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AND RESEARCH

Intelligence Information Brief

IIB-114.6

CHRONOLOGY OF STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE
BERLIN CRISIS FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 25, 1959, TO AUGUST 8, 1959

Prepared by
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
August 31, 1959

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

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This is a continuation of the series of chronologies covering the Berlin crisis. With this number, the series will be interrupted pending further developments. Previous publications in this series were:

IIB-42	October 24, 1958 - November 30, 1958
IIB-58	December 1, 1958 - December 18, 1958
IIB-100	December 19, 1958 - February 16, 1959
IIB-100S	(supplement to IIB-100)
IIB-114.1	February 12, 1959 - March 25, 1959
IIB-114.2	March 25, 1959 - April 21, 1959
IIB-114.3	April 22, 1959 - May 11, 1959
IIB-114.4	May 11, 1959 - May 26, 1959
IIB-114.5	May 27, 1959 - June 24, 1959

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This document contains summaries, excerpts and texts of the more important statements made by leaders in the West and in the Soviet Union and East Germany, regarding the Berlin crisis, for the period June 25, 1959 to August 8, 1959. (There are also a few items predating June 25 which did not appear in IIB-114.5 of July 6, 1959).

During these six weeks, the principal events were the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kozlov to the US, the reconvening of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers on July 13, the visit of Vice President Nixon to the USSR and Poland, and the invitation of President Eisenhower to Premier Khrushchev to visit the US which was announced on August 3.

The raising of the level of discussions to the top governmental echelons overshadowed both the Berlin crisis and the negotiations at Geneva on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers. However, there was no essential change in the positions of the Western Allies or the USSR on Berlin by the time the Geneva Conference recessed indefinitely on August 5, to be resumed at such time as may be arranged through diplomatic channels.

The Western Powers, while willing to reach an interim agreement on Berlin which would preserve their rights and the freedom of West Berlin, insisted that there could be no final solution of the Berlin problem short of German reunification for which the Four Powers are responsible.

The USSR retained its attitude that reunification was a matter for the Germans alone. The Soviets maintained that the Berlin problem should be resolved by completing the end of the occupation status in Germany, terminating the last vestiges of the occupation which exist only in Berlin, agreeing on a new status, preferably a "free city" status for West Berlin, and beginning work on a peace treaty.

These incompatible positions precluded agreement. Even the points on which a *modus vivendi* in Berlin could be based, as discussed at length from May 29 - June 19, were only reshaped. Agreement could not be reached since neither side was willing to prejudice its larger policy on Germany as a whole by making concessions in Berlin which might jeopardize its ability to hold its security position in West or East Germany.

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The Geneva recess was received with general relief by both sides as well as other nations which were not direct participants in the Conference. It seemed that a dangerous situation had been shoved under the rug, temporarily at least, by simply shifting discussions to a higher level which would consider the broader sphere of global policies.

The organization and material in this IIB follows the same pattern as previous numbers in this series. Since verbatim texts of the restricted Geneva sessions have been closely held for security reasons, texts of the semi-weekly summaries to the North Atlantic Council have been used to reproduce the sessions in a uniform manner.

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PART ONE
STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FROM SOVIET BLOC SOURCES

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June
23
(Unclassified)
(Article in
July 13
issue)

Excerpts from "Life" Article by Averell Harriman on Interview with Khrushchev: As a private person with no official status, I was careful to avoid raising any current diplomatic issues. But Khrushchev insisted on giving me his views in detail, not only on Berlin and German reunification but on all other outstanding international problems from the Middle East to Formosa.

The state of war with the Germans, he said, was an anachronism and must be terminated. The Western Powers, he claimed, had recognized the West German Federal Republic in contravention of wartime agreements. If we would not agree to a settlement in Berlin, he would act unilaterally and would terminate our rights himself.

"Your generals," he said, "talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. That is bluff." Khrushchev spoke with angry emphasis. "If you send in tanks, they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically," he added, and his colleagues around the table chorused the word "automatically."

I exclaimed that his attitude not only was dangerous but revealed a deep ignorance of the American position. Despite their other differences, the Republican and Democratic parties were united behind President Eisenhower in his determination to defend the two million West Berliners.

Khrushchev retorted that he was aware that the leaders of both parties in America supported Eisenhower. But, he said, the workers did not. His repeated references to the American "working class" which, he maintained, had no voice in political affairs illustrates only one of the many misconceptions the Russian premier entertains concerning the United States.

Then Khrushchev assumed a less threatening air. "We are prepared to give you every reasonable guarantee that the people of West Berlin can retain whatever structure they desire. We are prepared to have these guarantees supervised either by one or more neutral countries or by the United Nations," he said. His arguments did not convince me that his proposals provided adequate safeguards against West Berlin's eventual absorption by Eastern Germany.

The Soviet Union, he went on, has no desire to take over West Berlin. "What are a mere two million people to us with our bloc of 900 million?" he asked contemptuously. If the Soviet

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June (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)

Union were to take over West Berlin, it would only have to feed the people. "We prefer to let you feed them," he said.

As for the Western troops in Berlin, he said he was ready to let them stay for a short time, even though he could not understand why we wanted to keep them there. "In the event of fighting they would be swallowed up in a single gulp." But he insisted that he would not agree to have any more Western troops enter Berlin, and those that are there must leave eventually. "These days of the occupation," he said "are gone forever."

Turning to the problem of Germany as a whole, Khrushchev said he strongly doubted that any of the great powers sincerely wanted reunification. "You can rest assured," he said, "that I will agree to no reunification which does not provide for a 'socialist' /meaning Communist/ system. I am equally sure that you do not want a reunification that does not provide for your form of political system." It was obvious to him, therefore, that there could be no agreement on reunification at this time. Hence there was nothing to do but settle the Berlin issue by ending the occupation status and making peace with the two Germanies.

Opening up on Chancellor Adenauer, Khrushchev said he would never accept him as a representative of Germany. When he charged that Adenauer was "the most unpopular man in Germany," I could not refrain from replying that the West Germans had been given frequent opportunities to express their estimate of him at the polls. The East German Premier Grotewohl, on the contrary, had not faced a single free election. "Your views and mine on free elections," Khrushchev retorted contemptuously, "are hardly identical." He also made it clear that he had a low opinion of American elections as an expression of the will of the "working classes."...

Bringing up the subject of disarmament, Khrushchev said he was in favor of the strictest controls and inspection to ensure that disarmament is carried out. He said he would even be willing to accept Eisenhower's proposals for aerial inspection, although in view of the existence of American bases around the globe, this was patently unfair to the Soviets. But he would not agree to aerial inspections as a first step. Before that, an agreement must be reached on nuclear disarmament, especially on the discontinuance of testing.

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June (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)

Khrushchev argued that the Berlin and disarmament problem are the only serious outstanding issues of today. If the German problem were settled, he intimated, other problems would find easy solutions. He denied repeatedly that the Soviets had any pretensions in the rest of the world, but it was evident throughout our talks that he believed that Communism, as a superior social order, would one day inherit the globe.

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June
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(Secret)

US Embassy Moscow Report on Harriman - Khrushchev - Thompson Conversation: Khrushchev was serious but genial and repeatedly asserted his desire for a peaceful settlement of their differences with us. He suggested we should draw appropriate lessons from history which US did not appreciate as much as Soviet Union which had twice been invaded by Germany. I replied historic lesson we drew was that we should not repeat error following First World War of giving Germany grounds for thinking she was being mistreated. Khrushchev said he was not impressed by this argument. He expressed his contempt for Adenauer who had tried to flatter him and was trying to stir up trouble not only between Soviet Union and West but also between Western Allies, particularly France and Britain. I said our experience with Adenauer had shown that he genuinely wanted to prevent a recurrence of German militarism and had wholeheartedly supported plans for European integration which would prevent this. He said we must face German problem seriously and recognize that Ulbricht and Adenauer could never agree. West would never consent to a Communist Germany and he would never agree to Adenauer's absorbing East Germany. Best plan was to conclude a peace treaty and liquidate remains of war. When I pointed out we had recognized present situation by providing for a phased plan he said we had allowed two and one-half years whereas he would prefer 250 years. When Gromyko pointed out our plan based on elections Khrushchev said West would not allow Vietnam to be absorbed through free elections and how could we expect Soviet Union to allow Adenauer to absorb far more important area of East Germany.

It was clear that a reunited Germany would join NATO. West wanted them to allow greater population of West Germany to decide issue. He had no good answer to my argument that our plan provided for possibility separate vote in two parts of Germany. Khrushchev asked me if we would ever allow West Germany to opt for socialism. I said he would doubtless not believe me but I was sure that if West Germany took such a decision in a supervised election that was not under pressure of threats, we would abide by the decision. Khrushchev said I had best be careful and was I so sure that this might not one day happen after Soviets had continued to improve their own economic position and standard of living in East Germany had been raised. He said that Adenauer did not want German reunification for fear Germany would go socialist.

Khrushchev said it was clear German question could not be settled now and he had therefore put forward his Berlin proposal. He had envisioned the free city solution personally

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June (Cont.)
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(Secret)

although his associates agreed with him. He was prepared to give almost any kind of guarantee for the free city. He emphasized importance that Soviet Government which came to power after death of Stalin attached to keeping its word and that it would faithfully fulfill any guarantee given. He should know that when discussions were resumed in Geneva we should not expect change in Soviet position as they could not go beyond proposals already put forward. He understood our position to be that if there was no agreement in Geneva there would be no summit conference. If this were so, very well, but he would then conclude separate peace treaty and our occupation rights would cease to exist. He kept his temper when I inquired how he could reconcile this statement with his previous remarks about the importance the Soviet Government attached to keeping its word. This led to a long and inconclusive argument about who was to blame for breakdown of four power cooperation in Germany. He pointed to our conclusion of separate treaty with Japan. When I said we had reserved Soviet rights he replied that they had been kicked out of Allied Council and we had established military bases in Japan. Mikoyan interjected they would give us same deal on Germany as we had given them on Japan.

Khrushchev asked what was wrong with Soviet proposal. He emphasized that West Berlin and its population was of no importance to Soviet Union. I said I could believe this but Berlin was clearly important to West Germans who wanted to absorb it and Soviet proposals seemed to us clearly designed to facilitate this objective.

Khrushchev referred to Secretary Harter's speech which he characterized as an incorrect statement of the position. Gromyko had not intended to make public statement but would now be obliged to put record straight.

I referred to his earlier statement that Soviet Union had made its maximum offer and said I thought same was true of West although various combinations of essential elements of our offer were possible. He then suggested that perhaps we should cancel the meeting. I replied that I was not conducting negotiations with him but merely trying to explain my understanding of my Government's position. I explained this in some detail referring to Soviet action in disarming of East Berlin and now trying to move in on West Berlin. Then I outlined the concessions we had made and the distance we had gone to meet his position he said he had carefully examined our proposal which did in fact contain many constructive

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June (Cont.)
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(Secret)

elements. It was not bad except for one fact and that was that it was to operate until German reunification which was completely unacceptable. It might be all right as an interim arrangement to operate until a peace treaty could be drawn up and concluded.

I referred to a remark he had made that our troops in Berlin had no military value and that even if we had 100,000 there they would be wiped out immediately in the event of war. I asked why was he then so anxious to get rid of them. He replied that while they would have no military value in the event of war they did have a military value now. Gromyko explained that subversive organizations in Berlin operated under the protection of Western troops. If peace treaties were signed they could no longer fulfill this function. I said this indicated that Soviet Union or GDR would decide which organizations were legitimate and which were not. This would constitute interference in internal affairs of Berlin and showed clearly where Soviet proposals would lead. Khrushchev said this was an exaggerated interpretation.

I also referred to the lack of reciprocity in Soviet proposals on propaganda, etc. Khrushchev said it was obviously impossible to control activities in West Germany and allow Bonn to be free to continue them. I said we recognized this and were prepared to deal with it but could not accept arrangements on this matter that applied to West Berlin but not East Berlin.

Khrushchev referred to holding of presidential election in West Berlin as a provocative act but not in any manner suggesting Soviets intended to do anything about it. Khrushchev then told anecdotes to illustrate theses I was merely repeating old arguments.

Harrison emphasized strongly that both parties in US supported President's position on Berlin. Khrushchev suggested that while political parties might be in agreement some of our people were not, but he recognized they had to deal with our Government. Khrushchev concluded conversation by saying we should work out an interim arrangement that would lead to a peace treaty and he suggested this could be done in a way to avoid any aspect of an ultimatum.

Unless Department perceives objection, I propose inform my French, British and German colleagues of this conversation.

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June
26
(Official
Use Only)

Soviet Note to US on German Presidential Election in Berlin:
According to a communication of the Federal Republic of Germany Government, on July 1 this year it is planned to hold elections in West Berlin for the Federal Republic of Germany.

As is known, West Berlin, which is in the center of the German Democratic Republic, is not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the competence of the federal authorities does not extend to it. This generally recognized fact has also found expression even in the recent statements of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA, Great Britain and France at the Conference in Geneva. At the same time the representatives of the three powers have repeatedly emphasized their responsibility for the situation in West Berlin, from which it follows that the setting of the elections of the Federal Republic of Germany President for this city could not take place without their knowledge and consent.

The Soviet Government considers the conducting of these elections in West Berlin as a new attempt to use the current abnormal situation in the city in order to inflame even more the situation in Germany and to create additional obstacles on the path to the achievement of agreements on urgent international questions, including the question of West Berlin.

In drawing the attention of the Government of the USA to the above, the Government of the USSR expressed the hope that it will take appropriate measures in order that West Berlin not be used for new political demonstrations, incompatible with the task of relaxing tension in the center of Europe.

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June
27
(Official
Use Only)

Embassy Moscow Report of Soviet Reaction to Herter Speech:
Pravda commentator Plyshevski and Izvestia observer provide first Soviet editorial comment on Secretary's June 23 speech and future of Geneva Conference. Both stress virtually same theme: (1) Geneva meeting has had some "positive significance"; (2) Herter speech is "far from objective" and gives "incorrect interpretation of Soviet proposals which are designed to bring East-West positions closer together; (3) Secretary is being unduly influenced by Adenauer statements and positions; (4) period between now and resumption of talks should be, in words of Izvestia headline, "time for reflection" on part of West.

Embassy comment: Tone of both articles quite mild, with current Soviet effort apparently directed toward demonstrating willingness to negotiate with possibility of success dependent on West's adoption of proper and reasonable attitude.

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June

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(Unclassified)

Gromyko Statement on Germany: In view of the lively interest displayed in our country in the work of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers and of inquiries received in this matter by representatives of the press, the necessity has arisen to make a statement on both the position following the end of the first stage of the Conference and on its prospects. This is especially necessary since in the statements made by some other participants of the negotiations after their return from Geneva, particularly in the statement of the US Secretary of State, a tendentious interpretation of the course of the negotiations and of the attitude of the Soviet Union was manifest.

What were the real developments in the negotiations in Geneva? The inclusion in the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference of representatives of the two German states shows that, despite the opposition by extremist circles in the NATO countries, the awareness of the necessity to reduce international tension by mutually acceptable solutions prevails over the bankrupt position of strength policy.

The Soviet Government belongs, as is known, to those who believe that the time has come to ventilate the stuffy atmosphere of mistrust and hostility which now exists in international relations as a consequence of many years of cold war and to converge the efforts of all states in one single direction - the consolidation of peace.

Not a few problems have accumulated in the postwar period. They concern all those who seek to relax international tension instead of conceiving the future of mankind as a race toward a new war. The results of the Second World War in Europe, not yet removed because of the absence of a peace treaty with Germany, are corroding relations between many states. The unsettled position in West Berlin, that reserve of the occupation regime in the center of a sovereign state - the German Democratic Republic - is constantly causing tension in the international position. It is therefore quite natural that the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question become important items for discussion at the Geneva Conference.

The first weeks of the Conference were mainly devoted to examining the question of a peace treaty with Germany. To the extent to which the Ministers of the Western Powers touched upon the draft peace treaty put forward by the Soviet Government and the concrete proposals concerning the contents of the future treaty with Germany, the discussion was useful. However, the Western Powers made no little effort to wind-up the examination of the question of a peace treaty as quickly as possible.

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Striving to fence themselves off from a settlement of this long overdue task, the Governments of the United States, Britain, and France have many times hidden behind the statement - as if it were some shield - that their unwillingness to tackle the settlement of the question of a peace treaty with the two existing German states is dictated by nothing less than concern for the unification of Germany!

It would seem impossible to deny that in circumstances where two sovereign German states exist with differing social systems, there is no better way to help eliminate the alienation between them and to direct their development into a common stream of peaceful policy than to conclude a German peace treaty.

All talk about a reunification of Germany remains an empty sound if it is not accompanied by a readiness to really help the Germans of both German states to bring out what they have in common, and around which, in the process of a gradual rapprochement, a single peace-loving German state could crystallize.

This task can be accomplished by the conclusion of a German peace treaty. If there are people in the United States who pretend - to judge by the recent statement of Secretary of State Norton - that they do not understand the significance of a peace treaty for the unification of Germany, the reason is clear.

They do not want to see the positive effect which the conclusion of a German peace treaty would have for the cause of German reunification, just as they do not want reunification itself. The attempts of the US Secretary of State to prove the opposite only show how little truth is told to the people in the West concerning the true policy toward Germany and how much space is devoted there to cheap propaganda in which few people believe.

The endless postponement of the peace treaty has already caused sufficient harm to the cause of the restoration of German national unity. There can be no doubt that with further delays of a peaceful settlement with Germany, the paths to development of the GDR and the Federal German Republic will diverge more and more and the unification of Germany will become increasingly remote.

It is therefore not difficult to guess what it is that causes certain US statesmen to manipulate trivial arguments denying the significance of the peace treaty for the solution of the problem of German reunification. An admission on their part

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of the usefulness of the peace treaty for German reunification would be equivalent to their acknowledgment of the fiasco of a policy on the German question which, both in the past and today, is in fact aimed at consolidating the division of Germany.

Of course, the negative attitude of the Western Powers toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany does not signify that this subject may be regarded as exhausted. The Minister, said the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Zhuravskiy, on June 19, 1959, that the best solution to this problem would be the conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government, or with another plenipotentiary organ representing all of Germany. If, however, it is not possible to conclude a peace treaty on such a basis, then it will have to be signed with the two sovereign German states which exist today. In the aggressive and reactionary circles also present the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, there will be nothing left but to sign a peace treaty with the two

When the Soviet Government openly declares that it cannot delay the question of a peace treaty with Germany, the statesmen of the Western Powers try to represent this as almost a threat. Such assertions can hardly be taken seriously. Their authors cannot be slaves to their own imagination to such an extent that they fail to realize that the question here concerns the only way left to the Soviet Union, which it will be forced to take if the Western Powers continue to obstruct joint work on the elimination of the dangerous vestiges of war and occupation in Germany.

Last week the Conference concentrated its attention on the second question on the agenda: the Berlin question. A thorough and concrete discussion developed on this question and the work of the Conference was broken off at the very height of the discussion. The Soviet side tried in every way to convince the Western Powers of the need to alter the present dangerous situation which has developed in West Berlin. We continually emphasized that the occupation regime has long been obsolete and that 14 years after the end of the war the question of West Berlin should have found a new solution. West Berlin and its occupation regime, barracks where foreign soldiers are quarters, organs of the occupation administration which have the last word in the solution of all the most important questions in the life of the town and its inhabitants - this is a sorrowful monument to the period of the war and the occupation.

It is true that sometimes the representatives of the Western Powers say to us that the occupation regime is necessary

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must not be preserved forever, but only until the reunification of Germany. But this is an argument for naive people. To say that the occupation regime in West Germany must be preserved until the reunification of Germany means in fact to stand for its perpetuation, in view of the present policy of the Western Powers and the Adenauer government on the question of German unity.

There is another side to the question. It is sufficient to look at the map to understand that West Berlin, as a base for the "ATO" powers which has been formed in the center of a socialist state, is a field for subversive activity and provocations and constitutes a source of dangerous friction between the states and a constant potential threat to the cause of peace in Europe.

They have tried to convince us that the situation in West Berlin does not constitute a danger, and in this respect they have referred to the fact that so far nothing terrible has happened there. But why wait until something terrible occurs, we asked? If a conflict flares up - and in the present situation in West Berlin this can always be expected - it will possibly be too late to talk. Would it not be better to avert such a possibility?

The Soviet Government calls for this. An improvement of the situation in West Berlin, the strengthening of peace in Europe, and the improvement of relations between the powers have been the aims of all proposals of the Soviet Government on the Berlin question, and first among these has been the proposal to grant West Berlin the status of a demilitarized free city.

As a result of the stand of the Ministers of the Western Powers, it was not possible to reach agreement on a radical solution of the problem of West Berlin by granting it the status of a free city. The representatives of these powers preferred to discuss only individual - though having a certain significance - problems relating to West Berlin. The strength of the armed forces of the three powers stationed in West Berlin and the measures which might be taken with regard to the subversive activities and hostile propaganda against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries conducted from the territory of West Berlin were points under discussion, as well as the safeguarding of access to West Berlin.

We were, of course, concerned about the clarification of the attitudes taken toward each of these problems, having in view

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that they should be solved in combination with the main point, namely, in connection with the future fate of West Berlin itself.

Whether West Berlin should remain a city whose population is doomed to live indefinitely under the guns of foreign troops or to become a city free from occupation, independently building its life is the chief problem whose solution cannot be evaded.

When the question of the possibility of concluding an agreement came up, we stated clearly that this document should not contain stipulations that would perpetuate the occupation status in West Berlin, because this would contradict the interests of peace, the interests of relaxation of tension in Europe in general, and in Germany in particular.

Since the three Western Powers stubbornly refused to agree that the outdated occupation status in West Berlin should be abolished forthwith, the Soviet Government decided, in the interests of reaching agreement, not long before the interval in the work of the Geneva Conference, to put forward new proposals on the Berlin issue.

The Soviet Government proposed to liquidate the abnormal position in West Berlin gradually, at the same time preparing a peace treaty and working out measures aimed at the unification of Germany.

The new Soviet proposals provide that the four powers - the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France - conclude an interim agreement, of definite duration, on West Berlin. This agreement on the interim status of West Berlin would include agreement on the following issues:

- A. Reducing the occupation forces of the Western Powers in West Berlin to token contingents;
- B. Stopping the subversive activities from West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries;
- C. Not siting atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin.

These measures constitute the minimum of what must be done at once with a view to bringing about conditions of safety in West Berlin for the period during which the interim status of West Berlin is effective.

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A committee which would be set up - consisting of representatives of the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France - could be in control of the implementation of the obligations arising from the agreement. During this period the three Western Powers would retain certain occupation rights in West Berlin, and its communications with the outer world would be maintained in the same form as now.

In the meantime, conditions would be prepared for a more cardinal settlement of the Berlin problem on the basis of a peace treaty with Germany.

With a view to not permitting a suspension of work on the preparation of a peace treaty and at the same time to actually hold the rapprochement of both German states, the Soviet Government spoke out in its new proposals in favor of an all-German committee to be created by the two German states on a parity basis, consisting of representatives of the GDR and the German Federal Republic. The duties of the committee would include expansion and development of contacts with the two German states, working out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and examination of questions linked to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Obviously, should the GDR and the German Federal Republic prefer not to negotiate with each other on the above-mentioned question within the framework of such a committee but in some other way, it is their affair. They can select any form of cooperation acceptable to them.

The Soviet proposals envisage that by agreement between the four powers a definite time limit will be established for the temporary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all-German committee. The establishment of such a time limit is necessary because it is impossible to draw out indefinitely a peaceful settlement with Germany and maintain an occupation regime in West Berlin. If no definite time limit is established for the all-German committee to carry out its tasks, there will be no guarantees that one of the sides will not make use of this, and prefer marking time to serious talks. I say straightforwardly that the present attitude of the Government of the German Federal Republic, both on question of unifying Germany and on the peace treaty, fully confirms the grounds for these fears.

It emerges from statements by leading figures of the German Federal Republic that Bonn actually would like not a settlement of outstanding international problems but a continuation

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of the former policy of obstructing their settlements, which is so dear to the heart of Chancellor Adenauer. Is it reasonable not to take this circumstance into account? Obviously not!

For its part, the Soviet Government had proposed that the agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin be designed for a year and a half. The all-German committee would have to complete its work by the end of that period.

If, within the time limit agreed upon by the sides, both German states, as a result of negotiations within the framework of the all-German committee or in any other form, do not come to an agreement on the peaceful settlement and unification of Germany, the states represented at the 1959 Geneva Conference of European Ministers could return anew to an examination of the question concerning West Berlin.

Such is the essential content of the last proposal of the Soviet Government.

It may be asked: What has moved the Soviet Government to come out with new proposals for a temporary solution of the Berlin question? The answer is simple. We want a solution of the Berlin question on a concordant basis. We also want reasons to be taken at last to bring nearer the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. That is why the Soviet Government, as is known, introduced certain changes in its proposals, in order to take more fully into account the point of view of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, as expressed at the Geneva Conference, and to promote a rapprochement of the positions of the two sides.

Let us, for example, take the question on the term of validity of the temporary agreement on West Berlin proposed by the Soviet Union. At first, the Soviet Government proposed to fix this at one year. However, since this did not suit the Western Powers, another term was suggested, that is, one and a half years. We are prepared to negotiate on this topic. Let me recall that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France have themselves proposed at the Geneva Conference that a period of two and a half years should be fixed for the completion of the work of the all-German committee. If the two sides come to an agreed view on the main issues, it appears that it would not be too difficult to agree on the required period of time.

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I should like to call special attention to one misinterpretation of the last Soviet proposals which one often meets in the West and which, unfortunately, may be heard from statesmen of the Western Powers. It is asserted that fixing a period of time as envisaged in our proposals means that when this period expires all the rights of the United States, Great Britain, and France in West Berlin will automatically lapse, while the Soviet Union will immediately embark upon unilateral acts in relation to West Berlin. Why is such a conclusion drawn? Does not the fact that the Soviet Union is proposing to hold new negotiations on West Berlin after the expiration of the terms provided for in the agreement - if by that time the all-German committee does not succeed in its work - speak for itself?

If only a unilateral solution of the question of the rights of Western Powers in Berlin - either now or after the expiration of the term of validity of the above-mentioned temporary agreement on West Berlin - were envisaged, we would not have proposed jointly deciding on the temporary status of West Berlin, solving the question of the guarantees of such status, and creating a four-power supervisory agency. We would not have proposed that the joint discussion of the Berlin question should be renewed if the GDR and the German Federal Republic fail to come to an understanding in the all-German committee. Thus, the Soviet Government prefers to find an agreed solution regarding our new proposals also, I repeat, an agreed solution concerning West Berlin, which must, of course correspond to the present situation in Berlin and in Germany and must not, and cannot, emanate from a desire to perpetuate the occupation regime in West Berlin.

Critics of the Soviet proposals go so far as to try and ascribe to the Soviet Union the intention to swallow West Berlin and deprive its inhabitants of freedom. Strange assertions of this kind were contained, in particular, in the speech made by Mr. Harter on the radio on his return to the United States from Geneva. Is it necessary to say that such arguments do not contain even one grain of truth? In no way can they testify to a desired to throw an objective light on the Soviet Union's position.

Leaving aside the question of the kind of freedom for West Berliners that is supported by foreign tanks and machine guns, it is necessary to point out that the Soviet Government, both in its proposal to turn West Berlin into a free city and in the proposal to work out a temporary status for West Berlin, showed consideration for the way of life of the West Berlin population and strived to exclude the possibility of any outside interference in the internal affairs of this city. Everybody knows,

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too, that the GDR Government adheres to an analogous point of view on this issue, and has solemnly declared its readiness, together with the other states, to guarantee the observance of the agreed status of West Berlin.

It is not superfluous to recall that when, in the course of the talks, the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR declared the readiness of their governments to guard West Berlin from all outside interference, the Ministers of the Western Powers somehow suddenly lost interest in this problem. They did not want to speak of the participation of United Nations in the guarantees, although from the rostrum they frequently speak of the organization's role. But, as we see, speaking about it is one thing, and respecting it in practice is another thing.

It has become clear from all this that in reality they are concerned not with the maintenance of the existing way of life of the West Berlin population - with which, as is well known, nobody interferes - but with the continuation of foreign occupation in this part of the city. This, and nothing else.

Why, then, did the US Secretary of State deem it appropriate again to give currency to the version that the Soviet Union allegedly strives for some kind of annexation of West Berlin? There is nothing but to suppose that this version, too, which has been borrowed from the cold war arsenal, can hardly be intended for anything but to mislead public opinion in Western countries. But it is difficult to combine such methods with a business-like approach to the solution of the questions on the Conference agenda.

During the debate on Berlin, the United States, Berlin, and France showed great interest in securing the further stay of their troops in West Berlin. Taking this into account, we expressed readiness to agree to the temporary stay of a token quantity of US, British, and French troops in West Berlin. The Western Powers attached great importance to insuring freedom of access for American, British, and French military personnel to West Berlin. On this issue, too, we went some way toward meeting the wishes of the Western Powers, having declared that we agreed to the temporary maintenance of the links between West Berlin and the outside world in their present state and to return to the discussion of this question if the work of the all-German committee does not yield positive results.

Thus, the Soviet Union has gone some way to meet the positions of the Western Powers, although they by-pass it in silence.

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Apparently, the governments of the Western Powers have nothing to say to this, for in fact they are interested not in a reasonable solution of the aforementioned questions, but in the preservation of West Berlin as a permanent source of international tension.

In assessing the situation that has arisen at the Geneva Conference, one must note that the discussion on the question of a peace treaty and West Berlin reflected, like in a mirror, the two lines in the policy of the former members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition toward Germany.

Should a line be drawn under World War II in Europe? Should development of Germany as an independent, peace-loving, and democratic state be insured? The Soviet Union gives a positive reply to this question. It is for this reason that it proposes to prepare without delay and to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

In present conditions this would mean concluding such a treaty with two German states, thus solving the question of West Berlin in the interest of peace and easing tension.

A different reply is given by the Western Powers. The existing situation in Germany apparently suits them better, since it creates favorable conditions for the transformation of West Germany into a NATO rocket and atomic base and transforms West Berlin into a permanent cancerous growth on the body of Germany and Europe.

It is apposite to recall that on the eve of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, and even during the Conference, the US Government took further steps to provide nuclear and rocket armaments for a number of NATO countries, notably for the Federal German Republic. Can this fact be assessed in any way but as evidence of the governments concerned being guided not so much by the interests of achieving agreement and easing tension, but by the plans of NATO military staffs?

In connection with West Berlin, this is the main question: Shall an end be put to the occupation regime which is still being preserved in that part of the city and shall a fundamental improvement in the situation in Berlin - and consequently in Germany and Europe - be effected?

The Soviet Union gives a clear answer to that question, too. It strives for the quickest liquidation of the out-dated occupation rule in West Berlin.

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A different answer is given by the Western Powers. The proposals they presented for consideration by the Geneva Conference had but one aim in view: To preserve at all cost the occupation regime in West Berlin, as well as the occupation privileges. Apparently 14 years of occupation of that part of the city is not enough. How much longer do they want to prolong it - for 50, or for 100 years? Then let them say so, and also reply to this question: How is it possible to state earnest intentions to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question while at the same time clinging to the occupation regime in West Berlin. The two are incompatible.

Let us now consider the question of the creation of an all-German committee. Its essence is briefly this: Are Germans from East and West to sit at one table in order to jointly discuss concrete steps for bringing together the two German states and then completely re-establishing the unity of Germany? Are they to work out a common position in relation to a peace treaty, or are the German people to be deprived of this right? The Soviet Union supports the first course, the Western Powers stand for the second.

Speaking of the course of the Geneva Conference, it is impossible to remain silent about the role adopted by the Government of the Federal German Republic. There is a fully adequate basis for the conviction that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sent its delegation to Geneva with instructions to create as many difficulties as possible in the work of the Foreign Ministers' Conference and to hinder their adoption of any kind of positive decisions. With all good will, it is impossible to name a single speech by this delegation which even contained a hint of a striving to contribute to the settlement of the questions on the agenda of the Conference. Yet these were questions which directly touch upon the vital interests of Germans and therefore it would seem that the representatives of the German states, above all, should be concerned about them.

The role of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany looks especially unsocial in light of the fact that the GDR delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Boltz, exerted a lot of effort to contribute to the success of the Conference and to bring together the positions of the two German states. This, however, did not meet with due response from the Adenauer government, to which - and this came out once again during the Geneva Conference - the interests of peace in Europe are alien.

Speaking of the two opposing lines which were pursued during the Geneva Conference by the two German states - the GDR and the

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Federal Republic of Germany - it is essential to emphasize that the very fact of the active participation of the representatives of these states in the Geneva Conference has a great significance as a matter of principle. It is an admission that without the participation of both German states it is impossible to consider problems dealing with Germany. Although the Western Powers have not yet recognized the GDR diplomatically, they have nonetheless been forced to recognize its *de facto* existence, and even this is an important success of the Geneva Conference for the German people.

Let us add that during the discussion of a peace treaty, the US Government, through the words of its Secretary of State, was forced to state that the Federal Republic of Germany does not represent and cannot represent all Germany. This statement, which without a doubt represents a step forward in the assessment of the real position which has developed in Germany, was in itself a bucket of cold water on the heads of those politicians in Bonn who have more than once tried to assume the right to represent all the German people.

During the last few days Bonn has given a new illustration of its obstructionist policy by adopting a decision to hold the presidential election for the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin on July 1, although it is known that the Federal Republic of Germany has no relation to West Berlin. Why was such a demonstration necessary? Moreover, was it timed to take place at a moment when the question of West Berlin is on the agenda of the Geneva talks? Of course, not to make the talks easier, but in order to introduce acerbity in the work of the Geneva Conference.

The leaders of the Federal German Republic, and notably Chancellor Adenauer, openly let it be understood that the most joyous news from Geneva for them would be an announcement of the collapse of the negotiations. One can only regret that the influence of the rabid partisans of the cold war is clearly affecting the positions of our other partners in the negotiations, primarily the governments of France and the United States. One is justified in asking: How rational is a policy which is built upon the support, even the courting, of those forces which are preventing the removal of the sources of friction among states, which live only by the idea of how to make profits from the contradictions among the great powers and how to cause a really good quarrel between the USSR and the US?

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The Geneva Conference of Ministers has been adjourned until July 13 at the request of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and France. If one were to talk of the causes which have led the Western Powers to propose a three-week break in the work of the Conference, these must obviously not be sought in the course of the talks themselves. Judging by everything, this break was planned by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France beforehand, and they were merely looking for a pretext to declare it.

What conclusion can be drawn from the fact that so far it has not been possible to reach agreement on the important questions for whose consideration the Conference of the Foreign Ministers was convened? The USSR Government considers that there can be only one conclusion: Further efforts are needed by all those represented at the Geneva Conference of States in order to settle the unsolved international problems.

Though the first half of the Conference did not have the results which the world expected, yet the exchange of opinions which took place has been definitely useful. The positions of the participants have become better defined, the existing disagreements have been more precise, and attempts have been made to bring the positions of the two sides nearer on certain questions.

All this cannot, of course, fail to facilitate the continuation of the work of the Conference. In our opinion, there are points of departure which make it possible to hope that the work of the Geneva Conference will have a positive outcome, unless, of course, our partners intend to mark time and to hold the talks from a position of maintaining the cold war. If the desire is to hold talks after having barricaded oneself in the trenches of the cold war, the question may well be asked: Why was it necessary for the Western Ministers to go to Geneva?

We share to a great extent the evaluation of the prospects of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers and that of the following summit conference voiced in the House of Commons on June 24 by the British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, who spoke about the chances of success for the Conference. We should like to believe that the governments of the Western Powers will make use of the break in the work of the Conference to form a more sound appraisal of the Soviet proposals, renounce unrealistic views which make an understanding more difficult, and begin to prepare agreements which will help to normalize the situation in Berlin and to open the way to a peaceful settlement in Germany. As far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it will continue to make every effort to reach mutually acceptable agreements on questions which are under discussion at the Geneva Conference.

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Official Use)

US Mission Berlin Report of Attack on Allied Forces by Soviet Radio Station in Germany: AP West Berlin paper) on story June 28 (reprinted in only one West Berlin by recent violent attack against Allied forces in West Berlin by Soviet forces radio station in Germany, VOLGA. According to broadcast Allied troops have acquired infamous reputation as a result of their crimes against mankind and frequent participation in crushing national independence movements. Allied forces in Berlin according to VOLGA are "schooled in spirit of animal hate against peoples of Socialist camp" by mercenaries who "entered army to get rich quick and who were accustomed by bourgeois life to satisfy themselves by murder and robbery."

Although VOLGA has regularly criticized West, it has normally hewed to current Soviet-GDR line and emphasized their standard charges against espionage activities West Berlin, etc. RIAS which monitors VOLGA on one check basis states VOLGA attack is first instance noted since Berlin crisis of direct attack conduct and character Allied Berlin units.

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GDR Note to US on Presidential Election in Berlin. Presented Through Czech Foreign Office: "The Government of the German Democratic Republic has the honor to inform the Government of the USA of the following:

"At instigation of Government of German Federal Republic election of President of the Federal Republic is to be held in West Berlin that does not belong to territory of German Federal Republic on July 1, 1959. This step is incompatible with statements made at Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva on May 22, 1959 by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of France, Mr. Couve de Murville, also on behalf of the delegations of the USA and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that 'territory of West Berlin is not a part of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.'

"Realization of the election of President of the German Federal Republic in West Berlin is expression of a policy that does not aim at understanding on the West Berlin question and at the lessening of tensions in Germany, but wants to maintain West Berlin as focus of permanent provocations.

"Planned step again points to fact that the Federal Government wants to block understanding of states represented at Geneva Conference also in this question.

"Resolution about realization of election of West German Federal President outside territory of German Federal Republic reveals efforts of the Federal Government to continue from West Berlin and by help of West Berlin the provocations against GDR, against security of its population and against its peaceful building up as well as against other European states.

"Government of GDR considers it right to inform Government of USA that it most severely protests against this measure.

"It points to fact that authors of these provocations will be fully responsible for consequences resulting from them.

"This proceeding proves how necessary it is to find at Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva such a solution of West Berlin question that in future will make impossible measures directed against peace and against security of German nation and other European nations".

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Report of Kozlov's Talk with Secretary Hertzer: Kozlov talked with Secretary for slightly more than one hour this morning. He was obviously very well briefed on Soviet proposals re Berlin and Germany. Most emphasis was put on necessity for ending the "occupation regime". He reiterated abnormality of occupation situation 14 years after war's end. Time period in Soviet proposal, he said, is not an ultimatum since after suggested year there would be renewed negotiations. The extent of the time period is not a principal question, but can be discussed. He failed to respond adequately to the Secretary's question how Soviet recognition of our juridical and access rights could be reconciled with the statement that if agreement were not reached the Soviets would take unilateral action which somehow would end these rights.

The Secretary re-enunciated the Western proposal that any failure to agree on the part of the all-German commission should be resolved by free balloting of the population - if the vote showed a wish for separate Germanies. West would respect, but if reunification were desired, Soviets should respect that wish. Kozlov said we should let the two German states discuss the matter - no harm could be done. As for West Berlin there never has been and is not any intent to swallow up the West Berlin population. If they prefer the capitalist structure that is their affair and their wishes will be respected. The Soviets guarantee and the East Germans have pledged that any agreement reached will be fulfilled.

The Secretary asked Kozlov if it would mean war should their proposed action to deny us our rights force us to defend those rights. Kozlov replied force would have to be met by force but the Soviet Union stands for agreement by peaceful negotiation. Soviets agree that Western proposals regarding reduction of forces in West Berlin and no introduction of atomic weapons in West Berlin constitute a rational element and an appropriate basis for negotiations. The Secretary said that Western proposals had met many Soviet points but had been rejected. On basis of six weeks Geneva discussions the West cannot fail to ask for a definitive Soviet answer on the question of our rights, particularly in view of Gromyko's statement that the best solution for West Berlin would be its inclusion in East Germany. After the Secretary said we would return to Geneva in a sincere hope of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement, Kozlov reiterated the Soviet proposals for Berlin and emphasized the need of ending the "occupation regime".

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Report of Conversation Between German Ambassador Kroll and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin: Zorin told Kroll that the West still hadn't correctly understood the latest Soviet proposals in their exact significance. Hertzer in his final private conversation with Gromyko did not contest that. One should know that these suggestions contained no ultimatum and that the Soviet Government had no intention of taking unilateral aggressive measures during the duration of the German mixed advisory commission or even after an unproductive expiration of this commission. Such measures would be a possibility only in the event that, so to speak, all of the threads are lost ("stricken relation"). The Soviet Government wishes to reach an understanding as much on the matter of Berlin as on all other outstanding questions.

Kroll asked Zorin about the conditions and terms under which the Foreign Ministers' Conference would resume if the deliberations of the mixed commission should collapse, pointing out that Gromyko had been unclear about this.

Zorin replied that the Western Powers and the USSR would have to reach an understanding on the provisional status of Berlin before the meeting of the German mixed commission. The West would have the same rights as before, to be sure in an agreed revised form (e.g., reduced troop contingents, diminished propaganda). If the Foreign Ministers' Conference were resumed in 18 months or two years, upon the collapse of the mixed commission, the West would return with the same revised rights - as long as it had observed the stipulations of the agreement. When Kroll inquired as to who would break whether or not the conditions had been met, Zorin replied that each side would agree not to alter by diplomatic means the agreement over the provisional status of Berlin.

Zorin stated that the Soviet delegation (at Geneva) had been astonished at the reaction of the West, and especially of the West Germans to a suggestion concerning the German mixed commission. This proposal had in fact been originally made by the West, but when it was accepted by the USSR, the West drew back. If the West was not released by Soviet acceptance of abandoned Western proposals, the matter at least might have been discussed, especially with regard to the matter of parity and the scope of the commission. The Soviet Government holds such a commission to be fully in the interest of bringing together the two German states and to be in reality a step towards reunification. Inasmuch as the West received the proposal without power, the Soviet Government concludes that the West is not really well disposed towards

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German reunification. However, the Soviets did expect that the West German delegation, at least, would be willing to discuss the proposal.

Zorin stated that the Soviet Union did not favor the idea of independent experts being represented on the commission instead of the officials of the two governments.

Regarding the duration of the consultations of the commission, Zorin stated that this was a matter which could be discussed, mentioning in the conversation a period of two years as a possible compromise.

Zorin moreover complained that Gromyko's attempt to bring up for discussion the question of a security zone in Europe and related problems in the field of disarmament had failed due to the negative attitude taken by the Western Powers. Kroll considered it entirely possible that Gromyko will raise the subject in the forthcoming stage of the conference.

Kroll set forth for Mr. Zorin the point of view of the Federal Government, which is shared by the Western Powers, that the West cannot make any further proposals than it has already done. Zorin did not express himself clearly on this point but suggested that the USSR might be willing to raise for discussion at the second conference the same proposals which it had made previously, as these do not appear to have been clearly understood by the West.

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Excerpts from Speech by Soviet Deputy Premier Kozlov in Washington: A speech before such a large audience as I face today imposes a high responsibility, including the responsibility to make a thorough choice of the topic for my talk, particularly since I have been limited in time.

It is therefore only natural that I am going to speak about what is most important - the things that give our peoples, and not only them alone, their greatest cause for concern. This is primarily the question of how mutual understanding and friendship between the USA and the USSR can be strengthened so that American-Soviet relations do not as heretofore develop on the basis of the cold war, whose authors reside not in our country.

The possible lines of development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are now the authors of heated discussions among both statesmen and common people - in the plants, the factories, on farms and at the family hearth. And this can hardly cause wonder.

After World War II estrangement and distrust unfortunately arose between us.

The international situation came to be poisoned by the venom of suspicion. During this period more often than not the problem at issue did not only fail to find any solution, but were made even more confused and acute, thus causing additional complications in the development of relations between states.

There were even such days when peace hung by a thread. The greatest achievements of human genius were placed at the service of the reckless policy of preparing for another war. Millions of the ablest and healthiest people have been taken away from their near and dear ones and extracted from the sphere of fruitful labor in order to master the art of annihilation.

All this, indeed, compels one to ponder over the future prospects of the development of international relations. And not only to ponder, but to draw the firm conclusion that the time has come to abolish once and for all the policy of suspicion and distrust and to resolutely invigorate the international situation.

Genuine prosperity and happiness of the people should and can be built up not on the shaky soil of the armaments race and animosity kindled between nations, but on the firm basis of the establishment of mutual trust, the recognition of the principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social and

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political systems, as the major line in the development of international relations.

Only this will permit utilizing to the benefit and not to the detriment of all men the ability that mankind is acquiring to command the forces of the atom and to secure progress as yet unprecedented in world history.

The destiny of this progress, as well as the destiny of peace in general, depend to no small extent on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which the entire course of historical development has placed in the focal point of major international events.

Do there exist any grounds for our relations to be built on the unshakable foundation of peace and friendship?

No in the Soviet Union believe that there do exist such grounds.

In this understanding, we proceed from our conviction that common people in the United States as well as peoples in other countries cherish and love peace.

Already in the course of my brief stay in your country I have soon real proof that this conviction is correct.

My colleagues and I have already been able to meet with many Americans, and all of them, starting from the representatives of business circles as well as the common workers of the industrial enterprises which we visited, said with sincerity and conviction that the nations need peace and as soon as possible we should eliminate the alienation and suspicion that exists in relations between our countries.

The politicians of your state with whom I had pleasant and useful meetings also spoke to me about the elimination of international tension.

As for the Soviet people, who on more than one occasion have been compelled to take up arms in defense of their motherland against foreign invaders and who have sustained untold losses, in numerous bloody battles, for them there is no other word more hateful than war. That this is true could easily be noted by any unbiased person who at least once has visited our country....

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It may be perhaps somewhat more difficult for you Americans, who have not suffered the horrors of war in your homes, to understand the feeling of repulsion for war, of hatred for war which animates our people. Therefore, we, sometimes with irony, more often with feelings of indignation, hear and read about accusations to the effect that the Soviet Government is seeking to unleash a new war, that we have some sort of aggressive aspirations.

There is no greater slander on the Soviet people and its Government than this.

Neither are serious the attempts to oppose the will of our people for peace to the actions of the Soviet Government, which allegedly violates this will.

In availing myself of the opportunity to address you, I would like once again to emphasize that the will of the Soviet people is a sacred law for the Government of the USSR.

We, the members of the Government, are but the servants of our people.

We have always held peace dear. It is particularly dear to us now that the Soviet Union is embarking upon that period of its history which has been the cherished hope of our people and has been gained through much suffering in the struggle.

In our country, we can already perceive the visible features of the new society which brings happiness to all men of labor.

The final completion of this edifice, the realization of our tremendous ambitions is no longer a matter of the remote future...

Ours are plans of peaceful construction and they pursue one sole objective - the attainment of happiness and abundance for the people.

We plan to attain in our country in 15 years' time, and perhaps even before that, the highest living standard in the world. Already in the process of fulfilling the seven-year plan, we propose to abrogate all forms of taxation of the population, to expand considerably the system of social insurance, to introduce in the immediate future the shortest working week in the world - a working week containing 30 to 35 hours.

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Is it possible for a people and a government who pursue such grand aims to contemplate war? Certainly not.

In our vast country we have all the requisites for the fulfillment of the chartered plans. We have a great industrial people, a highly developed national economy, high standards of science and engineering and untold natural wealth.

We are building a new society and we believe it will be the most just social order on earth.

But we are not and do not intend to foist this by force upon anybody. We have declared so repeatedly. And this is the very basis of our policy.

There is only one road acceptable to the people and that is the road of peaceful co-existence. Provided the Soviet Union and the United States adhere to this path, the differences in their social order cannot present an obstacle to the development of good-neighbor and sincere relations between our peoples.

After all, these differences did not stand in the way of our becoming allies in the struggle against fascism.

Neither should they stand in our way now in the struggle for better relations between us for the prevention of another war.

Yesterday in Washington, I had a pleasant and very useful conversation with President Eisenhower, with whom we spoke of the necessity to improve relations between our countries and solve peacefully the outstanding questions of international relations.

But, my friends, today it is not enough to desire peace, now, more than ever before, it is necessary to actively fight for peace. Any any rate, in this, we Soviet leaders see one of our primary duties.

Accordingly, we are striving to do everything so as not by word, but by deed to promote the consolidation of peace; the establishment of mutual understanding between peoples, between states.

To substantiate my statements, I would like to recall just a few recent facts.

In recent years we cut our armed forces by approximately 2,000,000 men; also making corresponding reductions of armaments.

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Every passing year witnesses a decrease in the share of military expenditures in our budget. We have dismantled our military bases in the territories of foreign states - and by the way, we only had a few such military bases.

Is all this not proof of our goodwill?

We are prepared to withdraw our troops from the territories of the (East) German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, provided the Western Powers on their part withdraw their troops from the territories of West Germany and their other allies in Europe.

We are willing to have atomic and hydrogen weapons completely prohibited, and even eliminated. And this is so, not because we are not strong enough in these weapons.

We propose considerable reductions of conventional armaments. We proposed to your country a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Is this not a proof of our goodwill?

We proposed the abolition of the existing military groupings, or at least the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

We proposed to sum up the results of the last war - the last world war - by concluding a peace treaty with Germany, and normalizing the situation in West Berlin.

A lot is now being said in your country about the Soviet proposals on the German question and in particular on the question of West Berlin. And, unfortunately, often this is spoken of wrongly.

We are accused of trying to abrogate by our proposals the situation in Europe and throughout the world, of wanting to provoke a serious international conflict. Naturally all this is not true.

Is the proposal to conclude peace with Germany with the two independent sovereign states existing on her territory - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany - is this proposal a "cold war?"

As soon the question is put in this way nothing remains of the arguments of those who decry the policy of the Soviet Government.

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Or take the question of West Berlin. More than fourteen years have elapsed since the end of World War II and there still exists in West Berlin the occupation regime - the troops of the Western Powers are still deployed in the city. Why? For what reason? It is said that the reason is to protect the freedom of the West Berliners.

When the Soviet Government proposes to eliminate in West Berlin the unjustifiably long occupation regime, to withdraw foreign troops from that city or at least to reduce them in strength to create a free city of West Berlin under certain guarantees of accessibility to it from East and from West, we are accused of having aggressive intentions. And it is stated that we are putting forward an ultimatum.

Is this correct? We are proposing that over a period of one year, or eighteen months, an all-German committee made up of the representatives of both German states on the basis of parity should work and that there should be established a temporary status for West Berlin.

If during this time the Germans do not come to agreement between each other and a peace treaty is not signed, which of itself would resolve the Berlin issue, then we propose, once again, to have negotiations on this question and can a proposal to have negotiations be considered as an ultimatum.

To maintain foreign troops in West Berlin, to insist on the endless continuation of the occupation regime, this, if you please, is the struggle for peace. But the proposal to eliminate a hotbed of provocation and intrigue which is dangerous for the cause of peace and which West Berlin has now become - these are aggressive aspirations.

We naturally do not share such a viewpoint and are convinced that in the long run we will be correctly understood.

The statement of the Western countries should insistently and patiently seek just solutions of the urgent and acute questions of the international situation.

It is for this that we aspire - the leaders of the Soviet Government.

Or take the question of the development of trade between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. There was, indeed, a time when we traded with each other and this was

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beneficial to both you and us. But now trade relations between our states have ceased almost completely.

What is the reason for this? Who is to blame?

I will say outright that it is not we - the Soviet side - that is to blame. In the well-known message of N. S. Khrushchev, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, to United States President Eisenhower, the Soviet Government submitted a concrete program for the development of Soviet-American trade.

We could buy from you equipment and personal consumer goods; and to sell you our goods and raw materials, to bring the turnover of trade to several billion dollars a year.

Words can sometimes be heard in your country that - so it is said - trading with the USSR and selling that country your machines, the United States would be helping to build communism in our country. These are foolish assertions. The Soviet Union is such a powerful country, it has so many sincere friends in the world, that we will be quite able to build communism without the aid of the capitalists.

Our seven-year plan is based on our internal forces. And if we propose evermore insistently to expand our economic ties we do so because mutually beneficial trade is the best method of preserving and developing good relations between our countries.

We are also sure that trade with the Soviet Union and resort to the even greater market of the Socialist countries would bring serious benefits to the business men of the United States, would increase the work capacity of your powerful industry and would raise the employment of the population.

Unfortunately, our proposals, both in the field of solving acute problems of international relations and on the expansion of trade, have as yet not met with the understanding on the part of the United States Government.

This is obviously the influence of those quarters who to serve their selfish ends would seek to perpetuate the tension in the relations between our countries. But we must not lose heart and give up. Undoubtedly, it will require no little time and effort to obtain a radical improvement in the relations between the USA and the USSR.

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On this score, the Russians have a good proverb: "Without effort you cannot even drag a fish out of the pond."

No matter how thorny the road for mutual cooperation of our states, every step even the least significant one, made in this direction is met with a sigh of relief on the part of the broadest quarters of the population in every country of the world. And this is so because small as it may be, every such step is yet another stone laid in the foundation of the grand edifice of peace...

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US Mission Berlin Report of East Berlin Press Comment on Presidential Election: Organ Central Committee of SPD, Neues Deutschland, declared today that West will regret having ignored GDR warnings against holding Federal Republic presidential election in West Berlin.

In editorial entitled "New Proof" Neues Deutschland declared "Bonn thought they could cast serious warnings by GDR and GDR to winds. Provocation was carried out. They held election of Federal Republic president on territory of GDR in West Berlin or more precisely, they proclaimed a GDR man chief of state." Editorial continues that at opening of this trade-press, President of Bonn's "pseudo parliament", Gerstenmaier, stated "Berlin is a land of Bundesrepublik." Paper criticized him, said "Berlin" without limiting his reference to city to West Berlin "to make clear beyond doubt that it was a deliberate provocation."

Only because GDR refused to be provoked, article continues, were Federal Republic parliamentarians able to travel to West Berlin. Thus by crossing GDR borders they experienced the fact that Berlin lies on territory of GDR, permitting their travels "does not alter the fact that all Berlin basically and under international law belongs to the territory of GDR."

Gerstenmaier, by declaring Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic, "was in legal contradiction of international agreements on subject and even with so-called constitution for (West) Berlin promulgated 1950." Article also referred to letter from US, UK and French High Commissioners May 24, 1955, to Adenauer stating "West Berlin, now as previously, is not to be regarded as a state of Federal Republic." Also cited Brandt speech to the Bundestag February 24, 1955 (under international law West Berlin does not belong to Federal Republic) and to Couve de Murville's statement May 22 at Geneva.

Article then states Western Powers have rejected thesis that West Berlin is state of Federal Republic. "They place much more value on maintaining so-called four power status from 1945. Gerstenmaier has now destroyed this thesis, which in fact was already untenable. They will regret that they cast our warnings to the wind!"

Editorial concludes that West Berlin today unfree is most dangerous threat to peace, international understanding, Geneva Conference, etc. Most urgent task to maintain peace is therefore normalization and that in creation of deilitized free city of West Berlin.

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US Mission Berlin Report of East German Editorial on Resumption of Geneva Talks: East German daily National Zeitung in editorial entitled "The New Phase" repeated charge made in Neues Deutschland July 3 that election Federal Republic President July 1 and Gorsternier's statements have weakened Western legal position in Berlin.

Next phase Geneva, editorial stated, will be followed by summit conference. Forces of peace have already achieved great progress since negotiations began. Developments show position Western Powers is weakening. Editorial continues "realistic political circles West Germany recognize that Bonn has weakened this position by West Berlin Presidential election. Western Powers desire maintain occupation status, but Bonn declared Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic. Bonn gave West Berlin representatives equal voting rights with West Germans and let their ballots be cast in same urn. If West Berlin is declared to be Federal Republic state, then in accordance with Paris treaties, there can no longer be occupation rights there. On what then are the victors' rights of three Western Powers in West Berlin, which were so often proclaimed during the Geneva Conference, based?"

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US Mission Berlin Report of East German Position on Geneva Talks: In interval between two phases of Geneva Foreign Ministers' talks GDR spokesmen have frequently reiterated line developed by GDR delegation Geneva on day of adjournment to the effect that evaluation of first phase of talks reveals important positive results. Citing fact that negotiations are under way at all, they list as outstanding achievements the "de facto recognition of GDR", destruction of Bonn "pretensions" to be only German Government and alleged Western acceptance of "fact" that German problem cannot be settled without participation of both German states. First round of talks also praised for revealing to world "fact" that Adenauer leadership is main obstacle to international agreement and chief threat to peace, whereas GDR is only legitimate state having policies meeting the true desires of majority of German people. East German spokesmen also reiterated claim that Western leaders (specifically Foreign Minister Lloyd) have admitted West Berlin situation is "anomalous" and is susceptible of "improvement".

East German statements of last three weeks may also serve to indicate posture Soviets/GDR may take on certain points during next round of talks. Continuous reiteration of full support for GDR by "mighty" USSR and Socialist camp confirms view that at least initial posture Geneva will be hard and uncompromising, with insistence that negotiations be resumed on the basis of Gromyko proposals June 17. It is not unlikely that Soviet-GDR spokesmen will utilize early opportunity to launch a barrage of charges against West with Federal Republic main target.

There has been frequent repetition of theme that summit talks are inevitable and next round of talks at Geneva, while failing (as expected) to reach major decisions, will succeed in major task of preparing for summit talks; closely associated with this theme is firm assertion West wants and needs summit decisions and must not make serious mistake of assuming that Soviets are willing "pay a price" for such talks. East Germans continue to describe Soviet/GDR proposals as sincere effort to reach mutually acceptable compromise but this does not mean "willingness to sacrifice basic principles".

In various forms East German spokesmen have repeated explanations by Soviet spokesmen that time limits (first 15 and later 18 months) mentioned relative to Berlin agreement do not constitute an ultimatum. However, East Germans on several occasions have insisted they are unable to accept any deadline

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settlement for unlimited period of occupation of West Berlin based on rights allegedly derived from Nazi Germany capitulation. This theme seems to carry intimation they are willing to consider modified occupation status with rights derived from new agreement itself and not from World War II capitulation. Recent attacks on Federal Republic presidential election and Gerstenmaier statement indicate likelihood of charges at Geneva that this demonstrates unclear "anomalous" status of West Berlin.

Shortly before Foreign Ministers' talks adjourned Neues Deutschland editorial June 17 mentioned Western Powers originally expressed interest in, but subsequently cooled towards, creation of all-German commission, some form of zone of reduced armaments, non-aggression pact and an interim solution to Berlin. During last three weeks nearly all East German statements re Geneva have stressed importance of creation of all-German commission but have either not mentioned or soft-pedaled other subjects listed June 17. East Germans have also played up reports alleging "peoples' movement" developing West Germany in support of "East/West German negotiations and, in this connection, have stressed importance of East/West German talks in Geneva (outside of Conference room) between delegations of citizens and GDR official delegation. Pattern thus developed may indicate Soviets/GDR will press hard for agreement on all-German commission in this round of talks.

Attacks against Federal Republic, and particularly against Adenauer personally, have been maintained at high level during the last three weeks. Meetings of expelled groups have been mentioned as examples of Bonn's "revanchist policies". In one instance East German statements have hinted at possibility of Polish and Czech participation in talks might be revived at Geneva. Khrushchev's scheduled arrival Warsaw July 14 would fit in with such move. In addition, his decision to be in Warsaw as Conference resumes suggests he may use locale to bear down heavily on charges against "aggressive Federal Republic militaristic policies" with confidence of finding considerable resonance this theme among Poles and with hope of exerting pressure on Geneva talks.

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US Mission Berlin Report of Further East Berlin Press Campaign on Presidential Election: East Berlin daily, Neue Zeit, today returned to question of effect of July 1 presidential election and Gerstenmaier's statement upon legal position of Western Powers in Berlin and stated flatly Soviets/GDR will protest this action at Geneva. In front-page editorial Neue Zeit declared Bonn has unilaterally changed four power status of West Berlin. USSR and GDR obliged regard election as a provocation, and Gerstenmaier's insistence that West Berlin is land of Federal Republic as result of 1957 federal constitutional court was last straw.

Editorial continues "behind all this is fact that Willy Brandt, who so eagerly mixes into Federal Republic foreign policy, deliberately refrained from informing Dr. Gerstenmaier of protest by West Berlin commandants. The court decision, to which Gerstenmaier with great rathos referred, was never recognized as legal by Western Allies because it conflicted with their earlier decisions and the status of Berlin."

Editorial then states Gerstenmaier on own authority granted West Berlin electors right of vote and did not even insist on separate ballot boxes. "He did not, thereby, change election results. He only insured that foreign ministers now arriving will be faced with well-founded protest from USSR and GDR. They now cannot deny that the often-mentioned four power status has long been invalidated, with three Western Powers acquiescence, by Bonn Government actions including annual Bundestag meetings in Berlin and establishment here of Federal Republic agencies."

Editorial follows similar statements in Neues Deutschland July 3 and national Zeitung July 7 and is most categorical.

