet gruel, they eat a little salted portion of vegetables. Oat flour is the next lower type of food. The very poor, like those of Northern China, consume large quantities of bean cakes made from the leftovers of soybeans after the oil has been extracted. Although it contains a very high protein value, it is not a regular human food as it is commonly used as cattle fodder.

Although food, good food that is, is scarce, people of means can always have a variety and quantity as they desire. When rich Mongols entertain, large quantities of food are heaped in earthenware and spread over the rug. Besides sour milk, mutton in various forms, there are also pork, poultry, bread, melons, almonds and raisins.

Mongols are great tea and wine drinkers. Both theses products are brought in from China. Brick tea, called the caravan tea, is the type that the nomads insist on having. It is pressed into the shape of a brick suitable for long transport. Most of the brick tea brought into Mongolia is produced and pressed in the Hankow district in China where it is an ancient industry. This kind of tea requires peculiar skill in treating it right so that it retains its aroma after the long journey. The size and eight of brick tea varies with the methods of transportation.

Milk tea is the only food for Mongols in certain areas of the region. In some places, milk tea and goat cheese are served as breakfast. For ceremonial purposes a chunk of tea is chopped off from the brick and brewed in a large brass pot over the hearth fire in the tent. It is brewed together with milk, a hunk of butter and a chip of salt. When the tea is done, it is commonly served in wooden bowls.

In places where milk tea is used as ordinary everyday food, it is made with either oatmeal or millet. The procedure in preparing this tea is as follows: after the tea is made in a brass pot, the pot is swept out with a wisp of hairs from a horse tail. Then a little fat is melted in the pot and the cracklings are carefully removed. Enough meal is added to make the concoction into a kind of porridge. After the mixture has been cooking for a while, more meal is added and stirred till the mass becomes brown and dry. Then the tea, with the sediment removed, is pourted in and boiled, and the milk tea is ready. The fat and meals with tea is a substitute of milk which provides a substantial diet for northern Mongols.

Large quantities of rice winde and pai-kan (distilled liquor) which they buy from the Han Chinese, are consumed by Mongols. But milk wine (arki) is also drunk. The milk wine is distilled from fermented mare's or sheep's milk. A weddings and festival celebrations, carts loaded with liquor are provided for the guests who sometimes consume so much that they become completely drunk. Bowls are used for drinking and the Mongols have large capacities for wine. One can hardly find a man in this region who can possibly abstain from drinking. The offering of wine is a part of the ceremony, while entertaining and drinking become a habit with those who can affort it. The quotation translates from Yassa clearly indicates that driniing is tolerated by law.

> "He (Chinggis Khan) said also: "If a man cannot possibly abstain from drinking, let him get drunk three times in a month; if he get drunk more than three times in thirty days he does wrongly; if he get drunk twice in a month it is better, and if he only gets drunk once in a month it is better still; and if a man never gets drunk it is best of all. But where is such a man to be found?"
> (Haslung, Henning, Men and Gods in Mongolia, E.P. Dutton and Co. New York. p. 266)

It can be said that the staple diet of the Mongols consists of mutton and a small portion of beef. The animals they obtain from hunting, such as the hare, gazelle, pheasant, and antelope, are also eaten. When camels are old and have exhausted their usage, they are killed and eaten by the poor. Mongols consider the horse as a quasi-sacred animal so they never kill a horse or eat its meat. However, the poverty-stricken Mongols who cannot afford meat would eat the meat of a dead horse.

Large quantities of meat are consumed in winter ans spring. At the beginning of winter, the meat of the animals killed is preserved by the heavy frost for the winter and spring seasons. Portions of it to be used for each meal are hewn off with a hatchet or ax. The true Mongolian style of eating meat is to cut it with a knife and then eat with the fingers. But some Mongols also use home-made chopsticks. It is more elegant to use chopsticks for mutton and noodles which they serve at parties. Huge masses of tripe, wrapped up in the stomach of a sheep and frozen solid, provides meat for servants and the poor.

Mongolian people are not fond of vegetables and poultry. Only those who live near the Han Chinese eat pork, eggs, chicken, vegetables and potatoes.

The most easily acsessable food for nomads besides meat and millet are milk and the milk products. Milk from sheep or cows is used to a great extent to make the various milk products. In some tribes, mare's milk is also used. It is not only a favorite drink, but it can be made into cheese for winter use. During the summer time, the mare's milk is fermented to make kumis or kumyss. (Sour milk which has been lightly fermented by the addition of yeast.) The Mongolian milk products are as follows:

Jükei This cream is usually obtained in autumn. A cooking process solidifies the cream and the product is eaten with tea. The solid form of cream is called "Öromö."

Sün handa This products is made from the concentrated milk of goats to which fat from the sheep's tail is added. A small amount is sufficient to make the milk tea. Hence it is practially convenient for one to take along on a journey.

Edem or edem bushalak This is a mixture of cold milk and hot butter milk. Cheese (edem huruu) is obtained by collecting the curd when making edem bushalak.

Airak A form of sour milk which has been lightly fermented by addition of yeast. Airak serves as a beverage and when mixed with boiled millet it makes a meal. Butter is made from airak by churning. Churning is done by women in a wooden bucket or a container made of bull=skin. Mongols call this butter Chagan toso. Butter mixed with tea makes a favorites drink of the Mongols.

Chagga is the name for buttermilk. It is the residue of airak after the butter has been extracted. The buttermilk is boiled and kept in jugs. It is eaten with boiled millet during the winter season.

Ariki is alcohol made of cereals and oiled buttermilk.

Erme is the foamy deposit left by boiling buttermilk while making alcohol. The deposit is collected near the top and on the edge of the boiler. The collected substance is made into cheese which is called "ermen quru."

D. Attitude toward Work and Leisure

The Mongols of the steppe work very hard. The whole family works cooperatively in putting up a tent and a hut, each person being responsible for his or her duties. Most of them will get tired of fixed labor. However, if they are hired for a task, they work hard if the work is dignified. The Mongols despise set hours and they enjoy the freedom to work as they please. As nomads they prefer a freer life without restrictions. Nevertheless, Mongols such as the Tumets, and some of the Chahars who have been riased on a farm, lose a great deal of their own custom and pride, and make excellent steady workmen.

The Mongolians love to work leisurely without pressure or restrictions. They love the fresh air and horseback riding. This is particularly true with the young people. If they have nothing to do, they can sit in the saddle for a long time without feeling tired. Since they love the roaming life, Mongols make very good traveling companions, and they take much pride in doing so.

If they are not riding, Mongols, old and young, love to spend their leisure in singing their folk songs together, and in dancing. Old people will sit near the tent fire and chat, smoke, and drink tea with friends. The Mongols love company and guests. Whenever they meet someone who can talk their language, they love to converse at length. When the Mongols are not busy with work they can really enjoy life leisurely either riding in the open air or relaxing in their tents with singing and entertaining.

Men of the camel caravans are hard workers. Many Han Chinese and Mongols in this area make camel driving their life profession. They are men of a common experience for they are bound together by the training of a hard school. These men often come from families that have been engaged for generations in the caravan trade. If their families are well-to-do they choose this type of work and serve an exciting apprenticeship because no man can make money out of caravans unless he understands camels. They learn to know their camels on the march and in camp. After scores of days on the road, by day and night, they become familiar with the proper care of the animals; they learn to know whether the camels are full-humped and quarrelsome or worn-out and staggering. While they master all these things, they have also to become versed in the personal mysteries of their trade and the guarded privileges of the camel driver according to the laws of the road, the tent, and the camp. Their knowledge is accumulated by actual experience because of the strictest of all the unwritten laws which is that no man can expect help or advice from another. Camel men take great pride in thier profession, especially the old families whose business has been handed down from father to son. Hence, the personal name of the caravan master is used for the name of the caravan rather than the firm's name.

Camel mens' hobby is knitting, and they spend their leisure in making sweaters and socks. They not only knit while camping, they also do it on the march, using camel hair as yarn. As the caravan moves rather slowly, they can knit and walk at the same time.

Although all the hair from the camel from the camel herd supposedly belongs to the owner, it has become a rule that the camel drivers can use as much as they like for their knitting. It became a fashion among the rich Chinese at Kuei-sui (Hohchot) to wear the long scarfs knitted or crocheted by camel men. If the camel men ran out of yarn during the march, they would reach back to the first camel of the file they were leading, pluck a handful of hair from the neck and roll it in their palms into the beginning of a length of yarn. A weight was attached to the end of the yarn, by giving it a twist to start it spinning, the man went on feeding wool into the thread until he had spun enough yarn to continue his knitting. Some of them are very clever at knitting fancy patterns and sections in cable stitch. But the finished products seldom look well due to their carelessness in selecting the wool . Camel's wools have a variety of colors ranging from creamy white to dark brown, so the sweater or pair of socks may be oddly striped and streaked.

E. Attitude toward Death and Methods of Disposal

Mongolian people believe that after death the soul leaves the body. They believe that a holy person has a tiny hole in the back of his cranium. Such a skull, if found, is made into a libation bowl and becomes a much coveted possession. However, since most people do not have a hole in their head, a dying person is given a pill that is supposed to help the soul force its way to the top.

Rituals and Customs concerning death: In the more primitive parts of Mongolia, the customs concerning death are more rigid and people show greater respect to the dead than in the more advanced areas. When they believe the soul has departed from the deceased, the ceremony for disposal of the remains takes place. A lama inquires if the deceased had ever expressed the desire to be disposed of in some particular direction or area. If so, the lama will go out to look for a site, and a piece of land will be purchased from the owner. Then offerings are made by the lamas, and a large piece of felt is laid on the ground on which sheep and breaskin rugs are laid. On the rugs are placed nine kinds of offerings, such as nine ounces of gold; nine ounces of silver; nine items: pearl, coral, amber, turquoise, steel, copper, jade, wheat and millet; nine camels; nine horses; nine cows; nine sheep; nine bolts of cloth; and nine bricks of tea.

It is apparent that only wealthy families can afford this type of offering. If the family is poor, symbolic offerings such as nine mud images of sheep and other animals are substituted. For metals, they use minute quantities to symbolise the kind required. Apart from these, eighteen symbolic tools decorated with threads of five colors representing the five elements (gold, wood, water, fire, and earth) are also used.

After the offerings have been made and prayers chanted, the body is laid corssways on a camel that has been loaded with either two empty boxes or two big baskets used for carrying dung so as to provide a platform for the body to lie on. The dead should face the west during the journey. At the place where the body is to be left, it is undressed and laid down on the ground facing toward the west. It is hoped that the wolves will devour the body, but it is often eaten by other wild animals and dogs. When the party returns, the lama arranges a pile of stones on the very place where the person died, because it is very unlucky to tread on a place where a person has died.

During the funeral, all animals, sheep and cattle herds are kept in camp. Upon returning to the home, another ritual is performed by the lama with prayers accompanied by some musical instruments like bells and drums. Two fires by the wayside are lighted and libation of water is sprinkled to the spirits of the four directions. The ritual ends with the reading of Yurul (invocation). People who have handled the dead will wash their hands. Then refreshments are served consisting of food, tea, and drinks, usually wine.

Disposal of the dead: Various types of burial are practiced among people of different banners and tribes. The most common form of burial is cremation, water burial and open ground burial.

1. Cremation: Before the disposal of ashes certain ceremonies are performed and prayers are read. Then the ashes of the remains are mixed with certain kinds of mud and made into small stupa-like figures. When these figures are dry they are taken to a holy mountain and thrown into the Five Valleys or near the Obo or some large cliffs.

2. Water Burial: This is not highly recommended. The disposal is by casting the body into the deep waters of a river or lake where the water animals will gradually devour the body.

3. Open Ground Disposal: It is the most popular method of disposal. The body is laid on the surface of the ground so that it can be eaten by worms, birds, and animals.

The Mongols believe that after the soul has departed, the body is fit to be abandoned. They wish the body to be devoured by other living matter. When a Mongol sees a dead body by the roadside he is apt to laugh and make fun of it. If the body of the deceased is not eaten by animals, it is considered that the dead is unworthy and that even the animals shun it.

F. Sports and Recreation

Sports: Riding, horse racing, hunting, and wrestling are favorite sports for the Mongols. Children, women as well as men, know how to handle horses. They are trained young to ride. Mongolian children are expert riders soon after infancy. A man who cannot ride is considered a novelty.

Horse racing and wrestling are widely practiced apart from riding. The Mongols almost live in their saddles and therefore spend most of their time in the open. Horse racing and wrestling serve as a part of the program and fun at temple festivals. Men love to hunt whenever they have the opportunity. They are crack shots with guns, and they frequently hunt antelopes for meat and wolves for their skins to sell to Chinese merchants.

Recreation: Chess and games of various kinds are played indoors. One game is called "Men, gun and wolfe" which is played also by the Chinese who may have learned it from the Mongols. This game is played by both children and adults. Another game, commonly played, also symbolizes the love of animals by the nomads. It uses sheep knuckles and cow knuckles which are painted red or green. These are laid along a cross bow and scores are counted according to the way they are hit. Children play knuckles by throwing them up in the air and counting how many they can catch. Each side of the knuckles has a meaning. In the game called "arben gorben hemer," the four sides of the knuckle mean sheep, horse, donkey, and goat. Each player puts in a pile of knuckles and gets thirteen throws. Everytime he gets a donkey, he picks the knuckle out. The one who gets the most donkeys at the end of the game wins.

Another game, called "No robo," uses signs of the zodiac. There are four bricks to each sign and four bricks placed together are called a yurt. The winner gets all the yurts. The loser with no yurts has to sleep outside

"Shatara: or "Horse Chess" is played by two persons on a white board about three feet square with red borders. In the center, narrow black lines mark off the 64 squares. Paper ruled in lines like those on the wood board is used when traveling as the large board would be inconvenient to carry around.

The chessmen are carved from billow wood, then painted and varnished. The two sides are distinguished by the colors of the bases, one side red and the other side green, which to the Mongols represent good and evil, spiritual and material. The red chessmen represent Mongols and the green Chinese. Although the Chinese merchants and settlers laugh at the Mongols for playing a foreign and barbaric game, they themselves play it privately. The game is somewhat similar to European chess. The red "king" is a Mongol prince and the green "king" is an old-time Chinese viceroy.

G. Festivals and Festive Customs.

Like the Chinese, the Mongols also have seasonal celebrations. Four big festivals of the year are:

Spring: The New Year and the celebration of the White Month. The Mongolian New Year (Shene Fil) is ushered in by tsaghan sar, the White Month. It is the year's greatest festival and is celebrated during the first half of the month when all the people acclaim the return of light and spring.

The New Year is celebrated more or less in the same way throughout the region. That celebrated by the Torguts can be assumed to be representative of the country. On the first day of the New Year a new tent is set in front of the prince's (chief of the banner) palace. It is covered with white felt made from the wool of young lambs. Inside the tent, gold and silver brocades decorate the altar and walls of the tent. Three canopied thrones covered by embroidered gold and silver silk are placed in the rear of the tent. They are the seats for the gods. The floor is covered with thick rugs and along the walls paintings of warriors and men in sacred robes are hung. Everything in the tent is an heirloom. The erection of the tent is an annual ceremony symbolizing the tribe's adherence to the time-honored traditions of their ancestors.

Old and young, men and women, and children, all dressed in their gaily-colored festival attires, swarm in the front of the tent shouting, "Sain shini-lu," a blessed New Year, to each other. Soliders and secretaries of the tribe scattered among the crowd

the people's New Year gifts to the prince. Herdsmen bring in their good horses, oxen, and fat sheep, all adorned with silk ribbons; hunters bring forth precious furs or live fawns and red deers; and the poor offer whatever they can afford from their tents.

The ruler of the tribe comes out from his palace to receive the greetings from his people. He leads a procession of chiefs, great lamas, and officials passing through the silen, kneeling crowd into the tent. Each makes obeisance before the three thrones. When this ceremony is ended, the rulers and his people then engage themselves in joyful celebrations and feasting.

The Torguts observe the ancient tradition of keeping the first fifteen days of the year apart for feasting the fifteen personages of highest standing. These begin with the feast to the ruler and end with the less important rulers. Only selected guests are invited to these feasts. Those who are invited would gather in front of the palace, each clad in the traditional dress of his tribes and rank. Then all the guests are brought to their places at the tables in the palace where the Regent acts as host for the day.

Special food for the New Year Day is prepared on New Year's eve. A roasted or boiled whole sheep makes the main dish for entertaining purposes. "Banch" is also made and saved for later use. The "banch" is like a filled biscuit made by mincing mutton, mixing it with salt and chopped vegetables and doing it up in small nuts covered with a casing of dough.

Everyone wears a new cap on New Year's Day and the host of the tent puts on his elegant robes. New Year's greetings are in the form of a question, "Have you slept well?" No reference is made to the New Year. When people meet on New Year's Day they embrace each other. They stretch out their arms toward each other, one putting the ends of his coat sleeves under the ends of the coat sleeves of the other and saying, "Sain Ö?"

Friends and relatives visit eacth other's tent and exchange greetings. Tea and toasted bread are prepared by the host and served to visitors. For visitors who come fron a distance, "banch" is boiled and served.

In the homes, offerings of bread and mutton are made at the altar in the tent. The part of mutton used for this purpose is a piece of fat and the tail of the sheep. Little brass cups which serve as the altar lamps are filled with butter and lighted. In wealthy homes the altar is enclosed by silk hangings. Visitors who come to the tent must turn first to the altar upon entering and worship, before addressing themselves to the occupants of the tent.

In the northern part of the region, the Mongols restrict the feasting to one day, but in other parts the celebration is continued for a week or more. For people in the north, the ceremony of embracing is performed on the first occasion of their meeting friends who live far away. The ceremony is performed throughout the White Month and ceases at the end of the month.

Summer: The Missummer Festival. This is celebrated on the twelfth day of the sixth month. It is a great annual religious festival where both sexes and all classes of people resort at this time to the religious center of the country, the "Summit-spring Temple" to worship. Worshippers come to seek absolution from their sins by walking around the temple loaded with a heavy volume of sacred books.

In the temple lamas chant prayers all day long. The service which culminates on the fifteenth day of the month goes on for about two weeks. According to custom, distribution of money and food is made to all who take part in the services. For this reason nearly every lama who has connections with the place puts in an appearance.

Outside the temple the Chinese traders keep on arriving throughout the twelfth and thirteenth, selling vegetables, fresh fruits, dried meats, confections, sewing kits consisting of buttons, threads, needles and thimbles and toys. Mongolian children are fond of Chinese biscuits and sugar candy. They make good customers who frequent the traders' tents. Wine and pai-kan are sold to adults. Men would drink large quantities of it to celebrates the occasion.

Besides merry-making, eating and drinking, sacred dances are performed in the temple. Figures in fantastic dresses, wearing masks which resemble the heads of animals, prance about in circles in the center of the temple court to the sound of music. They leap from one foot to another. Fire crackers accompany the dance. The dance is a representation in a pantomine of the early history of Buddhism and the actors represent the eminent men, foes, and friends who helped or hindered Buddhism in its early struggle.

This festival also serves as a great meeting for the women. Formerly, Mongolian women seldom got out of their homes, except occasionally for a wedding celebration. This festival was then the only opportunity during the year that the women of a tribe had to meet each other. Also it was their annual holiday.

Autumn: Autumn Festival, Festival of the Fire. This is commonly held at the banner's principal temples on the first day of the Eighth Month of the Chinese lunar calendar. Offerings are made at temples and homes. In the temple, devil dances are sometimes performed and a big celebration is held. Men, women, and children all put on their fineries and best robes and come to the temple from great distances. Many come the night before in order not to miss any part of the ceremony.

Inside the temple, more pictures are hung and more rugs laid along the seats. Large trays of mutton and other foods are set before the principal altar in the inner sanctuary. Lamas and laymen, women and children, occupy their assigned seats on rugs. The service consists of chanting prayers and offering sacrificies. The lamas are dressed as secular princes of an earlier day in red, purple, orange, and yellow satin robes. The purpose of this celebration is to make an autumn sacrifice at which the rulers distribute food to the people after the sacrificial offering.

A whole roasted sheep is used as the sacrifice and it is then distributed and eaten. This is followed by mutton cooked with noodles. The roasted sheep is eaten in the temple but the noodles are eaten in the guest house. According to custom, the presentation of noodles is by rank; first the Mongols heads of families and honorary banner members and guests, then the lesser Mongol males, and finally, women and children.

Some leave the temple at night when the celebration and feasting are over; and others spend the night there in their own tents and rise early the next morning to return to their homes.

The occasion is also celebrated at home, and the celebration lasts three days. A lama is invited to the tent to read the scriptures and chant the incantations to the music of small drums, big drums, and cymbals. Feasting and drinking begin on the third day after the ceremony is over. The liquor is either wine distilled from fermented milk or the more potent "Harra Archie," a kind of Chinese sorghum wine. A whole boiled sheep is served with all manner of sweets. Customarily, there is always some quarreling; in fact, it someone does not become belligerent and want to fight, the host feels the party has been a failure. All quarreling, drunkeness and fighting is forgotten the following day.

Winter: Great Sacrificial Feast to Fire God. Once a year, on the twenty-third day in the Mongol's twelvth month, a great sacrificial feast in honor of the fire-god is held in all the tents of Inner Mongolia. It is an all-day affair. In the morning the young men of the family ride to the Chinese merchants to make purchases, while the women do the necessary cleaning in their tents. The fire place, smoke-vent, and the altar are dusted and cleaned. In the meantime, sheep are slaughtered to be sacrificed in the evening. From each sheep the breast-bone, four ribs, two knee-bones, and some of the fat surrounding the liver are cut off and laid on wooden dishes. These are to be offerings and are carried into the tent. Everyone puts on his or her best attire at sunset and gets ready for the occasion.

The family, relatives, and members of the clan who live in the neighboring tents, gather in one household. An elderly man, sometimes and old uncle, is asked to direct the ceremony of the sacrifice and to read the traditional ritual service. Although this is a family affair, outsiders who are worthy of a more intimate confidence are allowed to participate in the celebrations.

Each person occupies a definite position in the tent and all sit in a ring. The only opening is the place between the entrance to the tent and the hearth where the bloody skins of the sacrificial sheep lie on the ground. The person who directs the service is seated in front of the tent altar, facing the hearth in the northwestern corner. A low table is placed in front of him, containing the necessary sacrificial articles. Before the ceremony begins, the master of ceremonies examines the offerings that lie in front of him. Then he gives a sign and the youngest son of the tent dashes out of the tent with an old gun and fires four shots to drive away all evil spirits.

The master of ceremonies then hands over a bundle of sticks to the chief woman of the tent for her to lay them carefully in the middle of the hearth. She heaps up some dung along the inside of the fireplace; slowly and cautiously she lights the fire while all persons watch the first puffs of smoke in breathless excitement until the flame becomes bright.

Then four sticks of incense are lighted by the master and handed to each person in the tent, first to men then to women. After they have gone round the circle four times, the sticks are place in the four corners of the hearth. By now the tent is brightened up by a blazing fire and the warm and cheerful atmosphere fills the air with a pleasant incense and sweetness.

When the silent ritual is being performed, the chief woman fastens narrow strips of colored cloth which designate the colors of the dawn, the midday sun, twilight and night to the points of the fireplace. In the meantime, the master takes the choicest bits from the wooden dishes and throws them on the fire while uttering an old tent ritual. The sacrificial dish is then handed to the master of the tent and he descends from his place to the entrance and stands on the spread-out sheepskin, facing the fire. Pai-kan and butter are handed to the chief woman. During all these doings, the master of the tent empties the sacrificial dish containing flesh, bone and blood to the flames. When this is done the chief woman flings lumps of butter into the middle of the flame and pours brandy over it till the fire burns anew with colored flames. The old man, master of ceremonies, repeats the ritual through the crackling of the flames. Gradually the violent blaze of the fire dies down into a quiet steady flame and finally into embers. Everyone watches the changes in its color and shape. The sacrifice comes to its end when the last flames sink and when the old man recites the last ritual.

It is interesting to note that the ritual tells that the fire was originally lighted by the might Chinggis Khan, blown to a flame by Torgon Sjare who saved Chinggis Khan's life, and preserved by Chinggis Khan's wife. Hence the ceremony is performed by

three persons, an elderly uncle, the master of the tent, and the master's wife who resemble the three personifications of the old time.

The whole ritual uttered repeatedly during the ceremony is as follows:

"Thou who spreadest smoke, who can pierce through clouds,
Thou who has a heat which can pierce through Mother Earth,
Thou, lighted by the mighty Chinggis Khan,
Thou, nourished by the mighty Torgon Sjare
Thou, kept alive by the mighty chief woman
come to our tent.

Thou fire, who comst to us, when the mountains were but
hillocks,
When the brown he-goat was a kid,
When the trees were twigs
Thou, whose lot is as a mighty ruler's,
accept our sacrifice

The new fire on the hearth is happily lighted;
The fire-God of this hearth is pleased without sacrifice,
And the divine fire maidens of the world's four quarter have
again taken up their abode there
And will watch this tent's future."
(Haslund, pp. 128-130)

The ceremony is concluded with music, the singing of legends and storytelling to bring back memories of ancient gods and ancient times. Food is served and pai-kan is poured into a jug and served.

Besides the temple festivals, a special festival is held in the fifth month of every year. This is the obo festival, which is particular to the nomads and has a stronger attraction for them than the temple ceremonies. The festival has a deep meaning for the nomads and the significance of it is a belief of some devine powers who control the life and death of animals as well as of human beings. This mythology takes a deep root in the nomad's consciousness and has become a steppe tradition. The nomads believe in two mighty powers, the White Old Man and the Dragon Prince. The former is the protector of the Mongolian pastures and herds and it is he who makes the nomads prosperous; the latter is the lord of life and death over mankind (see below).

The Obo festival is the sacrificial feast to honor the White Old Man and his companion, the Dragon Prince. A lucky day is chosen in the fifth month by the astrologer of the tribe and the ceremony is held in the open.

The obos which consist of a pile of tree branches, stones, and remains of skeletons are put together to form a pyramid and placed on conspicuous points in the countryside. The height and width of the obos depends on their age. Many of these obos were laid centuries ago by other nomad people who were probably quite different from the ones who now live in the region. The obos are the objects of worship and they stand like monuments over the steppe. It is believed that the obos are resorts of the Divine powers and they dominate all the various local spirits in the territory. Many of the old obos rest on primitive stone foundations; they are always growing because every passer-by wants to put a new stone on its top in order to make the journey prosperous.

Preparation for the occasion is made on the even of the festival. Adults and children look forward to the day with excitement and enthusiasm. People of the rar-away districts arrive at the place a day ahead as no one wants to miss any part of the ceremonies and fun.

In the tents of the camp everyone engages in busy preparations. Men work feverishly at the saddle-cloths and the embroidery on the new riding boots; the heavy silver ornaments for the riding outfits are polished. The best marksmen of the different clans get their heaviest bows and longest arrows ready for use. Wrestlers polish the work on their armour-like leather waistcoats. Mothers put the last touch to the embroidered outfits which the sons will wear in the races. Excitement and anticipation fill every tent and no one cares if he gets any sleep or not.

At the crack of dawn, the steppe is full of parties of galloping horsemen from all quarters. The sacrificial fires are laid by the red-robed priests at the foot of the obo. Bright colors on men and animals create a fascinating sight in the open air. The chief of the stppe, his subordinate chiefs, and their wives all come to take part in the festival which the chief has prepared for himself and his people. The chief rides under a canopy of five colors; a couple of sturdy hunters riding in front of the cavalcade to announce his arrival. Men-at-arms with their feathered arrows fastened on their backs protect the procession at the rear. The thundering hoofbeats of the cattle and horses, the rattling of silver ornaments break the silence at intervals.

In the open, from another direction, comes a party of priests clothed in golden-yellow robes and riding on horseback and escorting a carriage in which a living Buddha sits in a meditative Buddha posture.

When the two parties are gathered on the southern slope of the hill, the chiefs are invited to take the seats of honor. Now the fire which has been laid around the obo is lighted, and columns of smoke rise straight toward the blue sky. All of those who take part in the festival stand in a wide semi-circle facing the canopy. The big crowd, usually numbering thousands of persons, fills the steppe where at other times seldom a soul can be seen. When everyone is in his position, the ceremony starts. The Living Buddha rises from his seat of honor, followed by a group of high priests striding up to a big sacrificial table which has been placed near the fire, facing the south. Two lamas with red robes blow their conches from the top of the obo and the long blasts sweep across the steppe; other lamas pour melted butter on the sacrificial fires. As the flames flicker up toward the sky, the Living Buddha calls on the heavenly powers and invites them to come down for the feast.

In the meantime, a group of shepherds drag in a slaughtered sheep; pieces of meat and fat are cut and laid on the sacrificial table. Then they are flung onto the obo and on the fire. Everyone watches the offering with strained attention while the smoke from the fires rise into the sky like white pillars. Other pieces of meat are thrown high into the air and are seized by the circling birds. This gives great joy and satisfaction to all for they consider the offerings are well received by the divine powers.

The festival now takes a joyful course without restrained. The best wrestlers are chosen from the tribes to meet in duels; the archers gather to shoot their targets; and a race is arranged between the young men of the tribe on their best horses. After the race, the winning horses are led up to the chiefs; both the animals and their riders are decorated with sky-blue scarves. Then one of the tribe's old masters of ceremonies pays the traditional verbal tribute to the horses and amulets of the Living Buddha are hung about their necks. From then on the winning horses are let loose on the steppe. They are only used for sports thereafter and no one may ride them.

After the races and duels, the people assemble around the obo fire to consume the food which is left over from the offerings. Groups of families and clans sit around other fires on the steppe to discuss the pleasures of the day and the prospects of the future. Singing continues till dawn. All bitter memories are left behind and the tribes look to the future with hope and confidence. To the nomads, the Old White Man and the Dragon Prince have accepted their offerings and they are blessed with prosperity till the time comes for another such sacrifice.

In comparison with other festivals mentioned previously, this one vividly describes the life and confiction of the people and the deep meaning the special festival has for the nomads. Source material on the obo festival was the first hand information obtained by a western traveler to inner Mongolia who, eighteen years ago, participated in such a celebration and recorded his observations.

Traditions and customs pertaining to the nomads of this region probably have not suffered much change. When the Chinese Nationalist Government was on the mainland, the policy toward the minority groups was to encourage the preservation of their own cultures. The Communists have adopted the same policy, except policies pertaining to political divisions of the banners and the economical reconstruction of the region. Therefore, it can be assumed that the nomads still celebrate their annual and seasonal festivals which have had great meaning in their lives.

E. Popular Beliefs, Superstition, Mysticism, and Sentimentalism

The Mongols believe in reincarnation. It is said that about three hundred years ago, when the Tibetans converted the Mongols to Lamaism, the Mongols wanted some holy men to match the Dalai Lama and other reincarnations of Tibet. Their Tibetan teachers then "discovered" the souls of several Tibetan saints, long since dead, that found new homes in the bodies of some Mongol lamas. It is believed that these newly revived saints had great knowledge, wisdom, and powers of healing. Their princes paid them special honors and later whole lamaseries grew up around them.

There are many Living Buddhas in Inner Mongolia. Whenever one of these Living Buddhas died, the lamas of his temple would begin looking for children who were born on the day of his death. If they found a child who could recognize some of the things that had belonged to the dead saint, they would then take it for granted that he was the new bodily home of the saint's soul. The child would then be brought back to the temple to fill the empty seat.

Usually the boys they found were very young. It was a tremendous honor to be the Living Buddha. They and their family enjoyed special honors and privileges, although the youngster was deprived of a normal childhood life. The boys who became the Living Buddhas were in the care of tutors and the regents. They were required to learn all the ritual and the formalities for receiving guests and audiences.

Mongolian people are very superstitious. Many of their superstitions are centered around animals. For instance, according to them, it is not right to shoot an antelope, nor a wild ass that lives among herds. It may be that the soul of a saint or a Buddha has passed into the body of a wild animal whose holiness gathers the others about it in great numbers. A Mongol will spend a great deal of time first breaking up a herd and then going after two or three apparently profane animals which have been separated from the herd.

The Mongolian caravan men would never slaughter a camel dying of injury or starvation. They believe that taking the life of the animal would prevent it being saved by a possible miracle.

They also believe that to kill the animal it might make its troubled soul follow the other camels of the caravan and would surely bring them bad luck.

The nomads believe in a mysterious force which leads them from the cradle to the grave and on to heaven, and which protects the family life, holds the clan together and orders the history of the tribe. It is this force which also upholds the morality, law, and order in the country in which there are no police and no professional judiciary forces.

Strong sentiments are attached to the hearth, i. e. the tent fire. From the custom of making sacrifices to the fire and the fire ceremony, one can understand how mysticism and sentimentalism grow around the hearth. Food and drink are cooked and heated over the tent fire; the hearth is the tent's only source of warmth in the long, cold winter. It is also under the light and flame of that fire that people gather in the evening to work and to make themselves comfortable after the lonely, tiring, journeys of the day. Again, it is around the tent fires in the evenings that living men's experiences are related, take shap, and are passed on. And it is by the lighted fire in the tents that the deeds of ancestors are told and sung; that the nomad's old tunes and legends are kept alive and handed on to the new generation.

The hearth consists of a four-sided block of wood, in the middle of which stands a piece of iron supported by four perpendicular iron legs and held together by four horizontal iron rings. The top of the iron legs are shaped like curved bird's beaks. The practical function of the four iron rings is to keep together the burning animal dung which is used for fuel by the Mongols.

The fireplace has its legends. In the time of their greatness, the four-legged iron fireplaces were not used and the fire was lighted inside a circle of stone. The introduction of the four-footed fire-place coincided with the end of the period of Mongol greatness. It was said that the fireplace was imposed on them by the Chinese conquerors. The century-old fireplace, which is the sacred hearth in all the tents of Inner Mongolia, was and still is believed to possess magic power. Its horizontal iron rings were supposed to bind the nomads to the place where they live and to prevent them from setting out on distant wanderings; and the beak-shaped tops of the four legs symbolized vultures which watch over all the great thoughts, inspirations and ideas which spring to life in the fire of the hearth. People in this region believed and still believe that an inimical power rules their lives until some day Heaven would send them a new Chinggis Khan who would free them and make their country strong and great again. From this legends and the reverence attributed by the Mongols to the tent fire it is easily understood why they regard the hearth as the most sacred object in the tent.

Popular belief of the White Old Man of the Steppe: The popular belief of the Mongolian people regarding the White Old Man of the Steppe has become steppe tradition. They believe that the White Old Man controls all the steppe cattle on which the Mongol's existence depends, and while the Old White Man owns the cattle, he generously allows the nomads to administer and exploit his wealth.

It is said that the White Old Man is a pleasure-loving old fellow who can be easily tempted into gambling and drunkeness. At his weak moment, he often gambles with the Dragon Prince, the ruler of all human sickness, who is also the lord of life and death. So, when the two divine powers come together to settle their gambling accounts, the poor Mongols have to suffer because, if the White Old Man was unlucky, he would spread a plague among his herds to obtain the necessary means to pay his debts, and if the Dragon Prince lost, he would go around collecting human lives. Therefore, the Mongols would firmly refuse the scientific prevention of cattle plagues by inoculation (they call it the magic needle) to render the cattle immune. Their logic being: If the White Old Man cannot collect the means to pay his debt, then the Dragon Prince will collect the human lives instead of cattle. Therefore when the villages and steppe are infected with either cattle plague or rinderpest, the Mongols pray to the divine power and let hundreds of thousands of cattle die in their camps.

IV The Chinese in Inner Mongolia

Chinese in Inner Mongolia are scattered largely in Chahar, especially in Ninghsia. The patterns of living of the Chinese, and their social values and customs resemble very much the people's of North China.

In Ninghsia province there are small farming plots owned by Chinese settlers. Most of the Chinese villages in this are had grown up around the Belgian mission which started its missionary work in the neighboring town of Tung-t'ang in the late 1870's among the Mongols and the Chinese. The foreign mission there helped the Chinese settlers to dig ditches and irregate the land and turn this uncertain grazing land into a rich farming region. Gradually small groups of Chinese farmers, poor refugees from famine stricken areas like Shansi and Shensi in North China moved into the area. They were followed by their kinfolks. These Chinese were all poor and ignoratn, and some of them were fugitives from justice. But they all helped to reclaim the land. Within a short period they had successfully established themselves as landowners and drove the Mongols back into the barren mountains.

Relationships between Mongols and Chinese were not very friendly, but the Mongols tolerated the Chinese for their supply of goods which they themselves could not produce. Nevertheless there has always been friction between the two groups. Formerly Chinese power in Inner Mongolia was indicated by the strongly built watchtowers which protected the villages from Mongol attack. Chinese pioneers lived in clusters of bungalows near the steppe. The merchants lived in walled towns.

The Chinese villages were also walled for protection from bandits. The farmers used to live in mud huts or mud houses with flat roofs. The house usually consisted of two rooms. Clans or groups of friends who came from the same district south of the great wall lived together for mutual protection against Mongol raiders.

The welathy Chinese who had large holdings of land and tenants made their homes in Ta-shun-chen (the big town). The place was actually a large farm, but the farm houses and its outer buildings were enclosed by strong mud walls with holes pierced into them for rifles. The main gate was always locked and a tall watch towers was built inside for sighting bandits. All doors were made of massive wood reinforced with iron.

Ordinary people and farmers worked very hard to make a living. Children of farmers received no education. They became helpers at home and shared the family's toil and struggle to make ends meet.

When work in the fields was done, Chinese farmers spent their leisure mostly in smoking their pipes and gossiping. But many men in this area could knit, thus spinning wool became a pre-occupation of the farmers. It was not uncommon to find young adults and old men spinning a length of coarse yarn on their way over for a chat with their neighbors and friends. They knit their shapeless sweaters, socks, and long trousers for winter from sheep wool and felt very proud of their own handiwork.

During the harvest season, men, women, as well as children worked very hard in the fields. Some cut the stalks of soybeans or wheat; some piled them into ox carts to take back to their family courtyards. Threshing was done by all members of the family in the open ground of the farm houses.

The early Han Chinese settlers in IMAR brought with them their traditional customs and beliefs. The custom of foot-binding of women had been practiced and preserved by the Chinese families and, according to one traveler, it was in evidence as late as 1945. Most of the older women of the Great Plain waddled around on bound feet. In some families, even the younger girls had had their feet bound by conservative mothers " to make them more desirable brides." This trait of an older culture was kept longer in frontier regions. The Han Chinese there were not necessarily more conservative, but they clung to customs in order to set themselves apart from the Mongols. Fortunately, foot-binding is gradually dying out.

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

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Additional Readings

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

I. Introduction

Culturally as well as politically, the Chinese-controlled regions of Mongolian population have the characteristics of an international crossroads, an East Asian Poland. Currently dominated by foreign settlers and policies, their native Mongol population clings fragmentarily to its remembered glories and rallies emotionally about its indigenous folk legends and arts. Forms of artistic expression among these people are as numerous as the influences, foreign and native, which complicate their development and present state. This study is a precis of the most important.

Until the advent of Western learning and science in China during the 19th century, and more broadly until the advent of Communist political activism in the twentieth, the Mongols of the region here in consideration lacked an independent intellectual tradition. Unlike the Chinese, Mongol culture and civilization were not balanced upon primary rationalizations of human relationships. A nomadic people whose economy was basically animal husbandry, the Mongols were not conditioned to durable political organization. Such unity as they achieved, including the vast empire of Chinggis Khan and his successors, was an extension of raiding aspects of nomadic economy. Until they assumed control of the Chinese Empire in the 13th century, Mongols had no bureaucracy, no civil service, and no well-formed theory of government or state. Relying on those of China, they developed none afterward. Expelled by the Chinese, they took little or none back to their own native places.

This is not to say that there have been no intellectual Mongols, if we define "intellectual" as the intelligent and inquiring man. Among the Mongols, however, such men occur and can be identified not by intellectual qualities thus defined, but by some other dependent tradition of intellectual activity, as distinguished from religious or political or artistic activity, implies that there is no definite standard whereby to define the intellectual in the idiom of Mongol people. The secular development of the mind was among the particularized. Among the Chinese, by contrast, it became in Imperial times, the hallmark of a social class and, theoretically, an element of *summum bonum.*

The record of intellectual creativity among the Mongols is not great. In religion, which was up to the 17th century the well-spring for what there was of it, original scriptural commentary was rare, in part because of a deep awe for the Tibetans in this work. In historical writing the way of life and the military nature of much Mongol greatness tended to produce chroniclers rather than historians. In formal literature, the political fate of the Mongol peoples tended to influence the collection of legends illustrative of past glories rather than original stories. In poetry, the lack of status for the intelllectual discouraged creative poetry and the difficulties of life tended to keep almost all the population out of purely literary pursuits. A deep feeling for their native places, however, a pride of group identity, and that profound emotional response common to societies bound more rigidly by their traditions, made almost every Mongol a rustic storyteller or poet. The best literateurs of the Mongols were folk artists and the people at large.

The status of the creative artist among these people, consequently, like that of the creative intellectual, is hard to establish. There is no native aesthetic set down, and what we should call a work of art in any category was generally admired and used as an adjunct to some other activity --- worship, group fun, or simple ornamentation. Much fine work in painting, embroidery, sculpture, and even music was considered the product of artisanship rather than of art, and the makers were given status accordingly. There was indeed no clear category of "artist" among the Mongols until the last century. A real and deep sense of beauty, however, is characteristic of all these people. Rooted in and most often expressed by a loving appreciation for natural scenes and musical rhymes. In addition, a full sense of humor, sometimes approaching real sophistication, colors their anecdotes and riddles.

Besides Mongols, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is populated by Chinese settlers who now grossly outnumber the native tribal peoples. The complications thus engendered in terms of the intellectual or artistic expression of these Chinese are not great; the majority tend to repeat the forms and conditions of expression common to their fellows in China Proper. For our purposes, the difference between Chinese intellectual and artistic expression within and beyond the Great Wall can best be shown through the influences, Mongol and other, which have somewhat modified them among the former ones. They have been in fact slight. If anything, the colonists are rather less active than their brothers back home; their life, agricultural or commercial, is busy and hard; and the frontier situation socially, geographically, and economically leaves them minimum time and wealth to produce a leisure class or to develop intellectual-artistic habits. The classes of people, moreover, who settled in lands originally Mongol, included little of the Imperial Chinese intelligentsia. The tendency of most educated persons has ever been to congregate in the political and economic centers of China, its cities, further reducing the talent resources of Inner Mongolian or West Manchurian Chinese. With some exceptions, therefore, the record of Mongol peoples is the major concern of this paper. For the Chinese, excepting special differences, we shall note, the reader is referred to the pertientn chapters of the China General Handbook.

The presence of Chinese in large numbers, on the other hand has heavily affected the culture of the indigenous population in ways which, if mostly negative, are significant in evaluating the present status of mind and art in the area. In addition to settlers, moreover, the political condition of the Mongols during the last several centuries had made considerable impression, negative and positive, upon them. Chinese and Mongol institutions, habits, concepts and economic practices differ widely in the intimate contact of a frontier situation. Neither group is well equipped by experience to understand the other's outlook and this basic difference has been reflected in the record of conflicts between them. Their folk legends, songs, and tales more or less reflect this mutually hostile feeling of apartness. Mongol art tends to older patterns, Mongol legends to glories of the conquering past. Where the two peoples meet, when the Mongols do not lose their identity, these are colored only in form by Chinese influences and not in content--Chinese musical scale but native lyrics in many songs, for example--except when Chinese things or men serve Mongols as villains or butts of humor. More often, however, the Mongols in and near Chinese towns lose their own tradition without picking up much of the Chinese.

Similarly, art, artisanship, and legends of the colonials look to Chinese patterns, history, and institutions. Notable in the tales popular among them is the prevalence of successful Chinese exploits against Mongols, as for example the campaigns of the Ming Yong-lo Emperor (1403-1425). Other subjects include fictional or legendary persons important to the area or to the parts of China, e.g. Yü, the flood-taming emperor (traditionally, about 2000 BC).

One of the most interesting and probably most significant programs of the Chinese Communist government dealing with the intellectual and artistic life of this area is the effort, universally made in China, to standardize the outlook and objectives of artists, literate persons, and the people generally among both races. By introducing a program of formal education, a socio-political teleology, a comprehensive aesthetic, and official encouragement to folk arts, Peking has introduced at least the opportunity for several changes in the activities of both national groups.

In the sphere of intellect, this policy raises the possibility that there will emerge a kind of quasi-intelligentsia among the Mongols. For the first time in their history, the most important role in society, the center of power and prestige, is the literate or semi-literate political activist, the party-cadre, instead of the warrior-chief or Buddhist Lama. The relative value and orientation of the "intellectual" aspects of Communist cadredom is discussed in the General China Handbook. However imperfectly an intellectual, however, the cadre represents among the Mongol a kind and use of mentality quite unlike anything familiar to him before, for his knowledge of at least one intellectual tradition in the form of state ideology is directed by purposes of a concatenated and rationalized state policy, theory of government, secular ethic, and philosophic system. A way of thinking which is important for its own sake as well as for its application is a concept quite new to the Mongol laity, but it is traditionally a habit of the Chinese mind. Such a principle, based in Chinese intellectual experience, is expected by the Peking regime to sinicize, as it were, not the Mongol culture but the Mongol and other minority people's mentality, to condition them to think and act in ways familiar to their actual Chinese rulers, to make them responsibe to the kind of stimuli which Mao's people are best accustomed to employ.

When we speak analogously of "sinicizing" Mongol mentality, we must remember that the Chinese Communists' conscious purpose is rather to "communize" or Stalin-Mao-ize" these people along with the Chinese and all appurtenant minorities; and the content of the new learning and discipline is not indigenously Chinese but the current orthodoxy of Peking neo-Marxists. The Chinese, nevertheless, are still Chinese; and the prestige which their culture has historically asigned to intellectuals has to some extent colored their communism with the native and Imperial yellow. Their effort to produce a kind of party line elite among minority peoples, therefore, while ostensibly a gesture toward minority autonomy within the conditioned-reflext politics of the Communist empire, is truly a sinic way of accomplishing the purpose.

Simultaneously, Peking's current official encouragement of folk-arts and crafts among minorities has and is likely to have effects both similar and different in quality from those of its political philosphy and organization among them. In terms of the Mongols, this encouragement is meant to stimulate loyalty through gratitude and to provide a native medium for propaganda. Certainly it has done both with at least some success. It has also the effect, probably not foreseen, of restoring a measure of cultural balance between the Mongol and Chinese colonial populations in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

In the past century, a number of factors have helped reduce the vitality of nomadic artistic and, such as they were, intellectual traditions in much though not all of the area now called the Autonomous region. The large and growing majority of Chinese immigrants, the policies of Chinese governments, especially the Republican, the policy of the Japanese in western Manchuria during the period of "Manchukuo" (1934-45), and the loss by Mongol tribes of their status, prestige, and political power have all influenced this decline. To understand this as well as the likely effects of the present Communist policies it is necessary to know a little of historical cultural relations between the two peoples.

Situated at a crossroads for trade and influence, the Inner Mongolian and West Manchurian Mongols have recieved for at least six hundred years cultural contributions from all sides. FromTibet, especially, the Buddhist religion, partly absorbing and partly replacing a primitive shamanistic magic, deeply cut the Mongol pattern; and Tibetan Lamaist Buddhism became a truly Mongolian church; but in liturgical music, monastery and temple architecture, scriptural learning and commentary, and religious art, the Mongols accepted rather than adapted the forms of Tibet. Classical Tibetan was the *lingua franca* of the Lamas, and study in some Tibetan monastic school was the accepted way to a reputation for or a degree in religious sciences and true Buddhist theology. This univocal and one-sided respect continues to some extent even today. It is strongest, and Tibetan artistic and cultural influence is strongest, in the Ordos and far western reaches of the Autonomous Region, weaker but still prevalent in all other of its parts.

In addition to the Tibetan, lesser influences from Central Asian Moslem and other peoples related to the Mongols reached at least the western settlements of Inner Mongolia. Some contact with such cousins survived the great westward campaigns of the Mongol Khans in the 13th century; others followed the trade routes through Chinese Turkestan. To the east, in the former Hsingan and Heilungkiang provinces of Manchuria, Tungusic tribes fringed and mingled with the Mongolian. Much later, Russian expansion into Siberia contributed to the development at first of political and later of cultural ideas in the present Mongolian People's Republic, formerly Outer Mongolia

For the Mongols of our region, however, the most important line of influence after the Tibetan, historically, has been the Chinese. Retreating from the resurgence of native Chinese power which introduced the Ming dynasty, the former Mongol conquerors of China took with them at least an amount of taste for things made and done south of the Great Wall. This very sinicization of taste, especially for luxuries, was bitterly condemned by leaders for the decline of vigos and power which, they believed, made their expulsion possible. In fact, of course, the reasons for the decline of the Mongol Yüan dynasty were many and complex though this may have been one of them. The taste, nevertheless survived, especially in matters of dress and ornament; and much commerce between nomadic tribes and Chinese merchants in later centuries was built upon the demand for Chinese silks and embroideries.

It must not be thought that the Mongol conquest of China and other contacts betwen the tribes and the Empire influenced only the former.

> "...cultivated China has found inspiration for some of its oldest and most vigorous creations in art and literature from the rude hordes of the steppes. The Chinese verse forms are built upon folk-music which is in a large measure of Central Asiatic origin; China's classical drama blossomed in the shelter of the Mongolian court; her romances revolve on expanded popular versions of Buddhist texts." (Henning Haslund, *Men and Gods in Mongolia*, p. 237)

The same author notes the contributions of Mogul architecture in India and the great palaces of Jehol which represented the taste if not the talents of Manchu cousins to the Mongols. In terms of Chinese art and folk-art these examples are less conclusive of a Mongolian contribution than the famous Yüan dramas and the probably northern origin of the pentatonic scale in Chinese music. For our purposes, admittedly, the most important line of influence is that from China into the lands and lives of the Mongolian tribes, but it is useful to remember that there were as well reciprocal contributions from the vigorous rude arts of the nomad to the sophisticated civilization of Imperial China. The majority of both either began or flourished most during the conquest Dynasty of the Mongols, the Yüan (1260-1368), when the contacts of the two peoples were more than they were to be again until the great Chinese migrations to Mongol lands began a century ago. It should be noted, moreover, that the intellectual and artistic results of the Yüan dynasty were considerably richer than those of the period of farmer colonization by the Han people. It would seem to be the rule that Mongols of high rank are able to make a contribution to the culture of Chinese gentlemen's subjects, whereas Chinese peasants are able only to smother the culture of Mongol herdsmen. The folk arts of both people were, by definition, made among the plebs; but in China the arts, whether so defined or regarded as artisanship, were governed and appreciated by the gentry. This condition was not true of the Mongols, whose elite were not a cultivated group and whose masses were capable either vigorously of producing their folk arts and literature or of abandoning and forgetting them in lassitude but not, like the selective Confucian or Western connosseur, of enriching their own with foreign loans.

The rise of a Manchu state in Northern and eastern Manchuria after 1575 further involved several Mongol tribes. Some in west Manchuria had been conquered or allied with it. From these and, later, from their kin in Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Manchu Emperors formed banner armies like their own and to them granted the honors of preferred racial brthren. This kinship policy was reciprocated in feeling by the Mongols, and it tended to place both peoples on a level of official favor higher than that of the Chinese during the Ch'ing Dynasty. It also introduced some Mongols to Chinese learning and more to Chinese goods and arts.

The Manchus sought, for prestige and power, to sinicize themselves intellectually; but although they favored Mongols in more practical matters and valued their military loyalty, they did not generally encourage them to match Manchus in this select field. For convenience and reward, they did permit a number of the former to take the Confucian imperial examinations and more to study in the bannermen's school at Peking. A few of these men became bureaucrats, but neither their orientation nor their numbers qualified them as an intelligentsia of the Mongol people or in the Mongol culture. They became, culturally, Chinese. The position which they enjoyed vis-a-vis the Chinese and the habits of their nobles did help stimulate among the mass of Mongols an increased demand for Chinese trade and artifacts. The conseuqent decline in native artisanship, similar to that of the Chinese under a tide of European goods, was not the only injurious reward of the Manchu alliance.

Later in the 19th century, distracted by foreign perils, wary of the Russian continental advance, and beyond caring about the feelings of their co-conquerors of 1644, Manchu rulers and Chinese local leaders began encouraging Chinese farmers to settle under-populated frontier lands. The result was severe pressure on all aspects of tribal life. including the cultural This policy, like the older one of friendship, thus contributed to the introduction of Chinese things and ways among the Mongols. What the tribespeople had accepted, even sought, while in a superior position, however, they tended to accept more reluctantly, even reject, as they became a persecuted minority in their own lands. Where the Chinese settled in numbers, they quickly came to dominate in almost every activity--social, economic, political, cultural; and as the more powerful group, they were better able than thier hosts to retain their own traditions.

For the Mongols, this migration meant a new kind of impingement and humiliation. Chinese governments, especially after 1912, strongly favored colonists in policy and treated the tribes, with some reason, as rebels and subversives, potential or actual. Tribal pastured land was ploughed, Mongolian discouraged as commercial language, men and animals killed by punitive expeditions. The result was a comprehensive depression of Mongol life including literary and artistic expression, a stimulation of westernized intellectual and political movements, and a division among the Mongols themselves.

Those forced by circumstances to settle in Chinese towns, mostly in Inner Mongolia, lost much of their own culture and acquired only a minimum of the Chinese. Those living around these places were influenced similarly, if less, a few older men and noble families retaining legends or chronicles of a better time. Chinese trade and arts made deep inroads on both groups. Those who moved with their herds to border areas remained substantially aloof, and among them survived most vigorously the folk arts and crafts, songs, dances, legends, riddles, and independence of spirit common to thier forbearers. Somewhere between the sinicizing and isolating, the Lamaist Church influenced and was influenced by both. Its artistic forms, so long Tibetan, syncretized Sino-Tibetan elements.

In addition, the Chinese republican government adopted and erratically maintained a policy of open attack upon minority institutions and cultures. Under the Kuomintang after 1927, sinicization by force was a political shibboleth. The successful revolt of Outer Mongolia (1919-21) stimulated the Peking authorities' desire to break the semi-autonomy of some tribes and to absorbe minorities in all respects, even racially, into one Chinese nation. Chinese language, dress, officials, learning, and customs were pressed where they were not accepted voluntarily; the Chinese state economy subordinated nomadic; railroads and resource-development cut nomadic grasslands purposefully. Chinese national unity and power were dreams whose realization lay partially with the overriding of Mongol men, lands, and ways.

Shortly after the beginning of this Kuomintang movement to sinicize, the Japanese seized Manchuria and Jehol province. Appealing to the anti-Chinese feeling among the tribes, they created in western Manchuria the province of Hsingan, now included in the northeastern part of the Autonomous Region, as a Mongol reserve. Establishing schools, uttering propaganda, extending economic assistance, they sought to mobilize the Mongols as a human resource in the development of their new acquisition. Officially encouraging folk arts with some success, Japan's attempt to "modernize: the natives nevertheless affected their intellectual and artistic expression in a negative way like that of the Chinese directly to suppress them. The Chinese cowed; the Japanese distracted. The Chinese made servants or laborers of herdsmen; the Japanese made mechanics and soldiers. Both systems tended to reduce the currency and vitality of nomadic ways. Intellectually, the Japanese system at least trained some Mongol schoolmasters and a few scholars, but scholarship was functional in their hands, though they relied on Mongol pride and historical memory.. Like the few Mongols who, under the Ch'ing dynasty, had taken the old Chinese literary examination, however, these Japanese-trained persons were too few and too far out of touch with the basic Mongol population to constitute an intelligentsia group among them. They did, however, provide a nucleus for the future Communist training in non-Mongolian studies, the first turn of a new orientation away from the old pattern of thought. Later, the Japanese program was briefly extended to eastern Inner Mongolia (1938-45).

With the rise of the Chinese Communist Party in North China, Inner Mongolia, and later Manchuria (1936-1947), the anti-Chinese feeling of the natives was skillfully exploited by one Chinese faction against another. Turning the blame for their depressed condition from the Chinese race to the Kuomintang government, Mao's cadres and propagandists appealed to an Asian brotherhood of underprivileged and promised autonomy and cultural freedom. They said nothing of the future status of the Chinese majority on Mongol lands, fully intending to confirm it for its economic values; but they won a number of converts among Mongol natives, especially the few educated and the many afflicted by intimidation. Since the organization of their government, the Communists have followed their promises with action to the extent of encrouaging native arts and trying to develop a new Mongol literary movement. Their purpose is propaganda. They are content to communize without sinicizing, but they make use of familiar folk arts and expression to convey messages If loyalty to Peking which a unifying political effect; and we have already noted an elment of qualitative sinicization in their "intellectual" development of cadres among minority peoples with no tradition of a philosophic secular elite. The well organized way in which these purposes are sought has already begat indications of a change in the content of Mongol ideas and art, as we shall note in more detail. A an approach to the problem of reconciling a minority people with the Chinese, however, and a subtle sinicization of their minds, the Communist experiment has a refinement never previously evident in the cultural or political relations of the two peoples and may have an

effect more lasting than any previous development if the Peking government survives and perseveres.

II. Intellectual Expression

A. Historical

Before the 18th century, all literate Mongols excepting a few scribes, chroniclers, and well-traveled nobles, were Buddhist Lamas; and as late as 1935, a considerable majority still lay among the priests and monks of the Lamaist Church. Despite their numbers, the literate members of the clergy did not constitute an intelligentsia in the Mongol scheme of culture nor in our sense of the word. Their literacy was an individual matter, for some priests were not able to read or write, and it was usually a result of their priesthood, their opportunities to study, travel in Tibet for advanced theology, and the like. If the clergy were, in terms of honor, a kind of elite, scholarship was not a prime qualification for that status--a situation quite unlike that of Imperial Chinese society.

The lamas were concerned actively with theology and scriptural studies, most of their work belongs to the chapter on religion. They did, however, make some historical intellectual contributions of secular value. The classical Mongolian scrip and literary style were tools which they more than any other part of the population commanded and used. The importation of religious and artistic ideas from Tibet, prestigious center of Lamaistic Buddhism, was their doing. The many and often extensive monastery libraries were their collections, and these libraries preserved tribal genealogies and occasional documents in Mongolian as well as a mass of devotional works and commentaries in Tibetan.

Mongol lamas, however, produced little writing of original value even, or especially, in theology and exegesis; for their respect and veneration of Tibetan work and models, which extended even to using Tibetan for most religious writing, stifled independent thought.

Secular education was virtually unknown to the Mongols until the Manchu conquest of China (1644) in which they participated as lesser partners. The Manchu Emperors sought to gain prestige and political strength for their own people by encouraging them to participate in the Chinese literary examinations for civil service eligibility. Generally they did not desire other minority peoples to seek that civil prestige which they wished for their own, but quite regularly for political reasons, they did allow or even seek Mongols to take the examination as well. Those who did were sometimes used in Imperial civil administration often but not invariably in Mongol areas, but their numbers were never large enough and their value to their own tribespeople as Chinese-style literati was never great enough for them to be considered a native intelligentsia. Most were from noble families to whom properly belonged a benefice related to rulership. The Ch'ing government maintained a school for bannermen of all three races who aspired to official careers, and as an additional administrative aid the Palace school at Peking offered instruction in Mongolian language. The majority of students in these were Chinese of Manchu bannermen anticipant of posts in the frontier reaches of the Empire. Some other scholars through independent curiosity became interested in Mongolian studies and helped form the equivalent of a Chinese academic field in them; but the number of Mongols engaged in any of these activities bearing on their own country or people was not great.

In the aggregate of more than two centuries, certainly, a considerable body of Mongols--princes, minor nobles, and others--did take the Imperial Examinations in Confucian learning. In the course of preparing for them, some such men became sincere Confucians; others were seeking bureaucratic advantage or personal presitge. For neither kind was the study pertinent among their own people, and relatively few of them gained prestige in Chinese circles achieved by many Manchu scholars. Those who did become members of a fundamentally Chinese intelligentsia out of touch with the nomadic culture and so often addicted to Chinese standards of taste and ways of though as to be contemptuous of Mongol tradition. For this reason, the literary language of educated Mongols other than lamas was until the recent nationalist resurgence, Chinese.

Among the successful, if undistinguished, Mongol literati who in this pattern became civil or military officials, Grand Councillors, and even pure scholars and literary figures, were Sai-shagna (1758-1848), Sung-yuan (1752-1835), Ch'ung-ch'i (1829-1900), the son of Sai-sham-ga, Wo-jen (? -1871), and Yun-tsang or Fashishan (1753-1813), a poet, among several. Significant of the role of such Mongol intellectuals, however, is the fact that the two Mongols most honored by the Manchu Ch''ing dynasty--Borjigits Tsereng (?-1750) and Seng-ko-lin-tsin (?-1865) were both military commanders neither of whom, apparently, ever passed a civil examination (though Tsereng studied briefly at Peking in 1692) and neither of whom left any notable writing to his name.

During the last decadres of the 19th century, a very few Mongols, mostly from tribal elite families, received European type training in China. Those living in or around the growing Chinese agricultural colonies were curious to find ways in which to regain a supremacy in politics and economy which was passing rapidly to the immigrant Han people; and with the advent of the Republic and the successful nationalist revolution of the Outer Mongolian tribes,natives from Inner Mongolia and, to a lesser extent from western Manchuria began to seek the lessons of the new learning. Even though their bent was anti-Chinese, most received training through and in con sequence of the Chinese educational reformation. Others went to study in Outer Mongolia and Japan. From this body, small but growing, of westernized Mongols rose the first true national Mongol intelligentsia.

Their interests were principally in history and political science, reflecting their race-pride and thier national aspirations. Disturbed by the agitation of such men for separation of Mongolian populations from Chinese sovereignty, as well as by other frontier troubles, the Kuomintang government undertook a policy of intellectual repression and cultural sinicization of Mongol minorities from about 1927-1935 which hindered the development of the native intellectual movement and for a time all but stopped the production of scholarly works by or for Mongols. The resentment which this policy added to an already strong anti-Chinese feeling among Mongols, especially the educated, turned to advantage the appeals to brotherhood, equality, and minority rights urged by propaganda from the Chinese Communist center of Yenan during the Japanese invasion.

Japanese occupation first of Manchuria and later, 1937, of North China, put Mongol dissatisfaction and ambition within reach of Japanese policy. The latter was aimed to weaken the Chinese by encouraging separatism and it found acceptance among many of the Mongols literate or not. In addition, the Japanese established schools and trained Mongols in sciences and history heavily cut with propaganda about Chinggis Khan and the heroic past. Lamas were sent, moreover to study a policy-influenced Pan-Buddhism in Japanese monasteries. The products of this training, while seldom intellectuals, were useful later as a nucleus of Mongols oriented to an industrial economy: and some few of them were won by the economic theory of the CCP. Because Japanese rule railed to produce real autonomy or to remove the chancre of Chinese settlers already in Mongol lands, however, it did not satisfy thinking natives; and it discredited many hereditary tribal princes who accepted it. Educated Mongols living under both the Chinese and Japanese came to share, during the 1930's and 1940's, at least three common objectives: unity of Mongols, at least Inner Mongols; destruction of the hereditary princes as a political system, and some reform of the church. The new training of European type was secular throughout, and it disposed its recipients to regard the traditionalism of the Lamaist clergy as an impediment to national aspirations and progress. On these same issues the Soviet rulers drew to organize the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, and on them the CCP played to win the assistance of the tribespeople and the educated againt the KMT.

It is worth noting here that, except for the brief period of study in Western liberal disciplines, educated Mongols had no experience of free inquiry. The Buddhist lamas were rigorously limited to their orthodoxy; the Confucian-trained few of the Ch'ing period had no roots in Mongol experience and belonged as much as they belonged to anything, to the monolithic Chinese ideological system; the Japanese-trained were heavily propagandized, as were their Russian-trained kin to the west and north. European systems of thought were never a Mongol intellectual tradition or experience, and the Mongols who had known it were persecuted and frustrated by the KMT and Japanese alike until they might well question the value of their empirical freedom.

(The life of the intellectual Merse [Chinese name Kuo T'ao-fu] illustrates the typical condition of educated Mongols at this time. A Daghor from Hailar in Manchuria, he was an aristocrat whose family's wealth gave him the opportunity for study. His talents and interest were in language, of which he spoke several, and in political science. Affiliated with the KMT, he was for a time secretary to Chang Hsüeh-liang when the latter allied with Nanking. He wrote several books and articles in Chinese and headed a school for Mongols in Mukden; but he was dismissed for separatist sympathies in running the school--a KMT propaganda center by design--and put under surveillance. Fleeing to Hailar, he disappeared in 1932)

In this situation, Communism had a very good chance both as a doctrine and as a program of promises for a minority people. The Mongolian position in Inner Mongolia and Western Manchuria, that of an intimidated minority on their own lands, was one in which a few instructed men could organize popular dissatisfaction into a vigorous movement. The value to the Communist Party of China of even a small number of intellectual or aspirant-intellectual Mongols, therefore, quite outweighted their value within the Mongol culture itself. They were out of step with the old system, but they were adequate nuclei for the growth of a new one. Among these men, and others drawn from the tribespeople, Mao's instructors made useful cadres. Yenan was thankfully near Mongol lands, and during the civil war of 1947-49 Communist troops occupied almost all the region now known as the Autonomous Region. Where they went, they organized as they had among the Chinese, centers of alliance, study groups, local improvement societies, and military formations--with the cooperation of communizing intellectuals

tions--with the cooperation of communizing intellectuals.

Opposition to Communism was not lacking on the intellectual level, but most of it came from groups whose power or even existence was called directly in question by the Communists and, indeed, by many of the nationalist intellectuals. The lamaist clergy during the 1930's decried the materialism which was infiltrating from the Russian-influenced Turkestan and outer Mongolia as well as from Red centers in North China. Tribal princes opposed the new doctrine on practical grounds, but a Torgu regent saw in it a threat to the spiritual values of the nomadic culture, (Haslund, Men and Gods in Mongolia, pp. 248-49) a strange view since he was educated in a European tradition which hardly better accorded with the "truest instincts of the nomad." Some Mongols in Japanese-controlled puppet "autonomous" regimes opposed it vocally as the arm of Russian imperialism, but Japanese imperialism was more in evidence when they spoke. When the issue was reduced, in 1945-50 to one of choosing sides between two Chinese factions one of which promised autonomy and cultural freedom and the other had a record of suppressing both, Mongol intellectuals had no great trouble over the decision. There is little reason to accuse them of bowing to the inevitable when it is so very probable that for patriotic reasons they did not object. There is little ground for accusing them of hypocrisy when their own experience at least did not dispose them to reject a way of thinking simply because it was dogmatic.

B. Communism

The number of educated, even of literate Mongols is still small. Those among them who by curiosity and training may be called intellectuals had, by 1950, received from non-Communist education and throught principles whereby to rationalize feelings of inferiority and resentment and to project the national ambitions of a depressed people. Their learning was functional in terms of Mongol grievances--perhaps the only way it could mesh in any way with the real conditions of the tribes. Under the Communists, the conditions and culture of the tribes may be altered to the point at which an amount of modern education will fit their economic situation and their society, of both the literate and illiterate come to accept the communist standard of values and the social and other reforms projected by Peking. For the period of organization of Communism among the Mongols, however, the more primitive nationalism so popular among backward peoples in Asia and Africa now was the only vital point at which the training of intellectuals could touch the lives of the commonality; and it was at this point that the appeal of the CCP made its entrance, intellectual, and practical, among them.

Communist Mongol cadres are not true intellectuals, but they bring to their people the most intimate association of philosophic ideas and intellectual activity with nomadic life in the history of these people. Their status introduces among the Mongols, as we have seen, a standard of the elite which is analogously Chinese in practice--a privileged group of political activists and propagandists who interpret and apply party doctrine and state policy at the lowest level. The idea that training in a doctrine can make a man valuable in society is not likely to sinicize--is not intended to sinicize--the Mongol culture to which it is foreign. It may, and probably is intended, to standardize the pattern of thought of Mongol with that of Chinese. The fact that it represents a Chinese intellectual habit is, from the Communist standpoint, an accident which is perhaps not recognized; this accident, if prolonged in practice and not soured by too much overt Chinese supervision, may do more to reconcile the tow peoples than force ever did. Such reconcilization would, obviously, be the denial of Mongol nationalism. Chinese state policy toward minorities, like Russian, is a mixture perhaps unknowing of Marxist-Stalinist doctrine with an older imperialism, and the unity at all levels, especially the intellectual, of the peoples under their control is undoubtedly a desire of the Peking government.

The spread of literacy in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region by group instruction will alter the relationship between intellectual and peasant in Mongolia less than in China Proper. In the latter case it removes one of the great marks of identity and prestige of the intellectual class; in the former, which had no intellectual class as such, it will help integrate the concept of learning with the necessities of living. In both, it helps secure the Peking regime against the formation of a counter elite. Those Mongols who are more truly intellectuals remain few, but a number are being trained in Chinese schools. There is little encouragement for them to study history and political science other than propaganda, but their training as technicians is forecast as useful to the state.

Finally, the Communists have elevated writers and folk artists to the level of artists and intellectuals, a new concept among Mongols who have regarded their pursuits either as artisanship or as amateur entertainment. Beyond official encouragement, colored by appeals to native quality and the value of native arts, such artists serve to spread propaganda among their people both in the content of their work, its appeal to native pride, and in their own new prestige status as we shall discuss.

C. Philosophy

There has been no formal tradition of philosophy among Mongolian people. Buddhism and Shamanist magic both belongs to the sphere of religion. The Confucianism learned by Mongols who took Chinese Imperial examinations under Manchu auspices was alien to the experience and sentiments of their tribes. Western systems of thought hardly reached them excepting nationalism. A negative form of nationalism had grown indigenously by opposition to the Chinese, and some Western concepts of it, reaching them, helped change the pitch of their own. Chinese colonists cling to a mixture of Confucian ethics and magic, adhering to the cosmology of the five elements, five significant numbers, cardinal points of compass, basic tones, *et. al.*: the theory of the harmony of nature in the balance of Yin and Yang.

The Mongols apparently accepted at least a five-element cosmology, exemplified in the symbolic structure of the Buddhist Suburgan (*chorten*, the more familiar Tibetan word) or reliquary shrine. This structure and the idea behind it, however, represents most likely a popular religious idea rather than a formal philosophic conept; and its source is probably Tibetan rather than Mongolian.

Communism in its full development as a system of thought is not known to the majority of Mongols. The intellectuals who accept it are beholden to the dictates of the Peking ideologists, Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i; those who do or did not accept it have been "reconditioned" by special training. The cadres represent a limited and totally conditioned from of communists whose purpose is to repeat and drill, not to comment or criticize. The training which Mongols receive either in state schools or from cadres is heavily weighted with the Party line; and the philosophic instruction for student in Chinese universities and other schools is equally limited and responsive to the ideological monolith. Other philosophic systems are neither taught nor tolerated. Buddhism survives, under some surveillance, only as a theology. The philosophic scene in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is narrowly patterened upon that in China.

D. Religious and Scholarly Literature

Since the humiliation and expulsion by the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-ca 1425), Mongol intellectual curiosity has turned on the consolations of religion and historical glory. The latter, at least, was also a natural preoccupation for a bellicose nomadic people whose political center was usually the successful war chief apotheosized a hero. Until the 20th century, consequently, most writing in Mongolian has concerned one or the other.

Despite an addiction to literary Tibetan, Mongol lamas produced some homiletics and moralities in their own script. The Siddhi-kur, a collection of Buddhist tales, has been used to verify or restore original Indian and Tibetan scriptures. Uliger-un-dalai (Sea of Comparisons), a book of Buddhist meditations apparently written first in a classical Mongolian, is esteemed one of the most important religious works in that language. Beyond these classics, several lamas made written collections of imaginative popular tales on Buddhistic themes, in particular of colorful hells, from oral vernacular traditions; for the past century, however, the production of such works has virtually stopped.

Books were printed in Mongolian in Peking during the Manchu dynasty and the Republic and earlier in Urga with woodblock type probably introduced from China. Moveable type seems to have reached Mongolia through Moslem peoples to the west, and one of the first complete fonts of Mongolian type in Inner Mongolia was made by Christian missionaries among the Tumets (Suiyuan province) in the 1860's. In the parts of Mongol territory which conern us, little printing occurred prior to that time.

The study of history has become a science in the last few centuries, and most early great culture--Greek, Roman, Chinese, Indian, and within limits even Medieval European--produced some critical writing in this field. Mongol historiography did not do so until the 20th century, and the study of Mongolia, its people and history, was on a scholarly level the work of Chinese and Manchu intellectuals, especially during the Ch'ing dynasty. Historical, topographical, genealogical and similar works either written or compiled by Chang Mu (1805-49), Ku Kuang-ch'i (1776-1835), Li Wen-t'ien (1834-95), the Manchu Sheng-yü (1850-1900) among others established them as Mongolists in the historiography of China. for the Mongols themselves, by contrast, non-critical chronicles comprised the bulk of written history. Their traditional form suited nomadic need as much as their heroic simplicity exhausted nomadic interest. The tribespeople esteemed them for recollection of their golden age, and under sharp rivalry from Chinese settlers and oppression from Chinese governments more recently the hardest pressed Mongols came to view these chronicles as a kind of cultural monument.

Unlike Chinese Mongolists, native chroniclers flourished early from the 13th to 17th centuries. Their works display much Buddhist pietism and legendary attributions from primitive shaman magic, but in detail some are valued sources for modern scholars.

Three are outstanding: 1) the anonymous Secret History of the Mongols (Monggol-um Niucha Tobchiyan) phonteically transcribed into Mongolian with Uighur characters (ca. 1240) and preserved until recelntly only in a Chinese transliteration. Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih; 2) the great Chronicle (Erdem yin tochi) of sanang Setsen (1604-1660?), a semi-legendized account of Jenghiz Khan's conquest completed in 1658; 3) the roughly contemporaneous "Altan Tobchi, and the Bolur Erike (String of Pearls by Rasi Pungsuk

The most honored figure of Mongol historiography is Sanang Setsen, an Ordos noble of the Usin banner, whose full honorary name was Janang Erke Setsi Khung. Born in 1604, he dies sometime after 1658 when his Chronicle was completed, becoming a folk-hero to the Ordos tribes who sacrificed formally on his anniversary as recently as at least 1934. In this honor and in the respect paid him among almost all Mongols, there is evidence that a quasi-intellectual figure could achieve statusin this unsophisticated society. It is probably, however, that veneration of Sanang Setsen is a tribute to his having celebrated so well that zenith of Mongol power in which the tribes took defensive pride during their times of trouble.

In any event, his quality was not afterward matched, and the creation of works in Mongolian history declined.

During the Ch'ing period, a number of Chinese works--dynastic histories and some Confucian writing both orthodox and heterodox for the period--received incidental Mongolian translations in the course of official renderings into Manchu, but such production ceased almost entirely in mid-19th century when the Peking court had troubles which their Mongol quondam-allied could not help solve. There is little indication that these works were popular in Mongolia except with those who had taken the Chinese examinations or studied Chinese philosophy avocationally.

The period from 1880 to about 1920 was one of stagnation and barrenness in formal writing either scholarly or literary, though the folk literature persisted quite strongly at the same time in face of Chinese immigration. Original works in Mongolian were not forthcoming, and even the monasteries suffered the prevailing sterility in production of devotional material.

During the late 1920's and early 1930's, some books and articles by Mongol intellectuals trained in the new learning appeared, notably those of Merse (Kuo T'ao-fu) who published in Mukden, and of Sangbo (Pao Wei-han) in Peking, but while these concerned Mongol history and currentl problems, they were written and printed in Chinese, betraying the academic background of their authors. Some words were printed dually in Mongol and Chinese in Nanking at the behest of the Nationalist government, and it is likely that Mongols cooperated in their compilation.

These, like the *Mongol 10-Day Journey (Monggol-on Arban...* and *Table of Mongol Leagues and Banners* (Monggol Chigolgan) were tabular in form. The *Azure Chronicle of the Yuan dynasty* (Köke Sudur, Peiping, ca. 1929), was a recreation of the glorious chronicle of Mongol traditions printed only in Mongolian. Writing since the Japanese and civil wars has been much restricted, the burden of Mongol publication under the Communists falling to literary men such as Malchinhu, to be discussed later. Understandably the Chinese Communists are not anxious to stimulate a Mongolian national historiography, although they are quite capable of citing the Chronicles to inspire Mongols with a belief in their own capacities--a gesture which, like all other intellectual and artistic policies of Peking, is a propaganda weapon to secure work and harmony with the Red regime.

E. Miscellaneous

Lest one dismiss too readily the quickness and keenness of nomadic intelligence, in the absence of deep intellectual traditions outside religious ones, we should remember that the Buddhist theology as accepted and understood among the Mongolian tribespeople who entered the monasteries is, in itself, a profound and subtle intellectual exercise. One may hypothesize that the dimness of Mongol intellectual tradition is the result not of a lack of capacity, but of opportunity. Nomadic life was demanding and rugged, and few of its captives had either leisure or need to develop the pursuits commonly regarded as intellectual--scholarship, formal literature, scientific inquiry, critical philosophy, or conscious and professional arts. Considering their environment, those who did so produced some remarkable results. Those who did not, expressed in their folk literature and arts a feeling of great depth. And in the herdsman's yurt, removed by a hundred leagues of steppe from the glittering awareness of the intellectual, the redeemer of unbusy hours lo these many centuries has been that cerebral paraclete, the game of chess.

III. Artistic Expression: Literature and Literary Expression

A. Formal Literature and Legends

Because the number of literate Mongols has not usually been large, most native literature has been colloquial. Because their history has been an active and often violent one ranging between virtual world conquest and almost total subjection, most of their colloquial literature exists in the form of heroic legends of songs. Because classical Mongolian script was largely the instrument of the lamas, few educated Mongols wrote literary works in it. During the 19th century, there was a

literary works in it. During the 19th century, there was a
fashion for Chinese works or translations among Mongols educated for the Confucian examinations, and today Chinese remains the predominant scholarly and literary language of Inner Mongolian and Western Manchuria, due in part, to the customarily Chinese education which contemporary Mongols received above the lowest level. Russian has similarly become the fashionable literary language of Outer Mongolia.

There has been an amount of formal literature, usually an echo of popular vernacular tradition. One of the most important works of this kind is the long Tibetan heroic legend *Gesser Khan* which was first printed in Mongolian script about 1716. This work, also anglicized *Gesar of Ling* is highly imaginative and written with great beauty. Its apotheosis of the romantic nomad knight and conqueror appeals well in the Mongol tradition. Magic beasts and warring spirits help or hinder the hero, and courtly love mixes with revenge and ambition to notivate him.

> "...and Gessar was cast into the hole of wasps, but when they swarmed about him and would have pierced his eyes from his head, he scattered the tears of the black fledgling among them and the wasps breathed their odor and perished.
>
> And Gessar slept, but with the dawn he lifted up his voice and sang, The glorious Khan of China thought to slay me by casting me into his hole of wasps. Yet he must needs rejoice in the end that Gessar was not slain by his wasps, but his wasps by Gessar!'

Vigorous and exultantly strong, the image of Gessar, "lord of the ten great regions of the earth whose coming was foretold" was a messianic chieftain with whom the Mongols identified their aspirations readily. His legend has become almost a Mongol annexation from the literature ofTibet.

Besides *Gessar Khan*, major popular works of Mongols included the quasi-epic *Janggariad*, perhaps second in importance. The *Siddhi-khur*, too, remained widely popular into the 1930's as did some collections of imaginative buddhist tales recorded from the popular tradition. Memorized selections from these works passed also around the campfires of the illiterate nomads, mixing with unwritten legends in a blur of folk history and heroic fiction. Another source which may be very roughly taken as literary was the Chinese story or novel borrowed through contact with the colonists and through the Chinese-educated Mongol from its own tradition and sufficiently disguised to make it palatable to the tribespeople as a tale of their own.

The line between fiction and record in Mongolian written literature, prior to the 1950's has been almost as tenuous as that in the folk legends. The problem of defining fiction does not seem to have arisen, and while the tellers and hearers of tales may have known that embellishments were common, they seem to have made few attempts to sort factual history out from them.

