An Area Manual

Volume II Cultural and Political Background

by

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CHINA:
An Area Manual

Volume II Cultural and Political Background

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PREFACE

This is the second of three volumes of an area manual on China prepared by a group of scholars familiar with the Chinese language, geography, history, and culture. It is intended to serve as a compendium of general information for use by military personnel. Years of academic research and study are represented in this document which is, obviously, a distillation of myriad sources available on the subject. So vast is the field of literature on China that only selected reading lists — for a reader interested in a specific aspect of the material — are included at the ends of various chapters.

As China is in the throes of rapid social, political, and economic changes, it is difficult to make any definitive observations and generalizations regarding her people. Also, the limitations and imperfections of research techniques, the geographical remoteness of the country, and language barriers combine to make it almost impossible to arrive at positive conclusions regarding the four-hundred-and-fifty million people who live in that vast country. So academic research can do little more than identify and explore certain problems that will confront the military. It would be wise to check against current intelligence data the statements and principles to which this type of study lends. The latter should be modified, or even cast aside, as and when these data render them suspect.

Volume 1 deals with Chinese geography, provinces, history, military affairs, and Communist leaders.

Volume 2 surveys the socio-political areas: traditional ideologies, social organization, government, politics, education, literature, mass communication, and such sketchy miscellany as humor, modes of dress, superstitions, etiquette, the traditional and modern calendar, and traditional personages.

Volume 3 is a detailed analysis of Chinese attitudes and thought patterns. How and why the Chinese act in their unique manner is systematically explained for the understanding of the uninformed Occidental who may one day have to deal with them. This volume is of particular interest to paywar personnel since the emphasis is placed upon this phase of military operations.

In the preparation of this Manual the following rules have been adopted for the transliteration of Chinese words:

1. For place names the NIS Gazetteer, February 1952, is standard with the following exceptions:

   (a) Names of all provinces, provincial capitals, large and/or well-known cities, rivers, canals and peninsulas are given conventional spelling (Chinese Postal Guide). An alphabetical table of all such place names is provided below, giving both the conventional spelling and the transliteration according to the NIS Gazetteer.

   (b) When place name is not covered by NIS Gazetteer, transliteration is according to the Wade-Giles system.

   (c) For non-Chinese place names not covered by the NIS Gazetteer (Mongolian, foreign, etc.) we use the Chinese Postal Guide's spelling as found in the National Geographic Society "Index to Map of China" (1945).
2. Personal names are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system with the following exceptions:
   (a) Names of well-known Chinese persons are given conventional spelling. For the convenience of the reader such names are listed below in an alphabetical table giving both the conventional spelling and the Wade-Giles transliteration.
   (b) All other Chinese words are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system.

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CHINA:
AN AREA MANUAL
CHAPTER 6
TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGIES

INTRODUCTION

This section bears the subtitle "Philosophy and Religion," for which an initial word of explanation is in order. One often hears references to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism as the three religions of China; often, too, one hears hotly disputed the claims of Confucianism to be called a religion. However, that may be, it is certain that all three of these systems have in one way or another penetrated and affected every aspect of Chinese life, and that each of them has different types of appeal for different people. The latter point can perhaps best be made clear by reference to a phenomenon which is familiar in the West. Within a group of Christians one finds the saint, the intellectual who is well-grounded in theology, the minister with his sociological interests, and the Sunday school child, and his indifferent or church-going parents. Christianity is a religion, but in any community those who have a genuine intellectual grasp of the religion, and live conscientiously "in the path of Christ," may be a very small minority. This is not surprising: the behavior and beliefs of the nominally-believing Christian majority are determined primarily by their education and environment, which in the United States no longer reflect Christian doctrine, if indeed they ever did. The belief in progress, for example, and in the scientific ordering of society for maximum collective security and comfort have all but replaced the Christian emphasis on the fallen nature of man and the necessity of redemption.

Until recently, the behavior of the Chinese conformed in large measure to the patterns and ideals of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The number of people who had any intellectual grasp of each system, however, was necessarily a minority in every age. For the philosophies and theologies, one must turn to this minority, who tried to live according to the ideals of Confucianism, or Buddhism, or Taoism, and who tried to affirm or reinterpret it in changing social, political, and intellectual conditions. To find the religion, one must turn to the millions, and their behavior in the forms of worship, prayer, festivals, and holidays, their attitudes toward this-worldly activity and other-worldly retreat. For religions are complex of attitudes and behavior drawing upon and partly distorting the intellectual systems.

The Metaphysics of Oriental Religions

The development of religions in China has been very different from that in the West, where formal philosophy very early broke away from religious tradition. In China, in the case both of Confucianism and Taoism, there is the curious phenomenon of religions being fathered by philosophies. The history of Chinese thought has always revealed an intimate relationship between philosophy and religion. In this section there is an attempt to outline the course of Chinese thought and, at the same time, to describe the religions as they affect the daily life of the people.
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, though they are three distinct attitudes toward life, complement one another in many ways. Each claims to be grounded in "reality," that is, in knowledge of reality, and each has shown great strength in persuading people to accept its view of reality and mold their lives in accordance with it. By reality, all mean the underlying principle or "stuff" of the universe. In China, this ultimate ordering principle is called Tao, or Heaven, as in the West it is called God. The characteristic Chinese approach in philosophy is to pose and try to answer the question: How are we to live intelligently in conformity with Heaven, Tao, or God?

The majority of Westerners, whatever their nominal beliefs, are recognizably positivists in their basic philosophy: they believe that empirical, scientific truths are the only positive facts about the universe; that reality, insofar as it is explainable, can be reduced to scientific terms; that the social order should be so patterned as to forward man's drive toward ever-increasing utilization and exploitation of nature; and that there is a force called Progress which assures man of ever-increasing comfort, power, and security. From the standpoint of Chinese thought, such a philosophy kills the mystery and sanctity of nature and, without intending to, degrades human nature by subordinating it to the smooth functioning of merely human schemes.

Confucius, to be sure, has been called a positivist by such authorities as Hu Shih. He was certainly something of an agnostic, in the sense that he refused to answer questions about the unknowable, and directed his attention primarily to the ordering of human society. But he decidedly would not have gone along with the kind of positivism that is prepared to substitute a human way for the way of Heaven, or Tao.

One major fact about Chinese philosophy and religion, then, is that each of its systems takes its departure from what it claims to be contact with reality. The ordering of society and state to which it leads is based on the conviction that human endeavor is beside the point unless it is in consonance with a nonhuman, divine purpose. Buddhism, an importation from India, is the most radical of these systems: it sees the phenomenal, temporal world as a cycle of increasing desire and suffering. The intelligent man liberates himself from this cycle by — there is no other way — living without craving and with compassion for all sentient beings. Taoist philosophy emphasizes the notion that the way of nature is something infinitely more grand than mere human endeavor, and that all human efforts not in conformity with Tao lead unavoidably to harm and stultification. Confucianism is the most this-worldly of the three, in the sense that its basic concern is with human nature, conduct, and society. But, as indicated already, the order it envisages is not merely human; the perfect government is perfect by virtue of its conformity with the way of Heaven. All three see in the ruthless exploitation of nature and the quest for dominion over one's fellow men only arrogance or depravity, and all three seek to discourage both. Until the rise of positivism in the West in quite recent centuries, such ideas were by no means alien to the European tradition. The Renaissance conception of the "chain of being," which spelled out relationships involving angels, men, and brutes, is highly congenial to the Confucian ideal.

The conceptions of reality held in China and in the West may be contrasted in several ways, even if one fixes attention only on that part of the West that considers the ultimate reality as the Godhead. One may say categorically that the Chinese conception of the Godhead is impersonal: Heaven or the Tao. The Western conception of the Godhead is anthropomorphic, that of a Creator and superhuman being. The God of the Old Testament is highly personal and has personal qualities: He is loving, vengeful, jealous. This trace of personality in the conception of God is never wholly absent from Western thought, even though Western theology, strictly speaking, does define God in transcendental terms,
that is termed the purely human. It is the contention of the East, a conceptualized but transcendentally human, not humanized but the essence of the Western, the Father, of the East, the Lord of Lords, the Son of God, the Christ, the Son of man, and the Eastern, the Son of the Father of God, the Holy Ghost, the Holy Spirit. This Eastern Christology, as the Wright and Schiller to some extent, is the outgrowth of Eastern and Islamic thought. In its native form, it may appear as a type of the same kind of understanding that is the Christology of the West. From the Eastern point of view, the Christology of the West is a type of that. The Christology of the West is a type of the Christology of the East. And that is the Christology of the East.

The concept of the personal God appears, again, from the Chinese point of view, to lead to a cult of personality. The cult of personality is the ultimate reality of the Chinese and Hindu. It is the teaching of the East, a concept which the West, in its native form, tends to mistranslate and misconstrue. As one will note, the notion of the West's kind of personality and its derivation, tends to be somewhat unclear and confusing, and it is the duty and responsibility of the Chinese and Hindu, and to some extent, the Chinese and Islamic, to set the record straight and to explain the meaning of the cult of personality in its native form. The cult of personality is the ultimate reality of the Chinese and Hindu. It is the teaching of the East, a concept which the West, in its native form, tends to mistranslate and misconstrue. As one will note, the notion of the West's kind of personality and its derivation, tends to be somewhat unclear and confusing, and it is the duty and responsibility of the Chinese and Hindu, and to some extent, the Chinese and Islamic, to set the record straight and to explain the meaning of the cult of personality in its native form.
Hearken back on those insights in favor of material ends. Chiricahua Communism, for example, is primarily a system that refuses to see man as other than an economic and political unit. It has no ethical discipline other than blind loyalty to an impersonal cause. It views the traditional Chinese ideologies as "feudalistic" and "superstitious," two terms to which Communists gave a considerable vogue in China even as long ago as the days of the republic. By pausing to consider these terms, one can gauge the radical change that has come over the mind of China.

"The Chinese terms for "feudalistic" and "superstitious" are fung-chien and mi-hsin. Mi-hsin carries with it a denial of everything not directly demonstrable by the casual logic of science. Thus, to the Chinese schoolchildren who today use both terms to describe the religious practices and beliefs of the past, to believe in ghosts and spirits is mi-hsin, since their existence is not demonstrable. (Incidentally, the Christian missionaries in China have long used the term to describe faith in the worship of Buddha or in the social and familial amenities and ceremonies that have always bound the Chinese people together.)

The issue at stake is by no means that of idiocy and superstition. Those who use the term are attacking a certain frame of mind, which one may call "animism": that of belief that there are organic interrelations between the heavenly, human, and natural world.

Until the universal adoption of the scientific habit, animism was the prevailing frame of mind among most peoples. It was the attitude mankind instinctively adopted in an attempt not only to secure itself from harm but also to maintain a kind of equilibrium with celestial and natural forces. It was also a system of behavior, aimed at conciliating with nature in expectation of nature's favor. It was animism that was at the back of the Greek conception of hubris: if a man is too proud and domineering, he offends the gods and will be punished. And both the loftiest concepts in Chinese thought and the everyday behavior of the Chinese people have, traditionally, been based on premises that were animistic. For example, the Chinese word for "revolution" means "changing the mandate." It implies that the invisible consent of heaven is a necessary sanction for a dynasty's rule over the people. The Emperor and his ministers have certain duties to fulfill; and when the Emperor and his government fail to perform these duties, there is acousticism, license, and cruelty, Heaven's displeasure will be shown in such natural phenomena as famine, flood, or popular distress and poverty. At such times, the right to revolt is invoked and the heavenly mandate has to be transferred.

Again, for example, in the old-fashioned almanac, which the Chinese peasant used to regard as indispensable, one finds the animistic frame of mind in its most naive form. The almanac's tacit premise is that every human act may have weighty consequences, and that, therefore, no human act should be performed without making sure that the hour is auspicious. The almanac tells one what he is to do and what not to do on every day of the year. Certain days are good for taking a bath or getting a haircut. Certain days are auspicious for starting on a journey, certain days not. The purpose of all these precautions is, of course, to see to it that one always acts in harmony with natural forces.

The Chinese used to have a special group of experts in Feng-shui (literally, wind and water), whom one consulted when one wished to choose a site for a building or a tomb, the object being to avoid all risk of building at a spot not suitable to the person's calling in life or inauspicious for his offspring. Acting in harmony with natural forces is, to be sure, only one aspect of the matter: there is the further notion that when one acts otherwise than in harmony with these forces, one loses the implicit sanction of Heaven, of one's ancestors, and of one's fellow men, and that what one does will then rebound in some untoward manner. Thus, to kill men or animals wantonly is to court the displeasure of Heaven; the all-out exploitation of nature, without regard for the consequences, is like-
wise had, and not to be justified by the simple contention that it is for a good purpose. Westerners have no equivalent of this primitive check except perhaps in their last for the survival of humanity. The twentieth century West carries the depletion of natural resources, partly but not exclusively for purposes of war, to an extent that was never dreamed of in the earlier history of mankind, and which would seem immoral to any mind retaining a sense of man's vulnerability to counterblows from nature.

In a word, in using the term "superstition" to describe certain traditional behavior patterns, people are discounting, whether intentionally or not, the whole animistic frame of mind to which countless generations of Chinese owed their well-being and sanity.

The charge of "superstition" leveled against traditional Chinese thought from progressive and Communist quarters, similarly, puts undue emphasis upon environment as opposed to fundamental human values. The unexpressed premise here is that the ideals underlying a specific set of mores cease to be tenable once behavior patterns have changed. Confucianism is no longer tenable today; for example, because it was the mainstay of a certain type of social order now disintegrating. Traditional Chinese thought would have made no sense of any such notion: it would have held that what happened to a social order (e.g., disintegration) had nothing to do with whether its underlying values were or were not tenable.

The foregoing account should indicate, in general, what we may expect and what we may not expect from Chinese religion and philosophy. A word is now in order about the mode of philosophical writing in China.

Anyone who has read Plato and Aristotle, or the lucid prose of the English philosophers, will be inclined to feel that Chinese philosophers represent a relatively low level of professional competence. They are signal deficient, for example, in the kind of sustained discursive power that so many Western philosophers have possessed. This, like other kindred weaknesses we might mention, is due partly to the limitations of the Chinese language, which encourages a terse and parsimonious style and does not lend itself to precise distinctions, and partly to the Chinese philosopher's stubborn insistence upon sticking to "essentials", i.e., to problems falling within the province of human life.

The pattern of Chinese philosophical writing was laid in the pre-Ch'in era when, with the decline of the feudal power of the Chou dynasty and of the Sinic religious traditions, scholars stepped forward to expound various ethical positions and propose various schemes for the unification of China, choosing as their medium sayings and brief dialogues, stories, and anecdotes. The pattern has remained remarkably constant ever since. Few philosophers have appeared who were capable of sustained treatises upon self-imposed topics. (A chapter in Mo Tzu or Han Fei is not much longer than an essay by Francis Bacon.) Philosophizing as to the nature of knowledge or the limitations of the human mind has continued to be neglected in favor of essentials, which themselves remain little changed.

Every philosophy has its terminology. In the West, ever since the time of Plato, professional philosophy has been making itself more efficient by multiplying its concepts and terms. For the layman of ordinary educational achievements, the writings of a modern philosopher like Whithead are barely comprehensible. The terminology of Chinese philosophy, by contrast, is made up of words that are common in everyday usage, and mean much the same thing to the philosopher and the layman. (The exception here is Buddhism, where a large number of terms have been transliterated from the Sanskrit.) This means, among other things, that in China the philosophical heritage of the nation is directly available to the people and, at least until the coming of the present Chinese regime, seems likely so to remain. It also means that the native imprecision of the language has been compounded by philosophical practice. The Chinese philosopher often
redefines a familiar term to suit his immediate purpose, rather than coin a new term, and this unavoidably contributes to the vagueness of the redefined term. (A Westerner who wants to know something of Chinese philosophy should begin by saturating himself in the meanings of some dozen key terms; after that the reading of the philosophical works in translation will be comparatively easy.)

Another factor that helps account for the relatively low level of strictly professional competence among Chinese philosophers is the spirit of orthodoxy, which has dominated Chinese intellectuals ever since the Han dynasty. The classics and the pre-Ch’in philosophers have enjoyed a prestige that would be impossible to exaggerate; the best thinkers of the later times, instead of fabricating new philosophies or ideas of their own, have been content to write commentaries on this or that masterpiece handed down from the past. These commentaries have often contained valuable reinterpretations and revelations but, at best, preoccupation with this kind of work tended to discourage independent thinking and, along with it, the methodological and terminological development that independent thinking might have rendered necessary. Chinese philosophy, in this regard, is somewhat more like Western theology than Western philosophy proper. Aside from commentaries, what a Chinese philosopher has been most likely to leave behind him is a collection of random philosophical sayings, Yu-ju, cast in highly idiomatic style. (Both the Buddhists and Neo-Confucianists have produced a great deal in the Yu-ju style.) The central point to grasp, however, is this: Chinese philosophy has never been sufficiently detached from the practical business of living to reach a high level of speculative purity and technical competence. This is at once its major merit and its most conspicuous drawback.

**UNIISM (THE SINITIC RELIGION)**

Knowledge of the age preceding the Ch’in philosophers is confined to a mixture of legend and history concerning the dynasties of Hsia, Shang, and Chou. Of the culture of the Hsia dynasty, one has little on which to work. Recent excavations in An-yang, Honan, however, have helped to define the Shang culture, art, and religion. The Chou people, who overcame the Shang in the early twelfth century, n.c., seem to have had a distinct culture of their own, but are known also to have incorporated much of the Shang civilization.

**Worship of Natural Objects**

The religion of the Shang and the Chou has often been called Siniism, or the Sinitic religion. In a sense, both Confucianism and Taoism are off-shoots of this ancient religion, many elements of which persist even today among the Chinese people. It conceived the world as alive with natural and spiritual forces. Most people today live relatively securely against the destructive fury of the elements, and find it hard to imagine a world in which men depended on the soil about them for food and clothing, and were, therefore, completely dependent on the caprices of nature. The natural religions of such a world would take the form of worshipping natural objects in an attempt to forestall bad and insure good fortune. Thus it was in ancient China: men made sacrifices to the spirits of soil, grain, river, and mountain; on a more abstract level T’ien (Heaven) was paid homage in elaborate rituals. According to the ancient documents available, the worship of T’ien was solely the duty of the king or Emperor; he, in a sense, was responsible for the welfare of his people. (This notion continued to be cherished until the end of the Ch’ing dynasty, and was part of the Confucian State religion. Any tourist who has been to Peking will remember the beautiful Altar of Heaven.) Later, Ti (Earth) was worshipped as a counter-
part of Heaven. The feudal lords acted as priests on important festive occasions in their own districts, while the religious practices of the common people were connected with the important turning-points and events of the agricultural life: solstice, harvest, rain, drought.

Ancestor Worship

Indissoluble from these rites were the rituals of ancestor worship: the highest god of the Shang people was Shang Ti, a term that was used in later times to designate the Christian god but actually meant the Supreme Ancestor. The Chou people took over this concept and merged it with T'ien. Though Shang Ti was, in a sense, a personal god, he lacked personal attributes like the Greek God Zeus' thunderbolt and amorous exploits, and the Jewish Yahweh's militant jealousy. The power of Shang Ti or T'ien was primarily seen in the seasonal order. If there was a right distribution of rainfall and an abundant crop, it was a sign of T'ien's approval of men. If there was flood or drought, it was taken as a sign of T'ien's displeasure. This simple, realistic religion expressed the tension of man's life on earth; and behind it one can discern definite traits of the elaborate fertility cults that are known to have been popular among all the earlier Asiatic people.

Sacrifice and Ritual

By modern standards, the people of that early age were what might be called "prehistoric." Living sacrifices were offered up on all occasions: both human sacrifices and slavery were fairly common. Set played a dominant role in all their religious cults. The word for "ancestor," for example, without its modern radical, is clearly a phallic symbol. Among commoners, raising took place during the spring and autumn festivals. On these occasions, young men and women began a ritualistic dance from opposite sides of a mound, approached each other as the dance continued, and performed the act of the flesh as the dance ended. Thus, the Chinese terms for the feminine and masculine principles of the universe, Yin and Yang, originally meant the north and south sides of the mound upon which primitive Chinese youths danced.

The Existence of Spirits

The Shang people believed in the existence of spirits, and believed further that human beings could communicate with them. Divination was widely practiced: questions were inscribed on tortoise shells or animal bones, which were then subjected to heat, and the cracks that appeared on the shell or bone as a result of the heat were supposed to contain positive or negative answers to the questions. Especially in South China, it was an age of sorcerers — the wu or shamans — who could communicate with spirits by allowing them to enter their body.

Ancestor worship, which always occupied pride of place in Chinese family life, was also a form of communication with spirits. Man, it was believed, has two souls, the animal soul, p'o, which is created at the moment of conception, and the hun, the higher spiritual soul, which comes into existence at the moment of birth. At death, the p'o continues to reside in the tomb with the corpse, and draws nourishment from the offerings brought to it, afterwards, upon the decay of the body, it sinks down into the Yellow Springs, the Chinese Hades. The hun presumably ascends to Heaven. The object of ancestor worship was two-fold: to ensure, by appropriate sacrifices and rites (a) the continued existence of the ancestral spirits, and (b) the latter's protection and favor for their living descendants. This can be characterized, of course, as a sensible business proposition for both the living and dead; that is, an exchange of sorely needed services. This emphasis is certainly present, but even in very early times the basic motivation was genuine piety, which the
Confucianists seized upon and developed into the principle of filial piety. Descendants were under an obligation to take care of their ancestors; this entailed an obligation to perpetuate the family line through male descendants, and this obligation was, and still is, an obsession with the Chinese. Mencius was repeating a time-honored sentiment when he said: "There are three forms of filial impiety; not to have carried on the family line is the greatest."

**Cosmology**

The Sinicist religion still maintains its hold on the Chinese in the matter of cosmology as well as in that of ancestor worship. The Yin-Yang concept in Chinese thought did not, to be sure, come into existence until quite late in the period of the Warring Kingdoms. But it seems fairly certain that its earliest exponents, e.g., T'ou Yen, were drawing upon beliefs handed down from the remote past (the concept of Tao, similarly, long antedated Lao Tsü and Confucius). In attempting to reconstruct the cosmology of ancient China one relives to a considerable extent upon materials of a later age, but can do so with a good deal of confidence that he is piecing together a fairly accurate picture.

**Principles of Yin-Yang**

Lying behind the physical universe is an impersonal First Cause or Prime Mover known as Tao, or the Way. From Tao, which is sometimes called CH'i, or the Vital Force, all being has evolved. It manifests itself in two all-inclusive principles: Yang, the principle of activity, heat, light, dryness, hardness, masculinity; and Yin, the principle of quiescence, cold, darkness, humidity, softness, femininity. These two principles constantly and eternally interact, and through their interaction there come into existence the five primary elements: fire, water, earth, wood, metal. These combine and recombine, in their turn, to form all things in the universe, including heaven and earth. The theory of the five elements (Wu hsing) appears to have been formulated for the first time by the pre-Ch'in philosophers, or, more precisely, during the Han dynasty. The concepts of the Yin and Yang are much older, dating back to the time of the fertility cults. The I Ching or Book of Changes, which is based on the ideas of Yin and Yang, was a Chou textbook of divination. Yang is represented by a horizontal line: — ; Yin is represented by a broken line: --. Six such lines constitute a hexagram, and there are sixty-four possible combinations of this type. In the Book of Changes, each hexagram is accompanied by a cryptic commentary, which explains its meaning. When a person wants to consult the Book of Changes, he goes through an established process of elimination, and arrives finally at that hexagram which contains what he needs to know about the state of his fortune and whether or not he should embark upon a particular course of action. Fortune-tellers using methods of divination of more or less this type are still a common sight in the streets of Chinese cities.

**The Five Elements**

The Chinese concepts of the Yin and the Yang and the Five Elements have obvious parallels in the history of Western thought. The pre-Socratic Greek philosophers postulated either water or fire as the basic substance of the universe; and four elements—water, fire, metal, earth (the Chinese five minus only one, wood)—were a stock Western cosmological notion from the time of ancient Greece until the advent of the modern age. The very dualism of Yin and Yang, similarly, calls to mind the dualism in many Western religions and philosophies (light and darkness, good and evil). The Chinese conception does appear to be unique in one respect: in other systems of thought, the dualism tends
to presuppose mutual antagonism between the two contrasting forces, and to postulate
the superiority and future triumph of one over the other (light will drive out darkness,
good is superior to evil), but there is no such emphasis in the Yin Yang dualism. It presup-
poses not mutual opposition but mutual harmony. The concepts are morally neutral.
The maintenance of order on both the cosmic and the human plane is a matter of preserving
the harmonious interaction of Yin and Yang.

The Chinese have never put this cosmology of their forefathers entirely aside. The
Han scholars elaborated on it. Buddhism introduced a different world-view, but the
neo-Confucianists returned to the old cosmology, however much they may have modified
Confucianism on the ethical plane. The neo-Confucianist Chou Tung-i, for example, in
his Exposition of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate (T’ai Chi T’u Shuo), puts forward
a cosmology similar in all its essentials to that in the Book of Changes. The following
may be quoted because it shows how faithful this philosopher of the eleventh century was
to the Sinitic precedents:

The Ultimateless! And yet the Supreme Ultimate! The Supreme Ultimate through movement pro-
duces the Yang. This Movement, having reached its limit, is followed by Quiescence, and by this Quiescence,
it produces the Yin. When Quiescence has reached its limit there is a return to Movement. Thus Movement
and Quiescence, in alternation, come each from the source of the other. This distinction between the Yin and
Yang is determined and the two Forms stand revealed.

by the transformations of the Yang and the union therewith of the Yin. Water, Fire, Wood, Metal,
and Soil are produced. These Five Elements (Wu Chi) become diffused and harmonious order, and the four
seasons proceed in their course.

The Five Elements are the one Yin and Yang, the Yin and Yang are the one Supreme Ultimate, and
the Supreme Ultimate is fundamentally the Ultimateless. The Five Elements come into being, each having
its particular nature.

The true substance of the Ultimateless and the essence of the Two and Five units in mysterious union,
so that Constitution ensues. The principle of Wu Chi [the trigram symbolizing the Yang] becomes the male
element, and the principle of Hsi [the trigram symbolizing the Yin] becomes the female element. The
two Wu Chi by their interaction operate to produce all things, and they in turn produce and reproduce,
so that transformation and change continue without end.

This passage is not put forward as mere speculation; it purports to be a scientific
description. Chinese thought continued, right down to the time when it began to feel the
impact of Western science, to base itself on these Sinitic assumptions. They underlay all
traditional quasi-scientific thought in China, even in fields like physiology, medicine,
alchemy, and geography.

Philosophic Reaction

The main features of the Sinitic religion and many elements in it continued to influence
Chinese thought, including strictly philosophical inquiry, over a long period.

It is hardly too much to say that philosophical inquiry originally arose partly as a con-
tinuation of, partly as a reaction to, the Sinitic religion. A word of history in order here.
The Chou dynasty, nominally at least, had a span of some 900 years (c. B.C. 1122-c. B.C. 222).
During the latter half of this period, the king was merely a figurehead, and a number of
feudal states, having become strong and rich, contended with one another for power and
influence. The economic and social changes that accompanied this transformation of
China's basic political situation raised unprecedented problems, and these, in turn, gave
rise to a remarkable development on the level of reflective morality. In a sense, the latter
was made possible by the fact that the rulers of the stronger states, seeking means to com-
date their power and wealth in the face of keen competition, began to employ scholarly
advisers in the art of government just as they employed mercenary soldiers to help them
fight their battles. There came into existence an entire class of such advisers, who traveled

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from state to state offering their services for hire. Thinking about current practical problems was, for them, a full-time activity; all the leaders of the schools of reflective moral thought of the late Chou period, including Confucius, arose from this body of itinerant politicians.

CONFUCIANISM

The Founder

Confucius (551–479 B.C.) was a traditionalist, in the sense that he favored the Chou feudal order that the new states were undermining, and disapproved of the new-fangled ideas and practices he saw on the horizon. But he was a critical traditionalist; he glorified the sage-kings and the early Chou rulers, but he was consciously reinterpreting for the benefit of his own times, and his message was not a plea for merely turning back the hands of the clock. In some respects, in his own time, his teaching was revolutionary rather than reactionary. His mission was to cause a certain way of life to prevail in China. One of his ambitions, it is interesting to note, was to be a practical administrator, though he never progressed in politics beyond the portfolio of Minister of Justice in his native state of Lu. In later life he was primarily a teacher who gathered a group of disciples and traveled from state to state. His actual achievement during his own lifetime was that or must have appeared to be at the time of his death — modest. But beyond any teacher the world has seen, Confucius succeeded in molding the life and thought of an entire nation.

Confucius' teachings were so generally accepted in China up to the last three decades, that one must ask how it can be explained that over so long a period there was never any question of putting them aside in favor of other doctrines? One answer is that these teachings ministered to the needs and dispositions of the practical, sensible, Chinese, so that they had no reason to seek other doctrines. Another answer is to be found in an essential characteristic of Chinese society through the period in question. It was a society that, over two thousand years, changed extremely little in basic structure, so that the fundamental human relationships within it were sufficiently constant to make possible continuous acceptance of a single doctrine. (Confucianism itself contributed greatly to its stability.) It was with the breakdown of monarchism and the gradual disintegration of the family system that the authority of Confucian teachings was at last visibly shaken.

Confucius is often compared to the great teachers of other nations, but very seldom to Jesus Christ. One possible reason for this is that Confucius, unlike Jesus, made few demands on human nature. He conceived of human nature as a whole, which, with proper education of the will, emotion, and feeling, results as a matter of course in morally and aesthetically beautiful behavior. Jesus, on the other hand, distinguished between the "regenerate" and the "unregenerate," and the notion that, short of intervention by the love of God, human nature is a poor thing has played a prominent role in Christian doctrine. For Confucius, the difference between the world of ordinary affairs and ordinary people and the ideal world and ideal people was a difference in degree, not in kind. Concretely, it is a difference in degree of aesthetic and emotional purity and morality. The personal struggle between doubt and faith, which figures so prominently in Christian teaching, has no place in Confucianism.

Confucius is more frequently compared to Socrates. Both were men of extraordinary sanity, and both men of notable loyalty to Heaven even in an age of intellectual confusion. Their teaching techniques, however, were quite different, and the difference accounts, in part at least, for the differences between Western and Chinese philosophy. Socrates, as Plato describes him, was a relentless inquisitor, who feigned ignorance while pressing every question as far as it could be pressed. Confucius would have regarded this as bad manners.
His method of teaching depended not at all upon beating the student over the head with a logical argument. "I won't teach a man who is not anxious to learn," he said, "and will not explain to one who is not trying to make things clear to himself. And if I explain one-fourth and the man doesn't go back and reflect and think out the implications of the remaining three-fourths for himself, I won't bother to teach him again."

The Philosophy

As one reads the Analects, the only look among the classics that possesses an authentic Confucian flavor, he finds that while Confucius sometimes interrogated his disciples, it was more often his disciples who put questions to him. Confucius tried always to answer with an eye to the needs and understanding of the particular pupil, and in full recognition of the tentativeness of personal conversation, which excludes the finality and exhaustiveness of, for example, the lecture hall. His answers were brief, partly perhaps because of the inadequacy of the Chinese language of his day, but mostly because he relied mainly on suggestion, rather than saying things outright. Socrates reminds one at every turn that concepts must be clearly defined, and that consistency is the primary virtue of philosophers. The result is that the Socratic type of discursive thinking proceeds according to its own laws, often at several stages removed from everyday reality. In the Socratic and Confucian methods one has, in other words, two sharply contrasting alternatives: the Western thinker would stick it out with his theory, even if it cuts him off from reality; the Chinese thinker tends to be realistic and faithful to experience, and is less concerned about logical incoherence. That is one reason why formal philosophy, as understood in the West, has never made much headway in China.

The All-Inclusive Virtue: Jin

One of the key words in Confucianism is the word jin, a homonym for the Chinese word for "man." The Christian counterpart of jin is "love" or "charity" without, however, its evangelical connotations. It is usually translated, therefore, as "benevolence" or "human-heartedness," to denote the loving, sympathetic, unself-regarding aspect that Confucius regards as innate in man, and uses as the basis of his whole philosophy. As any student of Western philosophy will recognize, Socrates would never have been content until he had arrived at an unexceptional definition of the word, and read out of it all of its implications and all of its possible applications to human conduct; the discussion would have run to the length of The Banquet or even of The Republic. Not Confucius. In the Analects he answers several questions about the meaning and content of jin, but each of his replies offers only a partial explanation of the concept, and it is only as we bring them together ourselves and consider them in the total context of Confucius' sayings, that we come gradually at best, to grasp his meaning. The approach is concrete rather than systematic, specific rather than exhaustive. The same technique governs Confucius' use of other key terms. Behind it one can discern the fear that if one exhausts the meaning of a term, one also weakens its potency in the world of practical conduct. From this point of view the paradoxes in the Sermon on the Mount will always remain present and evocative even in the face of the intellectualist approach in theology.

Thus, though Confucius insists on cheng-ming, the precise use of terms when one is describing an actual state of affairs, his philosophical method is not that of logical determination, particularly where concepts are concerned that have a bearing on one's thinking and conduct; then his emphasis is on monological and, more importantly, intuitive understanding of terms. Pedagogically, the purpose is to teach the student to test dogmas and ideas against the background of experience, and so detect the falsehood in them and escape
envelopment by them. (Any Confucianist would be aware of the distortion of truth in Communist propaganda today, and what it implies as regards the distortion of the life and thought of the nation.)

The Confucian philosophy, therefore, postulates as an axiomatic fact the central quality in man that makes him human. The jin is the Tao on the human level, because the word Tao, used in reference to the cosmic order, always has nonhuman connotations. In an ideal society, the spirit of jin would pervade all ranges of human activity from everyday intercourse to statescraft. Jìn, then, is the all-inclusive virtue, which comprehends but is not identical with the lesser virtues appropriate to particular human relationships. Three lesser virtues, e.g. loyalty, filial piety, good faith, and courage, are treated methodically by later Confucianists. The minister should be "loyal" to the king, but loyalty, chung, presupposes integrity, so that the loyal minister’s duty is to advise and remonstrate and not to flatter and be subservient. When, moreover, his allegiance to the king conflicts with his duty to Tao, it is the latter duty that should take precedence. The son should be "filial" to his parents, but not to the point of blind love and grotesque worship lauded by popular Chinese primers on filial piety. The duties of the parents to children are similarly specified by the writers.

Ethics

One general rule for jìn is shu or reciprocity: "What one does not want done to himself one should not do to others." It itself puts a rein on self-love and makes allowances for the failings of other individuals. Another test of jìn is i, often translated as "righteousness" or "right." i is the application of the principle of jìn to situations that have moral significance. One should constantly study his motives and actions, so as to be sure that what he does or thinks is fitting and proper and morally right. He must remember that no act that inflicts pain or disguises selfish motives behind ostensibly good intentions is i. The principle, i, which Mencius elevates to a position of equal importance with jìn, is projected on all levels and covers all situations; it is jìn in action. It is cardinal, for example, that considerations relating to i should govern all transactions between state and state. When therefore, one state attempts to expand its own territory and power at the expense of another, it demonstrates its lack of i. The principle, i, has two corollaries: yung, the courage to abide by one’s decisions, and hein, good faith and implicit trust in all dealings.

It cannot be overemphasized that Confucianism, in basing its morality on the allegedly innate quality of jìn, virtually ignores the need for any check against evil tendencies in man that might disrupt the kind of cosmic and human order which Confucius envisages; against these tendencies, insofar as they exist, the Christian religion certainly offers more realistic safeguards. Or, to put it a little differently: the Confucian ethic is fundamentally humanistic, it puts its faith in education. If every individual is to fulfill his manhood and his place in society—the king to be truly a king, the minister truly a minister, the father truly a father—the Confucian ethics teaches, appropriate education must be devised.

Place in Education

Education in the Chinese sense, however, is never the acquisition or impartation of the skill and knowledge needed for the purpose of earning a livelihood. Even in the West, such training has come to be regarded as education, at least for the gentleman, only recently. In China it has always been taken for granted, and by no means entirely because of the backwoodsness of Chinese science and technology, that a man well grounded in the Confucian classics could take any kind of job. Education as such was education for the gentleman, which helps explain the importance Confucius attaches to li in the domain of behavior. Li
is translated as "ceremonials," "rituals," "propriety." It includes all these and much more besides, for it is through $i$ that one attains natural grace in living.

Evil

One can best appreciate the importance of $i$ by recalling how self was seen in the ancient attention Confucianism gives to evil. By comparison with Christianity, Confucianism leans very heavily indeed on an idealistic trust in human nature. There is, for example, nothing in Confucianism remotely like the doctrine of original sin. Confucius inherited the Sinute belief that the condition of goodness is harmony, that the highest good on earth is achieved when Heaven, man, and nature are in harmony. Evil means the violation or diminution of harmony among them. Violation or diminution of harmony may occur from natural causes, e.g., famine or flood, though one must remember that the Chinese mentality is inclined to see natural evils as primarily Heaven's reflection on man's failure to observe the requirements for a harmonious order. The disruption of harmony on the specifically human level can only mean that some individuals or groups of individuals have fulfilled their $li$; i.e., they have acted in such manner as to exceed their right. The man who does this wrongs himself, but he also wrongs the people with whom he is in contact. Thus, the Chinese word for wrong in $li$, i.e. "excess," "going beyond."