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Excerpts from Khrushchev Speech in Stettin: Here on the regained Polish western lands, of all the many pages of Polish history, a particularly glorious one is brought to mind--the battle of Gruenwald, whose 550th anniversary occurs this year. It was said in ancient times that history is life's teacher. What does this ancient page of history teach us today? Gruenwald remains in the people's memory forever as an example not only of gallant resistance to foreign invaders, but also of the fact that the road to victory over the enemy lies in the unity of the threatened people. In one rank with the Poles, who took upon themselves the main burden of the struggle with the Teutonic order, were the Lithuanian and Czech detachments. The Russian, Smolensk, and Belorussian regiments were also there, firmly repulsing the onslaught of the Crusaders on the field of Gruenwald. Gruenwald has become the symbol of the joint struggle of our peoples, who are closely linked by language and tradition, by their way of life and culture.

We also feel this historic closeness and brotherhood deeply today. In the days of joint struggle against Hitlerite invaders, the Soviet and Polish soldiers fought together as true comrades-in-arms. But today our brotherhood and our unity have become considerably wider and much stronger. The fraternal alliance linking the peoples who have freed themselves from capitalist slavery, the peoples who are in complete agreement and who, with mutual support, are building their bright future, is a mighty and unconquerable force. The unity of the camp of the socialist countries fears no kind of threat.

Why are we today recalling and speaking of the lessons of the long distance past and of World War II? They must be recalled because there are people who do want to take into account the lessons of the past. There are organizations, newspapers, radio stations whose whole activity is directed at fanning ideas of revanchism. There are statesmen in Bonn, and not only in Bonn, who patronize this revenge-seeking propaganda, inspire it, and proclaim nonrecognition of Poland's western frontier. They even openly demand its revision. These gentlemen appear to have lost their sense of reality completely. They are dreaming that Wroclaw should transform itself again to Breslau, Gdansk into Danzig, and Szczecin into Stettin. But let them be aware that Wroclaw, Gdansk, and Szczecin are Polish towns and will remain so forever.

The historic rights of the Polish people to their western lands, the blood jointly shed by us for their liberation, the tremendous amount of work put in by the Polish people for their reconstruction, are all sacred, and nobody will be allowed to violate them.

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Now times have changed. For the first time in Poland's entire history it has a peace-loving neighbor on its western frontier. The first German state of workers and peasants, the German Democratic Republic, has been in existence and growing stronger for 10 years. The importance of the GDR to the peaceful development of the whole Europe is great. Recognition by the GDR of the frontier along the Oder and Neisse, renunciation of all kinds of territorial claims, resolute condemnation of revanchist propaganda, friendship and cooperation between the GDR and People's Poland marching together along the road of development to socialism, are all important factors guaranteeing peace and the inviolability of the frontiers of the Polish People's Republic.

The mighty socialist camp is growing and becoming stronger. When the militarist circles of the West on 7 June set up their aggressive military NATO bloc, the socialist countries were forced to counterbalance this bloc by resorting to the reunification of the Warsaw treaty countries so that the socialist might understand better that an aggressor's attack on any socialist country would lead to immediate retaliatory measures from all the countries of the socialist camp.

The western border of the socialist countries lies along the border between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. We regard this border of the GDR as our common frontier, as a line dividing the world of socialism from the world of capitalism. This border is for each of the countries of the Warsaw alliance and for the entire socialist camp as inviolable and sacred as the borders of each of our countries.

We have said more than once that we shall fight for that frontier against any foe who may try to encroach on it.

Those who still have any evil designs against People's Poland must know that Poland today is not the same as it was 20 years ago. It now has true allies, such as the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist camp. They will defend the frontiers of People's Poland as they defend their own frontiers. The Soviet Government has repeatedly and unequivocally made known its position on this question. Here in People's Poland's westernmost town it is appropriate to recall that the frontier posts on the Oder and Neisse will be defended by all of us, shoulder to shoulder with the Polish people.

Dear comrades, the basic problem of every nation is the preservation and strengthening of peace. There is not and cannot be a more important task than that of barrier to

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road to war. There is no more lofty aim than the preservation and strengthening of peace. The peoples of the whole world await an improvement in the international situation and the end of the cold war with great hope. Our proposals for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and thereby for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin, serve the cause of peace and the cause of easing international tension.

We have firmly upheld and will continue to uphold these proposals, because we are convinced that their settlement will lead to the creation of an atmosphere of trust between states and will pave the way to the settlement of other international issues. The people of the world demand the settlement of such issues of primordial importance as the questions of discontinuing the tests of nuclear weapons, of reducing armed forces and armaments, of banning atomic and hydrogen weapons, and of liquidating military bases in foreign territories. The future of the world and the security of the peoples are dependent on the settlement of these issues.

The Soviet Union wants to decide all controversial questions not through war, but through peaceful ways, through negotiations. However, certain circles in the West oppose this by every possible means and continue to increase international tension. This is shown by such facts as the creation of US rocket bases on the territory of a number of states, the speeded-up armament of West Germany, and the preparations for the equipping of the West German army with atomic weapons.

Nevertheless, we are convinced that the situation is not working out to the advantage of those amateurs who are taking part in war ventures. The might and the unity of the socialist camp and the weakening of the camp of imperialism creates conditions under which a new war can be prevented and peace secured. The peoples of the socialist countries are vigilantly watching the intrigues of the enemies of peace. They are ready to frustrate any plans of imperialist reaction.

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Excerpts from Joint Declaration Issued at Conclusion of USSR Delegation's Visit to Poland: The foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic are directed toward the elimination of the threat of a new war, toward the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and toward the easing of international tension and the comprehensive development of mutual cooperation between all states.

The successes of the countries of the powerful socialist camp will lead to an even greater growth and consolidation of the peace-loving forces in the whole world. The further growth and consolidation of the world system of socialism creates insurmountable obstacles to the aims of the aggressive circles. The socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, have put forward a number of concrete proposals for the settlement of urgent international problems through negotiations.

These proposals have the increasing support of working people and certain political circles in all countries. It is becoming increasingly obvious to the broad masses of (word indistinct) for various political forces of the capitalist world that no position of strength policy can halt the dominant process of current development of socialism or suppress the national liberation movement.

Only peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between the two systems can avert the outbreak of war. The existence of the socialist camp and its ever-increasing might is a powerful barrier to all attempts to impose upon the world decisions arising from the positions of strength policy.

The aggressive imperialist circles, which up until now have profited most from the cold war, however, refused to resign themselves to the fact that the positions-of-strength policy has brought on an ever-deepening crisis. They stubbornly reject all proposals which might relax tension and do whatever they can to prevent a détente and even aggravate the international situation.

This is the meaning of the policy of aggressive circles of the United States and NATO leaders for speeding up atomic armament and supplying atomic weapons to West German militarists and revanchists, and speeding up the construction of V2 rocket and atom bases around the countries of the socialist camp.

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This is the meaning of the policy of aggressive circles of the United States and NATO leaders for speeding up atomic armament and supplying atomic weapons to West German militarists and revanchists, and speeding up the construction of NATO rocket and atom bases around the countries of the socialist camp.

The delegations have given serious attention to questions relating to Germany. It was unanimously noted that the most important questions which require immediate settlement are the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. That the German peoples still have no peace treaty and that an occupation regime still exists in West Berlin are absolutely abnormal and intolerable.

This state of affairs which is exploited by forces hostile to the cause of peace, notably by the Government of the Federal German Republic, which seeks to aggravate the political situation in Europe, seriously jeopardizes peace. The militarization of West Germany becomes particularly dangerous in view of the actions of the Federal German Republic designed to supply the Bundeswehr with rocket and atomic weapons.

There is no doubt that West German militarism, adhering to the Atlantic concept of the policy of strength and counting on continued tension in international relations, seeks to gain a dominant position in Western Europe in order to launch in the future an imperialist war. (Words indistinct) economic expansion which in the course of the past 50 years has twice driven the world to disaster and brought to the German people nothing but calamity, death, and destruction.

The Federal Republic of Germany supports the activities of revanchist quarters—it is the only government in Europe which has territorial claims against other states, and it seeks to

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July (Cont.)
23
(Unclassified)

(perpetuate?) the division of Europe into opposition military blocs, avoiding the normalization of its relations with many countries in Eastern Europe.

Revanchist and militarist circles in West Germany, whose interests are represented by Chancellor Adenauer, at present act as the main opponent to the relaxation of international tension and the champions of cold-war conflicts.

Such a policy is unacceptable to the peoples of the world, particularly to those which only 15 years ago lived in the struggle against Hitlerism.

The delegations of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic believe that at the Geneva Conference the German Ministers have done a certain amount of useful work. The Conference has clarified the positions of the parties on a number of questions and specified the existing differences. Attempts have been made to narrow the gap between the viewpoints of the sides. At the same time, the delegations note with regret that in view of the attitude of the Western Powers the Geneva Conference has so far failed to reach agreement on the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin.

The present attitude of the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany makes more remote the agreement which is awaited by all the peoples and can lead to a further aggravation of the situation fraught with dangers for the cause of peace in Europe.

Both delegations consider that a meeting of heads of governments which would discuss and adopt decisions on the most urgent problems of the present-day international situation and which would certainly be conducive to the easing of international tension would be of great importance for the solution of the major issues of our time.

Both parties emphasize the particular right of Poland and Czechoslovakia to take part in the examination of questions pertaining to the German problem and European security at conferences between East and West and express the regret that in spite of the numerous proposals insistently advanced by the Soviet Union, the attitude of the Western Powers has so far robbed Poland and Czechoslovakia of the opportunity to make their contribution to the work of these conferences.

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(Unclassified)

Both delegations state that the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic will continue a consistent struggle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government or any other plenipotentiary authority representing all of Germany. Taking into account the situation that exists at present, the parties are of the opinion that in the present circumstances a peace treaty must be signed with both existing German states. If however, the aggressive Western circles torpedo a peaceful settlement on this basis, the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union will sign a peace treaty with the GDR, confident that a peace treaty with the GDR will also be signed by other states which are genuinely concerned in the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

Proceeding from the fact that the maintenance of an occupation regime in West Berlin is fraught with serious complications for the international situation, the delegations of the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union declare that one can no longer tolerate a situation directed toward regime in West Berlin. The granting to West Berlin of a guaranteed status as a free city would be a possible and quite satisfactory solution of this question until the reunification of Germany.

The peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union express their solidarity with and support of the first German state of workers and peasants in history, the GDR, which is successfully building socialism and waging an active struggle for security in Europe. Both sides note with satisfaction that the GDR Government made a considerable contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries directed toward a speedy conclusion of a German peace treaty, the solution of the Berlin problem, and the safeguarding of European security.

However, if, in spite of the good will of the GDR and other socialist countries, the abnormal situation in West Berlin is not liquidated, Poland and the USSR will support the GDR regarding those measures which it will deem necessary to undertake within the framework of its sovereign rights for the elimination of the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

The Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union fully support the proposal of the GDR for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany and the rejection by both German states of atomic and rocket weapons.

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The Governments of Poland and the Soviet Union have reaffirmed that the frontier along the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse is the only lawful, just, and inviolable frontier between Poland and Germany. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have repeatedly put forward constructive proposals for the relaxation of international tension and the creation of an atmosphere of trust between countries.

The Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union have advocated and are advocating the ending of the arms race and general disarmament and are consistently insisting on the full and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their permanent withdrawal from armaments.

The Western Powers, particularly the United States, are stubbornly objecting to the prohibition of these arms. Because the Western Powers have placed the threat of the use of atomic weapons at the basis of their foreign policy it has not been possible to solve this most important problem of our time until now.

The Governments of the USSR and Poland once more declare that they support the proposal for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Such a pact would be an important means for easing international tension, increasing confidence, and creating conditions for a peaceful settlement of questions at issue.

The Soviet Government once again declares that it fully supports the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment of an atom and rocket-free zone in Central Europe. This proposal, if accepted, could be an important step in easing international tension in Europe and eliminating the threat of a catastrophic atomic war on the European continent.

An atom-free zone in Central Europe could become an important link in the establishment of an atom-free zone dividing the two opposing military groups. The existence of such a zone would relieve the threat of an atomic war from occurring in the basin of the Baltic Sea and the Scandinavian Peninsula.

Conditions now exist for the peoples of the Baltic and Scandinavian areas to make efforts for the establishment in the Baltic area of a zone of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. All possibilities exist for these countries to develop mutual economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation in the interests of their peoples and for

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the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust so that the Baltic Sea will become a sea of peace.

Both parties would welcome and are ready to examine jointly any initiative designed to ease tension and insure mutual security and lasting peace in these areas. The Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union fully support the proposal to create an atom-free zone in the Balkan peninsula. A refusal by the countries of this area to station on their territories rocket and atomic bases would be an important contribution to the cause of peace and security in the Balkans.

Being mindful of the fact that the imperialist circles are speeding up military preparations directed against the socialist countries, both parties stress the necessity of a further strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty, which is in the present international situation a powerful factor of peace and security of its members. Yet, the Polish People's Republic and the USSR will support any sensible plan designed to reduce the armed forces of the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as well as other measures designed to ease international tension.

July
24
(Official
Use Only)

GDR Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference: East German papers today ridiculed "Western propaganda efforts" to pressure the "Socialist delegations" at Geneva by threats that the West might break off negotiations. Neues Deutschland dismissed this alleged tactic in front page editorial with the statement: "When the Western powers threaten to break off the Conference, it is obviously a transparent bluff. The Conference continues; the possibilities for understanding are in no way exhausted."

July
29
(Official
Use Only)

GDR Press Attacks on "Espionage" in Berlin: Continuing East German press attacks against West Berlin as an espionage center have increased in volume again this week. Several arrests reported in which "culprits" were described as "RIAS listeners" and "Western agents" attempting to carry out subversive activities including arson which resulted in serious fire damage.

July
29
(Official
Use Only)

East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference: There was little direct reporting with one paper announcing that the Soviets and the West had exchanged draft proposals and that Gromyko and Bolz met twice on Tuesday.

Commentaries were extensive in most papers with emphasis on the necessity for an all-German committee on a parity basis.

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Use Only)

Neues Deutschland heavily attacked Bonn leaders who decline to meet with Soviet Zone representatives. In a front page editorial and special article the paper cited with gloom the statement in yesterday's Der Tag (West Berlin GDR) editorial that if the Federal Republic were morally more secure there would be nothing to fear from all-German talks with the GDR. Neues Deutschland also said that Horster's efforts to prove that the West had tried for 14 years to reunify Germany are incorrect. It "demonstrated" by "historical review" that the West was responsible for the division of Germany. Volksrecht complained that the West was now unwilling to reduce its West Berlin force level although the West had often mentioned this in the early stages of the Conference. The paper also complained that the West refused to discontinue espionage activities in Berlin. Neues Zeit again attacked RIAS for attack and charged that the Horster visit was an example of the cold war policy of the US. GfG (German) delegate Florin in a Soviet Zone television interview stated that the West was seeking another recess rather than a summit.

July
31
(Official
Use Only)

East Berlin Press Treatment of Geneva Conference: All papers gave prominent coverage to developments at Geneva with reports generally accusing the West Germans of holding all the power to ensure that the Conference breaks up with no results. Berliner Zeitung in lead story labeled Horster's "urgent" trip to Geneva as an attempt "to prevent further circumstances an agreement which would lead to a summit conference." Under the title "Incited by US representatives," Berliner Zeitung reported on press conference of a female member of the West Berlin delegation of consumer goods trade who had been in Geneva Thursday. The lady was quoted as saying that the US delegation had treated them disgracefully and insulted them by saying they were "bought by money."

In editorial comment Neues Deutschland thought it "incomprehensible" that Horster should consider the Pan-American Conference more important than Geneva, and went on to reject the proposal for a permanent conference of foreign ministers or their deputies.

Under the headline "Let West resist—no peace treaty with USSR," Neues Deutschland topped, and other papers carried, the Soviet Zone Premier Grotovohl's remarks before 6,000 miners at Wismut. He quoted Grotovohl as saying: "If West Germany and the capitalist world 14 years after war continue to withhold peace treaty from Germany, then we say and now declare we are determined to make a peace treaty with the USSR and all countries which are willing to do so."

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(Unclassified)

Excerpts from Khrushchev Speech at Dnepropetrovsk: In one of his speeches, Mr. Nixon said that he favored world peace. We said: Add the words "world peace, the liquidation of military bases on foreign soil." (Stormy applause) He is in favor of world peace, but he does not mention the second part--military bases. The whole issue is that if he began to speak of the liquidation of military bases we would really believe that Mr. Nixon is in favor of world peace. But we do not lose hope that the time will come when the U.S. military bases in other countries will be liquidated.

We had quite frank discussions with Mr. Nixon on many matters, including the revival of militarism in West Germany. When I explained our position to him, Mr. Nixon asked: "Are you afraid of the Germans?" We do not fear German revanchists and militarists, I told him. A strong man does not fear a mad dog, but he does not want it to bite him.

Despite the existing difficulties, there is now some hope, in our opinion, that an acceptable solution of the problems can be found with the prestige of the states taking part in the negotiations suffering no loss.

On what is our optimism based? It is based on the fact that all participants in the talks, it seems to us, understand the need of doing away with the abnormal situation in Germany, and primarily in West Berlin. After bilateral statements it has become obvious to everyone that the Soviet Union as well as the Western powers do not want to violate the existing form of life of the West Berlin population. If the inhabitants of West Berlin express the desire to live in a capitalist order, let them do so--it's their internal business and we have no intention of interfering with them.

At present the lack of clarity and precise understanding has been eliminated regarding the period of validity of the agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin and the all-German organ for direct talks between the GDR and West Germany. By the way, we have emphasized more than once that the question of time limit is not the main question. All this, comrades, gives us the right to hope that we can come to a settlement of questions which would be in accordance with the interests of preserving and strengthening peace and in the interests of the European peoples, including the German people.

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(Unclassified)

The Soviet Government would like to hope that all interested states will approach the examination of our proposals regarding talks between the GDR and West Germany, and on the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, with due responsibility, and that relevant decisions will be adopted at the Geneva conference. I must state frankly that the ministers of foreign affairs encounter great difficulties, inasmuch as they must examine most important unsolved international questions on which the fate of the world depends. We say outright, as we have said earlier, that the discussion and, moreover, the solution of such problems, is easier for the heads of government. It is precisely the heads of government who have a greater experience in solving international questions; they also have greater and more extensive powers.

It seems to us that the time has come when the leaders of government must tackle this difficult work. Let the ministers make new efforts in the search for mutually acceptable solutions and agree on what they are able to agree, while the remainder, which is the most difficult, and based on principles, will be examined by the heads of government.

We pin our hopes on the belief that agreement can be reached on many issues in dispute and that peace can be insured. We consider that this agreement should be such as not to inflict any moral or material damage to either side. As regards the Soviet Union, it is ready for such an agreement.

The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are of paramount importance for the entire international situation. Our country and the United States are the two most powerful states in the world. If the other countries come to blows they can be taken apart. But if war should start between America and our country no one else will be able to stop it. It will be a catastrophe on a tremendous scale. Therefore every effort should be made to settle existing disputes without recourse to war, to achieve a relaxation of international tension, to insure peaceful coexistence of states with different social and political systems.

I think that President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon realize this and do not want war. Mr. Eisenhower knows what war means. During World War II when he was the commander in chief of the Anglo-American troops on

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(Unclassified)

the Western front, Mr. Eisenhower fulfilled honestly all the terms of the agreement with us. He should be given his due in this respect. We have no complaints against him on this score. We want to hope that President Eisenhower will strive for understanding with the Soviet Union and will do everything within his power to prevent the unleashing of a new war.

As for us, we shall not be found wanting. We are always ready to display good will. The Soviet Union will continue to fight ceaselessly for a relaxation of international tension, for the solution of disputes by peaceful means. In this struggle we have the support of all peace-loving nations, of all the peoples of the world.

The present leaders in the United States are naturally alarmed by the growth of the forces of communism, and this situation cannot be disregarded. However, we think that they will be reasonable. The more soberminded representatives of the capitalist world are coming to realize that it is senseless to fight communist ideas by arms and that guns will not stop the spread of communist ideas. It would be no less ridiculous to try to spread these ideas by force of arms. The Soviet Union never pursued and never will pursue such aims which are incompatible with the great teaching of Marxism-Leninism.

In the West, even the representatives of the ruling circles are beginning to clearly understand that the Soviet Union does not want war. Mr. Nixon told us: We believe that the Soviet people and the Soviet Government do not want war. To this I replied: If you believe in the peaceful intentions of our country then why do you continue the armament race and why do you build military bases around our frontiers?

After all, as long as your military bases are around the frontiers of the Soviet Union, friction between ourselves and the United States is inevitable. The danger is always present that the friction might produce a fire. (TASS English version quoted Khrushchev as saying that this friction "might produce war."--Ed.) When two soldiers from different countries face each other accidents can always happen, accidents which can lead to catastrophic consequences. Then why allow this to happen? It is better to conduct affairs in a way which will avoid a

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situation. It is better to liquidate foreign military bases on foreign territories and to withdraw troops within the limits of one's national frontiers. Then there will be no points of contact between our armed forces, and no reaction which might produce the spark capable of starting a fire.

We consider the Soviet Union's position to be more secure than it ever has been before. Our economic successes are tremendous. Our people have rallied closely around our own Communist Party. We possess strong allies who have united together with ourselves into the invincible camp of peace and socialism. Further good and concerted work both in the factories and on the collective farms will be a pledge of the success of our great cause and a pledge of the consolidation of peace. (Apr12so)

Comrades, the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet Government believe that a situation has at present been created in which the imperialists will hardly dare to launch a war against our motherland and against the countries of socialism. Our forces and those of our socialist allies are colossal and in the West, apparently, this is now understood.

As a result of World War I, Soviet Russia became a socialist country. As a result of World War II, 12 other countries became socialist countries. As a result of a third world war, should it ever be launched by the imperialists, capitalism will be eliminated. We are convinced of this. We hope that the imperialists also understand this and will not play with fire.

July
29
(Limited
Official use)

US Mission Berlin Report of GDR Statements on Treaty: Past week has seen in several statements by GDR spokesman renewed threat of separate peace treaty in event four powers reach no agreement, but such statements accompanied by hints of need for patience and extended time-table.

While Ulbricht on July 25 insisted separate peace treaty will be concluded if no four power resolution Berlin and German problems and warned against any action by West which might lead to World War 3 (Gurtel 12) Sept, 115 Bonn, 55 Geneva), he nonetheless acknowledged four power resolution Berlin and German problems may require several conferences "to bring about accommodation step by step."

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In July issue, SED ideological magazine Einheit article reviewing negotiations Geneva again specified USSR and GDR will, if western powers continue reject "socialist" proposals, take necessary measures and threat to peace posed by West Berlin. In such event GDR will conclude peace treaty with USSR and other states. "The conclusion of such a peace treaty will, beyond question, invalidate agreement between USSR and GDR reached in exchange of letters between respective premiers in 1955, and grant all sovereign rights concerning Berlin and access to West Berlin to the GDR." Article concludes that due to threat to peace resulting from West Berlin problem soviet and GDR doing everything possible reach agreement with Western powers. "They must, however, understand that a change is essential ... if the problem cannot be completely solved by one forum conference, then certain partial solutions must be achieved in the interest of peace. The objective remains the same: West Berlin, as a seat of tension, must be done away with."

Although above indications as to how long Sovs-GDR will "exercise patience" are elusive, they could be significant when considered against a background of retreat from previous deadlines and Grotewohl's specific statement on returning from Moscow June 21: "We have no illusions that any quick or decisive change in this situation can be brought about by our trip or Geneva negotiations."

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July

31
(Official
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US Mission Berlin Reports of GDR Statements Regarding Peace Treaty: East press today carried two additional references to possibility GDR-USSR might negotiate separate peace treaty. Neues Deutschland carried excerpts from speech given Rottburg July 30 by Min-Fres Grotewohl. Report cited Grotewohl as saying West could work against peace treaty at Geneva if it wished but day will come when a peace treaty no longer can be denied German people. Report continued with quote: "If West Germany and capitalist world 14 years after war's end continue withhold (Weiter Vorenthalten) German peace treaty, then we say today we are determined to conclude a peace treaty with USSR and all countries which are prepared therefore."

A second reference to separate treaty appeared in National Zeitung editorial which included following statement: "If the circumlocution is now brought to an end, Western powers are confronted by this question: Either they show themselves inclined (Geneigt) to resolve the West Berlin with USSR and GDR or they must accept as part of the bargain that this question will be clarified (Bereinigt) by USSR and GDR without them."

Comment: Two statements reported above reveal no new formula regarding circumstances under which, or time when, separate treaty might be concluded. We inclined believe such statements appearing now for purpose of restating threat contained in Ulbricht's radio speech of July 25 as current phase forum talks draws near end.

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August
1
(Confidential)

Ambassador Thompson's Report of Kuznetsov Remark: While awaiting Khrushchev at airport today I remarked to Kuznetsov that things did not seem to be going well at Geneva. He replied to effect that his impression was both sides were trying to find a way to disengage. He added with a smile that this was far from easy to do.

August
1
(Secret)

Ambassador Thompson's Report of Khrushchev-Nixon Talk: In Khrushchev's talk with VP last Sunday he made statement several times to effect that if occupation regime in Berlin was to be maintained there was no point in making an agreement since occupation regime already existed. This together with his speech at Dnepropetrovsk and Kuznetsov's remark reported above leads me to conclusion that Khrushchev has very possibly decided not (rpt not) to force issue on Berlin or on separate peace treaty at this time but simply let conference adjourn and hope eventually to resume discussions on a higher level. Wish to point out however that I have been absorbed with VP's visit and have not had time for thorough study of record.

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August
3
(Official
Use Only)

East Berlin Press Treatment of Geneva Conference: Neues Deutschland front-paged a radio interview with Kogel. The Soviet Zone spokesman was quoted as saying the present situation of the "six-power" conference was "difficult," but that there were still "chances for an understanding due to the attitude of the West German and Soviet delegations which are ready for understanding." Kogel added that he regarded Herter's announcement that he would have to leave Geneva on August 6 as an attempt to blackmail delegations of the two Socialist countries.

August
4
(Official
Use Only)

East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference and Eisenhower-Khrushchev Visits: Announcement of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits received top headlines and completely dominated all other news in the East Berlin papers. The reports frequently quoted President Eisenhower's press conference statement that he hoped the "talk with Khrushchev would help melt the ice in US-Soviet relations".

All papers reported on the Gromyko-Lloyd talks in Geneva on Monday, with the general lament being that there were still "great chances to come to an agreement on West Berlin" before the present phase of the Conference terminated. Neues Deutschland continued to charge Bonn with making all-out efforts to ensure that the Conference ends without results.

August
6
(Official
Use Only)

East Berlin Press Treatment of the Geneva Conference: All papers gave prominent coverage to the Geneva windup with particular attention paid to Gromyko's and Solz' final speeches. Neues Deutschland carried complete texts. National Zeitung noted that both Gromyko and Lloyd had emphasized the necessity of summit meetings, and that Lloyd "even mentioned a whole series" of such top level meetings. Editorial comment was limited to Neue Zeit ("East CDU) which continued on theme that Bonn was chief "troublemaker" and that Western Powers were responsible for failure to reach an agreement in Geneva.

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August
5

(Unclassified)

Excerpts from New York Times Times Report of Khrushchev News Conference: Mr. Khrushchev reported that there had been no agreement yet between him and President Eisenhower on what particular points would be discussed in the talks.

"Any questions that will help to melt the ice, as the President put it so well at his press conference yesterday, will have priority," the Premier said.

In his own mind, however, the "principal and most important question is that of liquidating the consequences of the Second World War," the Premier declared.

"Therefore, great importance is attached to the problem of a peace treaty with Germany to bring that about," he asserted. "It is quite apparent that this peace treaty will be with two German states unless beforehand they are united or have joined together in a federation.

"The German peace treaty of course is the question of questions—the problem of problems. And Berlin is the Gordian knot that must be cut. It is a consequence of the main problem of removing the consequences of World War II.

"It seems there is little hope of unifying Germany either from the West or the East. We should work toward a peace treaty with the two German states. And a settlement of that problem brings up the problem of Berlin, because it is a city with a capitalist system on the territory of a state with a Socialist system.

"The best solution is that West Berlin should become a free city with guarantees of noninterference in its internal affairs or in its communications with the rest of the world. We cannot see a different way out of the problem."

Excerpts from Tass Summary of Khrushchev News Conference: An American correspondent asked whether Mr. Khrushchev intended to have consultations with friendly countries regarding his trip to the United States, whether his meeting with President Eisenhower would be in lieu of a summit conference and whether the Berlin status would remain unchanged until the meetings between the heads of

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August (continued)
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(Unclassified)

government of the Soviet Union and the United States were over.

Nikita Khrushchev stated that he considered that any consultations with friends were always useful. They made for better understanding of problems. Apparently, he said, we shall exchange views in some form or other.

The question of ensuring peace is not a controversial one for the countries of the Socialist camp. They approve of all the steps of the Soviet Government in that direction, just as we approve of steps in that direction by the governments of any countries, Socialist or non-Socialist.

As to a meeting with President Eisenhower, the head of the Soviet Government said, it will be a meeting of representatives of two states and cannot substitute for a meeting of heads of governments, which was so much talked about by the press. One does not contradict or exclude the other.

Mr. Khrushchev noted that the Soviet Government believed that there can be no change in the Berlin status while negotiations were in progress. This was the Soviet Government's position before and it is the same now, he said.

Then Khrushchev was asked what place the question of Berlin and of a peace treaty with Germany would occupy in the talks. Khrushchev replied that in the first place it was essential to do away with the aftermath of World War II and sign a peace treaty with Germany. The Berlin problem was only an outgrowth of the German problem.

Khrushchev stated that, in view of the circumstances, it was necessary to deal with two German states. The prospects for their reunification in the near future were unrealistic. If a reasonable view was taken of this situation, a peace treaty was possible.

Khrushchev noted the contradictory position of those who talk about peace but refuse to eliminate all the consequences of World War II. These consequences, as represented by the German and Berlin problem were a burning fuse threatening with an explosion. In the first place, it was necessary to extinguish this fuse.

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Khrushchev was asked how his meeting with Eisenhower could affect French plans to stage nuclear-weapons tests in the Sahara and the Paris-Bonn axis in general. Nikita Khrushchev pointed out that there had been axes in the past but all of them, as is known, were broken and thrown into the ditch. The axis which rests on Bonn with one end is, of course, an unreliable axis. Bonn is an aggressive support for an axis. The marriage between Paris and Bonn, Khrushchev said, is not a love match, and since this is so it will break up. As for the plans of testing nuclear weapons in the Sahara, it is now high time to ban tests and not to plan them.

August
5
(Unclassified)

Ulbricht Reviews Geneva Talks Results: Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the SED Central Committee, today summed up the results of the Geneva six-power conference. Addressing the workers of the largest GDR production enterprise, the Leuna works at Halle, Ulbricht said:

What was the purpose of the Geneva Conference and what is the purpose of a future conference? The purpose of Geneva--to do away with the powder kegs in West Berlin and West Germany in order to prevent another war. Whoever wants to prevent war must first of all clear away what is left of the last war. This means that it is necessary to eliminate those points where the cinders of the last war are still smoldering. These danger points are the occupation status and the West Berlin agent and diversionary centers, the claims of frontier revision and revenge, and the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin.

Why was the West Berlin question raised? It was because of the agent and diversionary activities of West Germany, the US, British and French centers, directed from West Berlin against the GDR and the socialist countries. Brandt, head of the West Berlin administration, said himself that West Berlin should play the part of trouble-maker against the GDR. However, the question of West Berlin also arose by virtue of the atomic armament and revisionist claims in West Germany. The West German militarists used West Berlin as their advance outpost.

Our proposal for the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city and for the preparation of a peace treaty is a program for safeguarding peace. Of

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August (Cont.)
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(Unclassified)

course one cannot bring about a peace treaty at once. Since the entire attention of the USSR and GDR delegations was focused on the problem of making possible a gradual transition acceptable to the Western Powers. The Eastern Powers would lose nothing by the conclusion of a peace treaty, for the conditions of the peace treaty would apply to both parts of Germany. In both parts of Germany atomic armament would be forbidden, the size of the military forces would be limited upon, and aggressive militarist forces would be curbed. This would be a big stride forward to the reunification of Germany.

We have made all possible concessions, but we cannot and will not make any concessions at the expense of peace and of our working people.

Although no agreement could be reached at the Geneva Conference, it is obvious that useful preparatory work was carried out for a number of further international conferences to follow. Mutual invitations of Khrushchev and Eisenhower are of great international importance and will contribute to the further easing of international tension. The announcement of this visit has been joyfully welcomed throughout the world. This visit could initiate a turning point in the relations between the nations.

The great importance of the Geneva Conference lies in the fact that the delegations of the two German states, led by their two foreign ministers, took part in the Conference as equals. The GDR delegation made an important constructive contribution at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers.

The Bonn Government, on the other hand, tried to torpedo the Geneva Conference right from the start. By its attitude, the Bonn Government has become even more isolated in Germany and throughout the world.

No agreement was reached at Geneva because the Adenauer Government was opposed to it and the GDR Executive made no attempt to focus attention on its own plan for Germany or to exert pressure on the Adenauer Government. Although the SED leadership took a massive attitude, the Adenauer Government was unable to prevent a narrowing of the gap between the opposing views at Geneva.

It should be clearly understood that the longer the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is delayed, while nuclear armament in West Germany continues, the greater becomes the danger of provocation in West Berlin and West Germany. It is therefore

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August (Cont.) the main task of all peace-loving people to curb German militarism.

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(Unclassified)

In the United States, the armament tycoons are the decisive political power. These billionaires want to safeguard their profits. They are against the relaxation of tension and are pressing President Eisenhower to maintain US military bases in other countries. Nevertheless, the forces of peace in the United States are also growing. The fact that McCarthyism is gradually disappearing in the United States is, after all, a sign of some changes.

The US Secretary of State has said that the Soviet Union only wants to have the GDR recognized, but he is mistaken if he assumes that recognition of the GDR is the main issue for us. The Government's main concern is building socialism in the GDR and working for peace.

Every realistic person understands that reunification is not possible without the formation of an all-German committee. If the Bonn Government rejects reunification, we must wait until the people of West Germany reject those ministers in Bonn who do not want a peace treaty and reunification.

It is clear after Geneva that the reunification of Germany is not possible without the removal of Adenauer, Strauss, and Schroeder by the West German population. This is one of the things which Geneva has taught.

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PART TWO

STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS FROM WESTERN SOURCES

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Mayor Brandt's Foreign Policy Statement to a Specially Convened Session of Berlin House of Representatives: Mayor Brandt made following main points:

- (1) Soviet proposals do not constitute serious basis for negotiations since they are coupled with ultimatum and on close examination reveal they are designed to incorporate all Berlin into Ulbricht state.
- (2) Western Powers have made far-reaching offers to Soviet Union; their proposals for solution Berlin question go the limit of what can be tolerated.
- (3) Soviet Union must return to Geneva with new ideas if Foreign Ministers' Conference to have real meaning; it would be unrealistic for USSR to start July 13 with last staged Western position and then try to bargain it down.
- (4) Second phase of Geneva Conference should concentrate as little as possible on Berlin issue, especially since course of negotiations so far has demonstrated correctness of approach; there is no real solution of Berlin problem in isolation; real themes are East-West conflict, European security, German unity.
- (5) Time until resumption Geneva Conference should be utilized to clarify and improve Western position wherever necessary and make clear to Kremlin through diplomatic channels that summit conference can only come about if "long term interim solution" for Berlin achieved.

The first step Western peace plan (i.e. unification of Berlin) Brandt said united Berlin must not be placed in vacuum but must be free to choose affiliation with legal and currency matters of either part of Germany. Re Western four-point proposal June 1, Brandt said these proposals accented by Berlin and German public with "skeptical reservation" because it constitutes the extreme limit of what can be offered to Soviets in good conscience.

Brandt rejected Gromyko's June 10 proposal but underlined that Gromyko had explicitly confirmed legal basis Allied present position. Mayor stressed any new Berlin agreement must indispensably include recognition present legal position of Western Powers. Evident purpose of USSR is to replace these rights, existence of which Soviets no longer contest, by new agreement which might be subject to cancellation at will. Western presence Berlin would then cease to be on basis

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indisputable right but be placed on basis "magnanimous Soviet permission" for interim period of one year or 18 months. Re Western garrisons, Brandt said West cannot agree to reduction to "symbolic units" because these incapable of exercising protective functions. Purpose of Western garrisons is fittingly described as "trip wire defense" but for this purpose more than a platoon guarding the flag is necessary.

Brandt rejected Soviet charges West Berlin is propaganda and espionage base and said Senator for Interior will, in addition to his previous statements, publish detailed documentation proving East Berlin is espionage center.

Re regulation Berlin traffic to the Federal Republic, Brandt expressed belief that solution taking into account interests all participants could be found. It might be in interest of four powers, as well as both German administrations, to agree to invoke neutral office or united nations to solve disputes of technical nature. He also suggested creating of "inter-administrative commission" (i.e. composed of representatives both Germanies) to be competent in all practical questions arising between two German areas. This institution would deal with questions of trade, communications, payments, scientific and cultural exchanges, etc., and might have sub-commission for Berlin questions. It clear, however, that mixed "inter-administrative commission" should not be competent in questions which are responsibility of four powers; nevertheless four powers could instruct commission to deal with certain other subjects on which representatives of both administrations in Germany entitled to be consulted (editorial note: for example, certain aspects of reunification). Brandt said such "inter-administrative commission" would be preferable to four power commission (with German experts) designed to deal with questions of Berlin traffic alone.

Brandt emphasized that West's Berlin security guarantees remain valid and that Western Powers able make it clear they will not abandon their rights or their responsibilities toward Berlin population.

Re possible visit by Secretary Herter, Brandt said that Secretary had expressed to him intention of coming as soon as his duties permitted, possibly at suitable time after his return to Europe. "He will be very welcome here," said Brandt.

Re question of Berlin advisers to German delegation, Brandt explicitly denied that he had written letter to Von Brentano

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containing suggestions for improved consultation with Berlin Senat. He said, however, he unable to agree with Federal press chief that arrangements heretofore had been satisfactory and that there is no need to improve east system for keeping Berlin informed. He strongly urged that documents concerning fate of Berlin should be made known to qualified Berlin officials before they read them in the press. It is not only a question of being kept informed on continuing basis, he said, but also of being able to participate in formulation of documents affecting Berlin. Brandt reported Senator Klein this morning discussed this question with Von Brentano.

Brandt speech endorsed by SPD and CDU faction leaders Voeller and Endres in speeches following Brandt's.

Endres met Mayor's criticism of lack of information given Berlin representative to German delegation (Von Lettenheim) by saying this partly due to fact that representative sent to Geneva not high ranking enough. After Endres ended his speech Brandt rose to say "at official in question was qualified; problem was that certain documents vital to Berlin situation simply not made available.

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(Confidential)

Embassy Bonn Report Following Foreign Minister Brandt's Report on Geneva to Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee: Apart from factual summary he stressed harshness Soviets, hope that next round could get back to consideration of total German problem for which solution is essential if there is to be real and durable solution Berlin problem, and, in contradiction Chancellor, especially unity of the West. All parties supported him in these points. Government parties were anxious to avoid controversy in meeting and it was harmonious and rather superficial although it lasted over four hours. Brandt said Government would of course respond if foreign policy debate were demanded but considered present time inopportune. Opposition spokesmen reserved final decision for party leaders but were themselves agreeable to having no debate now.

Berlin deputies of all parties expressed concern that last Western Berlin proposals may have gone to outer limits of the possible. They mentioned especially troop ceilings which they feared would involve Soviet controls and might lead to further reduction of Western forces. They were also concerned about restriction propaganda activities which they believed Communists would abuse. Other deputies did not join this discussion

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except to express understanding of the Berlin point of view. Committee Chairman Furler's press conference after meeting gave contrary impression general expression concern at West's position. Brentano reassured them on both counts and said specifically RIAS, which had been special concern, would not be affected.

In Committee's discussion CDU spokesmen, especially those close to Chancellor, like Guttenberg and Kliesing, tended to opinion that West had played risky, though perhaps necessary, game with offers to Soviets, and should now turn back to relentless hardness. Equally the opposition stood by its foreign policy programs and urged that their well-known ideas be taken up in future Geneva negotiations. Discussion became briefly somewhat sharper as SPD defended parity in all-German groups having only an advisory role but generally meeting reflected confidence that West had done best possible at Geneva and unusual degree of agreement in assessment of interim situation.

Mood of opposition for present is one of resignation and, although they must as in Committee continue to uphold established party policies, some SPD and FDP deputies go so far as to say privately that they are inclined to stop fighting the government on reunification issue, that they believe division of Germany has reached point where it can only be ended by fundamental changes in world situation, that Berlin will probably be lost in time, and that they believe the prices for which the Soviets might once have accepted a German solution (Germany out of NATO, disengagement, atomic ban, etc.) are no longer of interest to Soviets. Nevertheless, they are anxious for another try at Geneva and hope elements of Western package, which they believe must remain related, will be negotiated further. Especially they feel that the one avenue which Soviets seem to have left open, some sort of discussion between Germans from both sides under Allied aegis, should be explored. Similar views held by CDU deputies such as Gerstenmaier and Gradl who feel most strongly about reunification and who would revive 1958 Bundestag proposals (now considered in retrospect by more conservative CDU elements as having gone too far) for permanent four power commission on German problem, with which would be associated some sort of all-German group. They would make this concession to Soviet position that reunification is matter for Germans, even if only to prove this too is futile and to maintain public confidence by appearing to remain active. Brentano in committee said it might be possible raise this proposal in second phase at Geneva.

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(Confidential)

Ambassador Houghton's Report of Conversation with Laloy at French Foreign Office: In conversation with Laloy he said he was turning over in his mind what steps the Western Powers might take between now and reconvening at Geneva to improve their position in negotiations with Soviets over Berlin. He agrees that experts should not be called together, but thinks it would be useful to begin exchange of views between governments on Geneva prospects as soon as possible. He indicated that French Embassy in Washington would be instructed in near future to contact Departmental representative, probably Merchant, in this regard.

Laloy said he fears Soviets will attempt to put the West in position of accepting the latest Soviet proposals as basis for discussion when talks begin July 13. To forestall this move, Laloy is considering whether it might be desirable for Western three to send notes to Soviet Government early in July which would recapitulate positions of the allies, emphasize reasonableness of Western proposals and state our aspiration that latter will be point of departure for further discussion.

Laloy said he realized there were possible drawbacks to this procedure, but he thought advantages might outweigh disadvantages and that move would put us in stronger position.

(Note: Laloy emphasized that the idea of the note was purely personal and tentative one which he did not wish to be discussed with other governments at this stage. Therefore, no mention of this should be made to French officials.)

Laloy praised Secretary's radio and television speech highly and said it struck right note of firmness and resolution. However, he thought Lloyd's and Macmillan's statements have been overly optimistic, and he fears that attitude reflected in these statements may make it very hard to resist Soviet pressures in next round of talks to go beyond concessions we have already made.

Laloy said several United States journalists have told him they felt West was "missing bat" for good compromise in not discussing last Gromyko proposal (Embassy has heard same line also), but that he continues to believe it would be fatal to accept any kind of time limit for occupation statute, even with provision for review of situation after expiration of time limit.

Laloy and other French officials are also perturbed by Gromyko's insistence on Pan-German committee and its link with Berlin.

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solution. They feel Gromyko may be disposed to give slightly on question of parity in composition of commission to extent of saying this is something which could be discussed at summit once principle of committee is accepted. Laloy fears this might appeal to British. He said French would strongly oppose it, however, and added that Grewe had made special point of telling him just before leaving Geneva that any move in direction of accepting Soviet proposals for German committee would be disastrous to Federal Republic policies and would be big step toward recognition of GDR.

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German Press Service Report of Defense Minister Strauss' Press Interview: In an interview with the CDU-sponsored Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz Defense Minister Strauss says that the West must be temperate, united, patient, and constantly prepared for a peace with the East, which will replace the present balance of terror by a policy of genuine coexistence where human dignity and national independence in the sense of the United Nations charter rest on a safe political foundation.

Strauss emphasized that there may be need for year-long negotiations with the Soviets to which the American-Chinese talks in Warsaw may serve as example.

In these negotiations the West will have to be firm and free of the illusion that it is possible at the present time to change the German status toward obtaining greater freedom for all of Germany. The Atlantic defense efforts must be carried on as necessary. Advance concessions liable to weaken the Western defense are out of the question. They would be dangerous and perhaps even fatal. Under no circumstances would they cause the Soviets to assume a more yielding attitude.

Strauss called for great patience in promoting the European integration effort combined with readiness to renounce certain sovereign rights. It would be erroneous to believe, however, that Europe would become a third world political power within the predictable future. Therefore, the European integration effort must be connected with an intensification of European-American cooperation, because there is no other way for the free world to really master its tasks.

Strauss accused the Soviet Union of trying to revive German nationalism by suggesting to the Germans that a neutral Germany should be their national aim. The Soviet Union is trying to create anti-Western sentiment in the West German public.

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(Secret)

US Reply to Soviet Note on German Presidential Election: The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the note of the Government of the USSR of June 26, 1959 concerning the German decision to hold the Federal Assembly for the election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin on July 1, 1959.

The Government of the USSR will recall that the second Federal Assembly for the election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany was convened in Berlin on July 17, 1954 and that there have been regular meetings of the Federal German Bundestag in that city every year since. The United States Government, therefore, considers the present German decision to convene the present Federal Assembly on July 1, 1959 as a continuation of an established tradition, which does not contravene any existing agreements either among the four powers or between the United States Government and the Federal Republic.

It has long been publicly assumed that the next German Presidential elections would be held in Berlin, and the President of the Federal German Bundestag, Dr. Gerstenmaier, who is constitutionally responsible for convening the electoral assembly, formally proposed to the Bundestag Council of Elders on the 14th of October, 1958 that the assembly meet in Berlin.

The United States Government believes there is no warrant for the expression of concern on the part of the Government of the USSR over a peaceful assemblage in furtherance of democratic processes. The United States Government does not consider that, in the circumstances, any action on its part is required.

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Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference: Robert C. Piermont of CBS News - Mr. President, in view of some recent statements by British statesmen, indicating that they feel that a summit conference may already be justified by the Geneva talks, I wonder if you could reconcile the apparent differences between ourselves and the British?

A. - Well, you say the differences between ourselves and the British. There are just as many opinions in Britain as there probably are in our country about the wisdom of many of the procedures contemplated in this field of negotiation.

Now, we have always taken the attitude here that there was some grounds discovered or prepared by the legitimate diplomatic agencies of governments which make such a - give some kind of promise to this summit meeting.

Now, this was the opinion and conviction of the foreign ministers as they came back from Geneva, when they asked - when they arranged the recess, and I think it still is.

Ray L. Scherer of NBC News - What sort of an impression did you get of Mr. (Prol R.) Koslov (First Deputy Soviet Premier) and his place in the Russian scheme of things from your visit to New York.

A. - Well, of course in most of the personal visits with representatives of the Soviet Government, you find that you have had a rather pleasant personal experience. They are outgoing, they apparently like to have fun, they appreciate a joke, they see humor in a number of things and so, by this standard, and I mean in this, you might say in this habit you might say, I found a man that was very friendly and frankly I enjoyed the visit I had with him.

It was entirely personal, it was not political. But, we were - he showed me with a great deal of interest and I think justifiable pride the - many items they had to show in their exhibition, and I think it will attract the eye and interest of anybody.

So, I would say that, and I am looking forward to my visit with him this morning, I think it's at 11:15, and unquestionably I don't know what we are going to talk about, it's a meeting without agenda. But whatever we talk about I am sure it will be a little bit more serious than that one.

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Stewart Hensley of United Press International - A little more on Mr. Kozlov. You said you expect your talk with him in a few minutes to be a little more serious than the New York -

A. - Yes.

Q. - Visit. He said when he arrived here yesterday that he hoped his talks with you and with others here would lead to getting rid of some of what he called the abnormalities in the Russian-American situation.

Do you have any suggestion for him as to how this can be done, or is the ball on his side of the court?

A. - Well, I suppose that in such a situation, each side rather thinks the other has some new or additional responsibility. We have, as our position, that described by Mr. Herter, here a few nights ago after he came back from Geneva, when he said there is only two or three basic principles which mark a minimum position in our negotiable, you might say, our readiness for negotiation, and everything else we try to be flexible in and we certainly will attempt to promote and develop some ideas that we hope will be fruitful.

But, of course, in this one or two basic things which I have so often repeated, why, of course, we cannot, we cannot recede.

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(Confidential)

West German Note to USSR in Reply to Soviet Note of June 27 on Presidential Election: "The Government of the Federal Republic has received with surprise the fact that USSR has raised formal objections and doubts four days before election day against calling Federal Assembly in Berlin for election of the Federal President."

The Government of USSR is aware that the President of the Bundestag, who is constitutionally responsible for calling the Federal Assembly, had already made public eight months ago, on the 14th of October, 1958, that the Federal Assembly would again meet in Berlin. It is also well known to the USSR that the present President of the German Federal Republic was elected in Berlin in 1954, and that since that time meetings of the German Bundestag have taken place in Berlin each year. The Government of the USSR has never expressed doubts or objections against this. It is not clear to the Federal Republic why the Government of USSR could once again have changed its attitude on the matter. Calling of the Federal Assembly for Berlin furthermore is not pertinently suited to provide grounds for objections or concerns of kind which are expressed in Note of Soviet Embassy of June 27, 1959. Meeting of Federal Assembly for election of Federal President is peaceful action in peaceful fulfillment of democratic tasks of representatives of German people designated by Constitution for task. The Federal Government can only hope that the Government of the USSR, too, as in past will not conceal its knowledge of this fact.

Under these circumstances, the Foreign Office especially regrets that the Embassy of the USSR has declared itself not in a position to be represented at the election on July 1."

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(Secret)

US Representative's Comment on July 6 MAC Meeting: Following lengthy and exhaustive discussion, consensus in Council reflected confidence in powers negotiating at Geneva and agreement on resuming Geneva talks on basis present Western position. We feel this is end of pressures for ministerial meeting.

Exchange of views brought out emphasis on necessity to seek clarification from Soviets re ultimatum attributed to their proposals and especially re status of existing Western rights after lapse of time period proposed by Soviets. Council unanimous in opinion that any abandonment of existing Western rights inadmissible.

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(Secret)

US Representative's Report of Discussion in MAC: MAC discussion, reflected largely reactions to question in I.S. (International Secretariat) paper designed to bring out Council's thinking on Western approach to Berlin and German problems at resumption of Geneva talks and thus provide basis for reaching decision as to whether ministerial meeting should be held before July 13.

Belgian permanent representative opened discussion by directing attention to "ultimatum" attributed to Soviet proposals. After reviewing these proposals in light of July 19 Gromyko press communiqué, Tass statement (which De Staerke admitted was unofficial) and June 28 Gromyko statement, he was of opinion there was no ultimatum. Expressed his Government's hope that Western Ministers would probe Soviet views at Geneva on this point to make clear no intention on Soviet part to make unilateral change in Berlin arrangements after lapse of time period.

Spain agreed with Belgium. Believe it was of even greater importance to clarify ambiguity of Soviet position on status of existing Western rights following time limit. Understood Western reluctance to rely on Soviet pronouncements that were not official or formal declaration of Conference. Should seek to get Soviet assurance on this point at Geneva.

Greek and Italian permanent representatives, with some nuances, agreed with necessity of getting such assurance. German permanent representative felt, however, it was clear Soviets, in event failure to reach agreement, intend to claim Western rights no longer exist.

United States permanent representative gave gist of Khrushchev views and of Kozlov talks. Emphasized Secretary's statement to

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Kozlov re need for definite Soviet answer on question of rights, past West probing of Soviets on this point at Geneva and Western intent make further probe on resumption of talks as response to Belgian permanent representative's concern.

Netherlands permanent representative, after paying tribute to unity of Western Ministers at Geneva and their firm support of Western principles agreed by Council, reviewed Dutch response to I.S. questions against background of Communist objectives of world domination and European aims to secure disengagement, withdrawal of foreign troops, recognition of GDR, and stabilization of satellites. Noted Soviets really not negotiating with Ministers but attempting to work on Western public opinion over Ministers' heads to create divisions in West. Saw no hope of solution of German problem and agreed Soviets should be probed re ultimatum. Suggested, however, Soviets should be pressed on meaning they attach to Pan-German Committee which might offer possible point of agreement. However, said Pan-German Committee in form now put forward by Soviets, with parity basis and dealing with problems of reunification and peace treaty, was dangerous idea, four-power machinery to study German problem might be second alternative but doubted Soviets would accept it.

Norwegian permanent representative agreed no prospect of solution of German problem and doubted whether it should be discussed further at Geneva. Re Berlin, thought latest Gromyko proposal recognized Western rights, at least during interim period, and saw nothing to fear on Western side re proposed all-German committee, although idea of latter dealing with peace treaty might be dangerous. Felt it might be better not to discuss Berlin situation in time-period stipulated in any provisional agreement but saw considerable merit in four-powers taking up discussion after lapse of time period. Norwegian permanent representative doubted Soviets could be persuaded to pledge they would not turn over functions in Berlin to GDR or make separate peace treaty. However, saw possibility of provisional arrangement in last two Soviet public statements which could provide basis for proceeding to discussion in some other forum (presumably summit).

Danish permanent representative stated, on instructions, that in event Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting did not lead to agreement, his Foreign Minister, would revive proposal made at April Ministerial meeting for establishment of experts committee,

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including consultants from East and West Germany to study problem. Re summit, Denmark favored it in principle and believed it would eventuate either as result of favorable developments at Geneva or crisis following failure. Felt West should play down position that satisfactory progress necessary for summit since decision to hold Conference might otherwise be interpreted as defeat for West and victory for Khrushchev.

Canadian permanent representative agreed with Denmark re summit conference. Expressed concern lest failure to reach agreement turn clock back to period following November 27 and permit Soviets to resume full freedom of action to turn Berlin functions over to GDR and make separate peace treaty. Warning that opinion in UN would not be sympathetic to idea of war threat resulting from East Germans assuming functions in connection with military access to Berlin, urged Western Ministers to continue search for agreement and remove conditions and barriers to summit meeting.

French acting permanent representative stressed link established by Soviets between all-German committee and time limit arrangements as means of undermining existing Western rights. Pointed to Khrushchev statement, as revealed by US permanent representative, that 250 years preferable time period for achieving German reunification, as proof Soviets have no serious idea of all-German committee achieving agreement. Thus, if Western Powers countersigned agreement along these lines, would only weaken existing rights since Soviets would contend maintenance those rights linked to time period and mount new pressures for "free city plan" that would eventuate in East German take over of West Berlin. Agreed Gromyko must be pressed to clarify proposal for all-German committee and Soviet position on Western rights after time period.

Belgium permanent representative disagreed with France, stating that German committee proposal offered possibility of mutually acceptable agreement. Called attention to October Bundestag resolution which presented idea of quadripartite commission with German advisors to study problem that had communicated to Soviets in Federal Republic note of November 17. Should take this up if Western "package proposal" fails. Re summit asked if there were not divergencies of views among Western negotiating powers. German permanent representative voiced opposition to any four-power committee with East German advisors to deal with Berlin problem since it would tend to recognize certain rights of East Germany in West Berlin where it had none.

UK permanent representative stressed complete unity of three powers but went on to make vague statement agreeing with

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skeptical attitude re Soviet intentions and necessity to avoid falling into trap but questioning whether West could afford to "stay where we are". West at Geneva had achieved some advance in diminishing and exposing Soviet threat. Question now was how to diminish it still further and postpone it. In asking whether it were possible to reach agreement on Berlin, stressed it was just as impossible to get Soviets to reaffirm Western rights as it is for West to accept abandonment of their existing rights at end of time period. What West is trying to do is to prolong situation. Should be cautious about asking precise questions of Soviets. Better to interpret Soviets statements as we see them. Indicated, however, Western Ministers would continue to probe Soviet intentions. Said his words were entirely impromptu, and that he spoke only to avoid any hint of split between three powers.

Spaak, in summarizing discussion, began by saying he felt there was no agreement in Council on Geneva matters and raised question whether Ministerial meeting would really be useless. However, after pointing out difference of opinion on question of conditions for holding summit, he proceeded to say that agreement actually existed in Council on number of points including support for temporary solution of Berlin situation, ambiguity of Soviet proposals, which require clarification. However, saw as basic question whether any temporary arrangements could be agreed on Berlin. Believing this was possible, stressed desirability of utilizing any time period established by such provisional arrangement to have four-power study of German problem. West, therefore, should resume talks at Geneva with willingness to agree to provisional settlement of 18 months or 2 years, including question of troop ceilings, subversive activities and nuclear weapons in Berlin, without, however, giving up existing rights and should advance proposal for study of German problem. Agreed with Denmark, that every effort should be made to keep discussions going and not break off.

Norway disagreed vigorously with Spaak assertion that there was no agreement in Council. All agreed there was no objection to provisional settlement with time limit that did not affect existing Western rights. All agreed Soviet ideas on German committee unacceptable in present form and that NATO in this matter should be guided by German views. No disagreement in Council but merely differences in nuances. Spaak then confirmed that his approach had been designed to demonstrate just that unity.

Turkish permanent representative stated it was clear to him that Soviet public statements re resumption of negotiations

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after lapse of time limit on basis of "existing situation" referred to situation that would be created by unilateral Soviet action. Saw Western chances of success at Geneva talks depending on maintenance of policy of firmness and holding to positions.

US permanent representative agreed with Turkey on necessity of Western firmness. Felt Council discussion had brought out some useful ideas. Re procedures of negotiations and tactics, emphasized Western Ministers must resume Geneva discussions with same firm positions as before recess. If West should begin by making concessions, Soviets would have US at serious disadvantage. Must therefore proceed from our present position which is good and sound one. Important that Western Ministers have support of Council. Agreed with Norway that differences expressed in Council discussion were of nuance and detail.

In conclusion of discussions, Belgium permanent representative stated he would report views expressed in Council to his Government which would find them useful in further consideration of possibility of holding Ministerial meeting later on if other questions arise. Italian permanent representative suggested Council might give further consideration to question of going to summit meeting. Canadian permanent representative emphasized necessity of consulting Council in the event Geneva talks should become deadlocked.

Spain assumed and UK confirmed that negotiating powers would continue same close consultation with NAC as in first Geneva session.

There was no mention of any further discussion in NAC before July 13 resumption at Geneva.

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(Secret)

Ambassador Thompson's Report of Kroll-Zorin Conversation: The German Ambassador informs me he had long conversation with Zorin from which it was clear that at the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva the Soviets will attempt to reopen discussion of separate peace treaty and of security zone in addition to Berlin problem.

- Regarding the latter he repeatedly stated no ultimatum was intended by Soviet proposal and indicated that Soviets would be prepared to accept time period of two years. With respect to allied rights he said certain of those rights would be satisfied by agreement itself. At end of time period the Foreign Ministers would meet and Allied rights would be the same as they were at beginning of time period. Both German and Netherlands Ambassador, who was present, attached considerable importance to this statement. I disagreed strongly pointing out that Soviet view was that acceptance of their proposal would virtually have ended occupation status.

Zorin remarked that separate peace treaty would be very serious step and Soviets would resort to it only after all attempts to negotiate had failed.

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(Secret)

Ambassador Bruce's Report of Conversation with Von Brentano:
I saw the Foreign Minister last night. He said he had met with Couvo and Lloyd at Geneva on June 20. Neither he personally nor Federal Government was prepared to agree to all-German commission as long as that commission does not have a definite task assigned to it, that is, something within stipulations of Western Peace Plan.

He had gone on to tell his British and French colleagues that he could imagine one could revert to some of the ideas suggested by Ambassador Greve during preparations for the Conference. These envisaged establishment of four-power commission to consider problems connected with reunification of Germany. There would be no objection to German experts being called in in an advisory capacity, provided they would have no executive or legislative powers, and further provided their functions were clearly defined by the four-power commission so that they would act merely as an auxiliary to that commission. In such case, said the Foreign Minister, no question of parity between two Germanies would arise, since it would not be an autonomous organization. Hence, the number of experts would not matter.

On July 3 Foreign Minister had discussed above with Greve and Duckwitz and will take it up today with Chancellor. Thereafter, he will inform the Allies of the German position in this respect, if possible before the Geneva Conference reconvenes. However, he is not certain he can meet this deadline.

The Foreign Minister said in last days of Conference, Von Eckardt had submitted a paper on his personal initiative, to the German delegation. Foreign Minister had not been in agreement with some of his ideas, but is continuing to consider his proposals. He said he was unhappy that an informal private paper submitted by a non-member of the Foreign Office had been brought to the Allies' attention. I told him, in defense of Von Eckardt, that this Embassy had no copy of the proposals, nor did I believe the Department had ever received one. Additionally, I said I had recently mentioned the matter myself to Von Eckardt, who answered that the paper was merely a representation of his private views.