The content and emphasis of Mongol folk legends vary somewhat with the location and tribal or clan history impinging their origins. Most clans have legends of their founder as either a mythical animal or a hero, very similar to popular tales of this kind among the Chinese. Others preserve legends about historical figures prominent in the life or times of their clan. The Korchin, for example, tell several religious and heroic legends about Khabto Khasar, brother of Chinggis Khan under whom Korching fought Graeda Merin The, and about the K'ang Hsi Emperor of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty whose blood was said to be three-quarters Mongol. The Jasaktu of Western Manchuria, early allies of the Manchus, have legendary recollection of that alliance and the glory of the conquest which they shared in 1644 and after. Tribes further west, in Inner Mongolia, specialize more in the days of Chinggis Khan.

The Ordos Mongols have a well preserved body of legend. Living close to Chinese areas, they yet inhabited land less inviting to Chinese colonists and suffered less than most Inner Mongolian people from the devilitation of their native culture which seemed to flow from the dominance of the Han immigrants. The burden of Ordos heroics is usually the superiority of their race to the Chinese, the conquests of Chinggis and the Manchus, and the bravery of their own people during them. One of their legends relates that Sanang Setsen, the chronicler, was put to death for refusing to serve the Manchu emperor because his empire was stained with Chinese population. More legends, however, identify the Mongol cause and success with that of the Manchus and argue a strong loyalty to the Ch'ing dynasty.

The amount of factual history in these legends is considerable, even at the expense of the herodes. Sanang Setsen himself wrote an account since legendized of an adultery forced upon a tributary chief's wife by Chinggis Khan. The incident is based on the execution of the Hsi Hsia king in 1227, though the reasons for it and its consequences (the murder of Chinggis by the ravished widow) are probably romanticized.

The subjects and themes of Mongol folk tales and other forms of vernacular literature tend to be standard among all the tribespeople. A very large number concern lamas and religious life, which traditionally bulked large. The lamas are both heroic and the butts of these, but scholarly monks who have a Tibetan degree in Religious Sciences and especially holy mendicant pilgrims are usually favored Morality tales and stories of revenge, mixing Buddhist ethics with nomadic chivalric codes are ma-

B. Riddles, Anecdotes, and Minor Literary Forms

Riddles are a form of folk entertainment known in most societies and more common in the less sophisticated. Mongol riddles, often poetic in expression, are universally popular in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. They concern familiar things--animals, places, processes of daily living, stars, parts of the body, costume, well known persons or several related subjects. Some are so frequently posed and answered that they have become a kind of folk poetry rather than a true game. Most are made by allegorical reference with an occasional disguised description. The former are better literature, but none are so reckoned by the natives who tell them. Many contain crude poetic insights, and they reveal the nomad's profoundly lyrical vision of his hard environment and spartan life. They are indigenous expression, herdsman and prince alike puzzling over "The pearls which cannot be strung" (stars) "The thread which cannot be wound in a ball" (road), "Two houses having but a single beam" (the nose), "The pen is narrow, the sheep are many , the ram strikes with his horn" (husking millet with mortar and pestle), "In a deep well, a crimson bird emits a hollow cry" (the heart).

The Mongols have, in addition to this strain of poetry, a ready humor whose produce is a comic literature of anecdotes anent human frustration, willful animals, moral pomposity, the inevitable Chinese, and the adventures of itinerant or, less often, of monastic lamas. In clerical anecdotes, which frequently reflect the religious prestige of Tibet, the priests usually win their gambits; for the itinerant mendicants, especially, this rule is not invariable. A delightful example is this dialogue between a lama Doctor of Religious Sciences (a degree obtainable in Tibet, signifying great scriptural erudition) and a tribal prince:

> "The Prince asked, 'When a Lama dies, what does he become become (in reincarnation)?'
> The Lama replied, 'He becomes an ass.'
> The Prince asked again, ' And when a Prince dies, what does does he becomce?'
> The Lama replied, 'He becomes a Doctor of Religious Sciences.'
> The Prince asked, 'How comes it so?'
> The Lama replied, 'That is to say, one become (in reincarnation) a bit like the people one has known.'" (A. Mostaert Folklore Ordos, p. 137).

Most minor forms of Mongol expression are gnomic. Riddle, anecdote, ejaculatory prayer, curse, proverb, invocation are suited to the brief exchange of the busy day; their economy fits them for moments of relief from hard work. Legends and songs, as well, of course, as riddles and jokes, entertain the leisure time of the night camp and its fireside circle; but most of them are too long for the busy day.

Among Mongols as among the once-nomadic Hebrew, proverbs and invocations crowd the tongue with habitual attitudes of culture and environment. Buddhist piety and the qualities of the land--vast, perilous to the herds--figure in most. "Who lets the wolf go (alive) sins against the grassland," "A blind man can crawl all his life without getting out of the Khorchin grasslands." Secular proverbs are current even in a Communist-inspired literature, though the religious are not, and so are familiar invocations:"When a thirst burns your vitals, may you find a peach orchard; when a grass fire starts, may the north wind bring a downpour." Rhythm and customary slight literary elevation of language and figure remove most minor forms of expression from the simply conversational

Mongol children's rhymes share at least the rhythmic quality of more serious expression. Some keep time for games of pace like skipping, some are lullabies, some the usual cruel raillery of childhood, some are musing nonsense chants. Most are in the strong trochees of heartbeats very natural to the young. Like some anecdotes, a few legends, and unlike the majority of riddles or proverbs, these rhymes reflect contact with Chinese colonists. Adult forms express this consciously in content; the children'sin the form itself. In regions heavily infiltrated by Han people, Chinese words mix with Mongol in nursery rhymes: the same verse may, though, occur in less colonized places without the loan word. The nonsense,"Candy, candy, sugar candy;/ My food to nourish me," is sung by children of the eastern Monggolcin with the Chinese "yang-yang" for "nourish." The western Khalkha Darkhan Beile children render the same in unadulterated Mongolian.

Like most relatively primitive people, the Mongols have a lively uninhibited sense of rhythm. We shall discuss it later anent music and dance, but it is not limited to these media. Prayers and liturgical chants, the above noted minor forms of expression, the nursery rhymes of children all reflect it. The natural rhythms of season, regenerating herds and flocks, pulsing horses, childbirth, and work intrude variously the Mongol's life. Undiverted by sophisticated palliatives and labor-saving devices, the nomad sees, feels, and reproduces them more readily than the city man and in some ways more fully than the farmer. The characteristic traits bred of Mongol culture which show most clearly in its literary forms of expression before the rise of Communism among and over its people are thus piety, courage, clan loyalty, pride, poetic spirit, kgo

courage, clan loyalty, pride, poetic spirit, good humor and a deep sense of rhythm. They and their expression show how much of human value a culture called primitive can inspire.

C. Under the Communists.

Under the Chinese Communists' program for "preservation and encouragement" of minority cultures, there has been a limited revival of some native art forms a century in decline, but the value and content of these and other better surviving have been diluted with ideological messages, and "preservation and encouragement" themselves have been selective. Legends and stories with an anti-Chinese burden, traditional or contemporary, are not tolerated officially, and tribal groups with well organized cadre systems do not indulge in them. Buddhist moralities are not encouraged, but similar tales exemplary of patriotism and service are circulated by cadres and"reformed" persons to rival or replace them. Communist morality is otherwise uttered in new anecdotes, revised proverbs, and reworked nursery rhymes.

Peking policy is apparently to discourage positively as seldom as possible any form of folk literature, but simultaneously to educate and organize through native cadres and committees working with approved materials. New values in arts and expression are thus to be inculcated whereby the natives will more or less voluntarily, instinctively,abandon the less useful and desirable of the old. The government is also intruding original items in the more common forms of folk expression are thus to be inculcated whereby the natives will more or less voluntarily, instinctively, abandon the less useful and desirable of the old. The government is also intruding original items in the more common forms of folk expression, each bearing in some familiar style a message suitable to the Communist order. This procedure is analysed in the propaganda chapter.

Of the old literature and minor expression, much remains intact: anecdotes, riddles, proverbs, invocations, children's rhymes, prayers, even a number of legends, purged only of the blatantly offensive. To a degree not presently calculable, the bulk of this traditional literature will probably continue to survive while the nomadic life of the tribes is not very radically changed. Communist alterations in it will, henceforth, tend to be by addition rather than subtraction, but unless the process is halted by other events, the entire tone and color of Mongolian literary expression of every kind is likely to become Communist-inspired and Chinese oriented. This seems to be as much as Peking intends at present, and its effects, intentional or not, will include a qualitative sinicization of Mongol outlook.

A change in nomadic economy and societal structure will have a deeper consequence, somewhat open to speculation, from the present division between town and steppe Mongols. The former are still weak and weakening in their own culture though the present policy toward minorities may restore a little their interest in and opportunity to express it, especially in dance, the visual arts, and songs and homiletics serviceable to propagandaists. If other Mongols become as they, sinicizing processes may accelerate and even be open policy.

More positively, Peking's "encouragement" is sponsoring a formal literary movement among Mongol authors. In one sense this is a way to complement with Communist habits of mind the native body of art. In another, it is a departure from tradition. Together with the artist, the literary man is now offered prestige as a creative member of the community. Art is rated a metier, valuable in itself. Neither idea has any root in Mongol experience or tradition; the former, at least, is Chinese.

The literary product of this movement is so far not very large, but there is little reason why it should not grow with the Mongol literacy rate. Imaginative and intelligent Mongols are plentiful, and the history and condition of their people offer rich materials for fiction. It is conceivable that, in time, the new artists and authors of this race will be allowed to express themselves with at least partial freedom of choice; it is equally possible that, should such a time come, the persons concerned may be so conditioned to the ideology as to make the change unnoticeable. For the present, the bulk of formal training in both literature and art takes place in Chinese schools or institutes under careful state supervision and review. The thread of the party line, therefore, is thick and pervasive of this newly-woven cloth.

Mongol authors and poets receive ready publication in Chinese government journals and literary collections. Some are subsidized. Most are praised before their own people, China, and the world. The Mongols, at least, are a captive audience for their work, but one wonders whether it does not sit strangely on their ears even after six years of indoctrination. An example is Malchinhu, a Khorchin, thus far the best-publicized Mongol novelist. His short story, "On the Khorchin Grasslands" (printed in English in Chinese Literature, Vol. I, Peking, 1954), like Chinese Communist-inspired literature in ideological approach, contains many typically Mongol themes. Briefly, it recounts the pursuit and capture of a sinister Kuomintang agent and incendiary by a heroic girl, her lover, a venerable cadre, and the people of a Mongol settlement who later, with good socialist coordination, put out a bull rush fire sc

set by the villain. The story is interrupted by encomiums on committee organization and verbatim quotes from half a dozen directive of the local constabulary headquarters, but it has a touch of steppe heroics and action to the Mongol taste. Old themes mix with new. The nomad's love of his pastures, native places, animals, his proverbs, his clan spirit translated into the "cooperative action," his chivalrous and romantic sexual code--all are here. Beside them are political self-help, the unfailing wisdom and benificence of party leaders, the value of youth activities, Mongol duty to the new China, loyalty to the person of Mao Tse-tung; collectivistic morality, self denial and sacrifice for group good, and a world of simple-minded anti-Kuomintang and anti-American propaganda. The propaganda, however, is not necessarily ineffective. Devils, demons, and bad Daniels generally are favored whipping boys in tribal legends and popular Buddhist lore. Thorough villains are not new to Mongol imagination and mentality, and the image of a crafty, cowardly, ugly, Kuomintang votary armed with locofocos fresh from a Wall Street vendor and sent among them to incinerate the people's weeds has all the essentials of a shining popularity. Against this design, nevertheless, must be weighted the so far imponderable progress of acclimatization. When the village cadre, climaxing the story, praises the heroince as , "a true Mongol of the era of Mao Tse-tung," the words are so strange in a Mongol context, we cannot be sure that they are not by now commonplace there, and we cannot estimate that, if they are not, persistence and the absence of contrasting style and idea will not soon made them so.

IV Artistic Expression: Music, Song, Dance, and Drama.

In the arts of music, song, dance, and drama, the differences among the Mongol tribes emerge more than in literary arts, and the boundary between Manchurian and Inner Mongolian tribes becomes more important. In these, too, the differences between Chinese and Mongol and their mutual influences are explicit. Respecting some of them, colonial Chinese differ from their kind in China proper more than in intellectual matters, and they deserve here scrutiny which, for their intellectual and literary expression, was adequately offered in the General China Handbook. Excepting song, the content of these arts less intimately related to the national history and emotional sympathies of the two races was more subject to osmotic cultural exchange between them.

A. Music

The basic scale used by both Chinese and Mongols is penta-

pentatonic (major FGACD, beginning on any one of these). Demi-tones occur infrequently in Chinese usage, very seldom in Mongol, and notation, a rarity, is commonly in the Chinese form among both where it exists. A heptatonic scale like the European major scale (FGABCDE) appeared in China probably in in the reign of Kublai Khan (1260-1294) and may have been the prevailing Mongolian scale of the time or, a loan from Western Asian or Russian music. It is still known by a few Mongols, notably the Chinese-infiltrated Tumets of Suiyüan, but it is now an antique curiosity. The Ordos Mongols, strong adherents of tribal tradition, use the pentatonic scale wholly in both contemporary and ancient songs as well as in religious chants and psalmodies.

Mongolian music is not an independent art but serves solely as accompaniement to songs, dances, and rites. This is not equally true of Chinese music, but among Inner Mongolian colonists at least it is more true than among their kin to the south perhaps because of Mongol influence, perhaps because leisure and intellectuals lacked to produce or preserve a pure music.

Mongolian religious music, like thought, literature, dance and other arts serving the church, forms a category apart in native culture. Tibetan influence and loans are large, and except for Buriat chants possibly influenced by Russian music. Tibetan liturgical music provides the Mongols with most of their demi -tone usage. Chants of priests are often quite melodic, but the accompaniment is usually uncoordinated among the several instruments and tends to disguise the theme.

Rhythm in Mongol popular song and dance tunes is commonly one stressed quarter followed by two unstressed eighths, suited to the usual dactyls of secular verse. Time is most often 2/4 or 4/4 and melody commonly has two phrases repeated according to the lyrics.

Instruments are primtive in development if not in manu facture or use. Temples and monasteries use two kinds--Tibetan long horns and cymbals for liturgy, orchestras of trumpets, clarionettes, strings, drums, and other percussion devices includingl cymabls. Secular instruments include flute, drum, castanets or wood blocks, and a variety of stringed items either bowed, strummed or plucked. Some of the latter are Chinese, including a seven-stringed zither, the ch'in, and the presence of these may account for change if any in Mongol music rhythms since they are suited to the Chinese. Professional balladeers and itinerant minstrels use bowed strings or guitars, and the more rustic tribal herdsmen still play a simple shepherd's pipe.

Both Chinese and Mongols learn and perform music by ear alone. A handful can read Chinese notation.

Chinese music in the colonial areas as elsewhere is essentially monodic without harmony or counterpoint. Melody is derived from the succession of notes each self-important and tonally related to those before or after it. Musical phrasing, therefore, notably in Chinese theatricals, is not rigidly fixed but is often extemporized on some melodic convention which is followed throughout the presentation. . Embellishments are personal. Instruments are standard Chinese with strings, flutes, and percussion dominant. The chief uses of this music are, like that of the Mongols, accompaniment, though the "lonely flute and lonely fiddle" are consolation solo instruments. Religious uses are less important among the Chinese, songs equally important, dramatics more so. In the latter or "operatic" performance, accompaniment proceeds from one to another kind of combination of instrument according to parts, scenes, and moods. Song accompaniment is usually by one instrument or several of a kind.

B. Songs

Singing has several functions among the Mongols. It is a form of entertainment, of communication, historical recollection, group fellowship, and exhuberant expression. The best Mongolian poetry occurs in song lyrics; and the closest affiliation of individual Mongols with their culture and traditions, their most common personal participation in artistic expression, is through singing. There is some distinction between the songs and singing of the Manchurian and Inner Mongolian tribes, and we shall review them separately.

Mongol singing is a gregarious activity in general, most of it taking place around campfires after the evening meal. Among the Eastern Mongols, singing is usually solo with the turn passed to all men who wish to participate. Women do not sing in public. Itinerant and professional troubadors are popualr among strictly nomadic groups, but infrequent where modern ways have reached the tribes. Their occupation is an ancient tradition, and they sometimes carry messages between chiefs of the nomad. Frequently they lead group songfests of the kind described above, but in these cases they share time with the others. More regularly they sing or recite traditional epic legends and ballds, adding verses of their own invetion.

Balladry is still current and unlike many other forms of expression, it retained creativity through the 19th and 20th centuries. Eastern Mongols had by 1950 become less active balladeers than Western, but the older men still invented in amount. Ballad themes in Manchuria were multiple--a few colorfully autobiographic, other homiletic Buddhist. The age of the great Khans and conquests, the beauty of nature and animals, age and physical decline and sexual love and the ideal of the perfect woman, nostalgia for native places were common leisure themes. Drinking songs, heroic legends, and the hunt served more sanguine occasions. Japanese occupation and modernization policies decreased the incidence of firelight balladry, but groups which remained on the steppe preserved it; old men universally clung to it, and even young men near the cities remembered the story of Djangsara Anga, "the girl of many qualities" so well-known in more primitive places.

The Japanese established elementary schools for Mongol children and taught them patriotic songs, but some of these used native verses about the glories of Chinggis Khan to stir feelings and motivate behavior pleasing to the occupation authorities.

Satiric songs are common to all Mongols, but those of Manchurian origin have tended more to become popular among Mongols in western parts of the Autonomous Region than have those of the latter to imitate the process. In very recent times, Japanese expansion into Inner Mongolia and the anti-Chinese regrain of some such songs may have helped their migration westward.

Among those Mongols who have escaped the heaviest Chinese settlement, notably the Ordos tribes, a slightly greater number of two-part songs and chants, both secular and religious, emphasizes the social use and importance of singing. In their popular songs, the customary stanza is a quatrain of imperfectly regular lines, though cinquains and other arrangements are known. The occasions for song are identical with those of Manchurian Mongols, and troubadors are common, the institution of them having spread to the Chinese as well. Mongol folk ballads from many Inner Mongolian tribes are sung in Chinese scale and tonality, the latter perhaps the consequence of using Chinese-type instruments, but the Ordos Mongols, like the Manchurian, have retained the older tonality and melodies while using the pentatonic scale.

If their scale and in some cases tonality are identical with the Chinese, their verses are strongly different and express feelings of Mongol race apartness suggestive of the negative aspects in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory of nationalism. Historical ballads dwell on Chinggis, Bayan, Ogotai, and their triumphs particularly over Chinese. The body of ballads shows characteristic exhuberance, naivete, occasional pleasure in earth, sky, sex, and drink, more common sensitivity to emotion and beauty. Ballad subjects include the gamut of nomadic experiences--horses, thieves, religious men, parents and family, girls married far from their native places, zodiacal animals, elegies, domestic quarrels, love, soldiers and war, humorous situations and a horde of minor excuses for making a song. There are separate songs for festivals, satire, lament, and war, none of them strictly ballads in form or development, and all but the first of them usually sung in stanzas longer than quatrain. Strangely enough, songs of love, satire, and family affections outnumber those concerning horses, hunting, and war. This fact may reflect a changing environment since the days of conquest, but it also demonstrates the continuing romanticism and lyric sensibility of the nomad.

Secular songs on religious topics, local monasteries or famous lamas, show one more aspect of the omnipresent nostalgia for the beloved place of one's birth. Strictly devotional songs, popular hymns inspired by, but not part of church music and liturgy, share with the topical religious ballad the frequent use of regrain and chant-style. Some are styled for two-part singing as are the secular songs on other themes; many employ stock phrases common to songs of several tribes. Few are as original or poetic as the ballads.

> "At the Spring of Sandhain Ghol is a temple whose several buildings were constructed bit by bit,
> Whose temple is it and of what kind? It is the temple of our Lama.
> There do we not read scriptures and recite holy offices?..."
> (A. Mostaert, Folklore Ordos, pp. 338-339 et seq.).

Satiric songs, Eastern and Western, are a native art of refinement. Mongol gallads are both literary and folk compositions in general, a number being both in part. Troubadors learn a traditional form and add their own stanzas which, in time, become traditional themselves. Satires, however, are almost all literary--i.e. composed ab pvp by one or a few balladeers on a given occasion and with an intentional design. Wit is a common Mongol possession, but the skilled wit of these songs requires a little more than haphazard practice. In all parts of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, satires, deal with unjust magistrates, proud and rich men, wilful animals, and standard balloons to be pricked. In the Inner Mongolian regions more even than the Manchurian, the more savage are aimed at Chinese in general and at Chinese merchants specifically.

"Think you that silk hat and bald head ride well (together)
on him?
Think you the black jackass that pushes this Chink* before
him to (point of) exhaustion cannot proceed?
Think you European socks and oxfords go well on him?
If you ask his family name, ... is it Chang?
(A. Mostaert, Folklore Ordos, pp. 333-334)

(*"Chink"-- the Mongolian argot is "todi" a term of derisive disrespect for which this is an English approximation. The song refers to a Chinese businessman notorious among the Usin clan ca. 1912)

Western Mongolian love songs tend to rich images, likening admired women to desirable animals or associating conjugal love with love for one's birthplace. Since both of the latter are vital values in Mongol scale, the disrespect of women is less than it seems in our words. The ideal female or ideal lover archetype so common in Manchuria is also present in Inner Mongolia but less pronounced. Many love songs are earthy and natural, and the Freudian might descry rampant symbolism in their frequent references to caparisoned stallions, verdant declivities, trees and the like--with some reason. Some deal with historical persons.

"The Tsoroin dunes and Ghurban valleys are the regions'
heart they say.
Undurma Okin, ... is loved of all, they say.
The bay-maned mare, ... what is its price?
The frivolous young Undurma, ... what is her age?
At the river's source in Burghastan valley are pools and
trees.
Undurma Okin, born to a good destiny, has an affable nature,
they say."
(Mostaert, op. cit., p. 346)

The romantic aspect of love, due a more lyrical treatment, is not neglected.

"At the hill of Gandari is the line which divides the lands.
When we meet, be it but once, it is distraction to your soul.
Oh! Had I a violin, I should pass my time playing it!
Oh! Were there no (contrary) law, we two should dwell together! ...
For the trotting horse stones and pebbles are a plague...
For lovers who wish to meet, a crowd is a plague. ..."
(Mostaert, Ordosica, p. 91)

Other songs include a few recent political compositions dating from the end of the Ch'ing dynasty who, restive under the pinching of Chinese commercial "swindles," members of some clans formed secret revolutionary clubs. From these cam campaign songs of little importance per se but proof that Mongol temperament had room for this kind of conscious literature and that the sense of brotherhood toward the Manchu people was dissolving under pressure. These circulated almost entirely among Western tribes.

Some of the best and most poetic Mongol songs are nostalgic laments, for the nomad was ever closest to the little land he could call his own--his place of birth. Departure from it was almost universlly inevitable in husbandry, and the poignancy of laments by men dying far from this kind of "home" reaches almost a speculative mystique.

"That which abides in the Great Void is the Blue Firmament;
Those who leave for war in the cold and dark are we, poor
lads.
By the waterside the wild geese and ducks give their cry;
When I think of my native place and my pastures, tears
roll from my eyes.
If the black horse (of the army) dies (in war), the (Bannermen) will indemnify for him.
If we the miserable ones die (in war), they will leave our
bodies in a foreign land..."
(Mostaert, Ordosica, p. 86)

The same theme is common in Chinese poetry, but the expression is purely Mongol.

Chinese colonists among Mongols developed some distinctive habits andlimitatons in respect to songs. We have remarked that the intellectual expression of these people was typically Chinese but limited in quantity and that their literature was usually their own traditional stuff. Considering the patterns of Chinese intellectual and literary history, this is as much as to say that the creative intellectual and leisure artist was in short supply on the frontier. Folk literature involves a different set of vitalities, and songs are the easiest, shortest, most common and usable form of any folk literature. It is interesting, therefore, that the production and singing of them by colonial Chinese differed from place to place. The cultural expression of the Mongol was most vigorous where the race was dominant, weakest where it was under pressure from the Chinese. With the latter, the opposite was true, and the difference is largely explicable by the two kinds of dominance. Chinese superiority meant a combination of numerical advantage and political-milimeant a combination of numerical advantage and political-military power involving often an organized state whose policies were in their favor. Mongol meant numerical plus a certain economic advantage, for it usually occurred in territory better suited to husbandry than agriculture, reinforced by occasional acts of banditry or terrorism which could not be regularized against the power of Chinese governments. In the latter situation, immigrants had reason to band tightly with their own kind, assert themselves, and hope reasonably to survive. In the former, the nomad was without hope unless he retreated to far steppes; those who did not became cowed. Similarly, their immigrant neighbors became flabby with security; In more recent times, moreover, the Chinese could approach the Mongol with selectively tempting goods--learning, competitive progress, and a chance for improvement in position--to trade for nomadic cultural traditions. The Mongol never had equivalents to offer the Chinese.

These elements reflected in cultural developments of which Chinese folk songs are an example. In the Tumet regions of Suiyüan province, heavily colonized, the settlers crowded in agricultural and commercial villages and towns. Grgariousness was common, but that kind served by song fests was not a vital necessity either for group identity or fellowship. These colonists sang fewer songs less often than their neighbors. What they did sing were often literary ballads based on Confucian moralities, farm festival songs, drinking songs, and laments over their distance from ancestral sites which, lacking the personal intensity of Mongol laments, were close to them in form. These people, before the Kuomintang educational movements and Communist propaganda, had no European concept of patria. China was a cultural tradition and the center of ancestral seats, a frame of reference and standard of values by which they could claim superior attainments and worth to those of the Mongol primitive, an echo of a Golden Age which belonged to their race independent of polity. They had no national songs, only a few resitual military ones, and no precisely political ones either.

Chinese in the Ordos regions were a minority, by contrast, and gregarious by emotional necessity. Like the Mongols, they gathered frequently, whenever possible, to talk and to sing. Their songs were universally popular folk ballads customarily from China Proper, and the singers emended and embellished them at will. The men took turns soloing; the women did not sing in public. The melodic lines of most of these songs were quite similar to each other, but the themes and stories of them varied among love, war, morality, nostalgia, agriculture, war, and herodes.

Among all Chinese colonists, and indeed among Mongols too, women's songs were privately sung--chiefly lullabies, of which some of the Chinese are quite lovely, and funderal laments, of which a majority were only undulating ejaculations or moans. Men, too, intoned these brief, repetitious dirges. The lyric varied with the degree of kinship to the dead and tended to be formalized as was the melody. Expression of sudden grief, e.g. at fatal accidents, are with almost all people naturally rhythmic and easily disposed to a chant. These, however, were so conventionalized in form as to be habitually associated with grief by the Chinese.

Children's songs were very like those of Mongols, and the two mingled regularly. The Chinese included perhaps more two-part rounds for games, but there was small difference otherwise except in language. Festival songs were sometimes original to the Chinese of Mongolian areas or those immediately south of them in Shensi, Shansi, and Hopei. Most famous for its adoption by the Communists as a Carmagnole is the two-part yang-ko, originally sung and danced by gyrations and counter-movement on the Lantern Festival. This was and is timed by percussion instruments.

Love songs were almost as popular among the colonists as among the Mongols, but in the better settled places tended to prosaic detail and melodic repetition. Most originated in China. The major aspect of love in their colonial versions was physical, the male dominating a suppliant vessel of his pleasure, with few of the rich allegories and little of the poetry of Mongol lyrics.

Chinese colonial songs generally, and love songs especially, tended to more rigid numerical sequence and formalism than Mongol equivalents. The ten stages of conducting the lover to fulfillment, the five wataches of the day likened to steps of wooing, more regular stanzaic patterns were characteristic of them. This formalism reflected the more sophisticated culture of China in which the bulk of songs originated, but it lacked the imaginative use of form and flexibility within form maintained by intellectual vigor in the culture and society of China within the wall. In a regressive way, therefore, some aspects of Chinese colonial culture contained a primitivism of their own.

C. Dances

Among the Chinese in Mongolian territories, folk dances were relatively common and popular. Only a few were indigenous, but festival dances from nearby North China could be claimed as almost so. The vigorous yang-ko mentioned above has become the most important by its use as a Communist stimulant and symbol.

Mongol dances may be divided between religious ritual and secular amusement. Of the latter, some were topical solo dances, mostly for male performers, such as the *daghur*, a depiction hunting accompanied by a two-stringed lute or viol. Others were rhythmic stomps, on occasion quite athletic, in which women participated. For these, percussion was the most audible accompaniment. Both kinds were universally popular, and mixed dancing was an element at Mongol festivals and celebrations among all tribes.

Temple dances were liturgical, but they partook of superstitions and practices syncretized by Mongolian Buddhism from Shaman-magic and primitive folk religion. The Devil Dance, invoking spirits, was performed by priests elaborately robed and masked about a *Gurtum*, or seer, who was to receive and speak for the spirit thus summoned. Accompanied by drums and Tibetan long-horns, the dance was a series of frenzied pirouettes and posturings culminating in the "possession" of the *Gurtum*. The exorcistic *Tsam* dance, similar in performance, was an exercise of allegorical figures--human, divine, natural, deathly, and the like. It resembled similar dances in Tibet and originated there, but its Mongolian form, indigenous and in some respects modified by shamanism, was a little less demonaical than the Devil Dance.

Another dance of the same genre, known as the "Magicians' Dance" was the wildest of the lot. Armed *Gurtums*, pre-possessed by divine spirits, whirled their bodies and weapons round a ring of spectators injuring them freely. The veneration for wounds thus received parallels that appurtaining certain analogous Hindu rites and is not uncommon in more primitive religions. It is surprising to find it in a Buddhist setting, but the Mongol nomad balanced between the very crude and very profound need occasion to express both. This dance was such an occasion; in theory symbolic of Buddhism's triumph over the old folk religion, it was in fact grossly atavistic.

Mongol secular dances were among the last forms of traditional expression to adhere to tribespeople settled near the Chinese, and they continue unabatedly popular among nomads more free. Temple dances survived until 1950 most vigorously in Inner Mongolian monasteries, and their general popularity among the faithful was retained by complicated appeal of devotional frenzy and colorful spectacle. The more violent, however, are not in favor with the Chinese Communist regime as legitimate forms of folk art. Their survival is problematical. Their religious content is probably marked for retirement by education to the status of an antiquity.

D. Drama

There is no indigenous Mongol theater. Dramas currently are written and performed in Urga and other Outer Mongolian cities, but their inspiration is Communist and their traditions begin only after 1912. The celebrated Yüan dramas, foundation of modern Chinese opera of the Peking type, were Chinese productions supported by the Mongol court and inspired or stimulated, possibly, by Mongol musical recitation and song. Contemporary Mongols of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region are exposed to dramatic performances by Chinese troups and encouraged to undertake themselves tableaux and theatricals after the design of Chinese propagandists. From their own history, they have no resources upon which to draw except the religious allegories of temple dances which constitute an analogous quasi-drama. These we have discussed in example above.

Chinese colonists, close to the Pang-tzu style of Chinese operatic tradition, originating in Shansi, have a well-developed theater--one of their most active forms of artistic expression. The pieces presented are in the Chinese sense opera--musical dramas whereof the orchestra provides appropriate background music and accompanies the solo parts. Some are scored, but non completely so, and embellishments ex-tempore are added by both musicians and singers. Instruments include blocks, triangles, plucked strings, cymbals, tambourines and the like. This style de-emphasizes music and stresses acrobatic dancing. The absence of fiddles, so vital to Peking style opera, is notable.

The sources and themes of these dramas are traditionally Chinese, the difference between frontier and homeland repertoires being only a matter of taste and selection among existing works. Chinese heroes of adventure are popular, an example being Liu Pei, a swashbuckler from the era of the Three Kingdoms (*San Kuo*0 (ca. 221-264) which produced so much Chinese romance. An opera about his doings *Return to Ching-chou* was one of the most popular of all among Inner Mongolian Chinese down to the civil war and may yet be.

E. Under the Communists

The main points of Communist policy toward literary arts apply also to the present four--minimal deletion, maximal propaganda intrusions, supervised encouragement, and selective preservation. Because of the auxiliary nature of Mongol music, Communist cultural programs have touched it only through the other media it serves. Dramatic groups on Chinese models are sponsored to present propaganda plays or tableaux which, in one aspect, serve as graphic means of disseminating news like the "living newspaper" tableaux used in north China after the Long March. These are useful to condition illiterates, but they hardly deserve the name art.

In song and dance the Communist program is more extensive. On the side of preservation, scholars, artists, and political officers are sent to tour the tribes collecting, cataloguing, and eliciting performances of traditional songs and dances. Local cadres are responsible for organizing groups of native amateurs to revive or increase public interest and participation in these arts. The ideological and political value of this system is twofold: by introducing official materials to familiarize Mongols with party doctrine and dispose them to party activity; by permitting and helping truly native cultural expression to win friendship and trust for Mao's regime.

On the side of encouragement, Chinese publicize native arts, give prestige and favor to native balladeers and dancers, send groups of folk performers on tour, and urge the tribespeople themselves to honor the artist as a useful citizen.

Such policies are influenced heavily by the dominantly Chinese background of the ruling group, and one result we have noted is a subtle drift toward sinicizing Mongol mentality and habit. Troupes of Chinese folk and professional artists have been sent to minority areas to study the native arts and to entertain with their own. The stated objective is to find themes and elements among all forms of folk expression within China's bounds which can be used to create a formal, professional national art on the broadest base. Obviously, if such a syncretic body of art is created, the vast majority of artists making it will be Chinese, but beyond that, the mixture of study and performance which accompanies the effort helps orient once hostile peoples like the Mongols to Chinese forms of expression. Since there is emphasis on formal as well as on folk arts, the well-developed Chinese traditions of the former assume the stature of recommended models among minorities whose expression is predominantly through folk arts.

The Communist Ministry ofCultural Affairs sponsors periodic competitive festivals of folk art for Chinese minority performers as well. The first of these, for music and dance, was held in Peking during 1954; it was preceded by local eliminations in which criteria included enthusiasm, and orthodox viewpoint as well as artistic skill. At least ten nationalities were represented, including Mongolian dancers and accompanists. As early as 1950, moreover, similar troups of minority folk dancers were invited to parade and perform in Peking on national holidays. A similar festival was held in 1955 and another in January of 1956.

The content of Mongol contributions in these events has been marked by Communist organizations and propaganda. Presentations included songs and dances, enacted by masked performers. If the costumes were Mongol, and the origin of selections native, the moral emphasis, atmosphere of presentation, and at least some of the media were not. Some songs were done in concert style, an innovation for tribespeople, e.g. Hai Liu Ma, a song about a miraculous horse. Ordos dancers performed on a formal stage and were elaborately costumed. Ritual heroic and romantic themes endured, but careful point was made of social class differences and folksy virtues in these. Masked dancers, in parody of temple lama and gurtum dancing rather than a tradition of Mongol lay arts, spoofed the hereditary nobility and old sages. Even where official ideology was not formally intruded, it colored and supported the forms of expression; and troubadors sang of the "Iron Oxen" with Peking's medals on their tunics reflecting the footlights of Peking's stage.

This condition of Mongol folk expression has been a relatively long time in process. The proximity of the Communist wartime center of Yunan to Mongol areas, and the strategic manouvering precursing civil war, occasioned formation of a Mongol folk dance group at Yenan in 1946. An experiment,was conducted when these dancers entertained troops and tribesmen and adapted certain propaganda themes to traditional dance forms. The Sword Dance was given a motif of fighters from the Peoples Liberation Army; the Wild Goose Dance, a simple depiction of birds migrating through storms toward the warm south, was allegorized as the People's struggle for liberation. The south, of course, is China and Mao is the sun.

> White clouds drift in the azure sky,
>   Swift run the horses below.
> I crack my whip, its sound is heard afar;
>   Countless birds fly overhead.
> Should anyone ask me:
>   What is this place?"
> I would proudly reply,
>   This is my native land!

Thus far one is in the ancient world of nomad nostalgia and lyricism. But what follows!

> We dearly love peace,
>   We love our native land.
> Sing, sing of our new life!
>   Sing of the Communist Party.
> Ah.' Chairman Mao and the Communist Party!

They shine over us and watch us grow.
Now the sun never sets on the steppes!"

(Wang Sun-tang, China, Land of Many Nationalities, pp. 63-64).

One dancer specializing in this tradition was sent to the World Youth Festival at Prague in 1950. Other individual performers have accompanied national art groups to other countries since.

No favoritism in cultural expression is shown the Chinese in Mongolian areas. Their own art forms are encouraged on the same basis as those of other Chinese, but their drama is expecially favored and flavored by Peking. Since they lay in the path of the red march during the civil war, and since they were predominantly peasants of a kind familiar to communist activists, party organization and the demand for response has been, if anything, more intense among them than among the Mongols.

It is not yet possible to evaluate the Mongol response to Communist cultural policy, but there is no indication that it has proved grossly unpopular. There is only one reason, from the Mongol position, why it should--it is created and applied by Han people. So long, however, as the minority people can be made to think that they can seek rapprochement with the Chinese on their own terms, their response may well be if not immediately enthusiastic, at least tolerant and interested.

V. Artistic Expression--Static and Graphic Arts and Artisanship

Despite the theory that animal husbandry is a poorer economy than agriculture, Mongols not circumstantially coerced into sedentary occupations among Chinese settlements have retained a greater flexibility of leisure time and often a more nearly surplus economy than their land-grubbing neighbors. This advantage has affected minor arts and crafts of both peoples, stimulating production of Chinese luxury goods for sale to Mongols, depressing the Mongol artisan, often to the level of pure utility. Some specialities have remained Mongol monopolies.

Mongol culture tends to rank static and graphic arts with crafts. Speculative art, professional artists in the independent definition we know, do not exist in the Mongol professional register. The Mongol craftsman, however, whether of a kind we should call "artist" or not, used to command prestige higher than his colleague in Chinese society. Metalsmiths, for example, especially in silver, were well regarded. Their work was individualistic, mixing ornament with utility, their patterns were indigenous, and their produce often finely finished. This art-craft, however, has been diminishing for almost a century under Chinese competitive trade-goods. Peking has indeed become a center for production by Chinese artisans of fine Mongol silver jewelry and carving. Such native craftsmen as survive among the tribes, nevertheless, still occupy a place of prestige. After balladeers and legendarists, they are the most creative of Mongol folk artists, and the recognition which their creativity commands exceeds that received by any of the more literary or intellectual forms of expression. Among static arts, however, only such relatively practical ones as this receive such public reward. Abilities to paint, carve, or build are less considered as creative than ability to design a silver button; but the former arts are often subsidiary and restricted by traditional forms while the latter is relatively free. The Mongolian attitudes, then accurately represent relations among arts determined by the cultural environment.

A. Painting, Sculpture, and Tapestry

Mongol painting and sculpture are restricted ancillaries of religious expression; the style and form are traditional derivatives of Tibetan and Chinese. Temple entries are guarded by carved demi-gods and demons, boddhisatva statuettes, large Buddha statues, elaborately carved screens, cornices, altars and canopies comprise most sculpture. Ornamental carving, probably indigenous, includes conventionalized flowers (e.g. daisies), beasts, and allegorical figures. Original work may have been done by laymen or priests, but maintenance and repair are priestly functions; perhaps for this reason, perhaps because of declining interest, such temple art is not flourishing now and resotrations are often crude.

Temple painting, beyond the coloring of carved images and decorations which is universal and colorful, extends to panel pictures sometimes in story sequence and to portraiture. Subjects are devotional or saintly, the workmanship that of Lamas; but like sculpture, painting is virtually a lost art, especially in Manchurian monasteries.

Religious tapestries or carpets, displayed on sacred festivals are monastery properties; and their possession is a matter of competitive pride for religious communities. Many are quite large, thirty by twenty feet being unexceptional. Their subjects are Buddhist saints or quasi-divinities such as the Lamaist Messiah Maidari (Maitreya) woven in such as the Lamaist Messiah Maidar (Maitreya) woven in varicolored wool or stitched on silk. Occasionally stitching is done with gold thread, a likely influence of fine Chinese needle-portraiture, though the devotional tapestry genre is Tibetan, Indian, or Central Indian in origin. Workmanship is obscure, possibly that of seamstresses who serve monasteries, ,and it is not considered an art in our sense, but priests care for such community treasure meticulously, and many remain in very good condition. A fine ornamental rug industry, ranging from Pao-t'ou to Ninghsia is maintained largely by Chinese Moslems living in the area. Designs are influenced by both Chinese and Islamic Central Asian traditions.

B. Architecture

Mongolian architecture is divided between religious and urban, both kinds derivative. Towns usually center about monasteries. The latter are divided into several buildings for worship, residence, and utility. Older monasteries in all parts of the Autonomous Region are customarily Tibetan style, some being fairly large potalas or monolithic fortified buildings of several stories built against the side of a hill. The Tibetan style is plain and clean, block buildings, slightly trapezoidal windows, terraced levels, straight lines, flat roofs. This style predominates in Outer Mongol towns as well, excepting larger temples or potalas the standard height of town and of secondary monastery constructions is one or two stories. Construction materials include stone and clay.

Monastic temples built after the 17th century are frequently Chinese in style or Sino-Tibetan hybrids of Chinese porticoes, and roofs on plain Tibetan buildings. The Chinese is an elaborate architecture characterized by ornamental balconies, carved cornices, curving roof lines, pillared porches and general ornateness. Its large-scale introduction among the Mongols came via a spate of pious building sponsored by the Manchu rulers of China after 1650; and its most extensive use was in Inner Mongolia. The further west in the present Autonomous Region, the more purely Tibetan, monastery architecture becomes.

If the Mongols can be said to have an indigenous architecture, it is that of the yurt, a highly functional nomadic dwelling of uncomplicated design and hardly anyone's idea of architectural art. The original native temples were tents of Tibetan design and a number of these portable shrines still exist either as shamanistic or lamaistic places of worship. Their interiors are often elaborately ornamented with hanging religious tapestries, prayer flags, colored streamers, together full temple altar and clerical regalia. The portable yurt, felt over sapling frames, shaped round and peaked, is the perfect union of available materials and domestic needs for nomad husbandmen. In a minor uncomplicated way, it is an architectural masterpiece, retentive of heat, windproof, roomy, easy to build.

The Suburgan reliquary, a copy of the Indo-Tibetan Chorten also known in China, is symbolic in design of the five elements--block base for earth, platform for wood, outrising bulbous body for water, shaft for fire, crown or ornamental top-piece for air.

Urban architecture in Inner Mongolia, and somewhat less in Manchurian parts of the Autonomous Region, is dominantly Chinese, a style copied by Mongol conquerors in building their luxury residences and public buildings. Private homes and business buildings are reproduced from the towns of China Proper, by Han colonists. Sedentary Mongols have more or less conformed to these patterns with some admixtures of Tibetan, while the latter persists for minor buildings in monasteries even in Chinese towns.

Among both peoples, architecture is a function of building and is ranked as a craft rather than an art; but the value of beauty is a conscious consideration in Chinese style, and utility of a good design in Tibeto-Mongolian so that both have artistic elements.

C. Minor Ornamental Arts

Clothing, especially of noblemen and women and lama ceremonial costumes are heavily decorated by overlays of crochet work, embroidery, tassels, and wrought silver pieces. Purposes include aesthetic and talismanic. Workmanship is divided between hereditary artisans for silver and other metal work and women for all kinds of fabric work. Southern tunics are frequently woven in Chinese designs; eastern are plain Mongol traditional more often. Facings and embroidery, too, copy Chinese designs of conventionalized flowers, dragons, significant characters, geometric borders. Men's dress is the most plain, women's the most ornate, religious (e.g. Tsam) dancers' the most artistically symbolic, shamans' the most primitively talismanic and cluttered. The status of such work is that of household artisanship, but much of the work is very finely done and the women of better families are paintakingly trained to it as are hereditary daghour or ornamental metalsmiths.

Hats and boots are similarly ornamented with overlay designs in cloth, leather, or braid. Women's, warriors' and shamans' boots are the most elaborate in about that order, lamas generally the most plain. Materials for hat ornamentation include feathers, stones, buttons, cloth tails, and embroideries; and the objective seems almost exclusively decorative, except for restriction of some more elaborate patterns to tribal nobles.

Saddles of powerful robbers, nobles, and other men of note are elaborately affixed with wrought silver, another example of the valued daghour's artisanship.

Chinese in Mongolian areas have domestic and minor arts and artisanship like those of their kin to the south and east which have been described in the General China Handbook. The custom of decorating windows with colored cutouts on oiled paper, native to North China, extends here. Subjects are familiar animals, local scenes, and the idea, if not the workmanship, is imaginative. Some urbanized Mongols have adopted the custom.

D. Under the Communists

As a matter of antiquarian interest and ingratiation of lamaists everywhere, the Chinese Communist government has undertaken to restore and preserve at least a few lamaist temples and their religious sculpture, carving, and painting. These are restored a la mode by teams of specialists from universities, and the process incidentally introduces to Mongols the idea that religion is a relic rather than a creative and living force.

Town architecture, notably of public buildings where new ones are built, is wholly responsive to the architectural policy and party line current at Peking. Since this has shifted from severely plain to elaborate traditional to hybrid plain once more, the present condition of architecture in any part of Communist China is confused. The architect has more prestige as a practical artist in the value scale of Maoism, but his imaginative freedom hardly exists to justify the honor. Outer Mongolian architecture is similarly responsive to Russian developments. In manchurian towns of the Inner Mongolia Autonmous Region, a few public buildings survive in the simple functional design of the Japanese occupation. A very few Mongols may be trained as architects, but their training and models are Chinese.

The window cutouts of Northern and Inner Mongolian Chinese have been adopted vigorously by the Communist propaganda system. State schools and academies study this as folk art, for example the Lu Hsun Art Academy formerly of Yan

Yenan. Modern artists such as Ku Yuan and Chang Kuang-yu are urged to add these to their forms of expression. New designs of the People's Fighters, "Revolutionary Peasants," industrial developments and Communist leaders are circulated for public use, and the household folk artists who originated this form are encouraged to produce their own poltica cutouts.

The Communist campaigns to break down the prestige of the hereditary nobility and shift social emphasis among Chinese and minority people alike may in time seriously curtail the native seamstresses and silversmiths, finest of Mongol artisans, whose products were luxury goods. Similarly, the mass publication of lithographed cutouts will probably devitalize the Chinese folk art. Any promising Mongol painters or sculptors who may rise under the "preservation and encouragement" program will receive, if possible, training in Chinese ateliers; but the extension universally of state-approved standards in all will, like that of intellectual dogma, almost certainly stifle and stultify original work either of Chinese or minority people. The results will also, probably, extend to national uniformity, effectual Communization and sinicization after the Communist pattern for Chinese culture, but the cultural unity of all peoples within the Chinese frontiers will then come at a qualitative low ebb of Chinese civilization viewed from those standards which have in the past made so much of it intellectually and artistically great.

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EDUCATION

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EDUCATION

I. Pre-Communist Education

A. Introduction

In Pre-Communist Inner Mongolia, education was the concern of the family, the Church, the community, and only incidentally of the government. Government and community sponsored schools were primarily for Chinese in the area, although during the Republic some effort was made to set up schools for Mongols, especially in the settled regions. Attendance was not compulsory, and illiteracy was high. The secondary schools (beyond the primary level) were found in the cities such as Kuei-sui, Kalgan, etcetera. Emphasis in the Chinese schools was on reading and writing Chinese, study of the Confucian classics (prior to the Republic) and elementary arithmetic, geography, Chinese history, hygiene and physical education. During the Republic, particularly after 1928, efforts were made to enforce compulsory attendance, with little success in the frontier area. For the most part, education was left to the provincial and local governments, and the amount and quality varied widely in the region. The formal pattern of Chinese education in the region followed that of China "inside the Great Wall"; textbooks were standardized, particularly for the elementary and some secondary schools. Materials relating to modern life were used, and Confucianism was replaced, in general, by "Sun Yat-Sen-ism." (For detailed treatment of Chinese Education, see China Handbook, Education).

Other than the regular, if imperfect, school system in Inner Mongolia, the Christian missions offered another source of education for Chinese and Mongols alike. The Missions, however, were few in the nomadic areas, and their efforts were added to those of the schools in the cities and settled countryside. Their students primarily were the children of Christianized Chinese and Mongols, subject matter conformed to that taught in regular schools, with the addition of material on Christian ethics and doctrine and perhaps more emphasis on sanitation. Mission schools in some areas also emphasized handicrafts and introduced new ideas in agricultural practices.

During the Republic, as in Manchu days, those Chinese who received the best education were the children of landlords, rich merchants and officials. Elementary education became somewhat more widespread under the Republic, and more students were encouraged to attend higher institutions of learning by subsidy, but the majority of Chinese in Inner Mongolia were unable to afford the pleasure of allowing many children to spend long periods away from home---the struggle with the soil required all hands, except in the most favored regions. Yet the Chinese in the region were still Chinese, and the prestige of learning was high; those who were able to make the sacrifice did attempt to educate a son so that he might enter government service or better his status in some other way.

B. Traditional Mongol Education

Nomadic Mongol education, for the commoner, was almost entirely obtained in the family or in the Tibetan Buddhist (lamaist) monastery. Family education consisted of teaching the boys and girls their separate tasks. Boys are taught herding, delivery of young animals, trade, milking of the mare, perhaps some Chinese characters or Mongolian script if the father was himself educated; girls were taught household duties such as preparation of food, sewing, etcetera, by their mothers. All members of the family cooperated on some tasks, for example, felt-making. Itinerant musicians might recite folk songs telling of the deeds of heroes or of Chingis Khan, or an elder might tell a folk tale such as the legend of Gesar Khan. In areas of Chinese-Mongol contact, the Mongol child usually picked up an ability to speak Chinese at an early age, and became familiar with local Chinese custom and beliefs.

By far the most formal education that the common Mongol might obtain was through the Lamaist monastery. Here, however, the teaching was theological, reading and writing were Tibetan (rather than Mongolian or Chinese), and handicrafts such as painting, embroidery, carpentry, etcetera, were devoted to the production of religious items. In the monasteries, prior to the later Republican period, the Mongol youth might obtain his broadest education, with the possibilities of an "academic" career in medicine, mathematics, or theology. If he proved an apt pupil, and could manage to obtain the necessary finances either from his family or by other means, the pupil might hope to go to Tibet and study in one of the famous monasteries. If his abilities lay in the direction of administration, he might aspire to a position in the monastic hierarchy, or to become the head lama at a small local monastery. At the very least, Mongol youth who had obtained some education at a monastery might be able to fill a minor position in the retinue of a prince.

Pei-tzu-miao and Wu-tan-chao are two of the most reknowned academic monasteries of Inner Mongolia. Pei-tzu-miao is located about 250 miles northeast of Kalgan in the territory of the East Abaghanar Banner of the Silingol League. Its name in Mongolian is Pandita Gegen Süme, meaning the Monastery of Pandita Gegen, which is the title of the Khutuktu of Pei-tzu-miao.

The monastery was founded in 1729 by a Tibetan without any Chinese assistance. This independence of its foundation was still reflected in its later position: it was the only major lamasery with no connections to Peking. It was instead, closely related to the Sera monastery in Tibet and represented in its teachings the Sera school, an uncommon branch of the Yellow sect. The monastic academy was divided into four departments, the Department of Dogma or Exoteric Department, the Esoteric Department, the Medical Department and the Astronomical Department, all housed in separate buildings. When visited by Nagao in 1943, over 800 lamas indulged in academic studies, by far the largest number of them in the Exoteric Department (over 700). Less than one-half of the students came from the immediate neighborhood, the other represented all parts of Inner Mongolia and included even some Outer Mongolian lamas, who of course at that time were not in a positon any more to return. As far as the number of students is concerned, Pei-tzu-miao was the largest monastic academy in Inner Mongolia; due probably to the lack of connections with any other center, however, the level of academic learning did not seem to be the highest.

Wu-tan-shao is a short distance northeast of Pao-t'ou and can be reached by a three hours' horse-back ride from one of the stations of the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway. It was founded in 1751 by a Tümet Mongol after completion of his academic studies in Tibet. The Mongolian name of the monastery is Bogotar Sume; Bogotar, the peony, was the name of a woman who had a relationship with the founder. The lamasery is one of the richest in Inner Mongolia, owning among other things, coal and lime mines. Much less secluded that Pei-tzu-miao, its academic level was particularly praised. By 1943 the Academy had about 400 students, about one hundred of them in what could be called preparatory courses, about 200 in the Exoteric Department, and thirty each in the Astronomical Department and in the Lower and Higher Exoteric Departments. Here, too, students came from all over Inner Mongolia, including the Ordos and Alashan, and even some students from Tibet were in attendance.

The higher monastic and secular positions, however, were usually filled by sons of the nobility. During the Manchu dynasty, Mongol nobility were encouraged to send their sons for training and eventual participation in the Chinese literary examinations for civil service eligibility. A few Mongols became so Sinified in this process that they were cut off from their own people, and found more in common with the Manchu Bannermen and scholars with whom they associated than with Mongols.

1. Education policy

Nationalist frontier education was based on directives promulgated by the Ministry of Education in 1930. These directives were supplemented by regulations issued during the war years, of which the one of May 1941 concerning unification of secondary education in frontier districts is of particular importance. The emphasis placed by the National Government on frontier education is shown by the fact that some of the secondary and normal schools for national minorities became national institutions during and after the war, whereas normally they were the responsibility of provincial and city governments.

In 1947 Chu Chia-hua, then Minister of Education of the National Government, demonstrated that frontier education was not so much concerned with geographical or administrative frontiers, but primarily with cultural frontiers, the ultimate aim being the abolition of these frontiers. Even though policies on frontier education had been issued half a generation ago, Chu argued, the realization of this aim was still in the distant future, due, among other reasons, to the low rate of school attendance. By July, 1947, only 6.2 percent of the Mongol children of school age attended school in the province of Jehol. For Chahar and Suiyuan, the percentages were 3.1 and 3.5 respectively.

In Chu's thinking, frontier education was to be based on the traditions of the nationalities, "selecting what is good and rejecting what is bad." These traditions should then be supplemented by education based on the National (Chinese) culture and nationality students should be led to embrace this national culture, so that the cultural frontier would eventually disappear.

Chu was well aware of the fact that the government was not at that time in a position to do more than work toward this aim. Government educational institutions were few in number and qualified educational personnel was hard to enlist. Chu therefore proposed to make use of clerical educational institutions particularly in Mongolia and the Northwest, where lamaseries and mosques had traditionally almost monopolized educational activities. The plan was to impose upon clerical schools the curriculum of secular education. The first experiment along these lines was undertaken at Labrang monastery, where a vocational school for young lamas was established. Other similar experiments were still in the planning stage by 1947. (Ministry of Education, Pien-ch'iang Chiao-yu Kai-k'uang, Nanking 1947, passim).

2. The National Frontier School and the Mongol Tibetan School

There were no educational institutions above the secondary level in Mongolia in pre-Communist times, Mongol students were supposed to get their higher education in China proper. Two schools were especially established to serve frontier education, the National Frontier School at Nanking and the Mongol Tibetan School of Peiping.

The National Frontier School (Kuo-li pien-ch'iang hsüeh-hsiao) is an outgrowth of the Mongolian and Tibetan classes of the Central Political Institute (Chung-yang Cheng-chih hsüeh-hsiao) and was established as an independent unit in 1930. It was known by different names and exercised different functions until its reorganization in 1941. Its main purpose then was to serve as a normal school for secondary and vocational teachers to be used in frontier regions. After the war the school returned from its exile in Szechwan to Nanking with newly provided facilities. By 1947 it had an enrollment of 301 students, the number of Mongols among them was not specified.

In the declining years of the Dynasty, and continuing with modernized curricula on into the Republican period, a Mongol-Tibetan School was established in Peking. This school had a checkered career. It was reinstituted as a National school in 1946 with an enrollment of 337 students. The primary purpose of the school was to train Mongols and Tibetans for governmental positions. In effect, this was the first modern school which specifically concerned itself with these groups. In its founding ordinance, the percentages of students from the different ethnic groups was stated to be the following: Inner and Outer Mongols --fifty percent; Tibetans -- fifteen percent; people from Chinghai -- ten percent. The remaining twenty-five percent were to be Chinese and Manchus.

Mongol students for the school were almost always the sons of nobles. Students were selected by heads of leagues, general commissioners, and chief administrators of each area, and travel expenses of the students to the Capital were to be furnished by local governments. Tuition and living expenses, however, were granted by the government. Only males between the ages of fifteen to twenty were to be admitted, and the number was set at "over 200." The school required students to complete four years in order to graduate, and the curriculum was divided into a preparatory course and a specialized course. If a student entered the school with poor preparation, he was required to study elementary subjects for one to two years before actually beginning his course work in the school. Classes were limited to a maximum of fifty students.

The curriculum in the preparatory course included Chinese, Mongolian, and Tibetan language, Ethics, Geography of China, History of China, World Geography, World History, Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, Biology, Physiology, Health Sciences, Physics, Chemistry, Art, Physical Education, Music, Handicrafts, Government and Economics.

Successful completion of this course of study made the student eligible for the "specialized" course. The purpose of this course was to teach "the science of law, government and economics." Three years of work was required for graduation. Students of the advanced curriculum were exempt from paying tuition, but were required to furnish their own living expenses. The studies were as follows: Chinese, Introduction to Law, Constitution, Civil Law, Criminal Law, Business Law, Administrative Law, International Law, Geography of China, History of China, World Geography, World History, Statistics, Diplomatic History, Foreign Policy, Introduction to Economics, Economic Policy, Political Theory, Science of Finance, Transportation Policy, Colonial Policy, Bookkeeping.

3. Secondary and primary education

From this school a small group of "westernized" Mongols developed, a group who later played a part in the growth of nationalistic feeling in Inner Mongolia, or were the chief instruments of the Nationalist Government in dealings with the Inner Mongols.

On a lower level, the Nationalist government, as represented in the provinces, attempted to carry through its policy of "assimilation" in the border areas through the schools. As mentioned above, the energy with which education, even of the purely Chinese model, was taken to the frontier communities depended upon local and provincial conditions, the National government however, taking an active part in frontier education. In Nationalist areas of Inner Mongolia in the years 1938-1944, primarily in Western Inner Mongolia, some attempt was made to write texts and reference books suitable to education in the region, and loans and scholarships were to be appropriated. In 1942, there were five national normal (higher level) schools, four vocational and a small number of primary schools distributed in different frontier localities. The purpose of "frontier" education during the war was to unify the various peoples of the borders under Chinese culture. Primary education emphasized citizenship training, language, vocational education and hygiene. Secondary education concentrated on technical subject matter. Needless to say, few Mongols participated in this scheme. For example, as late as 1945, a school established by General Fu Tso-yi among the Western Oirat of the Ulanchap League "had carefully avoided teaching anything that might arouse the boys interest in their national (i.e., Mongol) culture. They had never even had anything as practical as history or geography; just some Chinese Nationalist songs and a few characters." (Camam, Land of the Camel page 110)

However, in addition to the regular provincial school system, some schools were also maintained by the banners, such as the elementary school of the Tümet banner in Kuei-su, located in the Temple of Confucius, with an enrollment of about 300 in 1947 (many Chinese among them), where four hours of Mongolian were given each week.

Among the schools established by the National Government in Inner Mongolia, the most advanced one was the National Middle School for the Ikhechao League, established in 1939 in the Talat banner, with a branch in the Chün-wang banner established in 1947. The main school had an enrollment of 310 in 1947 and a staff of fifty, among whom some resolute Mongols were also represented. The school was provisionally housed in Japanese barracks in the outskirts of Pao-t'ou after the war.

In 1942 the National Government established a National Normal School for the Mongols of the unoccupied parts of Suiyuan and Ninghsia at Huang-ch'ü-ch'iao, Ninghsia. By 1947 this school had an enrollment of 259. Dependent upon this Normal School, elementary schools were set up between 1943 and 1946 in the following banners in Western Suiyuan: Dsungar, Hangin, Dalat, Otok, Jasak, Wu-fan, Chün-wang, and Hsi-king with a total enrollment of 838 in 1947. Immediately after the war the National Government established two more National Normal schools for the Mongols of Chahar and Jehol at Kalgan and Ch'ao-yang respectively, in which student enrollment by 1947 was 116 and one hundred. Political developments did not allow enough time for these normal schools to branch out into elementary schools.

D. Education in Japanese Occupied Areas

Japanese penetration, first into Western Manchuria and then, in consort with Mongols lead by Prince Teh, into Inner Mongolia, was accompanied by attention to the problem of education and re-education. Re-education was to be applied to the Lamas (monks) in both a religious and a secular sense. Religiously, attempts were made to send groups of lamas to Japan for this study of Buddhism, beginning in 1934 and continuing into the early 1940's. Japanese Buddhist scholars travelled in Inner Mongolia, studying in the monasteries and preaching the necessity of reform. The intent of this double-barreled approach was to re-orient Mongolian Buddhism toward Japan, as a center of the faith, and to promote a Mongolian Lamaist National Church, whose doctrine would be "purified" and brought more into line with Japanese Buddhist theology. Tokyo was to replace Lhasa in the affections of the Mongol Buddhists. Some success was obtained, although never widespread. To some extent, these attempts were hampered by the policy which was simultaneously employed with the purpose of secularizing many of the lamas.

Recognizing that many abuses had grown up in the monasteries, the Japanese attempted to reduce the number of lamas by means of tests. Failure in such a test meant return to secular life, accompanied in some cases by re-training in secular occupations. The Monastery was to be the channel for the introduction of new ideas, particularly for the introduction of courses in handicrafts and practices of modern medicine. Steps of this sort taken by the Nationalists in 1930-1933 included the institution of a pharmacy in the courtyard of the famous Peking Lamaist temple, Yung-ho Kung. Weather prediction was to be instituted by re-educating the Lama-astrologers.

Thus were the Lamas to be brought into participation in modern education. But the Japanese (and later Prince Te under their supervision) realized that more was needed to prepare the Mongols for a key role in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In the Hsingan Manchurian region, 314 schools had been established by 1936, in which compulsory attendance was enforced. Mongolian was established as the official written language and was taught in the schools. Teachers were trained in Japan or literate elders were used as teachers; such a combination in one school brought starkly to the fore the attempt to combine the traditional knowledge and the new. The response of the Mongol pupils was, in most cases, eager. Haslund (Mongolian Journey, p. 98) describes one group of pupils in this way: "The lads were dressed in a sort of cadet uniform with polished buttons, and I had to look closely at their clean washed faces to convince myself that they were really Mongols. They made not the slightest attempt to show that indifference to surprises by which Mongols usually set so much store; as soon as the lesson was over they flung themselves upon me with a stream of eager questions."

II. The Communist Period

During the period of the Japanese war, education was an area of struggle for the minds of the youth of Inner Mongolia. Despite efforts by the Japanese, Prince Te's Government, and some attempts by the Nationalists in the western part of Inner Mongolia, the number of primary schools by 1947 was slightly above 800 and a few secondary schools existed.

Communist emphasis on minorities' education has always been strong. In Yenan days they gained some experience in educating Mongol youngsters, as the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area included periodically Mongol inhabited territory. Already at that period they applied the principle, always neglected by the KMT, of using the Mongolian language for general topics in schools for Mongols. They also had used a set of textbooks in Mongolian on such disciplines as geography, history, and the natural sciences. During the war years a College of Nationalities was founded at Yenan for training national minority cadres, many of these Mongols (Report of Ulanfu, JMJP January 20, 1952). Ulanfu was at one time head of the College. Out of this College grew the Central Institute for Nationalities, headed by Ulanfu, which was opened on June 11, 1951 at Peking. At the time of its foundation the Institution consisted of three training classes for administrative and military workers. The enrolled students comprised minority students as well as Chinese to be trained to work in minority areas. Required courses at the Institute are: Introduction to the general conditions of the country; Fundamentals of China's international relations; The Sino-Soviet alliance; Chinese history including history of the nationalities; The Common Program; The Chinese Communist Party; The People's Liberation Army. Care was taken to have the Institute housed in a particularly impressive new building (Hsü Chien, Education for Minorities, China Monthly Review, October 1952, 361-365).

In Mongolia, an Inner Mongolia Military and Political College, an Inner Mongolia Autonomy College, an Administrative Cadre School, a Health Cadres School, and other cadres classes were founded after the inauguration of the IMAR. To these were added later an Inner Mongolian Teachers Training College founded in 1952; and an Institute for Animal Husbandry and Veterinarian Medicine.

For the period from 1947 to the present, we are at the mercy of the figures given by the Chinese Communists. Even if such figures are discounted, it is probable that the number of schools and students has risen with the concerted drive by the Communist Government to increase the effectiveness of organs of mass communication, such as newspapers and books. Accepting for the moment the Communist figures, prior to 1947 (the establishment of the IMAR), there were about 27,424 Mongol children in primary schools; by the end of 1951 there were 109,140 Mongols distributed among the 4084 or 4227 primary schools. The number of Mongol pupils, if this figure is even approximately correct was about one-third of the total number of pupils enrolled.

In 1953 the number of Mongol primary schools (i.e., having only Mongol pupils) was stated to be 1,140 with 93,166 students enrolled who were taught by 3,387 Mongol teachers. The number of mixed Mongol-Han schools is unstated. It was said that the number of Mongol primary students was 211 percent more than in "pre-liberation days." We are given a check on the consistency of the Communist figures by comparison with the figures for 1954: at the end of this year there were 7,400 primary schools in the region with 560,000 children, of which 1,194 primary schools with 83,424 children were Mongol. The number of Mongol pupils here is said to be "three times the peak pre-liberation figure." If we now compare the results of dividing 83,424 by three, we obtain a figure of roughly 29,800, a figure which is close to the 27,424 mentioned earlier, and is as close as many official figures come to one another. By the end of 1954 twenty-seven Mongol or joint Mongol-Chinese secondary schools are reported.

It must not be assumed that the number of schools and students mentioned represent concrete reality. On the basis of developments in other parts of China, many of these are probably "paper schools," and do not actually open for lack of textbooks, premises, administrators, etcetera.

Despite the increase in number of schools and in total enrollment, evidence points to the concentration of schools in areas of joint Mongol-Han settlement. By the end of 1954 we are told that there were forty-five primary and two middle schools in livestock areas (i.e., nomadic regions). Enrollment in the forty-seven schools was about 6,000 pupils. This was about seven percent of the total Mongol student enrollment in primary schools for 1954. Some of the schools in livestock areas were in fixed locations, where the herdsmen had been stabilized; some were boarding schools, and some travelled with the nomads. There are indications that attempts are being made to settle the nomads still more by fixing the grazing grounds--in effect, by gradually turning the nomad into husbandman.

Turning to the problem of teachers, it is indicated that up to 1955, teachers were procured from three sources; Chinese teachers trained in China proper; Mongol or other minority nationality teachers trained in the Inner Mongolian Teachers Training College (established in 1952); and teachers trained in local training centers or special Party schools. The Inner Mongolian Teachers Training College was supposed to have trained 400 teachers in the three years from 1952 to 1955; but in 1953 there were listed a total of 3,387 Mongol primary teachers, 243 Mongol secondary teachers, and sixteen Mongol teachers in the Inner Mongolian Institute of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine, and the Mongol Language School and the Inner Mongolian Teachers Training College. No figures are available to us for later periods. In addition to teachers from the above mentioned sources, two specialists from the Mongolian People's Republic were invited in 1955, presumably to teach in the Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine Institute.

Attempts are being made to institute schools of all levels for the students of nationalities other than Chinese or Mongol, but by the end of 1953 there were only 6,772 primary, 742 secondary and twenty-eight higher studies students of Chinese

Moslem, Korean, Manchu and Orochon groups. Teachers from these groups numbered 256 primary and 37 secondary. By the end of 1954, only 300 teachers of these nationalities were counted, a very minor increase.

There seems to be a concerted effort to teach the minority nationalities pupils in their own language, and to prepare textbooks for them in that language if it is written. More than 300,000 copies of textbooks in Mongolian were printed in 1952; and in 1955 a special organization was set up to translate and edit textbooks for Inner Mongolian students. Mongols are taught in Mongol where possible, but also learn Chinese, and in those places where a joint Mongol-Han school is established, separate classes are set up for each group if it is feasible. The lack of Mongol teachers has resulted, in many places, in the Mongol being taught in Chinese, and thus some dissatisfaction has been expressed. It is true, however, that more attention is being paid to training Mongol teachers and using the Mongolian languages in the schools for Mongols. Until 1955, the old Mongolian script was taught, but beginning in 1956, a new script, based on the Cyrillic alphabet is to be instituted. By 1960, all publication except the classics are to be in the new script.

In the schools of other nationalities, such as those belonging to the Chinese Moslem, Manchu, Korean or Orochon groups, Mongolian and Chinese are studied along with the mother tongue. The content of education under the Communists is oriented toward bringing the youth wholeheartedly into the national framework. A primary aim is the elimination of illiteracy, and in the first half of 1956 drives were being conducted to eliminate illiteracy in the various regions by certain target dates. For the IMAR, "young Mongolian illiterates are to be eliminated in 1958" (CMP #1202, Jan. 6, 1956).

The forwarding of this plan is not left to the schools alone; associations for eliminating illiteracy are being formed in all areas, through which every person capable of reading and writing is to teach an illiterate. Cooperatives, trade unions, youth organizations, etcetera, are to be pressed into the drive, and are to set up classes and programs for coping with the problem. Teachers are pressed to cooperate in the compilation of textbooks. The basis for the drive against mass illiteracy is stated to be so that "the people may keep pace with the needs of the growingly developed industry and agriculture, and promote the accelerated development of Socialist construction." (SCMP #1221, Feb. 2, 1956).

One of the means used to combat illiteracy is through adult education. In 1950, a Workers' and Peasants' Short-term Middle School and a Workers' and Peasants' Sparetime School were established for the purpose of raising the literacy standards of both Mongol and Han-Chinese cadres recruited from the farmers and workers. In January, 1954, at the express orders of the Central Committee of the CCP, the local party committees in Inner Mongolia as in other parts of China, were instructed to redouble their efforts at promoting spare-time cultural education work, for members of the party and the New Democratic Youth League, and winter schools for the peasants and herdsmen. In January, 1955, it was reported that there were 270,000 peasants and herdsmen in the IMAR attending winter schools taught by over 5,700 part-time Han Chinese and Mongol instructors.

Education in the IMAR, follows the line laid down at the First Conference on Nationalities Education in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Nov. 22-Dec. 1, 1954). One of the foremost tasks projected was the need to "strengthen education in patriotism, internationalism and nationalities solidarity and simultaneously to conduct education labor and discipline so as to cultivate the students' right viewpoint of labor and their self-conscious discipline." (Nei MK Jih Pao, Dec. 23, 1954). Within the schools this task is carried out not only in connection with materials used in course work, but through extra-curricular activities. Among these activities are participation by students in Young Pioneers' groups, in the Communist Youth League (formerly the NDYL), and in Student Unions (in the secondary schools). The Students Union in a secondary school must be led by the school principal, and the Student Union Committee aids him "to lead and the teachers to impel the students to implement the measures for elevating the quality of the students in study, to impel the students to abide by rules, to arouse the interest of the students in domestic and foreign events, and to organize adequately the students to take part in social and political activities."

Students also are expected to participate in extracurricular cultural, recreational and political activities, take part in public welfare and social work, and help to prepare wall posters and blackboard news.

The most important problems of the educational authorities in the IMAR seem to be the lack of teachers and the low standard of present teachers, the language problems (which will probably continue to be complicated due to the recent decision to introduce a new alphabet and pronunciation for Chinese and a new alphabet for Mongolian), the lack of material for teaching in the Mongolian language, the problem of providing separate classes or schools for Mongols and Chinese, and the necessity for students to leave the region to obtain specialized training other than Veterinary Medicine, Animal Husbandry, and Teaching.

(For further data on Books, Magazines, Newspapers and other mass media of communication, cf. sections of IMAR Handbook on Propaganda, and Public Information, and the Section on Education in the China Handbook).

RELIGION

I. Lamaism
  A. Development
  B. Inner Mongolian Lamaism
  C. Social and Political Role of Lamaism
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Additional Readings

RELIGION

I. Lamaism

A. Development

Lamaism is a distinct form of Buddhism, differentiated from the type prevailing in Japan, China, Southeast Asia and India by certain doctrinal and organizational variations. Yet Lamaism stems from the same source as does the Buddhism of these regions, and shares with them certain fundamental beliefs. The Buddhism of the sixth century B.C. gave rise to two major schools; the "pure" school called Hinayana (Small vehicle) or Theravada and the "mixed" school called Mahayana (Great vehicle). These two schools, respectively, are also called Southern Buddhism and Northern Buddhism, a division based on the area of influence each possesses. Southern Buddhism is prevalent today in Ceylon, parts of India, Burma, Thailand, and parts of Indo-China. Northern Buddhism has followers, grouped into several schools, in China, Japan, Indo-China, and of course, Tibet and Mongolia.

The Hinayana (Southern School) became a somewhat austere and abstract creed, emphasizing salvation for the individual by meditation, abstinence from worldly desires, and understanding of the causes of suffering in the world. It was a highly personal belief; one sought to retire from the world, ideally to join the community of monks as the only road to complete emancipation and salvation.

Prior to the beginning of the Christian era, forces working within Buddhism began to emerge. The need of a more human, emotional religion, offering a way of salvation to more than the world-renouncing individuals. This need eventually came to be expressed in the Mahayana school. Instead of individual salvation only, the salvation of all sentient beings became a goal; the individual who reached "sainthood" or enlightenment (Nirvana) renounced his salvation and returned to the world to work for the enlightenment of all. This "world-returning" individual became known as a Bodhisattva, and the historic Buddha himself, Sakyamuni Gautama, was considered to be only one of a number of "enlightened" Buddhas who appear in recurring periods to show the path to salvation. It is possibly from this idea of the re-appearance of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas that the concept of reincarnation of deities in human form took hold, and was extended to include the reincarnation of human "saints." Such reincarnations in Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) are the well-known Dalai and Panchen Lamas in Tibet, or the Chang-chia Khutukhtu and the Urga Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu of Inner and Outer Mongolia. These reincarnates, and many other reincarnations in Mongolia have been improperly called "living Buddhas."

Belief in a Buddha or Bodhisattva assured one of salvation in the Northern School, and the path to enlightenment was broadened. One did not need become a monk to be saved; pure belief, good works, or intellectual knowledge were alternate ways to enlightenment, and even a layman could aspire to "become Buddha."

It is the Northern form of Buddhism which came to Tibet, and became known as Lamaism. Lamaism itself is a further development of Northern Buddhist ideas, and it incorporates Mahayana ideological conceptions, native Tibetan beliefs in a sort of Shamanism called Bön, and Tantrism. Tantrism, which played a large part in forming the Lamaist ideology, is a system of magical and sacramental rituals, which professes to attain the highest aims of religion by such methods as spells, diagrams, gestures and other physical exercises. The influence of Tantrism and specialized aspects of the system is evident in the constant repetitions of the formula "Om mani padme hum," the use of the prayer cylinder and prayer flag, etcetera. Tantrism was much in consonance with the old Tibetan beliefs, and Padma Sambhava, founder (ca. 647 A.D.) of the "unreformed" Red Sect of Lamaism, the first to be established in Tibet, employed much Tantric ritual in planting the belief among the Tibetans.

The complex theology incorporated into or developed by Tibetan Buddhism included a massive pantheon of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, tutelary deities or protecting spirits, female deities who are consorts of the many Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, country, local and personal spirits, and "saints"--canonized mortals who were teachers, disciples of famous teachers, or scholars. The basic doctrines and explanations of the doctrine were translated from the Sanskrit into Tibetan, commentaries were written by Tibetan scholars through the ages, and the whole (forming the doctrinal basis of the present dominant sect in Tibet) was grouped together as the Kanjur and Tanjur.

But it was only the lamas (monks) who really grappled with the intricacies of the theology; the mass of believers were spared this intellectual exercise. In Tibet, and in the Lamaism which came to Inner and Outer Mongolia, the layman was told to put his faith in the Buddha, the Dharma (the rules of behavior, concepts of the world, the doctrine and way to salvation) and the Sangha (the community of Buddhists, primarily monks). In practice, the belief in the community of monks, the lamas, became the most important aspect of the religion for the layman. It was only through the lama and his intercession that the layman could be saved; it was the lama who interpreted and simplified the pantheon of gods, demons, and spirits for the layman. The layman accepted the pantheon, prayed to the various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, believed in the concept of a purgatory where fierce demons lead by the god of death battled with the "angry" aspects of the benevolent gods for the souls of the dead, believed in the power of the lama to coerce the gods or supplicate them into aiding a man in his daily life, and believed that the very existence of a community of lamas protected the lay community. The importance of the lama as a mediator between layman and the spiritual world cannot be exaggerated--for from this importance grew the social and political importance of Lamaism and the monastic system among the Mongols. The lama was the guide on the path to eventual escape from the apparently endless round of re-birth into the world, or at least was the one who could aid a person to obtain re-birth into a higher status. The position of the lama is nowhere better stated than in the work of Timkowski (Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China. London, 1827, v. 2, p. 350-51):

> "You will attain the highest wisdom if you honour the lamas; the sun itself, which dispels impenetrable mists, rises only that honour may be rendered to the lamas; the most enormous sins obtain pardon, by showing respect to the learned lamas. By glorifying the grand lama you incline the Bourkhans (deities) and the Bodisadu (Bodhisattva) to diffuse blessings, and to avert evil. The benediction of the grand lama gives bodily strength, communicates great advantages to you, and confers glory. If you sincerely implore, during a whole day, the benediction of a lama, all the sins committed during innumerable generations are effaced; a man then becomes a Bourkhan."

B. Inner Mongolian Lamaism

The Mongols are followers of Tibetan Buddhism. They belong to the reformed sect founded in the fifteenth century by Tsongkhapa. The older sects, collectively known as the "Red" sects, had incorporated much magic and tantric ritual into their beliefs, and had permitted their monks to marry. Tsongkhapa established a strict monastic discipline, marked by insistence upon celibacy, eliminated some of the magical practices (many were retained) which had crept into the religion and distinguished his sect from the older sects by a distinctive costume, the yellow "horse mane" hat. From the color of this distinctive costume the sect became known as the "Gelugpa," the yellow sect. Within a century and a half, the Yellow sect had established its dominance in Tibet, and held its position to the present.

The spread of Lamaism among the Mongols was rapid, covering almost all Mongolia by the end of the seventeenth century. In the eastern and northern portions of the present Inner Mongolian Autonomous Republic, Lamaism did not become dominant until the mid-1700's, and even today some groups of Mongols in this area practice shamanism. A strong impetus to the spread of Lamaism was given by the Mongol nobility and the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, particularly during the eighteenth century. The Manchu Court contributed to the building of temples, including magnificent centers in Peking and Jehol, and encouraged lamaism as a means of institutional control of the Mongols. An interesting sidelight upon the Manchu socio-religious policy toward the Mongols is found in many Mongolian monasteries. Frequently one finds a temple in the Lamaist monastery dedicated to the deified Chinese warrior Kuan Yü or Kuan Kung. When the Manchus had conquered the Mongols, they drew upon the popular Chinese tale, San-kuo-chih, wherein Kuan Yü, Liu Pei, and Chang Fei, three heroes, are allied. Drawing the parallel, the Manchus placed themselves in the part of Kuan Yü, the Mongols in the part of Liu Pei, and the Chinese in the part of Chang Fei. In effect, then, the temple of Kuan Yü in the Lamaist monastery is perhaps both a secular reminder of the alliance between Mongol and Manchu, and a religious symbol of the Emperor as head of the religion and defender of the faith.

Lamaism introduced new elements into the social structure of the Mongols. The most important introduction was the clerical hierarchy, the monks. At the time of the introduction of Lamaism (ca. 1560), the various levels of the hierarchy were equated with the different levels of Mongol society; thus reincarnations and high lamas were equated with the nobility, lamas of the lower grade and those without rank were equated to the commoners. Lamas were recruited from all classes of society, those belonging to the nobility being called "Toin." It was not rare for some of the sons of banner chiefs to become lamas and be placed at the head of large monasteries. Throughout the Ch'ing dynasty, the Court attempted to discourage this practice, and to keep separate the clergy and lay nobility.

Within the lamaist institutional organization, a complex structure of statuses, grades and ranks existed. Lamas might seek academic degrees (based on knowledge of theology, astrology and mathematics, medicine, or esoterics), monastic administrative positions, or positions as part-time lamas in local temples in the nomadic regions. Basically, the clerical hierarchy and its aspirations were modelled on the Tibetan prototype, and those who sought academic status attempted to spend some time in Tibetan monastic schools.