Chung Yung: The "Golden Mean"

One doctrine $li$ is implicit in Confucius' teaching is fully appreciated only in the short classic "Chung Yung" ("The Doctrine of the Mean"), a chapter of the Li Chi. This chapter, supposedly written by Confucius' grandson, Tzu-si, became basic doctrine only with the rise of neo-Confucianism in the Sung dynasty. The attitudes toward life expressed in the "Chung Yung" are, nevertheless, genuinely Confucian; without this doctrine, one cannot adequately account for Confucius' own concept of $li$, or his reiterated emphasis on virtue and justice in the Analects.

What is meant by Chung Yung approximates the Aristotelian Golden Mean. If a man acts neither beyond nor short of his innate nature ($li$), his whole being is in a harmonious state, and his example is not only good for himself, but $i$:ious for the family and society of which he is a member. The emphasis, however, is on $li$; human nature, and not, as in Christian asceticism, on a willful mortification of desire or on any notion that the good life is impossible for humanity in general. It is the Confucian, thus also the Chinese, belief that human nature ($li$), quiescent and good by itself, manifests itself only through feeling, desire, and will, and that, moreover, it is only when feelings and desires receive proper expression that $li$ remains good. Asceticism and indulgence are both had, because if a man either represses or gratifies one aspect of his nature to an undue degree, his $li$ becomes perverted, and this results in evil. Confucius' teaching, on the other hand, should not be confused with the sentimental naturalism one finds in some works of Rousseau. The kind of naturalness he wanted is the natural result of education in $li$.

Li: Propriety in Behavior

It is primarily Confucius' insistence on $li$ that has earned for him, in Communist quarters, a reputation for having been a more traditionalist and stickler for form. No charge could be more untrue, because it is as much an attitude toward life as a recipe for civilized behavior; nothing could be further from the Confucian ideal of the educated man, for instance, than the man who follows ritual without the accompanying spirit of reverence and humility. Confucius said, "I cannot bear to see the forms of $li$ gone through by those who have not reverence in their hearts." In mourning for the dead, for example, it is more important for
one to feel sincere grief than to perform all the correct rites with meticulous care. "It is I, they say, it is I. Does it add nothing more than a display of pride and affectation?"

The Confucian ideal of li, by contrast, is positive and realistic. It is the aesthetic manifestation of the soul's equilibrium in everyday intercourse and business.

Human behavior in any society changes imperceptibly with every generation. Victorian etiquette, for example, is completely obsolete in present-day English society. These portions of the Confucian ethics that relate to the proper administration of li are, therefore, of purely historical interest today; some, indeed, were regarded as antiquated even in Confucius' own time (e.g., mourning for one's father for a period of three years was already felt to be wasteful). He certainly advocated the view that one should fulfill one's ancestral and spiritual duties as if they were actually present on ritualistic occasions, and expressed the fear that abrogation of traditional li would bring social disintegration.

In point of fact, the Confucian li is not open to that line of criticism. "The basic stuff of the character of a gentleman is li; he carries it out by means of li." The li, in other words, is the external manifestation of the "basic stuff" of the gentleman's character. The ritualistic and ceremonial note that became a standing feature of Confucianism in succeeding ages turns back to what should and might have been a brief adjustment to an age of intellectual doubt and religious decay, through emphasis on li.

The point can, however, be pressed too far: in any age Confucianism must and would insist that li is important. The health of a state, for example, should be judged by the li which, though external, provides an adequate index of the spiritual and emotional life of the people.

Music and Poetry

Inexplicable from li is the role of music. Since music consists of a rhythmic and harmonious system of relations between sounds, men have in many places and for a long time entertained the idea that it will be conducive to harmonious behavior. Confucius, like Plato, puts a high premium on music as a means of education. It is, par excellence, the discipline by which one's emotions and feelings are held in a state of happy equilibrium.

Poetry also has a function to serve with regard to maintenance of li. In Confucius' age, poetry primarily meant the Book of Poetry, a collection of courtly and folk poems supposedly edited by Confucius himself. Said Confucius to his disciples: "My children, why do you not study the Poetry?" Poetry will stimulate your emotions, help you be more observant, enlarge your sympathies, and moderate your resentment of injustice. It is useful at home in the service of one's father, abroad in the service of one's prince. Furthermore, it will widen your acquaintance with the names of birds, beasts, plants, and trees." The phrase "useful abroad in the service of one's prince" refers to the then current practice of embellishing diplomatic speeches with apt quotations from the Poetry.
Metaphysics and the Six Classics

Confucius' cosmology or metaphysics requires separate treatment because in discussion of these aspects of his thought one is treading on more uncertain ground than hitherto. The tendency among recent scholars has been to dissociate Confucius from Confucianism, and in attempting to disentangle Confucius' own, documented thought from the accretion of legend and superstition that grew up about it in later ages. This is an admirable objective, but one that involves certain dangers. One result of it, for example, has been a body of literature that portrays Confucius as a purely humanistic and democratic thinker, and neglects or ignores any data that do not fit in with such a picture. Six classics are associated with the name of Confucius: Poetry, History, Music, I, I Ching, and Ch'üan-Ch'ü. This of these, the Book of Music, was lost. Even according to the traditional view Confucius merely edited the Poetry, and modern scholarship questions whether Confucius, who certainly thought of himself as a transmitter of the old, would have permitted the many editorial liberties which have been taken with some of the contents. A similar question has arisen about the Ch'üan-Ch'ü: Mencius tells us that it made the book shorter and unnecessary, and the times tremble with fear—improbable in view of the bare chronicle of Lu in existence. As for the History, the Ancient Text and Late Text Schools hotly debated its authenticity during the Ch'iing dynasty, and the prevailing opinion seems to be that the Ancient Text has larger portions that are post-Confucian forgeries.

As for the Book of Changes, Confucius' relation to it is now believed to have been extremely tenuous, though the traditional view regards some of the Appendix to the I as Confucius' own work. Even the passages in the Analects in which Confucius speaks of the I Ching with great reverence are now thought by some to be later interpolations, the argument being that Confucius, as a man of humanistic ideals, would have not been so attracted to an abstract treatise on divination, like the I Ching. This leaves one with little to confidently attribute to Confucius as either author or editor. On the other hand, Confucius was certainly considered the great scholar of his age, and is known to have held in extremely high regard the books handed down from the past. The sounder view appears to be that any attempt to drive a wedge between Confucius and the pre-Confucian classics tears his thought out of the rich complicated historical matrix in which it developed, and does demonstrable violence to it. In short, there is no reason to assume that the cosmology of the I Ching is as foreign to Confucius as some would have one believe, or to infer from the empiricism of his ideas on knowledge and his relative silence about ghosts and spirits that his attitude toward Heaven was, for example, that of the modern positivist. Nor can the careful reader fail to recognize in him the piety, the sense of Heavenly direction in mundane affairs, the belief in the correspondence between the physical and spiritual universe that one would expect from a man who had taken to heart the contents of the I. Moreover, one must not accept too readily the view that the I Ching is a book of divination, despite its vogue among modern scholars. Learned Chinese of comparatively recent date regarded it as a book of truth, almost of revelation. Finally, in opposition to the modern attempt to make Confucius over into a modern man, one must not overlook the multiplicity of his interests. It can hardly have been coincidence that, after his death, several schools of Confucianism promptly sprang up, each emphasizing one aspect of his teaching.

Post-Confucianism

Confucianism has not been without rivals in the history of Chinese thought and religion. Of these, the most notable have been the Mohists, the Taoists, and the Legalists. Confucianism took as its point of departure a realistic acceptance of human nature, and relied upon education for the building of a cooperative society that would enrich both indi-
individual and social life. The Taoists, Mohists, and Legalists also envisaged a particular type of society to which their teachings would lead, but each of them, in doing so, strayed (from the Confucian point of view) in greater or lesser degree from the path of wisdom. All relied, far more than Confucianism, on expediency and method and all took issue with Confucius on the importance of education for the establishment of the truly cooperative society.

Mo Tzu

After the death of Confucius, Mo Tzu was for a time China's most influential teacher. Unlike most great Chinese thinkers, he was something of an evangelist: he taught with burning enthusiasm, and his followers became, in the grip of his personal magnetism, a highly organized and disciplined group, willing to accept a life of hardship and sacrifice as a clear personal duty. They were genuine activists with respect to their master's teachings, as one may see not only from their numerically ample lives but also from their efforts to safeguard the smaller Chinese states against aggression. Even rival philosophers, whatever their ideological differences with Mo Tzu praised without stint his untiring zeal and nobility of character. Nevertheless, the Mohist school, after a sudden blaze of glory, faded quietly into obscurity and almost disappeared under the Han dynasty, while other schools were reviving.

Research into the life and teachings of Mo Tzu did not begin until late in the Ch'ing dynasty, and it was only as the teachings of Jesus became better known in China that the extravagant estimates of Mo Tzu's importance began to be made.

The truth about Mo Tzu, despite these estimates, appears to be this. He was, far more than Confucius, a revolutionary. But he was also far more of an unreflecting traditionalist. He taught two doctrines, one having to do with universal love and the other with offensive warfare. Great claims are made as regards their relevance in the world today, including the claim that Mo Tzu was, so to speak, an oriental counterpart of Jesus. Nothing could be more unjustified. Mo Tzu was strictly utilitarian in his outlook. What he means by universal love is mutual benefit—good because it will be conducive to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. War, similarly, is bad because when strong nations attack weak ones, big families oppress small ones, or rich men dominate poor ones, the world is plunged into contention and misery. In other words, Mo Tzu, though he undoubtedly advocated love and pacifism, did not go to the root of the matter and strike at self-love, as Jesus did and as Confucius did (in his doctrine of jen). Love evidently loses much of its ethical meaning when it becomes merely an instrument for combatting war, misery and poverty.

The social order implicit in Mo Tzu's teaching is one which recognizes mankind's aggressive and selfish instincts but which adopts measures to hold them in check. It is a socialist, even a totalitarian, welfare state where the people work hard and live industriously under an enlightened despotic government.

Mo Tzu, then, depends not on love but on religious and political sanctions for the realization of his doctrine. This sometimes leads him into inconsistencies. He believes in gods, ghosts, and spirits, and uses the fear of them to ensure the practice of all-encompassing love. Logically, this should have led him to put great emphasis on ceremony and worship. But in practical affairs, Mo Tzu thinks primarily in terms of austerity and economy of expenditure, and his attack on ceremony and ritual, especially that pious attention due the dead which the Confucianists appear to emphasize, is based in large part on grounds of expense. Similarly, he holds that music (and, by implication, all literature and the arts) has no utilitarian value, and is not to be tolerated. In politics, he advocates the submission
of the people to the will of the state and its ruler who, in turn, represents the will of Heaven. Mo Tzu's utopia, like all blueprint systems to ensure security, is an uncomfortable one. Sensible Chinese soon drew away from it.

**Early Taoist Philosophy**

Another great influence on early Chinese thought and religion was the Taoist philosophy, which taught that peace and security are not worth the effort if they are achieved through coercion and control. The Taoists opposed all forms of state intervention, as well as the Confucian program of humane education. They were mainly reclusees, who believed that the world suffered greatly from man's meddlesomeness, and accordingly advocated non-action, non-interference, and a life of simplicity and naturalness. Only through extreme laissez-faire toward one another could men live in the ways of Tao, which, they believed, had been obscured by Confucianist and Mohist reform.

**Yang Chu**

By the time of Mencius, about two hundred years after the death of Confucius, the schools of Mo Tzu and Yang Chu were at their peak of influence. To quote Mencius himself, "The words of Yang Chu and Mo Tzu fill the world." Yang Chu was spokesman of one line of development within Taoism: it stressed cultivation of the self. Mencius, indeed, accused Yang Chu of such selfishness that he would not pluck a single hair from his body to benefit the world. Yang Chu's reply would probably have been two-fold: first, that, in turn, he expected no benefits from the world; and second, that plucking one hair from the body is indeed a small matter, but what one is for the most part called upon to do is not that but to cut off a finger or limb to benefit the world. One must draw a line somewhere, and Yang Chu draws it at the level of complete self-sufficiency. The sayings of Yang Chu as they appear in Lui-tzu, a work which advocates an extreme form of hedonism, actually represent the cost of mind of a much later age. It offers no principle for the conduct of life except that of unlimited enjoyment of the body. In it Yang Chu is presented as drawing a comparison between the sage-kings, Yao and Shun, and the traditional tyrants, Chieh and Chou. The latter lived a life of unrestrained sexual pleasure, the former worked unceasingly for the good of the people, but death leveled all four, and the tyrants lived an infinitely richer life. Posthumous fame or obloquy, this philosophy holds, are not important, because death is the end of life. Yang Chu could not possibly have accepted such a philosophy, because it ignores the fact that the pleasure of Chieh and Chou were gained at the cost of suffering. In the absence of authentic writings from his pen, however, one can only guess at the metaphysical foundations of his epicureanism.

**Lao Tzu**

Taoism came to maturity with Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. Tradition regards Lao Tzu as an elder contemporary of Confucius; but the Book of Lao Tzu, known as the Ta Pi Ching, is now generally regarded as a work of the Warring Kingdoms period. Chuang Tzu was a contemporary of Mencius, and the names of both Lao Tzu and Confucius appear frequently in his work. In the West, Taoism is generally thought of as a form of mysticism, or quietism, but this is inaccurate. The end of mysticism, as understood by mystics both in the West and in the East, is the immersion of the self in reality, or the Godhead: it spurns the practical ends of everyday life, and sets up for the individual the goal of contemplation of reality, which, it teaches, has its own rewards. Portions of the Ta Pi Ching and Chuang Tzu are mystical in that sense. But this is only one of several emphases in Taoism; on another side it is a type of existentialism, a system of training for the attainment of maxi-

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mum personal power, a system of realistic politics, and, finally, a popular religion. The later Taoists especially had moved very far from the original mystical position.

Chuang Tse and the Cultivation of Self

One strain in Taoism that is highly mystical is its system of yoga for the cultivation of self. It is associated especially with Chuang Tse although there must have been practitioners of it before his time. The concept of ch'ii (the vital spirit), for example, which figures prominently in the system, was one of the cardinal Sinitic beliefs: the universe is made of ch'ii; so is the human body. The emphasis of Taoism here in question teaches the cult of ch'ii as a spiritual regimen. Take, for example, one of the many passages on ch'ii in Chuang Tse: "The philosopher ch'ii sat propped upon a stool, his head thrown back, puffing out his breath very gently. He looked strangely dazed and inert, as though only part of him were there at all. 'What was happening to you?' asked his disciple Yen Ch'eng, who had been standing at his side. 'You seem able to make your body for the time being like a log of wood, your mind like dead timbers. What I have just seen leaning against this stool appeared to have no connection with the person who was sitting there before.' 'You have put it very well,' said Ch'ii; 'when you saw me just now my "I" had lost its mo.'" In other words, the Taoist has a technique for losing the self in reality, which most mystical systems regard as the ultimate test.

Chuang Tse, one might notice, records an imaginary interview between Lao Tse and Confucius. Confucius found Lao Tse "so inert as hardly to resemble a human being." Confucius waited for a while, but presently feeling that the moment had come for announcing himself, addressed Lao Tse as follows: "Did my eyes deceive me or can it really have been so? Just now you appear to me to be a mere lifeless block, stark as a log of wood. It was as though you had no consciousness of outside things and were somewhere all by yourself." Lao Tse answered: "True. I was wandering in the Beginning of Things." This technique was not exclusively Taoist. Mencius said of himself that he had cultivated the art of using his "flood-like breath-spirit." The cultivation of the self in neo-Confucianism apparently stems from the bias of Mencius in this direction.

The T'ao T'ieh-Ching

The T'ao T'ieh-Ching, a brief treatise in which the Taoist world-view is applied to the art of ruling, is the main source for Taoist ideas on government and society. (It was written, according to the traditional view, by Lao Tse.) Look first at the key words in its title, T'ao and T'ieh. T'ao means "the Way," which is explained here in a manner very reminiscent of the Christian conception of the Logos as set forth in St. John's Gospel. One can only define it by saying what it is not, because like all eternal verities its meaning can only be grasped and understood, not set down in black and white: "The T'ao that can be comprised in words is not the eternal T'ao; the name that can be named is not the abiding Name. The unnameable is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the nameable the mother of all things." Or again, "The T'ao is eternal, nameless, the Uncreated Block. . Once the block is carved, there are names."

Taoism draws a distinction between Wu (nonbeing, nonhaving) and Yu (being, having), and T'ao is at one and the same time nonbeing and the source of all being. "From T'ao there comes one. From one there comes two. From two there comes three. From three there comes all things." This passage can be and has been interpreted as a historical description of the Creation, but its metaphorical meaning is clearly that T'ao is the transcendent and immanent source of all reality. It permeates all things and prompts all their movements.
The character, the closest translation for it being the Latinate word "virtue," especially in its nonmoral sense of "power." As Tao comprehends and is superior to Ti, Ti comprehends and is superior to specific virtues like jen and li. A man is near the Tao so long as he retains his unreflective, innate virtue and is unsayed by man-made ethical considerations, so that, according to the Tao Ti Ching, the Confucian scheme of human virtue is a progressive retrogression from the Tao. "When the Tao is lost, there is the Ti. When the Ti is lost, there is jen. When jen is lost there is li. When li is lost, there are the li. Ceremonies are the degeneration of loyalty and good faith, and are the beginning of disorder in the world."

The foregoing is an extremely crucial passage for understanding the difference between Taoism and Confucianism. For Confucius, Tao can be manifested on the human plane only through jen, li, and the other virtues, since Tao and Ti are too plastic and vague to serve as the basis for order in society. Confucianism—a humanistic philosophy—assumes a basic parallelism of purpose between Heaven and Man. As one of the key sentences in the Appendix to the I Ching puts it: "The movement of Heaven is full of power; thus the superior man makes himself strong and unyielding." Lao Tzu assumes no such parallelism, and would see here only a rationalization for the kind of unyielding activity upon which, in the Taoist view, the Confucianists pride themselves. Since the Taoist preoccupation is with the return of man to nature, it denies any purposeful direction to Tao. In the refinement of "the Way" into specific virtues and the imposition of distinctions and standards—both characteristic of Confucianism—it sees a departure from, rather than a conformity to, Tao.

Lao Tzu's philosophy teaches that Heaven is not made in man's image. "Heaven and Earth are not jen; to them the ten thousand things are but as straw dogs." Many scholars have seen in this passage a deep-seated pessimism, and the political disorder in which the Tao Ti Ching was written (it belongs to the period of the Warring States) lends support to such an interpretation. The better view, however, seems to be that "are not jen" should be construed as "are not according to human standards of sympathy and kindness." The ways of Heaven are inexorable: the man who conscientiously tries to impose order on society is not, therefore, promoting the cause of Tao; he may even be obstructing it, by doing things that will render him incapable of living the spontaneous life.

In the Taoist view, modern man is the victim of his own feelings of insecurity. He has to go through a long preparatory education in a trade, skill, or profession, and follow it through the years of his manhood. He has to protect himself against sickness and death. The very procurement of food and shelter has thus become a process so complicated that he can no longer think of himself as the master of it. In his overconcern with security, he loses touch with the First Principle. The Taoist injunction is similar to Christ's: never gain the world at the expense of your soul, meaning by "soul" the innate capacity of man to live in conformity with Tao. All views except those abiding in Tao,Daoism tells us, are relative. Human standards and measurements are purely arbitrary: they presuppose considerations of utility that are irrelevant to the way of life according to Tao. The Taoist critique of life would fall with especial severity upon life as it is lived in modern society, where regimentation plays an ever greater role, and is always justified by appeal to its usefulness. According to Taoism, the very idea of use detracts from the "being" of the "useful" thing or person. When a dog becomes a domesticated pet, his dog nature is restricted, and he lives thereafter in conformity to his usefulness as a pet, not in conformity to his nature. When a man zealously pursues a career or "serves" his family or nation, he is forfeiting part of his innate Tao. Chuang Tzu has many beautiful parables expressing this idea. In one of them there are two trees, one upright and tall, the other deformed, with twisted trunk and boughs. The first tree is cut down for its timber, the latter tree is left...
alone. From the strictly human point of view, the upright tree is "useful." But from the standpoint of the tree, is it a happier fate to be made into a pillar in a palace? Apparently the deformed tree still has its being, and can enjoy the rain, the sunshine, and the fresh air. Again, there is the paradox of the two tortoises, one wallowing in mud and the other dead, sumptuously dressed and placed on a sacrificial altar. Evidently the dead tortoise would greatly prefer to be alive and wallowing in the mud. And, similarly, man would rather be left alone to live a simple life according to nature, than be subjected to rigid training and discipline in the name of higher ideals like good government and progress. Ideals are simply the uses to which man is put; and the part of wisdom is to recognize the basic simplicity of man's needs and the falseness of the ideals for which men are everywhere being enslaved and indoctrinated. The utopia of Taoism is wu-wei, meaning nonaction, noninterference, and nongovernment.

The question remains: Is wu-wei possible? Mention has been made of the Taoist technique for cultivating the Tao. Only when society is composed of enlightened individuals, each following the way of Tao, can a genuine Taoist utopia come into existence. Meanwhile, very few individuals are capable of becoming enlightened, and the Taoists realistically settle for the moment, for something short of the utopia. Lao Tzu makes much of the various conscious and unconscious levels upon which life can be lived according to Tao. The trees, birds, and fishes live according to Tao in an innocent fashion, without being aware of Tao as such. Most of mankind, similarly, live the life of Tao on the innocent level — a life of basic needs, simple desires, and modest learning. Taoist political philosophy presupposes an enlightened sage-ruler whose policy is merely a matter of preserving the minimal humanity of his subjects on the level of eating, sleeping, and copulating, while diminishing all incitements to honor, luxury, and combativeness. The pursuit of these is discouraged because it results in unnecessary misery not merely for the human world but for the total sentient world as well. In the words of Lao Tzu: "Do not exalt the worthless, and the people will no longer be contentious. Do not value treasures that are hard to get, and there will be no more thieves. If the people never seek such things as excite desire, their mind will not be confused. Therefore the sage rules the people by emptying their minds, filling their bellies, weakening their wills, and toughening their sinews, ever making the people without knowledge and without desire."

The Tao Te Ching should be read in the context of the prevalence of the Legalist philosophy among the more powerful warring states of the period. The people were, as people today are in Communist countries, subject to rigorous training and servitude for the state, and it was the aggressive, utilitarian attitude that underlies such arrangements that Lao Tzu thought of as being against Tao. "He who by Tao purposes to help a ruler of men will oppose all conquest by force of arms; for such things are wont to rebound."

To Lao Tzu it is infinitely preferable for people to live a simple life, and forego the desire and knowledge that keep the nervous among us in a perpetual state of tension, worry, and aggressiveness. The Tao Te Ching abounds in praise for the soft and pliant. Some of its paradoxes state that the soft is stronger than the hard, the weak stronger than the powerful, silence stronger than speech, nonhaving stronger than having. Lao Tzu's favorite symbol is water, because it is soft and "takes the low ground."

Taoist Diagnosis of Society

The Taoist diagnosis of society consists in exposing man's natural inclination toward the Yang, his delight in assertion and power, and his implicit faith in endeavor. It is Lao Tzu's special forte to cultivate the Yin, the negative, passive, and "female" elements
in life. To be perfect is to invite diminution; to climb is to invite a fall. The images of the incomplete, the grotesque, the lowly fill the pages of Chuang Tzu. Its spirit of nonassertion is unique among philosophies that are not expressly other-worldly.

The Nature of Government

The nature of the government envisaged by Taoism is not set forth in detail. The sage-ruler should not interfere with the rhythm of life of ordinary men, nor should he invite men to accomplish any utilitarian purposes except those that are involved as a matter of course in the simple business of living. Instead of attempting to define the responsibility of the individual toward society and state, the Taoist seeks to cultivate himself, with happiness and liberation as his objective. Chuang Tzu offers abundant examples of the sort of happiness the Taoists have in mind, and also expresses a good many things that are not that sort of happiness. The average man's standard of happiness—keeping up with the Joneses—is ipso facto wrong in the Taoist view because it is measured by a man-made criterion. (In Chuang Tzu's parable, the roe can cover vast distances in one flight sustained as he is by wind and cloud; the sparrow can only jump from tree to tree. But it is stupid of the roe to scorn the sparrow, and stupid of the sparrow to envy the roe. Each is capable of contentment and happiness within its own sphere.) The preliminary stage of happiness, indeed, comes precisely when one has learned to disregard not only man-made criteria but man-made rules of conduct as well, for the Taoist deplores the amount of human energy normally wasted on the attempt to conform.

The Greatest Good

The happiness achieved in the preliminary stage is, however, only "relative happiness." Absolute happiness is achieved only through liberation from self, that is, destroying the final impediment to the knowledge of reality, of Tao. Chuang Tzu and other Taoist mystics describe the process by which this knowledge is attained in terms of eliminating and forgetting. The following dialogue between Confucius (whom Chuang Tzu often caustic to talk like a Taoist) and his beloved disciple Yen Hui is significant in this connection:

Yen Hui said, "I have made some progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I have forgotten him and her," replied Yen Hui. "Very well, but that is not enough," said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said, "I have made progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I have forgotten self and music," replied Yen Hui. "Very well, but that is not enough," said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said, "I have made some progress." "What do you mean?" asked Confucius. "I sit in forgetfulness," replied Yen Hui.

To which Confucius retorted, "What do you mean by sitting in forgetfulness?" To which Yen Hui replied, "My limbs are powerless and intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the Infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forgetfulness." Then Confucius said, "If you have become one with the Infinite, you have no personal likes and dislikes. If you have become one with the Great Evolution (of the universe), you are one who merely follows its changes. If you really have achieved that, I should like to follow your steps."

In Taoism, then, the greatest good is intuitive knowledge of Tao. The techniques, e.g., breath-control, that it teaches as a means of achieving such knowledge, have been mentioned earlier. Sometimes, however, these techniques have led to strange by-products, and these, in turn, to the ultimate neglect of reality. The chief of these by-products is power, for there is reason to believe that the man who cultivates his chi by Taoist techniques can lengthen his life and prolong his capacity for sensual enjoyment—or even, some would say, develop the power of healing and performing miracles. Very early there appeared a sect of Taoists who cultivated these by-products—longevity, sexual potency, physical and

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Mencius, too, was developing a thought similar to that of the Confucian school. He held that the fundamental principle of all human action should be the "benevolent principle." This principle is to be found in all human beings, and it is the foundation of the moral and ethical behavior of all people. Mencius believed that this principle could be cultivated through education and practice, and that it was the key to a harmonious and just society.

Mencius's thought was later to be further developed by the Neo-Confucian school, which placed great emphasis on the cultivation of the "benevolent principle." This school of thought was to have a profound influence on the development of Chinese philosophy and society, and it remains an important part of the Chinese cultural heritage to this day.
king who abuses his power technically ceases to be king because he is no longer entrusted with the mandate of Heaven. The people have the right to depose him. "When a ruler treats his subjects like grass and dirt, then it is right of his subjects to treat him as a bandit and an enemy." These and similar sayings are proverbial in China. They were, for example, incorporated in Sun Yat-sen's "Sun Min Chiu I."

Mencius advocated a system of government based on virtue, education, and persuasion, which found little favor with the princes among whom Mencius moved. In the prince's view, "the" had not yet justified themselves in terms of practical concrete results (even at that time, apparently, the terms "the" and "i", had begun to sound a little hackneyed and remote). The princes preferred to follow the more "efficient" methods taught by the Legalists. In time it was possible to say that one tribal state, the Ch'in, which was untouched by the culture of Chou, had adopted Legalist teachings (those of Shang Yang and Li-she), became the strongest state in China, and conquered all the other states one by one. A word now about the Legalists.

LEGALISM

Han Fei Tzu

The architect of Legalism, Han Fei Tzu, was a disciple of the eminent Confucian philosopher, Han Fei Tzu, to whom, therefore, one must look for the beginnings of Legalist doctrine. Han Fei Tzu took as his point of departure Confucius' views on education and "the," and developed a theory sharply contrary to that of Mencius, which taught that human nature is originally evil, and can be rectified only through education. One should not interpret evil as "indulgent," as the Christians use the term. Han Fei Tzu's interpretation was that if human desires and instincts are given free rein, that is, not disciplined by education and "the," misbehavior will result. The good promptings in the human heart, as Mencius conceived them, Han Fei Tzu regards as inadequate to keep people in line, though he does not deny their existence. Mencius stresses nature while Han Fei Tzu stresses nurture, holding that everything that is good and valuable in the product of deliberate human effort. Han Fei Tzu, in other words, was what we today call a humanist.

Mencius and Han Fei Tzu are interested in one and the same question: What makes man human? Han Fei Tzu's theory of the evil in human nature is, as he develops it, merely a further argument in favor of the Confucian ideal, that is, in favor of the view that "the" and "i" should prevail in society. It is, however, only a brief step from his position to a position that regards humanity with contempt, and holds that the human passions are so unruly that they can be restrained only by law and force, from which it follows that the best form of government is that which succeeds in forcing people to obey the law. The Legalists took that brief step, and in doing so broke not only with Confucius but with Han Fei Tzu as well. Han Fei Tzu, like Confucius, dwells upon man's potentialities for receiving education. The Legalists are saying, in effect, that man is not worth the trouble it would take to try to educate him. Mencius flatly assumes that everybody can become "the" and "i". Han Fei Tzu is prepared to go along, with the proviso that first each individual must be thoroughly grounded in "the" and "i", and sincerity. Han Fei Tzu hence holds that to give every individual his chances to realize his true manhood, to practice "the" and "i", is impractical. Any way one looks at them, he insists, the masses simply do not love virtue and goodness, and the ruler must formulate his policies with that in mind. "In his rule of a State," says Han Fei Tzu, "the sage does not depend upon men doing good themselves, but brings it about that they can do no wrong. Within the frontiers of a State, there are no more than ten people who will do good of them-
selves; nevertheless, if one brings it about that the people can do no wrong, the entire State can be kept peaceful. He who rules a country makes use of the majority and neglects the few, and so does not concern himself with virtue but with law.

The Legalist position is evidently the first cousin to the Taoist teaching, that the people should live without knowledge and without desire. But the Taoist and the Legalist part company over the question of utility: the Taoist would have the people live in a state of simplicity and inactivity, the Legaest wishes to see to it that the people's immense manpower shall be so channelled as to further the ends of the State. This, of course, is very remote indeed from Confucian notions about government. The Confucian ruler is a sage relying upon his sagacity. The Legalist ruler is a despot for the law. His task is to develop techniques to ensure proper enforcement of law and fair distribution of rewards and punishments.

Han Fei Tse

Han Fei Tse represents a clear approximation to the type of thinking that underlies the modern totalitarian state. For once again, it is a brief step from the search for techniques to make people docile and pliant by law, to the search for techniques to manipulate people so as to further the power and wealth of the ruler. In the time of Han Fei Tse as today, the ambitious ruler and his advisors were tempted to conclude, with an eye to possible conflict with other states, that every individual must be drawn into the service of the State and become a unit in his machine.

In the China State, the ground for totalitarian rule was broken by Shang Yang. Han Fei Tse, it is interesting to note, died in prison in China. If so, another disciple of Han Fei Tse, was already pioneer of China when Han Fei Tse came there to seek office, and, recognising him as a possible rival for political preferment, hastened his death. It's subsequent career was brilliant. He stayed on as advisor to Shang Shih; first to the first Qin Emperor, who proceeded to conquer the other Chinese states and to establish his own dynasty. Han Fei Tse had written that "all speech and action which is not in accord with the laws and decrees is to be prohibited." For the security of the state. The first Qin Emperor took this teaching to heart, and once he was in a position to do so forbade free discussion and the teaching of philosophy.

The period from Confucius to Han Fei Tse is the most brilliant in Chinese philosophy. It was a period of vigorous intellectual inquiry, especially into the nature of man and government. In general, it was also a period during which kings and princes were eager to listen to philosophers. But the question they wanted answered was that put to Stenches by King Hui of Lu: How shall I profit by my kingdom? That being the case, the foregoing summaries should explain why Lao Tse and Chuang Tse were recluses, why Confucius and Mencius were never entrusted with important positions, and why the influence of Mo Tse, despite his innumerable followers during a brief period, died out completely.

The philosophy that won out in the end and that was put into practice was the philosophy with the lowest opinion of human nature, i.e., Han Fei Tse's. Among other things, he did much to explicate the Chinese myth of the golden age of the sage-kings. Kingdoms in the past were relatively peaceful because there was little cause for contention: there were few people but plenty of supplies, and therefore the people did not quarrel. But now, it is said, people do not consider a family of five children a large family, and each child having again five children, before the death of the grandchild, there may be twenty-five grandchildren. The result is that there are many people but few supplies, and one has to work hard for a meager return. So the people fall to quarrelling. Not the least of Han Fei Tse's departures from the earlier thinkers was his tendency to see the problem of government in...
terms of impersonal causes, history as a process of change, and new problems as solvable only by new measures. In these respects, Han Fei Tzu can be called a "modern." His essays were written in beautiful prose, and are executed in such fashion that the Western reader will find himself very much at home with them.

**Han Confucianism**

During the reign of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti Chinese philosophical inquiry suffered a setback from which it never fully recovered. Huang-ti's regime presents several interesting parallels with the present-day Communist regime. Chinese history has seen its share of tyrants, war lords, and bandits, who have killed many people and accomplished great destruction; but, except for the First Emperor of the Ch'in and the rulers of Red China, these influences have accomplished their mischief without imposing an ideology in the attempt to justify it.

The pre-Ch'in era had certainly been glorious; it produced Confucius, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, Mo Tzu, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, Han Fei Tzu, and several other interesting philosophers. The Han dynasty, which followed the Ch'in, cannot be spoken of as glorious, but it did much to undo the major reverses of the Ch'in period. Its scholars early made it their business to recapture and synthesize the past achievements of Chinese thought. The traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, and the Yin-yang School were recovered and reinterpreted, especially in identifying, editing, and interpreting the pre-Confucian and Confucian classics. Subsequent Chinese scholarship is deeply indebted to the Han scholars, despite the fact that the quantity and depth of their work often left much to be desired. The Ancient Text School and New Text School of Confucianism, for example, both descended frequently to niggling pedantry, and classics like Ch'un Ch'iu and I Ching, though they embodied little Confucian thought, were used as sources of doctrine on an elaborate scale. (The New Text School accused the Old Text School of forgery, and the academic war between them raged with fury even as recently as the Ch'ing dynasty.)

The root difficulty, however, was the currently accepted conception of orthodoxy: no philosopher dared to think for himself to the extent of venturing new propositions regarding the universe and the art of government. Confucianism was formally adopted as the State religion during the reign of the second Han Emperor, Wu Ti, and was soon made the basis of the famed Han examination system.

**The Emperor Wu Ti**

Wu Ti, a shrewd man, appears to have adopted Confucianism as a popular gesture to enhance his prestige, rather than out of genuine conviction. His own beliefs, like those of Shih Huang-ti, tended toward the ideas of the Taoist magicians who, instead of seeking liberation in Tao, studied alchemy, magic, and sorcery to further worldly ends (indeed, his own quest for immortality finally resulted in his death). In politics, he was inclined toward Legalism, which he did not, however, dare to espouse openly.

**Confucianism as the State Religion**

The day came when only Confucians were appointed to official posts, and when the State was subsidizing the scholars to perform the tasks of Confucianist scholarship and research. At least two of the Confucianists patronized by Wu Ti who deserve mention here were Kung-sun Hung and Tung Chung-shu. One of them, Kung-sun Hung, had Legalist leanings, and the other, Tung Chung-shu, had a deep affinity with the Yin-yang School, that is, with the school of thought that heaved closest to the line of the ancient Sinitic beliefs, and had, for this reason, deep roots among the Chinese people. The official Confu-
chianism, in part through their influence, soon became a melting pot for various systems of thought. It is often said that, because of the State subsidy and other forms of official support for Confucianism, thought was standardized along Confucianist lines under the Han. A more correct statement would be that as a result of the intervention Confucianism itself underwent a radical change under the Han dynasty. Most particularly, it acquired many of the characteristics of a religion; Confucius became in popular conception a king and the son of Heaven. Temples were erected in his honor. Once Confucianism became a form of orthodoxy, it was natural that a great many students whose real interests lay elsewhere, became professional Confucians too and interpreted Confucianism in the light of their basic Taoist, Legalist, or other philosophy.

Many elements of the ancient Shang religion, including its cosmology, were at the same time absorbed into Confucianist doctrine. As Hu Shih puts it, the kind of Confucianism developed under Emperor Wu was "a great synthetic religion into which were fused all the elements of popular superstition and state worship... thinly covered up under the disguise of Confucian and pre-Confucian classics in order to make them appear respectable and authoritative." And he adds that "this Confucianism was not at all what Confucius taught and Mencius philosophized about..."