I did not tell the Foreign Minister that two days ago Von Eckardt had said to me he intended to renew his suggestions to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

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I think at this point it would be a mistake for the Department to mention Von Eckardt's proposals. He will have more of them and some of them may be worth consideration, but only if they are put forward with approval of the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister expects to arrive Geneva Saturday night.

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7
(Confidential)

US Mission Berlin Report of Brandt's Telegram to Von Brentano:
On instructions governing Mayor, Mission officers were shown lengthy telegram Brandt sent to Foreign Minister Von Brentano July 4 covering the following points:

Consultation of Berlin delegates at Geneva. Brandt strongly reiterated his previous public and private statements that Berlin representatives at Geneva inadequately informed and documented his case by detailed account of two instances when information which had already been transmitted to Soviets was withheld from Berlin delegation. Brandt reminded Von Brentano of latter's promise of full participation of Berlin representatives and insisted they be not only fully informed but also consulted in drafting stages. Brandt informed Von Brentano that Von Mettenheim and Deputy Press Chief Kettlein will again represent Berlin; Senator Klein would be available for consultation on short notice.

Decision on Berlin meeting of Federal Assembly. Without comment Brandt stated in telegram that on May 30 Von Brentano had denied to Senator Klein that locus of assembly had been subject of conversation among Western Foreign Ministers; subsequently, Brandt learned that subject had been discussed on May 22. Governing Mayor then stated it had been his impression during his conversation with the three Western Foreign Ministers that they not opposed to holding the elections in Berlin and that Secretary Herter especially positive on this point. Re Allied intercession with Gerstenmaier, governing Mayor correctly summarized substance of Burns' conversation with him. Brandt then stated he and Senator Klein saw Gerstenmaier and conveyed to him message delivered by Burns. Brandt mentioned only that Gerstenmaier said he would especially stress Allied rights in Berlin, but Brandt's telegram reported nothing further re Gerstenmaier's decision.

Second phase of Geneva. Brandt reiterated public and private statements that Western plan of June 16 represents limit of what can be offered "in good conscience." Brandt promised that

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July (Cont.) detailed working paper on access containing specific proposals for improvement will be forwarded to the German delegation.
 7 (Confidential) (USSET learned on another occasion that a small working group of experts from Sermit Departments of Economics and Traffic are working on this problem but have not yet issued a report.)

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Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference: John Scall of the Associated Press - Mr. President, Averell Harriman reports that on June 23, Premier Khrushchev told him:

"Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. That is bluff. If you sent in tanks, they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember, it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically."

What do you think of talk such as this?

A. - Well, I don't think anything about it at all. I don't believe that responsible people should indulge in anything that can be even remotely considered ultimatums or threats. That is not the way to reach peaceful solutions.

Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News - Mr. President, Mr. Harriman also reported that he thought it would be a good idea if Mr. Khrushchev were invited to the United States, to rid him of some of his misconceptions. I know he has talked about this before, but what do you think about an invitation to come at this time, inasmuch as Mr. (Anastas I.) Mikoyan and First Deputy Kozlov (Soviet Deputy Premiers) have already come here?

A. - Well, here is something that I would never rule out of the realm of possibility. But we have, as I say, very tough questions to settle. We have to concert our positions with our friends and allies, so if this ran were to be - make just a ceremonial visit, I'd say there it would be only a matter of his own, let's say, oh, reception would be the thing that would be important in the country.

Chalmers M. Roberts of the Washington Post and Times Herald - Mr. President, the Foreign Ministers are going to be back at Geneva again on Monday. I wonder if you could tell us if you see any change in the prospects of agreement on Berlin and thereby the possibilities of a summit, whether you have given Secretary Herter any new instructions this morning?

A. - Well, I think there has been no change in our attitude from that reported by Mr. Herter shortly after he returned from Geneva from his prior visit.

We continue to say that the firm position we have is that one - that of respecting our responsibilities and making certain that we retain our rights with respect to Berlin. From there on,

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and with that solid conviction as the unmovable stone in the whole structure, we are ready to talk and discuss anything because we certainly do want to find some way of reaching a solution that will not keep the whole world on edge, well, for example, as evidenced by the number of questions that are properly brought up on this matter right here in meetings such as this. And, I concede that under the present conditions they are proper, and they are newsworthy. But we are trying to get to a place where that will be little less than that, and we must do it in my opinion if we are going to do a real service for the citizens of the world.

Lawrence H. Burd of the Chicago Tribune - Mr. President, you had rather a long talk last week after you saw us with Mr. Yozlov. Did anything - was anything produced out of that talk that would give any new hopes, any new elements raised?

A. - I saw nothing new. Of course that was a great protestation of friendly intentions, just as I say - on my side that we want to be friendly, that we recognize that there is a basic friendship between the Russian people and our people. Everybody that comes back and reports this, reports the interest of the Russian people in what we are doing, how we live, and then, seem to feel that it will be a great service to mankind when the feelings of those people are allowed to give away, to take - be influential, let's say. And, I say the same thing.

I would say I think the American people basically like the Russian people, as they know them. So therefore I think there ought to be some way of exploiting that natural almost affinity between the two peoples and see whether we can't get somewhere.

Roscoe Drummond of the New York Herald Tribune - Mr. President, in light of the tenor of the questions here this morning on West Berlin, and in light of Mr. Khrushchev's provocative remarks to Governor Harriman, do you feel that the American people are adequately alerted to the consequences that might flow from failure to get an agreed solution on this problem?

A. - Well, I think they are, Mr. Drummond. It seems to me we have been talking about - both the near and far-term consequences of failure to get some kind of an agreement. We are constantly plagued with this, that we are putting more of our substance, more of our sweat, our toil and our man-hours into these negative things we call armaments for no reason whatsoever, no constructive thing. They're just to hold on what we have.

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We are, even our minds are atmospherized in the trough of destruction. We think in terms of atomic bombs and missiles. No, the world, is suffering a terrible loss, and I think spiritually and in every way, materially, in this failure. Now, but I'm quite sure that the people are alerted to what could be the eventual consequences of this failure, and that's the reason we must never stop trying, and that's the reason I say I am personally ready to go any place where I think any good can be done and at any time.

So, I really - if they are not alert to it, then I don't know where they are, because I do meet a good many types of people that are working around me, and I know that their understanding is quite clear, that this is a tough situation all the time.

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London Times Report of Debate in Commons on Foreign Affairs - Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, opened a debate on foreign affairs.

He said that the two major matters of disagreement remaining at the Geneva Conference on nuclear tests dealt with the staffing and facilities of the control posts and the inspection teams, and the circumstances in which an inspection team would operate.

There were other matters outstanding, but he believed that the differences between the two sides were definitely narrowing. What the West wanted was a system that was sufficiently realistic to form an efficient deterrent to potential breakers of treaties.

Not much progress could be claimed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference on German reunification, although the prolonged discussions on this, in an atmosphere of frankness and cordiality, were the best-humoured discussions in which he had taken part with Soviet representatives in the last seven years. There must be a continuing review of these problems, because time could bring about the possibility of an agreement on some of them. After all, there had been more than 300 meetings before the Austrian treaty was signed, and if they were sufficiently patient and persevering, agreement could be attained in the long run.

It was clear that they must return to Geneva next Monday determined to make another attempt to reach agreement on Berlin. In the present state of relations between East and West it was of supreme importance to achieve some agreement, however limited.

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They could not make an agreement merely for the sake of doing so; that meant abandoning their basic position that the West Berliners must be free to choose their way of life, must feel confident of that freedom, and must have free access to the outside world, which made that freedom a reality and not a paper formula. But if, subject to that proviso, they could reach a limited agreement, it could be a turning point to the wider agreements which would mean so much to the peace and stability of Europe.

On the summit meetings they must proceed step by step, and the next step was to make a success of the coming phase of the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva. It might be limited success, but the way would then be open for a meeting of heads of Governments. To start speculating on what might happen if the talks broke down seemed to be the best way of ensuring that they would break down. Since February the atmosphere had been steadily improving; they had sought to maintain that improvement, and were working quietly and steadily together for agreement.

He still believed it was possible to reach agreement on Berlin, even though it was not finalized at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Such an agreement would open the way to further progress, and with that belief he would go back to the meeting on Monday.

Mr. Bevan said that the opposition were glad to hear the Foreign Secretary's optimism about the eventual outcome of the Conference on the suspension of nuclear tests, and they hoped that if it went on indefinitely and no agreement on control and inspection was reached, the tests would remain suspended. The best thing, short of an agreement about inspection, was that the Conference on tests should continue indefinitely.

It was probably a good thing that the Foreign Ministers' Conference went into recess. Everyone was tired and had begun to misunderstand each other more than ordinarily. Mr. Khrushchev had been making a series of statements. It was unfortunate that while the Conference was on there were all kinds of "noises off." There were "noises off" by Dr. Adenauer.

Did Mr. Lloyd expect an agreement on matters of substance at Geneva? All that Britain did at the Conference was to put forward proposals which were based not on what they understood to be the strategy of the Prime Minister but on the strategy of the other Western Powers.

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The opposition had been led to believe that the visits of the Prime Minister to Moscow, Bonn, Paris, and Washington indicated a new initiative on the part of the British Government. Those visits were one of the most highly publicized odysseys since the Greeks. Mr. Macmillan said he was going to proceed modestly, and if some small step forward could be taken he would be gratified. He said it with that assumption of tired wisdom he had now adopted. The opposition accepted it all in good faith. They should never have been so credulous.

Did the Prime Minister fight for his proposals? If so where were they? Did he run away? It was not the first time he had started to fight and run away. He who fought and ran away lived to run away another day. As we were the third hydrogen power, Great Britain was supposed to have some influence on colleagues; but the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, who were not hydrogen powers, had had more influence on American diplomatic strategy than Great Britain.

Any fair-minded treatment of the discussions at Geneva would verify that so far there was no sign that what the Prime Minister had told them was his approach had had the slightest effect on either France, Germany, or the United States. At the time there had been from the other Powers any concession to what was assumed to be the British point of view.

The opposition considered that to try to reach agreement on so wide a front, on so many issues, before reaching agreement on any one, was a profound blunder and a recipe for failure. The opposition believed that an essential condition was that there should be an area of disengagement in Europe. That was the right form of approach.

The Government's record on disarmament would have a malign influence on the development of discussions. What the Prime Minister had admitted to the House was that to give Great Britain the opportunity of having and testing the hydrogen bomb he was prepared to sabotage and destroy the disarmament committee.

Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister - I should not be asked.

Mr. Bevan - The Prime Minister has been waving the bomb about for the last six months, and lost his balance with it.

We make clear now and I want to emphasize it so there will be no misunderstanding - it would be a bad thing to try to misrepresent the position of the British Labour Party in this matter that we

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do not believe it is any contribution to the peace of the world to bring about a sudden rupture and dismantling in the Western alliances.

We believe that if any action were taken by a British Government the effects of which were to destroy the Western alliance, it would not be a contribution to peace. It might precipitate the world into war. It is a great mistake for people to imagine that by suddenly getting rid of our friends and allies we make any contribution to peace. On the contrary, we would invite adventures of all sorts that might land us in the very place we want to avoid.

That is our position today, and it has been our position before. What we have said is that any repudiation of the hydrogen bomb that involved the repudiation of the alliances would be opposed by the opposition. If, however, the time ever arrives when the greater authority of the United Nations could supersede the authority of NATO we would be more pleased than anyone else. We therefore would suggest that even now we should try to open disarmament negotiations, because we think the world situation is deteriorating so rapidly that something ought to be done to arrest it...

Although there was a great deal of attractiveness in turning the back on reality when it was grim, this did not dispose of it. One still had to face it.

The opposition had been trying to do so, and trying to do so honestly. Their proposal was that all nations which had not yet made these weapons, or had not yet had tests, should renounce them and agree to systems of inspection. If a significant number did so, Britain should accept renunciation herself.

If this were achieved the USSR and the United States would be surrounded with such a climate of international opinion as to make it easier for them to reach agreement about the destruction of their stocks.

Mr. Arthur Henderson said that if it was correct, as Mr. Averell Harriman had reported, that Mr. Khrushchev had said that he would agree to no reunification of Germany which did not provide for a Communist system, it was to be hoped that the Soviet Government would modify their view, otherwise it would place an insurmountable obstacle in the path of a reunited Germany.

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Mr. Macmillan said that in general the nuclear test conference was proceeding slowly but steadily. But there were obstacles to be overcome. He believed it was possible in one or two cases that they could only be resolved by the heads of the Governments concerned. Nevertheless he thought these conferences should be able to clarify the final points that might remain for settlement and present them in a form in which the heads of Government could reach a decision.

Although he had been incorrect in saying the other day, that all the Powers had made declarations that while discussions were going on the tests would not take place, he felt pretty confident that while the discussions were going on, the tests would not take place. The agreement would come into force, as regards the renunciation, from the date of the agreement.

The objective of a start in international control and inspection, a comprehensive agreement covering all types of test, and signed by the three great Powers, operating in this sphere, was a great prize, worth long effort and much patience in trying to attain. For it was on control and inspection, rather than in some generalized plan, that real progress in disarmament, conventional and unconventional, depended.

Three great question marks surrounded Mr. Gaitskill's proposal. Was it a practical one? Was there any real chance that the other countries would agree, at any rate until the three Powers had themselves reached some agreement on tests? If not, it was just a formula for internal use.

Secondly, what would be the conditions of this club: non-manufacture or non-possession? If it was only non-manufacture, there were certain limitations, including the enormous expense involved. It was no good stopping manufacture unless one could stop possession, for what was to prevent the great Powers that remained in the nuclear field from giving these weapons to their allies or satellites?

But, whatever the decision, it must be enforced, and they were having a lot of trouble in agreeing the conditions for enforcing an inspection of tests. If they were to enforce, all over the world, both non-manufacture and non-possession it seemed a very formidable task. Unless these questions were answered, this concept was not realistic.

While recognizing the immense material power of the two great giants, Russia and America, was it really desirable that this power, with all its influence on the gravest issues of foreign

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policy, should be their perpetual monopoly, uninfluenced and untempered from any other sources?

Any British Government, with their responsibility to themselves and to the Commonwealth, and as a leading European Power, must think long and carefully before taking such decisions. They would do better to concentrate on the disarmament efforts which they were making.

He believed that certain questions could only be decided by a summit meeting, and it might be that the Berlin question was one of them.

This meeting might be able to give the answers to questions passed on to it by the Geneva Conference. Then they might find it possible to define the next target to be approached - and here, he thought, the question of general disarmament was the most hopeful. If they could only succeed in taking this first step - a solution, even a temporary solution with the reduction of sanctions in Berlin - then they might begin on the wider questions on which the whole future of the world must depend.

He recognized the dangers, although he thought they had been overestimated, of a great spread of nuclear power. But if the three Powers were unable to agree among themselves, of what value would a gesture be to other nations? The pilgrimage ahead was likely to be a long one, and it would require patience as well as faith.

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Excerpts from Secretary Herter's News Conference: Ladies and gentlemen, if I may, I would like to say just a word or two before the questions begin. As Andy Berding (Andrew H. Berding), Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, just told you, this is my first open press conference and I hope that it will be one of a regular series just as soon as I can get my life regulated to a point where I will be in Washington for any extended period of time.

During the two and a half months that I have been Secretary, I have had a number of background conferences, one here and four in Geneva. But I feel very strongly that there should be periodic open press conferences of this kind and, as I say, I hope that the exigencies of the Foreign Ministers' Conference will make it possible for me to be with you at regular intervals in the near future. I say this because of a profound conviction that any Secretary of State has a definite responsibility to make as clear as he is able to the bases on which our Government acts in the foreign policy field.

With that rather brief preliminary statement I would be very glad to answer any questions that I can.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, you are returning now to Geneva to resume your talks with Mr. Gromyko and the Western Ministers. Would you give us at this time your assessment of the possibility of reaching any worthwhile agreement on Berlin there and laying the groundwork for any summit conference, please.

A. - I am afraid I could not give that to you in terms of betting odds. We naturally do not know just what we will find at Geneva from the point of view of any change or any more explicit interpretation of what at the moment we are not certain about in the Russian position.

As you know, at midnight of the night on which we decided to recess, Mr. Gromyko put out a statement in Geneva which indicated that the position we had taken with respect to the last proposal made by the Soviets contained certain misinterpretations. However, our statement that we put out earlier in the day was based not only on the working of the document but on Mr. Khrushchev's radio speech which had come over to us that same afternoon.

Here in Washington I made a report to the nation a few days after our return and I think it was on June 28 that Mr. Gromyko saw fit to answer that particular statement. He took

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exception to some of the things I had said and we have been studying with great care the wording that he has used with respect to the exceptions that he has taken.

In particular he objected to an assumption that we had made and I think we probably made on the basis of evidence before us, that if we entered into any interim agreement with respect to Berlin and then resumed negotiations at the expiration of the term of that agreement, we would have forfeited our occupation rights. Mr. Gromyko indicated that was an entirely false assumption, and that otherwise they would not have suggested we would resume negotiations after a blank period of time. That is a new point on which we certainly would want some clarification.

The other point, which is very indefinite, of course, is the one concerning their suggestion of an interim agreement, at first for a year and then one and a half years. Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khrushchev made the statement that the period of time was neither a matter of importance nor of principle. This presumably means the period of time is one for negotiation.

I think that we shall have to explore first of all, when we get back to Geneva, the meaning of those statements, if the meanings are as apparently intended by the Russians, but certainly not borne out by the earlier documents.

I think there is some possibility we might reach agreement. I dare say there is some possibility but we are not saying it with optimism. I have never been optimistic, as you know, about reaching a successful negotiation.

With respect to the summit conference, I think that was made amply clear by the President: Unless we can make progress which would justify such a conference, that he would not be willing to go.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, have you made an effort, through Ambassador (Llewellyn E.) Thompson in Moscow, to clarify these two points in Mr. Gromyko's statement?

A. - No, we haven't.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, if the Soviet Union indicates in Geneva, as Gromyko's statement seems to indicate, that our rights would not run out at the end of this period, would we be willing to settle for an indefinite or an intermediate extension

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of those rights laid down, as you put it, I believe, in your speech or in the official Western statement, until the reunification of Germany is brought about.

A. - I would hesitate to make any commitment on that. Actually, it is difficult to make a commitment, speaking as only one foreign minister among four. Obviously, the first thing, and the very important thing is to concert our positions with our Allies.

Before making any reply as to what we might do under hypothetical circumstances, naturally, we would want to be certain of the attitude of the Allies.

Q. - Has there not been in this period any discussion with our Allies on this point?

A. - Very little discussion largely because of other engagements on the part of our Allies. Couve de Murville, the Foreign Minister of France, went to Madagascar with General de Gaulle and has been away from Paris. Mr. von Brentano has been away for some time from Bonn. The consultations will take place just as soon as we return to Geneva.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to the character of the remarks which Mr. Khrushchev made to Governor Harrigan?

A. - Well, I don't know just how to characterize them. I think the President did it pretty well yesterday and I think we had better stand on what he then said.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, in the event that your negotiations at Geneva are not successful, is there a fully agreed Allied plan on counter-measures to maintain our position in Berlin, if the Soviets take some unilateral action?

A. - That matter has been discussed for a considerable period of time and I would say that on the whole our position is well concerted.

Q. - Could you estimate on that?

A. - No, I would not go into details.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the absence of the German and the French Foreign Ministers. Have you been in consultation with Secretary Lloyd over the last several weeks?

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A. - No, I have not been in direct conversation with him at all. I have talked with the Ambassador once or twice here.

Q. - Has there been contact between the President and Mr. Macmillan?

A. - None direct, that I know of.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, in view of the lack of these contacts in the interim, plus a number of other items, including an interpretation by Mr. Macmillan which differed from ours on the progress of the first meeting, and the near-crisis situation in some respects between our Government and France over nuclear armaments, taking these things cumulatively, how much are they likely to militate against a united front amongst the Western Allies at this second meeting?

A. - Well, I assume that any family difficulties we have are always taken account of by the Russians. On the other hand, I can say this, I have said it before, and I want to repeat it: that in Geneva the united front was a genuine front and I hope it is a front that will hold, and hold effectively. Both the process of consultation and the process of reaching agreement, and I mean genuine agreement, was very real, and to me very heartening.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, in your speech I believe you said that Mr. Khrushchov had said that no item in the Western proposal package was negotiable. Have you any reason to revise your opinion of that now?

A. - No, that statement of Mr. Khrushchov's applied to our proposal, the seven-point proposal with regard to West Berlin, not to the initial Western peace plan. It was on that that he said that none of the seven points was subject to negotiation.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, how long would you go on in Geneva if there were no progress, as there was in the previous six weeks? Would you stay on two or three weeks, or longer? Or how seriously do you take your Puerto Rico engagement?

A. - Well, I wish I could give you the answer to that. I am hoping that we will not be there longer than three weeks.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, in view of the position the United States has taken with regard to the continuation of our rights in Berlin, how could these be modified at all in any new discussion based on these latest remarks of Mr. Gromyko's?

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A. - Well, as I say, the remarks of Mr. Khrushchov, and those of Mr. Gromyko do not exactly ride, and I think that our first responsibility is to find out what the official position is. As you know, the remarks of Mr. Khrushchov were as reported in an interview, the remarks of Mr. Gromyko in documentary form, and I think that we have a definite responsibility to find out which represents the official Russian attitude.

Q. - Do you have any idea that the United States might modify its position on the maintenance of its rights in Berlin?

A. - We have not indicated any such thing.

Q. - If the Russians withdraw their limitations on alleged or proposed limitation on our rights in Berlin, does that qualify as the progress that is necessary to go on to the summit? Or will we require some other further progress?

A. - Well, as you know, we had not come close to agreement. There are other elements, obviously, that have still not to be planned out, and when I mentioned this one particular attitude of the Russians, it does not necessarily mean that a satisfactory answer to that means a satisfactory agreement.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, if the Soviets did give a satisfactory answer on that point, would it be possible for the Western Powers then to join in negotiations on the basis of the Soviet proposal?

A. - Not necessarily. The Soviet proposal contains a number of things that I think you would realize, in view of our position, are objectionable to us. The Soviet proposal and our own proposals I think had only two or three things in common, that actually overlapped, from the point of view of points at issue. I would hope that we would return to negotiations on the basis of our proposals.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, I am not clear from your remarks as to whether you are more optimistic now as to some agreement with the Soviets than you were after the negotiations recessed and you gave your television report to the nation.

A. - No, nothing has happened since. The only thing is the Gromyko statement I spoke of, that is the only thing that has intervened, and that is an important statement.

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Q. - Mr. Secretary, would agreement on a reasonable agenda be enough at Geneva to take the two sides on to a summit meeting?

A. - Well, that determination would be made elsewhere. I would not make that determination. A reasonable agenda might cover a lot of things. At a summit meeting there is no way of stopping any head of state who is there from bringing up any subject he wants to bring up. I am not at all sure how precise an agenda would be required, if any at all. The President has taken the same position consistently, that if the developments were such in the present negotiations that are going on to justify a summit conference he will be glad to go to it.

Q. - What would you consider as progress sufficient to warrant a summit conference?

A. - That determination I would not want to make at this time.

Q. - To clarify question, Mr. Secretary, I think you said you would have to consider a substitute for you perhaps at the Geneva talks at some point. Did you mean that that would be at a foreign minister's level or some lesser level in the consultations?

A. - Well, if it were agreed that the conversations should carry on for this indefinite period, then they would probably be carried on at a lower level.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, various Soviet spokesmen, including Premier Khrushchev, in the past few weeks have said that the Soviet Union definitely will go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless we agree to proposals that the Soviet Union believes acceptable. What do you think would be the result if the Soviet Union went ahead and signed such a separate peace treaty?

A. - Well, a separate peace treaty is a part of two questions. One is the question of the access routes and the sovereignty to be exercised over the access routes. Actually, the Soviet Government when it created the East German state in 1955 had an exchange of letters, known as the Zorin-Bolz letters, with the newly created East German Government in this, on the one hand, all access rights to Berlin dealing with the civilian population were put in the hands of the East German Government. Those dealing with access rights of the garrisons of the three Allied Powers in West Berlin were reserved to the Russians in accordance with the agreement which they had with the Allies.

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Today, if the Russian Government wanted to turn over to the East German Government the access rights that we now enjoy, they could do so by the plain cancellation of that Zorin letter. So that the peace treaty, as such, is not an essential part of that particular act.

I think that in talking of a separate peace treaty the Russians hope that they can get other nations outside of the Soviet bloc to recognize the East German Government at the same time that they make a peace treaty with East Germany.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, do you intend to pay a visit to Berlin in the near future?

A. - Yes, I am hoping to go to Berlin at the conclusion of the Conference in Geneva. I am not sure that I will be welcome there, but I have talked to Mayor (Willy) Brandt about it, and I have told him that I wanted very much to come to Berlin, just to pay him a courtesy call. And I have agreed to do it just as soon as I can, just as soon as the Conference is over.

Q. - Why do you say you think you might not be welcome in Berlin?

A. - Well, perhaps Berlin might be unhappy as a result (of failure) of the Conference. I am hoping very much that that will not be the case. Perhaps I was talking a little facetiously.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, one of the points in both the Western and the Western Berlin proposals is the creation of some kind of all-German group. The Russians insist on parity. We have proposed a 25-10 ratio, I believe. Is this no-parity posture on the West an absolute position?

A. - Well, the numbers that make up the group I don't feel is an item of too great importance. In the proposal that we made in the Western peace plan for a so-called all-German committee, we used that proportion. But we said that all decisions of the group should be made by a three-quarters vote. So that, in effect, either side had a veto on the other. If agreement had to be reached, the numbers on each side are not of primary importance.

Q. - Mr. Secretary, do you find that the Russians are using Geneva mainly for propaganda purposes?

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A. - No, I wouldn't say that. On occasion, they do. But the greater number of meetings that we had there were so-called "private" meetings, not the plenary sessions, at one villa or another. And they were very scrupulous from the point of view of not putting out any press releases as a result of the "private" conversation. And after each one of the meetings we would discuss what might be put out, or what shouldn't be put out, and they didn't use those meetings for propaganda to the extent that we thought that they might.

Q. - Well, then, would you conclude that they are trying seriously to find a solution to Berlin?

A. - One day I think that, and the next day I think "no" so - I think that they are trying to find an answer.

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Ambassador Thompson's Comments on Resumption of Geneva Conference: I find MAC discussion Berlin as well as world press treatment this problem most disturbing. The Soviets appear to have succeeded in focusing discussion on their proposal rather than ours. Moreover, discussion of Soviet proposal in turn has centered on position of Allied rights at end of time period. We now appear to be in position that if Soviets should make categorical statement re validity of our rights at end of proposed period, it would be very difficult for us to reject their proposal. The fact remains that price Soviets are demanding for limited continuation of present access arrangements is excessively high. We are asked to establish a German committee on parity basis which means in effect *de facto* recognition of GDR, acceptance of idea that such committee should work out peace treaty and reunification, presumably not based on free elections; non-reciprocal arrangements concerning subversive activities and atomic weapons and finally reduction of occupation forces to "symbolic contingents".

In resumption of Geneva discussions I suggest that in any discussion of Soviet proposal rather than concentrate on status of allied rights at end of time period, we insist upon clear-cut statement from Soviets as to what is meant by "symbolic contingents". By this I mean not numbers but rather function of such contingents. It seems clear to me from previous discussion at Geneva and subsequent Soviet statements in Moscow that Soviets do not intend that these reduced forces would operate on present basis as occupation troops with all rights flowing from such status but rather that they merely symbolize

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Allied "presence" in Berlin.

It appears to me that maximum additional concession we might make at Geneva would be to add to our proposal provision for a four power commission with German experts (or advisors) to discuss reunification and peace treaty, with Foreign Ministers to meet whenever such committee is ready to report but in any event not later than say two years. Last paragraph of our proposal might then be dropped.

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Embassy Paris Report of Comments by French Foreign Office on Future Course of Geneva Talks: In conversation today at Foreign Office with Jurgensen, he mentioned in serious tone that French are worried about reports from "well informed persons" indicating that British have utilized interim period since Geneva adjournment "to work on" US and bring US around to view that Gromyko's latest proposals constitute a satisfactory basis of discussion and compromise which would lead to summit meeting.

Embassy representative said he was sure these reports did not correspond with reality and that US was returning to Geneva determined to continue negotiations on basis of Western proposals in effort to probe Gromyko to see if there is any flexibility in his position.

Jurgensen said he hoped this was the case, but that they are not reassured by British conduct since adjournment. He said French were disturbed by recent public speeches by Lloyd and Macmillan displaying conciliatory attitude toward Soviet proposals and eagerness for summit meeting.

Jurgensen stated French feel West has gone as far as it can and that Foreign Office regards any effort by Soviets to impose time limit on occupation rights, or to tie Berlin situation to outcome of deliberations of all-German committee, as intolerable.

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US Mission Berlin Report of Mayor Brandt's Views: In informal meeting with Commandants this afternoon, Mayor Brandt made following points re Geneva:

He thought there is possibility that Soviets might accept Western paper of June 16 as basis for discussion and would then offer "improvements" interpreting Western proposals in Soviet sense. Brandt thought in that case it necessary for Western Powers be prepared immediately to counteract Soviet proposals by tabling interpretations of their own.

Brandt's thoughts on Western plan being sent to Bonn on Von Brentano's request. Brandt most concerned with points relating to access and curbing of activities against public order mentioned in Western paper. Re access, he not satisfied with words "wie bisher" used in formulating demand for continued free and unrestricted access in German version of Western paper. Brandt said "wie bisher" might conceivably also include blockade period.

Re curbing of certain activities, Brandt said that phrase "measures should be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties" likely to lead to interminable wrangling between East and West since Communist interpretation of what constituted fundamental human rights quite different from Western. West Berlin newspaper article criticizing USSR might be considered by Soviets as violation of Berlin agreement. Senator Lipschitz had suggested language specifying that activities which violate recognized penal codes in both parts of Germany be curbed, but Brandt not entirely satisfied with this definition either.

Brandt felt perhaps most dangerous point of Western proposal related to limiting Western troop strength but he refraining from commenting formally on this point since not within his competence. Expressing his personal opinion he was certain that any commitment which would give Soviets an opportunity to introduce controls over Allied troop strength would be dangerous. Should West Berlin be exposed to concerted infiltration attempt by Communists, Allied troop levels would make a real difference because West Berlin police morale would be affected if Allied garrisons reduced to a point where police recognize Allied troops could no longer be effective in supporting police action.

Brandt expressed personal belief that minor Allied troop reduction would not be considered by Soviets as meaningful

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concession and would gain us nothing. Serious reduction would call into question concept "trip wire mechanism." Handful of Allied troops might simply be "arrested" without being able to offer meaningful resistance, in which case it could not be clearly established that act of aggression had been committed.

In reply to question from British Commandant whether troop reduction would affect the morale of West Berlin population as a whole, Brandt said there was danger it would be regarded as first step toward Allied evacuation and could therefore have strongly negative effect on Berlin morale.

In reply to another question from British Commandant as to whether Allied force reduction of two to three thousand could be compensated for by increase in West Berlin police, Brandt said the two issues not directly related. If people were afraid that Allied policy over long run was to evacuate Berlin, police reinforcements would do nothing to dispel such fears; in addition, decline in police morale occasioned by troop reductions might offset increasing police numbers. Reinforcing police should be considered in any event.

Brandt repeated to Commandants his dissatisfaction with Federal Republic's failure to keep him informed of Geneva developments either through Von Mettenheir at Geneva or through the Foreign Office in Bonn. He had discussed this matter last Monday with Chancellor and Von Brentano and they had agreed to rectify situation. Brandt told Commandants he hoped they would support with (other?) governments the inclusion of Berlin's representative at Geneva as a technical advisor to any working group which might be concerned with formulation of proposals directly affecting Berlin. (Presumably the Federal Republic has indicated to Brandt it is willing to make such proposal). Brandt felt such technical advice would be of great benefit.

Brandt said he or Senator Klein prepared to go to Geneva at any time if their views or advice on technical points might be deemed helpful. Added that commencing July 21 he would be vacationing near Munich and could get to Geneva on a few hours' notice.

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Embassy Bonn Report of German Opinion: Interest in Geneva negotiations among Bonn parties and politicians is surprisingly passive for moment. It will intensify, even in summer vacation period, as meetings resume. They are generally agreed in interim assessment that West has made and Soviets have refused maximum possible offer on Berlin and that negotiations should turn back to overall problem of Germany and security. Government parties tend to be pessimistic and urge that West stand firm on original package.

CDU generally finds that Soviet intransigence leaves no way open except continuation of status quo and Federal Republic's past policies. SPD and FDP, on other hand, continue to see possibilities of agreement and are ready to blame Federal Government if these are not realized. Opposition parties do not see early or easy progress toward reunification but believe that disengagement in some form remains possible and useful and that there is room for agreements leading to summit. FDP puts special emphasis on bringing representation from two parts of Germany together and believe this possible in framework of a Four-Power Commission to give continuing consideration to German problem. This idea, with variations, is supported in all parties. It is consistent with unanimous Bundestag resolutions of last year and is seen at least as a means of keeping hope alive of two Germanies. There is something of an ostrich attitude on question of Berlin, some in opposition saying privately that city will ultimately be lost and those in CDU who do not simply hope the problem will go away rather desperately hopeful that firmness will make force unnecessary.

In absence of foreign policy debate which all parties found inopportune during recess of Geneva Conference current views of political parties on Geneva have not been formally expressed. However, in addition to discussion in Foreign Affairs Committee (Embel 2926) there have been number of statements by party leaders and by party press services which give fair picture of party opinion at this juncture.

There have been restatements of CDU views on Federal Republic's relations with East and its general foreign policy by Defense Minister Strauss and on Federal Republic's views on European integration and its position in West by Finance Minister Etzel. Views of Strauss, who advocated policy of "no illusions" and frank recognition that Soviet Union is not now prepared to grant reunification, and of further strengthening of Federal Republic's defenses in European and NATO framework,

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are also reflected in private views of majority of CDU leaders most closely identified with Adenauer, and of nearly all CSU. Stalwarts like Kliesing, Gutenberg, Majonica and Pasner say that enough, if not too much, has already been done to demonstrate West's desire for reunification in peace and freedom and Soviet aggressiveness and rigidity. They say that time has come to return to safe ground and to hold it resolutely. Minority in CDU, typified by Berliners like Grall and Gerner, are actively concerned about avoiding increase and are pushing at least for keeping negotiations going by creating a permanent allied commission with German participation to keep working toward a solution of the German problem. Threat to Berlin continues to cast a shadow and none are any more able now than six months ago to propose truly satisfactory solution involving neither concessions nor war should Soviets block access to city. On this point, thinking, for present is wishful that problem will not present itself. All parties now back up position taken by Berlin Deputies in Foreign Affairs Committee that Western proposals on Berlin have now gone as far as one can go.

Supplementing these CDU views has been some comment in press services. Politische Information, often used by Government for unofficial statements, remarks that Western Powers have gone to limit in proposals on Berlin. Soviets must understand that West will not retreat under threats or force in Berlin and, on resumption negotiations, will should return to total German problem since Berlin problem cannot be satisfactorily solved on any other basis. It is doubtful that Soviets would bring things to point of war over Berlin. We would not consider it fruitful for Western Powers further to seek a summit conference by way of an interim agreement on Berlin...Holding of a summit conference was at best justifiable because it would create an opportunity for direct conversation with Khrushchev. Now, however, Khrushchev in first phase of Conference has shown himself absolutely negative. It was his work that Conference was interrupted after coming to brink of collapse. Under these circumstances, one can hardly expect anything from summit conference which would be deemed to failure if Khrushchev maintained his position. A summit conference which fails is worse than none at all. Article goes on to speak critically of Macmillan's pressure for summit meeting, to praise American reserve on this point. It also notes with satisfaction Lloyd's statement to Commons on resolution in support of Berlin and stresses unity of West and close cooperation during first phase among three Western Powers and with Federal Republic's delegation. Article

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concludes Soviets refuse freedom for people of Zone and it would be unrealistic to expect them to change their mind. ... Soviets not only want to keep what they have but to use it as a basis for further expansion. Detente for which world hopes is still far away but it remains goal of West to keep ways open toward it. In this connection, attention is drawn to proposal of Bundestag for Four-Power Commission for continuing consideration of German problem in which advisors from Bonn and Pankow could play role. However, there is no reason to rush into any changed policy which would involve altering reasonable and fair plan which West has already put on table in Geneva. In a later article, the Politische Informationen repeats praise for West's reasonableness and again warns against new plans saying that West has now done its best but is frustrated by provocative and stubborn continuance of cold war from Moscow.

CDU press services also comment that Geneva Conference really ended on June 9 when Gromyko responded to the West's Berlin proposals with a new ultimatum. Nevertheless, recess is preferable to a breaking-off negotiations since it offers one more chance to get at a solution of German problem. No one was surprised that Soviets showed themselves intransigent and aggressive as they have been through last 14 years. Patience, reasonableness and constructiveness of West in face of this was exemplary.

Then again CDU press service says, "Question troubling everybody is 'How do we proceed from here?' East and West have won time to evaluate situation. West will doubtlessly seek to bring up total German problem again and continue past willingness to reach agreements when these do not go beyond acceptable limits as for example, in essential guarantees of freedom of 2.5 million Berliners. Decision on summit conference may depend on results of second act at Geneva for no progress has been made so far which would justify meeting on highest level."

These articles reflect thinking of CDU Deputies. Majonica, Chairman of CDU Foreign Affairs Working Group, and Rasner, CDU whip, have said their views and those of other CDU/CSU faction leaders are similar.

SPD always strongly favored meeting of Foreign Ministers, and continues to hope it will lead to summit conference, because they believe new approaches offer only hope for progress on German problem. There is developing in SPD an open split on

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point beyond which Federal Republic and its Allies must not go in promoting such a solution. Underlying these differences is conflict between right and left wings of party, personified in the present dispute between Party Vice Chairman Herbert Wehner and Parliamentary whip, Dr. Haerpfer. Executive organs of SPD are meeting now to try to work out an agreed foreign policy line. Effect of internal dispute is to block Party so far from taking clear position on what to do next in Geneva but SPD is united in hoping stalemate will not arise and is consequently advocating, like all other parties, some sort of continuing Allied commission. They also insist that Berlin problem should not be handled in isolation and agree that West has gone as far as it should go on Berlin and should now turn back to broader problems.

SPD press services say neither East nor West has really tried to get at problem of European security based on area of relaxed tensions. Work on this problem, together with broader negotiations on stopping atomic tests could create a basis for solving political problems of divided Europe and divided Germany. It is time that SPD's Deutschland Plan was taken seriously. In another article, SPD press stresses that Berlin problem must not be treated in isolation. It also urges creation of continuing Four-Power body with German participation as a means of keeping total problem alive. It concludes that opportunities for fruitful discussion were not exhausted in first round and that what was neglected there should surely be taken up when Ministers meet again. Again later, SPD reacted to CDU statements like that of Minister Strauss with warnings that Federal Government is about to abandon reunification. Some Social Democrats, like Wehner and Merten, for example, say privately that Adenauer Government has already gone so far in this direction that the situation is irretrievably that Berlin and the Zone will be permanently lost. Fritz Erler, leading SPD spokesman, has urged publicly that discussion turn back to withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Europe. However, his main emphasis was on creation of a permanent Four-Power commission to negotiate on the German question. He said that commitments should be given that as long as this commission continues to meet there should be no threats to Berlin or to present status of Zone and no atomic arms for German forces. His statements have been taken up strongly by Party press and will probably be reflected in the SPD's formal position on Geneva second conference which will be published this week.

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The FDP is beginning to attack the West for alleged sins of omission. In charging West with failing to follow up opportunities to continue discussion of elements of Western package, they are pressing particularly their favorite point, all-German negotiations toward reunification under Allied aegis. This proposal came from FDP originally about a year ago and was implicit in Bundestag resolutions of July 2 and October 1, 1959, for which the FDP takes credit.

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New York Times Report of Erhard Proposals for Economic Measures Against USSR: The West should adopt a tough economic policy toward the Communist world if the Soviet Union refuses a reasonable settlement of present political tensions, Dr. Ludwig Erhard said today.

In an interview, the West German Minister of the Economy said he was prepared to recommend the new policy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if forthcoming negotiations with the Russians failed.

"We should not help fill the gaps in the Communists' economy created by their diversion of manpower and other economic resources to military programs," Dr. Erhard declared.

His idea of attempting to blunt the Communists' military build-up by economic means has been discussed with Dr. Konrad Adenauer and the Chancellor "fully supports it," Dr. Erhard added.

However, he said, the West should find it possible to help the Soviet Union economically if the Communist leaders are prepared to solve outstanding questions between the East and the West.

As for the problem of how to judge the Russians' intentions, Dr. Erhard, speaking as an economist, said this should not be difficult.

"If the Russians are really serious about their Seven-Year Plan, the possibilities of manpower and other resources impose limits on them," the Minister said. "It is not possible to be serious about the Seven-Year Plan as proposed and continue an energetic armaments and military program.

"Therefore, if they are serious, they must want disarmament and be prepared to pay some price for it—at the least a

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Berlin settlement and possibly a general relaxation of tension. If that is the case, we should have in NATO a general re-orientation of trade policy toward the Soviet bloc."

Under those circumstances, Dr. Erhard implied support for more liberal trading arrangements between the capitalist and Communist worlds.

"But if they refuse to cut down drastically on armaments and other military purposes, then our trading policy is much too soft," he said.

"If after the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference or a similar conference later in the year the Russians remained hard and give no evidence of truly wanting a settlement, we should impose stronger controls over trading with the Soviet bloc and eliminate all credit arrangements in order not to build up Soviet military power."

West Germany would not undertake a new tough policy alone, Dr. Erhard said, adding that it should be a joint NATO policy.

He made clear his belief that any proposal for such a policy would run into difficulties within NATO, especially from the British, who recently signed a new trade agreement with the Russians that included the kind of middle-term credits that Dr. Erhard believes to be a mistake.

He did not expect any serious opposition from West German industry if NATO should decide on a new policy. He said only two percent of West Germany's total trade was with the Communist world. And this, he implied, could be diverted elsewhere.

The Western Allies have maintained a coordinating committee in Paris for many years to keep an eye on East-West trade. It is not a part of NATO but works closely with it.

The committee has three lists of goods. One is completely embargoed for sale to the Soviet bloc, the second carries a partial embargo and the third is merely one on which the committee keeps a watch regarding quantity.

The pressure within the committee has been for a relaxation of the embargo lists rather than for a tightening of the kind advocated by Dr. Erhard in the event the Russians prove obdurate in the next few months of negotiations.

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(Secret)West German Position Papers for Resumption of Geneva Conference Sent Department July 11. Presented by von Brentano at Geneva July 12:

I. Tactics at the opening of the Second Phase.

1. There should be no complete abstention from a further treatment of the German theme as a whole, even though practically scarcely any prospect exists for a coming together of the positions of the two sides.

The Federal Government deems it advisable to keep the subject of the German question as a whole in discussion so that: Every agreement on Berlin remains connected with the final goal of the unity of Germany, and so that a possible summit conference also draws this theme into its discussions.

2. In order to give new support to the discussion of the German theme, the presentation of the principles of a peace treaty should be considered.

3. The West should proceed from the point that the conclusion of an acceptable Berlin agreement during the second phase of negotiations is desirable. It should simultaneously, however, use as its point of departure that the achievement of such an agreement in the second phase of negotiations is not absolutely essential, and therefore also does not justify the granting of far reaching new concessions.

4. The Western proposals of the 17th of June contain no further margin for possible concessions in the area of questions concerning Berlin. They go so far towards the limits of the acceptable that they should be withdrawn in the event that the Soviets maintain their own proposals in the second phase of the negotiations.

A further discussion of the Berlin question should equally not be permitted in such a form that the Soviets take the Western proposals of the 17th of June as the obvious point of departure for further negotiations and attempt to bring the West to further, even farther-reaching concessions.

5. The sole area of negotiations on the basis of the text of the 17th of June lies in linking the Berlin proposal there presented with the proposal for the formation of a standing Four-Power group (France, UK, USA, USSR) for discussion of the German question, to which German experts or advisors can be attached.

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6. A corresponding proposal of the Federal Government has to be sure already been rejected by the Soviet Union. The proposal could, nevertheless, be presented in a new form.

The following subjects of discussion and advisement could be proposed: a) Concrete measures for the reestablishment of the unity of Germany, in particular election procedures and an all-German election law. b) Broadening of contacts between both parts of Germany. c) Basic principles of a peace settlement.

7. Without giving ground in the area of Berlin question, the West would thereby carry out still another step of accommodation in the direction of the Soviet proposals of the 17th of June. The mixed German committee foreseen there is in no case acceptable for the Federal Government.

A Four Power commission with the cooperation of German experts or advisors, on the other hand, avoids one of the most dangerous elements of the Soviet proposal. It also does not bring up the difficult question of parity or proportional composition.

8. The proposal could be introduced into the text of the 17th of June in the following formulations:

"3) The Ministers agreed to form a standing committee of representatives of their governments which is to concern itself with the following questions:

a) Broadening of contacts between both parts of Germany; b) Concrete measures for the reunification of Germany; c) Basic principles of a peace settlement.

The committee may at its own discretion draw upon the services of German experts from both parts of Germany in its work."

9. In connection with this proposal, a formulation of the following type could at the utmost be proposed in the question of the time limit:

"4) The ministers agreed that this Committee should at the outset attempt to achieve agreed results in a period of two and one half years. Should unity of views not be achieved in this time, the Foreign Ministers will concern themselves more with the questions mentioned above as well as with the Berlin question. In that case, it will be left to their disposition to find new solutions for all the questions raised."

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II. Tactics for the event of a renewed failure of negotiations.

10. Should the Soviets show no readiness for sufficient compromise in the second phase of negotiations as well, the Western governments will have to decide whether they should nevertheless agree to a summit conference.

11. Should a summit conference be considered unavoidable, it should, according to the view of the Federal Government, be accented only under the following minimum conditions: (2) The Conference of the Foreign Ministers will not be concluded but interrupted once again; it will be resumed again at an appropriate interval after the Summit Conference. (b) It will not be the mission of the Summit Conference to carry out negotiations on an agreement concurring Berlin. This duty continues to be left to the Foreign Ministers in a third negotiation phase of their Conference. (c) The Foreign Ministers came to agreement concerning those topics of negotiation which are to be discussed by the heads of government, the following come into questions: Disarmament; Germany and European security; General measures for relaxation of tensions.

It will be the duty of the Foreign Ministers to negotiate further and in detail the questions discussed by the heads of government.

12. In the event that the Soviet delegation rejects the proposal formulated under number 8 above, the Federal Government is considering a declaration in which it will formulate the basic principles of its future conditions for talks with the representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

The text of such a declaration would in due course be made the subject of consultation with the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

III. The negotiation situation following the conclusion of the first phase of the Conference.

1. The Western peace plan and the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty with two German states (together with establishment of a "free city" of West Berlin) oppose each other without practical prospect of a coming together of the positions of both sides.

2. In the Berlin question, the Western proposals of the 17th of June stand vis-a-vis the Soviet proposals of June 19. The disparity lying between the proposals is considerable. It

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concerns not only questions of formulation and presentation, but also questions of substance.

3. The Soviet proposals are - also in the light of the careful examination which has been carried out in the interim - not acceptable and specifically for the following reasons: (a) The proposed time limit of 1-1/2 years is formulated in such a way that it implies the extinction of the Western rights upon the elapsing of this period; (b) There is no guarantee that a new Foreign Ministers' Conference will be summoned after the time limit elapses. It is still more uncertain whether the Soviets will abstain from unilateral measures to change the *status quo* until such a conference or even until agreement in substance by the Foreign Ministers; (c) The Berlin proposals are linked with the proposal for the formation of an all-German committee, which is unacceptable as such because it (1) requires composition on the basis of parity and (2) is not included in an over-all agreement leading to the reunification of Germany; (d) The Soviet proposals are directed exclusively at West Berlin and thereby breach the principle of a unified four-power status to which the entire city of Berlin is subject.

4. This interpretation of the Soviet proposals already arises from a critical analysis of its text. It is confirmed through the Khrushchev speech held on the 19th of June. The declarations of Soviet leaders which have reached the public during the break in the Conference, in particular those of Khrushchev, offer no basis for the assumption that the Soviet attitude has changed since the end of the first phase of the Conference or that it will change in the second phase. The sole statement whose meaning merits further investigation and confirmation is the remark of Gromyko on the 29th of June that it is incorrect to interpret the Soviet proposals in such a way that following the end of the 18 month period, the rights of the US, Great Britain and West Berlin would automatically cease to exist and the Soviets would thereupon adopt unilateral measures with regard to West Berlin.

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Excerpts from General Maxwell D. Taylor's Appearance on "Meet the Press." MR. SPIVAK: General Taylor, when you were in West Berlin several months ago, this is what you said: "The United States is in nothing more united than in its determination to keep West Berlin free."

Does that in your judgment mean you believe we are prepared to go to war rather than abandon West Berlin?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would say that our country has committed itself publicly without reservation to maintaining the freedom of 2.5 million West Berliners. I don't know precisely what that will mean in terms of our reaction, but I would say we can't compromise with that commitment.

MR. SPIVAK: General, Mr. Harriman quoted Prime Minister Khrushchev as saying this: "Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin with force. That's a bluff."

What do you think we ought to do to convince Mr. Khrushchev that we are not bluffing?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I think we have to act in consistence with that conviction, that any price is worth paying if Berlin is truly in danger.

I would point out, of course, that the generals do not decide those matters. They will be determined by our responsible civilian leadership.

MR. SPIVAK: General, the New York Times recently quoted you as saying before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, "Berlin can be defended, and in my judgment it must be defended," and then in a later story the New York Times quotes you as saying that Berlin itself is militarily untenable.

Now that sounds like a contradiction. Can you tell us if you were accurately quoted, and if so, what that meant?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Yes, I think that is an accurate quote. I would say Berlin is an island 100 miles inside the Iron Curtain and as a specific spot on the earth's surface is indefensible by the means available to it inside the city, but when we look at the resources the United States has and the free world outside of Berlin, I would say we have adequate means to protect our position.

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MR. SPIVAK: One more question, General: As a military commander, knowing Soviet superiority in ground forces, if a war does start in Berlin, would we have any choice but to use our most powerful weapon, the H-bomb?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I would always say we should use just the force necessary to the situation. The last thing we would ever want to do is embark on general atomic war. I think we have many responses short of that. Whether they would be sufficient or not, only history would tell.

MR. WILSON: General Taylor, I wonder if the question with respect to Berlin, in view of the analyses you have made in the past of the state of readiness of the Army, I wonder if the problem there is not whether we should go in in case the crisis really rises, but whether if we go in we can be effective. Have the policies which have been adopted in the past few years made us weaker with respect to a situation like Berlin?

GENERAL TAYLOR: If you mean, Mr. Wilson, to ask the question whether or not we have failed to develop our conventional forces on a par with equal effort as with our general war forces, I would agree with your question.

I would not say, however, that that should make us hesitant as to what we should do in Berlin. I have been in enough crises to know that when the cards are down in a critical time you have to move forward and throw your fears over your shoulder. I would have that attitude toward Berlin.

MR. WILSON: This isn't really the point I am getting at. I think perhaps your point of view on that is widely shared in the government and certainly also in the executive part of the government and also in Congress. But the point I am trying to get at is whether or not the policies which have been adopted put us in a disadvantageous position with respect to doing what we ought to do in Berlin?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Of course that would depend upon the situation posed to us in Berlin. I would agree again with what you are implying in your statement that we are not strong across the board. We have given emphasis in certain areas of cooperation without complete balance elsewhere, and it is to correct that imbalance I think we should direct our effort in the future months and years.

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MR. DRUMMOND: General, what is your attitude toward ending nuclear tests, on the assumption of adequate inspection?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, when you say on the assumption of adequate inspection, you really pose the real problem, don't you? I can hardly conceive of adequate inspection as I know the Soviet reaction.

But even if we had adequate inspection, we would be very unfortunate if we stopped the testing of very small-yield weapons, a point which was made on the program last week.

MR. WILSON: The President has also said, General Taylor, that we will never fight a ground war over Berlin. Why do you need all these forces if that is the case?

GENERAL TAYLOR: Well, I would suspect there may be challenges other than Berlin if we are indeed not going to fight a ground war.

MR. WILSON: Do you agree with him on that point?

GENERAL TAYLOR: I can not predict the future, Mr. Wilson.

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Summary of Article by Lord Montgomery in London Times: The problem of German reunification is so acute that there could be no hope of agreement so long as Western proposals are linked to it. It is time to tell the Germans what everyone knows but fears to say--that reunification is impossible for time being, and until European security problem is settled to the satisfaction of both East and West. Germans must be made to understand this; after all they are basically responsible for present state of affairs. Finally, the big danger facing West is that of getting impatient and settling for some quick solution which sacrifices everything we have struggled for for so long.

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Excerpts from TV Interview of Averell Harriman: Collingwood: Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev is really ready to risk war over Berlin and risk all the progress that the Soviet Union has made in order to force a war over Berlin?

Harriman: No, of course, he isn't. But the danger of the situation is that he may overplay his hand. I found him quite ignorant of many things in the United States and many things of Western position of the ... Western nations, and the unity of the people in America, and also basic unity among our Allies. And, therefore, I have said I thought it was very important for Mr. Khrushchev to meet at the summit with the Western leaders, so that he could hear directly from them, directly from President Eisenhower and the others exactly where they stood.

Miven: Governor, doesn't Khrushchev know that he can't have a summit meeting if he leaves his Berlin threat on the table? Does he think the summit is all set or does he take the idea of Eisenhower at his word when he says there won't be a summit without some progress at Geneva?

Harriman: Well, I don't think he's ready to go to the summit. My impression was he wasn't ready to go to the summit with any commitments. One time he said that President Eisenhower thinks he's going to go to the summit just to persuade me, to do what he, President Eisenhower, wants, why, I won't go. So that he's a bit temperamental on this subject and isn't going to rush to the summit or appear to be over-keen.

Collingwood: Governor, to get back to Berlin a moment, did you find in your talks with Khrushchev any ray of hope that an accommodation might be reached on Berlin that we could live with and permit the summit meeting which we're talking about?

Harriman: Well, I'm not sure that he'll permit much to happen at the Foreign Ministers' meeting. He never did want the Foreign Ministers' meeting and he made it quite plain that Gromyko was only a mouthpiece and wasn't there to negotiate.

Collingwood: What about the summit?

Harriman: Now, therefore, I think that there's some hope at the summit, I believe, because it was my impression -- and this was indirectly what he said -- that he wanted to have a greater acceptance of the East German regime. It would take some commitment, it seemed to me, to Ulbricht to help him. And of course, you know the East German regime is the most dominated by the Soviets, requires as a matter of fact more

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help from the Soviets than any of the other satellites - and I think in some ways it might be of some value to give the East German regime a little more acceptance, a *de facto* acceptance, not recognition in the diplomatic sense, and then perhaps there would be a development in East Germany more along the lines of "oland."

Collingwood: You mean that were the West to give a *de facto* acceptance to the separation of Germany, that something might be worked out on Berlin and that this might redound to our benefit rather than to our ... (inter.) ...

Harriman: Yes, I think that there's an area there, that ... of course, we must ... I told him without any question that we were going to protect the interests of these two million West Berliners that we had taken a commitment to, there was no question about that and he had to recognize it. But he did give me the impression that, because he went so rapidly and said, well, he is quite willing to do that, but the occupation must end, a state of giving some acceptance to the East German regime, that we might come to some sort of an agreement. Perhaps not a permanent one, I think we are in a difficult spot in West Germany, and until there is reunification of the two Germanies.

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(Confidential)

Embassy London Report of British Opinion on Geneva Conference:
There has been no substantial change evident during past few weeks in UK attitudes toward Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting and prospect of summit conference. Adjournment was accepted calmly and persistently optimistic view of possibility of reaching Berlin agreement has been unimpaired either by reports of Harriman interview with Khrushchev or statements of Kozlov in the US. Most recent opportunity for public exposition of views of government or opposition on Foreign Ministers' meeting and on possible summit meeting was afforded by foreign affairs debate in House of Commons on July 8. It is apparent from statements made in debate and from press treatment that efforts of Gromyko to present picture of Soviet reasonableness and willingness to negotiate have achieved considerable success. Foreign Secretary told Commons on July 8 that agreement on Berlin must preserve basic Western position that people of West Berlin must be free to choose their own way of life. He added that this freedom was dependent upon maintenance of necessary free access between Berlin and outside

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world but added, rather ambiguously, "if, however, we can reach a time limit, as I have said frequently during our meetings, that could be a turning point and could open the way to wider agreements which would mean so much for peace and stability in Europe". During this debate the Labor Party "shadow Foreign Secretary" Aneurin Bevan argued that it was very clear Western Foreign Ministers had misunderstood character of Gromyko's proposals on June 19. Bevan said the "time limit" was a good thing since it was always desirable to work according to time framework. He noted Gromyko had a question of time limit with respect to Berlin was rather neither of major importance nor of principle to Soviet Union. Bevan also cited Gromyko's remarks concerning resumption of negotiations at end of specified time limit if all-German committee had not reached agreement. From this Bevan concluded Soviet proposals could not be considered ultimatum.

Bevan expressed the view that the West could concede Soviet demand for parity in all-German committee. He also thought that some reduction of Western forces in Berlin could be accepted by the West since it is not size of forces which is itself protection against military action which might be taken against Berlin. Leader of Labor Party Gaitskill in same debate said with reference to this point that "symbolic reduction" in Western forces in Berlin might be agreed since "a few hundred off the 11,000 would not make much difference."

There has been no change in the basic British view, both Conservative and Labor, that a summit meeting is desirable regardless of what is accomplished by the Foreign Ministers. The Government still regards Foreign Ministers' meeting as a bridge to summit and is not at all insistent that it need be a broad thoroughfare.

Prime Minister in July 8 debate elaborated on connection between Foreign Ministers' meeting and summit by saying that British Government had never expected the Foreign Ministers would be able to solve all questions placed before it. He said he still hoped, however, that the Foreign Ministers would "reduce the matters in dispute into a manageable compass and present them in such a way that the remaining points can be presented and considered by a meeting of heads of governments."

He indicated that perhaps Berlin settlement even on a temporary basis might be finalized only at a summit conference. He suggested that a summit might reach a decision on Berlin and possibly on "some of the other questions from the nuclear

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discussions." Macmillan again expressed view that East-West problems should be tackled progressively in series of summit meetings. Labor Party equally insistent on utility and desirability of a summit conference.

In summary, it appears that at the moment the public is not particularly alarmed about Berlin and that both the Government and opposition believe that Gromyko's statements immediately before and just after recess of the Foreign Ministers' meeting open promising avenue for temporary Berlin solution.

Accent now is on acceptability of temporary solution and no more is expected. There is also expectation that the Foreign Ministers' meeting will arrive at some formula permitting convening of summit conference. The Foreign Office in briefing press correspondents has taken this line and has indicated belief that the Foreign Ministers' meeting may last approximately three weeks before arriving at agreement on a summit conference.

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(Secret)

Secretary Herter's Report of Western Ministers' Discussion at Couve's Dinner for Pella: Von Brentano following general lines of German tactics paper made available Department just prior to my departure urged Western Ministers return to problem of Germany as a whole and disarmament rather than pick up Berlin where we left. Couve objected and I supported him:

Lloyd then raised what he termed defect in our June 16 Berlin proposal which was absence any provision for dealing on continuing basis with problem of Germany as a whole. He asked tentatively what his colleagues would think of embellishing our memorandum with proposed establishment four-power commission with German delegations attached. Couve objected on grounds this would play into Soviet hands by adding to stature of FRG and embarrassing Federal Republic. I disagreed with Couve and urged we consider Lloyd's suggestion seriously.

Pella then took over conversation for prolonged period. He opened with plea for more formal and enduring association of Italy with Conference and its staff work. In this connection he referred to importance of Italy's position in alliance particularly with respect to atomic risks to which it was now exposed. He indicated Italy, while pessimistic over prospects for sufficient present progress to justify summit, was nevertheless anxious one be held. He referred to fragile character Italian public opinion and narrow parliamentary margin in which government operates. He then proposed some new dramatic solution for Berlin and unveiled a proposal that occurring evacuation turn West Berlin over to Federal Republic retaining temporarily their forces in city under invitation from Senat reading his ruling on legality of transfer of sovereignty. He promised to submit detailed memorandum on this proposal and expressed fervent hope opportunity for prolonged consideration of it with his colleagues in days ahead.

None of us commented substantively as hour was growing extremely late.

During course of general conversation prior to Pella's discourse Lloyd described in classically British form essentiality summit irrespective result of this Conference. I agreed with some of his argumentation but pointed out our task was to insure achievement sufficient progress to justify it. Couve, somewhat to my surprise and in contrast pre-conference attitude, agreed we should search for minimum agreement with Soviets which would warrant summit and seek interim solution on Berlin which seemed obvious arrangement to attain this purpose. Von Brentano interjected no objection to this trend of thought at this point.