Lamas were divided into four classes: reincarnations

(Khutukhtus), "jasak lamas," monastery lamas and lay lamas. The reincarnations were those called "living Buddhas" and were thought to appear in new bodies generation after generation. A reincarnation could be found among commoner or noble families, although noble reincarnates predominated. Primary in Inner Mongolia during the Ch'ing dynasty were the Changchia Khutukhtu and a group of reincarnations resident in Peking. Even as late as the Republic and the period of Japanese invasion of Inner Mongolia some of these Peking reincarnates played an important political role. During the Ch'ing dynasty the "cult of reincarnates" spread most strongly in Inner Mongolia, where officially 157 such personages were counted, and the unofficial number was even higher.

Jasak lamas were not very well represented in Inner Mongolia. These were the group who were both lamas and princes, having control of pastures, people, and herds as their private domain. A Jasak lama was entitled to both political and religious power in his territory. In Inner Mongolia, the most prominent Jasak Lamas were the Changchia Khutukhtu, with territory around Dolonor, the Shiretu Kulun Jasak Ta Lama of Hsiao Kulun, a small territory in the southeast extremity of present day Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic, and the reincarnations resident at Kueihua and Dolonor. The power of these lamas was greatly restricted during the Republic and under the Japanese domination during the Mengchiang period.

Monastery lamas were those attached full-time to a monastery. This group was divided into "academic" lamas and "administrative" lamas. The academicians were those concerned with studying or teaching various aspects of the doctrine, and the administrators, of various ranks, with the actual day to day operation of the monastery. In most cases, reincarnations were also actually "monastery lamas," having control over academic and/or administrative affairs within the monastery, either by prestige or by virtue of office.

Lay-lamas were most often widows and widowers who had reached the age of fifty. They had taken first vows of abstinence, celibacy, belief in the community of lamas, etcetera, and remained at home. They were entitled to wear lamas' robes and for the most part they devoted their lives to the service of the Buddha, through prayer, pilgrimage, and worship.

Not least in importance was the introduction through Lamaism of the monastery itself. Into a region of nomadism, Lamaism brought a center of stability, a sedentary establishment. The monastic system functioned as a means of population control, a necessity imposed by the restriction of the Mongols to banner territories. Almost every family had at least one son in the monastery, and many families found it necessary to place more of their male children there because of the lack of pasture land. The monastery also drew inhabitants from among the old, sick, and crippled, thus functioning as a sort of "rest home." Within the monasteries, almost one-fourth of the total Inner Mongolian population resided, or between fifteen to thirteen percent of the male population. The monasteries were the points around which the nomads began to settle down. In places where a monastery was located there were frequently established administrative headquarters and trade centers. Monasteries were erected in key positions; along caravan routes, in wooded areas, near major border towns.

Monasteries became important economic institutions in Inner Mongolia. In addition to their roles as trade centers, the monasteries held land, loaned money, manufactured small articles, participated in transport, stored grain. Much of the monastery income was derived from contributions, and the effect was to deplete the resources of the lay Mongol, particularly on the numerous occasions of major religious celebrations. Basically, the monastery was a prime consumer of Mongol subsistence goods, although its role as a catalyst in the exchange process between Chinese and Mongol cannot be ignored.

In addition to its institutional aspects, Lamaism brought into Mongolia certain aspects of Tibetan culture. Tibetan language, dress, art forms, medicinal practices, ceremonial calendar, folktales were adopted by monks or lay Mongols and became part of Mongol life. The influence of the religion itself penetrated deeply into the every-day life of the people. The whole life of the Mongol was impregnated with religion, and there were few occasions of importance which were not accompanied by some religious rite. Attempts by rival religions such as Christianity to convert the Mongols have had little success.

The day-to-day influence of the religion and the clergy upon Mongol life can be described best by illustrations. For example, the Mongol built his tent or house only in a place indicated by the lama, and occupied it only after the lama had blessed the habitation. Each Mongolian family had, usually in front of the door a "kei mori," a square piece of white linen covered with magic formulas in Tibetan letters, bearing a picture of a horse with a jewel (chindamani) on his back. This flag was tied to a post and blessed by the lama at the moment when the pole was sunk into the ground. In front of the "kei mori" is a small hillock, usually of beaten earth;it is on this hillock, which serves as an altar that an offering of incense was made to obtain good luck. It might be offered every day, on the first or fifteenth of the month or on special occasions.

Like the Tibetan, the Mongol lamaist carried a rosary which was counted while the formula "Om mani padme hum" was recited over and over again. Contributions were given to the mendicant monks, and to temples for maintenance and construction. Contributions were also periodically requested and given for the purchase of religious books or pictures of divinities for the temples, images, or for celebration of a service. Those families which had a son in a monastery were obligated for a portion of his up-keep, and if he were studying for an academic degree, had to contribute to a feast for the monks at his "graduation." Lamas were invited and paid for funeral services, sick calls, to bless a journey, at births, etcetera. On almost every possible occasion, the religion and its practicioners were called in to participate.

Religion entered into the occupations of the Mongol as well. The nomadic herders paid honor to "Hayan Kirwaa" (Hayagriva, the horse-headed god) by dedicating a horse to him. Such consecrated horses wore a distinguishing band of linen, blessed by a lama, which was tied into the mane. The mane was never thereafter cut. For prosperity and fecundity of the oxen, sheep goat and camel herds, the "White Old Man," a pre-Buddhist figure (since the entry of Lamaism incorporated into Buddhism) was worshipped. (See section on Social Values and Patterns of Living.)

The agricultural Mongols also resort to the lama and to a religious ceremony to obtain a good harvest. Each year, a little before the harvest is ripe, a certain number of cultivators of neighboring fields meet in a pre-determined place and plant in the earth a bundle of willow-branches brought from the sand-dunes. This bundle is called "shangshi." It has been blessed by a lama, and a little flag covered with formulas and prayers is fixed to it. On the occasion of the ceremony, a goat is sacrificed near the "shangshi" and wrestling contests held. Lamas are also asked to perform a ceremony to bring rain, particularly in time of drought. The ceremony lasts for three days or longer, and may be performed in one of these three forms:
1) use of a "rain-stone" (jada), which is buried in a marshy place inside a bottle; 2) reading of a section of the Tibetan religious work Kanjur by lamas in horse-back procession;
3) reading of the Kanju (yöm volumes) by lamas in the temple, on a hill, or near a spring.

Lamas were also called in for purification ceremonies on many occasions, such as the following: if iron should drop into a well, the lama had to be called as soon as possible to purify it. A woman who had given birth was unclean for a month, and during this period a stranger could not enter house or tent on pain of contamination. Should he do so, a lama had to perform the purification.

C. Social and Political Role of Lamaism:

As has been noted above, Lamaism brought into Mongol society a hierarchical clerical organization with its own complex economic-political-ideological system, and the necessity for a sedentary life for the majority of its adherents. From the first, the upper ranks of the clergy were allied with the Mongolian nobility and the Manchu court. The lamas of all ranks became a privileged class within the society, having about them an aura of sanctity which was useful in claiming their privileges. The lamas of all classes had religious authority over secular princes and were exempt from all secular duties and taxes. As the educated group of Mongols, other than a few of the higher nobility, lamas frequently became important in secular administrative affairs in the role of scribes.

Within the class of lamas, however, there was a considerable gap between the rank and file and the reincarnations and monastery administrators. In some areas, the economic difference between an ordinary lama and his monastic superiors was perhaps greater than the difference between a common herdsman and his prince. Thus during the Japanese occupation of Jehol, it was found that the ordinary lama in Ch'eng-te was barely able to eke out a living of about six yen a month, from a government subsidy, worshipper's offerings, money from sales of incense, etcetera. Some lamas turned to helping farmers in the fields as part-time laborers. However, despite such a situation, the lamas as a group formed a class apart from the rest of the Mongol people.

The Japanese did not underestimate the position of this class in Mongol life when they began preparations to move into Innter Mongolia. One section of the Japanese high-policy planners considered it important for the Japanese to continue the Manchu policy of setting Lamaism in opposition to the temporal Banner system and using it as an aid in settling the Mongols. Japanese use of Monasteries and Lamas had begun as early as the Russo-Japanese war. After the war a party of thirty high lamas and dignitaries were invited to Japan and a conference was held between them and the Higashi Hongwanji Buddhist sect, around the idea of pan-Buddhism. In 1918 a "Buddhist Association of Mongolia and Japan" (Nichi-Mo Bukkyokai) was established, with seventeen lamas in attendance. In 1919, as a result of a Japanese tour of Inner Mongolia, the name of the association was changed to the Buddhist Association of Asia, and a Mukden agency was founded to aid in the exchange of students between Japan and Mongolia. Japanese interests reached as far west in Inner Mongolia as Chinghai, with the journey in 1920-21 of a Kudo Tesusaburo to the "Living Buddha" of the Labrang monastery to collect funds for the purpose of financing troops and restoring "the world as it was in the days of the Ch'ing Dynasty."

Over the course of time, many abuses had grown up around the lamaist system, and despite the veneration in which the religion and the lamas were held, a small group of Inner Mongol princes and "progressive youth" desired to reform the church. This movement was supported by the Japanese, since it fit in with their desire to use the Church in their political designs. Reforms included the re-orientation of Mongol lamas toward Japan and away from Tibet (to be accomplished by re-educating a number of lamas in Japan); the replacement of Tibetan by Mongolian as the religious and monastic language; the restriction of the number of lamas and the forbidding of lamas to deal with Chinese merchants; denial of the right of reincarnations to hold "shabinar" ("disciples," either lama or lay, who were obliged to work for the one whose shabinar they were); introduction of new medical and scientific ideas into monastic education; and encouragement of a "militant monasticism," by training lama troops.

The admitted need for reforms in the church did not indicate a denial of religion; rather it meant a revitalization of the religion. Lamaism was to do again what it had once done in its early life in Inner Mongolia--to infuse into Mongol life new aspects of another culture, and bring even the old gods into the modern world. (For more on the political role of Lamaism in the Mengchiang period, see section on History).

II. Shamanistic Traditions

Lamaism established itself among the Mongols by cooperation with the nobility, by the support of the dominant political power in the region, and by incorporation of many aspects of the existing religious beliefs into the Lamaist system. This existing religion consisted of worship of deities of the mountains, fire, the hearth, sickness, thunder, spirits of the ancestors, etcetera. Only the shaman was en rapport with the spirits or had them at his command. It was through the shaman that one established connection with the spirits. In all religious ceremonies, the shaman was the principal actor. But shamanism was not an organized religion; it had no established church, no clerical hierarchy. Only certain individuals, usually those with emotional or physical abnormalities, were marked out to become shamans. Such a loose and un-structured system readily gave way before Lamaism. Most of the deities were equated by the lamas with Buddhist deities, although some of them were taken over in toto. One such deity is the White Old Man, previously mentioned, who has a prominent place in the annual masked dances of Mongol monasteries. The shaman himself has

been supplanted in many of his functions by a special lama, the "gurtum," who functions during the dances as an oracle and diviner.

The major religious ceremonials of the Mongols are conducted by the Lamas or with the participation of a lama. Chief among these ceremonies is the annual monastery performance of the masked dances of "Cham," commonly called "devil dances." During this ceremony, the dancers perform a series of "acts" which tell the story of the founding of the religion and the triumph over the pre-Buddhist forces in Tibet. Interpolated into this story in Mongolia are the symbolic struggle of the White Old Man with the Dragon King, for the souls of men or the spirits of cattle.

Obo Festival

In the popular religion, however, the annual "Obo" festival is perhaps the most significant among the nomads. Obos, usually placed in conspicuous points in the countryside, consist of stones, branches of trees, and the remains of skeletons, piled up to form a pyramidal structure. Such structures are carried over from the pre-Buddhist religion, and are offerings to the various local deities of the place of their erection. Obos were made by banners as a whole or by a section of a banner, and during the Ch'ing dynasty, some were constructed as boundary markers between banners.

In the fifth month of every year, the banner always observed festivities in honor of its obos. The banner chief himself took charge of the observances, on the day calculated by the astrologers to be the luckiest day for the festival. When the preparations had been made at the foot of the obo by priests and laymen-attendants, the fire was lighted around the obo and on the obo top lamas blew blasts on conches. The Chief lama and his assistants knelt in front of the obo and recited prayers. The chief lama, representing all the people, prayed to the gods of heaven and earth, mountains and rivers, for the protection of all the people of his banner and the safety of their cattle. All the people then worshipped simultaneously while facing the obos, and the service ended with the scattering of pieces of sacrificial animals to the obo, the fire, and into the air. Afterward all joined in horseracing, wrestling and archery contests. The whole ceremony came to an end with the distribution and eating of the food left over from the sacrifices.

But despite the inclusiveness of Lamaism, some aspects of Shamanism, and in some places shamans, still exist outside of the pale of the organized religion. The ceremonial fire worship is still primarily a pre-Buddhist ceremony. This ceremony is held once a year, on the twenty-third day of the Mongols' twelfth month. Each tent conducts its own ceremony. All fires are extinguished on the morning of the twenty-third, and preparations for the ceremony begun. An elder of the family officiates as the director of the sacrifice. The hearth is prepared by the chief woman of the tent and the kindling is lit by her. The director of the ceremony then throws bits of sacrificial meat, liquor, and butter into the fire while reciting a prayer to the fire-god and the divine fire-maidens. No lamas take part in this ceremony.

The stronghold of Shamanism among the Mongols of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic, however, is in the Hu-Na League (northernmost Inner Mongolia). It is prevalent among the Dagurs, Solons, Olonchons, and some Buryats. Traces of shamanist worship and extant shamans however, occur down to the southeastern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic, and in the northeastern portion of the Silingol league. Among one Jarod group, located on the east face of the Hsingan mountains, the position of shaman was hereditary. The chief function of the shaman was in the treatment of illness. Numerous gods were invoked, drums were beaten and a dance performed, accompanied by chants. The treatment was aimed at driving the evil spirits of sickness out of the patient's body. Frequently the gods that are invoked are those who reside on the tops of mountains.

Among the Ordos, in particular (although practiced elsewhere as well), the cult of Chingis Khan is prominent. Three local sanctuaries were most important: Yeke Edjin Khoro, Domd Edjin Khoro, and Baga Edjin Khoro. In the Yeke Edjin Khoro were kept the bones of Chingis Khan, according to legend. These sanctuaries were guarded by a special "tribe" called Darkhat, members of which were not subject to pay taxes and were not subordinated to other princes. The Darkhat were due honor equivalent to that of princes. Darkhat collected alms for the maintenance of the sanctuaries from as far afield as the Chahar and Khalkha Mongols, none of whom could easily refuse a contribution.

Every year on the twenty-first of the sixth lunar month, a ceremony in honor of Chingis Khan was held in a special place located near the Yeke Edjin Khoro. On the day of celebration, all three Edjin Khoro were dismantled and brought together. Lamas are invited to participate in this ceremony, reading prayers in honor of Chingis. Only men take part in the worship, women watching from a distance. First the men proceed to the three Edjin Khoro and bow before them; they then proceed to the horse which represents a horse which Chingis Khan dedicated to the gods, bow, and leave money before it; then they go to the person who represents the golden picket to which the Khan's horse was to be tied--this picket was, in the legend,

stolen by an ancestor of the person chosen to represent it in the ceremony. The group then proceeds to the horse which Chingis used for riding, and finally to the nine white camels which drew the carts carrying the Edjin Khoro.

During the time when the worshippers go from one place to another, the Darkhats hurry the worshippers. To the most important Prince of the group, the Darkhats shout "quickly, quickly Prince, go, go!" Not even old and fat princes are allowed to move slowly. The commoners are treated even more roughly; they are pursued by the Darkhats with willow twigs and beaten. Lesser nobility are also treated to the twig if they appear without their bead of rank on their hats.

The ceremony lasts two days, the second day being devoted to sacrifices and worship of Chingis alone. During the second day, a sheep's chest is opened and the heart, lungs, and possibly the windpipe from the living animal are placed before the shrine of Chingis. Signs are supposed to appear on the quivering heart, from which are foretold the future for the area. Toward the end of the day, the Darkhats of the Baga Edjin Khoro load it on a cart and depart secretly. The Darkhats of the Yeke Edjin Khoro pursue them through the night, and if they do not manage to catch up with the Baga Edjin Khoro before it crosses a river en route to its permanent locale, they are in disgrace for the year. The reverse holds true should they succeed.

Recently, the Communist Government has attempted to make use of the veneration of Chingis by building a mausoleum at Edjin Khoto to house the remains. Obviously, this cannot help but change the nature of the ceremony and the position of the Darkhats.

Another remnant of the old pre-Buddhist religion is the "Cult of Heaven." It is to Heaven (Tengri) that the first drops of milk are offered after the morning's milking. Buddhist elements are incorporated into the practice of this cult, however, for when the drops of milk are tossed toward the sky, the formula "Om Ah Hum" is uttered. A similar practice is observed before drinking tea, alcohol, fermented mare's milk (kumiss) etcetera. A portion of solid food is also dedicated to Heaven before beginning to eat.

Where Mongols and Chinese have resided side by side for a number of years, some Chinese influence has crept into Mongol practices. The Chinese New Year's Eve, for example, is celebrated in addition to their own Lamaist ceremonies. Sheep and hogs are sacrificed on this day and are offered before the image of Buddha. Sweets and bean-jam buns are also offered to the Buddha. The whole family assembles and has a meal called "pu-ho-lo" in the morning. In the evening, a service for the Buddha is held, under the auspices of a lama. When the reading of the service is completed by the lama, the head of the family and the members of the family bow to each other and firecrackers are exploded three times. Then the youngest greets father, mother and seniors in order of age, each taking his or her turn. Following the greeting, each receives a small amount of money, and the head of the household is knelt before. Throughout this evening, the fire must be kept burning, for should it go out, there will be trouble about food and shelter during the year.

On New Year's day, the yurts (tents) are wrapped with red. Morning worship is made to the gods of the four directions and to the Buddha. Then all members of the family gather in front of the head of the family, kneel down and pay respect, and await his words. Such words include a wish for long life, marriage or children, happiness and prosperity in the coming year. The rest of the day is spent in visiting or being visited by neighbors.

The period of visiting is generally spent at home until the fourth or fifth of the first month, when a round of calls to relatives and friends begins. Newlywed couples are expected to visit the house of the wife's parents as well as the husband's parents, where they are entertained with food.

A ceremony which seems to be peculiarly Mongol occurs on the sixteenth of the first month. This is known by the Chinese name "Ta-hua-lien." On this day there is observed the custom of mutual daubing, with a jet black mixture of soot and oil, between a man and his elder sister-in-law and a man and his younger sister-in-law. It is not permissible to become angry, whatever one has to suffer. If daubing is successfully done, it is believed that the year's crops will have no destructive diseases. On this night, also, when all the stars are shining, all households remove the offerings which have been displayed before the image of the Buddha.

III. Communist Policy Toward Lamaism and Mongol Religious Practices

Very little data have come to light on the policy toward Lamaism of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic People's Government or the central Peoples' Government. In theory, of course, freedom of worship is guaranteed in the Constitution. In fact, there have been various phases in the policy of the Party toward religion in general, from early persecution of organized religions to a policy of absorption into the state apparatus.

Writing in the publication "China Youth" (Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien), February 1, 1955, the author Wen Ch'ing reviews Communist doctrine on the origins of religion, then states the thesis of Mao Tze-tung: "The idols were set up by the peasants, and in time they will pull them down with their own hands; there is no need for any body else prematurely to pull down the idols for them...... it is wrong for anyone else to do these things for them." This seems to be more or less the present line in Inner Mongolia in regard to Lamaism. Attention is less aimed toward destruction of the religion by direct attack than by cutting the ground out from under it. Education and medicine, for example, have been taken over by secular authorities; opportunities are open for Mongol youth to participate in many other fields than simply herding or the clerical life. The period of persecution which led to the killing of many lamas and the confiscation or destruction of monastery property has passed for the moment; the lamas as a group are disunited, and Communist policy attempts to keep them divided amongst themselves.

Distinction is made between the high dignitaries of the Church and the ordinary lama--propaganda and attack against the higher lamas was conducted on the basis that they were an exploiting group comparable to landlords and "reactionaries." Some "upper-class" lamas have been able to reform themselves through contributions to drives such as the Resist America, Aid Korea Movement. Ordinary lamas are persuaded to take up secular occupations, given a chance to "reform themselves through labor," or even to participate in political activities. Lower rank lamas were given the chance to be re-educated, and some have become representatives to local People's Congresses. Lamas have also participated in signature obtaining drives, such as the Anti-Atomic Bomb drive. There seems to be little attempt to interfere actively with the performance of religious ceremonies by the people, but it is questionable whether the multiplicity of activities in which an individual must participate leaves him much time for such religious ceremonies.

Some of the activities of the Church, such as the annual temple fair, have been completely taken over by the Government. One fair, the Natamu, has been "transformed into a really big event in trade, an exhibition and demonstration center for the spread of scientific knowledge, and an occasion on which new plays, dances and music are performed." (Wang Shu-tang, "China, Land of Many Nationalities," Foreign Languages Press, 1953, pp. 49-50). In some cases, the monasteries themselves have been used as schools; newspaper reading groups and literacy classes have been held in them.

On the national level, the policy in Inner Mongolia toward Lamaism has been overshadowed by the emphasis placed on Buddhism and Lamaism as such, particularly with the incorporation of Tibet into the CPR. Attention has been given to restoration of famous Lamaist temples, such as Yung-ho-kung in Peking. This temple has become a showplace, to which Buddhist visitors are taken on their arrival in Peking, to illustrate the "freedom of worship" and the tolerant attitude of the Government toward religion.

An effort has also been made to "nationalize" Lamaism together with Chinese Buddhism within a joint association. In 1953, ninety-three persons were elected to the Board of Directors of the newly formed Chinese Buddhist Association, representing the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia (a reincarnate lama) and the Venerable Hsu Yün were elected honorary presidents of the Association. Such a development is fully in accord with the policy of bringing together the various nationalities in China into the "big happy family." There is little doubt, however, that such an Association, like the Islamic Association is aimed at impressing Buddhists in Southeast Asia and Japan with the broad-mindedness of the Chinese Government.

The policy of "undercutting" and removing the secular functions of the monasteries and of the religion has apparently had some success, more so than a vigorous attack might have had. Peter Townsend (China Phoenix, London 1955, p. 329) offers an illustration of the effects of this policy: "At the Lama Temple in the north-west corner of Peking, this absence of business (i.e., in charms and incense, etcetera) was very obvious. The buildings, scheduled as ancient monuments, were undergoing repair at government expense. An old monk guided me round and tried to interest me in seeing, for a payment, the mildly pornographic paintings of the Passion Buddha. 'No?' he said sadly, 'no one does these days.' Three alcolytes intoned prayers in the central hall. 'There were five hundred when the Manchus were here,' he said. 'Now there are only ninety, and not many of those are here during the day. ...They've gone to dig irrigation ditches. They get paid for that. Then they come back here to sleep. They all want to find other jobs. There's no money in this monk business any more. If I was younger, I'd be after a job, too.'

In view of the results of the Japanese experiment in retraining Lamas in Japan during the period of Manchukuo and Mengchiang, this view may not be wide of the mark. Many who went to Japan as monks returned to secular life on coming back to Inner Mongolia, and with many sources of income cut off from the monastery today, it is no doubt a difficult matter to attract disciples. The abuses of Lamaism by its practitioners

in Inner Mongolia laid it open to attack, and reform was inevitable. The Communists had a fertile field in which to work.

IV. Islam

Lamaism is the most striking religion of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic, it is, after all a Mongol religion having few, if any Chinese adherents. Islam, in contrast, is the belief of about 40,000 to 60,000 Chinese inhabiting the region. Of this group, about 15,000 live in Kueihua, descendants for the most part, of Mohammedans, settled there during the reign of the Ch'ien-lung emperor. Kueihua is the center of Inner Mongolian Islamic culture, four schools of Arabic and Chinese being established there. Islamic schools in Kueihua draw students from the Moslems of Chahar (i.e., Kalgan, Dolonor and Hsüan-hua). Other groups are scattered in cities such as Pao-t'ou, Saratsi (Sa-la-ch'i) and Ch'ang-pei.

The center of Moslem life in a city or in the few rural communities where they live is the mosque. A community of several hundred is most common, except in the larger cities. The community is defined by its mosque, which is an essential and integral part of community life. If the population of a community reaches such a size that its members cannot hear the call to prayer from the mosque, the community splits in two, with the excess members forming a new community. In Kuei-sui (Kueihua and Suiy-üan-cheng) the maximum size of a community was about 2,000.

Moslems are either born, converted or adopted into the religion. Conversion was generally due to marriage or economic causes. Conversion might be brought about by the attraction of the mutual interdependence and solidarity of the Moslem community, or because in close trade relations, it was financially advantageous to become a Moslem.

Each community has a council of elders, elected by all the male tenants of the community to a certain term of office. The number of a community's elders generally did not exceed a dozen. The elders are charged with the management of their mosque's general affairs; they are responsible for its treasury and have the virtual power of appointing or dismissing the "Ahung," the ministrant of the mosque.

The religious officials of the mosque parallel those of other Islamic communities. The chief ministrant (ahung) once appointed, is charged with the performance of religious services and at the same time of maintaining the Islamic social order of his community. In Inner Mongolia, most of the ahung were born in North China, trained in Peking or Tientsin and came ultimately to their Inner Mongolia positions. Anyone holding the title of ahung, whether Chinese or Turk from Sinkiang, is eligible to fill the post of chief ministrant in a mosque in Inner Mongolia. The powers of the ahung in Inner Mongolia were more limited, and his ability to sanction transgressors against Islamic custom was circumscribed. The major power of sanction which the ahung has is expulsion from his community, though in the larger mosques, such as at Pao-t'ou, corporal punishment may be levied.

The duties of the ahung are: 1) propagation of the faith; 2) direction of religious services; 3) performance of matrimonial, funereal and other rites; 4) instruction of the khalifa and children of the tenants; 5) maintenance of the Islamic law and order in the community.

While there are other offices to be filled in the mosque, most Inner Mongolian mosques have only one functionary other than the ahung. This second official is the khalifa (an apprentice ahung. The term "khalifa" for an ahung apprentice seems to be specifically in use in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. In Central Asiatic and Western Moslem Countries, the word "khalifa" literally meaning "successor," is used exclusively for the successor to the Prophet and similar positions of high power). This limited roster of officials shows considerable deviation from the practice in Western Asiatic Islam.

Most of the mosques in Inner Mongolia derive their revenues from ground and house rents and from monthly contributions of their tenants. An income tax (zakat) and an alms tax (sadaqa) are given to mosque officials and to the poor, usually in the month of Ramadan. The income tax is obligatory, while the alms tax is voluntary. Offerings are also made to mosque officials on the occasion of marriage, funeral and other rites.

Two distinct sects of Islam exist in Inner Mongolia, called the "Old Teaching Sect" (Lao-chiao) and the "New New Teaching Sect" (Hsin-hsin-chiao). The Old sect represents the majority of the Moslems in Inner Mongolia. While sub-sects of the Old Sect exist, differences among them are merely in minor details, and an ahung of one sub-sect may be chosen to officiate in the mosque of another sect. Between the Old sect and the "New New Sect," however, there is considerable antagonism. The "New News" insist on purity of ritual and a shedding of the Chinese elements which have crept into the religion. The New News tend to be more Pan-Islamic in outlook than others, and adherence to the letter of Islam is more strict among them.

Inner Mongolian Islamic communities evidence a divergence from their co-religionists in China proper in a number of respects. First, they were, on the whole, founded more recently (after the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty); secondly, they tend to have very few officials other than the ahung and khalifa

in their mosques; thirdly, they are supported by monthly contributions of their tenants, whereas the Moslem communities in China proper (i.e., south of the Great Wall in this comparison) depend more upon revenues from real estate; fourthly, they are a relatively homogeneous group; and finally, Inner Mongolian Moslems tend to be more strict in their observances of rules of Islamic society and ritual.

While Chinese influences have made some inroads, the Inner Mongolian Moslems are characterized by a lack of ancestor worship, by ignoring the Chinese important yearly festivals, and by different matrimonial and burial customs. In external features, such as dress, food (with the exception of pork), and habitation, there is little distinction between the Moslem and the Han Chinese in the Region.

V. Religions of the Chinese

Religiously, the Chinese in Inner Mongolia, as those in other parts of the country, can be divided into two classes. One is a higher class, which believes in or practices higher religions. The other class includes those whose religious activities are more or less of the natural or primitive types. Sophisticated Chinese in the cities of Inner Mongolia mostly believe in and practice traditions which center around the widely-known ancestor worship or veneration and the continuation of the family line. At the New Year celebration and other festivals either simple or complicated rituals are practiced in homes and in the community. On such occasions, family or clan ancestors are remembered and not a few people believe that the spirits of the ancestors are in existence in the other world and have unseen relations with them. These relations mean that the descendants' filial conduct will be blessed while those in contradiction with traditional ethics will sooner or later be punished.

In addition to ancestor worship and family perpetuation, people who have been brought up in the teachings of Confucianism revere Confucius and some of his renowned as deities. An official temple of Confucius accompanied by Tseng-tzu and Yen Yüan is seen in every significant city. In such a temple the local Confucian scholars and students of the traditional type conduct homage offering ceremonies at some special occasions during the year. Though these ceremonies are conducted more in the sense of remembrance and respect than as strictly religious worship, the tradition has nevertheless become a cult of the Confucian gentry class.

The majority of the city people, however, do not go to the temple of Confucius and his disciples. A general idea is that, although every Chinese is indebted to the teachings of Confucius, the temple of Confucius is a place reserved only for the scholars or members of the gentry; it is too exalted a place for ordinary people. Persons with no ambition of becoming either scholars or members of the gentry have other places for the expression of their religious feelings. Artisans, for example, go to temples or shrines where there are images of the ancestors or founders of their respective trades or professions and merchants go to the temple or shrine of the God of Wealth. In addition, everybody goes to the temple of Kwan Yü or Yueh Fei. Kwan Yü and Yueh Fei were great national heroes, persons of great integrity and virtue. People worship them either out of respect for great heroes and great persons, or with a sense of religious faith. In this case, the heroes are deified and the worshippers believe that as deities they can fulfill their prayers and protect them from harm. Temples of Kwan Yü, the temple of Yueh Fei, or the temples of other great historical figures, the temple of the God of Wealth, the temple of Lu Pan, founder of the carpentry trade, etcetera, are found in every one of the county seats and larger cities. It is the same in Inner Mongolia as it is in other parts of China. That temples of Kwan Yü, the God of War, are particularly plentiful in Inner Mongolia, may be due to the fact that traditions of the expeditionary armies have been kept alive by the Chinese settlers, many of whose ancestors may have first entered the country in connection with some martial exploit. Furthermore, Kwan Yü has always been considered the protective deity of secret societies prevalent in Inner Mongolia.

There are two composite religions which have followers both in the main parts of China and in the cities of Inner Mongolia. One is an earlier combination of elements of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taochiao. This combination is seen in temples in which the deities are Wen Chang the God of Literature, and Kwan Yü (representing Confucianism), Buddha and Kuan-yin, the Goddess of Mercy (representing Buddhism), the God of Mountains, the God of Earth, the God of Wealth, the King of Horses and the Dragon King (representing lower Taoism). Near Wu-yuan, in the county of Suiyuan, there is a temple called the Temple of Four Branches (Szu-Ta-Ku-Miao), or the Temple of All Gods. The images in the temple include the God of Devil Suppression, the True Emperor of the Virtue of Fire, the God of the River, the God of Medicine, the God of Horses, the God of Cattle, the Yellow Emperor, Wen Chang, and others.

The other composite religion embraces elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam and Christianity. This combination religion is still new and is mainly practiced by members of religious and social welfare organization, such as the Red Swastika Association and the Tao-te-hui. Members of these organizations are in the main retired old-fashioned warlords, politicians, old-fashioned members of the gentry with means and leisure, and a few local businessmen who wished to mingle with people of importance. Both the Red Swastika Association and the Tao-te-hui have magnificent buildings. In these buildings there are tablets of Confucius, Buddha, Laotzu, Mohammed and Jesus. On certain days of the month members come to practice ceremonies, paying homage to all the tablets, listening to the reading and interpretation of the classics of the five religions. There is also the meditation hour, but most members pass the idle hours playing the game of fu-luan(writing in sand with a stick supported by two blindfolded persons, a form of planchette). Even though tablets of both Mohammed and Jesus are there, very little attention is paid to these two religious founders and practically no interpretations are given of the Bible or the Koran.

Christian teachings and Christian faith may not have caught the interest of the members of the Red Swastika Association or the Tao-te-hui, but they too have established footholds in Inner Mongolia. The most important Protestant institution in this region is the China Inland Mission. It first arrived in Suiyuan in 1890. The first church was established at Tung-shun-kai and was named the China Inland Church, or Chung-kuo Nei-ti-hui. Until the 1930's this church had a membership of over 200 people. A few other China Inland churches were established in nearby regions. Missionaries of the China Inland Mission in Inner Mongolia came mostly from Sweden. The churches grew slowly. During the Boxer Movement several members of the China Inland church in Pa-tzu-pu-lung were killed. For this the church received a large indemnity. The Swedish missionaries used the money to build an irrigation canal and were able to reclaim a great section of arable land, a project which recruited a large membership and stimulated the development of the church. One third of the congregation were Mongols; later, however, the number of Mongol converts decreased considerably due to the fact that one of the succeeding missionaries could not speak Mongolian. The number of Chinese members, however, continued to increase. After some years, when the church's irrigation canal was taken over by the government, the increase in members stopped and then declined. In 1936 when Li Ying-fang made a survey of the religions in Suiyuan, this church had a membership of some twenty to thirty people. Its only educational institution, a primary school, was also about to be closed.

For some years, an indigenous Christian organization called the Chinese Church of Jesus, or Chung-Hua Yeh-Su Chiao-Hui, founded by a Chinese pastor named Li Chin-piao prospered in Inner Mongolia. Li founded several churches in Kui-sui, Pao-t'ou, Feng-chen, T'ao-lin, Chi-ning and other places. Some of these churches have big congregations ranging from two hundred to five hundred people. All of Li's churches are independent of foreign influence. They are really indigenous Christian churches. At the same time another man by the name of Ch'eng Yang-hsün started a similar movement. He also succeeded in establishing in the Wu-yüan district a few really Chinese Christian churches. His churches emphasized self-support; all the evangelists in this movement have their own vocations and do not depend upon a salary from the congregation which would be too hard for poor converts to muster. In the 1930's there was a kind of Christian organization called the "Family of Jesus" or Yeh-Su Chia-T'ing which was started and prospered in Tai-an, Shantung. A man named Meng Chao-han brought this movement to Pao-t'ou and established such an organization there. The membership is not large but it stresses a life of Christian socialism with all the members working and living cooperatively in the manner of a big family, on the basis of Christian love.

Actually, however, it is the Catholic Church which has the greater influence in Inner Mongolia, especially in the district of Lin-ho. The Catholic Church came to Suiyuan in 1857 where it started in the city of Kuei-hua. After some eighty years, it had established many branch churches, social welfare institutions, schools, and had acquired real estate worth over half a million dollars.

"The strongest points of the Catholic Church in Suiyuan are the places around Shen-pa in the county of Lin-ho. The earliest Catholic Church in this district was built in the thirteenth year of Kwang-hsü (1888). The church was located in San-sheng-kung. After three or four years another one was built in a place called Huang-yang-mu-t'ou; one was built in Yu-lung some years later. In the year 1901 the Catholic Church in Ta-fa-kung was burned and destroyed by the Mongols and thirty-two Church members were killed in the incident. For this, the Mongols compensated the Catholic Church with a consicrable amount of money. The Church used this money to build the Huang-tu-la-hsi Irrigation Canal, and established a number of Catholic Churches in the territories along the canal. To mention a few, the Catholic Church in T'ai-ho-chen was built in 1902, the churches in T'ai-chao-hsiang and T'ai-an-chen were built in 1911; the church in P'ing-hua-hsiang was built in 1923. In the next year the churches in T'ai-feng-hsiang, T'ai-ping-hsiang were built. In 1925 the church reclaimed a big piece of land in a place called Fa-tch. Now in the whole district, the Catholic churches are operating registered lower primary schools and one registered complete primary school. The total number of pupils is over 280......

"The Catholic Church in T'ai-an-chen now has a congregation of over 600 families. The one in T'ai-ho-chen has between 600 and 700 families, the one in T'ai-chao-hsiang has 150 families, the churches in T'ai-wu-hsiang, T'ai-hsi-hsiang and P'ing-hua-hsiang have around 100 families each; in the third and fourth districts of Lin-ho county there are altogether over ten thousand Catholics, constituting one-tenth of the population of the whole county. The cultivable land in these two districts amounts to several thousand ching (one ching equals 100 mou and one mou equals one-sixth of an acre). Each year over two thousand ching are actually cultivated and of this Catholics have over nine hundred ching, or about one half.

"The reason for the prosperity of the Catholics in these districts is that they have had a leader by the name Li Kao who was very capable at managing the irrigation system belonging to the Catholics, that is, the Huang-t'u-la-hsi Irrigation Canal. In comparison with other canals this one irrigates agreat deal more land but damages very little. Unfortunately, Li died last year (1935). The more important reason is, however, that the Catholic churches have a strong and stable organization among themselves. In each of the Catholic churches there is, in addition to the religious leaders, a priest who is charged solely with the civil and economic affairs of the church members. Regardless of what kind of political, social, or natural changes or troubles may happen in the districts, the Catholic Church's programs will go on as usual, or at least not be disrupted. When a Catholic farmer has any difficulties he goes to see his priest in the church. The priest will always help him in one way or another. The Church may lend money to its needy members, or may help them with draft animals and other means which are needed on the farm. In case a member is involved in political or legal affairs and he is too timid to visit the county government or the county court, the priest would go in the member's behalf to see the official concerned. Occasionally, the priests even help the Church members in fighting against bandits. Thus, the relationship between the Catholic Church and its members is considerably different from that between the government and the local people. It is also different from the relationship between the tenants and their capitalistic landlords. The common peasants are afraid to see the officials or the capitalists. The priests do this for them. When a Church member calls on a priest the latter always welcomes the caller with kindness, sympathy, and a helping hand. He helps the troubled member meet his need, solve his problem, and attempts to relieve him from difficulties. The churches have rules and regulations which the members must observe. The members observe the rules and regulations eagerly. As a result of this situation, the Catholic people in Lin-ho county seem to recognize only the priests as their leaders and the Catholic Church as the organization upon which they depend for help. They have faith in their priests instead of in the government. Consequently, the Catholic churches have become organizations which are almost independent of the Chinese Government. Needless to say, this is not a normal situation. But the Catholic Church members ought not be blamed for this situation. Instead, the local government should take the responsibility. (Yü-Kung 6, S. Nov. 1, 1936, 145-147)

People who believe in natural or primitive religions are by and large the peasants and the lower classes in the cities. By natural or primitive religions we mean the worship of mountains, rivers, the sun, the moon, gigantic trees, or peculiar animals. Anything which is unusual, which has an odd or striking form, or which is powerful and frightening is considered as some sort of deity and worshipped. All Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia originally came from North Chinese provinces. When they came, they brought with them all kinds of primitive religious beliefs and practices of which the North China villages have plenty. In both North China and Inner Mongolia rainfall is scarce and for this reason the peasants in these regions consider water a great treasure during the growing seasons. Consequently, a water cult has developed a long time ago. In the rural areas of Inner Mongolia the most numerous temples are those in which the Dragon King (the rain maker or water provider) is enshrined and a great part of the peasants' religious activities are related to praying and pleasing the Dragon King.

An investigation conducted by a team from the Catholic University in Peiping in 1948 in the District of Hsuan-hua, Chahar, resulted in the following report: "If the Wu-tao temple is the most popular, the Lung-wang temple, (Temple of the Dragon King), is by its size and by the wealth of its images and of its lateral buildings (except for a few Buddhist monasteries) by far the most important temple of the region. Therefore it is often chosen to be the seat of the official administrations recently introduced in village life: Mayor's office, primary school. It fulfilled a similar role, with greater influence, even, under the Empire by its association. (Grootaers, 1951).

The Lung-wang temple is visited by the people mostly to obtain rain in time of drought. Theatrical performances or 'rain plays' are often held in honor of the Dragon King, at which occasion the other gods of the villages are 'invited' by a delegation of villagers going from one temple to the other, some minutes before the play starts in front of the Lung-wang Temple, so as to make sure that all the gods are present....

"These theatrical plays may of course occur any day when the local people feel the need of rain more urgently. But besides such extraordinary performances, the Lung-wang Temple, as many other temples, have their miao-hui, or Temple Day, on which plays are regularly held, with a concourse of people from all neighboring villages. The expression miao-hui means often Temple Fair as well, giving an idea of the secular festivities connected with the religious feast.

"The Lung-wang Temple in the Hsüan-hua area is the center of another semi-religious activity, which is of greater importance than the temple feasts. It is the center of a benevolent society, called Lung-wang lao-she, 'The venerable Association of the Dragon King.' The nature and the workings of this society are not always welcome subjects of conversation, specially with complete strangers as we are. There are good reasons to suppose that such a society exists in all important villages.....An indirect indication of its existence in some other villages was given by a wooden board hanging in an abandoned sanctuary.

"By putting together the fragmentary information we could obtain on this society, a somewhat coherent image emerges, although there is no guarantee that every single detail will be verified in all villages. The attributions of the association are rather broad: it takes care of everything pertaining to village government, waterways and irrigation, crops, charity works, legal suits, schools, temple feasts and temple revenue accruing from foundations. The heads of the association were said, in one place, to be four: ts'un-tso, village secretary, ts'un-chang, village mayor, she-shou, head of the association and hsiang-yueh, village headman. They were six in another; in the latter case however, it was explained that two were chosen from these six men. These two manage practically everything and are called: hsiang-yueh, village headman and pu-chang, treasurer. These heads of the association were chosen by election accessible to everybody and held yearly on the second day of the second moon.

"We suspect that the latter set-up is more general. It is in fact striking that the official mayor......is not even mentioned in the association board. We were lucky to find in one place the Lung-wang Temple completely deserted; we had a look at the numerous registers held by the local Lung-wang association for decades. The list of expenses for several years showed conclusively that no important thing was done in the village except through this association. For the gathering of funds, the contributions of the official mayor were listed among those of other villagers and were, if anything, less important than those of the real masters of the village, the members of the board of the Lung-wang she.

"It is particularly for the ever-recurring problem of rationing the water from the irrigation canals, that a strong authority is needed. The Lung-wang association appoints she-t'ou, 'bosses of the society,' one for every canal used by the village. This function is given to one man chosen yearly from among the four main owners of the fields using that particular canal. Considering the role of the Lung-wang she in the management of the irrigation canals, it is but natural to find in the Lung-wang temple the official documents pertaining to an irrigation scheme extending over several villages. When canals are dug with the common labor of several localities the distribution of the water is determined in full detail on a stone slab, put up in the Temple of the Dragon King, where the association has its headquarters." (ibid, 39-40)

"In the above chapter we have seen the Lung-wang temple functioning as a clearing-house for many other cults; and as a center of village administration. The cult itself of the Lung-wang combines features of a god granting rain and punishing evil, as is made clear from the lateral frescoes. Two further details emphasize these separate characteristics. In two Lung-wang temples, the beams of the temple are supporting the frightening representations of huge coiled dragons, which tear to pieces the bodies of evil doers." (ibid, 41)

In another Lung-wang temple the text reads:

Lung-wang wen Shui-mu
Hsia-yü to tai yüan
Yü hsia san-ch'ien li
Feng shui wan-wan nien.

'The dragon King asks the Mother of the Water: "When it rains, many injustices accompany it. May the rain fall on 3,000 li, may wind and water last forever."

VI. The Fate of Christianity

The fate of the Catholic Church in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Republic was determined by two factors: The Church was particularly well entrenched in this region and had shown proof of its adamant anti-Communist stand to the extend of organizing armed resistance; and Communist measures of repression started earlier here than inside the Great Wall, at a period when a carefully mapped-out strategy against the Church had possibly not yet been conceived. In the later stages, particularly since 1952, the patterns of Communist repression resemble those applied in other regions (see Northwest Handbook, Religion): in the earlier years, however, uncoordinated action led to much bloodshed. In this period the situation resembled somewhat the events in Manchuria. Among the earliest martyrs were those of Ch'ih-feng and Yang-chia-p'ing; the center of Hsi-wan-tzu was particularly hard hit; Father Pierre Tchang of Jehol was executed; Father Micheal Tchang of Suiyuan died in a forced labor camp; and Bishop Leon de Smedt of Hsi-wan-tzu died in prison (November 1951).

From then on, the policy of expelling all foreign Church workers went into action. In November 1954, the last Sisters from Hsi-wan-tzu left; and in November 1955, the last Scheut Father, active in Mongolia, was deported.

As in other parts of China, the spirit of the Chinese clergy was magnificent. They maintained the cohesion of the Church and the continuation of the services of the Church under most difficult conditions. Archbishop B. Wang, particularly, carried on in a way that won him wide recognition. This attitude of the Chinese clergy is all the more commendable since in Mongolia, in contradistinction to other regions of China, the Chinese clergy was hit as hard as the foreigners. Bishop Melchior Chang of Hsi-wan-tzu was imprisoned right at the beginning and according to latest reports is still in prison. The exact number of Chinese priests thrown into prison or forced labor camps camps on charges of collusion with imperialist countries and promotion of the Legion of Mary is not known, there must be several dozens of them. But still, the "independent" Catholic Church which the Communists attempted to introduce in Inner Mongolia proved to be a failure here, as well as in other parts of China.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION

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PUBLIC INFORMATION

I. Introduction

This section deals exclusively with the utilization of newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasting, and films for mass communication and persuasion by the Chinese Communists in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) during the period 1947-1956. To begin with, it is necessary to review the policy of the Chinese Communist regime toward nationalities. According to the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference set forth in September, 1949 , their aims are to eradicate "discrimination," greater nationalism and local nationalism," and the "remnants of counter-revolutionaries" (Article 50); "to develop their spoken and written languages;" "to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs"; and "to assist the broad masses of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work" (Article 53) by means of "the spirit of equality, unity, fraternal-cooperation, and mutual assistance under the regional autonomy and democratic-coalition governments of nationalities!" This policy was restated in the "General Program of the People"s Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities" promulgated by the Central People's Government on August 9, 1952 and also in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

For the Chinese Communists, the implementation of this policy of "a big multi-national family" through the system of mass communications presents difficulties. Numerous problems are involved due to the variety of nationalities (Chinese, Mongols of both the Eastern and Western branches, Russians, Manchus, Tunguso-Manchurians, Koreans, and Chinese Moslems) inhabiting the IMAR, the different tongues spoken in the area, the low degree of literacy among the local peoples of this region, the limited radio facilities and scarcity of receiving sets, and the underdeveloped state of China's film industry. The following are some of the efforts being made by the present regime in the different fields of mass communications. (See China General, Public Information).

II. Publishing Enterprises

A. Books

In accordance with the principles and policies outlined by the Central People's Government towards nationalities, the Central Commission on Nationalities was assigned to translate

Mao Tse-tung's writings, important party-government decisions and policies, Marxist-Leninist treatises, scientific and technological studies, writings on natural and social sciences, and certain novels and other literary works into the various languages of the national minorities. In addition, the Commission was put in charge of issuing textbooks for elementary and secondary schools. For the IMAR alone, it is reported that by 1953, a total of 2,700,000 books comprising 366 titles were distributed by the branches of the Hsin-hua Bookstore and cultural centers throughout the region. Of these works, the most significant ones were translations into Mongolian of such works as Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy," the "Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", "On Practice," and "On Coalition Government," and Liu Shao-ch'i's "On the Quality of Chinese Communist Workers," and "The Leaders of the Chinese Revolution." As a further step in the Communist re-education, ideologically, culturally, and politically, of China's many nationalities, the Nationalities Publishing House of the Central People's Government was established in January, 1953, in Peking. It is reported that up until 1955 over 500 titles, including school textbooks, important party-government documents and decisions, writings on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, histories of the Chinese Revolution, popular reading materials, illustrated handbooks on animal husbandry and health, folk literature, arts and music, and plays and poems by Chinese and foreign authors, totaling approximately 3.8 million copies had been published for the IMAR. Among these works, the Mongolian edition of the first volume of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" (1953) and Mao's "On the Collectivization of Agriculture (1955) ranked the highest; the former, which was claimed to be in its third edition, sold over 1,650,000 copies by the end of 1954. The Mongolian edition of"Joseph Stalin, a Short Biography" was sold out as soon as it was on sale in the Hsin-hua Bookstores in March, 1953. Important party and government documents and decisions appearing in Mongolian were the following: The Agreement between the Central People's Government and the Tibetan Local Government on the peaceful liberation of Tibet (1951), the Organic Law of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (1954), the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954), Chou En-lai's Report on the Work of the Government (1954), the Organic Law of the State Council (1954), the Organic Laws of the Local People's Congresses and Councils of the People's Republic of China (1954), China's First Five-Year Plan (1954), Draft Model Regulations for Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (1955), and the Resolution of the Communist Party of China on the Collectivization of Agriculture (1955). In the field of literature, there were Luhsun's "Madman's Diary" and "The True Story of Ah Q;" Liu Ching's "Wall of Bronze" based on the war of "liberation;" Yang Shou's "Over the Expanse of 3,000 Li" on the Korean War; the popular Mongolian folk story, the "Ko-ssu-erh ti ku-shih" (the Story of Ko-ssu-erh); the famous novel from Outer Mongolia, "A-yu-hsi;" Malchinhu's "On the Korchin Grasslands;" Punsek's "Golden Khingan Mountains;" and the Soviet novels "Days and Nights" by K. Simonov, and "Mother" by M. Gorky. In April, 1955, the Inner Mongolian People's Publishing House was established to augment the distribution of books and magazines by the Nationalities Publishing House in Peking, with plans to issue one and a quarter million books in the Mongolian language. Later in the year it was reported that this Publishing House had published (distributed?) some 500 titles totaling 3,792,800 copies of which more than 82 percent were in the Mongolian language.

B. Newspapers

In addition to national newspapers like the "Jen-min jih-pao," the "Kuang-ming jih-pao," and "Ta-kung-pao," which are distributed in the IMAR, it is reported that up until the summer of 1955 there were six bilingual Mongolian-Chinese newspapers published in Inner Mongolia. These papers are organs of local party-government organizations, part of the entire Chinese Communist press apparatus, and in a way serve essentially the same functions for the region that the national papers fulfill for the nation at large. To a certain extent, the format and other characteristics of these newspapers are similar to those of the "Jen-min jih-pao." As expected, their pages are devoted to the reprint of both central and local party-government directives, documents, laws, and regulations, along with authoritative comment, interpretation, and justification. These papers also reproduce speeches by Communist leaders and editorials from major national newspapers, and print directives for party and government officials on improving local sanitation, reviving and expanding trade, and increasing the agricultural and industrial production. They all follow the policy of "a big multi-national family," designed to obtain the support of the local people for the central authority, to increase production in accordance with the first Five-Year Plan, and to further the collectivization of agriculture.

Of the six newspapers in Inner Mongolia, the most influential is the "Nei Meng-ku jih-pao" (Inner Mongolian Daily), the organ of the Inner Mongolian Sub-Committee of the Communist Party of China. However, its circulation in 1953 was only 6,500, despite efforts to make subscriptions mandatory among all cadre members and all agencies and institutions and to

encourage the formation of newspaper-reading groups among the literate. To make up for the low literacy as well as the lack of interest shown by the readers, the Communists have made full use of pictorials such as the fortnightly "Nei Meng-ku hua-pao" (Inner Mongolia Pictorial), the Mongolian edition of the "Jen-min hua-pao" (People's Pictorial), and the "Min-tsu hua-pao" (Nationalities' Pictorial). These pictorials are accompanied by supplements, the one with the largest circulation being the "People's Pictorial Supplement", published in Peking.

In addition to the above-mentioned newspapers, blackboard newspapers and farm newspapers are popular. Aside from containing local news of all kinds as well as important decisions and policies of the local governments and local party organs, the blackboard newspapers offer suggestions as to how to improve sanitation, treat venereal diseases, and prevent plague. The farm papers are devoted to the introduction of scientific techniques of livestock breeding, soil amelioration, water conservation, and the like.

C. Periodicals

Since 1949, Inner Mongolian periodicals, like other journals throughout China, concentrate on the expositon of the principles of patriotism, internationalism, dialectical materialism, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in a more direct and simplified language. The periodicals carry articles to further the local readers' understanding of timely issues of importance such as the elucidation and evaluation of Mao Tse-tung's writings, the manifestation of national sentiment against dominant-nationality chauvinism, the promulgation and "improvement" of Mongolian folk literature and music, the advocation of the projected Mongolian language based on the Cyrillic alphabet, and the exposure of "reactionary" ideologies. Like the periodicals throughout China, these publications also supported the Resist-America-and Aid-Korea campaign, the "three-anti" and "five-anti" movements, and the campaign for the liberation of Formosa. In addition, they contain articles on such subjects as the importance of China's first Five-Year Plan, the significance of the collectivization of agriculture, and the gradual realization of the socialist construction of the nation. It is believed that periodicals will not only increase the local readers' political consciousness and patriotism, but will make them remain loyal to the central government and party.

Of the magazines published in Inner Mongolia, the two with the widest circulation are the'Nei Meng-ku chou-k'an (Inner Mongolian Weekly), and the "Hsin Nei Meng-ku" (New Inner Mongolia). Other important magazines are the "Inner Mongolia Militia Bulletin," "Nei Meng-ku chiao-yü" (Inner Mongolia

Education), and the "Nei Meng-ku ch'ing-nien" (Inner Mongolia Youth). "Inner Mongolia Education" advocates the study of folk literature from the Marxist viewpoint; deals with the reform of the Mongolian grammar and phonetics; publicizes the projected Mongolian script, still being developed, based on the Cyrillic alphabet; and criticizes "bourgeois idealistic interpretations" in the field of education. In addition, it also publishes folk songs and rhymes, and Mongolian folk legends and fairy tales. The chief objective of "Inner Mongolia Youth," the organ of the Inner Mongolian Sub-Committe of the New Democratic Youth League (now the Communist Youth League), is to develop patriotism and internationalism among the youth. In accordance with the programs of self-education, its contents consist of short and easy-to-understand articles on current events, agricultural techniques, languages, history, geography, and sciences.

III. Radio Broadcasting

Radio broadcasting was first used as a medium of mass communication and persuasion in Inner Mongolia in February, 1947, when Ulanfu, then chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association, set up three stations in the Silingol League to broadcast the themes of autonomy and the unification of the Eastern and Western Mongolian governments. Of these, two were in the Abaga Banner, and one in the Ujumuchin Banner. Since 1949 the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking regularly broadcasts special programs in Mongolian beamed to the IMAR. In addition, there are two Inner Mongolian People's Broadcasting Stations located at Huhehot, one at Ulanhot (Wang-yeh-miao), and another one at Kalgan. On the whole, the programs of the Central People's Broadcasting Station consist of special talks on how to familiarize the population with important party and government decisions, how to rally the different nationalities under the banner of the party, how to increase their political knowledge and political awareness, how to mobilize the local people for the fulfillment of the political and economic tasks faced by the nation, and how to popularize the new farming methods and scientific livestock breeding, along with brief news commentaries, music, and educational subjects. Aside from these network programs and the information and propaganda sent by radio or telephone for rebroadcast, the various stations present local news, peasant's hours, policies and decisions of the local people's governments and local party organs, folk music, plays, and literary readings.

Owing to the underdeveloped Chinese electronics industry, the IMAR, like other parts of China, has to depend primarily upon diffusion and monitoring stations, as well as upon group listening. It is said that in 1955 there were forty-seven diffusion stations and 575 monitoring stations scattered among livestock and agricultural cooperatives, and in army units and distant areas. The diffusion stations, as described in the general handbook, consist of one portable receiving set with an amplification system and many loudspeakers. Through these outlets, not only can the programs of the main stations be received and channelled through, but they can also do their own local broadcasts on a small scale. In Inner Mongolia, the primary function of these diffusion stations is to provide the local peoples with programs which include domestic news, music, weather forecasts, and information about scientific methods of raising livestock, soil amelioration, water conservation, and so on. In the monitoring stations, particularly those in distant border regions and in outlying grasslands where there are poor communication facilities, an operator takes down commentaries, talks, and news from the main stations at dictation speed, and circulates them locally through printed or duplicated bulletins. The operations of the radio personnel in Inner Mongolia are similar to those in China proper (see China General, Public Information). In addition, there are meteorological stations in the northern grasslands of Inner Mongolia to help prevent natural calamities. To remedy further the shortage of receiving sets, a large number of five tube battery-operated superheterodyne radio receivers manufactured by the State-operated People's Broadcasting Equipment Factory in Shanghai were distributed to cooperatives in the IMAR in May, 1955.

IV. Films and Lantern Slides

Because of the shortage of Chinese-made films (art features, newsreels, documentaries and scientific educational films), and the lack of acceptable scripts, the Chinese Communists have turned to dubbing in Chinese and Mongolian sound tracks on Soviet and foreign films. Also to compensate for the lack of theatres in Inner Mongolia, they have made use of mobile film projection and lantern-slide teams sent from China (see China, General, Public Information). For Inner Mongolia, the dubbing-in of Mongolian is conducted by the Northeast Film Studio. It is reported that in 1954 there were thirty-four mobile film projection teams touring the villages and pastoral and hunting communities of Inner Mongolia. The planning commission of the IMAR calls for the increase of such teams to 140 by the end of 1955.

The most significant feature films about Inner Mongolia for Inner Mongolian consumption have been "Victory of the People of

Inner Mongolia," produced in 1952, and the "People of the Grasslands," with screenplay by the Mongolian writer, Malchinhu. The former deals with the war with the Nationalists in 1947; the latter, portrays the "free and happy life of the herdsmen of Inner Mongolia," depicts the story of a girl leader of a mutual aid team in love with a boy leader of another mutual aid team, and how they foiled the plot of a Kuomintang agent. The themes behind other art features delineate the unification of the national minorities of the IMAR in the struggle against imperialist aggression, their happiness and progress under the present regime, and their suffering and bravery under the Japanese domination and Kuomintang administration.

Newsreels and documentaries on similar themes portray the progress of the IMAR since 1947. Representative documentaries are 'Inner Mongolia Advances," "Folk Songs and Dances," and "The Great Union of Nationalities in China."

Scientific educational films such as "Water and Soil Conservancy," "Safe Use of Electricity," "Modern Baby-Delivery Methods," "Food and Nourishment" and the like, aim to promote advanced production methods, disseminate scientific knowledge, advocate safety measures in mines and factories, and initiate village health work in the prevention of endemic diseases.

Special programs have been developed in Inner Mongolia to promote the showing of lantern slides. These are widely used for propaganda on the policies of the central government, the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technical skills; the popularization of artistic works, spreading information on the prevention of the plague, syphilis and other diseases, and the promotion of production in industry and agriculture. The lantern slides have captions written in Mongolian.

V. Libraries, Cultural Halls and Cultrual Troupes

The expansion of activities in the publication of books and periodicals, the use of films, lantern slides and radio was accompanied by the increase in the number of outlets for these media of mass communications. In the spring of 1953 there were already motion picture theaters and cultural halls in the major cities of Inner Mongolia, such as Huhehot, Ulanhot, and Pao-t'ou, and there were five cultural troupes that toured the region giving exhibitions and propaganda-type theatrical performances. Considerable promotional work was done by the Inner Mongolia chapter of the Federation of Literary and Art Workers, which, in addition to giving encouragement to native writers, artists and actors, also trained large numbers of native cadres to serve as librarians, managers of cultural halls and supervisors of travelling cultural troupes. Early in 1953, as many as fifty-eight percent of the cultural and art workers in the IMAR were Mongol cadres.

In May of 1954, there were some eighty cultural halls, cultural stations, libraries and mobile cultural troupes for the pastoral areas in the IMAR. The largest library in Inner Mongolia had some 100,000 books in Mongolian and Chinese languages. In addition, there were many radio receiving stations, motion picture theaters, opera houses and workers cultural palaces. Plans for further expansion in 1956 are now underway. The Bureau of Cultural Affairs of the IMAR People's Government plans to establish 5,000 cultural clubs throughout the region. The number of libraries in the agricultural areas will be brought up to 5,000 this year, and for the pastoral areas, sixteen new cultural halls will be set up. Travelling cultural teams and dramatic troupes will visit the more distant parts of the region to give stage plays, pictorial exhibitions and lantern slide shows.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

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VII. Present Conditions of Health and Sanitation.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. Sanitary Conditions

A. Housing

The Mongols in general live in tents, usually called "yurts" and which the Mongols themselves call "ger." Because the Mongols are engaged in nomadic life, tents can be moved about in order to look for areas where there is abundant pasture with nearby lakes, streams, and wells. Wherever they go, they put up a tent on the northeastern slope of hills for the cool breeze in the summer time, and in the southeastern valley where sunshine pours down, to protect themselves from the northerly wind during the winter season.

There are many shortcoming in living in a tent, especially in the winter season. The ventilation is not good. An opening on top of the tent which serves as a vent is not enough. Oil is used for lighting and the light is dim and unsatisfactory. The Mongols use animal dung for heating and cooking. Among them sheep dung is the best, because it has no odor and its heat is strong and long-lasting. Cow dung is next and horse dung is worst. However, the dung fuel as a whole emits pungent smoke which causes eye diseases and leaves a bad odor. As movable tents of the commoners do not have wooden couches, rugs or the skins of cows or sheep are spread on the ground. Since the Mongols sleep on the ground, which is damp and cold, they are subject to many illnesses, especially rheumatism.

In the districts occupied by them, the Chinese settlers build stationary houses. But these houses are small and narrow mud huts, and one third of the interior is raised for a floor on which they sleep and live, and a k'ang (a brick bed warmed from underneath by a fire) is installed for protection against cold. The interior of both tents and stationary houses are extremely unclean.

However, the officials in the capital towns and the lamas have relatively better houses. Lamaist temples are stationary buildings. Some of them are famous temples. Lighting in the temples is comparatively good and ventilation is fair. In fact, lamas enjoy a much more agreeable life than the commoners. But they live together in a larger number which suggest the possibility of an easy source of contagious deseases.

In short the Mongol housing is unsanitary.

B. Clothing and Washing

The dress of both sexes, as far as shape is concerned, is much alike. The main difference is that the men gird themselves with a belt, while women are beltless. Both men and women wear boots.

The rich dress impressively. The men have beautiful robes lined with the finest lamb's skin, and hang a profusion of massive silver ornaments from their belts. They also wear expensive fur caps. The dress of the poor is wretched. Men and women go about in rags, tatters, and filth, shivering in the cold.

The Mongol women's hair ornaments and headdresses are remarkable. Even a poor woman, if married, has a profusion of silver ornaments and fittings on her head, which hang from her hair. By looking at these ornaments one can tell which tribe a woman belongs to because the precise nature and shape of ornaments vary with tribes. (See Social Value and Pattern of Living.)

The Mongols, with the exception of lamas and princes, do not wash their clothes even if their garments are shining black with grease and filth. They also rarely wash their faces and when they wash they use little water. Feet and body are occasionally washed. The Mongols discharge their excrements in the field. The lack of washing results from the religious taboo which regards water as a sacred object. It is also due to the fact that water is scanty in the region.

The uncleanness of Mongols' clothes and body is the source of skin diseases which sweep over Mongolia and also the breeding place for lice. "One of the most prevalent diseases in Mongolia is itch. The Mongols very seldom change their clothes and practice the least possible amount of washing, either of their persons or of their clothes, having a superstitious belief that if they use too much water, after death they will become fish. In their tents they live so closely huddled up that when one gets itch, all soon have it. Travellers and visitors, who pass the night in an infected family, are pretty sure to catch the disease too, as they have to borrow a garment to serve as a blanket." (James Gilmour, Among the Mongols, p. 192-3.)

II. Dietary Habits and Nutritional Status of the People

The variety of Mongol food is extremely limited. They do not eat vegetables and grain very much. Their principle diet is animal products such as sheep, cattle, horses, yaks. Poor people even eat camel meat They use all these animals' milk, but yak and mare milk are most favored, and from milk they make butter and cheese. They use sheep milk to make a kind of tea called marija, which is their popular drink. They

drink this kind of tea in the morning and noon. They also take brick tea which they get from the Chinese. They always drink brick tea whenever they have time. Tobacco, too, they are extremely fond of. In the evening they eat mutton and tripe; occasionally millet cooked with soup might be added. Despite the Mongols' simple food, they do not seem undernourished. They are not aware of what vitamins are yet they are supplied with vitamins unconsciously from butter tea and the entrails eaten with their mutton.

The most serious problem in Mongolia is drinking water. The drinking water used by natives every day is from shallow and exposed wells and is used also for washing and for the livestock. The quality of the water is generally bad, and the color is yellowish and frequently much sediment is left. The taste and smell of the water are peculiar. Chlorine contents sometimes are sixty percent, and other substances are found in the water. This is because the opening of Mongolian wells is usually lower than the ground level and they also are not deep enough. The water slopped by horses and cows while they drink and in some extreme cases, even the urine voided by people right after they drink seeps into the well. Therefore the well water contains ammonia and nitrous acid and tastes very bad. This unsanitary drinking water causes epidemic diseases such as dysentery.

III. People's Concepts of Health and Disease

A great majority of uneducated Mongols or even educated old-type Mongols believe that all diseases are caused by the activities of evil spirits and the punishment of Buddha. People enjoy their health or suffer from disease as controlled by Buddha. When a Mongol is convinced that his case is hopeless, he takes it very calmly, and bows to his fate, whether it be death or chronic disease; and both physicians and patients, after a succession of failures regard the affliction as a thing fated which is beyond human wisdom to cure. (See Health and Sanitation in General Handbook.)

The Mongols have complete faith in lamas and they worship Lamaism for their whole life. Their conduct in everyday life is commanded and controlled by the Lamaist doctrines and the suggestions of lamas. To show their belief, an example may serve: a lama instructed a couple to divorce because the bad combination of the ages of husband and wife invoked evil upon each other and caused eye trouble. They took the instruction and parted.

The Mongols being Lamaists, their traditional concept of disease is extracted from Lamist scriptures in Mongol or

Tibetan which in turn are based on Indian sources. In contradistinction to Hinayanistic writings in which the exercise of the medical art is not recommended to the clergy, Mahayana Buddhism derives the duty to heal from its concept of the great compassionate Bodhisatva. The Bodhisatva is a healer not only in the spiritual sense but is also concerned with the diseases of the body. He is thus the "unus medicus animarum et corporum." Diseases of the body were proclaimed one of the great obstacles to enlightenment, the ultimate goal of the Bodhisatva; thus human beings should be cured of their pains before the law of harnessing the spirit is preached to them. The main agent and patron of the art of healing is the Bodhisatva par excellence, Avalokitesvara (Chin.: Kuan-yin, Mong. Nidüber Üdzekchi). In Tantric Buddhism however another Bodhisatva has generally replaced him (or her) in importance. This is the Medicine King, or Lord of Healing (Chih.: Yao-wang, Mong.: Otochi). Frequently also a group of five deities, the so-called Medical Buddhas, are implored in cases of disease. In this group Gautama Buddha is surrounded by Maitreya (Mong. : Maidari), Sarvanivaranavishkambe (Mong. :Tütker tein arilghakchi), Manjusri and Avalokitesvara.

Throughout Buddhist literature, diseases are considered to be caused by an imbalance of the four cardinal elements of the body: the solid element of earth, the humid element of water, the hot element of fire, and the agitating element of wind. In particular, three major types of afflictions are discussed: afflictions of the wind element, which can be cured by butter, afflictions of the hot element (the bile), which can be cured by butter, afflictions of the water element (phlegm), which can be cured by ginger infusions. They correspond to the three major afflictions of the mind: cupidity, hate, and error. Each of these major afflictions is subdivided into 101 diseases, to which another 101 are added caused by a combination of major afflictions, which gives a total of 404 different diseases.

Recognized causes of disease include faulty diet and hygiene, overexertion or faulty attitudes during meditation, fractures and wounds due to accident or violence, poison, and spells and demoniac obsessions. Retribution of misdeeds committed in a previous existence is however the major source of diseases.

Therapy may take different forms according to the cause of the disease: administering of drugs, correct forms of meditation, exorcism and charms, and finally repentance. The Mongol materia medica is again largely dominated by Tibeto-Indian traditions; it has however been greatly enriched by the formulae of Chinese herbalists.

IV. Incidence of Disease and Mortality

Common diseases among the Mongol population are: (1) skin diseases which are widespread and are due to their uncleanness of body and clothing, (2) bronchitis caused by the arid climate with its dust, (3) smallpox (4) venereal diseases (5) tuberculosis, and (6) rheumatism, which is induced by the climate of the country and the manner of life. All these diseases have contributed to the high rates of mortality and sickness.

The principal diseases are diphtheria, typhoid fever and bubonic plague. Infant mortality is high. For instance, in 1929, 248 out of the 928 infants born during the year in a certain banner of the Jaoda League died of influenza. In another banner, 320 infants died of contagious diseases during the spring. In still another banner, 124 of the 261 infants died during the spring months.

V. Medical Practitioners and Institutes

A. Lamaist Medical Practice.

The Mongol native practitioners were, in the past, mostly lamas. There were also a few laymen who added medical practice to other occupations. The reasons why lamas were trained to be physicians were: (1) educational institutions in the monastic academies included generally a department of medicine; (2) a lama in riper years, being free from family care and government duty, had his time more at his own disposal than the laymen and so had more opportunities for using his medical skill; (3) Mongols seldom separate medicine from prayers, and a clerical physician had the advantage over a layman in that he could attend personally to both departments, administering drugs on the one hand and performing religious ceremonies on the other.

The medical lamas, whom the Mongols call "emchi lama," acquired the medical science of Tibet which is similar in many respects to the ancient medical science of China. Clinical dignosis is limited to the examination of the pulse, the purity of the color of urine, the condition of the tongue, and vever as gested by the palm of the hand, the rest depending upon the complaint of the patients. But the greater part of the treatment consisted of incantation and prayers of a Buddhist scholar.

The treatment included two parts, one of which was for internal purposes. The medicine which the medical lama used for internal treatment was made from grinding various materials out of mineral, animal, herbal and vegetable matters and then making them into a kind of compound measured by eye in a silver spoon. The patients take them internally. The other was surgical treatment, rarely practiced, which consisted of a group of shallow scratches made on the skin with a thin-bladed knife.

B. Medical Institutes and the Training of Medical Lamas

All medical institutes belong to Lamaist monasteries. The better ones in Inner Mongolia are Pei-tzu-miao and Pai-ling-miao. The boys in the banners who were bright and who had completed primary education entered the institute as lamas. But they must have knowledge of the Tibetan language because the medical text gooks used are written in Tibetan. The whole course was divided into three steps: the elementary class, intermediate class, and advanced class. The students attended lectures on the fundamental science of medicine, diagnostics, and therapeutics, and many kinds of ceremony. Lectures and clinical instructions are given by the principal of the medical instutite.

It is not easy for a student to graduate from a medical institute. He must study the voluminous Tibetan medical books and master them. It required many years for a student to pass the graduation examinations. After that he had to debate on various subjects with all the lamas of the monastery and overturn their arguments; then something like a medical doctor's degree was conferred. However, another difficult problem arose at this time. The student had to offer a piece of trimmed silk, gold and silver, confections, food, etc., to the lamas in the monastery. But in a large monastery with hundreds or thousands of lamas, he was bound to spend a great sum of money; and if he was poor, the degree was unattainable even if he qualified. This was the reason why the number of medical lamas was small in Mongolia. There were usually one or a few medical lamas in a Lamasery, most of whom were unqualified; the level of their knowledge and technique was low. In fact, only a few of the medical lamas could understand Tibetan medical books. The rest only glanced through the medical books translated into Chinese, and were merely trained for several years in either their own temple or by the older medical lamas who had more experience.

Medical lamas asked a rather high fee for treatment with the purpose of elevating their influence and status.

The Mongols' treatment of disease was filled with superstitions. Most disease they failed to cure; therefore medical lamas invented pretexts in order to reduce their responsibilities. They would tell their patients that diseases were given

by Buddha and there was in the nature of things no need for treatment.

C. The Chinese Nationalist Government Health Work

The Chinese Nationalist Government set up a Prevention of Bubonic Plague Planning Committee for Inner Mongolia in 1931. Later the government sent prevention teams to Suiyuan. Between 1931 and 1935 there were ten hospitals in Kalgan, Chahar, and six hospitals in Huhehot (Kuei-sui), Suiyuan. The former had 112 beds and the latter 163 beds. These hospitals were both established by the provincial government and by individuals.

After the Japanese war, the Nationalist government set up a number of health centers in different provinces which were under the provincial health departments. In the early period of 1947, there were twelve health centers in Jehol, sixteen in Chahar and nine in Suiyuan which were scattered in various localities of these three provinces.

According to the central government's health administration system, a hsien (county) health center was under the guidance of the provincial health department. "There shall also be a health center in each district, a health station in each town or village, and a health worker in each pao (six to fifteen Chia which comprises six to fifteen households each). Each hsien health center is to maintain a hospital of twenty to twenty-four beds, an out-patient department and a mobile unit. In case of epidemics, a separate isolation ward is to be set up. Each hsien health center shall be staffed by an officer in charge, one to three doctors, one to eight nurses, two to four midwives, one or two dispensers, two to four sanitation inspectors, one to three clerks, and several health workers." (Public Health and Medicine, p. 685. China Handbook, 1950.)

There are no available data to indicate whether Inner Mongolia followed the Nationalist government health administration system and had actually carried out the health work or not. However, it was certain that some of the Nationalist Government health work had been undertaken in Inner Mongolia during its rule on the China mainland.

D. Christian Medical Missions

In four cities in Chahar Province and cities in Suiyuan Province, there were Christian missions of Catholics and different denominations of Protestants. They practiced medical treatment as a part of evangelical work. However, Mongols who have received the modern medical treatment are few in number. This is partly due to their superstitions and suspicions of foreigners and partly due to the rumors invented by medical lamas which caution against the dangers of foreign medicine and physicians.

There is a Swedish Unitarian Church in the Chahar League, which operated a hospital on a rather large scale. The mission rendered free treatment and medicine to those who believe in Christianity. But they charged the unbelievers for medicine.

A modern Catholic hospital near Hou-ho was established in the vicarage of Suiyuan in 1921 by T.R.P. Joseph Rutten, at the time the head of the Mission of Scheut. The hospital had 120 beds, eight wards and about thirty rooms. Its buildings and grounds covered fifteen hectares. Its staff consisted of three doctors, fifteen sisters, forty native hospital attendants (men and women) and fifty other employees.

A school for training hospital attendants was attached to the hospital. Before it was closed down, it had trained one hundred attendants.

The hospital had equipment for surgery, radiodiagnostic, ophthalmology, obstetrics, laboratory work, pharmacy, and auxiliary services.

There was an average of one hundred patients in treatment at one time. The average number of consultations in 1942 was 500 per month, of cases cared for by the free dispensary, six hundred. Treatment lasted from two or three days to several months. Patients came from the various cities and towns of Suiyuan.

The Mission also established many dispensaries at different localities in Suiyuan.

E. Japanese Medical Practices.

Before and during the Japanese War of 1937-45 the medical facilities by the so-called Government of Manchukuo in Manchuria and Mongolia increased. The Manchuria Medical College dispatched a Medical Treatment Party to Mongolia every summer since 1923, which carried out a touring medical service throughout Heilungkiang, Liaotung and Jehol. Besides the medical treatment, the Party also investigated medical herbs, insects, hot springs and the quality of water.

F. The Medical Service of Prince Te

It was reported that in Inner Mongolia under Prince Te, the Chairman of Federated Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia, and the others, through the aid of the Japanese, organized a Medical Treatment Party in Inner Mongolia since 1934. This Party established the medical stations in several places of different banners with the purpose of improving the sanitation and health of the Mongolian people, such as the medical stations in Pei-tzu-miao in the Abaghanar Banner, in the vicinity of the Sunit Banner of the Silingol League, and in some banners of Charhar League, etc. It was estimated that the stations had treated altogether 17,000 out-patients, 4,000 in surgery, 2,500 in medicine, 4,200 in dermatology, 2,400 in ophthalmology, 3,200 in urology and venereal diseases, 300 in gynaecology and obstetrics and 200 in dentistry, etc. The active epidemics, the Medical Treatment Party treated were mainly dysentery and smallpox. However, the number of cases was small and the total number of the patients treated at the entire stations between the years 1934 and 1938 was some twenty in smallpox cases and slightly over a hundred dysentery cases.

The Japanese had set up quite a few hospitals in Inner Mongolia which benefited a number of Mongols.

VI. Present Conditions of Health and Sanitation

Both the Chinese Communist regime and the Inner Mongolian regime have given some official data in regard to the Inner Mongolian present conditions of health and sanitation.

Ulanfu, the Chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region said: "In the field of public health, we are presently engaged in the prevention of bubonic plague. By this August (1950), 7,380,000 rats have been caught, and 273,187 people have been inoculated against the disease. As compared with last year, both the number of people stricken by this disease and the number of deaths through it has decreased greatly. (Last year, 343 people were stricken and 196 died thereof, while this year, 19 people were stricken and 11 died). There now are a total of 700 anti-plague personnel, and anti-plague organizations of a permanent nature have been established in localities where plague has been found to occur. The badly stricken area of T'ungliao hsien has been turned into an anti-plague experimental hsien. As a result of effective anti-plague measures, not a single instance of plague has been discovered in the numicipality of Ulanhot for the past three years. With the establishment of an experimental station for the cure of venereal diseases in one banner of the Hu-na League, a start has been made in the important movement for the eradication of venereal diseases." (Jen-min jih-pao. Oct. 1, 1950.)

It was also reported that the medical facilities have been improved and medical personnel trained since the inauguration of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947. In four years (1947-1951), a fair record has been set in health work, epidemic prevention, and health protection in the region. Up to the present, three clinics for the prevention and treatment of syphilis, one epidemic prevention corps, one regional hospital, one sanitorium, one nursing school, four hospitals for the Leagues, one health center, three epidemic prevention station, two isolation hospitals for contagious diseases, eight centers for bubonic plague prevention and control, thirteen maternity stations, and six chil helath centers have been established. The medical personnel has increased ten-fold as compared with the old days, with 704 for epidemic prevention, 179 medical doctors, and 201 nurses and assistants. In maternal and child health work, over 500 old-fashioned midwives have received new training. Modern midwifery is being practiced. Infants are given the necessary vaccination and inoculations after they are born. The work for health protection is also conducted for adults, such as to help them to get rid of the opium smoking habit.

Pai Chih-pin, one of the Inner Mongolian government's officials and a Party member; remarked:"Great emphasis has been laid on the promotion of public health by the People's Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In the past, the health of the Inner Mongolian area was extremely poor as a result of the oppression of interior and exterior reactionary rulers. Venereal diseases were common and were one of the principle reasons for the steady decrease of population. Even in the early stages of the liberation, over sixty percent of the population in the pastoral areas still suffered from syphilis. In 1950, the Department of Health of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People's Government set up an anti-syphilis center in the Hu-na League for the prevention and cure of the disease, and an anti-syphilitic campaign was launched. By the end of 1951, all syphilitic subjects in the four pastoral areas in Hu-na League were given preliminary treatment, and at the same time treatment was extended to the Silingol League. A total of 34,813 persons have been examined, and 14,068 of these have received treatment. A survey in Ch'en Pa-erh-hu (Old Bargu) Banner in Hu-na League shows that 72.6 percent of the treated subjects have been completely cured and another 12.6 percent have shown improvement. The victory of the anti-syphilitic campaign has effectively checked the tendency of the fall of the population, which is beginning to increase instead. In 1950 a total of 201 babies were born in Ch'en Pa-erh-hu Banner, and 151 persons died in the same year, showing an increase of fifty in the population of the banner. During the year of its liberation, the total births were only fifty, while the total deaths were 109. To eradicate the scourge of syphilis, the anti-syphilitic center in Hu-na League has been expanded this year (1952) into a venereal disease clinic.

"In agricultural areas, as a result of the energetic promotion of new midwifery and reform of old-style midwives, infant mortality rates have fallen considerably in certain areas. For instance, the infant mortality rate in T'uch'uan hsien, Hsing-an League, has fallen from the normal 37.1 percent to 3.2 percent." (Jen-min jih-pao, June 9, 1953.)