It has been stated that Confucius himself was more or less an agnostic in religious matters, and that, while some of the pre-Confucian classics dealt with cosmology, a connection between those classics and Confucius' own thought is difficult to demonstrate. An agnostic philosophy is difficult to make over into a religion, since a religion must, as a matter of course, offer an explanation for every phenomenon in the universe. The Han Confucians, bent as they were on making Confucianism a religion, had first to make it over into a coherent and comprehensive system. To that end, they supplemented the Confucian teachings in ethics and politics with an elaborate system of cosmology that, ultimately, became their well-nigh exclusive concern. There is, indeed, a special term, Wei Shu, for the type of forgeries committed at this time to supplement the classics. (Wei literally means the warp of a fabric, and is used in opposition to ching, a word which is usually translated as classic, but literally means the warp of a fabric.) In these writings, Confucius became a superhuman being, the prophet of the Han dynasty.

Tung Chung-shu

The passion for giving Confucianism a cosmological twist was evident in the writings of Tung Chung-shu, the first systematizer of Confucian thought under Wu Ti. Tung's ethics were basically Confucian: his theory of the Three Kang and the Five Ch'ang was merely a codification of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. The Three Kang are the three basic human relationships: sovereign-subject, father-son, husband-wife. The Five Ch'ang are the five norms in conduct: jen, i, li, chih (wisdom), hein (good faith). The condition of good individual and social life is the correct application of these five virtues in the three basic human situations. In ethics as such, in other words, Tung is on safe Confucian grounds.

The Use of Analogy

It is in his embroidering of the theory just summarized that Tung Chung-shu reveals the typical bias of Han thought first of all by his use of analogy. He equates the Five Ch'ang with the five elements: wood, metal, fire, water, soil. He then associates each of the three basic relationships with the principles of Yin and Yang. Thus the sovereign is Yang, the subject is Yin; the father is Yang, the son is Yin; the husband is Yang, the wife is Yin. Finally, he equates the four "ways" of government (beneficence, rewards, punishments, and executions), with the four seasons. Determined to explain human affairs in terms drawn
from nature Tung puts great emphasis on natural calamities and abnormalities, which, in his view, necessarily reflect disorders and abnormalities in the human world. Like the medieval theologians in their reading of the Bible and nature, Tung Chung-shu bends everything to his central purpose. But it is easy to recognize, behind these naive views, the old Sinitic urge to keep human life in rhythmic relation with the broader harmonies of Heaven and Earth.

Most recent Confucian scholars, as good rationalists, tend to deprecate the superstitious elements in Han Confucianism, and point especially to analogies like those just considered as regrettable. This, however, is unhistorical. Until men learned, through scientific investigations, to interpret events in terms of cause and effect, thinking by the method of analogy was universal. The European Renaissance books on alchemy, medicine, education, and government all have exhaustive classifications based on what we today regard as false analogy. Some examples are the theory of the four Humours, and the Shakespearean notion that natural calamities reflect political disorder. In early Western theology the practice of straining for analogies is carried much further than in either the Han forgeries or the Han commentaries on the classics. Philosophy in the Han times may have lacked intellectual rigor, but it should not be dismissed, because the same lack would apply equally to highly respected ideas of the same period in other countries.

It should be remembered also, in this connection, that the philosophers of the pre-Ch'in era had addressed themselves to rulers, and that their thought had scarcely touched, much less undermined, the customs and beliefs of the general Chinese populace. In order to make Confucianism a religion that would conceivably be accepted by the populace, ritualistic and magical elements with more appeal had to be incorporated in it, and T'ien had to be invested with attributes of anger and pleasure; thus the emphasis in Han Confucianism, on ceremony in the performance of the rituals for worshipping Heaven and the basic elements (mountains, water, and grain). Nor, since Han Confucianism was state-supported, should one be surprised at its exalting loyalty to the king equally with that of filial piety toward parents as a stabilizer of social order. When a system of thought permeates the government and social life of a nation, it cannot hope to retain its pristine purity of doctrine. Sanctions and rules have to be enshrined in it to make it work.

The Examination System

The important new contribution of Han Confucianism was, of course, the examination system, which early became the accepted means by which the Han regime recruited officials from among its subjects. The virtues of the system are well known: it enabled China to perpetuate a homogeneous Confucian culture and, at the same time, to retain a fairly democratic social structure — so that aristocracy and caste have been virtually non-existent in China for a very long while. Its defects lay in the exclusively literary emphasis of the examinations, and the resultant discouragement of specialized knowledge. In the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, the system so degenerated that the composition of essays in a prescribed style became the unique test of merit. Cultivation of this style became the well-nigh exclusive preoccupation of the candidates, who consequently never had an opportunity to develop other than a superficial frame of mind about learning and scholarship. (The required readings in the Confucian canon did, however, give the Chinese officials a common attitude regarding individual responsibility to society and state, and so contributed over a long period to the stability of Chinese culture.

Wang Ch'ung and the Rationalist Tradition

The rationalist tradition within Confucianism was not without powerful spokesmen, even in Han times. One of them was Wang Ch'ung (27–? ca. 100 A.D.), whose work, Lun
Il-ho, or Critical Essays, is an important expression of the rationalist temper in Chinese thought. Wang Ch'ung says of his book: "Though the Book of Poetry numbered three hundred (poems), one phrase can cover them all, namely, 'With undravped thoughts' (a saying of Confucius in the Analects). And though the chapters of my Lun Il-ho may be numbered (only) in the tens, one phrase covers them all, namely, 'Hatred of fictions and falsehoods.' " In essay after essay Wang Ch'ung demolished the notion of the necessary interaction between Heaven and man, which the Confucianists had defended ever since Tung Chung-shu. "In things there is nothing more manifest," he says, "than having results, and in argument there is nothing more decisive than having evidence." He strikes at each and every one of the alleged proofs of the intervention of Heaven in mundane affairs. Lun Il-ho is available in English translation. To read it is not only to meet a powerful mind, but to acquire a fascinating picture of the superstitions and myths of the author's time.

TAOIST RELIGION

Transition from Philosophy

Wang Ch'ung anticipated in some respects the spirit of the neo-Taoists who began to dominate the intellectual scene upon the fall of the Han dynasty. Here a few words must be included about the submergence of Taoism and occultism under the Yin-yang School and the simultaneous rise of the Taoist religion, during the Han dynasty. Even more than Confucianism, Taoism came to be so weighted down with the superstitions and popular beliefs of the time as to lose its affinity with its founders (i.e., Lao Tsu and Chuang Tsu). Tao Chiao (Tao religion) practically lost its connection with Tao Chia (Taoist philosophy), as the Taoist teaching was perverted to make room for the occult and magic arts. The mystical sayings of Lao Tsu lent themselves, in considerable degree, to the kind of misinterpretation they now suffered. The Tao T'ieh Ching, for instance, reads:

He who contains within himself richness of Tao's virtue
Is like a babe.
Poisonous insects do not sting him,
Fierce beasts do not assail him.
Birds of prey do not strike him
Although his bones be weak and his sinews tender
Yet his grip is strong.

The purpose of the hyperbole here is to convey the notion of the invulnerability and innocence of the infant, a notion not without parallels in Western literature. But it was now misconstrued as imputing miraculous powers to the adept Taoist and, in conjunction with similar passages, was used by the later Taoists to justify their pursuit of magic.

Popular Taoism was both optimistic and this-worldly, and thus stood in sharp contrast to the actual teachings of Lao Tsu and Chuang Tsu. Its magic and occultism were always cultivated as means of securing a happy life free from harm on this earth, and not for other-worldly purposes; the objective was to master the secrets of nature and thus be able to mollify the powers of death, disease, and accident. In the Han period, the adept Taoists became, accordingly, dabblers in alchemy, medicine, feng-shui, sorcery, and charms, all of which represent the quest for magical formulae capable of protecting and enriching life -- an elixir for immortality, or a way of producing gold by heating a mixture of sulfur and a mercury compound. (Chinese alchemy, however, differed from European in that its main purpose was not the creation of material wealth but the preparation of a gold elixir that would prolong life or confer immortality. The theory of the elixir was that gold is indestructible, and that by eating it one would incorporate indestructibility into one's body.)
The art of alchemy, already well known in China as early as the second century B.C., went on intermittently throughout the Han dynasty, now with and now without imperial patronage. After the fall of the Han, Ko Häng wrote a treatise on alchemy, in which he furnishes detailed instructions for the preparation of the drugs mentioned. The results to be expected from taking these drugs are as follows: "White hair will become black; lost teeth will grow again; the strength of the body will be renewed. He who takes it will never grow old, an old man will become a youth once more, he will live forever and not die."

By the end of the Han dynasty, Taoism possessed a venerable philosophy, a corpus of scientific truth, and a body of professionals practicing a variety of arts and sciences; following the example of Buddhism, it also had acquired a mythology and a pantheon of gods. The time was ripe for Taoism to become a religion, as it finally did under the leadership of Chang Ling, later known as Chang Tao-ling, in the second century A.D. Chang Ling studied alchemy and sought the drug of immortality; modern research also establishes his indebtedness to Persian Zoroastrianism, then known as Mazdazism. He could, allegedly, cure diseases by having his patients confess their sins and pray to the three divine powers, Heaven, Earth, and Water. The religion he founded—which equated the monotheistic god of Mazdazism with Tao—quickly attracted a large following. Because converts were expected to pay five t'ao (approximately nine quarts) of grain, it was at first called the Religion of the Five Tao of Grain. Tradition says that Chang Ling, the first T'ien-shih (Heaven's Apostle) of the Taoist religion, ascended to Heaven upon a dragon.

Spread of the Movement

In the time of Chang Ling's grandson, Chang Lu, the Taoist religion had spread to many parts of China, the social unrest preceding the fall of the Han providing a congenial context for the spread of a religion able to appeal to the masses. In the course of time, it became the rallying-point for a popular revolt led by Chang Chiao, a kinman of the Chang clan known as the Rebellion of the Yellow Turbans. The latter anticipated, in some respects, the T'ao-p'ing Rebellion of the Ch'ing dynasty under Heng Hsiu-ch'üan The Yellow Turbans were crushed, but the Taoist movement itself continued to spread until, in 415, K'ou Ch'ien-t'ai amalgamated the Religion of the Five Tao of Grain with certain native Taoist traditions, and took the title of T'ien-shih. Tao Chiao was therefor the firmly established religion, equal to Confucianism and Buddhism.

The Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove

After the downfall of the Han, there was a considerable resurgence of Taoism, entirely unrelated to the spread of Taoist religion, in intellectual circles. The latter reigns of the Eastern Han dynasty, when the actual powers of government were in the hands of eunuchs and of the ruling house, disillusioned many intellectuals, and some of them, in consequence, became curious about the teachings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. As a result, during the Wei and Chin dynasties there were numerous Taoist intellectuals who were independent critics of the existing governments and many who became recluse in the woods in quest of a life of freedom. Representative of such men were, for example, the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, most of whom, e.g., Yuan Chih, Ch'ü Ch'ung, Lü Lin, and Ch'ang Shou, left behind them some brilliant poetry and prose. Their attitude toward life would today be called Existentialism, though they would have shrunk from asserting the final absurdity of the universe. They despised social conventions and standards of decency, and interpreted Tao in terms of impulse and spontaneity; one reveals one's nature, they held, in impulse and not in blind compliance with established usage. Upon learning of the death of his mother, one Taoist would pluck a harp and sing; another would get drunk for a few days,
and then weep aloud. They drank, took Taoist drugs, and engaged in conversation. Their mode of conversation was called "pure talk," a sad much indulged in at those times. Many examples of "pure talk" were gathered in the contemporary book Shih-chiao Hsin Yu (Contemporary Records of New Discourses).

The fact that these undoubtedly brilliant men did not take positions of responsibility in the government reflected certain basic characteristics of Taoism. Taoism lacks the Confucian trust in the capacity of man to achieve peace and order through discipline. Its ideal of society is predicated upon a complete denial of civilization, for all that one must admire its negative caution against human assertiveness. Meanwhile, the Taoist who is not in the position of a sage-king can do little except effect his own liberation, as did these men. Because of their love of nature and their spontaneity, however, they have left an indelible impress on subsequent Chinese art and poetry. Some of them attempted intellectual formulations of Taoism: Wang Mi left behind him the standard commentary on the Tao T'ı Ching; and Shang Shou left an unfinished commentary on Chuang Tzu, which was completed by Ku Hsiang, and is one of the great achievements of Taoist philosophy. What in Chuang Tzu was aphorism and parable is translated here into philosophical terms with immeasurable gains in coherence and clarity.

Since the period of Wei and Chin, Taoism has produced few distinguished thinkers, although many painters and poets have caught the Taoist spirit, which gives their work a distinctive flavor. This is what one should expect. Philosophical Taoism is first and foremost an attitude toward life, and does not lend itself to precise intellectual formulation.

The Taoist religion became very popular; under the T'ang dynasty it enjoyed patronage by the Emperors. (The T'ang Emperors had the family name Li, and were persuaded to believe that they were descended from Lao Tzu or Li Erh.) However, after the Sung the Taoist religion suffered a gradual decline.

**Ontology**

The Taoist religion, properly speaking, an "imitation" religion, which borrowed heavily from Buddhist and Sinic beliefs and rituals. It took over, for example, the Sinic belief in ghosts and spirits. Upon the model of Buddhism, it erected a pantheon of gods. (Lao Tzu, as the founder of Taoism, was made the Supreme Deity, while the god in charge of mundane affairs was the Jade Emperor. Sometimes the Jade Emperor, Lao Tzu, and another god were conceived as a trinity.)

To learn something of the life of Taoist imagination in creating gods and superhuman beings, one has only to read the popular literature in China. In the novel Ping Shih P'u, for example, one finds a fantastic account of a war between the true and the heretic Taoist gods and heroes, with the downfall of the Shang dynasty as its point of departure. The corruption and cruelty of Chieh was due to the influence of his favorite mistress, a malignant fox spirit. The heretical Taoist gods supported the corrupt regime; Lao Tzu, the Jade Emperor, and their associates sided with King Wen of Chou. In reading this literature today, one may easily get the impression that the spirits it refers to were not taken very seriously, or conceived of as actually existing. The historical evidence, however, points in the other direction. Even among Chinese literates, belief in spirits and ghosts has now, undoubtedly, ceased to be strong, but that is the result of a great change that has operated over the last forty years. If, for example, one turns to a Christian missionary's account of religious life during the Ch'ing dynasty, he sees at once that evil spirits and ghosts were taken very seriously and had to be placated and appeased from moment to moment. In case of an epidemic, famine, or flood, religious ceremonies and parades, the purpose of which was to pacify the evil spirits, were held as a matter of course. The principles of Yin and
Yang, which originally referred to merely complementary forces in nature, had come to be synonymous with the principles of evil and good. Xiu, or the ghosts, were Yin forces. Women and illiterates were thought of as especially subject to Yin influence, while the learned scholar, particularly one holding high rank in government, was safe from it because what predominated in him was Yang. Charms and spells, sometimes the Confucian classics themselves, were used to ward off the evil spirits. Confucianism as well as Buddhist and Taoist elements were apparent in the popular animistic religion. But the Taoist religion was undoubtedly more responsible for the perpetuation of animistic notions than the other two. For example, the typical activities of Taoist priests concerned not devotion to or living in the way of Tao, but calling upon members of the divine hierarchy to defeat the machinations of devils. This naturally encouraged people to blame evils of all sorts—pain, disease, plague, fire, flood, and drought—on the actions of evil spirits. On the positive side, the Taoist religion continued to stress the cultivation of health, longevity, and sexual virility, and much of the folklore of the day was based on the notion that anything alive, a fox or even a tree, could through proper cultivation acquire spiritual powers (stories of animals assuming human form were, for example, very common); the corollary of this notion was that any man could through cultivation become a Kaiten (genius). A special branch of literature, still popular today, depicts the powers of Taoist recluse and priests over mundane affairs, e.g., their knowledge of drugs that increase sexual potency and cure venereal disease. (Advertisements for quack medicines still occupy a great deal of space in the Chinese-language newspapers published in the United States.)

Good and Evil

The Taoist religion had, like all popular religions, a mixture of positive moral principle over and above the mere eschewing of evil and the cultivation of health and power. Its central doctrine of moral principle, with which it sanctioned virtuous living, is the doctrine of Indifference, i.e. that good and evil deeds are duly repaid. This is a principle that is widespread in Chinese culture, though probably it was reinforced by Buddhism. In any case, it has been for centuries one of the most firmly and widely held of Chinese beliefs. Taoism very early took it over and developed (or some would say distorted) the Buddhist idea of Karma, into the materialist dogma of Pao Ying (retribution). This dogma holds that punishment may fall on the person who does a wicked deed either in this world or in the next, or it may fall upon his descendants. Similarly, the performance of good deeds will repay the individual in this or the other life, and will bless his descendants. The rewards and punishments are not necessarily forthcoming within the mortal life of an individual. The less educated Chinese tend to hold this dogma with unquestioning faith.

This raises the question of how the Taoist religion defines "good" and "wicked." Taoist philosophy held originally that all moral values are relative; Taoist religion having long ago ceased to claim any genuine kinship with Taoist philosophy, simply took over the commonly accepted standards of good and bad conduct and made them its own. It holds, with Buddhism, that wanton destruction of human and animal life is evil. Others of its standards it has borrowed wholesale from Confucianism. The most popular classic of a Taoist religion is perhaps Tai-shang Kuan-yin P'ien, commonly translated as The Book of Rewards and Punishments, in which the virtues of filial piety and charity are extolled and the punishments for impiety and adultery on the part of women are rigorously set forth. (In twentieth century China, when the spirit of Confucianism had been rigidly codified, chastity was erected into a cardinal virtue for women, though no such idea was emphasized by Confucius. Incidentally, the discredit into which Confucianism has fallen is partly due to the discriminatory treatment of women in Chinese society.)
Historic Perspective

In short, Taoism maintained its vitality by assimilating animistic beliefs on the one hand and current ethical standards on the other. It fed the popular appetite for gods and spirits, and, at the same time, offered people a perversion of Buddhism and Confucianism. Taoist religion is undoubtedly, from some points of view, a "low-grade" religion; but one must not overlook the numerous ways in which it satisfied the material and spiritual needs of the Chinese people. When Western science and medicine were introduced into China they brought with them a new kind of magic, far more potent than Taoist spells and charms. The old animistic view of the world is, in consequence, dying out among the Chinese, and the Taoist religion is dying out with it.

Buddhism

The rise of the Taoist religion and the resurgence of Taoist philosophy in the period of Wei and Chin had as its background the introduction into China of Buddhism. According to tradition, the Emperor Ming (A.D. 55-75) of the Eastern Han dynasty dreamed a dream of a new god in the West, and sent messengers to the West to seek the new religion. When they returned in A.D. 67, they brought back with them a Buddhist native of Central India by the name of Kaushapaminda, and the literature of Buddhism. The story is apocryphal, and, in any case, wrong about the date, since China's first contact with Buddhism must have occurred well before 67. In any case, the translation of the Buddhist sutras into Chinese was under way very soon after the first contact, and Indian Buddhists did indeed come to China to help Chinese scholars understand and live the new faith.

Buddhism's success in China is not easy to explain, since it was uncongenial to both traditional Chinese thought and traditional Chinese sensibility. It possesses, moreover, a comprehensive metaphysical structure, and is thus hard to communicate to the uninstructed. Readers of Western philosophy find the thought structure behind Confucianism and Taoism fairly simple; not so the various systems of Buddhist metaphysics.

The "Great Vehicle": Mahayana Buddhism

The survey of Buddhism in China can begin by setting forth, in simple, untechnical terms, the gist of Mahayana Buddhism, the so-called "great vehicle" Buddhist branch that spread over China, Korea, and Japan.

By comparison with Christianity, Buddhism is radical in outlook, which is to say that it carries the fundamental Christian tenchings about charity on out to their extreme logical implications: one must do hurt to no sentient being, human, animal, or insect. God, according to Christian teaching, created man; man fell, and since his fall he requires the intercession of Christ in order to be saved. But Heaven and Earth will one day pass away. God will annihilate His own work and sit in final judgment, according justice to the quick and the dead. It is all very definite, and projected in time, with a beginning and an end. Buddhism, by contrast, puts little emphasis on God the Creator: its world is, so to speak, almost without a beginning and without an end, and its time and space are conceived, by the Indians especially, in terms of eternity. The Christian religion tends to be anthropocentric, and posits only one Incarnation of God on earth; in the Buddhist scheme there is a Gautama Buddha, the Savior, but millions of Buddhas are possible, not merely theoretically but in the actual unfolding of history, each with Buddha's enlightenment and his love for and transcendency of the world of suffering. Though the Christian idea of charity is all-embracing, it primarily centers upon the world of man, as far as daily behavior is concerned. Exploitation of nature and other sentient beings to accommodate man's needs is taken as a matter of course, and is certainly not looked upon as evil; God gave Adam per-
mition to exploit nature in the satisfaction of his needs. In Buddhism man must, to the best of his ability, refrain from harming not only other men but other sentient beings as well. The ideal for man is the total cessation of biological activity and complete absorption in spiritual development: the development of Buddhahood. For the Buddhist, all biological activity put forth in the struggle for existence is evil. In order to perpetuate the species, man and insect alike are, no doubt, biologically compelled to eat, to kill, and to procreate. But the Buddhist views the whole process of procreation and destruction as an endless cyclical movement in time and space, evil and illusory from the standpoint of ultimate reality; the first task man must perform in order to be saved is to see through, and detach himself from, this illusory world. Given his higher organic endowment and development, man is not, like other sentient beings, bound to the endless round of birth, population, and death. He is capable of forming other modes of attachment, and the Buddhist is called upon to emancipate himself from all biological and emotional commitments: anger, sorrow, lust, craving of any kind. The second task is to be pitiful toward all sentient beings who are still blindly whirling around the wheel of Birth and Death. Buddhist Compassion is, therefore, more comprehensive than Christian Charity: it feels sorry for the very law and mechanism of existence.

How then is the Buddhist to act and what is he to do? It is evidently impossible for a man to refrain from all biological activity and still remain alive, and most Buddhists do compromise: for most the way becomes a matter of taking only vegetarian food, and dedicating one's self to one's own enlightenment and to the enlightenment of others; for others, it becomes a matter of leading a celibate life. By enlightenment is meant liberation through the knowledge that the world of time and craving is an illusion, and that only as a man detaches himself from the world of time and craving can he realize his Buddhahood and come in contact with reality.

The Hinayana Buddhism (the "small vehicle") originally taught the doctrine of individual salvation alone. Mahayana Buddhism differs from it in making it incumbent upon any individual who wants to realize his Buddhahood to save other beings as well.

Definitions of Terms

A few definitions of Buddhist terms are in order here. The total inheritance of man on the unenlightened biological and human level is Karma: whatever an individual thinks, speaks, and does, is part of his Karma. Buddhism assumes the transmigration of souls from one form of life to another, so that Karma does not terminate with the dissolution of the body. Rather, man inherits the Karma of his past lives: it conditions his present life, and the merits or demerits of his present life will further condition the welfare of his soul in future existence. The idea of Karma is sometimes given a more worldly interpretation, so that it smacks of the notion of retribution; if a man is living a happy life it is on account of the accumulated merit of his past lives. In the strict Buddhist scheme, however, good and bad, fortune and misfortune, are irrelevant: the man who is not enlightened is still on the Samsara, the Wheel of Birth and Death, and is not free from the burden of Karma. An individual soul may go through transmigration after transmigration, accumulating his Karma, and still remain on the rack of Samsara.

The only hope of escape from Karma lies in replacing Ignorance, Avidya, with Enlightenment, which in Sanskrit is called Bodhi. But every man, according to Buddhist teaching, has in him a spark of Bodhi, so that the Buddhist religion is really less pessimistic than it is likely to seem at first glance.

The person who attains the state of Bodhi is called Buddha. Buddha lives in a state of Nirvana, which is to say that he has completely extinguished his individuality and
immersed his mind in Reality, or God. Historically, the Buddha was Gautama Siddhartha, who founded Buddhism in the sixth century B.C. (For an account of his life, the poem The Light of Asia, by the Victorian poet Sir Edwin Arnold, is recommended.) Gautama, however, does not occupy the central position in Chinese Buddhism, for the principal object of contemplation and prayer in China is Amitabha, Buddha of the Western Paradise.

Those who strive after Bodhi but have not yet attained Nirvana are called Bodhisattvas. The most popular Bodhisattva in China is Guan-yin, the Goddess of Mercy (whose position is similar to that of the Virgin Mary in the Catholic Church); Wen-shu, the Lord of Wisdom; and Ti-tsang, who saves suffering spirits from hell. It is generally held that these Bodhisattvas deliberately forego the bliss of Nirvana and stay in the Cycle of Transmigration in order to save the sentient beings in this world. On a still lower stage toward Enlightenment are the Lokas.

Despite the fact that Buddhism has a vast pantheon of superhuman beings that gives it the appearance of a polytheistic religion, Buddhist teaching actually assigns to the Bodhisattvas a position comparable to that of the angels in Christianity, and to the Buddhas a position comparable to that of Christ; they are gods only by metaphorical extension or as presented in popular picture or popular fiction. On the other hand, Buddhism has no central figure comparable to the Christians' God, for the ultimate reality in Buddhism is impersonal.

If everybody were to embrace Buddhism and fully practice its teachings, mankind would become extinct within a very few decades. To people brought up on the ethical and political wisdom of Confucius -- e.g., the duty to perpetuate the family, to practice filial piety -- the ideals of Buddhism (the sanctity of animal life, transmigration, the law of Karma, the value of asceticism) must have seemed very strange indeed. Nevertheless, Buddhism grew steadily in power and popularity and competed successfully with Confucianism soon after its introduction, from which one concludes that it must have appealed to deep spiritual needs of the Chinese people. In some areas it spread with astonishing rapidity: the nihilistic intellectual atmosphere of the post-Han period, for example, seems to have been highly congenial to its expansion; under the southern dynasties, also, the Chinese people seem to have found in Buddhism an escape from the stresses and strains of constant warfare and a source of spiritual consolation. Moreover, the barbaric tribes that entered North China at that time, perhaps because they had not been formed in a Confucian environment, eagerly took to Buddhism.

Impact on China

The impact of Buddhism upon China from the Han to the T'ang dynasty can conveniently be divided under three headings: cultural, social, and political. Culturally, this period was one of intensified exchange and mutual exploration between China and India. Eminent Buddhist monks came from India to translate the sutras and teach the Chinese: two of the most notable of these were the great translator Kumārajīva, who was in China from 401 to 413; and Bodhisattva, the seventy-eightth patriarch after Buddha in India and the first on Chinese soil, who came to China around the year 527 (during the reign of Tsiang Wu Ti). Pilgrims also went from China to India, e.g., Fa Hsien (603 to 641), Hsian Tseng (602 to 654), and I-ching (635 to 713), all of whom made the perilous journey over deserts and mountains to visit sanctuaries, to study, and to bring back sacred books in Sanskrit which they and other monks, Indian and Chinese, translated into Chinese.

The introduction of Buddhism had important results from a social point of view. Despite steady opposition from the Confucianists, Buddhism won over a large section of the Chinese population, many of whom adopted a way of life hitherto unknown in China.
They forsook the world and became monks and nuns. Like an epidemic, the Buddhist army marched in by mundane pursuits struck king and peasant alike. The pious Liang Wu Ti abdicated his throne to devote himself to religion, and by doing so brought about the downfall of his capital at Nanjing and his dynasty. Large numbers of Buddhist temples and pagoda arose, and gave a new impetus to such arts as architecture and sculpture. Most converts, of course, did not comprehend Buddhism in its philosophical aspect; they were attuned to it as a scheme of salvation and renunciation, to which the popular imagination reacted by visualizing Heaven and Hell in the most graphic terms conceivable, so that the latter's horrors became a vivid reality to most people. This also tended to encourage asceticism and, along with it, personal sacrifice and disfigurement, e.g. the burning of a finger or a limb. Every monk and nun, before being confirmed, had to have marks branded on his or her shaved head.

Buddhism naturally aroused opposition among those who wished to preserve Chinese culture and the integrity of the Chinese nation. Among the Confucianists, Fan Yü, the great Tang prose writer and poet, was an especially ardent opponent. He argued the merit of the new movement on two levels, the philosophical and the sociological. Philosophically, he condemned Buddhism because of its heterodoxy vis-a-vis Confucianism, from which standpoint it was, he alleged, worse even than the philosophies of Yang Chu and Mo T'ieh because of the perversity of its attitude toward life. On the sociological level, he insisted that the state can thrive only on the well-being of society as a whole, the family, and the individual, and that if a large number of people were to renounce their duties toward society and the family, as Buddhism bids them to do, the nation would have neither the resources nor the manpower to defend itself against foreign aggression and, ultimately, foreign conquest. In short, a government can survive only if its people are committed to a "this-worldly" philosophy.

Opposition

The Taoists, by contrast with the Confucianists, did not oppose Buddhism on the level of argument and polemic. But they were keenly aware of the rivalry of Buddhism, and sought constantly to undermine its influence and power.

Anyone acquainted with seventeenth century European history will necessarily find himself asking why the Confucianists did not take up arms against the Buddhists, as the Roundheads fought against the Royalists — why, in other words, Chinese history at this juncture does not turn into a chronicle of religious wars. One reason is that the religious wars in Europe were, on one side, economic struggles between different nations or different social strata within a nation. In England, for example, the triumph of Puritanism was also the triumph of middleclass business men over the aristocratic gentry. But in China the lines between religious groups never coincided to any great extent with those between economic interests; Buddhist monks and Confucian officials differed sharply about religion and philosophy, but did so as men drawn from the same class of people.

The fact that there were no religious wars in China does not mean that all was peace between the competing religions, for this would ignore the series of persecutions suffered by Buddhism, i.e. the series of situations in which a reigning king or Emperor, whether out of deep conviction or out of whim, either persecuted or patronized the Buddhist religion. The persecutors, as one might expect, were usually abetted by Confucian or Taoist counsellors. The Buddhist monks speak to this day of the four great persecutions under the reigns of "three Wu and one Taung": T'ai-wu Ti of the Wei dynasty in 410, Wu Ti of the Northern Chou dynasty in 574, Wu Taung of the T'ang dynasty in 845, and Shih Taung of the Liao dynasty in 955, each of whom carried out a large-scale persecution of Buddhist believers.
The Buddhist suppression campaign assumed its most terrible proportions under T'ang Wu Tsang, when 4,600 large monasteries and more than 40,000 small ones were destroyed, upwards of 260,000 monks and nuns forced to return to lay life, and millions of acres of monastic land property confiscated. The effect of this repression was to break the back of Buddhist fanaticism but not of the Buddhist religion, which had already become a part of the national heritage and continued, without interruption, to play an important ethical and aesthetic role in Chinese life. In any case, a free market in ideas cannot possibly be said to have determined the result of the competition between Confucianism and Buddhism, because at the crucial moment the former used force and legal coercion. As of 1949, when the Communists took over in China, the male population tended to be Confucianist in outlook, while the female population tended to seek sustenance and consolation in Buddhism, which permitted their emotional nature, repressed under the strict Confucian code of family life, to express itself in prayer, pilgrimage, and religious observance. Thus the stability of Chinese family and social life was maintained in part through a family-to-family blending of the practical outlook of Confucianism with the retiring spiritual outlook of Buddhism.

Brief Survey of Historical Growth

It would be beyond the scope of this study to trace the development of Buddhist philosophical thought in China in any great detail, for it has passed through many stages. During the first two centuries after Buddhism was introduced into China, the interest of its philosophers centered around a comparative study of the basic concepts of Taoism and Buddhism. The Buddhist concept Sunyata, which was rendered into Chinese as "K'ung" (emptiness, nothingness) early came to be equated with the Taoist idea of Wu. The great labor of translation carried out by Kumarnjiva and his disciples made more Buddhist texts available in Chinese, one of them being the Suddharmapundarika Sutra, known in Chinese as the Lotus Sutra, upon which the Chinese Buddhist scholar Hui-ssô concentrated his effort. In the sixth century, the monk Chih-k'ai (522-597) made this Sutra the basis of a new school known as the T'ien T'ai School (T'ien T'ai was the name of the mountain atop which Chih-k'ai lived and taught). The metaphysical burden of the Lotus Sutra is to be found in the doctrine that phenomena themselves are real although as they are perceived by the mind they are unreal. To put it more precisely, phenomena are real in the sense that reality manifests itself in them. The Buddhist terminology is more complicated than that, but we have here a good illustration of the extent to which Buddhist philosophy concentrated on metaphysics and epistemology, two branches of philosophy that hitherto had received little attention from Chinese philosophers. The T'ien T'ai School was popular up to the T'ang dynasty, but after that went into decline.

In the T'ang dynasty, the famous pilgrim, Hsien Taeng, was the primary agent in the formation of another school of Buddhism. He revised and translated no less than seventy-five Buddhist works, the most notable of which was the Cheng Wei-shih Lun, upon which the new movement, the Wei-shih or Only-Consciousness School, was to be based. It teaches that all objects in the Universe are merely the manifestations of consciousness, a view very close to what the West calls Subjective Idealism. The school waned in popularity soon after the ninth century.

Another highly metaphysical Buddhist philosophical tendency was that of the Hua-yen School, which claimed to preach the higher and more complete doctrine of Buddha. Its founders were Tu Fa-shun (557-610) and Fa-tseng, and its basic text the Buddhavatamsaka maha Vaipulya Sutra, known in China as the Huayen Sutra.
These schools, dealing with the interrelations between appearance and reality, attracted only scholars; their doctrines could not possibly have been communicated to the masses. All the schools mentioned waned after the eighth or ninth century because they failed to provide ritual and religious formulae to accommodate the simpler faith of the Buddhist layman, and because the Chinese mind, not being strong in abstract speculation, soon wearyes of it. The most popular and enduring form of Buddhism in China has, therefore, been the Pure Land School, which because of the simplicity of its doctrine and its emphasis on salvation, gives even the illiterate something to lean on. The most typically Chinese form of Buddhism among intellectuals, similarly, has been Ch'ianism, which reduces the apprehension of reality to a simple technique of contemplation. (Other non speculative schools worth mentioning are the Lü School, which believes in salvation through actions, and the Mi or Esoteric School, which puts great emphasis on magical formulae or on what is known as Ching Yen, i.e., true words. The latter survives now in Tibet as Lamain.)

The Pure Land School

The Pure Land School, more than any other school, has emphasized salvation through faith. It has had a long history. One of the first Buddhist texts to be translated into Chinese was the Mahayana Sūtra, by the great expounder of Mahayana Buddhism, Asanga. The Chinese title is Ch'i Hsia Lun, The Awakening of Faith. This book, which taught that through faith in Amitabha Buddha one could obtain salvation, greatly influenced the formation of the "Pure Land" School. The real founder of the school was Hui-yuan (333–110), a former Taoist philosopher who had abandoned Taoism because Buddhism seemed to him to penetrate more deeply into the nature of Tao. The basic texts of the school were three: the larger Sukhavati Vyuha Sutra (Wu-liang-shou Ching); the smaller Sukhavati Vyuha Sutra (O-mi-to ching); and the Anulita Vurdhyanu Sutra (Kuan-wu-liang-chou Ching). In the larger Sukhavati Vyuha Sutra we learn that Amitabha, before attaining Buddhahood, took 48 vows, one of which stipulated that he would not become a Buddha unless it was possible for all sentient beings except those who had committed a heinous sin to be reborn into his Buddhahood immediately after death. However, these sentient beings had to meet two conditions: they had to desire to be thus reborn, and they had to have turned to him in faith by reciting his Buddha name as many as ten times before death. Amitabha's Buddhahood is the Pure Land, or the Western Paradise, not identical with Nirvana because one still has to strive towards Buddhahood in the Pure Land, although, since here there is neither desire nor distraction, one's attainment of Buddhahood is assured.

The Pure Land School holds out to every believing man or woman the assurance of ultimate salvation. In this regard, it is similar to Christianity; it cuts Buddhism loose from the deep-seated pessimism of the doctrine of Karma, which imbues most sentient beings to one earthly existence after another without hope of salvation. It substitutes for salvation through enlightenment an easier, more certain salvation through faith in Amitabha. The words that are most constantly on the lips of Chinese Buddhists are "Nan-mo O-mi-t'o-fu," which mean "turning in faith to Amitabha." Most Chinese women, even illiterate ones, can recite a few short sutras from memory, e.g., the Diamond Sutra or the Wisdom Sutra; but as they count their beads in their devotions they merely mumble the words "Nan-mo O-mi-t'o-fu." Pure Land Buddhism further attenuates the rigor of other Buddhist doctrines by providing for worship of Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, who is always ready to listen to the supplications of the faithful. She is the special favorite of Chinese women who turn to her for favors of all kinds. They ask her, for example, to relieve their pains during childbirth, or, even after long years of unfruitful marriage, to grant them a son.
The Pure Land School eliminates the necessity for salvation through enlightenment just as the Taoist religion deemphasizes enlightenment through Tao. Given a vast and illiterate population, religion must stoop if it is to succeed. The Buddhist believer of the Pure Land School reads his prayers and sutras, goes on pilgrimages, gives offerings to the poor, contributes to the temples, and limits himself to a vegetarian diet during stipulated periods each year. He observes these acts of Buddhist teaching that reinforce the pietistic tendency in Chinese character; e.g., he holds the professions of killing (soldiery, butchery) in the lowest esteem. He is amenable to certain emotions (the graphically imagined Hell mentioned above) that check any impulse he has to evil. His Buddhism is linked up with the practice of ancestor worship, which gives him a further incentive to do good and so ensure the welfare of his family. If his motives for doing good are not always unselfish, his Buddhism does teach him to feel compassion for all sentient beings and to resist sensual temptations, and reinforces these lessons with an admixture of the Taoist love of nature and the Confucian ethical ideals, all of which give a certain sanity to his outlook on life.