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Just before break-up Lloyd informed colleagues he had torn up proposed reply to Soviets on Balkan atom free zone prepared by his experts and dictated own draft which would be despatched today (presumably without consultation in MAC).

He said he took more forthcoming position to effect regional zone of character proposed by Soviets made no sense except in larger context global disarmament measures safeguarded by adequate inspection system. Lloyd also said UK had received no assurances from Soviets during recess as some press reports indicated.

We agreed deputies' coordinating group would meet early this morning and Western Foreign Ministers at noon.

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(Secret)

US Delegation Report of Meeting of Western Foreign Ministers:
After agreeing procedure to be followed in today's plenary session following topics which had been raised in coordinating group were discussed by Ministers: (1) German proposal to admit Poles and Czechs to Conference to set stage for German Federal Republic unilateral declaration or possible offer of non-aggression pact to those two countries; (2) German suggestion that Western Powers propose creation of four-power commission, to which German experts could be attached, to study problems of East-West contacts, reunification and peace treaty during interim of temporary agreement on Berlin.

Although US, UK and French Foreign Ministers agreed that idea of German Federal Republic offer on non-aggression pact to Poland and Czechoslovakia was interesting and merited study, they were unanimous in their view that Poles and Czechs should not be admitted to Conference for reasons advanced at the beginning of Conference and which were still valid. Furthermore, they agreed that Geneva Conference was not best forum for such a proposal if eventually made by Federal Republic. In these circumstances Von Brentano said he would not insist on his suggestion but would circulate to Ministers German draft declaration which he hoped they would study.

Von Brentano then urged German point of view as set forth in their working paper (entitled "Western tactics during second phase of Conference" available in Despatchment) that in reconvened Conference Western Foreign Ministers should put primary emphasis on overall German questions and referred to German proposal for four-power commission. Couve described his strong

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objection to proposal first because it created link between Berlin problem and that of Germany as a whole, and secondly because it would create what would in effect be a permanent body which afforded Russians means to interfere in internal affairs of Federal Republic. This would facilitate Soviet objectives of strengthening GDR and weakening German Federal Republic. Thirdly he saw danger in having identical terminal date for interim agreement on Berlin and work of four-power commission. This would provide Soviets with convenient leverage to create crisis and pressure on Berlin problem.

Von Brentano replied that linkage was originally Western and not Soviet idea. The object was to insure that discussions of German question would continue.

Couve contended that Western Powers did not establish link but had said that they would not accept any change in status of Berlin in outside process of reunification. He considered it dangerous now to accept link which made it implicit that status of Berlin would change without reunification.

Secretary observed that Couve's position posed serious problem since he and Lloyd viewed German proposal favorably. Furthermore, he understood Couve had some suggestion as to how Berlin problem and all-German issue could be separated.

Accordingly he proposed that Ministers formulate their views over night and meet July 14 at 10:30 A.M. in effort to resolve issue. This was agreed.

Agreement was reached to seek private meeting July 14 at plenary today. General approval was also expressed of Lloyd's suggestion that probe of Groryko's position (with particular reference to his June 28 statement re status Allied rights at expiry any period agreed for temporary Berlin agreement) could be conducted without accepting Soviet proposal of June 19 as basis for discussion by comparing subject by subject its points common with those of Western proposal of June 16.

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US Mission Berlin Report of Letter and Memo Sent by Brandt to Von Brentano: Office of governing Mayor distributed today in confidence to liaison officers of three Allies text of short letter with lengthy attached memorandum addressed past week end by Mayor to Foreign Minister Von Brentano. Summary translations follow:

Letter: Letter states that enclosure contains Senat's position on Western proposals of June 16 and observations on relationship of Berlin to Federal Republic. Von Brentano requested to forward memorandum to Western delegation as opinion of Berlin Senat, in case there were no objections to formulation (*Fassung*).

Enclosure: (1) Position on Western proposals of 16 June: Senat is of opinion that no proposal should be submitted to the Soviets which limits freedom of West Berlin population to determine its own form of government, attachment to free Germany, or social and economic life. Western proposals represent outer limits of what can be regarded as bearable. Any yielding to Soviet pressure for further concessions by West would go beyond limits. West is now fighting in Berlin question with back to wall. A Berlin deputy has even used expression that we are fighting with back to precipice. Situation not only prohibits any further yielding but demands sharp clarification of certain passages of Western proposals when further considered in second phase Foreign Ministers' Conference. Specifically:

A. Fixing strength of troops stationed in West Berlin: Senat is gratified that Western June 16 formulation contains no binding obligation to limit or reduce troop strength in Berlin but that West Powers alone decide on this. Protective character of troops requires a number having more than "symbolic" meaning. In judging this point Senat assumes that chosen formulation excludes a treaty undertaking concerning troop strength in West Berlin and control over troop strength by Soviets in any form. Senat sees no objection to entering treaty obligation on question of equipping Berlin occupation troops with conventional weapons only.

B. Prevention of certain activity both parts of Berlin: Hard to imagine how measures implementing Point 2 of June 16 proposals could be compatible with basic rights and basic freedoms. Same conception of basic rights and basic freedoms would have to be applied in both parts of Berlin in order to judge what kinds of activity in future should be allowed or prevented. Very difficulty to find common standard of what disturbs public

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order both parts of Berlin, what seriously affects rights and interest of others, or what amounts to interference in internal affairs of others. Measures to eliminate such activities must, as Western proposal makes clear, be based on principle of reciprocity. That means: (a) Each side will be obligated in that part of Berlin under its jurisdiction to forbid activities that are defined as punishable in both parts of Germany and that are punished in comparable manner; (b) Obligation of one side to take repressive measures presumes that the actions to be forbidden, which originate in its part of Germany and have effect in other part, are already forbidden in corresponding manner also in other part of Germany, and that guarantee exists that they will be forbidden in future; (c) To facilitate execution of proposed settlement it is recommended that disagreements arising in connection with application of above principles be submitted for adjustment to commission proposed in Point 1-A (sic. should be 1-B) of June 16 proposals.

Point 2 of West proposals is so far reaching and formulated in such general terms that doubts exist whether it could be carried out at all. Soviet Union and so-called GDR could exploit terms of agreement in this field to claim that factual criticisms of conditions in Soviet Zone, in Soviet Union and in other totalitarian states affect rights or amount to interference. How to eliminate the conflict, undoubtedly existing here, with the right of freedom of expression must still be clarified. Virtually insoluble difficulties will arise in executing agreement. A suitable agreement could never cover all doubtful and borderline questions so that there would be source of continual differences of opinion and controversies.

C. Access to West Berlin: Senat has objections to formulation that traffic "continue to be (auch weiterhin) free and unrestricted" and that procedures in effect in April 1949 shall be "further applied (weiterhin Anwendung finden)." In discussing this proposal with Soviet delegation words "auch weiterhin" and "weiterhin" should be deleted since traffic has not in past been completely free and unrestricted. Question of traffic connections between West Berlin and Federal Republic is not only especially difficult but concerns very life of city. Agreement on Point 1-B should therefore be tightened up with goal of removing gaps, clearing up points of disagreement, and facilitating access as well as guaranteeing right of access. In order to normalize situation traffic would have to be normalized in form of agreement making it possible to accommodate justified interests of all participants.

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D. Adjustment of disagreements by commission of four: Proposed four power committee should not only be empowered to settle disagreements on access questions; one could also empower it to set up working parties for certain limited tasks (e.g. preparation of traffic agreement).

(2) Remarks on relations of West Berlin to Federal Republic: In case Soviet delegation attacks fact that West Berlin belongs to Federal Republic, Senat suggests Allied side give comprehensive answer along following lines setting forth development that led to integration of West Berlin in Federal Republic.

In 1948 economic conditions in Germany unbearable and requisite for survival was creation of new currency. After Western Powers realized that Soviets not willing to agree to unified currency they introduced deutschmark for Western Zone and Soviets set up own currency reform, thus splitting Germany into two economic regions. These measures made situation in Berlin particularly difficult. Soviet Commandant attempted to force East currency on greater Berlin. This was nothing more than an attempt to bring all Berlin under Soviet influence. With consent of freely elected Berlin Government, Western Powers introduced West deutschmark on grounds of their supreme authority in West sectors. Soviets attempted to bring West sectors under their domination through blockade which met with airlift by Western Powers. By introducing unified currency in Western Zones of Germany and West sectors of Berlin, a unified currency and economic region was created. From it an administrative and political unity had to develop as a consequence.

In 1949 Federal Republic created with proclamation of basic law. Berlin is designated as Land Federal Republic in Article 23 of basic law. Adoption of this provision was in accordance with political will of population of Berlin and its constitutional bodies which insisted on having as close connection with Federal Republic as possible.

In framework of their supreme authority three Western Powers made allowance for German desires for close connection of West Berlin to Federal Republic. Western Powers, however, accepted this provision of basic law of Federal Republic and of 1950 Berlin constitution with reservations that are still valid. Besides, three Western Powers emphasized in 1954 treaty with Federal Republic their responsibility regarding relations of West Berlin to Federal Republic. In Berlin declaration of 1955 Western Powers established Kommandatura as supreme authority.

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In course of years connection of West Berlin to Federal Republic strengthened without prejudice supreme authority and control of Western Powers practically all federal laws accepted in West Berlin under a special procedure. West Berlin is represented by Federal Republic in international law. Federal offices have been established in West Berlin with consent of Western Powers. In contrast to peaceful and orderly integration of West Berlin in Federal Republic, inclusion of Soviet sector of Berlin into so-called GDR accomplished under other conditions (which omit details).

It is clear in every case that in West Berlin nothing has happened in contradiction supreme authority of three Western Powers and which could prejudice their rights and responsibilities in Berlin. Process of political and economic integration of West Berlin into free Germany can no longer be made retroactive without deep convulsions in political, social and economic life of Berlin with consequent effects on rest of Germany and on European development. Western Powers will surely not lend a hand to this.

July
14
(Confidential)

Embassy London Report of British Foreign Office Concerning Alleged USSR Assurances to UK: Article by Thomas Ronan which appeared in July 12 New York Times states that UK had received assurances from Soviet Government that Western rights in West Berlin would remain intact during period of an interim agreement on Berlin. According to Foreign Office, story was based on report of conversation between UK Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Patrick Feilly, and Kuznetsov July 9. Foreign Office says Ronan has sensationalized report of this conversation since really nothing new in what Kuznetsov told Feilly. Furthermore, Ronan's statement that UK considers possible economic split of Western Europe as more pressing danger than Soviet threat is completely without foundation.

Reilly report to Foreign Office, which was shown to Embassy officer, said that Kuznetsov had engaged in some vigorous "wedge-driving" by praising British attitude toward Geneva negotiations and at same time sharply criticizing UK and Federal Republic. Reilly said he had replied by stressing Western unity and assuring Kuznetsov that it would be mistake for Soviet Government to believe otherwise. Kuznetsov said Soviet proposals of June 19 offered good basis for agreement and he added without elaboration that during period of interim agreement Western rights would be maintained.

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(Secret)

US Delegation Report of Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting:
They agreed not to pursue Gromyko regarding private meeting but to have plenary sessions tomorrow and Thursday. Couve, who is having Gromyko to lunch on Friday, offered to convert luncheon into private session if developments should make this desirable.

Couve to make principal speech at tomorrow's plenary session directed at questioning Gromyko on Soviet all-German committee proposal, analysis of Gromyko's July 13 speech and emphasis on Western peace plan.

Coordinating group will meet tomorrow morning. Large part of discussion turned around Couve's concern that if West discussed Berlin question and all-German committee proposal together as Gromyko wishes, we should be negotiating both issues under Berlin threat and run risk of having to make concessions on both counts. In his view Russians should be told that West prepared to discuss both questions, but not together, and that if Berlin question resolved then discussion of all-German committee could be taken up. He thought that if West wanted to go to summit meeting, having removed Berlin threat, then it must accept time limit on interim Berlin arrangements. There was, however, no reason and it would be highly dangerous to accept concurrent time limit in respect to broader German questions which would then be brought as well under Berlin threat. This would provide Russians with convenient lever with which to interfere in Western Germany. Although Ministers reached no definitive decision on this question of tactics which will be dealt with further, discussion revealed large measure of agreement with Couve's analysis.

At outset of meeting at Lloyd's suggestion British Ambassador Pelly reported on his talk in Moscow with Kuznetsov, which was described in today's New York Times. He said that although Kuznetsov's remarks had not seemed to him to contain anything new, he had filled in his French and German colleagues and would have informed Thompson, if time had permitted.

Brentano was visibly upset at leaks in French press of German working paper and report that full text would appear in tomorrow's New York Times. He had been queried by Adenauer in this connection. He requested his colleagues to return the copies that had been provided him so he could assert the paper did not exist and made impassioned plea for greater security saying he was conducting investigation in his own delegation.

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(Unclassified)

Excerpts from President Eisenhower's News Conference: Robert J. Donovan of the New York Herald Tribune - Mr. President, have you any comment on the new talks at Geneva - any comment on the resumed talks at Geneva?

A. - Well, no; they seem to be off to a very slow start. At the first session, when it was suggested that they resume these private talks, which seem to be more productive than the plenary talks, Mr. Gromyko insisted that the Germans come into this particular type of meeting. I believe the final agreement was - they'd have to go back to plenary sessions, and I believe it's on, I think it's Friday, maybe it's Thursday, the next one. The 15th, wasn't it? [Conferred with Mr. McNamara]

A. - I think it is. But in any event, there doesn't seem to be any bright, hopeful rift in the clouds at the moment, but we are still plugging away.

Henry M. Taylor of Springfield Evening Republican - Mr. President, in this Geneva tangle at the present time there has been some discussion of the possibility of leaving the Berlin issue unsolved without any further easement on it, if the Soviets won't permit it, to go forward to a summit conference on other issues entirely. I wonder if you could give us your view on that?

A. - Well, I don't know exactly what you mean. Do you mean that you would go to a summit conference under a - under an ultimatum of time, or under a statement that we were going to be thrown out at a particular time, whether it's one year, two years or three years? Is that - I don't know exactly what you mean.

Q. - Well, this presupposes...

A. - There has to be - in other words, let me answer it this way: There has to be some clear understanding of our rights and our responsibilities before you can go ahead and negotiate.

Now, I am not adverse, along with the other, my associates or this Government's associates, in negotiating about ultimate fate of Germany, Berlin and all the rest of it, but in the meantime there has got to be clear recognition of our rights and responsibilities.

Frank Bourgholtzer of ABC News - Can you tell us whether you have given Secretary Herter sufficient authority to commit you to a summit conference or can he only advise you for a final decision on your part?

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A. - Secretary Herter and I are completely in agreement with all the rest of the Government as far as I know, almost unanimously with the American people, that we are not going to surrender our rights or to make a retreat that could be clear evidence of weakness on our resolution, and weakness in the West.

Now, if that matter is settled clearly, we have that kind of progress, why then Secretary Herter has the authority to make any kind of a plan, subject of course to final approval as to detail, but he knows that he can go ahead from there and negotiate.

John Scali of the Associated Press - Mr. President, over the week-end Averell Harriman suggested that it might be wise to give some form of diplomatic recognition to East Germany. What do you think of such an idea?

A. - Well, I don't know how you can give some form of diplomatic recognition as of now. We certainly had no such thought in our heads.

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Ambassador Bruce Relays McCloy's Report of Talk with Adenauer: Chancellor's chief concern seemed possibility Western disunity due to appeasing tactics of British. Said he liked Lloyd and distrusted Macmillan. He had confidence in Secretary Herter, but felt there were elements in the US too amenable to British influence.

There should be a meeting of Western chiefs of state before any summit meeting.

At summit meeting, the chief topic for discussion should be disarmament.

He thinks US should alter attitude toward France, which under De Gaulle leadership has again become strong power. US does not seem to realize extent of recent favorable changes in France. He emphasized great importance he attaches to good Franco-German relations which are unpalatable to British, who still cling to anachronistic policy of balance of power on continent through division.

His deep suspicion of British was recurrent theme. McCloy told Chancellor he did not share his estimate of Macmillan, who was strong and capable man. Moreover, when chips were down, British are best of Allies, etc. McCloy did not know if his defense of British had made impression. He advised Adenauer to have personal talk with Macmillan. Chancellor said he intended to do so at suitable time.

McCloy did not mention any discussion of Geneva proceedings.

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(Confidential)

Ambassador Whitney's Report of British Conservative Opinion on Summit Conference: At lunch with me today a number of representative and influential Conservative members of Commons were unanimous in view public opinion in UK expected summit meeting to be held although at same time they thought public had little hope of summit meeting producing results. If meeting failed to materialize the blame would be placed primarily on the US. Resentment would also be directed against Conservative Party and would hurt Party's chances in forthcoming general election.

From point of view prospects Conservative Party in general election these MP's believed ideal situation would be for agreement to be reached to hold summit conference in November and for Macmillan government to go to country in general

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election in October. If on other hand summit meeting held before general election and failed to produce an agreement, or if question of summit meeting still open at time of election, they did not believe either would adversely affect Conservative prospects. Macmillan, in any case, would get credit for having made or continuing to make effort.

From this exchange I derived strong impression that Conservatives will insist on summit meeting, regardless of possible outcome, primarily for domestic political reasons.

July
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(Secret)

US Delegation Report of Western Ministers' Discussion: The four Western Foreign Ministers met this morning to discuss tactics for today's luncheon-meeting with Gromyko. It was agreed to endeavor to direct conversation to Western June 16 paper, but not to bring up proposal for four power commission. Lloyd said he would like to pick up his statement of yesterday comparing Western and Soviet positions. Couve stressed the importance of concentrating on principal issues which he listed as time limit, situation at end of period and all-German committee in order to avoid appearance of the West blocking an agreement almost achieved. In discussion of relative importance of several issues, the Secretary pointed out that question of access, although it might seem less important an issue in interim agreement than it would be if separate German peace treaty were signed, was in fact particularly important on civil side. In fact it offered only opportunity we might have to improve Berlin situation from our point of view.

Groew reconfirmed Bonn's unwillingness to agree to any arrangement which called for direct discussion between East and West Germans but reaffirmed Bonn's support of proposal for four power commission. Couve, however, demonstrated reluctance to accept even this formula and took up willingly Lloyd's idea that thought should be given to a possible formula for keeping present conference in being in some form as alternative to four power commission proposal. Lloyd undertook to prepare something along this line, and it was agreed that four power commission proposal would not be raised with Gromyko until Ministers reached a decision concerning possible alternatives.

Baraduc (French press officer) reported that Kharlamov (Soviet press officer) had asked him at what time he should appear at French residence following luncheon in accordance with past

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practice at private meetings. It was noted that this revealed Gromyko's decision that today's luncheon would in effect mark resumption of private meetings.

Couve and Groew reported that correspondents were talking about a new US draft. It was agreed to tell press that there were many papers and to deny that any specific paper, US or otherwise, was subject of particular attention of Ministers.

July
18
(Secret)

Reformulated Statement of Federal Republic's Policy at Geneva: It is the unanimous view of the Governments of the Western Powers and the Federal Republic that the solution of the Berlin problem cannot be separated from that of the German problem. That is why the Berlin problem was included in the Western peace plan. The spokesman of the Western Powers, Mr. Herter, United States Secretary of State, pointed out when presenting the Western peace plan that, in dealing with the present Berlin crisis, examination of the question of German reunification could not be excluded. The Berlin question, he said, was part of the main German problem, viz., the partition of Germany. As soon as a solution had been found to this main problem, the Berlin problem would disappear, and the city of Berlin would once again resume her rightful position as Germany's capital.

2) This political and logical interrelation between Berlin with the German problem and the Berlin problem exists whenever it is the goal of the negotiations to change the unsatisfactory status of both Berlin and Germany.

3) The statement, or rather the reverse, that the West was prepared during the first phase of the Conference, contrary to the original plan, to dissolve the package and treat the Berlin question in isolation, is objectively unjustified. The Soviet Union having refused even to discuss the Western peace plan, and the Soviet Foreign Minister having stated that to talk of the German question at the Conference would simply be waste of time, it was both logical and necessary, in the face of the ultimate threats contained in the Soviet Note of 27 November 1958, to take up the Berlin problem.

This was not done with a view to bringing about a change, i.e., an improvement, in the status of the city of Berlin, but in order to assure its present status and thus to create the indispensable prerequisite for the continuation of the negotiations, whether at the Conference of Foreign Ministers or at a later Summit Conference.

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4) It seems necessary in this second phase of the Geneva Conference to call attention to the fact that the Western peace plan continues to be the basis upon which the Western Governments are prepared to negotiate on the German problem and its pertinent questions which include the Berlin problem.

5) This does not exclude the possibility of a renewed attempt by the West to bring about a settlement for Berlin which would mean no change in the status of Berlin but the maintenance of its present status. It must be said that the Conference will be doomed to failure if no understanding can be reached on this point. Whether a summit meeting is possible without such an understanding would appear at least questionable, since any further negotiations would be conducted under the pressure of the Soviet Russian threats of 27 November.

6) The Western proposal of 17 June should continue to be the basis for dealing with the Berlin question. It is opposed by the Russian proposal. It is true that both proposals show certain points of contact. In essential points, however, they deviate:

a) the Western proposal proceeds from a time-limit until reunification; the Soviet proposal from a specific time-limit.

b) the Western proposal provides for the constitution of a Four-Power Commission whose specific task it would be to settle questions of doubt arising from the application of the Berlin statute; the Russian proposal speaks of the formation of a so-called all-German committee to be composed of representatives from the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic on a basis of parity and to be assigned the task of dealing with the all-German problem.

7) These differences go to show that one cannot take these two contradictory proposals the basis for further negotiations. It hardly seems feasible to change the Western proposal of 17 June, or, to be more exact, to modify it to meet Soviet demands.

On the one hand, this applies to the question of the time-limit. It can be assumed that no time-limit is politically acceptable unless it is assured at the same time that the existing status will continue to be valid upon the expiry of the limit; that means that no time-limit can be accepted as long as explicitly or by implication it can be inferred from it that upon the expiry of the time-limit the original right of the Western Allies to remain in Berlin and to ensure the freedom of that city will terminate.

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The speech made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, on 28 June 1959 gives no clear indication of Soviet intention. Although he stresses the fact that the Soviet Union has proposed new negotiations upon the expiry of the time-limit fixed in an agreement, his speech does not tend to show that such new negotiations would be conducted on the same basis as the present negotiations, i.e., that the Western Allies would be able to base themselves upon the right of occupation at such negotiations. The statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister at the meeting held on 13 July were still more reserved, and consequently still less clear.

But even the two proposals on the future treatment of the German problem cancel each other out. The Four-Power Commission for Berlin proposed by the West is completely fundamentally different from the all-German Committee proposed by the Soviet Union.

8) Any Western proposal on Berlin must take these considerations into account. Whether there would be any purpose in calling in the United Nations in any respect requires careful examination.

Under no circumstances should the calling of an organ or a representative of the United Nations be allowed

a) to affect the original rights of the Western Allies in Berlin,
b) to bring about even a partial transfer of such rights to an organ of the United Nations, or
c) to invest such an organ with the competence to interpret authentically the Allied rights or to qualify them by way of arbitration.

9) From the consideration that the connection between the German question and the Berlin question is, in the Western peace plan, rightfully based upon the idea that the status of Germany and Berlin should be changed within the scope of the policy of reunification, arises the conclusion that any special settlement pertaining to Berlin and intended merely to maintain its present status is not related to the German problem as a whole, and therefore should not be tied to that problem.

10) This does not exclude the consideration whether, independently of the confirmation of the legal situation of Berlin, it should not be attempted to renew talks on the all-German problem, or to keep them going. This idea could be served

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by the constitution of a Four-Power Commission as suggested in the German notes of 17 November 1958 and 5 January 1959.

11) A Four-Power commission of this kind has nothing in common with an all-German committee. The institution of the all-German committee as provided in the peace plan is something essentially different. In that plan such a committee, not composed on the basis of parity, was to be fitted into a precisely determined process of development. The committee was given concrete tasks. Its activities and responsibilities were precisely defined and subject to a time-limit.

The all-German committee proposed by the Soviet Union would not be a means to a given political end, but an end in itself. It would confirm the Russian thesis that there are two sovereign German States facing each other, which have to solve the German problem in their own competence. An all-German committee of this kind would constitute the first step on the road to recognition of the "German Democratic Republic", and would not promote reunification in freedom, but would finally render it impossible. Any talks on reunification with the functionaries is feasible only if the prerequisites of the Soviet Union are accepted, i.e., if one is prepared to implement reunification on the basis of communism.

12) This difference between a Four-Power commission and the all-German committee must be made quite clear. The Four-Power commission would confirm the responsibility of the Four Powers for solving the German problem. Talks would be conducted in this Four-Power commission. It can be left to the commission to call upon German experts in an advisory capacity. Such German advisors, however, have no independent task, but are simply to help achieve and facilitate the goal and the task of the Four-Power commission.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, in the statement that he made on 10 June, modified his proposal that an all-German committee be constituted as follows:

Should this proposal appear unacceptable to either of the German States, then the Four Powers could recommend the Governments of the two German States to choose a form of cooperation acceptable to them with a view to solving the problems referred to.

The proposal to constitute a Four-Power commission could be based upon that comment. On the face of it this would appear to some extent to be a concession to the Soviet Union. It is

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a concession without danger and acceptable so long as the calling in of German advisors remains the prerogative of the Four-Power commission and so long as such German advisors do not constitute an independent organ, but can merely be called upon as auxiliary personnel of the Four-Power commission.

13) Should it appear useful in the course of the Geneva negotiations to broach this idea in connection with the Berlin question, it must be made perfectly clear that this Four-Power commission has absolutely nothing in common with the all-German committee proposed by the Soviet Union.

14) The task of this Four-Power commission would be:

1) to initiate concrete measures conducive to re-establishing the unity of Germany, i.e., especially to discuss and decide upon an electoral law and electoral procedure, to ensure the implementation of free elections in Germany;

2) to contribute to broadening the contacts between the two separated parts of Germany, i.e., for instance, to establish and to ensure freedom of movement, the free exchange of goods and commodities, and the right of freedom of speech in all parts of Germany;

3) furthermore this commission could concern itself with the elaboration of principles for a peace treaty, subject to such a treaty being negotiated and concluded with a freely elected all-German government.

The Western members of this Four-Power commission would in all probability, in making their proposals and decisions, be guided mainly by the commonly approved Western peace plan.

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July
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(Confidential)

Summary of Mayor Brandt's Press Conference: At press conference on afternoon of July 20, Brandt discussed in general terms closed meeting of Senat June 18 which reviewed Berlin situation and concluded that conditions in West Berlin better than could have been anticipated last December. Meeting also agreed that Berlin question now understood abroad more fully and sympathetically than ever before.

Brandt said participants at Senat meeting reaffirmed their basic policies, i.e.:

- 1) Right of Berliners to decide their own way of life must be preserved;
- 2) Rights and responsibilities of Allied powers must be maintained undiminished in the city;
- 3) Right of free access must be maintained;
- 4) Integration of West Berlin into Federal Republic under supreme authority of Allied powers must not be disturbed.

Regarding the possible UN involvement in certain activities in Berlin, Brandt reiterated that such involvement should be purely supplementary to the role of Four Powers.

Regarding point 4 above, which he described as growth of Berlin into organism of Federal Republic, he said this should not become matter of dispute between Germans and allies, or between Berlin and Bonn. Berlin's constitutional relations re Federal Republic, he maintained, cannot be questioned, even though under international law occupation rights are supreme. Allies retain supreme authority and answerability for Berlin and Berlin wants it this way. Growth relationship of Berlin with Federal Republic has taken place with knowledge and in accordance with desires of Allied powers.

Referring to "inter-administrative commission" Brandt said Commission should handle questions on a "practical" plane, such as interzonal trade agreements, travel, cultural matters, etc., under aegis of four powers. Brandt said he is, however, against transferring to Germans connected with this Commission any major problems such as level of foreign troops. He stressed he would not want accord to the Soviet Zone regime recognition to which it not entitled or anything that would deepen the division of Germany. He added that situation must be avoided which might lead world to say "Germans have exhausted possibilities of reaching understanding and book is closed on any hope of reunification."

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Brandt smoothed over alleged friction between Berlin and Bonn regarding consultation on Geneva and remarked that he agrees with Federal Republic there is only one German foreign policy.

Berlin would have complained bitterly, Brandt said, if Presidential election held here. He said that any suggestion the Mayor of Berlin had not kept the Bundestag President informed about developments, including Allied viewpoints, was completely false. He added that he meant Allied viewpoints and not objections, since there were no objections. Referring to Federal Republic party politics, Brandt said any attempt to play us off against the Bundestag President is doomed to failure.

In question-answer period, Brandt sidestepped attempts to make him compare SPD "Germany plan" with Senat-backed "inter-administrative commission."

He handled question re his earlier statement that Berlin should not be subject of negotiations while ultimatum in force by pointing out that May 27 has passed.

Asked about alleged Brentano protest that Brandt had failed to pass on view of McCloy during latter's recent visit, Brandt countered that if Brentano did make complaint it was on basis of false information, as he (Brandt) would have passed on any information of interest.

In reply to several questions on "inter-administrative commission," Brandt said that idea was expansion of June 17 proposals of Western Foreign Ministers.

Brandt answered question re Allied view on constitutional relationship of Berlin to Federal Republic by stating that notwithstanding Allied supreme authority in Berlin, constitutional issue is one for the Germans to decide.

Asked if he still held view expressed at beginning of Geneva Conference that it should be "de-Berlinized," Brandt said evasively this would depend on future developments.

Brandt replied to question concerning West's efforts to obtain formal Soviet recognition of Allied rights in Berlin by indicating that Berliners less interested in formal Soviet recognition than in West continuing to hold and exercise these rights in fact. Said he had no knowledge of new West proposals.

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into Berlin and that the jamming of Western radar could make a mass airlift operation very difficult. The President's view is that a new blockade would be much tougher to crack than the one 10 years ago, he feels the allies could not supply the Berlin with enough of the raw materials which its economy needs. He also vice president said conditions forthcoming would be similar, he will carry no important new messages to the Berlin, nor will he be empowered by the President to negotiate east-west differences.

Eisenhower feels the United States could be represented by no more capable men than Nixon, who leaves tomorrow for Moscow. And the President also believes that Khrushchev, in talks with Nixon, may make some proposal of substance regarding east-west differences. If that should happen Nixon has been instructed to cable Eisenhower a detailed report on how he should react. Eisenhower's pessimism regarding the summit meeting has been increasing since the Soviet ministers resumed talks in Geneva on July 12. It can be stated authoritatively that on the basis of reports the President received from Secretary of State Christian A. Porter as late as yesterday, Eisenhower concluded that the Soviets were being tougher than ever about Berlin.

that the Soviets were coming to Berlin.
Lindbergh was aware of speculation that at the last minute the Russians might make dramatic concessions which would open the way to a summit conference. But the President has received no evidence to support such speculation. In my own view that the Soviets likely have given in to some extent on Berlin, is almost impossible to tell. It survives the war and does not exist now. The President is known to be quite close to Lord Halifax. The Berlin officials are also very close to Mr. Tolpin. The Berlin officials are also very close to Mr. Tolpin. The Berlin officials are also very close to Mr. Tolpin. The Berlin officials are also very close to Mr. Tolpin.

July
27

Secret

US el Geneva Report of Cowie de Murville's comments on
a possible eastern summit: when secretary gen Cowie
and Alphand this morning, he queried Cowie's latter's
views on possible desirability of eastern summit
meeting in event present Geneva conference breaks up
or adjourns without positive results.

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Couve thought such meeting might be desirable but suggested that it should not be held until the 1967 Geneva adjournment. He felt it might be possible to hold Western summit meeting just prior to termination of UN Conference, September 12, if this would fit in with President's schedule and termination of 1967 Congressional session.

Couve added that meeting of senior chiefs of the Council could be held in Paris and that this would be particularly useful since it would be a place of meeting for talks between President de Gaulle and the British Prime Minister. He believed that the British Prime Minister would be willing to do this.

July
22

(Confidential)

US mission Berlin a row of the Berlin street is
President Eisenhower's "back room" conversation
Important Berlin newspaper the "Berliner Zeitung" has
two-deck banner headline "The Berliners fear
new blockade Berlin". In the bold-face text
directly beneath headline, paragraph that it titled
"sensational report from Washington in which the
CIA (central intelligence agency) in AF quoted unnamed
"high-ranking sources" to effect President's possible action
over Geneva as result of secret after reports that
expects new blockade of Berlin.

[illegible]

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(Unclassified)

Excerpts from President Eisenhower's Press Conference: Marvin L. Arrowsmith of the Associated Press - In Warsaw yesterday Premier Khrushchev professed to be puzzled about why Vice President Nixon is going to Russia and he apparently linked this puzzlement with criticism of your proclamation on the captive nations. Do you see this attitude as a sort of strike against the Nixon visit even before it starts?

A. - Well, no. I wouldn't think of it in that way. The Nixon visit was of course proposed quite a while back, and it's really an exchange of visits between Mr. (Frol R.) Kozlov (Soviet Deputy Premier) and Mr. Nixon. It's a goodwill gesture and we wanted to have a prominent American to officiate at the opening of our exhibit.

Now, as far as the resolution about the captive nations, this was a resolution by the Congress, asked me to issue a proclamation, which I did; and asked the United States to observe ceremonies, conduct ceremonies in memory of the plight of such people.

But I don't think there is any specific relationship between the two things.

Merriman Smith of United Press International - Mr. President, in the same connection, sir, what do you think, quite aside from the Nixon visit, of the proposition of the Russians through Pravda, in a three-column article this morning, and through statements by Khrushchev literally criticizing the proclamation by you of a week of prayer for the captive people? What do you think of their basic criticism of you for proclaiming a week of prayer?

A. - Well, of course they don't admit there are any captive nations. They have their own propaganda. They present a picture to their own peoples, including the world, so far as they can, that we think, that we know is distorted and untrue.

Now, this to me, to our way of thinking, is quite important not only because it is a matter of simple justice and human concern for all these people, but when you come down to it this country is made up of a great many of those people. We have relatives and people of the ethnic derivation of all those captive nations and it becomes sort of a personal thing with us, and would be very, almost unusual for us to be - to be silent all the time and just acquiesce presumably in their right to express themselves in the form of their government.

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Ray L. Scherer of ABC News - Do you see any danger that continued stalemate at Geneva might bring about an erosion in the Western position, in the effort to get something settled?

A. - Well, once in a while you see such hints, because there is implied that there is a weakening of the strength of will of our delegation.

Well, knowing Mr. Harker and some of the others, I'm quite certain, on his part, at least, that this is not taking place, and I'm confident with respect to the others and the others, so that while these things are very wearing, and certainly physically wearing as well as mentally, intellectually, I think there need be no fear that they are standing steadily on principle.

But I do insist always, we are ready, they are ready, and to take any negotiation on any suggestion or any offer that, recognizing our basic rights as the starting point, still offer some promise to ensure what we call world peace.

Michael J. O'Neill of the New York Daily News - Mr. President, do you feel that the time has come when the West should bring off the negotiations at Geneva?

A. - Well, that's something that has to be determined, of course, by, mostly by people on the spot. Now, in some of the daily telegrams and conversations with State, there are all sorts of things come up, and you never know when another proposal, with a slightly different cast or character, is proposed.

Now, what I say again is, we, I don't think that that is so terribly important, the exact time of when these things have to cease, because of finally patently failure to progress. But I do say we do not want to weaken the very basic part, purpose of our stand.

David P. Gentner of the Herald Newsman - Mr. President, would you tell us at least one question you would like Vice President Nixon to ask an answer to from Premier Khrushchev?

A. - Well now, we should be careful to understand one thing about the Vice Presidential position in this Government of ours. He has a position of his own. He is not a subordinate of the President, and he is not a part of the diplomatic processes and machinery of this country. He cannot be sent out on a special mission except as a - as he agrees to act as a special agent of the President.

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by West's proposing UN control of traffic to Berlin. This would be consistent with Senat contention that any UN involvement should be additional to, and not supplant, allied rights and responsibilities. Any UN control should be exercised by UN's own officials rather than by representatives of other countries.

Amrehn stressed importance of avoiding unclear formulations in any possible agreement, citing as example that should West agree to accept GDR personnel as agents in "control" of access, "control" must be clearly defined as it has not been so far.

Amrehn confirmed that Senat paper on proposals for improvement in access field under preparation. Since proposals technical in nature and therefore not appropriate for discussion on Foreign Minister level, they will not be forwarded to conference. Discussions on proposals will continue with Federal Republic representatives and paper will be readied for possible future need. Amrehn also touched on relationship of Berlin to Federal Republic. Senat is of opinion that integration of Berlin into Federal Republic must continue in the future, but main problem presently is that measures of integration of Berlin already achieved be maintained. Small Senat committee will begin discussions in fall on problem of strengthening Berlin-Federal Republic relations. Mayor Amrehn also remarked that Berlin population remains calm and trusts fully in its own moral force and in protection of allied authorities.

In closing, Amrehn stressed again Senat's hopes that policy of November-December will be continued and that West will remain as firm and strong as possible.

July
24
(Secret)

Embassy London Report of Foreign Office Views: Recent discussions between Embassy and Foreign Office officials mentioned below presumably illustrative of extent to which views on present Geneva talks and possible summit meeting vary as between senior working level officials involved:

Deputy Under-Secretary Patrick Dean commented on July 23 that evasive tactics being shown by Gromyko, particularly since conference resumed fortnight ago, reinforced the belief that matters involved could not

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(Confidential)

from all-German problem. Gromyko now gives appearance of having accepted original Western opinion, whereas allies have only discussed interim agreement on Berlin to give time to discuss all-German problem. This indicative of change in atmosphere of discussion at Geneva which has caused Senat alarm. Mayor Amrehn cited recent article in Le Monde, reflecting semi-official view, which stated that Berlin is untouchable and must be sold to Russians as expensively as possible and that allies should facilitate evacuation of Berliners wanting to leave and construct "Chinese wall" along the iron curtain. (French commandant afterwards explained that Le Monde not semi-official newspaper but that regrettably many were under impression it is.)

Amrehn then presented certain principles which in Senat view are essential: (1) West should not offer any concession without demanding counter-concessions. Amrehn suggested that weakness of June 16 proposals lay in fact that West did not say to Russians if you prepared grant free access, recognition allied rights Berlin, ties of Berlin with West, etc. (Matters on which no concession or limitation of troops, etc.) (2) No solution should be acceptable in which date of expiration fixed short of reunification. As long as time period fixed, Russian threat to Berlin kept alive and Berlin remains hostage for Russian demands. (3) Any form of recognition CDR cannot be considered. No steps should be taken towards recognition or towards formation all-German committee. (Amrehn cited, as type of occurrence causing "sorrow" among colleagues, a July 20 London Times article reporting Lloyd attempt persuade Von Bismarck that West should agree to some form East-West German talks.) Senat requires certain technical conversations necessary of type already carried on (e.g., commercial talks); Gromyko's proposal of inter-administrative commission provides for discussion between experts but only under responsibility four powers. (4) Because of impossibility of reaching agreed basis for restricting certain activities involving public media of expression, UN control would not be practicable. Senat colleagues, Mayor Amrehn revealed, alarmed over fact that, because 1st second phase Geneva talks started from June 16 proposals and Gromyko proposed all-German committee, a new compromise would be required going beyond June 16 proposals. Mayor Amrehn tried to calm colleagues by saying compromise might be bought on another plane

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be settled decisively at forum level but only at summit. I am felt this had already become clear several days before conference recessed back in June. He admitted that Macmillan's desires for summit conference regardless of progress present forums' discussions was "to certain extent" based on British election considerations. At same time, without endeavoring to assess importance of public or political opinion in Britain, I am aware of importance of summit on grounds that only at that level can we determine possibility of reaching agreement, even limited, with Sovs on Berlin and Germany.

In contrast to above, Acting Head Western Department Killick, in July 24 conversation, emphasized that West cannot afford make any further concessions at Geneva and expressed his personal opposition to whole summit idea, impetus for which he still feels comes predominantly from Prime Minister. Comment: While Sovs' efforts working level views, presumably of importance, should be recalled that, as stressed Sept 1 1957 rptd Geneva 17 June 15 and other Western sources, Macmillan's views those matters obviously have been and will continue to be controlling, as far as WGO concerned.

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saying compromise might be bought on another plane

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24
(Secret)

Secretary Herter's Report of 'Western Foreign Ministers' Meeting: Ministers discussed briefly possibility that Gromyko may raise disarmament either as conference item or separately with Lloyd, Couve and me in view of his and our separate talks with Hammarskjold. I said that we were considering Hammarskjold's suggestion, that we thought the participation of neutrals would complicate disarmament talks and render them more difficult and perhaps less productive of serious results, but that if talks were to be held under aegis of United Nations Hammarskjold's suggestion might turn out to be only reasonable formula we could get. Lloyd thought we should be prepared soon to resolve this question of a suitable disarmament forum in order to avoid worse alternatives which were sure to be suggested between now and convening of General Assembly.

I agreed to discuss the matter again with Lloyd and Couve on Tuesday.

During discussion we speculated on Department suggestion re securing Swedish chairman. Suggestion particularly pertinent in light Gromyko's reported remark that Mexicans were not neutral. It was agreed this would be desirable though recognized ineligibility of Mexican would increase risk of an Indian being chosen.

While of opinion that we should be willing to accept Hammarskjold formula if necessary, I may first sound out Gromyko on a small disarmament forum without neutrals to be placed in some manner under aegis of UN, the exact method to be worked out later. In this connection see Secto 334, July 16, 1959, reporting Gromyko's statement to Hammarskjold that he wanted to see groups small and felt parity not necessary ingredient.

Would appreciate State/Defense views soonest.

July
25
(Unclassified)

Secretary Herter's Statement at Various Ceremony in Berlin: "It is a privilege for me to be in the city of Berlin on the occasion of the... street named in honor of my 'Martin Luther' predecessor, Mr John Foster Dulles. His esteem to his memory is greatly appreciated not only by my government but also by the German people. Mr Dulles was always keenly aware of the essential values of the Berlin embassies. He came to this city four times during the post-world war II period and was able to observe, from visit to visit, the notable progress made in economic, cultural and political reconstruction. On several occasions he expressed the view that a visit to Berlin, or failing that, a knowledge of its postwar history, was essential to an understanding of the significance of the major issues in Europe today."

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25

(Unclassified)

As some of you may know, I was stationed in Berlin as attache of Embassy as far back as 1946. Since then I have returned to this city several times. However, this is my first visit since 1947. I am looking forward to the tour around your city which is to take place later in the month. I have already been impressed by the many visible evidences I have seen of achievement in the field of reconstruction as well as by the imaginative willingness to experiment in new forms of architecture and urban design. No one can be ignorant of this record of achievement in the post-war period, a record which is all the more impressive when one considers the almost total destruction of the city at the termination of hostilities in 1945.

The United States is proud to have been able to assist in this reconstruction and to know that there are throughout Berlin a number of tangible examples of my country's continuing interest in this city. But basically, the post-war record of Berlin has derived from the special qualities of the Berliners themselves -- their courage, their wit, their sense of humor in the face of adversity, and their willingness to build for the future in the midst of an uncertain present. This spirit and vision is not only commendable, it is something we all need in some measure, for it is good that the free world has the Berliners to set it this example.

Berlin, too, has been fortunate in the high quality of its leadership during these 15 years. Its civilian leaders have become internationally recognized figures whose leadership and their will to work together have in effect become a model for the free world. Our present governing Mayor, Willy Brandt, carries on in this great tradition.

I will not say much here about the conference in Geneva to which I shall be returning. We enter upon our 9th week in the search for some settlement which is consistent with our obligations to the free people of Berlin. We do not underestimate the gravity of the task, nor will we, out of impatience, agree to an arrangement which is inconsistent with those obligations.

I need not point out to you the origins of the present

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July (cont.)
25

(Unclassified)

Berlin crisis. It began on June 17, 1948, with a Soviet announcement of intention to take unilateral action. The world could not ignore the fact that the threat to the Berlin crisis.

... was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis. The Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis. The Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis.

On May 11, at the very beginning of the Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis. The Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis.

On several occasions in the past, the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis. The Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis was a direct result of the Soviet Union's attempt to force the termination of the Berlin crisis.

I know that the people of West Berlin are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise.

I will leave Berlin with the feeling that the people of West Berlin are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise. They are not only brave, but also wise.

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July (cont.) fundamental rights and liberties must and will be
25 preserved. I assure the Berliners that the United
(Unclassified) States will not let its responsibilities toward
Berlin in this or any other respect."

July Secretate from Mayor Brandt's speech during Secretary
25 Kerner's visit to Berlin: "I thank you - Mr. Secretary
(Unclassified) for this visit which I may call a mission of confidence.

"The Berliners know full well what the USA and their
British and French friends have meant to us in the
past and that the continued friendship will mean to
us in times to come. To them we owe our life in
freedom, even the fact that we have been able to
survive.

During the negotiations in the past weeks, you,
Mr. Secretary, have never lost sight of the points
of decisive importance for us. I am
thinking on the one hand of the rights and obligations
the allied powers have accepted in Berlin and in
respect of free access to Berlin and on the other
hand of the fact that the Berliners themselves have to
organize their life in freedom and to remain
closely connected with the Federal Republic as long
as this city of Berlin will not be able to serve as
capital of all Germany in the full sense of the word.

I would, however, conceal important facts from you were
I not to think of a more serious concern, some
inclination to even, in the future, inclination.

We are concerned because we are not sure whether the
other side in this political match of strength has
realized with sufficient clarity that the preparedness
alone to accept an interim agreement concerning Berlin
represents a considerable concession. The two creators
of the Berlin crisis recall aware of the fact - and
this is a question to which we do not yet have an
answer - that they run a terrible risk if they carry
this to extremes and is it generally known in
the West that erroneous decisions on the Berlin
problem would have far-reaching disastrous consequences.

Our indignation is caused by the fact that more than
fourteen years after the end of the war there are no
indications as to when and how it will be possible to
bridge the split which today separates millions of
Germans in this country and which maintains this
continent in a permanent state of unrest. Only a few

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July (cont.) days ago we learned that the Soviet Union had
25 for Berlin the position between the allied powers.
(Unclassified) This means a new step in the direction of
separation of our country from the West. The
foreign arms is to be denied the right to self-
determination also in future. It is a step
explicitly that the Germans will not accept and
and allows to express a kind of humanistic
dangerous illusion that these people have become
reconciled to the state of unnatural division.

Our indignation is caused by the fact that
our work, our intentions are systematically
that facts and concepts are distorted. In the
respect of our rights and obligations in
on power. Several million Berliners are
to be no better than the men on a chess board
by whom we are exposed to provocations
lateral would-be-rent power. I am fairly well
informed even concerning certain Berlin protests
all too often schemes in the emergence of a threat.

We here in West Berlin, Mr. Secretary, do not
believe that the statement of the Soviet Union
would be prepared to bear the responsibility for a
renewed cut-off of our city. They should know that
an action would need to be taken to prevent
the world and this has not been done. The
before the United Nations. The Soviet Union
make the single statement that the Soviet Union
next possible new obstructive action. We shall
our right to live with all means at our disposal.

There are others who seem to a deal to be in a hurry
time. They should know that we are not
have very good nerves.

The men who speak for this city are aware of the
responsibility. They must be responsible for
unscrupulous individuals. Freedom of the city
however not be issued on coupons.

The men who speak for this city are aware of the
war and peace is their only aim. They must be
also and particularly with such a situation. But
but they realize that it would mean a threat to our
our freedom.

Our hopes, all our possibilities are at stake.

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July (cont.)
25

(Confidential)

We are making efforts to re-unite that which belongs together. We hope and pray the representatives of the great powers will not be obliged much longer to waste their time on artificially created Berlin crises but that it will soon be possible for them to devote themselves to the real problems of Europe and the world.

Humanity is waiting for solutions which will ease suffering and tension. Berlin and the German people to which it belongs are willing to make their contribution but that will certainly be possible only if a minimum of fair-play is observed or rather reintroduced.

July
27

(Confidential)

Commission Berlin report on Berlin reaction to Secretary Khrushchev's visit: visit of Secretary to West Berlin viewed as great success by all observers. Number of people (15,000 at Rathaus, 20,000 at Congress Hall, 25,000 lining streets police estimate) who turned out on 10th day (for Berlin) normally spent in functions indicative of importance population attracted to seeing Secretary and being seen by him. Mayor Gubelin and other officials have remarked to mission officers that reception exceeded what they had expected for a visitor in post-war Berlin.

Spontaneous demonstration demonstrated that Berliners that Secretary champions their cause and to move. As one official commented, people have not been given sense of personal participation in Khrushchev.

Secretary Khrushchev speech, which was carried by radio to all Soviets on to all Germany, greeted by cheers and slogans welcome reassurance that United States will abide by its commitments. Statements most widely repeated on radio, greeted most enthusiastically were assurances that U.S. would accept no time limit on division in Berlin, that allied troops would remain, and that American will resist any liberties would be removed.

Berlin press under and Monday gave broader coverage to Secretary's visit than to any single event since Berlin crisis began. Editorial comment uniformly laudatory.

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July (cont.)
27

(Confidential)

GDR press reaction has been strong and hostile. However, a similar reaction has been observed in the GDR press about the Western press will maintain in hopes that success of Secretary's visit rankles.

In sum Berlin officials, members of the general public with whom mission officers have spoken are unanimous in judgment that Secretary's visit was successful, had obvious effect of bolstering morale, and, as one Berlin observer put it, served as a shot in the arm at this particular time.

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July
25
(Unclassified)

New York Times Report of Secretary Herter's Trip to Berlin:
Secretary of State Christian A. Herter declared today that Western troops were indispensable to West Berlin's freedom and would remain here.

Mr. Herter also said that the West never would accept a Soviet deadline for a settlement of the Berlin problem in the Foreign Ministers' negotiations in Geneva.

Mr. Herter flew here for a visit during a day off in the Geneva Conference. He dedicated a street named for his predecessor, the late John Foster Dulles.

The visit was aimed at improving the morale of West Berlin's two and one-quarter million citizens, who have begun to worry about what is going to happen in the eight-week-old Geneva negotiations.

In a ceremony of signing the golden visitors' book of West Berlin City Hall, Mr. Herter said:

"I know that the people of West Berlin regard our troops, and those of France and the United Kingdom, as defenders of their freedom. I know that the presence of these troops, which will be preserved, is indispensable to the continuance of that freedom."

He declared that Western rights in Berlin could not be terminated by action of the Soviet Union alone. He said, "We have not accepted and will not accept any deadline on them."

"Freedom," Mr. Herter asserted, "is a precious thing. It includes the right of free speech so essential to the function of democracy. That right, as well as all other fundamental rights and liberties must and will be preserved. I assure Berliners that the United States will not forget its responsibilities toward Berlin in this or any other respect."

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July
31
(Secret)

US Delegation Report of Herter-Von Brandt-Von Brentano Conversation: Brandt took position that free viewpoint of Berliners it would be better to have conference break down and face crisis now rather than to agree to arrangement on basis of allied concessions which would convince Berliners they were at "beginning of the end." He especially feared, now that new Western and Soviet papers had been put forward, that pressures on conference would lead West to accept position somewhere in between two extremes.

Secretary stressed that Western powers were firm on question of their rights and unacceptability All-German Committee. They had only considered discussing question of troop levels if satisfactory agreement had been reached in all other respects containing sufficient compensatory advantages. Secretary said he thought it unlikely conference would reach this point. In any event it would be most unfortunate if impression given that Brandt or West Germans were exercising pressure on other Western Allies out of fear that they were making harmful concessions. This would play directly into Soviet game of attempting attribute Western firmness solely to Federal Republic obduracy.

Von Brentano said Brandt had come at his invitation since it seemed entirely appropriate that governing Mayor of Berlin be able to be in position to receive first hand report about developments during closing days of conference. His presence here obviously no sign of distrust. Brandt added that he regarded himself as adviser to the German delegation and would refrain from issuing any statements on his own while here.

Secretary saw Von Brentano this morning; at latter's request. Foreign Minister expressed concern over recent developments at Geneva, particularly alleged trend on part Western Powers towards making additional concessions. He argued that break-up of conference would be preferable to further concessions which would only increase Soviet appetite. Could not see how in face of continuing Soviet intransigence, there was any possibility of agreement in last few days before departure of Secretary.

Secretary pointed out that Western position was not weak but continuingly firm on basic issues. West would stand fast on preservation of rights and unacceptability of All-German Committee. Issue of troop levels had acquired psychological as well as purely numerical aspect. Western Powers agreed they would only discuss this if it

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July (continued)
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(Secret)

were last outstanding item and there were compensatory advantages in rest of arrangements agreed. Secretary said he considered it highly unlikely we would reach this point in discussions or that agreement could be attained by Wednesday. Such agreement would require significant change in Soviet position.

Secretary noted that Gromyko was undoubtedly creating impression that Soviets were willing continue negotiating and that any breakdown of conference was due to Western powers acting under pressure from Federal Republic. Impression would be particularly bad, Secretary noted, if through pessimistic press accounts, such as had been appearing during last twenty-four hours in German newspapers, impression were created that West Germans were applying pressures on other Western Powers to strengthen determination against making unacceptable concessions.

Von Brentano said he agreed such impression would be most unfortunate and intimated he had not come in effort exert pressure on Secretary but merely to obtain private benefit of his views as well as to express his personal concern over developments of last few days. He noted that Gromyko was undoubtedly aware of heavy pressures from Prime Minister under which Lloyd was working and took this into account in calculating strength of Western position. Von Brentano urged that Secretary assert himself more clearly as spokesman for West even though this might mean offending certain sensibilities.

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August
2
(Secret)

Report for Vice-President on Plans for Western Summit: President Eisenhower suggested in messages Saturday, August first to Macmillan, DeGaulle and Adenauer that he would be willing to attend a western summit meeting with them toward the end of August, if they wish.

DeGaulle indicated recently that he did not wish to issue invitations to such a meeting in Paris and would probably not participate in one. However, Macmillan is rather insistent on such a meeting and will no doubt issue invitations for it in London. In that case the President has suggested to DeGaulle that he would be happy to visit DeGaulle in Paris on August twenty-seventh, that being the fifteenth anniversary of the President's meeting with DeGaulle incident to liberation Paris in 1945.

August
4
(Official
Use Only)

Berlin Senat's Four Principles for Negotiations on Berlin:

1. As long as Berlin solution through agreement on all of Germany cannot be brought about, present legal basis for Western protective powers and status of Berlin must be maintained. There must be no time limit on this legal basis. Troop strength must be maintained at level adequate for full security of Berlin population.
2. New agreements on this basis would have to define and guarantee above all free access to Berlin.
3. Connection of West Berlin with legal and financial system of Federal Republic must be safeguarded as well as freedom of movement in Berlin.
4. Should provisions be made concerning the observation of certain activities these would have to apply to all parts of city. Their application in West Berlin alone would be an intolerable discrimination.

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August
3
(Unclassified)

US statement concerning exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Eisenhower: The President of the United States has invited Nikita Khrushchev, chairman of the council of ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to pay an official visit to the United States in September. Mr. Khrushchev has accepted with pleasure.

The President has also accepted with pleasure Mr. Khrushchev's invitation to pay an official visit to the USSR later this fall.

Mr. Khrushchev will visit Washington for two or three days and will also spend ten days or so travelling in the United States. He will have informal talks with the President, which will afford an opportunity for an exchange of views about problems of mutual interest.

On his tour of the United States, Mr. Khrushchev will be able, at first hand, to see the country, its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

President Eisenhower will visit Moscow and will also spend some days travelling in the Soviet Union. This will provide further opportunity for informal talks and exchange of views about problems of mutual interest with the chairman of the council of Ministers of the USSR.

On his tour of the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower likewise will be able at first hand, to see the country, its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

Both governments express the hope that the forthcoming visits will help create better understanding between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and will promote the cause of peace.

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August

(Confidential) US Mission Berlin Report of Conversation with Senator Klein on Brandt Trip to Geneva: Senator Klein struck almost apologetic note, emphasizing Brandt's trip in no way an expression on part of Governing Mayor of misgivings about a possible Geneva compromise. Klein also reported briefly Brandt's conversations with British and French Foreign Ministers.

Klein said Brentano urgently called Brandt to Geneva on Ambassador Grewe's advice, but motive behind call never clear. Klein thought German delegation may have believed in possibility that agreement involving (unspecified) Western concessions beyond June 16 position might be concluded and that Brandt's presence was desired to ensure he would share in blame. Another possibility was that Brandt was called down to fortify West German opposition to possible Western concessions. At any rate Brentano never stated precise reasons for his call to Brandt. The morning after Brandt's arrival Brentano saw SecState and subsequently expressed to Brandt full satisfaction with renewed assurances received from Secretary.

After his conversation with Secretary, Brandt saw Lloyd and Couve. Klein reported that Lloyd made essentially same points to Brandt previously made by Secretary. Lloyd was especially strong regarding legal position Western Powers in Berlin and said that on this point he had support even of opposition, citing Bevan as stating that West's legal basis in Berlin must not be impaired. Brandt and Lloyd also discussed vaguely possibility of Lloyd visit to Berlin without mentioning dates other than to agree it should not be now.

In discussion with Couve Brandt was asked how Berlin population would react to reduction of Western garrisons. Brandt replied that a concession on this point would have a serious effect on Berlin morale and that he was therefore strongly opposed to it; but that, if a limitation on the size of the Western garrisons were agreed upon, he would of course have to do his best to defend such a decision vis-a-vis West Berlin population. Brandt raised question of free access but Couve said subject too technical and detailed for discussion by the Foreign Minister and furthermore West Berlin's civilian communications matter between Federal Republic and "GDR". Klein said he and Brandt were surprised at this opinion since all Berlin communications, civilian and military, in final analysis rest on Four Power agreements, but that Brandt did not press point with Couve.

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¹
(Confidential) In final talks with Brentano and Grewe, Brentano assured Brandt that situation had improved since call went to him to come to Geneva. Brandt then decided to leave, although Grewe felt there might be some advantage in his staying on. Klein made some unfavorable remarks about Geneva "rumor-mill"; e.g. at one point a member of German delegation claimed that Brandt had agreed to limitation on Allied garrisons.

In other comment Senator Klein reiterated concern regarding West Berlin's civilian access, expressing belief that this subject, which is connected with military access, not adequately discussed at Conference. He said Soviets had no need to raise this point since it obviously weakest aspect Berlin's position while West clearly unwilling discuss access on theory it best let sleeping dogs lie. Nevertheless he felt this was a most important question because if the Four Powers were ever to agree to turn control functions over to German personnel it would have to be clearly understood "what is to be controlled and how." He feels new Four Power agreements would as a minimum have to reaffirm old rights or, better, introduce new "modalities" to improve situation. Klein mentioned again working paper on access which would be forwarded to Federal Republic for use in further negotiations.

August

⁴
(Confidential) Ambassador Matthews' Report of Conversation with Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky: Foreign Minister Kreisky told me today of conversation he had few days ago in Vienna with Rapacki during latter's brief stopover here. He said he told Polish Foreign Minister (to draw him out) he was under impression Khrushchev was no longer much interested in summit conference. Was this correct. Rapacki said no. Kreisky continued he had a feeling Soviet leader might feel since this is now last year or so of President Eisenhower's administration it might be better to wait until after next year's elections. If this was case said Kreisky he thought it great mistake as President's prestige and popularity had grown greatly in last few months whereas any successor would be too busy on internal problems to give thought to summit conference during first year of administration. Furthermore he reminded Rapacki that Democrats feel just as strongly about Berlin as Republicans in case any thought of US weakening in case of change of administration was in Khrushchev's mind. This seemed to impress Rapacki Kreisky said.

Kreisky strongly advocated a Berlin status quo arrangement for another five years during which time some progress might be made towards a settlement which could last until the time when reunification might be possible. Such settlement however must include East Berlin. Rapacki objected that this was the capital

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⁴
(Confidential) of East Germany and would therefore be impossible. Kreisky countered Berlin would be the capital of a reunited Germany and it only logical to move East German capital elsewhere pending reunification just as Federal Republic is now in Bonn. (As Department is aware, Kreisky sees no possibility of reunification anytime in near future in view of Soviet determination this only possible under Communist domination).

Kreisky criticized Polish and Soviet attacks on West Germany. He said he could understand Polish fears of revival of German nationalism and Austria too occasionally shared this anxiety in view of its sufferings from that quarter in past. But such attacks he said could only increase tension and stimulate such revival and Poles should remember that situation in West Germany is different today and offers best hope of continuance democracy.

Furthermore the Poles should welcome German participation in the Western alliance and in European integration moves for these were bound to have a restraining effect. Rapacki seems to recognize a certain validity in these arguments but of course neither could nor would make any positive statements. Kreisky added that with increased West German military strength a Germany freed from all ties with the West could only be a greater menace to Poland.