On October 8, 1955 the Jen-min jih-pao reported that the first session of the Women and Children Health Work Conference of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was convened from September 15 to 24, 1955 at Huhehot. The meeting summed up the women and children health work of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region for the past six years. It was reported that during the past six years, the region fostered a total of 295 obstetric nurses and 442 health workers (of which 259 were nationalities cadres). The old-style medwives remolded and the new midwives trained also numbered 10,538. At the same time, large numbers of personnel to give publicity to women and children health work were also trained.

Through the promotion of modern midwifery in two-thirds of the region, a lesser number of infants and lying-in women were reported to be dying of tetanus and puerperal fever. In the pastoral areas, the pre-liberation trend for the population to go down was checked. In the cities and towns as well as the industrial and mining districts, the women and children work met with great improvement.

The Conference resolved to set up the next two years health centers for women and children and to give rotary training to the senior and middle-level backbone elements engaged in women and children health work of the banner, hsien and municipality level and above in the autonomous region and the heads of the health centers for women and children in the pastoral areas. Junior working personnel for the women and children health work should also be trained. The Conference also resolved that the hygienic knowledge for women and children must be vigorously publicized, and the line of giving priority to prevention must be implemented in earnest. The practitioners of Chinese and western medicines must unite to learn the advanced Soviet experience in a positive manner and their relations with the leadership must be clarified.

The above reports show that the Inner Mongols' present conditions of health and sanitation are much better than before. However, the basic requirements for health and sanifation, such as sewage systems, electricity for lighting, running water or at least improving the old-type wells, the sanitary way of disposal of excrement, and improving the people's living quarters are not mentioned.

PUBLIC WELFARE

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PUBLIC WELFARE

1. Introduction

The Mongol family was small. It was easy for the head of the family to look after each of the members, old and young, of his family. There were very few cases in which a family needed outside help.

Children were welcomed and prized everywhere in Mongolia. There were no deserted babies. Children born out of wedlock were welcomed just as if they were legitimate. No one thought of the mother as a disgrace to her family or to herself. This was because Mongolian families were small, often childless, seldom with more than one or two children. Children of both sexes were equally welcomed and treated affectionately. Orphaned children were immediately adopted by other families.

Aged people were always respected and supported by the younger generation of their families if they had no means of self-support. So there were few aged people who needed help or care outside of their own families. Moreover, the Mongols were generous in giving charity to folk who by misfortune were without means of support. They also took care of travellers. Since there were no inns or hotels in old times, all travellers depended on monasteries or private houses for shelter and refreshment. Travellers received hospitality everywhere. All these practices showed that Mongols were kindhearted and generous. They had a saying which was "If a neighbor has no horse and I have two, then it is only sensible that he should have one of them. A man can take nothing with him when he leaves this world."

A particular case, however, were beggars and thieves. Mongol beggars were frequently sturdy fellows who begged round the country, and mounted beggars were quite common in Mongolia. The lamas among them sometimes rode good horses and lived on the best the tent afforded. Not contented with this, they expected a gift in money or food when they left. No one liked to refuse admittance or withhold the gift, lest the lama should curse them. But if those beggars were too old to beg on horseback, they lived night and day on the stony ground, covered with a few scraps of filthy skins and cast-off felts and waited there to die. They received no government relief.

In Mongolia known thieves were treated as respectable members of society as long as they managed well and were successful and not caught. Sometimes lamas became thieves; after they did so they did not lose their status.

The Banner Government had no provision for reforming beggars and thieves. The people themselves practically took care of every detail in their own society. The term public welfare in modern sense was unknown to the Mongols except the limited sort of relief work carried out by the banner government for its people.

II. Some Public Welfare and Relief Programs

A. By Mongolian Local Government

1. Old Time Relief.

In the past, a banner government in Inner Mongolia taxed thirty percent of its people's grain in the agricultural areas. In the pastoral areas, cattle were taxed from well-to-do families. The government used grain and cattle for relieving the poor in time of famine and the severe winter season.

A half century ago Inner Mongolia was penetrated by all sorts of international influences. The Mongols' relatively peaceful and simple and backward life underwent great changes. Naturally the situations of all levels of society became complicated. Social problems arose one after another. More notably one was poverty. This was also due to the fact that the number of Chinese immigrants increased. As a result, relief was needed as well as welfare work.

These were some government public welfare and relief institutions:

2. Modern Type Institutions.

The municipal government in Kalgan established an orphanage, a rest home for the aged, a poor house for women, a refuge center for unmarried women, and a free clinic for the poor in 1929. There were seventy-two children in the orphanage receiving instuctions in shoe repairing, sewing, music and the Mongol dance performing. Forty aged people were admitted to the rest home. Practically all of them were incapable if doing any kind of productive work. The home provided everything for them. There were 115 women in the poor house, most of them widows. They engaged in sewing and spinning. They could support themselves partially by working. The refuge center was for prostitutes and concubines who had given up their occupations and homes. At the time of reporting only eight women were in the center. They also did sewing and spinning in order to earn a part of their board and room.

The Municipal Government of Pao-t'ou had some relief institutions such as the home for vagrants, the refuge for homeless poor and unemployed persons. At the time of reporting these institutions had admitted only twelve people.

During Prince Te's administration as the head of the Mengchiang Government some charity work was done for Inner Mongolia. He set up a philanthropic society in Hou-ho in 1929 which served as a center for distribution of old clothing, food, books and other useful things donated either by the government officials or by well-to-do people to the poor. The society also had a young labor service, a primary school for poor children which was somewhat similar to an orphanage. There were 100 children in this school and everything was free. In addition, the society had a medical clinic for free treatment of the poor. Prince Te also supported the families of soldiers who were killed in action, and gave provisions to disabled veterans.

B. By Religious Groups

1. Catholic Missionaries.

The Roman Catholic Church Mission in Inner Mongolia owned a large amount of land. For instance in Chahar one church owned over 137 acres of land while another owned over 171 acres. The latter received over 496 bushels of crops from the farmers to whom the land was leased. In Suiyuan the total church property was estimated at over 1,421 acres of land, and some 6,400 head of livestock.

Because the Church was in a good financial condition, it had a large scale program of public welfare. The work was distributed in the large cities in Chahar, Jehol, Ninghsia, and Suiyuan. The following chart shows the kinds of welfare institutions in 1938:

TABLE I. Welfare Work in Inner Mongolia. 1938 (Moko Taikan, p.118)

Location	Number of dispensaries	Number of patients	Number of orphanages	Number of children	Number of children in nurseries
Chahar	2	82	5	303	1,319
Jehol	3	58	23	395	116
Ninghsia	1	37	10	167	70
Suiyuan	8	910	40	1,760	2,269
TOTAL	14	1,087	78	2,625	3,774

It was reported that all dispensaries were under direct management of a Catholic missionary. In 1933 the record revealed that within a period of one year over 2,000 patients received treatment in different dispensaries. Children under five years of age were being cared for by nursery schools and those over five were under the care of the missionary orphanages.

A Kuei-sui Public Hospital was built in 1924 by the Church. This was considered the largest hospital of its kind in Suiyuan. There was one foreign doctor, two Chinese doctors, and twelve foreign nuns. It was equipped with some ten patient rooms, an X-ray room, and a maternity ward. A nurse-training school was attached to it with an enrollment of forty male and thirty female students. The fee charged was low and free clinical treatment was given to the poor. The Church also provided the farmers with an opportunity to cultivate its lands.

Lands were leased, various agricultural tools, and water supplies were distributed and other essential needs were offered to the poor farmers. In return, the Church received from the farmers twenty percent of the total harvest and allowed them to keep the remaining eighty percent. This was a kind of relief work.

2. Red Swastika Society.

The Red Swastika Society in Kalgan and in other large cities has done agreat deal of charity work. The Society operated hospitals, orphanages and homes for the aged. In addition, the Society also distributed food and clothing to sufferers during the time of famine. In winter months it set up porridge kitchens and warm shelters while in the summer season free medicines were given to the poor.

3. Monasteries.

The monasteries or lama temples rarely did any charity work for Mongols. If there was any, it was in the form of prayers and blessings for the people during certain occasions, such as at weddings, funerals and natural disaster times. Sometimes a lama temple gave free herb medicine to the very poor sick people.

Very often the common Mongols helped the lama temples with their wealth instead. It was not uncommon for rich people to give their property to the monastery. For instance a Mongol who had been rich in his younger days but who in his old age was somewhat reduced in circumstance, and had no son on whom he could devolve the management of his affairs would sometimes seek to escape from the losing battle of life by transferring all his property to some lama temple, on condition that the temple would feed, lodge and clothe him for the rest of his life. This arrangement had a great fascination for some; it relieved them from anxiety about their temporal affairs, freed them from the necessity of labor in their declining years and permitted them to devote the close of their lives without distraction to the duties of religion.

There were still two other kinds of people who entered the lama temple. Those who suffered from some incurable disease would leave their homes and wait death in the temple belonging to their native place. The others were those who, before sickness had laid its hand upon them, would leave the turmoil of the world and withdraw to the longed-for sanctity and peace, which they hoped to find in some holy temple.

III. The Chinese Government Famine Relief Measures

The Yellow and Yangtze Rivers with their many tributaries account for the major part of flooding. In all there are some fifteen provinces subject to flood from these two great water courses. The provinces of Inner Mongolia are among them. During drought times, Ninghsia and Suiyuan were always most affected. As a result there was famine.

In 1928-1929 there was a serious drought in Ninghsia, Suiyuan and Chahar. In 1933 there was a severe flood along the Yellow River. Suiyuan was one of the provinces affected by it. Each time during flood and drought, the government spent a large sum of money on relief in the region through the help of the China International Famine Relief Commission and other relief organizations. For instance, in 1920-1921 in Suiyuan an important project was started in the irrigation system at Saratsi, which was planned to improve 250,000 acres of farm land. The Saratsi irrigation system, while initiated as a famine relief project, was carried to completion in 1931 primarily as a famine prevention project. Although later this project proved a failure due to too much alkali in the soil and the location, yet thousands of relief laborers were benefited by the employment given to them.

For flood relief in Ninghsia provinces during 1942, the National Relief Commission made two appropriations of $500,000 and $1,480,000. The latter amount was partly used for the relief of drought sufferers from Honan who had been sent to Ninghsia to engage in land reclamation projects there. In 1944, appropriation for the relief of suffers of flood and famine in Ninghsia totalled $2,000,000.

IV. The Work of the UNRRA and CNRRA

At the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government organized the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) on January 21, 1945, and to assist the CNRRA carry out its program, the China Office of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established at the end of January, 1945. These two organizations conceived their relations as a partnership. Through these two organizations relief and rehabilitation programs were carried out throughout the whole of China. Inner Mongolia, of course, was included. However, due to the difficulties of transportation and the armed rebellion of the Chinese Communist's in the North and Northeast of China, the relief and rehabilitation work done in Inner Mongolia was only limited to large cities, while the interior and remote areas could not be reached easily and the people in those areas were not benefited.

Despite the fact that most parts of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan were occupied by the Chinese Communist force right after the Japanese surrender in 1945, UNRRA still distributed large amounts of relief supplies to these three provinces, that is Inner Mongolia. The relief supplies included food, clothing, medicines and industrial, agricultural materials and facilities.

The following table shows the amount of distribution:

TABLE II. Supplies Distributed to Communist Areas (Unit: Ton)

Region	Food	Clothing	Medical	Industrial	Agricult.
Hopei-Jehol-Peiping-Tientsin	4,522	3,363	834	2,419	1,795
Shansi-Chahar-Suiyuan	1,525	372	69		19

(Source: China Handbook 1950, p. 717.)

The table is incomplete and just serves to give the reader a general idea showing the amount of supplies distributed to the Communist-occupied area of Inner Mongolia. There were the areas of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan, which were under the Nationalist government control, which received a large amount of the CNRRA's relief supplies. The total figures (including the Chinese Communist occupied areas) were: Hopei-Jehol-Peiping-Tientsin received 52,283 tons of relief supplies and Shansi-Chahar-Suiyuan received 27,784 tons.

The reason why the several provinces were joined together as indicated above was because the CNRRA divided the whole of China into different relief areas. How much relief supplies Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan actually received individually is not recorded.

In addition to CNRRA's relief work, its welfare program was also carried to some extent to the Inner Mongolian region. For instance, for child welfare, the CNRRA set up nutrition stations, service stations, recreation stations and education stations; for homeless old people, who were over sixty, charity homes were provided where they were properly clothed and fed and were given some pocket money; and also provisions were given for the disabled. For refugees, the CNRRA helped thousands of the Mongol refugees to return to their own homes.

V. Present Public Welfare and Relief Measures.

Inner Mongolia became an Autonomous Region of Communist China in 1947. Ever since then the Red regime is modeled after the Chinese Red regime's. The principal aim of the Chinese Communist Party's policy in Inner Mongolia during the past few years has unquestionably been the training of young Mongol cadres. This is to prepare for industrialization of the region and indoctrination of the people. Both the regional regime and the Red Chinese regime care little for public welfare. But in their publications they show how much progress the region has been making since its "liberation." Among this propaganda literature very little mention is made of welfare work among the Mongols. The data available are classified into four categories.

A. In Pastoral Areas.

The Mongol regime as well as the people value their livestock above anything else. So the first thing the Red regime did was to help people increase the number of their cattle. It is reported that in pastoral areas, through the government help, the rate of propagation of livestock has generally gone up. (See the Agriculture Section). This is the result of the government policy of free pasturage, promotion of epidemic prevention work for livestock and encouragement of breeding, intensive wolf hunts and improvement of animal husbandry methods.

The New China News Agency in Huhehot reported in 1955 that 237 veterinary organizations and clinics have been set up in the livestock areas of Inner Mongolia. They receive financial and technical aid from the Region's People's Autonomous Government. They are staffed by more than 4,000 veterinarians of Mongolian, Chinese Han and Hui (Chinese Moslem) nationalities. A scientific study of measures to improve the pasture land has begun in 1955 with the arrival of experts from Peking, Nanking and other parts of China proper.

During the last few years mutual-aid teams were organized by the Party leaders in the pastoral areas of the region. Two of them are concerning this survey. One of these is the seasonal mutual aid teams such as the winter anti-calamity mutual-aid teams, spring anti-calamity and breeding mutual aid teams, summer haying mutual aid teams. The other is the annual pastural mutual-aid teams for preventing calamities, undertaking breeding and haying. In short, these teams are formed to aid herdsmen and shepherds. They include preventative veterinary medicine, organized campaigns to kill wolves, mobilization of the people to cut and store grass for winter feeding, digging of wells where surface water is scarce and building of cattle-pens and sheep-folds for shelter against snowstorms and wild beasts.

In addition, the regional regime also made loans to the herdsmen. It is said that during the first eight months of 1952 alone, loans in the form of livestock equipment and supplies, aggregated 15,000 million yüan. (Approximately U.S.$667,557.) Mongol herdsmen today own an average of sixty-four head of livestock each. In some places the average is as high as 108 head. The mutual aid teams and cooperatives are intended to help the herdsmen to give up their nomadic existence in favor of homes in permanent settlements.

This in turn is believed to help to raise their living standards.

B. In Agricultural Areas

It is reported that the agrarian reform in the agricultural areas in Inner Mongolia was completed in 1948. Since then the gradual decline of agricultural production was halted and every year has seen a constantly increasing crop yield. This is the result of government help in form of loans, constructing irrigation systems which have benefited farming a great deal. Moreover, the regime encourages the farmers to use fertilizers, select seeds for sowing and modern farming implements and methods, and also working on large-scale installations to prevent both drought and flood.

Ulanfu, the Chairman of the People's Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, said that due consideration must be given to the very poor in the allocation of loans, trading centers and cooperatives must be established without discrimination and the old custom of mutual help and the freedom to borrow and lend must be encouraged. In the semi-farming and semi-pastoral areas, because of physical and transportation limitations, the local masses have often not become better off in spite of their hard labor on the land year by year. Hereafter, the government should continue to encourage and help them, in a planned and guided manner, to develop animal-husbandry in order to achieve the purpose of improving their standard of living.

C. Famine Relief

It is reported that in the past few years, as a result of organizing the peasants in the region to fight against the calamitous effects of storms, pests, frost, snow, cold, hail, etc., over 150,000 mou of stricken land have been plowed and planted over again. Active measures have been taken for the repairing of dikes and emergency flood prevention. For instance, in the Jerim League alone, a total of over 400,000 man-days have been devoted to dike repairing in the course of 1950. As a result a million mou of fertile fields in different areas have been saved from the ravages of flood. Drought is also controlled by improving irrigation systems.

The above reports are very vague and sound like propaganda. In fact, if there are any relief measures against flood, drought and other disasters undertaken by the regional regime, it is mostly the animals which would be benefited first and the people next. This is because livestock are the wealth of the region. So the party leaders value them much more than the people. For example, snow storms hit Inner Mongolia in March-April in 1953, endangering the lives of several tens of thousands of animals in the Mongolian steppes, (human potential victims were not counted) and cutting the line of communication. In face of this threat, the Inner Mongolian Sub-Bureau of the Communist Party went into action. The Sub-Bureau issued a slogan to the public: "save every sheep." There was no mention of human beings. The airforce sent out fifteen planes which in three days (April 1-3) dropped 14,000 kilograms of fodder and food, and innumerable leaflets, bearing consoling messages from the Central Government. As the food and fodder from the Government was insufficient, the neighboring sections were ordered to send food and fodder to the famine stricken area. Although the government's relief work did not amount to much, yet the fact that the government used planes in its relief work served a wide propaganda purpose and touched the hearts of the discouraged sufferers.

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ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

I. Attitudes Of The Mongols

A. Introduction

Inner Mongolia as a political and geographical unit dates only from the conquest of China by the Manchus in the seventeenth century. At that time the Mongol inhabitants of the region, who had aided the Manchus in the latter stages of the conquest, were brought into the political and military system of the new regime, and, in recognition of their services to the conquerors, were treated with a certain degree of consideration in the conduct of their own affairs and in their relations with the Manchu government. This preferential treatment helped to set apart the region and its people from Outer Mongolia, which was more stubborn in its resistance to the Manchus and more remote from the seat of the empire.

While the new administrative structure divided Inner and Outer Mongolia politically, and perhaps psychologically, Chinese penetration along the border regions of Inner Mongolia, even before the Ch'ing Dynasty, had already introduced a factor which contributed to the distinction of the two regions. As a consequence of this Chinese influence, Inner Mongolia has become a transitional zone in which Mongolian culture ranges from a sedentary, almost wholly Chinese type through a semi-agricultural form to a purely nomadic culture indistinguishable from that of Outer Mongolia. The degree of acculturation depends upon accessibility of the region from the Chinese border, value of the land to the Chinese and other factors, but in general Chinese cultural, as well as political influence has been greater throughout Inner Mongolia than it has in Outer Mongolia. The situation is further complicated by certain regional differences of another character, some of which had begun to develop before the Ch'ing Dynasty, and others of which were introduced by the Manchus when they transplanted whole tribes from Dzungaria to easter Mongolia after their conquest of the Mongols in the northwest.

Thus the attitudes and reactions of the Mongols who inhabit the IMAR today are colored by the history and varied origins of the people, and differ in many ways from those of Mongols who live in Outer Mongolia and elsewhere in Asia.

B. Attitudes Toward Mongolian Nationalism

Although nationalism in the sense of devotion to national unity or aspiration for independence is of recent origin in Inner Mongolia, Mongols of all classes and in all parts of the region are bound by a cultural unity which manifests itself in their everyday life and which, since the eighties of the last century, has periodically expressed itself in the form of local uprisings: protests against Chinese domination or attempts to join with Outer Mongolia in a pan-Mongolian union (See Political Dynamics Section for further details). The basis for this cultural unity is essentially pride in being a Mongol, in the Mongols' way of life which is ideally the nomadic life. Yet even those who have given up much of this life and live in sedentary or semi-pastoral districts are still proud to be Mongols and can be easily distinguished from the Chinese in the subtler aspects of their culture, particularly in their devotion to Lamaism and their adherence to their own principles of kinship. These Sinicized Mongols usually speak Mongolian at home and do not like to be mistaken for Chinese.

The typical Mongol, then, is a herder of livestock who believes that his way of life is superior to all others. He loves to show off his skill in riding and athletic contests, he values his almost unlimited freedom of movement and likes to hear visitors tell him how wonderful Mongolia is. Yet the pride he feels in his country and his culture is a negative thing and seldom finds expression until a major event or the cumulative force of sustained pressure threatens to expel him from his homeland or disrupt the pattern of his life. Under normal conditions he is content to pursue his nomadic existence without interference or aid from outsiders. Although he is conscious that he has a country, he has little interest in politics or government and less in history. He supports, or at least tolerates the ruling class and has faith in the church, and feels that he shares in the prestige which these institutions enjoy.

This complex of institutions, customs and patterns of behavior supplies the basis for Mongolian unity, a unity which was felt and sometimes expressed by the Mongols themselves. Thus the potentiality for political nationalism has long existed in Inner Mongolia in the form of what might be called a cultural nationalism.

Development of nationalism was long retarded by the system, introduced by the Manchus for control of the Inner Mongolian territories. Under this dynasty the Mongolian ruling princes became in effect agents of the Manchu government in administering the affairs of the Mongols and enforcing imperial decrees. In return for this service the imperial government subsidized each prince and supported his authority in his own territory. This arrangement served as an effective mechanism for preventing national unity. During periods of Chinese colonization and land reclamation in Mongolian territories, the military and landlord class of the frontier provinces utilized the power and position of the

princes to support their seizures of Mongolian lands. Subsidies to the princes, and to some of the high lamas, were even continued for a time under the republic. It is not surprising, therefore, that a nationalistic movement failed to develop among the ruling Mongolian aristocracy who had everything to gain by perpetuating the old system. It was, rather, the lesser nobility, those who lost power and privilege as the Chinese advanced, that supplied the leadership for the early insurrections, which were not really nationalistic, though pro-Mongolian in character. It is almost impossible to determine whether these "rebel" leaders or those Mongols who followed them in rebellion were motivated by aspirations for Mongolian political unity, but such incidents supplied the foundation for a later development of nationalism. The consequences of these uprisings, moreover, which almost always resulted in harsh treatment and further land seizures by the Chinese, were such as to increase Mongol-Chinese hostility. Only in a few instances were Mongol insurrections directed against the banner chiefs. Apparently the majority of the Mongols did not associate their misfortunes with their own ruling princes, who were generally respected by their subjects.

Thus the concept of nationalism developed and spread gradually among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia as the pressure of Chinese colonization and control increased, both before and after the Revolution. Outer Mongolia's independence movement, Japanese propaganda and occupation and the introduction of western ideas and technology all contributed to the germination of new movements for independence or autonomy and supplied the means for a broader dissemination of nationalistic ideas to include all strata of the society and a wider area of the country.

The Mongol's attitude toward nationalism has developed, therefore, from a feeling of cultural unity through a vague and localized type of anti-Chinese protest movement, to emerge as a widely held public opinion with positive aspirations for political unity. From its inception until relatively recent times the concept of nationalism has been restricted to a small segment of the society: chiefly the educated youth and lesser nobility, most of whom favored the idea, and the ruling princes and high church officials, who usually opposed it. The uneducated Mongol commoners had little opportunity to acquire concepts of nationalism until they were exposed first to Japanese and then Chinese Communist propaganda. The first attempt to extend education to include all Mongols came during Japanese occupation. The Communist government has carried the program even further in an attempt to make all Mongols literate, and the new educational system probably encourages the development of a Mongolian nationalism acceptable to the present regime.

C. Attitude Toward Other Peoples

Foreign travelers through Inner Mongolia almost invariably comment upon the sincere friendliness and hospitality of the Mongols. The hospitality is typically Mongolian and is extended to all travelers as an obligation of the host, who will expect the same reception when he travels, but the warmth and friendliness experienced by Europeans, Americans and Japanese in their relations with the Mongols is a manifestation of a particular attitude toward foreigners. The Mongols like most foreigners and most foreigners like the Mongols. This generalization, however, does not apply to the Chinese, whose long and intimate association with the Mongols has given rise to special attitudes among both peoples.

1. The Chinese

In general the Mongol attitude toward the Chinese has been one of hostility and contempt, but this statement is subject to considerable modification, since feeling for the Chinese ranges from intense hatred to friendly acceptance, depending upon class, locality, nature of Chinese contacts and other factors. Whatever their attitudes may be, however, the Mongols agree, almost without exception, that they are superior to the Chinese.

Proximity to Chinese settlements or residence in the same village with Chinese has no necessary correlation with the Mongols' likes or dislikes of their Chinese neighbors. Under such conditions the Mongols tend to dissociate the Chinese farmers from Chinese officialdom, as in one small southern Chahar community, where the two groups cooperated to some extent in community projects or in defense against bandits. Here Mongolian banner officials even intervened in behalf of Chinese peasants in disputes with the tax collector or other government representatives. This attitude of tolerance on the part of the Mongols did not mean that they accepted the Chinese as equals. Though they rented their lands to Chinese tenants and derived profit from the arrangement, the single Mongol in the community who himself engaged in farming was looked upon with extreme contempt.

Close association of Chinese with Mongols and acceptance by the Mongols of Chinese goals and cultural elements did not always guarantee a friendly integration of the two societies. In two southern Jehol agricultural communities, for example, the apparently Sinicized Mongols who accepted the goals of the Chinese bureaucracy and society and failed to attain them, reacted by becoming even more Mongolian, by adopting typical Mongolian cultural elements which they had lost or never had, and by shifting their aims toward what they considered to be the ideals of Mongolian society.

The agricultural Dagurs in far northeastern Inner Mongolia consciously rejected Chinese culture and disliked Chinese soldiers and civil officials. Even a Chinese storekeeper was required to obtain consent first from the leading family in the village before he was permitted to set up shop. Schools established by the Chinese for the Dagurs were attended only under Chinese pressure.

The pastoral nomadic Mongols and the Chinese usually viewed each other with mutual distrust and contempt. Successful Chinese traders were often respected and sometimes liked by the Mongols, but in general those who engaged in buying and selling and dealt in money instead of livestock were looked upon as men without scruples. Yet some of these traders were exceptional men who understood and like the Mongols and made friends of them in even the most hostile Mongolian territory. Schuyler Cammann attended a Mongolian festival in the notoriously anti-Chinese Ordos region where the guests of honor included a Chinese landlord and two Chinese traders who had been adopted into the Oirat banner (Cammann, p. 103).

Positive attitudes of open hostility toward the Chinese were generated only under extreme provocation, as in late Manchu and early Republican times when the Mongols were subjected to harsh treatment in reprisal for local uprisings. In these cases the Chinese armies often punished the guilty and the innocent indiscriminately and thus hardened the dislike of the Mongols. These incidents usually occurred in the early stages of colonization or land-grabbing, and the intensity of Mongol feeling subsided somewhat as the Chinese consolidated their advances into Mongolian territory. Even under extreme conditions the dislike of the Mongols was often directed more toward the Chinese government than toward the Chinese as individuals or as a people.

Marriage of Mongols, either men or women, to Chinese, was considered undesirable but occurred occasionally among the sedentary Mongols, especially between Chinese merchants and Mongolian girls who were either poor or socially outcast. A Chinese woman who married a Mongol, head of a prominent family in southern Chahar, was treated as an inferior by her husband and denied many of the usual prerogatives of a Mongolian wife (Vreeland, p. 151).

2. The Outer Mongols

Frequency of contacts between the Mongols of Inner Mongolia and those of Outer Mongolia varied with locality, but there is not evidence that in recent years any general feeling of hostility has existed between the two peoples. On the contrary, the Mongols of what was then western Manchuria twice attempted to form a union with Outer Mongolia during the Chinese revolution, and the hope of consummating such a union was held by Inner Mongolian revolutionary leaders during the early years of the Chinese republic. When Outer Mongolian troops invaded Inner Mongolia with Russian forces after the fall of Japan, there was much fraternization between the Outer and Inner Mongols. The Pan-Mongolian movements were opposed by the ruling princes of Inner Mongolia, who feared Russian and Outer Mongolian influence, but were favored by the young Mongol leaders and a large segment of the Mongol population in the northern part of Inner Mongolia. In the south and west there was little intercourse with the Outer Mongols except when Khalkha refugees from Communist purges began to settle across the border and occupy Inner Mongolian pastures in northern Suiyuan. The Ordos and Alashan people had little contact with them, but those who visited the Khalkha camps felt uneasy in the presence of the northerners. Yet there were common bonds, such as membership in the same league, and the two groups communicated without difficulty. Pan-Mongolism generated little enthusiasm in the southwest, although representatives from the Ordos attended meetings called in Barga to further the movement. In general, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia looked upon the Outer Mongols as a people closely related, but recognized the political, economic and cultural barriers which set them apart, and had no particular inclination to participate in their affairs or to turn to them for assistance.

3. Europeans and Americans

Europeans and Americans have generally been welcomed by the Mongols and received with courtesy and respect. Before the Chinese revolution and even during the Republican period, most westerners were either missionaries or explorers who treated the Mongols with consideration, paid well for the goods and services they required and, in return, were hospitably treated by the Mongols. In these relationships, as in those with other foreigners, the attitudes of the Mongols differed somewhat depending upon their own experiences and upon the aims and behavior of the visitors. Missionaries, for example, were not always well-received, and other travelers often found it necessary to overcome a prejudice toward westerners which the Mongols had acquired as the result of missionary activities. In his travels through Inner Mongolia in the 1930's Söderbom found that "It was often very hard for us non-missionaries, because the Mongols looked upon us as belonging to the faith of the missionaries, which was true. We had, therefore, to establish ourselves in a manner often displeasing to the Mission, for instance by contributing to the Lama Church, by placing an offering on the altar, etcetera" (Söderbom, mss. 1k, p. 8).

Such an attitude on the part of the Mongols was not general, but was perhaps typical of lamas, who at first resented the introduction of a competitive faith. The Mongol laity were less critical of missionaries and at times rendered them great service, even to the point of assisting in their escape during the Boxer rebellion. Mongol friends of Larson, the noted Swedish missionary, crossed over into China to rescue other Christian missionaries from the Boxers. Successful missions, such as that of the Belgian Catholics in the Ordos region, attracted Mongol adherents under the intelligent leadership of men who understood and sincerely liked them, respected their religious institutions and encouraged their cultural individuality. The Mongols sometimes responded by making the mission, instead of the lamasery, the focus of their traditional social activities.

Mongols commonly make no distinction between foreigners of European stock, but lump them all together under a term which means "Russians." As a result of this classificiation, Khalkha refugees in the northern Ordos region were extremely hostile toward American visitors until they were convinced that the travelers were different from other "Russians." Mongols in some regions, particularly the northeast, have learned to distinguish between "White Russians" and "Red Russians." The latter were associated with the Chinese Communists and were thought to be very ferocious and cruel. Even after their experiences with the "Red Russians," the Mongols felt no animosity toward other foreigners. Their attitude in this respect may be summed up as one of reserve and curiosity, rather than fear or hostility, until the strangers have revealed the purpose of their visit and their own attitude toward the Mongols.

4. The Japanese

First Mongol contacts with the Japanese were made under exceptional conditions; i.e., at a time when the depredations of undisciplined Chinese troops had strengthened the developing spirit of Mongolian nationalism and aroused in the Mongols a new and intensified anti-Chinese feeling. The promises of the Japanese to establish Inner Mongolian autonomy, and their more refined and better controlled methods of exploiting the Mongols at first inspired confidence in the new over-lords. The Japanese at least respected the Mongols' religion and refrained from looting or destroying their property. Schools were provided to educate Mongol youth and children, lamas were sent to Japan to be instructed or indoctrinated in the principles of Japanese Buddhism, and farmers and herders were given substantial aid. The new regime quickly accomplished more than the old had promised and, moreover, delivered the Mongols from the domination of the hated Chinese. It is not surprising, therefore, that relations with the Japanese were, at first, harmonious and the attitude of the Mongols was friendly. As late as 1944 Japanese travelers in southern Chahar encountered no Mongol hostility. Their reception was very much the same as that accorded to

Europeans or Americans in other sections of Inner Mongolia. Only in the far west, remote from their centers of operation, did the Japanese fail to win the cooperation of the Mongols; and even here it was not loyalty to the Chinese that influenced Mongol attitudes. Nationalist troops had thoroughly looted the territory, and the Mongols hated the Chinese as individuals and as a people, but the presence of Chinese troops and the failure of the Japanese to penetrate the area in force left the Mongols with little choice.

D. Material Concepts

Due to the sparsity of population, lack of urban settlements, absence of facilities for rapid communication and mass transportation, relative remoteness of the region in relation to the complex civilizations of the world, and the nature of the economy, the Mongols have, until very recently, been spared the necessity of developing attitudes toward many of the material concepts common to European and some Asiatic societies. There have been no problems of industrialization, financial manipulation or economic control comparable to those in the densely populated, technologically advanced nations. No serious conflicts have arisen between science and religion, labor and management, or consumer and producer in the same sense as they have in urban societies. Nevertheless the Mongols do have, as does any human group, patterned attitudes toward the material things within their experience.

1. Property and wealth

Mongols are very conscious of wealth and the social distinctions which it engenders; but the tokens of wealth are not always the same as those valued by other societies, nor are concepts of wealth and property the same everywhere in Inner Mongolia. Before Communist days everyone usually had a little cash, and wealthy men sometimes owned a quantity of gold bullion, but when an individual had accumulated enough money, he invested it in livestock, preferably horses.

Land was never individually owned in the traditional nomadic society, but was held by the clan in pre-Manchu times and by the Banner thereafter. The territory was used in common by members of the clan or banner. The concept of private ownership of land or of land as a form of property was therefore altogether foreign to the Mongols until they were influenced by Chinese colonization along the southern border of the region. Banner princes then began to first lease and then sell land to the Chinese who occasionally sold tracts back to Mongol farmers. Thus Mongols in the sedentary agricultural regions often became landowners and came to look upon land as a form of property.

Property other than land was owned either by the individual or the family, and its inheritance and distribution were governed by well-defined rules. Dwellings, livestock, tools and equipment were family property, with ownership vested in the male head of the family. Domestic animals were all marked with the owner's brand and recognized as his property. Articles of personal adornment--jewelry, clothing, etcetera,--were always individually owned, and the Mongols took great pride in the display of such finery. Property was never owned jointly by two or more families. Kinship rules and the continual splitting up of extended families made such a situation impossible. (For further details on ownership and inheritance of property see Family Section, IMAR Handbook).

2. Science

Until recent years the Mongols have had little contact with the concepts or products of modern science. Missionaries and travelers have attempted, sometimes successfully to treat the diseases of men and livestock, but until Communist control was introduced these treatments were often opposed by the lamas and rejected by the laity. The Mongols' concept of the operation of natural laws and the occurrence of natural phenomena was inextricably bound up with superstitious and religious ideas. Man had achieved a sort of balance in his relations with natural and supernatural forces, and any interference with the established order might have disastrous consequences. It was this attitude that members of the Sino-Swedish expedition encountered when they sought to inoculate the Mongols' cattle during a severe epidemic in the 1930's. Only a few herdsmen consented to the treatment offered by the Europeans, but after most of the untreated cattle had died, much of the Mongol opposition disappeared.

Their reluctance or refusal to accept the products or concepts of foreign science does not imply that the Mongols lacked their own means of coping with problems which might be dealt with "scientifically" in another society. There were treatments or cures for the ailments of man and domestic animals, and explanations for all natural phenomena. This body of knowledge and practice embraced concepts and methods which, though perhaps not arrived at scientifically, were nevertheless more than empirical. The Mongol did not move blindly, without considering cause and effect. He knew causes, had his own methods of dealing with them, and predicted the outcome. If the results were not those he had expected, it was due to an error in method or to interruption of the natural course of events by some inimical force. Foreign science might be just such a hostile influence, and it was safer to rely on traditional methods until it was shown that the new ideas were beneficial or, at least, harmless.

That the Communists have succeeded in overcoming or overriding Mongol attitudes toward scientific innovations is evident from reports of improved health conditions in the IMAR, mass treatment of venereal diseases, and a rising birth rate. The benefits of scientific knowledge have also been applied to the care of livestock, a field which was, in traditional Mongolian society almost of greater concern to man than his own welfare. Improvement of livestock is one of the prime targets of the Communist government in the pastoral regions, and it is clear that the Mongol's objections to modern methods must have been either removed or ignored. The acceptance by the Mongols of modern scientific ideas may be correlated to some extent with the decline of the power and influence of the Tibetan-Buddhist church, but the Communists have even utilized this influence in Ulanchab League by establishing a lama clinic where the churchmen are trained to give medical care to the pastoral people.

It must be remembered that for many years, under the Chinese Republic, the Japanese and the various autonomous governments, young Mongols have been sent in increasing numbers to be educated in progressive schools. Many of these men are now leaders in the Autonomous region and each is a potential source for the diffusion of new ideas to other Mongols.

3. Collectivization

Cooperation in work is not new to the Mongols, nor are true cooperatives a Communist innovation in Inner Mongolia. Banner co-ops were in operation during the Republican period. Collectivism, however, as practiced under the Communist government has little in common with the voluntary and informal exchange of services so generally practiced in traditional Mongolian society. Under the new system participation is organized and directed by government agencies; the spontaneous nature of the old system is lacking. The aims of collectivization, furthermore, are such as to deny to the Mongols that cherished freedom of movement which is so essential to their way of life.

Early Communist attempts to "convert" the Mongols of Inner Mongolia were nothing more than campaigns of terror and destruction, conducted without benefit of propaganda, and the Mongols either resisted or destroyed their livestock to keep it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Subsequently the Communists adopted a subtler approach, prefacing their organization campaigns with skilful propaganda drives which seem to have achieved some success.

Present Mongol attitudes toward collectivization can only be inferred from Communist news sources which depict the "prosperous and happy life" of the Mongols, the continuous growth of farm and herding cooperatives, and the manifold activities of mutual-aid teams. There is a hint as to the reaction to land reform, which has been carried out in the region, in the admonitions to "raise revolutionary vigilance" against the counter-revolutionary who "sets fire on the farm of our peasants. He manipulates individual backward peasants, sows discord among them, instigates them to create disturbances and seeks to undermine the internal unity of agricultural producer cooperatives and mutual-aid teams and hamper or check the development of the mutual-aid and cooperative movement." (Hailar Nei Meng Ku Jih Pao, SCMP, No. 970, Jan. 18, 1955). Evidence of Mongol opposition to collectivization and to the Communist regime in general is, however, scanty, and the process of organization and reorganization continues with the apparently enthusiastic support of the educated young Mongols who are being trained in ever increasing numbers by the cadre training centers and in the new schools and colleges. (For further details on Mongol reaction to the present regime see Political Dynamics section, IMAR Handbook.)

E. National Symbols

To imbue the Mongols with an officially approved concept of nationalism the Communist government has been compelled to reconcile the former conflicting interests and mutual hostilities of Chinese and Mongols, to create symbols which will become rallying points for Mongol nationalism, and at the same time to prevent the growth of a "narrow nationalism" inimical to the interests of Communist China.

To preserve the cultural identity of the Mongols, the Communists have encouraged the use of the Mongolian language and dress, the performances of native singing and dancing teams, and the holding of traditional festivals. These are all elements and activities intimately associated with Mongolian life, and their sponsorship by the government may produce favorable Mongol reactions, but even these forms of expression are rigidly channeled to make them conform to the current ideology. Publications in the Mongolian language are mostly translations of Russian or Chinese Communist works, dances depict scenes from the new, happy and prosperous life of the Mongols under Communism and patriotic songs are sung to old Mongolian tunes. The festivals, formerly partly religious in character, are now held in celebration of national holidays set to commemorate some great event in the history of local or international Communism.

National heroes have been created, revived or refurbished to become symbols of Mongol greatness. The alleged remains of Chingis Khan, who in the early days of Mongolian Communism, was condemned as an enemy of the people, were re-enshrined recently (1955) in a new mausoleum, after they were recovered from the "fleeing Chiang Kai-shek bandits." Other historical figures from Mongolia's past have been given new characters in keeping with the marriage of Mongolian nationalism and Chinese Communism. Galdan, for example, has emerged as a patriotic Mongol leader fighting against Manchu oppression instead of an ambitious conqueror who fought both Chinese and Mongols in his rise to power.

The symbols of nationalism created for the Mongols have been carefully blended to convey an impression of respect for tradition combined with enthusiasm for Communist progress. It was not necessary to destroy any important symbols of national unity, for the unity itself has never existed in Inner Mongolia.

F. Summary

If the Communist government meets with repeated successes in its program for organizing and controlling Inner Mongolia, it could mean that the old style Mongols with their traditional attitudes and way of life would eventually disappear, to be replaced by the educated youth, already trained to carry out the directives of the state. These youths would, in turn, be followed by others as the children now being educated in the primary schools grow up to take their places in the organization. Education, therefore, is one of the keys to the Communist program for political, social and economic reform. Once all or the vast majority of the Mongols have been indoctrinated and trained from childhood, the state can carry out its objectives almost without opposition.

The accomplishment of such objectives would necessarily bring profound changes in the Mongol social structure which would be so modified as to be almost unrecognizable. The superficial aspects of Mongolian culture would probably be maintained so long as they were useful to the government. Language may survive longer than most traits, but all Mongol youths and adults will be required to learn Chinese, and Mongolian may become the second language.

All thse developments would require time and the full cooperation of the Mongols. If the government's plans meet with reverses in the near future, there is still enough of the truly Mongolian element in the region to spark a revival of the old spirit. There are educated Mongols who were not schooled by the Communists and who may be capable of exploiting the nationalism, hero worship and organizational methods fostered by the new regime. Increased pressure by the government, whether due to its own mistakes or to lack of Mongol cooperation, could easily provoke violent and widespread reactions, as has been demonstrated repeatedly in earlier Mongolian history. It is also possible that consistent failure of the government to attain its objectives might disillusion even the Communist-educated youths,

who are taught to believe that their own welfare and that of their country is dependent upon the continued success of the People's government.

II. Attitudes of the Chinese Settlers

Since a majority of the Chinese in Inner Mongolia immigrated not long ago from the provinces of North China, their attitudes and reaction are to a great extend similar to those of the people in those provinces. For this reason, the reader is referred to the same section in the General Handbook. However, Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia, as those in Manchuria, had to face natural elements and human environments which differ in many respects from those in China proper and immigrants, especially the poor peasants must have had the feeling that they were unwanted or expendable people in their home communities and that they must make good and be successful in the new land in order to eradicate the shame and bitterness and gain a sense of pride. These facts account for attitudes which are particular to the settlers in Inner Mongolia.

One particularity can be seen in the people's religious emphasis. According to a survey conducted in the area of Hsüan-hua of Chahar by Willem A. Grootaers and his team, the religious activities of Chinese farmers in this part of Inner Mongolia are mostly related to their farming business, or more specifically, to the obtaining of rain or water; "In reality the greatest attention, the largest expenses, the most frequent duties are attached to the various rain cults." (Rural Temples around Hsüan-hua, Folklore Studies, 1951, p. 115). Of all the larger cult units of the Hsüan-hua area 377 units, or fifty-nine percent, are related to prosperity in this world and of these 244 units, or thirty-eight point three percent, are agricultural cults. Of the agricultural cults 175, or twenty-seven point four percent are practiced to obtain rain or water. The next important religious emphasis is that in regard to retribution. There are more than one hundred units of religious establishments related to the judgment of evil deeds. "Actually, we have seen that even the temples dedicated to rain gods show many reminders of the god's power to chastize evil doers." Thus, the prosperity of the farming business and the judgment of the soul are by all counts the basic tenets and practices of the Chinese popular religion in this part of Inner Mongolia.

This same religious emphasis is seen in the Chinese societies in the Back Loop regions. Here the Chinese peasants would worship anything which has the power of giving rain or water for the growing of crops and the increasing of livestock. Wang T'ung-chun was after his death in 1935 worshipped as a deity because he made a tremendous contribution to the development of irrigation in the districts of the Back Loop. No one else had done so much in the land reclamation in that region and Wang's work played an important part in practically every farm of the Chinese settlers.

Another distinctive attitude is the one in regard to land. In the provinces of China proper everywhere land is very much limited and has a precious value and consequently every person feels deeply sentimental about the little piece of land he owns. Land is almost as dear as one's own life. Here in Inner Mongolia, as in the newly developed areas of Manchuria, the situation is quite different. There are vast sections of land which are cultivable but have as yet to be developed. Land development here depends largely upon the building of irrigation facilities. Such work is beyond the financial power of any average individual. It must be done by corporations or a successful financier. When the irrigation facilities are available, large areas of land are reclaimed and are cultivated. When the facilities break down, all the land within their reach loses its usefulness. When irrigation is available, one owns or cultivates acres by hundreds. One or one-half acre means nothing. When irrigation is not available, the cultivator has to find another livelihood or suffer starvation. All these facts mean that the Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia are either big landowners, or operators, or people who give no thought at all to land. They do not have a sentimental attachment to land. Owning or operating farmland is strictly a kind of business. Neither the land, nor the farming business is something inherited from a long line of ancestors. Therefore, the Chinese farmers in Inner Mongolia do not treasure every little piece or every corner of cultivated acres as their fellow citizens in the densely populated provinces do. Of course, this statement is not applicable to those who have been farming in the south and southeastern sections of Inner Mongolia and who have owned the land for many generations.

Because of the frontier situation of life and because of their past relations with the people in the old provinces, the Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia, as those in the north of Manchuria, are known for their great hospitality, especially if the visitors are from the home provinces. This hospitality made the people less covetous of daily necessities. It is said that when a visitor enters the home of a family which has abundant food and livestock, he can stay as long as he wishes without causing the hosts' resentment. Every peaceful visitor, whether an acquaintance or a stranger, is welcomed and generously treated. This fondness of visitors fostered in the pioneers' hearts sincerity, simplicity and open-mindedness toward outsiders. It is reported that when a traveler stops at the door of a home in the rural

districts for a drink of water, a meal, or an overnight lodging, he is immediately received into the inner chamber of the house. He is introduced to every member of the household, including young ladies. If the visitor has to stay, he is invited to share whatever meal or meals the family can spread on the table. At night the stranger may share the same k'ang with the family members, if another room or bed is not available.

Probably because of the influence of Mongolian ethics, Chinese settlers in Inner Mongolia also make the stealing of livestock a serious crime. Livestock is property that is jealously guarded and a stranger may not touch a horse, a sheep, or a camel without the owner's permission.

Those who do not live on farms are for the most part in trade with the Mongols. These people may not be as generous as the country folk in receiving visitors, but their attitudes, compared to those who have fewer opportunities of dealing with groups of other races, are cosmopolitan. They are comparatively free from racial prejudices against the Mongols and other minority groups. They seem to be at ease in associating with Mongols even under those well-known unsanitary conditions, and appreciate some of the merits of nomad life. It is not rare for Chinese in Inner Mongolia to become nomads and take up the business of herd grazing. Traveling across vast deserts and semi-deserts, trading with people of different cultures, and looking at the greatness of the extensive plains and magnificent mountains, one cannot but become broadminded both in facing nature, and in dealing with fellow men. There are of course, conflicts between the two peoples whenever their immediate interests are contradictory.

In regard to political affairs, the average Chinese in Inner Mongolia has very little feeling and not much reaction. What the Chinese want is for both the Chinese and other ethnic groups to co-exist peacefully and profitably, all fellow citizens of one nation. They do not want to be treated as a minority by the Mongols, of course, but they also see no point in those Chinese policies which the Mongols consider oppressive. But they do agree that good land belonging to the Mongols ought to be cultivated by the Chinese.

Finally, the Chinese in Inner Mongolia are not as strict as the people in the old provinces in regard to relations between men and women. This is quite understandable, since in a frontier society, it is difficult to maintain all the conventions practiced in the old country. Being unconventional is not necessarily the lack of morality. It might just be a kind of simplicity and genuineness. But this simplicity and genuineness is occasionally misinterpreted by more conventional visitors. Some might even take advantage of and abuse the hospitality of the frontier people. In that case, the immorality is the outsiders' and not the ple. In that case, the immorality is the outsiders' and not the settlers'.

Attitudes of the population of the urban centers of Inner Mongolia, even though basically the same as within the Great Wall, have also been influenced to a degree by environmental factors. In view of the absence of a gentry tradition, the gentry sense of responsibility was also generally lacking and was only faintly reflected in the attitudes of frontier officialdom. Officialdom on the other hand, all through Republican times, at least ostentatiously displayed a greater consciousness of Imperial mission. Frontier officials liked to think of themselves as fighting an outpost battle politically, economically and culturally. Their position was thus an understandable mixture of Chinese cultural chauvinism and frontier adventurism. Their attitude towards the Mongols was frequently in contradistinction to that of the rural settlers - universally one of suspicion if not disdain, at times softened by a certain sense of curiosity. Their policy toward Mongol life and Mongol aspirations varied, ranging from benevolent assimilationism to unscrupulous exploitation.

The frontier atmosphere also influenced the attitudes of the mercantile population of Inner Mongolian cities. Merchants too felt less restrained by traditions and conventions prevalent in the old provinces. Frontier experience usually added daring and self-reliance to their personalities and an imaginativeness in exploiting untraditional opportunities. They were usually not blinded by political or cultural chauvinism and never displayed, even rarely felt, that superiority which characterized the frontier official. Their keen individualism did not exclude the insight that the frontier situation makes concerted action an advantage. The mid-morning snack at the tavern and the evening meeting at the public bath were great social occasions. Their clubs, however, seemed more like free associations than like bonded guilds. Yet with all these characteristics, there was maintained among the merchants too, that nostalgic feeling toward the old home and that sentimental pride in its conventions and traditions.

Frontier chauvinism is apparently an attitude of which Communist officials and cadres, all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, are not free. The special atmosphere, however, that Chinese merchants gave to Inner Mongolian cities, will soon be a phenomenon of the past.

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

I. Introduction

II. Constitutional and Legal Position of the IMAR

- A. Constitutional and Legally Defined Rights of National Autonomous Regions
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ADDITIONAL READINGS

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

I. Introduction

The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was the first national autonomous region to be established, and to some extent is the leading exhibit in the attempt to establish the "attitude of equality, fraternity, unity, and mutual assistance among the nationalities, and in overcoming all tendencies to domination by the majority nationality or to narrow nationalism." As a national autonomous region, it is an "inalienable part of the People's Republic of China." (Constitution, Ch. 1, General Principles, Article 3; General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities, Article 2). It has no Constitution of its own, and exists as an administrative area by virtue of clauses in the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China relative to "national minorities" and "national autonomous regions." As such a region, it functions under the Constitution, the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities (August 9, 1952), and the Organic Law of the People's Congresses and People's Councils, as well as all other laws and regulations which may be enforced in China Proper and deemed applicable.

II. Constitutional and Legal Position of the IMAR

Legally, the IMAR is established under the provision of the Constitution that "Regional autonomy applies in areas where people of national minorities live in compact communities..." (Constitution, Ch. 1, General Principles, Article 3). The specific type of autonomous region that the IMAR represents is provided for in the General Program, Article 2, which states, "According to the relations obtaining between the nationalities of the locality, and to the conditions of local economic development, with due consideration of the historical background..." an autonomous region may be:

1. "....established on the basis of an area inhabited by one national minority.
2. "....established on the basis of an area inhabited by one large national minority, including certain areas inhabited by other national minorities with very small populations who, likewise, shall enjoy regional autonomy.
3. "....jointly established on the basis of two or more areas, each inhabited by a different national minority...."

The IMAR is of the second type, established on the basis of an area inhabited by the Mongols in Inner Mongolia (the "one large national minority"), and including certain areas inhabited by the Oronchon, Koreans, Solons, Tungus, Evenki, and Dagur Mongols (the "other national minorities with very small populations"). Also included in the area of the IMAR are Han Chinese, who comprise seventy to eighty percent of the population and who provide the basis for a number of "democratic-coalition" governments on lower government levels.

A. Constitutional and Legally Defined Rights of National Autonomous Regions

The Constitution and the General Program grant limited autonomy to the autonomous regions, allowing them the following rights:

a)...to determine the actual form which the government of a national autonomous region is to take. (Article 70; modified in the General Program, Articles 5, 11, and in Decisions on Measures...for Democratic-Coalition Governments).
b)...to use the national minority's spoken and written language in dealing with various matters of the region. (Article 71; modified in the General Program, Articles 15-16).
c)...to train cadres from among the nationalities of the region. (General Program 17).
d)...to carry out internal reforms in the national autonomous region in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its people and of the local leaders who are associated with the people. (Article 70; General Program 18).
e)...to administer the region's finances, to develop the region's economy and organize its own local security forces, within the framework of the unified economic system and planning of the state. (Constitution, Article 70; General Program 19, 20, 22).
f)...to take necessary and appropriate steps to develop the economy, culture, education, arts, and health services of the various nationalities inhabiting the region. (Article 70; General Program 21).
g)...to draw up special regulations for the region, within the limits stipulated by the people's governments of higher levels. (Article 70, modified by General Program 23).

In the modifications and explanations of these rights are to be found the real meaning of "autonomy." The right to determine the "actual form which the government of a national autonomous region is to take" is a limited right, as that government must be set up "according to the basic principles of democratic centralism and of the system of the people's congresses" (see China General, Constitution). Further, the local organs of government in autonomous areas are to be instituted "in accordance with the basic principles governing the organization of local organs of state as specified in section IV of chapter 2 of the Constitution." The functions and powers of these local organs are detailed in the "Organic Regulations for People's Congresses of All Levels and People's Councils of all Levels in the IMAR" [cf. Current Background #370, Nov. 28, 1955].

Areas inhabited by a concentrated population of Han Chinese are directed to form governments of the type generally in use in the rest of the country. Where there is a large number of Hans together with a sizable group of the minority, a "democratic-coalition" government of nationalities is established. Officially, such a government is formed to protect the minorities from domination by the Hans; in fact, it cements more firmly the place of the minorities within the national structure.

In effect, the form of government in the autonomous areas is prescribed at the higher levels of authority, corresponding to what they have determined to be the "present stage of development of the respective nationalities" (Chou En-lai, in a discussion of the General Program). In the IMAR, some concessions have been made to traditional forms of governmental organization, particularly in regard to nomadic regions. Insistance upon a more traditional form of government, or refusal to approve suggestions that a democratic-coalition be established are interpreted as "narrow nationalism." Decisions concerning the readiness of a minority to advance into a new stage of government are decided by the high-level authorities of the central government.

In all other administrative matters regarding economy, finance, education, security forces, and the like, regional autonomous governments function under the national plans and with the aid and control of the central People's Government. Exercise of any of the autonomy rights, therefore, must meet the approval of the national government and conform to its policies. Similarly, the "right of interpretation and amendment...rests with the central People's Government."

The total effect of the "regional autonomy" policy, then, is to bring into administrative circles trusted members of the nationality to act as agents of the central government to interpret to the nationality their place in the overall plan.

B. Constitutionally and Legally Defined Rights of Nationalities in National Autonomous Regions

Within the national autonomous region, all nationalities are granted rights both as individuals and as a collective Body. Such rights include representation in government, legal equality with the Han nationality, freedom in cultural matters (i.e., preservation of language, development of the language, and preservation of traditions, customs, and beliefs, including religious beliefs), and freedom to initiate proposals for the readjustment of the boundaries of the region, etc. The effect of these rights, which correspond to those guaranteed to the Hans under the central government, is to put the minorities on an equal footing with the Hans in participation in the activities of the country. In legislating such rights specifically for nationalities, the intent is to draw them into the total life of the country; the rights are to be used to aid nationalities to "establish unity and mutual aid among themselves.... so that the People's Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family comprising all its nationalities.... Actions involving discrimination, oppression, and splitting the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited." (Common Program 50).

This attitude toward minority nationalities is a reversal of the earlier Chinese Communist attitude, as stated by Mao Tse-tung in 1930, that non-Chinese minorities would have the choice of either forming their own autonomous region within the Chinese state, seceding from the Chinese Soviet Republic and forming their own independent state, or joining the Soviet Union. This view had already been dropped by 1938, however, when Mao proclaimed that minorities would have equal rights with the Chinese in jointly establishing a unified state (see China IMAR, Political Dynamics).

Within the Soviet Union, only the Union republics have a constitutionally-defined right to secession. An autonomous republic or lower unit such as an autonomous region is considered fundamentally a part of the Union republic of which it forms a part. Its constitution, if any, is subject to confirmation by the Union republic, which also determines its economic and cultural development, and the Union republic's Council of Ministers may annul the decisions and orders of its executive organs. Autonomous republics or regions can, however, eventually rise to the status of a Union republic provided they are located on the border of the Soviet Union and have a sufficiently large population. Thus the autonomous regions of China are comparable in their relation to the mother state to those of the Soviet Union.

Viewed from the standpoint of officially-stated doctrine, the People's Government policy toward nationalities and national autonomous regions is an attempt at integration rather than domination, assimilation, or indifference. Thus the emphasis is on drawing minority peoples into the work of national development and convincing them that their future advancement lies in cooperation with the Hans and that every attempt will be made to prevent the Hans from forcing Han cultural forms on them.

C. Obligations of Autonomous Organs and Nationalities in National Autonomous Regions

1. Obligations of autonomous organs:

1) An autonomous organ may adopt the language most commonly used in the region as the chief medium of intercourse in the exercise of its authority. But when the autonomous organ exercises its authority over a nationality to whom this language is unfamiliar, the language of the latter nationality shall also be adopted. (General Program 15).
2) Reforms must be carried out in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the people in a region and of the local leaders who are associated with the people. (General Program 18).
3) Special regulations of the Government of an Autonomous Region must be submitted through channels to the Government Administration Council of the central People's Government for registration, and approved by people's governments of higher levels. (General Program 23).
4) Autonomous organs must safeguard the rights granted to all nationalities in the region, and prohibit all acts liable to pro- voke disputes between the nationalities (General Program 25, 26, 35).
5) Autonomous organs must consult representatives of a nationality about problems relating to that nationality, help the nat- ionalities to practice regional autonomy, and educate and guide the people of a region toward unity and mutual assistance. (General Program 27-29, 30).
6) Autonomous organs must promote love of the People's Republic of China and patriotism.
7) Autonomous organs must assist efforts to develop political, economic, cultural, and educational sides of their life, aid expansion of health services, and acquaint people of the reg- ion with advanced practice in these matters. (General Pro- gram 33, 34).

These obligations laid upon the governments of autonomous regions are repeated for people's governments of lower levels in the "Decisions on Measures for the Establishment of Local Democratic-Coalition Governments of Nationalities." It is clear from the above that the autonomous organs of national autonomous regions are not intended merely to decide disputes between nationalities, but are directed to take an active part in promoting the policy of unity and integration between the nationalities. The obligations put upon nationalities parallel those put upon the government organs, and may be summed up as follows:

2. Obligations of nationalities in national autonomous regions

Nationalities must use the rights and privileges granted to them to rid themselves of "actual inequality," i.e., to emerge from their "backward" political, economic, and cultural conditions. The rights are granted to them not as a measure of preservation, but as a means of enabling them to assume equality in the struggle to build a new Chinese nation and culture. Therefore, the nationalities are obliged to combat the use of their rights to promote "narrow nationalism" (attempts to be independent of China and the Hans) and to bring themselves to a "genuine appreciation for China's greatness and progress."

D. Actual Practice in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region

Whereas in certain regions exercise of these rights is attenuated by virtue of a lower administrative status, in the IMAR all of the rights granted to autonomous regions and nationalities may be exercised to their limits. This relative freedom of action was originally allowed because the IMAR was classified as a greater administrative area, on an equal footing with the North, Northeast, Northwest, East, Central-South, and Southwest Administrative Areas of China proper, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The People's Government of the IMAR is directly subordinate to the central People's Government, and functions on behalf of that government. There is thus no doubt that the IMAR conforms to the constitutional provision that "National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China" and that "Each national autonomous region is an integral part of the territory of the People's Republic of China" (General Program 2).

In the IMAR, the various rights guaranteed to regions and nationalities have been implemented; the "forms" of the governments in the region vary in name and composition from the form of governments in other parts of China. Thus one has in the IMAR the league, banner, otok, and kaza (administrative village), the equivalents of provinces, hsien (counties), ch'ü (districts), and chen (administrative townships). In addition to these traditional groupings, there are, primarily in areas with heavy concentration of Hans, the regular administrative divisions of hsien, ch'ü, hsiang, municipalities, and "democratic-coalition" governments

The principle of regional autonomy for nationalities and the injunction upon local governments to aid groups in practicing regional autonomy has resulted in the establishment in the IMAR of national autonomous governments for the Oronchons and Koreans, and nationality hsien and hsiang governments where possible. In predominantly Han regions, democratic-coalition governments have been set up. Representation of all nationalities is practiced more or less in proportion to the importance of the group in the area; for example in December, 1951, of the 1,272 delegates to the representative conferences of the people of various banners, hsien, and municipalities in the Hsingan League, 47.4 percent were Mongols, 51.6 percent were Hans, one percent were Koreans and Moslems, and eight percent other groups. In 1953, of the twelve chiefs and deputy chiefs of leagues, seven were Mongols.

The language provisions of the constitution in regard to national autonomous regions are also apparently being heeded. Mongolian is used concurrently with Chinese, and the junior and senior primary schools in predominantly Mongol areas use Mongolian instructional materials. Chinese is studied by Mongols in the middle schools and colleges, and is the language used in predominantly Han areas. In the Oronchon area primary school instruction is in the Oronchon language. There are Mongolian language newspapers as well as Chinese, Mongolian broadcasts, and an increasing supply of Mongolian language literature. There are indications, however, that the overall language policy is determined for the minority at the national level of government. One of these indications is the announcement of September 5, 1955 (NCNA, September 15, 1955) that the IMAR People's Council issued a "Resolution to adopt a new Mongolian language." This "language" will, in effect, be a standardized script and pronunciation; the dialect which is to be used as the standard was not specified, however. The script is to be written horizontally instead of vertically, as was the old Mongolian script, and it is to be based on the colloquial language. It will be introduced into general use in the second half of 1958. From 1955 to 1958, the fundamental dialects will be investigated and a standard dialect worked out. Textbooks will be printed in the new script, which will be introduced in articles and news items, and in a special alphabet and vocabulary section of the chief newspapers of the autonomous region.

From 1958 to 1961, the transition to the new script is intended to be completed. It will then be used in all schools, government correspondence, and new books and publications. There are indications that this script is based upon that in use in Outer Mongolia, and is derived from the Cyrillic script there in use. There is no indication that this change was initiated by the people or the government of the IMAR.

Emphasis has been placed upon the recruitment and training of cadres, particularly Mongol, and their education in patriotism is directed toward the Chinese Peoples Republic rather than their own nationality. In the years from 1947 to 1953 it was stated that over 15,000 "nationality cadres" were trained in the IMAR.

Han Cadres are taken from both the local Han populace and that of China proper. A gap between provisions of the constitution and actual practice appears with regard to the cadre question, but it is hard to see if it exists in other fields. It is admitted that Han cadres are not fighting "Greater Han Chauvinism" with as much energy as they might, and continue to discriminate against the non-Hans. It is apparent from the statements of Ulanfu (Chairman of the IMAR) that the Hans show suspicion, distrust, and attitudes of superiority toward the non-Hans. However, there has not yet been reported any case of discrimination brought to the People's Governments by a nationality group or individual against a Han. Presumably such acts, where committed, have been settled by self-criticism and concession (see China IMAR, Political Dynamics).

Emphasis has also been placed on health measures, production of food and goods, encouragement of Mongol folk-culture, and development of local security forces and the Peoples Liberation Army. In general, most aspects of the rights, obligations, and duties specified in the constitution and the General Program have been followed, with varying degrees of emphasis and success in implementation. It seems true that the special attention given to the nationalities question has resulted in more participation by the nationalities in the political and economic life of the nation than was the case under previous governments. There is even a slight degree more freedom in the IMAR for the non-Hans because of the emphasis on "slower change due to historical factors" among the nationalities. Thus in pastoral areas, while "abolishing feudal prerogatives," a policy of "no struggle, no redistribution; protection and multiplication of animals" was instituted.

The major gaps between the promises of the constitution and General Program and performance in the IMAR appear to be in the implementation of the "non-discrimination" policy and the lack of real free choice in the forms of government in the autonomous region. Despite repeated statements that the nationalities may determine their own forms of government, the provision has worked to establish in the IMAR the basic forms of government and organizations which appear in China proper. Aside from the traditional grouping of Mongols into leagues, banners, and their subdivisions, no form of government appears to be uniquely Inner Mongol.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

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STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. Imperial (Manchu) Period and the Republic

From the early years of the Manchu dynasty a dichotomy of administration existed in the governmental organization of Inner Mongolia. Mongol and Chinese administrative systems were differently organized and staffed. Certain groups of Mongols were administered separately from other Mongol groups, and internal civil administration among the Mongols was for the most part the concern of the Mongol nobility and its functionaries. The superstructure underwent a change with the installation of the Republic in China, but the basic organization of administration in Inner Mongolia remained the same. The current attempts to order government in Inner Mongolia on a regional basis appears to be a well-planned and at least partly successful move to integrate the various ethnic and cultural groups more firmly than has previously been attempted.

A. Internal Mongol Governmental Structure

1. The league, "tribe," and banner

During the period of Manchu control, the administration of Inner Mongolia was aimed at keeping the Mongols from uniting and preventing the Chinese from overwhelming them. The administration of the Mongols was separated from that of the Chinese, and traditional Mongol organization was retained where it fitted into the needs of the Manchu state.

The basis of Mongol tribal organization was the aimak (Chinese: pu or pu-lo, tribe) and the khosun (Chinese: ch'i, banner). Originally, the khosun was a quasi-military principality under the control of a ruling hereditary prince. The aimak was composed of a number of more or less related banners, which formed the inheritance of one princely family. In the course of time the aimak became divided into several independent principalities; but despite the division fostered by the Manchus, the connection between such groups was not broken, and the senior prince in the family was considered to be the head of the aimak. The several divisions of the aimak usually occupied geographically contiguous territories:e.g., the Chahar aimak was broken into several banners resident in Chahar and bordering areas; and the Khorchin aimak, administrated under various leagues, inhabited contiguous regions of southeastern Inner Mongolia.

In actual practice the aimak division meant little after the Manchu conquest in the seventeenth century, though the Chinese continued to list the aimak along with banner and league affiliation of different groups throughout the republican period. The effective units of government during the Manchu period and the Republic were the banner and the league. Each banner had an allotted territory under the rule of the hereditary prince. It was further subdivided into the "arrows" (Mongolian: sumu, sumun) or divisions, and the brigades (Mongolian: khara), each having both cilvil and military functions. After 1644, when the Manchus ascended the throne of China, the banners and their subdivisions were organized into larger administrative units of leagues (Mongolian: chugulgan). The leagues were combined into two sections, the "Eastern Four Inner," including the Jerim, Josotu, Jouda, and Silingol Leagues, and the "Western Two Inner," comprising the Ulanchab and Ikechon Leagues. Each League had a varying number of banners attached to it, and each league had its "captain-general," who functioned as chief administrator in both a civil and military capacity. All leagues were responsible to the Board for Administration of Dependencies in Peking.

The captain-general of the league was elected by the Assembly of Chiefs of the Banners, and was confirmed in office by the Board for Administration of Dependencies. A Chinese official who functioned in an "advisory" capacity to the captain-general was appointed by the Board (later by the president of the Republic through the Mongolian and Tibetan Bureau). All the josak (chiefs) of the leagues and banners met together periodically in an assembly, which had the power to settle only the following:

a) judicial affairs in which persons of different banners were interested parties;
b) economic and administrative matters concerning the whole league;
c) matters relating to statistics about the league (i.e., census, boundary questions, etc.).

The Assembly of the Leagues was convened by order of the Peking government, and a Chinese official was specially deputed to open the assembly. In reality, this official had all the powers of the captain-general. The clerical work was done by Chinese. The captain-general of the league had no power of initiative; his authority stopped at the execution of the assembly's decisions. The league had no power to interfere with the local administration of a banner. The banner heads referred to the captain-general appointments to official positions, the conferring of titles, and especially important grave sentences for crimes. The orders and decisions of the Peking government were transmitted through the captain-general of the league and his assistant, the deputy captain-general.

2. Banner administration

Aside from three specially-administered groups of Mongols, the local government of the Mongols was vested in the hereditary Mongol nobility and their appointed functionaries. The banner was the basic administrative unit. Not all the Mongolian banners were precisely similar to the Manchu banners. For instance, the banners of the Bargu of Manchuria, the Tümet of Kuei-hua, and the Chahar, received an organization much more like the Manchu banners than did those which were placed under the authority of nobles descended from Chingis or his brother Khasar, or from Jelme of the Uriangkhan (i.e., Kharachin and the left wing of the Tümet). Most of these banners were grouped in confederations or leagues, each of which included a certain number of banners. In each league, the jasak of one of the banners was its daruga, or captain-general. Another jasak of that same group of banners was its ded daruga, or deputy captain-general, and a third jasak had the title of shiidkekchi daruga or chief judge. These three, although acting as great chiefs of the league, remained jasak of their own banners. Only the first had a special seal, the Great Seal of the League, which he held in addition to the seal of the banner in which he was the jasak. It was the rule that when the great chief of the League died, the second chief became his successor, and the chief judge advanced to the position of second great chief. It sometimes happened that this rule was not observed and that particular considerations made the choice of the government fall on someone else. It was the first great chief who settled the differences which rose between two banners; in general, any affair in which a banner chief was a party in the litigation was referred to the first chief of the league. He also had the right to delegate his powers to the second great chief.

The grouping into leagues did not change the internal organization of the individual banners in any way. In its main features, any banner governed by a prince had essentially the same organization as another.

The office of chief of the banner was hereditary, but the Chinese government had to confirm the occupant in his office. He received a yearly allowance from the central government. Besides the title of jasak, the chiefs of banners also had honorary titles, some of which were hereditary. Every jasak was required to appear in Peking once in three years to attend the New Year court functions, in accordance with schedules arranged by the Board for the Administration of Dependencies.

If a banner chief died when his son and heir-apparent was still a minor (under eighteen) the youth could not immediately take the title of jasak and govern his banner. Until he became of age one of the more important officials, ordinarily the first minister, kept the Great Seal of the Banner and governed the banner. When the heir-apparent reached his majority, the central government conferred on him the title of jasak and in that way gave him the power of exercising the functions of chief of the banner.

In most parts of Inner Mongolia, the chiefs had great power. They controlled and decided all the internal affairs of their banners; their subjects were practically their serfs, whom they could give away as dowries or as presents to high-ranking lamas; they distributed the various state corvees that were furnished by their banners, including military service; and they had the power to levy a limited commodity tax and certain special taxes and imposts upon the people of their banners. Their administrations could not be interfered with by the league president. They were permitted by the central government to nominate members of their staffs within the requirements of the civil service laws, the nominations being confirmed by the Board for the Administration of Dependencies and the emperor.

In the government of the banner, the jasak was helped by five dignitaries: two tusalakchi (ministers), one jakirukchi (military assistant) and two meiren (lieutenant-generals). A commoner could not become a minister, but could fill one of the three other positions. These five dignitaries were designated collectively by the name tabun jinken (five principals). The chief of the banner would decide, according to the circumstances and affairs which arose, what duties each of them would have. The jasak was advised mainly by his two ministers, and in many cases his staff actually administered his power.

In each banner there was always a taiji designated to become minister in case one of the two tusalakchi should die. He was usually called dashi noyon or dashi tusalakchi. If the first minister should die, the second minister would take his place and the dashi noyon would become second minister.

The tusalakchi was nominally chosen from among the hereditary nobles who had not received any of the Manchu titles granted to Mongols. The banner jasak nominated a taiji to the position of tusalakchi through the office of the league captain-general, and the central government confirmed the choice. The tusalakchi generally had a dominating influence in the banner administration, ruling it in the absence of the jasak or during a jasak's minority, or while awaiting confirmation of a new jasak after the death of a previous one. Although there were generally two tusalakchi, only one could administer at any particular tim. All questions discussed at a league meeting were reported directly to the tusalakchi.

The military assistant, jakirukchi, was chosen for his knowledge and ability from among the non-taiji or common Mongols of the banner. Nominally he looked after the militia which the banner was required to supply upon demand. He reviewed the forces of the banner, superintended education, arranged the care of the horses and arms, and appointed men to various services.

Each banner had a definite territory. The limits were fixed by specially-deputed Imperial Commissioners at the time of the establishment of the different banners. Some official maps also exist whereon are marked the milestones fixing the limits of each banner. In spite of this, conflicts often broke out between banners over the border.

At the time of the establishment of the banners the population of each, including the noble families, was distributed amongst a certain number of sumu. The sumu was originally a military unit; once could in fact call it a "company." At the beginning, a sumu counted 150 male adults, to which the members of their families were added. At the present time, it is very probable that in many banners a sumu rarely included 150 families. It is a well-known fact that in certain banners there were sumun which eventually existed only on paper. Such a sumu was called hoki sumu, "sumu lacking in dependents."

During times of peace, the military organization was concerned with the collection of revenue, police work, or the practical work of the jasak's court. In practice, only one or two officials attended in turn at the jasak's court to transact business. When necessary, the jasak would call a council of all his officials. In his court were settled criminal and civil judicial cases, guided by a collection of former decisions of the Board for Administration of Dependencies. The Mongols were judged by Mongol laws, as were also the Chinese, if the offense occurred in Mongolia. If there was no Mongol law to cover a situation, a Chinese law was applied, irrespective of the individual involved. Important cases were carried to the league and the Chinese representative to the league. Below the level of banner and sumu organization were the bag, groups of ten families, each of which was headed by an elder.

In a Mongolian banner there were also a considerable number of other offices of less importance outside of the "five principals." In some banners the sumun were distributed into a certain number of khara. Each khara was under the authority of an officer called kharaan jalan. The kharaan jalan were

considered to be superior officers, and the chiefs of the sumun which formed their khara were under their command; they were formerly in charge of legal matters and arranged for the trial of persons belonging to the different sumun. One of their main functions was to deliberate together with the "five principals" on the important affairs of the banner and to decide with them the amount to be raised by taxation and the distribution of these taxes between the different khara. This deliberation took place regularly each year at the time of the great assembly of the main officers of the banners, which opened around the twentieth of the first lunation (chagan sara, "white month"). This meeting, marking the end of the New Year's holidays was called tamaga-in chugulgan, "meeting of the seal," because from the day the meeting opened, the yamen again began to handle the public affairs and the jasak again used his seal.

The chiefs of the sumun were called sumun jangi. Under their command were different subaltern officers with titles of tabini kündee, khorini boshko, and arbani daruga, who were originally appointed over fifty, twenty, and ten families, respectively. In recent years, although the title of the officer remained the same, the number of families was evidently no longer the same as it was previously. The main duty of these officers was to help the sumun jangi to raise the taxes.

Each banner jealously guarded the integrity of its territory, particularly since Chinese colonists were often tempted to encroach upon Mongolian land, and the banners on the common border sometimes made protest about the milestones which marked it. Consequently, in each banner there were officers especially appointed to survey the border. These officers were called by different names, depending upon the banner. The function of some of them was to make sure from time to time that the milestones had not been moved to the prejudice of their banner. Others had the function of collecting dues in money owed by Chinese colonists cultivating Mongolian lands.

The administrative center of the banner was formed by what was called the shang-yamen. The shang was the palace of the jasak, chief of the banner and holder of the seal. The yamen was where the administration of the banner held session. The shang and the yamen, although separate, were always close together, sometimes at a distance of only some ten steps.

The yamen was the seat of administration of the banner, serving as tribunal and chancellery, in which the archives of the banner were deposited. The census roles and the role of the militia were also kept in this office.

Law suits which could not be taken care of by the lower authorities were adjudicated by the yamen. Official correspondence, either with the Chinese authorities or with authorities of other Mongolian banners was written in the yamen. It was also at the yamen that the documents concerning the administration of the banner, such as those relating to the raising of taxes or military service, were transcribed. Deliberations were also held there about all the important affairs of the banner and especially about the way to satisfy the Chinese creditors, often numerous and troublesome.

At the yamen there was always a demchi, or intendant in charge of the material administration of the banner. There was also always one of the "five principals" in attendance. Depending upon the nature of the affairs being treated, he could call in officers of inferior rank, and it was not rare for all the five principal dignitaries to be in attendance. All writing was done by scribes (bichechi) who functioned in this office for two consecutive months, at the end of which time they were relieved by others.

The yamen also included a certain number of subaltern officers called boshko. They were employed primarily as messengers, and as such they were called elchi. It was also the boshko who, in the name of either the jasak or the yamen, requisitioned riding horses from private houses or camels and oxen for the transportation of loads. These requisitioned animals were called ula (ulaga). Mounts were requisitioned for the members of the jasak's suite or the retinue of great dignitaries when they went on a journey. The beasts of burden were requisitioned mainly for the transportation of grain or flour stocks, etc., for the shang or the yamen, and to carry the luggage of the jasak or the higher officials. At the time of the great assembly (chugulgan) to deal with important affairs, which took place either at the end of the New Year's holidays or occasionally during the course of the year, it was again the boshko who requisitioned the food supplies for the officers and the grain for the animals. The annual requisition of sheep for the tables of the jasak and his great dignitaries was also made by a boshko.

A boshko always rode a requisitioned horse while on official duty, and was always supplied with a paisa (from the Chinese p'ai-tzu) or "requisitioner's tablet." The paisa was carried in the belt on the left side; that of a banner chief was circular in shape, and that of a great chief of the league was oblong in shape. On the front and back sides of this tablet were fixed silver plates carrying an inscription, in Manchurian on the front and in Mongolian on the back. The finances of the Mongolian banners were often in a miserable condition and in quite a number of banners the income never balanced the expenditures.

The amount of money that certain banners owed to Chinese business houses was sometimes so enormous that it was impossible for them to get rid of their debts. This financial situation was probably due primarily to the mal-administration of the Mongolian authorities. Another reason was that the jasak often allowed himself expenses in excess of his allowance from the Chinese government, in which case they were charged, at least in part, to the banner's account. Finally, the debt was sometimes caused by the rapacity of the Chinese creditors and usurers.

Strictly speaking, the administrative expenses of a banner were not very large, because most of the officers were paid very little or not at all. It is to this latter that the Ordos proverb alludes in saying: "It is the ox which makes the efforts, but it is the cart which is anointed (i.e., with kumys or butter)," meaning that the officers were the ones who worked, while the jasak reaped the advantages. It naturally followed that the officers would recoup themselves by gouging those whom they administered, and especially by taking part of the banner's revenue for themselves. In this way, they contributed to the disorder of the banner's finances.

A considerable part of the banner's revenues was also devoured by the militia which each banner had to keep under arms in order to defend itself against bands of robbers. Certain public revenues were also kept for the jasak. These were called noyani tataburi.

The banner's revenues came largely from the exploitation of the natural resources, mainly salt, soda, and coal. In general, the exploitation of these resources was not done on a large scale. The salt and soda were exploited either by the Mongols themselves or by Chinese companies which paid annual royalties to the banner. Certain salt lakes were placed under the control of a Chinese monopoly, which exploited them to its own profit in exchange for annual payments to the banner. The coal mines were generally let to Chinese companies.

Another source of revenue was the exploitation of licorice and orobanche (broomrape, strangleweed), which were used in Chinese medicine. The exploitation of these two plants was apportioned equally to Chinese firms for annual royalty.

As many Mongolian lands were cultivated by Chinese farmers, the rent that they paid each year to the banner constituted an important source of income. The same held for the taxes paid by the Chinese for each head of cattle they gave to the Mongols for herding. These animals were kept together with Mongol herds in the Mongolian pasture-lands. The Chinese gave sheep, goats, oxen, horses, and rarely camels, to the Mongols to herd.

In the banners bordering or neighboring on Kansu, an important source of revenue was the tax on camels that the Moslem merchants of that province brought in great numbers to Mongolia each year to graze in the pastures during the summer and part of the autumn. The Moslems would settle in the steppes in small tents and herd their camels themselves.

The expenses incurred by the banner were also partly covered by the returns of money coming from the alba (taxes, contributions), of which there were various kinds. One can distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary taxes. The first kind were paid annually, and the others imposed only when the banner had some extraordinary expense. As has been said previously, the total amount of ordinary taxes to be imposed was fixed each year at the time of the tamagain chugulgan, or the meeting which took place usually at the end of the New Year's holidays. Among the duties of the "five principal" dignitaries and the kharan jalan was the fixing of the amount of these taxes. After the total sum had been fixed, it was assessed on the various khara and then shared between the sumu of each khara. It was up to the sumu jangi, or commander of the sumu, to fix the quota to be paid by each of the taxable families in the sumu. The collection of the taxes was the function of the same sumu jangi, who was helped by his tabini kündee.