Ch'anism

Ch'anism, the distinctively Chinese form of philosophical Buddhism, reduces the problem of enlightenment to a simple technique. Its success represents a triumph of the practical Chinese mind over the love for logical and metaphysical minutiae that is characteristic of the Indian mind. Enlightenment, in the Buddhist sense, is first and foremost a matter of "knowing" reality. The Chinese mind soon recognized that if the purpose is to achieve the mystical experience of reality, then philosophical studies that are primarily aids to understanding are superfluous. Ch'anist Buddhism, in accordance with this recognition, focuses attention on meditation, to the exclusion of metaphysics, deeds, and worship.

Its history goes back to a moment very early in the history of Buddhism when certain Chinese monks who had once been Taoists, Seng-chao and Tao-chên in particular, saw the affinity between the Chinese conception of Tao and the Indian concept of reality. They knew that the perception of reality is radically different from ordinary sensory perceptions—that the external senses register the phenomenal world, and cannot so perceive the reality that is transcendent of, though immanent in, the phenomenal world. One must, they decided, leap over a chasm in order to perceive that reality, and for the man who has not made the leap, good works and prayers are equally of no avail. What counts, they came to hold, is the mystical experience, the sudden Enlightenment. Ch'anism is essentially a school of mystics.

The traditional founder of Ch'anism was Bodhidharma, the great Patriarch. In the seventh century the philosophy split into two schools: the Northern, under Shen-shui (d. 701), and the more popular Southern school, under Hu-nêng (638 to 713). In the course of the next two centuries two thinkers, Mu Tsu (d. 738) and I Hsüan (d. 860), greatly enhanced its prestige among Chinese intellectuals.

Ch'anism was primarily a monastic discipline intended for a very few psychologically and temperamentally equipped individuals in each generation, and unlikely to appeal to any who might find satisfaction in good works, prayer, and ritual. Its following was always drawn, for the most part, from among Chinese intellectuals. The methods of Ch'anist meditation were highly arbitrary and subjective. The final reality it held, cannot be verbally rendered, and there was, in consequence, little Ch'anist literature to which the uninitiated might turn for help. Its tradition was always maintained, rather, through personal contact between master and disciple. Part of its purpose was to encourage spontaneity and suspension from the self. If one deliberately wills to reach Buddhahood, it contended, the very act will prove an impediment to understanding; and it ridiculed and discouraged
understanding through intellect as well. If a novice asked his master what reality is, the latter not infrequently gave him a box on the ear, or shouted deviously at him, or gave him some trivial, completely irrelevant answer — on the theory this would induce in him an awareness of the futility of the rationalist approach. Unless and until he intuitively grasped the meaning of reality, he was likely to remain on the brink of despair. A meditative technique called yoga was Ch'anism's chief means to Sudden Enlightenment. The yogi often sat for hours at a stretch, year in and year out, contemplating his nose or his navel; by this process, according to Ch'anism, he might reach the state of detachment that is necessary for salvation. Ch'anism was highly popular from the eighth to eleventh century, and even today meditation is an important exercise in the daily life of the Chinese monks.

The place of Ch'anism in Buddhism was like that of monastic asceticism in any religion: it set an example of the contemplative life for men and women engaged in mundane affairs. Unlike the Christian monastic orders, it was entirely devoid of charitable interests, and made no attempt at integration with everyday practical life through the contemplation of suffering or through prayer for the redemption of the world. Thus many Confucian scholars who by the time of the Sung dynasty were drawn to Ch'anism and found its technique of meditation useful, also regarded it as inadequate because of its lack of concern with ordinary human life. As time passed, therefore, some of them fused Confucianism with the metaphysical basis of Ch'anism, and sought to use the latter's knowledge of reality to further the political and ethical ideals of Confucius. The result of this fusion was known as neo-Confucianism.

**Neo-Confucianism**

Neo-Confucianism is a loose term used to refer to the development of Confucianism from the Sung dynasty to the Ming dynasty. Like Ch'anism, it was primarily philosophy rather than religion; it emphasized the cultivation of the individual and neglected the ritualistic and formal elements in Confucianism. It represented a violent swing away from Han Confucianism, which emphasized form and ritual and had the status of a religion. It was Confucianism with deeper roots in metaphysics but still essentially this-worldly in outlook.

To judge by the Analects, Confucius was not much of a metaphysician. His definition of knowledge was empirical: “To say that you know a thing when you know it, and to say that you do not know it when you really do not know it — that is knowledge.” The modern philosopher with some training in epistemology will promptly ask what is meant by “knowing” and “not knowing” a thing. Is it mere registration of the sensory qualities and characteristics of a thing, or does it involve understanding the nature or essence of the thing? Does the object of knowledge exist solely in the mind, or is it independent of any knowing mind? The neo-Confucians were ready with answers to this kind of question, because they had been at great pains to replace the crude cosmology of Confucianism with a more adequate metaphysics.

Taoism and Buddhism flourished mainly under the T'ang dynasty, when the vigor of Confucianism was in eclipse. Only when Confucianism's tradition had fallen into decay was it affirmed and defended as an orthodoxy. Han Yu, mentioned earlier for his attack on Buddhism, was a firm supporter of orthodoxy, and in his significant essay on the origin and nature of Tao, he developed the idea that the line by which Tao was transmitted went from the sage-kings to the founders of the Chou dynasty to Confucius. “Confucius transmitted it to Mencius. After Mencius, it was no longer transmitted. Han Yu (Tao) and Yang (Huang) [a Han Confucianist] selected from it, but without reaching the essential position; they discussed it, but without sufficient clarity.” Han Yu’s ambition was to reaffirm the Confucian orthodoxy in an effective manner. Actual accomplishment of that ambition was, however, to await the Sung philosophers.
Because Han Yu had appropriated the term Tao, the early Neo-Confucians were
called the School of Tao Haish (the study of Tao). This remarkable group included Chou
Tun-i (1017-73), Shao Yung (1011-77), Chang T'ai (1020-77), and the brothers Ch'eng Hao
(1032-1086) and Ch'eng I (1033-1107). (It is interesting to note that they continued to use
the terminology of the Taoist and Yin-yang School, but avoided Buddhist terms.) Their
cosmology, in general, reaffirmed the Confucianist-Yin-yang tradition, but discarded its
fanciful elaborations. They called the principle of reality, Tao, or the Great Ultimate, and
insisted, in violent opposition to the Ch'anist conception of the void, on the purposefulness
of the universe.

The Ch'eng brothers were responsible for the split of neo-Confucianism into two
schools: the School of Reason (Li Haish) and the School of Mind (Hsin Haish). Chu Hsi
(1127-1200), following in the footsteps of Ch'eng I, interpreted the universe in terms of li
(reason, this being a separate character from li, ritual); his contemporary Lu Shang-chih
and the Ming philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472-1523), following in the footsteps of
Ch'eng Hao, maintained the idealistic position that reality is Mind.

The School of Reason and Chu Hsi

Chu Hsi was the greatest of the neo-Confucians; his position in the history of Con-

fucianism is not unlike that of Thomas Aquinas in the history of Catholic Christianity.
Part of his lasting contribution to Confucianism is his standard commentary on the Four
Books, which is a sort of Summa. From Chu Hsi's time forward, the Four Books together
with their commentaries were committed to memory by every school boy who aspired to
pass the state examinations. The Confucian canon was huge and miscellaneous. Some of
the pro-Confucian classics and post-Confucian forgeries actually had little bearing on Con-
fucianism as a philosophy. Chu Hsi wisely picked as his four books the Analects, the Men-
cius, the Great Learning, and the "Book of the Mean" (two chapters from Li Chi, a book
supposedly written by Confucius' grandson Ta Shu) and put them forward as the basic
texts of Confucian teaching. The five classics have offered scholars a more fertile field for
research, but to this day, the Four Books have a higher moral authority. And Chu Hsi's
commentaries, from the standpoint of lucidity of definition, are an unparalleled achievement
of Chinese philosophy.

The basic metaphysical terms used by Chu Hsi are li (reason, law) and ch'i (spirit).
These, he assumes, are the essence and at the same time the dynamics of the universe.
Everything has its li, the reason or law that makes it what it is; its behavior, however, is
partly determined by its ch'i, its vital spirit. Li is the eternal principle inherent in it; ch'i
gives it shape, motion, and direction. The li of man is approximately what we have called
above hsin, his essential human nature which is stable and eternal, and comes to much the
same thing as the Confucian jen. Through the operation of ch'i, hsin manifests itself in
ching (feelings, emotions) and yi (yearning, desires), and according to neo-Confucianist theory
(based on the doctrine of the Mean) the ch'i, unless it is in harmony with hsin, tends to
obscure it. The cultivation of self consists in learning to order one's emotions and feelings
in closer accord with hsin; in this area the neo-Confucians borrow much from Ch'an-ism.
They tend, for example, to equate yi (yearning) with evil, especially with selfish desire (su-yi).
However, cultivation of the self with a view to reaching an understanding of li and, in con-
sequence of that understanding, eliminating selfish desires, is not for the neo-Confucians,
as for the Ch'an monks, the ultimate end in life. Rather, it is a first step: it trains a man to
take his part in the socio-political world. This is the essential difference between neo-Con-
fucianism and Ch'an-ism.
The Great Learning

The cornerstone of Chu Hsi's philosophy is the opening section in The Great Learning:

The teaching of the Great Learning is to manifest one's illustrious virtue, love the people, and rest in the highest good. . . . The sages who wished to manifest illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their own states, they first regulated their own families. Wishing to regulate their own families, they first cultivated their own minds. Wishing to rectify their own minds, they first sought for absolute sincerity in their thoughts. Wishing for absolute sincerity in their thoughts, they first extended their knowledge. This extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, only then did their knowledge become extended. Their knowledge being extended, only then did their thought become sincere. Their thought being sincere, only then did their mind become rectified. Their mind being rectified, only then did their selves become cultivated. Their selves being cultivated, only then did their families become regulated. Their families being regulated, only then did their States become rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, only then could the world be at peace.

This progression from the well-ordered state to the investigation of things of the world and back may seem curious, but the basic assumption throughout is merely that the "illustrious virtue" can be manifested in every concrete relationship of human life. It is the Confucian criticism of Ch'anism that contemplation of reality by itself is not enough; one's actions should indeed be grounded in reality, but it is of the first importance that one devote the knowledge emanating from that reality to the ordering of the world, and bear in mind that the world includes many levels of human relations. To translate this into neo-Confucian terms, the "illustrious virtue" is the li. There is the li of man as well as the li of family and state. The Ch'an technique places emphasis on the manifestation of li on the individual level: the Confucian ideal holds that li must be manifested in the more complex human relations as well.

The hierarchy of objectives outlined in The Great Learning is: the investigation of things; the extension of knowledge; sincerity of thought; rectification of the mind; cultivation of the self; regulation of families; ordering of the state; the peace of the world. It is clear that achievement of the Confucian world order calls for an immense effort, since the welfare of the state depends on the welfare of every individual and family in it, and world peace on the proper ordering of each and every state.

One readily grasps the importance of the rectification of the mind and cultivation of the self, and how they fit into the scheme of objectives. What still perplexes scholars is the initial stage, that of investigating things. The original Chinese phrase, Ko Wu, is rather ambiguous. The safest guess is that to the neo-Confucians it meant primarily the investigation of li in things, animals, and plants in order to supplement the knowledge of li in the conduct of human affairs. They would, moreover, probably have meant by it intuitive rather than scientific investigation. Ever since Hu Shih's studies in Chinese philosophy, however, the phrase has been construed as meaning the scientific investigation of things. For, according to Hu Shih, it was only the lack of the necessary equipment and methodology that kept science from developing in China as a direct result of the neo-Confucian emphasis on Ko Wu.

Chu Hsi did make some shrewd observations on fossil formation, but his emphasis is clearly moralistic and humanistic rather than scientific. "In every human mind," he wrote, "there is the knowing faculty; and in everything, there is its reason. The incompleteness of our knowledge is due to our insufficiency in investigating the reason of things. The student must go to all things under heaven, beginning with the known principles, and seeking to reach the uttermost. After sufficient labor has been devoted to it, the day will come when all things will suddenly become clear and intelligible." This statement would evidently
cover such laws as the law of gravitation, but the preoccupation is the poet's rather than scientist's. What is beyond dispute is that scientific investigation, as one understands it today, did not make much headway among the neo-Confucians.

The attribute of li in man does not adequately account for his multiple desires and impulses, and neo-Confucianism does not take the position that the passions are illusions. It seeks rather a state of affairs within the individual where the emotions are subordinate to, and thus regulated by, reason. This results from self-cultivation, and from purification of the mind and will, which the neo-Confucianists felt required, above all, ch'ing (reverence) and ch'ing (sincerity), which they believed capable of checking the aggressive, licentious instincts in man.

The School of Mind

The problem of self-cultivation and the philosophical inquiry into the nature of man absorbed all the energies of the neo-Confucians. Although they professed to be concerned about the well-being of the state and society, their actual thought was about the individual, not about broader social groupings. When the great Confucian, Wang An-shih (1021-1086) attempted to bring about a radical reform of the Sung government, he won no support from individuals, and some of them attacked him vehemently. From a doctrinal point of view, this is perhaps less surprising than it looks; a possible inference from their general position is that these individuals felt that any reforms not resulting from rectification of human relations would be short-lived and so, in the long run, futile.

In short, the neo-Confucians failed to provide any real grounds for participation in practical political activity. They had none of the Taoist or Legalist cynicism which strongly limits the capacity for moral improvement in most men, so that individual effort, without supplementary effort by responsible men at the helm of government, cannot be counted on to produce the desired rectification of human relations. The neo-Confucians, to put it a little differently, placed too great stress on self-cultivation to the neglect of family and state. Despite the nobility of their avowed intentions, they produced no convincing evidence that their teachings could bring about the peace of the world.

The reverence to Ch'uanism and the exclusive preoccupation with the self is even more apparent in the School of Mind, led by Lu Ch'iu-yuan and Wang Yang-ming. For Chu Hsi, reality is independent of the mind; for Lu and Wang, the mind and the universe are synonymous. The School of Reason holds that since the mind is the impure embodiment of both li and ch'ing, it is capable of error, and can be kept in conformity with li only through discipline. For the School of Mind, discipline is beside the point, since the mind is the sole percipient of reality, and it is both the arbiter of conduct and the instrument of knowledge.

The School of Mind is characterized by a strong tendency to equate virtue with knowledge. Like certain Protestant sects, it dispenses with external authority and emphasizes "the Inner Light." Lu Ch'iu-yuan strikes this note when he says, "If in learning one gains a comprehension of what is fundamental, then the Six Classics become one's footnotes.

Any theory that gives intuitive knowledge a place of cardinal importance is open to the criticism that it makes things too simple, and does not adequately account for the fact of evil in man and in the universe. The favorite example was, with the Ch'uanists and the School of Mind of neo-Confucianism, is the stain on the mirror. For both, the eight processes of education outlined in The Great Learning become in fact one process: the removal of stains on the mirror of original illusions virtue. Wang Yang-ming says:

The mind of man is Heaven. There is nothing that is not included in the mind of man. All of us are this single Heaven, but because of the obscurings caused by selfishness, the original state of Heaven is not made manifest. Every time we extend our intuitive knowledge, we clear away the obscurings, and when all of them are cleared away, our original nature is restored, and we again become part of this Heaven. The intuitive knowledge of the whole is the intuitive knowledge of the part. Everything is the single whole."
In such radical simplicity lies the great defect of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy. The Christian and Buddhist ethics, which recognize ignorance and the inclination to evil as fundamental in the makeup of the human being, are undoubtedly closer to the facts on this point.

Wang Yang-ming's philosophy, however, does supply a ground for action. A person, it holds, should abide by his intuitive knowledge of the good, and act accordingly. The failure to apply intuitive knowledge in everyday dealings is a failure of courage, and means ultimately the atrophy of the Heaven-nature in man. But it was Japan, not China, that benefited most from this emphasis on the unity of thought and action, for such philosophical exiles from China as Chu Shên-chih made the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming popular in Japan at an early date.

Reaction Against Neo-Confucianists

By the end of the Ming dynasty, a reaction set in against neo-Confucianism. The new-style thinkers, notably Ku Yen-wu (1613–1652), turned their backs on speculation in favor of rigorous scholarship and a philosophy that paid more attention than earlier Chinese philosophies to empirically observed fact. The conditions at the end of the Ming dynasty, with its corruption and military weakness, seemed to them to demonstrate the futility of self-cultivation when it is not integrated with practical politics. As great Confucian scholars, they felt that the neo-Confucianists had construed the classics in line with their own moral ideas, and in doing so had both distorted Confucian thought and done scant justice to the historical context in which they had emerged. In short, they rebelled both against the allegedly bad scholarship and against the individual perfectionism of neo-Confucianism.

Their rebellion against the first produced three hundred years of distinguished Ch'ing scholarship; against the second it produced a courageous effort to integrate moral ideas into the realm of practical affairs. The path of sincerity and reverence, they held, should not lead to a moral vacuum, nor should progress along it be achieved at the expense of human desires and emotions.

Typical of this trend of thought was the Ch'ing philosopher Tai Chên (1721–1777), who took sharp issue with Chu Hsi's distinction between li reason) and ch'i (spirit or emotion). In Tai Chên's opinion, ch'i cannot be inferior to li, since it is only in the operation of the vital force of desire and emotion that reason can be made manifest. "Man and creatures all have desires and desires are the function of their nature. Men and creatures all have feelings, and feelings are the operations of their nature." Since feelings are inborn, they should not be violated. Thus Tai Chên reasserted the wholeness of the human being, and held that reason and desire should be a single organic whole. Similarly, he proclaimed the necessity of supplementing intuitive knowledge by the empirical study of facts. Tai Chên stresses practical applications, as does his fellow philosopher Yen Yuăn. Even so, Tai Chên severely failed to integrate his philosophy with the issues of his times.

Chinese philosophy never did live up to the brilliant promise of the pre-Ch'in era. The later philosophers merely elaborated on earlier insights, without really making any attempt to achieve a net philosophical advance over their predecessors. Except for those in the Buddhist tradition, with its more elaborate metaphysics, most later Chinese philosophers were thus completely overshadowed by Confucius, Mencius, Hsin Tsê, Lao Tsê, and Chuang Tsê. From Hán to Sung to Ch'ing, to be sure, Confucianism underwent many changes, but they were changes in sensibility, involving no genuine progress toward greater precision of thought or toward the development of special techniques and vocabularies for particular fields of inquiry. The Chinese have never, for example, developed a system of logic, and even their excursions into the field of epistemology have always been projected on
a modest scale. The most favorable and generous way of expressing this is to say that the Chinese are interested in philosophy only insofar as it deals concretely with life on both the ethical and the political planes. What Chinese philosophy has to offer to the world are, in consequence, a few insights into reality and the application of these insights to the problem of living. The philosophers' task seems to be merely that of conserving these insights from generation to generation. Their role is in the defense and maintenance of orthodoxy in the face of changing situations. The major premises are accepted by all; each philosopher merely reaffirms these old truths with slightly different emphasis.

**Influence from the West**

With the influx of new ideas from the West, this kind of traditionalism began to disappear, as may be seen from, for example, K'ang Yu-wei's daring reinterpretation of Confucianism. Clearly reflecting Western influences, K'ang Yu-wei treated Confucius as a great revolutionary and reformer, and tried in that way to strengthen his own plea for radical contemporary reform in China. He did retain one of the old insights, however—that the mission of Confucius' followers is to bring about, in the long run, the great commonwealth of nations on earth. Moreover, he recognized the inferiority of modern ideologies to Confucianism, but recognized also that China must imitate the West if it were to survive. Later, having failed to achieve his reforms, K'ang became a bitter ultraconservative, and became a spokesman for a Confucian rearguard action against the Western ideologies.

With the new ideas came exposure of the abuses and injustices of the social system that had been built and maintained in the name of Confucius, and this tended to bring the Confucian ideals themselves into disrepute. Recent important political leaders, like Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, have tried to weld a modern temper of mind to the basic Confucian ideals, but their efforts in this direction have not been successful. Confucianism is no longer a vital force among China's youth.

Buddhism and Taoism have fared even worse through the last forty years. Taoism has borne the main brunt of attack on superstition that has resulted from the introduction of Western ideas, and stands discredited in consequence. Buddhism, with its other-worldly teachings, appears to have little appeal for the younger generation, even though there has been a considerable revival of Buddhist studies among Chinese scholars. Under the leadership of the Buddhist abbot Tai-hsiu, new Buddhist colleges have been founded, and new Buddhist magazines launched. In the big cities, there were even, until the Communist take-over, Buddhist broadcasting stations. But this means merely that its hold is still fairly strong on the older generation, especially the women (just as in the United States, women are more faithful churchgoers than men).

**Other Religions**

**Mohammedanism**

Two other forms of world religion remain to be fitted into our picture of China: Mohammedanism and Christianity. There are over ten million Moslems in China, some in separate religious communities, the rest scattered among the cities of China. Mohammedanism first entered China at the time of the T'ang dynasty, but attracted little attention and won few converts until an influx of foreign Moslem soldiers occurred under the Yuan dynasty. The Moslem groups in Sinkiang and Northwestern China retain to this day their peculiar customs, and are bound together by a strong sense of solidarity. Most particularly, they retain their peculiar religious practices which set them off sharply from the Chinese among whom they live and give them a way of life far more similar to that of their fellow believers in other lands. In the large cities like Peking and Shanghai, however, they now can hardly
be distinguished from the rest of the Chinese except perhaps by the fact that they do not eat pork, which is China's favorite meat. Every large Chinese city has its special restaurants catering to Moslems which do not serve pork.

Christianity

Until the Communist take-over, Christianity was the only religion that was actually gaining adherents in China. It had great influence in educational, governmental, and business circles. Because of its connection with Western culture, it was regarded as open to the charge of feeding on superstition, though it was, from an early moment, accused of being an adjunct of Western imperialism. Because it had missionaries and clergymen who gave large amounts of time to spreading its teachings in the churches, the schools, and the colleges, it was able to keep in touch with the younger generation at a time when Buddhism and Taoism were without any comparable contacts with it. The Christian churches had financial resources (largely from abroad) not only to maintain themselves but to found hospitals and charity and recreational centers. Most indigenous believers received higher education, and entered respectable professions, whereas the Taoist and Buddhist groups represented the old-fashioned business and farming interests.

It remains to be seen, now that its foreign funds and personnel have withdrawn or been expelled, whether the Christian faith can continue to thrive in China. The available evidence suggests that the believers have compromised with the Communist regime, and that each mission school as are still operating have ceased to be centers of Christian education.

Christianity first reached China in the seventh century, during the reign of T'ang T'ai-t'ung, when some Central Asian Christians, mostly Nestorians, made trade trips to China over the caravan routes. Nestorianism was called in Chinese Ch'ine Chiao, that is, the Luminous Religion. It died out temporarily at the end of the T'ang dynasty, in part because of government-directed persecution, but returned, and extended deep into China proper, when the Mongols conquered China and Central Asia. This time, also, the Nestorians of Central Asia were among its leaders, but so were Roman Catholic missionaries.

When the Yüan dynasty entered into decline, Christianity virtually disappeared again, and did not come back until the latter half of the sixteenth century, during the Ming dynasty. It came this time as one phase of a multiracial European penetration of China. The first missionaries were Jesuits, tactful and learned men who studied the Chinese classics, gladly associated themselves with Chinese scholars, and won the confidence even of the Court, which was much impressed by the Western-type science they brought with them. The most famous Jesuit at court was Matteo Ricci, who as well as being a skilled mathematician and astronomer, was thoroughly versed in Chinese classics. Christianity's spirit of tolerance and curiosity had, at this time, a profound impact on Chinese scholars.

The Ch'ing dynasty followed the Ming's example with respect to the Catholic missionaries, and held them in high esteem. Before long, several Catholic orders and societies were represented in the provinces, and might well have continued to spread over the face of China had not the Papacy, in the eighteenth century, reversed itself in the attitude. Catholic missionaries were to adopt on the observance by converts of the Confucian rites of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship by converts had previously been allowed; it was now forbidden. Missionaries sent to China after this reversal tended to emphasize the mutual exclusiveness of Christianity and Confucianism, and this resulted in failure to make allowances for traditional Chinese culture. The friendly relations between the missionaries and Chinese scholars did not long survive this change; by the time Protestant missionaries began to arrive in the nineteenth century, the missionary enterprise became associated with the
European nations' mercurial and imperialistic objectives in China. While the missionaries preached, the Western governments were busy exacting trade concessions in, and territorial rights from, China.

Both the Catholic and Protestant churches, however, made slow but steady progress among ordinary Chinese. But the intellectual leaders of China, not only under the Manchus but under the republic as well, concluded that Christianity was no longer a vital factor in Western civilization, and that the Western nations, with their ruthless expansionist policy, were motivated not by the Christianity they professed to believe in, but by self-interest. The direct result was that in the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty even those who wished to imitate the West were encouraging students to study the West's science, technology, and positivistic philosophy rather than the alleged Christian tradition of its culture. The teaching of Christianity was neither encouraged nor discouraged. The Chinese were bent on rebuilding their nation upon a firm modern basis, and regarded as dispensable everything, religion especially, that did not directly contribute to national reconstruction.

In view of the general decay of religious feeling in China, it seems unlikely that the spiritual roots of Christianity are deeply implanted there, or that the doctrine of the fall and of the necessity of redemption through Christ have come to occupy a permanent and secure place in China's thinking.

This is not to deny that there are many pious Christians in China, both Protestant and Catholic, who are, at present, standing up against Communist tyranny with fortitude and faith. But the fact is that the environment of modern China, both intellectual and moral, is too materialistic to be congenial to religion. Moreover, many foreign observers have posed the question whether the Chinese are capable of genuine religious faith, especially in view of their long record of scepticism and materialism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity, behind which it is possible to see a profound indifference to religion as a system of revelation or truth. Nor is this disproved by the fanaticism with which Chinese believers in nationalism, science, and Communism have advocated their respective causes. What is happening in China, as in other Oriental nations, is the simultaneous growth of short-range fanaticism and of indifference to problems touching on man's relation with God or reality. China is losing its insight into reality and its long-range view of man in the scheme of the universe—the two things that have made Chinese civilization, by and large, so very stable. For it was not philosophy or religion but axiomatic truths handed down from generation to generation, century to century, that gave continuity and stability to Chinese civilization.

**Nationalism and the Decay of Religious Feeling**

With the coming of the Western powers to China the problem of national security came to outweigh everything else in the minds of thinking Chinese. Mass education, military strength, and the development of natural resources seemed, therefore, to have become major necessities, to which all else must be subordinated. The educational system of the past few decades thus gave rise to shallow, ardent, practical-minded Chinese who were impatient of the country's traditional wisdom and proved, when the moment came, highly susceptible to Communist propaganda.

The extent of damage done to the Chinese mind during the present Communist regime cannot be gauged. Certainly, however, tradition is not so strong a barrier against it as many would like to believe. Along with the task of material reconstruction, China's future leaders will inherit that of recovering insight into the art of government which links the individual, the family, the state, and all states into a single cooperative world society.
A SELECTED READING LIST


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CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL FORCES

The basic pattern of China's social order remained highly stable for more than two thousand years: it can be traced back as far as the Han dynasty in the third century B.C., and had undergone little fundamental change as late as the heyday of the Ch'ing dynasty in the nineteenth century. Herein that basic pattern is called the "traditional social order."

The Ch'ing dynasty was brought to an end by a revolution, which gave birth to the republic of China. Simultaneously, the traditional social order underwent drastic changes.

The main reason for the stability of the traditional social order was the unchanging character of China's agrarian economy, in which land has always been the limiting factor. Human labor was always in abundant supply, so that there was little incentive to change the existing technology, which was based on human labor. The same farming implements and methods continued to be used on the same limited quantity of land, so that China had a closed economy with little room for expansion. The social teachings of Confucius presupposed this type of productive system, and in turn reinforced the economic stagnation it entailed; ideologically speaking, they thus bound the social order together through the centuries. It was a social order in which every person had a role that was clearly defined in terms of both behavior and attitudes. The various roles were based upon the kinship system.

CLASSES IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

Scholars

The traditional social order involved four traditional classes. The highest echelon were the scholars, or literati, trained in Chinese classics and literature with a view to passing the state examinations, through which one became an official. The Chinese empire was large and its communications poor. For both reasons the imperial regime early came to depend upon the scholar-officials, the bureaucratic elite, to conduct local administration and maintain order throughout its domains. Local officials were allowed to govern their areas with a minimum of interference from above, provided only that they maintained peace and order and contributed their share to the national treasury. Through the state examinations lay the road to power, social recognition, and wealth. Theoretically, almost any Chinese subject had the right to become an official if only he passed the examination. Actually, the majority of those who took the examinations came from well-to-do families who could afford to master such learning. Most were descendants of officials. The latter were free to levy taxes, make grain assessments, and demand favors. They were variously tyrants and enlightened rulers, and collectively and individually they had every reason to resist revolts against the imperial order they represented, since a revolt might mean their downfall as well as that of the regime. They were, according to the blueprint drawn up by Confucius, distinguished by their love of humanity.
The qualifications required of the officials were two: knowledge of the classics, and skill at manipulating verbal symbols. The examinations were open to all people of all classes, and people of all classes cherished the ideal on which they were based: that China was not a feudal society of closed classes. It was not easy to move from one class to another. But it was possible.

It was common practice for the scholar-hunrcncnats to accumulate savings during their career, and invest them in land. When they retired, they became the gentry of their home towns, living off the land they owned. Some scholars, of course, failed the state examinations. They became teachers in rich homes, or retired into religious solitude, or returned home to live off such land as their families possessed.

**Peasants**

Next to the top were the peasants. They made up the bulk (probably 80 percent) of the population. The majority were free, land-owning, farmers, or tenants with permanent leases to the land they farmed. The former paid taxes to the government; the latter, rent to the absentee landlords. Actual cultivation of the land remained in the same hands even if the land itself changed hands. Only a small percentage were laborers with only their labor to sell.

The peasants were the wealth-producers of the nation. The primary imperial tax was the land tax, and its proceeds, together with the rent paid by the tenants, represented a very large share of the peasants' tiny income.

The main characteristic of the Chinese agrarian system was that the farms were small, having been parceled out and subdivided into more and more units through the centuries. An aerial view of the Chinese countryside still looks like a minutely pieced patchwork quilt. Cultivation, based on time-honored methods, was intensive and painstaking. The plentiful supply of labor tended to inhibit the search for new methods of cultivation. Living standards were low by any criterion, and the notion of an expanding economy was not even present to people's minds.

The peasant was largely self-sufficient. He ate the produce of his land, and wore what he wove with his own hands. He carried some of his produce to the local market, and thus acquired what little cash he needed for salt, iron, and other things. His family's only means of escape from this way of life was to accumulate enough savings and enough land to be able to educate a son who, having passed the state examinations, could raise the status of the whole family to that of the scholar. After his retirement, the scholar-son could return home to a life of honorable leisure and willingly-accorded prestige, respectability, and admiration.

**Artisans**

The third class were the artisans or craftsmen, who used their hands to gain a livelihood. They performed personal services for the scholars and gentry. They were the barbers who carried their barber chairs and basins over their shoulders. They were the carpenters, blacksmiths, knife sharpeners, and china-ware menders. They were the oil pressers, who made oil from beans and sesame seeds. They were the rug makers, furniture makers, and masons. Some of them had land to cultivate, and engaged in one of the services mentioned as a subsidiary occupation. Since physical labor was held in disdain by the Confucian school of thought, their status was a low one.
Merchants

The lowest rung on the social ladder was occupied by the merchants, or tradesmen, who made their living by exchanging the fruits of other men's toil.

Despite their low prestige, they were essential to the functioning of society. For one thing, they were the bridge between the artisans, peasants, and the scholar-officials, all of whom, especially the first and last of the three, depended on the process of exchange.

The more successful merchant had, because of his wealth, a good deal of influence. One possibility always more or less open to him was that of buying an office and thus forcing his way into the ruling class. However, they represented no threat to the elite; they never acted collectively, there were no legitimate channels through which they could go to expand their influence, and they had no great amount of capital or wealth to manipulate. All large-scale enterprises, e.g., salt and mining, were government monopolies. There was, indeed, no great surplus anywhere, for money was not thought of as a good form in which to hold wealth; one got money in order to buy land. Even the merchants had no desire to retain money. Like the peasants, their only hope of changing their low status was to educate their sons to pass the state examinations, and in the long run this called for land.

The merchants had no legal protection, e.g., no contractual arrangements under which to operate their business. As the centuries passed, however, they became very group conscious, and organized themselves into guilds for purposes of market control and mutual protection. Even the guilds reflected the Confucian idea of human relations. Relatives and friends and "old customers" received fair deals, while strangers might be cheated without moral compunction of any kind.

FAMILY, CLAN, AND VILLAGE

Importance of the Family

In speaking of a country or nation, the Chinese use the term kwou-chia, the literal translation of which is "nation-family." The analogy of the family, in other words, dominates even the idea of country. "Wishing to order well their states," wrote Confucius, "they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons." There is reason to believe that loyalty to family as it exists in China tends to weaken — or at least is competitive with — loyalty to the state. But this is not the intent of Confucian doctrine. Confucius taught that strong family and kinship groups were indispensable to the healthy state; perfect family loyalty implied a perfect family, and no perfect family would ever permit its members to slight the state. "If everybody is filial and brotherly, nobody will oppose the law." In reply to a ruler's boast that in his state a son would inform on his father if the latter committed a crime, Confucius replied that in his state no son would ever be found accusing his father of a crime. He meant that a proper family could never produce a crime-committing member!

It was to the family, not to the state, that the individual Chinese always looked for economic and social security. It was the family on which he relied for education. The family supervised his moral and political behavior. The state, for example, dealt exclusively with the head of each family for such purposes as registration, taxation, and compulsory labor service. What is meant by the traditional Chinese family? Two ideal examples in Chinese history are the Chang family in the T'ang dynasty and the Chu'en family in the Sung dynasty. In the Chang family, six generations lived together in a single household, and for nine generations there was no division of property. In the Chu'en family, 700 persons lived under the same roof as a single household. How could this be possible?
The traditional family in its ideal form was not, like the usual Western family, confined to a man, his wife, and their children. Its vertical axis at any given moment could extend through nine generations, and its horizontal axis through five collateral grades. There were 21 categories of relatives, including lineal ascendants and lineal descendants, brothers and their wives, unmarried sisters, cousins, and their wives. There were more than 300 kinship terms. When the entire family, so defined, lived harmoniously under one and the same roof, the ultimate ideal was regarded as achieved. In the actuality, even in the scholar or gentry class, which came nearest to the ideal than any other class, three or four entire generations, but rarely more, were held together in the desired manner. In most families, only one of the sons could marry and continue to live with his parents; the other sons and all the daughters, if they married, went out of the family unit, so that the typical family hardly ever exceeded six to eight persons — a great many less than in the scholar class, where economic resources were less strained and where, in any case, the mortality rate was lower. Even the members of these relatively small families, however, clung to the traditional "large family" as the ideal, strove constantly to achieve it, and imitated its pattern of living, however simple and however small a scale.

Whatever its size, the Chinese family was an economic unit. It consisted of persons related to each other (by blood, marriage, and adoption) and it had a common budget and common property. Its members produced and consumed goods, as much as possible, within the family. This was especially true in the peasant families, where each member of the family was fitted into a general scheme for providing food, shelter, clothing, and even shoes for the entire group. In the artisan and merchant families, members cooperated in production and shared in consumption (apprentices were treated as members of the family, occupying a position similar to that of an adopted son). While members of the typical family among the gentry had many things made and done for it by persons not of the family group, even they simulated self-sufficiency as much as possible, and their servants were made to feel as if they belonged to the family. In a word, the traditional Chinese family was characterized by a high degree of self-sufficiency, both economically and socially, since there was little occasion for members of a family except the chia chang, or family head, to have any outside contacts.

In general, the division of labor in the family was along the following lines: The men did the nonhousehold work; they plowed the fields, made and sold their handiworks, or performed their functions as officials. The women were responsible for the household work. In peasant families, they cooked and washed, wove cloth, and made shoes. In upper-class families, perhaps the women did not actually do these chores, but did manage and supervise them.

The smooth functioning of the group was made possible by assigning each member of the family a specific and understood role to perform, which was determined with an eye to his or her blood relationship to the family. This relationship varied with generation, age, and sex.