Kreisky also expressed his emphatic opinion that unless the Russians are really prepared to reach some agreement in the field of nuclear testing, disarmament, Berlin, or in some other fields at the summit, a summit conference would be very dangerous and result in far greater tension and threat than the failure to hold one.

Kreisky seems to feel that foregoing conversation will be passed on to Russians and might carry some small weight if similar expressions emanating from other neutral sources reach Kremlin ears.

August

⁵
(Official
Use Only)

Excerpts from Secretary's Background Press Conference After Close of Conference: Obviously, when a conference ends, that has been lasting as long as this, everybody tries to set up a sort of a balance sheet as to the pros and cons of what went on here. And I think I can just say this: from the point of view of specific agreement, no results except for agreement as to the points on which agreement might be reached for an interim settlement on Berlin. But from the point of view of the overall picture which is one of considerable tension, beginning last November and carrying through to a lesser extent probably at

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the time of this conference, I think the tensions have been eased some. There has been value in really exploring pretty thoroughly what might be done, finding out what the real difficulties are and where areas of agreement might be found in the future. In that respect it served a useful purpose.

Naturally, for those who were participants in a conference as long as this, it is disappointing not to come up with more concrete results. But at least from a personal point of view, I was skeptical at the outset; I was skeptical at the time of the recess when we resumed our negotiations; so that I can't say that I am too surprised as to the results as of this time.

I assume you want to know something about Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States. I am not in a position to give you any details on that. But it is very obvious that the announcement of that exchange of visits to take place probably during the rest of the year in a sense softens the edge of what might have been considered a failure here, in that everyone will expect that to a limited extent at least the scene will be shifted elsewhere.

Q. What is the link between the Khrushchev visit to the United States and the work of this conference?

A. Well, I wouldn't say that there was any direct link at all. I discussed it with the President at the time I was in Washington during the recess, but the decision to invite Khrushchev was in no way directly linked to the Geneva conference.

Q. Sir, you said a few moments ago that the invitation in a sense softened the edge of what might have been considered to have been a failure here. Would you say that perhaps the link shows itself in this fashion? For example, could you tell us whether or not your report when you went home from here June 20 about what you expected here was so gloomy that the idea of inviting Mr. Khrushchev originated at that time and in anticipation of failure.

A. No, I wouldn't say that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was no hope then that the initiation of the invitation would have any productive results on this conference?

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A. No, I think that the idea of inviting Mr. Khrushchev—and again I am getting a little off base here—the idea of inviting him was distinct from the outcome of this conference.

Q. Should you have felt, sir, it would have any effect on this conference in perhaps reducing the possibility of a Russian concession, assuming there was such a possibility?

A. To be very honest with you, I was looking to see if it would have any effect, and I couldn't see that it did.

Q. And did you inform Mr. Couve and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd as soon as the conference reconvened?

A. Right.

Q. Before the conference reconvened?

A. No, I didn't see them before the conference reconvened.

Q. I mean, by diplomatic channels.

A. No, I discussed it with them here.

Q. Could you tell us how far back in history this idea of the Khrushchev invitation goes? Does it date back to last year?

A. Oh, I couldn't date it specifically. It is something that has been discussed on and off for quite a long time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us why in your assessment the Russians suddenly made troop reductions a major issue?

A. That has been mounting steadily. They started by emphasizing it and they felt it would come easy. When we insisted that we would not repeat not go beyond limiting forces to where we were, then it became a major point with them. And I think that it is a major point largely from the psychological point of view. They themselves said that it was to show a desire by us to cooperate in the solution of the Berlin problem, but I think much more than that it was to try to give the Berliners a feeling that we were walking out on them.

Q. Sir, in your speech today, you proposed that the German question be the subject of continuing discussion by this foreign ministers conference as presently constituted, though perhaps at a different level or place. Could you tell us what you meant by that?

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A. We tabled a formal paper on that at the conference here. --- which was a substitute for the All-German committee. We suggested that. What it really meant was a lower echelon but made up just as it is here now with advisers, German advisers, to continue the discussion of the German problem, the various phases of the German problem.

Q. Had Mr. Khrushchev accepted the invitation to the United States before this second phase began? Had that all been settled?

A. No, he accepted it only very recently.

Q. I see, but at the beginning of the second phase you did tell Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Couve that this was ---

A. That it was in the works.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you the impression that Mr. Gromyko was aware that this invitation was pending from the beginning of the second round?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say that at the end of this phase of the conference there is no longer a Soviet ultimatum or time limit imposed on Berlin? What do you feel about that at this stage?

A. Well, certainly it has been lifted to a very large extent. It was lifted to the extent of their wanting to enter into an interim agreement for "x" period. The one great difficulty that we had, of course, there in connection with that "x" was period of time was not so much on the length of time as it was on what their interpretation of where we stood would be at the end of that time. And that is where we were absolutely unable to get an answer.

Q. We detected here, Mr. Secretary, a sense almost of panic among the West German delegation at what we now know to be the stage when they were told that we were inviting Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. We were further told that they brought Mr. Brandt here to discuss this matter. Can you tell us how this sense of panic among the West German group was stilled by yourself and the other Western ministers?

A. Well, I hadn't heard a word about panic in the West German delegation--on the subject of the Khrushchev visit, was it?

Q. Yes, sir.

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A. No. I haven't heard anything about it. Certainly there was no inkling of it. I have seen von Brentano every day, I have seen Greve every day. There was no mentioning of the panicking in any slight degree.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the time you told Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Couve, did you also inform Mr. von Brentano?

A. Not just at that same time. We synchronized them on it a little later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your assumption that during the period of five or six months the Russians will now in Germany only mark time and in fact take no overt action affecting West Berlin's status?

A. No I don't think they will take any overt action. After all, remember the speech of Mr. Khrushchev, I have forgotten the exact date of it, in which he said the May 27 date had just been plucked out of the air, that it might have been another date six months, a year, or two years later. He indicated that the time element was not an important one. And there is no question but what on this Berlin problem they would infinitely rather have it settled by an agreement than they would by unilateral action.

Q. Sir, when did you come to the conclusion that the Russians would infinitely rather settle the Berlin question by negotiation rather than unilateral action, and on what basis?

A. Because of their repeated statements that they wanted to go on talking about it. They have acknowledged that we have got rights there. Every time we try to pin them down as to whether by unilateral action they think they can destroy those rights, they duck on it and say, why would we have entered into negotiations if we had wanted to act in that way? I am not barring their taking unilateral action one of these days, but I think that for the moment at least unilateral action is probably deferred. I would doubt very much if they would do it in the next few months, and certainly I would doubt if they would do it until efforts had been made to reconvene the foreign ministers for further talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a while ago you said, sir, that we still came out of this with a status quo in Berlin. Would you say that the Khrushchev visit to the United States means that we recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe?

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A. No, not necessarily. I don't see there is any necessary connection between the two. The Berlin situation after all was a situation that we knew was reasonably artificial, but that we felt did not contain any seeds of danger such as the Russians stirred up there in their talks about it, which necessitated their taking drastic action to change it.

Q. Sir, as you have said before, it is almost impossible to try to figure out what Russian motivation is, but in the light of everything that has happened now, is it your feeling that the Berlin crisis was artificially created in order to get the kind of talks with us that the Russians have long wanted, or do you believe it was in itself seriously meant?

A. No. I may be wrong, but I think that it was a rather hasty action of Khrushchev's based on very real pressures from Wilbrandt and the Communist leaders in East Germany, who were dissatisfied with the kind of backing that they thought they were getting from the Soviets in the establishment of their position.

August
8
(Confidential)

West German Statement on Close of Geneva Talks with Embassy
Bonn Comment: Second phase Geneva Conference, which ended August 5, achieved no results. This no great shortcoming, however, if one considers that Soviet delegation entered Conference with aim changing political and territorial status Central Germany to advantage of Communists, and Soviet Union did not achieve this purpose. Thus from German point of view, which is point of view West as whole, possible say:

1) Soviets did not succeed making Western Powers give up their rights in Berlin; aim which caused them want Conference, West renounced no part of its rights to remain Berlin. Thereby basis presence Three Western Powers in West Berlin, based on occupation rights, remains unchanged.

2) West demonstrated its peaceful intentions and readiness negotiate—fact once again made clear entire world. With boundless patience, West presented proposals Soviet delegation which could have proved satisfactory basis for improving prevailing conditions in Central Germany, or at least establishment of tolerable *modus vivendi* in Berlin.

3) Representatives Soviet Union and Soviet Zone Germany rejected these offers and instead countered with totally unacceptable demands. In so doing they revealed that they were not interested in German reunification or in insuring freedom

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West Berlin, but rather solely in perpetuating division Germany and incorporating West Berlin into Communist sphere. To this extent Conference exposed position and gave insight into policies Communists.

4) Conference demonstrated unity of Western purposes. At no point during 10 weeks negotiation did members of West German delegation or those other Western nations—flexible though they were in their attitudes and proposals—ever for moment attempt break solid front. This, too, unmistakable gain which should not be underestimated since in future it will be warning Soviet Government not speculate on lack unity Western camp.

In this connection West German delegation which would have regretted nothing more than seeing Conference end without good results, has pointed out well-known tenet Federal Republic's policy—that all international issues should be solved by peaceful negotiation. This tenet is in particular applicable to subjects that were under discussion Geneva: Berlin, Germany and international security.

Vice President Nixon's return to Washington and his report to President Eisenhower may perhaps have effects that will contribute towards solving problems discussed Geneva. Meanwhile, it has been announced that President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev planning to meet. Far from being opposed plan, Federal Government is hopeful such talks might relax tensions between East and West. Bonn fully trusts United States to act in interest of Germany, whether or not German problem is discussed at such meeting. In any case it seems certain to German observers that while Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Washington is pending no unilateral Soviet actions against Berlin are to be expected.

Comment:

Actually German government not as sanguine about Conference results as published statements indicate. Foreign Office official, who asked that his identity be protected, said that in German view Soviets achieved major victory. West lost whatever opportunity there might have been wrest Soviet concessions by "premature" initiation Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange on arrangements for mutual visits. This took Conference off dead center, but it also removed any compulsion there might have been on Gromyko take a more conciliatory stand in Geneva. For "without yielding a centimeter", Khrushchev got very thing he was seeking, something he wanted even more than summit—personal meeting with President Eisenhower, a super Summit meeting. Moreover, he got this with less *quid pro quo* than West had been insisting all along required for ordinary summit.

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Brentano Comment on Geneva Conference:

On August 7 Foreign Minister Brentano has reported to the foreign affairs committee of the Bundestag on the second phase of the Geneva Conference. Speaking to press representatives in Bonn, Brentano said that he believes President Eisenhower and the Soviet Premier will very likely discuss the German question, adding that he sees no risks in such a discussion. Asked whether the Federal Government desires a Western summit conference prior to Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union, Brentano said: "How talks are held is not important. It is important only that consultations are conducted in a good and cordial atmosphere."

Professor Furler, chairman of the foreign affairs committee, told journalists that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting contains opportunities but also certain risks.

Referring to details of the Conference, Brentano and Furler stated that an interim solution for Berlin failed because of Soviet intransigence. Also it was not possible to resume talks on the German question in connection with Berlin. In general, the foreign affairs committee does not consider the result of the Conference entirely negative. Geneva also had positive aspects, since the West clearly indicated how far it was willing to go in making concessions regarding the Berlin question.

As regards disarmament, it was stated that the four-power decision to resume consultations on the convocation of a new disarmament conference must be positively evaluated.

The foreign affairs committee agreed that the question of concluding a nonaggression pact with Poland and Czechoslovakia would be discussed at the first session after the summer vacation, and also the resumption of diplomatic relations with East Bloc states.

According to Brentano, in the future the Federal Government will at every opportunity take the initiative to implement the Bundestag resolution on the establishment of a four-power committee with German advisors. Brentano considers this proposal, which unfortunately was rejected in Geneva, still the best way to achieve reunification.

Furler reported that there was no unanimous opinion regarding the establishment of an all-German committee, as suggested by Gromyko, to solve the Berlin question. It is indicated that representatives of the CDU-CSU would oppose the establishment of such a committee, while the opposition parties, in particular the SPD, believe the matter should be discussed.

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PART THREE
WESTERN PRESS COMMENTARY

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July
28
(Unclassified)

USIS Brussels Summary of Belgian Press on Berlin July 21-28:
Berlin problem buried in general comment Nixon and Geneva.
Three main points Nixon visit: Initial concern cool
reception, possibilities saving Geneva, importance direct
Soviet-American contact. Allied refusal Gromyko's German
committee plan applauded by many papers as indication West's
solidarity. General skepticism re Geneva message: Both
sides seen as hesitating pronounce final no in order avoid
blame for failure. Hertz's Berlin visit well-covered:
influential Catholic Libre Belgique frontpage photo taken
allee ceremony.

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June
30
(Unclassified)

Embassy
/London Report of UK Press Comment: Gromyko statement of June 28 concerning Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting has been reported in British press as withdrawal of Soviet ultimatum and encouraging development with respect summit prospects. Diplomatic correspondent Manchester Guardian (Liberal) said Gromyko had been at pains to stress Soviet willingness, if all German committee had not reached agreement in 18 months, to resume negotiations with Western Powers before taking unilateral action which would affect their rights in Berlin and their access to city. Correspondent added "it is hardly possible, in view of this, to continue to talk of a Soviet ultimatum in connection with Berlin. This at least is one small achievement of the six weeks' Geneva negotiations."

Editorial in News Chronicle (Liberal) said "Mr. Gromyko's statement yesterday shows every sign that Moscow is prepared to accept the Eisenhower condition of 'detectable progress' among the Foreign Ministers when they reconvene next month." Editorial added, however, that of Western Heads of State only Macmillan appeared eager for summit. Adenauer's views on Russia were "flexible as crowbar" and "American President is constantly more adept at finding reasons for avoiding rather than accepting summit talks".

Daily Telegraph (Conservative) editorial June 29 deplored "Western disarray" and regretted that conference of heads of Western govts had not been held during Geneva adjournment. Editorial took line that while little can be expected from conferences with Soviet Union whether "summit or sub-summit" this does not mean that they should not be held, since "it is always well to travel hopefully even if you do not expect to arrive". Telegraph concluded "we contend therefore that the adjournment at Geneva should be taken literally; that the conference should resume; that our allies should cease hinting that Britain is rocking the boat; and that we should see whether the Russians are willing to fulfil the assurance given by one of their broadcasts that they will 'go halfway to meet us'".

Gallup poll published in News Chronicle June 29 indicates 53 per cent those polled believe Russia responsible for slow progress at Geneva and 17 percent the United States.

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July
22
(Unclassified)

President's views on Geneva carried all important leading papers except Daily Express (Conservative) and News Chronicle (Liberal), both of which give big play to other articles of interest, and Daily Mail (Conservative). Express carries story from Warsaw with front-page banner "I'm for Macmillan" -- a summit long ago if it had been left to us." Interviewing Khrushchev at reception in Soviet Embassy, Warsaw, correspondent Eric Bourne reports "he told me if matters had rested with Mr. Macmillan and himself, there would have been a summit long ago. And Mr. Khrushchev added 'in Moscow I had a very sincere talk with Mr. Macmillan. I had the impression that he wanted a meeting and I felt also that he is a very sincere man.' What about the others?" asked. Mr. Khrushchev flashed back: "No, do you mean -- the Americans? Then you must ask the State Department. But if you ask the State Department they say that 'summit does not want it' (a summit)."

Asked by Bourne about the present state of Geneva conference, Khrushchev replied "I think nothing. Why must I think? You had better ask a horse, because a horse has a big head for thinking. We have our minister at Geneva -- let him do the thinking."

Daily Mirror (Labor) and Daily Telegraph (Conservative) also carry story on Khrushchev, former very briefly. Latter notes that Khrushchev was "puzzled by the aims of Mr. Nixon in going to Moscow. He said he assumed Mr. Nixon had 'good intentions'."

Express also carried feature on Vice-President Nixon by Mrs. Maccoll headed "trouble-shooter Nixon's biggest test" and editorial, both of which make point that in opening US exhibition Vice-President has unusual opportunity to talk to Soviets. "He carries with him," editorial says, "the hopes of many nations. For he goes at a time when a deep depression has settled over Geneva . . . Perhaps his conversations with Mr. Khrushchev will undo some of the damage done at Geneva, so that the leaders of the nations may yet meet at the summit to get to grips with the problems of peace. For Mr. Richard Nixon, this is the chance of lifetime."

News Chronicle front-pages story from Geneva by William Forrest who learns from "East European source" that "Mr. Khrushchev has summoned the Communist leaders from all Soviet satellites and from China to a conference in Moscow."

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July (continued)
28
(Unclassified)

Typical headlines on Eisenhower story: Daily Telegraph (Conservative): "Eisenhower pessimism on summit prospects -- judgment reserved till after Nixon visit." Manchester Guardian (Liberal): "Soviet 'wrecking' at Geneva: Fr. Eisenhower fears the worst." Daily Mirror (Labor): "Summit hopes are dim - Ike." Daily Herald (Labor) carries banner headline on front page: "Ike blow at summit Britain still eager but President is gloomy: 'No hope' for Geneva talks." Daily Worker: "Ike deals blow at summit -- deliberate 'leak' of his views." Times (Independent Conservative) notes President's views in story on Nixon departure.

Early edition Evening Standard carries front-page story headlined "Macmillan sees summit hopes fading -- so election may be delayed." Article says Macmillan has been forced to recognize that prospect of early summit is "receding" and that this could delay general election expected in October. "Today, with other members of the cabinet, he is considering President Eisenhower's doubts, and the import of Mr. Khrushchev's sudden, unpromising burst of diplomatic activity."

July
28
(Unclassified)

USIS London weekly roundup of British press on Berlin issue. Press during past week has broached no new ideas on Berlin: approaches to the subject have been built-in with reportage and comment on Geneva conference which has now entered what several papers regard as decisive week. Times July 26 said "most serious differences" were "being narrowed and some resolved" at Geneva. Paper's special correspondent quoted Communists as saying "they had given up insistence on all-German committee as condition for Berlin agreement" and French as claiming "U.S. had come closer to British position about Western rights in Berlin." Times concluded that on evidence of July 27, which it regarded as "most business-like and best day" of conference, "No one would doubt Western Ministers were reaching compromise on Berlin which would enable summit to be recommended, were it not that memory is all too green of sharp and much publicized differences at weekend between British and American positions, and were it not for constant reports ministers might adjourn."

Under headline "Lloyd fights for summit now," News Chronicle said July 26 Foreign Secretary would settle for summit now but other three Western Ministers deny any progress to date and insist on much more as price for summit. Fearing Khrushchev "will never give no-time-limit Berlin guarantee" that Secretary Herter "above all demands," paper remarked

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July (continued)
28
(Unclassified)

"Herter, alas, has also corrupted himself," as "real strong stand at Geneva, to which he pledged himself during his flying visit to Berlin, is frontpage news throughout America today".

Throughout week press has hoped Vice-President Nixon's visit to U.S.S.R. would smooth over differences at Geneva and pave way to summit. Manchester Guardian editorial on Nixon-Khrushchev clashes said July 25 that Moscow "is the only place where Geneva conference and chance of summit meeting can be saved." While Vice-President "has no power to negotiate," paper thought "in his private talks with Khrushchev, the American Vice-President might still clarify position sufficiently to make possible meeting of heads of government later on." Guardian said that "if Mr. Khrushchev still wants to get to summit, he must now say the word that would enable Geneva conference to make that 'decent progress' which President Eisenhower this week mentioned."

Times and Guardian July 26 report from Washington possibility of Eisenhower-Macmillan-de Gaulle meeting in Paris in September.

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August
6
(Secret)

UK Reaction to Adjournment of Geneva Conference: Despite the failure of the Foreign Ministers to reach agreement, adjournment of the Geneva Conference seems to have been accepted by the British with ease. Current news value of Geneva had already been worn away in the course of protracted fruitless negotiations. With Parliament in recess and August holiday period now in full swing, main result has been satisfaction that Geneva not ending in tension, but against hopeful new backdrop of August third announcement of Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits. British reaction to this announcement has been uniformly cordial on part of both Government and opposition leaders and entire press.

Whatever reflections Macmillan may have had upon seeing the initiative pass so dramatically into other hands, he has been able to capitalize to certain extent upon whole development. As it is, although opposition and Communist press are suggesting that "reason has prevailed," almost entire Conservative press proclaiming that "Macmillan has prevailed". Prospect now opened up of further period of high-level contacts and talks, including in British opinion, likelihood in due course of full "summit" meeting. This prospect interpreted as ensuring at minimum further postponement, perhaps for indefinite period, of crisis over Berlin, which may be about as much as Macmillan hoped for anyway. He has more than once indicated that this was at heart of his program, and it may be enough to satisfy the British public. In any event pressures for immediate "summit" following Geneva have noticeably subsided. With regard to Geneva, Lloyd's performance has clearly increased his stature in UK. Although from time to time there are still rumors of his replacement in post-election cabinet shuffle, general verdict by the end of Geneva and recent Parliamentary session was favorable to him.

In terms of substance discussed at Conference, Embassy's impression, based on press reactions and contacts with various political leaders, has been one of general British approval of standing firm on Western positions re Berlin. In contrast, British attitudes on terms of settlement of all-German problem seem excessively flexible. British approach to problems of recognition and dealing with unrepresentative governments is markedly pragmatic. There is no particular reluctance about bargaining continuation of Western position in Berlin against greater recognition of GDR, and a good deal of feeling that other Western Powers are hampered by rigidities of Adenauer's policies. Consequently some inclinations observable here to accept all-German committee proposal, also since

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August (Cont.)
6
(Secret)

so many Britishers are incredulous, indifferent, or even antagonistic toward German unification. Finally, as Department is aware, there is inclination in some quarters here to favor disengagement without at same time requiring unification.

In connection with forthcoming Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits, Embassy has noticed virtually no indication of distrust that US might negotiate behind Britain's back. On contrary, reaction is so favorably hopeful that there may be danger of public here expecting too much to come out of these visits and talks.

Assuming, as most everyone does, that Macmillan will decide on election in October, it strikes us that present timetable, i.e., with full "summit" to be held after election at earliest, is much better from US viewpoint than that until recently envisaged by Macmillan Government. New timetable should eliminate danger of Prime Minister feeling under pressure to reach agreements for sake of his election prospects.

At same time we anticipate that as election approaches, Macmillan will desire to hold out promise of subsequent summit meeting as more certain than now. He would probably much prefer to have firm date agreed and announced before election. He is otherwise likely to be exposed to strong opposition attack during campaign.

Thus, in terms of summit problem we have long faced in Britain, announcement of forthcoming Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits has given us breather and greatly softened announcement of adjournment at Geneva. Depending on future developments, summit pressures may of course emerge again, but if Macmillan successfully gets election out of way, such pressures from his own party would be diminished and in any event he will be in much better position to deal with them objectively. At same time, we believe Macmillan sincerely believes in "summit" idea and therefore likely to continue to press it even after election is out of way. Additionally, opinion polls continue to show great majority still favoring summit (thus July 23-27 Gallup Poll indicated 75 percent favored such meeting and only 5 percent against, remaining 20 percent "Don't know").

Main British idea continues to be, not so much expectation that negotiations likely to achieve big results, as feeling that contact and continuous diplomatic activity can deflect Soviet threats and improve chances of reasonable modus vivendi. For this they would be willing to spin out talks at various levels, with full "summit" meeting, or series of them, to fall back on whenever other efforts fail.

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July
9
(Official
Use Only)

Broadcast Summary of French Press: The Paris papers this morning comment on the widely varying statements Khrushchev made to Mr. Harriman on one hand, and to the seven American Governors on the other, as well as on President Eisenhower's "reply."

Paris-Journal (Moderate-Indep) declares: "A few days before the Geneva conference resumes, Khrushchev is having fun subjecting the world public to his hot and cold showers. After showing his claws in the most aggressive and provocative manner, he is now drawing in his claws and loudly purring with peace."

L'Aurore (Conservative) says: "President Eisenhower has not hesitated to say that 'No responsible person should use such language' . . . (AFP ellipsis) it is hoped that Khrushchev will understand that the United States, joined by the whole West, will not always retreat and that there are things to which they will not agree, however great their desire to avoid a solution by force."

Le Populaire (Socialist) says: "Khrushchev's recent statements are not likely to produce optimism about the outcome of the forthcoming Geneva conference. . . . (AFP ellipsis) if by acting in this fashion Khrushchev hopes to persuade the Western Powers of the necessity to meet at the summit, he is making a crude mistake."

Liberation (Communist) says: "Mr. Khrushchev yesterday made other statements. They are available in the form of a text which is much more authentic than an equivocal journalistic montage. These statements indicate what may possibly happen in the next few years and have nothing threatening about them . . . (AFP ellipsis) and yet, for all that, many things have begun to change in the United States: Mr. Kozlov's visit, the Soviet exhibition in New York, the Bolshoi's tour of the United States, Nixon's forthcoming visit to the USSR, and the very presence in the Kremlin of the American Governors to whom Khrushchev addressed himself . . . (AFP ellipsis) the late Senator McCarthy must be turning over in his grave."

Paris press editorials this morning point out a certain stiffening in East-West relations, connecting the position adopted by Gromyko in Geneva with Khrushchev's abandonment of his trip to the Scandinavian countries. L'Aurore (Conservative) stresses the second point in its headlines and notes: "One may wonder if there is not a common tie between

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July
21 (continued)
(Official
Use Only)

the decision of Khrushchev to remain at home and the affirmation, repeated so many times by Gromyko, that the theses in Geneva are diametrically opposed. Perhaps after so much palaver in Geneva, Moscow now wants to see the exact point of the Western powers' will to resist. That, for the USSR, would be a very dangerous game."

PARIS-JOURNAL (Moderate-Indep.) remarks: "Since yesterday, everything is happening as though Moscow had suddenly changed its tactics. Will the USSR, convinced wrongly or rightly of its military superiority over America, go to the point of force to settle the Berlin question, believing that the West will not react . . . (AFP ellipsis)? That is certain in any event is the urgent need for the Western powers to be closely united. Too often there has been a lack of harmony during the past weeks. It is to be hoped that the complete agreement manifested yesterday by the French, British, and Americans will be lasting. Mr. K. must not be able to speculate on Western divisions or be able to commit the tragic error of believing in the capitulation of the West."

COMBAT (Left-Indep) discussing the cancellation of the Scandinavian trip, notes: "It may be that Mr. Khrushchev will refrain from undertaking a mission, the success of which is not certain. Perhaps he is expecting other grave events or still other invitations or meetings sufficiently important to warrant the cancellation of his Scandinavian visit, in spite of the bad effect this preference on the world stage could have in Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. Mr. Khrushchev's tour to Scandinavia would have been the first an entrance of the Soviet leader on this side of the iron curtain. It could have provided useful contacts. Its cancellation will certainly not help relax tension."

L'HUMANITE (Communist) commenting on the Geneva proceedings, states: "The Western powers know that by acting as they did today, their proposals are doomed to rejection. They systematically carry out the worst policy and sabotage any agreement. However, they forget the precariousness of their situation in Berlin and that in the end, if they choose to pursue the cold war, they would have more to lose than to gain."

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(Official
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June
26
(Unclassified)

Embassy Bonn Reports of German Press Comment: German press reports claim that at yesterday's meeting Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee members "from almost all parties" expressed concern that during first part Geneva Conference West went "further than appropriate in its proposals for interim Berlin solution" and "yielded to Soviet demands to a dangerous degree."

Considerable part press picked up this sentiment editorially. In assessing accomplishments Geneva, for example Die Welt said editorially "Brentano in his statement to Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee insisted there were no significant differences among Western Powers during Geneva negotiations. However, he did not intend deny existence several views on international situation among Western Powers. It is known, for example, that British government is more optimistic than its allies on value early summit meeting. But views did not prevent Western Powers taking common position at Geneva. Same may be said of attitudes political parties in Bonn. They, of course, have different views on attitude FRG should adopt. However, at Foreign Affairs Committee meeting yesterday opposition and coalition parties agreed that West went very far in making concessions to Soviets on Berlin and must not go any further." On this point there were not differences between those pursuing 'hard' and those pursuing 'soft' policy. This encouraging. Although it self-evident that free Berlin cannot be abandoned, it is useful to make it clear to Soviets that they err if they count on a softening up on this point."

June
29
(Unclassified)

Papers took generally firm position behind holding presidential elections Berlin July 1. Some questioned wisdom of original decision, but non available suggested removing elections from Berlin in view Soviet note which generally believed mild. Koelnische Rundschau (CDU): no reason for Soviet frowning at presidential election in Berlin. German policy clearly showed good will by postponing decision on site until after Geneva conference adjournment.

July
9
(Unclassified)

Increasingly heavy comment on forthcoming Geneva session takes decidedly serious view of East-West conflict. Little expectation of progress reflected, with considerable feeling insecurity indicated concerning future. Widespread disapproval British attitudes, with reaction ranging from patience or "let's not magnify differences" to outspoken criticism.

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July (cont.)
9
(Unclassified)

Koelnische Rundschau (CDU) urges free world, NATO and German parties to overcome minor differences and unite to face Soviet threat which overshadows Geneva like Mont Blanc. "Not only for NATO and whole Free World but also for internal differences is dead serious this sentence: Only he who does his share for self-preservation will survive Soviet threat against all." Frankfurter Neue Presse (pro-Soviet tone used by Khrushchev in Harriman talks gives rise to question whether any use resuming talks. But Khrushchev is at longer end of Berlin lever, so West has no choice but to go back to tiring talks in order postpone Soviet ultimatum deadline and extend Berlin waiting period; however, one can no longer hope for elasticity by Gromyko.

Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, Protestant Weekly): Soviets gained halfway de facto GDR recognition, expect second half recognition at second half conference. Having then gained from Foreign Ministers what they originally hoped for only at Summit, no reason for Soviets not to demand that much at Summit. Khrushchev, Koslov utterances all amount to fact threat of war no longer to be tied to single date of one ultimatum but to be constantly held over head of West like Damocles sword. Soviets not softening up on Berlin because they have foot in door. Germans can't complain because everything West offered Soviets was previously advocated in Germany. All now depends on Herter renewing leadership role which predecessor possessed at his best. One can be flexible if one is sure. If one uncertain, better to stand still -- but solidly.

July
10
(Unclassified)

FEDREP press comment re Herter press conference and Geneva. Wire service reports Herter Conference top story Right-Center Frankfurter Allgemeine today (July 10) extensive coverage Die Welt (Hamburg, Indep), moderate coverage other papers. Reports arrived too late for significant speculation today. Die Welt headlined "Herter not optimistic -- sees perhaps some possibility understanding over Berlin." Frankfurter Allgemeine sub-headlined Herter's confirmation expected post-conference Berlin visit. Lead reported Herter's emphasis on Eisenhower position of no Summit without Geneva progress.

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July
10
(Unclassified)

Significant Editorial Comment on Geneva and Herter Press Conference: Khrushchev probably will obtain his desired Summit meeting for not more than half a Soviet promise to refrain from confronting British, French, and Americans with unpleasant situation of having to prove seriousness of their pledge to keep West Berlin free. Pompous negotiation package, which Western Powers put on the conference table in May, lies forgotten in corner. Call from Germany to "de-Berlinize" Geneva Conference and to return to issues of German reunification and European security finds only a little reaction. No matter how much Western policy vacillated between toughness and softness, between pessimism and sudden confidence, Khrushchev has not let it be forgotten for one day that he is as determined as ever to deprive West Berlin of its direct protection by Western Powers.

Neue Rhein Zeitung (Cologne, pro-SPD): West goes to second phase Geneva Conference without Utopian ideas. It knows Khrushchev indeed wants Summit, but most of all Berlin. If not today, then tomorrow or day after; if not "legally", then with hope that world will be tired of burdening itself with Berlin. West also knows Moscow means its words just as hard and radical as they are constantly threateningly expressed. Nothing leads to conclusion Moscow now only seeking comfortable way out. Whoever believes that, lives under illusion Khrushchev merely blustering and will finally be amenable to persuasion.

With this situation, negotiating room at Geneva as tight as imaginable. West cannot retreat centimeter on principal questions, has already offered virtually utmost limit of technical-tactical concessions. Moscow can only extend time limits, cannot reduce goals, for example, by discontinuing creeping conquest of Berlin.

What then remains? If Geneva not to end in fiasco, all participants must agree to leave current status unchanged for foreseeable future. Such a standstill agreement would mean Khrushchev's threat loses ultimative character; then Summit would be closer. Much indication ministers can make such arrangement at Geneva. That, of course, would not yet be solution, but in our time even assurance not to undertake anything is progress. Fact is we live in epoch where problems are adjoined from crisis to crisis, solely to avoid big crash. Geneva can only confirm this thesis -- no more. But even that is worth something.

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July
13
(Unclassified)

Heavy comment re conference: Editorials predominantly pessimistic about final results, with few indications hope. Many papers expressed concern about eastern steadfastness or feeling that West about to agree to Summit without prerequisites. Koelnische Rundschau (CDU): There are about equal dangers now coming from Eastern aggressiveness and signs of West getting tired. Frankfurter Neue Presse (pro-Gov): Standstill agreement West is expected to propose provides another -- though minor -- retreat in Berlin in return for nothing except ultimatum extension. For granting West respite in Berlin, Khrushchev to be given two additional bonuses: West pledge to restrict propaganda in Berlin and renounce stationing nuclear weapons there, and establishment of all-German Commission tantamount to de facto GDR recognition. West obviously has tacitly renounced aim to change status quo in Europe. Even Eisenhower no longer opposed to Summit. Policy of yielding, which Macmillan persistently advocates and which is gaining in US, will possibly lead to summit and de facto recognition of colonial empire USSR established in heart Europe. And all this is called realistic policy... Der Mittag (Duesseldorf, Right-Center): Even in Washington there are political observers who believe Eisenhower will, eventually yield to Soviet pressure. Die Welt (Hamburg, Indep): Perhaps Khrushchev playing with idea of intensifying Berlin crisis to force West to Summit without Eastern concessions. Bremer Nachrichten (Indep): Germans on both sides of iron curtain view second part of conference with even greater skepticism than they displayed toward first part. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich, Left-Center) and Frankfurter Rundschau (pro-SPD) however emphasized importance of continuing negotiations. Westdeutsche Allgemeine (Essen, Indep) and Sueddeutsche Zeitung believed that real Soviet goal is not Berlin, but neutralizing FEDREP or bolstering GDR; others disagreed.

Almost only optimistic comment in Allgemeine Zeitung (Mainz, Indep) which argued: Khrushchev probably unable implement seven year plan unless he eases armament burden on USSR. Therefore wind not blowing against West. Rather time works for West, provided it holds its own in coming East-West negotiations, even if they last years.

July
15
(Unclassified)

Allegation of Western disunity, doubt about West's firmness and confusion as to West's (and even East's) negotiating position continues to produce heavy editorial coverage of overwhelming pessimistic nature. News on Geneva stressed intra-Western discord.

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July (cont.)
15
(Unclassified)

Tone of press typified by following: Frankfurter Allgemeine (Right-Center): Geneva faced insoluble problem from beginning: West wants keep Berlin, Soviets want take it. Task tantamount to finding compromise between fire and water. If Berlin only subject, negotiations useless; nothing to negotiate. Better than Western offer of negotiation would have been statement to effect "if you want city, why don't you take it?" It should be remembered many wars started because certain powers failed to state clearly and convincingly certain things could not be had by another power without war. If Soviets want war anyway -- which we do not assert -- Berlin in abandonment would start it.

Most papers refused believe McCloy's talks with Brandt and Adenauer "purely private." Widespread speculation, McCloy had come to break bad tidings about US policy. Muenchener Merkur (pro-Gov) philosophized: Bruce and McCloy perhaps tried make Adenauer realize West must make a few concessions, most painful of which might be time limit to Berlin's present status and recognition of Sovzone regime.

July
16
(Unclassified)

Despite continuing serious concern over negotiations, papers give less panicky impression today (July 16). At least some slight alleviation of fears of possible allied compromise unacceptable to Germans, indicated by decreased comment and by calm tone of such papers as Frankfurter Allgemeine (Right-Center), although no corresponding increase in optimism that conference will achieve results. Despite absence of direct comment, news treatment of Eisenhower press conference implies this had reassuring effect. Comment on Geneva continues to talk of FEDREP differences with allies, but interpretation of McCloy visit markedly more reassuring than yesterday's comments.

July
20
(Unclassified)

Papers generally took summit conference for granted, but differed on Western policy. Muenchener Merkur (pro-Gov) claimed Western tactical disunity compensated for by satisfactory teamwork and "Western consensus that neither Berlin freedom nor future of free Germany must be imperiled," but pro-SPD Westfaelische Rundschau (Dortmund) and Hannoversche Presse warned West would come to agreement with Soviets despite Bonn. Former inferred this meant Bonn-Pankow talks, implying GDR recognition, but latter implied West preparing for "final withdrawal" from Berlin. Although Deutsche Zeitung (Cologne, pro-CDU) and Stuttgarter Nachrichten (Indep) criticized FEDREP tactics as having contributed to difficulty, no pro-Gov or Indep papers took position similar to above pro-SPD comments.

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July
23
(Unclassified)

FEDREP Press Comment on Geneva and Related Matters: Most commenting papers interpreted Eisenhower's press conference remarks as warning to USSR not to underestimate seriousness of crisis conjured up by Soviets and determination of West to protect its Berlin rights (Koelnische Rundschau, CDU; Deutsche Zeitung, Cologne, pro-CDU; Neue Rhein Zeitung (Cologne, pro-SPD). But Der Mittag (Dusseldorf, Right-Center) said when Khrushchev acts so rudely, Eisenhower should express himself "realistically and more heroically," adding "when will West finally quit defensive and attack?"

July
24
(Unclassified)

Heavy editorial comment on international situation. All commenting papers interpreted Warsaw communique and Khrushchev's Moscow remarks as deliberate attempt intensify tensions, but most papers implied he was paradoxically still interested in Summit. Several papers believed action intended to torpedo Geneva Conference. Many talked of a new Berlin crisis.

July
27
(Unclassified)

Moderately Heavy Comment on Nixon Tour and Herter Berlin visit, light comment on Geneva negotiations. Westfaelische Rundschau (Dortmund, pro-SPD): From Soviet viewpoint, requests for abolition Berlin "occupation" regime and establishment all-German committee not illogical. Abnormal Berlin status will have to be changed some day. Breakup of Geneva conference now would shorten road to disaster and deprive West of possibility of controlling developments from conference table. What turn would conference have taken if FEDGOV had been ready for policy of detente and European armament reduction instead of continuing integrating FEDREP more and more into NATO? Any schoolboy knows there will be no reunification under NATO. What then is to result from Geneva but final confirmation of partition?

Die Welt (Hamburg, Indep) called on FEDGOV to make clear even to man-in-the-street why it opposes all-German committee; or else failure to understand opposition to seemingly reasonable suggestion that Germans should meet Germans to reunite Fatherland may become dangerous to FEDREP. Almost always better to say "yes, but..." than "no" to opponent's proposal.

All commentaries on Herter Berlin visit emphasized reassuring effect on Berliners and Herter's pleasant "surprise" at spontaneous Berlin support.

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July (cont.) Frankfurter Allgemeine (Right-Center) criticized Mayor Brandt for "inter-administrative committee" proposal, both as to content and procedure. Committee, unless Four-Power sponsorship, could give Pankow diplomatic recognition without progress toward German reunification. Moreover fact that Brandt informed Herter of plan without going through Bonn might give impression Berlin pursuing own foreign policy as if it were "free city" Soviets want to make it.

July 31 (Unclassified) FEDREP Press Comment on Geneva and Related Matters: Heavy editorial comment lauded Herter for deciding to terminate the Conference and strongly rejected Soviet terms as a basis for further negotiations. The non-aggression pact idea found its strongest positive echo to date. Pro-Mixon editorials continued to outnumber critical ones.

The general reaction to Soviet working paper was exemplified by Frankfurter Allgemeine (right-center): Latest Soviet paper practically amounts to a cheeky and brutal reiteration of the Berlin ultimatum. Implementation of Soviet requests would actually convert Berlin into a "free city," i.e., a city deprived of its freedoms and most of its protective military forces. It also provides for an all-German committee and now four-power negotiations in eighteen months if the committee fails to agree. In other words, by Christmas 1960 Moscow will again point a pistol at the West after having meanwhile kept pointing it at the West German representatives in the all-German committee in an attempt to make them accept Soviet peace treaty plans and reunification under Ulbricht. The demands clearly indicate Moscow's cold determination to strangle both Berlin and Germany. The demands are unacceptable, and the clearer the West makes this to the Soviets at Geneva, the less will be the danger of misunderstandings in Moscow.

Dio Welt (Hamburg, independent), and other papers similarly, said: Herter is to be lauded for establishing a time limit. Unlike the Russians, he did not combine it with a threat. Herter made it clear the West is not ready to indefinitely continue fruitless talks under pressure of Soviet threats. It is urgently necessary that this be made clear, not only because Geneva farce beginning to affect the dignity and prestige of the Western Foreign Ministers--but more important--because there is a danger that the Western Powers, in efforts to reach agreement with the Soviets, may be inclined to make too many concessions. The move is also courageous

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July (Cont.) 31 (Unclassified)

because Herter defied the danger of Soviets attempting to blame him for the fruitless end of the negotiations. Khrushchev wants a summit and presses for changes in Berlin, so it's Moscow's turn to make the next move. He probably will not start aggression because he wants to meet Eisenhower. If he attempts a blackmail maneuver, the West should not buckle, because one cannot protect oneself against robbers and blackmailers by yielding to their demands.

Koelnische Rundschau (CDU): The Soviet "rhet" policy compels West to forget its differences for the sake of self-preservation.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich, left-center): Khrushchev's real aim is the legalization of existing spheres of influence by an international agreement, to replace the questionable Potsdam documents.

A pessimistic "naguet-on-both-your-houses" editorial in Frankfurter Rundschau (pro-SFD) asked: Can the West back Berlin troop strength without incurring the Berliners' vehement opposition? Can it admit to propaganda and subversive activities directed from West Berlin? Can it now to defer GDR recognition beyond the eighteen-month term proposed by Moscow?

On non-aggression the Stuttgarter Zeitung (independent) said that by failing to acknowledge the existence of Poland and Czechoslovakia, we refuse to see historical facts. They will have their say when peace treaty re-establishes Germany. Discarding the Hallstein doctrine, we do not give up our rights. Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (Heidelberg, pro-government) and Frankfurter Allgemeine also endorsed facts.

August 4 (Official Use Only)

Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits received maximum coverage. Some major papers devoted most of the front page plus many inside page stories to the news. The West German Government expressed the hope that the visits will pave the way for settlement of the German and Berlin questions. Adenauer said: "I hope Khrushchev's visit to the US will convince him of the strength of the US and the fact that it is determined to maintain peace and freedom in the world." Government circles said the great advantage of these visits is the fact that they are not under time pressure like the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Bonn did not consider visits as a substitute for a possible summit meeting; instead, they could only create prerequisites for a summit meeting. Nixon's

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August (Cont.)
4
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Use Only)

successful tour in the USSR and his friendly reception in Poland had dissolved previous doubts about Moscow-Washington talks. The Chancellor knew, the sources added, that in the US the Khrushchev visit is considered a happy bridging of the vacuum following the fruitless end of the Geneva Conference. The Chancellor also strongly supported a Western summit meeting before the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting.

Deputy Berlin Mayor Amrehn said: Berlin is thankful for every initiative that would serve the true lessening of tension among the great powers". The Social Democratic party made a similar official statement. The free democrats also welcomed the news, but warned against expectations that the two leaders would seriously attempt to solve the German question.

The heavy press comment on the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits reflected considerable differences of opinion. Virtually all editorials considered the invitations a Khrushchev success. The papers also agreed it meant a Berlin respite. But differences were evident concerning the desirability and probable results of big two talks.

The strongest critic was Der Mittag (Duesseldorf, right-center): Khrushchev achieved his goal; not without bitterness we note that that is the way to achieve something. Western policy remains defensive, Communist policy aggressive. Whether the visit will produce progress is of subordinate significance. Decisive alone is the fact that Khrushchev's initiative was successful and that West had no choice but to comply. It is not yet clear whether there is reason for Bonn to be concerned. Theoretically, East-West agreement over the heads of the Germans is possible, but, practically, it is out of place. Even from US viewpoint it would be unwise to leave the Germans in the lurch. This would be the surest way to push the Germans into neutralism where they would become a prey of Communism. Reconciliation between East and West is bound to come some day. The task of Bonn foreign policy is to prevent reconciliation at Germany's expense.

Koelnische Rundschau (CDU): There must have been striking reasons for the Eisenhower decision which would probably have caused Dulles to take similar action. The summit meeting proposed by Macmillan seemed to be uncomfortable under present circumstances because it would be more committal

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August (Cont.)
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Use Only)

than Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks. Eisenhower will not ignore the captive nations nor will he ride rough-shod over German and European interests. "To promote peace" cannot mean to legalize injustice and slavery.

Frankfurter Allgemeine (right-center): It is hard to applaud if one sees in this new method merely a result of the failure of old methods which seemed more reasonable. There may be advantages to giving Khrushchev an opportunity to see the US with his own eyes, but there are also dangers involved in this method, especially if applied by a democracy.

Die Welt (Hamburg, independent): All efforts by the Soviets in recent years, from developing long-range missiles and Sputniks to starting crises in the Near East, were aimed at achieving bilateral talks. But only the Berlin move did the trick. Berlin and the German problem brought about talks but they will not be the dominating subjects. Settlement of the German problem alone cannot bring about an international detente but a detente may very well lead to the settlement of the German problem. We have the greatest confidence that US policy will continue to support our cause and be sure that the USSR will be ready to agree to a solution acceptable to the whole German people.

General-Anzeiger (Bonn, independent): After the Geneva failure, something had to happen. The invitation to Khrushchev is a flight ahead, a test of whether a way out of the darkness can be found in personal talks after the failure of all international conferences. He who nourishes such hopes does not like being told that any discussion with Khrushchev is bound to fail. It is wise of Adenauer to accept the news with grace and approve US-Soviet travel plans.

Neue Rhein Zeitung (Cologne, pro-SPD): No one will welcome this history-making event emphatically. He who hopes that a "two-man summit" will cut the Gordian knot will be disappointed. Its purpose is not to negotiate, but to open the eyes of the visitor, to show him what the other nation wants, how it lives and what power it represents. Khrushchev has frequently proved his ideas about the US are dangerously wrong. He now has a chance to correct them.

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August
5
(Official
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West German Press Comment on East-West Relations: Press on US-USSR exchange of visits, and East-West relations generally, reflected mixed but predominantly unenthusiastic reaction, although papers concede a favorable popular response. Most papers agreed that Eisenhower could be trusted to defend the Allies' interests. Nevertheless, several papers lamented that the world's fate is being determined without European participation. Most papers felt that the turn of events was reason for optimism but not Western satisfaction. Only a few displayed confidence that the visits signalled real improvement in the international climate.

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June
26
(Official
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US Mission Berlin Review of West Berlin Press, June 22-26: Willy Brandt foreign policy statement: All West papers headlined and covered fully Brandt's June 25 proposals to Berlin House of Representatives. Initial West press editorial reaction commented favorably on various aspects of Brandt speech. Der Tagesspiegel (independent) thought West had gone to "brink of the bearable" in its Geneva proposals, agreed with Brandt that West should not have agreed to isolated discussions on Berlin, thought Brandt's commission proposal should be considered, and agreed that presence of Berlin expert in Federal Republic delegation to Geneva a good idea. Der Tag (CDU) endorsed idea of Berlin House discussing foreign policy even though Bundestag had refrained. Der Tag also thought that Brandt was right in suggesting increased participation of Berlin representatives in resumed Geneva Conference. Telegraf (SPD) applauded Brandt's statement and thought his proposal should be given to West Powers so they could be offered at Geneva.

Geneva Conference: West press gave heavy frontpage coverage to aftermath of Conference and developments during the week. West press prominently reported Secretary Wenter's statement that West will never compromise freedom of West Berliners as well as later statements to same effect by Macmillan and Lloyd.

Financial aid to Berlin: West press featured prominently and favorably promise by Chairman Fritz Berg of Association of Germany Industry that Berlin could expect increased economic assistance from Federal Republic during coming months and statement that Federal Republic will place 500 million marks more orders in West Berlin this year than last.

Presidential election in West Berlin: West papers in news reports and editorials indicated belief that East will not interfere with Bundestag access to Berlin during Presidential election on July 1 despite Eisler's earlier threat. West Nachdenkchen (SPD) noted that Gindermann, CDU Central Committee propagandist, said over East television that the election "will neither disturb us nor the Geneva Conference. Die Welt (independent) June 26 carried report that East Berlin Soviet Embassy spokesman said election an "unnecessary provocation" but that "in his opinion the Soviet Union and GDR do not follow Federal Republic policy of aggravating existing tensions".

Secretary Wenter to visit West Berlin: West papers reported Mayor Brandt's statement that Secretary Wenter planned to visit West Berlin "at appropriate time" after the resumption of the Conference.

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June
30
(Official
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U.S. Mission Berlin Report of West-Berlin Press Comment:
West Berlin press in four days preceding election Federal president gave moderately heavy play various issues involved. West papers covered Gromyko remarks and Soviet notes objecting to Berlin as election site and frontpaged allied rejection this Soviet position. Der Tag (CDU) and Telegraf (SPD) reported "relaxed attitude" Berlin senate toward "relatively mild" Sov remonstrances against holding election in Berlin. West press in general discounted possibility Sov/DDR action against delegates traveling to and from Berlin. Papers also reported election maneuvers of German political parties and challenge to Berlin voting rights made by Fedrep Interior Minister Schroeder in letter to Gerstenmaier.

Editorially, B.Z. (indep) decried Sov opposition to holding presidential election in Berlin as interference in German domestic affairs. Die Welt (indep) approved Fedrep decision not to challenge legality of election, despite Schroeder's objection to counting Berlin votes. Spandauer Volksblatt (indep) expressed opinion that Khrushchev's offensive against Berlin as election site stemmed from his need for foreign policy successes and that Sov appearance of strength conceivably belied by cracks below monolithic surface totalitarian state.

July
3
(Official
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U.S. Mission Berlin Review of West Berlin Press, June 27 - July 3: Presidential election: Heavy election coverage throughout week trailed off into reports of international reaction to Luebbe's victory and new version of allied approach to Gerstenmaier. According this version, appearing only in Der Tag (CDU) and Tagesspiegel (Indep), Allies attempted prevail on Gerstenmaier, through intermediary Brandt, to conduct election exactly as in 1954 and to make no specific reference to status Berlin. Tagesspiegel reported Allies displeased both because no separate voting urn for Berlin as in 1954 and because Gerstenmaier made legal argument that Berlin a land of Fedrep though one in which Allies held supreme power.

Geneva Conference: Interest in conference revived as reconvening date approached with West press generally pessimistic over prospects Sov reasonableness. This attitude fostered by 1) reports July 2 Couve de Murville statement to effect that *modus vivendi* in Berlin best that could be hoped for; 2) coverage of Khrushchev-Harriman conversations; and 3) analysis of Gromyko statement of June 28.

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July (continued)
3
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Kozlov visit: Details of visit covered fully, perhaps a bit anxiously, by West press. All papers charged Nixon warning to Kozlov against underestimating American unity in foreign affairs, particularly re Berlin. Tagesspiegel also played Kozlov threats in TV speech to conclude separate treaty with Pankov and counter with force any western effort force access to Berlin.

July
11
(Official Use
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U.S. Mission Berlin Review of West Berlin Press, July 8-11: Secretariat Herter's press conference: West press Friday reported extensively Secretary Herter's remarks on prospects at Geneva. Papers also reported Herter plans visit Berlin after conference, and quoted Secretary saying: "I am not sure how Berliners will receive me . . . they may be dissatisfied with results conference." No Friday editorial. Today's press makes no further mention press conference. Only editorial appears in Spandauer Volksblatt (Indep), which asked: "Does Herter statement mean that Allies ready to grant Soviets even more far-reaching concessions than heretofore?" Paper warned if democratic rights of Berlin curtailed, hardly any country in western defense would in future fully trust Allied declarations of guarantee and support.

Geneva conference: Telegraf (SPD) and others today quoted "London circles" as disclosing Soviets have confidentially assured British they would "freeze" Berlin rights of occupation forces until 1961 thus giving Allies time to work out new Berlin agreement without limitations their occupation rights. Die Welt (Indep) said British confident a quiet meeting will convene within two months.

July
14
(Official
Use Only)

Geneva conference: All papers headlined opening session and reported fully statements Herter and Gromyko. West papers also quoted Senator Humphrey's statement American people determined to stand by Berlin; cited Harriman's remark he convinced Khrushchev will not insist on eastern withdrawal from Berlin if West gives SR some kind of recognition, which Harriman reportedly advocated, and reported Brucker's statement U.S. has power and will fight and win if pressed too far by Sovs.

Most papers editorialized on second phase conference with emphasis of Western demands for written assurance Sovs will not take unilateral action following expiration any

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July (continued)
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Use Only)

provisional Berlin settlement. Der Tagesspiegel (Indep) thought written assurance would meet West's major summit requirement, but warned that pressure for summit meeting soon might cause West "make more concessions." Since western readiness make concessions already "very great," paper proffered Fomins not try for quick Berlin settlement but rather make recommendations to government heads for their decision at Summit. Der Tag (CDU) thought it "amazing" West now showing readiness for summit after repeatedly saying there could be no summit without Berlin settlement. Der Kurier (CDU) thought conference second phase might produce procedural compromise leading to summit but advised West not to agree unless Soviets give written guarantee on Berlin. Paper pointed out it not only Berlin at stake but that western weakness in defense of freedom would encourage Sov expansionism seek new point of attack elsewhere. Nachtedespeche (SPD) felt summit conference would bring durable results only if West halted Communist expansion and made West Berlin "Khrushchev-free zone."

July
21
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Geneva conference: Cancellation Khrushchev Scandinavian tour monopolized West Press headlines, but most papers also prominently front-paged conference developments. Papers gave main emphasis to western hardy proposal and its rejection by East (see East Press). Press also noted Bronyko statement he will study proposal carefully. Most papers carried Geneva dispatches reporting Secretary Herter had written Mayor Brandt saying he would like to visit Berlin Sunday if conference permits. Papers said Herter planned stay 24 hours and would be accompanied by Von Brentano. All papers reported Mayor Brandt's press conference.

July
22
(Official
Use Only)

Herter visit Berlin. All papers headlined or prominently front-paged Secretary's visit, one paper headlining: "Big Day for Berlin." Reports from Geneva say Fedrep delegation welcomes trip as reaffirmation American interest freedom and security Berlin.

Geneva conference: Two papers headlined and others prominently front-paged reports no progress made yesterday and West Fomins considering conference, break-off or recess because of unrelenting attitude Soviets. Telegraf (SPD) bannerlined "Eisenhower Fears New Blockade Berlin," reported President so pessimistic he expects new blockade.

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July (continued)
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Telegraf editorialized its belief that in Soviet's reported views and pessimistic western reports from Geneva are factors moves which do not mean conference will actually be broken off. All other Berlin papers editorializing on Geneva took gloomy view, exemplified by Berliner Zeitung (Indep) conclusion "conference has reached deadlock; only miracle can save it." Both Der Tag (CDU) and Spreitauer Volksblatt (Indep) wondered if Kremlin realizes West has reached limit in concessions. Volksblatt asked why West should try price for its right to hold Berlin and said: "When Secretary Herter comes to our distressed city ... he will feel our sorrows but also our firm will not to give in to Soviet threats."

July
23
(Official
Use Only)

President's press conference: Three papers headlined and others prominently front-paged President Eisenhower's press conference statements on Berlin situation. Telegraf (SPD) banner headlined: "Eisenhower Clarifies Berlin Situation" and followed with report that President in press conference had reiterated his view on Berlin and Monday to small group press representatives. President concentrated on President's statement and will not limit counter-measures to airlift if Soviet will not limit. and also on President's pessimism regarding conference prospects. Telegraf editorialized that President's statement and realistic evaluation of over-all situation and Berlin "shock therapy" but in view his statement and Berlin blockade, Berliners have no cause to be alarmed. In July 22 Telegraf treatment, Der Tagesspiegel (Indep) in editorial that President's remarks misinterpreted by press of German press. Tagesspiegel said it had been afraid to presume President was trying to frighten public rather than purpose was to remind Khrushchev of full extent of Berlin blockade and thereby prevent "over-escalation." Der Tag (CDU) and Der Abend (Indep) welcomed President's statement, US not limiting itself to airlift and said that Berliners need be concerned.

Mayor Arndt statement: One paper headlined and others prominently reported Arndt's press statement that present cause for fear despite difficult Berlin situation. Referring to President Eisenhower's reported remarks on blockade possibility (e.g., July 22 Telegraf article), Arndt emphasized it naturally busy every day and will consider all conceivable contingencies in order to prevent meet them. For this reason, he said, Berliners need not be concerned.

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July (Cont.)

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(Official
Use Only)

stockpiled heavily to meet blockade contingency. Moreover, knowledge of existence these ample supplies renders new blockade more improbable.

Geneva conference: Several papers headlined and others front-paged conference developments. All emphasized Secretary Herter's statement Sovs trying use Berliners as pawns to force all Germany to communism. Papers welcomed Western firmness with Morgenpost (INDEP) commenting it had reduced danger Khrushchev trying obtain by force what was being refused him in Geneva. Spandauer Volksblatt (INDEP) judged present situation almost hopeless and suggested another recess to allow Sovs re-assess situation.

July
25-26(Official
Use Only)

Herter Visit: All Sunday papers headlined and gave Secretary's visit very full news and photo coverage. Saturday press welcomed Secretary as friend of Berlin and gave details his schedule.

Geneva conference: Saturday press covered conference developments prominently. Sunday news coverage slight but editorial comments prominent. Sunday papers emphasized Gromyko still comment heavy. Saturday papers emphasized Gromyko still linking interim Berlin solution with all-German committee. Der Tag (CDU) quoted "reliable sources" as saying two members GDR delegation Geneva, one high-ranking, had informed FedRep delegation they would defect to West German side "under certain (unspecified) conditions."

Most papers discussed Khrushchev's statements, President Eisenhower's press conference, Vice President Nixon's activities Moscow and Secretary Herter's visit in their wide-ranging and generally inconclusive editorials on Geneva conference.

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August

1
(Official
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West Berlin press reported prominently today that Governing Mayor Brandt "highly gratified" after conversation with Secretary Herter and Fomin Von Brentano at latter's Friday luncheon in Geneva. Herter reportedly told Brandt that assurances given in Berlin speech last week are "completely valid" and were made with full agreement of other two allies. Brandt quoted as saying that any misgivings over Western position that may have existed have been accomplished, papers reported. Brandt reportedly expected to fly to Berlin on Sunday, report to Senat, and then return to Bavarian vacation spot.

Today's Berlin edition of Die Welt frontpaged exclusive interview with Brandt in Munich before his trip to Geneva in which Brandt expressed criticism of current Western position, especially five-year time limit. Brandt quoted as saying that Western side has no more negotiating room and that Western proposal offering a five-year Berlin interim agreement represents extension going even further than June 16 proposals. Brandt reported as speaking with bitterness about "time limit" issue, forecasting a possible compromise between 18 months and five years. Brandt denied possibility of another crisis over Berlin after expiration of time limit and questioned whether allied rights in Berlin could be any stronger then and whether West German industry would be justified in supporting Berlin in face of new insecurity of time limit.

August

2
(Official
Use Only)

Geneva Conference: All papers Saturday led with or gave prominent coverage to Secretary Herter's reassurances to Mayor Willy Brandt and also emphasized Brandt's remark that "any conceivable concern" over Western attitude now removed. Sunday press noted Brandt as saying that he did not consider unilateral Soviet action likely in near future. In special Telegraf (SH) interview reported from Geneva, Brandt expressed satisfaction with Western determination as conference second phase neared end. Mayor thought four power discussions regarding Berlin probably would be resumed at some later date. In editorial comment papers generally thought conference would recess without agreement but that third phase could be expected. Der Tagesspiegel (Indep) editor Silex said main concern all Berliners - East and West - was that West might reduce strength of troops protecting city and remarked, "if Berliners had choice between Western troop cut and formation German administrative committee in framework so-called small solution, they would veto troop withdrawal." Telegraf editorially questioned necessity for calling Brandt to Geneva in view Secretary Herter's recent assurances in Berlin.

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August (Cont.)2
(Official
Use Only)

Khrushchev Visit to US: Late Saturday and Sunday papers all gave prominent coverage reports that invitation to Khrushchev to visit U.S. expected shortly. In light editorial comment, Die Welt Am Sonntag (Indep) thought expected visit would give world new hope, but Berliner Morgenpost (Indep) doubted that Khrushchev's visit could "set things right in Communist brains." Telegraf expressed opinion that Khrushchev visit to U.S. would temporarily make aggravation of Berlin crisis unlikely.