The taxes were generally paid in silver, and sometimes partly in wool. Poor tax-payers who were unable to raise the amount were obliged to pay in statute-labor, to be performed either in the shang or the yamen.

The taxes were generally heavy, and the collectors inflexible. When a banner was hopelessly in debt and it was impossible to delay the payment further, the administration could resort to an extraordinary tax, payable in cattle. These cattle were then sold to the Chinese, sometimes for a ridiculously low price, and the product of that sale used to pay the creditors. Resort to such a procedure was dangerous, because the people, shocked by the abuses it entailed, sometimes rose in revolt, as did the Mongols of the Otok Banner in the Ordos in 1907.

We have mentioned previously the taxes paid by non-Mongolian owners of cattle grazing on Mongolian lands. Besides these, the banner drew revenue from a few taxes of less importance. For example, the tax paid to have a male child entered on the register containing the names of the male non-noble population; and the tax called golumtan jus (literally "sapeq-of-the-home"), which means "tax that one pays for the right to possess a home." The latter tax was extracted annually from Mongols of other banners living on the territory of the banner.

Internally, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, with the exceptions to be noted below, governed themselves under a mixture of traditional patterns within the framework of the league and banner system enforced by the Manchus. Outside the banner government, inter-Mongol and Mongol-Chinese relationships were channeled through the Chinese superintendent of the League Assembly (Chugulgan), ultimately to be decided upon by the Board for the Administration of Dependencies and the emperor. Requirements laid upon the banners and their subdivisions by the Imperial Government were passed down through these channels. The actual power above the local level rested in the hands of Chinese officials. Under the National Government of the Republic, little change took place on the local level of administration; the upper levels, i.e., provincial and national, are discussed elsewhere in this section.

3. Special administrative districts

In addition to the six leagues of the forty-nine banners, there were three special administrative districts in Inner Mongolia: 1) the Chahar Pastures, with eight banners, directly administered by the Manchu government; 2) the Kuei-hua Tümet in Suiyuan, who were placed under the rule of the Kuei-hua (Suiyuan) general; and 3) the Alashan Mongols of Ninghsia (see China Northwest, Structure of Government).

a) The Chahar Mongols

1) Background: early Manchu period

The Chahar, who were the last to bow to the Manchus, were placed in a special relationship to their conquerors. They were deprived of the right to be ruled by their hereditary chiefs (jasaks), but were given the honor of being incorporated into the Manchu military organization on an equal footing with the eight banners of the Manchus themselves. Within their territory were situated the Imperial Pastures, which the Chahars were charged with guarding. This function, together with their military position, had an effect upon their internal governmental structure.

The uppermost level of Chahar government was the office of the Manchu tu-t'ung, or military lieutenant governor. His jurisdiction extended over all the Chahar banners and included the Silingol League as well. He was assisted by a deputy lieutenant governor, a Mongol advisor, and a staff of clerks, the office being located at Kalgan.

When the Imperial Pastures were instituted among the Chahar, a variation of this structure was inaugurated.

2) The Pastures

Inhabitants of the Pastures were charged with raising and guarding the herds and flocks reserved to the Imperial Household and the Imperial Stud. These territories and their inhabitants were under the supervision of the military lieutenant governor of Chahar up to 1908. Below him were the four ambans, individually assigned to govern four newly-created divisions of the Chahar residing in the Pastures. These divisions were called süreg, and were equivalent to the original eight banners. Below the amban and the süreg level were the smaller units, called banners by the Mongols, but of a lower administrative level than the eight banners. Units for these new "banners," and through them for the süreg, were drawn from the original eight Chahar banners.

With the installation of the Pastures, the Chahar administrative units consisted of the eight banners and four süreg, all responsible to the Manchu-appointed military lieutenant governor. Each division had its amban, as described above, and no united organization was permitted.

Below the süreg and banner level in the Pastures, the "unit of ten" was instituted. The "tens" consisted of a group of families under the control of a "leader of ten", called the arabanai daraga. These families had no specific territorial unity, and in some cases the leader of the unit lived in a village inhabited by only a few of his constituents.

All the officials were assigned assistants in lesser numbers as the rank descended. Separate offices were maintained by the Pasture administration and the administrations of each of the banners (i.e., in a Pasture with five banners, there would be six distinct offices). The "leader of ten" would hold office in his own home, aided by his assistants.

In December, 1909, the management of the imperial herds in the Pastures was placed under the Office of the Superintendant of Government Droves of Horses and Cattle, within the Ministry of War. Two supervisors were appointed for the two divisions of Chahar territory, the Left Wing and the Right Wing, and below them was appointed a staff concerned with the direct management of the herds. The civil administration of each of the Pastures delegated certain clerks to deal with matters concerning the herds, and the amban allocated the livestock to his subordinates on the banner level.

3. Summary

During the Manchu dynasty and until the reorganization of 1927-28, the Chahars were more directly integrated into the Central Chinese administrative system than were the majority of Inner Mongol groups (always excepting the Tümet). With the establishment of the Pastures there was a plethora of distinct administrative units, none allowing for any unified control by the Chahar themselves, and all ultimately depending upon the office of the military lieutenant governor. No part of the administrative structure of Chahar derived from indigenous organization; all was conceived and imposed by the central government.

b. The Kuei-hua Tümet

The Tümet of Kuei-hua (Kukuhoto, "Old City") were among the most Sinified of the Inner Mongols. Some of them had become amalgamated with Mongols of the Ordos, and a small group had migrated into Manchuria and had set up as a separate banner, the Monggoljin. The Tümet who remained in Inner Mongolia as a group were divided into two banners, which in turn were arranged into two wings, the Left and Right. The Kuei-hua Tümet were governed directly by the office of the Manchu general-in-chief of the Sui-yüan-ch'eng and the Manchu brigade-general of Kuei-hua-ch'eng. (The twin cities of Sui-yüan and and Kuei-hua have been known as Kuei-sui since 1908). They had no independent Mongol banner government. Lawsuits and judicial affairs, as well as questions concerning taxes collected from Chinese and Mongols in the camps of the Tümet were handled by the Kuei-hua - Suiy-uan-ch'eng intendant and his staff, under Shansi province. In those areas where Chinese colonization had given the Chinese a majority, ordinary Chinese county government applied to the Mongols and Chinese alike. In 1928 the Tümet and four Chahar banners were reorganized into the new Suiyuan province.

B. Government of the Chinese in Inner Mongolia

During the later part of the Manchu reign, the problem of administration of Chinese settlements in the Inner Mongolian territory became increasingly important, due to an increased immigration and relaxation of controls. In the early days of the regime, it had been enough to apply to the Chinese in this area a few specific regulations with regard to legal disputes between Chinese and Mongols, restraining Chinese from purchasing Mongol lands, prohibiting the wives and children of Chinese men from entering Inner Mongolia, etcetera. With the relaxation of the immigration controls, the regulations in force in China proper were applied to the growing Chinese population. The regular provincial and county organization was set up under Chinese officials where a section had become largely Chinese in population. In places where Chinese influence predominated, but which were not annexed to one of the provinces, the immediate official in charge was the tungpan. The tungpan had control over judicial affairs and the collection of revenue from the banner under his jurisdiction, and had the authority to supervise the transaction of business at the office of the banner head. Chinese were subject to the regulations of the Board for Administration of Dependencies with regard to relations between them and the Mongols, but were not responsible to the military lieutenant-governor of the area within which they lived. Above the tungpan level of administration, the provincial administrations of Chihli, Fengtien, Jehol, Kuei-hua (later Suiyan), Heilungkiang, and Kirin had control over the Chinese of banner areas. (See China NE, Structure of Government).

C. National And Provincial Levels

1. Manchu period and the Republic to 1929-30

Under the Manchu Empire, all Mongol affairs were handled by the Board for Administration of Dependencies, on which Mongol princes held posts. The units of local government--the leagues and banners--were placed under the general supervision of a Manchu military-lieutenant governor. Thus the military governors at Heilungkiang, Mukden, Kalgan, and Kuei-hua-ch'eng shared the task of supervising the Mongols of different leagues residing within their jurisdiction. In the office of each military governor there was a bureau concerned specifically with the administration of banner and league matters.

Under the Republic, the system remained essentially the same. The overall board became known as the Bureau of Mongol and Tibetan Affairs, retaining the same functions as the old board. In 1928, after a period of administration as "special areas," the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia were established and immediate control over the affairs of the Mongols in these provinces was entrusted to the provincial department of Mongol Affairs. In Chahar, the Silingol League was placed under the direct control of the central government, rather than under provincial control. Four banners of the Chahar were split off from the main body and incorporated into the territory of Suiyuan province. Mongols in Jehol were placed under the Jehol provincial administration, and those in other parts of Manchuria were governed by their usual provincial administration.

Not all positions in these national or provincial posts were filled by Chinese, although key positions were kept firmly in their hands. Mongols who were willing to compromise with or conform to Chinese policy were appointed to the Board of Mongol and Tibetan Affairs, or to consultive positions in other agencies. The ultimate aim of central government policy in the last years of the Manchu dynasty and during the Republic was the assimilation of the Mongols into the Chinese nation through the agency of colonization. The recasting of Mongol territories into

Chinese provinces was one of a series of steps leading to the eventual inclusion of the Mongols into the regular Chinese administrative structure.

During the latter part of the Manchu dynasty and through the early years of the Republic, colonization became a government affair. Under the Manchus, Colonization Bureaus operating out of the Office of the Military Lieutenant-Governor of the area were established for the Tümet, Chahar, Jehol and Manchurian territories. Frequently the military lieutenant-governor was concurrently head of the Colonization Bureau. Through persuasion and/or coercion of the princes, some land was allotted to the Mongols from their original territories, and the rest was "purchased" or declared "free for reclamation." A percentage of the money paid for the "freed" land was paid to the jasak of the banner concerned, and the remainder was diverted to the pockets of colonization officials or to the government (see China IMAR, Historical Setting).

2. Inner Mongolian autonomy movements

The attempt of the Chinese government to pursue a policy of integrating the Mongols into the normal Chinese administrative and economic structure was clearly visible in 1930. In May, 1930, a Mongolian affairs conference was called, at which only fifty delegates out of an expected 200 attended. At the conference a number of concrete proposals were made. These included provisions for improving both the banner and civil administrations in Mongolia; a resolution forbidding the clergy (lamas) from participating in or interfering with the local administration of the various banners in Mongolia; and resolutions on the reform of religion and registration of temples, on financial reform, the abolition of slavery, the institution of mass education, the organization of a Mongolian militia, the improvement of the economy and the improvement of communications. In addition, public health was to be promoted and opium suppressed.

A development of joint participation by Mongols and Chinese on administrative organs was envisaged, but such joint participation was left to the provincial authorities to implement, and the old patterns were continued. The conference carefully sidestepped the issues of Mongol self-determination and their desire to end Chinese colonization.

The program for improvements was never implemented, some portions of it being obstructed by many of the princes and lamas, and the economic development was hampered by the Japanese War. Anti-Chinese sentiment continued to develop, and the establishment of the "autonomous" Mongolian areas in the Hsingan provinces in Manchukuo fanned the flames of nationalism.

The administration in the Hsingan provinces retained the old banner and league systems, but channeled more positions into the hands of Mongols above this level. The provincial administration was in part elected by tribal organizations and in part appointed by the Manchukuo Government. A national capital for the Mongols was set up, and Japanese advisors to the Mongol administration were appointed, who exercised little direct control in the early period. In effect, the Mongol autonomous areas in Manchuria were formally given the rights and privileges, under Japanese suzerainty, which the Mongols had been asking from Nationalist China.

After attempting to win concessions from the National Government, and gaining only acceptance of limited rights to self-government, a group of Inner Mongols under the leadership of Prince Te and the Silingol League set up, under Japanese auspices, the Federated Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia. The Japanese-approved authorities emphasized the "Mongol" nature of their government by adopting a new calendar, based on the "Chingis Khan era," dating its beginning from the birth of Chingis Khan. Initially, the government was controlled by Mongols in all key positions, with Japanese "advisors" as their colleagues. Immediate attention was directed toward economic problems, and agreements were worked out with other Japanese-sponsored governments in North China, leading to a more unified economy for all. Health measures were instituted with the aid of Japanese doctors and public-health experts. The Mengchiang government also embarked upon an ambitious educational program. Despite these measures, antagonisms between the leaders of Eastern Inner Mongolia (Mengchiang) and those of the Suiyan-Ordos region led to a complete break in 1937. These antagonisms were utilized by the Nationalist Chinese government to withdraw support from Prince Te. Concessions, essentially of the sort which Prince Te had desired were made to the western princes in order to advance the break. The Nationalists, however, were still unable to bring themselves to grant complete autonomy to these Mongols, and insisted on establishing their administration under the control of the provincial regimes involved.

Thus there were, in effect, three governments in Inner Mongolia: the autonomous governments of the Hsingan provinces in Manchuria; the Federated Autonomous Government (Mengchiang) of Prince Te, controlling the region up to Sui yuan; and the Mongolian adherents to the Nationalist government in parts of Suiyuan and Ninghsia--the so-called Inner Mongolian Autonomous Committee.

Prince Te's government anticipated the problems that an independent Autonomous Inner Mongolia would have to face. The delegates to the government-forming congress in 1937 elected Prince Yün of the Ulanchab League president, and Prince Te vice-president. A Ministry of War under Li Shou-hsin was established, and Prince Te concurrently became chairman of the General Affairs Commission, which handled problems of industry, finance, education, etcetera. Prince Te began to introduce modern education and minor economic reforms, and endeavored to retain as much independence from Japanese control as he could. A unified currency and bank was established in the federation, and plans were laid for extending communications. Economic development was envisaged under a Three Year Plan which would attempt to improve the production and marketing of animal products, and develop industry and electrification. The development, however, was primarily carried on by the Japanese, operating through the "autonomous" government. The three Mongolias--Prince Te's federation, the Japanese Hsingan regimes, and the Chinese Loyalists--were all swept away by the end of the war when the IMAR Government was established under Chinese Communist auspices.

D. General Summary

With the exception of the changes noted under the heading "National and Provincial Level," the local structure of government changed very little until the institution of the People's Government of China and that of the IMAR. The trend of government structure from the time of the imperial Manchu government through the period of the Nationalist Republic had been first, to prevent the Mongols from uniting and forming a threat to the Manchu dynasty or a secessionist movement under the Republic, and second, under the Republic, to incorporate the Mongols and their regions into the economic, cultural, and political system of China proper by assimilation. The IMAR People's Government reverses these trends, bringing together into a geographic-political entity both Mongols and Chinese under a unified government, on a theoretical basis of equality between the two nationalities. However, the political separation of Chinese and Mongol administrative structures continues to exist on the local level, at least in name, although attempts have been made to bridge the gap by incorporating local Chinese administrative units into the leagues where Mongols predominate, and by establishing "democratic-coalition governments" where the Mongols or Chinese form a settled large minority.

II. Structure of the IMAR

A. Development

In mid-1947, Ulanfu became president of the Inner Mongolian

Autonomous Government situated at Wang-yeh-miao (re-named Ulanhot). The actual formalization of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, however, came much later. The focus of activity of the government seems to have been military, i.e., providing Mongol cavalry to the People's Liberation Army fighting in Manchuria. In August of 1949, it became apparent that Inner Mongolia was a regional unit separate from the Northeastern Administration set up by the Communists, and in September of the same year the IMAR sent delegates to the People's Political Consultive Conference in Peking, thus confirming its existence.

The actual geographical extent of the IMAR was apparently not settled immediately upon establishment of the government. From 1947 to 1950, the region probably included only the four divisions of the old Hsingan province in western Manchuria and possibly a portion of northern Chahar province (i.e., Silingol). In 1950, the capital of the IMAR was shifted to Kalgan, outside the borders of the IMAR, and took on the designation "People's Government," probably incorporating at the time the rest of Chahar province. It is intriguing to note that in 1949 Ulanfu claimed jurisdiction over all the Mongols in former leagues and banners as well as those special groups such as the Mongols of Ninghsia and the Tümet. It was not until 1952, however, that any official indication was given that Suiyan and its banners and leagues were to be included in the region. On June 28, 1952, the State Administrative Council of the Chinese People's Republic issued a decree regarding the interrelation and activities between Suiyuan province and Inner Mongolia, which said: The People's Government of Suiyuan province is subordinate to the State Administrative Council and to the People's Government of the Autonomous Inner Mongolian Region; however, the Suiyuan Government can settle its own ordinary administrative matters or matters which are not connected with work that belongs to the central government in relation to the ethnic groups living in the Autonomous Region. Nationality problems of Suiyuan are also decided by the government of Inner Mongolia.

In July, 1952, in order to implement this decision, the IMAR government moved its headquarters to Kuei-sui, apparently outside the geographic bounds of its own jurisdiction. It was not until January 3, 1954, that the Administrative Council of Inner Mongolia approved the decision of the third Conference of All Nationalities of Suiyuan to include the province into the IMAR. With that approval, Kukuhoto (Kuei-sui) became the official capital of the Region. The actual impetus for this decision abolishing Suiyuan as a province came not from the conference of Nationalities of Suiyuan, as explained in the Russian source drawn upon above, (Dybykov, 1953), but from the Central People's Government. This was made clear in an NCNA dispatch of May 3, 1955: Ulanfu, reporting to the second session of the first People's Congress of Inner Mongolia held at Kukuhoto, pointed out that "in 1954, the central government decided to abolish Suiyuan province and place its territory under the consolidated leadership of Inner Mongolia..." It seems quite apparent that the decision had been made in 1952, and that the move of the capital to Kuei-sui was the opening move in preparing the people of Suiyuan for their ultimate adherence to Inner Mongolia.

The present jurisdiction of Inner Mongolia remains much the same as it stood after the inclusion of Suiyuan. There have been small transfers of territory to the IMAR along the old southern Chahar border, and portions of five counties (including the important trading center of Dolonnor) in old northern Chahar. The most recent transfer of population and territory into the jurisdiction of the IMAR was officially decided upon July 18, 1955, and approved that month by the First People's Congress. By this decision, the IMAR will gain a portion of the former Jehol province (now abolished): the three hsien of Chi-feng, Ning-cheng, and Wu-tan, which include the territories of the Aokhan Banner, and the Kharachin Banner (with the exception of the Left Wing), and the Onniut Banner.

B. Administrative Divisions and Organs of Local Self-Government

Detailed material on the present administrative divisions of the IMAR is lacking. It appears that the borders of all the old banner territories have been abolished, in accordance with the official policy of "free grazing." Some have been reallocated to leagues other than those to which they formerly belonged, and in at least one case, two have been combined into a "joint banner." Thus each banner, in theory, should no longer be identified with a specific territory. In the far north (the old Barga area), the Hulunbuir and Nonni Valley (Naramuren) Leagues have been joined to form the Huna League. Other leagues have been split or combined by inclusion into administrative districts. The Eastern Administrative District, which was abolished in 1954, included the Hsingan, Huna, Jerim and Jouda Leagues.

The present P'ing-ti-ch'üan (formerly Chi-ning) Administrative District includes the Tümet Banner and four eastern Suiyuan (Chahar) Banners. The latter were reorganized into three banners: the Chahar Right Wing Rear (Red), which includes the eastern part of T'ao-lin hsien and the northeastern part of Chi-ning hsien; the Chahar Right Wing Central (Bordered Blue and Bordered Red joint banner), which includes the southwestern part of Tao-lin and the northern part of Cho-tzu hsien; and the Chahar Right Wing Front (Yellow). The borders given here are as of February, 1954. The P'ing-ti-ch'üan Administrative

District also included the hsien of Feng-chen, Saratsi, Chi-ning, Hsing-ho, Liang-ch'eng, Cho-tzu, Ho-lin-ko-er, To-ko-to, Wu-tung, Wu-ch'uan, Ch'ing-shui-ho, and P'ing-ti-ch'üan.

The Hou-t'ao Administrative District includes the Hang-chin (Hanggin) Rear Banner, and the Talat Rear Banner, the hsien of Wu-yüan, Lin-ho, An-pei, and Lang-shan, and the town of Hsia-pa.

The actual structure of the People's Government of the IMAR is patterned closely after that of China proper, (see China General, Structure of Government). For a detailed breakdown of the central administration of the IMAR, see Chart A at the end of this section.

The military affairs of the IMAR People's Government are handled by the Inner Mongolian Military District of the People's Liberation Army under the supervision of the IMAR People's Government. Ulanfu, chairman of the IMAR People's Government, secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the Communist party, and chairman of the government's Economic-Financial Committee, is concurrently the commander and political commissar of the Inner Mongolian Military District. Other members of the civil government also hold such posts in the military organization as deputy commanders, chief of staff, and director of the Political Department of the Military District. Lower level organization is not discussed in the available material. Below the top level it is very difficult to get data on even the names and positions of individuals in the government.

Semi-governmental organizations of region-wide importance are the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, the Young Communist League, the Inner Mongolian Trade Union Council, and the Inner Mongolian Democratic Women's Federation.

The Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the Communist party has its secretary, deputy secretary, secretary-general of the district committees, executive officer, and committees and departments. It is not possible to differentiate very accurately the work of the various secretaries on the basis of present information. There is an Organization Department with committees for each league and district, a Department of Propaganda, study groups, and in all probability, other organs paralleling the organization of the CCP.

The organization of the Young Communist League (formerly New Democratic Youth League) in Inner Mongolia is nowhere spelled out, but frequent mention is made of the Work Committee and an Organization Department under it. Details are also lacking on the structure of the Democratic Women's Federation and the Trade Union Council. (see China General, Structure of Government).

The local government structure of the IMAR differs from that of a province of China proper in that the hsien (county) governments and other lower levels of the regular administration are supplemented by the banner organization, and certain innovations have been made such as the "democratic-coalition" governments and the special administrative districts, etc. (for a discussion of the workings of a regular hsien government, see China General, Structure of Government).

On the secondary and local levels, the IMAR is divided into leagues (i.e., meng, aimak), banners (ch'i), counties (hsien), agricultural regions, cattle regions, administrative villages (kaza), and units of two or three villages (aimi). There are also special municipalities directly under the IMAR People's Government, and in the predominantly Chinese areas, there are the regular hsien, ch'ü, hsiang, and chen-tsun organizations. There is also at least one National Autonomous district, that of the Oronchons, directly under the Central IMAR People's Government (see China IMAR, Ethnic Groups).

In the Mongol or Mongol/Chinese agricultural regions, the banners or the hsien (if the population is mostly Chinese) are the local units of government. These are subdivided into sub-banner districts such as the kaza and the aimi. In the nomadic regions, the banners are subdivided into sumun and the sumun are divided into bag (groups of nomad farmers), khoto ("towns"), and ail (settlements of a family or a few families of nomads). The internal structure of these various administrative units is not detailed in available materials.

The electoral processes and the functions of the local organs of power in the IMAR follow the stipulations of the Electoral Law, the Organic Law, the General Line of the People's Congresses on all Levels, and the most recent (November 11, 1955), the Organic Regulations for People's Congresses of all Levels and People's Councils of all Levels in the IMAR. The Organic Regulations are almost identical with those of China proper (see China General, Constitution), except that they are applied to the Mongol Banner organization. Since the banners have been reorganized by the Communist regime, they differ very little in administration from the Chinese-type civil administration. In villages and settlements the members of the administrative organs are also elected at the time of the general elections.

The lower level national organs are subordinated to the higher administrative units, and all administrative organs of a district are subordinated to the central People's Government. In accordance with the policy of bringing about unity between the nationalities, an effort has been made to set up "democratic-coalition governments" in localities where Mongols and Chinese are both represented in substantial groups (see discussion of "democratic-coalition government" in China IMAR, Constitutional System).

C. Summary

The government of Inner Mongolia is structurally similar to that of China proper, although certain peculiarities are apparent, due to the presence of large numbers of nomadic Mongols. It is clear that while the old names of administrative divisions have been kept in Mongol areas, some revision has occurred, such as the shifting of banners from one league to another and the elimination of all old banner boundaries. The electoral system and the functions of administrative organs parallel that in China. It would be of the utmost interest to be able to find the reason for the boundary revisions that have taken place.

The most significant feature in the structure of government in Inner Mongolia is the attempt to govern the region as an entity, and to incorporate both Han Chinese and Mongol or other national units into the governmental structure of the whole region. This is perhaps a logical continuation of the Japanese Mongol policy of Mengchiang days, with its principle of unity of all "nationalities" in the region. Prior to Mengchiang, Hans and Mongols always functioned under two virtually independent governments, with opposing aims. It is clear that the intent of the IMAR Government is to make the Mongols an integral part of the Chinese nation, politically and economically.

CHART I

STRUCTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION


THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS OF VARIOUS MUNICIPALITIES
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES OF VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENTS OF VARIOUS LEAGUES
THE HEADQUARTERS OF MILITARY REGIONS
PEOPLE'S COURTS
PEOPLE'S BUREAU OF PROCURATORATE
COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND ECONOMY
COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION
COMMITTEE ON PEOPLE'S SUPERVISION (PEOPLE'S SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE)
MINISTRY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMITTEE ON NATIONALITIES' AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION
MINISTRY OF FOOD
MINISTRY OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
MINISTRY OF FORESTRY
BUREAU OF LABOR
SALT ADMINISTRATION
BUREAU OF CULTURE
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH
BUREAU OF PUBLICATION
COMMITTEE ON PHYSICAL CULTURE AND ATHLETICS
MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL
STATE COUNCIL
THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF INNER MONGOLIA
THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION
GENERAL OFFICE
COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE

Table 1: Current Administrative Divisions of Leagues and Banners

League	Administrative center	Banners & administrative districts	Composition: old groups included under present divisions
Huna	Nailar	Solon	From ten Old Barga banners.
		Butekha	East Butekha; from the former eight Butekha banners.
		Ayung	From the former eight Butekha banners.
		Moridawa	From the former eight Butekha banners.
		Oronchon	Includes the Bayan and Nonni Oronchons (Udehe).
		New Barga Right Wing	From the former eight New Barga banners plus the "Old Refugee" Buryat. All Buryat.
		New Barga Left Wing	From the former eight New Barga banners plus the "New Refugee" Buryat. All Buryat.
		Old Barga	Includes the Chipchin Bargut and Hailar Dagurs. From ten Old Barga banners and the Hailar Dagur Banner.
		Ergun	Reindeer Tungus (Evenki) and Manegir Tungus.
		Siglütu	West Butekha, from the former eight Butekha banners; Kidsagar, from the same; possibly also includes Olöts and one Oronchon banner. (Part of the territory of the former Kidsagar

Table 1 (Continued)

League	Administrative center	Banners & administrative districts	Composition: Old groups included under present divisions
		Tung-liao district	Includes some territory from the Darkhan and Bo Wang Banners.
Jouda	Lin-tung	Aru Khorchin	May include a very small portion of the old Jarod West Wing territory.
		Barin Left Wing	Barin West Wing or "Little "Barin."
		Barin Right Wing	Barin East Wing or "Great Barin."
		Keshikten	
		Lin-hsi district	From part of Barin Right Wing and part of old Naiman Banners.
		Kharachin	Formerly Karachin West Wing and Center Banners.

Table 1 (Continued)

League	Administrative center	Banners & administrative districts	Composition: Old groups included under present divisions
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		Barin Right Wing	Barin East Wing or "Great Barin."
		Keshikten	
		Lin-hsi district	From part of Barin Right Wing and part of old Naiman Banners.
		Kharachin	Formerly Karachin West Wing and Center Banners.

Table 2: Special Administrative Areas

District	Administrative center	Composition
Kuei-hua	Kuei-hua	
Hou-t'ao	Shan-pa	Formerly Dalat and Hanggin Banners of the Ikechou League
P'ing-ti-ch'uan	P'ing-ti-ch'uan	Includes the Tumet Banner and the four Chahar banners formerly in Suiyuan.

In addition, the territory of the Alashan and Edsongol Mongols, formerly in Northwest China, have recently been incorporated into the IMAR, according to a report in the Jen-min jih-pao, May 20, 1956. No information has yet been given as to their present administrative status, however.

Additional Readings

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Policy towards Nationalities of the Peoples Republic of China, Peking, 1953.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

I. The Background

II. Consolidation of the IMAR

III. Ascendancy of the Chinese Communists

IV. Autonomy and the Elections of 1954

V. Collectivization and Further Colonial Expansion

ADDITIONAL READINGS

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

I. The Background

In the north, across the Gobi Desert, lies Outer Mongolia, supported by the might of Soviet Russia; in the south are the teeming plains of China with an expanding population continually pushing out into less densely populated regions, encouraged at times by the policies of an aggressive government; in the west is the polyglot domain of North west China, seething with unrest; and in the east is the rich realm of Manchuria, which for twenty years was the bailiwick of Japan; the area which today constitutes the IMAR has for many years been the arena for the clash of international forces. Internally, the country has been rent by the conflicts of interests of nomadic herdsmen and sedentary peasants, of Mongols and Chinese - conflicts fanned by the rising tide of nationalism on both sides and aggravated by the cross currents of external politics.

Although there has been antagonism between the Mongols and the Chinese in the past, much of the conflict between them developed in relatively recent times. During the three centuries of Manchu rule, a change had gradually come over Inner Mongolia, brought about as a result of the immigration of Chinese artisans, merchants and farmers. Civil wars and natural catastrophes drove more Chinese into Southern Mongolia where they settled down and acquired land from the Mongol princes and where, by their resourcefulness and industry, they gradually gained domination of the economy. The influx of Chinese immigrants accelerated at the closing decade of the last century when the government, which heretofore had striven to preserve the economic integrity of the Mongols, itself embarked on a policy of colonization. Following the establishment of the Chinese republic in 1912, there were land booms. The land reclamation schemes were furthered by the construction of railways, which pushed into the land of the Mongols from the south and from the east, and by the Chinese use of modern weapons to overawe and subdue the Mongols The encroachment of Chinese farmers reached a high water mark in 1930, on the eve of the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, when half to two-thirds of the pasture land of some of the Mongol Leagues came under the plough of the Chinese.

The increasing pressure of Chinese colonists into the land of the Mongols, the depression of the standard of living and the impoverishment of the Mongol peoples, the oppression of local officials and the inability of the local inhabitants to find redress, led to growing animosity of the Mongols towards the Chinese. Many of the princes, particularly those in the north whose lands were still untouched by agriculture and colonization, took the lead in the drive to rally the Mongols to resist Chinese colonial expansion.

At first, the resistance of the Mongols, which dated back to the second half of the last century, employed peaceful means to halt the advance of Chinese colonization, but when peaceful efforts failed, they were often driven to outright revolt. Sporadic Mongol insurrections took place in 1891, which were inspired by Taoist secret societies, in 1911-12, when the Mongols in the Barga Plain declared for separation from China and a union with Outer Mongolia, in 1916-19, and again in 1928. These uprisings, carried out by Mongols driven to to desperation, were easily crushed by the Chinese, and their failure, which had been due to lack of coordination and organization, and to the poverty in experience and equipment, led Mongols to think in terms of ways of uniting their people and a carefully planned course of action.

The emergence of Mongol nationalism was spurred by the rising tide of nationalism in China following the establishment of the Chinese republic and the pronouncements of the policy of racial equality by Chinese revolutionary leaders. As an outgrowth of Chinese nationalism there evolved a policy of assimilation of the border people, a policy which was pushed by Chinese nationalist extremists and which has been denounced by its enemies as Great Hanism. The building of schools in Mongolia and the encouragement of Mongol youth to enter schools in China, which were among the means employed to acculturate the Mongols and to indoctrinate them with Chinese political ideologies, had the effect of further instilling them with ideas of equality, self-government, and material improvement of their people. A new class of Mongolian intellectuals grew up whose nationalistic views were sharpened by poverty and unemployment that confronted them after they left school.

A second factor in the rise of Mongol nationalism was the example of Outer Mongolia which had succeeded, in all but in name, in winning independence from China. Many of the revolutionaries of Inner Mongolia found refuge in Outer Mongolia. Upon their return, they joined forces with the young intellectuals to work for self-rule in Inner Mongolia.

Following a conference at Kalgan in 1925, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was formed. Its announced aims were (1) organized resistance to Chinese domination, and (2) abolition of feudalism. The members of the new organization were apparently not agreed on the third and last aim of the party, which was independence from China and union with Outer Mongolia. A strong faction was satisfied with the attainment of a large degree of autonomy within the political framework of China.

The new party, although alert and active, represented, nonetheless, only a very small segment of the population of Inner Mongolia. The majority of the Mongols were not involved. The new liberal ideas from outside required time to seep down to them, and except for a desire for a better deal in life, they were not interested in politics. The princes, the lama chiefs and the leaders of the Chinese communities who had a hand in political life were not all sympathetic to the revolutionary aims of the new party.

Generally speaking, the groups who were active in the political game of Inner Mongolia, prior to the advent of the Communists, were the following:

1. The nobility: the princes and jasaks were themselves divided into three factions: those who strongly favored and worked for autonomy, such as Prince Te (Demchukdonggrub), of the Silingol League, those who were neutral, such as Prince Yun (Yondanwangchuk) of the Ulanchab League, who, it was reported, joined Prince Te only for the motive of personal financial gains, and those who were opposed to the revolutionary movement and who believed that their future lay in cooperation with the Chinese. Prince Sha (Shakdorjab) of the Ikechao League represented the last group.
2. The lamas. For a long time, the living buddhas and the leaders of the Lamaist Church, being the only educated group, dominated the political scene of Mongolia. However, in recent decades, they have been steadily losing ground against the tide of new ideas and their prestige was further undermined by the Young Mongol revolutionaries who were determined to deprive them of their political influence and to permit them to retain only their religious prerogatives.
3. The young intellectuals. The young Mongols who had gone to school in China and had imbibed the heady draught of nationalism and those who had sojourned in Outer Mongolia were the most articulate in the movement for self-rule. Like the princes, they were divided into three factions: (1) the old faction who rallied around the princes and who sought to unite the Mongol people by calling upon them to follow the great tradition of Chinggis Khan, (2) the new faction who sought to utilize the prestige of the princes in the achievement of self-government and then to hand over the reins of government to the people, and (3) an offshoot of the new faction who believed that the princes and lamas were impediments to the struggle for autonomy and who sought to wipe out all vestiges of feudalism.
4. The Chinese settlers. The descendants of the early Chinese who had pioneered in the colonization and who had established themselves in Mongolia by their industry and resources resented and opposed the new waves of Chinese immigrants whom they feared would compete with them and undermine their economic powition. These Chinese settlers therefore in many cases sided with the Mongols in their resistance to the newcomers.

Later, with the coming of the Chinese Communists a new ingredient was added. The new leaders and new elite were the Mongol Communists trained in Yenan, who,having eliminated the princes and lamas as political forces, have sought to consolidate their rule by whittling down the opposition, by training cadres to carry out their dictates and by indoctrinating the people to fear and to follow them. They were ostensibly assisted by Chinese Communist cadres brought in from China Proper. However, friction between Mongolian Communist leaders and their Chinese confreres, sub rosa as well as in the open, have been reported.

The prelude for the advent of the Communists in Inner Mongolia took place in the thirties. On one hand, with the establishment of the Nationalist Government in Nanking, Chinese attempts to consolidate their hold on Inner Mongolia intensified. The outward signs of this trend were incorporation (in 1928) of areas in Inner Mongolia then demarcated as the special districts of Jehol, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Ninghsia, into provinces under the direct administration of the central government, and the increase of Chinese immigration into the region. On the other hand, the Japanese, who had seized Manchuria in 1931 and established the state of Manchukuo, spared no effort to woo the Mongols to their side. They set aside Hsingan province for the establishment of a Mongol government, which they declared in their propaganda, was autonomous, but which actually was administered behind the scenes by Japanese advisers. They made a great ado in publicizing their action of halting Chinese colonization into Mongol lands, but, in place of Chinese immigrants, they brought in hordes of Japanese colonists. Continuing the policy of the Chinese, they built additional railways into Hsingan and Jehol to open up lands for agriculture and industry.

The Mongols, led by Prince Te, caught between two fires, increased their demands for self-government and, after a conference at Pai-ling-miao in 1933, succeeded in persuading the Chinese government to permit them to establish a regional autonomous political council and to agree to halt the opening of pastoral lands. But the settlement was shortlived. For one thing, the conflict of interests among the Mongol leaders was too deeply rooted for them to present a united front. They split into two factions, one under Prince Te which openly espoused the Japanese cause and sought Japanese support, and the other under Prince Sha which gave active assistance to the Chinese Nationalist general Fu Tso-i. Fighting flared up immediately between the two factions.

The Sian Incident in December, 1936, drastically changed the situation in Inner Mongolia as in China itself. The terms of the settlement of the incident committed the Nationalist government to outright opposition to Japanese expansion and to relaxing its pressure on the Chinese Communists who took advantage of the shift of events to move into Inner Mongolia and to establish a strong underground movement there.

Japan, also becoming more belligerent, occupied North China in the summer of 1937. Following their seizure of the province of Suiyuan, the Japanese set up the Federated Autonomous Mongol Government at Kueisui (now Huhehot), which, shortly after, was enlarged into the Autonomous Government of Mengchiang, with Prince Te as chairman. However, it was to all intents and purposes a Japanese-dominated regime.

The Mengchiang government lasted till August, 1945, when Soviet intervention in the Far East drastically altered the situation. Soviet and Outer Mongolian troops occupied Pai-ling-miao and drove out Prince Te. One of his lieutenants, P'u-ying-ta-lai, who remained, secured Soviet assistance to organize the Inner Mongolian (Western) Autonomous Government with the avowed intention of joining Outer Mongolia. However, at this time, Chinese Communist forces were pouring into Manchuria and the Soviet Army, in preparation for withdrawal, gave them full authority over Inner Mongolia. In the wake of the Communist army came large numbers of Mongol Communists trained in Yenan. Led by Ulanfu, they organized the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association at Kalgan in November, 1945, and began the training of large numbers of Mongol cadres to serve as the instruments of Communist policy. They ousted P'u-ying-ta'lai, whom they denounced as a traitor.

At the entry of the Soviet army into Manchuria, Mongol groups in the Hsingan region mutinied and organized an interim government at Hailar. At Wang-yeh-miao (Ulanhot), the Mongols set up the Inner Mongolia Liberation Committee with the former Hsingan governor Po-yen-ma-tu as president and Hafengga as secretary-general. These regimes in Manchuria, however, experienced considerable difficulty in their search for support for recognition. At first, they were rebuffed by the West Mongolian Government, by Outer Mongolia and by the Chinese Nationalist government. Finally, they turned back to the Western Mongolian government, which, by then,had come under Communist control, and were welcomed. In March, 1946, delegates from the eastern and western factions of Inner Mongolia met at Ch'engte in Jehol in a conference which worked out the details for a merger. As a result, the regimes at Hailar and at Wang-yeh-miao (Ulanhot) were dissolved and its leaders joined the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association. The Communist Mongol leaders of the west appeared to have gained the upper hand, for Ulanfu became the president of the now enlarged Inner Mongolian Association.

The merger of the eastern and western factions took place just in time for Ulanfu and his Communist followers. Shortly afterwards, when the Nationalists captured Kalgan and Ch'engte, Ulanfu and his followers retired into Manchuria which was then held by the strong Communist army under Lin Piao. Under its aegis, the people's government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was formally inaugurated at Wang-yeh-miao (Ulanhot) on May 1, 1947.

II. Consolidation of the IMAR

The first two years of the IMAR were devoted to the consolidation of the People's Government against both external and domestic enemies. Its cavalry forces fought in the People's Liberation Army in the crucial battles in Manchuria in 1947-48 and checked the counter-offensives of the Nationalists, who in 1947 had pushed deep into Jehol. Simultaneously, the IMAR launched a ruthless campaign against "Kuomintang remnants and bandits" in areas under its control. Its adversaries included not only dispossessed landlords and farmers who had opposed the land reform, but also the Mongol nationalists, many of whom were formerly followers of Prince Te and P'u-ying-ta-lia as troops led by Li Shou-hsin. The savagery of the struggles may be seen in the Communist claim that from May, 1947, to May, 1949, their forces fought 633 engagements and annihilated 19,300 "counter-revolutionaries."

In the spring of 1949, when it appeared that the Communists were going to gain control of China, Prince Te (see China IMAR, Historical Setting) came out of his retirement in Peiping and, flying to Ting-yüan-ying in Ninghsia, across the Yellow River from Suiyuan, he gathered a force of anti-Communist guerillas and men from the Alashan and Edsingol Banners, reputedly numbering seven thousand, for a last stand against the Communists. But his efforts were doomed from the start. The Nationalist Government, to which he appealed for succor, was too beset with its own troubles to assist him. Although at one time his forces reached the outskirts of Pao-t'ou, he was driven back to take refuge in the Wu-la Mountains, west of his old base of Pai-ling-miao, where eventually his force disbanded. Some of his followers fled to Outer Mongolia, and others made their way to Formosa, where they were last reported carrying on anti-communist propaganda work for the Nationalist Government.

The spirit of resistance against Communism was not extinguished in Inner Mongolia despite the large-scale and penetrative campaign for the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries" launched in 1952 and again in 1954.

The ruthless, heavy-handed suppression of the forces of resistance was geared to the mobilization of the people of Inner Mongolia. Although, in China proper, the organization of the people was a part of the agrarian reform, in Inner Mongolia, because of the historic conflict of interests between the farmers and the herdsmen, conditions were not similar, and the Communists had to moderate their policy. The land reform in Inner Mongolia was launched in 1948; not only were the properties of the landlords confiscated, but the prerogatives of the princes and the lamas were abolished. Ulanfu, in his speech of December 20, 1951, said, "Feudal rights and privileges have been abolished in the pastoral areas and all nationalisties and various strata of the people who are opposed to U.S. imperialism and the reactionary Kuomintang have been mobilized and united to oppose successfully counter-revolutionary forces."

The land reform, which was carried out with horror and bloodshed in order to eliminate opponents of the Communists and to intimidate others, was followed immediately by the organization of the farmers into mutual-aid teams, a preliminary step to collectivization. The growth of the teams was rapid: 270,000 members in the first year, 1949; 600,000 in 1950; 800,000 in 1951. By May, 1953, it was claimed that exclusive of Chahar, there were 56,417 mutual-aid teams, comprising seventy percent of the agricultural population, both Chinese and Mongol. The second step, collectivization, was initiated in 1953, and by the end of the year, the number of agricultural producers' cooperatives had grown from fifteen to 368, with a membership of 1,090,000 farmers, or forty percent of the total population of Inner Mongolia. Workers in cities were organized into trade unions, and in eastern Mongolia in 1952 there were said to be 50,000 members of trade unions, or sixty-five percent of the total number of workers, with an additional fourteen thousand enrolled in study classes.

So far, the Communists had concentrated their efforts on the organization of the farmers and workers, who make up about eighty percent of the population of Inner Mongolia. Living compactly together, they were more easily organized, and because they resided close to the railroads, they were economically dependent upon China and could be overawed by military strength. With regard to the nomads in the pastoral areas, who have a tradition of stubborn resistance to regimentation and infringement upon their rights of pasturage, the Communists pursued at first a more cautious and conciliatory policy. To win their good will, the Communist authorities reduced the tariff on certain items of goods destined for the lamaseries and proclaimed a three-fold policy of "No struggle (a term which includes everything from mob trials to confiscation of property), no racial discrimination, and no class demarcation." In abolishing the feudal prerogatives of the princes, the Communists also raised the minimum wages of the herdsmen from one sheep to two and gave them a share of the proceeds. The Communists advertised their sending medical and veterinary teams to the pastoral areas with the slogan of "co-prosperity for men and beasts."

To augment the farmers' association, the Communist authorities also mobilized the people into organizations of mass control such as the New Democratic Youth League (renamed Young Communist League in September, 1955), the Federation of Democratic Women, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Association of Industry and Commerce, and the Federation of Trade Unions (cf. IMAR Propaganda). The mobilization of the masses was intensified in 1953 in preparation for the general elections and in conformity with the "general line of the state during the period of transition to socialism." In regard to the mobilization of women, the Jen-min jih-pao (January 29, 1954) stated: "We must further educate them to the fact that by their participation in socialist production or in labor of a socialist character, women can be completely emancipated...and that to tread the path of the Communist Party is to follow the path to happiness." Liao Ch'eng-chih, president of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, declared that the fundamental task was to educate the broad masses of the youth to follow the leadership of the CCP.

All the mass organizations have their branches in Inner Mongolia, headed by picked personnel, many of whom, if not all, are Communist party members. Ulan, head of the Federation of Democratic Women in Inner Mongolia, and Ko-li-keng, secretary of the Inner Mongolia Work Committee of the New Democratic Youth League, and concurrently chairman of the People's Supervisory Committee, are both members of the Inner Mongolian Government Council, as well as party members, thus insuring efficiency and singleness of purpose in the government, the party, and the quasi-popular organizations.

Particular emphasis was placed on the organization of the youth, which are more pliable to control and easier to indoctrinate. By 1951, Communists claimed that the number of primary schools (2,875) was three times that of 1947, and the number of students (238,900) was sixty-one percent of all the children of school age. Adults were encouraged to enter "spare-time" schools to learn to read and write, and to acquire political consciousness by "patriotic education."

In the mobilization of the masses, especially the youth, attention was focussed on the recruitment and training of cadres.

Communist cadres of Mongol descent had been trained in the College of Nationalities at Yenan during the war, and after the Communists established themselves in Inner Mongolia in 1945, there was a steady expansion in the number of cadres trained in the Military and Political College and the Autonomy College. An intensified recruiting campaign was carried on in 1947, and a Military and Political University and five cadre training schools were established. In 1949 there were said to be eleven thousand cadres in Inner Mongolia, of whom 2,244 were Mongols. In 1950, two advanced training schools were set up to raise the "cultural standards" of the Mongol and Chinese cadres.

On November 24, 1950, the Government Administration Council in Peking issued a directive calling for the "large-scale fostering of cadres from all the minority peoples," and urged the regional governments to "absorb the intelligentsia as fully as possible, promote the old and foster the new, and to foster suitable numbers of Han cadres who would volunteer to work with the nationality groups in order to assist the work of liberation and construction among the racial minorities." Priority was given to the training of military and political cadres in the Central Nationalities Institute in Peking and its branches.

A year later, Ulanfu reported that among the twenty-five thousand cadres trained in Inner Mongolia (exclusive of cadres engaged in production) eleven thousand were Mongols. Since it was also announced that eleven thousand Mongols had joined the New Democratic Youth League, it may be assumed that these were the same young men and women who had been trained as cadres. Of this number, 485 of the more deserving ones were sent to China for advanced studies. Urging a further expansion of the number of cadres, Ulanfu declared, "The energetic training of cadres...is the key to the successful implementation of the various policies of the Central People's Government and performance of various kinds of work." Two years later, it was reported that there were fifteen thousand Mongol cadres in Inner Mongolia, and thirty thousand early in 1954.

In the fall of 1950, having organized the peasant households, mustered a large body of trained and seasoned cadres, mobilized the people in mass organizations, conciliated the pastoral nomads by promises, and overawed all by their tour de force in the conquest of China, the Communists were ready to permit the people of Inner Mongolia, as elsewhere in China, to exercise their state power within the scope and limitation allowed to them by the government and party. By the end of October, county and banner people's representative conferences had been held in all parts of Inner Mongolia except Chahar, and in the

following year, all-circles people's representative conferences were held in all grades of the Inner Mongolia People's Governments, including the Silingol, Chahar, and Hunan Leagues, thirty-two banners, seven counties, three municipalities; in 2,184 kaza (administrative villages), or ninety percent of all the villages, "democratic coalition" governments were formed, that is, governments formed of more than one nationality group.

No details were given as to how these governments were formed. Apparently, the people's representative conferences in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region followed the pattern of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, convened in Peiping in September, 1949, where the delegates were either Communist dignitaries or Communist-approved "democratic personages" who had been invited to attend. These representative conferences had little power of their own. According to a decree of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the CPPCC, dated July 19, 1951 (based on articles 9 and 10 of the General Organic Law for the conferences of representatives), the functions of the people's representative conferences were to propagage decisions of the conference, examine and discuss decisions of the central People's Government, assist the government in mobilizing the people to participate in "patriotic" movements, such as the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries" and the Aid-Korea and Resist-America Campaign, and to promote education on current affairs. No provision was made for the representative to initiate legislation.

Small banners, such as the Oronchon Banner, which has a population of about a thousand (with another thousand in Manchuria) and numerically small minority groups such as the Moslem communities in Kuei-sui and Pao-t'ou (see China IMAR, Ethnic Groups), totaling 4,400 persons, were at first permitted to hold representative conferences and to organize autonomous districts, probably in order to give the Communists an intimation as to how well they fared. Most of the representative conferences were held in agricultural areas, and to a smaller extent, in the semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas; few were held in wholly pastoral areas. More sessions of the conferences were held in the lower levels than in higher levels. In the village level, where two to four sessions were held in 1951, nine-tenths of the governments that were formed were "democratic coalitions" in which the Chinese were numerically predominant. Ulanfu, in his speech of December 20, 1951, observed: "In areas where Han Chinese are pronouncedly numerous, democratic coalition governments of all nationalities have been established. For instance, of the 1,272 representatives to the representative conference of the people of the various banners, hsien, and municipalities in the Hsingan League, 47.4 percent were Mongols, 51.6 percent were Han Chinese, and the remaining one percent were Koreans and Moslems."

At the top level, in the Government Council of the IMAR People's Government, the Mongols still had a majority in 1952. Fifteen out of eighteen counsellors and seventeen out of thirty-one directors of departments and bureaus were Mongols; seven of the twelve chiefs and deputy chiefs of the six leagues were Mongols, and there were forty-three Mongol heads of banners Large numbers of Mongol cadres also worked in the party, government, or in public tele-communications, tax-collection, forestry, trade, finance, and cultural organs. They were the men who had struggled through hardships and fought against odds to create the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; their official positions were their rewards for years of loyalty and devotion, and Peking apparently considered it prudent not to undermine their power, at least for the time being.

Moreover, as Ulanfu pointed out in his December 1951 speech, these top-ranking members of the People's Government of the IMAR held their positions not because they were Mongols, but because they were party members, and their presence was to "insure the performance and completion of various kinds of work in the IMAR." This may be seen in the interlocking positions which a number of the top officials hold in the party, government, army, and mass organizations. In 1952, Ulanfu, for example, was chairman of the IMAR People's Government, secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee, commander and political commissar of the Inner Mongolian Military District, a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, deputy chairman of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs in the Central People's Government, and a delegate to various conferences in Peking. Wang Tsai-t'ien (Namchisereng) was a member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, a member of the Government Council, a director of the Department of Public Security, and deputy commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District. Hsia Fu-jen was a member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory Committee, and head of the Bureau of Personnel. Almost every member of the Government Council served in one or more capacities in the government, party, or army, in order to insure the smooth and efficient operation of the tightly-knit Communist organization.

The Communist Party organization in the IMAR is a replica of its parent body. The Sub-Bureau of the CCP in Inner Mongolia is the counterpart of the Central Committee in Peking, consisting of a Politburo, a Secretariat, and Departments of Organization, Propaganda, United Front Work, Social Affairs, and an administrative office Administrative policies in Inner Mongolia, such as the land reform, the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries," the so-called patriotic campaigns, and the study programs preparatory to the general elections, were all initiated by party headquarters and carried out by the People's Government (see China IMAR, Structure of Government).

III. Ascendancy of the Chinese Communists.

The consolidation of Communist power in Inner Mongolia was to all appearances the extension of the political sway of the Communist government in Peking over that vast domain. However, because a large proportion of its population is Mongol, led by Mongol leaders who have established a government largely through their own efforts, Inner Mongolia, oriented towards Manchuria and with nationalistic and separatist sentiments still strong in the mind of the people, poses unique problems. Even with faithful and devoted agents such as Ulanfu at the helm in Inner Mongolia, Peking could not outright and openly take over its administration, but had to resort to slower and more devious methods to assert its control.

As in China proper, many of the men who had allied themselves and collaborated with the Communists in the establishment of the autonomous region were not Communists, but nationalists who had for more than two decades fought for independence and political and economic reforms. Even within the ranks of the Communists, there were many who desired to set up a state either wholly independent or in partnership with Communist China. The first and one of the most important tasks of Ulanfu and his coterie was to build up a strong foundation of Chinese Communist Party leadership over Inner Mongolia. This was accomplished by a series of "democratic reforms," during which there was a wholesale purge of all charged with deviation for entertaining the "erroneous opinions" that "the society of Inner Mongolia is so special that there is no call for democratic reforms" or that "the society of Inner Mongolia is classless and has no need of agrarian reform."

Nationalist thinking came under strong attack and was condemned as "bourgeois deviation," and party members were advised to take the stand that the revolution in Inner Mongolia was a part of the Chinese Revolution. They were told to oppose "national separationism" and "national isolationism," and to appreciate the need for winning the help of the Han Chinese people and especially the Han Chinese cadres. They were told to oppose anti-foreignism, the tacit corollary being the necessity to learn from China and Soviet Russia. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which for over twenty years had been the fountainhead of nationalism, was abolished, and all its teachings, such as the slogan of

"Mongolia for the Mongols," were denounced as dangerous aberrations. Mongol leaders and their followers who advocated a policy of neutrality and non-interference in the civil war in China in order to conserve Mongol strength and to build up Inner Mongolia, were denounced as "traitorous capitulationists," and were eliminated when the Mongol Communists sent their army to assist the Chinese Communists in the campaigns in Manchuria and North China.

The land reform, used to annihilate the opponents of the Communists, served also as the means for "rectifying" the "mistaken views" of the cadres. Many of the Mongol cadres had opposed land reform from the very start, saying that no reform was needed in Inner Mongolia, and they were later on appalled and alienated by the ferocity and violence with which the reforms were carried out. The Communists saw fit to wipe out these men, for fear that their disillusionment and resentment might grow into overt hostility. To carry out the land reform, the Communists brought in large numbers of Han Chinese cadres. Trained in the agricultural regions of China and lacking understanding of conditions in Inner Mongolia, they raised the slogans of "land for the tillers," "livestock to the herdsmen," and "houses to the dwellers," all of which, it was charged, "did considerable damage to the policy of the Communist Party." They themselves not only felt superior to the Mongols, but by their actions stirred up Mongol ill-will towards the Chinese.

Despite the terrors of the purge and the rigors of the training, the threats and the exhortations, and the re-assessments and the reassignments, the ideological rectification of the cadres failed to achieve the desired results. In November, 1951, fully a month before the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference issued its directive against graft, waste, and bureaucraticism which later developed into the Three-Anti Campaign, Ulanfu, speaking in his capacity as secretary of the Inner Mongolian Sub-Bureau of the CCP, called upon all party members, cadres, Youth League members, and revolutionary workers "to mobilize the masses thoroughly" and to wage a popular struggle against such "evil" tendencies as "corruption, waste, and bureaucracy."

Early in 1952, following the launching of the Three-Anti Campaign in Inner Mongolia, it was suggested that the way to arrest corrupt practices was not so much a question of mobilizing the masses as reforming the cadres and government officials who were permeated with "serious rightist tendencies." 'The leadership cadres' hands are unclean and their rightist tendencies have been serious," said the Jen-min jih-pao in an article on Inner Mongolia entitled, "Why the Anti-Corruption Campaign Bogged Down" (February 29, 1952). One official was found guilty of misappropriating forty million yüan (about US$ 2,000) in public funds, and another, who had been chairman of the Anti-Corruption Campaign in Inner Mongolia, confessed to the misappropriation of over twenty million yüan (about US$ 1,000). The deputy director of the Department of Communications was accused of "squeeze" (he rode in a third-class train and charged the government for a second class fare in his expense account) and of ignoring the will of the people (when some people came to his office to lodge complaints, he fell asleep).

By singling officials out for attack on charges of graft, waste, and bureaucratic behavior, many of which no doubt were fabricated, the Communist authorities were able to unseat many officials in the Inner Mongolia People's Government. The Three-Anti Campaign against non-conforming officials was carried out in 1952, along with the Campaign for the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries and the Five-Anti Campaign, the purpose of which was to put down popular opposition, and the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea, which aimed at harnessing both the minds and the pocketbooks of the people to the foreign policy of the state. Having frightened the cadres by the purge, the Communists redoubled their efforts at indoctrinating them. In June, 1952, under the sponsorship of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, of which he was secretary, Ulanfu directed all the officials of the government and the cadres to undergo a six-mongs' re-indoctrination program, during which they would pay whole-hearted attention to the study of Mao Tse-tung's writings. Ulanfu himself acted as the chief of this study program, and his second in command was Hu Chao-heng, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau.

The ineffectiveness of this training program may be seen in the fact that in May, 1953, barely half a year after the completion of the six-months' study period, Ulanfu declared in a speech that "weakness and errors" still existed in the political structure of Inner Mongolia, and that in order to check "ideological deviation," it was necessary to intensify the education on "patriotism and internationalism." He said that the most urgent task was the organization of the whole body of cadres to learn theory from and absorb the experience of the Soviet Union, to strengthen the political leadership, to emphasize centralization in order to overcome dispersionism, and to build up the administration of Inner Mongolia in conformity with the resolutions of the central government.

The major obstacle to the direct control of Inner Mongolia by Peking and the smooth, untrammeled supervision of Inner Mongolian affairs by its henchmen was the age-old incompatibility between the Chinese and the Mongols. Contrary to the propaganda claims that following the "liberation" of the border regions harmony was restored between the Chinese and the minority nationalities, there was actually a heightening of the conflicts between the Chinese and the non-Chinese, and particularly between the Chinese cadres and non-Chinese cadres, brought on largely by the efforts of the Chinese Communists to extend their authority into regions inhabited by minority peoples.

The Communists blamed this racial friction on the residue of Great Han ideology in the minds of the Chinese and on "narrow nationalism" in the minds of the minority peoples. The Common Program of 1949 warned against the persistence of these extreme views and urged unity and friendship between the nationalities in order that they might live together as "members of a great family." Again, the Resolution to Promote Cadres from the Minority Peoples, promulgated by the Government Administration Council in November, 1951, which stressed the help of Han Chinese cadres in the administration and reconstruction of areas inhabited by minority peoples, and numerous other documents and speeches concerning the policy towards the minority peoples, all warned against the tendencies toward "great nation ideology" and "narrow nationalism." But neither admonitions nor appeals had any effect in achieving harmony. In his speech of December 20, 1951, concerning conditionsin Inner Mongolia, Ulanfu declared: "The national minorities (including the Mongols) tend to regard the big nationality with suspicion and to cherish narrow nationalism. They often show great vagueness in their class stand. Even their support of the Communist Party stems from such nationalism." As to the Han Chinese cadres, Ulanfu went on: "Experience has also shown that it is necessary to have a number of well-tried veteran cadres to carry on the work in national minority areas including the work of training national minority cadres. However, as most of the veteran cadres are Han Chinese, they tend to look down upon or distrust Mongol cadres...and often monopolize the work themselves. Moreover, they do not devote themselves to the study of conditions in Inner Mongolia, nor do they want to study the Mongolian language. They do not consider carefully the mentality and feeling of their Mongol comrades. As a result, they have been unable to strengthen their ties with their Mongol comrades."

Ulanfu urged the strengthening of the unity between the Mongol and Han Chinese cadres by means of education, criticism

and self-criticism, Communist euphemisms for brain-washing. "The people of Inner Mongolia fully understand that all good things are possible only under the leadership of the CCP... The Inner Mongolian nationality fully understand that they must have the cooperation of the Han Chinese in the autonomous region as well as the assistance of the Han Chinese nationality as a whole if they are to achieve progress in pllitical, economic and cultural fields." But, he warned, the Han Chinese cadres "must be taught to devote themselves to the service of the national minorities."

The animosity between the Chinese and Mongol cadres became increasingly aggravated as the Chinese Communists, penetrating deeper into Inner Mongolian politics, began to infringe upon what the Mongols regarded as their own preserves. In June, 1953, at a conference of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs, a stronger appeal was made for harmony between the Chinese and the minority peoples. A report of the commission stated that the result of the past three years had revealed the need for full understanding of the special characteristics and conditions of the minorities. The lack of understanding had resulted in dissatisfaction on the part of the minorities "leading even to temporary chaos which has greatly undermined the promotion of autonomy in some regions." The causes for the dissatisfaction were said to be Great Hanism on the one hand and "chauvinistic nationalism" on the other.

Although fully cognizant of the discontent among the minorities, the Chinese Communists continued to push through their program of subordinating the minority peoples. In their efforts to nationalize the political organs in the autonomous areas, the Communists brought in large numbers of Han Chinese cadres, who gradually began to displace the cadres of non-Chinese extraction, driving many of them to the point of insurrection. Instead of relieving the situation, the Communists blamed external forces for the discontent of the minority peoples, stating that "the insurrections have in practically every case been connected with the instigation of enemy secret agents and counter-revolutionaries" (NCNA September 9, 1953).

The persistence of the political and psychological cleavage between the Chinese and Mongol cadres impeded work in every department of the People's Government. In March, 1954, when the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP held an enlarged session lasting seventeen days to discuss the means of implementing the "resolution on strengthening party unity" adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Ulanfu revealed that the government and party officials of Inner Mongolia were affected by "all kinds of conceit, departmentalism, parochialism, dispersionism, sectarianism, liberalism, and individualism, which are reflections of bourgeois ideology and which endanger and corrode party unity." He charged that Han Chinese cadres had not fully cooperated with their Mongol colleagues, that "diverse trends of bourgeois nationalism" were still rampant among the Mongol cadres, and that "imperialists and counter-revolutionaries are making constant attempts to undermine... and create every opportunity to destroy party unity." The need for unity between the nationalities, that is to say between the Chinese and the Mongols, he concluded, had become urgent, "particularly because of the recent incorporation of Suiyuan" (NCNA April 18, 1954).

The inclusion of the province of Suiyuan in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region early in 1954 was an overt action on the part of the Chinese Communists, coordinated with the steady infiltration of Chinese cadres, to trim the power of the Mongol leaders and to turn the orientation of Inner Mongolia from the East, towards Manchuria, to the South, towards China proper.

When the IMAR was formally established on May 1, 1947, the Communists in North China were beset by military reverses. Yenan, their capital, had fallen to Nationalist forces just five weeks before, and the Chinese Communists were so preoccupied in their struggle for survival that they could afford to give little attention to the Mongols, a fact which enhanced the prestige of the Mongol revolutionaries. Consequently, the IMAR People's Government was established without having to undergo the process prescribed by the Communists for the achievement of autonomy by racial minorities. It received aid and support, however, from the Communist military authorities in Manchuria, and a Mongol cavalry unit fought in the People's Liberation Army in the crucial battles of 1947-48.

With its capital, Ulanhot (Wang-ye-miao) located in Manchuria, on a rail-line connected with the Manchurian system, the IMAR was politically, economically, and militarily attached to Manchuria. Its Communist headquarters was a sub-bureau of the Northeast (Manchuria) Bureau of the Central Committee, and in 1948 it was Kao Kang, a member of the Northeast Bureau, who harangued the Mongol cadres and directed them to work for the abolition of "feudalism" and the initiation of land reform.

It was only in September, 1949, following their conquest of China, when the Communists were making preparations for the inauguration of the People's Republic, that the IMAR sent delegates to the People's Political Consultative Conference at

Peking, and thus the region formally became an administrative unit of China.

Although it was generally proclaimed that the status of the IMAR was that of an administrative region, early maps placed it, along with the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, and Shansi, under the direct jurisdiction of the central government, in contrast with the other administrative regions which were under their own "military and administrative commissions." This apparently permitted closer supervision over the Inner Mongolian People's Government and more intimate relations with the Mongol leaders, relations which had been rather tenuous since 1947. With the administration directly under Peking and with the region's Communist party subordinated to the Manchurian Bureau, there was a schism in the party and government of Inner Mongolia and a consequent reduction in their efficiency.

To turn Inner Mongolia away from Manchuria and towards China, the capital of Inner Mongolia was moved in 1950 from Ulanhot (Wang-yeh-miao) to Kalgan, in Chahar, a province outside the territorial jurisdiction of the IMAR. Two years later, it was moved to Huhehot (Kuei-sui) in Suiyuan, which was also outside the territorial jurisdiction of the IMAR. The location of the seat of government of one region within the territory of another brought about conflict in administration and resulted in a reduction of the effectiveness of that government. In both Chahar and Suiyuan, the predominance of the Chinese population served to deter any separatist tendency of the Mongols. To break Inner Mongolia's economic ties with Manchuria, the Government Administrative Council, early in 1951, ordered the conversion of all Northeast and Inner Mongolian notes held by the people of the IMAR into jen-min-piao at the rate of ten to one.

To soften this sharp and sudden shift of orientation, Peking added two Mongol leagues in Manchuria and three Mongol-inhabited areas in Chahar to the IMAR, making a total of six leagues and an area of 231,000 square miles. An Eastern Inner Mongolia Administrative Office was formed at Ulanhot (Wang-yeh-miao) to govern the Hsingan, Jerim, and Huna Leagues, while the Jouda, Silingol, and the Chahar Leagues were administered separately. Many Mongol groups living on the perimeter of the IMAR were excluded, such as the Durbet Banner (Jerim League) in Manchuria, the Annuit and Aokhan Banners (Jouda League), and the Khorchin Banners (Josotu League) in Jehol, the Ulanchab and Ikechou Leagues in Suiyuan, and the Alashan and Edsingol Banners in Ninghsia, all of which were granted the status of autonomous districts. (In the spring of 1956, the land of the Alashan and Edsingol Banners of Ninghsia were incorporated into the IMAR.)

This anomalous situation was largely the outcome of political considerations. The leaders of the Ikechou and Ulanchab Leagues, the territories of which make up the province of Suiyuan, as well as the Mongol banners in Ninghsia, had in the past been the allies of the Nationalist general Fu Tso-i, and many of the men of the leagues, which were predominantly Chinese, had fought in his army against the Mongol revolutionaries. It was generally believed that when Fu Tso-yi finally agreed to submit to the Communists in January, 1949, one of the terms he bargained for and obtained was that the status quo be maintained in Suiyuan, which had been his base of operations. Consequently, the governor of Suiyuan, who was his close associate, was retained as governor under the Communists, and the two leagues in Suiyuan were not incorporated into the IMAR.

Early in 1954, the Chinese Communist leaders in Peking felt that their position had been sufficiently secured to warrant a change in the status of Suiyuan. Claiming that its action was in compliance with the wishes of the "people's governments" and party headquarters of Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia, the central People's Government announced the abolition of the province of Suiyuan, and its amalgamation with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Ikechou and Ulanchab Leagues were divested of their regional autonomy and placed under the control of the IMAR People's Government, but two new administrative districts were created in the predominantly Chinese-inhabited areas in the vicinity of Chi-ning. The Tumet and four other banners were incorporated into one of these administrative districts, and the Hanggin Dalate Banner into the other. In many localities, the traditional Mongol system of banner government was changed to the Chinese system of county government.

There were also administrative changes in eastern Inner Mongolia in 1954. The Hulunbuir and Nonni Valley Leagues were merged into the Huna League, and with the abolition of the Eastern Inner Mongolian Administrative Office, this region was administered directly by the People's Government of Inner Mongolia.

The change extended the Chinese system of government to the greater part of Inner Mongolia, and the gerrymandering of administrative districts bolstered the ascendency of the Peking-dominated Chinese population over the Mongols. The addition of the Chahar counties in 1953 had already increased the proportion of farmers to nomadic herders and the proportion of Chinese to Mongols, and the number of farmers and Chinese was further increased by the inclusion of Suiyuan. The population of the IMAR before 1954 was estimated at 2,400,000, of which 800,000, or thirty-four percent, were Mongols, 1,500,000, or sixty-three percent were Chinese, and the remaining three percent, other racial minorities. Three-quarters of the 2,400,000 were farmers, including both Mongols and Chinese.

(According to the Jen-min shou-tse, 1951, the population of the six leagues in the IMAR came to 2,239,000. Lin Ming, in Nei Meng-ku-ti Hsin-shen, 1952, gave the population as 2,900,000 in one place and 2,037,892 in another, of which 83,000 were Mongols. According to Mao Ao-hai, "Mongols of China on the March," [JMJP May 3, 1953], the Mongol population of North China came to 170,000, of which 160,000 resided in Suiyuan; and of Manchuria, 450,000, of which 270,000 lived in Jehol and 110,000 in Liao-pei. This totaled 620,000, of whom 540,000, according to the author, resided in Inner Mongolia. However, excluding Jehol, which was not included in the IMAR, and Suiyuan, which did not become a part of the IMAR till 1954, this leaves only 110,000 Mongols living in the IMAR prior to 1954. The China News Analysis, (Hongkong) No. 29, March 26, 1954, estimated the Mongol population of the IMAR to be roughly 500,000.)

The inclusion of Suiyuan, with its population of three million, increased the population of Inner Mongolia to 6,100,000. Of this number, the Mongols came to about a million, or sixteen percent of the population, and the Chinese population was increased to five million, or over eighty percent. There was also a marked increase proportionately in the number of farmers.

The Chinese Communists made no effort to conceal the fact that the purpose of the amalgamation of Suiyuan with the IMAR was to increase in the IMAR the number of Chinese farmers, whom they made more tractable by the land reform and other means of indoctrination, and also the number of Chinese cadres, in order to dilute the solidarity and to restrain any independent action of the Mongols, especially during the critical period of the "transition to socialism," as announced by the Chinese Communists early in 1954. The Jen-min Jih-pao stated candidly in an editorial (February 27, 1954): "With the amalgamation of Suiyuan into the IMAR, the Han Chinese population in the region is being increased compared with the past. The participation of more Han Chinese in the autonomous region will give greater opportunities for the Han Chinese to assist their brotherly nationality in the work of construction... The growth and development of the IMAR in the past could not be separated from the brotherly and enthusiastic assistance rendered by the Han Chinese. Today, the people of the Mongol nationality must all the more enthusiastically welcome this assistance, and unite all the better, cooperate all the closer with the Han people for the construction of the IMAR."

This compelling of the Mongols to cooperate with the Chinese and to be enthusiastic in their cooperation may have been a principal cause for the discontent and the insurrections reported in Inner Mongolia, which obliged Ulanfu to state that since the incorporation of Suiyuan the need for unity between the Mongol and Chinese cadres was greater than ever before.

IV. Autonomy and the Elections of 1954.

Coincident with and correlated to the extension of Chinese Communist influence in Inner Mongolia was the development of autonomous governments of Inner Mongolia within the political framework of Communist China. For over forty years the Mongols had striven for self-government and the Chinese Communists, prior to their rise to power, had time and again publicly promised autonomy to the minority peoples of China in an effort to win them to the Communist cause and the Nationalist government.

As early as 1930, speaking at the first All-China Congress of Soviets, Mao Tse-tung declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or join the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic (The Soviets in China, Moscow 1933, p. 440, quoted in Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, 1950, p. 115). But Mao corrected his views when, speaking at an enlarged session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CCP in 1938, he said that the minorities enjoy equal rights with the Chinese and have the authority to control their own affairs and to establish, jointly with the Han nationality, a unified state (JMJP September 9, 1953). The promise of equality, regional self-government, and preservation of language, culture, and religion was reaffirmed in chapter 6 of the Common Program adopted by the Central Peoples Political Consultative Council in September, 1949.

The IMAR, having been established more than two years before the Chinese Communists' seizure of power in China, served as the testing-ground for the application of the nationalities policies of Mao Tse-tung, which, as Liu Shao-ch'i explained, were based on Marxist - Leninist ideas. The formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government, Liu went on, provided the Chinese Communists with experience in the formation of regional self-governments for the minority peoples. Ulanfu, head of the People's Government in Inner Mongolia and also deputy director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs of the Central People's Government, contributed considerably to the crystallization of the policy of the Chinese Communists towards the minority peoples.

This policy was incorporated into the "General Program for the Enforcement of Nationalities' Regional Autonomy of the People's Republic of China," which was promulgated in August, 1952, along with two supplementary documents concerning the enforcement of democratic coalition and the protection of the equality and interests of the minority peoples.

Chapter 1, article 2, of the General Program stated, "All national autonomous districts shall be an inseparable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China...and shall be under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and subject to guidance by people's governments of superior levels."

Chapter 2, article 5, stipulated that in national autonomous areas, which include districts inhabited by Han Chinese, and in towns and cities which contain residential districts of Han Chinese, the administration of the Han Chinese should be along the lines adopted in China proper, and there would be no need for an autonomous form of government, but in autonomous regions where Han Chinese were numerous, coalition governments should be formed.

Chapter 4 defined the extent of autonomy. This included acquiescence to the wishes of the leadership personnel (that is, the cadres), the use of their own language and literature, and the promotion of patriotic cadres from the nationalities. Questions of finance and the organization of the public security forces and the militia were subject to authorization by the central People's Government. Chapter 5 enjoined the minority peoples to love the Han Chinese, and chapter 6 decreed that they must follow the leadership of the People's Governments of higher levels.

These provisions were reaffirmed in the Organic Law of the Peoples Congresses and Peoples Councils, which was ratified in Peking in November, 1955, and was an almost word for word reproduction of the Chinese Communist Constitution of 1954. These documents stressed the claim that the autonomous regions were integral and inalienable parts of China. The autonomous governments of the minority nationalities had no legislative power of their own, and no freedom from the supervision and control of the central government. The functions of the people's congresses, according to Articles 9 and 11 of the Organic Law, were to "guarantee the observance and implementation of the laws, decress, and resolutions of the National People's Congress," and their activities were subject to the scrutiny and supervision of the political organs of higher levels and by the Communist party and the central People's Government. This was the meaning and purpose of "democratic centralism," and by this arrangement, the autonomous regions in no way differed from the Chinese provinces. The Chinese Communist interpretation of "autonomy for racial minorities" means, in substance, only the right to use their own language and literature.

The influx of swarms of Chinese cadres and the inclusion of Chinese-populated Suiyuan in the IMAR created conditions which favored the Chinese Communists in their program to nationalize the people's governments in the nationality autonomous areas. The Jen-min jih-pao, in its editorial of September 9, 1953, specifically pointed out the fact that according to the "General Program for the Enforcement of Nationality Autonomous Regions," the "concrete form of an autonomy organ should be based on the aspirations of the majority of the people in the autonomous area and those of the leaders," which, in the case of Inner Mongolia, would mean the Chinese people and the Chinese cadres.

The editorial then went on to state: "Naturally the nationalization of the various national autonomous organs cannot be separated from the strengthening of the leadership of the autonomous regions by the CCP and the People's Governments at the higher levels. It cannot be separated from the support and help of the cadres and people of the Han Chinese and other nationalities. If it is considered that by assuming control of one's own household, and by nationalization, there is no further need for the leadership of the CCP and the leadership of the people's governments at higher levels, and there is no need for the support of the Han people and cadres, then it is an obvious mistake which must be prevented and rectified."

In a later (October 10, 1953) editorial, the Jen-min jih-pao went on to explain that the mission of the Communist party and its basic policy in regard to the national minorities was "the consolidation of the unification of the fatherland and the unity of various nationalities for the joint effort in the construction of the large family of our great fatherland."

Having consolidated their position in Inner Mongolia, as they had throughout the mainland of China, the Chinese Communists in 1953 were ready to go through the motions of permitting the people to participate in state affairs by choosing their representatives. The Election Law, published by the central People's Government in February, provided for suffrage for all adults except those classified by the state as lunatics, landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and those whom the state had deprived of the rights of citizenship. Since the political system in Communist

China was pyramidal, the people only voted for men to represent them in the lowest political stratum, that is, the hsiang (village), small towns, and small undivided unicipalities, where, the Election Law stipulates, the election should be direct, that is, by a show of hands. Illiterates, and there is a large number in Inner Mongolia, may vote by proxy. By these means, the state through the agency of the cadres, could keep close supervision on the election.

The responsibility of the average individual ends when he has voted by raising his hand in the basic level elections. His elected representatives then meet to elect representatives in the large municipalities and in the provinces, and the latter in turn meet to elect representatives to the national congress.

The candidates were nominated jointly by groups, because "joint and organized nomination is superior to single and individual nomination," the people were told (Wang Shui, "How to nominate candidates for election," JMJP June 11, 1953). Although there was no restriction against individuals nominating candidates of their own choice from the floor, the practice was generally discouraged, and any such attempts dissipated. "Through the method of small group discussion and appraisals ...individual nomination will gradually be standardized." (Ibid.)

Most of the candidates had been previously chosen by the Communist authorities, although for the sake of appearance the names of fellow-travelers and others approved by the party may be submitted by organized groups. "As nomination from below is democratic and nomination from above is comprehensive, the best method is to combine nomination from below with nomination from above." (Ibid.)

In parts of the country with large numbers of non-Chinese, a graduated system was worked out whereby minority people who constitute up to one-third of the population may have half the total number of elected representatives; up to one-fifth, one-third of the representatives; up to one-tenth, one-fifth of the representatives; and less than one-tenth, one representative. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region prior to 1954, the Mongols constituted one-third of the population and would have been able to elect half of the representatives, but after 1954, with the addition of Suiyuan, the ratio of the Mongols was only one-fifth of the number of Chinese, and consequently, they could elect only one-third of the representatives.

Preparatory to the elections, the people were subjected to a barrage of propaganda. In June, the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the CPPCC issued a directive to its local committees in all provinces, municipalities, counties, and nationalities to organize the people into study groups to study the Common Program and to strengthen the indoctrination of the people in "patriotism and internationalism." A large number of cadres were trained and assigned to the work of conducting the elections at the basic level, appointed to serve as chairmen of basic level election committees and to direct the work of basic level elections. The assignment was one cadre for every two thousand voters, and one technical cadre for every five hundred voters. In Inner Mongolia, over 6,600 cadres were mobilized to work in the basic level elections. In addition to the cadres, a large number of propagandists were mobilized, "to make extensive and penetrating propaganda for the election." (NCNA April 7, 1953, July 20, 1953, and September 26, 1953).

According to the original schedule, the basic level elections were to take place from May to October, the country and municipal elections during October, and the elections in the autonomous areas of the national minorities one month ahead of the elections in China proper; however, the Communist authorities were still hesitant to go ahead with the elections, so "experimental elections" were carried out first, in the fall of 1953. The purpose was not only to train cadres to conduct the elections and to furnish an opportunity for a house-to-house check of the voters, but also to serve as a straw vote and give the authorities an idea of how well-indoctrinated the people were and whether it was advisable to go ahead with the actual elections.

The experimental elections were generally satisfactory. In Inner Mongolia they were carried out in 141 basic units in agricultural, semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral, and wholly pastoral areas, forest areas, and cities. In the cities and the agricultural regions, it was claimed that the showing at the pools was a hundred percent, while in the pastoral and forest areas inhabited by such groups as the Oronchon, the showing was eighty percent.

The real basic level elections were held immediately following the experiment. By November, they were held in 103 villages and small towns in Inner Mongolia and again the results were as the Communists had expected. Eighty-three percent of the representatives elected were Communist cadres. However, these basic level elections were not totally comprehensive. Teng Hsiop'ing, who had overall charge of the elections throughout the country, revealed that the elections were held only in areas where the number of racial minority people comprises three-quarters of the total population of the area, and he revealed also that elections were not held in some of the nationality areas "due to the lack of requisite conditions." These conditions, it may be inferred from the Communist literature on the subject of nationalities autonomy, were

the degree of the organization of the people and the number and dependability of the native cadres. In Inner Mongolia, as Ulanfu pointed out, 62.16 percent of the peasants in the agricultural areas, and about thirty percent of the herdsmen in the pastoral areas were organized at the time of the elections, and as for the Mongol cadres, their trustworthiness and loyalty to Peking were still doubtful.

As the basic level elections in Inner Mongolia drew to an end in March, 1954, elections were held on the level of the banners, counties, and municipalities, and these were followed in June by elections in the leagues and administrative districts. The outcome was, from the Communist point of view, successful. The men elected as delegates, as the Communist press was pleased to point out, were all "elite personages." The statistics of the banner and county elections showed that in vocational background, eighty-eight percent of the delegates were model workers and farmers, and in racial background, only twenty-six percent were Mongols, about one percent Moslems or Manchus, and the rest Chinese.