Authority

The oldest male member of the oldest generation was the chia chang (family head). He was usually the father. He was the highest authority in the family, held title to all family property, and disposed of all the family's earnings and savings (thus of the earnings and savings of each member). He officiated at all such ceremonies as marriages, funerals, and ancestor worship, and at the three big festivals of the year: New Year's, Tuan Wu (in the spring), and Chang Ch'iu (the midautumn harvest festival). He arranged his
children's marriages and exacted strict obedience from all junior members of the family. The young learned subordination to the old, in accordance with Confucius' saying, "Filial piety is the root of all virtue." Filial piety was not confined to father-son relationships, or even to relationships with the chia chang. The latter was not regarded as an authority unto himself and in his own right, but as an agent of his and his son's ancestors, with whose spirits it was the family's duty to keep in constant communication. They must, for example, be informed and consulted before every imminent event of any importance, the informing and consulting taking place at the family shrine where the ancestor's spirits were believed to be represented. The ancestral spirits, it was further believed, watched over their descendants, kept the family free from disease and want, and gave it heirs and prosperity. Finally, the living were thought of as being able by making offerings of incense, food, and paper money to their ancestors, to better the lot of the ancestral spirits. The chia chang officiated at all the ceremonies.

Upon his death, the father became one of the ancestors, to whom the young man of filial piety could add weight and respect by his personal achievements. In the same way, he decreed gave his ancestors a bad name. In short, the family not only exercised economic and social control over its members; its moral influence continuously penetrated every corner of their actions and even their thoughts.

**Continuity**

One concrete expression of filial piety was the perpetuation of the family line. Failure to produce offspring meant the end not only of the living family, but of the entire family line, and so involved hurt to the ancestors as well. The desire for male descendants was, therefore, universal and well-nigh obsessive. According to Mencius, "Of three unfilial acts, lack of posterity is the greatest." For one's sons to marry was not so much good as necessary, and necessary not so much for the son's sake as for the sake of the family, which must have descendants. Marriage was a family, not a personal, affair and the choice of mates was the parents' concern. It was arranged through an agent, a matchmaker. Acting out of intimate knowledge of the families involved, he (or she) first carried a gift from the boy's family to the girl's. He then took to the fortune-teller the eight characters standing for the girl's name, and the year, day, month, and year of her birth, to be compared with the corresponding characters for the boy. If the comparison was favorable and auspicious, the match would be full of harmony and auspiciousness. Not the least of the matchmaker's function was that of advising about the betrothal gift. The bride's family very naturally, since their daughter, in becoming a member of a new household, would have her very fate decided for her, demanded assurances as to what kind of fate awaited her. This meant an adequate gift from the boy's family, and evidence of his family's economic status, normally judged by the amount of land it owned. After the two family heads had approved everything and signed the marriage contract, the bride made the journey to the groom's family in a completely curtained, suffocating, red (as a symbol for joy) sedan chair. She was clothed for the occasion in a red satin gown, with a red scarf completely covering her head and a heavily ornamented headdress. The marriage ceremony was a family ritual, at which the chia chang officiated in the presence of kinsfolk and relatives. At this ceremony, the first time, the bride and groom laid eyes upon another. Through the good offices of a hired "master of ceremonies," and in a deafening fanfare of gongs, cymbals, and flutes, they went through the ritual of being presented to each other, to the various members of the family, and to the ancestors at the ancestral shrine. It was not, however, until the
new wife had borne a son that her position was fully stabilized. If she did not have a son, there were two alternatives open to her husband: he could take a concubine, or he could adopt a son.

The social and economic relationship of all kinfolk were extensions of this basic pattern. A man's relationship to his father's brother followed the father-son pattern. The relationship between cousins of the same sex followed the brotherly pattern. The intensity of each relationship varied with the closeness of the blood tie. (Only the husband-wife pattern had no extension in the wider kinship system.) This called, of course, for an extremely elaborate kinship terminology. There was the father's elder brother, the father's second younger brother, the father's second elder brother's wife, and so on. (The terminology for maternal relatives was less specific: they had a different surname, and were thought of as belonging to another family.)

As a concrete illustration of how the kinship system penetrated every phase of life, one may note the rules for mourning as stated in the Book of Rituals (Li Chi). The length of mourning for blood relations varied with the closeness of the blood tie, ranging from three years for one's father and mother to three months for one's remote cousins.

The more prosperous a family became, the better were its chances to expand and become the ideal (large) family; and once a family had so expanded, it was obliged, with so many people to support, to maintain a broad economic base. The latter was hard to do, so that the usual course of events was for a family's wealth to become somewhat depleted after three or four generations, and relations within it became, in consequence, strained and unstable. According to the Chinese principle of inheritance, each son then inherited equal shares of the family property, and the family ceased to be an economic unit. Although economically separated, kinship ties between the new distinct units were strong and binding; but taken together they were thought of not as a family but as a Tsu, or clan.

The Clan

In ancient times, to be sure, the one-household family and the clan had probably been identical. But as time passed and ancestors inevitably became more numerous, the clan expanded until the only link between its constituents was a single surname and a common ancestor. In the central and southern parts of China, there are whole villages in which one finds only one surname.

The clan always maintained a common ancestral temple and common burial grounds. It preserved the elaborate kinship terminology, scheme of rights, and duties of the kinship system, and continued to observe the rules of mourning. A single clan might have members from all social classes, from merchant to scholar. It held property as an organization, exercised certain broad judicial functions, and arranged for ancestral worship at proper times. Although economically divided, the clansmen felt bound by a strong sense of obligation. If prosperous, the clan had large reserves for relief and education, and supported a school. Its wealthy members felt obliged to help their poor relatives, either by giving them direct assistance or by providing them with employment. Often some of the evils of nepotism presented themselves: relatives were employed regardless of their fitness (or need) for the job, and poor relatives became parasites.

Each clan maintained its own genealogical records, in which its members were registered and their more illustrious deeds recorded. It even had a role to play in the social control of marriage; namely, that of seeing to it that its members did not intermarry.
Village Organization

A number of economic families, sometimes of different clans, sometimes all of the same clan, constituted a village, their life and property being made safer by their living together. In the rural village, the fields usually lay beyond the cluster of houses. Each family's field was a distinct patch of ground, so marked as to leave no doubt about its boundaries. Proximity, not kinship, was the essential tie between the constituent families, but even here kinship terms were used to establish and reinforce social relations. The terms appropriate to paternal relations were used in addressing one's father's friends. Terms appropriate to maternal relations were used in addressing one's mother's friends. Terms used with grandparents were used in addressing one's grandparents' friends. This defined all social relations. The younger generations were taught to address correctly a person belonging to an older generation. Failure on their part to use correct forms of address showed lack of proper upbringing and resulted in loss of face for the entire family.

Although there was no formal village organization, there were universally recognized and respected village heads, usually the heads of the larger clans and families. Often the village head was a man who had in the past performed some social services for the village as a whole. He was either a retired scholar, a member of the village gentry, or the former village teacher. He was assumed, both because of his age and education, to possess wisdom. The government, when issuing orders to the populace, dealt with and through these already accepted village heads; in strict theory they were "appointed" village heads by the government. Each village had its ti-pao, whom the government recognized as the responsible representative of the village, and who was held answerable for peace and good order in the village and for the collection and payment of taxes. If he reported a crime, it was he who was made responsible and he who received the punishment. The ti-pao, naturally enough, tried to settle all village problems directly with the people so that most disputes were settled locally, without resort to any court. The village heads looked after public property, took the census, arranged market days with the heads of other villages, transmitted official orders, wrote people's letters for them, and even managed marriage ceremonies. Though not formally elected, their authority was unquestionably accepted by all. So long as land taxes were paid, and no crimes arose, the villagers were hardly aware of the government's existence. It was the village heads always played a political role and never attempted to change or destroy the existing order.

Sometimes the village acted collectively. The inhabitants organized themselves, for example, into village defense-brigades, set up village schools, and made arrangements for collective protection of crops by hiring a watchman who patrolled the fields at night. The villagers also performed common rites and ceremonies in case of drought, flood, or locust plagues. Most villages had village temples for the local deity, the tu ti lao yeh, which, it was believed, was able to give protection and peace to the locality. He also protected the spirits of the dead members of the village in the world beyond.

Each village had its tea house — a combined club house, newspaper, and entertainment center for its male members and, because it was here that opinions were ventilated and formed, an instrument of social control as well. Within each distinct neighborhood of the village, people had certain recognized mutual obligations — for example, announcements and gifts in connection with births, weddings, and funerals; mutual aid at planting and harvest time, and in the execution of irrigation projects. Village solidarity was manifested in every department of life, from the cultivation of crops to the preparation of food. But there are several points about it that cannot be overemphasized. It perpetuated itself without formal organization for the most part, i.e., as a series of interpersonal relations. And it was not in any sense imposed from without the village boundaries.
Several villages would meet together on certain days and at a common market place for the exchange of their goods. The date and place were both specified by arrangement among the village heads. From such market places most Chinese towns and cities grew, the transition from enlarged trading center to a town being accomplished when the former was designated the seat of a government official. The smallest political unit was the hsiian, or prefecture, which was the seat of a county magistrate who was charged with responsibility for collecting taxes, recording land deeds, handling government funds, and serving as head of police. The larger towns and cities were, so to speak, collections of villages, and were divided into wards organized much like the villages (i.e., with heads and a ti-poo), though in the cities the mutual aid and solidarity aspects of the village were apt to be overshadowed by the activities of the police and the yamen (magistrate’s office).

GUILDS AND SECRET SOCIETIES

Craft Guilds

Outside the family and the village, artisans’, merchants’, and some farmers’ guilds were the major traditional social organizations.

A craft guild included all the practitioners of a single craft, masters as well as workmen, within a certain district. (It was not uncommon for a man to be a farmer and an artisan at the same time; not a few guild members, therefore, were farmers.) Within the guilds no sharp line was drawn between employer and employee, since, as far as guild matters were concerned, members were all on an equal footing, each of them having, for example, an equal voice in the selection of officers and the framing of regulations. The manner of electing officers differed greatly from guild to guild. The usual practice was to have at the helm a committee made up of men of experience and prestige who were generally known and respected by the members and who took turns as chairmen.

The guilds financed themselves by taxes levied on their members. The guild made it its business to see to it that no one could afford not to belong, since the primary purpose of the guild was to control and divide the market for the goods or services and, to that end, control production with an eye to the state of the market.

Merchant Guilds

The merchants were organized in merchant guilds. The line between these guilds and the craft guilds is not a sharp one, since some craftsmen were merchants as well. The druggists’ guild and the tea guild were two conspicuous borderline cases. The merchants’ guilds followed the same general plan of organization as the craft guilds. Unlike the latter, which were primarily interested in production or service and only secondarily interested in their distribution, the merchant guilds existed primarily, as their names suggest, for the exchange of goods. As an example of the merchants’ guild one might cite the bankers’ guild, which had branches all over the country engaged in the exchange of coins and bills of exchange.

In general, both types of guild were democratic, both in the conduct of their affairs and in the sharing of benefits. Both existed for the sole purpose of protecting their members and promoting their interests. If, for example, a guild member had a case in a court of law, the guild helped him see it through. They did not attempt to work through or manipulate the government. They were not licensed, although the state fully recognized their power and rights. They tended, indeed, to avoid relations with the government. They sought to
control the particular market in which they were interested with a view to discouraging competition and stabilizing business, their tacit premise being that competition is hazardous. They regulated wages and apprenticeship training, and the craft guilds fixed the weights and measures standards used by their members in all their dealings.

*Provincial Clubs*

The provincial clubs, which were like guilds in many respects, began as organizations of people from a single province, i.e., candidates for the state examinations or merchants engaged in trade, who found themselves residents of one and the same city a considerable distance from home. Their primary function, like that of the guilds, was mutual protection. Any reputable native of the province was eligible. Each club had its club house, where the members congregated or even resided. Like the guilds, they went into action especially when a member was taken into court or got into some other kind of trouble. If a member died, the club saw to his proper burial.

All the organizations mentioned had religious functions. They had patron saints or special gods upon whom they counted for protection. The carpenters and masons had La Pan. Others had the Goddess of Mercy. The guilds and clubs were centers of social activities, and celebrated certain annual occasions with feasts, entertainment, and religious ceremonies.

*Secret Societies*

No one can say exactly how much the secret societies have influenced Chinese history. Certainly, however, they have often played an important role even in the fate of dynasties, to say nothing of their continuing function of providing socially significant satisfactions for their members.

Because of the secret nature of these bodies, information about them has always been difficult to uncover. Each, it seems certain, was a secret fraternity with its own binding vows and its own rigid code of honor and chivalry. Many were affiliated with religious sects, and had rituals of a religious character. Their membership policy largely ignored dividing lines between strata of society. In time of peace, their primary function was that of providing protection and aid for their members, who paid dues, and owed certain types of obedience to a leader selected by themselves. On one side, membership was a sort of insurance policy against, for example, hard times, or crop failures, or even death (if a member died, his society even took care of his family). During times of unrest and popular dissatisfaction, the secret societies have often emerged into the open and revealed their strength, sometimes through their weight on the side of revolution.

The first known instance of this sort of thing was a revolt against the government by the C'hih Mei, or Carnation Eyebrow Rebels, toward the close of the earlier Han dynasty (202 B.C. to A.D. 9). When the government replied with measures of persecution, the members sought safety in monasteries (for the most part Taoist).

The most powerful of all secret societies before and during the Ch'ing dynasty was the White Lotus Society, the founder of which was a Buddhist teacher who lived in the fourth century. His original eighteen disciples or Lohan were deified. White Lotus monks traveled far and wide to spread his teachings. It was originally a religious sect, and became an underground secret society only in the thirteenth century, when it joined in the rebellion against the Mongols and helped end the Yüan dynasty.
When the Tartars swept over China and overthrew the Ming dynasty, there was bitter resentment among the Ming patriots, many of whom were relentlessly persecuted. Many secret societies came into being at that time, e.g., the "White Feather Sect," the "Three Incense Sticks," and "The Eight Diagrams." They participated in many of the uprisings of the ensuing period, and often, especially under the Manchus, were hard driven by the government.

The most powerful of the secret societies, "The Triad Society" (San Ia Hu), appears to have been founded during the reign of the second Manchu Emperor (1622-1723), when five monks who were also trained soldiers barely escaped with their lives from a monastery besieged by imperial forces. It took its name from the fact that it was the "society of Heaven, Earth, and Man." The founders' aim was to "Overthrow Ch'ing, Restore Ming," and they seem to have carried their cause into every town and village in the land in their attempt to mobilize all types of mutual aid organizations against the existing regime. The organization, in any case, spread throughout China, and more and more leaders were brought into it.

In traditional Chinese society, there was no effective central organ of political authority. Local officials maintained the local governments, this being mainly a matter of collecting taxes and maintaining the status quo; and there was no sharp dividing-line between these officials and the "people." After retiring from their posts, they took their place among the landowning gentry, and continued to exercise power as they discharged their obligations as family heads, clan patriarchs, and village leaders. It was the organized groups — the family, the clan, the village, the guild, the secret societies, the provincial clubs, all of them private and essentially local in origin — and not the central government that kept things running and so perpetuated the traditional social order. The latter was undoubtedly attended by considerable evils, mainly those of nepotism and corruption, but within the orbit of its control the individual enjoyed a considerable area of freedom in which to think and live his life.

SUMMARY

The characteristic traits of traditional Chinese society were: (1) It was a family-oriented society, in which age and seniority among one's kin gave one such respect, prestige, and power as one enjoyed. Youth was subordinate and insignificant. (2) It was a man's society, where women occupied a subordinate position as a matter of course. Marriage was arranged primarily for the purpose of producing a male descendant for the husband's family. (3) It was a society that presupposed mutual aid and clearly-understood moral standards throughout. Neither involved much in the way of external apparatus; there were, for example, no old people's homes, no poor houses, and no reform schools. (4) It was a society in which initiative, competition, and departures from the existing way of doing things brought defeat to the individual. Conformity was indispensable to survival. (5) It was a society in which a classical education was the only pathway to high social distinction. It held technical skill, physical labor, and military prowess in disdain. (6) It was a society based upon land, and a society in which ownership of land was the best form of investment. There was little capital invested in business, and cash was not in great demand. (7) It was a society which, despite its bureaucratic character, was essentially democratic. There were no closed classes. The individual could always, though with difficulty, raise himself into a higher class and take his family with him. It was a society in which Confucius' teaching concerning the golden mean, the avoidance of extremes, was
generally observed. The main obligation imposed upon the people by the state was that of paying their taxes. Taxes apart, they lived in a democratic society built upon tolerance, rationality, and candid realism.

THE TRANSITIONAL SOCIAL ORDER

Effects of Relations with the West

China's relations with the West, which were destined to undermine the traditional social order in the long run, were sporadic and of a highly limited character. From the second century B.C., when the first contact occurred, to the early sixteenth century A.D., there was some trade with the Romans, the Arabs, with India, and with the Medes. A famous visitor from the West, Marco Polo, reached China across Asia in the thirteenth century, then returned home. At no time, in other words, were Sino-Western relations intensified or permitted by the Chinese to be other than marginal and superficial. The West was eager to acquire Chinese silks, porcelain, and tea, but China, with her self-sufficient economy and conservatism, did not need foreign trade and thus did not encourage it. China's traditional social order was unaffected. It functioned, century after century, just as it would have if the West had not existed.

The West's discovery of the sea route to the East initiated a new phase in China's history, during which the West did at last begin to have an impact on Chinese society. The following paragraphs are a brief review of the main events of the next four centuries.

The Portuguese, the first Westerners to use the route, arrived in Canton in 1517. Hard on their heels came the Dutch and Spanish. Chinese authorities, however, continued to discourage trade with them, partly by restricting their activities to Canton. Even as late as 1793, when the Emperor Ch'ien Lung received a British diplomatic mission whose purpose was to intensify trade relations between China and Great Britain, China was flatly refusing to alter its traditional policy, and seemed unlikely to do so in the absence of drastic political change within its frontiers. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that such a change finally took place, in the form of a sharp decline in the power of the Ch'ing government. When it did come, however, it came at a time when the West was ready and able to make the most of it. Its industrial revolution had greatly increased its productivity and thus its appetite for new markets, and given it new, well-nigh irresistible military weapons. Therefore, over the next decades it was consistently able to translate the growing weakness of China's government into intensified trade and contact between China and Europe.

At first, the swelling stream of Western traders continued to be restricted to Canton. The Chinese thought poorly of merchants and the Western merchants represented a double evil — covetousness and barbarism. For a long while, the Westerners were not permitted to carry on any direct trade with Chinese dealers and consumers. A specific group of middle-men, called compradores, were authorized by the government to conduct all transactions involving Sino-Western trade, and all other Chinese were strictly forbidden to touch them.

England, implanted in India and more eager than ever to tap China's huge market, was to take the lead in topping over the barriers between China and the outside world. India produced large quantities of opium. England, itself lacking that which could be exchanged for China's rich cargoes, discovered that the otherwise wantonless Chinese would buy opium, which hitherto China had consumed in only moderate quantities (chiefly for medicinal purposes). As early as the end of the eighteenth century opium was entering China,
through Canton, in such quantities that the Chinese government saw nothing for it but to forbid the sale of opium altogether, which it attempted to do by means of an imperial decree. Despite the decree, the opium trade continued to prosper and the day finally came when the Chinese government confiscated a huge stock of British opium it had discovered in warehouses in Fukien. The British declared war, won hands down, and in 1842 forced on China the treaty of Nanking, which, so to speak, underlined China's weakness by imposing on the Chinese government certain disabilities and restrictions that were without precedent in international affairs. Other countries, over the next years, demanded similar treaties, and got them. In 1855, Japan inflicted a further humiliating defeat upon China, and further tied the hands of the Chinese government in the policies it was to apply in dealings with the outside world.

Events moved swiftly in the ensuing years. In 1890, on the initiative of the US, the Western powers adopted the so-called Open Door policy, which, though designed to prevent the final partition of China on the basis of already-existing spheres of influence, left China in a worse position than ever to stave off the impact of the West upon its life and institutions. One result of it was to hasten the decline of the Manchu government, by losing it the confidence of the Chinese people. Another was to create within China a wave of anti-foreign feeling that led, in 1901, to the famous Boxer Rebellion, which forced all Westerners, missionaries and merchants alike, to flee China for their lives. The response of the Western powers was to crush the rebellion out of hand, and to impose a new set of humiliating demands on the Chinese government, most particularly the opening of Chinese ports, once and for all, to foreign trade. In the big treaty ports such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tientsin, and Hankow, large territories were leased to foreigners, and were made subject to foreign administration and law. Huge indemnities were demanded, and their payment ensured by arrangements for foreign supervision of Chinese maritime and internal customs and by restrictions on China's capacity to set its own tariffs. In short, within half a century, a great Oriental empire was reduced to the status of a semicolonial or, as Sun Yat-sen put it, to a country nominally independent but for all practical purposes under foreign control.

Within China, the impact of these events was profound and far-reaching. The country's traditionally self-sufficient, self-complacent social order was shaken to its very roots. For China's contact with the West, though it was developed through trade, was by no means confined to the economic sphere. Missionaries — both Protestant and Catholic — appeared on the scene and opened churches, schools, and hospitals. The modern school, with its emphasis on practical subjects, was introduced. In the 70s, a first group of 30 young Chinese were sent abroad to study, a step that would have been unthinkable 50 years earlier. Peasants and businessmen from South China began to emigrate to America and the South Seas in search of wealth — another sharp break with traditional Chinese patterns of behavior. Perhaps most important of all, Chinese politics began to reflect the new age.

The Chinese people, disillusioned with their government, expressed their confusion and resentment at what was happening to them in a series of revolts. The most important of these was the Taiping Rebellion, which was led by a few peasants and seaborne officials inspired by a belief in a homemade brand of Christianity. Capitalizing upon the prevailing discontent, they were able to make their movement nationwide in scope, and powerful enough to disturb the equilibrium of the whole existing social and economic order. The military operations in connection with it went on for 13 years (1851-64), and involved almost all the provinces along the Yangtze River. More than a million men were mobilized on each side, and the government's expenditures on the suppression of the rebellion were so large as to exhaust the national treasury. Some twenty million people lost their lives in the fighting or as a result of the accompanying pestilence. The people, in larger and larger
numbers and more and more vocally, demanded radical reforms in government and in the educational system. The Boxer Rebellion and its humiliating consequences further increased the pressure upon the Ch'ing regime, which finally, but far too late, made some desperate gestures in the direction of meeting the popular demands of the day. In 1905, for example, the traditional civil service examinations were abolished, and a commission was sent to Japan and England to study governmental practices with an eye to their possible introduction in China. But the time when half-measures might have saved the regime was already long past.

The Republic of Sun Yat-sen

In the late nineties, a young medical doctor by the name of Sun Yat-sen, who had received his education in Honolulu and at Queen's College in Hong Kong, organized the "Hsing Chung Hui" (Rescue China Society) in Macao. Branches of this society soon sprang up among the Chinese living in Honolulu, the US, Japan — wherever there were Chinese who for one reason or another were beyond the reach of the Manchus. Working through this society, which later began to call itself the "T'ung Meng Hui", Dr. Sun set out to marshal support for a "people's revolution" among Chinese both within and without the country. His creed was simple. He believed that a Chinese absolute monarchy must give way to a democratic republic, and that extensive social reforms had to be undertaken on behalf of what he called the "people's livelihood." He further believed that China could cope with Western and Japanese imperialism only by frankly imitating Western nationalism. The "T'ung Meng Hui" fanned the flames of revolutionary feeling within China through the age-old device of secret societies. China was ready for its message, and the revolution, heralded by a series of uprisings and assassinations, occurred with unexpected suddenness on 10 October 1911. The Manchu emperor was deposed, and Dr. Sun became President of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic.

The republic produced a new regime, but it did not bring China internal peace; it soon became evident, for example, that the postrevolutionary government could not extend its power over the entire country. By 1916, again for example, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the republic's first President, was attempting to restore a monarchy; and his failure to do so, followed hard by his death, initiated what is called the war-lord period, during which political power in China was shared out, on a crazy-quilt pattern, among a never-constant number of military men with armies at their disposal, and as much territory to govern as they could conquer and hold. Sun Yat-sen's influence was confined to the south — in Shanghai and in Canton — where he sought to maintain a parliamentary regime.

From without, the Western powers and Japan continued to press demands on the Chinese government, but there was at least one startling new development: the new Russian government renounced all the conquests and special privileges the Czarist government had acquired in China. By 1923, partly because of that gesture but mostly because he had developed personally satisfactory reasons for trusting the USSR, Dr. Sun was accepting the help of Russian advisors in a drive to reorganize the Kuomintang party. Within the party, meantime, the left wing was gaining the advantage over the right wing, which greatly alarmed the merchants and gentry of the south, who were supporting Sun. A reckoning between left and right was postponed for a time as all groups joined forces behind a military expedition that marched North to try to unite China under a single government.
Chiang Kai-shek vs the Communists

At this crucial moment Dr. Sun died, but Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the southern armies, fortified by Russian aid and help both from the secret societies and the students and industrial workers, gained victory after victory. During his absence in the North, however, the Leftist group sought to oust him as leader, and when documents were discovered in the Peking Soviet Embassy that revealed Russia's designs for world conquest, a real split took place within the party. Chiang initiated a purge of all radical elements both from the party and the government. The northern expedition was successful, but Chiang continued to have to base his leadership on alliances and political intrigues with the country's still numerous war lords. He was able to drive the Communist Party underground, some of its members withdrawing to remain as the left wing of the Kuomintang. The party as a whole suffered a distinct decline in membership, though not, or not at least for very long, in popular following. Its closely knit organization and the appealing character of its propaganda continued to win it sympathizers, especially among the new classes, the students and professors, and the factory workers. The Communist leaders, concentrating their remaining forces first in Hankow and Kiangsi, and later in Kwangtung, Hunan, and Anhwei, advocated a society patterned after that of Russia, and were soon calling themselves the First Soviet Republic of China. Before long also, by conscripting manpower in the localities they occupied, they were able to build a large army and, Chiang having diverted his military strength to the North, force attention to themselves as a major military threat. In 1932 and 1933, the Soviet areas comprised an estimated 330,000 square miles, one-sixth of China proper, and ninety million people. But until 1934, after his third campaign, did Chiang succeed in driving them from their Central China stronghold and forcing them to take up their Long March to the Northwest, in the course of which they burned or destroyed everything they could not take with them.

Pressures from Japan

Externally, Japan was the most immediate threat to republican China. The settlement among the powers following World War I gave the Japanese Shantung Province. In 1931, they took Manchuria. In 1932, they made an unsuccessful attempt on Shanghai, which, however, netted them a sphere of influence in one section of the city. In 1935, they further encroached upon China's northern boundaries by carving a so-called autonomous area out of Eastern Hopeh Province.

Such was the turbulent political background in which the forces making for the transformation of traditional China worked themselves out through this transitional period. The major characteristic of the period was the overlapping and coexistence of the disappearing social order and the emergent social order. A familiar scene in China in the latter part of this period was the spectacle of wheelbarrows and rickshaws, drawn by men just as they had been in past centuries, in and out among formidable buses and clanging street cars — or, on another level, the funeral procession, with paper effigies for the souls of the dead and mourners in white hemp robes, moving along to the strains of "Yankee Doodle" or "Marching through Georgia."

The Rise of New Classes

Business Class

The most conspicuous change taking place in China through the transitional period had to do with the rise of new social classes. First of these is the new business class. In 1863, the official and military commander Tseng Kuo-fan supervised the establishment of an
ironworks at Shanghai. In 1868, the first Chinese-built steamship was launched in that city. In 1861 the official and military commander Tao Tung-chang oversaw the building of a navy yard in Foochow. In 1863, Western-style arsenals were built at An-yang.

All these projects looked to the production of munitions and war supplies. All of them were initiated by scholar-officials who had become aware of China's urgent need for better military defense, and what it implied with respect to the state of China's industry. It was such men who fostered, and themselves became members of, the new business class. There was also Li Hung-chang, who with the aid of foreign forces helped to crush the Tai-ping Rebellion and, having come to understand what Western-type arms and technology could contribute to China's security, became a patron not only of industry but of communications as well. He helped to found the China Merchant's Shipping Line and the Shanghai-Woosung Railway, and went ahead to build telegraph lines and a cotton-mill at Shanghai. Chang Chih-tung, governor first of one Chinese province and then of another, started the project for a Peking-Hankow railway, helped establish the Han Yeh Ping Iron and Steel Works, and interested himself in cotton mills, silk factories, and tanneries. All of these men, however, were promoters, not managers, of industry and/or communications.

The better-known industrial executives of this beginning phase were also scholar-officials. There was, for instance, Sheng Hsuan-huai, who had clearly grasped the relation between modern communications and national strength; backed by Li Hung-chang he became the first general manager of the Tientsin-Shanghai telegraph lines, was in charge of national railway affairs, managed the China Merchant's Line (which he also reorganized), managed a cotton mill in Shanghai, and the Han Yeh Ping Iron and Steel Works, became Minister of Commerce, organized a national bank, and founded the Chinese Red Cross.

There was the disenchanted scholar-official, Chang Ch'ien, who with the help of Chang Chih-tung started China's first cotton mill, Ta Sun, and organized a shipping company in protest against the favored foreign shipping companies. He also took a hand in civic improvements in his hometown of Ta-t'ung, Kiangsu, where he established a museum, a library, a public park, a weather station, and a normal school.

Both these men, incidentally, were conscious of the need for legal protection of investments and favored the introduction of contractual arrangements into Chinese enterprise. Neither, on the other hand, was by any means the prototype of the modern Chinese business executive. They were, by contemporary standards, relative novices, who never really put aside their essentially Confucianist outlook, with its emphasis upon personal relations. Nevertheless, it was their activities that got business enterprise under way in China; they openly engaged in business enterprise despite being scholar-officials.

Certain scholar-officials participated in building the foundations of Chinese business enterprise in still another way, namely, by facing up to the inadequacy of the type of education they had themselves received, and giving their sons a "Western-style" or "modern" education. This they did either by sending them to a modern school in China, which in most cases meant a mission school, or—what called for an even sharper break with tradition—by sending them to be trained in America, Europe, or Japan. As business matured in China, it was this new student group, together with the Chinese who had emigrated and learned modern business practices abroad, that was to be a major source of management personnel for business enterprises.

Another source of such personnel was the traditional merchant class whose activities had given them better preparation than other Chinese could possibly have for successful business enterprise. There were, for example, the compradores, the first Chinese merchants to have direct contact with Western traders. The comprador was not merely a go-between; from an early date he performed several important business functions—accounting,
cashiering, brokerage, etc. The foreigners paid him, in general, extremely well, and he soon learned to rely on them rather than Chinese officials for his protection. If, moreover, he was on his toes, he not infrequently had opportunities to make profits "on the side" out of the foreigners he dealt with, and could, as time passed, acquire capital of his own — indeed, the compradors were among the first Chinese to acquire great wealth through business activity. After restrictions on foreign trade were removed, many of them went into trade for themselves. The new business class drew many of its recruits from their ranks, and many others from among merchants who had not been compradors, but had known how to make the most of the growing freedom and gradually improving social position of persons engaged in trade.

This newfound freedom was the consequence of a changed attitude toward the merchants on the part of officials who, in coping with the problems posed by the decay of the Ch'ing government and the rising tide of internal warfare, found that they could "cooperate with merchants more often than they had found it advisable to do in the past." Such cooperation was profitable both to the merchants and themselves.

In this survey of the sources of the new business class and the factors that contributed to its rise, the increasing role of money in the Chinese economy through the period must be noted. The two major commodities traded during this period, opium and textiles, came to be in such demand that many people found themselves wanting money who had previously had no use for it.

In short, there gradually grew up a class of business men. The trend toward industry was initiated by the scholar-officials as promoters and executives, but it involved compradors, trained in Western business methods, native merchants, who found themselves handling a large volume of trade, and, at a later date, a new scholar or student class, that had received a Western-style education in mission schools or in schools abroad. There were, finally, the Chinese emigres, who despite their loose ties to their native land, despite also their broadened outlook, remained interested in the progress of China.

In general, one may speak of four stages in the development of Chinese industry. (1) The period 1862-1877, when industry got off to a slow start with the building of some munitions factories, at the stimulus from Chinese officials; China got its start in the industry through ordinary commercial incentives, particularly in the textile field, with the lead being taken by new-style entrepreneurs. (2) The years 1893 to 1902, when foreign merchants were given certain rights looking to the encouragement of private enterprise. (3) The years 1903 to 1910, when Chinese banks, commercial associations, and official agencies for commercial control were first organized. (4) The years 1911 to 1928, when Chinese domestic enterprise, especially in the cotton industry, boomed as a result of the outbreak of World War I. It was in this period that the modern business corporation made its appearance, and began to play a role comparable to that which it plays in other countries.

A further word as to why the officials and the gentry took the lead in these developments for a long period, during which the people generally, including even the merchants, viewed them with indifference. There were several reasons for this: In the first place, the officials and gentry were a "protected" class, and did not need special legislation redefining their rights in order to become active in building the new enterprises. They, more easily than others, could counter resistance in the name of traditionalism, because they were recognized as representing the traditional order. Secondly, the industries launched in the early years were largely financed with public funds, derived either from new taxes or from loans and investments from abroad that only the government was in position to arrange, and the officials and gentry were in a better position than others to levy on such funds.
(According to one estimate, half the textile mills, half the coal mines, and two-thirds of the steam-powered coastal and inland shipping developed before 1900 were made possible by investments from abroad.) Attempts were made, to be sure, to recruit capital from the merchants, compradores, and overseas Chinese tradesmen, but mostly without success, because there elements fought shy of the idea of government sponsorship, and did not wish it known that they had capital in any such quantities.

By 1903, spurred on by the example of the factories set up by foreigners, the Chinese government became eager for its own people to take a hand in industry, and set out to encourage private enterprise. As a result of the uncertainty of the times, however, the chief developments were in trade rather than in general industrialization, which called for long-term investment and held out scant prospect of the quick profits for which most people with capital were looking.

By 1928, the growing unification of the country and the decreasing threat of war helped China's industrialization to make real progress. A modern business class was taking shape, but it had to overcome formidable political obstacles, and had to fight against constant resistance on the part of the traditionalist forces. Political influence thus continued to be an important asset, and it was still beneficial to know the right people.

_Laboring Class_

There arose a new laboring class. With the development of factories and industry, there was a sudden demand for industrial workers. The introduction of machine-made products, especially textiles, which were cheaper and better than the homemade products the Chinese had traditionally used, condemned the traditional, self-sufficient Chinese family to gradual extinction. People began to rely for part of what they consumed on transactions that took place outside the home and called for cash. Peasants and artisans in increasing numbers sought employment in industry because the wages offered had become necessary in a way in which they could not have been necessary a few years earlier. The new factories were destroying the artisans' market, and there was a surplus of labor in rural areas; neither group was able to support itself as it had in the past. From the employer's point of view, the low living standards of the Chinese and the abundance of cheap labor, which together meant that wages could be kept low, provided an incentive for continuous expansion which in turn made room for still more workers. The factories tended to concentrate in a few cities, chiefly Shanghai, Wusih, Tianjin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong, Dairen, and certain cities in Manchuria. How rapidly the demand for labor increased is made abundantly clear by the statistics of the textile industry alone. There were 417,000 cotton spindles in 1896; 1,210,000 in 1913; and 4,223,000 in 1930. By 1930, the total number of industrial workers in 30 industrial cities was 1,281,915—47 percent of them (more than half women) were in textiles, 14.7 percent in food factories, 6.6 percent in clothing, 6.5 percent in building, 6 percent in chemicals, 5.4 percent in machinery, and 4.9 percent in the printing business.

_Labor_ was recruited for the most part by the contract or _Pao t'ou_ system, under which employers delegated the hiring and even the paying of workers to a middleman, who provided a constant supply of workers, particularly women, drawn primarily from the countryside. The _Pao shang_, or foreman, would make a contract, usually for three years, with the prospective employee's family, and take her away to the city where she would live in a factory dormitory and work at a nominal wage, the remainder of her remuneration going to her parents.
The factory system, with all its attendant problems and evils, was confined chiefly to six provinces, comprising 10 percent of China's total area and 30 percent of its total population (even in these provinces the traditional craft shops, where artisans and their families worked together as one economic unit, hung on for a long while). Home industries, in which peasant families engaged as a sideline also survived, and in the more remote areas of China, the handicraft system went on just as it had before.) But industrialization in China did not, at first anyway, create exactly the same problems and evils it was creating elsewhere in the world. The factories remained small. From 1912 to 1920, 84.5 percent of China's industrial workers were employed in factories of from 7 to 30 workers, and less than 1 percent in factories of more than 500 workers.

In the small-scale Chinese factory, the owner was likely to be an artisan or master craftsman who started out with a small workshop. Having acquired a little capital, he rented looms and began to hire other people, apprentices mostly, to work for him. There was considerable mobility of labor among enterprises of this character, and both for this reason and because on-the-job activities tended to be more specialized than formerly, relations between employer and employee were much less personal and family-like than in traditional China. The typical factory sold its products to one or more merchants, who supplied the raw materials. Later, this master craftsman, as he prospered, became the factory manager.