August10
(Official
Use Only)

Berlin Press Reaction to Eisenhower-Khrushchev Trips: Papers here playing on themes not contained in West German press as reported by Embassy Bonn; subject being given straight news coverage. In general Berlin press gratified that continuing despite from threat of Sov Bloc action being afforded by scheduled high level conversations.

Monday morning press headlined news that Eisenhower, now coming to Bonn noting this first American President to visit German capital for discussions with German head of Government. No editorial reaction as yet to this development.

Afternoon paper Der Abend (Indep) reports Berlin Mayor Brandt prepared fly Bonn August 27 for Eisenhower visit. Article adds Brandt has received no such invitation yet.

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July
29
(Official
Use Only)

US Mission Berlin Review of West Berlin Press: The majority of the press headlined Tuesday's Western proposal for an interim solution on Berlin and emphasized the provision for re-examining an agreement after about five years if Germany not previously reunited. The press reported that Western rights would continue after the termination of the five-year period. The papers also said that the Western proposal provided for UN observers to supervise the implementation of possible agreement on the discontinuation of propaganda activities in both parts of the city. Der Tagesspiegel (Independent) Geneva correspondent said the Western proposal was designed to serve the following purposes: (1) To elicit a written Gromyko response revealing if he is insistent on linking an interim Berlin solution with the all-German committee; (2) to establish a unified Western position to be maintained in future talks with the Soviets. Secretary play was given to the Soviets' Tuesday proposal. Telegraf (Indep) reported that the Soviets for the first time demanded a reduction of Western forces in Berlin from 11,000 to 3 to 4,000. Der Tag (CDU) said the Soviet document no longer insists on the formation of an all-German committee with an equal number of West and East Germans.

The three papers editorialized on Conference developments. Telegraf said it was too early to draw conclusions from the document exchange but thought the situation was now more flexible. Brandauer Volksblatt (Independent) thought the new proposals may have "opened the door to genuine negotiations" looking toward an interim solution in Berlin. Berliner Zeitung (Independent) thought the Conference would be useful if only it succeeded in convincing Gromyko of the West's seriousness on a Berlin guaranty. The paper also thought that Khrushchev should be invited to the US in order to correct his wrong ideas about that country.

July
31
(Official
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Most papers led with or gave prominent front page coverage to Mayor Willy Brandt's sudden trip to Geneva. Der Tagesspiegel (Independent) said the Berlin Mayor could be expected to intervene with the Western Foreign Ministers if the event they decided to make concessions going beyond the June 16 proposal. The papers also reported that Brandt would today hand Secretary Rortke a "Federal Republic aide-memoire on Conference developments of the last 48 hours. According to press reports, the Federal Republic feared that Gromyko might make a last minute concession which would prompt the West to make counter-concessions on troop strength and "subversive activities" in Berlin.

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In editorial comment, Der Tagesspiegel and Berliner Morgenpost (independent) both spoke out very strongly against any new Western concessions and particularly against reduction of force levels in Berlin. Der Tagesspiegel noted that "previous Western concessions" already had reached the "limit of bearability" as regards Berlin's freedom and security. Telegraf (pro-SPD) warned the West to be prepared for Gromyko dropping the linkage of Berlin with the all-German committee and then attempting to place blame on the West for Conference failure. Die Welt (independent) praised Herter for his "courageous deed" in setting a time limit to the Geneva talks and making clear that the West was "not willing to continue useless talks indefinitely under the pressure of Soviet threats."

August
3
(Official
Use Only)

Monday papers played up the imminent US invitation to Khrushchev with Die Welt (independent) citing "well-informed Western delegation circles Geneva" as confirming that their governments were queried and have already agreed to Khrushchev's trip to America in the near future. Two papers mentioned this report in connection with the possibility of Western summit meeting prior to the Khrushchev visit. Berliner Montagsecho (FDV) however led with an AP report that the White House Sunday declined to comment on an invitation to Khrushchev. According to the report, the White House reserve was probably induced by the Tass statement (on the eve of Nixon's departure) declaring US-Soviet friendship dependent on the abolition of American foreign bases.

Commenting editorially on the Geneva Conference Die Welt declared that the Geneva negotiations are "no longer decisive" because of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting and the prospective scope of their deliberations. The paper welcomed this development since talks centering solely on Germany and Berlin carried the risk that too many Western concessions might be made in order to attain a summit conference. Berliner Zeitung (independent) remarked that the "conference is dying slowly and painlessly. It is immaterial if it is broken off or merely interrupted." The paper predicted that East-West talks would continue for a long time and on various levels.

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August (Cont.)
3
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The forthcoming Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange of visits was top news in all papers and the chief subject of editorial comment. The press reported that West Berlin officials welcomed news of visits. Most papers were of the opinion that the meeting of the two leaders might help to improve East-West relations and perhaps relax international tension. In an editorial entitled "possible turning point," Der Tagesspiegel (independent) thought it hard to imagine that after Khrushchev-Eisenhower visits there would be "no change in East-West relations. The paper observed, however, that by skillful and risky game Khrushchev had successfully parlayed his ultimatum into a face-to-face meeting with Eisenhower. Berliner Morgenpost (independent) commented editorially that as long as the top leaders are talking the situation cannot worsen, nor can the Geneva Conference end in complete failure. Der Tag (CDU) called the extension of the invitation a "realistic political move" and remarked that if Eisenhower could make clear to Khrushchev that aggression would be firmly resisted, their September meeting would be the world's "greatest service to peace." Telegraf (SPD) thought direct Soviet-US talks might bring about a change in the handling of the Berlin question.

Most papers reverted on inside pages that the Geneva Conference was "sinking back into shadows" and would end with Wednesday's plenary session. Der Tagesspiegel quoted the West German Conference delegates as saying that the West had accomplished the following at Geneva: (1) eliminated the immediate threat of the Soviet Berlin ultimatum, (2) frustrated attempts to form an all-German body with Soviet non-parity, (3) despite some divergencies and disagreement, maintained a common Western position on Berlin.

August
6
(Official
Use Only)

The windup of the Geneva Conference was top news in several papers and received prominent coverage in all others. West papers carried the full text of the communiqué and Der Tagesspiegel gave particularly full coverage to the final speech by Herter.

In editorial comment Der Tagesspiegel (independent) remarked "to Berliners, the meager final communiqué means that for the time being nothing will change and everything will remain as is." In this connection the paper expressed satisfaction that neither the Soviet plan nor the Western-proposed interim solution was accepted, particularly because in the opinion of chief editor the West plan contained the seeds of possible deterioration of Berlin's position. Berliner Morgenpost (independent) commented that the communiqué does

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not make anyone unhappy except the Soviet Zone Foreign Minister Bolz," who is going home with empty hands. The decisive result of the Conference, the paper said, was that the West had not made any rash concessions and had remained "firm and united on all basic issues"; "no result is better than a bad result and no compromise is better than a poor compromise."

Die Welt (independent) was pleased that the Foreign Ministers had successfully "sat out" the Berlin crisis, and now had an opportunity to find "new starting points" by way of "mutual visits, a summit meeting, and new disarmament talks." Telegraf (SPD) asserted that in the last few meetings at Geneva the West had seemed to be coming more and more around to the Soviet view that there should be a time limit on an interim solution for West Berlin. In spite of this, however, the paper felt that Berliners should be "satisfied with the present 'standstill.'" Der Tag (CDU) said the Conference had frustrated the aim of the Soviets to shatter Western unity by utilizing the Berlin question as a wedge directed against the Federal Republic.

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July
22
(Official
Use Only)

Broadcast Summary of Swiss Press Comments: Commenting on the Geneva Conference, the Zurich paper Die Tat (Independent Party) notes on July 22 that the Western Powers have managed quite successfully to whittle down the original Russian plan. Successful as this tactic may have been, it nevertheless has its hidden pitfalls. These will become apparent when Khrushchev, who so far has been watching this process with concealed anger, suddenly loses his patience, a possibility which certainly must be taken into account in view of the unmotivated cancellation of his Scandinavian visit.

Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Independent, influential) believes that one of the reasons for the cancellation is Khrushchev's state of health. According to Western observers Khrushchev is giving the impression of a tired and sick man during his current tour of Poland. A more important reason, however, may be that Khrushchev's latest move against USSR "managers," consisting in the setting up of party commissions in the enterprises, may have caused serious domestic troubles necessitating his presence at home. Also, there are still certain tensions and unrest in Soviet society noticeable behind the mendacious facade of the Soviet system which make a visit to foreign countries appear inadvisable at the present time, especially since his enemies once before prepared a blow against him when he stayed in Finland in the summer of 1957.

Basler Nachrichten (Moderate conservative) wonders whether Khrushchev's visit to Poland really has been successful. For the past two days his doings in Poland have been surrounded by mystery, and it is possible that the Soviet leader wanted to gain some breathing space by issuing the memorandums against the Scandinavian states.

Under the headline, "In the Blind Alley," Journal de Geneve (Moderate conservative) maintains that it can hardly be assured that the Soviets will renounce an all-German commitment. They created the Berlin crisis as an instrument for strengthening Pankow's position, and they certainly will not accept the Western plan which allocates a secondary role to the GDR.

Gazette de Lausanne (Moderate conservative) says that Soviet policy in Europe is determined by the desire to secure the Soviet borders and those of the Soviet satellites, so that Moscow can carry out its vast economic program. In accordance with this desire the Soviet Union is strongly interested in establishing neutral zones around its borders in Europe and the Near East.

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July
30
(Official
Use Only)

Broadcast Summary of Swiss Press Comments: The German correspondent of Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Independent, influential) commenting about European integration, writes on July 30 that Germany's close alliance with France has produced dividends, particularly in Geneva. The need to have a decisive say in world political decisions has also reawakened enthusiasm for European political integration in Italy and Belgium. Neue Zürcher Zeitung believes that these facts could contribute to a strengthening of the foreign policy of the continental European community of interests so that it may gain more weight, especially on the German question, in negotiations with the Soviet Union. This policy would be much more in conformity with continental interests, and it is not believed that Macmillan is the man to be entrusted with representing this policy.

Journal de Genève (Moderate conservative) is of the opinion that there will be a summit conference at the beginning of September. Certain decisions, for example the one relative to the duration of the interim regime in Berlin, can only be taken by government chiefs. In view of Nixon's remarks in the Soviet Union, it can be assumed that President Eisenhower may be ready to agree to a summit conference even if the conditions which he had stipulated for such a conference are not fulfilled. However, in case the summit conference should take place, the Western Allies ought to get together beforehand and iron out their differences. For this reason talks between Eisenhower, Macmillan, and De Gaulle are absolutely necessary because their position in negotiations with Khrushchev would be stronger if they were first to settle the differences that divide them.

Journal de Genève continues that it is not unknown that the English feel that certain of General de Gaulle's initiatives have insulted them. They have the impression that France wants to force England off the continent and that the common market is an attempt to create a political community which will be headed by General de Gaulle.

August
5
(Unclassified)

USIA Report of Swiss Press Comment: La Suisse (Unaffiliated) July 31 says limited agreement on Berlin appears little probable because of Gromyko's insistence on reduction of Western forces in West Berlin. These forces "will always constitute merely a symbolic presence, with a minimum of good faith the Russians should agree that these eleven million men don't constitute a menace to East Germany."

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August
5
(Unclassified)

National Zeitung (Moderate) August 1-2 says "Soviets don't intend to put away Berlin sword of Damocles as long as they remain convinced they can settle this matter without war and force the West to yield and settle German issue by permanent division or by reunited, neutralized and East oriented country which would gradually be devoured."

August
6
(Official
Use Only)

Broadcast Summary of Swiss Press Comments: Reviewing the results of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Independent, influential) says that since the West could not get the Soviets to agree to leaving things as they were in Berlin, the initiative had to be taken outside the Conference with Eisenhower's invitation to Khrushchev. The American trump card of direct talks between the two government heads could have been used by Washington with greater advantage than playing it merely to protect what has been recognized for 14 years as the rights of the Western Powers and West Berlin. The invitation from Eisenhower is a greater victory for Khrushchev than the limited degree of recognition for the GDR which Gromyko was able to force from the Western Powers at Geneva. This relative gain for the Soviets is more than balanced by the political moratorium on Berlin. According to the paper, in the decisive issue of the Geneva Conference—the Berlin problem—the Western Foreign Ministers achieved success inasmuch as they did not relinquish their positions.

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PART FOUR

REPORTS OF INCIDENTS RELATIVE TO BELIEF

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June
22
(Confidential)

Letter of Protest from General Hamlett to Soviet General Zakharov: Within the past week there have occurred three instances of East German interference with United States traffic on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn. In each case United States military personnel traveling in United States army-licensed vehicles were stopped between Muehlow and Helmstedt by East German police and in one case the United States army officer in question was held approximately three hours.

Each of the vehicles was previously processed through Soviet checkpoints prior to their illegal detainment. Their documents were in all cases entirely in order and there was therefore no reason whatsoever for their being stopped by East German traffic officials. I must, therefore, call to your attention these unwarranted interferences with United States traffic in Berlin in order that you may instruct those concerned to take steps to insure that documented United States traveling on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn be permitted to proceed unhindered between checkpoints.

June
26
(Official
Use Only)

Letter from Acting Soviet Commandant General in Berlin to General Hamlett's Letter of June 22: Dear Sir: I received your letter addressed to General V. P. Zakharov and read it over carefully.

As it is apparent from the text of the letter, your officers have met with no hindrances at the Soviet checkpoints, whereas the incidents mentioned in the letter, occurred in places which are outside of our sphere of influence, and therefore, I must inform you that the misunderstanding indicated in your letter, should be settled with proper authorities of the German Democratic Republic.

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June
29
(Confidential)

AMOL US Soldier Seeks Asylum in GDR: Ernie F. Fletcher, Specialist 4, stationed in Berlin, was reported as AMOL June 8, 1959. A routine inquiry concerning his whereabouts was made to Soviets by the Berlin Command Provost Marshal Colonel Salisbury on 25 June. The following telephone message from the Soviet POLAD to the US POLAD was received today.

"In accordance with the request of Lt. Col. Salisbury we conducted an investigation about the whereabouts of the American soldier, Ernie Fletcher, for whom you are looking. We have established that this American soldier is in the German Democratic Republic and has asked for political asylum."

The Berlin Command reports Fletcher's education and intelligence to be below average, military record average with no record of previous serious difficulties. Fletcher's unit commander states that he is involved with German girl believed to have record of prostitution in both East and West sectors of Berlin. CID reports that girl's sister is wife of previous American defector and states that girl abandoned her West Berlin apartment June 7, the week end of Fletcher's disappearance.

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June
30
(Official
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US Mission Berlin Report of Autobahn Slowdowns: German autobahn traffic outbound from West Berlin subjected by East Germans to slowdown at Babelsberg (Nowawes) checkpoint from 2045 hours June 29 to 0230 June 30. During slowdown, clearance time through checkpoint averaged three hours and traffic backed up for several miles. After 0230 East Germans again processed traffic at normal rate and eliminated backlog.

No interference with Allied traffic to or from Berlin at Nowawes or Marienborn. We have received no official reports of interference with inbound German election traffic at Marienborn.

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July
2
(Confidential)

US Mission Berlin Report of US Response to Soviet Protest:
General Hamlett sent following reply dated July 2 to Acting
Soviet Commandant Korol:

"Your letter of 26 June 1959 was brought to my attention upon my return to Berlin. I cannot accept your disavowal of responsibility for the incidents mentioned in my letter of 22 June and I shall continue to hold the Soviet authorities accountable for insuring the free and uninterrupted movement of our traffic along the length of the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn."

Review of files indicates this is not first time Soviets have asserted autobahn between checkpoints under control of East Germans. Re apprehension and fining of two US enlisted men by East German police on speeding charge in 1957, Soviet authorities stated "the speed violation does not concern Soviet authorities since the East German Government owns the autobahn...therefore the matter should be settled with the Volkspolizei."

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July
8
(Confidential)

US Mission Berlin Report of Soviet Complaint on Access
Violations: Following is text of letter from Colonel Korol, acting commander Soviet garrison in Berlin, sent to General Hamlett late July 7:

Lately there have taken place serious violations of quadripartite agreements on part of American military authorities and individual officials of the American army in connection with the use of communications between East Berlin and West Germany.

The main violations consist of deliberate deviations from prescribed routes by military and civilian personnel, illegal transportation of suspicious individuals in private automobiles and passenger trains into German Democratic Republic and preparation of travel orders.

Here are facts:

1. On 2 June 1959, Fouillard, an enlisted man driving transport checkpoint Howaves in car at 0905 hours, deviated from route prescribed for him and tried to cross border of GDR in area of junction.
- On 16 June 1959, Sgt. Nichols in charge of a truck with a trailer, cleared through checkpoint Howaves at 0600 hours and also deviated from route to Helmstedt and returned to checkpoint Howaves at 1330 hours on 16 June 1959.
2. At 0230 hours, 6 June 1959 at railroad checkpoint Marienborn, German national Kurt Fischer was discovered among crates on a flat car of American train Eyou and removed from it in presence of train commander Lieutenant Chirardelli. This person tried to enter illegally German Democratic Republic.
3. American serviceman and civilian employees are trying to proceed through checkpoints into West Berlin and from West Berlin to West Germany with expired movement orders and improperly prepared travel orders.

Thus, a civilian employee Wisniski tried to go to Berlin on 17 April without having signature on her travel orders.

A civilian employee, Ralph Tornipseed, persistently tried on 30 May to go to West Berlin through checkpoint Marienborn on expired movement orders.

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July (Cont.) 8
(Confidential)

Similar attempts were made by Sgt. David Shildl 9 April, Private Kenneth Spencer and Robert Fiat 29 April, Fred Bernet 7 and 23 May, Private Charles Grandt, Jerry Anthony, Jack Sanders 16 May.

4. We consider as very serious the constant violations of borders of outer circle of greater Berlin by American helicopters.

Thus, on 5 June 1959 at 0910 hours in the area of Altglienicke helicopter with American markings violated border of outer circle of greater Berlin by penetrating territory of GDR and afterwards hovering at low altitude over a military checkpoint.

Violation of outer circle of Greater Berlin by American helicopters took place on 4th, 13th and 22nd of May and also on 1st and 8th of June 1959.

This practice of American military authorities might cause undesirable consequences.

In connection with indicated illegal activities of American military authorities, individual servicemen and civilian employees, I lodge strong protest and request you adopt proper measures in order to prevent recurrence of similar incidents in the future which complicate work of our checkpoints.

Above allegations are being carefully investigated by Berlin command prior to General Hamlett making reply.

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July 12
(Confidential)

East German Press Report on US Soldier Seeking Asylum in GDR:
Neues Deutschland reported that the American soldier Fletcher and two British corporals from the Berlin garrison, Allan Brooks and Derek Alderson, have requested political asylum in the GDR. According to the article, "Competent GDR authorities are considering whether these requests for asylum shall be granted."

British confirm the Neues Deutschland report. They are trying to arrange a "confrontation" with their two soldiers, who disappeared in mid-May.

Local American reporter visited the East German Foreign Office in an unsuccessful effort to get to see Allied soldiers, particularly Fletcher. He was given little information but received the impression that the East Germans may be planning to hold a press conference at which these soldiers could be presented.

July 25
(Confidential)

Letter to General Vorontsov Re US Soldier Seeking GDR Asylum:
The following text of letter will be delivered to Chief of Staff, GSFG or his representative as early as possible:

"Dear General Vorontsov: Thank you for your letter of 20 July. I am indeed pleased to note that the Staff of the GSFG will cooperate by negotiating with civil authorities so that your representative may meet US Army Specialist-4 Fletcher for a meeting with our representative.

You will recall that General Edleman, in his letter of 22 April 1959 to Marshal Zakharov, indicated hope that his assistance in arranging a confrontation with Frontia would establish the basis for a mutual procedure in handling future analogous cases. Your proffered assistance in negotiating for a confrontation with Fletcher suggests your favorable impression of General Edleman's proposal. I sympathize with you regarding the delay you experienced in making these arrangements with civil authorities; we, too, find that such things take time, as in the cases of former Soviet soldiers Frontia and Panchenko. Colonel McNeill is designated as the senior representative of this headquarters for the purpose of interviewing US Army Specialist-4 Fletcher. Colonel McNeill and his assistant are prepared to conduct such an interview, in the presence of Soviet Military authorities representing your headquarters, at the time, date, and place determined by you.

Sincerely,

S/Ralph M. Osborne
Major General, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

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July
21
(Confidential)

US Mission Berlin Report of East German Boarding of US Military Train: The American military freight train No. 6300 westbound from Berlin made routine stop at the Potsdam railroad yard (approximately 5 kilometers inside the Soviet Zone) at 1937 hours on July 20. The American train commander, Capt. C. P. Land, observed East German personnel apparently inspecting the train. On disembarking for purposes of investigation, Land saw two East German customs policemen near an American flat car and one East German climbing aboard the car. All three East Germans were armed. Capt. Land ordered the East German off the car and he complied immediately. The other two East Germans approached and told Land he should return to his car immediately as he not permitted to get off train. Land replied that they must first desist from efforts to board the train. The East Germans stated that they were in charge and would do as they pleased. Land replied that they had no jurisdiction over this train and requested to speak with a Soviet officer. The East Germans stated that they would confer with their superior and one East German departed. Before the superior arrived or other action was taken the train departed from Potsdam (not on orders of the US train commander; presumably on the initiative of the East German train engineer) and continued the journey without incident.

The Berlin command US army reports that the train consisted of 34 cars all clearly marked with the usual American identification. The train was proceeding according to fixed schedule on which information had been given the East German Reichsbahn 24 hours in advance. The flat car boarded was one of four carrying signal equipment (telephone cable and micro-wave spare parts) understood to be procured in Berlin for the US air force.

There is no record here of any previous attempt by East German officials to board an American military train. USCIB is protesting to the Soviet commandant re the foregoing incident.

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July
22
(Confidential)

Letter of Protest from General Hanlett Re Train Incident, and US Mission Berlin Comments: Following written protest to incident sent Soviet commandant by USCIB:

"A most serious incident involving an American military train occurred shortly after 1930 hours on the evening of July 20. At this time at the Potsdam railroad station the American train commander observed several armed German uniformed personnel attempting to board train. At least one case of trespass actually occurred before train commander ordered violators to desist.

I strongly protest this unwarranted and unprecedented interference with an American military train and request that you take immediate and decisive measures to prevent a recurrence of such activities."

Acting British and French COMADG agreed with our conclusion that strong written protest be made in order to discourage, if possible, further incidents of this type and to inhibit Soviet or GDR efforts designed to: (1) "establish the principle of inspection of Allied military trains; (2) establish the right of East German officials to interfere with Allied military train traffic; and (3) "establish the right of ex-ante "control function" in places other than checkpoints.

British and French acting COMADG also can find no basis for their military train traffic has previously been involved in incidents similar to that described in previous communications.

Acting French COMADG, when informed of the above incident yesterday, reported an incident involving a French military train on the night of June 16. A westbound French train made a routine traffic halt at Magdeburg in the Soviet zone. Two East German officers approached the train and asked to board it to search for two East Germans. The French refused their entrance. After ten minutes of impasse, a German civilian train pulled into the station. Whereupon the Soviet officers apologized and said the East Germans were on the train which had just arrived. The French train then completed its journey without incident. In view of the Soviet officers' apology, the French did not protest to the Soviet authorities.

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July
28
(Confidential)

US Mission Berlin Report of US Government Employee Accepting GDR Visa: Miss Doris May Malwitz, ICA employee holding special passport and enroute to the United States on home leave from post in New Delhi, arrived July 26, 1959 at East German checkpoint Marienborn while eastbound on autobahn crossing East-West German border in direction of Berlin for short visit. Miss Malwitz was driving personally owned and recently purchased Italian Fiat automobile bearing Swiss license plate. Unbriefed on US Government attitude toward acceptance of East German visas or on the question of contacts with East German officials on the autobahn between Berlin and Western Germany, Miss Malwitz presented her passport to an East German official when requested to do so. A short time later, the East German official returned the passport and Miss Malwitz continued her journey to Berlin. When Miss Malwitz later visited the US Mission Berlin it was discovered that East German official at Marienborn had stamped a transit visa in passport. Usual five-West Mark fee for such transit visas apparently waived in this instance, since East Germans did not ask Miss Malwitz for money. (It is possible that East German officials were well aware of type of passport held by Miss Malwitz and sought to establish precedent for acceptance of East German visas by official personnel without arousing undue interest or suspicion on the part of Miss Malwitz or without her knowledge). Miss Malwitz states that she would not have accepted visa had she been previously briefed or had there been stamp in her passport indicating prohibition against acceptance of East German visas by employees of the US Government.

To avoid having to document her with US movement orders on return trip when she had GDR visa in her passport, Mission arranged air passage to Hanover July 30 for Miss Malwitz. Free university student was engaged to drive the car over autobahn to West Germany same day.

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July
28
(Confidential)

Letter of Protest from General Eddleman to Soviet Commander in Germany:

"Dear Marshal Zakharov:
"I recognize that you are extremely busy with your command just as I am; nevertheless, I consider that we should take the time necessary to consider fully all aspects of two matters which affect us both.

"The first subject concerns your reaction to my suggestion of 21 May 1959 that restrictions imposed on the USHLM be reduced to the level of 1951 just as I, voluntarily, had reduced in April 1959 restrictions on the SHLM. I was both perplexed and surprised to learn that the areas restricted to my mission by your new maps and your signs are considerable greater than those areas restricted to the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt. By letter of 7 July 1959 my Chief of Staff expressed to your Chief of Staff the serious view I take of the inequity resulting from your decision. Regrettably no reply to that letter has been received to date. Notwithstanding, I have deferred taking any action with respect to your decision pending your reply to this communication. I hopefully anticipate a favorable solution on the basis of reciprocity as expressed by Lieutenant General Vorontsov during his meeting with Colonel McQuail on 20 July 1959.

"The second subject is one which I view as a most serious incident. I refer to the unwarranted search and seizure of the personal belongings of three accredited members of the USHLM in their hotel rooms in Chemnitz in the early morning hours of 11 July 1959. Although the forcible entry and actual search and seizure were accomplished by East German Criminal Police, your Chief of Commandant was present in the hotel rooms during the latter portion of the incident. Additionally, the situation was aggravated by the prolonged detention of the two US Army Officers and one US Army enlisted man at your Chemnitz Kommandatura throughout the day of 11 July 1959.

"On 12 July 1959 my Chief of Staff directed a letter of protest concerning this incident to your Chief of Staff. General Vorontsov refused to accept this official communication. His refusal does not alter the basic facts of the case nor does it serve to lessen the responsibility of your personnel.

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July (cont.)
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(Confidential)

"The Huebner-Malinin agreement is based on the principle that regulation of our respective missions is a USAREUR-GSPG responsibility.

"We both recognize that instances of misunderstandings can arise with local authorities or with the various uniformed forces. It is for this very reason that it is expected our respective headquarters will administer all such matters as has been done for years in the past. I had assumed that you did not wish to disturb the arrangements established under the cited agreement. On my part it is a serious duty to represent members of your mission in Frankfurt whenever local authorities are involved. The USAREUR credentials carried by the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt guarantee this treatment. The USMM personnel are issued and carry similar credentials issued by your headquarters which purport to guarantee my personnel and their equipment passage and security.

"Since obviously these credentials were not honored by the East Germans or your Chemnitz Commandant, I must ask whether the 11 July incident reflects your new interpretation of the responsibility which devolves on us as military commanders for the security of personnel accredited to our commands?

"I look forward to your reply in the hope that these matters may be resolved in a mutually agreeable manner.

"Sincerely, C. D. Eddleman, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief.

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July
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(Confidential)

Reply to USCOB Protest of 22 July Received from Acting
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Troops in Berlin:

"Dear General B. Hanlett:

"This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated July 22, 1959, addressed to General M.F. Zakharov, and to inform you that the mentioned incident with the American military train took place on July 20 due to the fact that the train was a mixed train, that is, one consisting of freight and passenger cars.

"In connection with this, I was able to ascertain that the German officials did not know how to deal with passengers proceeding in passenger cars of this mixed train.

"German officials have now received appropriate instructions and clarification regarding the treatment of such military trains to and from Berlin. I therefore, hope that similar incidents will not occur in the future.

Respectfully yours,
Colonel Korol
Acting Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Troops in Berlin"

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PART FIVE
REPORTS AND EXCERPTS OF PROCEEDINGS AT
THE GENEVA FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

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June
17
(Secret)

June 17 SAC Meeting on the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Meeting:
The United States and United Kingdom permanent representatives opened the meeting by reviewing the Geneva situation including a general statement as to the Western inner handed Gromyko yesterday. They indicated that there did not seem much hope of Soviet acceptance. The time was approaching, therefore, when the West will have to make a major decision. The United Kingdom permanent representative, who had just returned from Geneva, indicated that the Foreign Ministers would value the views of the Alliance about this decision.

The Belgian permanent representative asked if adjournment or rupture were being considered and where such a rupture would lead us. He emphasized the danger of any breakup of the Conference without consulting governments or the Council since they would have the task of dealing with public opinion. He had been struck by the Gromyko statement that the Soviets had indicated that no ultimatum was intended in offering their recent proposals and had, in fact, come up with two new propositions, a one year time limit and a mixed German committee. He asked if there might be something "hidden" in these proposals that could be drawn out for further discussion. The Canadian permanent representative echoed the Belgian viewpoint. It is important for the Council to know whether the Conference has reached the stage of adjournment. Noting the United Kingdom permanent representative's reference to consulting the Council, he expressed concern lest adjournment or rupture should take place within the next 48 hours. He followed certain points of the Gromyko proposals could be combined with aspects of the Western propositions to make a basis of compromise. He warned that if the Conference broke up and the Soviets subsequently transferred their responsibility to the GDR, there could be no return and any further negotiations would take place in a less satisfactory atmosphere. He felt that the West had placed too much emphasis on negotiation which are a "diminishing asset" and which would not receive much sympathy in the UN if the Western case were presented on that basis. If adjournment occurred, he hoped that arrangements would be made for the resumption of talks. The Italian permanent representative feared that despite the good tactical position of the West, Gromyko had been authorized to take certain risks because of differences and difficulties that had arisen in NATO on other matters. He echoed fears that the Conference might end without prior consultation with the Council which was necessary in order to give governments guidance for dealing with public opinions. He hoped that the Council could be informed about Western plans. The Greek

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June (Cont.) permanent representative stressed that the Western proposals
17 regarding Germany and Berlin should be given greater stress in
(Secret) the propaganda of NATO countries. The Turkish permanent representative stated his opinion, based on experience, that there was no danger of adjournment. The Soviets did not want a rupture which would jeopardize a summit meeting.

Spaak emphasized that the Alliance had come to an important and difficult point since a decision for adjournment might be reached this afternoon. He agreed that the West could not negotiate under an ultimatum but since Gromyko had denied that this was intended, it was difficult to say whether an ultimatum had really been given. He was not at all clear that Gromyko had said that after one year the Soviets would apply the measures indicated. He asked the answer to the question, if after one year, the mixed German committee had not reached agreement, could the discussions be resumed. Had Gromyko given an answer to this question? If the Soviets stated that following one year of all-German committee talks, discussion might be resumed, the Allies would gain.

Spaak stated that there was no answer to the question at present as to whether a harder Soviet line had been dictated by difficulties in the Alliance or whether Khrushchev felt, for this or other reasons, that there was no pressure for a summit. However, should the Conference adjourn or break up, the Soviets would almost be forced to turn over functions re Berlin to the East Germans, and we would have to deal with them. The public would not understand Allied difficulties with the documentation and stamping in this situation. Spaak stated that he was rather unhappy about the negotiations. Certain questions were not clear which should be put to Soviets. The Conference could take the Western or the Soviet proposals as a basis for further discussion. If Gromyko had not intended an ultimatum, we should be prepared to discuss the Gromyko paper further.

The Netherlands permanent representative stressed that the Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva had not given up any substantive points of the Western positions that had been discussed and agreed on in the Council. They had acted in complete agreement with the views expressed in the MAC and he had the greatest confidence in the way they had handled the negotiations. It was difficult here in Paris to come to a definite opinion on further moves since we did not know the atmosphere. Concerning the Canadian statement for blending the Soviet and Western proposals in a compromise, he stated this would mean giving up substantive points agreed on in the

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Council. He hoped that before this occurred or before any decision was reached about a summit conference, the Council will be able to receive, at first hand, the atmosphere of the Geneva talks. He suggested that one of the Foreign Ministers might come to Paris to explain the situation. The Norwegian permanent representative stressed that while the atmosphere was important, it should not be exaggerated because the effects of decisions taken at Geneva will live long after the atmosphere. He felt that the latest Western paper was reasonable and recognized the danger of accepting any time limit on Western rights. However, it appeared that if there is a possibility of compromise, it would have to involve some sort of formula establishing a time limit. He saw importance in Gromyko's statement that if the West did not like a one-year time limit, it should propose another. He emphasized the necessity of giving the Council a clear picture if the Geneva talks were approaching an end and of whether a break off would be a rupture or an adjournment looking forward to the resumption of talks or to a summit conference. Like others who preceded him, he stressed the importance of preparing Western opinion through fuller MAC discussion.

The United Kingdom permanent representative undertook to answer various questions, indicating, however, that he could not give authoritative replies. He stated that the latest Western paper was designed to avoid the issue of the Soviets having to confirm Western rights but also drafted with a view to public opinion in the event the Soviets had decided on a rupture. It did not mean the last word from the West. He emphasized that the Foreign Ministers' discussion at Geneva was not intended to finalize agreements. The West was only trying to see if there is enough "give" in the Soviet position to go to a summit. The Western paper thus goes as far as possible to meet the Soviet points but without abandoning the Western positions agreed to by the Council. He pointed out that adjournment or rupture as far as he knew had not been discussed at Geneva on a Ministerial level. He doubted if the Council would be confronted with a fait accompli this afternoon. As to the substance of the talks, he referred to the Soviet suggestion that Western troops in Berlin might be limited to the figure of troops now guarding Saxony to emphasize the danger of discussing figures with Soviets. He agreed that if the Soviets were willing to resume discussions in a four power forum after one year of a mixed German committee, it would be helpful. Gromyko, however, had given no indication that he was prepared to compromise his proposals. He also agreed that there could be a difference in point of view as

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June (Cont.)
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to the desirability of negotiating on the basis of the Soviet proposals. He said such a difference of opinion existed in the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva.

The French permanent representative added that if the Soviet paper were accepted as the basis of negotiations, the Soviet view on a peace treaty and on West Berlin as a free city was accepted.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Spaak took up the Netherlands proposal for one of the Ministers to come to the Council. He stated that this might not be feasible in view of the necessity of the presence of all the Ministers at Geneva. It also might add to the atmosphere of crisis. The Belgian permanent representative then suggested that Spaak might go to Geneva to get a first hand picture of the situation. Spaak objected that this might permit the Soviets to interpret his presence as evidence of concern in NATO over the situation. After the Greek permanent representative had agreed this might be the case, Spaak suggested that the Ministers might invite the Secretary General to come to Geneva, thus avoiding such a Soviet interpretation. He stated that this procedure might be better than having a Minister come to Paris. The Norwegian permanent representative countered however, by questioning the desirability of bringing NATO to foreground at this juncture of the Geneva discussion. It would permit the Soviets to blame NATO if a rupture occurred. Moreover, the discussions in the Council about Geneva had been marked by freedom for expressing views. If Spaak went to Geneva, thereby focusing the attention of the press on the Council, it would be difficult to continue this freedom of discussion. He favored the Netherlands proposal for a Minister coming to Paris.

The United States permanent representative stated that he would like to explore the possibilities of additional contacts with Geneva. Thus far, four permanent representatives had visited the Conference. He felt there was a way of doing this but agreed with the possibility of a Secretary General's visit being given an adverse interpretation. He suggested that one of the other permanent representatives might be sent. However, he agreed to convey the idea to Geneva that the Council would like to have some more direct contacts. Concerning the substance of the talks, he stated that the negotiations had gone much as expected. From the June 10 Soviet proposals, it appeared the latter had taken the decision that there could probably be tough negotiations but he could not say this for sure. The West had gone a long way in attempting to find

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ideas to meet Soviet desires. He pointed out, however, that if the West were going to win in this exchange, it must be ready to hold out firmly for its basic positions. He recognized that public opinion had to be taken into consideration. Spaak closed the discussion by asking the permanent representatives to convey to their Foreign Ministers at Geneva the concern and apprehension of the Council lest they be confronted with a fait accompli on adjournment without prior consultation, and the Council's desire for some more direct contact which would avoid, however, any spectacular or dramatic effect, and the ideas expressed about the possibility of advancing further the compromise proposal.

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Report to MAC on Geneva Conference by Courvoisier
Couve noted that the Conference was adjourned until July 18. He said the positions on both sides were clearly defined in documents, i.e., for the West, the peace plan and Berlin proposals made public June 19; for the Soviets, (a) a peace treaty proposal; (b) the Berlin proposal of June 9; (c) the revision of (b) dated June 18. He noted that the Berlin problem was created by the USSR, not by the West, who only agreed to discuss it separately when a deadlock on other proposals was reached. He also noted that the latest Soviet document on Berlin coincided with Khrushchev's speech which highlighted the problem in a manner very unfavorable to the West. He defined the Western position as being ready to discuss practical problems (paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Western paper) but unwilling to give up rights. The Soviet documents, on the other hand, do not give a clear picture of their position. Couve thought that this was intentional. Personally, he felt that the Soviets had not given up the idea of terminating the occupation of West Berlin.

The West believes it would have implicitly renounced its rights in Berlin at the end of the 18 month period proposed by the Soviets, but the Soviets tell us our interpretation is not a good one and that we are making them say what they did not. At all events, the Soviets have not said that Western rights would be intact at the end of the 18 months. Couve thought this position was not now essentially different from that of last November. He emphasized that the West was determined to protect Western Berlin from domination by the GDR or the USSR. He doubted that there would be any change in the Soviet position between now and July 13 but warned that accurate prognosis was not possible. He concluded by assuring the MAC

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that the Western Ministers would maintain close contact, informing it of developments and enabling it to pass on opinions.

Virtually all the members expressed thanks to Couve for his willingness to report to the MACT personally and satisfaction at the conduct of the negotiations by the Western Ministers.

The Belgian permanent representative thought that the press had minimized the good results of the Conference which he stated were: (a) West Berlin remains protected and the Soviets did not follow up their November ultimatum; (b) the Czechs and Poles were not admitted to the Conference; (c) ultimatum was absent from the latest Soviet proposal (the Belgian permanent representative reverted to this last point several times during the ensuing discussion.) He asked: (a) if the Soviet June 19 proposals would not enable the West to improve the Berlin status; (b) did the Western Ministers desire the 'MAC members to submit views in aide memoires?

Couve said that the Ministers would be happy to have the views of the MAC allies in any appropriate way. He admitted that the latest Soviet Berlin proposals fuzzed up ultimatum aspects but he was pessimistic about making progress with this as a basis. He emphasized Western position was at rock bottom. He pointed out that the Russians had appeared willing to accept a modus vivendi up to the presentation of the June 9 paper which showed a change of the Soviet position.

The Italian permanent representative thought that the question of an ultimatum remained unclear. On the basis of the Soviet paper he asked if the Soviets had made any hints about a summit meeting. Couve replied that he thought Gromyko had mentioned a summit only once, when he said it could not be an object for barter. The thought was implicit in the latest Soviet paper that if the West does not agree with Soviet proposals they will conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. He pointed out that at the end of 18 months we could only discuss our rights since stops would have to be taken on other practical problems.

Grocco asked if Couve thought that the Russians regarded negotiations only as an incident in the cold war or as a first step towards adjustment with the West. Couve guessed that it was more than an incident in the cold war but personally was not sure that the Soviets really wished to end tensions.

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The Norwegian permanent representative wondered if the talks, when resumed, would be on a more confidential basis and thought they should be. He asked if the West would communicate with the Soviets. He expressed the belief that the West seemed to have gone out of its way to put the worst possible interpretation on the latest Soviet paper. Couve thought that there was not much possibility of contact with the Soviets and pointed to the shortness of the interim period. He noted that Gromyko's remarks to the press were not quite the same as his private remarks which had conveyed the definite impression that he considered Western rights in Berlin to be transitory.

The Portuguese permanent representative agreed with the Belgian permanent representative that the press had tended to emphasize concessions by the West rather than achievements. The Netherlands permanent representative thought that the Conference today had strengthened the morale of the West, especially the West Berliners. He firmly stated his Government's thought that there must be signs of progress before the West agreed to a summit.

The Canadian permanent representative expressed interest in Gromyko's brief remarks on the disarmament question and hoped that the interim would be used to prepare for a summit as well as for resumption of the Conference. Couve noted that the Western Powers had mentioned disarmament in the peace plan and when Gromyko asked what we had in mind the West had said it could not discuss the matter but felt it should be dealt with in the United Nations, probably in a forum with fewer members than the present disarmament commission. The West was thinking of preparing a draft resolution to this effect for consideration at the next U'GA session. Gromyko had not pressed the matter but said he preferred disarmament discussions in Geneva.

The Norwegian permanent representative thought that the press on the whole had been better than the remarks of some of his colleagues would indicate, but Portugal noted recent articles in Le Monde and France Soir which emphasized the view that the West had made concessions. Couve felt that on the whole the press had not presented the Western proposals too badly.

The United States permanent representative expressed appreciation for Couve's excellent presentation and thought they had been useful discussions.

The United Kingdom permanent representative agreed.

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Statement of Italian Representative to MAC: "I have received instructions from my Government to make the following statement to the Council:

1. The Italian Government noted with satisfaction the firm attitude of the Western countries at Geneva. It is of the opinion that this attitude has borne fruit, owing also to a certain flexibility in the negotiations which the Italian Government has always desired.
2. In the opinion of my Government, in the present circumstances it would be well to consider very carefully the advisability of taking advantage of the forthcoming meetings to attempt to ensure the possibility of a summit conference. If matters were to reach a serious crisis, public opinion in our countries ought to be convinced that we left no stone unturned to avert it.
3. It is very probable that even at the forthcoming meetings it will be impossible to reach an agreement on Berlin. Indeed, it is to be expected that Khrushchev will not wish to come to the Summit Conference without his trump card.
4. Moreover, the views expressed by the two sides on the Berlin question do not appear to be so divergent as to preclude the hope of reaching an understanding at a possible summit conference. Indeed, the principal Western objection, which the Italian Government fully shares, relates to the period fixed by the Soviets for the duration of the agreement on the status of Berlin. Even if this period cannot be defined as an ultimatum in the strict sense of the word, (omission) from the fact that in its present form this period would deprive the Western countries of the legal basis of their position.
5. Nevertheless it does not appear impossible to find a basis for agreement on even this point by replacing an explicitly fixed period by a more general formula.
6. Far from being inspired by a spirit of appeasement, such an attitude might exploit, from the tactical standpoint, Khrushchev's latest statements, which might be interpreted by public opinion in our countries as an indication of a desire to reach a compromise.

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7. Since the Berlin question and its consequences concern the whole alliance and since the responsibility of the alliance might become directly involved at any moment, a thorough consultation among all of its members seems to be the only means of ensuring a common, freely adopted attitude, which is necessary in these circumstances.

Accordingly, by order of my Government I have the honor to request that before July 13, the date on which the four Foreign Ministers will resume their conversations in Geneva, a special session of the Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level be held in Paris."

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US Delegation Summary of 19th Plenary Session: After Secretary's opening statement, Couve spoke. Agreed with Secretary's summary and suggestion that future sessions be private. Noted first six weeks devoted to attempting find settlement Soviet-instigated crisis, first by attempting work out settlement German problem as whole, later, by trying reach solution Berlin problem alone. He had thought some progress made until June 9 when new Soviet proposal signalled reappearance of threats and Soviet desire to link certain problems re Germany as a whole with Berlin. Reversal proposed because of uncertainties re Soviet position.

Lloyd agreed future meetings should be private sessions and listed as documents before Conference Soviet Berlin proposal June 19, West's Berlin proposal, Gromyko's June 19 and June 28 statements and Khrushchev's speech at end first session. First task now should be to eliminate uncertainties in Soviet statements. Task should be facilitated because some points of agreement exist between two sides. Lloyd then recalled his recent Commons statement of objectives as being a) progress toward German reunification; b) maintenance of freedom of West Berlin and free access for its people; c) reduction of tension and improvement in European stability. He did not exclude possibility of making contribution to world stability by agreement at Geneva but said West will not give way on matters of principle.

Gromyko, in thirty minute statement, hoped recess had enabled West to gain clearer understanding of Soviet proposals and reviewed terms Soviet June 19 proposals. He noted some agreement between them and Western proposals but said Western proposal re control of subversive activities not acceptable because it places East and West Berlin on equal basis. As example of Western activities, he cited "demonstrations" in West Berlin involving election of Federal Republic President, an act condoned by West although it took place during recess in Geneva Conference and West knew it was provocative. Also cited statement of "German Federal Republic official" that West Berlin is part of Federal Republic as another provocative action.

He then attacked Western Powers, especially Adenauer Government, along familiar lines for wishing prolong occupation of West Berlin and thus increase tensions. He was surprised that West indifferent to Soviet offers of guarantees of West Berlin social order and freedom of access contained in Soviet "free city" proposal. Noted West, though extolling UN, did not

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agree to Soviet proposals for associating UN with Berlin guarantees. Asked if Western desire were not really to prolong occupation rather than maintain freedom of West Berlin.

Re latest Soviet proposals, said some people allege that at end of eighteen month period only thing that would happen would be unilateral Soviet action but Soviet proposal provided for resumption discussions by Geneva conference. Soviets cannot agree to indefinite occupation and therefore set time limit for deliberations of all-German committee. This committee could enable two Germanies to draw together which is only way to build foundations for German reunification in specific time period and permit participation of Germans in drawing up peace treaty which all countries in war against Germany could consider, including Poland and Czechoslovakia. Gromyko then advanced familiar position re formation committee on basis of parity and ended by stating Soviets consider work of conference very important. Soviets will strive to narrow gap between two sides and reduce tensions.

Secretary said he wanted to set record straight re Gromyko allegation that holding of Presidential election in West Berlin was "provocative action". Said West could have prevented it but did not consider action provocative and in fact it did not so turn out. Recalled decision hold election taken nine months ago and followed precedent set in 1954 on which occasion Soviets had not protested.

Bolz said GDR "Delegation" had used recess to discuss Conference with GDR Government and people. All Germans desire peace treaty, even in West Germany as shown by recent GDR and FRG proposals. Attacked West Germans for revanchism, militarism and such "provocative" acts as a) Adenauer June 14 speech in which he allegedly demanded there be no further talk of reunification but only of liberation of East Germany; b) Presidential elections in West Berlin; c) Gromyko's statement West Berlin was Federal Republic land; d) Landrainschaft rallies in West Germany and Berlin. He (b), recalled GDR June 9 note warning against holding Federal Republic elections on territory of another state. Also said fact there no dangerous results due GDR forbearance. He (c) recalled many statements of three Western Powers that West Berlin not Federal Republic land and Couve statement to same effect during first phase of Conference. Reaffirmed GDR support for Soviet "free city" and June 19 proposals re Berlin, stressing guarantees for West Berlin access to food, raw materials, unimpeded trade, etc. Recalled GDR proposals for a) GDR-Federal Republic negotiations; b) non-aggressions pact.

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Gromyko noted there were number of assertions in Gromyko and Bolz speeches contrary to facts. Denied them and reserved the right to comment later. Referred to Federal Republic note to USSR as adequate answer to allegations re holding Presidential elections in West Berlin and fielded problem Gerstenmaier statement well. Noted Gromyko's statement there would be no Soviet unilateral action re Berlin. Recalled that 1949 statement of occupying powers re status of Berlin contradicted Bolz allegation it is part of East Zone.

Gromyko then pressed for inclusion of Germans in private sessions, West resisted and impasse resolved for time being by agreement hold plenary session 3:30 P.M., June 15.

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Text of Address by Secretary Herter at Geneva Conference: At the opening of the second session of this Conference a brief review of the first six weeks will be helpful in gauging where we now stand and how we should continue our deliberations.

The discussions during the first six weeks revealed certain points of agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. But even more clearly it showed that the positions taken at the close of the first series of meetings were so far apart that any significant agreement seemed virtually impossible unless time were taken for reflection and reconsideration.

It was clear that successful negotiations would require a change in the approach to the problems with which we were dealing. Therefore we proposed a recess in the hope that the Soviet Union would consider the gravity of the situation we were facing and would return to the next phase of the Conference ready to continue our discussions in a realistic and understanding manner.

From our earlier discussion we found that the Foreign Ministers all agreed that Germany should be reunified, that there should be free elections held for this purpose and that there should be a final peace settlement at the earliest practicable time. They were unable to agree, however, on procedures for achieving these ends.

The Western Powers presented a plan for German reunification which would be permanent because it would be freely accepted by the German people and would bring about a peace settlement which would assure Germany's neighbors that their security interests would be thoroughly safeguarded. The plan was based on the conviction that a lasting settlement of the major causes of European instability must rest on consent and mutual confidence.

The plan therefore provided the German people with the right of self-determination through the mechanism of free elections. However, it took account of the views of the Soviet Union by proposing a transitional period during which plans for free all-German elections and for the development of closer contacts between both parts of Germany could be developed by a German mixed committee.

The plan also provided a basis for the discussion of regional security in Europe and disarmament which both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have recognized as forming an integral part of the problem of achieving a permanent program for the stabilization of Europe.

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Unfortunately the Soviet Union has so far refused to consider this plan as a basis for discussion. On their part they proposed that a peace treaty be signed on the basis of the two areas which has been divided. Their proposal contained no specific provisions for the reunification of Germany. On the contrary, they insisted that reunification be worked out by the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic within the framework of a confederation plan which would have denied for the foreseeable future to the population of the eastern part of Germany the right of choosing its government through free elections.

This plan would perpetuate by formal international agreement the continuation in office of the unrepresentative regime which is now in power in eastern Germany and which now holds no proper mandate to speak for all or any part of the German people. The more the Soviet proposal was expounded, the clearer it seemed to us that it would result in the permanent partition of Germany.

A refusal on the part of the Soviet Union to discuss German reunification and European security in terms consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter calling for free determination also blocked progress toward a solution of the Berlin crisis which had been precipitated by the Soviet Union last October.

In planning and establishing the four-power occupation zones for Germany in 1944 and 1945, the four victorious powers had given Berlin a special status intended to last until the conclusion of a peace settlement with an all-German Government. In line with the original intentions of the four powers and with the dictates of logic, the Western Powers considered the natural solution of the Berlin problem to be the reunification of Germany.

However, in view of the fact that the Western peace plan provided for a transitional period of two and a half years before German reunification would take place, the Western peace plan also included an interim plan for Berlin which would unite the two parts of the city through free all-Berlin elections and would thus serve as a model in miniature for the reunification of the entire country in which the Western peace plan would culminate.

In presenting this interim plan the Western Powers emphasized that they must preserve unimpaired their ability to protect the integrity of the city and to safeguard the population of Berlin from pressure and intimidation until reunification eliminates the hostile forces by which Berlin is encircled.

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We attached particular importance to the matter because of the importance which the people of Berlin attach to it. In a series of overwhelming votes, the last in December, 1958, the West Berlin voters have expressed their belief that the freedom of the city requires the protective presence of Western troops, the maintenance of the city's economic, financial and cultural ties with the West and unrestricted access to and from the city by land, water, air and communication channels.

It is important to note in this connection that in the course of the Conference Mr. Gromyko specifically admitted the validity of Western rights in Berlin.

Owing to the impasse reached by the end of the second week of the Conference in the discussion of general plans for reunification and European security, the discussion shifted to the narrower question of whether some agreement could be reached which would reduce the dangers inherent in the Berlin crisis which the Soviet Union had precipitated.

On May 26 I outlined in some detail the Western proposal for an interim Berlin settlement providing for all-Berlin elections, the establishment of an all-Berlin government, the maintenance of forces in Berlin by the four powers, the level of which could be the subject of an agreement between the four powers, and the guaranteeing of free and unrestricted access to Berlin and the guaranteeing of free and unrestricted access to Berlin for all persons, goods and communications. This proposal was rejected out by hand by the Soviet Government. On May 31 Mr. Khrushchov said that "the seven-point program does not contain a single element for negotiation."

On June 1, Mr. Gromyko then outlined a Berlin proposal which was basically a reiteration of the Soviet so-called "free city" plan which had been spelled out in the Soviet note of November 27, 1958.

This was, of course, incompatible with the obligations of the Western Powers toward the population of West Berlin. It would have deprived West Berlin of the protection afforded by the Western forces - either by eliminating them or reducing them drastically and introducing Soviet forces into West Berlin. It would have involved a specific termination of the Western rights in Berlin and the establishment of a status for West Berlin in which the city would have been entirely dependent upon verbal or written assurances extended to it by the Soviet Union and the so-called German Democratic Republic.

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Furthermore, Mr. Gromyko made the acceptance of this new status for the city of West Berlin, which the Soviet Union had proposed, the basic condition for discussing any Western proposals on the city.

During the next few days discussions continued in private on the Berlin problem; considerable progress was made in isolating the questions which each side considered of special importance. These discussions were then reflected in a new series of more limited proposals which were put forward in the closing weeks of the first phase of the Conference.

It is worth while summarizing these proposals briefly.

On June 4, and 8 the Western Foreign Ministers gave Mr. Gromyko talking papers which discussed the possibility of supplementary arrangements in Berlin within the recognized framework of Western rights in the city. They indicated that they could accept the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Berlin, which it must be pointed out is an offer of no real significance, in view of the fact that the city is surrounded by some twenty-six divisions of Soviet and East German troops and vast military installations. They also were willing to declare their intention not to increase the combined total of their own forces in the city.

They might also be able to reduce their forces to the extent that developments in Berlin and the maintenance of their responsibilities permitted. Measures consistent with fundamental rights and liberties might be taken in both parts of Berlin to avoid activities which might disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests of the several parties.

They held that continuing rights of access to Berlin, both Allied and German, must be recognized by the Soviet Government as well as free access between East and West Berlin but were prepared to agree that access procedures could be carried out by German personnel on the understanding that existing responsibilities remained unchanged. Disputes on access should be settled between the four governments, who could establish a quadripartite commission in Berlin to facilitate the settlement of such disputes. Arrangements agreed on were to remain in force until German reunification.

On June 10 Mr. Gromyko presented new proposals which he characterized as providing for the temporary maintenance of certain Western occupation rights in West Berlin for a limited period of one year. During this period an all-German committee was to be

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established on a basis of parity for the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic to promote greater contacts between the two parts of Germany, to prepare for German reunification and to consider a peace treaty.

He further stipulated four requirements in West Berlin: the reduction of Western forces and armaments to token levels, the termination of hostile propaganda against the so-called German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, the liquidation of all alleged organizations for espionage and subversion against the so-called German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries; and a ban on atomic or rocket installations. The Western powers pointed out that this proposal was unacceptable, apart from its unreasonable content, because of its threatening nature. It sought to establish a limit of twelve months for the continued rightful presence of the Western Powers in West Berlin. The attempted imposition of such a time limit was immediately rejected by the Western Powers.

On June 16 the Western Powers made additional proposals including an assurance they would continue to arm their forces in Berlin only with conventional weapons. They declared that their governments would from time to time consider the possibility of reducing such forces if developments in the situation warranted. They also proposed that all disputes which might arise with respect to access be raised and settled between the four governments and that a quadripartite commission be established to examine any difficulties arising out of access and to facilitate their settlement. Unless subsequently notified by the four powers, the arrangements agreed to were to continue in force until the reunification of Germany.

On June 19 Mr. Gromyko proposed the extension of the time limit specified in this proposal of June 10 from one year to 18 months. However, the new Soviet proposal as presented to the Foreign Ministers reserved to the Soviet Government freedom of unilateral action at the expiration of that period. Mr. Gromyko seemed to maintain that it was the view of his government that the Western Powers, upon signing such an agreement, would acquiesce in the liquidation of their rights in Berlin and the abandonment of their responsibility for maintaining the freedom of West Berlin. Furthermore the Soviet Government at the highest level declared its intention to conclude a peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic if no agreement on a peace treaty was reached by the all-German committee proposed within 18 months. The Soviet Government has also clearly stated that in its view such a treaty would

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extinguish Western rights in Berlin.

Since then the Soviet Foreign Minister, in a statement on June 28, asked a rhetorical question, "does not the fact that the Soviet Union is proposing to hold new negotiations on West Berlin after the expiration of the terms provided for in the agreement - if by that time the all-German committee does not succeed in its work - speak for itself?"

The very purpose of drawing up international agreements is to avoid reliance on facts that speak for themselves. Our purpose in the coming negotiations will be to try to reach understanding which can later be reduced to writing to minimize the danger of subsequent differing interpretations.

I remain convinced that a satisfactory long-range solution to the German and Berlin problem can be found if we realistically face the dangers created by the artificial division of this great country and seek to eliminate them by a plan for reunification within the framework of a general agreement on security which will guarantee all countries of Europe against the dangers of irresponsible actions endangering the peace. This our Western peace plan would accomplish.

My Government hopes that we will make the measure of progress needed to warrant a subsequent meeting of heads of government. I believe that the best promise of such progress lies in an early return to restricted sessions. I propose to my colleagues that our next session be private.

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Text of Address by Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva Conference:
We have returned to Geneva and have again assembled in this room to continue our negotiations and to try to find a mutually acceptable solution to those important questions for the consideration of which the Conference of Foreign Ministers has been convened. We shall have to complete the examination of the questions pertaining to Germany and, first of all, to work out measures to eliminate the dangerous situation in Berlin which is a source of a constant apprehension for the destinies of European peace. Some other questions raised in the course of negotiations by the members of the Conference, and which have not a small significance from the point of view of the relaxation of international tension and consolidation of peace, have not received their consummation either.

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Because of three weeks' recess the work of the Conference has been somewhat delayed. But, as the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining. The recess afforded the members of the Conference an additional opportunity to meticulously think over and weigh everything that had been said and proposed at the Conference, and thus get a more precise picture of the positions of the sides. We hope the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers came here after the recess with a more clear understanding of the Soviet Union's proposals.

At the end of the first stage our negotiations bore a clear stamp of haste, which was particularly evident in the evaluations given by the Western delegations to the latest Soviet proposals. Let us not miss the fact that the answer of the three Western Powers' delegations to those proposals, which were submitted on June 19, was that on the same day, some two hours later, they asked for a recess, as a result of which our work was postponed for three weeks.

Even before the first stage of our Conference was over, we expressed a hope that the first reaction to our proposals would be a result of a preliminary acquaintance which was not free of prejudice and that the Western Powers' governments would submit them to a more careful and serious examination. And this was the promise given to us by our partners.

Later, even in the West, the undertaking that the new initiative of the Soviet Government serves to increase the chances to achieve agreement began to grow. One should think that at present a more objective and realistic approach would be displayed to Soviet proposals which are aimed at creating a basis for a further fruitful work of the Conference.

The Soviet delegation suggests that we begin where we left off, i.e. with the consideration of the Soviet proposals submitted on June 19. For this reason let us recall the substance of the proposals.

Our proposals are that the four powers - the USSR, the USA, Britain and France - conclude an agreement on an interim status of West Berlin. This agreement could include the following:

Reduction of armed forces and armaments of the three Western Powers in West Berlin to symbolic contingents;

Termination of subversive and hostile propaganda activities from West Berlin against the GDR (East Germany) and other Socialist countries;

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Non-location in West Berlin of atomic and rocket weapons.

The observation of relevant undertakings on these questions could be supervised by the committee set up for this very purpose and composed of the representative of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France.

In case such an agreement is attained, the present procedure of the use of communications with West Berlin would be preserved.

The agreement on an interim status for West Berlin should provide for a time limit in the course of which an all-German committee or another body acceptable for the Germans composed of the representatives of the GDR and of the FRG (West Germany) could consider and work out concrete measures for the development of contacts between the two German states and to consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty and to the German reunification. Eighteen months would be sufficient.

If the two German states fail in the course of this period to reach, either in the framework of an all-German committee or otherwise, an agreement on these questions, then the member states of the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers of 1959 should take up again the question of West Berlin.

This is the substance of the recent Soviet proposals. It is not difficult to see that the proposals in no small degree are designed to meet the positions of other participants in the negotiations as they were stated here by the respective delegations. And indeed, if we are to compare the proposals of the Soviet Government with regard to Berlin with the proposals by the governments of the USA, Britain and France of June 16, then it will become evident that there are points which are not so far from each other and, if the Western governments do really wish an agreement, then the Soviet proposals offer the basis for such an agreement.

The Soviet delegation's proposals speak of the necessity to reduce the number of foreign armed forces in West Berlin and not to locate atomic and rocket weapons there. It is not difficult to realize the great significance which the implementation of these measures aimed at the normalization of the situation in West Berlin would have for strengthening confidence among states. No one can deny that agreement on the reduction of foreign troops in West Berlin to a symbolic level and on non-location of nuclear and rocket weapons there would substantially reduce the tension in Berlin and in Europe as a whole.