The first meeting of the People's Congress of the IMAR was held at Huhehot (Kuei-sui), July 27 to August 4, with 376 deputies attending, over half of whom were labor heroes and model farmers. This body discussed the constitution of China and elected by secret ballot thirteen delegates to attend the National People's Congress in Peking. Of these thirteen, ten were ex-officio members of the Inner Mongolia People's Government.

The National People's Congress, which met in Peking, in September, 1954, adopted the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, which further strengthened the control of the central government over the nationalities' autonomous regions. Article 53 stated implicitly: "The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authority" (see China IMAR, The Constitutional System). In reducing the autonomous regions to the status of provinces, the administrative organs in the autonomous regions were correspondingly reduced in rank. According to the Draft Regulations for the Organization of People's Congresses, adopted by the National Congress, the departments (pu) in the autonomous governments were reduced to the rank of offices (t'ing), the leagues were equated with administrative districts, the banners with counties (hsien), and the kaza and sumu with villages (hsiang).

With the subordination of the IMAR to the central People's Government, and consequently to the convention of the People's Congress, there were also changes in the top echelon of the People's Government in Inner Mongolia. In the first session of the first Chinese People's Consultative Conference held in Inner Mongolia, Yang Chih-lin, vice-chairman of the People's Government of the IMAR, was elected chairman of the Inner Mongolia CPPCC, a quasi-government organization that presumes to express the will of the people in the selction of government officials. Of the five vice-chairmen of this organization, three were Chinese and two Mongols.

There were, however, some hitches in the formation of the People's Council of the IMAR. In August, 1954, Peking appointed twenty-five men and women to be members of the IMAR People's Council, of whom sixteen were Chinese, seven Mongols, one Manchu, and one Moslem. The Mongols apparently demurred at this preponderance of Chinese, and there seems to have been considerable behind-the-scenes bickering and readjustment, so that when the People's Council of the IMAR was formally inaugurated at the second session of the first people's congress, held at Huhehot (Kuei-sui) during the last week of April, the composition of its members was revised. It was enlarged to thirty-seven members (according to the Organic Law of People's Congresses and People's Councils in the IMAR, adopted in November, 1955, the People's Council of the IMAR may have forty-two to forty-nine members,) of whom twenty were Chinese, fifteen Mongols, one Manchu, and one Moslem. The Manchu member was a Sinicized Manchu, and the Moslem was a Chinese from Tientsin.

Ulanfu retained the office of chairman of the Inner Mongolia People's Council, as well as his concurrent positions as secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, and the command of the Inner Mongolia military forces. For his services to Peking, he was promoted to be one of the vice-premiers and chairman of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Central People's Government. The number of vice-chairmen in the IMAR People's Council was increased to seven, of whom three were Mongols and four Chinese. The Chinese included the incumbent Yang Chih-lin, who was also chairman of the Inner Mongolia People's Consultative Conference; Su Chien-i, who was also deputy secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP; and Wang I-lun, who also held a responsible position in the Manchurian province of Heilungkiang. Of the Mongol vice chairmen, Kuei Pi was director of the Department of Civil Affairs in the Inner Mongolian People's Government and at the same time director of the Department of Organization in the regional party headquarters, Wang Tsai-t'ien was director of the Department of Public Security, deputy commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District, and a member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP. The third Mongol member, Hafengga, was promoted from his former position as director of the Department of Culture and Education.

In the People's Council of the IMAR, as it was organized in April, 1955, twenty-three of the twenty-five appointees of the central People's Government were retained. Among the substitutions was Ulan, Mongol head of the Federation of Democratic Women, who replaced Liu Hsiu-mei, a Chinese woman, former secretary of the Suiyuan Provincial Committee. However, compared with the pre-election People's Government of the IMAR, the change was quite marked. Only nine of the eighteen members of the Government Council of 1952 were members of the People's Council formed last year. Some were promoted, like Temuragen, who became president of the Inner Mongolia People's High Court; Kuei Pi, Wang Tsai-t'ien and Wang I-lun, who became vice-chairmen; Peng Ssu-k'o, who prefers to Russianize his name as Pengsk, who was made head of the General Office in the Commission on Nationality Affairs in Peking; and Liu Chun, who was made a vice-chairman of the Commission.

V. Collectivization and Further Colonial Expansion

In December 1951 Ulanfu stated that the reorganizing of the political and social life of Inner Mongolia was to be achieved "by a series of reforms from above down to the lowest level and then from the bottom upward." This method had been employed in the consolidation of Communist power in Inner Mongolia. The ascendency of the Chinese Communists in the government of the IMAR was paralleled by the tightening of their grip over the people. By the summer of 1955, branch headquarters of the CCP were established in ninety percent of the villages in the agricultural areas. In the month of July alone, it was reported that 3,600 Mongol, Han Chinese, Moslem, Korean and Sibo youth had joined the party, and that many of them had been given positions of responsibility. In the Khorchin banner, 780 party members were serving as directors of the agricultural producers cooperatives and as heads of mutual-aid teams.

The schools were the principal training centers of the cadres. By the summer of 1955, there were said to be 1,195 Mongolian primary schools with 83,432 students, or 81.4 percent of the children of school age, and sixty-eight middle schools with a total of 55,000 students (exclusive of those who enrolled in 1955); there is one college with 165 Mongol students and according to plans, there will be three colleges with 2,000 students by 1957. Upon graduation, the majority of the students were given jobs as cadres. In August it was reported that except for a small number who went on to college, most of the 1,243 Mongolian, Moslem, Manchu, Korean, and Oronchun middle school graduates had become cadres, to work on construction projects, in the party, and in the government.

Supplementing the schools in the training of cadres is the Young Communist League (New Democratic Youth League) which in Inner Mongolia had 850,000 basic level units with 180,000 members. In the summer of 1955, 30,000 of them graduated to membership in the Communist Party. A third source of cadres was from the ranks of the unemployed. In June, 1955, 1,640 of the 3,000 unemployed Moslems in the IMAR were given training as cadres and jobs in the cooperatives and state-controlled industries.

The recruiting of large numbers of cadres and the tightening of control over the people of Inner Mongolia were concomitant with what the Communists termed the "general line of the state during the period of transition to socialism." This was announced by the central People's Government in the fall of 1953, and the general elections and the adoption of the constitution represented its political aspects, which were to be coordinated with the economic aspects. These were the development of state capitalism, industrialization in the urban areas, and collectivization in the rural. In Inner Mongolia, where industrialization was still in its infancy, the emphasis of the Five-Year Plan was directed toward collectivization in agricultural as well as in pastoral areas. A firm foundation had already been built by the land reform and the organization of the peasants and herders into mutual-aid teams, and it was but another step to transform them into cooperatives, which at first were merely larger and more advanced mutual-aid teams, but which eventually were to become collective farms.

The program of collectivization in Inner Mongolia had been astonishingly rapid, and its success had encouraged the Communist government to revise its original policy of proceeding slowly in the minority nationalities autonomous regions. Beginning in 1953 with fifteen agricultural producers' cooperatives, by the end of the year there were 137; by the end of 1954 there were 3,926, with 93,823 peasant households, and by the fall of 1955, there were 7,372 cooperatives, comprising 17.27 percent of all peasant households. Present plans are for the increase of collectivized peasant households to thirty to thirty-five percent in 1956 and to fifty percent in 1957. Under the supervision of the Inner Mongolia Committee of the CCP, the collectivization was first carried out in the Ulanchab League and the P'ing-ti-chuan district of Suiyuan, and in the Hulunbuir League in the northernmost part of the IMAR. Later the cadres, including 7,300 Mongols, bolstered by an additional 11,400 new agents, were sent to assist in the collectivization of other areas.

To buttress the agricultural cooperatives there were also

credit cooperatives, which were also first organized in 1953. By spring of 1955, there were nearly 2,000 credit cooperatives established in sixty percent of the villages. These cooperatives had no other function than to control the finances of the peasantry in order to further communization. They had no funds to lend the peasants. Sixty-three percent of them altogether had less than five million yuan in old currency (about US$ 250) and thirty-eight percent of these had no deposits at all. Moreover, it was revealed that they only catered to the landlords and rich peasants.

Collectivization, as the farmers of Inner Mongolia soon found out, did not increase their welfare, but only worsened their plight. Under the "three stabilizations" policy which the government began to enforce in 1955, they found that they had to sell a fixed amount of grain and produce to the state at a fixed price, regardless of the yield of their land. The Ayung banner, consisting of 180 peasant households, for example, was required to sell 360,000 catties (about 2,160 tons) of food to the state (Tientsin Ta-kung Pao, April 29, 1955).

The aggravation of economic conditions and the regimentation of their daily life aroused the peasants' latent spirit of rebellion, and impelled many of them to oppose the authorities. The Nei Meng-ku Jih-pao, official organ of the party in Inner Mongolia, charged (on November 18, 1954) that the peasant opposition was inspired by the counter-revolutionaries, and stated: At the moment...acts of sabotage are more conspicuous in rural villages. The enemy sets fire on the farms of our peasants. He manipulates individual backward peasants, sows discord among them, instigates them to create disturbances and seeks to undermine the internal unity of the agricultural producers cooperatives and mutual aid teams and hamper and check the development of the mutual aid and cooperative movement in rural villages. He sabotages the work of our government and falsely accuses our cadres in an attempt to split the government and the people."

A rigorous campaign of suppression, launched in the winter of 1954-55, had little effect in intimidating the peasants, and in April, 1955, the people's Government of the IMAR issued a directive to all banners, counties, and municipalities and administrative districts to crack down on the "counter-revolutionaries," and to check the spread of peasant resistance. It claimed that "murder, arson, poisoning, rumor-mongering, and the sabotage of planned purchasing and marketing" had been committed by "escaped counter-revolutionaries and elements of the hostile classes. Disguised with false papers, they often pretend to be active and progressive."

The resistance stemmed from two sources, according to the directive: externally, from enemy agents sent by "imperialist" nations; and internally, from classes already or about to be eliminated. "Some of the stubborn counter-revolutionaries definitely will connive with foreign imperialism and increase their efforts to resist and undermine the cause of socialist construction and socialist transformation."

The directive listed five categories of "counter-revolutionaries": bandits, secret agents, despots, members of reactionary parties and cliques, and heads of relitious sects, all from the agrarian areas of Inner Mongolia. The mainstay of the resistance movement were the dispossessed farmers and the former members of the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, augmented by outcast government and party officials who had escaped the purge. As in the past, the anti-government movement came under the influence and leadership of the Taoists (for a discussion of Taoism, see China General Religion).

In June, 1955, six Taoist sects were proscribed by the Inner Mongolian People's Government as "counter-revolutionary." Of these, the strongest and most often mentioned in the Communist press was the I Kuan Tao, a nation-wide organization. The leader of the I Kuan Tao in Inner Mongolia operated from his headquarters at Shangtu, and in the tradition of secret societies, he proclaimed himself emperor, assumed a dynastic title and designed a dynastic flag. The I Kuan Tao was so influential in Inner Mongolia that five of the directors of agricultural producers' cooperatives at Shangtu were reported to be leaders of the sect and thereby able to sabotage the cooperative movement in that locality (NCNA June 16, 1955).

Despite the severity of the suppression by the public security forces, the Inner Mongolia authorities conceded that it would be difficult to overcome the opposition of the peasants, and they admitted that "the greater our victory in socialist construction the more frantically they will destroy our cause."

Simultaneously with the program of collectivization in the agricultural areas, the Communists are steadily pushing into the pastoral areas and converting the nomads into farmers. The encroachment on the pasture by the Communists began with their land reform in 1948, and already by 1952 it was revealed that in the region that was once the province of Chahar, agricultural land had been increased by twenty-five percent and that nineteen percent more of the land was being ploughed. In 1952, a report claimed that eighty percent of the people in the Fa-futun kaza in the K'e-ya Front Banner had been turned into peasants, and that eighty percent of the people in the East Sunit Banner of the Silingol League had been incorporated into cooperatives. An article in the Jen-min jih-pao (May 5, 1954) stated that out of 2,256 households in the Durbet Banner in Heilungkiang, 1,804, or eighty percent, were leading the lives of "middle peasants."

The expansion of the cooperatives acted further to turn the Mongols to farming, as a New China News Agency dispatch (September 9, 1954) stated: "On the basis of local conditions, the various leagues have drawn up plans to develop agricultural producers' cooperatives and to hold mutual aid and cooperative training classes. Before the autumn harvesting in the Jerim League, 2,400 backbone cadres will be trained to set up cooperatives."In pastoral areas still untouched by the plough, the first step towards collectivization has been made by organizing the people into animal-husbandry mutual-aid teams. In March, 1954, there were nearly 5,000 animal-husbandry mutual-aid teams. In Inner Mongolia there were 1,000 in the Hulunbuir plain and 4,000 among the Mongol, Solon, and Tungusic herdsmen, representing eighty percent of the nomadic population. The next step took place in 1955 with the organization of twenty agricultural-pastoral producers' cooperatives, eight pastoral producers' cooperatives, and thirty-one state farms and state ranches, embracing forty percent of the nomadic population, and at the end of the first Five Year Plan in 1957 it is expected that sixty percent of the herdsmen would be collectivized.

The Communists make no attempt to hide the fact that the purpose of collectivizing the nomads is to transform them eventually into farmers. The Jen-min Jih-pao (November 14, 1955) stated: "We must, under the leadership of the state ranches and state farms and on the basis of pastoral mutual aid and cooperation, systematically and gradually assist and guide the herdsmen to grow fodder crops and ... to settle down and build permanent homes. Later, according to the requirement of the herdsmen, the pastoral development will gradually combine itself with agriculture."

The thirty-one state ranches and state farms now in operation are primarily located in two localities, both of which are accessible by railroads. The majority of them are in the Hsingan range, where the former Chinese Eastern Railway passes through. Work is now underway to lengthen two spur lines, one extending northward from T'u-li'ho for fifty miles into the Great Hsingan Mountains, and the other extending southward into the Little Hsingan mountains. The other location of the state farms is in the Silingol League, in the regions opened up by the two-hundred-mile Chi-ning-Erh-lien Railway, which connects the Peking-Suiyuan Railway with a line running south from Ulan Bator, capital of Outer Mongolia. The line, opened to traffic in December, 1955, brings the herdsmen of the Silingol League, who in past years had been among the most resolute in the fight for independence and the preservation of their tribal heritage, within three to five days of Peking and, as the Communists boasted in their propaganda, would bring changes to the "desolate and backward pastureland of the Silingol League." (China News Agency, December 12, 1954). Six trucking lines supplemented the railway in the transportation of freight and passengers.

Farther to the south, the construction of the Fengt'ai--Shach'eng line to supplement the Peking-Suiyuan Railway not only strengthened the communication between China proper and Inner Mongolia, but also reinforced the economic dependence of Inner Mongolia on China proper, and Peking's political domination over Inner Mongolia. In addition, the survey of the route for the Pao-t'ou-Lanchou Railway has been completed. As in the past, the construction of railways has led to a surge of Chinese farmers into Inner Mongolia, and their intrusion into Mongol lands has intensified the conflict between the two peoples, resulting in frequent armed clashes. "Such man-made conflicts cannot be completely eradicated," wrote the Jen-min Jih-pao (November 14, 1955), and it continued: "Peasants often reclaim land at random just to suit their own convenience in tilling and herdsmen frequently spoil agricultural fields also merely to facilitate the tending of their livestock. In some places where the herdsmen wanted to protect the pastures, the peasants might dig up the grass roots and cut down the grass stalks and take them for fuel. Consequently conflicts of this sort almost continuously happen between the peasants and herdsmen, between village and village, between ch'ü and ch'ü, and between banner (or country) and banner (or county), despite the incessant mediation of the government."

This was the situation in Inner Mongolia at the beginning of 1956, a picture of conflict between herdsmen and farmers, between Mongols and Chinese, and between the nationalists and the Communists. It is an unhealthy picture. Far from placating the conflicts, the Chinese Communists by their policies and actions have aggravated them. The extension of Chinese political authority and the penetration of farmers into Inner Mongolia has been going on for over half a century - under the last ruler of the Ch'ing dynasty, under the early republic, and under the Nationalist government - but never has there been as relentless and concerted a drive as under the Communists today. In the past, the Mongols have risen in rebellion each time the Chinese pushed into their homeland, and the Communists are fully cognizant of this fact, which is why they predict that the greater the pressure upon the people of Inner Mongolia, the greater will be the resistance.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Lattimore, Owen, The Mongols of Manchuria. New York, 1934.

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Public Safety
II. The Judicial System

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Public Safety

In pre-Communist times, different systems of public-safety administration prevailed in the various Mongol banners and the several Chinese counties. Each Mongol banner was both a civilian and a military unit and all male adults of a banner were soldiers. During the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), units of three male adults shared an armor. So it was the Mongol bannermen themselves who were responsible for the peace and security of the banner.

At the time of the inception of the Chinese Republic in 1912, the military strength of the various Mongol banners was weakened by the shortage of modern weapons. The Mongols, armed with bows and arrows and other old-fashioned weapons were unequal to the tasks of defense and maintenance of the peace. Both defence and the maintenance of peace became the function of soldiers bearing firearms in the service of various Mongol princes. In pre-Communist days, the troops of Prince Te, Deputy Captain General of the Silingol League, were the strongest troops of all the Mongol banners, and were able to guard the area under the jurisdiction of the prince against bandit disturbances. The military units under the command of other Mongol princes were very small in number and insufficient for maintaining local peace. In the 1930's, there was a total of about 2,000 Mongol troops in the various Mongol banners in Chahar. When attacked by large groups of bandits, the troops of two or more banners usually joined forces under the unified command of the League.

The Dürben-Khükhet tribe of the Ikhe Chao League had a garrison force of some two hundred strong recruited from the tribe's male adults between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, who served in rotation. The troops of all other Mongol banners seemed to consist of professional soldiers.

In 1933, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Executive Yüan of the National Government adopted a resolution which required the various Mongol banners to re-organize their garrison troops into Pao-an-tui or peace-preservation troops and to eliminate the bandits within specified time limits. Some Mongol troops received new equipment from the National Government.

The Mongol troops were utilized by several Mongol princes, particularly Prince Te, as an asset in their demand for national autonomy. As a result, armed conflicts often arose between them and local Chinese troops (mainly those under the command of General Fu Tso-i). When the Japanese invaded Northern Chahar in 1935, Prince Te surrendered to the Japanese with his troops, but Prince Sha, Peace Preservation Officer (Pao-an chang-kuan) of the Ikhe Chao League, led other Mongol banners in resisting Japanese aggression. Prince Te's troops were combined with the Japanese trained and equipped Mongol troops under the command of General Li Shou-hsin to become the national army of the puppet East Mongolian Autonomous Government, which Prince Te himself headed. Prince Sha's troops were benefitted by supplies furnished by the National Government.

The public safety system in the Chinese populated counties was the same as that in effect in the interior of the country. In each county, there was a Public Security Bureau (Kung-an-chü) and a Defense Corps (Pao-wei-t'uan). As of 1937 the public-safety forces in the four counties of T'ao-lin, Chi-ning, Hsing-ho and Feng-chen in eastern Suiyuan were as follows: T'ao-lin----The Public Security Bureau had three police officers, sixty policemen, fifty guns and thirty-one horses. The Defense Corps consisted of twenty-nine officers and one hundred sixty-two servicemen, and possessed one hundred forty-six carbines and ninety-eight horses; Chi-ning----The Defense-Corps Unit in town consisted of ten officers and eighteen servicemen carrying twenty carbines. The Defense-Corps units in the countryside totalled fifty-six officers and two hundred eighty-one servicemen and had a total of two hundred ninety-six carbines; Hsing-ho----The Public Security Bureau had two police officers and thirty policemen, who were equipped with thirty-eight guns. The Defense Corps consisted of one hundred eighty officers and eight hundred sixty-four servicemen and was in possession of eight hundred carbines, one hundred eighty-one native guns and about two hundred horses; Feng-chen----The Public Safety Bureau had two police officers and seventy-seven policemen and ninety-two guns. The Defense Corps consisted of forty-four officers and one hundred seventy-five servicemen, and possessed two hundred carbines and about two hundred horses. In addition, there was a squad of Trade Guards (Pao-shang-t'uan) composed of thirty-two men and forty-six horses. These four counties are representative of all other counties in Inner Mongolia.

In addition to the above mentioned banner and county public-safety forces, there were units of the Chinese National Army and provincial peace-preservation troops (Pao-an-tui), both of which were under the command of the various banner and county public-safety forces.

In more serious cases of internal disorder, especially those which threatened the public safety of the whole county or of the neighboring provinces, troops and public-safety units of the central government and neighboring provinces might be dispatched to Inner Mongolia for suppressive action. For example, on January 28, 1937 the Ushin and Otok Banners of the Ikhe Chao League engaged in hostilities in a boundary dispute, and on February 21 of the same year the Rural Pacification and Rehabilitation Commission (Ch'ing-hsiang shan-hou-hui) of the County of Yü-lin of the Province of Shensi (south of the Ikhe Chao League) sent local troops to the area to force the said banners to come to an armistice, which they signed on March fourteenth.

During the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, special security measures were adopted in Suiyuan against Japanese espionage and sabotage by Chinese and Mongol traitors. Identification cards were issued and trips and changes of residence were registered. Passes were required of those who wished to leave the province. Inspection stations were established in all ports, passes and ferries, and patrols maintained along the rivers to prevent the penetration of subversive elements. All refugees entering the province were investigated, placed under strict government control and prohibited from leaving for two years after their entry.

The various types of banner and local public-safety forces in Inner Mongolia were re-organized by the Communist Government into public-security troops (Kung-an pu-tui) in 1949. These troops constituted part of the public security forces which were under the general command of the Ministry of Public Security of the Communist Government. These troops, with the assistance of the National Army, were first engaged in the suppression of bandits and subversive elements. The number of bandits killed, wounded and captured by June 30, 1950, was reported to be more than 1,300 in the whole Autonomous Region.

The present public-safety administrative system in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was established in accordance with the Regulations of the Organization of the People's Congresses and the People's Councils at All Levels of Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which was promulgated by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China on November 11, 1955. In the People's Council of the Autonomous Region, there is a Department of Public Security, which controls and commands all public security troops of the Autonomous Region and directs and supervises the work of the bureaus of public security and equivalent units of all local units of the Autonomous Region, and which is itself under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China. In the People's Councils of the several leagues, administrative districts, and cities subordinate to the Autonomous Region, there is a bureau, an office, a section or a committee of public security. In the various banners, counties, and districts of cities subordinate to the Autonomous Region, there is a bureau or section or some other unit of public security. The people's councils of kacha, villages, nationality villages and towns are allowed to set up a committee of peace maintenance, but those of sumu are directly in charge of all admihistrative services, including peace maintenance. It may be noted that while during the Nationalist period there were in each county a Public Safety Bureau and a Defense Corps, under the present system all public-safety forces of a local unit are under the unified control of the public-security unit of its people's council, and that while previously the Mongol princes were often at odds with the provincial governors, the Regional Department of Public Security now has general command of all Mongol and Chinese troops in the region. However, there is no information as to whether the Mongol and the Chinese soldiers and policemen are segregated.

II. The Judicial System

During the Ch'ing Dynasty, there were no legally established courts in Inner (and Outer) Mongolia. All civil and criminal cases were first brought to the Jasaks or chiefs of the banners concerned. Their decisions were appellable to the Captains-General of the Leagues concerned and, finally, to the Superintendency of Dependencies (Li-fan-yüan) of the Chinese Imperial Government at Peking. However, appeals from the decisions of the Jasaks were not frequently made.

This situation continued until December 6, 1930, when the Judicial Yüan of the National Government issued the Outlines of the Improvement of the Mongolian Judicial System, which provided for the establishment of "independent judicial organs" (i.e., courts) in the seats of the banner governments or other appropriate places in Mongol territory to be staffed with both Chinese and Mongol judges and procurators. The various Mongol banners were required to send Mongol youths versed in both Chinese and Mongolian to the various (Chinese) law schools for the necessary legal training. In purely pastoral areas, an itinerant judicial system might be adopted. As of 1934, the provisions of these Outlines were realized only in part of Chahar.

The judicial systems prevailing in the various parts of Inner Mongolia as of 1934 are as follows: (1) The Silingol League---- There were no counties in the jurisdiction of this league. All judicial cases were tried and decided in the first instance by the government of the banner concerned, and appeals might be made first to the competent captain-general of the league and finally

to the Higher Court of the Province of Chahar. In general, the Mongols did not resort to appeals, and practically all appeals were made by the Chinese. (2) The Ulanjab and Ikhe Chao Leagues---- Most of the territory under the jurisdiction of these two leagues was divided into counties governed by Chinese magistrates, who in law had judicial authority over both Mongols and Chinese. In practice, however, cases involving Mongols were settled only by the banner chiefs and sometimes even by Headquarters of Mongol garrison troops. Their decisions, though legally appellable to the leagues, were seldom questioned and protested. The county governments only heard cases instituted by the Chinese or with the Chinese as defendants. The decisions of the county magistrates were by law appellable to the Higher Court of Suiyuan. (3) The Twelve Banners of Chahar Mongols ----Suits between a Mongol and a Chinese were heard first by both the banner chiefs and the county magistrates concerned. Appeals against their joint decisions could be made to the Higher Court of Chahar. Five judicial offices were set up to hear suits between Mongols. They were: the judicial office at Ta-la, which had jurisdiction over the Plain Red and Plain Yellow Banners of the Right Wing; the judicial office at Pa-yui-ch'a-han, which had jurisdiction over the Bordered Red and Bordered Blue Banners of the Right Wing; the judicial office at A-kuei-t'u, which had jurisdiction over the Bordered Yellow and Plain White Banners of the Left Wing; the judicial office at Kung-kuo-lo, which had jurisdiction over the Bordered White and Plain Blue Banners of the Left Wing; and the judicial office at Ming-an, which heard cases arising from the cattle and sheep droves (the former Imperial pastorages). All these five judicial offices were of the ranks of a local court and were subject to the appelate jurisdiction of the Higher Court of Chahar. As for the Shang-tu Pastoral Group and the Left-Wing and Right-Wing Droves, minor judicial cases were handled by their respective chiefs (called tsung-kuan or superintendants), and grave cases were forwarded by the latter to the Higher Court of Chahar through the Provincial Government of Chahar. (4) The Tumet Banner of Kuei-hua----All cases were tried by the county magistrate concerned with the Higher Court of Suiyuan as the appellate court. (The Mongols of this banner were almost completely Sinicized).

On September 7, 1939, the Mengchiang Government was established by the Japanese as the general autonomous government for that part of Inner Mongolia that was occupied by the Japanese. (By 1945, the Japanese had occupied all of the present Inner Mongolia with the exception of western Suiyuan and the Ninghsia part of Inner Mongolia). Directly under the President of the Political Yüan of this government, there was a Judicial Commission, which was the department of justice, having administrative supervision over all the courts and procuratorial offices in Inner Mongolia. The judicial system concisted of a Supreme Court, a number of Higher Courts and a greater number of local courts and corresponding procuratorial offices, similar to that of Nationalist China. As the Mengchiang Government was dissolved at the time of the Japanese surrender in the fall of 1945, the abovementioned judicial system should have been abolished at that time.

The Chinese Communists captured Inner Mongolia in 1946, and established the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947. No information is available on the Communist judicial system in the region prior to September 9, 1951. On that date, two sets of regulations were promulgated by the Central People's Government Council providing respectively for the organization of the people's courts and that of the people's procuratorates in the whole country. According to these regulations, there were in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region a People's Court and a People's Procuratorate having jurisdiction over the entire region. In each of the various counties, banners, cities directly subordinate to the autonomous region and other equivalent local governmental units, there were also a people's court and a people's procuratorate.

On September 21, 1954, the present judicial system of the country was adopted by the National People's Congress. In Inner Mongolia, there is a Higher People's Court, which tries and decides all civil and criminal cases generally upon appeal from decisions of the various lower people's courts. The lower courts consist of Intermediary People's Courts, which are established in each league, administrative district and equivalent unit, and the Foundation-Level People's Courts, which are set up in each county, banner, and equivalent local unit. The Foundation-Level People's Courts are courts of the first instance, and the Higher People's Court of the region and the several Intermediary Courts have both initial and appellate jurisdiction. However, the latter hears cases at first instance only when the cases are transferred to them from the lower courts. To each people's court, there is a people's procuratorate. For every criminal or civil case, only one appeal is allowed. Cases initially decided by a foundation-level people's court are appellable to the competent intermediary people's court, those initially decided by an intermediary people's court to the Higher People's Court of the region, and those initially decided by the latter to the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China.

Each people's court consists of a president, one or more vice-presidents and a certain number of judges. The president is elected by the corresponding people's congress, and the vice-presidents and judges are appointed by the corresponding people's council. Each people's procuratorate is made up of a chief procurator, one or more deputy chief procurators. The chief procurator, deputy chief procurators and procurators of the People's Procuratorate of the Autonomous Region are all appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress upon the recommendation of the Chief Procuratorate at Peking, and those of all lower people's procuratorates are appointed by the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the Autonomous Region. The Chief Procurator of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is Temurbagan.

In the People's Council of the Autonomous Region there is a Department of Justice, which is in charge of administrative services of all the courts in the region. Similar units also exist in the people's councils of leagues, administrative districts and cities subordinate to the Autonomous Region, but not in those of lower local units.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. Inner Mongolia in the Traditional Chinese Context
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FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. Inner Mongolia in the Traditional Chinese Context

Inner Mongolia cannot be said to have a foreign policy in the strict sense of the term. With the exception of the period of the Mongol dynasty, the Mongols were subject to the controls of China, Japan, or Russia. Mongolia was a tool in the international game of power politics. Its strategic location between Russia and China made it a desirable buffer zone between these two powers. To Japan it meant a buffer zone separating Russian from Japan's continental interests.

Following the fall of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, the Mongols once again became a tributary of the Chinese Court. The frontier policy of the Ming dynasty was to divide and rule; to prevent any union of the numerous Mongol tribes under one powerful leader and to incorporate, eventually, the area with China.

According to the Ming Dynastic History (Ming-shih) whenever "barbarians" submitted, their chiefs were made officials, given military ranks, diplomas and seals, and commandaries (wei-so) and high commandaries (tu-ssu) were created for them (Ming-shih, 90, 19b). In effect, these commandaries were protectorates with puppet princes. Each constituted an auxiliary force separating the still independent Mongol tribes from the Chinese border. On the other hand, some Mongols who submitted, were permitted to enter China. Most of these were incorporated into Mongol contingents of the Ming armies. Henry Serruys, in a recent study of Sino-Jurced Relations, in noting the formation of these military units, commandaries and chiliarchies, writes that:

"The leaders, princes and noblemen or whatever they were, were given military ranks, and recognized as the officers, commanding in the name of the Ming, of these military groups. These units thus came to be part of the military organization of the Ming. This move also constituted a first step towards introduction of complete and direct Chinese administration and annexation in the full sense of the word, of the people and the territory." (Sino-Jurced Relations During the Yung-Lo Period (1403-1424), p. 14).

During this period, the Chinese did not directly interfere in Mongol affairs, preferring to work through Mongol chiefs. But this was regarded as a purely temporary measure. Those protectorates created along the northern and northwestern borders were quickly absorbed. Those Chinese and Chinese military units who moved north of the present-day Great Wall Line, however, were subjected to pressure from Mongols who had never submitted. The Chinese were eventually forced back and the Great Wall became the boundary between Mongolia and China. The Mings were never able to extend direct control over those areas slated for annexation. In spite of the growing power of Mongol princes in Upper Mongolia, however, a steady stream of Mongols continued to submit to the Mings, preferring peace and order under Chinese control to turmoil under their own princes. By and large, the populations along the southern fringes of Mongolia -- the present area of Inner Mongolia -- continued to look towards China. Many of those Mongols incorporated into Chinese control remained loyal to the Ming Court in spite of sporadic local outbursts of dissatisfaction.

The Manchu conquest of China in alliance with the Inner Mongols marked the end, as one author has noted, of the "corridor" aspect of Inner Mongolia. (Cf. "The Historical Setting" of the Handbook.) The Manchu control of the Mongols was patterned after the Ming system. The policy of division was continued by defining the territorial limits of the various tribes, administration was centralized in Peking, Mongol rulers were subsidized and brought into direct relationship with the Court through marriage. All Mongol officials had to be confirmed in Peking, and the people organized into Banners. Self-governing tribes were organized into banners under the control of a hereditary chieftain. These Banners were organized into Leagues under the control of a Peking appointed official and the leagues and banners were placed under the control of the Chinese Government. Non-self-governing tribes were organized into Banners and squadrons under the direct control of the nearest Imperial agent or an official placed over them. By virtue of their cooperation with the Manchus, the Inner Mongols were given a considerable degree of autonomy. In return, the Inner Mongol princes acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and were expected to conform to all the rules and procedures of the tributary system. (On the tributary system see the "Foreign Relations" section of the General China Handbook.)

In order to prevent friction between Chinese and Mongols and to preserve the Mongol military virtues from enervation by Chinese cultural influences, strict rules were laid down governing Sino-Mongolian contacts. Mongols could enter Chinese inhabited regions only for the specified purpose of trade, pilgrimages, or when Princes and their retinues came to Court. Each Mongol Prince collected his own revenue and dispensed justice among his subjects. Chinese traders entering Mongolia were not allowed to buy wives or cohabit with Mongol women. Chinese were not permitted to settle on Mongol land. In some areas where Mongols practised agriculture, Chinese migratory workers were permitted to enter, but were required to leave immediately after the harvest.

Under the Manchu policy a considerable degree of stability was introduced into Inner Mongolia and it was not until the end of the eighteenth century and especially by mid nineteenth century that the stability was disturbed. As the Manchu dynasty weakened and faced the threat of western invasions of its sovereignty, it relaxed the prohibitions against Chinese colonization in Mongolia. They hoped to bring the area under more direct control as a buffer to Russian expansion. Actually, the Mongol Princes were the first to violate the rules by importing Chinese to build them sumptuous palaces modelled after those they saw in Peking, and by importing Chinese to cultivate their land from which they derived revenue to support their new standard of living. By the end of the eighteenth century, the checks against Chinese colonization were not effectively enforced. By mid nineteenth century the Chinese population had grown to such an extent that the Manchu Court had to appoint Chinese officials to act as intermediaries between the Chinese communities and the Mongol authorities, and in 1906 the Mongolian Bureau of Colonization was established in Peking. Coupled with the gradual usurpation of Mongol lands through colonization, many Mongols were forced to mortgage their lands to meet their share of indemnity payments assessed on them by Peking.

The formal institution of a government sponsored colonization program naturally gave rise to Mongol resistance. The period was marked by an increased Mongol nationalism and attempted independence movements.

II. Inner Mongolia in China's Relations to Russia and Japan

The shift in Manchu policy from indirect to more direct control of Inner Mongolia was at least in part motivated by a desire to block Russian encroachments of Central Asia.

Since the mid-seventeenth century, Russia had gradually expanded into Asia until it made contact with Chinese forces. Perhaps the first treaty concluded between China and a foreign power was that concluded with Russia in 1689 at Nerchinsk. Until the mid-nineteenth century and the imperialistic advances against Chinese territory, Sino-Russian relations had remained on a reasonably stable and friendly basis. The treaty of Khiakhta, signed in 1727 between Russia and China, opened up the caravan routes which passed through Inner Mongolia and brought the peoples of Inner Mongolia face to face with the expanding influence of the Russians. The expansion of other Western powers on the Asiatic Continent, made Chinese weakness obvious and Russia again looked to expansion. The expansion was not to be unlimited, however. The predominating opinion guiding Russia's foreign policy looked to Mongolia as a buffer against both China and Japan. They wanted Russia to use its influence to prevent Mongolia from falling completely under Chinese or Japanese control, especially the latter.

Russian and Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent brought them into direct conflict leading to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Following the war, the two countries entered into a series of negotiations defining their respective spheres of interest. According to the preamble of the Secret Convention of the July 30, 1907 Russo-Japanese treaty, the purpose of the treaty was to eliminate "all causes of friction or misunderstanding with respect to certain questions relating to Manchuria, Korea and Mongolia." (Price, p. 35). According to Article Three, Japan recognized Russia's "special interests" in Outer Mongolia and promised to "refrain from any interference which might prejudice those interests." (Price, p. 108). In a secret treaty of June 25/July 28, 1912, Russia and Japan agreed to an extension of the line marking their spheres of interest and to define "their spheres of special interests in Inner Mongolia..." According to Article One: "Starting from the point of intersection of the Tolaho River and Meridian 122^{0} East of Greenwich, the above-mentioned line of demarcation follows the course of the Oulountchourh River and the Moushisha River up to the line of the watershed between the Moushisha River and the Haldaitai River; thence it follows the frontier line between the Province of Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia until reaching the extreme point of the frontier between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia."

Article Two divided Inner Mongolia into two parts: East and West using 116^{0} 27' East of Greenwich as the dividing line. Russia agreed to recognize and respect the Japanese "special interests in the part of Inner Mongolia to the East of the meridian above indicated." Japan, in turn, recognized Russian "special interests" in the area west of the meridian."

The Chinese Revolution and the fall of the Manchu dynasty offered Russia an opportunity to assert its so-called special interests by supporting the independence movement of Outer Mongolia. But true to its secret promises to the Japanese in the Russo-Mongolian treaty of November 3, 1512, Russia forced the Outer Mongolian government to recognize its separation from Inner Mongolia by pointing to Japan's position and rights, and its treaty obligations with the Japanese.

Both China and the Mongols accepted the provisions of the treaty recognizing Outer Mongolian independence. China wanted more than a paper suzerainty over Outer-Mongolia while the Mongols wanted complete independence for all Mongolia. In a move to re-unite Mongolia, Outer Mongolia undertook military operations in Inner Mongolia and requested

Russian assistance in driving out the Chinese troops. When this was refused they made overtures to Japan. Here the Mongols received some encouragement. Japan saw an opportunity to extend control over all Mongolia if Outer and Inner Mongolia were re-united. But as the Mongols sent their dispatches to the Japanese via the Russians, Japan's hands were tied. Without assistance, the Mongol efforts to re-unite all Mongolia were doomed to failure. Finally, a tripartite conference between Russia, China and Outer-Mongolia met in Khiakhta in September, 1915 and resulted in an agreement signed by all three parties on June 7, 1915 embodying the essential provisions of the earlier Russo-Mongolian and Sino-Russian agreements.

Japan, in the meantime, had determined on legalizing by treaties its position in Manchuria and Mongolia. This it attempted to do by presenting to China its now infamous Twenty-one Demands. As regards Inner Mongolia, Group two of the Demands stated that since the Chinese government'has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria, and Eastern Inner Mongolia," it was to agree that Japanese subjects could reside and travel in eastern Inner Mongolia and engage in any kind of business and manufacture; that Japanese subjects by given the right to open mines in eastern Inner Mongolia; that Japanese subjects be permitted to lease or own land suitable for erecting buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming; that Japanese consent be obtained before a third power be permitted to build any railroads or make a loan for the purpose of building a railroad, or local taxes were pledged as security for a loan; that the Japanese government would be consulted before the Chinese government employed any political, financial or military advisors in eastern Inner Mongolia; and, finally, that control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway be vested in Japan for ninety-nine years.

The Chinese government attempted in vain to place the provisions relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia in a different category than those relating to South Manchuria, and she was forced to grant the Japanese demands. The final agreement signed, contained four provisions relating to Inner Mongolia:

Article I. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

Article II. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide funds for building railways in Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

Article III. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as commercial ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

Article IV. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No. 41).

III. Inner Mongolia and the Republic

Much of the Russian and Japanese extensions of control into Mongolia were accomplished during the period following the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. Yuan Shih-k'ai, the first president of Republican China had made unsuccessful attempts to keep all Mongolia under Chinese control. After his death Inner Mongolia, still under Chinese control, fell to the control of various overlords who, in alliance with Mongol princes, exploited the area for their personal gain and actually promoted Chinese colonization of the areas as a profit-making venture. Chinese influence in Mongolia was dominant again following the Russian revolution in 1917. A Chinese army under Hsü Shu-cheng, moving north from Inner Mongolia, reasserted Chinese authority for a time in the Outer Mongolia capital of Urga (Ulan Bator). From 1911 to 1926-27 there was no central government in Peking strong enough to impose a unified national policy upon the warlords controlling various sections of Inner Mongolia. As a result, warlord pressure upon Inner Mongolia was uneven. It depended upon the energy of the individual warlord in the provinces bordering Mongolia and including Mongol territory. The uneven pressure of the warlords prevented unified Mongol opposition. Local rebellions occurred, but a united rebellion or revolution was impossible.

With the Chinese Nationalists' assumption of power, the Chinese Mongolian policy underwent a change. The Nationalists attempted to achieve a uniform policy and control through a policy of assimilation. No distinction was to be drawn between the various minority groups and the Chinese. All were one family. Inner Mongolia was to be carved into regular Chinese provinces and colonization was to be carried out under government auspices. Between August 5, 1928 and early October of the same year, Inner Mongolia was divided into the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Jehol and Ninghsia. Some members of the Mongol KMT organizations supported the forces of Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan against the Nationalist Government forces apparently in the hope of gaining support for independence. The KMT Central Executive Committee, probably to forestall wholesale Mongol support of the two warlords, enacted a resolution calling for assistance to Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and the Mohammedans in achieving autonomy, thus fulfilling the previous promise of racial equality for all races. As soon as the Feng-Yen forces were defeated, mainly by the alliance of Chang Hsueh-wang with Chiang Kai-shek, the status quo was returned. The policy of assimilation continued and Inner Mongolian resistance remained local. On paper, the policy of the Nationalist Government was to improve the economic and social position of the Mongols. Political control remained, however, in the hand of Nanking and nothing was done to alter the provincial arrangments of Inner Mongolia or to give it autonomy. Even in the sphere of economic and social reforms the Nationalist Government delayed and during the delay many Inner Mongolian nationalists began to look to Japan for support. In 1932 Japan had established Hsingan province supposedly under Mongol control as an example of Japanese policy. It soon became obvious, however, that actual control rested in Japanese hands and many of the Inner Mongolian nationalists while demanding autonomy from China also expressed a desire to remain as part of the Chinese realm. (See Historical Setting, China, IMAR Handbook.)

IV. Japan and Inner Mongolia

Under Japanese hegemony, some economic reforms were undertaken in the fields of transportation, light industry, development of mineral resources, and attempts to integrate the agricultural, pastoral and industrial activities of the Mongols of eastern Mongolia. Essentially these measures were designed for and instituted to benefit the Japanese economy.

Japanese expansion into Inner Mongolia according to official pronouncements was dictated by a desire to block the spread of Communism. It is very unlikely that any one factor dictated the Japanese action. It will be remembered that Japan's first expressed interest in Inner Mongolia came when the Tsarist government was still in existence. Anti-communism could not therefore have been the predominant reason. It is more likely that Japan anticipated a war with Russia at some future date and desired a buffer zone between that power and Japanese holdings in Manchuria and North China which would make difficult any cooperation between Russia and China. At one point Japanese statesmen contemplated action against Outer Mongolia which would have given her a strategic position as regards possible action against Siberia. That the Japanese military may have entertained such ideas might possibly account for the frequent border clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces. Japan may have been testing Soviet defence. According to testimony given at the War Crimes Trials in Tokyo, Japan felt that Russia's conciliatory moves, overtures for a non-aggression pact and the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, were measures designed to gain time to recover from the Revolution and build up its armed strength and economic position in Siberia. When this was accomplished, Japan feared Russia would challenge its position in Manchuria. Some hint of what motivated Japanese policy may be gained from the March 23, 1936 statement of the Chief of Staff of the Kwanling Army, Itagaki, to the Japanese Foreign Minister, that if Outer Mongolia could be brought in with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet holdings in the Far East would be endangered and it was possible that Soviet influence in the Far E ast could be eliminated without war. (Cf. Jones "Japan's New Order in Asia," 1937-45, p. 19, citing the International Military Tribunal, Far East, Judgment, p. 670.) Japan's subsequent alliance with Germany, the sudden shift in German policy in regard to Russia, Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia and the resulting Japanese-American war, prevented any move against Russia. Thereafter, Japan feared a Russian advance against her and did everything to prevent such an event. Attempts were even made by the Japanese foreign office to mediate between Germany and Russia. Until its defeat in 1945, Japan concentrated its efforts in Inner Mongolia to economally unite that area with Manchukuo.

V. Chinese Communist Policy in Inner Mongolia

At the end of the war, Inner Mongolian leaders of the east, again approached the Nationalist Government with requests for autonomy but each attempt was rebuffed and treated with contempt. Mongol Communist officials of the west, on the other hand, welcomed a delegation of eastern Mongols, sent to sound out their views on autonomy and, in exchange for promises of support of Ulanfu, head of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Association at Kalgan, encouraged them to join the association.

After the Chinese Communist regime was established in China proper, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous region was continued. Ultimate political control, of course, rests with the Peking regime, but local government is conducted by Mongols who are themselves Communists, Communist sympathizers or under close observation of the Communist party and officials. The Peking regime, like the Japanese before them, also assert their control through the manipulation of the Mongol religion and at the same time encourage the preservation of the Mongol cultural heritage. A steady stream of propaganda is directed to the Mongols from Peking designed to convince the

Mongols that Peking's policy is motivated by, and based upon the principle of the cultural independence and mutual cooperation of the five races.

VI. Relations to Outer Mongolia

Despite the profuse professions of friendship and fraternity between Communist China and Outer Mongolia, the relations between the two countries have not been wholly cordial. The reasons may have been two: first, an undercurrent of animosity among some of the Communist leaders in Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region towards Outer Mongolia, and second, a certain degree of coolness between the top leaders of Communist China and Outer Mongolia.

During the war, it may be remembered, when both the Mengchiang Government in Inner Mongolia and the Hsingan Autonomous Government in Manchuria were under the direction of the Japanese, Inner Mongolia was made into a bulwark against the penetration of Communism from Soviet Russia, and the Japanese by propaganda sought to inculcate in the minds of the people of Inner Mongolia a strong antipathy against the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. In August, 1945, when Soviet Russia entered the war against Japan, Outer Mongolian troops accompanied the Soviet Army into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. At Pailingmiao, seat of the Mengchiang Government, the Russian and Outer Mongolian troops treated the people with ruthless barbarity. Besides massacres and tortures, the Mongol natives who resisted were given terms of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years. When they withdrew, the Soviet troops according to one conservative source, carried away 10,000 Mongol youth and a million heads of cattle, and the Outer Mongolian troops carried off 4,000 Mongols and Chinese (including 400 women) and half a million heads of cattle. Those who were taken captives by the Outer Mongolians were reported to be resettled in the Seleng Aimak, northwest of Ulan Bator. Others were put to work in factories in Ulan Bator. Ch'en Hsi-wen, an official of the All China Federation of Labor and a Chinese Communist delegate to the thirtieth anniversary observance of the Outer Mongolian Revolution in July 1951, wrote that there were over 8,000 Chinese citizens in Ulan Bator and that many of them were youths from Inner Mongolia who came at the end of the war (Hsin Kuan-cha, Sept. 1, 1951).

The Russians and Outer Mongolian military authorities also made an error which incurred the displeasure of the Communist leaders in Inner Mongolia. When Prince Te fled, his lieutenant, P'u-ying-ta-lai took over as head of the autonomous government and he received material support from the Russians and Outer Mongolians until the coming of the Mongol Communists under Ulanfu who ousted him. In the east, when the Mongols in Hsingan province of Manchuria revolted and organized autonomous governments at Hailar and at Ulanhot (Wangyehmiao), their first act was to seek support and recognition from Outer Mongolia, but the latter rejected their advances. These actions of Outer Mongolia must have rankled the Communist leaders who in May 1947 established the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

On a higher diplomatic level, the relations between Peking and Ulan Bator first also left much to be desired. Choibalsan, premier and foreign minister of Outer Mongolia notified Peking of the decision of his government to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China on October 6, 1949. But, unlike its prompt acknowledgment of the messages of recognition from other countries, Peking waited ten days before acknowledging it. Then, diplomatic relations between the two countries were not implemented till nine months later when, in July, Outer Mongolia sent Bayaryn Jargalsaihan to be its ambassador to Peking and Communist China appointed, a week later, Chi Ya-t'ai, a native of Inner Mongolia, to be ambassador to Ulan Bator.

Even with the establishment of official contacts, the relations between the two countries were still strained. There was the question of the delimitation of the boundary between China and Outer Mongolia. This boundary extended from Sinkiang, through Inner Mongolia to Manchuria and was the longest stretch of undemarcated border of China. Both countries chose to keep silent on this matter, a subject which if broached might lead to ill-feeling between them. Early Chinese Communist maps even showed Outer Mongolia as a part of China but, as this was offensive to Outer Mongolia, the later maps were rectified.

Another cause for the lack of accord between the two countries was probably the fact that Marshal Choibalsan, who was the prime mover of the revolution of 1921, was senior to Mao Tse-tung as a Communist revolutionist, and had no desire to defer to the Chinese Communist leader. This obstacle to smooth relations was removed early in 1952 by the death of Choibalsan and the succession of Tsedenbal, a much younger man, as premier of Outer Mongolia.

On the part of the Peking leaders there was also an undercurrent of fear that intimate relations with Outer Mongolia might encourage the Mongols of Inner Mongolia to disassociate themselves with China and veer towards Outer Mongolia. This fear was not without basis for since Outer Mongolia broke away from China in 1912 it has exerted a strong attraction to Inner Mongolian revolutionaries, many of whom have openly advocated separation from China, reunion with Outer Mongolia and the establishment of a single Mongol state. It has been speculated that the incorporation of Suiyuan province, with its predominant Chinese population, was a measure devised by Peking to counteract the separatist aspirations of the Mongols.

Even though the Communist Mongols of Inner Mongolia have proclaimed and demonstrated their loyalty to Peking, it was they who did much to bridge relations between Communist China and Outer Mongolia. During the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the revolution in Outer Mongolia at Ulan Bator on July 11, 1951, two of the five members of the Peking delegation were from Inner Mongolia. One was Wang Tsai-t'ien (Namchisereng) who, as deputy commander of the Inner Mongolia Military district, procurator general of the Inner Mongolia office of the Supreme Procuratorate, and later (in 1954) one of the vice chairmen of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, was next to Ulanfu the most powerful man in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The other was Ka-po-tse-pu, member of the Government Council of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The visit of this delegation to Ulan Bator opened the way to the further intercourse between Communist China and Outer Mongolia. A branch of the China Peace Committee was established in Ulan Bator and during the Resist-America and Aid Korea Campaign, it raised 270,000 tögreg (about US$67,000) from the Chinese citizens residing in the city, most of whom were from Inner Mongolia. During May Day celebration in 1952, an Outer Mongolian Trade Union Delegation arrived in Peking to establish liaison with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

The Communist Chinese ambassador in Ulan Bator, Chi Ya-t'ai, who later (in 1954) became the vice chairman of the first CPPCC Inner Mongolia Committee and director of the United Front Work Department of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, also labored hard to build up friendly relations between Communist China and Outer Mongolia. Through his efforts, a Ten Day Celebration of Mongolian-Chinese Friendship was held which lasted fifteen days (from September 30 to October 15). Vice premier Sharap, who was also the chairman of the Preparatory Commission of the Ten Days of Mongolian-Chinese Friendship, stated that the ten days celebration was scheduled to coincide with the third anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Asian-Pacific Peace Conference which was held in Peking, and the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), held in Moscow. Chi Ya-t'ai, the Communist Chinese ambassador, termed the Ten Day Celebration the commencement of a "new epoch of friendly and cooperative relations between China and Mongolia." The celebrations were attended by a Chinese Literary and Artistic Delegation which included a Song and Dance Ensemble, and a Chinese Industrial Exhibition was held at Ulan Bator.

While the Ten Days Celebrations was in progress, the Outer Mongolian premier and secretary general of the Mongolian Communist Party, Tsedenbal arrived in Peking with a large retinue, and on October 4, concluded with Chou En-lai, premier and foreign minister of Communist China, a Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation. The agreement consisted of three one-line articles, and it may be speculated whether it was a cover for secret agreements entered into. It is significant that in his speeches, both at the ceremony of the signing of the treaty and at the airport at the time of his departure, Tsedenbal expressed his support for Mao Tse-tung, whom he hailed as a sincere friend of the Mongolian people.

The instruments of the Sino-Mongolian Economic and Cultural Cooperation agreement were exchanged at Ulan Bator on December 29, following details worked out between the Chinese Communist envoy Chi Ya-t'ai and the Mongolian vice premier and foreign minister Lhamsuren. Two weeks later, a Postal and Telecommunication Agreement was signed at Peking.

In April 1953 a 127-man Mongolian Art Delegation arrived in China and toured the major cities of the country. It was headed by Ouyun, the Choibalsan Poet Laureate. With less publicity but perhaps of greater significance was the arrival of the Mongolian Trade Delegation in Peking in May. No information as to the commercial negotiations has been revealed, but whatever trade there would be between Outer Mongolia and Communist China would be of great concern to the inhabitants of Inner Mongolia, not only because the commerce would be in the commodities used by the Mongols there, but also because the flow of trade would pass through Inner Mongolia. The recent completion of the railway between Chining and Ulan Bator opened up large regions of northern Inner Mongolia to commerce and would materially change the outlook and way of life of the people of Inner Mongolia.

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

I. Historical Background of Mongol Dissatisfaction

II. Beginning of Organized Mongol Resistance

III. Pan-Mongolism and Nationalism

IV. IMAR under Communist Domination

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

I. Historical Background of Mongol Dissatisfaction

It is a commonplace that measures of suppression, whether political or economic, will arouse even the most apathetic of peoples - to say nothing of a people such as the Mongols, whose past is one filled with tribal wars and fierce resistance against foreign encroachment.

The general policy which the pre-revolutionary dynasties followed was that of "divide and rule," a policy which was used in all the areas beyond the borders of China proper. This, it was believed, was the best method to prevent a munio of all Mongols against Chinese domination. The Manchus continued to rule in more or less the same way as their Chinese predecessors, but as a result of Mongol and Manchu cooperation in the establishment of the dynasty, the former were given a considerable amount of self-government. Thus, in the beginning of the Manchu regime, the Mongols considered themselves as the equals of the Manchus and the fact that Peking controlled Mongolian affairs did not bother them very much - quite the contrary, the Manchu ruler was accepted by the Mongols as their overlord and this ended the fighting among the descendants of Chinghis Khan. Mongol leaders were given honors and subsidies which made for generally peaceful relations. In fact, after the attempt of Galdan, toward the end of the 17th century, to challenge the imperial government, uprisings remained local and were directed mainly against Chinese infiltration rather than against Manchu rule. Only since the 19th century, when the dynasty itself began to weaken and Chinese colonization could no longer be effectively controlled, did resentment grow into more ominous unrest and revolt.

At the same time, the Mongol princes were becoming increasingly oppressive in their own territories. In the middle of the 19th century a rising in one of the banners of the Ordos occurred in protest against taxes and the corvee services imposed by the prince. It was often the case that princes would work with the Chinese officials and in this way manage to attain personal profit from land speculation or trade at the expense of their people. The interests of the high lamas were the same as those of the princes, and subsidies were given them even in the early days of the Republic in order to ensure their cooperation with Chinese rule. In order to prevent the emergence of a unified Mongol nationalism, the church and the princes were supported separately by the imperial government, the selection of the Living Buddhas from princely families was forbidden as part of the policy of divide and rule. Besides their religious functions, the clergy engaged in economic pursuits - trade, real estate, and usury - which put them in a most profitable position between the Mongols and the Chinese. The nobility of the frontier districts often became indistinguishable from Chinese landlords, and their influence was equally high. As a rule, the Chinese government would support Mongol princes against tribal law or against the wishes of the people, in exchange for loyalty to the Chinese administration. Thus, social and economic reasons for dissatisfaction became oversimplified in the minds of many Mongols, who saw the growing unrest in terms of a purely nationalistic antagonism toward the Chinese rulers on the part of the Mongolian subjects.

II. Beginning of Organized Mongol Resistance

The tyranny of some of the native rulers, the progressive encroachment of their land by Chinese settlers and the lack of redress for the wrongs, real and fancied, drove the Mongols to organize themselves for self-preservation.

The local Mongolian outbreaks against oppression were often based on organizations well suited for underground action. One such institution was the dunguilang - circle or a ring without a ringleader, where all the members were equal. It is impossible to know the origin of this type of secret cell organization. Probably its first notable appearance was during the risings in the Ordos of the 1850's, and it was the dunguiland which combined resistance against the Chinese with uprisings against the local princes. While the dunguilang may have been a survival of tribal organization, there is also a possibility that it may have been influenced by the Chinese secret societies. The latter conjecture is substantiated by the fact that the earliest dunguiland appeared near the province of Shensi, where secret societies had an old history.

The Chinese settlers of Inner Mongolia, too, had organizations in which they were able to present a united front against government authorities. Besides the secret societies, one of the instututions which served to bind the Chinese peasants of Inner Mongolia was an institution of a more peaceful character, the benevolent society known as "The Venerable Association of the Dragon King," (Lung-wang lao-she), which combined religious and secular functions. The Temple of the Dragon King, the maker of rain, was usually one of the important places of worship in the Chinese villages of the Inner Mongolian countryside and they were closely related with local administration. While the specific activities of the Associations differed from one locality to another, their work apparently included much of rural government. Primary education, charity, law suits, irrigation, as well as religious festivals, came under the supervision of the local association, and members of the board of the association were the real heads of a village. Considering on the one hand its efficiency and importance in village life, and on the other its semi-religious position which veiled much of its work to outsiders, one should not be surprised to find the Dragon King Association a potential center of opposition toward an unpopular administration.

There were times, though they were relatively few, when both Mongol and Chinese peasants would rise against wealthy Mongolian landowners and Chinese landlords. This was the case when the Tumet Mongols, near the Yellow River, rebelled in the 1890's. While there were thus instances of simple Mongol uprisings against the Chinese, and more complex social and economic alignments of Chinese and Mongol peasants rising against their wealthier compatriots, it must be remembered that there were also cases of Chinese attacks on Mongols. In Jehol Province, for instance, members of the Chin-tan Society, a Chinese secret society, tried to drive out all the Mongols from the area, and largely succeeded in doing so. It is no wonder, then, that the Inner Mongolian frontier has seen much turmoil and unrest since the last century, and that "banditry" for a variety of causes has almost become a tradition there.

Banditry for its own sake - adventurism pure and simple - attracted many in the frontier areas. After harvest time, the area from the Ordos bend of the Yellow River to northwestern Manchuria formed the stage not only for raids against the Chinese or the large landowners but also for the onslaught of private bandit armies. The warlord years brought more banditry and greater unrest to the area. As elsewhere, and in China itself, the ruthlessness of local military leaders, the movement of troops and the general lack of a central authority gave rise to numberless outbreaks of violence. There was no coordinated, unified counterattack on the part of the Mongols - outbreaks occurred in answer to warlord encroachment, which itself differed with time and place. Where land had been taken away from Mongols, banditry became the only means of retaliation. Sporadic fighting became the rule during much of the Republican period. With the approach of the Japanese the resistance became more nationalistic and purposeful.

Besides the more sporadic rebellions resulting from outright suppression or general lawlessness, the nationalist ideal of Pan Mongolism served as an important revolutionary battle-cry.

When the Manchu dynasty was overthrown in 1911 and Outer Mongolia declared its independence, attempts were made for a union with Inner Mongolia. An expeditionary force from Outer Mongolia made up of five columns, two of which were under the command of Inner Mongolian leaders, tried to establish unity, but was defeated. The Chinese, using modern methods of warfare were able to suppress the outbreaks of the Mongols both in Inner Mongolia and in Manchuria. The international situation too, prevented Inner and Outer Mongolia from uniting: in 1912 Russia and Japan had divided Mongolia into two spheres of influence with the Peking meridian forming the line of demarcation.

Aside from geographic and political reasons, the achievement of unity between Inner and Outer Mongolia involved the continuation of a historical tradition. Unification had always been the result of a period of tribal wars from which an outstanding and ambitious leader emerged. It was he who would unify Mongolia and lead his armies south to a successful conquest of China. In the opinion of Lattimore, therefore, the average Mongol thinks of unification only in terms of war - a preliminary civil war which would determine the subsequent leadership. Thus, speaking of the 30's, he concludes: "Deeply engrained in the Mongol consciousness is the feeling that any Mongol horde which can master other Mongols, can master anyone else in the world, so that in spite of totally changed conditions, their political instinct continues to function in its old channels." (The Mongols of Manchuria, 1955.)

Only in the extreme northeast - in the region known as the Barga and inhabited by farmers and nomadic herders, among whom cultural assimilation has not advanced very far - did Pan-Mongol feelings remain alive. Contact with Russian and Chinese farmers had evidently brought little change in the thinking and activities of the Mongols, and it was here in the Barga region that movements for Mongol autonomy have been apparent. The ties with Outer Mongolia remained relatively strong and served as the basis for a lingering Pan-Mongolism. (See "General Character of Society.")

However, in the years that followed the revolution, only sporadic outbreaks continued, with aims as diversified as the restoration of the Manchu dynasty on the one hand, and struggles for the achievement of national independence on the other. While Babojab, an Eastern Tumet leader, together with the Manchu Prince Su, tried to restore the Ch'ing empire, the Mongols of the Barga Plain, and those in the east rose against the Chinese colonists in a desperate attempt to defend their land from confiscation. None of these revolts saw victory and none of them had the support of a mass following.

III. Pan-Mongolism and Nationalism

As for the Pan Mongol movement, not even the nationalistic upsurge of the 1930's was able to bring about the unity so many visualized. With the establishment of Manchukuo in 1931 the Japanese had set aside the province of Hsingan as an autonomous Mongol territory with effective Japanese control. But among the Mongols, hopes for unity with Outer Mongolia rather than with Manchukuo continues as was evident from the many charges of Mongol subversion. Outside the Japanese-controlled provinces, a movement for independence from Chinese rule grew under the leadership of Prince Te of West Sunid. His demands for self-government and unity stirred the imagination of many Mongolian nationalists, but all his efforts failed. By 1937, as a result of Chinese stubbornness combined with inter-tribal conflicts, Prince Te began to look to the Japanese for aid, and instead of the unification of Mongolia, the puppet state of Mengchiang was created. In spite of his good intentions and considerable popularity, Prince Te did not win the loyalty of the Western Mongols, for in the West resistance against Japan continued, either by independent armies, or in cooperation with the Chinese. After the war, Prince Te was defeated by the Com0 munists whom he had tried to resist.

The policies of the warlord era and later those of the Kuomintang were in many ways a continuation of Manchu policies, and made for even greater antagonism with their innovations. It was believed by Chiang Kai-shek and his followers that assimilation would be the solution against discrimination; evidently, they did not realize that cultural integration, when strictly enforced, would embitter the Mongols more than ever. As before, the Chinese administration continued to work closely with the Mongol princes and the church. In many cases the Mongol ruling circles continued to profit materially from these relations with the government. Even the more positive side of the Nationalist policy of assimilation contributed to the general sense of dissatisfaction. The schools which were provided for Mongol students both in Inner Mongolia and in China stimulated them to champion the reformist ideals of the Chinese intelligentsia. Mongol nationalism gradually became more radical and it seemed obvious that as long as the old social order remained as it was, Chinese interference and colonization would also continue.

The hopes for improved conditions began to run along two general lines: the more conservative nationalists felt that if political independence alone could be achieved, Chinese infringement could be checked and perhaps stopped; the more liberal and radical nationalists demanded the complete abolition of princely rule and the introduction of a system of democratic elections open for all the people. (Lattimore points out that this is not a very revolutionary idea, as "the oldest Mongol traditions provided for a certain degree of selection in the appointment of princes, and even for the impeachment and deposition of unsatisfactory princes, and it was only under the Manchus that these rights had fallen in abeyance." ("The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolia Nationalism," p. 399.) From this second group there emerged a number of men whose aim was above all social reform and who came to be generally known as the Young Mongols.

In the 1920's under the influence of the independence of Outer Mongolia and the radical program of the left wing of the Kuomintang, the Young Mongols organized the "National Revival Club," which in 1925 became the "Mongolian People's Party of Inner Mongolia." Here the names of Pai Yün-ti, Merse, and Ulanfu began to be heard. It is understandable that many intellectuals, dissatisfied with Chinese policies, and finding all roads toward peaceful reform blocked, joined the new revolutionary movement.

It is interesting to note, however, that in many cases the nationalist leaders were themselves members of the princely class, even if not ruling princes. They stood "just below the actual ruling princes, in the class which lost its privileges in proportion as the Chinese advanced, but was not, like the actual ruling princes, worth being bribed." (Ibid. p. 397) The other sector of the population which offered some leadership against the Chinese advance into Inner Mongolia were the educated commoners - usually young men employed in the government agencies which dealt with Mongolian affairs. While some of them became willing servants of the Chinese government, others became fiercely nationalistic and ardent Mongol patriots.

In spite of the idealism of the leaders and the restlessness of the people, the insurrections were invariably suppressed by the Chinese with their superior arms and more disciplined troops. The building of railways and the construction of roads and other modern aids in communication left the Mongols little chance for victories.

The many failures bred a defeatist mood among some of the Mongols whose only spiritual refuge came to be in a mystical belief in a miraculous return of Chinggis Khan or some other Mongol hero. This glorification of the past made for a Mongolian nationalism which lacked the progressive ideology that revolutionary movements must have. Much of the potential Mongol leadership, furthermore, had become attracted to Chinese culture and the effects of assimilation made themselves felt among the younger generation. When it came to a choice between cooperation with the Japanese or with the Nationalists, many sided with the Chinese. With no alternative between promises of a Chinese sponsored autonomy or a Japanese one - neither one assuring real independence - Mongol chances to be rid of foreign administrators were doomed to failure.

In spite of the long periods of foreign domination, the hopes for ultimate independence or an acceptable autonomy continued to stir the minds of Mongolian leaders. The education received during the years of the Republic and under Japanese sponsorship, mixed with the liberalism of the pre-war years and the subsequent radicalism of early Communist activities, have surely left their mark on Mongolian intellectuals.

IV. IMAR under Communist Domination

The post-war period was one of great confusion, and it is nearly impossible to trace the history of resistance through the interlacing conflicts between Mongols and Chinese, Communists and Nationalists, and the shifting interests of international politics. With all its detriments, the Japanese-led Mengchiang government had still come close to representing a unified government; yet when it ended, the most that remained of it was a strong feeling for regional autonomy. Until May 1, 1947, when the "People's Government of the IMAR" was formed, a number of meetings for the consolidation of regional autonomy movements took place, in which the Communists soon became the strongest force. It was then that unity on quite different premises was imposed upon the people - a unity based neither on Mongol nationalism, nor on assimilation with Chinese or Japanese culture, but on an extension of the Communist movement of China.

Until recently, the Communists have tried to avoid class warfare in the steppes of Inner Mongolia, and by means of improving economic conditions as well as promising further progress, claimed to have established their populatiry among large sections of the population. Agrarian reform was initiated between 1947 and 1948, but the pastoral areas were treated according to the slogan "no struggle, no redistribution, and no differentiation of class status." (Peking, Jen Min Jih Pao, Feb. 28, 1954, "How IM Enforces Nationalities Regional Autonomy.") Thus the pressure on nomadic herders to accept cooperative methods was not as great as in the rural areas or as in China proper. The nobility was at first not attacked to the

same degree as the landlord class in China, and its nominal privileges and prestige were maintained for a time. Religious freedom was upheld, though strongly mixed with the new sprit of "patriotism," and only the upper clergy actually suffered from the new regime.

The major cause for friction in the relations between Communist China and Communist Inner Mongolia is, as before, outright oppression and too much reliance on Chinese officials in the administration of the region. Using Ulanfu and the IM Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee as their main support, the Chinese Communist Party has complete control of the area. Similarly, the regional administration is under the direct supervision of the Central People's Government. The IM armed forces are an official part of the People's Liberation Army, and the region is one of the military districts of China, under Chinese military command. In addition, the mass organizations which the Chinese Communists use for the contolled enthusiasm of the population toward national "drives" all have their sub-divisions in Inner Mongolia. The entire propaganda machine - newspapers, radio, magazines, books, and the arts - comes under the direction of the CCP. While from an administrative point of view, the position of the Communists is quite strong, voluntary support of the regime can exist only if material benefits are evident, and if coercion is kept at a minimum.

The Communists have always been extremely concerned about the problems of "Great Hanism" and "narrow (Mongol) nationalism." They realize that it was Chinese penetration and misrule which aroused Mongol nationalism; they want to avoid the mistakes of the past without relinquishing their position in Inner Mongolia or elsewhere beyond the borders of China. The solution was seen in the training of great numbers of Mongol cadres and government workers. From the time of the establishment of the IMAR in May 1947 until the end of 1951 "over 10,000 Mongolian government workers have been trained and are administering affairs of the region...(and) among the leading cadres of this region, more than three-fourths are Mongols...." However, it would seem that friction still continued and that the top positions remain in the hands of the Chinese. Ulanfu, in a report of December 1951 stated: "As most of the veteran cadres are Han Chinese...they tend to look down upon and to distrust Mongol cadres...and often monopolize the work themselves.... They do not carefully consider the mentality and feelings of their Mongol comrades. As a result, they have been unable to strengthen their ties with their Mongol comrades." (Curr. Bkgr. 190).

V. Counter-Revolutionary Resistance

In the first five years since its establishment, the People's Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was mainly occupied with the problem of suppressing its opposition. There were many Mongol revolutionists who still entertained pan-Mongolist thoughts and the hope of political separation from China and union with Outer Mongolia. Many of them were members of the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Party. These ideas were denounced as deviation by the Communist leaders of Inner Mongolia and the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Party was dissolved. There were many people who had been indoctrinated during the period of Japanese predominance with a hatred of Communism. The Communists sought by means of propaganda and the mass organizations to convert some, and in the Campaign for the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries, launched simultaneously with the land reform in 1948, to exterminate them. There were the Mongol leaders expecially the princes and jazaks of the Ulanchab and Ike Chao Leagues in Suiyuan who had cooperated with the Chinese Nationalist Government. They were either converted or destroyed.

A strong core of resistance to Communist rule existed in the Mongol followers of Prince Te, who during Japanese rule was the chairman of the Mengchiang Government. When the Communists under Ulanfu gained control of parts of Chahar and Jehol in 1946, the troops of the former Mengchiang Government, led by P'u-yin-ta-lai and Li Shou-hsin, fled westward to the mountains west of Pailingmiao where they continued to carry out guerrilla warfare against the Communists. The ferocity of the fighting is revealed in the Communist press dispatches. From May 1947 to May 1949, it was reported that the troops of the IMAR People's Government fought 633 engagements and killed 19,300 "Kuomintang remnants and bandits." In a later press dispatch, it was revealed that in the three years up to May 1950, the army of the IMAR People's government fought a total of 654 battles and wiped out 21,900 bandits.

The large number of battles and the large number of casualties inflicted indicated that it was not only the anti-Communist forces under P'u-yin-ta-lai and Li Shou-hsin which resisted the Communists but also large numbers of embattled Chinese and Mongol farmers, who dispossessed of their land during the agrarian reforms of 1948-49, threw in their lot with the anti-Communist forces. In the spring of 1949, following the Communist capture of Peking, Prince Te, who was living in retirement there, flew to the Alashan banner in Ninghsia to organize resistance of the Mongols against the Communists. Many of the Mongols who had fled from the terrors of Communist rule joined him and he was reported to have mustered an army of 7,000 men. Large bodies of guerrillas in the Hopei-Jehol, the Liaoning border area and the Jehol-Chahar border area, as well as the forces under Li Shou-hsin joined him. (P'u-yin-ta-la, meantime, had been killed in one of the battles). On one occasion, the forces led b y Li Shou-hsin pushed to the outskirts of Pao-t'ou before they were repulsed. But theirs was a lost cause, doomed to failure from the start by the lack of arms and material support. Desertion was heavy. Many of the anti-Communist Mongol youths fled to South China and eventually found their way to Formosa. Others continued to fight on from their base in the U-la Mountains in Suiyuan, and there were reports in the Communist press as late as 1952 concerning pacification campaigns launched against these "bandits."

Since then the intensification of agricultural collectivization, together with the relentless nation-wide campaign against "counter-revolutionaries" has sharpened the conflict between national groups as well as among economic classes. Five kinds of counter-revolutionaries are sought - bandits, secret agents, despots, principal elements of reactionary parties and cliques, and chiefs of reactionary sects - while these categories are sufficiently vague to include ass undesirable individuals, they may also serve as centers for politically discontented individuals.

The efforts of collectivization at times resulted in much bitterness and few immediate improvements. In 1955, the "three-fixed" policy was enforced, compelling farmers to sell fixed amounts of grain and at fixed prices. Other restrictions combined with policies which completely overturned ancient tribal and family traditions, brought forth instances of violent opposition. The government followed the same methods of repression as in China proper - that of "combining suppression with magnanimity" toward counter-revolutionaries.

The campaign of the winter of 1954 -it was apparently not strong enough, for by Spring 1955, it was intensified still further. Denunciations by other s as well as by the "criminal" himself were encouraged in directives that alternated between persuasion and threats. That the campaign was not to end in the very near future, and that the crimes themselves were all a part of an inevitable historical scheme is expressed in the following paragraph of an editorial in Nei Meng-ku jih-pao of April 13, 1955: "It is clear...that the remnant counter-revolutionaries not only still exist but employ more covert and pernicious means to carry out their activities.

This is quite understandable. Because China is at present just in the stage of Socialist revolution, namely, the stage of Socialist transformation. This is a revolution much broader and deeper than the New Democratic revolution, embracing an extremely complex and active struggle."

Acts of sabotage, mainly in agricultural production, are most commonly mentioned as the counter-revolutionary means with which the socialization process is undermined. They consist of "murder, arson, poisoning, rumor-mongering, sabotage of planned purchase and marketing and other outrageous acts..." (Nei Meng-ku Jih-pao, April 13, 1955, editorial, "Resolutely Arrest All Escaped Counter-Revolutionaries.") Special warning was made to watch for subversive infiltration during the "busy season of autumn harvest, and more especially in the midst of grain collection and purchase...."

Vi. Activities of the Secret Societies

Implicated in many of the reports on counter-revolutionaries, both those already captured and those still at large, are leaders and members of the secret societies. The various branches of I-kuan-tao are most often involved.

The activities of the I-kuan-tao do not have a very long history. It is one of those syncretistic societies which want to merge Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity and which became so popular in the twenties. Actually, many of the tenets and the rituals of the I-kuan-tao are almost identical with those of other societies, such as the Tao-yüan; revelations from their deities are also recorded through the planchette. The name of the society is derived from a passage in the Analects of Confucius, in which the Master said that there is one thread running through (I-kuan) his Way (doctrine, tao), this thread being explained by one of the disciples as loyalty and reciprocity. Actually the manuals of the I-kuan-tao add a highly mystical explanation derived from Neo-Confucianist speculation, to the Chinese characters which represent its name. The doctrine is claimed to have originated in primeval times with a Mother Deity, Mu, for whom the Society invented a special Chinese character. The doctrine was then supposedly handed down through Confucianist, Taoist and Buddhist traditions; especially the Ch'an (zen) sect of Buddhism has been pillaged for an additional amount of accrued tenets. It was however revealed also to Moslems and Christians. One of their manuals contains the following revelation:

"The lambs which have lost their way met the boat of
life.
The Creation of God, how all-inclusive it is!
Once every year there is the day of utmost joy,
When all believers assemble to celebrate Christmas."

Jesus Christ received the Sacred Instruction to betake himself to the Eastern Garden (China) in order to appear before the face of God, etc." Their teachings are basically eschatological. Their three supreme secrets are (1) an initiation ritual called "the opening of the mysterious channel by touching" in which the initiating monk touched the nasal septum of the initiee; (2) a hymn to Maitreya Buddha, and (3) a finger gesture during prostration; the thunb of one hand was put against the little finger of the other.

The I-kuan-tao was particularly active during the time of the Japanese occupation. During this period it spread from Shantung all over North China and well into Inner Mongolia. The two main principles expressed in its name, loyalty to a strongly religious even though crudely expressed tradition and reciprocity in the relationships of the brotherhood, apparently gave it enough strength and cohesion to survive fierce persecution by the Japanese. On the other hand it has been reported that officials of the Nanking puppet regime sought its protection by heavy support. (These two aspects, by the way, are not in the least incompatible.). After the war, the society was again persecuted by the National Government, but it survived this persecution as well. (William A. Grootaers, Une Societe Secrete Moderne, I-kuan-tao, in Folklore Studies 1946, 316-352).

A dispatch from Paoting of November, 1954, states that the sphere of their activities covered six cities and twenty-three counties in the provinces of Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Shansi and Kansu, and stretched into the IMAR. The article speaks of only two branches of I Kuan Tao, the "Golden Line," and "Yüan-li-tien-tao," originally the "Chi-hsien-tan" of the I-kuan-tao which were active in Inner Mongolia. But it is a well-known fact that names of societies are frequently changed and that the number of their offshoots is limitless. While many followers of these societies are continually captured and while many have been completely intimidated, it is difficult to believe that underground activities will ever be entirely suppressed in a region where banditry, uprisings, and methods of secret organization have such a strong tradition. It cannot be known, however, whether the leaders have any practical plans other than the overthrow of the present regime and perhaps even a return to a past which only the dispossessed classes may yearn for. Whatever their aims, their activities seem to give the authorities great cause for concern, but one can only speculate whether these sporadic signs of opposition can grow into something more dangerous to the Communist government. In any case, it is safe to assume the secret societies will continue to be centers of resistance and that individuals opposing the government will look to them for organization as well as for support.

The campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries has brought forth innumerable denunciations of individual acts of sabotage as well as more organized attempts to hinder the execution of government policies.

VII. Anti-Communist Activities from Abroad

Aside from secret societies, whose influence seems to be still fairly strong, the Communist fear of espionage directed from abroad seems to be based on more definite experience than mere dogmatic presupposition. The editorial in the Nei-meng-ku jih-pao, in its April 13, 1955, editorial, went on to state: "On the one hand, externally there exist the encirclements of imperialism which will resort to all sorts of means and outrageous means to sabotage our cause of socialism, and one of these means is to dispatch secret agents and spies to the interior of China. On the other hand, internally, the classes about to be eliminated will surely resist while those already brought down will not face their destruction willingly. Some of the stubborn counter-revolutionaries definitely will connive at foreign imperialism and increase their efforts to resist and undermine the cause of socialist construction. For this reason, so long as the encirclement of imperialism exists, so long as the class struggle continues within the country, it will be impossible to completely wipe out these counter-revolutionaries, nor will they cease to sabotage. The greater our victory in socialist construction the more frantically will they destroy our cause."

Despite the Communist charges of "American imperialist spies" and "Kuomintang agents," especially during the period of the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea, there has been no mention in their press of the arrest of these spies and agents in Inner Mongolia, in comparison to the many press reports of the arrest and trial of these foreign agents in other parts of China. The only group now publicly carrying out anti-Communist work relating to Inner Mongolia are a few of the former followers of Prince Te who had fled to Formosa, where they were enlisted by the Nationalist Government to conduct propaganda against the Communists by means of publications and the radio. Up to 1954, they had published eleven books and twenty-eight pamphlets in addition to their broadcasts beamed at Inner Mongolia.

While the effect of the propaganda, planning, and direct action on the part of Inner Mongolian refugees on Formosa cannot be measured, it must be taken into account. The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs sponsors most of the work done and encourages students and refugees from the border regions to help in the writing and in the planning for a counter-offensive. Although Nationalist claims of success in maintaining contact with Inner Mongolia may be exaggerated, some of them are no doubt true. On the other hand, Communist claims of sabotage on the part of "Chiang bandits" are probably stretched to fit the mood of the campaign against the counter-revolutionaries - but again, not all of them could be pure fabrication, and between the Formosan and Communist dispatches a certain percentage of organized subversion is surely taking place. While the drives and purges within the party reflect the tactics of the Chinese Communist Party as a whole and affect officials and cadres rather than the population at large, the intensification of socialization all over China created an upsurge of rebellious activities which has been felt everywhere. Such movements as the "three-anti" and "five-anti" resulted in much unsettlement and untold arrests among all parts of the population.