Many such enterprisers had "outworkers," for example, the employee of a match factory who took away material for matchboxes to work on at home, probably with the assistance of his family. Even the worker employed within the shop might bring a member of his family along every day to help him do his job. The little boy pulling a laden wheelbarrow pushed by his father was a common sight in the mines in those days. In other words, the personal and family element stubbornly persisted, despite the factory system.

The category of industrial workers thus included not only women and men, but children as well. One reason for this was the predominance of light industry. But this made it possible for women and children to do the jobs; what made it necessary were the low wages and the high costs, by peasant standards of the day, of urban living. In any case, from 1914 to 1920, 47 percent to 65 percent of the workers in the textile industry, and 31 to 43 percent in the food industries, were women. In 1930, a survey by the Ministry of Industry of 799,912 workers in 28 cities showed that 16.6 percent were women, 46 percent were men, and 6 percent were children.

All this meant that a large number of individuals who had been reared in peasant homes and artisan families had to adjust to an entirely new way of life, from which the personal and human elements that had characterized their roles in traditional society were almost completely absent. They did not know their employer, and he did not know them. His only interest in them was the profit he could make from what they produced, and he cared little whether the profit was earned at the expense of their health and welfare. There were no labor laws to protect them, no standard wage rates, no ceilings over working hours, no minimum wages. In most shops, they spent their hours on the job endlessly repeating one and the same operation which called for the kind of discipline and continuous attention that nothing in their background had prepared them for. Their lot was by no means a happy one.

The first Chinese labor union was the Tongshan Labor Union, which was organized among the Tongshan miners in North China in 1911. In general, however, China's industrial workers remained unorganized until 1919 and 1920. The earliest strike reported in a modern Chinese industry did not occur until 1912, on the Lung-hai Railway.
ranks and counsels. For when the split in the government took place, and the Communist party was driven underground, the labor movement found itself immeasurably weakened. In an attempt to get it back on its feet, the central government now created the Association of Worker's Delegates, to consolidate the principal unions. A Central Executive Committee was formed, to promote programs for education, publication, political education, and military training for union members. In 1929, the Labor Union Law was promulgated, stipulating that only labor unions approved by the Bureau of Social Affairs under the central government would henceforth be regarded as legal. By 1936, the government reports put the total number of labor unions in China at 872, and estimated their membership at 718,761.

**Student Class**

There arose a new student class. A new type of education was introduced during this period which replaced the classical training that had for centuries been the backbone of China's educational system. The lead here came from the missions, China's first Christian college having been founded as early as 1881, but there were soon modern schools under other auspices as well which offered Western-type training, with emphasis on practical subjects, including the social sciences, the natural sciences, and mathematics. In 1912, the republic officially adopted a new school system, modeled on that of the West, and included normal schools and technical training schools. By 1919, 147,501 primary schools were already functioning, national and provincial universities were gradually being established, and school facilities were, for the first time, being provided for girls. The enthusiasm for modern education was fed and given direction by a growing body of translated Western philosophical and scientific works, including those of Darwin, Spencer, Montesquieu, J. S. Mill, and Adam Smith, and, among fiction writers, Dickens, Scott, Lamb, Goldsmith, Dumas, Ibeen, and Tolstoy. After Japan's victory over China in 1895, large numbers of students went to Japan, many of them to study military science, and, as time passed, more and more students went to America and Europe for advanced training.

In 1918, a group of National Peking University students started a magazine called *The Renaissance*, as part of a movement whose purpose was to promote a new literature, to be written and read in *p"ai hua*, China's spoken language. Unavoidably, given the forces mobilized behind the classical literature, it became a movement for the emancipation of the individual from tradition and authority, and soon captured the imagination of China's youth. Slogans like "equality for women" began to make their appearance, and the movement's targets came to include, along with the classical literature, Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture, the movement and those whom it influenced became committed to what might be called "whole hog" importation of new Western ideas, with no questions asked as to their validity or their possible effects. A common joke was that even the moon shone brighter in the Western Hemisphere.

In 1915, Japan took advantage of the fact that the Western powers had their hands full in Europe and helped itself to Shantung Province. When World War I hostilities ceased, the day was celebrated with a gigantic student's parade in Peking, international justice, it was believed, would now be meted out, and Tsingtau and the other German concessions in Shantung would be returned to their rightful owner. When, therefore, the Versailles decision went in favor of Japan, the students were bitterly disillusioned, and on 1 May 1919, staged a demonstration against the Versailles settlement. The police intervened, and arrested 32 students. The Peking student population protested energetically, and the protest was echoed by students out over the nation. The government
was showered with telegrams from merchants, newspapers, and professors expressing solidarity with the demonstrators who had been jailed, until finally it had no alternative but to release them. The Minister of Education and the Chancellor of Peking University promptly resigned, and the students were able to chalk up their first victory. From then on, the students as a class were more or less regular participants in the national political scene, and exercised a profound influence upon the subsequent course of events.

There were several reasons why the students were able to do this: To begin with, they enjoyed the social prestige and respect inherited from the traditional literati or scholar class. In China, the educated man had always been respected, regardless of what he really knew. Students returned from study abroad enjoyed a prestige of their own, although often what they had learned was, in many cases, quite without application in China. Second, perhaps because of their youth, they were more daring and idealistic, more ready to struggle for freedom and justice than other people; because of their daring the initiative came to lie with them, and many who were less daring could not at least recognize in what they did an expression of their own aspirations. Third, the student demonstrations were an impressive spectacle, and thus a dramatic means of making public opinion articulate, especially since the Chinese press was still relatively undeveloped. (The reading public at that time comprised not more than five percent of the total population.) Fourth, because they were concentrated in the colleges and schools, the students were in a better position than others to organize and develop collective strength.

After their first victory, a marked change came over the students: a great surge of patriotism and nationalism swept over them, and, at the same time, their anti foreign resentment was transferred from the Manchus to the Japanese and the Western imperialists. Instead of uncritically accepting the West, many of them began to view Western practices and ideas with great skepticism, especially as they became more conscious of their own power. This skepticism was fed by two famous scholars, Liang Chi-chao and Liang Sou-ming, both of whom, in their writings, expressed grave doubts about Western civilization. Their long-term influence upon the Chinese student was tremendous, and there was widespread study and discussion of the pros and cons of Eastern and Western civilization. The dislike the students had felt toward Confucianism was translated into dislike of Christianity and, in the end, all religions and all mission schools. More and more of the students came to believe devoutly in modern science as the source of all good and the source of all power; more and more of them came to regard Western imperialism as the source of all evil. In short, they adopted a general intellectual position in the context of which the Russian Revolution of 1917 was to have a very special meaning for them.

Both Chi'en Tu-hsiu, the Peking University professor, and Li Tsé-ch'ao argued, convincingly from the students' point of view, that World War I marked the failure of capitalism and hailed the victory of the "proletariat" in Russia and Germany. Bolshevism, they held, would triumph over capitalism and imperialism. Soon many students were speaking of bolshevism as the answer to China's problems. The first recruits of the Chinese Communist Party were these students and some of their professors. Only gradually were they able to attract labor and the peasants to their fold.

Dr. Sun also viewed Russia with a certain approval, and sought its help in uniting the country. In 1923 he sent Chiang Kai-shek to Russia to study Soviet military organization. (Later Chiang was to head the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, where students from every part of the country were sent for military training.) The traditional attitude of the educated class (and of many other Chinese as well) toward military prowess gradually changed as military strength and physical force became accepted as necessary for the expression of patriotism.
In 1925, on 30 May, the students again showed their strength by a strike and mass demonstration in sympathy with a labor strike in a Japanese-owned mill, only to be fired upon by the British police in the Shanghai British concession. In four or five days Shanghai was paralyzed by a city-wide strike involving 200,000 workers. The whole nation became indignant, and parades were staged in almost all the important cities. The ground was thus laid for the successful unifying of China by the Nationalist government in 1927, with the battle song of “Down with the powers! Eliminate the war lords! Success to the national revolution!”

There seems no doubt, in retrospect, that the Communist ideology gained adherents among the students fairly rapidly through the 20s, and that a major reason for this was that the Communists’ propaganda was tailored to the students’ mood. Even after the split in the government during 1927–1928, when the Communist student organizations were driven underground, such Communist propaganda plus the secrecy and discipline of the Communist movement, continued to attract China’s frustrated and confused youth. The social sciences were much in vogue among them, and this also aided in their Communization because of the vigor with which the Communists fed their interest in social questions with books on Marxism and dialectic methods, and with new translations of Communist authors like Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Bukharin.

When the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the students again expressed indignation by organizing parades and strikes, and commandeering trains bound for Nanking, where they could present their protests against Japan to the central government itself. Although the government did what it could to repress these activities, they continued through the next four years. The students, in general, showed little interest in the government’s counter-propaganda campaign, the so-called New Life Movement, the purpose of which was to persuade individuals to revive the Confucianist virtues in their daily lives. When Japan invaded the five North China provinces in 1933, the student movement exploded into the massive demonstration of 9 December. The following year, an all-China student union was inaugurated in Shanghai, with representatives from 16 cities representing 200,000 students at universities and middle schools. A Students’ National Salvation Union was organized, and later integrated into the People’s National Salvation Front. Teachers and students began to carry their message into the countryside and the industrial centers. By 1937, one could speak of a resistance movement that was nation-wide. The government’s declaration of war on 7 July 1937 was at least in part a product of the students’ efforts.

White-Collar Class

There arose a new class corresponding to the white-collar class in Western industrial society. It included that body of business personnel which kept track of the commitments involved in everyday business and which operated all of the new technical paraphernalia: bank clerks, accountants, stenographers, and secretaries, and, along with them, the teacher in the modern primary or high schools, and the rank-and-file civil servants. Most people in the categories mentioned were people born into the scholar class, and most of them were products of modern education; they had gone at least through a modern high school, and for other reasons, they were losing their traditional economic base (i.e., land ownership).

Professional Class

There arose a new class of specialists (doctors, lawyers, engineers, and architects), and professional military men who had studied at the Whampoa Academy or gone to Japan, Russia, or Germany for military training. The traditional notion that "good iron is not
used for nails and good men are not soldiers” gradually lost ground as this class won recognition. Fighting for one’s country became, to the minds of many people, an honorable or even glorious professional activity.

IMPACT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

The transitional period in the class structure of Chinese society just described was paralleled by a transitional period in Chinese family organization, which became, among other things, a major preoccupation on the part of Chinese writers. The traditional family did not completely disintegrate or disappear any more than the traditional social classes. In the interior sections of China, especially, marriage still remained the affair of the young couple’s parents, not of the principals themselves. The combination of old and new that characterized the transitional period was, if anything, more striking within the family than elsewhere, if for no other reason than because of the sheer variety of the modifications and compromises that individual family units worked out for themselves.

The Family

The family was rapidly losing the self-sufficiency that it at least approximated in the past, and had always striven for as an ideal. Good quality, cheaply priced textiles appear to have played an important role here, in the sense that it was these that first attracted the peasants to the idea of meeting some of their needs outside the family, and thus to the idea of earning cash with which to pay the price. Opportunities for earning cash outside of the family were expanding rapidly, and were open to men, women, and children. The fact that labor was to some extent redundant on the farms hastened the peasants’ adjustment to the new state of affairs. Some peasants sent their sons to the cities and hired the sons of neighbors to do their farm-work. Younger sons were especially likely, along with daughters, to be urged to seek urban employment, and simultaneously decrease the family’s needs and add to its income. The fact that individual members of the family were less directly under the supervision of the family head also speeded the adjustment, as did improved transportation facilities, which tended to encourage migration.

The chia chang ceased to be the chief provider for the family and the chief authority on how to gain one’s livelihood; and as his economic functions thus became more restricted, he lost also in power and authority in general. Young people, by contrast, simply because young and thus more daring and adaptable, learned the new ways quickly, and gained rapidly in economic function; many found themselves, overnight, earning more than their parents had ever dreamed of. In the eyes of those who did make the adjustment, the “old man” ceased to represent wisdom and virtue and became a symbol of outworn tradition. The chia chang, to be sure, remained nominal head of the family, and most of the younger members of the family who went out to earn a living sent home part of their earnings. But they were none the less obviously in a new bargaining position, and the hold their families had over them unavoidably became less and less strong. Yet even this statement must not be pressed too far: the old values were not snuffed out, and Chinese society, by comparison with other societies, remained one in which respect for and courtesy to the older generation were universal. The size of the family, similarly, continued to vary with economic status. Indeed, the major change here had to do with the large-family system among the well-to-do, which disintegrated rapidly as young couples went off to the city, leaving the older generation behind on the farm because of the high cost of urban living and the housing shortage in the cities.
Individual loyalties began to shift to broader groupings than the family. Modern education, the new ideologies, the encroachment of foreign powers and the feeling of injustice and indignity that it produced—all these made the individual aware of his identity as a Chinese and gave him a common bond with all other Chinese. The surge of nationalism, predominant among the students, spread over the entire country. Young people of all classes argued about politics and Westernization. The family remained an important factor in people's lives, but they ceased to weigh their actions as if they had no long-term significance save to cast glory or dishonor upon ancestors; indeed, many youths became willing to forgo their family life in order to join the struggle for national freedom.

A third conspicuous development was the changing role of women. Attention has been paid to the high percentage of women among the new industrial workers, but that is only part of the picture. A study of factory girls in Shanghai, made in 1937, showed 12.4 percent of them to be between 18 and 21 years of age, 83 percent of them single, and 16.5 percent married. This meant that the time had come in China when a woman could establish her identity as an individual apart from her family. Far from being economically dependent upon it, the family had come to depend in greater or lesser degree upon her. Daughters ceased to be regarded as liabilities, to be gotten rid of through marriage at an early age, but rather as economic assets as more and more women were drawn into textile factories, match factories, and electric appliance shops, or became waiting-wives, barbers, shop assistants, and beauty technicians. Marriage, though still regarded as a woman's ultimate destiny, tended to be postponed to a later moment in life than formerly. (In the more well-to-do families marriage tended now to be postponed, but for a different reason, namely, the number of years required to complete a modern education.)

The daughter who left home to work was thrown on her own resources. She made new contacts outside of the home. Usually these first experiences of freedom resulted in her demanding more of it, and soon she was wishing to choose her own mate, rather than spend her life under the domination of some male who had never seen before the day of her marriage. A husband of her own choosing would be more likely to show her respect as a person. The day came when women suffragettes made their voices heard. Educated women penetrated all fields of work, and began to feel themselves equals of the men with whom they worked and competed. Women succeeded as lawyers, doctors, social workers, radio announcers, dentists, nurses, government officials, bankers, police officers, and even agricultural specialists and engineers. They participated in the protest movements and in the demonstrations. They joined national athletic meets and established new records. They became movie stars and jazz singers. They entered the literary field and the educational field as professors or as directors of schools or academies. A women's bank was launched. Some women adopted the practice of maintaining their maiden names even after marriage, to emphasize their individuality. Grandparents still wanted grandchildren, but a daughter-in-law was no longer judged solely according to her ability to produce male heirs (childless marriages, however, were still frowned upon, and a baby boy was still much preferred to a baby girl, and the wish for continuity of the family was still deeply rooted). Ancestor worship, without by any means dying out, became less formal and less elaborate, and the feeling of absolute obligation to one's ancestors was less intense than formerly even in those families in which the formalities were most scrupulously observed. Ancestor worship became more and more a mere memorial ceremony, like the Western custom of putting flowers on the graves of one's grandparents, and more and more was valued primarily as an occasion for getting all the family together for a good feast. Gradually having took the place of "kowtowing." "I kowtow to my ancestors' tablets to make my parents happy," became a common saying.
Youth's demand to be heard about the choice of marriage partners produced many conflicts and many compromises, with not a few tragedies and disasters. Some young people, having made their stand, discovered that they were not prepared to give up their family inheritance, and backed down, i.e. acquiesced in their parents' wishes as to whom they should marry. In some families, the parents drew up a list of possible candidates, and allowed the son or daughter to choose from among the names on it. Many young people chose for themselves, but left the final decision up to their parents. But there were also extreme individualists, who completely ignored their parents' wishes.

One result of all this, and the confusion it produced, was that there were numerous cases of hasty marriage, the typical case being that of the young student who left behind him, while he pursued his studies, a wife chosen by his parents, fell in love with a girl of his own choosing at school or in the context of this or that urban contact, and ended up marrying her. Engagements, especially childhood betrothals, could be broken, but divorce was possible only by mutual consent, and the wife would not be likely to agree to it. Usually, therefore, she was left in ignorance of her husband's new attachment, to live off her husband's family land and hope for the best as to what he might do in the city. In this period, there were no set standards, and sharply differing opinions as to what was right and what was wrong. Among the wealthy, there was a good deal of open cohabitation.

Another interesting phenomenon of the transitional period was the glorification of romantic love. The writers dealing with the family attacked the old system, and chronicled the frustrations and tragedies of contemporary youth. A translation of Dumas' story of Camille became a "best seller."

In the wedding ceremony itself there were numerous compromises. The bride no longer covered her head with a scarf, and her wedding gown might well be of pink satin—not red, as in the old fashioned family-arranged wedding, nor white, the color of the modern Western-styled bridal costume, but the color worn, in traditional China at funerals. The bridal couple did not always kowtow (k’o-t’ou), but as often as not merely bowed to their elders and to the ancestral tablets. The bride did not necessarily come in a sedan chair; a borrowed automobile with red and green streamers and, as likely as not, a cupid fastened to the hood, was a common substitute for it. The marriage broker had pretty much disappeared from the scene, but men and women and boys and girls often were without the upbringing they needed in order to do without him; they were not used to being together, and felt ill at ease in each other's presence. There were not many mixed social occasions, so that the typical young man had to rely on friends, friends' wives, or his own sisters to introduce him to girls. (Newspaper ads for "lifelong mates" often appeared in the press.) At the wedding ceremony, which was the traditional ceremony only slightly modified, the friends who first introduced the couple to each other were often invited to take the role of the middleman. Not infrequently, couples would decide to get married, and then invite some common friend to take the role of middleman at their wedding, so that there came to be a popular joke about the "middleman" who became a middleman just after his clients decided to get married.

As for the ceremony itself (few weddings were held in churches) some person of reputation and high social standing was usually invited to be "chairman." The wedding march would start, and the bride, in her semi-modern bridal costume, veil and all, would walk in on the groom's arm. Two middlemen (representing bride and groom), the bride's father and the groom's father would take their places with the chairman on the platform in front of the bride. Each would make a short speech followed by a long speech from the chairman, full of wishes for luck, prosperity, and, invariably, for offspring. After the exchanging of rings, and after everyone (middleman, father, chairman, bride, and groom) had fixed his
路演 the marriage certificate, the bridal couple bowed to each other, bowed to the per-
sonages on the stage, and bowed to the guests. Finally, there was a feast, or perhaps only
a tea, in the course of which the newlyweds would toast all the guests and thank them for
being present.

There existed the ultra-modern, free-love contingent, not large in numbers but highly
symptomatic of the times. The newspapers often, for example, carried an announcement
that such and such a man and woman had mutually agreed to "cease cohabiting," and that
"the marriage of either party will be of no concern to the other."

A new legal code was finally promulgated in 1930, in the attempt to impose some order
on all this confusion. Its provisions were based on an essentially Western concept of
marriage: marriage is a civil contract, and the only way agreement to marry can be made
is "by male and female of their own accord." Engagements can be broken with legal
impunity if they are family-arranged. Marriage vows must be assumed in an open ceremony
and in the presence of two "introducers" (usually friends, not professional middlemen).
No registration is necessary in order for a marriage to be legal. Divorce is like the breaking
of any civil contract, and is thus permitted by mutual consent, given in the presence of two
witnesses. (The breaking of childhood betrothals and engagements were numerous after
the new code was promulgated, and were frequently mentioned in the press.)

The new code contemplates that the wife will reside in her husband's home and assume
his surname, but otherwise recognizes the equality of women. They can choose their mates
as freely as men, and retain their property rights after marriage. (The inheritance laws
of the period also put the daughters on an equal footing with sons.)

The code makes adultery a punishable offense without regard to whether it is com-
mittcd by a man or a woman, and does not mention concubinage. (The children of con-
cubines, although illegal, can easily acquire legal status.)

Public opinion on these questions moved less rapidly than the law, and continued to
apply a double standard. Women were more readily condemned than men. In the vast
hinterland, especially the rural areas, traditional marriage customs changed much less
dramatically than the new code would suggest. The kinship group during the transitional
period tended, generally speaking, to be restricted to a narrower circle of relations, i.e. to
the persons who might fall within the category of the large family in any country: parents,
sibs and their families, maternal uncles and their offspring, married sisters and paternal
aunts, maternal grandparents and maternal uncles, fathers-in-law and their married
daughters and their families. However, the differences here from group to group were
quite arbitrary, and the size of the kinship group, like that of the family, continued to
depend upon economic considerations. The poor had fewer relatives than the well-to-do,
partly because they were more short-lived than the rich, and partly because their limited
resources made it more difficult for them to keep in touch with all eligibles.

The notion that relatives are obliged to help one another did not, however, disappear,
nor was it necessarily circumscribed at an equal pace with the shrinking of the day-to-day
kinship group. For example, it was still customary for the well-to-do to assist their needy
relations with money, and for the poor to help them as they could in other ways; the only
change was that the public opinion pressure was less insistent than before. In the villages,
the lending of tools and mutual assistance continued to be common practice. The cele-
bration of festivals continued to enjoy a high priority and, at least at New Year's and the
mid-Autumn Festival, the traditional concept that people who were akin should be united,
and that gifts should be given on such occasions, still held strong — for all that the govern-
ment, in connection with the New Life Movement, was denouncing feasts and gift-giving
at least as "extravagant," and was promoting mass weddings, i.e. simultaneous weddings
of a number of people, who pooled expenses. The government's onus was against the traditional New Year Festival of the Lunar Calendar, and its simultaneous attempt to "sell" China on the Western New Year, also failed of their purpose. Far from eliminating New Year feasting, they ended up giving the Chinese two New Year feasts instead of one: first, the official national holiday on 1 January, and then, later, the traditional New Year's, with all shops closed and no one appearing for work, largely by tacit and wholly unofficial common understanding.

The Clan System

The clan system declined through the transitional period. In the South, where it had been strongest, one continued to see evidence of its operation, particularly in the villages. The ancestral temples, the well-kept graveyards, the clan schools, and clan lands. Most of the clans had always drawn their income from land, which they leased out either to members or to outsiders, and from money-lending operations. It was on this income that clans had relied for financing their defense, their celebrations, and their schools, which could not have been maintained without it. The clearest indication of the clan's decline during the transitional period was the falling off of such income, which was in turn largely the result of an increase in private land-ownership at the expense of clan land-ownership. (Many of the socially prominent and economically powerful members of the clan had used their position to enrich their immediate families at the expense of other clan members.)

In Central and North China, where the clan had never been very strong, it now ceased to show any strength at all. Temples fell into decay, or disappeared. The clan heads became mere figureheads, who held office for life. Clan ceremonies often failed to be held, and clan ancestor worship was neglected. Even here, however, the well-to-do continued to recognize responsibilities toward clan relatives who were in distress, and the powerful continued to give preference to and do favors for fellow clansmen, both in filling jobs and in transacting business. Indeed, such nepotism now became, for the first time, a problem; the traditional order could function normally with pretty much any amount of it, but from the standpoint of the industrialization and modernization of China, it was distinctly a handicap.

Town and Village

In traditional China, there had been no urban areas. There were towns, of course, but these were not centers of production; rather they were the seats of the local governments and the dwelling-places of the gentry. In the transitional period, the towns underwent little change. The rice-shops, pawnshops, tea houses, tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, and other craftsmen carried on pretty much as usual. The tailor might now have a Singer sewing machine, and the tea shops might have Standard Oil lamps. Flashlight beams might cut through the night in the dark streets, and one might see an occasional bicycle. In general, there were more work-shops and small-scale factories for making cigarettes or matches or weaving and spinning. But the general pattern of town life remained the same.

In the village, the class structure remained unchanged: peasants, landlords, and hired laborers. Absentee landlords, however, became more numerous as a result of a general movement of well-off landowners to the prefectural towns. Despite the periodic re-emergence of a reasonably strong central government, the fundamental unit of government continued to be the town or county (haisen). One widespread phenomenon of the times was the abuse
of power by the gentry and/or local officials at the expense of fellow villagers and nearby farmers, usually with a view to acquiring increased income with which to buy more land, and further monopolize the money-lending business and local trade. For the peasants, this meant excessive taxes and exorbitant interest rates and prices. Land ownership was, as it always had been, very unevenly distributed. In 1933, the National Land Commission investigated 1515 large landholding families and 752,655 peasant families in 87 districts scattered over 11 provinces. The average size of the former's holdings was 29.90 mow, and that of the latter's holdings 15.8 mow. Both rents and taxes remained high, so that the peasants were constantly borrowing money at a high rate of interest. The National Agricultural Research Bureau's 1933 report, based on data from 530 areas in 22 provinces, indicated that 55 percent of the farmers had had to borrow money in that year. Nor did the peasants' difficulties end there; every civil war, every flood, drought, and famine brought further hardships, as did the world depression following World War I and the decay of Chinese home industry as a result of the introduction of manufactured goods.

Village economic activity in general had, however, broadened. With the improvement of river, railroad, and highway communications, internal trade expanded with great rapidity. Localities began to specialize in the production of particular commodities that they might sell over the entire country, although the still prohibitive cost of transportation service placed sharp upper limits on how far this trend could go.

More and more village youths went off to the cities. Greater mobility was partly possible due to the improved transportation facilities, but partly to the currency of new ideas and new ways of doing things.

Before 1931, such attempts as were made at reforms in the rural areas were made, in the main, by private organizations such as the Chinese International Famine Relief Organization, by the mass education centers such as the Tientsin Experiment, and by extension projects at several colleges. Active government work in rural reconstruction did not begin until 1933, when the National Economic Council and the Rural Rehabilitation Commission came into being, and the National Agricultural Research Bureau of the Ministry of Industry undertook a number of surveys and projects. These resulted in technical improvements in plant and animal breeding, in soil improvement, in insect control, and in the introduction of veterinary medicine—all, however, on a comparatively small scale. But there was a decided increase in crop production, and significant progress was made in the building of dikes and irrigation canals. Highway and public health programs were also developed.

With a view to correcting existing inequities in land ownership, the Land Law of 1930 (revised in 1936) created arrangements under which tillers of the soil might become owners of the land or, failing that, have their rent reduced. A move out for a 25 percent reduction in land rent had, indeed, gotten under way in 1929. Reform of the land tax was undertaken at the National Financial Conference in 1931, but the resulting measures were carried out with varying degrees of success in different provinces.

As a reaction against high interest rates, there finally arose a credit cooperative movement. Beginning in Hopeh, it spread to 16 provinces and three cities until there were, by the end of 1933, 26,221 cooperatives with 1,001,102 members. Only 30 percent of these were credit cooperatives, the remainder being marketing cooperatives, producers' cooperatives, and consumer's cooperatives. Some 51 percent were organized by the local government, 27 percent by cooperative organizing offices, 7 percent by the China International Famine Relief Commission, 4 percent by a provincial cooperative committee, and 11 percent under other institutions (e.g., colleges and banks). The first national law on cooperatives was passed in 1931, and a Department of Cooperatives was set up in the Ministry of Industries in 1933. The government encouraged the building of farmers' unions and farmers' self-help organizations, assisting them with lecture groups and winter schools.
The Guild

The guild also entered into decline during the period of transition. The strengths of the traditional guild had been its control of a local market, its simplicity, and its tight organization. As broader markets, including some abroad, were developed, the guild could no longer control the market in which its goods were sold. Increased mobility of labor and the attractions factories were able to hold out to artisans hastened the day when the guild would also lose control of its members. The apprenticeship system languished; apprenticeship was unnecessary in order to become an industrial worker in a factory, and the trades that required apprentices were not always able to compete with the factories for recruits. When China's first big strike occurred, in 1919, some of the big merchants' guilds took part, and there was a beginning period in the history of the labor movement when many guilds called themselves unions. Furthermore, many early labor unions developed out of guilds as the split between employer and employee became evident in the factories and labor looked around for means of protecting itself against exploitation. When this happened, the new organization did not bid for control of markets, but for better wages and better working conditions.

In 1930, the employers organized a Chinese Chamber of Commerce, modeled upon the foreign Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai and Tientsin. Actually an interguild organization (i.e., intermerchant guild), its purpose was to integrate China's now sprawling business community. It was similar to the guilds in that it could, by sitting much like a court, settle industrial disputes.

The Secret Societies

The secret societies became more active than ever during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty. In 1899, the long dormant White Lotus Society took part in the Boxer Rebellion. The Hung (Red) League joined the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, but withdrew its support before the latter had run its course. As the confusion of times increased, the Hung League grew in size and power, and became an organization with various branches. Both the Ch'ing government and, later, the Western powers who were concerned about its activities in the colonies, did what they could to suppress it, but it flourished not only within China but among the Chinese emigrés in the US, Canada, South America, and the British colonies. In 1899, other secret societies joined forces with it, and its power was therefrom able to make itself felt in those provinces far in the interior such as Szechuan, Shensi, and Shansi. Sun Yat-sen was deeply aware of its power resources, and whenever possible had his own revolutionary societies work with it.

In 1905 Sun founded the T'ung Ming Hui, one purpose of which was to unify China's secret societies. He paid personal visits to the various branches of the Hung League, persuaded them, for immediate political purposes, to function as branches of the T'ung Ming Hui, and then went abroad to raise funds for financing the revolution from their members. In the October 10th Revolution, it was the members of the Hung League who took control of the cities in the name of the revolutionary movement.

Another secret society that deserves mention is the Ch'ing Pang or Green League which operated mainly in Shanghai and is said, along with the Hung, to have dominated Shanghai's underground (often the societies helped the Shanghai police apprehend murderers and other criminals). It is estimated that the Ch'ing Pang had more than 100,000 members in the late 20s: shopkeepers, merchants, coolies, bankers, ricksha boys, restaurant owners, policemen, gamblers, and lawyers.
In 1932, when the Japanese warships and army invaded Shanghai, the Red and Green Leagues took responsibility for the defense of the city. Eventually the Japanese withdrew their warships. In 1937 they again tried to defend the city; having failed, they fled in large numbers to Chungking. But those of their members who stayed behind became the mainstay of the underground behind the Japanese lines.

Mention must be made in passing of the emergence during the transitional period of modern organizations comparable to those of other countries, e.g., the YMCA, the YWCA, the Banker’s Club, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and alumni and alumnæ associations.

RISE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

China had progressed during the transitional period. By the end of it, it once more had a central government. By 1936, it had 10,000 miles of railroad and 60,000 miles of highways (10,000 more miles were under construction). It had a telegraph network and a telephone network. Airlines linked major cities. It had an efficient postal service that was paying its own way. It had a modern banking system and a class of modern businessmen. Its tariff autonomy had been regained. The number of students in its primary schools was 21.4 million— as against 1,500,000 in 1900-10. The basic policy of the Chinese government as of 1936 was to create a stable new social system that would be a synthesis of traditional Chinese and Western ideas. To this end, the revolutionary renovation of traditional Chinese society was to go on, by peaceful and controlled means if possible, for many years. Much remained to be done. Administration on the higher echelons of national and provincial government had been modernized and improved, but little or nothing had been accomplished in this regard on the prefectural level. For one thing, the constant threat of domestic Communism and the continuous pressure from Japan had encouraged the government to emphasize administration from above, so that it had viewed prefectural problems with indifference, and had not even attempted to mobilize local initiative behind the general objectives. For another thing, the old-style war lords and gentry, unable to defeat the national party, had joined it, and had reasons of their own for using their influence to prevent both the renovation of local government and the reform of agriculture. Life for the common man had not become any easier: revolution and war and famines and floods continued to be his lot.

First Soviet Republic of China

A small group of Communists that had taken refuge in the southeast provinces set up the First Soviet Republic of China. It declared itself, and remained, independent of the national government, and very early began to conscript an army from among the peasants in the districts it governed. It expropriated the property of the rich, and divided the land thus acquired among landless farmers. It destroyed land deeds, promissory notes, and mortgages, and prosecuted such usurers and landlords and tax gatherers as it could lay hands on. It called itself, incidentally, the peasant movement, and proclaimed its devotion to freedom of assembly and freedom of elections. Women, it maintained, are the equals of men, and it created a new association to protect women’s rights. It advocated new labor laws to protect “the workers.” It opened “Lenin schools” to indoctrinate the public with its ideas. Most of all, it seized every opportunity afforded by the confusion of the times to undermine the existing order and the existing government of China, on the evident theory that the way to win power is to create chaos. Its technique was to work, as Marx had put it, “with the natural forces.” It appealed to the idealistic and patriotic student and professor
by denouncing imperialism; it appealed to the peasant by taking sides with him against the landlord and the gentry; it appealed to the industrial worker by taking sides with him against his employer.

**Kuomintang Actions**

When he took over the areas laid waste by the Communists during their withdrawal to the Northwest, General Chiang attempted an extensive rural welfare program, with improved public health standards, an amended land law, reduced taxation, and improved agricultural methods as its objectives. He also sought to bring about a return to the Confucianist virtues in daily living: good manners, justice, integrity, self-respect, austerity. (Confucius' birthday, for example, was declared a national holiday.) This was the "New Life Movement," which now spread to other parts of the country that it had never reached before. Had it succeeded, it might have done much to counteract the maladjustments caused by what might be called the lack of fixed standards of behavior at the end of the transitional period. But it did not succeed, in part because it was imposed from above. Later, the Communists would make the most of this lack of standards, as of Chiang's other failures. However, Chiang's record was by no means one of failure in all directions. By 1937, China was united as it never had been since well before the fall of the Manchu dynasty. The government, moreover, was presiding over an expanding economy, and was beginning to solve its revenue problem. Given time, it might have made great strides toward a new and stable society, but time ran out when the first shots were exchanged between Japan and China at Lu-kou-ch'iao in North China in 1937, and started hostilities between the two countries. Chiang finally acceded to popular pressure and declared war.

**Summary**

To summarize, the great changes that took place during the transition were: (1) The emergence of a new attitude toward age: the aged continued to be held in high regard, but the young were no longer prepared to submit to the command of a family patriarch. (2) The emergence of a new conception of the scholar and education: classical knowledge was gradually abandoned in favor of practical knowledge and the study of contemporary problems. (3) The emergence of a new relation between the sexes: the double standard did not disappear, but women acquired rights they had never enjoyed in traditional Chinese society, among others the right to compete with men in the professions. (4) The emergence of a new attitude toward land: land ceased to be the only or even the predominant form of wealth. (5) The emergence of a new loyalty, above that to the family, namely: loyalty to one's country.

**The Sino-Japanese War, 1938 to 1945**

**General Effects**

The Sino-Japanese War, though it was to go on for a long while, brought major disaster to China even during 1938, the first year of the hostilities. Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow all fell into enemy hands, and gigantic mass migration had to be undertaken if China was to survive. Millions of people had no realistic course open to them but to leave the coastal areas: their homes had been destroyed, their land could not be tilled, and they could expect no mercy from the Japanese. The number of refugees has been estimated as having risen at various stages as high as sixty million.
The disruption of China's normal life, and the loss of lives and property were vast because the country's great industrial and cultural centers fell to the enemy very early in the war. Private organizations promptly rallied behind the government, however, to effect the necessary migration and accomplish certain things that had to be done before it could take place on the scale contemplated. Even with the war in progress, for example, China actually expanded its highway system, opened new air routes, and built bridges and ferries. More than 600 factories were moved inland, involving some 110,000 tons of equipment and some 12,000 skilled workers and their families. Of China's 103 institutions of higher learning, 94 either moved or suspended operations. Museums and libraries were transplanted--by truck, rail, steamer, junk, sampan, raft, pushcart, ricksha, or wheelbarrow. Where there were railways, people perched on top of boxcars; where there were highways, they huddled rides on trucks. The rest walked, or were trundled on wheelbarrows, or moved along in rickshas. The refugees underwent incredible privations. Many of them were obliged to relearn from natives of the interior areas to which they fled practices that their ancestors had put up by generations earlier: how to make oil wicks fabricated out of reeds do the work of Standard Oil lamps, how to live with paper in lieu of glass window panes, how to build and live in houses of bamboo frame plastered with mud instead of bricks and concrete. But the Chinese appear to have accepted all this with little complaint. The world has rarely seen such a surge of spontaneous nationalist sentiment or such a display of unified, unshakable will to resist an external enemy.

The war and the migration together ushered in a new period of rapid social change. The big, all-prevailing fact of the period was the sheer impossibility of maintaining industrial and agricultural production at a level capable of meeting the needs of a suddenly displaced population plus a fighting army, and the growing difficulties in which the government found itself as a result. Many of the government's supporters, the business class in the industrial centers in particular, had lost their economic base and were unable to come to its assistance. The Japanese had occupied the coastal areas which meant among other things that the government received no customs revenue, and had to rely for its income almost exclusively on the land tax from, of course, a territory greatly reduced in size. Yet the demands upon the resources were unavoidably greater than ever. Displaced persons turned to it, insisting that they not be left to starve. So did the civil servants who had held posts in what was now occupied territory. So, finally, did the students who had left their homes in thousands to pursue their studies in Free China. One of the most remarkable phenomena of the period is that all the students in national universities were given free tuition and their room and board.