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One cannot underestimate that, since the said measures would be the result of an agreed decision of the Powers, this fact alone would be of no small significance. The achievement of such an agreement concerning West Berlin would create more favorable conditions for solving outstanding questions in the future as well on an agreed basis in the interests of strengthening peace.

We propose further that hostile propaganda and subversive activities from the territory of West Berlin against the GDR and other Socialist countries should be stopped. The need in such measures arises from the fact that hostile, subversive activities directed against the GDR and other Socialist countries are being carried out day after day from the territory of West Berlin. It is designed to increase tension in relations between states and to excite hatreds and differences between them.

Thus, if one is to view the facts objectively, one cannot deny that the Soviet Union's proposals on this question are justified. The proposals of the Western Powers also touch upon this question, but it is being done in such a manner which in no way can be considered acceptable. In fact, these proposals distort the essence of the question, since an attempt is being made to treat almost in the same manner the state of affairs in East Berlin and in West Berlin, which has been turned into a veritable base for systematic subversive, sabotage and espionage activities against the country in the center of which it is situated.

If an example is needed to show how the territory of West Berlin is being used for the purpose of subversion, for the purposes of aggravating the international situation, particularly the situation in Europe, then such an example was given us quite recently during the recess of our Conference. At the time when the West Berlin question is being considered at the Conference and the Ministers of the three Western Powers quite correctly confirm that West Berlin is by no means a part of the Federal Republic of Germany, the West German authorities stage a demonstration with the election of the FRG President in West Berlin and the United States, British and French Governments give their protection to the provocative action of Bonn.

This example alone gives a sufficiently graphic proof that West Berlin is being used as an instrument for fanning the cold war and it shows how urgent is the necessity of invigorating the situation in that city.

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Experience shows that those people in Bonn who are trying by all means to prevent understanding between the interested states-participants in the Geneva Conference, today are also pursuing this course hostile to peace. They are exerting no small effort to fan differences between the participants in the negotiations without stopping at direct provocations in connection with the question of West Berlin. Judging by everything, a sober approach to the questions which are the subject of our negotiations is alien to them.

Is it not testified to by delirious statements of certain statesmen of the FRG that allegedly West Berlin is a territory of the FRG and almost a suburb of Bonn? It is obvious that such statements can be made only by people who have lost all capability of soberly assessing the situation in Germany and in Europe and who are blindfolded by their hostility toward the German Democratic Republic, which has proved its being a staunch champion for the cause of peace, for genuine national interests of the Germans.

Such people are certainly aware of the fact that their statements as to the belonging of West Berlin to the FRG constitute an absurdity which can only make smile every person of common sense.

But they are little concerned about this. Why? Because they are seeking by fanning differences between the powers to warm their hands on these differences and contradictions.

This attitude of certain circles in the West German capital convinces us anew of how important are the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin, which is used as a source of tension, as a center of provocations and sabotage, particularly intensive at the present time. Indeed, it can be said that in the course of our Conference such utilization of it is of a deliberately demonstrative nature.

What primarily divides us on the Berlin question? The United States, Britain and France desire to preserve, or to be more exact, to perpetuate the occupation regime in West Berlin while the Soviet Union stands for the elimination of the occupation regime since it is necessitated by vital interests of invigorating the situation in Germany and Europe as a whole.

We proceed from the assumption that it is impossible to maintain endlessly the occupation regime established in the first post-war years, that it is necessary at last to put an end to all the remains of World War II. Should this not be done, West

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Berlin will remain a source of tension and dangerous conflicts. But this can be advocated only by those who would like to see Europe constantly shivering in military fever, with the clouds of a war threat overhanging it.

It is true we are told that the Western Powers want to maintain the occupation regime in West Berlin not indefinitely but pending the reunification of Germany.

But such arguments could have sense only if some progress in the reunification of the two German states were really discernable. But the Foreign Ministers of the three powers know very well that this is not the case. Moreover, the United States, British and French Governments, to say nothing of the FRG Government, resist by every possible means any slightest step towards the rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG without which all the talks of the unification of Germany have been and remain not more than an empty sound.

What is then, given the existing situation, given the existing policy of the Western Powers on the German problem, what is the difference between the current proposals of these powers and an effort to perpetuate the foreign occupation of West Berlin? Any difference can be established in this connection only if elementary logic is eliminated and if one closes one's eyes to the real policy of the Western Powers on the German problem.

Those who wish to understand correctly the Soviet position in the Berlin matter must remember one thing: The Soviet Union was, is, and will be an unreconcilable and principled opponent of having the life of West Berlin forever confined in the prison of foreign occupation.

In present conditions, when there is a social system in West Berlin different from the one which exists in the German Democratic Republic, the only just solution of the matter would be the transformation of West Berlin into a free city with the corresponding guarantee as to its independence and its ties with the outside world.

As to the question of guarantees, to our surprise the representatives of the Western Powers, who have always stressed their interest in the maintenance of the existing social order in West Berlin, have been quite indifferent to the establishment of any guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin. This alone shows what is the true price of the statements alleging that the Western Powers are guided by concern for the fate of the people of West Berlin.

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(Unclassified) It is only to be regretted that the Western Powers were unable to truly evaluate the proposal for the free city, although they recognize the abnormality of the present situation in West Berlin and the necessity of adopting measures for its improvement.

What are the basic objections of the three Governments against the transformation of West Berlin, against the granting to West Berlin of the status of a free city?

It is stated first of all that allegedly this proposal is unacceptable for the Western Powers because it does not provide for the maintenance of the existing way of life in West Berlin.

Secondly, it is stated that this proposal does not provide for freedom of communication of West Berlin with the outside world.

But anyone who knows the contents of the proposal of the Soviet Union can see clearly that these two arguments have no basis, that they miss their target completely. The Soviet proposals are based upon the fact that the population of West Berlin should be guaranteed the full possibility of having the social order which they wish themselves. As to the communications of West Berlin with the outside world, the Soviet proposals envisage that the maintenance of such communications should be guaranteed.

In order to eliminate any doubts, we proposed to the Western Powers that the agreement on West Berlin be based upon the most secure types of guarantees known to international practice.

We proposed to draw upon the United Nations Organization for the implementation of these guarantees. However, to our regret, the Governments of the Three Western Powers, which earlier made many bows in the direction of the United Nations and like to speak of the significance of this organization, adopted a different line of conduct when they met in practice with a proposal for tying in the United Nations to the solution of one of the most important international matters. They manifested complete indifference and disdain insofar as the United Nations Organization was concerned.

And if the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and of France did not manifest any interest in the solution of these matters in connection with the proposal pertaining to the Free City, the conclusion which arises is quite clear: in reality they are not so much preoccupied by the maintenance of

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(Unclassified) the ties between West Berlin and the outside world and the maintenance of the existing social order there which is not menaced by anyone, but by the maintenance of their own specific order in West Berlin, namely, the out-lived occupation regime.

With such a difference in positions of the participants of our Conference, the way out can be for the time being to reach agreement on a provisional status for West Berlin, agreeing upon the urgent practical steps which would assist in easing the situation both in West Berlin and in Germany. Such a solution is provided for by the latest Soviet proposals.

The period of time which we proposed for this provisional agreement—a year and a half—is based upon the fact that during this period the all-German committee would be able to carry out the useful work and would create the preliminary basis for the cardinal solution of the German problem and consequently of the Berlin problem through the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Our proposal provides for the carrying out at the end of the period mentioned in the agreement of new negotiations, if during this period of time the all-German committee has not reached any positive results. In this connection, sometimes the following question is put: Does this proposal signify that at the end of the period which would be established by the participants at the Conference there would be only one path left, the path of unilateral actions by the Soviet Union? But it is well known that at the end of the period of the provisional agreement we propose to conduct negotiations.

If the Soviet Government had in mind only unilateral actions insofar as West Berlin is concerned, it could have employed them now. However, we do not do this, but we propose to work out jointly a provisional status for West Berlin, we propose to create a special organ of the Four Powers in order to observe the fulfillment of the various undertakings which would be adopted by the participants of the agreement concerning the measures to be conducted in West Berlin. As stated on many occasions by the head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, we prefer the solution of this matter on an agreed basis together with the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It is clear that our proposal concerning subsequent negotiations does not speak in favor of those who would like to throw false light upon the position of the Soviet Union in the Berlin question.

We are told that it is better in this connection not to raise the question of a time limit. But this is like asking the

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Soviet Union to agree on the perpetuation of the occupation status in West Berlin, which the Soviet Union can never accept and will never accept for reasons which have been mentioned by us on many occasions. If the question is put in this way, this would take the ground from under any possible agreement.

However urgent, however important may be the task of reaching an agreement in this connection with West Berlin, it does not, understandably, cover all the unsolved matters pertaining to Germany and, first of all, to the main central problem, that of concluding a peace treaty. If it were possible to agree on the formation of an all-German committee, one of the main tasks of which would be the study of matters tied to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty, this would to a considerable extent facilitate the efforts of the interested states to reach a peace settlement with Germany and thus to draw a line under the war which took place in Europe. In addition this would also facilitate the solution of the Berlin problem through the possibility of a final settlement in the peace treaty with Germany.

The establishment of an all-German committee would allow both German states to participate actively in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and also to turn to practical work in connection with the development of contacts between the GDR and the FRG.

The Germans and only the Germans are competent to discuss and to adopt decisions upon matters which pertain to the ways and means of bringing closer together the two German states, and without such a bringing together of these two states—it must be said again—it is impossible to speak of any reunification of Germany. Such words would be simply a waste of time.

An agreement on the establishment of an all-German committee would provide an active assistance to the two German states in establishing such cooperation with each other which would allow the establishment of a common viewpoint on matters pertaining to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. For this reason we propose to utilize all the possibilities which would be provided by the establishment of an all-German committee. It would seem that such a proposal would have been supported by the Western Powers. However, and it is to be regretted, the Western Powers did not indicate any positive attitude on their part as far as this proposal is concerned.

Sometimes we hear that the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany is a task which is part of the competence of the four

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great Powers only and that therefore it cannot be discussed by the representatives of the two German states. Unquestionably, of course, the main participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition during the Second World War bear the responsibility for a peace settlement with Germany and must do everything possible in order to hasten such a settlement. But does this indicate that the matter pertaining to a peace treaty with Germany is of interest only to the four great Powers? Of course not. It is impossible, for instance, to deny the direct and natural interest of the Germans in what the peace treaty with Germany will be like.

We of course do not propose that the preparation of the peace treaty be taken up by the Germans alone, that they, so to speak, conclude the peace treaty with themselves. Of course the draft of the treaty would have to be agreed by the basically interested states and, first of all, by the participants at this Conference.

Moreover, the Soviet Government, as is well known, proposes that the draft peace treaty with Germany be studied at a peace conference of all states which participated in the war with their armed forces against Hitlerite Germany. More particularly, the Soviet Government stressed on many occasions the basic interest in the solution of matters pertaining to Germany, including the matter of the peace treaty with Germany, of such neighbors of Germany as Poland and Czechoslovakia. But undoubtedly the Germans themselves, bearing in mind the fact that two German states exist, must discuss among themselves directly the questions of interest to them, questions tied to the preparation of a peace treaty.

Let us try and give an example in this connection. When at our meeting the Soviet draft of a peace treaty with Germany was discussed, we heard claims that certain provisions of this treaty discriminate in one way or another as far as Germany is concerned. But if there are fears in this connection, although these fears are baseless, why not provide the Germans themselves with the possibility of studying this whole matter of expressing their common viewpoint, which would be the viewpoint of Germany as a whole?

If this matter of discrimination is referred to, it should be recognized that it is just the objections of the Western Powers against a discussion by the German representatives in the all-German committee of matters pertaining to the preparation of the peace treaty which point to a specific discriminatory attitude insofar as the Germans are concerned.

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July (Cont.) Of course, one should bear in mind that this path of bringing
13 together the Federal Republic and the German Democratic
(Unclassified) Republic to an agreement insofar as the peace treaty and the
reunification of Germany are concerned is not an easy path.
Years were spent in the development of differences between them;
ten years development of the two German states continued along
different directions, in almost opposite directions. It is
senseless to construct lasting bridges across an enormous
ravine, for instance, without the necessary preparatory work.
And for this reason we speak in favor of an all-German committee
and we propose a specific limited period of time for its work.
But bridges can be constructed, the work of the all-German
committee can lead to satisfactory results if the two sides
only indicate that they wish to cooperate with each other.

If the work of the all-German committee, or any other organ
acceptable for the Germans, is successful, then an important
step will be made toward the conclusion of a German peace
treaty, and when this problem is solved we will finally solve
the Berlin problem.

As far as it is possible to study the statements made by the
representatives of the Western Powers, the objections emanating
from them are directed against the principle of parity in
connection with the establishment of the all-German committee.
Perhaps it would be useful to clarify the position of the
Soviet Union in this matter.

In our opinion, the only correct solution is one which would
not place one side in a dependent position vis-a-vis the other;
in other words, as in any other negotiations, as fully equal
partners the two sides would have equal rights and equal
possibilities. We believe that the Government of the GDR
adopted a realistic and fully clear position insofar as this
matter is concerned. The main thing is that no side can force
its will upon the other, that matters be solved on the basis
of mutual agreement of the two sides and this requires the
principle of parity and of equality of sides in the work of the
committee.

It may happen that the all-German committee will not fulfill
the hopes and expectations which will be placed upon it. This
cannot be excluded if we take into account the present-day
position of the Adenauer Government which has the reputation of
being an enemy of any rapprochement between the two German
states and of a decrease in international tension. Every new
step, every new action made by the Government of the Federal

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Republic on the international scene, including the line which
is being developed by its representatives at the current
Conference, are new confirmation of the fact of how alien to
the Government of the Federal Republic are the interests of de-
creasing tension, the interests of true international coopera-
tion.

It seems that nothing frightens more the circles which are
responsible for the policy of West Germany than the possibility
of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, of a
rapprochement between the two German states for their unifica-
tion, the cessation in the armaments race and in the cold war.

And nothing pleases these circles - which determine the foreign
policy of the Federal Republic and push West German militarism -
more than to see the strengthening in the network of atomic
bases which covers their country and as a result of which new
means of destruction arise.

Such a policy of the Federal Republic Government of course leads
to apprehension and alarm among those who are interested in the
strengthening of peace and who wish to conclude a peace treaty.
It is clear that if in the all-German committee no positive
results would be obtained in connection with the preparation
of the peace treaty, then the urgency of the task of concluding
a peace treaty with Germany would not decrease but would in-
crease still more. We cannot leave open a matter forever which
must be solved in order to create the conditions of a truly
stable peace in Europe.

The Soviet Government views with particular importance the
attainment of an agreement on matters which are being discussed
at the Geneva Conference. The proposals of the Soviet Union
attest to the fact that the Soviet Government continues to strive
to bring together the positions of the two sides and to achieve
success in the work of the Conference. We have the right to
expect that the governments of the Western Powers on their side
will show that they are ready to reach mutual understanding,
that they favor a productive consideration of the latest pro-
posals of the Soviet Union, which would permit, finally, our
Conference to turn to the preparation of concrete decisions.

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Secretary Rorter's Report of Luncheon Talks with Hammarskjold:
On nuclear test suspension talks Hammarskjold believes Soviets genuinely desire agreement. He believes inclusion underground tests unripe for solution and inclined to think Russians will be prepared to put this aside for later inclusion while settling now for atmospheric high altitude. He then raised question of possible nature relationship of control organ to UN which he said he felt was subject no one had given much thought to. His own ideas tentative but he has in mind the possibility of some connection with Security Council which might involve organ making periodic reports to it.

I mentioned to him possibility that if agreement emerged from present Foreign Ministers' Conference on Berlin it might provide for representative of his to exercise monitoring function on propaganda directed from and at Berlin. He readily agreed responsibility of this sort would be acceptable to him if he were called by all parties to perform it.

We then discussed at length possible future procedural handling of disarmament talks which I said could be expected to be on agenda any summit conference. He exposed his thoughts on organization of UN Disarmament Commission which he said he had discussed at length six months ago with Zorin. This would be to organize bureau for commission composed of chairman, two vice chairmen and rapporteur. His suggestion further is that both chairman and rapporteur should be neutrals and in light of present candidates he believes neither office would fall to an Indian. In his view one vice chairman should be representative country in Soviet Bloc other than Soviet Union itself and other representative small Western nation such as Netherlands or Canada. Given this set-up it would be logical when big powers discussed practicalities of serious discussion disarmament problem to create sub-committee of 82 nation Disarmament Commission composed of the four members of bureau to whom would be added US, UK, France and USSR. This would arrive by above devious route at 4-2-2 composition and avoid pitfall of parity. I said that this seemed to me excellent but that in addition it might be well to add one additional representative from each side such as Czechoslovakia for Soviet Bloc and Italy (or Canada if latter failed of election as vice chairman) for Western nations. Hammarskjold agreed. We were also in agreement that it would be well if bureau was organized along lines he proposed somewhat in advance of any discussion of the problem of forum between big four. Hammarskjold indicated that he did plan to raise this subject with Sobolev in near future, probably end of next week. He believes this would result in more objective consideration by Soviets than if he talked to Gromyko about it here.

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US Delegation Summary of 20th Plenary Session: Meeting consisted of series of exchanges between Gromyko and Western Foreign Ministers seeking clarification of respective positions. Discussion centered on Soviet interjection of all-German committee into interim solution of Berlin problem with West seeking explanation why Soviets had unnecessarily reopened overall German problem in this manner and Gromyko insisting upon logical connection between interim Berlin arrangement and all-German committee. Meeting ended inconclusively with Secretary proposing Conference take up all open issues re interim Berlin solution and Gromyko replying that all-German committee proposal could not be left out of consideration.

Meeting opened with Couve pointing out Soviet proposal of June 9, as modified on June 19, combined issue of all-German settlement with distinct problem of separate solution of Berlin matter in manner stultifying prior work regarding separate Berlin solution. Couve requested Soviets explain why such action taken and why action did not reopen all prior differences regarding general settlement German problem.

Gromyko replied with series of questions directed to why West had not given concrete answers to latest Soviet proposals on all-German committee and provisional status of Berlin in view of fact West had first suggested all-German committee and all-proposal met previously expressed Western concern. Added Couve's statement had not clarified the situation.

Secretary stated Gromyko should reply to Couve's questions as Soviets had introduced all-German committee into Berlin discussion. After further interchange re who should answer first, Gromyko stated vital link between Berlin settlement and all-German committee was fact if committee succeeded in task, Berlin question necessarily solved; added Soviets did not intend to reopen question of reunification, which German matter.

Couve pointed out that Soviets, on basis our reference to all-German committee in Western peace plan, expected West to accept entire Soviet position on Germany. Lloyd added no logical link between interim Berlin settlement and all-German committee. Lloyd attempted debating point re inconsistency Soviet position on reunification with Article 22 of Soviet draft peace treaty which Gromyko fielded. Gromyko then deprecated West position on reunification shedding crocodile tears on its injustice to Germans.

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Lloyd and Couve both commented on fact course of discussion in meeting demonstrated that Soviet all-German committee proposal necessarily reopened previous sterile debates on settlement of overall German problem. Following exchange in which Gromyko inquired why if the West so strongly advocated free elections in Germany they would not leave the matter for decision by the Germans and Couve pointed out answer is to be found in the Western peace plan. Secretary made the suggestion regarding taking up open points on an interim Berlin settlement one by one reported above and Gromyko voiced the position that as question of all-German committee had been raised it could not be ignored.

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US Delegation Report of Twenty-First Plenary Session:
Secretary opened with detailed examination Western proposal of June 16 regarding Berlin and request that Soviets discuss it seriously. Lloyd then assessed respective West and Soviet positions on elements on interim Berlin agreement. Asked Gromyko to correct him if wrong in describing Soviet position.

Gromyko regretted lack of Western support for Soviet proposals regarding Berlin and discussed Soviet June 19 proposals along familiar lines, said Lloyd had apparently summed up on basis what Gromyko had not said rather than what he had said.

After Couve noted Gromyko had answered his questions of yesterday regarding All-German committee and expressed his concern at answers, Bolz stated Soviet proposals regarding Berlin had full support of GDR and argued along familiar lines for All-German committee.

Grewe attacked linking of All-German committee and Berlin settlement and pointed out differences between Western proposal for mixed committee and Soviet All-German committee, again stating latter would perpetuate division of Germany. Bolz concluded meeting by replying to some of Grewe's points. Date of next meeting left for later agreement.

After Secretary had spoken, Lloyd supported his statement and chided Gromyko for unwillingness discuss Western June 16 proposal which had been put up three days before Soviet proposal. He noted both sides agreed on interim arrangements for Berlin provided these satisfactory. He then gave respective West and Soviet positions regarding: A) force levels; B) armaments in Berlin; C) activities; D) duration of interim arrangements; E) access; F) situation at end interim arrangements. Lloyd said he understood that during interim period

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A) no unilateral action would be taken by either side;
B) if agreement not reached, four powers would resume discussions and pending results such discussions, situation would remain unaltered. Noted West maintains four powers could continue negotiate in some forum or through diplomatic channels during duration of interim arrangements. Understood Gromyko had said that if either of two Germanies found All-German committee unacceptable, some other way could be found to carry on discussions between two Germanies. Concluded there seemed some elements of flexibility in Soviet position and of agreement between Soviets and West.

Gromyko said conference should discuss concrete matters. Regretted lack Western support for "free city" and June 19 proposals. Emphasized Soviets could not accept perpetuation occupation West Berlin. Reaffirmed that duration interim arrangements relatively unimportant but said Soviets attach importance to reaching agreement on level forces and curtailment subversive activities. Regarding All-German committee, considered link between it and Berlin problem logical. Confirmed Lloyd's understanding other forum possible but he gathered from press that Federal Republic opposed to any conversations between two Germanies. If this in so, all would seek persuade Federal Republic such conversations necessary to reduce tension and further cause of peace. Gromyko also repeated familiar Soviet position regarding subjects All-German committee should consider. Could not agree with secretary that Berlin crisis instigated by Soviets. Regarding role of UN, Soviet "free city" proposal contemplated participation in guarantee of city's status and Soviets had only consider UN participation in concrete context. Would wish to know in what UN would participate.

In short statement, Couve noted Gromyko had not answered questions posed today but had answered Couve's questions of yesterday by implicitly accepting responsibility for restarting negotiations by linking All-German committee with Berlin problem and by assigning to committee the discussion of questions which were responsibility of four powers. This attitude Couve found disturbing.

Bolz then made statement summarized above, stating GDR could not agree to exercise of controls over activities in East Berlin because this would infringe GDR sovereignty in its capital. Stressed value of All-German committee in promoting cooperation between both Germanies which he said all Germans desire.

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Groves, after disputing Bolz statement that all Germans agree Berlin is capital of GDR, said Gromyko must have known West could not accept demands for linking All-German committee with Berlin *modus vivendi*. Indicated why West could not accept Soviet All-German committee, though it had itself suggested mixed committee, by analyzing differences between two proposals. Said Soviet committee would maintain partition of Germany, not justify it, since position of GDR would be thereby modified with its social system which totally differed from that of Federal Republic. Asked Gromyko if Khrushchev's statements, as reported by Harriman, that Soviet would not agree to reunified Germany which did not have socialist system were true and if so was introduction of communist system in Germany a subject to be discussed by All-German committee? Noted other Khrushchev statements to same effect. Said Soviet linking of all German committee with Berlin agreement confirms that Soviets exploiting Berlin question to attain political ends.

Gromyko countered that position of Soviet government on reunification is stated by its officials and not by foreign spokesman. Bolz A) reiterated GDR insistence on parity in any All-German committee; B) maintained GDR did not need Federal Republic recognition because it is flourishing state with fifth largest industry in Europe and is recognized by large number other countries of world.

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Secretary Rorter's Statement at 21st Plenary Session: At yesterday's plenary meeting, I suggested that we end the discussion of whether or not there is any essential link between procedures looking to solution of the problem of the continued division of Germany and procedures looking to arrangements for Berlin to last until reunification of Germany.

Instead, I proposed that we might, with greater profit, consider the substance of the Berlin proposals made by the Western Powers and by the Soviet Union. I suggested that when we resume today we should consider these proposals, point by point, so that a clear understanding of each position would be assured and further useful negotiations made possible.

I would now like to do just this.

A convenient starting point is to consider the three-power paper on Berlin, handed to the Soviet Foreign Minister on June 16, 1959. This paper was developed by the Western Powers after a detailed and prolonged discussion in private sessions with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

This paper was a genuine effort to meet views expressed by the Soviet Foreign Minister on a number of occasions.

As I indicated yesterday, this three-power paper was ignored by the Soviet Foreign Minister without any discussion of its specific point. The alleged reason given by Mr. Gromyko was that these proposed arrangements would require the USSR to reaffirm the occupation rights in Berlin of the US, the UK and France.

The fact is that these Western rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the USSR as legitimate in origin and continuing in fact, derive from the war and from solemn post-war agreements ratified by the USSR. Nothing that the USSR is now being asked to state or do would add to or detract from these rights, nor from Soviet responsibility.

We have gone far to meet an earlier proposal on the Soviet Foreign Ministers that a solution of the Berlin problem should deal with specific arrangements. I hope that, in the light of this clarification, the Soviet Foreign Minister will realize that his earlier reason for ignoring the Western proposals was without basis.

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I turn now to the specific elements of the June 16 paper:

I. First, it expressed the willingness of the three Western Powers to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present level, which is approximately 11,000 men. It proposed that forces in Berlin be armed only with conventional weapons.

The Western Powers would also declare that their governments would consider from time to time the possibility of reducing their forces if developments in the situation permitted.

The Soviet Foreign Minister had proposed earlier that the Western contingents in Berlin be reduced to token levels. (The word "token" is defined in the English dictionary as "something serves as a symbol, or something given or shown as a guarantee of one's authority.") surrounded by Communist forces, some thirty or forty times more numerous, a contingent of 11,000 men under this or any other definition can only be considered a token force.

And by agreeing not to increase - and to consider possible reductions in - this level, the Western Powers proposed to give further assurance that these forces would remain but token contingents.

II. Secondly, the June 16 paper proposed that there should continue to be free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by sea, and by air, for all persons and goods - including those of the Western forces in Berlin. The procedures applicable would be those in effect in April 1959. This proposal should be acceptable to the USSR since its own proposal of June 19 also specifies that "for the duration of the agreement, the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in the present shape."

Correspondence between Western and Soviet views also appears to exist in connection with the three-power proposal for a quadripartite commission, which would consider any difficulties arising in connection with access procedures with respect to Berlin.

III. Thirdly, the June 16 paper proposed that measures be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs, of others.

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Mr. Gromyko claims that tensions in Berlin are a source of great concern to the Communists. He insists that provision must be made for their reduction if there is to be an acceptable solution for Berlin's future until Germany's reunification.

It is common knowledge, the evidence for which I have previously cited in some detail, that East Berlin is a hotbed of subversive activity. Accordingly, the Western proposals for Berlin call for reciprocal measures to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might disturb public order.

Surely, the USSR, with its constant emphasis on parity of treatment, will understand the need for parity of responsibility in this instance.

Let me say now that the Western Power categorically rule out of consideration any one-sided restraints, as part of a Berlin resolution until reunification. If there are to be agreed restraints they must be reciprocally applied in both parts of this city where tensions are alleged to exist; if these reciprocal restraints are to be applied in an even handed fashion, our experience with international agreements to date suggests that it would be well to provide for verification of their fulfillment.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, in his recent statement on June 28, charged the Western Powers with paying only lip service to a United Nations' role in connection with Berlin. He then said, "...when, in the course of the talks, the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR declared the readiness of their governments to guard West Berlin from all interference, the Ministers of the Western Powers somehow suddenly lost interest in the problem. They did not want to speak of the participation of the United Nations in the guarantees, although from the rostrum they frequently speak of the organization's role. But, as we see, speaking about it is one thing, and practicing it in practice is another thing."

Even as the Soviet Foreign Minister was making this baseless charge, my Government was giving serious consideration to the possibility of a significant United Nations' role in connection with Berlin. We may wish later, when detailed negotiations begin, to suggest that the four powers responsible for Berlin consider a request for the Secretary General of the United Nations to establish an adequate staff in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city, for the purpose of reporting on propaganda activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights of others.

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I believe and have reason to hope from recent public statements of the UN Secretary General that he would be responsive to such a request for this form of United Nations' participation in a Berlin settlement.

I hope that the Soviet Union will consider this possibility of establishing an international scrutiny over one aspect of the life of this city which is of such importance to both the Communists and the free world.

IV. Fourth: The final point on the Western proposal is the provision that these arrangements concerning Berlin will continue in force until the reunification of Germany.

This principle was repeatedly accounted by Mr. Gromyko in our earlier private discussions. He acknowledged that any agreement reached at the Conference concerning Berlin should last until Germany was unified. But then the Soviet proposals of June 9 and 19 apparently changed this position. It seems to call for an agreement to expire after a brief specified period.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this is a point on which the true interests of all our countries coincide. Each of our countries has an underlying interest in the preservation of peace. And I cannot conceive that the cause of peace would be served by any agreement which merely ensured that the Berlin crisis would be revived after a short interval.

We have so far faced two major international crises over Berlin - one in 1948, when the USSR tried to starve the city into submission, and now again in 1959. Each of these crises cannot help but prevent that relaxation of tensions which the Soviet Union professes to desire. It is impossible to build relations between our countries on a sound and business-like basis, if these relations are to be periodically thrown into an uproar by Soviet threats to Berlin and by the Soviet Union's attempted reopening of past agreements covering Berlin.

I hope that Mr. Gromyko will weigh these thoughts carefully, from the standpoint of his own country's self-interest, if from no other. I hope that this weighing will lead him, as it has led me, to conclude that his original view was correct - that the accord on Berlin should last until reunification.

Now that the issue of Berlin has been raised once more, and now that relations between our countries have been profoundly disturbed by this fact, we would be remiss in our duty to the

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peoples of the world if we did not settle that issue once and for all on a basis that will endure until a solution of the German problem is accomplished.

Conclusion - These then, Mr. Chairman, are the four main points in the Western proposal concerning Berlin:

1. No increase of forces in Berlin.
2. Guaranteed free access to Berlin.
3. Measures to avoid disturbing activities in either part of Berlin.
4. Agreement that these arrangements should last until German unification.

Taken together, I believe that these four points offer a sound basis for successful negotiations at this Conference. I hope, therefore, that the Soviet Foreign Minister will now discuss them - seriously, substantively, and one by one - so that we can get on to an agreement.

It does not matter whether he does this on the basis of our proposals or not - so long as he addresses these four points, which seem to be the pillars on which any acceptable Berlin agreement must rest.

I hope that he will not avoid discussing these points by turning to other subjects - like procedures for German unification, which we can discuss separately if it seems useful at this Conference.

I hope that he will not avoid this discussion by throwing out bogus slogans like "free city," and that he will concentrate on specific improvements in the Berlin situation, rather than on changes in terminology.

And finally I hope that he will not avoid discussing these points by making generalized and misleading attacks on the Western proposal which comprehends them - claiming to perceive in that proposal requirements and consequences other than those spelled out in these four points.

None of these attempts at evasion would be worthy of the serious problems and the over-riding need which we face.

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The problem is that of devising arrangements for Berlin which will preserve the city's freedom and guard against future crises over this issue until Germany is reunified.

The need is to fulfill the hopes which peoples around the world have placed in this Conference by reaching a measure of agreement on such arrangements, so that by having made real progress we can proceed promptly to a meeting of the heads of government, where other issues can be discussed.

I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to show how the problem could be met in a way consistent with the interests and honor of all our countries.

It is for Mr. Gromyko to determine whether we can now begin serious negotiations which will fulfill the need.

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UK Delegation Report to NAC of Private Meeting: At the luncheon meeting the Western Ministers informed Mr. Gromyko of the proposal which they intended to make at the afternoon plenary session. Mr. Lloyd read out the text which was communicated to the NATO council on the morning of July 20. Mr. Gromyko said he would comment in detail later, but that his first reaction was that this proposal did not reconcile the fundamental difference in principle between the Soviet and Western approach. The Western Powers continued to insist on four power responsibility for reunification, whereas Soviets considered this was a matter to be settled between the two German states. Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out that the question of principle to which Mr. Gromyko referred was left open in the Western proposal, and Mr. Herter said that the proposal did not subject the Germans to any form of compulsion. After further exchange on the lines later developed in speeches at the plenary session, the meeting concluded.

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US Delegation Summary of Twenty-second Plenary Session: Secretary opened with statement presenting new Western proposal for continuation Geneva conference (Secto 358). Couve and Lloyd supported it. Lloyd reviewed conference to date, reasserted West must have clear statement regarding situation at end interim period, voiced objections to All-German committee and noted advantages new Western proposal.

After Bolz emphasized necessity GDR participation in negotiations on basis full equality and supported All-German committee and noted advantages new Western proposal.

After Bolz emphasized necessity GDR participation in negotiations on basis full equality and supported All-German committee proposal, Grewe said Federal Republic supported new Western proposal.

Gromyko, in uncompromising statement, emphasized basically different approaches of Soviet and Western proposals and thought new Western proposal unacceptable because its basis entirely different from that of Soviets. Again stated Soviet willingness consider forms for discussions between two Germanies other than All-German committee which were agreeable to all parties but not subject to four power surveillance. Reserved right comment further. Secretary appealed for consideration of principles, not forms of discussions.

After Secretary's statement and Couve's very short statement in support, Lloyd briefly reviewed conference to date. Noted both Western proposal June 16 and Soviet proposal June 19 for interim Berlin settlement dealt with same general subjects, e. g., force levels, activities, etc. Important point was fact Gromyko not willing say clearly what would be situation at end interim period. West could not accept blank check on this point. Also said it unreasonable to expect West accept Soviet contention that agree-

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ment on All-German committee must precede discussion other points interim Berlin settlement. However, new Western proposals represent attempt go some way to meet Soviet position. Lloyd objected to All-German committee on following grounds: (a) juridical - would involve *de jure* recognition of division of Germany; (b) practical - no progress could be made if four powers abrogated responsibilities; (c) procedural - Soviet proposal would make possible use of threat and pressure on All-German committee members and on West Berlin people. Lloyd noted new Western proposal was flexible, did not shelve All-German question and provided (in its last sentence) for exploring different ways to make progress.

Bolz spoke next emphasizing necessity for GDR participation on basis full equality in negotiations concerning Germany and supporting All-German committee. Denied Secretary's statement that GDR regime is imposed on people. Suggested possibility establishing six power body, all participants having equal status, to consider concerted views of two other bodies consisting of: (a) two Germanies; (b) four powers. Stressed necessity setting time limit about deliberations. Said reunification could not be brought about from outside as West proposed. Regarding contacts between two Germanies, meant fundamental political contacts such as agreement on renunciation of force, rather than technical agreements on railroads, etc.

After Greve had given Federal Republic support to new Western proposal, saying it differed only in form from earlier Federal Republic proposal spoke for itself since position Federal Republic on peace treaty and reunification well known. Gromyko then said he would speak briefly on proposals Mr. Herter had just put forward, reserving right say more later. Said Western and Soviet proposals envisaged basically different approaches. Soviet propose four powers should assist two Germanies to reach agreement between themselves while West envisages settlement by four powers of German questions with assistance German advisers. Reunification old CVH possible through rapprochement between two Germanies and Soviets proposed All-German committee as form of securing this which would be acceptable to all. Soviets willing consider other forms such as commencement in Geneva of negotiations between GDR and FRG without control or surveillance of four powers. Door not shut to other proposals but new Western proposal does not reflect desire find another acceptable form because its fundamental basis differs from that of Soviet proposal and does not contemplate equality and sovereignty for parties concerned. Gromyko appealed to West to be more flexible in taking into account Soviet views. If differences between social and economic structures of GDR and FRG did not exist there would be no problem of finding proper form of discussion. Therefore, should not dwell on these differences as Secretary had.

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Wrong to say as Lloyd did that Soviets underestimate importance of reunification. They merely favor realistic approach. Secretary concluded meeting by noting Gromyko had talked of basic principles and asked for greater flexibility by West in connection with Soviet views. Hoped that principles themselves can be discussed henceforth, not just forms for working out principles.

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Secretary Herter's Statement at Twenty-second Plenary Session: As indicated in my statement of July 16, I had hoped that we might concentrate on the specific elements of an interim agreed Berlin arrangement to last until German unification -- deferring until later in our deliberations further discussion of procedures for attaining German unification. This had seemed a necessary course since Mr. Gromyko had adamantly refused to discuss the problem of German reunification when the Western powers pressed for earlier consideration of this question by the conference. Because of this refusal, we had been unable to make progress in our discussions of the over-all German question and had moved on to a review of the situation in Berlin.

The Soviet proposal for a committee of free and communist Germans interrupted our discussion of measures which might be taken in Berlin. It thereby confused two separate issues with consequent delay in the work of this conference. Mr. Couve de Murville has already pointed this out at our meetings on July 15 and 16.

Mr. Gromyko, however, refuses to drop this new insistence that we now consider the Soviet proposal regarding procedures for future efforts to achieve German unification.

Since we agree that this is an important - although separate - question, I shall today set forth a new proposal of the Western powers as to the procedures for promoting German unity which given the circumstances holds the greatest promise. I hope to show that this proposal provides a sound basis for further consideration by the foreign ministers of this question, in which we have a great and continuing interest.

To this end, I intend to take advantage of Mr. Gromyko's suggestion that we should, if we can not accept his proposal for a mixed committee of free and communist Germans, offer some alternative proposal for future discussions of German reunification. Before I do so, however, let me review briefly where we now stand in our consideration of this matter.

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The Western peace plan which was first submitted to this conference more than two months ago is a phased plan for achieving German reunification. If accepted by the Soviets, it will most certainly lead to early reunification of Germany. This plan provides for a mixed German committee. This committee would operate within the framework of the most comprehensive program yet submitted to solve the problem of German reunification on the basis of free determination by the German people.

The mixed German committee in the Western peace plan would be established after the four powers had taken a final decision on early reunification and on the process whereby it could be achieved. Its major task would be to prepare a draft law providing free elections which would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany. If the committee could not agree on such a law, its members from the Federal Republic and East Germany would prepare alternative draft laws, to be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. Acceptance by a majority of the population of both parts of Germany would be required for the approval of a specific electoral law. This provision was intended to assure maximum freedom of choice for the population of the so-called GDR. On the basis of resulting free elections, an All-German assembly would be chosen to draft an All-German constitution. The All-German government formed on the basis of that constitution would be responsible for negotiating an All-German peace treaty.

Thus, in the Western peace plan, the mixed German committee would represent one step in a truly Democratic process whose fulfillment would assure German unity in freedom and a peace settlement with a German government representing all of the German people.

What Mr. Gromyko has done is to pull this one feature of the Western peace plan out of its context, changing its composition and its task, and then relating it to the Berlin question in a way which distorts the correct approach to both the Berlin problem and the problem of Germany as a whole.

The mixed German committee was included in the Western peace plan as one of a number of important innovations which responded to Soviet criticisms of the proposal made by the Western powers at Geneva in 1955. We have no doubt that a number of other provisions included in this effort to take account of Soviet views would also be attractive to the Soviet government if taken out of context.

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The Soviet union is now suggesting that the Western powers should agree to the isolated establishment of a German committee with a time limit to its deliberations. This would not be in return for Soviet agreement to a plan which would assure German unification. It would merely be in return for a statement that the Soviet Union, for a very limited period of time, would not violate its existing solemn commitments with respect to Berlin.

The USSR proposal has, moreover, so altered the context of this part of the Western peace plan that its acceptance would now perpetuate the division of Germany, rather than assure its unification.

The Soviet proposal does not provide for an agreed process which would lead to reunification. And it is perfectly clear to every one of us in this room that unity in freedom would not be the clearly accepted goal of all its members. For the authorities of the so-called GDR have made evident time and time again that they are not prepared to work out plans which would permit reunification on any basis that would not result in the communization of the FRG regardless of the will of the people. Mr. Gromyko has insisted that we cannot predict what his German committee would achieve. For my part, I can predict with confidence that, on the basis of available evidence and experience, and under the conditions proposed by Mr. Gromyko the committee would surely and quickly deadlock.

There is not the slightest hope that the committee would call for the selection of an All-German government on the basis of free elections. One-half of the committee would be composed of representatives of a regime which is aware that free elections conducted within its borders would inevitably lead to its disappearance. We can be equally sure, on the other hand, that the representatives of the Federal Republic would not sacrifice their freedom by accepting proposals whose clearly demonstrated purpose is to undermine that freedom.

For the reasons which I have just given, the All-German committee proposed by the Soviet foreign minister in his statement to the plenary session of this conference of June 10 and repeated by him in his proposal of June 19 is totally unacceptable.

Let me further point out that his proposal would constitute a substantial abandonment by the four powers of their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany.

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The basic responsibility for the solution of these matters, so gravely affecting not only Germany but all Europe and indeed all the world, must be placed where it belongs — on the representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. This conforms to common sense and to the solemn written commitments which Prime Minister Bulganin concluded with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Faure, and Prime Minister Eden, when the four heads of government reaffirmed their recognition of this common responsibility at the summit conference in 1955. It is in the interest of each one of our countries that this responsibility should be fulfilled, so that we can be assured that Germany will be reunified on terms which strengthen the peace of the world.

The intention of the Soviet proposal, furthermore, is to obtain an unwarranted measure of respectability for the regime which has been imposed upon the people of East Germany. I am speaking of the so-called German Democratic Republic. That regime has no mandate from its people. It lacks that true independence which is a basic attribute of a sovereign state.

The purpose of the Soviets in putting forward the proposal is all too clearly to perpetuate the partition of Germany. I repeat, therefore, that this proposal is not acceptable.

In rejecting the Soviet proposal for an All-German committee, however, the governments of France, Great Britain and the United States refuse to abandon their 14-year old effort to achieve the reunification of Germany in freedom. This is a responsibility which they share with the Soviet Union.

The Western peace plan testifies to our continued search for the means to this end. It also testifies to our willingness to meet Soviet criticisms of past plans. Unhappily, Mr. Gromyko rejected the Western peace plan, despite its patent reasonableness and workability.

We must not flag in our efforts, notwithstanding rebuffs, rejections, and obstructions thrown up in our path. The German people want reunification. Justice demands it. Indeed, all those who have a stake in future peace demand it.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and the United States, ever since the Soviet foreign minister rejected the Western peace plan, have been considering how the three of us together with our Soviet colleague could best continue to discharge our responsibility for the German question as a whole, which includes the matter of reunification and a peace settlement with Germany. I say a peace settlement with Germany, rather

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than with two parts of Germany as the Soviets propose — because there can be no peace settlement unless all of Germany is represented in its negotiation by the freely chosen government of a reunified Germany. The Soviet Union itself recognizes this principle at least in form, when it speaks of a peace treaty with Germany — even though what it goes on to propose are peace treaties with parts of a divided Germany.

The three Western foreign ministers have concluded that there is a sensible and businesslike way of continuing a common search for the road to reunification and a peace settlement with Germany.

Our proposal is as follows:

"The Geneva Conference of foreign ministers, as at present constituted shall continue in being for the purpose of considering the German problem as a whole. It should also consider questions relating to the extension and development of contacts between the two parts of Germany. For these purposes the conference shall meet from time to time at such level and at such place as are agreed. The conference may also make special arrangements for the consideration of particular questions arising out of its terms of reference as defined above."

This proposal would enable representatives of our four governments to keep under continuing discussion a problem which is of major importance to each of us, to the German people, and indeed to peoples throughout the world. It will permit a thorough consideration of the Western peace plan, the most comprehensive plan yet developed for solving the problem of divided Germany.

It would enable the four powers to utilize German advisers following the practice adopted by the present conference.

It would provide, by its terms of reference, for this conference to consider all the subjects which the Soviet foreign minister catalogued in his proposal of June 19. He proposed then that the All-German committee — and I now quote — "should promote the extension and development of contacts between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany".

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The three Western powers submit this proposal, after careful and serious deliberation, in an effort to meet the desire of the Soviet foreign minister that we here agree on a method for continuing discussions looking to German unification — but in a manner that is consistent with our respective responsibilities. The USSR foreign minister has offered to accept any procedure for considering the problem of divided Germany which is acceptable to the Germans. I am informed that the procedure here proposed is acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany, the legitimate authority representing 51 million Germans.

I hope that the Soviet foreign minister will consider this proposal carefully. Thank you. HERTER

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Lloyd Speech at 22nd Plenary Session: As Mr. Herter has said, he introduced this new paper on behalf of the three Western delegations.

It is a short paper, but not the less important on account of that. Therefore I should like, following the speeches of Mr. Herter and Mr. H. Couve de Murville, to explain how I myself see the background to this paper and its significance.

I will begin by tracing briefly what has happened during the present conference.

At the outset, two main sets of proposals were put forward. On the Western side, there was the Western peace plan. On the Soviet side there was the draft Soviet peace treaty, including the proposal for a demilitarized free city of West Berlin.

Both were "package deals," both dealt with All-German questions, both plans including interim settlements for Berlin. When I use the word "interim" in this connection, what I mean is plans to operate pending the re-establishment of German unity.

For two weeks we argued in vain around this table. Neither side would accept the proposals of the other. The reasons are known to everyone here.

So we concentrated on the question of arrangements for Berlin. This did not mean that we had abandoned our aim of an All-German settlement, which would ipso facto settle the Berlin question. It meant that, since we had been unable to make progress on the wider question, we agreed to try to deal with the narrower question. This seemed to be the sensible thing to do.

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We hoped that, if we could reach an agreement on this issue, that would of itself be a substantial achievement; it might prove a turning point, which would open the way to the wider agreements which would mean so much for peace.

When the conference went into recess on June 20, we had two main papers before us. We had the Western paper of June 16, and we had the Soviet paper of June 19.

Although there were serious differences between the positions expressed in these two papers and in the accompanying explanations, the two papers did for the most part deal with the same issues.

These were:

1. Force levels in Berlin
2. The armaments of forces in Berlin.
3. "Activities" in Berlin.
4. The duration of any agreement on Berlin.
5. Access to West Berlin.
6. The position at the end of the agreement.
7. Arrangement to handle discussions about wider German problems, including the association of representatives of both parts of Germany with those discussions.

All these points were dealt with in the positions of the two sides, as set out in those papers, with the exception of the last point. This is of course a point of great importance, to which I will return.

We on the Western side are ready further to discuss all these points and to see what exactly is the position of each side upon them and how our positions can be brought closer together. On one or two points we are in virtual agreement; for instance, about the armament of the Western forces in West Berlin. On other points uncertainty still exists. This is true, for instance, as regards what would happen at the end of an agreement on Berlin.

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Obviously we cannot determine how near we are to an agreement or how far away from it we are until we have been over the whole ground. Nor can we determine the chances of agreement on any particular point until each side clearly understands the position of the other side.

A case in point is the issue which I have just mentioned, namely, what would be the position at the end of an interim agreement on Berlin. On this issue, according to the Western paper of June 16, at the end of the period Germany would have been reunited and Berlin would have become its capital. This is the same inference which is to be drawn from the original Soviet proposal (Article 25).

But in the Soviet statements of June 10 and June 19, there was put forward a different conception, the conception of an interim arrangement for West Berlin, subject to a fixed time limit.

That raised two sets of questions—what would happen during the fixed interim period and what would happen at the end of it? On that last point, I stated in my speech of July 16 what I understood the Soviet position to be. This is what I said then:

"The Soviet position is that at the end of the period fixed for these interim arrangements, if agreement has not been reached in some way, then we resume these negotiations, and pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations as foreign ministers, the situation will remain unaltered. As I understand it, no unilateral action will be taken by either side pending the result of that further phase in our negotiations."

I think that in the debate in the House of Commons on July 8, Mr. Aneurin Bevan, speaking for Her Majesty's Opposition, put the point in these words. He said:

"There is no suggestion as far as I can see that we should abandon our occupation rights in Berlin if we agree to a time limit. All they [The Russians] say is that the two sides take up their respective positions at the end of the period, as they take them up now."

Mr. Gromyko has not been willing to say whether this is the right interpretation or not. But I tell him quite frankly that, unless this point is cleared up in such a manner as to leave no doubt or ambiguity, I do not see how agreement is possible.

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It may be asked why the Western powers are prepared to contemplate any agreement about Berlin which has its terminating point a fixed date rather than the fact of German reunification. It is certainly not because we are prepared directly or indirectly to allow our position or the freedom of West Berlin to be thereby undermined.

The answer is that we regard our willingness to contemplate an interim solution of this kind as an important attempt to get round one of the major difficulties confronting us. But obviously we cannot consider an interim arrangement of this kind until we are certain what the position will be at the end of the stated term. Otherwise we should be signing a blank check.

To sum up what I am trying to say on this point, we regard our attitude to this new Soviet position as constructive and conciliatory. We feel that, partly for that reason and partly because of the tremendous issues at stake, we are entitled to an unequivocal answer on the point which I have put.

What is the Soviet attitude to our discussions generally? Mr. Gromyko has said that he is not prepared to deal with the first six points which I enumerated earlier until Number 7 has been dealt with, namely:

"Arrangements to handle wider German problems, including the association of representatives of both parts of Germany with those discussions."

Apparently we are expected to make agreement on this point a condition precedent to everything else.

We think this attitude unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Western delegations have tried to go some way to meet it. We have introduced our new paper today, as a constructive initiative, a serious attempt to come nearer to agreement. Let us try to explain what I mean.

I should like first to state my objections to the Soviet proposal for an All-German committee. My objections to it are three-fold; juridical, practical and procedural.

The juridical objection, as I see it, is that the Soviet proposal involves the recognition de jure of the partition of Germany.

In other words, we give the force of law to the division of Germany in perpetuity. If anyone really wants to do that, let him come into the open and say so.

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Or is that the construction that we are to put on Mr. Khrushchev's speech on July 17?

The practical objection is that no sensible person can suppose that, if the four powers abrogate their duties and responsibilities in these matters, any agreement on the major questions would be reached. We believe that if progress on reunification is to be made, the assistance of the four powers is required. I cannot believe that a procedure of the kind proposed by the Soviets would do anything but make reunification and the problem of European security more difficult.

If we, the four powers with our responsibility, wash our hands of the problems and say that the representatives of the two parts of Germany must be shut up together to solve them, I cannot believe that any progress toward agreement on any of the major questions will be reached. We do not want just new institutions or new formulas. We want practical progress. The Soviet proposal for an all-German committee will not lead to this.

My third and procedural objection to the Soviet proposal is that if accepted it could be used as a means of pressure upon West Berlin. It could be said that failure in the all-German committee must lead to changes in Berlin and to the modification of the position of the people of West Berlin. Equally the threat to the people of West Berlin could be used as a means of what we would regard as quite unfair pressure in the discussions of the all-German committee.

So much for my view of the Soviet proposal. I now turn to the new Western proposal. The first advantage which I see in it is that it is flexible. It does not set narrow limits to items such as the level of the discussions proposed or their place or their timing.

The second advantage is that it does not involve shelving the all-German question or of relegating it to a body where it would languish. One advantage of our proposal is that these talks would be under our own supervision as foreign ministers. We should be keeping an eye on them. If they seemed to be going wrong, we could intervene. When necessary, we could resume the talks ourselves at foreign ministers' level.

The third advantage which I see in our proposals is that the last sentence of our new paper proposes means by which this conference can make experiments of a procedural kind. If one experiment does not work, then it is open to us to try another.

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Mr. Gromyko said the other day that we cannot force the representative of either part of Germany to do what they do not want to do. I quite agree. We have got to find something which is acceptable to both.

To sum up, I would say that what Mr. Gromyko may feel tempted to describe in our proposals as their imprecision is a strength, not a weakness: it has to be interpreted not as vagueness, but rather as a willingness to discuss and negotiate. The test of our proposals is the extent to which the Soviet Government feels able to cooperate in making them succeed.

We hope that Mr. Gromyko will consider our proposals carefully. I would not wish to press him for an immediate reply. If, on the other hand, he now seeks any clarification, I will do my best to provide it.

As I pointed out on July 16, Mr. Gromyko has indicated that there is some flexibility in the Soviet position. On June 10 he said that, if the proposal for the establishment of the all-German committee were unacceptable to one or the other German side, the four powers could recommend the governments of both German sides to choose a form of cooperation acceptable to them. In the Soviet paper of June 19 there are the words: "within the frame work of an all-German committee or otherwise."

I am encouraged by this and feel that with goodwill it should be possible to find common ground between us.

In all these discussions it has been our purpose to come closer to an agreement which would make a real contribution to a lessening of tension in Europe. I hope that Mr. Gromyko will feel able to approach our proposals in the same spirit.

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Report to NAC on Private Meeting of July 21: Mr. Gromyko set forth certain important points in the Soviet position. With respect to "negotiations" between the two Germanies, Mr. Gromyko repeated that the important thing was a recommendation by the Four Powers to the two German states to initiate direct negotiations without control by the Four Powers. The Three Powers should give up speaking of their responsibilities in the matter of reunification. A four-power discussion of free elections was a waste of time. When questioned concerning contacts between the two Germanies, Mr. Gromyko stated that "technical" contacts already existed. When the Soviet Union spoke of contacts between the two governments, it meant political contacts on important matters. Mr. Gromyko stated flatly that talks between the two Germanies limited to eighteen months might be concerned with reunification but especially with the peace treaty and, in that connection, with the following points: Ban on political and military alliances, size and arming of forces, and economic ties between Germany and other countries. If, at the end of the eighteen-month period, no accord should be reached on reunification, a Six-Power Conference would be opened to settle definitively the problem of the peace treaty and that of Berlin. Reunification would be a closed matter. The treaty would be signed with the two Germanies.

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US Delegation Report of Twenty-third Plenary Session: Gromyko rehearsed Soviet proposal for German committee and attacked western proposal continuing FM conference. Suggested four powers could, while seeking some acceptable form inter-German contacts, conduct parallel discussion Berlin arrangements. Promised no unilateral Soviet action during interim Berlin agreement and negotiations following such agreement.

Secretary attacked Soviet proposal linkage between German unity and Berlin.

Couve attacked linkage too, and found no comfort in Gromyko's remarks today re what would happen after interim Berlin arrangement.

End summary.

Gromyko stressed need for "Two German states" coming together (1) to reach agreed German viewpoint re peace treaty, for which four powers bear main responsibility; (2) to discuss unity, which could not be achieved in any other way; (3) to promote inter-German contacts on more than technical problems. Attacked western proposal for continuing FM conference with German advisers, as involving procedure for four power consultation to Germans on German questions, and as being but forward to discussion of Soviet proposal. Soviets still merely to evade discussion of Soviet proposal. Soviets still hope some method acceptable inter-German discussion can be found, e.g., two German delegations could begin their contacts at this conference and try to agree on future procedures, proposal of Dr. Bolt at last plenary are sufficiently elastic to create other possibilities, etc. While seeking agreed method of inter-German discussion, four powers could conduct parallel, discussion of inter-German arrangements to clarify difficulties, possibilities of agreement and to realize such possibilities. Then said, referring past Lloyd and Horner questions, that during interim agreement on Berlin and during negotiations at Foreign Ministers Conference following agreement, Soviets would take no unilateral action if Western Powers observed agreement.

Secretary gave prepared statement attacking Soviet proposals for linkage between German committee's consideration of German unification and interim Berlin arrangement.

Couve also attacked relating discussion of all-German question to that of Berlin arrangement, since measures addressed to German question could not be tied to Berlin measures. Also said alternative means of inter-German discussion advanced by

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Gromyko involved no real difference all-German committee. Said Gromyko's assurance today re unilateral action did not answer question status western rights after expiration interim agreement Berlin. Would be willing discuss all-German question next meeting.

Lloyd deferred comment Gromyko statement pending consideration.

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Gromyko Speech of Twenty-third Plenary Session: For several days running, an exchange of views has been taking place at our conference concerning the possibility to organize negotiations between the GDR (German Democratic Republic, or East Germany) and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany) for the consideration by them of such questions that have primary importance for the German people as the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the working out of measures aimed at restoring national unity and the development of contacts between the two German states.

In the course of the conference Soviet delegation has repeatedly justified the necessity of concluding a peace treaty with Germany both from viewpoint of strengthening peace in Europe and from the viewpoint of the national interests of the German people, and there is hardly any need now to dwell in detail on this question. Besides, none of the participants of the conference denied the importance of a peace settlement with Germany.

However, the Western powers did not go beyond this admission. As soon as the conference started considering specific proposals whose aim was to place the solution of the problem of a peace treaty with Germany on a businesslike basis, there at once appeared two diametrically opposite approaches to this problem.

On the one hand, there was a steadfast desire to proceed without any delay to the practical solution of the task of a peaceful settlement taking into account the actual situation that obtains in Germany. On the other hand, there is an evident tendency to evade by all means the conclusion of a German peace treaty and to delay the solution of this question ad infinitum.

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These two different lines were also expressed in the statements made by the representatives of the GDR and the FRG at our conference. It would seem natural in such a situation that representatives of the two German states meet together and try to consider the possibilities of overcoming the existing difficulties and of formulating a common German viewpoint on the question of a peace treaty. What objections can be raised to this? Would this cause any harm to the four states that bear prime responsibility for a peace settlement with Germany? Certainly not. On the contrary, negotiations between the GDR and the FRG would be only useful both for the Germans themselves and for the great powers since they are interested in strengthening peace in Europe.

But in all appearances the governments of some powers want neither the normalization of relations between the two parts of Germany nor the invigoration of the situation in Europe as a whole. They appear to be frightened by the very idea of the possibility of making some step in this direction.

How can this be explained? Evidently, there can be only one explanation: the governments of the Western powers today as well as in the future intend in their policy to follow a line aimed at preserving the heavy burden of remnants of the past war which press down upon relations between many states, first of all between the great powers, and at preserving the unsettled situation in Europe.

The question of a peace settlement with Germany serves at present as a good touchstone to test the sincerity of the statements of various governments about their desire to reduce international tension and to create conditions of a stable peace, since the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is inseparable from the implementation of these aims. One would like to ascertain a hope that the governments of the Western powers would weigh in a most serious manner the consequences which may come about owing to their negative position in this pressing issue.

The proposal of the Soviet Government on negotiations between the two German states also provides for the discussion between the representatives of both parts of

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Germany of such a problem as the reunification of Germany. We urgently press for negotiations and a rapprochement between the two German states because in the present situation there exists no other way at all to the restoration of Germany's unity. If some people try to pretend that the unification of Germany can be attained by foreign hands, brought in from outside by issuing some instructions for the Germans, this can be done only as a blind.

All the drafts which overlook the fact of the existence of the two German states, which for many years have been developing in opposite directions, are obviously unviable, remote from the actual situation existing in Germany and in Europe; practically they are but additional obstacles in the way of Germany's unity.

The road to the restoration of Germany's unity now lies only through a rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG. We have been saying and will say so. To speak differently means to ignore the reality, to deliberately misrepresent the facts.

It should be noted that the realistic understanding of the ways whereby the unity of Germany can be attained under present conditions is gaining ground in the West as well, even among prominent Western statesmen. We can but regret that this fact is being passed over in silence here, in Geneva, probably on the ground that our conference is not considered to be a proper place for stating these sober views. But where else if not at the conference dealing with questions relating to Germany should the language of realism and due consideration of the situation be used in the search for ways for agreement on the questions which affect the vital interests of the German nation and which are of great importance for maintaining peace in Europe?

The Soviet Government is known also to propose that one of the subjects at the negotiations between the two German states should be the question of developing contacts between the GDR and the FRG. The proposals submitted to our conference by the Western powers also contained references to contacts.

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However, the statements of the Foreign Ministers of the Western powers and particularly of the FRG representative showed them to understand the question of contacts between the Germans in a peculiar way. They would speak only of purely technical ties, which have already been existing for a long time between the GDR and the FRG.

The fact that such tasks as a peace settlement with Germany and unification remain unsolved necessitates the development of contacts of an entirely different kind between the two German states. How can the Germans come to a common viewpoint on these cardinal problems if contacts between the two parts of Germany are restricted, as already mentioned here, to such questions as street-car systems or postal and telephone communications?

The situation at present, however, is such that the Adenauer Government with the support of the three Western powers shies away from any proposal that opens up prospects for businesslike negotiations between the Germans on questions that really are of national significance for them.

We have heard it asserted here that if the Germans enter into joint negotiations, either in an all-German committee or through any other method acceptable to them, this will allegedly lead to an aggravation of Germany's division. One can but view with amazement the unfounded arguments resorted to by the opponents of a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany in their attempts somehow to whitewash their position.

What kind of an "aggravation of the division" is it if the question is one of elaborating a joint German stand on questions of a peace treaty and Germany unity? Since when has the elimination of differences between the Germans come to signify an "aggravation of the division" of Germany?

This is a very lame kind of logic indeed.

If, however, one were to be an extreme pessimist and expect the worst -- namely, that such negotiations would result in the representatives of both parts of Germany failing to find common language -- then the situation would remain the same as it stands now.