Thus it may be well to reconsider the five groups called counter-revolutionary by the Communists: Surely bandits have not ceased to exist with the change of regime - on the contrary, with the insecurity brought about by Communist drives, measures for rapid socialization combined with outright repression, banditry becomes once more the traditional method of resistance. Little can be known about "secret agents" in Inner Mongolia, but even if they are not active at the present moment, individuals with moral or material support from Formosa are probably ready to strike when a favorable time presents itself. That real "despots and principal elements of reactionary parties and cliques" are still hidden in a Communist controlled area is very unlikely, but individuals of lesser importance who have grievances against the regime or have been disillusioned by it have by now inherited these epithets. It is men such as these who would fill the ranks of a rebellious army. Some of them would look to the "reactionary sects" - the secret societies and semi-religious benevolent organizations - for guidance, while others with a stronger lust for adventure would follow the way of bandits or spies.

At present, spontaneous acts of destruction perpetrated by individuals who have been deprived of their former wealth or power still seem to predominate as the most common form of opposition, but if the central government should begin to weaken while continuing to withhold from its people the basic liberties they must have, the forces and organization for a possible overthrow of the present regime could easily come to the surface and touch off a rebellion fatal to Chinese Communism in Inner Mongolia.

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PROPAGANDA

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IV. Effects of Propaganda

PROPAGANDA

I. Functions of Propaganda

In the Communist world, the words "agitation," "education," and "propaganda" are generally used together, for the same purpose of winning over the people to the Communist cause, remolding the minds of the people, manipulating the people to carry out the dictates of the Communist government, consolidating the authority and influence of the Communist party, and weakening and confounding the enemy. The propaganda efforts are regarded as essential functions of the party and government, and as such are far more extensive within Communist countries than abroad. As far back as 1929, the second Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP stated in a resolution: "The party must seize every opportunity to use open means to do work in propaganda and agitation, to summon the masses to struggle publicly and to organize them publicly in order to be able to win over the broad masses to the influence of the party."

Speaking at Yenan in May, 1937, Mao Tse-tung also stressed the employment of propaganda to enable the proletariat, through the Communist party, to exercise political leadership over China. "The broad masses of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie," he said, "stand in need of our propaganda, agitation, and organization.

The reliance on propaganda and agitation did not decrease with the triumph of the Communists and the formal establishment of their regime in 1949. On the contrary, their propaganda and mass control efforts were redoubled because, as Mao Tse-tung declared (in his essay, the People's Democratic Dictatorship), "reactionary influences" were still very strong among the people and "methods of persuasion" were needed to "reform their bad habits and thoughts derived from the old society." This need was reiterated in a directive issued by the Central Committee of the CCP in January, 1951, which stated: "One of the inborn duties of the communists lies in the incessant effort to carry out propaganda among the people so as to educate them to wage relentless war against all counter-revolutionary and mistaken concepts and principles, and to promote as well as to raise the degree of political consciousness of the masses....It behooves every party organization and every communist to work together with the active elements among the masses for propaganda activities of various descriptions."

The importance and value which the Chinese Communists place upon propaganda as an instrument of party and government policy may be seen in their widespread utilization of all media of mass communication and mass control during the past five years of Communist rule. They recognize the fact that party objectives cannot be achieved unless the people are thoroughly indoctrinated, and that after sufficient indoctrination, the people will accept all party dictates as the truth.

Propaganda is also one of the primary means of extending Chinese Communist domination over the minority peoples, binding them tighter to China, and launching them, together with the Han Chinese, on the road to socialism.

II. The Propaganda Machinery of the Party and State

The three main sources from which the people are bombarded by propaganda in China are the government, the Chinese Communist party, and the mass organizations. Since all three sources derive inspiration and instructions from a few top leaders who hold concurrent positions in the government and the party, the dissemination of propaganda is centralized and its content is uniform. The singleness of purpose of the Chinese Communists rules out any conflict of jurisdiction or clash of interest. Since the mass organizations are government-controlled, and since their leaders are chosen, dedicated men of proven loyalty to the government and party, their propaganda efforts are identical with the propaganda lines of the government and the party. Whether the people listen to the propaganda of the government agencies, the party organizations, or of the mass organizations, the propaganda they hear is the same.

In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the purveyance of propaganda is carried out by its own counterparts of the central government, the CCP Central Committee, and the mass organizations which implement and supplement the torrent of propaganda (see chart of organization). With the local propaganda lines echoing those of the parent bodies, there are no cross purposes or conflicts.

In the IMAR, as in the other border regions, the low standard of literacy entails a slightly different emphasis in propaganda methods from those in China proper. Instead of reading materials, such as books, pamphlets, and newspapers, stress is placed on the use of auditory and visual media such as parades, accusation meetings, harangues, pictorial exhibitions, and the radio - techniques which appeal to the nomads' love of oratory and pomp.

To achieve the aim of making propaganda as comprehensive and as penetrative as possible, the Chinese Communists have built a gigantic machine which encompasses every sphere of activity, utilizes all media of political control and political indoctrination,

CHART 1 ORGANIZATION OF THE MACHINERY FOR PROPAGANDA IN THE INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION



CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL PEOPLE'S POLITICAL CONSULTATION COUNCIL
GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
STATE COUNCIL
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE IMAR
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
PROPAGANDA NETWORK
LEAGUES
BANNERS
COUNTIES
MUNICIPALITIES
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
POLITBURO
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF UNITED FRONT WORK
DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA
INNER MONGOLIA COMMITTEE
MASS ORGANIZATIONS
WORLD PEACE CONGRESS
CHINA COMMITTEE
CHINA PEACE COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE TO OPPOSE U.S. AGGRESSION
IM REGIONAL COMMITTEE
STANDING COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA
ACTIVITIES
Signature Campaigns
Fund Raising Drives
Accusation Meetings
Newspapers
Broadcasting
Exhibitions

following page 468

and reaches down to every individual in the nation. Every pronouncement, comment, or publication of the leaders serves as propaganda, to be dinned into the ears of the people, and echoed and chorused by them. Every official, every cadre, every member of political and economic agencies and of the mass organizations, and every model farmer and labor hero, is expected and under obligation to assume the role of propagandist. Article 25 of the Official Regulations of People's Congresses and People's Councils in the IMAR (promulgated on November 11, 1955), which passes for a constitution, states: "Deputies to the People's Congresses of all levels in the IMAR shall... carry out propaganda on the laws, regulations, and policies of the government." Articles 32, 33, and 34 stipulate that the functions of the people's councils include the direction of the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, and the control of cultural and educational work (see China General, Propaganda).

The fountainhead of the torrent of propaganda that deluges China today and determines her ideological climate is the Central Committee of the CCP. Although all its subdivisions, such as the Department of Social Affairs and the Department of United Front Work, perform the work of propaganda, the chief propaganda outlet is its Department of Propaganda. In the IMAR the Sub-Bureau of the Central Committee is a replica of its parent body, and the propaganda campaigns, the indoctrination and ideological rectification of the cadres, and the "study" programs are all initiated by the Propaganda Department. It was this department which, in the summer of 1952, organized and directed the cadres of the party, the government, and the military establishment to study the writings of Mao Tse-tung, a program headed by Ulanfu, secretary of the sub-bureau, and Hu Chao-heng, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department. In the winter of 1953, it was Wang Wen-ta, chief of the Propaganda Department of the Inner Mongolia-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau, who was in charge of the program to study the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. In the same year, it was the Propaganda Department which issued directives to the New Democratic Youth League to prepare for the May Fourth Youth Day celebrations.

To carry out and expand the activities of the party, in January, 1951, the Central Committee of the CCP promulgated a decision to establish a propaganda network for the masses. Propaganda officers were consequently appointed in all party branch headquarters, and "reporters" in all party guidance agencies. The ranks of the propaganda officers and reporters include every secretary of every party branch headquarters, and members of party branch headquarters or youth league members regularly in touch with the people, such as labor union cadres, cooperative cadres, district and village cadres, school teachers, personnel of mass propaganda centers, editors of wall newspapers, model workers, and others. Their various activities embrace giving talks, distributing information, including that which they could obtain over the radio; propaganda art work; writing articles, and putting out wall newspapers (see China General, Propaganda)

The decision of the Central Committee stated that the reporters were to give reports on current developments and the aims and policies of the government at mass meetings to be held once every two months. Their guide was to be a publication of the Central Committee entitled Propaganda Officers Journal, supplemented by regularly-distributed outlines and summaries of propaganda.

The establishment of the propaganda network was undertaken in coordination with the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea, the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries, and the Campaign to Increase Production, all of which were launched in 1951. The phenomenal growth of the system may be seen in Kalgan, where by summer, propaganda machinery was said to have been set up in [illegible] percent of the party organs.

III. Special Means of Propaganda Implementation

A. Accusation Meetings

Among the basic duties of the reporters and propaganda officers [illegible] and the convening of mass meetings [illegible] the people on the alleged crimes of [illegible] imperialists. When the listeners [illegible] they are made to [illegible] signing names to petitions and [illegible] and pledges of [illegible] Korea and disabled vet- [illegible] June 1, 1952 [illegible]

[illegible]

(November 1, 1951) said that it was 1,350,000.)

The purpose of the accusation meetings was given in a directive of the China Peace Committee on March 15, 1951, calling for mass meetings to be held during the last week of April: "Accusation meetings [are] designed to arouse mass hatred and raise mass vigilance against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, bandit Chiang's secret agents, and to make the broad masses realize, through the trials and tribulations they have seen, heard, or personally experienced, the detestableness of U.S. imperialism and the necessity of the "resist U.S., aid Korea, and oppose the rearming of Japan" campaign and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, thus leading the masses to take an active part in the campaigns and to assist the government in its purge of secret agents." The Current Affairs Handbook (Shih-shih shou-tse) No. 12 (April 5, 1951), in a chapter entitled "How to hold accusation meetings," explained the steps for arousing popular hysteria.

1. Study the atrocities committed by the U.S., Japan, and the secret agents of bandit Chiang,
2. Propagandize current events and give patriotic education relative to the Resist U.S. and Aid Korea Movement,
3. Before a meeting is held, it is necessary to find out and cultivate the active elements and typical characters in accusation meetings. Call them in for a good talk before the meeting to arouse their positiveness and to acquaint them with the method of accusation.
4. During the accusation, arrange the cases in proper order as to the nature and content so as to make it possible to concentrate on the object of accusation and have the accusations made in series. Moreover, the degree of tension should be adjusted.
5. In accusing the U.S. and Japan, have interludes of emphatic speeches to stress the fact that the U.S. is brutal but fragile, and China is strong.
6. At the climax of the accusation, it is necessary to lead the masses to change their indignation into strength, to conclude or examine patriotic pacts, to sign and support the conclusion of peace pacts, to vote against the U.S. rearming of Japan, and to help the government suppress the counter-revolutionaries, or in other patriotic activities.

These accusation meetings were held in all cities, towns, forest areas, rural districts, and grasslands in the IMAR during 1951, and provided the stimulus for the collection of signatures for the peace pacts and funds for the purchase of aircraft and artillery.

B. Mass Control Organizations

To augment the activities of the cadres, the Communist authorities also summoned the assistance of all the other so-called political

the masses." By the end of 1952, it was revealed (in Jen-min
jih-pao May 3, 1953) that over seventy percent of the rural
manpower of the IMAR had been organized, a figure which
corresponded with a statement by Pengsk (People's China,
January 1, 1952) that seventy-two percent of the people of the
IMAR had taken part in the signature campaign. The Inner
Mongolian members of the Young Communist League (New
Democratic Youth League) - numbering 11,000 in 1951 - served
as auxiliaries of the CCP and participated along with the cadres
and CCP members in the program for the "study and propagan-
da of the general line of the state during the transition period"
in 1953 and 1954. The First Inner Mongolian Committee of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which met
in February, 1955, devoted its first plenary session to signing
resolutions for the "liberation" of Taiwan, the strengthening
of the unification of the IMAR with "the fatherland," socialist
industrialization, and the condemnation of the use of atomic
weapons.

In 1950, with the formal merging of the IMAR into the Chin-
ese People's Republic and the gearing of the political machin-
ery of the IMAR to the Central People's Government, branches
of the principal organizations of mass control were established
in Inner Mongolia. In November, 1950, these branches joined
voices with those of their parent and fraternal organizations
in supporting the message of Chou En-lai to the U.N. Security
Council protesting U.N. "interference" in Korea, and later in
participating in all the other so-called patriotic activities of
the nation.

The propaganda activities of the organizations of mass con-
trol may be seen in the work of a few of the more representative
ones. Membership statistics are rarely given, and are present-
ed here when available.

The Democratic League: This organization, whose history
dates back to World War II, took the lead as early as October,
1950, to organize forums to discuss and oppose the "aggressive
designs of American imperialism," and to mobilize the students
and teachers to build up a propaganda campaign. In a news bul-
letin (NCNA November 29, 1951) on its propaganda work, it
claimed credit for mobilizing the masses to resist America and
aid Korea, and to carry out the suppression of the "couter-
revolutionaries," and for strengthening the state power of the
"peoples' governments." In 1953, at the behest of the Central
Committee of the CCP, the members of the Democratic League
adopted a resolution changing the focus of their activities to "cul-
tural-educational work" - that is, propaganda and agitation -
claiming that sixty percent of their members were already (by 1952)
connected with schools and universities, and the remainder were

parties and other agencies of mass control to guide and activ-
ate the people. A directive of the Central Committee of the CCP
on January 1, 1951, stated, "In all national propaganda move-
ments, the party organizations should be skillful in cooperating
with all democratic parties and groups and in organizing every-
one in the people's governments, the People's Liberation Army,
the cultural, educational, and artistic professions to combine
the broadest propaganda campaign in accordance with outline ob-
jectives."

Some of the organizations of mass control which have stood in
the forefront of successive propaganda campaigns are: the Chin-
ese People's Political Consultative Conference, the United Work
Front of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Democratic
League, the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, the China
Democratic National Construction Association, the China Associ-
ation for the Promotion of Democracy, the China Peasants' and
Workers' Democratic Party, the Chih-kung-tang, the Chiu-san
Association, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce,
the All-China Federation of Labor Unions, the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Work-
ers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Young Com-
munist League (formerly New Democratic Youth League), the
Federation of Democratic Women, the Chinese Students' Associ-
ation, and the Peasants' Association.

Most, if not all, of these organizations are galvanized into
action each time the Communist party sponsors a patriotic cam-
paign, whether it is for the collection of signatures, the holding
of mass accusation meetings, demonstrations, or the collect-
ion of funds. They represent the "people" in the Communist
sense of the word, and their repeating of Communist catechisms
and shouting of Communist slogans are proclaimed as the voice
of the people. In 1951, it was the Campaign to Resist America
and Aid Korea that occupied their fullest attention; in 1953, it
was the study of the "general line of the state during the trans-
ition to socialism"; and in 1954, it was the drafting of a joint de-
claration for the "liberation" of Taiwan and a pledge to follow the
leadership of the CCP.

The IMAR was established two and a half years before the
formal inauguration of the Chinese People's Republic, and the
organization of the people in the IMAR took place as early as
1948, with the agrarian reform, the formation of farmers' as-
sociations and mutual aid teams, women's and youth organiza-
tions, and the training of cadres. It was but a short step to
shift the attention and function of these organizations to propagan-
da activities. In 1951 it was reported that large numbers of lamas,
workers, peasants, and herdsmen had joined the "united demo-
cratic front" sponsored by the Department of United Front Work
of the Inner Mongolian Sub-Bureau, and were active in "arousing

engaged in journalistic, cultural, artistic, and scientific work. Thus, as the Communist party and the New Democratic Youth League had charge of organizing the cadres for the study of the writings of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, the Democratic League, bolstered by the Federation of Students and the Federation of Literary and Art Workers, had the job of organizing the students and teachers.

The Federation of Literary and Art Workers: As early as 1942, Mao Tse-tung had termed literature and art "a component part of the entire mechanism of the revolution," and "powerful weapons for uniting the people together, educating the people, and dealing blows against the enemy."

Although the Inner Mongolian committee of the Federation of Literary and Art Workers was not formally organized until November, 1954, efforts to turn the attention of Mongol writers and actors to the work of propaganda began as early as the founding of the regime. The literary achievements of the Mongols which conform to the party line, such as the novel On the Khorchin Grasslands by Malchinhu, the poem "A Toast to Chairman Mao," by Mei-li-chi-ko, and thirty-one other songs, plays, and novels were given rewards by the Peking government. Since the standard of literacy of the Mongols is low, propaganda is disseminated chiefly through the medium of drama. In 1953 there were five cultural and twenty-two amateur theatrical groups in the IMAR, and Mongol cadres constituted fifty-eight percent of the total number of literary, artistic and theatrical cadres in the region. There were yang-ko dance teams in every village, and 212 villages in the Hsingan League alone staged dramatic performances. The bulk of the two thousand men and women who attended the first conference of writers and artists in Inner Mongolia in October, 1954, were members of amateur and professional theatrical groups (see China General and China IMAR, Literature).

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association: Compared to other parts of China, the growth of the association in Inner Mongolia was rather slow. Up to the end of March, 1951, there were only 8,700 members in Inner Mongolia. However, the total membership for the whole of China was then only about 5,374,000 (NCNA April 14, 1951). With the expansion of the total membership to over fifteen million in the fall of 1951 (NCNA September 22, 1951), and to twenty-three million early in 1952 (NCNA February 13, 1952), membership in the IMAR must have increased proportionately.

In carrying out its primary function of assisting the government and other organizations in the work of propaganda, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association issued, in April, 1951, a notice to all grades of its branches and chapters to link their publicity and education work with the campaign to popularize the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign. "Each member of the association...should recognize

more profoundly the role of the Soviet Union as a fortress for the preservation of world peace, and carry out propaganda work among the nasses" (NCNA April 17, 1951). Every branch and chapter of the association was instructed to coordinate its work with the China Peace Committee to promote publicity on the friendship and alliance between China and Russia, to hold accusation meetings against the United States, to take part in the signature campaign for a five-power peace pact, and to mobilize the masses for the May Day parade. In the following year, the Association launched the Sino-Soviet Friendship Month to impress upon the people the great achievements of the Soviet Union and the great amount of Soviet aid to China, to strengthen the bonds of amity between the two nations, and to learn through the study of Marxism and Leninism the technology and experiences of Soviet Russia. In 1953, the Inner Mongolian committee of the Association initiated a work conference to discuss the means of implementing the proposals of Soviet advisors on propaganda work among the workers. In Inner Mongolia the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association printed and distributed pamphlets in Mongolian on Soviet construction and Soviet methods of livestock raising and feeding.

The China Peace Committee: The principal extra-governmental agency for the execution of the propaganda policies of the CCP is the China Peace Committee, a special organization founded on October 26, 1950, for the express purpose of mobilizing the people of China for war and coordinating their activities in the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign. The China Peace Committee is an abbreviation for the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace and Against American Aggression, and was formed by the merger of the Chinese Committee for the Defense of World Peace with the Committee of the Chinese People to Oppose American Aggression against Taiwan and Korea. The president, Kuo Mo-jo, is also president of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers.

Externally, the Committee derived inspiration and stimulus from the World Peace Congresses, held at Warsaw in 1950 and at Vienna in 1953, while internally it sought to embrace all localities and all nationalities and to dovetail its work with the war effort of the Chinese Communist government. The signature campaigns of 1951 and 1955 and the drive to raise funds for the purchase of military equipment were pushed through by this committee. The committee had under it a propaganda department, which was divided into five sub-committees: newspaper supplements, broadcasting, art, books, and exhibitions, and the purpose of these sub-committees was "to carry out all phases of propaganda work through-out the nation" (NCNA November 22, 1950). In addition to organizing parades and accusation meetings, the Committee drafted a program of publicity work in March, 1951, covering: "...all publicity, educational, and cultural organizations, including schools, night schools, cultural centers, libraries, literary classes, newspaper readers' groups, newspapers, broadcasting stations, pictorials, publishing houses, bookstores, literary bodies, musical bodies, art bodies, dramatic and singing bodies, cultural troupes, movie studios, movie and film strip projection teams, cinema houses, theaters, and amusement grounds, as well as public centers, including factories, stores, markets, hotels, stations, communication centers, scenic spots, temple fairs, and ports (Proclamation of the China Peace Committee, NCNA March 15, 1951)."

As in the national organizations, the heads of the branch organizations in the IMAR were all top-ranking Communist party members and ex officio members of the People's Government. Kolikeng, who was the chairman of the Inner Mongolian branch of the China Peace Committee, was also director of the Work Committee of the New Domocratic Youth League (now Young Communist League), and concurrently head of the Supervisory Committee of the IMAR People's Government, and a member of the Government Council.

C. Schools

According to Communist figures, the increase in the number of schools in the IMAR under the Communists has been phenomenal. Compared to the 873 primary schools and nine middle schools in 1947, at the end of 1954 there were reported to be 7,400 primary schools with 560,000 children, of which 1,194 schools with 83,424 children were Mongols; 68 middle schools with 55,000 students, of which 27 were Mongol or mixed Mongol and Han Chinese schools, with 6,648 students; two colleges with 125 Mongol students, and about 2,670 winter spare-time schools, with an enrollment of 270,000.

(The statistics quoted in the Chinese Communist press on school enrollment are extremely confusing. On October 1, 1950, the Jen-min jih-pao reported that in 1950 there were 238,970 students in primary schools in Inner Mongolia, or 61 percent of all school-age children. This number was said to have increased to over 300,000, or 80 percent, in 1952 (JMJP June 9, 1952). In 1955, the NCNA reported that there were 560,000 primary school students, or more than twice the 61 percent given in 1950. Yet, according to Hu Chao-heng, vice-chairman of the Planning Commission of the IMAR, only 81.4 percent of the children of school age were in primary schools in 1955. The Jen-min jih-pao on October 1, 1950, also reported that the number of adults in winter schools in 1950 came to 306,000, but the NCNA, on January 19, 1955, said that the number in 1955 was 270,000, "representing an increase of 40 percent.")

While the aim of the expansion of education was to raise the standard of literacy in Inner Mongolia, where as late as 1947, over

ninety percent of the people were illiterate, the more conclusive reasons were to mold the minds of the children, to train the youth as cadres, and to regiment the thinking of the adults. Ma Hsü-lun, Minister of Education of the central People's Government, declared at the All-China Conference of Minority Education, September 20-28, 1951, that in establishing an overall policy of education for the minority peoples, the content of the policy must be "new democratic" in nature, ostensibly for the development of minority culture, but actually for the training of minority cadres and the strengthening of Communist leadership. Political and ideological education in patriotism, he said, should be centered around the Resist America and Aid Korea Movement, and should be implemented in all national minority areas (NCNA October 6 and December 21, 1951).

The emphasis on patriotic education was redoubled in 1954, when the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CCP issued a directive that all senior primary and junior middle school graduates must conduct propaganda on labor production, and all cadres must conduct propaganda among the teachers, students, and parents of the students. This program was reaffirmed in the meeting of the Democratic National Construction Association held in August, and in the first conference on nationalities education in the IMAR, held from November 22 to December 1, in which it was stated that the first of the seven main tasks of nationalities education was "to strengthen education in patriotism, internationalism, and nationalities solidarity." (Nei Meng-ku jih-pao, December 23, 1954)

The way in which propaganda permeates every aspect of education may be seen in this excerpt from a report in the Sian Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, March 30, 1952, on Mongol schools in the province of Chinghai: "In mathematics, the number of American and bandit Rhee's troops annihilated by the Chinese and Korean people's armies in Korea, and the construction figures in Chinghai, were made into questions for the students and the masses to solve. In this manner they not only learned mathematics but also retained in their minds the victorious results of our war and the great achievements in construction following the liberation."

In Inner Mongolia, this political indoctrination through the medium of schools has been both penetrative and widespread. In a directive of October 9, 1954, calling for the expansion of adult enrollment in winter classes, the People's Government of the IMAR expressed satisfaction with the way that propaganda in education was carried out in 1953, and went on to urge continued propaganda efforts on the subjects of the "general task" and the constitution, with special emphasis on the necessity for mutual aid and cooperation. Youth Leagues, women's federations, and militia organizations were called upon to assume active leadership of the studies

of the peasants and herdsmen and the training of cadres and pub-
lic security troops, for "the key to forming good basic militia teams
lies in conducting intensive propaganda."

D. Communications

Newspapers, magazines, and books are all coordinated with the
patriotic drives and the expansion of schools in order to create a
cumulative impact on the minds of the people. As the Jen-min jih-
pao stated in an editorial on June 25, 1951: "Newspapers are polit-
ical tools. The basic aim of newspapers is to raise the political
consciousness of the masses, to lead them towards faith in the
victory of our new people's democracy in the reconstruction of
the country and towards the bright future of socialism."

Although handicapped by a scarcity of Chinese made films,
wide use is made by the Chinese Communists of motion pictures
and lantern slides as media of propaganda, and mobile teams tour
the villages and pastoral and hunting communities of Inner Mongol-
ia. Since 1950 there has been a steadily increased use of radio for
propaganda dissemination. However, while radio transmitters
have become more numerous and more powerful, the number of
receiving sets is restricted in an effort to control clandestine
listening to non-Communist broadcasts. Specially-trained radio
cadres listen to approved programs and publicize them to the
people, organize supervised radio-listening groups, and assemble
mass meetings to hear special broadcasts on propaganda drives,
which are followed by "accusations"(see China IMAR, Public In-
formation).

E. Festivals and the Tomb of Chingis Khan

The fact that the Chinese Communists are not missing a trick to
utilize all media and all occasions to propagandize may be seen in
the way they have made use of Mongolian festivals. Pengsk (Peng
Ssu-k'o), an Inner Mongolian dignitary, wrote: "Natamu, the
great fair of the steppelands...now has been transformed into
a big national fair and trading center, and exhibition and cultur-
al center for the spread of scientific knowledge and the presenta-
tion of new plays, dances, musical and literary compositions. Nat-
amu meetings elect model herdsmen, hear talks on the current
international situation and reports on government policy. Here the
peasants see films of the advanced agricultural experience of the
Soviet Union and the fraternal Mongolian People's Republic (Peo-
ple's China, January 1, 1952).

The 1952 Natamu Fair, held May 20-June 2 at the Chen Pa-erh-
hu (Old Bargu) Banner in the Huna League, was for the purpose of
celebrating the achievements in construction and to welcome dele-
gates of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the North Korean
Army. The chief of the banner, acting as host, thanked the Peking

government for wiping out venereal disease, and thanked the Chinese People's Volunteers for their happy life in Inner Mongolia. As a result, he said, 173 babies had been born. During the festival, "the Huna League working team also held a pictorial exhibition on the Resist-America and Aid-Korean Campaign, and sent working personnel into the land of the herdsmen to conduct propaganda on current events" (NCNA June 2, 1952).

To cater to the pride of the Mongols, the Communist authorities had the bier allegedly containing the remains of the great Mongol hero, Chingis Khan, transported from Chinghai province to Huhehot (Kuei-sui) in April, 1954. They were then taken to the old burial place near Edjin Khoro in the Ikechou League for interment in a newly-built mausoleum. The ceremony on April 23, marking the 727th anniversary of the death of the great khan, was attended by over 5,000 Mongols, including the high officials Wang Tsai-t'ien, Sa Kung-liao, and Pengsk. In his oration, Ulanfu used the occasion to call upon the Mongols to unite closely with the Chinese people to build together a great new country.

F. The Signature Campaigns, 1950 - 1953

Since the purpose of propaganda is to arouse the people and herd them to do the bidding of the state, the Chinese Communists launch one "patriotic campaign" after another to keep the people in a continuous state of excitement. With one campaign following closely in the wake of another, and many times overlapping each other, the pitch is not only sustained, but each time heightened. No lags are permitted between campaigns that might allow the excitement of the people to flag, or their minds to dwell on the misery, privation, and regimentation of their daily lives under the Communist regime.

In Inner Mongolia the attention of the people was first directed to the land reform movement and the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," but with the establishment of the central People's Government in October, 1949, the propaganda machinery and propaganda lines were geared to those of Peking. Just when the excitement over the unification of China by the Communists was about to die down, they launched a drive in May, 1950, for signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal, sponsored by the Cominform. Up to the middle of November, 1,485,113 people in Inner Mongolia had signed their names.

By this time, the Chinese Communists had found an opportune occasion in the outbreak of hostilities in Korea to galvanize the people of China to action. In October, a month before the troops of Communist China crossed the Korean frontier, ground was prepared for this intervention by the initiation of a propaganda campaign against "American imperialist aggression." Spurred on by the newspapers and led by mass organizations such as those for the students, writers, and artists, the Democratic League, and other collateral groups, a movement got underway to oppose the United

States, described as a "paper tiger," and to relieve Korea. Accusation meetings were held in schools and in public gatherings.

The People's Government of the IMAR rose to the occasion by offering to send two medical teams to Korea, although it was doubtful whether it could spare any of its short-handed medical personnel. In the name of the people of Inner Mongolia, a message was sent to the U.N. Security Council on November 14, justifying the entry of Chinese troops into Korea and condemning the speeches and reports of General Douglas MacArthur. Early in February, 1951, three thousand Mongols (of the Tumet Banner) and Moslems marched through the streets of Huhehot (Kuei-sui) to protest the rearming of Japan by the United States and the branding of Communist China as an aggressor by the U.N. General Assembly.

With the creation of the China Peace Committee in November, 1950, the propaganda activities related to the "Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea" throughout the nation came under the direction of this body and its affiliated organs. Plans were made to intensify and expand the campaign. Up to this time, the campaign had been carried out only half-heartedly and superficially by the cadres. The *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 14, 1951) charged that the cadres had "failed to regard the movement as the most important task in national life." In the rural villages it was charged that they had failed to arouse the farmers, to link the campaign with the suppression of "counter-revolutionaries," and to mobilize the women and the factory workers in the cities, and that as a result, the people throughout the nation regarded the resistance to imperialism as an extraneous matter which did not concern them. It was said that as many as thirty percent of the people and twenty percent of the students had not heard of the campaign.

To remedy the situation, the China Peace Committee issued a proclamation on March 14, 1951, to popularize the campaign to resist America and aid Korea by calling upon all trade unions, peasant associations, New Democratic Youth League forces, students, industrial and commercial federations, religious bodies, etc., throughout the country to prepare to hold accusation meetings to denounce the United States in April and to stage demonstrations in May.

The meetings and parades held in April and May were climaxed by the signing of "patriotic compacts," whereby the people pledged: (1) To manifest support of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the People's Government, and the Chinese Communist Party; to support the campaign to resist America and aid Korea; to oppose U.S. aggression in Taiwan and the rearming of Japan; and to suppress the counter-revolutionaries; and (2) To work harder and to increase production.

In Inner Mongolia, May 1, Labor Day, coincided with the anniversary of the establishment of the autonomous region, and was the occasion for a large-scale mobilization of the masses. The number of people who took part in demonstrations was at first given as 590,000, belonging to eight cities and eleven banners (NCNA May 13, 1951), but the number was exaggerated to 880,000 (NCNA May 12, 1951), and eventually to 1,350,000, or 56.25 percent of the total population (*Jen-min jih-pao*, November 1, 1951). It was reported that in the city of Ulanhot (Wang-yeh-miao) alone, over 30,000 people took part in the demonstrations, which hardly seems possible, since the total population of that city in 1953 was only 30,000.

But when it came to the signing of the "patriotic compacts," the result was disappointing to the Communists. The press reports did not give government statistics on the number of people in Inner Mongolia who signed the compacts, specifying only the Oronchon tribesmen, who number about a thousand, and the lama representatives of four leagues.

The China Peace Committee, claiming that the failure was due to the fact that the "propaganda was not penetrative enough and the slogans empty" (*Jen-min jih-pao*, July 29, 1951), issued three appeals urging the people of Inner Mongolia to sign the compacts. But still there was little response.

One reason for the small number of signatures on the "patriotic compacts" may be due to the diversion of the people's attention to two concurrent signature campaigns launched in April, one to support a five-power (Communist China, Soviet Russia, Britain, France, and the United States) peace pact, and the other to denounce the arming of Japan by the United States. At the request of the China Peace Committee, and acting upon instructions from the Communist Party, the People's Governments of Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia convened a conference of lamas and Moslem arkhuns at Huhehot (Kuei-sui) on April 27-29, just before the May Day celebrations, to brief them on the way to obtain signatures. As a result, on May Day and during the week immediately following, 981,242 people signed the appeal for the five-power pact, and 981,227 signed the protest against the rearming of Japan.

During July, the China Peace Committee intensified the signature campaign and enlarged its machinery. July 1-7 was "Signature Movement Week." This was followed with "Support the People of Korea Week," July 7-14, and "Oppose U.S. Aggression against Korea and Taiwan Week," July 15-22. The result was to increase the total number of signatures on both the petition for the five-power pact and the petition against the rearming of Japan to 1,744,595. On August 13, the China Peace Committee ordered the initiation of a third stage, a "Campaign for Extending the Peace Signature Movement," which was a protest against "U.S. aggression and imperialism."

The three stages of the signature campaign had been mapped out by the China Peace Committee in November, 1950. The scope of the campaign was to embrace all localities and all nationalities, the method was to coordinate it with large-scale propaganda, and the purpose was "to knit the Chinese people closer to the struggle against American aggression."

This machinery for the procurement of signatures was used in 1952 for the pledge to wipe out the alleged use of germ warfare by the United States in Korea, and for a protest against the arrest of the French Communist leader Jacques Duclos; and again in 1953, following the World Peace Congress at Vienna, to appeal again for a five-power peace pact, and to protest the execution of the Rosenbergs. The fact that the Communist press did not report on the results of these signature campaigns may be an indication that they fared rather poorly.

G. Fund-raising Campaigns for the Purchase of Arms

In 1951 a signature campaign was used to prepare the people for a fund-raising drive. Late in April, the China Peace Committee launched a campaign to collect funds for the Chinese forces in Korea and the North Korean army. The amount contributed by the people of Inner Mongolia came to JMP$144,577,672 (about US $7,229. The exchange in 1951 was about JMP$20,000 to US$1.00). This was only 0.16 percent of the total amount that was to be collected throughout the nation. However, the people of Inner Mongolia had been made to contribute funds long before the drive started. During the lunar Chinese New Year festival in 1951, Inner Mongolia contributed JMP$1,300,000,000 (about US$65,000), in addition to 1,700,000 catties (about 9,350 tons) of food and clothing.

In June, in a directive urging the intensification of the signature campaign, the China Peace Committee issued a call for a campaign for the donation of funds to purchase planes, heavy artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns, which were sorely needed by the Communist forces in Korea. The response to the appeal was slow. Up to the end of October, the amount donated by the people of Inner Mongolia - JMP$13,700,000,000 (about US$685,000) - was only enough, according to a press dispatch, to buy fourteen fighter planes and three guns (the press dispatches often indicate a rather weak grasp of monetary values). This was the quota originally assigned to Inner Mongolia; to the Communists, however, fulfilling a quota is not enough: it is the degree to which it is surpassed that counts.

As the second and third stages of the signature campaign, carried out in July and August, were not strong enough to make the people dig deeper into their pockets, "meetings were held in all cities, towns, forest areas, rural districts, and grasslands in the IMAR, for denunciations of crimes committed by the Japanese invaders, the imperialists, and the Chiang bandits, and to stress the defense of peace and opposition to the rearming of Japan." (JMJP November 1, 1951) As a result, the IMAR raised JMP$34,900,000,000 (about US$1,745,000) by the end of the year, oversubscribing its quota by 47 percent. In February, 1952, the donation of funds by the IMAR reached JMP$42,830,223,000 (about US$2,141,511) which, according to a Communist press dispatch, was sufficient to buy 28 1/2 fighter planes, or, according to another dispatch, 26 planes and four artillery pieces.

In addition, the people of Inner Mongolia, by increasing production and practicing austerity, went over their quota of 108,000 tons by contributing 450,000 tons of food, including 15,000 kilograms of dried meat and 12,000 sheep.

The burden was shared by almost everyone in Inner Mongolia. Workers donated a week's wages, and peasants their livestock and food. One peasant family donated an ox, a pig, and a sheep, as well as JMP$30,000 (US$1.50). Three thousand herdsmen attending the Natamu festival donated four thousand head of livestock, 16,000 silver dollars, and fifty bars of silver, each bar weighing fifty ounces, as well as quantities of gold and dried meat. A Living Buddha gave eight thousand silver dollars. The Silingol League handed in JMP$2,000,000,000 (about US$100,000), and the residents of Huhehot (Kuei-sui) gave JMP$450,000,000 (about US $22,500) to buy a fighter plane. All the funds and food were donated at a time when the people of Inner Mongolia were suffering from a severe drought (JMJP June 9, 1952). Adding insult to injury, after they had contributed their savings and their food, the people of Inner Mongolia were obliged to write a letter thanking Mao Tse-tung for his kindness (NCNA June 28, 1952).

H. The Study Program

In 1952, as the signature campaign began to fizzle out and truce talks superceded fighting in Korea, the Chinese Communists attempted to sustain the psychological pitch of the people by launching such campaigns as the Three-Anti Movement against corrupt or deviationist government and party officials, the Five-Anti Movement against the businessmen, the Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Week. Early in 1953, there was added a Propaganda Month for the Popularization and Implementation of the Marriage Law.

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Week, originally scheduled for February, 1952, was, for lack of adequate preparation, postponed to October, when it was enlarged into the Sino-Soviet Friendship Month. The salient points of the propaganda for the Friendship Month were: the achievements of the Soviet Union; Soviet aid to China; the strengthening of the friendship pact; the alliance, mutual aid, and cooperation between Communist China and the Soviet Union; and the need to learn from Russia and to study Marxism-Leninism.

All the organs of mass control, such as the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the New Democratic Youth League, and the Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party were set in motion to help in the propagation of these lines. Particular efforts were made to direct these propaganda points to the racial minorities of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang.

The program of study of the experiences and technology of Soviet Russia, sponsored by the Sino-Soviet Association, merged later into the general Study Movement for Ideological Reform, which was the result of a decision of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference, and was made public in January, 1952. The demoralization of the government functionaries and the cadres as exposed in the course of the Three-Anti Campaign, and the antipathy of the people towards the new regime as revealed in the course of the Five-Anti and Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries campaigns, and the need to prepare the people for the general elections, to harness their backs to the five-year plan for industrialization and collectivization, and to indoctrinate their minds to the transition to socialism, all demanded a broadening of the scope of the Study Movement. "The study movement," declared Ch'en Shu-t'ung, spokesman for the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, "is an important method for ideological reform, for the completion of the construction task, and for the consolidation of the people's democratic united front" (NCNA February 5, 1953).

The Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP took the lead in instituting the study movement in the IMAR. Ulanfu, chairman of the IMAR People's Government and concurrently secretary of the sub-bureau, appointed himself chief of the study program and Hu Ch'ao-heng, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the sub-bureau, deputy chief of the study program. All senior cadres of the party, the People's Government, and the military district were required to devote six hours a week for a period of six months to the study of the writings of Mao Tse-tung "in order for them to acquire the correct methodology."

Following the conclusion of the study of Mao's writings, the cadres were required to devote every Wednesday and Saturday afternoon for a period of two months to the study of the documents of the 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the report of Malenkov read at this session, Marxist-Leninist tracts, the biography and published works of Stalin, especially his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, and his articles on the nationality problem.

As a result of this emphasis on Soviet works, the Huhehot (Kuei-sui) branch of the Hsin-hua Bookstore sold out its entire stock of the Mongol edition of *Joseph Stalin, a Short Biography*, and 25,000 copies of the first volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. About half a million copies of textbooks on Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were circulated in primary and middle schools in Inner Mongolia.

During the fall of 1953, the Inner Mongolia-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the CCP directed the cadres to study the "general line and general work of the state during the transitional period," and to develop a large-scale propaganda program to publicize the gradual change to socialism. In contrast with other parts of China, such as in the Northwest, where the study program was two to three months long, in Inner Mongolia it was shortened to one and one-half to two months. The work was under the direction of Wang Wen-ta, director of the Department of Propaganda of the Inner Mongolia Suiyuan Sub-Bureau, and the text for study was chapter nine of Stalin's *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.

Beginning with the cadres, the program for the study of Communist documents and books concerning the transition to socialism was extended to the masses. The Inner Mongolia-Suiyuan Sub-Bureau of the CCP urged the study of economic developments in agriculture and the pastoral industry in the Soviet Union as a means of implementing the program of industrialization and collectivization. The People's Government of the IMAR set up thirteen technical aid stations in 1953 to "popularize advanced agricultural techniques and to give instructions to peasants...in mutual aid teams and producers' cooperatives" (NCNA March 11, 1953). In this task, the Inner Mongolian branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association did a yeomanly job in implementing the Soviet experts' proposals on propaganda among the workers and peasants of Inner Mongolia, in introducing experiences and the "science" of Soviet Union to the people, and following a work conference in April, 1953, in organizing local propaganda agencies to strive to carry out the general line of the state.

In 1954, the study program on the "general line of the state during the transition to socialism" was intensified. The New Democratic Youth League mapped out a program to encourage the youth of the nation to study the documents on the General Line during February, and the Ministry of Interior issued instructions regarding the mobilization of literary and art workers in the rural areas to publicize the General Line and the Marriage Law during the lunar New Year festivities. The Federation of Labor Unions endorsed a directive of the Central Committee of the CCP "to broadly, conscientiously, and penetratingly carry out propaganda and discussions" on the General Line and the draft constitution.

The general elections held in 1954, an initial phase in the transition of China to socialism, were the occasion for a spate of propaganda to the minority peoples on the Chinese borders. The propaganda on the tasks of the CCP vis-a-vis the nationality question during the period of transition, according to the *Jen-min jih-pao* (April 17, 1954), should stress the consolidation of the unification of the fatherland, and should organize everybody to struggle for the realization of the socialist state. The minority peoples must be told that under the rule of the Communists everything was better than before, but that in order to safeguard their "happy life," they must be vigilant against external and domestic enemies, and be on guard against enemy sabotage. The degree of their political, economic, and cultural development was said to depend upon the assistance and cooperation of the Han Chinese and the CCP.

I. Signature Campaigns, 1954-55

By fall of 1954, as the elections reached their final stage, the propaganda on the General Line began to pall, and the Communist leaders found it necessary to devise new propaganda themes to occupy the minds of the people. Early in September, the organs of mass control such as the Democratic League, the Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, the Federation of Trade Unions, etc., were instructed to convene meetings of their members to study, initiate, and to publicize, under the leadership of the CCP and the central People's Government, a joint declaration for the "liberation" of Taiwan. "Every member of these organizations must align himself with ideological reality, elevate his socialist consciousness, manifest his patriotic spirit and dedicate his whole strength" (NCNA August 28, 1954). They were not only required to sign the declaration, but also to obtain signatures.

There were no government announcements or press dispatches describing the outcome of this signature drive. In November there was another propaganda campaign, urging the people to fulfill their 1954 pledges for funds for the construction of the capital, and early in 1955, people's councils throughout the nation were ordered to hold forums to discuss the conscription law and "to publicize it through the media of papers, radio, and the propagandists and reporting personnel."

The propaganda along this line was temporarily shelved in February, 1955, when in response to the World Peace Council, the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Central People's Political Consultative Council and the Standing Committee of the China Peace Committee jointly organized a National Anti-Atomic Weapons Signature Committee. This new signature campaign was launched with fanfare reminiscent of the signature drives of 1950 and 1951. In addition to all the organizations of mass control, the quasi-governmental agencies, scientists, noted persons, textile workers, returned students, and Catholic, Buddhist, and Moslem

priests, were drafted to give talks denouncing the use of atomic energy in war weapons and urging its use for peace. Newspapers, radio, motion pictures, stage plays, cultural palaces, paintings, musical programs, and mobile publicity teams, loud-speakers mounted on trucks, in fact all the paraphernalia of public information, were employed to give wide publicity to the campaign. In Inner Mongolia, Lamaist temples and schools were used for mass accusation meetings, and mutual aid teams and cooperatives held special conventions to denouce atomic weapons and obtain signatures. One of the first acts of the first Central People's Political Consultative Council Inner Mongolia Committee was to pass resolutions urging (1) unity in the IMAR, (2) socialist industrialization, (3) the liberation of Taiwan, and (4) the issuance of a signed statement on world peace and a ban on atomic weapons.

The propaganda campaign was drummed up to a crescendo when the signature drive was launched from February 14 to March 10. By the end of February, 100,000 people in the IMAR had signed the declaration, 60,000 of whom were residents of Huhehot (Kuei-sui); by March 14, 1,086,000 had signed; and by March 23, over 3,500,000 signatures had been collected in Inner Mongolia. Following an intense publicity barrage directed at the nomads of the Silingol League and the tribesmen in the Great Hsingan Mountains, seventy percent of these Mongols, according to Communist claims, signed the declaration, and the overall results were far more widespread and comprehensive than had been the signature campaigns of 1950 and 1951.

Immediately following the signature campaign against atomic weapons, the mass organizations throughout the nation, at the instigation of the Federation of Literary and Art Workers, were set in motion to denounce Hu Feng, a literary leader who had been accused of ideological deviation. This campaign, which lasted from May to August, was carried out through the Federation of Trade Unions, the Federation of Industry and Commerce, three literary and artistic associations, three youth organizations, all the splinter political parties and mass organizations such as the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and the Democratic League, the Cultural Sub-Committee of the Central People's Political Consultative Council, the Democratic National Construction Association, and all the newspapers, magazines, films, and radio. Before the anti-Hu Feng campaign had come to a close, all the above-mentioned organizations and media were directed to discuss the Five-year Plan for Industrialization and Collectivization (termed, for propaganda purposes, cooperativization), and to draft statements pledging their support to the accomplishment of the plan. This new campaign was still in process at the end of the year 1955.

IV. Effects of Propaganda

A word must be said about the effect and outcome of the impact of Communist propaganda on the people of Inner Mongolia. After eight years under Communist rule, incessantly barraged with propaganda, hearing only what the Communists want them to hear and seeing only what the Communists want them to see, isolated from news from the outside and deprived of the opportunity to think freely and to verify the information fabricated for them and fed to them by the Communists, the people of Inner Mongolia have found it difficult to keep their sense of discernment and their faculty of distinguishing facts from fiction. The sheer weight of Communist propaganda has been so pervasive and so oppressive that many people in Inner Mongolia have no doubt found it easier to go along with the current and accept even the most fantastic claims and exorbitant statistics of Communist achievements than to go against the current and express doubt or bewilderment.

Despite the misery and squalor, the terror and the injustices which they see around them, the people of Inner Mongolia are told that everything is better under the rule of the Communists and that their life is happier. In the Communist world, the statements and claims of the party and the government, not the actual facts of the situation, are regarded as the truth.

Many tall stories have been propagandized as fact, and the people have been encouraged to swallow them as truth. For example, it was said that after the coming of the Communists, there were so many fish in Dalai Nor (lake) in the Hulunbuir grasslands that their fins stuck up out of the water, and if a pole was put into the water it would not topple over. One fisherman on a mid-winter day was said to have been able to haul in 104 tons of fish (Li Chung, "Inner Mongolia Today," China Reconstructs, II, (March-April, 1952).

Chang, Su

See General Handbook

Ch'en, Ping-ch'ien

Government official, Communist

Native of Shansi, 1954, member of the Government Council and vice chairman of the Political and Legal Commission of the Inner Mongolian People's Government; vice chairman of the first plenary session of the first CPPCC, Inner Mongolia Committee.

Chi, Ya-t'ai

Mongol, background unknown, Chinese Communist ambassador to the Outer Mongolia People's Republic, 1950-54, 1954 director of the United Front Work Department of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the CCP, vice chairman of the first CPPCC, Inner Mongolia Committee, 1955.

Chou, Pei-feng

Government official

Native of Shensi, 1954, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; delegate to the National People's Congress in Peking; 1955, member of the People's Council of the IMPG.

Ch'uan, Hsing-yuan

Government and party official

Native of Hopei; 1950, member of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; 1952, executive officer of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; 1954, member of the Government Council, director of the Department of Industry, and vice chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government.

Demchukdonggrub

Chinese name: Te-mu-ch'u-tung-lu-k'e, better known as Prince Te.

Mongol Prince and political leader.

Born 1903 (in 1935 he was 33 sui), prince of the West Sunid, deputy chief of the Silingol League, 1934, secretary-general of the Mongolia Political Council, 1937, head of the Autonomous Government of the Mongolian Federation, November, 1937, member of the Federated Mengchiang Commission, at Kalgan, September 1939, chairman of the Federated Mongolian Commission, and 1939-45, chairman of the Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia.

Prince Te was the most active leader of the Mongol nationalists in the thirties. As a boy, he had studied in a Chinese Middle School in Suiyuan, and he spoke and wrote fluent Chinese. As chief of a Mongol banner and deputy chief of a league, as a man of independent means, and of liberal political inclination, he attracted a large number of young Mongol intellectuals to his cause. His group represented a new feeling among progressive young Mongols that, by concerted effort, they could win independence from China. His immediate following numbered about 70 young men, mostly graduates of schools and universities in China, and he had the support of a large number of Mongol students and Mongols resident in China who supported him financially and also did publicity work for Mongol independence, a movement which reached a crescendo in the early 1930's. Their slogan was "Mongolia for the Mongols."

In 1934, the Nationalist Government sent two officials to negotiate with him and other Inner Mongolian princes associated with him at Pailingmiao. Out of the conference, the Mongolian Political Council was created, with Prince Te as the secretary-general. However, deep-rooted differences between his faction and the Nationalist Government remained unresolved, and Prince Te formed the East Tehua Military Government as a step towards the realization of independence while drifting slowly towards the Japanese camp. In 1937, he aided the Japanese in the capture of the eastern portion of Suiyuan. The Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia that was established, with headquarters at Kalgan was actually a special administered district of both the Japanese and Manchukuo. It was anti -Communist and anti-Soviet, and it sought the unity of all Mongols after the tradition of Chingghis Khan.

In 1945, when Soviet and Outer Mongolian forces reached Pailingmiao, Prince Te at first made friendly overtures to the Soviet authorities, but when his properties were seized and his family carried away, he fled to China, where he lived in retirement in Peiping. In 1949, when the Communists came into power, he flew to Ninghsia where he rallied the Alashan and Edsingol banners to put up defense against the Communists, but, unable to obtain assistance from the Nationalist government, his efforts failed. The present whereabouts of Prince Te is unknown.

Fu, Tso-i

See China, General Handbook

Hafengga

Government official

Native of the Central Banner of the East Khorchins in the Jerim League, date of birth and early career unknown. In 1946, secretary-general, East Mongolian People's Government, 1946, delegate to Ulan Bator, January 1946, chairman of the National People's Conference of Representatives held at Ko-keng-miao, 1947, vice-chairman, People's Council, IMAR, 1952, director of the Commission on Culture and Education, and director of the Department of Culture and Education; 1954, re-elected vice-chairman of the IMAR People's Council.

Hafengga was one of the men responsible for the establishment of the East Mongolian People's Government at Ulanhot (Wangyehmiao) in August 1945, at the time the Soviet Red Army entered Manchuria. He played an important role in the merger of the East and West Mongolian Autonomous Movements, and is today one of the few leaders of the East Mongolian People's Government who still occupy a high position in the present IMAR People's Government.

Hsia, Fu-jen

Government and party official

Personal data and early career unavailable; 1950, vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission, Inner Mongolia People's Government, deputy director of the Organization Department of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, 1952, director of the Department of Personnel of the IMPG.

Hu, Chao-heng

Party and government official

Chinese, native of Honan province, 1952, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the CCP, 1954, elected to the Inner Mongolia People's Council, and appointed vice-chairman of the Planning Commission in the IMAR. Concurrently vice-chairman, Cultural and Educational Commission of the IMPG.

Hu assisted Ulanfu in 1952 in promoting the study of Soviet Communist Party documents and in advertising the advance Soviet technology as a part of the ideological reform of the cadres. As vice-chairman of the planning commission, he was responsible for extending the collectivization of the cadres and indoctrination of school children.

Hu, Ping-ch'uan

Background unknown; 1952, member of the Government Council of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, and concurrently chief of staff of the Inner Mongolia Military District.

Kao, K'e-lin

See General Handbook

K'e-li-keng

Government official

Mongol, background and early career unknown; 1949, chairman of the People's Supervisory Committee, Inner Mongolia People's Government, secretary of the Inner Mongolia Work Committee of the New Democratic Youth League, vice-chairman (?) of the Inner Mongolia headquarters of the China Peace Committee, 1954, member of the Inner Mongolia People's Council.

Kuei Pi

Government official, Communist

Member of the Tumet banner, Suiyuan. Date of birth and early career unknown; 1947, member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP; 1947-52, director of the Commission on Civil Affairs, IMPG; 1949, delegate to the first CPPCC in Peking, 1949, vice-chairman of the Suiyuan People's Government; 1951, member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Central People's Government; member of the Inner Mongolia People's Government Council; 1954, delegate to the National People's Congress, Peking; 1955, vice-chairman of the Inner Mongolia People's Council.

Kuei Pi was dismissed from office in 1952 but by 1954 had succeeded in staging a come-back.

Liang, I-ming

Government official

Native of Hunan, 1952-54, secretary-general of the Inner Mongolia People's Government.

Liu, Ch'ün

Government official, Communist

Chinese, background and early career unknown. September 1949, IMAR delegate to the CPPCC, 1949, vice-president of the College of Nationalities, member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-Bureau of the CCP, deputy secretary-general of the Suiyuan-Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau, 1951, member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, Central People's Government, 1952-54, member of the government council of the IMAR, 1952, member of the Central Committee and the Central Executive Office of the China Farmers and Workers Democratic Party, 1955, deputy chairman of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, Central People's Government.

Liu, Hsiu-mei

Government and party official, woman

Native of Shensi, 1949-54, secretary of the Suiyuan Provincial People's Council, 1954-55, deputy director of the Personnel Department of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, 1954,

member of the Government Council IMPG, delegate to the National People's Congress.

Liu Hsiu-mei was one of the party officials of Suiyuan who was retained when Suiyuan was incorporated into the IMAR in 1954. She was a member of the reorganized Government Council of IMPG for only a few months, losing her position to Ulan, a government official and head of the Inner Mongolia Federation of Democratic Women.

Malchinhu

Writer

Mongol writer; author of "On the Khorchin Grasslands." The book has been acclaimed by the Communists as a creative work of the "new writers" of Inner Mongolia and has been made into a film.

Namchisereng

Chinese name: Wang Tsai-t'ien

Army officer and government official, Communist

Member of the central banner of the East Khorchin in the Jerim League, date of birth and early career unknown; 1947, member of the Inner Mongolia sub-bureau of the CCP Central Committee, director of the Department of Public Security and member of the Government Council of the IMAR People's Government, deputy commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District, procurator-general of the Inner Mongolia office of the Supreme Procuratorate; member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Central People's Government; 1954, elected one of the vice-chairmen of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; September 1954, IMAR delegate to the National People's Congress.

Next to Ulanfu, Namchisereng occupies the largest number of concurrent positions in the party, in the government, and in the army, at the regional level as well as at the national level.

Pai, Yün-t'i

Courtesy name: Chü-ch'uan

Government official, Kuomintang

Born 1894, a native of the Kharachin Banner; 1913, graduate of the Mongolian and Tibetan College in Peking; member of the first Parliament in Peking, 1918, member of the Extraordinary Parliament held at Canton; member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee; engaged in Kuomintang party work in Inner Mongolia; 1928, member of the Kuomintang Central Political Committee and concurrently member of the State Council; member of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in the National Government; November 1929, supported the "Reorganizationists" under Wang Ching-wei; participated in the military coalition of North China (led by Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan) against Chiang Kai-shek; 1930, expelled from the Kuomintang; December 1931, reinstated member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; 1934, member of the Mongolian Local Autonomy Political Council; 1947-48, vice-chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; 1948-49, chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.

Pai Yün-t'i has been a leader of the Young Mongols since 1925 and one of the founders of the Mongolian People's Party of Inner Mongolia, at the convention held at Kalgan. He belonged to the faction of Mongolian leaders who believed that autonomy for the Mongols could be achieved and the best interests of the Mongols served by collaboration with the National Government. He belonged to the Left-wing of the Kuomintang and took part in the 1929 coalition of the North China leaders against Nanking. He organized the Inner Mongolia volunteer corps and established a military officers' school of Inner Mongolia at Pao-t'ou, in which he was president. But with the collapse of the anti-Chiang coalition, he was reinstated in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and rose to be head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission after the war. He has been inactive since 1949.

Pengsk
Chinese name: P'eng Ssu-k'e
Member of the East Khorchin Front Banner in the Jerim League, director of the Department of Organization in the East Mongolia People's Government, 1945, 1950, member of the Inner Mongolia Government Council, 1954, deputy director of the General Office of the Commission on Nationalities, Central People's Government.

Po-yen-man-tu (Bayan Mendu?)
A Mongol, Po-yen-man-tu was an official in the Autonomous Mongol Government in Hsingan, one of the provinces of the Japanese-sponsored state of Manchukuo, August 1945, head of the East Mongolian Autonomous Government; 1946, visited Outer Mongolia, attended the conference at Ch'eng-te (in Jehol) which merged the East and the Western Mongol Autonomous Governments; 1947-54, member of the Government Council, 1954, reappointed member of the People's Council; 1954-55, director of the Councillors Office, IMPG.

Although at one time he headed the East Mongolian Autonomous Government at Ulanhot (Wangyehmiao), Po-yen-man-tu has been more or less a figure-head in the People's Government

of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region since its establishment in 1947.

Su, Ch'ien-i
Party official
Chinese, background unknown. Deputy secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the CCP, 1954, vice-chairman of the IMAR People's Government, delegate to the National People's Congress in Peking, vice-chairman of the First CPPCC Inner Mongolia Committee.

Su has remained largely in the background, but next to Ulanfu, he is perhaps the most influential man in the party organization in Inner Mongolia.

Sun, Lan-feng (Courtesy name: Wan-chiu)
Government official
Native of Shantung, 1949, one of the delegates invited to attend the CPPCC in Peking; 1951, vice-chairman of the Suiyuan Military and Administrative Council; vice-chairman of the Suiyuan People's Government; 1951, re-elected vice-chairman of the Suiyuan People's Government; 1955, vice-chairman of the Inner Mongolia People's Council, vice-chairman of the first plenary session of the Inner Mongolia Committee of the CPPCC.

Sung, Chen-ting
Government official
Native of Kiangsu; 1952, director of the Department of Forestry and member of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; 1954, member of the People's Council, IMPG.

Te Wang
See under Demchukdonggrub

Temurbagen (Temübegen)
Government official
Born 1903, member of the North Khorchin Banner of the Jerim League, graduate of the Sun Yat-sen University (Canton or Moscow ?), 1931-35, arrested several times by the Japanese police on suspicion of Communist activities; employed in the Economic Department in the Hsingan autonomous government of Manchukuo; 1945, Minister of Economic Affairs in the East Mongolia People's Government, 1946 delegate to Ulan Bator, May 1946, elected chairman of the Hsingan government; 1947-52, director of the Department of Finance and member of the government council, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government; 1949, member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, Central

People's Government; 1954, IMAR delegate to the National People's Council; 1955, elected vice-chairman of the first CPPCC Inner Mongolia Committee and president of the Inner Mongolia High Court. Member of the Executive Committee of the Chinese People's Welfare Association.

Ting, Mou

Government and party official

Background unknown; 1950, member of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; 1952, director of the Political Department of the Inner Mongolia Military District.

Ulan

Party and government official (woman)

Member of the Tumet Banner, Suiyuan, director of the Inner Mongolia Committee of the Federation of Democratic Women, 1947-54, member of the IMAR People's Government Council, and member of the People's Supervisory Commission, 1954, delegate to the National People's Congress in Peking, 1955-member of the IMAR People's Council.

Ulan's principal responsibility was the mobilization and organization of the women of Inner Mongolia. She suffered a temporary eclipse in 1954 when she was not elected to the people's council; however, in 1955, her name was back on the list of members of the people's council again, replacing Liu Hsiu-mei, a woman member of the former Suiyuan-Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau.

Ulanfu

Chinese name: Yün Tse

Government and party official, Communist

Born 1903 (or 1904? 1905?), a member of the Tumet Banner in Suiyuan; studied in the Mongolian and Tibetan School, Peking; participated in the West Mongolia Revolutionary Movement since 1920; 1924, joined the Young Communist League and became secretary, active in agit-prop work; 1925, delegate to the first conference of the Inner Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party; took part in the organization of the Inner Mongolia People's Revolutionary Army in Kalga; 1927, joined the Chinese Communist Party; 1925-30, student in the Oriental University in Moscow; returned to China in 1930; 1934, teacher in a primary school in the Tumet banner; 1935, took part in the recapture of Pailing-miao by Nationalist forces under Fu Tso-i; 1937, participated in the armed activities of the Suiyuan-Mongolian Peace Preservation Corps, in which he was a political commissar under the command of Pai Hai-feng (qv in Northwest Handbook); 1937-41, commander of a Mongolian Banner Independent Brigade stationed at I-meng; 1941 (or 1939?) went to Tenan; 1941-45, president of the Nationality College in the Anti-Japanese University at Yenan and concurrently director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government; 1944, established the Democratic Anti-Japanese Government in the Ikhohao League in Suiyuan; 1945, elected an alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP at the 7th All-China Conference; 1946, chairman of the Conference of Eastern and Western Mongolian leaders at Ch'eng-te, Jehol, which led to the merger of the two factions into the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Association, precursor of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; 1946, Communist appointed governor of Suiyuan (the Nationalist governor of Suiyuan was then Tung Ch'i-wu); 1947, chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; chairman of the Economic and Financial Commission of the IMAR People's Government; commander and political commissar of the Inner Mongolia Military District; secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP; 1949, delegate to the first CPPCC in Peking and elected member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC; deputy director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, member of the Political and Legal Commission in the Central People's Government; deputy commander, Suiyuan Military District; and secretary of the Suiyuan-Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the CCP.

Member of the Board of Directors of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; member of the National Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the China Peace Committee; member of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of Children.

1953, member of the Central People's Government Council; member of the Commission for Drafting the Constitution of the People's Republic of China; 1954, re-elected chairman of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region People's Government; delegate to the National People's Congress held in Peking, member of the Presidium of the National People's Congress; 1955, vice-premier of the State Council and concurrently chairman of the Commission on Nationality Affairs of the Central People's Government, member of the National Defense Council.

Ulanfu is responsible, more than any other Mongol leader, in the establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government and in bringing it into the political fold of Communist China. He had participated since 1920 in the revolutionary movement of the Mongols which was primarily for independence and self-government, but later he was one of those Mongol nationalists who sought to achieve Mongol autonomy through the help of the Communists. While in Russia, where he spent nearly ten years of his life, he became imbued with the theories of Marxism-Leninism and later, while president of the Nationality College at Yenan, he helped to formulate the policy of the Chinese Communists towards the national minorities. Today, he is chairman of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Central People's Government.

In the IMAR, Ulanfu holds concurrent positions in the government, as chairman of the region, in the army, as commander and political commissar in the Inner Mongolia Military district, and in the party, as secretary of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau (later the Inner Mongolia Committee). It was Ulanfu who instituted the land reform and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries campaigns, and it was he who instituted the "study" programs, and the ideological reform and purges of the cadres in 1951-52. By pushing through the Communist version of regional autonomy for the minorities, he has betrayed the aspirations of his fellow Mongols for self-rule, and by enforcing the domination of Peking over Inner Mongolia, he has stifled the desire of his people for independence.

Ulitu
Government official
Mongol; 1950, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, 1952, promoted to director; 1955, member of the People's Council of the IMPG.

Wang, I-lun
Government and party official
Background unknown; 1952, member of the Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and deputy chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, 1955, vice-chairman of the People's Council, IMPG.

Wang, To
Government official
Background unknown; 1952-55, member of the Government Council of the Inner Mongolia People's Government; 1952-54, director of the East Mongolia Administrative Office; 1954, delegate to the National People's Congress, Peking.

Wang, Ts'ai-t'ien
See under Namchisereng

Wang, Wen-ta
Government and party official
Native of Shansi; 1953, director of Department of Propaganda, Inner Mongolia Sub-bureau, 1954, member of the Government Council, vice-chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission of the IMPG.

Wang Wen-ta was in charge of the campaign for the study of advance Soviet technology launched in 1954 which was part of the ideological remolding movement directed at the Communist cadres.

Yang, Chih-lin
Government official
Chinese, vice-chairman of Suiyuan People's Government 1950-51, 1951-54, vice-chairman of the IMPG, 1954, re-elected vice-chairman of the IMAR People's Government; 1955, chairman of the first CPPCC Inner Mongolia Committee.

Yüh Tse
See under Ulanfu

Yung, Fu
Government official
1950, member of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Inner Mongolia People's Government, concurrently director of the Nei Mang-kü Jih-pao (Inner Mongolia Daily).

AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

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AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

I. The Pre-Communist Period

A. The Setting

The geography of Inner Mongolia consists essentially of an inland plateau with a more or less flat surface at an elevation above three thousand feet, fringed by mountains and valleys. The region lies in the warm temperate zone with low summer monsoonal rainfall (fifteen to twenty inches), strong evaporation, almost perpetual sunshine, and constant northwesterlies. All these constituent factors have made this region essentially a natural grassland for all kinds of pastoral animals (horses, cattle, sheep, goats, camels).

The seasons are marked by sharp climatic fluctuations. In summer, when the rainy season occurs, rain often comes in gentle showers associated with passing cyclonic storms. The annual rainfall ranges from fifteen to twenty inches, most of which falls during the summer. Precipitation may be quite local, so that while one area receives a light rain, ten miles away not a drop falls. Winters are long and bitterly cold, with strong icy winds out of Siberia. The season arrives suddenly, any time after the middle of September. Skies are generally clear, and monthly temperature averages remain below freezing for six months. Often during the winter the ground freezes to a depth of one meter or more, causing the spring sowing to occur late. In 1906 food was recorded as late as June 3.

On the steppe, grasses and a few xerophytic plants provide the chief resources available to man. Since the grass is rarely tall enough to harvest and bring into barns, man is perforce a nomad. Because of the variations in precipitation, the pastoralist wanders from place to place in quest of pasture for his flocks of sheep, goats, or cattle. The soils of Inner Mongolia are of two types: a chestnut brown soil, in which cereals can be raised by dry farming once every two or three years after sufficient moisture has accumulated in the soil, and a rich black soil in the southern extremity of the Mongolian plateau.

B. Mongol Animal Husbandry

The Mongols of Inner Mongolia have been nomads for thousands of years. Various theories have been propounded to explain the cause and persistance of nomadism in this region, so that these problems will not concern us here (see China IMAR, Social Structure). In Suiyuan and Chahar, herding practices of the Mongol people have varied according to the region. For purposes of convenience we will first examine the Mongol groups that have engaged in animal husbandry and practiced agriculture. This was common for the Ikechou and Ulanchah Leagues, and other districts. These Mongols still considered their pastoral activities important and only engaged in agriculture as a subsidiary occupation. The chief crop grown was millet, and the methods of planting, cultivating, and harvesting this staple were extremely crude. In April the seeds were thrown onto the fields and after some time elapsed, oxen were used to cultivate the land. No further care was administered until the sowing season in the fall, when the crop was cut with small knives. This form of farming did not require full attention by the Mongol people, and so they devoted most of their efforts to taking care of their herds.

The second type of region may be considered as an area for pure animal husbandry. This area was in the Silingol League in Chahar. The area occupied by this league was one of the few left where the Mongols were purely nomadic herdsmen. The procedures of herding were as follows: in March on a clear day, the Mongols made a huge fire as a symbol of rejoicing for the coming spring. During the first ten days of May, the herdsmen took their belongings and their herds and moved to good pasturage. There they arranged their herds for grazing and set up their camps. The arrangement of herds for grazing was done by selecting several groups of different types of animals and placing them in different pasture areas. Each group of animals was guarded by several Mongol herders. The horses were divided into groups of five-hundred (depending on the size of the total herd) and allowed to graze over an area of roughly four square miles. After about fifteen days, it was necessary to move the herds to different pasture; however, after another fifteen days, (a period sufficient to allow the grass to grow again) the Mongols brought their herds back to the previous pasture to graze again. The following table is an estimate of the size of herding groups and the number of Mongol herdsmen that were required to watch over each group. (Goto Tomio, 1942, p. 270):

Type of Animal	No. of animals/group	No. herdsmen
Horses	500 head	2 or 3
	1,000	4
	1,500	6
	2,000	8
Cows	500	2 or 3
	1,000	4
Sheep	100	1

There were two forms of production relationships necessary for this society of nomadic herders. The first was the owner-slave relationship, in which the owner of a great herd possessed a number of slaves, controlling their labor power and regulating it as he saw fit. The second form was a contractual labor relationship. In this case, the owner of a herd would give a portion of

his herd to another herd-owner to take care of. As payment, the herder who had taken the additional animals under his care might receive milk from the cows, and could borrow the herder's wagon, or he might be paid in some form of goods. If any of the livestock died in his care he was required to return the dead animal to the rightful owner.

Japanese observers in Inner Mongolia in the late 1930's reported that the methods of animal breeding and care were very primitive. The animals were permitted to wander freely, and frequently little or no facilities were provided for them during the cold seasons. They described the procedure for herding and care of the animals as follows: during the summer months, pastureland in the vicinity of rivers or lakes was selected and at a suitable time the herds were moved from one pasture to another to utilize the pasture land more efficiently. In the winter, the Mongol nomads transferred their tents to the southeastern slopes of hills and mountains to avoid the stinging north and west winds. Here the animals were forced to forage for themselves by digging into the frozen snow for whatever vegetation existed. The Japanese estimated that about 24 to 40 per cent of the livestock were lost annually because of the severe cold and the high rate of disease.

Japanese farm experts stated their opinion of the quality of Mongolian livestock as follows. (Contemporary Manchuria, April, 1939, pp. 85-6.) In other pastoral areas of the world, one finds a great variety in the type of animals raised, but in Inner Mongolia, many thousands of years of the same environment and persistent usage of primitive herding techniques in care of livestock have produced a fixed type of animal through the process of natural selection. The type of stock that exists in Inner Mongolia is sturdy and stands up well under the rigors of climate and countryside. But from a qualitative standpoint the animals and their by-products, e.g. wool, milk, cheese, etc. are inferior in quality as compared to pastoral animals in other centers of the world. Breeding by selected animals and more attention to care and preservation of the younger stock might not only result in the emergence of superior animals, but lead to a quantitative improvement as well.

The following chart shows the distribution of types of animals raised in the Mongol pastoral area and the Chinese agricultural region (Goto Tomio, 1942, p. 61):

Type of Animal	Distribution of all types of animals for Mongol areas	Distribution of animals in Chinese area
Horses	9.0	15.9
Cows	10.6	12.2
Goats and Sheep	77.9	71.3
Camels	2.5	.6
	100.0	100.0

Because the Chinese population was greater than the Mongol, there was a vast difference in the number of animals per person. If one were to averagè out the number of animals per person, each Mongol would own about six aminals, and for the Chinese region, there would be about .2 animals per person.

Few statistics are available to enable us to show any trend in Inner Mongolia in regard to livestock number. The following figures from the Chinese Economic Bulletin for March 7, 1925, (quoted in Chang Yin-t'ang, 1933, p. 84) give the total number of each kind of animal for Inner Mongolia, Jehol, and the Jerim Prairie:

Type of Livestock	Number
Horses	5,000,000
Cattle	5,555,000
Sheep and goats	7,272,000
Camels	15,000
Total	17,842,000

We have another set of statistics for Suiyuan and Chahar for the year 1935, from a study by Wang Ping-hsün (pp. 34-5):

Place	Type of Animal	Number of Animals
Chahar and Suiyuan	Horses	247,000
	Cattle	527,000
	Sheep & goats	5,027,000
	Other	3,202,000
		9,003,000

For a ten-year period, this represents a rapid decline in the number of livestock. However, the data for the year 1925 includes a slightly larger area than that for the year 1935.

From Japanese observers who were in Inner Mongolia in 1939, we are provided with another set of statistics which give us quite a different picture:

Type	Chanan	Hsinpei	Federated Mongol Leagues	Total
Cattle	41.0	110.0	408.0	560.0
Horses	11.0	30.0	459.0	500.0
Mules	10.4	60.0	26.2	96.0
Donkeys	68.0	130.0	77.0	275.0
Goats	74.7	120.0	700.0	894.0
Sheep	125.0	180.0	3,650.0	3,955.0
Camels	10.0	2.0	40.6	52.6
				6,333.2

From the data presented so far, it is clear that there has been a decline in the absolute number of livestock in Inner Mongolia. Paralleling the decline of animal husbandry has been a decline in population over the past few hundred years. According to Ho Yang-lin's estimates, in the early Ch'ing period (no precise data is given) the population for Chahar was 132,750, but by 1931 this number had been reduced to 85,075, representing a decline of 47,675. For Suiyuan in the early Ch'ing period, the total number was 290,500, but by 1931 the figure was 197,319, a reduction of 93,181. This would mean that the total Mongol population for the indicated parts of Inner Mongolia in 1931 was 282,394.

The Japanese in 1939 also presented their estimates of population decline and their findings compare closely with Ho Yang-lin's data (see Ho, 1935, pp. 27-36). The Japanese estimated that in the early Ch'ing period the total population was 423,250, but by 1939 the number was 257,465, a decline of 165,785. The difference between the Chinese and Japanese population figures of 1931 and 1939 is 24,929. The nine years between the surveys made by the Chinese and Japanese were, however, marked by banditry and by warfare between the Japanese and Soviet armies, as well as a falling birthrate, which could account for the difference of 24,929.

It is dangerous to establish a causal relationship between the decline of animal resources and human population. Ho Yang-lin gives several important factors that accounted for the rapid fall in the Mongol population.

1) The policy of encouraging Lamaism by the Manchu dynasty meant that more Mongol men went into the priesthood, after which they were forbidden to marry.

2) Disease and plague carried off large numbers of the population.

3) Natural disasters like drought and floods claimed many lives.

4) The assimilation of Mongol society and culture by the Chinese gradually reduced the number of pure Mongol inhabitants; the Manchus encouraged intermarriage between Mongols and Chinese.

The factor that probably caused the rapid decline of livestock during the 1930's was the incessant encroachment of Chinese traders and farmers onto the Mongol lands. By the twentieth century, in the southern fringe areas of Inner Mongolia and on the eastern border of Manchuria, the extensive Mongol economy of pastoral nomadism gradually became subordinated to Chinese agriculture because of Chinese colonization. This new economy was more intensive than that of the Mongols but less so as the agriculture of China within the great wall, because even at the margin of the steppe there was not enough water from either streams or wells to make irrigation a general practice.

The appearance of railroads skirting and jutting into portions of Inner Mongolia came to be the wedge that transformed Mongol society to a mixed economy of herding and farming. These were the Trans-Siberian Railway in Manchuria and the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway reaching up into a southern portion of Inner Mongolia. From the east and south the railways despatched into Inner Mongolia even more Chinese colonists than traders, because rail transport reversed the direction of grain export, making the

Chinese market more profitable than the steppe market.

The scope of nomadic movements varies and depends largely on the pastoral range. There is an intricate relationship between the kind of pasture that predominates, the frequency of moving camp, the distance traveled from one grazing ground to the next, and the climate and soil. Sheep and camels do not do well on wet pastures; a lime soil is best for horses and a saline soil for camels. Goats and sheep crop the pasture more closely than other animals, therefore they can graze where cattle and horses have already passed; but cattle and horses cannot feed on a pasture where sheep and goats have recently been feeding.

In the modern period, with the movement of Chinese colonization forcing the Mongols into poorer pastures, goats were becoming more common than sheep, leading to a further vicious impoverishment of the environment and a more acute degeneration of the Mongol economy and society. This was aggravated by the fact that goats were more subject to fatal epizootic diseases than sheep. Goats were able to live on poorer pastures than sheep and gave much the same products, though of poorer quality. Both sheep and goats, especially goats, destroyed pastureland when it was grazed too long and too closely because their sharp hoofs cut the turf. This exposed the topsoil, which was blown away by the wind, with results that were often mistaken for climatic desiccation.

Thus as the Mongols were compelled either to adapt to a mixed economy of sedentary farming and livestock raising or retreat into poorer pastoral regions of the steppe, Mongol animal resources declined and the population was further reduced. Starvation, disease, banditry, and the ravages of civil war exacted a further toll of animal and human resources. This was the state of affairs the Chinese Communists found when they came to power in 1947.

C. Chinese Agriculture in Inner Mongolia

The southern area of Inner Mongolia is an area devoted primarily to farming, though of course there is considerable livestock raising done also. In 1939 an expedition of Japanese scholars sought to determine the northern frontier line of the agricultural belt. Their findings at this time indicate that the line of the agricultural belt. Their findings at this time indicate that the line of the agricultural belt runs through a point 30 kilometers north of Te-hua (170 kilometers north of Kalgan), proceeds westward through a point ten kilometers north of Tumulutai in Tao-lin-hsien, through Ulan Khoto (Ulanhot), Tarmusum, Ssu-tzu-pu-wang-fu, and through a point 32 kilometers to the south of Pai-ling-miao (about 150 kilometers north of Pao-t'ou). From this we can estimate that the northernmost line of the agricultural belt runs westward parallel with, but a trifle to the south of, north latitude 42

degrees, and we can thus conclude that the point 27 kilometers southwest of Hsi-la-mu-lin-miao is the northernmost tip of the agricultural belt.

There are serious obstacles to the development of farming in Inner Mongolia, with which Chinese colonizers have had to contend ever since their migrations into the southern fringes of the region. We have already mentioned the climatic problems of early frost and the consequent short growing season. Often after planting has taken place, the shortness of the summer season does not allow the crops to ripen sufficiently and they must be cut while still green and allowed to dry in order to ripen. Double cropping is an impossibility and it is extremely important that the one seasonal crop be harvested as initially planned, since there is no compensation for loss. The time element then is of the utmost importance and circumstances demand that the harvest occur within a hundred days of planting.

The immigrant Chinese farmers tended to deride the Mongol for his failure to plow the rich soil and raise crops. It is clear, however, that once the sparse vegetation is removed and the surface sod destroyed, serious erosion follows. E.R. Huc in his Travels in Tartary. Tibet and China describes an area of Inner Mongolia (in the middle of the last century) as follows: "Towards the middle of the seventeenth century, the Chinese began to penetrate into this district. At that period, the whole landscape was still one of rude grandeur; the mountains were covered with fine forests, and the Mongol tents whitened the valleys, amid rich pasturages. For a very modest sum, the Chinese obtained permission to cultivate the desert, and as cultivation advanced, the Mongols were obliged to retreat, conducting their flocks and herds elsewhere.

"From that time forth, the aspect of the country became entirely changed. All the trees were grubbed up, the forests disappeared from the hills, the prairies were cleared by means of fire, and the new cultivators set busily to work in exhausting the fecundity of the soil. Almost the entire region is now in the hands of the Chinese, and it is probably to their system of devastation that we must attribute the extreme irregularity of the seasons which now desolate this unhappy land. Droughts are of almost annual occurrence, the spring winds setting in, dry up the soil; the heavens assume a sinister aspect, and the unfortunate population await, in utter terror, the manifestation of some terrible calamity; the winds by degrees redouble their violence, and sometimes continue to blow far into the summer months. Then the dust rises in clouds, the atmosphere becomes thick and dark; and often, at mid-day, you are environed with the terrors of night, or rather, with an intense and almost palpable blackness, a thousand times more fearful than the most sombre night. Next after these hurricanes comes the rain; but so comes, that instead of being an object of desire, it is an object of dread, for it pours down in furious raging torrents. Sometimes the heavens, suddenly opening, pour forth in, as it were, an immense cascade, all the water with which they are charged in that quarter; and immediately the fields and their crops disappear under a sea of mud, whose enormous waves follow the course of the valleys and carry everything before them. The torrent rushes on, and in a few hours, the earth reappears, but the crops are gone, and worse even than that, the arable soil also has gone with them. Nothing remains but ramification of ruts, filled with gravel, and thenceforward incapable of being plowed."

The following chart gives the total number of acres for Inner Mongolia (Chahar and Suiyuan), the amount of cultivated land, the number of farm households, and the average cultivated acres per farm (Cressey, 1955, p. 105):

Province	Area in acres	Cultivated land	Farm households	Aver. per/farm
Chahar	70,096,092.5	2,556,000	309,000	8.3
Suiyuan	81,400,998.7	2,813,000	250,000	11.3
Total	151,497,091.2	5,369,000	559,000	9.8

This would indicate that the percentage of cultivated land out of the total area was around four per cent. Turning now to the individual farm and the type of crops grown, we can present the following picture.