With the government supporting more persons than ever on a sharply reduced income, and with the cost of living soaring from week to week, it was clearly impossible to maintain the government's charges in the style to which, respectively, they were accustomed. The civil servants and the professors in the national universities and institutions, for example, were, in real income terms, paid a mere pittance, and showed little understanding of the government's predicament. They became, in consequence, discontented and sharply critical. There was, on the other hand, a small minority who were able to make a good thing, via hoarding and speculation, out of the new state of affairs, and this served to enhance the sense of injustice and the dissatisfaction on the part of others. The government's attempts to deal with this situation, e.g., by a program of price control and a rationing system, were failures, in part no doubt because of the complexity and confusion of the problems involved. Prices continued to rise, and the government, to meet its obligations printed more banknotes which only sent prices still higher. The masses of the people lived from hand to mouth. Budgeting was out of the question, as were all kinds of fiscal and
monetary planning. The government's difficulties became more and more acute as the inflation proceeded; as supplies of goods, food especially, became progressively short of the demand, the general flight from currency into goods became more pronounced. The spirit of self-sacrifice and common purpose characteristic of the early days of the war gave way to anarchic pursuit of self-interest. The slogan of the day came to be "every man for himself."

The Industrial Workers

So effective was the Japanese coastal blockade that China's industry found itself completely cut off from foreign imports and any contribution they might make to its development. It was, therefore, forced back upon native materials and upon such ingenuity as it could muster in the use of them. Aside from the Hsin-Yeh-Ping Steel and Iron Works, which had been salvaged and transported, none of China's large-scale enterprises was left. The mines, electrical plants, and transportation facilities in Free China, however, the government took control of and kept, for the most part, in operation. Small-scale machine shops were set up to make native lathes, looms, steam turbines, oil burners, automobile spare parts, and light armaments such as rifles, machine guns, mortars, and hand grenades. Other types of industrial enterprise which were able to keep going were chemical plants, leather tanneries, and paper and alcohol factories.

The number of Free China's industrial enterprises at the end of the war has been estimated at 2266, which presupposes a considerable number of industrial workers. The unskilled workers among them were mostly recruited in the locality in which the particular enterprise had come to rest at the end of the migration; the skilled workers and foremen were refugees, some of whom had brought their families with them, while others had not. They lived in congested makeshift quarters, and as the war went on suffered great privation because of the rising cost of living. Many positions in industry were filled by women, now more eager to work than ever because their families needed the extra income. Wages, of course, were able to rise some as the war progressed because, as a result of the inflation, manufactured goods could command progressively higher prices. Wages always lagged behind the rise in prices and, in any case, the industrial workers fared badly in this respect as compared to the traditional artisans and peddlers, who did business on a day-to-day basis and trafficked in necessities, or even as compared to such independent unskilled workers as the ricksha puller and hired coolie. In fact, one of the big changes in this period was the general improvement of the lot of workers used to a relatively low standard of living received at, so to speak, the expense of that of workers who had been used to a relatively high standard.

One interesting development of this period was the organization, fostered both by the government and private industry, of producers' cooperatives as an alternative to the strictly capitalistic form of enterprise that had always been found in China in the past. Most of these cooperatives were established in villages, where they served both to meet local demand for their products and to contribute to the maintenance, safe from Japan's military and economic offensive, of a certain modest level of industrial production. They were established in such diverse fields as iron and coal mining, textiles, paper, printing, tobacco, building and building materials, flour and rice milling, dyeing and bleaching, pottery and porcelain, and machine works. Many of them came to grief because of inadequate capital.

 Strikes were rare in Free China's industrial enterprises because with most people patriotism remained at a high pitch throughout the war. For the same reason Communism made scant headway among the workers, particularly during the early years.
The Students

A large number of students migrated with the universities and colleges when they were forced out of the coastal areas. Others came later, as enemy control tightened in occupied China. Many lost everything, including their credentials (transcripts and identification papers) on the way to the interior. Many made a considerable part of the journey on foot. Arriving at their destination in Free China, they were crowded into improvised school dormitories, mostly in dilapidated, floorless local temples or in temporary barracks. Cold, malnutrition, and disease were their daily lot. The support they received from the beleaguered Nationalist government, though generous by comparison with the resources at its disposal, was always inadequate to meet their basic needs. Their lessons were constantly interrupted by bombings, or, worse still, by the recurrent need to move on as the Japanese Army advanced. Mock prints on grayish brittle paper served them in lieu of textbooks. Laboratory equipment was seldom available, even for courses in which it is usually regarded as indispensable. When the students were obliged to study at night, they pored over their badly printed leaflets as often as not under candlelight.

Free China's educational institutions were scattered about over the hinterland, with a considerable concentration in three centers: Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming. In spite of all these physical privations, the students' spirit and interest in national and international affairs continued. By 1939, astonishing as this may seem, there were 40,000 students enrolled in refugee colleges, as against only 32,000 in all institutions before the war. To be sure, this expansion took place to some extent at the expense of the colleges' standards especially because of the bombings and the inadequate equipment — at least in the strict academic sense, because in other respects the colleges thrived as never before. Many students for the first time came into direct contact with the peasants, and saw how the majority of their fellow countrymen lived and toiled. Because of their poverty, moreover, they were forced to move closer to practical living than they ever would have, had the colleges never migrated. They grew their own victory gardens. They learned the value of labor. They produced new types of poetry, and a new kind of drama, modeled on that of the West and emphasizing such new themes as nationalism, individualism, and freedom. They made agricultural and sociological surveys of hitherto little known parts of China's vast undeveloped hinterland.

As times became harder the Communists, capitalizing upon the injustices the students saw about them and the hardship they were suffering under the existing social order, were increasingly successful in winning converts among them.

The Farmers

Few peasants moved into Free China. It was not easy for them, tied as they were to the land, to join the migration. Those who remained in occupied territory, especially those who remained in the areas of battle, suffered intensely. The Japanese Army lived off the food they grew, and kept them terrorized by its foraging and its disregard for the law and for normal standards of justice.

Most of the landlords and local gentry moved, fairly early in the war, into the towns and cities. The peasants, in consequence, enjoyed more freedom than they ever had before, and had a relatively free hand in supporting, or even participating in, guerrilla activities calculated to harass the thinly-spread Japanese troops.

The peasants in the hinterland fared somewhat better. They still had their high rents and taxes to pay, but soon after the war began agricultural products were commanding unprecedented prices. Because the government could not do without their produce, it
went to great lengths with assistance measures for them. It sponsored the extension of credits through various banks. It made soil surveys and conducted novel agricultural experiments; it introduced new foods and new methods of cultivation. Conscription however, impoverished the farming areas by draining off tens of thousands of able-bodied men, and the landlords, by successfully evading taxes, shifted much of the wartime tax burden onto the backs of the peasants. Early in the war, when taxes and rents were still being paid in cash, this added burden was not intolerably heavy. But by 1941, taxes were being collected in kind rather than in cash, and the peasants' lot became harder, though it was at no time the class upon which the war levies fell heaviest.

_Salaried Class_

The Chinese upon whom the war inflicted its wounds most savagely and directly were those of the salaried class: the professors, the civil servants, the clerks, and the teachers. Their income, despite a series of upward adjustments, always lagged far behind the rapidly rising price level. In order to survive, they were obliged to strip themselves of possessions, send their wives out to work, hold down several jobs simultaneously, seek jobs as manual laborers (which they would never have considered doing in the past), and learn to perform for themselves the manual tasks that they would normally have had performed for them by servants. The government was not unaware of or indifferent to their predicament: besides increasing their pay, it sought to help them by rationing such staples as cooking oil or cloth, and, in the end, tied their wages directly to the cost of living as is done in some contemporary labor agreements. As these measures proved cumulatively inadequate, salaried people, making perhaps the most difficult adjustment of all (given their backgrounds and upbringing), began to protect themselves by "playing" the market for goods—getting their current resources out of cash into goods, especially goods whose prices might surely be expected to go up. This, of course, merely increased inflation, which in turn forced them into further operations of the same kind. Nor was that all: this dabbling in the functions of the "lowly merchant," in a context in which others were playing the market more successfully and on a much larger scale, did much to undermine their capacity to give to Chinese society the chief contribution it needed from them, namely, that of maintaining high professional and patriotic ideals in such fashion as to serve as an example to others.

_Speculators and Racketeers_

There was, as has been intimated, one group that profited enormously from the war—the speculators and racketeers. This group recruited itself, as the war proceeded, from several major sources: former gentry who had become government grain assessors and tax collectors, military officers handling army payroll funds,covetous merchants who knew a good thing when they saw it—all people who either because of their official position or because of their accumulated capital were in a position either to outguess or manipulate the market. As the scale of their operations increased, and the inflation itself soared to greater heights, they became increasingly daring and ruthless, and more and more often crossed the line that divides shrewd business transactions from out-and-out crime. The government, in part because many of them were among its supporters, never dealt with them with the firm hand that would have been needed if the inflation were to be stopped.

_The Family_

A vast number of families were broken up by the mass migration. The pattern, insofar as there was one, was for the grandparents to go back where they came from and live off the land, and for the younger members of the family to try their luck in unoccupied China.
But bombings and the hazards of wartime travel drove the members of particular families every which way, and once a family's members were separated there was little likelihood of their getting back together.

Thousands of the industrial workers and government employees who followed the government into the hinterland left their wives and children behind them, many of them because their wives refused to venture into the unknown hardships ahead. The resulting separations lasted for many years, and created great problems of their own, not the least of which was that of the "war-of-resistance wife," who became a still greater problem if the "war-of-resistance husband's" first wife finally got through the lines to join him. After the war, a law was passed giving "resistance wives" legal status, and the problems, in consequence, mounted still further.

In Free China, family life went forward in conditions of great economic stringency. Most families were cut off from any economic base they had had in the land, and thus could not fall back on it in a pinch as they had done in the past. Most were progressively impoverished by the inflation; and because of inflation and overcrowding even the most elementary hygienic precautions went by the board.

Women, in much larger numbers than in the past, found it necessary to find some way of supplementing their families' incomes. Many launched small businesses: little tea shops, for example, or second-hand clothes stalls in street markets—anything that did not call for a large amount of capital. Many sought jobs as teachers, clerks, and office managers.

The People's Political Council, highest advisory organ in the government, had its complement of women members. Nurseries staffed by women were organized for the children of employed mothers, as were the orphanages and Red Cross organizations launched in connection with the war. Some women joined the army, and served in various military capacities. The famous guerrilla leader, Madame Chao, was only the most famous of Free China's women soldiers.

Austerity was the dominant note in the family ceremonies of Free China. Marriages were solemnized en masse instead of in the traditional separate ceremony for each couple, or were regarded as solemnized once they had been announced in a newspaper. What with the breakdown of normal local community restraints, sexual morals became unprecedentedly lax. Divorces, like marriages, often took the form of a mere newspaper announcement.

One important development brought about by the war was that different classes of people—students, laborers, government officials, families, and individuals alike—shared the same hardships in one and the same cause, and thus were thrown together as they never had been before. They undoubtedly emerged from the experience with a new understanding for each other, and a new kind of mutual respect and affection.

Some other changes that occurred during this period can be mentioned here, despite the fact that they do not concern the family as such. The isolated, conservative hinterland, where modern ideas and methods, especially in industry, had never before penetrated, became overnight a vast laboratory of social and economic change. The vital importance of agricultural products in the imports-starved wartime economy of Free China was reflected in a whole series of measures by which the government tried to promote the welfare of the farmer, particularly by reducing his rent and the rate of interest at which he could borrow money.

Over against the rapprochement between classes must be set the fact that as the inflation made living conditions more and more difficult, the law-abiding enslaved classes deeply resented the sudden wealth and privileges of the speculators. Their disillusionment and discontent on this score were aggravated by the unhappy course of the war itself, which finally shook many people's faith in the inevitability of victory and the future independence

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of China. Many developed a kind of cynicism that made them fertile ground for the seeds of Communist ideology. This tendency in turn was aggravated by the government's persecution of the more radical elements, which seemed to many of them to confirm the Marxist dogma as to the relation between poverty and freedom under capitalism.

Problems of the Nationalist Government

The difficulty and complexity of the problems faced by the government of Free China cannot be exaggerated. It had to create, out of extremely limited resources, an entire new economy, and make the latter meet the needs of a population being constantly expanded by the migration. It had to support a huge army, and provide facilities for its communications and logistics in a vast undeveloped area.

Many critics believe that the government's greatest error lay in the policy of moderation it adopted throughout the war. It never succeeded, these critics allege, in shaking off the traditional Confucian emphasis on the "bitterness factor" and on tolerance. It was motivated by a deep sense of obligation toward its people, and hesitated to adopt the drastic and ruthless policies that might have strengthened its hand in the war. It tried to assist everyone and, consequently, it is further alleged, pleased no one.

Another mistake with which the government is often charged is that of failing to put down roots in the Chinese masses with which to capture their imagination and support. This it probably could have done only at the price of giving attention to and acting upon some of the current popular demands for reform, which would have called for very considerable change of basic political philosophy on its part. The whole regime, as started by Dr. Sun and continued by Chiang, was based on the notion of authority and direction from above — on the notion of having government serve the needs of the people as interpreted not by themselves but by higher authority. This failure had at least three important consequences: first, the government was never as effective as it might have been had it enjoyed enthusiastic popular support; second, its cumulative ineffectiveness drove it to tighter and tighter controls of a semitotalitarian character (e.g., its secret police force became increasingly active as the war years passed) — or, to put it a little differently, because it did not move closer to the people, it found itself obliged to move away from them; and third, by not reaching for mass support it gave the Communists an enormous strategic opportunity to do just that — to cultivate the masses to espouse programs calculated to please them and to argue plausibly that Communist objectives and popular aspirations always coincided. They developed local units which concerned themselves, not always unsuccessfully, with local problems. They encouraged local meetings at which ordinary people were encouraged to speak their minds. They fostered cooperatives. They worked courageously with the peasants behind the Japanese lines, and themselves engaged in extensive guerrilla activities. And all this gave them a certain rapport with the masses that was to pay huge dividends at a later date.

Alliance with the Communists

In 1937, at the beginning of the War, the Communists and Nationalists had agreed to a united front. At that time, the Communists already had their own autonomous regime on the Shensi-Kansu border, with some three million people subject to its control. Militarily they concentrated on guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, and thus had none of the problems of supply and transportation that the Nationalists had to face. They were able to give to political agitation a kind of attention that the Nationalists reserved only for the
War. That is, they never forgot that they were engaged in a struggle for power that would go on after the War. To this end they poured great energies (as more and more evidence that has come to light clearly shows) into developing a program of land reform, to improving local administration, to perfecting their party organizations, and to building up an army for future use rather than for deployment against the Japanese. There are now available numerous eye-witness accounts of how they sought to undermine rather than forward the Nationalist war effort, both by skillful propaganda exploitation of conditions in Free China and by seeing to it that it was their influence, not the Nationalists', that extended to the rural areas of occupied China. It was, therefore, the Nationalist Army that bore the brunt of the Japanese fighting. Late in the war, when the national government's forces were greatly reduced and weakened, the Communists became openly militant and aggressive toward them, with the result that an increasing number of armed clashes took place even while both were supposed to be fighting the Japanese.

The Communist Army, only 85,000 strong in 1937, had expanded to over a million by the end of the War. The population the Communists governed had grown, meantime, from three million to sixty to eighty million people covering not less than eight provinces of North China. Party membership had grown from one hundred thousand in 1937 to one million two hundred thousand in 1945.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT, 1945 TO 1949.

Internal Problems

When the War finally ended, the weary Chinese were quite eager to put all thoughts of it out of their minds except their resentment of the Japanese. China had won, and now everything would be all right. Most of all, everyone began to think about reversing the flow of the migration and going home. Every conceivable mode of transportation was pressed into service, so that soon all shipping space was booked for six months ahead. Believing that there would be better and cheaper goods at home, families set up roadside booths and offered for sale the possessions that they did not need immediately and that would take up space on the return trip. Most of what they sold went for a song because of the limited purchasing power of the local population.

The problems the Nationalist government was now called on to solve were staggering, and out of all proportion greater than those the Communists had to deal with in the territory they governed. It had to provide at least the equivalent of the prewar communications system of its area. It had to get the economy and social order of complex urban communities back on their feet. It had to take over the administration of Manchuria and Taiwan (Formosa). It had to set up arrangements for disposing of enemy property and for relocating millions of displaced people from both Free and Occupied China.

Communist Duplicity

These problems were eased somewhat by assistance of various kinds from the government of the United States. But Chiang paid dearly for this assistance as far as his domestic political position was concerned. For the Communists seized on the continued presence of US troops as a means of whipping up anti-imperialist, anti-American feelings, especially among the students and professors, and of identifying Chiang with American imperialism.

This was the period when Chiang was often criticized abroad, even by nations allied to China, for his "refusal" to "cooperate" with the Communists. Was not even Communist Russia an ally and friend now? And were not the Chinese Communists, unlike Chiang,
showing every willingness to cooperate? Such criticisms, which, reported back to China, further weakened Chiang's hand politically, overlooked the fact that the Communists had nothing to lose by cooperating, especially since they were able to handle their negotiations with Chiang in such a fashion as to make it appear that he was determined to destroy them. They did this so successfully, indeed, that soon they were able to abandon even the pretense of a united front and, having progressively built themselves up into a well-organized, well indoctrinated force, to become openly defiant. Thanks to their Russian neighbors in Manchuria, they were able to provide themselves with a huge supply of captive Japanese arms and equipment. When the Russians withdrew from most of Manchuria, they were able to consolidate their position there, thus not only adding to their own strength but also, by the mere denial of Manchuria's resources to China, preventing the restoration of the rail network in eastern China and dealing a severe blow to China's entire economy.

Instead of cooperating in the reconstruction of China, they made it their major business to further discredit the national government. The threat of civil war loomed ever larger in people's minds, and created a state of uncertainty that helped the Communists if only by making Chiang look as if he were unable to govern China. This was especially true in economics, where the uncertainty, combined with the galloping inflation, discouraged investment and thus indefinitely postponed recovery. But it was true in other areas as well. Just as during the War, there were repressive measures, corruption, and thriving racketeers, all of which the Communists made the most of in their propaganda.

Open Warfare

By the middle of 1947, a full-scale civil war was indeed under way. It began, by Communist choice, of course, not in China proper but in Manchuria, where they were able, because of the Nationalists' long, stretched-out lines, to put to good use the guerrilla tactics in which they had gained so much experience during the preceding years. For the second time in a decade, the Chinese people found themselves fleeing before an army sweeping down from the North. Again trains and highways were jammed as, in area after area, the Communists' approach created general panic, with everyone eager to get away but with no clear notion as to where to go. Most people's first impulse was to go to whatever place in China they had originally come from where there was family land that might keep them from starving, and where they could stay at least until they had some good reason for going elsewhere. For a time there was utter confusion, in many towns, with some people struggling to reach a given spot as a place of refuge while others were leaving it because it had become too dangerous. Finally, however, the strong traditional Chinese tendency to accept whatever comes fatalistically asserted itself, and people decided that escape was futile. "Anyway," they reasoned, "we shall have peace. The Communists are Chinese, a change might be good. Could we be worse off than we are? After all, have not our former friends and allies also denounced the government?"

Communist Victory

The national government finally abandoned the mainland, and took refuge on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). The Communists marched successively into Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, and, finally, Szechwan. The whole of the vast mainland was theirs at last.

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In September 1919, the Communist Party convened the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference made up of representatives of the various regions, of the army, of certain political organizations, and of a number of specified social groupings. This conference set up a central state structure, called the Chinese People's Republic. On 1 October 1919, the new structure was officially inaugurated.

THE COMMUNIST SOCIAL ORDER, 1919 TO —

The Communists brought with them a new social order, developed and then tested under conditions of civil warfare. They have taken over, largely intact, the dynamic program of the Communist Party in the USSR, and adopted as its philosophy the doctrine of Leninism-Stalinism. By way of making sure that their will shall not be challenged, they maintain a well-disciplined and experienced army, four to five million strong. The backbone of the regime, however, is a highly disciplined Communist Party, which now has more than three million members, which, though it has always called itself the “party of the working class,” does not, in fact, represent either China’s workers nor its peasants. It has always shouted anti-imperialist slogans but that does not make it nationalistic. It originated — and has remained — a small group of professional revolutionaries, whose objective was the seizure and maintenance of power. It had a highly selected membership, and is regularly purged of its unworthy and doubting elements. The Communist Party is, in a word, a bureaucratic elite, whose object is total control, political, economic, and social, of the Chinese people.

The Communist Party is, in a word, a bureaucratic elite, whose object is total control, political, economic, and social, of the Chinese people. It makes no secret of the fact that the Chinese People's Republic is merely a convenient instrument for accomplishing the eventual transition to a classless society in which its leadership will be undisputed. The ultimate aim, to which it ruthlessly subordinates all else, is “a socialist and eventually Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony.”

The social order that the Communists have built, and are continuing to build, has been planned at every point with an eye to a carefully formulated political goal. This is true in two senses. The social order, and the social program that underlies it, are calculated to translate into reality a political philosophy, and, meantime, to keep political power exclusively in the hands of those who accept that philosophy. When, with the passing of the year 1927, the Chinese Communist Party found itself driven from the cities and obliged to settle in the rural areas, Party strategy gave top priority to gaining the support of the peasant. Having grasped the enormous revolutionary potential of rural China, it saw to it that its army and the organizations it built and controlled were, for the most part, made up of peasants and dependent primarily on peasant support. Naturally enough, therefore, it emphasized a vigorous program of agrarian reform, and carried it out relentlessly.

The “New Democracy”

When, however, years later, it approached the conquest of the whole of China, it remade its program, tailoring it to the preferences of city dwellers, especially industrial workers and intellectuals. At this time, therefore, one finds Mao formulating his concept of the “New Democracy,” that is, “a new type of revolution wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at setting up a new democratic society, a new state of the combined dictatorship of all revolutionary classes.” By 1919 he is saying: “The center of gravity has now shifted to the cities and the Party must do its utmost to learn how to administer and build up the city.” To this end, he adds, the Party must not rely merely upon the working class, but must “win over the intelligentsia and win over as
much as possible the petty bourgeoisie and their representative personages to cooperate. More specifically, the New Democracy is "a people's democratic dictatorship"—an alliance of four classes: labor, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie (meaning all merchants and industrialists untainted by foreign imperialism). Under the leadership of the working class (and Communist Party), these four classes are to unite together, form their own state, and elect their own government whose task it will be to exercise dictatorship over the "vultures of imperialism," the "landlord class," the "bureaucratic capitalist class," and the "Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen." The apparatus of the army, the police, and the courts, will one day wither away, but will continue to be necessary as long as reactionaries and imperialism are present on the scene. The classes hostile to the coming of Communism must somehow be deprived of their capacity to affect events, which means first of all cutting them off from political power by reserving to the "people" the right to vote and to voice opinions. Even the "people," of course, have within them the vestiges of reactionary influences; they must be persuaded "to reform their bad habits and thoughts derived from the old society." In the case of the reactionaries, more drastic measures will be used if they are needed to defend the people's interest. Thus the Communist Party justifies the liquidation of the undesirable elements in its social order.

The People's Republic

The People's Republic of China was launched as a "united front" of "the people." By "people," the Communists mean only "those who agree to support the New Democracy, oppose imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and agree to overthrow the Kuomintang reactionary regime." There were 662 delegates at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that created the republic. They represented, according to Communist claims, a broad cross section of the people — the reactionaries excluded.

The Organic Law of the CPPCC

The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference officially adopted an Organic Law of the new Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. This "Government," the supreme organ of the new state, has, as its executive head, a Central People's Government Council, of which Mao Tse-tung is President (he is also Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, which controls all the country's armed forces). The conference also adopted a new capital — Peking — a new flag, and a new national anthem — the simple and familiar battle song which had electrified the whole country during the first days of patriotic fervor after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War: "Arise, ye who would not be bond slaves!"

The Central People's Government

The Central People's Government, viewed as a political system, is an ascending hierarchy of people's congresses on several levels: hien, county, province, and administrative area, with the All-China People's Congress at the top. Each congress elects the people's government at its level (e.g., the All-China People's Congress elects the Central People's Government). In practice, however, because of what is known as "democratic centralism," the system does not operate in the manner this description would suggest. For the people's government at the lower level is in fact confirmed by the people's govern-
ment at the higher level, and it is clearly understood by all concerned that the people’s government at the lower level obeys the people’s government of the higher level (thus the smallest local people’s government, any place in the country is a subject to the will of the Central People’s Government on all matters in which it chooses to intervene). This “vertical” democratic centralism is supplemented by a horizontal device that helps to maintain control by a small group at the top and center; the same personnel, i.e., the Communist Party leaders are the highest officers of the People’s Liberation Army, and the highest officials of the government, not only on the highest level but also on the regional, provincial, and municipal levels.

**Indoctrination of the People**

In the present initial “revolutionary stage,” the first task of the political machine just described, and of the social order it controls, is “the mobilization of revolutionary forces.” This the Communist Party accomplishes by sending well-indoctrinated and trusted Party executives or cadres out among “the people” to rally them around some interest or program that will carry China a step farther toward the classless society, or, what amounts to the same thing, will further undermine some traditional social force that stands in the way of such a society — if only by obstructing total Communist control. Each of these interests or programs thus becomes the raison d’être for a new institution, carefully devised to fit into the future fully totalitarian state. Always, however, these programs take the form of a mass organization of one kind or another. For example: the Communists identify a group of discontented people, and go to work to persuade them that they should demand such and such rights, or such and such a reform, which, whatever their or its merits would never have been conceded by the old order in China. Having persuaded them, the next step is to induce them to organize themselves for the express purpose of securing those rights or that reform. The common characteristic of its members may be social, economic, or professional, or it may be a matter merely of sex or age. It may be the Peasant’s Association, or a Democratic Women’s Federation, or a Federation of Democratic Youth, or an Association of Writers and Artists, or a Children’s Corps or a Young Pioneers’ Corps, or a Students’ Federation. It might have as its base of operations a factory, a shop, a school, a company, or a government office. Its members might be the carpenters, or butchers, or artists. Every member of “the people’s” society — and nobody else is eligible — sooner or later finds himself caught up in one of these “grass-roots” organizations, which really are grass-roots organizations except that the original impulse comes from elsewhere; most individuals will find themselves, sooner or later, in more than one.

By controlling and guiding these organized protest groups, the Party can “coordinate directly and indirectly the armed struggle — the principal form of struggle — with many other necessary struggles, the struggle of the workers, the struggle of the peasants, the struggle of youth, of women and of all the people with the struggle for political power.” The last five words of the passage quoted are the significant ones, for they say as clearly as possible that the Communists ultimately use these organizations for purposes entirely unrelated to the program or issue that brings them into being. Women’s organizations or even children’s organizations find themselves promoting land reform peasants’ associations, become centers for adult education, which turns out to be merely Communist indoctrination. In Southern and Eastern China the peasants’ associations became devices for, among other things, “registering” the peasants’ weapons.

Most mass organizations have a pyramidal structure like that of the political system, extending into every part of the country from the prefecture to the county to the province to the administrative area to the nation. Each has its congress and its executive committee.
at each administrative and geographic level. Each applies the principle of "democratic centralism"; the congress at each level is "elected" by the organizational units at a lower level, but in fact is appointed from above. The apparently continuous link from the people to the top of the hierarchy enables the central authorities not only to keep a finger on the pulse of the organization as a whole, but to make the pulse behave as they wish. As in the political system, the real chain of command runs from the top downward, mostly via a hierarchy of committees. The executive committee at each level is the actual directing body, and is, in theory, elected by the congress. Actually, the committee membership must be approved by the executive committee of the next higher level, and is subject to its discipline and orders. Every major "decision," "order," "program," and "policy" thus originates with the central committee, and is passed down through the regional committees to the grassroots, where it is seen to that the mass membership follows and implements it. At the top of each organization is the inevitable national congress and the inevitable central committee.

The Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party is specifically designated the "highest command for the leadership of all organizations." Every organization is understood to be subordinate to the Party, is expected to look to the Party for leadership and direction, and is kept constantly reminded that "one may always appeal up." In each, a nucleus of Communist Party cadres call the tricks — as the official literature puts it, "for the purpose of strengthening the Party's influence and carrying out the Party's program and work." And, as indicated previously, the mass organizations are woven together into a complicated network the function of which is to produce mutual support for carrying out the Party's program. Communists in the political and military set-up often, to this end, are named to the executive committees of the most important mass organizations.

In October 1950, according to official Communist statistics, the All-China Federation of Labor had over four million members, the All-China Democratic Women's Federation over thirty million, and the Federation of Democratic Youth over seven million. In mid-1951, according to the same source, the peasant's associations in four of China's six administrative areas had a membership totalling over eighty-four million. Making a generous allowance for exaggeration, one must still think of these mass organizations as gigantic. There is, moreover, every reason to think that they are still growing.

The Family

In the early days of their regime the Communists, as expected, found in the family the most stubborn and entrenched stronghold of China's traditional social order. This was especially true in the rural areas, where the Communists achieved their first great successes. From a very early moment, therefore, Communist propaganda denounced the traditional family system as "feudalistic and barbarous," and sought to expose its injustices and shortcomings.

The Marriage Law of 1950

The first law enacted following the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, accordingly, was a new "Marriage Law" (1 May 1950). It purported, above all, to vouchsafe to women the rights they had been denied by the traditional order. Its basic principles were: individual rights and interests are to take precedence over those of the family;
marriage is to take place only by mutual consent, and thus becomes a matter of individual preference; coercion of either bride or groom, intervention by a middleman, and payment of a dowry — all typical features of traditional Chinese marriages — are prohibited under penal law; the family is the nuclear conjugal family; in order to contract marriage, a man and woman have merely to register in person with the people's government in the locality in which they reside, a husband and wife who wish to divorce may, similarly, obtain one merely by registering, though this step should, in the view of the law, be taken only after efforts have been made to preserve the marriage: in the absence of mutual consent to a divorce, either party to a marriage may apply for a divorce on the grounds that continuation of the marriage will lead only to continued strife and to reduced productive capacity; within a going marriage, husband and wife are companions, and enjoy equal status in the home; each has the right to choose his or her occupation, to engage in work, and to participate in social and political activities without interference from the other; husband and wife should engage in emulation contests of their own, and should review their achievements together; they have the same property rights, and each has the right to use his or her surname; children born out of wedlock can easily be legitimized by legal action. "Husband and wife are in duty bound . . . to live in harmony, to engage in production, to care for the children, and to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of a new society."

Thus the duties and privileges of each member of the conjugal family, husband and wife, children and parents, are removed from private jurisdiction, to be defined by the state. Any violation of the Marriage Law is declared subject to punishment. Neither filial piety nor ancestors, both pillars of the traditional family system, are mentioned. The family is divested of all collective responsibility for its members' actions, and members of the family are no longer expected to put filial piety and duties to the family head first. Women under the new law, enjoy equal rights with men. (For example, widows are encouraged to remarry, and to make their own decisions as to what surname to use.) Equal rights, however, e.g., the equal right to own land, carry with them equal responsibilities. Women are expected to be equally productive with men; they are, for example, to till the fields not as a part-time job but as a major activity. By throwing the weight of the regime behind individual economic rights and claims (the wife's equal right to own land), the Communists weaken the traditional family and clan: families end up owning less land and individual dependence on them is reduced. The regime does, to be sure, encourage family councils, but the theory is that they will make for more rational division of labor and thus increase production, and that they will give the young a chance to express opinions on an equal basis with their elders. Thus, of course, is far from the traditional family and its practices.

The regime has consistently urged women to seek assistance from the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, and it appears that many of the women who have benefited as individuals, from the Federation's efforts, have become ardent members.

There has been a marked increase in the number of cases involving marriage disputes that are heard by the courts, especially in the large cities, where such cases have accounted for half of all civil suits. The regime's intended substitutes for the family are such organizations as the Democratic Women's Federation, the peasant's associations, the Democratic Youth Corps (for youths 14 to 25), the Children's Corps, and the Young Pioneers' Corps (for boys and girls 9 to 14). Each of these organizations attempts to protect the rights of its individual members, and thus performs many functions that the family performed traditionally. Each, like the old family, demands the highest loyalty on the part of its individual members.
An early piece of Communist literature—one which found its way into thousands of Chinese villages well ahead of the Red Army during the civil war—throws interesting light on the Communist attitude toward the traditional family and its relationships. It was entitled "Don't Kill Him" and told the story of an old mother who actually begs the Communists to spare the life of the Red soldier who has killed her son. "He was only an opium smoker," she pleads, "so why kill a good soldier for him." Wives who criticize their husbands, children who inform on their parents, are put forward in such literature as examples of progressiveness and patriotism. The man and woman who have married for love and are careful not to neglect their work for the Party symbolize the happy Communist family. "They were able to reconcile their marriage and work." "I shall always," says the wife, "make work come first. I shall eradicate the little irritations in my private life, so that we shall have unity of purpose and thought and harmony in love."

One story offers an account of a family of four sons. The eldest, an ardent Communist who serves in the army, tries to persuade his parents to let one or two of his brothers join up. "Are you no longer a member of our household?" the father gravely demands, "Are you owned by the state?" The parents' "feudal ideas" are eventually changed, and they happily watch their sons go forth to do battle.

No other blow that the family has sustained from the regime has been so damaging to it as the emphasis it puts on continuous attendance at long-drawn-out meetings within the organizations mentioned, with no ostensible reference to the family. Because of it, children spend little or no time with their parents: on many days they are away from home from early morning until time to go to bed, with every minute taken up with school and organization activities. Similarly, because of their jobs and their organizations, husband and wife see much less of one another than would be the case if the regime did not make such a point of attendance at the latter.

The Communists encourage openness and frankness in the expression of one's thoughts, among other things about relations between persons of opposite sex. This also helps to break down the beliefs and attitudes clustered about the traditional family. The manifest ultimate aim of the Communist Party, in short, is the complete liquidation of the family system which China had known in the past.

The regime attaches great value to having children under state care and protection from an early moment in their lives. By 1951 the number of nurseries had increased ninefold as compared to the "preliberation" periods. Nurseries have been organized, for example, for children of working mothers, with such organizations as the women's federations, peasant associations, and mutual aid groups taking the lead. A mid-1951 directive of the Northeast Administrative Area stipulates that "Every factory or mine where there are women workers who have children must set up a creche or a kindergarten or both." Nor does the People's Government leave any doubts in anyone's mind that these are only the beginnings of a large and ambitious program in this area.

**Youth Groups**

The main organizations for children are the Children's Corps and the Young Pioneers' Corps. The Children's Corps has its far-reaching "Little Teachers" program, i.e., its members teaching adults in their home or village what they have learned in school, and helping peasant women keep in touch with their soldier husbands by mail. The Young Pioneers' Corps, a rapidly growing organization of boys and girls from 9 to 11, are taught Five Loves—love of mother land, love of the people, love of labor, love of science, and love of public property—not, be it noted, love of parents or home. The bases for these groups are schools, children's institutions, or residential areas (e.g., an entire street or a village).
to fifteen children constitute a platoon, three to five platoons a company, and three to five companies a "detachment." The impelling force behind the program is the New Democratic Youth Corps, whose members, together with a large number of school teachers, act as leaders and instructors of the various Pioneers' groupings (i.e., Party indoctrination). "Public activities" are their major concerns.

Three all-China youth organizations — the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, the All-China Student's Federation, and the New Democratic Youth Corps — have been functioning since 1949. They were formed by merging all existing youth groups.

The Farmers (or Peasants) and Agrarian Reform

Another strong social force with which the Communists have had to reckon is the rural gentry. This class, even as recently as the time of the Communist take-over, constituted a concentration of power which, clearly, the Communists could not have contained and captured from the moment the movement began. Even so, the gentry continued to retain and hold on to a large share of land, and for a time the Communists were faced with the problem of what to do about them.

The law provides that every individual, man and woman, shall have a portion of land. But here, as in many other matters, the major reliance has been placed in the hands of a mass organization whose techniques and procedures one can take as illustrative of the techniques and procedures of all Communist mass organizations. The law is simple. The Communists, after passing their agrarian reform law in 1949, have been able to build up an individual right which the condemned traditional social force impedes. The law provides that every individual, man and woman, shall have a portion of land. But here, as in all other matters, the major reliance has been placed in the hands of a mass organization whose techniques and procedures one can take as illustrative of the techniques and procedures of all Communist mass organizations. (It should be borne in mind, however, that one reason for the success of these huge programs is the realism and practicality of the Communist approach. The cadres are constantly reminded that they must not alienate themselves from the people; that they must rely on the people; that they must adapt to local conditions. The program of agrarian reform thus varies slightly from locality to locality, though not so much as to break the general pattern.)