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But even then the negotiations would have been useful, for both sides would come to a better understanding of one another's position and would see with greater clarity the difficulties to be overcome by them. But why should the very worst be expected in advance?

It follows that the arguments about some sort of aggravation of the division of Germany in the event of negotiations between the Germans are from beginning to end artificial and only testify to the fact that the stock of arguments of the opponents of a rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG has been substantially drained.

What is the conclusion that stems from the fact that the governments of the Western powers, to say nothing of the FRG Government, stubbornly oppose the establishment of an all-German committee or the holding of negotiations between the GDR and the FRG in any other form acceptable to them?

The conclusion is obvious: They oppose both the conclusion of a peace treaty and German unification although they are not loath to pay lip service to their concern over the solution of these tasks, particularly the task of German unity.

It is impossible at one and the same time to talk of the desire to see Germany united and to object to any step aimed at bringing the two German states closer together.

A day or two ago, the Western delegations submitted their proposal that instead of having direct negotiations between the GDR and the FRG the Geneva conference of foreign ministers be converted into a sort of permanent institution within whose framework there would proceed endless negotiations, absolutely unlimited in time, with the great powers dealing with purely German affairs related to the unification of Germany and the representatives of the GDR and the FRG performing auxiliary "advisory" functions.

We have already made clear our attitude to this proposal of the Western powers. We are criticizing it not just out of the desire to argue but because not only is it unable to lead to the solution of the tasks that face us, but it

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does not move matters forward one inch. Satisfaction over the introduction of this proposal can be and is expressed solely by those who are enemies both of a peace settlement with Germany and of German unity.

As a matter of fact, we find that this proposal is a vivid expression of the basic position of the Western powers on the German question. They would like the four powers to sit atop a sort of pyramid and dictate their will on such questions as the elaboration of German laws, the holding of elections and plebiscites in Germany, etc., with the Germans merely playing the part of obedient followers of this diktat.

And the authors of these proposals still talk of freedom for Germany. If this is freedom, it is only freedom for foreign powers to foist their decisions upon the Germans.

The matter is not changed one iota by the readiness of the Adenauer Government and its delegation to our conference to accept any prescription infringing upon the interests of the Germans in the negotiations on important questions concerning the ways of Germany's development in the future, no matter how humiliating for the German people these prescriptions may be.

The following circumstance is significant. In the first phase of our conference, the three Western powers themselves submitted proposals that provided in particular for negotiations on political questions between the representatives of both parts of Germany. It is true that according to the said proposals these negotiations were to be supervised and directed by the four powers. But in this context, the important point lies elsewhere.

The important thing is that the Western powers themselves proposed political negotiations between the representatives of both parts of Germany. But when the proposal on negotiations between the GDR and the FRG was submitted by the Soviet Union, there appeared right away statements to the effect that such negotiations were harmful and even dangerous, that they would lead to "the consolidation of the GDR," to the "aggravation of Germany's division", etc.

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So, it appears that what was correct but several weeks ago seems in the opinion of the Western powers to be incorrect today.

The thing, of course, is not that the importance of such negotiations could have undergone a change in the course of several weeks, but that in the first case the intention of the Western powers to impose their will on the German participants of the negotiations, and in the other case it is proposed that the Germans discuss their problems and adopt decisions thereon freely without any pressure from outside -- in other words, that they should not be executors of others' will.

The latest proposals put forward by the Western powers are actually aimed at preventing the establishment of the only possible basis for the efforts to unify Germany. Of course, these proposals do not constitute a basis for negotiations.

One cannot help drawing the conclusion that they were submitted not to seek ways to agreement but with the sole purpose, as the Western press openly says, of parrying somehow the Soviet proposal to arrange negotiations between the two German states in a form acceptable to them, so as to evade the discussion of this proposal.

We regret that the proposal of the Soviet Government on the establishment of an all-German committee met with a negative attitude on the part of the Western powers. We would not like, however, to abandon the hope that a form of negotiations acceptable to both German states will be found. We proposed various alternatives in this respect, particularly, the establishment, to begin with, of contacts between the two German delegations at our conference so that this contact would subsequently develop elsewhere on agreement between the two sides.

We have also heard other proposals here. At the last session Dr. (Lothar) Bolz, the Foreign Minister of the GDR, expressed a number of considerations concerning the forms of negotiations between the GDR and the FRG, which, in our conviction, are flexible enough and worthy of serious study.

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In a word, it is no way possible to consider that the question of negotiations between the Germans has lost its acuteness. The Soviet delegation, on its part, is ready to continue efforts to find an agreed solution of this question at our conference. We should like to think that the Western powers will take a more constructive position with regard to the real ways of bringing the two parts of Germany closer together.

As we have already declared to the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and France, we do not object to a simultaneous exchange of views on questions relating to an interim agreement on West Berlin. Such a method of examining the questions under discussion would permit of assessing more realistically the difficulties which we have to overcome and to ascertain the existing possibilities of reaching agreement.

In conclusion, I would like to dwell on one more question relating to an interim agreement on West Berlin.

Referring to the question of West Berlin and to an interim agreement on this point, Mr. Lloyd in his statement of July 20 asked what would be the situation during the period of the interim agreement and also during the negotiations which are provided for by the Soviet proposal following the expiration of this period. Mr. Lloyd raised pointblank the question of whether there would be no danger that one side might undertake unilateral action during this period.

It seems to us that from what we have said on this score the position of the Soviet Government on this question should not seem unclear. But if there is some lack of clarity then I consider it necessary to state the following:

While an interim agreement on West Berlin is in force as well as in the course of the negotiation to be held at a conference of the states participants of this Geneva conference to consider again the question of West Berlin, no unilateral action will be taken by the Soviet Union. It stands to reason that we proceed from the assumption that the other participants in the agreement will likewise commit no breach of the agreement.

I trust that from now on there will be no uncertainty in this question.

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Secretary Warner's Statement at Twenty-third Plenary Session:
I would like to speak very briefly, on behalf of the United States delegation, on one matter. And that concerns the linkage which the Soviet Union is seeking to establish between the questions of German unification and an interim Berlin arrangement. This matter was referred to again by Mr. Gromyko in the speech he has just concluded.

This attempted linkage illustrates a very real difference which, I believe, lies at the root of much of the difficulty we are now having in reaching agreement at this conference. That difference arises out of the basic fact that the free world pursues a strategy of consent in international affairs, while the Communists pursue a strategy of duress.

For example, the Soviet Union created this year's Berlin crisis with a threat that, if the Western powers did not accept their Berlin proposal by May 27, the Soviets would attempt to extinguish Western rights in Berlin. This was an application of the traditional Communist strategy of duress. It did not succeed.

The Soviet Union is now engaged in another application of this strategy of duress in an effort to capitalize on the Western powers' desire to end the Berlin crisis.

The Soviet Union is saying, in effect, that it will end the Berlin crisis - for a while - but only at a price. That price is Western acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the problem of a divided Germany be put in the hands of a committee of Communist Germans and free Germans. We are told, at least implicitly, that if this price is not paid - if we do not agree to the formation of this committee - the USSR will try to make our position in Berlin impossible.

If accepted, this Soviet proposal would result in still a third, and even more dangerous, application of the strategy of duress.

The committee of Communist and free Germans would be given but a short time to solve a difficult problem, with which the four powers have wrestled unsuccessfully since the war. Failure in its task would be assured by the basic fact that the leaders

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of the Soviet Government and of the so-called German Democratic Republic have made crystal clear that they will never agree to reunification of Germany under conditions which did not assure the communication of the Federal Republic. Such a committee would have no chance of success.

And what is the price of failure?

Significantly, the USSR's proposal for a Berlin arrangement includes the termination of the arrangement at the same time scheduled for the expiration of the life of the "mixed committee". The price for the Federal Republic of Germany and for the Western Powers would thus be another threat to their West Berlin brothers in freedom. The price of failure for the East Germans would, by the same token, be the prospect of another attempt by their Soviet friends to help East Germany annex West Berlin.

This then would be the final element of the three-stage strategy of duress in which the Soviets are now engaged, if we accepted the Soviet proposals for an all-German committee and for an interim Berlin arrangement with the same time limit.

In devising these proposals the Soviet Government has constructed an ingenious device whereby it clearly hopes to apply pressure on the Western allies eventually to accept changes injurious to their rights and interests in respect of either Berlin or Germany -- or preferably both.

Mr. Gromyko has made this intent quite evident in the present negotiations.

First, he suggests that the all-German committee be given a year and a half in which to complete its labors, if at the end of that time it fails to agree, then, Mr. Gromyko explains, there will be no point in its continuing to discuss German unity and the Soviet Union will enter into new negotiations about Berlin, and apparently about a German peace treaty, too, with the Western powers.

Mr. Gromyko has given us certain assurances that no unilateral action will be taken during these subsequent negotiations.

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He has been careful, however, to say nothing about what will happen if these negotiations fail -- as the Soviet Union can quickly cause them to do.

He has thus refused to give us any assurance that the Soviet Union will not, soon after expiration of the year and a half period which he has proposed, sign a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic -- a treaty which the Soviet Union would then claim extinguished all Western rights in Berlin.

The coincidence of the expiration dates for the interim agreement on Berlin and on the life of the all-German committee must thus, according to Soviet calculation, ensure one of two results.

Either the Federal Republic will capitulate in the all-German committee to any and all demands of the so-called German Democratic Republic in an effort to avert unilateral Soviet action in Berlin, or the Soviet Union will use the lack of progress in the all-German committee as the pretext for confronting the three Western powers with what the Soviets would expect to be an impossible situation in West Berlin.

In effect, what the Soviet Union is proposing to do is to hold for ransom a whole city -- two million human beings. And the Soviet Union even suggests that we should become its unwitting accomplice in this deal by agreeing to the very arrangements which would make this possible.

This, in brief, is why the Soviet Union proposes that the questions of the all-German committee and of any interim agreement on Berlin be inextricably linked.

This in brief also is why the Western powers reject this linkage.

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US Delegation Report of Twenty-fourth Plenary Session:
Begin summary. Lloyd opened by outlining West's objections to Soviet all-German committee proposal. Believed Gromyko's statement of yesterday had confirmed Lloyd's understanding

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re situation at end interim period and during any subsequent negotiations but had not dealt with situation at end these negotiations. Thought interim plan for Berlin now sketched out and agreement possible here or elsewhere. Urged Gromyko reconsider West's July 20 proposal.

After Secretary's statement Corvo also attacked all-German committee and supported western proposal. Stressed in reply to Gromyko's contention that reunification problem is one for Germans themselves to work out, that peace plan does in fact leave question to Germans in last analysis.

Gromyko then accused West of lack of objectivity toward all-German committee proposal and of obstructing conference. Said Soviets willing discuss anytime other questions re Berlin "in parallel" with all-German committee proposal.

Bolz spoke along familiar lines in favor of negotiations between two Germanies and attacked Federal Republic for policy of "force" and "militarism". Grove denied Bolz's allegations.

Time of next plenary meeting to be decided later. (Following adjournment it was agreed to have private luncheon meeting tomorrow at Villa Greta.) and summary.

Lloyd listed Western objections to all-German committee as: A) would end four power responsibility for settlement of German problem which necessary if reunification to be achieved; B) provides no incentives to GDR to make consent to since it would obtain recognition in event of deadlock; C) really provides for Federal Republic a Soviet satellite without US, UK and France since GDR under complete Soviet control. Stressed necessity for free all-German elections. Traced progress negotiations to date. Thought interim agreement re Berlin now sketched out and though Gromyko had confirmed yesterday his (Lloyd's) understanding that Soviet position is that at end interim period if no agreement reached, negotiations would be resumed by present Geneva conference, and, pending results these negotiations, the situation re Berlin would remain unaltered with neither side taking any unilateral action. Lloyd noted there is further point as to

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what happens at end these further negotiations and denied categorically that anything he had said implied he agreed Soviets have any right take unilateral action re Berlin at any time. Concluded as noted in summary above.

After Secretary's statement Couve also attacked all-German committee proposal, noting especially it designed promote recognition GDR and would make reunification impossible since the two negotiating parties speak entirely different languages. Pointed out differences between all-German committee and peace plan's mixed committee. Soviet plan provides no recourse if two Germanies do not agree but peace plan leaves final decision to German people as a whole through free elections.

In addition points noted in summary above, Gromyko denied Lloyd's allegation GDR policy dictated from Moscow and said socialist countries rejoice in unity of purpose in their foreign policies which work for peace and in their common Communist internal organization. Sarcastically hoped Secretary's fear Federal Republic would be communized not based on flimsiness Federal Republic Government. Reiterated aims Soviet Government stated by its representatives, not foreigners who interviewed them. Agreed with Couve German reunification was for Germans to decide and noted Soviets had departed from this view by allowing four powers to assist them in solving problem.

Secretary said Gromyko had misinterpreted his statement re fear of communizing of Federal Republic. Recalled he had said GDR would never allow reunification unless Federal Republic went Communist. The basic weakness exists not in Federal Republic but in East German camp where people not allowed express selves in free elections.

Bolz, after alleging all Germans favor negotiations between two Germanies who are represented on equal basis in Geneva, accused Bonn of desiring use force to bring about reunification. Denied GDR desired communization Federal Republic and stated Germans wish avoid imposition on them of "revanchist" Federal Republic Regime. Denied Lloyd's allegation re subservience to USSR and, re elections, asked what would be result in

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Federal Republic of plebiscite re socialization and re GDR proposals on elections which made before Federal Republic joined NATO and introduced universal military service. Alleged Federal Republic prefers remilitarization to reunification and noted question at President's news conference re possibility of rearmed Germany turning against West.

Grewe denied allegations re militarism and policy of force, citing London and Paris agreements and statements Federal Republic leaders.

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Secretary Herter's Statement at 24th Plenary Session:

At the outset let me ask for your indulgence if in the few remarks that I am about to make I cover some of the same ground which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd just covered so clearly and directly in dealing with the question of the so-called all-German committee. If some of my remarks appear to be repetitive, it is I think only an indication that we feel very strongly on the points which have been brought out during the course of the discussions.

This conference is seized, as you pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, with two separate issues: what should be the procedures for future discussion of the problem of Germany as a whole and what should be the terms of an interim arrangement for Berlin.

Yesterday I indicated why my government could not accept the Soviet proposal for linking these two problems under an arrangement which would leave the Soviet Union free, after a specified period, to take unilateral action against Berlin if there were lack of progress toward German unity.

Any interim arrangements which thus permitted the Berlin crisis to be revived after a short interval would establish, for all practical purposes, exactly the kind of tie between an interim arrangement for Berlin and the question of German unity which could be exploited to apply pressure both on the German people and the three western powers on the two issues.

Since I believe that these two issues--however important each of them may be--should not thus be linked in any conference agreement, I also believe that it would be more orderly for this conference to address them separately. I gather that this procedure is agreeable in view of Mr. Gromyko's statement of yesterday that we should exchange views pertaining to an interim solution on Berlin, in order to arrive at an agreement and to realize those possibilities.

If we are to discuss these two questions separately, I would like today both to conclude my previous discussion of the Soviet proposal for a mixed German committee and to indicate where I believe that this discussion leaves this conference as far as its future work is concerned.

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I will begin, Mr. Chairman, by summarizing the principal reasons why the Soviet proposal for a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans is unacceptable to the Western powers.

Mr. Gromyko has tried to give the impression of surprise at our refusal to agree that such a committee would, as he put it in his proposal of June 19, - promote the extension and development of contacts between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

With an air of reasonableness, he told us that nothing would be more logical than arranging for the Germans to get together to discuss and agree on matters vitally affecting their own future. He went on to suggest that it is only blindness, obstinacy, and revanchist-mindedness which stands in the way of the four powers reaching agreement on his proposal.

When we pointed out that the outcome of any such confrontation of representatives of the Federal Republic and of the so-called German Democratic Republic would be an early and total deadlock, Mr. Gromyko asked how we could be sure of the outcome before we had given the proposal a trial.

We have explained to Mr. Gromyko that we can be sure of the outcome for the simple reason that the highest personages of the Soviet government and of the so-called GDR have made crystal clear that they will never agree to the reunification of Germany under conditions which did not guarantee the communication of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The all-German committee, under the terms of reference proposed by the Soviet Union, is thus not worth the trial because the outcome of the experiment is entirely predictable in advance. It is also not worth the trial for three other reasons:

First, by the device of this proposal, the Soviet government very cleverly seeks to have its cake and eat it, too.

The Soviet government tells us that reunification is none of our affair and that we should turn this over to the Germans to work out among themselves. This is a strange

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position for the Soviet Union to take when its own national interests are so clearly identified with the terms and conditions under which Germany will be reunified.

How does Mr. Gromyko resolve this problem? For, despite all its protests to the contrary, I cannot believe that the Soviet Union is actually willing to renounce its interest in the manner and terms of German reunification.

The answer is very simple if, as Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has pointed out, one understands the relationship between the men who head the regime of the so-called German Democratic Republic and the government of the Soviet Union. This relationship is such that it is impossible for representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic to pursue a policy which is contrary to that which the Soviet Union considers to be in its own interest.

The negotiation in any all-German committee would thus not be a free one between two free governments. It would be a negotiation between one free government -- The Federal Republic of Germany -- and representatives of a regime who were, in fact, only speaking for the Soviet Union.

This leads me to the second of the three reasons we reject the Soviet proposal.

If that proposal were put into effect, the three Western powers would be compelled to abdicate their responsibility for assuring German reunification under conditions which would enable all Germans freely to determine the form of their own government. This, again, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has developed. Equally important, they would have to abdicate their common responsibility for creating a reunited Germany in a framework of European security which would assure that war would not erupt again in the center of Europe, as it has twice in our own lifetime.

These are responsibilities and interests which the four of us share. They have been confirmed in past four-power agreements, the latest of which was reached on July 23, 1955, when Chairman Bulganin subscribed, along with President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, and M. Faure to a document which included the following words: "The heads of government recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and

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the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

No one can dispute that this language squarely reserved responsibility for German unification to the four powers. We do not propose here to enter into an agreement which sets this responsibility to one side.

The Soviet proposal would both maintain the Soviet Union in a position of responsibility and control in regard to German reunification and exclude the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States from exercising the role in this process which their own interests require.

The third reason that we reject the Soviet proposal is because it would amount to our announcing to the world at large that we considered the regime in East Germany to be on a basis of equality with the freely chosen government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This for obvious reasons we are not willing to do, and the Soviet government knew that we were not willing to do so when it framed this proposal. For these reasons as well as because its later would be doomed to failure from the start -- we cannot accept the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee.

There are thus, as I see it, two basic difficulties with which this conference is confronted, apart from the very important problem of the terms of an interim agreement on Berlin.

First, the Soviet Union's insistence which I have just discussed, that we must agree to its proposal for a mixed German committee -- or to some variant which would have the same effect.

Second, the Soviet Union's attempt to so arrange matters that the Western Powers will be exposed to unilateral action in Berlin after a specified period, if there is no progress toward German unity.

There is clearly little hope for success of this conference unless each of these obstacles can be overcome. The Western Powers have made constructive proposals to meet each of these difficulties.

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First, they have suggested that the present conference continue its consideration, with German advisers, of the questions of German unification, a peace treaty, and inter-German contacts. This would permit the range of issues that Mr. Gromyko has in mind to be discussed, in such forms as may be judged appropriate, but without abrogating the basic Four Power responsibility that the USSR has repeatedly acknowledged in the past. Second, the Western Powers have indicated their willingness -- whether or not an agreement is here concluded on procedures for future discussions of German unity -- to enter into an interim Berlin agreement which is not tied to a coterminous time period for work on German unification. It should be clear however that the arrangements provided for by such an agreement could be altered, if it came up for review, only by negotiation -- not by force. The Western Powers call for consent, rather than duress as the means of possibly revising any temporary Berlin arrangements into which they might enter.

I believe that these Western proposals go far toward meeting some of the views that have been expressed by Mr. Gromyko and that they offer a sound basis for agreement.

I must say, in all candor, however, that I see no evidence that Mr. Gromyko regards them as anything but milestones in a negotiating process that leads inexorably toward agreement on Soviet terms. He appears to mistake the moves that we have made to meet him half-way as signs of weakness, which can be exploited through continuing pressure.

I want to assure Mr. Gromyko, in all seriousness, that this is not the case.

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Report to NAC of Private Meeting of July 24: The Western Foreign Ministers began by reaffirming the complete unacceptability of the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee and the Soviet effort to link this to an interim Berlin arrangement, but Mr. Gromyko succeeded fairly quickly in focusing the talk on the seven points of Mr. Lloyd's July 20 speech. At one point there was a warm exchange regarding procedure in which Mr. Gromyko, endeavoring to present himself as the victim of unfair treatment, demanded to be dealt with as an equal. It was quite apparent he was in no hurry to make progress.

Mr. Herter started the discussion by underlining the importance of clarifying the relationship between the question of all-German negotiations and an interim Berlin solution, of all-German negotiations and an interim Berlin solution, saying that he saw little use in entering into a detailed discussion of the Berlin problem so long as Mr. Gromyko insisted on the link between it and the proposal for an all-German committee. Mr. Couve De Murville, supporting Mr. Herter, tried to focus attention on the link problem by attempting to draw Mr. Gromyko into a debate on the question of the duration of a Berlin agreement. Mr. Gromyko, however, would have none of this and insisted on proceeding with a discussion on the basis of the order of items indicated in Mr. Lloyd's speech of July 20 despite the fact that Mr. Lloyd pointed out that the sequence he had used was purely arbitrary and of no significance. Notwithstanding Mr. Gromyko's repeated insistence on reaching an understanding on troop levels (i.e., Mr. Lloyd's first point) before proceeding to a discussion of other points, the Western Foreign Ministers did succeed in focusing some attention on other aspects of the problem. As a result, the following points were brought out:

1. Troop levels. Mr. Gromyko was told that the West considers the present troop strength in West Berlin to be symbolic (11,000-12,000). However, Mr. Gromyko violently disagreed, stating that the Soviet requirement for a symbolic level could only be met by a substantial reduction in the present strength to at least a 3,000-4,000 level. Mr. Herter pointed out that Western agreement to limit the Berlin troop strength to existing levels represented a major concession since the West has the absolute right to raise its troop strength to any level it considers appropriate or desirable.

2. Armaments. Mr. Gromyko could not agree with Mr. Lloyd's impression that agreement had already been reached on a formulation with regard to the non-stationing in Berlin of nuclear and missile weapons. Referring to the language of

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the June 16 proposal, Mr. Gromyko insisted that reference to the type of armaments should appear as a separate point and should be more precisely stated in order to indicate that the restriction applies only to West Berlin since there are no Soviet troops in East Berlin. Mr. Herter insisted that if this is to be a separate item, the restriction must apply to Berlin as a whole. (Mr. Gromyko's insistence on isolating armaments as a separate item in the Berlin agreement may be an indication that the Soviets intend to exploit any Western agreement to an atom-free zone in Berlin as a precedent for the establishment of atom-free zones in other parts of Europe.)

3. Propaganda and subversive activities. Mr. Herter vigorously asserted that the West would never agree to restraints on activities in West Berlin except on terms of absolute reciprocity. Mr. Gromyko called this an unacceptable approach since the espionage and subversive activities to which the ban will be applied are carried on only in West Berlin. He said that agreement to prohibit such activities in East Berlin would misrepresent the situation because there is no activity of this sort there. All the Western Foreign Ministers sharply rebutted Mr. Gromyko by referring to Mr. Herter's detailed account in a plenary session several weeks ago of espionage, sabotage and other diversionary activities which were being carried on in East Berlin. Despite his repeated insistence that there could be no mention of East Berlin, Mr. Gromyko expressed the hope that language could be found which would be mutually acceptable, citing the Soviet June 9 formula as a model. However, he took this attitude only after Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville had reminded him that in discussions of this topic five weeks ago he had apparently agreed to reciprocity.

4. Access. Mr. Herter asked Mr. Gromyko if he would be prepared to accept the idea of a Four Power Commission for the settlement of difficulties over access as recommended in the Western June 16 proposal. Mr. Gromyko replied that he saw no need for such a commission since it was unlikely that any difficulties would arise if agreement were reached to maintain the "present arrangements" with regard to access.

In a sharp exchange with Mr. Gromyko on the reasonableness of the attitudes of the two sides toward negotiations, Mr. Herter criticized Mr. Gromyko for expecting the West to make all the concessions while the Soviets were unwilling to make any. He reminded Mr. Gromyko that the Berlin crisis is of Soviet origin and since the Soviets hold the view, which the West does not share, that Berlin is a danger spot, it is up to the Soviets to make an equal effort to remove any sources of tension.

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At one point in the discussion Mr. Gromyko, responding to an inquiry, said he had an open mind on the question of the nature of the document in which a possible Berlin agreement would be contained; a communique, recommendations to governments, or a formal agreement would be acceptable to him.

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Report to NAC of Private Meeting of July 27: The discussion was for the most part unproductive. Mr. Gromyko did, however, agree to Mr. Lloyd's suggestion that each side spend Tuesday, July 28, drafting its version of the terms of a Berlin settlement to be discussed possibly Wednesday morning, July 29. Also Mr. Gromyko may have intended slightly to relax his insistence on the link between a Berlin settlement and all-German negotiations although he continued, despite sharp probing, to refuse to take a clear stand on this issue. On the other hand he was adamant on the need for Western agreement to reduce the present troop strength in West Berlin.

Mr. Lloyd began the meeting by reviewing his conversation with Mr. Gromyko who was his guest at lunch today. Mr. Gromyko had made the following points:

1. Mr. Gromyko opposed any mention of "agreements in force" in any document which recorded an interim Berlin agreement, asserting that any reference should be to the existing situation only.
2. He also opposed stipulating reunification as the terminal point of any arrangements and insisted that any reference to the duration of an interim settlement should be confined to the provision that the Foreign Ministers Meeting as presently constituted, should reconvene after "X" months to discuss the Berlin Question.

In the subsequent Four Power discussion of other aspects of a possible Berlin settlement the following points emerged.

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1. Concerning troop levels, Mr. Herter again stressed the extent of the concession by the West in limiting its troop strength to present levels and gave Mr. Gromyko to understand that this was the final Western offer. Mr. Gromyko, however, insisted that this represented change in the present "existing situation" and was therefore totally unacceptable to the Soviets. When pressed for an explanation as to why the Soviets attach so much importance to this question, Mr. Gromyko said that Western agreement to reduce troop strength would be a substantial proof of Western willingness to cooperate with the Soviets in reducing tensions and furthermore would dispel Soviet suspicions that the Western insistence on the present troop levels is connected in some way with secret plans for their use for certain sinister purposes which however are unknown to the Soviets. Mr. Lloyd suggested that this question could be left to the heads of government, but Mr. Gromyko replied that if the Foreign Ministers could not reach an understanding, he doubted if the heads of government would be able to resolve the question.

2. Concerning a ban on propaganda and subversive activities, the Western Ministers made clear that there must be absolute reciprocity. Mr. Gromyko, more forthcoming than he had previously been, said he would not exclude the possibility of agreeing on a formula which would provide for restraining GDR interference in the internal affairs of West Berlin and, in any case, thought that a mutually acceptable formula could be worked out. However, it must not place responsibility equally on both parts of Berlin.

3. Concerning the Soviet June 19 proposal for a Four Power supervisory commission, both Mr. Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville underlined the inconsistency in the Soviet position which obligated the West to accept a Soviet commitment without inspection on access procedures but prescribed an inspection of Western commitments with regard to troop levels and armaments. Mr. Gromyko had previously made clear that the Commission's responsibilities would be confined to troop levels, armaments and activities but would not extend to the access problem.

At Mr. Lloyd's suggestion, Mr. Gromyko, although first proposing a plenary session on July 28, agreed to devote the day to a preparation of papers on a Berlin settlement.

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Paper Agreed by Four Western Foreign Ministers, Handed Soldatov by Merchant: "Berlin" The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. They agreed that the best solution for these problems would be the reunification of Germany. They recognize, however, that meanwhile the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

"(A) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present figure (approximately 11,000). The three Ministers further declare that their governments will from time to time discuss the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

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"(B) The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States further declare that it is the intention of their governments to continue not to locate atomic weapons or missile installations in West Berlin.

"(C) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, will be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement will continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the Four governments. The latter will establish a quadripartite commission which will meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The commission may make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

"(D) Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in it with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. The four governments will consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

"(E) The arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs (A) through (D) above can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers Conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the four governments."

Reservation of Western Foreign Ministers on Agreed Paper:

1) Lloyd reserved right to reopen for possible later deletion "and the agreements at present in force" in final sentence introductory paragraph. Other three ministers all opposed deletion.

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2) Foreign Ministers agreed declaration of intention in second part sub-paragraph (A) might, if necessary, be changed to direct declaration that governments would limit combined total of their forces, etc.

3) Foreign Ministers agreed that final two sentences of sub-paragraph (C) might be eliminated, if in course of discussion with Gromyko removal of quadripartite commission with respect access necessary to combat insistence by Gromyko on commission for other aspects of agreement.

4) Germans reserved right to press later for elimination of language "or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others" in sub-paragraph (D).

5) Foreign Ministers agreed they would be prepared to drop "in the absence of reunification" in sub-paragraph (E) if necessary in course of negotiations.

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Soviet proposal handed Merchant by Soldatov: The Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva has considered the Berlin question in the desire to find a mutually satisfactory solution. The participants in the conference have agreed to implement, with the aim to change the existing situation in West Berlin, measures which will be of an interim nature -- for a year and a half period and will comprise the following:

Reduction of Armed Forces:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France after the coming into force of the present agreement will reduce the strength of their garrisons in West Berlin and correspondingly their armaments to token contingents so that the total strength of these garrisons should not exceed 3,000 to 4,000 men.

Non-location of Atomic and Rocket Weapons:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France shall not locate in West Berlin nuclear weapons or rocket installations of any kind.

Termination of Subversive Activities:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France will take measures not to allow the use of the territory of West Berlin for interference in the internal affairs of

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other states and for all kinds of subversive activities directed against the USSR, the GDR and other socialist states as well as for hostile propaganda against them.

(Also included is a reference to the relevant declaration of the GDR Government dealing with noninterference in the internal affairs of West Berlin and respect for the agreement on the interim status of West Berlin.)

Supervisory Committee:

To supervise the fulfillment of the obligations stemming from the present agreement regarding agreed measures in West Berlin, and to take, in case of necessity, measures assuring the implementation of the arrangement arrived at, a committee composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA and France will be set up within a month of the date the agreement comes into force.

Comments:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the USA and France take cognizance of the declaration of the Government of the USSR that for the duration of the present agreement the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in their present shape.

Negotiations Between the Two German States:

The Four Powers - the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA and France have pronounced themselves in favour of setting up an all-German committee composed of the representatives of the two parts of Germany, or holding negotiations between the two German states in some other form acceptable to them to consider questions related to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany which would also ensure a radical solution of the question of West Berlin, and to consider and work out concrete measures on the unification of Germany and the development of contacts.

It is understood that in the course of these negotiations all decisions will be taken by agreement between the sides.

If after the expiration of the year and a half period no agreement will have been reached on the questions under consideration within the all-German committee or otherwise, then the states represented at the Geneva conference will again hold negotiations on the question of West Berlin.

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US Delegation Summary of Positions of East and West on Issues at Geneva:

1. Force levels in Berlin. Western position is unilateral commitment not to increase over present 11,000 and to consider reduction when circumstances permit (June 16 proposal).

Gromyko insists on reduction to "symbolic" level described by him as three to four thousand.

2. Armament of forces in Berlin. Western position is unilateral undertaking to continue not to locate atomic weapons or missile installations in West Berlin.

This would seem to meet Gromyko's search for commitment that there shall be no atomic or missile weapons in West Berlin, ostensibly so phrased to cover improbable contingency that US or UK might arm Western Berlin police with nuclear weapons. He also insists that commitment stand as independent point of agreement, possibly to support Soviet exploitation of Western consent to pilot denuclearized zone as pressure for acceptance of other wider zones.

3. Activities in Berlin. West proposes agreement to take measures consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others. West has insisted this undertaking must be on basis of absolute reciprocity and has proposed that a representative of the Secretary General report to him any propaganda activities in conflict with foregoing criteria.

Gromyko seeks Western commitment to terminate subversive activities emanating from West Berlin and directed against GDR and other socialist states. Although vigorously denying any basis for reciprocal approach to this question, he had indicated he would accept some measure of reciprocity provided formula does not attempt assign responsibility equally to both parts of Germany. His July 23 paper, however, reverts to initial unilateral Western undertaking and simply offers GDR declaration on non-interference in internal affairs of West Berlin and respect for interim West Berlin settlement.

4. Duration of any agreement on Berlin. Western position is that duration should be until reunification of Germany but that after five years at request of any of four Governments question of Berlin could be considered by resumed Foreign Ministers Conference as presently constituted.

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Gromyko objects to any reference to reunification as terminal point of Berlin arrangement. While he agrees to review by Foreign Ministers Conference as now constituted after specified period, latter should be eighteen months as set forth June 19 and July 28 proposals. Despite June 19 and 28 assertions of willingness to negotiate time period, Gromyko has made no mention of this in either private or plenary sessions since reconvening, and his paper just delivered again stipulates eighteen months.

5. Access. Western position is free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, will be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959; freedom of movement will continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin; and that all disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the Four Governments through a quadripartite commission which would meet in Berlin and would consult German experts, if necessary.

Gromyko's position is that Soviets will maintain "present arrangements" on access for duration of interim Berlin arrangement but insists there should be no supervision of this commitment.

6. Position at end of agreement. Western position is that allied rights and obligations must remain unimpaired at the expiry of Berlin arrangement and also after renewed negotiations by foreign ministers when agreement expires.

Gromyko states that there must be no reference in Berlin settlement to rights or existing agreements. He does, however, pledge Soviet Government to take no unilateral action during agreement and ensuing negotiations.

7. Arrangements for discussion of wider German problem. Western proposal is that the Foreign Ministers Conference, as presently constituted, shall continue in being to consider German problem as a whole and to consider questions relating to contacts; that conference shall meet at such level and at such place as agreed; and that conference may make special arrangements for consideration of questions arising out of its terms of reference.

Gromyko proposes an all-German Committee to consider German problems, including reunification, peace settlement, and contacts. He insists that reunification must be exclusive concern of two Germanies and that any consideration of

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German problem, in this framework, must be subject to a time limit. He has indicated willingness consider alternative procedures for direct negotiations between Germans provided these are free of Four Power surveillance.

8. Supervisory commission. The Western position is that a Four Power Supervisory Commission should be established to settle disputes re access.

Gromyko proposes a Four Power Supervisory Committee which, however, would be responsible for supervising fulfillment of Western commitments re troop levels, arms and activities in West Berlin. Gromyko insists there can be no supervision of the Soviet pledge to maintain present access procedures. We reject his proposal for quadripartite supervision Western undertakings re troop levels and arms. Regarding activities we are prepared accept supervision, preferably by UN representative, and only if on all-Berlin basis.

In addition to positions on above issues, Gromyko has indicated following views, possibly only for tactical reasons:

1) West's agreement to acceptable procedure for German talks is linked with conclusion of Berlin settlement (although he refuses clarify whether this absolute precondition).

2) Agreement on any one aspect of Berlin settlement is dependent on agreement on all others. (We agree with this.) He has applied this principle of interdependence particularly to question of troop levels and has stated decision cannot be usefully discussed until agreement reached on this aspect. In recent days he has increasingly stressed importance troop level issue.

3) It is impractical to think that heads of government could resolve questions which stump foreign ministers. (This represents a reversal of traditional Khrushchev position that summit is magic formula for resolution of all question insoluble at lower levels.)

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UK Delegation Report to NAC of Conversation Between Mr. Herter and Mr. Gromyko: As he had previously agreed with his Western colleagues Mr. Herter began by raising the question of procedure. He said that he would have to leave Geneva by August 6 to attend the meeting in Santiago of the organization of American states. He suggested that if agreement could not be reached by that time the conference could either continue at the level of deputies or again go into recess. Mr. Gromyko reacted unfavorably to both suggestions. He said that in his view it was necessary to speed up the work of the conference and to finish by August 5.

Mr. Herter and Mr. Gromyko then proceeded to discuss the two papers exchanged on July 28, the text of which was included in our previous report to the NATO council. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet paper contained no new feature except for the provision that the four power supervisory commission was "to take in case of necessity measures ensuring the implementation of the arrangement arrived at". His main insistence was on the question of troop reductions. He repeatedly came back to this point. In reply Mr. Herter repeatedly insisted on discussing the link which the Soviet delegation had been seeking to establish between Berlin and All-German questions. When Mr. Herter asked whether he was trying by means of the formulation in the final paragraph of the new Soviet paper to establish this link Mr. Gromyko implied that, if agreement could be reached on force reductions, the All-German committee could be discussed separately. He did not, however, make it clear whether the separate discussion of this question would constitute the dissolution of the link.

As regards "activities" in Berlin, Mr. Herter maintained the Western insistence that any arrangements made should be reciprocal. Mr. Gromyko argued that if any propaganda from East Berlin and East Germany could be held to be of a subversive nature, it had only been a reaction to subversive propaganda from West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko did not give the impression that he regarded "activities" as a matter of major importance.

On Western rights Mr. Gromyko conceded that no unilateral action could be taken during the currency of the interim agreement or during ensuing negotiations, but he would not go beyond that. He insisted that, if the ensuing negotiations were fruitless, the Soviet government could not agree to the indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime. He referred to the phrase in paragraph (E) of the new Western

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paper about the resumption of negotiations after the interim period by the foreign ministers conference "as now constituted". He said that in his understanding this would mean the ministers of the four powers and advisers from the two parts of Germany at whatever level the latter chose.

On access Mr. Gromyko confirmed that the Soviet formulation about the communications of West Berlin with the outside world being "preserved in their present shape" covered not only military access but also civilian access and freedom of movement between West and East Berlin.

On the duration of an interim agreement Mr. Gromyko said he could not agree to as long as five years, nor could he agree to the interim agreement continuing automatically if the negotiations at the end of the interim period failed. He did however agree that any relevant points could be raised in those negotiations, i. e., he did not insist that they should only be about West Berlin.

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UK Delegation Report to NAC of Private Meeting of July 30: Discussion at this meeting centered on the Western paper. Mr. Gromyko said that he could see no substantial change in the Western position since June 16. He could not accept the Western idea of a five year period for an interim Berlin agreement. This was twice the original period proposed by the Western powers. Mr. Herter pointed out that the time limit of two and a half years in the Western peace plan related to an entirely different state of affairs and that this was the first time that the Western side had mentioned a figure for an interim agreement on Berlin. Mr. Gromyko added that he did not think the Western position had been altered by the reference in paragraph (E) of the new Western paper to the possibility of review. This was still contrary to one of the Soviet side's fundamental positions. He would prefer that the phrase "in the absence of reunification" be omitted from paragraph (E) of the Western paper.

M. Couve de Murville asked what the position would be in the Soviet view at the end of the period of an interim agreement. Would the agreement be prolonged while negotiations continued, or would there be a return to the status quo ante? Mr. Gromyko replied that the parties would meet again to discuss the question of West Berlin. In the course of these negotiations no unilateral action would be taken by the Soviet Union on any aspect, including access. The Soviet Union had bound themselves for the period of post-interim negotiations, but so far the Western powers had said nothing.

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Mr. Gromyko suggested that it might be possible to dispense with a preamble to an interim agreement by saying simply "the foreign ministers have agreed on the following arrangements which will remain in force for blank years."

On the stationing of atomic weapons in Berlin the four ministers agreed that there was no difference of substance between the use of the word "rocket" in the Soviet paper and "missile" in the Western paper.

Mr. Gromyko made the following points on other provisions in the Western paper.

(1) in paragraph (A) reference to the decision that there should be no Soviet troops in Berlin would only be acceptable if the Western powers were prepared to withdraw all their troops from Berlin as well;

(2) on access, the Soviet side would prefer to relate this to the present situation rather than to April 1959. The Soviet obligation would cover movement between East and West Berlin, about which there were already in existence some agreements between the two local authorities in Berlin;

(3) on "activities", there was the possibility of an appropriate declaration by the D.D.R. government outside the framework of an interim agreement.

There followed a lengthy discussion on the question of the supervision by a quadripartite commission of obligations under the agreement. M. Couve de Murville said that the Soviet proposal providing for the supervision of troop levels, armaments and "activities" but not of access, was one-sided. Mr. Gromyko argued that the Western and Soviet obligations under an agreement would be of a different character. The Western obligations would be new and would stem directly from the agreement, whereas the Soviet obligations on access would not constitute any change. There would be reciprocity on "activities", because the quadripartite commission could hear complaints regarding both East and West Berlin. Mr. Herter said it should be possible to find a formula for supervision of "activities", but not of troops or armaments.

Mr. Herter then suggested that the time had come to produce an agreed form of words on some of the provisions of an interim agreement. They could leave a gap for troop levels which could be filled in later. Mr. Gromyko said that, if gaps were left, it made it difficult to draft other clauses. When agreement was reached on the most important point, which was troop levels,

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the drafting of the other clauses should not be difficult. It was then agreed, on Mr. Lloyd's proposal, that a working party of officials of the four powers should meet on the morning of July 31 and that the foreign ministers should meet in the afternoon to consider any forms of words for particular clauses upon which the officials might have agreed.

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UK Delegation Report to MAC of Private Meetings of July 31: The morning meeting of officials did not produce any agreed formulas. In the afternoon the Western foreign minister pressed Mr. Gromyko to be more specific as to the Soviet view of Western rights in Berlin after the expiry of an interim agreement. Mr. Gromyko, however, would not commit himself beyond repeating that the Soviet government would not take unilateral action at that stage, and that there would be negotiations.

The discussion then turned to "activities" in Berlin. Mr. Gromyko criticised as artificial the proposal that the United Nations should be given a supervisory role. He argued in favor of a quadripartite commission which would supervise troop levels and armaments as well as "activities". After some discussion, he said that the Soviet side would take over their position on "activities" and, after consultation with the East Germans, might have a new proposal to put forward.

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US Delegation Comments on Soviet Proposal of July 28: New Soviet proposal is of course totally unacceptable and in some respects even more objectionable than June 19 proposal. Obligations which bind West are now spelled out in greater detail than in previous Soviet proposals. Furthermore all Western commitments under interim Berlin solution are in form of obligations whereas Soviet undertakings are expressed as unilateral declarations. Text of proposal reflects clear design on part of Soviets to enhance status of GDR through reference to conference participants as parties to agreement (which in Soviet view includes GDR), declaration by GDR on non-interference, and specifying desirability of negotiations "between German states".

We hope following specific comments on text of new Soviet proposal:

In preamble objective is described to change situation on West Berlin. This, coupled with description of measures as of interim nature, would set stage for elimination of Western rights.

Extending concept of force reduction to armaments could be claimed to imply Western commitment to restrict forces in West Berlin to light weapons. Might also provide basis for Soviet or GDR claim to inspect military cargo moving to Berlin.

Specifying "rocket installations of any kind", a broader definition than heretofore, could mean Western agreement to eliminate all rocket weapons, such as Bazookas, from arsenal available to West Berlin force.

On subversive activities, West is obligated to ban in West Berlin interference in internal affairs, subversive activities, and hostile propaganda directed against all communist states, whereas other side's undertaking is limited to non-interference in internal affairs, of West Berlin and this is simply in form of unilateral declaration by GDR.

By including in definition of supervisory committee's responsibilities the taking of measures to insure implementation of agreement, Soviet proposal could be interpreted as according executive authority to committee; Soviet press spokesman has indicated jurisdiction of committee could extend to access although, if this then case, question arises why access clause follows committee clause.

In provision dealing with All-German negotiations question, use of phrase "have pronounced themselves in favor of" may reflect Soviet sensitivity to Western criticism that original

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July (Cont.)

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Soviet proposal for All-German committee embodies element of coercion on two parts of Germany. Furthermore, link between All-German committee and Berlin settlement appears to be maintained, although Soviet press spokesman intimate last night this not necessarily the case.

August

1
(Secret)

Report to NAC of Private Meeting between Mr. Herter and Mr. Gromyko on August 1: For almost three hours Mr. Herter discussed with Mr. Gromyko the question of Allied rights in Berlin within the framework of an interim agreement, that is, an agreement that would terminate at the end of a given period. Despite Mr. Herter's efforts to obtain an unambiguous statement from the Soviets acknowledging that an interim agreement does not affect the legal situation in Berlin, Mr. Gromyko merely repeated what he had said the evening before at the private meeting of the four ministers. Mr. Herter emphasized several times the fundamental importance that the West attaches to elucidation of the question of rights, in order to make it clear to Mr. Gromyko that no agreement is possible unless it is explicitly agreed that Allied rights in Berlin will remain intact.

Mr. Herter began by informing Mr. Gromyko that what the West is seeking is not Soviet recognition of occupation rights for an indefinite period, but simply a statement whereby Mr. Gromyko would agree that the legal situation upon the expiration of any agreement would be exactly the same as it is now.

The elucidation of this question, Mr. Herter said, was essential to the West, especially in view of past Soviet declarations, for example those of the June 9 proposal, which made it apparent that it was the intention of the Soviet Government to terminate Allied rights. The Western powers would be satisfied in this regard if the Soviets were prepared to include in the text of an interim agreement on Berlin a statement to the effect that the agreement would in no way involve the question of rights.

Mr. Gromyko stated that he could not agree to the inclusion of such a statement in the text in as much as, according to him, each party would thereby be under obligation to take a public stand on the question of rights, which would only complicate the situation. The Western powers take the position that the occupation regime should be perpetuated indefinitely. The Soviets take the position that the occupation regime has lasted

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August (Cont.)

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(Secret)

too long and should be terminated. According to Mr. Gromyko, the best way of preventing such contradictory positions from becoming public would be to avoid all mention of rights in the text of a temporary agreement. This text should be limited to the statement of jointly agreed concrete arrangements for a given period with respect to Berlin. Mr. Herter understood that the Soviet proposal of June 9 had been superseded by the proposal of the 19th which does not pre- scribe an end to the occupation regime but simply provides for the opening of negotiations upon expiration of the interim agreement.

Mr. Herter emphasized that if, as Mr. Gromyko alleged, the occupation regime did not come to an end automatically upon the expiration of an interim agreement, this doubtless meant that Allied rights would remain in force. Since this was obviously the logical consequence of Mr. Gromyko's position, his refusal to make an unequivocal statement on this question raised doubts on the part of Mr. Herter as to the Soviet's real intentions. If the Western powers wish to obtain from the Soviets an unequivocal interpretation of the agreements to the effect that the legal situation would remain unchanged, it is precisely in order to eliminate the suspicion that the Soviets might consider a provisional agreement as a first step toward the final liquidation of Allied rights.

Mr. Gromyko replied that this was a request to which the Soviets could not accede. He was prepared to state that the question of rights raised in connection with the negotiation of an interim agreement; but he could not consent to including in the text of such an agreement a statement to the effect that the agreement would not involve the the matter of "rights." Any statement of that nature would be interpreted as Soviet acceptance of an indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime, which would be directly contrary to the Soviet position.

Mr. Herter then stated that he had to be entirely frank with Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Gromyko should understand that so long as there existed in the minds of the Western Ministers doubt as to Soviet intentions regarding Allied rights no interim agreement of any kind would be possible. Despite Mr. Gromyko's assurances that the West's distrust was not justified, Mr. Herter could not help feeling that Mr. Gromyko's evasive

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August (Cont.)

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attitude during the recent discussions on the question of rights signified that the Soviets indeed considered an interim agreement an important step toward the final liquidation of Allied rights. Mr. Herter concluded by stating that the longer the discussion lasted the more convinced he was that this was indeed the Soviet attitude.

August

3

(Official
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Report to MAC of Private Meeting between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Lloyd on August 3: Mr. Gromyko invited Mr. Lloyd to lunch on August 3. Mr. Gromyko concurred in Mr. Lloyd's suggestion that a joint communiqué should be issued on August 5, when the conference adjourned. Mr. Gromyko did not request that a date be set for resumption of the talks. On the other hand, he did request that the communiqué make mention of a forthcoming meeting of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government. However, Mr. Lloyd did not have the impression that Mr. Gromyko would be very insistent on this point. With respect to the form the communiqué will take there will doubtless be some discussion. The Russians envisage it as listing the points of agreement and disagreement (including the all-German committee). Mr. Lloyd submitted a very short text that had been proposed by the Western delegations and is presently under discussion.

When Mr. Selwyn Lloyd proposed that a plenary meeting be held Wednesday morning Mr. Gromyko did not take a position on this matter. After the luncheon given on August 4 by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd the Ministers decided to continue work on the draft of the final communiqué during the day.

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August

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(Unclassified)

Secretary Rorter's Statement at Twenty-fifth Plenary Session:

As we come to the end of the second phase of the Geneva talks, I think that it will be useful to summarize briefly the course of the negotiations and the prospects that lie ahead.

I regret that, despite the hopes held at the start of this Conference, we have not been able to reach an agreement.

These discussions started in Geneva to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

They took place because the Soviet Union last year suddenly announced that, unless the Western Allies accepted its proposal for a change in the status of Berlin, it intended to change the situation in Berlin unilaterally after May 27. The three Western Powers rejected this proposal, and stated that no useful discussions could take place against the background of a Soviet strategy of duress.

After the Soviet Union removed the threat by indicating that the date of May 27 was not significant, the Four Powers agreed to meet in Geneva to try to deal with these problems through negotiation. This is what I call a strategy of consent.

The Western Powers approached this task in good faith. They genuinely sought to find an agreed solution to the problem which the Soviets had raised. They continued this effort, earnestly and vigorously, for the better part of the last three months.

The Conference agenda gave first place to the question of Germany. The Western Powers agreed that this question was of overriding importance. At the start of the meeting, they proposed a Western peace plan to achieve German reunification through the free choice of the German people. This Western peace plan was acclaimed throughout the world as a constructive offer.

The Soviet Union never gave this plan a moment's serious consideration.

The reason was clear: The Soviet Union knew that German reunification in freedom would end Communist rule in East Germany. Instead, the Soviet Union proposed, in effect, that the Four Powers formalize the division of Germany by signing separate peace treaties with the two parts of Germany. This is Western Powers refused to do.

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(Unclassified)

The Foreign Ministers then turned to the question of Berlin to see if they could agree on an interim Berlin arrangement. A good deal of the time in these negotiations was spent in an effort to find out what Mr. Gromyko's position was on certain points. On the central problem of "rights" we never did succeed in finding out. This made our talks more like a research expedition than free interchange of views, which is necessary to fruitful results.

The Soviet manner of negotiation may have resulted from the contradiction between the Soviet Union's ostensible and actual purposes in this Conference.

The Soviet Union is, as far as I can determine, not really interested in "improving" the situation in Berlin. It is interested in getting the Western Powers out of Berlin. Apparently continued competitive coexistence of freedom and Communism in Berlin is unrewarding to the Soviet Union.

The key to our differences about Berlin is thus not so much in the specific issues we have discussed as in the basic question of whether or not the West Berliners are to remain free.

The Soviet proposals to date have seemed to us to be designed gradually to annex these people to the Communist system against their will. This cannot be permitted.

We are willing to enter into an interim arrangement with the Soviet Union which will assure a continued prospect of freedom for Berlin. Such an interim arrangement might include five elements, which I shall discuss in turn.

First, force levels in Berlin: We proposed statements noting the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin and making known the intention of the Western governments to limit their forces in West Berlin to their present level and to consider from time to time the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

The Soviet Union refuses to accept any reference to its projected withdrawal of forces from Berlin—another indication of its consistent position of non-reciprocity—and proposes to drastically reduce our forces in West Berlin below the approximately 11,000 men now stationed there.

Why is the Soviet Government so anxious to reduce these forces drastically?

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August (Cont.) The Soviet Foreign Minister says that Western forces should
5 be only symbolic. The total Communist forces in East Germany
(Unclassified) are of the order of 500,000 men, not counting another 350,000
so-called workers' militia. In other words, Western forces
in Berlin are less than 2 percent of the forces that surround
them.

Clearly, the Soviet Union is proposing a drastic reduction of Western forces not for the reason given, but as the first step toward total withdrawal of Western forces. When the period specified in an interim agreement had expired, it would then call for still another reduction. And so on, until we no longer had any forces in Berlin.

This situation would not be substantially altered by a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Berlin. These forces would merely be stationed a few miles outside the city limits. To withdraw Western forces from Berlin would be an entirely different matter.

The real difference between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies is thus not as to the level of Western forces in Berlin. It is whether Western forces should stay in Berlin, or eventually be withdrawn.

We are determined that adequate Western forces will stay in Berlin as long as they are wanted by the peoples of West Berlin and are essential to their protection.

The second element of a possible interim Berlin arrangement involves the arms for the forces in Berlin. The Four Powers are agreed in principle that nuclear weapons and missile installations shall not be located in West Berlin. Some differences over phraseology still exist, but should not prove impossible to resolve. The Western Powers have never had the slightest interest in or intent to deploy such weapons in West Berlin. This provision was added to the Western proposal for an interim Berlin arrangement specifically to meet asserted Soviet concerns.

The third element of an interim arrangement involves restraints on certain unfriendly activities in Berlin. The Western proposal is that measures should be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in, the internal affairs of others.

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August (Cont.) The Secretary General of the United Nations would be requested
5 to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to
(Unclassified) be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the
city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any
propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the
foregoing principles. And the four governments would consult
with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate
action to be taken in respect to any such report.

The Soviet Union's position on such activities differs from this Western proposal in two major respects:

First, the Soviet Union suggests much more extensive restraints on activities in West Berlin than in East Berlin. We insist that both parts of the city be treated even-handedly.

Second, the Soviet Union proposes that a Four Power commission have the right to "supervise" and "assure the implementation" of restraints on West Berlin without any corresponding imposition of restraints on East Berlin. This proposal is obviously unacceptable because of its discriminatory nature.

We recognized, however, the desirability of some international machinery. To meet this need and thus narrow the difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves on this point, we added to our proposal the suggestion for a UN presence in Berlin which I have described.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's rejection of this proposal and his labeling it as "artificial" in our private sessions has been, to my mind, one of the more regrettable results of this Conference. If there is ever to be real progress toward peace based on justice, there must surely be a strengthening of the main instrument that is available to us for international cooperation—the United Nations. In walking away from any possibility of a UN role under an interim Berlin arrangement, the Soviet Union has evidenced an attitude toward the United Nations which cannot help but make the search for peace more difficult.

The fourth element involved the question of the duration of any interim agreement on Berlin and the position at the end of that agreement.

The Soviet Union's presently avowed aim is to "change" existing Berlin rights and responsibilities. Since we are determined

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that this aim shall not be achieved without our consent, it was important that the Western Powers have some assurance that any arrangements here agreed upon did not have that automatic effect.

It will be recalled that the interim agreement offered to the Soviet Union on June 16 was to last until the reunification of Germany. And in the preamble to that agreement it was recognized that:

"...pending reunification, the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects..."

Mr. Gromyko objected to any agreement lasting until the reunification of Germany and the Western Foreign Ministers then changed their offer to provide that:

"the arrangements...can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers' Conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the four governments."

Mr. Gromyko again objected, stating that under this formulation the arrangements here agreed to would continue if, after such a review, the Foreign Ministers' Conference was unable to reach agreements upon changes. He insisted that any arrangement agreed here expire by their terms after a specified period.

This Soviet position had to be examined in the light of Mr. Gromyko's categorical refusal to answer the question frequently put to him, both in plenary and in private sessions, as to the status of the rights and responsibilities of the four powers with respect to Berlin in the event that the Foreign Ministers were unable to reach agreement in any subsequent negotiations.

It was necessary also to review that proposal in the light of repeated statements by Mr. Khrushchev, as well as by Mr. Gromyko, that the Soviet Union was somehow entitled unilaterally to void the rights of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin by signing a separate peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic. On June 10, for example, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR was not prepared to insist on "immediate and complete abolition" of the occupation regime in West Berlin, but would agree to the provisional maintenance of

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certain of these rights on condition, and I quote, "that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely one year". While he has since failed to repeat this frank avowal of purpose, he has equally refused to renounce or deny it.

In the most recent discussions with Mr. Gromyko, the Western Foreign Ministers indicated that they were prepared to consider interim arrangements relating to Berlin under an agreement which would expire after a specified period. At the same time they made it unmistakably clear that neither the agreement nor its expiration would be in derogation of the now existing rights and responsibilities of the Western Powers with respect to Berlin. They insisted that an appropriate statement to that effect be included in any agreed arrangement which would expire after a specified period. There are several ways in which this assurance could be expressed. The Soviet Union should be willing to agree to one of those ways. If, as Mr. Khrushchev said in his speech of July 28, the Soviet Union is seeking agreements which do not do any "moral or material damage to either side."

At no time—and I wish to emphasize this point—at no time did we ask the Soviet Union to perpetuate or reaffirm our rights. There was no need for us to do so. These rights, which on a number of occasions have been recognized by the Soviet Union as legitimate in origin and continuing in fact, derive from our victory in the war. The manner in which they would be exercised was specified in solemn post-war agreements entered into by the Soviet Union. Nothing that the Soviet Union was asked to state or to do at Geneva would add to or detract from those rights or from Soviet responsibilities. The only thing that was contemplated here was a modification of the agreements spelling out how those rights are to be exercised.

In view of our heavy responsibilities for the more than 2,000,000 inhabitants of West Berlin, which I have recently reaffirmed on behalf of my Government, we feel that we are entitled to a plain answer to the question:

"At the end of the period specified in any interim agreement with respect to Berlin, will the Soviet Union maintain that this agreement has weakened our rights or not?"

Mr. Gromyko's only reply has been, "let us not answer that question." He seems to be saying, "let us wait and see."

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August (Cont.) Any such answer is totally unacceptable to my Government, which
5 on repeated occasions has made it plain that it does not intend
(Unclassified) to enter into any agreement which could be interpreted as an
express or implied weakening of those rights.

The fifth element involves civilian and military access to and from West Berlin.

The three Western Powers propose that free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement would continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access would be raised and settled between the four governments. The latter would establish a quadripartite commission which would meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and would seek to settle such difficulties. The commission might make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

The language of the Soviet proposal on this point is much briefer than that of the Western Powers. Its formulation has some elements which are unacceptable to us. But, as I understand it from our discussions and leaving the issue of the quadripartite commission aside, the substance of the Western position on civilian and military access to and from and within Berlin during an interim arrangement for Berlin is not unacceptable to the Soviets. I trust that my understanding is correct.

A final question involves the arrangements to get on with discussions concerning the all-German problem, including the association of both parts of Germany in those discussions.

We believe that the German question is important and pressing. We propose that it be the subject of continuing discussion by this Foreign Ministers' Conference, as presently constituted, though, perhaps at a different level and place.

This procedure would enable the four Powers to discharge responsibilities in regard to this question which they have repeatedly acknowledged.

It would enable German advisers to play a role which has been devised and tested in the present discussions.

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August (Cont.) It would permit us to proceed flexibly with, as Mr. Lloyd said
5 on July 23, "any combination or permutation of delegations here
(Unclassified) in this room", agreeing from time to time on the specific procedures to be adopted in the light of our developing work.

The Soviets, by contract, originally insisted on linking an interim arrangement for Berlin to the establishment of a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans which would negotiate about the all-German question including the matter of a peace treaty.

This was an unrealistic proposal and I hope that the Soviets have come to recognize it as such.

Not only is there no logical tie between the work of such a committee and an interim Berlin arrangement, but the basic idea of having a mixed committee of free and Communist Germans is only valid if it is part of a phased process which will lead to German unification whether or not that committee reaches agreement. The reason for this is simply that, unless it is part of such a larger process, the committee is certain not to reach agreement. The Communist members of the committee will reject unification in freedom, and the representatives of the Federal Republic could not accept unification on any other basis.

For these reasons, the Western proposal seems a more promising approach to this question.

These then are the differences and the areas of agreement that have been defined in the past few weeks. I believe that the work of the Conference has been useful in isolating these points, which could lead to a Berlin settlement.

I would hope, therefore, that we will resume our negotiations, at a date to be determined by our governments in order to address these differences, one by one. If we can reconcile these differences, this should lead to an agreement which will give real hope for a secure position for the free people of West Berlin. This should also permit a start to be made on overcoming the continued division of Germany.

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August

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(Unclassified)

Communiqué Issued at Close of Geneva Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers: The conference of foreign ministers met in Geneva from May 11 to June 20 and from July 13 to August 5, 1959.

The conference considered questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

The positions of the participants in the conference were set out on these questions.

A frank and comprehensive discussion took place on the Berlin question.

The positions of both sides on certain points became closer.

The discussions which have taken place will be useful for the further negotiations which are necessary in order to reach an agreement.

Furthermore, the conference provided the opportunity for useful exchanges of views on other questions of mutual interest.

The foreign ministers have agreed to report the results of the conference to their respective governments.

The date and place for the resumption of the work of the conference will be settled through diplomatic channels."

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