Reports by Japanese observers in the late 1930's state that the size of plots averaged around 20 to 30 meters in width with a length of 150 meters, which gave them a narrow rectangular appearance. Thus the plots were roughly 1.2 sq. acres. Cultivation was said to be conducted on carefully selected land and soil, contrary to the general belief that only level land was used for farming. The level lands of rich soil were the first to be cultivated by the settlers, but numerous tracts of flat land were now idle, no doubt due to lack of fertility and constant erosion, and there were terrace-like elongated fields at the foot and the middle portions of hills. The only reason to explain this, according to these observers, was that the farmers through personal experience decided to cultivate higher lands simply for the reason that the soil there was richer and more productive than the soil of the more level lands.

The average area of land cultivated per household varied according to the locale. From land surveys conducted by Japanese scholars in the area, it was believed that the scale of farming north of the Yinshan Ranges was smaller than in the south. In general, the average area of land cultivated by a household was found by these survey teams to be as follows:

Chang-pei and vicinity (Chahar League)	300 mou (about 45 acres)
Shang-tu and vicinity (Chahar League)	100 mou (about 15 acres)
Tumulutai and vicinity (Chahar League)	200 mou (about 30 acres)
Wu-chuan and vicinity (Ulanchab League)	130 mou (about 20 acres)

(Contemporary Manchuria, April, 1939, pp. 109-10)

From the above tabulation it would appear that the average area of land cultivated by a one-family farming unit is quite high, but since the source of this information cannot be confirmed, there is room for error. It would appear that the average household tills between 100 and 150 mou, or roughly between 15 and 24 acres of land, as recorded by Japanese observers.

The type of crops grown in this agricultural belt is similar to those grown in North China. Different types of wheat are planted, based on their suitability to the ground and climate. Rye, barley, potatoes, corn, and kaoliang are some of the other principal crops. Barley is important for its use in the production of alcohol. Potatoes have been grown in increasing numbers over the years with considerable success because the plant is hardy, the yield high, and it serves as a good food item. Oil seed-bearing plants rank high in use, and are planted largely for their killing effect on weeds. When harvested, the oil is squeezed out by primitive methods, and the good oil is used for domestic purposes, while the remainder serves as fertilizer and livestock feed. During the war experiments were carried out on the growing of dry rice, and were so successful that dry rice can now be considered an important crop.

The methods of farming are primitive and resemble the native methods used by North China farmers. However, since the area of land cultivated by the average household is comparatively larger, simpler methods are used. First, the ground is cleared by burning or trampling down the weeds and pasture grass. Seeds are then sown in straight lines, placed 30 centimeters apart with dried fertilizer if this is available. Care such as weeding is given only once or twice. At harvest time, wheat and related grains are harvested with sickles, but millet is harvested with knives. After the harvested crops are allowed to dry and ripen in the open, they are transported to the storehouse of each household. Then after a crop has been harvested, that ground is permitted to lie fallow and adjacent land is used for the following year's planting. Autumn cultivation is begun immediately after the harvest. This is encouraged because sowing can take place even if the fields are not taken care of during the period between thawing and sowing in the spring.

In the southern sections of Chahar there are few large streams where irrigation systems can be constructed. Instead, most water is found in wells. Therefore, it is by the digging and maintenance of wells that water is provided in this region for farming and the watering of animals.

However, in the northern part of the Ordos region, in Hou-t'ao, an intricate system of canals and irrigation ditches has been constructed. This elaborate irrigation system existed as early as the Ch'in dynasty (B.C. 255-206). In the beginning of the twentieth century, the system was created anew and put into an excellent working condition. During the early years of the Republican period, these canals and ditches fell into ruin from lack of repair, but in 1935 funds were raised to set about the work of improving the embankments and the main channels of the canals.

The system of land ownership in this region is very complicated and the lack of documentation makes it virtually impossible not only to determine the specific types of relationships that prevailed on the land, but also the number of tenants and landlords. There were very complicated arrangements for landholdings. At that time some land was owned by the Chinese government, and some was still retained by Mongol princes, although the latter had lost much to Chinese merchants through usury. Land was leased to Chinese farmers by Mongol princes, and by Chinese merchants to Chinese farmers. The relationship between tenant and landlord in every case was not rigid and contracts were easily broken. There seem to be numerous incidents of tenants who changed their landlords, and after saving up money, became landowners themselves. Landlords and tenants usually decided how much to share out of the produce, and the landlord supplied the tenant with the necessary seeds and farm implements to carry out the work. The fact that large new areas could be reclaimed and cultivated may be one reason for the flexibility in land relationships. There was no critical problem of tenantry. (See also section Social Structure.)

It is impossible to determine whether there was a decline in output, and, if so, how much of a decline during the 1930's and early 1940's. We do have figures which give the average output for the 1930's, but this can only be given for the two provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, which today constitute the greatest portion of Inner Mongolia. The output figures are in metric tons and are an average for the years 1931 to 1937. The average amount of cultivated ground for each crop is given in hectares.

Average Output for 1931-1939 (in metric tons)

	Wheat	Barley	Rapeseed	Rice	Kaoliang	Millet
Chahar	126,650	158,950	16,750	16,750	255,450	205,050
Suiyuan	119,150	45,600	35,350	- - -	89,450	8 9,100

Average for years 1931-1939 (in hectares; 1 hectare = 2.471 acres)

	Wheat	Barley	Rapeseed	Rice	Kaoliang	Millet
Chahar	162,867	169,733	41,467	16,467	207,400	205,400
Suiyuan	163,600	58,067	82,933	- - -	90,067	113,733

(W.H.Shen, 1951, pp. 374-377.)

D. Conclusion

Despite the impoverishment of Inner Mongolia, the region has potentialities for economic growth and could contribute greatly to Chinese economic development if the proper measures were taken to preserve and strengthen the occupation of livestock raising. This does not presuppose a total disregard for the farming sector which would, of course, be maintained, but grain surpluses have never been very great, nor does it seem likely they ever will be, given the climate, the shortness of the growing season, and the poor soil, although small quantities have been exported to China over the past years.

One study in 1933 explored the likelihood of developing the processing industries of livestock by-products, i.e., wool, bristles, intestines, etc., and how valuable this could be for China as well as Inner Mongolia, if such small-scale industries could be established and the increase of livestock promoted (Chang, 1933, pp. 75-132). However, before this could take place there would have to be a rapid introduction and wide diffusion of knowledge pertaining to livestock care and breeding, and various steps would have to be taken such as importing breeding animals, veterinary teams, and establishing means of protecting the stock from severe climatic fluctuations. If such measures were taken and applied rigorously on a wide scale throughout the pastoral regions, a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the livestock might be of such magnitude to justify establishing subsidiary industries to process the animal by-products. Horses in great number could be exported to other sections of China to carry out better plowing and cultivating, thus increasing productivity in these areas, and China for the first time might have an area that could supply her population with the necessary meat and dairy products.

However, one of the critical problems that remains to be solved is the dispute between Mongols and Chinese over the ownership and operation of certain types of land. The Mongols resent being continually forced off their land and seeing their rich pastures used as farm land by the Chinese immigrants. The problem of finding suitable pasture land for the Mongols to feed their herds is becoming critical. At the same time, the Chinese farmers have wastefully destroyed much fertile land by their carelessness and crude methods of farming. The solution to these problems will hinge on the proper demarcation of land for pasture and for farming purposes. The Chinese Nationalist government was unable or too unconcerned to try to find this solution.

II. The Communist Period

A. Communist Policy toward Animal Husbandry

Besides being vitally concerned with extending their political authority over the region, the Chinese Communists wished to create an environment conducive to increasing the number of livestock. To solve the problem of the declining number of livestock, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government has placed special emphasis on the development of cattle raising and the utilization of all kinds of grazing lands. Chinese Communist policy toward the Mongolian herders in this respect differed greatly from the measures taken by Soviet authorities in Outer Mongolia. In 1928, the Seventh Congress and the Fifth Great Khural in Outer Mongolia initiated an extreme "leftist" policy, and mass confiscation of the property of the clerical and "feudal" lords was undertaken. In addition to the massive expropriation of property after 1929, there were large-scale attempts of collectivization of herds. But the efforts on the part of the Soviet authorities to collectivize and set a planned economy in motion failed dismally due to the open revolt of the population, who slaughtered their livestock. In 1932 the government leadership of Outer Mongolia altered its policy and emphasis was placed on improving the environmental conditions for livestock. This was comparable to the policy enacted by the Chinese Communists in Inner Mongolia in 1947. Whether the Chinese Communists learned from the bitter experience of the Russians that enforced collectivization of nomadic communities was an ill-advised venture, it is not known. But clearly Chinese Communist policy in Inner Mongolia toward the Mongol herding communities was careful and cautious, and no steps were taken to confiscate the property of the wealthy herd owners or the Lamaist monasteries. The social structure was left intact, and the steps taken were of a more concrete nature. The following were the five steps taken (although establishing cattle-raising cooperatives was a policy measure, and mostly a means to organize labor brigades, nevertheless it constituted a real step toward cooperativization):

1. Increase the number of all kinds of livestock and improve the quality of the stock.
2. Attempt not to plough up grazing or semi-grazing areas.
3. Cultivate fodder-grass.
4. Establish cattle raising co-ops.
5. Encourage the Mongols to settle down.

Various obstacles stood in the way of the program to increase the number of livestock, principally deprivations of wild animals, disease, and inadquate weather forecasting. In 1949, 58,000 head of cattle alone were slaughtered by wolves. Extermination of wolves was therefore commenced on a mass scale, and the honor of "wolf-hunting hero" was bestowed on shepherds as an incentive to get them to pay more heed to their herds and preserve the offspring. In the year of 1950, it was reported that 8,100 wolves were slain, which contributed greatly to the 51 per cent increase in the number of livestock of the Huna, Hsingan, and Jerim Leagues.

In 1949, the government of Inner Mongolia was taking steps to immunize and carry out anti-epizootic activities. By October of 1950, around 183,000 head of livestock were reported to have been innoculated, which was about 70 per cent of all cattle in the region. Other measures complementing these campaigns were the establishment of stud farms, veterinarian organizations and clinics, and the construction of wells throughout the pastoral region. Brigades of workers were sent into the cattle-breeding areas of the Silingol and Huna Leagues to locate and build wells in poorly-watered grazing areas. At the present time there are said to be 3,479 wells in the grazing areas, each one capable of supplying water for 500 head of cattle. In the past five years, various weather stations have been constructed to warn the herders of the sudden, violent storms, which have always in the past claimed a large number of cattle. It is not known exactly how information is communicated from the weather stations to the herders. There may be a few radios among some of the livestock cooperatives, but cooperativization is far from complete yet. Additional improvements of livestock have resulted from breeding. It was reported in 1955 that 20,000 sheep were crossed with the Soviet Tsgaisky pedigree sheep by the artificial insemination method (Far Eastern Economic Review, November 24, 1955, p. 661). The result was a larger sheep, producing twice as much good quality wool as the local breed.

Besides these measures to increase production of livestock, they have also attacked the major problem of deciding which land the Mongols would use and which land would be farmed. Steps were taken to distinguish grazing land from farming land in February of 1954, when Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia were amalgamated into one autonomous region. This policy was similar to the demarcation of farming and grazing land for cattle set forth in Inner Mongolia in 1953. In August of 1953, the Shen-pa Administrative Bureau convened in a conference on animal husbandry in which the emphasis on agriculture and slighting of animal husbandry was criticized; and the following regulations governing the readjustment of grazing fields were set forth:

1. The boundaries of existing grazing fields were to be clearly defined and a survey of pastureland was to be made to determine the basis of the type of grass and number of animals that may graze there.
2. In regard to cultivated land within the grazing fields, if it was reclaimed before the demarcating of grazing fields, it could be kept. If reclaimed after demarcation, the masses were to be persuaded and mobilized to abandon the ground.
3. Inhabitants of grazing areas were permitted to cut grass or

gather firewood within specified areas by the Animal Husbandry Administrative Committee. They could not do this for their own use, and there was to be no selling of firewood or uprooting of grass.

4. In regard to the management of pastures on the grazing fields, the operation was to be done collectively. After demarcation the grazing fields would be managed by administrative committees democratically created, being composed of an adequate number of members chosen by herdsmen of Mongolian and Han nationalities, pasture workers, and people in both agriculture and animal husbandry. (Survey of China Mainland Press, Dec. 15, 1954.)

It is presumed that some steps for demarcation were undertaken immediately after the land reform, but 1953 is the first year that concrete instructions on this matter were published. This is a gap of six years, which indicates the slowness of pace at which steps were taken to prohibit the plowing up of Mongol grazing land and preserve the existent grazing land.

It is impossible to determine the measure of success of the Communist Party's attempts to cultivate additional fodder-grass. No doubt this activity would be incorporated along with the general planned policy of attempting to expand the grazing area.

The Communist party placed considerable emphasis and care on organizing cooperatives among the Mongol herders. The scheme provided first for the creation of cattle-breeding teams, which were to help use the grazing areas more efficiently, improve the methods of cattle raising, organize more efficiently the Mongols and their herds to combat natural calamities, and undertake to utilize all available human and material resources. The lowest level of this type of brigade were the mutual-aid and labor teams, which were highly mobile units designed to go from area to area to eliminate labor shortages. It was planned later to organize these teams on a broader and more permanent basis (already the movement toward this type of cooperative has begun) where part of the members would work permanently at cattle raising and the remainder work where cattle were raised more as a side task. In such a cooperative at the more permanent level, everything would be owned collectively by the members and profits would be divided among the members according to the work output of each. Collectivization is surely the goal of the Chinese Communists in the IMAR, although they are proceeding more slowly and less openly than in other regions.

Meanwhile, however, some work has gone ahead on the construction of state mechanized farms, mobile stud units, state ranches, and the building of roads linking these apparatuses to the hinterland, making for a larger transportation and communication network. In 1953 construction was taking place on nine state ranches and state farms and one mechanized farm; sixteen

highways of a total length of 4,000 kilometers are also reported to have been built.

Communist reports on the extent of collectivization in 1955 stated that 40 per cent of all herdsman households were now organized in various forms of cooperatives and that the region contained over 5,000 mutual aid teams and eight large-scale cooperatives. By the end of the first Five Year Plan, 1957, the Communist propose to have 60 per cent of the region in cooperatives of a large-type or of the mutual-aid type. Fifty livestock producer-cooperatives are to be established by this date also. Another report indicates that though the government has tried to organize the shepherds into mutual-aid teams, up to 1955, this effort had met with little success. This report gives the number of mutual-aid teams at 4,900, but it is claimed that these are mostly seasonal cooperatives; and it also makes the statement that there are twenty production cooperatives of shepherds. In addition, the state is running twenty-five animal farms.

In May of 1954, the People's Government of the IMAR stepped up its program of "no struggle, no discrimination, and no class demarcation" among the Mongols. This program was aimed at abolishing class differences and attempting to further extend the movement of cooperativization. What the government has done to implement this policy is to draw up a series of wage scales in the various leagues in accordance with the production conditions. In the pastoral areas an old system called the suluke had prevailed, by which the owner of a herd would pay a certain amount (in terms of animals) to a herdsman to take care of pasturing his livestock. In the past, the owners had only permitted the suluke households to shear wool and milk cows in lieu of wages. The government has attempted to abolish this system for the principles of collective ownership and mutual benefit. The government's claim is that the suluke system hindered the breeding rate and that since the suluke has been abolished and collective efforts have taken place in some areas, the number of livestock has increased. No figures are given to bear this statement out, however,

On June 25, 1954, the People's Government Council of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region announced provisional regulations governing a pastoral tax for the autonomous region. The tax was to be established on a progressive scale and to be levied once a year on persons who possessed herds in the pastoral areas. In the semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas, persons engaged mainly in agriculture were to be exempt from the pastoral tax. Those persons mainly in animal husbandry and in agriculture as a secondary occupation would pay the pastoral tax as well as an agricultural tax. Those persons engaged in both occupations simultaneously with equal income earned from both occupations would be exempt from the pastoral tax. The tax was to be levied on the household unit and on the following livestock categories: large animals such as horses, oxen, and camels; and small animals such as sheep and goats. Sheep were to be taken as the standard unit of payment of the pastoral tax, and a listing was given of the different types of animals and their equivalent to one sheep. The pastoral tax was to be levied according to a progressive scale based on ten different grades with 300 sheep for each grade. The progressive scale of pastoral tax was as follows (Survey of China Mainland Press Supplement, Dec. 15, 1954):

Grade	Number of sheep	Rate of tax
1	1-300	0.7
2	301-600	1.4
3	601-900	2.1
4	901-900	2.8
5	1201-1500	3.5
6	1501-1800	4.2
7	1801-2100	4.9
8	2101-2400	5.6
9	2401-2700	6.3
10	2701-3000	7.0

The pastoral tax was to be levied according to a progressive scale of ten different grades with 300 head of sheep for each grade. The tax rate on herds exceeding the tenth grade would remain the same as that levied on the tenth grade and would not progress further. Each grade was divided into ten sub-divisions with 30 head of sheep for each division. For herds under the tenth grade, any number less than 30 but more than 15 would be considered as 30. If the number was less than 15 the herd would be exempt from taxation. For herds exceeding the tenth grade, the tax was to be levied on the actual number of animals.

The final articles of this new pastoral tax directive relate to the matter of exemptions and the collection of the tax. In cases where it would be impossible to pay in sheep, other animals could be substituted (like goats, horses, or oxen). In cases where natural calamities had rendered great destruction in an area, the tax would be reduced and a new levy made according to the extent of damage. In all cases, the tax was to be paid in male animals, but these animals could be offered only if they were within a certain age limit, and of excellent breeding quality.

What is the significance of this new tax? The Communist press gave two reasons. Before the liberation of Mongolia, they claimed, animal husbandry was in acute deterioration and in the light of this fact, for the first seven years the People's Government did not levy a pastoral tax. But since progress in the past four years had been very rapid and production had reached the highest pre-liberation level, it was now suitable to levy a pastoral tax. The second reason was that the patriotic fervor and political

consciousness of the herdsmen had risen to unprecedented heights and they were now eager to participate in the socialization of their country.

The progressive character of this pastoral tax may be indicative of the fact that the number of livestock has been rapidly increased. In Outer Mongolia, the tax on livestock herders is regressional. This provides speculation as to the reason for different tax policies imposed in these two regions. It could mean that this is an attempt to limit the growth of larger herds in favor of supporting small herders, or it could mean that the People's Government so desperately needs the livestock of this region that it serves as a means of draining the material resources of the region for more urgent needs in China. Whatever the reason for this tax, it does indicate that a certain amount of improvement must have resulted and that the Communists no longer fear to intimidate the Mongol people by levying taxes on them.

The Chinese Communist party has made every effort to channel the surplus produce from the pastoral regions of Inner Mongolia into its own trading concerns. In late 1954, purchases of wool amounted to 7,770,000 tons (15 per cent over 1953); purchases of hides and skins amounted to 1.3 million pieces; purchases of goat intestines used for sausage casings, hair bristles, and furs were valued around 10,000 million yuan (about U.S. $146,482). State commercial agencies are making purchases of draught animals to be distributed throughout China: in 1955, 24,000 horses were shipped out of Inner Mongolia to be delivered to Hopei, Honan, Shantung, and Shansi.

In May of 1954, while the Dragon Boat Festival was in progress in Peking and Tientsin, it was reported that over 3,400 head of cattle, sheep, hogs, and 900,000 catties (44,640 bushels) of eggs were transported from Inner Mongolia to Peking and Tientsin. The region was to ship 1,550 head of cattle, 3,000 head of sheep, 1,000 fat hogs, and large quantities of fresh eggs to meet the needs in Peking and Tientsin for the future. The growth of export trade in live animals and animal products from Inner Mongolia is illustrated by the index increase of government trade in 1954 (1950 = 100).

Live oxen:	380
Live sheep:	378
Ox skins:	290
Sheep skins:	290
Wool:	123

(China News Analysis. Nov. 18, 1955, p. 6.)

It seems that Inner Mongolia is gradually being called upon to furnish other agrarian sections of China with vitally needed livestock, in addition to furnishing the large northern cities with meat and dairy products. This in itself would indicate that the region has made a rapid comeback and that productivity increases in livestock raising have risen greatly due to the Communist measures taken. However, we have no information as to whether Inner Mongolia can afford this draining off of livestock surplus and whether the present trend can be sustained; on paper the results appear excellent, but one wonders what, in terms of real commodities, is being offered in return to the herding people.

It is virtually impossible to determine the exact number of livestock of the Mongol people at the time the region became Communist controlled (May 1, 1947). We do have a rough figure for the region as a whole; this, however, is a Japanese estimate made in 1939, and since then this figure would have declined. Our problem of statistics is further complicated by the fact that since 1947 all increases in the number of livestock are represented by percentage increases, but this is meaningless without an exact number for the base year, 1947. Furthermore, when the Communist party does publish percentage increases, it does so in a non-uniform fashion, stating merely the per cent increases for one banner or several banners, and seldom gives annual uniform per cent increases for the region as a whole. This makes it most difficult to determine the annual growth rate. Percentage increases for the early years are not very informative and must be accepted with reservation; only when we move into the years 1954 and 1955 (first year of the Five Year Plan) can we begin to deduce with any accuracy the rate of growth since 1947. Henceforth when Chinese Communist figures are given, it must be recognized that they are only claims.

Press statements and reports from the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government itself from the period 1949 to 1952 all make the same statement that in the Hulunbuin League in 1947 there were only 600,000 head of sheep, horses, and cattle, which by 1948 decreased to around 200,000 (largely from disease). This example is a favorite of Communists' and they often present for comparison their figures on later output increases to show the vast gains made in livestock raising under their regime. No other figures are supplied for other portions of Inner Mongolia for the base year, 1947.

By the end of 1954, the number of cattle, horses, camels, and sheep totaled around twenty million, nearly three and a half times the 1949 figure (Foreign Broadcast Information Service. No. 87, 1955). It is planned to increase the area's livestock for 1955 by two million head. In the Silingol League each herdsman's family now possesses an average of 198 head of livestock. Complementing this increase in the number of livestock has been the construction of dairy product plants. In 1953 there were thirty of these, whose total annual purchase of milk amounted to over 20,000,000 cubic meters or 528,000,000 gallons. This gave 10,000,000 yuan (about U.S. $430,000) to the pastoral peoples. By 1954 the number of creameries had increased to 53, and by 1955 to fifty-seven.

The problem of statistical differences is clearly seen when we find conflicting Communist reports of livestock increases since 1947. Another report in 1955 stated that the number of livestock was now nineteen million, which represented a 140 per cent increase over the 1949 figures (Survey of China Mainland Press, April 15, 1955). This would probably be around a 200 per cent increase if we push the figures back to the year 1947, and represent a twofold increase instead of a three and a half fold increase. Faced with these conflicting statistical data, we can at best only guess the real increase.

Three key problems persist in the pastoral areas. The first is the acute shortage of labor. This was pointed out by Chairman Ulanfu, who wrote in the Peking Kuang-ming jih-pao, November 11, 1955 (translated in Survey of China Mainland Press, Jan. 27, 1956), that the shortage of labor for managing the herds has hindered the increase of livestock in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. Ulanfu went on to stress the gravity of this problem to justify more rapid collectivization among the pastoral peoples, and the hiring of workers, by which it was hoped to overcome labor shortages. This latter emergency measure indicates the serious nature of the labor problem.

The second problem related to extending collectivization by intensive propaganda among the herders and upper-level lamas. The latter had not been stripped of their property by the Chinese Communists during the land reform, for fear of antagonizing them. According to Ulanfu, no real effective movement of collectivization can continue in the pastoral regions unless this group and their wealth are finally brought into the cooperatives.

The third problem is the need of improving the backward techniques used in animal husbandry. After many years of loud Communist claims of their success in bettering techniques, Chairman Ulanfu was forced to admit in the same article that they have "still not been able to stabilize pastoral production, and, at the slightest attack by natural calamities, animals have died in large numbers, thus causing very heavy losses.... We have, therefore, begun to make preparations for the establishment of state farms in the larger pastoral areas so as to strive for self-sufficiency in grain and fodder in these areas within a period of a few years."

From this statement it would appear that the Communist party has not been completely successful in organizing the Mongol herders and radically transforming the technical and physical features of Mongol animal husbandry. The great reliance on state farms seems to be a Communist admission that the state must finally enter the scene in order to assure that livestock production can be maintained and increased while at the same time, all-out efforts are still being taken to bring the Mongols into cooperatives.

B. Communist Policy toward Agriculture

A general land reform took place in Inner Mongolia, but the speed with which it was enacted and its general character have never been specified. It can be assumed, however, that the land reform moved along similar lines as applied in China later, with the breakup of the large landowning class, the landlords, and a general distribution of this land to the poorer and middle-scale peasants (those peasants who possess some land but are still tenants). After the land reform a tableau of directives was set forth which aimed at increasing productivity by introducing more efficient farming methods. It was resolved to create cooperatives which were to be the foundations for organizing agriculture and promoting larger output increases by the following methods:

1. Compulsory weeding and the use of fertilizers.
2. Extension of cultivation and irrigation wherever possible.
3. Plowing of land and rotation of crops.
4. Establishment of mutual aid teams and producer cooperatives to carry out Communist farming directives, serve as the recipients of subsidies, and to utilize wherever possible machinery and better farming techniques.

By 1949, the amount of night soil as fertilizer was increased by ten per cent over 1947, and by 1950 fertilizer had been applied to 32.51 per cent of the total planted acreage in the Huna, Hsingan, Jouda, and Jerim Leagues, representing an increase of 50 per cent over the total of 322,718 mou (or 49,053 acres) which had received fertilizer the preceding year. By 1951 2,400 weeders were being used by the peasants and the average per mou yield in the Huna League, which was 120 catties (or 5.6 bushels) in 1948, had been increased to 160 catties (or 7.9 bushels) in 1949. This level was maintained on into 1950, despite a severe drought for that year.

During the years 1948 to 1950 the peasants were reported to have ploughed up 3,255,000 mou (494,760 acres) of virgin land, which in turn increased the agricultural belt of the region by 25 per cent. In 1950 the agricultural area was 1,249,503 hectares (3,086,272 acres). In 1950, 1,950,000 mou (22,800 acres) of stricken land (land ruined by storms, pests, etc.) had been ploughed and replanted. Despite floods and loss of man hours for the repair of dikes along the Hsi-liao River, harvest conditions were normal and it had been possible to maintain the former year's production figure of 1,100,000 tons of foodstuffs.

Besides technical improvements, output was to be increased by patriotic campaigns. In 1951, Chairman Ulanfu reported that

there was to be a production increase and economy campaign in order to create an extra 450,000 tons of grain. The plans for this task meant not only greater efforts to boost production through better organization, longer working hours, and more efficient work, but meant that wastes were to be eliminated wherever possible and consumption standards tightly controlled. Chairman Ulanfu lashed out at bureaucratism in the planning and operational procedures and urged preparation for a bumper harvest and increase of animals in the next year.

The Communist party was able to mobilize the peasants for the ambitious campaigns just cited by means of organizational methods and this meant along cooperative lines. First, labor teams on a temporary and seasonal basis were established, usually from groups of people closely bound together. The primary goal of this sort of team was to eliminate labor shortages throughout the region. The second type was the mutual-aid team, which was a more permanent type, to be organized entirely on a voluntary vasis. The members were to be paid according to their productivity and a more highly divided system of work was created. This group was to receive assistance from the government in the form of subsidies, modern agricultural machinery, and was to market its surplus directly to state trading companies. From this level, producer cooperatives were to be established by combining the mutual aid teams and directly pooling land and livestock into one small cooperative. These cooperatives, though small, were directly dependent on the state for credit, supplies, and channels to distribute their produce. It was hoped that finally producer cooperatives could be combined into large-scale mechanized collective farms, but of course this was not to occur for some time yet.

Chairman Ulanfu reported in 1955 that there were around 5,000 mutual-aid teams and over 7,000 agriculture producer-cooperatives, embracing more than 17 per cent of peasant families. In 1956, 30 to 35 per cent of the peasant population are scheduled to be included in such cooperatives, which would number around 11,000. It is planned that by 1957 in 50 per cent of the regions, all peasant households will become members of cooperatives, which will bring their number to 18,000. The figure of 7,000 producer cooperatives for 1955 is supposed to represent a fivefold increase over 1954. The July, 1955 directive issued by Mao Tse-tung for more rapid collectivization has reportedly already brought about results, especially in the agriculture zone.

At the same time that it embarked on a rapid program for bringing the peasants into small-scale cooperatives, the government attempted to supply credit as a further inducement for getting them started, and to have them sell their surplus directly to the state. Credit is supposed to be supplied to enable the peasants to buy any draft animals, carts, farm tools, seed, and fodder that they may need. By the end of 1954 there were 1,609 credit co-operatives, 52 credit teams, and 11 credit departments, showing a total increase of 27 times over 1953. Every village group within the four banners and counties now was supposed to have its own credit cooperative. The capital of most cooperatives is between ten and 30 million yuan (about U.S. $435 to $1,304), the largest being over 100 million yuan (U.S. $4,348). Their business operations are to absorb idle capital in the rural areas for prompt re-investment in agriculture through loans. According to the Communist figures for 1954, a total of 15,900 million yuan (about U.S. $691,000) were absorbed and a total production loan of 20,300 million yuan (about U.S. $883,000) was issued, which constituted about 29 per cent of the state's agricultural loans. These credit cooperatives coordinate their activities with the producer and supply marketing cooperatives. It is reported that these credit cooperatives have played a great role in eliminating usurious practices and guiding rural loans into channels beneficial to productive development.

The development of credit cooperatives makes it convenient for the bank to extend its services to the countryside. A branch of the Agricultural Bank of China was set up in Huhehot in 1955 to handle state credit for the development of agriculture and stock-raising, and sub-branches of the bank were scheduled to be set up in the near future. So far this bank has appointed 26 credit cooperatives and a number of small credit teams to offer on its behalf preferential interest rates on peasants' savings deposits from the proceeds of their grain sales. The Agricultural Bank and its subdivisions are to mop up all idle credit plus all available savings into bank deposits, to be used for investment purposes. By July of 1955 savings deposits in the cities of Inner Mongolia had risen by 77 per cent over that of June, 1954; in Huhehot (the principal city in the region's biggest livestock center), the number of depositors rose to about one-third over the number at the end of 1954.

The China Communists are free in reporting the difficulties of establishing and consolidating credit cooperatives. One difficulty was that once they had been set up on an experimental basis, there was no further effort to consolidate these small ones into larger credit cooperatives. In other cases, some had rushed ahead and expanded only to collapse. Another difficulty was the lack of trained specialists to operate the credit cooperatives. The lack of accountants and planners had allowed large funds to be ill-appropriated; there was evidence that funds had been given out for speculative purposes, and in some instances, the rate of interest on deposits had been deliberately lowered and then when

loans were made, the interest rates were raised to net profits for the cooperatives, but the consequent effect was to cheat the peasants. The basic troubles underlying the above mistakes seemed to be poor organization and the absence of trained cadres and specialists to operate the credit cooperatives efficiently.

Supply marketing cooperatives were additional ancillary government agencies instituted at the same time as the agricultural producer and credit cooperatives. Their function was to supply the producer cooperatives and mutual-aid brigades with the necessary farm implements, seeds, etc., and make the necessary purchases of surplus crops at harvest time to meet the quotas set by the state. At the conference in September, 1954, on the unified purchase of grain and oil-bearing crops, it was pointed out that 1954 had been an unprecedented bumper crop year (this conference met just before the purchases were to be made on the harvest for 1954) and that the mainland needed additional grain and oil-bearing produce. This meant that marketing cooperatives in Inner Mongolia would have to increase their purchases of more grain, etc., and in addition, the peasants were required to pay their agricultural taxes in kind so as to increase the supply even more. All who possessed surplus grain were urged to sell it to the state in accordance with the price fixed by the state.

The method of carrying out purchases was to use test-check investigations of harvest outputs and compare these results with harvest conditions for past years. The agricultural tax had been collected on the basis of "tax assessment according to scale, reduction or exemption according to law, and no increase of tax for increased production," but the purchases of surplus grain from the peasant would be made on a progressive scale according to the principle of "purchasing more when the surplus is big, purchasing less when the surplus is small, and not purchasing at all when there is no surplus."

In the past the peasants of Inner Mongolia had expanded the acreage of oil-producing plants and increased the output of these crops, but this output could hardly meet the needs both of the people and of state economic construction in China. In view of this situation, the conference in September of 1954, attended by the financial and economic affairs committee, decided to further implement the policy of planned purchasing and supply of oil-bearing crops in order to guarantee oil supplies for big cities and industrial and mining areas. This was to be done by increasing the supply quotas that the supply and market cooperatives would have to meet for purchasing and supplying the edible oil for the cities, by increasing the production of oil-bearing crops as much as possible and by encouraging oil-scarce areas to plant or increase oil-bearing crops so as to become more and more self-sufficient, and at the same time, to take steps to improve the oil-processing technique to save more and avoid waste, to promote the use of substitutes for ordinary oil, and strive to expand oil resources.

In the purchasing of grain in the past the conference pointed out many mistakes that would have to be corrected in the near future. These were largely organizational mistakes due to the lack of trained cadres and planners. Such mistakes accounted for the failure to meet the quotas set for the cooperatives and even when quotas had been met on the purchasing side the cooperatives had failed to supply the locales that needed the grain. Both operations would have to be coordinated by making a detailed examination of the consumption of grain and fodder, etc., and by fixing the quantity offered by households according to the production and consumption standards of each locale. On the supply side, the cooperatives were to supply more when the shortage was great, supply less when the shortage was small, and not supply at all when there was no shortage.

The conference urged all cadres to rally the poorer peasants and the new middle peasant into the unified grain marketing and purchasing cooperatives and exclude the rich peasant. The cadres were also responsible for the elimination of rumors of food shortages among the peasants, and steps were to be taken to prevent people from purchasing grain and reselling it at a profit. The rural tactics of relying on a certain group of the peasantry , and playing one class off against another, is a deliberate attempt by the Communist party to extend its control over the peasants in order that its agricultural policies which are so necessary to the overall schemes of industrialization will be carried out. One of the most important of these agricultural policies is the purchasing of surplus produce and supplying it to areas which need it most.

In 1954 supply marketing cooperatives were reported to have expanded and had regulated the distribution of 8,445 farm horses and supplied 34,000 new types of agricultural implements, 540,000 catties (26,784 bushels) of insecticide, and large quantities of producer goods for pastoral pursuits. However, the supply marketing cooperatives still did not fully understand market changes and conditions, and business operations in many were unsatisfactory. There was the problem of supplying the necessary industrial and consumer goods to the countryside and rationing this out through proper distribution. Emphasis was to be placed on handicraft cooperatives to step up their output so that native products could be converted into a source of wealth for the national economy and not be abandoned or neglected in rural villages or the grasslands. Transport had suffered severe bottlenecks and storage facilities were not always adequate. The cooperatives were urged to cut down their expenses, liquidate old debts and refrain from incurring new ones, propagandize among

the peasants, and transform rural merchants into useful agents for the state.

Turning to the efforts to increase the yield of certain crops by expanding planting and cultivation, we note that certain changes have taken place. Since 1954, activities in agriculture have been designed to plant specific crops, which would give Inner Mongolia a comparative advantage. Emphasis has been placed more on growing fruits and sugar beets, as well as reviving the production of crops traditionally grown in the region, like oil-bearing plants. In May of 1954 reports indicated that over 120,000 apple, pear, and peach seedlings from fruit-growing regions in other parts of the country were being planted in that year. Good results were reported for the same year when more than a thousand apple seedlings were planted on wasteland outside of Huhenot. How successful future planting of such types of fruit will be is uncertain, since there are the problems of early frosts and the shortness of the growing season. If selected strains are grown, the outcome may prove favorable for the region.

A great deal of attention has been placed on the production of sugar beets. The best yield reported so far is 22.5 tons per hectare (9.1 tons per acre), and the sugar beets are supposed to have a 20 per cent sugar content. In the area where planting of the crop is taking place, work began on a sugar refinery in May, 1954. The refinery was to produce 22,000 tons of granulated sugar, but it was not said how long it would take to refine this amount. In 1955 the government decided to grow beets on 120,000 mou (18,240 acres) of land in the western part of the region. The plan called for an output of 182,000 tons of beets for the Pao-t'ou sugar mill, which was to begin production in this same year. A conference was held to study plans for beet production and cultivating the 120,000 mou (18,240 acres) of land and to devise measures to ensure fulfillment of this plan. The beets were to be grown in the Tümet and Jungar Banners, in the three hsien of Saratsi; Cho-tzu, and Wu-tung, and in the suburbs of the two cities of Huhehot and Pao-t'ou, because irrigation was available and communications convenient in these localities. Leaders at the various levels in the localities were to intensify political propaganda on various subjects as well as the education of worker-peasant alliance, to fix reasonable exchange ratios between beets and other agricultural products, to rely on mutual-aid and cooperative organizations, and mobilize the peasants to enlarge the areas of beet cultivation and improve their techniques of cultivation; the output per acre was to be increased so that fulfillment of the production task could be ensured and the demand for beets of the Pao-t'ou sugar mill satisfied.

It was also decided that the supply of food grain to the beet-growing peasants should be guaranteed by the government and that the peasants pay their agricultural tax in cash. The exchange ratios between beets and other agricultural products and grants for transport charges were also readjusted. At the conference to discuss this matter, technical guidance was emphasized, and it was resolved that the work of distributing technicians be strengthened. The government was also prepared to provide 1,000 sprayers for collective use in the beet-growing areas. In addition, the supply-marketing cooperatives were to supply 78,000 catties (3,869 bushels) of insecticide such as DDT and "666," and 1,400 sprayers to the peasants for combatting insect pests.

The success of such a highly detailed coordinated venture will depend largely on the planning, organization, and technical assistance rendered to the peasants. Of course, steps are being taken to allow the peasants to work full time on planting the beet crop by supplying them with food and allowing them to pay their taxes in money income, but from the intricate and time-important plan that has been created, it would take only a single setback in one sector to throw the entire operation into confusion and virtual collapse. If the Communists are able to bring off such ventures with a modicum of success it would certainly be an achievement.

It is clear that by erecting subsidiary small-scale industries to process certain agricultural crops, the Communist Government is attempting to encourage a pattern of comparative advantage for the region where certain crops will be emphasized and receive more care than others, and the end-products from these principal crops will be used to supply the needs of the mainland (in this case, sugar).

In October, 1954, Soviet strains of sesame, highly resistant to cold, were planted by many of the agricultural cooperatives with technical assistance from experimental farms. Twenty-seven thousand tons of sesame, rapeseed, castor oil, and sunflower were harvested on 333,000 hectares (822,510 acres) of 1954. Sesame was the major oil-bearing plant and occupied 166,000 hectares (410,000 acres) of land.

We possess no figures on agricultural output for Inner Mongolia. There have been surpluses in wheat which have been sent to China and we are provided figures for these surpluses but no annual figures of grain output. In the second quarter of 1955, it was planned that in the Yellow River inner bend area, 44,500 tons of surplus wheat and other grains were to be sent to other parts of the country. Because of the favorable harvests in the past three years there have been ample surpluses of grain, but we are given no data on the increase of agricultural output since 1947. The only exact figures that are presented are those for livestock and the by-products which are exported to China. At any rate, it seems that the IMAR so far has been able to maintain an adequate supply of food in addition to producing small surpluses for export.

C. Forestry

It was pointless to speak of forest reserves in Inner Mongolia during the pre-Communist period, for there were none. However, certain sections of Manchuria are now included in the new Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. With the accession of Hsingan province, Inner Mongolia now possesses adequate forest reserves in the Hsingan Mountains, which are supposed to account for one-sixth of the country's forest land. In 1954, this area provided 1.2 million cubic meters of timber. Roads are now being constructed into this region to facilitate the exploitation of timber reserves.

D. Conclusion

Inner Mongolia will play a most important role in the economic development of mainland China in providing greater and greater quantities of livestock. This is Inner Mongolia's strongest and most vital link to the economic development of China. If she can continue to provide the northeast and northern regions of China with draught animals for farming purposes, thereby helping to increase productivity and releasing manpower and resources in those areas for other tasks, and if she can be depended upon to supply much of the needed meat and dairy products for the large urban centers, this will allow the northern and northeastern sections of China to engage more fully in the production of grain and cereals, which already give these areas a certain comparative advantage. The problem, of course, will be whether the Communists will be able to continually improve the livestock of Inner Mongolia, both from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint, to meet the pressing needs of northern and northeastern China. If she can, and as yet we have no evidence of whether the needs of North China are being adequately satisfied, Inner Mongolia will contribute largely to the economic development of these regions.

In the fringe area where agriculture is carried on, vast efforts have been made to expand cultivation and increase output. In addition, there has been concentration on certain commercial crops which the Communists feel that Inner Mongolia has a special comparative advantage in producing because of its resources, climate, and location. We have already discussed the emphasis given to the planting of sugar beets, fruit, and oil-bearing crops. Although there was some grain exported to China in 1954, when portions of the mainland were struck by floods and famine, the amount was very meager. Because of the type of farming practiced in Inner Mongolia, the climate, and the resources, it is doubtful whether the grain output from her agricultural sector will ever be critical in supplying China with what she will need. The valuable commercial crops that Inner Mongolia is specializing in will be more important to China, and the output from these crops may possibly be large enough for China to export and thus help acquire the necessary foreign exchange to purchase capital equipment from abroad. As yet, we have little data on the output of these types of crops (sugar beets, fruit, and oil-bearing seeds), but there is evidence in the resources available and the attention being given to exploit these resources by capital investment that future outputs may be substantial.

At this point we ought to consider the responses of the rural people and nomads to Communist agrarian programs. Some newspaper reports from Inner Mongolia indicate that the Communist party has been forced to maintain what they call "counter-revolutionary vigilance" and that there have been numerous arrests of people who have been accused of "obstructing the socialization program." The peasants are urged at harvest time to heighten their vigilance against the burning of granaries and destruction of crops. When the peasants are in the fields sufficient measures are taken to guard the villages and night guards are posted at farmyards near cattle, and near field crops to ensure smooth harvesting. Efforts are to be made by the cadres to eliminate rumors and to weed out people in the agriculture producer cooperatives who are bent on creating disturbances and sowing dissension.

According to Chinese press reports, there have been numerous secret societies operating in the region, which have been responsible for sabotaging collectivization, fires, and spreading rumors harmful to Communist programs. These societies are reported to have a wide range of operation and concentrate not only in Inner Mongolia, where there is already great friction between the Han peoples and the Mongols, but in North China and parts of the Northwest. The recent capture and speedy trials of persons professed to belonging to these sects have resulted in executions for many and long prison sentences for others.

Such reports are indicative of the fact that abundant social friction exists and that perhaps the human response to Communist collectivization has not been as favorable as the party has hoped or claimed. This will, no doubt, continue to be a nagging problem for the Communist party as their collectivization program is increased in tempo.

IMAR AGRICULTURE

Additional Reading

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TRADE

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I. The Pre-Communist Period

Trade in Inner Mongolia before the Communists took over was carried out mainly by Chinese merchants. The principal markets, merchant activities, method of payment and main commodities may be described briefly as follows:

A. Principal Markets

Generally speaking, there were four main markets in Inner Mongolia; Dolonor, Kalgan, Kueisui (Huhehot), and Paotou. (Ho Yang-lin Cha Sui Meng-min ching-chi ti Chieh-pan. (Analysis of Inner Mongolian People's Economy of Chahar and Suiyuan). (Second book of the Frontier Administrative Series. January 1935.) The information on principal markets is largely from this work.) All commercial activity, e.g. barter, exchange of goods for currency, etc., within Inner Mongolia was directly related to these four main markets. Located in different areas of the region, these markets performed the function of gathering all commercial products of the region into four main centers from which they could be exported from Inner Mongolia. At the same time, items from China proper were collected and distributed throughout the interior of Inner Mongolia. These four principal centers became markets because of their ideal geographic location, because they were close to caravan routes, railways, or waterways, and because they were large towns close enough to the steppe hinterland yet within easy transport distance from several of the large cities of Northern China.

The first market of importance was in the western section of Inner Mongolia called Dolonor. Goods from Kalgan and Peiping flowed to Donolor and goods from the interior of this section of Inner Mongolia were exported from Dolonor to Kalgan, to Tientsin and the northeast provinces. From March to July, the period of trade was brisk for this was the season of Mongol festivals when many Mongols brought their goods, mainly livestock, and products to trade with the merchants of Dolonor. After Japanese occupation of Dolonor it was used as the distribution center of Japanese goods in the western section of Inner Mongolia.

The second market was Kalgan, the center for commercial dealings in Inner Mongolia in early Republican period. Merchants from Western nations, England, France, and Germany, etc., were active in this regional market. In the early part of the twentieth century, the quantity of trade between Kalgan and Urga (Ulan Bator) amounted to several tens of millions of taels a year. In 1918 and 1919 the annual value of trade at Kalgan (total annual imports and exports) was estimated to be 300,000,000 Chinese dollars, however, in the late 20's and early 30's, commerce declined with the declining importance of Outer Mongolian trade and the average yearly export and import values were around 100,000,000 Chinese dollars. (Roughly 40,000,000 in 1930 U.S. dollars) Volume of trade shrunk further during the Sino-Japanese war. While in 1919 there were some 7,000 commercial establishments, by 1942 there were only a few hundred.

The third market, Kueisui (now Huhehot) was a regional market where organization was tightly controlled by four main merchant organizations: The Chi-ching Co., the Sinkiang Co., the Mohammedan Merchant Co., and the Chiang-chuang Co. These four organizations dominated the trade in this market, and traded with the hinterland of Inner Mongolia, Kansu, and Sinkiang. Under these four large organizations, which functioned more as giant wholesale agents, one may divide the trading firms into two other groups. The first consisted of ten companies which were companies closely related with trading activities of the four large organizations. In other words these companies relied for their supplies mainly on these four large organizations, whether cloth, silk, carpets, or wool, etc. The second group of companies consisted of some twenty companies which operated less dependenly on the four organizations than the companies of group one. A pattern thus emerged where the four large merchant organizations through a network of subsidiary companies dominate the trade throughout the Northwest and the steppe land of Inner Mongolia. In contrast to Kalgan, by the 1930's, volume of trade was increasing at Kueisui following improved transport facilities. Kueisui became a center of exchange of goods between north China and northwest China.

The fourth principal center was Paotou located near a rail transport network and the water traffic along the Yellow River. The Paotou market incorporated the regions of Ninghsia, Chinghai, portions of Outer Mongolia and Kansu. The main commodities include hides, medicine, grain, cloth, etc.

B. Merchant Activities.

Merchant activities in Inner Mongolia take somewhat different forms in the sinicized and un-sinicized areas. In the sinicized area, which embraces the four principal markets, the merchants are almost entirely Chinese, especially those from the province of Shansi. The stores there may be divided into three principal types. One is the general store dealing with native products, in Chinese known as hang-chan. The main business of this type of store is to deal with grain and other Mongolian products, but it also engages in lending, brokerage, providing lodging and warehousing facilities, and handling transportation, insurance and the like. A second type of store is general store dealing mainly with imported goods, such as silk, cotton cloth, cotton yarn, sugar, tea, matches, paper, kerosene, tobacco and metal utensils. This type of store is usually a wholesale dealer, and many of them have branches in the un-sinicized area or regularly send out their men to travel from one place to another, buying native products from the Mongols on the one hand, and supplying imported goods to them on the other. A third type of store specializes in buying hide and fur from the Mongols or from the traveling merchants for the purpose of export.

In the un-sinicized are, there are both Chinese and Mongolian merchants. The stores there may also be divided into three principal types. One is a sort of Jack-of-all-trade, in Chinese known as shao-kuo. One of the main businesses of this type of store is, with the permission of the Mongolian dukes, to run large plantations and sell the products thereof. Besides, it also deals with lending, remittances, and the sale and purchase of auxilliary crops, cattle or the various imported goods. A second type is the grain store, which usually lends money to the farmers in advance and takes their products as repayment after the harvest. A third type of store is the retail store, which supplies the daily necessities to the Mongols. Some of them are also engaged in lending.

Aside from the stores, there are travelling salesmen. Sent by a general store or working independently, they usually set off from the different principal markets between the third and the fifth month or the seventh and the ninth month each year, bringing with them the goods wanted by the Mongols in ox-carts, the number of which ranges from three or four to thirty or forty in one group. Sometimes they also use camels. They do not do business while travelling. But when they reach a market town, they will stay for a few days and display their goods for sale.

C. Method of Payment

Trade in Inner Mongolia is carried out largely on credit. For instance, the proportions of cash and credit transactions with the thirteen major wholesale firms in Kalgan in 1938 were as follows:

Table I. The Proportions of Cash and Credit Transactions with the Thirteen Major Wholesale Firms in Kalgan, 1938.

Name of Firm	% of Cash	% of Credit
Yung-ch'eng-ming	50	50
Fu-hsing-lung	40	60
Chi-ching-hsing	20	80

TABLE I. (Continued)

Name of Firm	% of Cash	% of Credit
I-ho-t'ung	20	80
Lung-shen-yu	30	70
Ho-shen-lung	50	50
Te-i-lung	30	70
I-ho-yuan	30	70
Yung-hsing-lung	-	100
Kung-ch'ing-ti	50	50
I-yuan-ch'eng	10	90
Yu-hua-ch'eng	70	30
Chin-jung-ch'ang	30	70

(Source: Goto Tomio: Moko no Yuboku Shakai)

As to the travelling merchants, they also arrange credit for that portion of goods for which the Mongols lack sufficient livestock products to pay for immediately. In return, they receive a note from the Mongols, known as mien-t'iao-tzu, on which is entered the amount of money to be paid, the family name of the person contracting the debt, the day, month and year of the transaction and the number of the bill. The notes of reputable firms or merchants passed as currency in the region. When they fell due and if there was good cause why they could not be paid, they were reissued.

The credits were paid off in cash or in sheep and cattle at regular intervals. For instance, in Kalgan, they settled their accounts four times a year in cash: the Spring payment was made on the 19th of the second month, the Summer payment on the 17th of the fifth month, the Autumn payment on the 17th of the eighty month, and the Winter payment on the 14th of the eleventh month. The total sum to be paid off was usually twenty percent larger than the original debt. In the un-sinicized area, the debts were usually paid in kind, and the rate of interest varied from place to place, ranging from no interest charges to one hundred percent per annum or more. If they could not pay off within a year, the remainder was carried over to the next year as a new debt. Thus most of the Mongols were perpetually in debt with the merchants, paying only a part of it each year.

D. Main Commodities

According to an estimate by Karamischeff in 1925, the main commodities in Mongolia and their capacities of export and import were as follows:

TABLE II. The Annual Export and Import Capacities of Mongolia as Estimated by Karamischeff in 1925.

Description	Quantity or Value
A. Exports	
Horned cattle	74,500 head
Horses	70,000 head
Sheep	800,000 head
Meat and fat	600,000 piculs
Sheep's wool	120,000 piculs
Camel's wool	13,000 piculs
Horse hair	11,000 piculs
Sheepskins & goatskins	500,000 piculs
Lambskins	700,000 piculs
Horned cattle hides	84,000 piculs
Horse hides	70,000 piculs
Milk, butter, canned milk, etc. (1 bucket=27 lb)	1,323,000,000 lbs
Furs (of all kinds)	12,000,000 dollars
B. Imports	
Tea	240,000 cases
Flour	61,200,000 lbs
Millet & rice	54,700,000 lbs
Tobacco	2,592,000 lbs
Sugar	460,000 lbs
Spirits	2,117,280 lbs
Textiles	13,600,000 yards
Silk	190,000 yards
Woolen cloth	135,000 yards
Cotton velvet	210,000 yards
Sateen	125,000 yards
Chintz	115,000 yards
Brocade	45,000 yards
Haberdashery	300,000 dollars
Hardware	1,200,000 dollars
Religious paraphernalia	750,000
Fancy goods	900,000

(Source: W. Karamischeff, Mongolia and West China.)

II. The Communist Period

After the Communists took over, trade in Inner Mongolia underwent the following changes:

A. Physical Changes

Since the nature of Mongolian economy remained practically the same as before, there were few changes in the physical character of trade in Inner Mongolia. However, the following changes may deserve out attention, because they affected trade developments in the long run. The most important change of this kind was perhaps the re-opening of trade with Outer Mongolia. But trade between China and Outer Mongolia was almost completely stopped after Russia seized control of the latter in 1924. After the Chinese Communists recognized Outer Mongolia as a friendly nation, normal trade relations were resumed. Consequently, the commercial importance of the principal markets in Inner Mongolia increased.

Another important change was the improvement in transportation. Aside from the newly built Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway, which is destined to be the main artery between Russia, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and China, the Communists have built a new highway between Pusi, capital of the Molitawa Banner, and Hsiao-erh-kou, capital of the Oronchun Banner, a distance of over 100 kilometers. Besides, they have also renovated or built sixteen highways during 1949-1952, totaling over 4,000 kilometers. All this will undoubtedly have a favorable effect on trade in Inner Mongolia.

Still another important change is the beginning of industrial development in Inner Mongolia. The Communists plan to make Paotou one of the most important industrial centers in North China, and they have already built a few chemical and textile factories there. Besides, the government sponsored cooperatives in Inner Mongolia are also operating small scale industrial workshops. For instance, a number of factories handling dairy products have been opened up in the four pastoral counties of the Huna League. Tanneries, carpentry workshops, and food and footwear factories have also been established there. The industrial development of Inner Mongolia will eventually change the contents of trade, but for the time being, it has not yet brought about any appreciable effects.

B. Government Control

The Communist government control over trade in Inner Mongolia follows the same pattern as that in other parts of the nation. On the one hand, they seek to control the wholesale trade and the retail trade in the urban areas through the state trading companies. On the other hand, they use cooperatives and mobile trading units as the means of control in the rural and pastoral areas. The purpose of all this is to eliminate private merchants.

According to a 1953 report, they have established state trading companies in nineteen cities or towns in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and organized 1,414 cooperatives throughout the region, with a membership of over one

million people. Compared to 1950, the business of the state trading companies and cooperatives was doubled in 1951, and it increased another seventy-seven percent in 1952. About half of the trade consisted in the purchase of the peasants' and herdsmen's products, such as grain, livestock, hide and wool. During the three and a half years preceeding August, 1953, seventy-eight percent of the total production of this region was purchased and marketed by the state trading companies and cooperatives (cf. Survey of China's Mainland Press, No. 637, pp. 38-39).

There is no information on the value of products as purchased by the state trading companies and cooperatives from this region as a whole. However, it is reported that in the Huna League, one of the six major divisions of Inner Mongolia with 14.5 percent of its whole population, the total value of state purchase during the four years preceeding July, 1953, amounted to 26,000,000,000 yuan (approximately US$1,066,800). If this figure is representative of this region as a whole in terms of volume of trade per capita, the total value of state purchase in Inner Mongolia during the aforesaid four years would be approximately 170,000,000,000 yuan (about US$6,702,000).

Aside from buying up the local products, the state trading companies and cooperatives provide the Mongols with manufactured goods and other products of China, such as aluminum cooking pots, enamel utensils, soap, cloth, tea, dried fruits, etc. The Communists boasted that the varieties have increased many times, and the term of trade has been more favorable to the Mongols. For instance, in the Huna League, the herdsmen could buy six or seven bricks of tea for one sheep in 1952, whereas the ratio of exchange was one to one before the Communists took over.

C. The Future

As to the future development of trade in Inner Mongolia, Chairman Ulanfu, in his address on the sixty anniversary of the foundation of the People's Government of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, said: "As regards the trading companies and cooperatives, we must further develope the interflow of goods between the cities and villages on the one hand and that between the pastoral and agricultural areas on the other, organize mutual support among industrial and pastoral producer and consumer goods, especially producer goods, and further stress the trading and cooperative works in the pastoral area. In the villages attention should be given to the holding of fairs. In the pastoral area emphasis should be laid upon the opening of trade channels, improvement of business methods, establishment of movable trading centers and their gradual transformation into fixed trading centers, which will gradually be developed into political, economic and cultural centers of the pastoral area." From these remarks, it is clear that there are still many things to be done in the way of trade control, and that the success of trade control in Inner Mongolia as reported by the Communist press must be greatly discounted.

COMMUNICATIONS

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    A. Geographical Setting
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COMMUNICATIONS

I. Introduction

A. Geographical Setting

The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, which comprises the whole territory of former Suiyuan province, the northern part of Chahar, the northwestern part of Jehol, and the western part of Heilungkiang, lies in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction roughly between 38° and 53° north latitude and between 104° and 126° east longitude. It is screened from North China on the south by the Great Wall and the Cheng-te-I-hsien Railway; and on the east from Northeast China by the Shuang-liao Tsitsihar Railway and the Nonni River (Nun-chiang). On the north and northwest it borders the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia, and on the extreme west is separated from Kansu by the Yellow River.

The economic resources in this area have been virtually untouched. The exploitation of the economic potential and the promotion of universal education and a higher living standard are largely dependent upon the development of communications, to which Communist China is now giving considerable attention. At the present time, railway and highway coverage is quite poor compared with other regions. Navigation is only possible along the upper course of the Yellow River. As for civil air service, there are two international air lines crossing the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, one from Northeast China to Chita, and the other from Peking to Ulan Bator and thence to Russia. The principal means of transportation, however, are still the old-fashioned carts and pack animals which travel the dry caravan routes.

B. Factors Causing Underdevelopment Of Communications

1. The geographical factor

In China most railway construction in the past has been financed by foreign powers with political, economic, and most of all, strategic considerations in mind. Some railways were controlled by foreign countries, such as the former Chinese Eastern Railway, controlled by Russia, and the South Manchurian Railway system run by Japanese. In many cases, though not all, the railroad tracks were placed where they were for strategic reasons. Inner Mongolia, surrounded by Outer Mongolia, Northeast China and North China, has no such seaports and economic and strategic centers as Dairen, Tientsin, Peking, or Hankow. Though Inner Mongolia is rich in livestock, timber and even mineral products, these were not abundant enough to draw the attention of communications developers in the early days. However, since the collapse of the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland in 1949, the whole situation has greatly changed. With closer Sino-Soviet relationships, the geographical importance of Inner Mongolia is greater than ever. In fact, the hasty construction of the Chi-ning - Ulan Bator Railway was evidently not for the exploitation of the natural resources in that area, but for the sake of strengthening the link between Russia and Communist China.

2. Regional immobility

Besides the geographical factor, there were some natural obstacles which hindered communications development in this region. Due to the swampy land of the Chahar League north of Dolonor, traffic usually came to a stop during the rainy season. Roads in the Great Hsingan and Yin-shan Ranges, and on the 2,000 foot high plateau west of the Hsingan Range, were difficult to travel. In the region between the Silingol League and the Sunit Left Banner, when the land dries after the rains, it cracks into long fissures several feet wide, forming the most serious obstacle to communications. As for the desert area in the southern part of the Silingol League, the route could hardly be traced. Along the uninhabited, waterless plains, as in the western part of Silingol, one could easily become lost without a local guide.

C. Transportation Means

In addition to trains and automobiles, other means of transportation are as follows:

1. Camels

Camels are used extensively in this area for carrying burdens and for riding, since even when heavily laden (an average load is 500 catties or about 667 pounds) they can travel long distances without drinking. Usually they are organized into caravans comprising up to 300 - 500 camels, each carrying a bell around its neck. They are tied to each other by means of a rope leading from the tail of one to the nose of the next. The last camel drags a wooden frame or an arrangement of sticks through the sand, so the trail of the caravan can be easily identified. The caravan is guarded and kept in order by a team of horsemen. Camel caravans travel at night, during the period from autumn to spring. In summer the camels are left to graze. With their headquarters at Kalgan (now in Hopei province), the camel teams often travel as far west as Ili in Sinkiang (about a five months' journey), east to Lin-hsi, or north to Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia. A fast camel caravan can cover the distance from Kalgan to Ulan Bator in twenty days. Sometimes they are utilized along the route from Kalgan to Dzhirgalantu (Khobdo) or to Kiakhta on the Russian border. They operate also into North Chinese cities such as Peking and Tientsin. Even in the days of motor and rail traffic, the camel caravan has in no way lost its importance.

2. Horses and animal-drawn carts

While horses are mostly used for riding, carts drawn by horses, mules, or oxen are regularly used for carrying freight. Their headquarters were also at Kalgan. Carts were a principal means of transport before the development of highway and railway construction. Caravans of ox-drawn carts were the main means of transportation along the caravan routes during the summer months. They are much slower than camels, needing approximately three months to cover the distance from Kalgan to Ulan Bator. A caravan may consist of up to several hundred carts. In addition to the so-called Peking cart, a simpler Mongolian version is used, which is sturdier and does less damage to the roads. Since the 1920's, motor vehicles of all descriptions have to a certain extent taken over on the caravan routes, but even now, caravans of carts are used as auxiliaries to the modern transportation facilities, to penetrate both the countryside and the remote areas.

3. Ox-hide rafts

Rafts made of ox-hide were used in the Northwest along the upper stretches of the Yellow River from Lan-chou to Pao-t'ou, in addition to ordinary boats and small steam ships (only about 100 kilometers of the Yellow River in Inner Mongolia is navigable by steamer).

II. Communication Development Before and Under the Nationalist Government

A. Caravan Routes

Caravan routes which were primarily used by pack animals and animal-drawn carts cut the territory of Inner Mongolia in various directions. In the southwestern steppes the caravan roads were most convenient and usable the year round. They were only usable between October and May in the northwestern part of Inner Mongolia, and were good for general transportation merely in winter in the eastern and northeastern parts. Wells were dug approximately every thirty miles along these routes, and provided resting places for men and beasts.

Linking China and Outer Mongolia, the Kalgan-Ulan Bator caravan route was the main artery and played a very important economic role before the construction of highways and the Chining-Ulan Bator Railway. This road was the principal route for the flow of goods in Inner Mongolia until the development of modern transportation began at the end of the nineteenth century; however, pack animals were still utilized as auxiliary transportation to places where no motor vehicles or trains could penetrate.

B. Railways

The construction of railways in Inner Mongolia was started at the end of the nineteenth century. The former Chinese Eastern Railway, built by Russia under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1896, was the first line to cut through the northern part of Inner Mongolia from Man-chou-li to Hsin-chan. The Chinese Eastern Railway (now the Chinese Chang-chun Railway) was primarily constructed with the purpose of opening another land route from Russia to Vladivostok. Besides serving as the artery from Peking to Moscow after its transfer to Communist China in December, 1952, the Man-chou-li—Hsin-chan section was also used for transporting timber out of the great Hsingan forest area and bringing coal from Chalainor and salt products from Hulun Lake to the industrial base of Hailar. A railway was constructed by the Chinese in 1930 from Pai-ch'eng (T'ao-an) to Kokenmiao, and thence to Solun via Wang-yeh-miao between 1933 and 1935 during the period of Japanese occupation, by using some of the pre-existing Chinese construction. In 1936 it was led westward over the Great Hsingan Range to A-erh-shan. This line was connected with other railways at Sze-p'ing, a large rail junction in Northeast China. A branch of the Ch'eng-chia-t'un (Shuang-liao)—T'ung-liao Railway went deep into the southeastern part of Inner Mongolia. It cut through farming and livestock territory in the Cherim League, and crossing the corner of Liaoning province, turned west via Chin-ling-sze to Yeh-pai-shou, where two lines were constructed by Japan in 1936, one leading to Ch'eng-te in present day Hopei province, and another to Ch'ih-feng in Inner Mongolia. Both of these two stretches of railway were destroyed in 1945.

In addition to these railways, the Feng-chen—Pao-t'ou section of the Peking—Pao-t'ou Railway, completed in 1922, transverses the southwestern corner of Inner Mongolia for a distance of about 400 kilometers. The Peking—Pao-t'ou Railway was designed and built by China's first construction engineer, the late famous Chang T'ien-yu. The line ran from Peking to Pao—t'ou via Nan-k'ou, over the steep Pa-ta-ling Mountains, a remarkable feat of engineering. It facilitates the interflow of raw materials out of Inner Mongolia to North and Northeast China, and iron and coal to the newly-developed industrial base at Pao-t'ou. With the construction of the Feng-tai—Sha-ch'eng Railway and the Chi-ning—Ulan Bator international railway, the significance of this line, economic as well as strategic, has been enhanced. When the Lan-chou—Pao-t'ou and the Lan-chou-

Urumchi—Alma Ata Railways are completed, it will form a solid link of railway network connecting North and Northwest China, not only facilitating the exploitation of the natural resources in this vast territory, but also strengthening Communist control over the minority nationalities.

The distribution of railroad tracks is very uneven in the IMAR, and in the area of the Silingol League where there is no railway, transportation has to be carried on over caravan routes and highways.

C. Highways

Prior to the Communist regime, highway transportation was mainly centered at Kalgan. One main highway went from Kalgan northeast via Ch'ang-pei, Pao-ch'ang, and Ku-yüan to Dolonor, a distance of about 250 kilometers, and from there a line led north to Pei-tzu-miao and another east to Lin-hsi. This road is the main artery for the transport of livestock from the Silingol League, the western part of the Jouda League, and from Chahar into the industrial centers of the IMAR. Two highways stretch out from Lin-hsi, one going south to Ch'ih-feng and another east via K'ai-lu to T'ung-liao and to T'as-nan to link up with the Northeast Railway system. The K'ai-lu T'ung-liao road is one of the most heavily travelled routes in use throughout the year. The second trunk line starting at Kalgan extended to Kuei-sui, where a line went along the rear bend of the Yellow River via Pao-t'ou, Ninghsia (Yin-ch'uan), to Lan-chou. (After the war, moving sand-dunes made part of this highway impracticable). It then crossed the Yellow River twice and took the route through the Ordos. Another highway went northwestward through Pai-ling-miao and Hami to Urumchi, for a distance of over 2,300 kilometers. Through the middle of Inner Mongolia passed a considerable length of the Kalgan-Ulan Bator highway, which is the main artery linking China with Outer Mongolia, and was very important economically and strategically before the construction of the Chi-ning—Ulan Bator Railway. From Kalgan and Kuei-sui there were roads leading south to Peking, Ta-t'ung, Sian, T'ai-yüan, etcetera, in North and Northwest China.

Bus service was operated by privately owned industrial cooperatives (Kung-ho) during and after the Sino-Japanese War. Busses and other kinds of motor vehicles ran regularly along the Kalgan—Lan-chou Highway. It is also interesting to note that some Russian trucks were brought in at that time in exchange for sheep's wool. After 1947, the operation of the bus lines was taken over by the Ministry of Transportation of the Nationalist government.

In the northeast corner of Inner Mongolia, the center of highway transportation was Hailar, from whence highways

radiated in all directions: Along the Chinese Chang-chun Railway they ran eastward to the cities in the northern part of Northeast China, westward to Bayan Tumen in Outer Mongolia by way of Chalainor and Hulun Lake; southward to A-er-shan and thence across the Pai-ch'eng-Aer-shan Railway to the middle of Northeast China; and northward to Ssu-chia, a city on the Argun River; to Manchouli and Kanshire at the Outer Mongolian border in the West, Shih-pei in the North, Tsitsihar and Ganjut, site of an important market fair, in the East.

It should be noted that most of the highways in Inner Mongolia, like those in other territories, were dirt roads with a levelled surface, subject to rapid deterioration because they were built with relatively crude equipment; some of them were even constructed on caravan routes. Most them, therefore, should not be taken as the first class highways, except for a few lines running between some of the main cities. The main difference between the caravan routes and the highways was that the latter were built wider with better levelled surfaces for motor vehicles, while the former reached farther, even to the desert and most remote areas, and were mostly used by the caravans. By December, 1936, over 10,000 kilometers of such highways were in use in the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia (total for China: 109,749). About 500 motor vehicles were registered in the same provinces at that time (total for China: 44,802).

D. Inland Waterway Navigation

In this area only the upper course of the Yellow River and a short stretch of the Argun River in the northern part are navigable. The Yellow River, next to the Yangtze in length, rises in Chinghai and zigzags through Inner Mongolia, emptying into the sea north of Shantung, a total distance of nearly 4,500 kilometers away. It has brought countless flood disasters, caused by the vast amounts of silt it deposits. The precipitated silt forms an ever thicker layer on the riverbed, and much of the river often flows above the plain instead of in a channel through it, making it less navigable than the Yangtze River. However, the upper stretch of it from Chung-wei in Kansu to Ho-k'ou-ch'eng in Inner Mongolia, about 900 kilometers long, is navigable by boat. Steamer service has operated on the course between Shih-tzu-wei-shan and Pao-t'ou. Cargoes of ox-hide rafts from Lan-chou on the Yellow River can be seen at the port of Pao-t'ou. Navigation on the Argun River is possible only from the city of Kilalin up to the Shilka River junction, a distance of about 400 kilometers.

E. Civil Aviation

Civil aviation service in Inner Mongolia was begun in October, 1934. It was operated by the German sponsored Euro-Asia Aviation Company along the Peking-Pao-t'ou-Lan-chou Line. During the period of the Japanese occupation, an additional line was created from Ch'eng-te in Jehol via Ch'ang-pei and Te-hua to the Sunit Left Banner for strategic, rather than economic reasons.

F. Postal Service and Telecommunications

The Mongol postal system has been justly famous ever since the Yüan dynasty. It consisted of a very fast courier service, of which Marco Polo gave an impressive description. A network of relay stations where horses were changed spread over the whole Empire. This system was continued and expanded by later dynasties and was developed to its peak of efficiency during the Ch'ing dynasty. The distance from Peking to Kalgan was covered in four days, to Kuei-hua in six days, and to Argun in seven days. In remote areas of Mongolia, where relay stations were not available, other means of transportation were used, including a relay system on foot. In this way, Ninghsia was reached (from Peking) in twenty-three days, and Urga in forty-eight. In addition to this imperial postal system, which mainly served the dispatch of official documents, Chinese merchants operating in Inner Mongolia undertook the delivery of letters, money orders, and parcels within the regions of their activities for a small fee. In Republican times these systems of postal communications were more or less continued until motor traffic took over wherever possible.

The history of telecommunications in Mongolia started in 1896, when a cable line connecting Irkutsk, Urga, and Peking was finished. This line was operated by the Great Northern Telegraph Company, a Danish concern. During the Republic, and especially under the Nationalist government, telegraph service in Mongolia was vastly expanded. In 1935 there were forty-four telegraph offices in Mongolia, excluding those parts which then belonged to Manchuria, and the lines covered almost 7,000 miles. In addition, nine short-wave stations served the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia. Telephone service in the urban centers of Inner Mongolia, such as Kalgan, Kuei-sui, and Pao-t'ou was operated by private companies. There were 1,500 miles of long distance telephone lines in Inner Mongolia (excluding the Manchurian sections) in 1935.

III. Communications Development Under the Communist Regime

Following the Communist occupation of the Chinese mainland, Inner Mongolia became the first "autonomous region," although it was actually under the control of the People's Government. To implement its policy of building up the frontier areas and in order to tighten control over the national minorities so as to strengthen its frontier defense, Communist China enlarged the Inner Mongolia region and made plans to build new railways and highways in addition to rebuilding the destroyed railways and renovating roads already in existence.

A. Railways

1. Railway construction

a. The Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway

The Communist Chinese, Soviet Russian and Outer Mongolian Governments issued a joint communique on September 15, 1952 on the construction of a railway from Chi-ning, the mid-point of the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway, to Ulan Bator, capital of Outer Mongolia, which would cover a distance of roughly 1,200 kilometers and link up with the Soviet Trans-Siberian Railway system. The Outer Mongolian and Soviet Governments were to be responsible for the construction of the section on Outer Mongolian territory, while that on Chinese territory was to be undertaken by Communist China. Construction on the 338-kilometer section from Chi-ning-Erh-lien in Chinese territory was started on the first of May, 1953, and the track-laying was completed in December, 1954. It was reported that the tracks on the Chi-ning-Erh-lien section were specially converted from standard gauge to accommodate the wide gauge of the Outer Mongolian Railway. That work was completed in October, 1955. International through traffic from Peking, capital of Red China via Outer Mongolia to Russia was begun on the third of January, 1956. (Owing to the difference in width between the standard gauge used in China and the wide gauges in Outer Mongolia and Russia, the through trains travelling the Peking-Ulan Bator-Moscow Railway have to have their wheels adjusted at Chi-ning.

The construction of this railway is of great economic and strategic importance. Inner Mongolia is rich in natural resources but was still lagging in industrial and agricultural development. This railway, cutting through the Ulanchab and Silingol Leagues, makes possible the large-scale exploitation of Inner Mongolia's resources by facilitating the flow of goods. For instance, the Sunit Right Banner of the Silingol League began to do a good trade not only in wool and hides, but in products such as bones, hoofs, and horns, which were once virtually worthless because there was no way of transporting them. These can now go directly by train to other parts of China or be exported to countries where they are in demand for industrial use and as fertilizer. In 1955 the Chahar Right Rear Banner sold 600 tons of sheep-dung, to be used as fertilizer by farming cooperatives in several North China provinces. In return, the herdsmen were able to buy grain, fodder for their animals, household utensils, cloth, mowing machines, sewing machines, and so on, for themselves. Between January 1955, when the Chinese section of the line began operating and October of the same year, 48,000 tons of goods came in from China to places where even tea and tobacco had sometimes been unobtainable in the past, (People's China, No. 4, February 16, 1956, p. 38). The new rail link, incidentally, also helped farming in other parts of China. Sturdy Mongolian horses were shipped over it in thousands to supply the traction for ploughs, harvesters, and threshers.

At the opening ceremony it was reported that the train from the north was carrying factory equipment, cranes, steel products, piping, electric furnaces, axles for heavy duty freight locomotives, motor trucks, and other needed materials to Red China. These supplies came not only from the Soviet Union but from the European Communist countries. The train from the south carried Chinese agricultural and mineral products, as well as some industrial goods, destined for various countries.

From this it seems clear that the completion of this railway means a faster rate of industrialization for Red China, because it facilitates the shipment of machinery and equipment from the Soviet Union and other countries for Communist China's economic construction. By the new shortened route these materials get to their destinations two or three days earlier than by the old route through the Chinese Chang-chun Railway and at lower freight charges. For Outer Mongolia, this railway may mean greatly expanded trade and the acceleration of its own economic construction. For the Soviet Union and all the other countries in the Communist bloc it will mean an increase in economic and cultural exchange. It also shortens the route between Peking and Moscow by about 1,100 kilometers in comparison with the route by way of the Chinese Chang-chun Railway in Northeast China, thus strengthening Sino-Soviet military cooperation and facilitating their military movements. More important than that is the fact that the newly built Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway is far more secure from air attack than the round-about route of the Chinese Chang-chun Railway, which was apparently quite vulnerable.

b. Ku-tu-erh-Tu-li-ho Forest Railway

Construction on the seventy-two kilometer section of forest railway was started in late June, 1952 from Ku-tu-erh, the terminal of the Ya-k'e-shih Forest Railway branch of the Chinese Chang-chun Railway, to Tu-li-ho. It was completed in October and opened to traffic in early November, 1952. With the completion of this section, some of the primeval forests in the Great Hsingan Range were linked with the factories, mines, and cities of China through the northeastern railway network, so as to facilitate the development of the timber industry in Inner Mongolia.

c. Lan-chou-Pao-t'ou Railway

Construction of the 1,000 kilometer Lan-chou-Pao-t'ou Railway, which would link Northwest China with the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was started in 1955 on the fifty kilometer section from Lan-chou to Hsing-hsing-wan. This trunk line, when completed, will connect Lanchow and Pao-t'ou with the sea coast through the Lung-hai and Peking-Pao-t'ou Railways, and to the west with Sinkiang or even further, with Russia through the Lan-chou-Sinkiang-Alma Ata Railway. Furthermore, it would shorten the route between Peking and Moscow even more than does the existing Chi-ning-Ulan Bator line.

2. Railway rehabilitation

Owing to the importance of rail transportation in meeting its increasing strategic and economic demands, Communist China has been giving high priority to railway rehabilitation. Through traffic on the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway, the Chi-hsia-ying-Kuei-sui section of which was destroyed during the civil war period, was resumed by 1953. Rehabilitation work on the Yeh-pai-shou-Ch'ih-feng Railway of 144 kilometers was completed in 1952. It was reported that by 1953 the length of railway tracks in Inner Mongolia was about 1,500 kilometers (Ovdienko, 1954, p. 125), making the total mileage of railways in Inner Mongolia approximately 2,000 kilometers at the end of 1955.

B. Highway Construction

The Chinese Communists claim that in Inner Mongolia there were only 507 kilometers of highways in 1950, the rest having been demolished, and that by 1953 about 4,000 kilometers of highways had been built and opened to traffic in this region (Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 636, August 21, 1953, p. 30). It was reported that the most notable of the newly built ones were the 700 kilometer highway between Pei-tzu-miao, administrative seat of the Silingol League, and Kalgan, completed in 1953; and the 900 kilometer highway from Chang-pei in Hopei to Tung-liao, on which construction was completed in 1952. These two highways were in existence before the establishment of the Communist Regime, so they should not be considered as entirely new construction, but as renovation work. However, along with the broadening of the gauge on the Chi-ning-Erh-lien Railway in 1955, a highway was built westward from Tumuerhtai a transportation station on the railway, reaching Ssu-tzu-wang Banner early in October, 1955, and one was built eastward to the joint banner in East Silingol League, a distance of 300 kilometers. Another highway was also built from the railway to Pai-nai-miao in the grasslands of the Ulanchab League.

In summary, the main highways now in existence in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region are the Kuei-sui-Pao-t'ou-Yin-ch'uan-Lan-chou Highway, the Kuei-sui-Pai-ling-miao-Hami-Urumchi Highway, the Kalgan-Ulan Bator Hoghway, the Ch'ang-pei-Dolonor-T'ung-liao Highway, the Kalgan-Pei-tzu-miao Highway, the Hailar-Aershan-Pai-ch'eng Highway, the Hailar-Sze-chia Highway, the Chalainor-Bayan Tumen Highway, and those branching out from some of the stations along the Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway. There were roughly 5,000 kilometers of highways in Inner Mongolia in 1955.

C. Others

No information is obtainable on the improvement of inland waterway navigation under the Communist regime by 1955, nor are figures available for postal and telecommunication services. As for civil aviation, two international lines were reported to have been flying over the IMAR, but no regular ports of call were indicated. Owing to the increasing importance of this region, it would be likely that such major cities as Pao-t'ou, Erhlien (terminus of the Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway) and Hailar would be among the ports of call of the regular airlines.



INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION
ETHNIC GROUPS AND SUB-DIVISIONS

CHINA
N MONGOLS
A Buryats
B Dagurs
W MONGOLS
PREDOMINANTLY CHINESE
TUNGUS GROUPS
a Oronchon
b Solons
c Buteina
d Evenki
E MONGOLS
1 Jalait
2 Khorchin
3 Jarud
4 Naiman
5 Aru Khorchin
6 Barin
7 Keshikten
8 Aukhan
9 Kharachin
10 Chahar
11 Ujumuchin
12 Khochit
13 Abaga
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15 Sunit
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
CHINA
INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS REGION
MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
1955-56
ULANCHAP LEAGUE
IKHE CHOU LEAGUE
HOU TAO
PING-TI-CHÜAN
CHAHAR
SILINGOL LEAGUE
JOUDA
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
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ULANCHAP LEAGUE
PING-TI-CHÜAN ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT
ULAN HOTO
PEITZUMIAO
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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
5 July 1956
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
INNER MONGOLIAN
AUTONOMOUS REGION
ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS DURING
THE REPUBLIC
CHINA
YELLOW RIVER
ORDOS
SUIYUAN PROVINCE
PART OF SHENSI P
N CHAHAR PROVINCE
N JEHOL PROVINCE
W LIAONING P
W HEILUNGKIANG PROVINCE
100 50 0 100 200 300 400 KM.
100 50 0 100 200 MI
105
110
115
120
125
130
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45
50


INNER MONGOLIAN
AUTONOMOUS REGION
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
CHINA
OUTER MONGOLIA
LEGEND
Southwestern boundary before 1954
Railroad
Unconfirmed railroad
Planned railroad
Area of Chinese colonization
HARBIN
CHANGCHUN
SSUPINGKAI
MUKDEN
TSITSIHAR
HAILAR
CHITA
PEIPING
KALGAN
TATUNG
SUIYUAN
100 200 MI
100 200 300 400 KM
100
105
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