As the Communist Army liberated each new village, the first task to be undertaken was the suppression of bandits, i.e., the elimination of the remaining Kuomintang troops and any other identifiable anti-Communist forces. It was usually undertaken by the Red Army unit that had liberated the village, and in cooperation with a locally organized defense corps. When this operation was well under way, party cadres or work teams arrived in the village to get propaganda activities started to collect a first land-tax. The teams usually included either a political worker from the People's Liberation Army or a member of one of the cultural work camps which trained specialists in all kinds of propaganda work. They preferred to put in their appearance at harvest time, so that the cadres might join in the work, gain the peasants' confidence, and gradually gather data about their grievances. They literally flooded the village with propaganda stories, plays, ballads, posters, and yangko dances. Personal interviews and informal group discussions figured prominently in their activities, as did "welfare programs" (eliminating insects, teaching illiterate adults to read).

As time passed, the cadres were able to identify the "positive elements" and mobilize them, at which point the emphasis shifted from general propaganda to indoctrination of these elements. Conferences of peasant representatives would then be held at various
levels, beginning with the prefecture, then the county, then the village, with a view to setting up "preparatory committees" for local peasants' associations, which finally formally launched these associations. A system of "people's democratic political machinery," with the continuing function to recruit and train new cadre from among the more promising villagers, soon replaced the old pao-chia system. The stage was then considered ready for the crucial "agrarian reform committees," which again were set up at various levels, and assigned the threefold function of gathering local population and crop statistics, surveying the land, and uncovering concealed land holdings. The peasant associations, meantime, would be expanding their membership and, a function of equal importance, learning to keep their leadership "purified" of any remnants or agents of the gentry class.

The central task of each peasant association was to carry out a program focusing on the local "tyrants" and "despots," i.e., the larger local landlords, who were pretty certain to have been also local officials. This involved, first of all, drastic rent reduction, which the peasant had by now been taught to regard as merely taking away from the landlord what had never rightfully belonged to him. So-called "speak bitterness" or "truth-telling" meetings were held, at which the peasants were urged to air their grievances, and at which, in open discussion, the class status of the local inhabitants was determined. Since a man's class status determined his fate, this was a matter of great importance. If, for example, peasant X ended up being classified as a landlord, his land, draft animals, farm implements, surplus grain, and surplus house in the countryside were forthwith confiscated. If he was classified as a rich peasant the land he owned, even if it were cultivated by hired labor, and his other properties as well thereby became protected against encroachment. (The distinction between landlord and rich peasant is, accordingly, fairly arbitrary, and has caused no end of difficulty— all the more because there was also a "middle peasant" classification, which carried with it protection of land ownership and other types of property.) If he was classified a poor peasant or a farm laborer, he would be given land and other properties (farm implements, draught animals) expropriated from the landlords. His classification also determined both his rate of taxation and his eligibility to join the various mass organizations. No one status was regarded as fixed until it had been confirmed from a superior echelon of the hierarchy of control.

Another aspect of the associations' activities was the holding of carefully prearranged "accusation meetings," at which a handful of the allegedly worst local despots would be publicly tried. The idea was to do all that was necessary to stir up the hate and anger of the masses, and let it gain momentum and fury as the proceedings continued. This accomplished several Communist objectives: it intensified class consciousness; it released the pent-up energy of the masses in a direction congenial to Communist purposes; and it enhanced the authority of the top local Communists by reminding possible future victims where power now lay in the community and how far it extended. In many localities such fury reached such a pitch of intensity on occasion that the accused had to be spirited away to prevent his being torn to pieces. The actual sentences were pronounced at a later date by a "People's Tribunal," i.e., one of the special courts created at this time to handle agrarian reform problems on the basis of evidence collected at the accusation meeting—at which, incidentally, emotions were further aroused by the yangko dancing in vogue at this time.

The antidespot movement gradually widened in scope to include landlords who had in any way showed their resentment of the reform, or had allegedly participated in secret society activities. The usual penalty, even in these cases, was death.

After the surplus properties of the landlords had been duly registered and divided among peasants, whether at public meetings or by committee action on individual requests, the final victory of the association was consummated at a "celebration meeting."
title deeds were burned and new ones given out. The peasants’ feeling of triumph was now deliberately intensified by various propaganda devices, just as, at an earlier stage, their fury had been stirred up, the idea being to make them, as the new masters of China, feel deeply their responsibility to step up agricultural production. By November 1951, according to Chinese Communist Party sources, three hundred ten million peasants throughout China had been “freed from feudal bondage,” and thus been made eligible to participate in a “celebration meeting.”

The peasant association established itself in each village as the effective and continuous decision-making authority, with the power to punish and the power to reward. For the associations by no means lapsed when the land reform was completed; they kept right on functioning, with the avowed two-folded purpose of protecting “the interests of the peasants” and “organizing their production,” which should be understood to mean steering it toward the Soviet-type state farm or collective farm. This shift from individual to collectivized labor, is being accomplished in two ways: (1) The peasant associations, in conjunction with the All-China Federation of Cooperatives (another mass organization with the usual hierarchal structure), are organizing vast numbers of rural cooperatives, both of the producer-marketing and the consumer type. The consumer cooperatives offer their members low-priced consumption goods from the state-owned, trading organizations and loans at a lower rate of interest. The marketing cooperatives are the channel by which agricultural produce reaches the state trading organizations and, ultimately, the consumer. By the end of September 1950 there were 45,000 cooperatives, of which four-fifths were in villages. (2) The associations organize mutual aid teams, some of which are permanent and others set up merely to meet an immediate situation or problem. The most usual type is the team of 1 to 10 peasants who work their lands in common on a division of labor basis, and pool their draft animals and tools.

The mutual aid teams, in particular, have had to make way against the psychological aversion of the Chinese peasant toward any form of agricultural production that is not individualistic. The regime has, therefore, been obliged to develop incentives for participation in mutual aid teams, e.g., by offering their members an inside run on loans, both of each and of agricultural implements owned by the government. There are, to date, only a few collective farms.

The Communist principle of “democratic centralism” is at work in the peasant associations just as it is in the other mass organizations. It employs “a method of persuasion” with great emphasis on indoctrination, propaganda, and education, which take primarily the form of “learning sessions.” The slogan is “Learn, learn, and learn again,” with “learning” being equated with understanding the necessity of eradicating all “reactionary and feudal” ideas, of becoming a devout believer in Marxism-Leninism, of hating the Kuomintang and “Imperialist America,” and of appreciating the “greatness” of the Soviet Union. The man who has “learned” well can, above all, be counted on to pitch in and help with whatever task the People’s Government sets for the moment as the important goal, whether it be the purchase of victory bonds, the emulation drives in donations of cash or grain, or the emulation contests relating to production and/or volunteering for the army.

Criticism Meetings
Another aspect of “democratic centralism,” closely related to learning, and previously mentioned only briefly, is the practice of “criticism and self-criticism,” especially at the numerous meetings held for this purpose. At such meetings the individuals present are supposed to point out relentlessly their own and each other’s errors in thought and action.
Each person is called upon to accept humbly and gracefully the criticisms directed at him by others, and to acknowledge in a public confession the error of his ways. While nominally calculated to give everybody an opportunity to express his ideas and point out the mistakes of cadres, Communist Party members, and government personnel, these meetings are in point of fact an important part of the apparatus by which the Communist Party disciplines and controls the rank-and-file of the population. The meetings lay bare "deviations," whether of thought or action, and enable them to be dealt with promptly. It offers the ordinary person not so much a chance to speak his mind as a situation in which he must speak it, since to remain silent is to "isolate oneself from the group," to be uncooperative, and virtually plead oneself guilty to the suspicion of harboring "reactionary" thoughts.

Its business, moreover, is carefully supervised by Party cadres, so that nothing is likely to be said that displeases the Communist Party. Its chief utility to the regime lies, however, in the fact that once a person has confessed to such and such past mistakes and publicly declared his intention to follow the ways of the New Democracy, it is easy, by putting pressure on him, to keep his subsequently overt actions in line with his declarations. Watchful neighbors and co-workers are thus made to perform a function which the secret police would otherwise have to perform by itself, and one which the secret police, in any case, cannot do as well. The indirect pressure of the group accomplishes the regime's purpose and, better still, does it in the name of democracy and public opinion. Coercion by state power is, of course, always available as a last resort in dealing with the recalcitrant individual, and, at the margin, the Party certainly does not hesitate to use it. Those who are found guilty of harboring "feudal reactionary" thoughts are first put through a process of reindoctrination or relearning. If this does not do the job, they go to the forced labor camps; if they remain untouched there, they are executed.

Communist Difficulties

The Communist regime admits that it has run into genuine difficulties with both the major programs surrounding the Marriage Law and the Agrarian Reform Law. The difficulties do not, however, appear to have been of the same character in the two cases. The Marriage Law, as it was passed by the National People's Congress, was intended to make headway against the deeply rooted family system, seems to have suffered from the fact that it has not enjoyed too wide an acceptance as a proposed change in the way of immediate benefits, and thus has been widely ignored or even disregarded. The blame, according to the regime, belongs to the Party cadres, who allegedly still cling to "feudal ideologies" and have not insisted on thorough enforcement. By September 1951, in any case, the People's Government Administrative Council was directing all local authorities to conduct a general investigation of conditions pertaining to the Marriage Law in their respective areas, and the five leading mass organizations (the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, the All-China Federation of Labor, the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth Corps, the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and the All-China Students' Federation) were issuing a joint statement on the question to all their local units.

The difficulties the agrarian reform program has run up against have been of a different and, from the regime's point of view, more serious character. In widespread areas of China, the forces of "resistance" appear to have rallied around the secret societies, and to have had some little success in infiltrating and manipulating the peasants' associations. Local people's militia units and local people's tribunals have been sent into extensive action repeatedly to deal with such situations through severe repressive measures, although even here the emphasis is on mass persuasion and indoctrination plus the offering of special privileges to the strategically situated.
Resistance to the reform appears to have been strongest in the villages of South China, where consciousness of the clan and the family are most deeply rooted. The Land Reform Committee of the Military and Political Committee in Central-South China is known, for example, to have conducted a spot check in December 1930, and to have reported that only twenty percent of the land reform program in the various districts of its area were considered “successful,” as against 30 percent that were considered “unsuccessful” and 50 percent somewhere in between. The same area has been the source of numerous reports alleging that persons accused of counterrevolutionary activities have been subjected to this or that type of violence, and some actually put to death at mass meetings.

One evidence of the concern with which the regime views its agrarian reform programs, despite the impressive statistics with which it documents the programs’ effectiveness, is the speeding-up of the actual Sovietization of Chinese agriculture. On 1 January 1932 the , the leading Chinese Communist organ, called for much more rapid and large-scale development of state farms on the regional, the provincial, the county, and even the cucounty levels. Even according to Communist sources, China proper has, at present, only 15 “comparatively large" state farms with a "sufficient number of tractors, combines, and other mechanical contrivances": ten in North China, three in East China, and one each in Central-South and Northwest China. Fifteen together are said to cover 92,500 acres, of which 27,500 acres are actually being worked, and to have a staff of 4200 workers and laborers, many of whom are revolutionaries who have been sentenced to forced labor. The number will presumably rise rapidly over the next months and years.

The Workers

The Communist Party defines itself as the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class or proletariat, and the People’s Government claims to represent the best interests of labor. Since the taking over of the cities in 1949 increased stress has been placed on bringing the working class (as opposed to the peasants) into a position of greater leadership in both Party and regime. In August 1939, the National Trade Union Worker’s Conference of the All-China Federation of Labor laid down a plan for organizing workers of all types over the entire nation, and intensified its efforts to bring all local trade unions into the national organization.

Labor Union Law of 1950

In April 1950, a new Labor Union Law was promulgated, the avowed objective of which was that the working class “may better organize itself” for participation in the new regime. It applies to all “physical and mental laborers” for hire in China, i.e., all those who depend upon wages, including technicians and administrative personnel (whose status, however, remains well above that of the ordinary worker). It requires every labor union, as soon as it is organized, to report to and associate itself with the All-China Federation of Labor as the supreme guiding agency of the working class. It forbids any working class organization that is found not to meet the Federation’s rules and standards to call itself a labor union, and it expressly prohibits strikes for any purpose whatever. The purposes of labor unions, according to this law, are “to protect the fundamental interests of the working class, to educate and organize the workers and employees so as to support the law and ordinances of the People’s Government as well as to implement the policy of the People’s Government, to educate and organize the workers and employees for the establishment of
a new attitude of labor for the strict observance of labor discipline, and for the organization of production emulation together with other production movements. Union members are given benefits, under a labor insurance law, that are not available to nonmembers.

By 1951, there were seven national industrial unions, covering railways, ports and telecommunications, transport, textiles, electric power, munitions, and education. No distinction is drawn, either by the regime or by the labor leaders, between "protecting the fundamental interests of the working class," and "increasing production." Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the pressure on the workers to step up production has steadily mounted. Several devices are called into play to make this pressure effective: (1) Continuous indoctrination of the workers, in small discussion meetings and in mass meetings, with strong emphasis on "the glory of labor," "the task of leadership belongs to the workers," and other themes of similar character. Press articles, plays, and stories written by workers are mixed with the propaganda output of the professionals to build up worker morale and self-confidence. (2) "Democratization of management," via the creation of a factory administrative committee in each state-owned factory. Such a committee, headed by the director of the factory, is otherwise made up of representatives of the workers and the administrative staff. It operates with the advice of the People's Government's Industrial Administrative Bureau, and is convened by the head of the trade union to which the factory's workers happen to belong. There is no evidence, as yet, that any such committee has brought about great changes in the management of its factory. (3) Emulation campaigns among workers, which have become increasingly common as more and more workers are organized and thus categorized. These take several forms. Individuals who have demonstrated outstanding skill and energy are made "labor heroes." A team of factory workers challenges another to a production race or contest. The man or team that sets a record of output in a particular production process is singled out for honors and publicity. The new record also becomes the topic for widespread negotiations and discussions, conducted with a view to establishing a new national standard for the production process in question (usually it is a compromise between the old standard and the new record). The relevant trade union, the Party, and the administrative authorities are all brought into the negotiations. This is good reasoning since the new production standard will be inserted in all future collective contracts between the workers and the factory authorities. (4) The opening of new educational opportunities for loyal and productive workers, and the offering of assurances that the education will lead to promotion, perhaps even to a government position. There is, for example, a three-year short-term middle school for workers and peasants, whose graduates may go to college. Also, there are special schools and reading classes. (Workers in private industry are by no means exempt from these programs looking to greater productivity, but their main emphasis is on state industries.)

These programs have not met with uniform or unqualified enthusiasm, especially when first launched. "Some workers," says a Communist writer, regarded ... the movement as another government plot to squeeze more labor from them. But they were convinced that the state-run factories now belonged to them; that while increased production still meant increased profits, this money no longer went into the pockets of capitalists or bureaucrats but would serve to strengthen the workers' own government and build up the national economy. There would then be more workers and to a certain extent, profits would no longer. Toward improving the immediate wage scale of the factory involved. Once this new attitude to labor was established, all skepticism gave way to productive enthusiasm. The wage of the industrial worker has remaizned low. But he is told that his low wages will soon be a thing of the past, and the government is determined to speed the day
when they can be raised. Welfare, he is told, cannot be discussed until the problem of increasing production has been solved.

Current reports do point to higher industrial output than in the past. Reliable figures are hard to come by, but there is evidence that the program as a whole may not come off: data have come to light about factories that have not responded to the speed-up, and about resentment at the simultaneous speed-up and the low wages.

The Merchants and Private Industrialists

The Chinese Communists, unlike, for example, the Czech Communists, did not when they came to power find waiting for them a highly developed industrial system which they had merely to take over. They have thus felt obliged to maintain a semblance of cooperation with private capitalists, in the hope that the capitalists, out of their private capital accumulation, will expand the nation's industrial resources far beyond their present low level of adequacy. Thus Mao, to the surprise of many doctrinaire Communists, included merchants and private industrialists as one of the four classes constituting "the people" of the New Democracy. "For now," he wrote, "capitalism is to be controlled, not eliminated. When the time comes to realize socialism, private enterprise will be nationalized." In general, private investment has not, since the take-over, occurred on any such scale as the Communists appear to have expected. There are two self-evident reasons for this. The regime's actual day-to-day policies—high taxes, forced savings, and "voluntary contributions"—have greatly reduced the Chinese capitalist's ability to invest. And the known intentions of the regime as to the long-term future of private investments have greatly diminished the capitalist's disposition to invest. Nor has public investment taken place on a scale capable of affecting greatly the level of the nation's productive capital, for at least one self-evident reason: the Communists need personnel capable of taking over management and operation of factories, in part because their best managers had for many years before the take-over devoted their well-nigh exclusive attention to agricultural enterprise.

The government's chief impact upon business enterprise, has been via the state trading organizations, the nationalized banks, and the machinery for regulating, directly and indirectly, various prices. These three weapons have given it a high degree of control over the merchants and other private businessmen, and there is considerable evidence that this control has recently been used, more openly and on a larger scale than formerly, to put pressure on them. The reason, as put by a lending Communist in a speech in January 1952, is that the best way to prevent the middle classes from increasing in strength is to "restrict capital." "Some middle-headed comrades," he said, "have proceeded on the false assumption that the party had to depend upon capitalists because of their business know-how." The time had come, he added, to stop "permitting private merchants to compete against state trusts."

The merchants, in spite of the present restrictions on their activities and power, remain a formidable menace to Communist rule, in the Communists' own view at least. The government's recent "four anti" movement, makes this abundantly clear. (The four slogans of the movement are "antibrbery," "antifraud," "antiprofiteering," and "antitax evasion."). Both merchants and private industrialists are accused of subverting backsliding members of the Communist Party with "sugar coated capitalist bulletins." In this connection, private industrialists are being subjected to an intensified program of "ideological remolding," and have been warned that unless they change their ways they cannot hope to save either themselves or their factories or stores. Concretely, they must stand ready to make
sacrifices on orders placed by state trusts, pay their taxes promptly and in full, and eliminate "squeezes" and graft. They are organized for indoctrination purposes in small study groups and expected to go through the standard purge procedure of confession and mutual denunciation.

The government, meantime, is known to be planning a new All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, whose task it will be to give the "right" direction to private industrialists. If the incentives offered to merchants and tradesmen continue to be shaved down, and the day comes when the state must take over all distribution and merchandising, the new Federation may well prove to be the instrument it will employ.

One further reason for the tightening of control is, undoubtedly, the heavy fiscal and economic cost of the Korean War. The jian min yiao, the Communist currency, has been kept remarkably stable by an effective rationing system, currency stabilization measures, and the drive against speculation. Industrial prices, however, have risen steadily, and, with the state claiming an ever higher share of the national income, the trend is naturally toward a lower standard of living, especially for the middle class. The poor are not better off than before, by any means, their presumptive gains from rent reduction and increased land holdings have been wiped out by the large "voluntary" contributions exacted from them, by high taxes, and by rising industrial prices.

Education

The Communists have a new concept of education. The traditional ideal of the "ivory tower" literati has been abandoned. The aim of the new education is "to produce the personnel, the readiness and the desired attitude to aid in the economic and material development of China" (i.e., technical and scientific knowledge), and to "eradicate reactionary ideas and to indoctrinate a new ideology based on Marxism-Leninism" — political education. Like other programs, the educational program shifts with and is closely coordinated with the policies of the state.

In the Communist social order, education is indoctrination and propaganda. Ideological indoctrination includes dialectical materialism, the ideology of the class struggle, the study of human evolution, and instruction concerning the advanced culture of the Soviet Union and the "decadent capitalism of imperialist America."

The new education is highly utilitarian. The student must be so educated that he can make a direct contribution to the material and economic reconstruction of the nation. He must learn by participating in labor and production activities. Classroom study must be linked with the actual conditions, problems, and tasks in the contemporary world. Science and technology are not only given precedence over other studies; there are no liberal arts as such.

In the schools, as elsewhere, the emphasis is on collective activity. Both teachers and students regularly attend learning sessions and criticism meetings. "Democratic administration" of schools, that is, having students and janitors represented in the formulation of academic policies is much in vogue.

The Communists, determined to make education available to the masses, devote great energy to the drive against illiteracy. If indoctrination and propaganda are to have their full effect, everyone must know how to read, and to feel at home with the vocabulary of the New Democracy. The whole trend is towards a more extensive, and consequently less intensive, educational program. There is a similar development in literature, at least in the sense that quality is being more and more subordinated to the need for drawing literary
output from numerous sources. Laborers and peasants are encouraged to write accounts of their experiences. Much of the new "literature" is valued because it is written in the dialect of particular local areas.

Abbreviated middle school courses are available to workers and peasants. The Chinese People's University offers complete courses of as little as six months' duration. New schools have also been organized to meet certain needs of the state for personnel for various programs, e.g., land reform or the collection of taxes.

The Chinese Communists have always given special attention to youth and to student groups. The students have, consequently, always been one of their main sources of support. When they came to power in China, the Communists launched three powerful, nationwide mass organizations for youth: the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, the Students' Federation, and the New Democratic Youth Corps. All are built in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism, although the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth and the Students' Federation are both loosely knit when compared to the Youth Corps, because they are composed of youth organizations rather than individuals.

**New Democratic Youth Corps**

The most important is the New Democratic Youth Corps which is directly linked to the Communist Party. Its members, boys and girls between 14 and 25 years of age, are under tight discipline, occupy key positions in all other youth groups, and, under the direction of the Party, exercise "leadership and control over all youth." The purpose of the Youth Corps is to "organize youth to positively accomplish the various important work and missions determined by the Communist Party of China, the People's Democratic Government of China." It works in the cities, among young factory workers. It works in the country, with the "liberated young farmers," and participates in their mutual aid programs and their cooperative movements. It works in the schools, with the student associations.

The Youth Corps runs a cadre training school, manages an Arts College for Chinese Youth, and leads the Young Pioneers' Corps. The placing of young and relatively inexperienced boys and girls in positions of power and leadership undoubtedly has been a source of friction between the state and the common people, most of whom still hold age, seniority, and experience in deep reverence and respect.

**Evaluation of Communist Achievements**

The Chinese Communist regime has taken on a tremendous task by attempting to categorize and control some four hundred fifty million individuals about whom, hitherto, there were not even accurate census data. Its business is "revolution," i.e., the complete destruction of a social order of two thousand years' heritage. The mood of moderation, compromise, and tolerance that had dominated Chinese life in the past is constricted along with that social order.

Until recently, the Communists had proceeded with relative caution. But the pressure of the Korean War has led to a general speed-up of the pace of the "revolution." It has also led to a general tightening up within the Party itself, which is no more immune than other organizations to external strains and problems. The most important development here is the "triple opposition" movement now in progress in the Party's ranks, that is, the movement against "corruption, waste, and bureaucracy." In addressing top-ranking members of the Communist Party's North-East Bureau on 10 January 1952, their leader unloosed a strong attack on "bourgeois collusion" and "rightist tendencies" within the Party. More and more backsliding Party members are being dismissed.
Although reliable statistics and a full picture of what is happening behind the Bamboo Curtain is difficult to piece together, it seems probable that the nation's real national income has increased under the Communist regime. This gain, however, must be set off against the drain upon the national economy occasioned by the Korean War, so that benefits that might have accrued to the average man have not, with the higher taxes and the emulation "contributions," been forthcoming. Whether he is a farmer, an industrial worker, or a merchant, the average man is beginning to realize that his actual lot is not what he was promised before the Communists came to power. Instead of living better, he finds himself tightening his belt — in a situation in which he dares not complain about it. Even passive resistance has ceased to be a realistic alternative, because it will be punished just as relentlessly when it is discovered as the more active types of oppositionist activity; and, under present conditions of surveillance and general lack of privacy, it will be discovered.

The fact that the average Chinese still has some spirit left, despite these grievances, is evidenced by the anecdotes and jokes which continue to filter through the Bamboo Curtain. Says one industrial worker to another, with a sad smile: "In past days, everybody exploited everybody. Nowadays, one man does all the exploiting." A ricksha coolie remarked, "In former days, we were tortoise, slow perhaps but still able to advance. Nowadays, the tortoise has turned over [fan xiang, a Communist expression for taking over leadership], and he can no longer budge."

SOCIAL ORDER UNDER THE NATIONALISTS 1949-

Evacuation to Formosa

Some two million Chinese who felt they could not accept Communism fled to Taiwan (Formosa) with the Nationalist government before the onslaught of the Communist Army in 1949. Many others have since followed. A small number of these were close associates of President Chiang Kai-shek. Some were private businessmen who believed that state Communism and private enterprise are incompatible. Some were men and women who, because of their personal experience or knowledge of Communism, were afraid to remain inside the Bamboo Curtain. There is a strong presumption that most if not all of them value freedom and democracy.

The present population of Taiwan is approximately nine million, some seven million of whom are Taiwanese natives of pure Chinese descent. (There are a few non-Chinese aborigines.)

Effect of Japanese Occupation

To appreciate fully what the National government has accomplished in Taiwan, a word should be said about the state of affairs there just after the Second World War. As of V-J Day, Taiwan's economy was in full chaos. Its industrial plant had been bombed out. The Taiwanese, after 50 years of subjugation by the Japanese, had neither the training nor the experience they needed in order to take over from the Japanese. The island's currency was inflated. Its normal trade was geared to that of Japan, where SCAP was prohibiting the resumption of normal operations.

Japan had taken great pains to teach the Taiwanese to regard their struggling compatriots on the mainland with contempt and disdain. They did not, therefore, expect much help from the Chinese government, and the latter, weakened by eight years of continuous war and thrown off balance by the onslaught of Chinese Communism, could indeed do little to help the once well-off Taiwanese get back on their feet. A further important complication
was that the Taiwanese were accustomed to the peace and order of a country under a foreign tyranny, and could not, at first, understand the "lack of uniformity" and "the complexities" of democratic rule (thanks to the Japanese, on the other hand, they had no illusions about or yearnings after Communism). Finally, the men who governed Taiwan immediately after the reoccupation gave every evidence of being more interested in increasing their power and lining their pockets than in providing good management. When, therefore, the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan in 1949, it found that it had taken on numerous grave local problems in addition to those it had brought with it from the mainland.

Political Reform

The Kuomintang, the leading political party, prepared itself to deal with these problems by putting itself through a reorganization. Its younger, more liberal leaders were, to this end, appointed to a Central Reform Committee, the main task of which was to strengthen and tighten party organization and eliminate corrupt elements, opportunists, and bureaucratic politicians. On 1 September 1950, the Nationalist government was ready to announce a new political program. Its objectives were to encourage private enterprise to the extent of avoiding monopolistic combinations and to transfer government-operated light industries to private ownership; to establish a democratic industrial system in which the workers' welfare is safeguarded by allowing them a share and a voice in the ownership and management of private enterprise; to promote the interests of tenant farmers and farmers through land reform, water conservancy, and land reclamation; to carry out local self-government and to protect civil rights.

Local self-government and land reform were the fields in which the government brought about the most spectacular changes. It first removed all the social barriers and segregation measures that had been created and maintained by the Japanese. The native Taiwanese were no longer barred from institutions of higher learning, or from the worthwhile positions in commerce and politics. They were encouraged to participate in local self-government, and to think for themselves. By 6 May 1951, 21 mayors and magistrates in 10 counties and 5 municipalities had been elected to their respective offices by popular vote. There are now 6304 village and 6i (comparable to urban wards) assemblies, in which the Taiwanese are learning the art of self-government. Representing them in town and district assemblies are 6923 village and 6i delegates. On the county and municipal levels, there are about 541 popularly elected councilmen. Of an estimated 2,650,000 qualified men and women voters, some 2,416,072 are registered. In keeping with the government's policy of economy, the total number of government employees was reduced in June, 1950 to 81,000. The percentage of indigenous citizens in the government service rose to 65.40 percent.

There has also been a marked change in the importance and responsibility of the posts held by Taiwanese. In the category of first class officials, indigenous personnel have increased from 0.92 percent under Japanese rule to 17.45 percent in the present government. In the category of second class officials, indigenous personnel rose from 1.29 percent to 25 percent.

Land Reform

The other outstanding reform accomplished by the government has been the carrying out of a new land reform program, which has greatly benefited the lot of the farmers, who are no less than 60 percent of the population. For the 70 percent of the farmers who are
tenants there has been a rent reform program, which went into effect in 1949 and set a maximum rental ceiling of 37.5 percent of the total yield (average rental had theretofore ranged from 46 to 62.5 percent of the total yield). The income of tenant farmers has, in consequence of the program, risen by an average of 30 percent. The reform legislation provides that where the main crop yields are less than 20 percent of normal the tenant shall not be required to pay any rent at all. It also gives the farmer security of tenure (landlords may no longer refuse to renew contracts in order to re-rent on more favorable terms), and it restricts landlords' right to dispossess tenants. By 1951, 97.51 percent of the tenant farmers had completed new contracts under the new law, and the landlord problem had been brought, for the most part, under control. The price of land has steadily declined, which, of course, enables more and more tenant farmers to buy land to own. The rent reduction program has been carried out in cooperation with a Chinese-American organization, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, which is responsible for a program of general agricultural improvement: the construction of irrigation dams and canals, reclamation projects, the making available of better seeds and fertilizers, animal disease control, the organization of farmer associations and rural cooperatives, and rural health measures.

By the end of the period 1950-1951, the use of US-financed fertilizer had brought rice production to the highest peak in the history of Taiwan. In exchange for much-needed foreign currency, twenty-two thousand, five hundred eighty-seven metric tons of Taiwan's surplus were exported to Japan and South Korea. Other foods basic to local consumption were also above prewar production levels. Sweet potatoes were up 20 percent, wheat 105 percent, and peanuts 89 percent. Considering the handicaps under which the government started, the economy of Taiwan is now surprisingly stable, largely because of the increased agricultural productivity reflected in the foregoing statistics.

**Economic Reform**

In 1949, to meet the economic crisis precipitated by the soaring inflation of the Chinese National currency, to which the Taiwan dollar was then linked, a fresh start was made by introducing a new currency, linked to the US dollar and backed by gold bullion brought over from the mainland. At the same time, a series of deflationary measures were enlisted. The government's expenditures, for example, were curtailed by reducing its personnel and cutting back certain of its activities; at the same time, its resources were increased by means of a new luxury tax (based upon ownership of property, including cars and refrigerators), a defense tax, the floating of bonds, and the sale of government assets. The program, as a whole, had the effect of encouraging private enterprise, so that the usual sources of revenue (customs receipts, returns from the salt monopoly, the postal services, and assorted government enterprises in fields like telecommunication, air transport, navigation, petroleum, aluminum, gold, coal, copper, and steel) became more productive.

**Industrial Recovery**

In industry, Taiwan's return to prosperity has been extremely rapid. At the time of Japan's surrender, the annual coal production had dropped to 776,000 metric tons (as compared to peak production of 1,182,635 in 1941); electric power had fallen off to 52,616 KW (as compared to the peak load of 152,355 KW in 1943); the production of sugar (the chief product for export) had declined to 86,073 metric tons (as compared to 1,418,000 metric tons before WW II), that of cement to 78,000 metric tons (as compared to peak production
of 303,400 metric tons) and that of industrial salt to 67,000 metric tons (as compared to peak production of 465,000 metric tons). The production of chemical fertilizer (33,800 metric tons before the war) had come to a halt. Tea processing plants and pineapple packing plants stood deserted. In short, by V-J Day the ravages of war, materials shortages, and lack of maintenance had almost paralyzed the industry of Taiwan. The railroads had wound up no less than 1400 steel bridges which had to be classified as unsafe to use. After V-J Day, rehabilitation work on the railroads was given a high priority. Erased steel bridge spans were removed, worn-out sleepers and rails were replaced, road beds were reconditioned. Today, passenger traffic exceeds the peak load of the prewar period; freight traffic, after tripling itself in one year, is approaching prewar peak.

Rehabilitation of the power system made great demands on the ingenuity of the available Chinese engineers. Little foreign exchange was available with which to buy needed replacements, so that the repairs had to be accomplished by reworking obsolete and broken equipment scattered about over the island. Through tedious patching and repairing operations, and the acquisition of a few spare parts that could not be imported, they tripled generating capacity in two years. By 1951, capacity had reached an all time high of 217,000 KW. Today coal (1,451,000 metric tons in 1952), cement (359,000 tons in 1951), chemical fertilizers (more than three times prewar production), petroleum, cotton yarn (three times Japanese peak production) and cotton piece goods (four times Japanese peak production) have all surpassed prewar production figures.

The sugar industry, which, as in the past, is Taiwan's most important source of foreign exchange, has done less well by comparison with prewar standards, but not, or at least not primarily, because rehabilitation operations failed to be carried out. In 1945, 27 of 36 plants stood seriously damaged. By 1948, all the factories and plantation railways had been completely rehabilitated, and by 1950 sugar production had climbed back to 630,000 metric tons. The Taiwan Sugar Corporation's capacity is now over one million tons a year. In 1949-50, however, sugar dropped in price on the world market, and farmers turned from sugar to rice. In 1951-52, the world market price began to rise, and sugar production is gradually returning to its previous high levels.

Paper and pulp mills, machinery shops, shipbuilding, and aluminum works have, likewise, been gradually restored. Another worthwhile project has been the development of a fishery industry which has improved the Taiwanese diet (including that of the Nationalist Army) without great expenditures. American economic aid has played an important role in the rehabilitation and development of all these industries.

A labor insurance policy was put into effect on 1 March 1950. Its object is described as "safeguarding the livelihood of the workers and promoting harmonious relations between labor and management so as to ensure social security and high production." According to the Labor Insurance Regulations, all workers employed in public and private factories, mines, salt fields, communications, and public utilities in Taiwan shall be insured. It is compulsory labor insurance on a limited scale. The benefits are insurance against injury, death, maternity, disability, and old age. It also has provision for free medical clinics. Thus new system of social insurance was put into effect with the cooperation of the Chinese Federation of Labor, the Free China Labor League, and the Provincial General Labor Union. Their delegates also sits as members of the legislature of the provincial government. The government has also carried out a tax reform and overhauled the tax collection system. The reform program went into effect on 1 January 1951. The number of distinct taxes was reduced from 29 to 11, leaving the income, inheritance, stamp, commodity, land, business, slaughter-house, entertainment and amusement, vehicle license, and household taxes.
Education

Free primary school education is now available to everyone, and the average number of children attending school is 80 percent. (The Japanese had restricted the education of the Taiwanese, with few exceptions, to a certain level and to certain schools.) All Taiwanese are free to attend any school or college.

In 1950, there were 121 middle schools in Taiwan. Of these 31 were provincial schools, 74 established by towns or municipalities, and 13 private schools. In 1950, there were eight normal schools, as compared to three on V-J Day, several vocational schools, and six institutions of higher learning, including a national university with a total enrollment of 6,973 students.

Since most of the institutions of higher learning are run by the government with a view to keeping costs down, a Taiwanese may obtain a high school or college education with only a small outlay of money. However, the demand for education far exceeds the opportunities because educational facilities are still in short supply. Thus the schools are overcrowded and competition for admission to them is keen. Education remains a major unsolved problem.

Evaluation of Nationalist Achievements

The Taiwanese economy today supports a considerably larger population than in the past. It also supports an army, which though it has itself cultivated land and increased other types of production in an attempt to provide in part for its own consumption, still creates a heavy drain upon the government treasury. By Western standards government employees are poorly paid; an army officer, for example, earns less than a storekeeper or peddler. The cost of living remains high in relation to average income, despite the fact that the currency is more stable than it has been for over a decade. There is some unemployment (though no beggars).

In general, however, the island's postwar record of internal peace, order, and achievement is impressive. The police force and local administration are efficient and reasonably free from corruption. Crime is at a low level. For the first time in many centuries, the government has taken an accurate census. The government gives every evidence of sincerely respecting the wishes and opinions of the people. To be sure, a permit is required for entering and leaving the island, and all residents carry identification cards. Some would attribute such measures to an overzealous secret police, but the alleged reason for them, military security, appears to be the real one. It must be remembered that a government constantly on the defensive against a merciless enemy must take extensive precautions. The important point is that despite these precautions, and the presence of five hundred thousand exiled troops on the island, the Taiwanese who keep within the law are not likely to be deprived of life, liberty, or property. This is rather confirmed than disproved by the considerable amount of grumbling in which they indulge. At any Taiwanese newstand one may purchase magazines and newspapers critical of the existing regime as well as those favorable to it, and there are no restrictions on listening to the short-wave radio. There is, on the other hand, no mercy shown genuine political offenders. The Communists employ every method in the book in their attempt to recruit Taiwanese, including blackmail and threats of harm to relatives on the mainland. The Communist slogan, familiar to everyone on the mainland, is: "We will use blood to wash Taiwan clean!" The secret police in Taiwan have good reason, therefore, to keep on the alert, and the government good reason to mete out swift justice to the proven spy or traitor. It is the general opinion
among foreign observers that in Taiwan there are fewer Communists, less unrest, and more security of the person than in any other country in the Far East except possibly Japan.

Taiwan is indisputably a thorn in the side of the Chinese Communist Party. It provides every Chinese malcontent a rallying ground on which he will be welcomed. It channels into a national force what would otherwise be the suppressed discontent of a weak and divided people. As in the Chungking days, the exiles think of themselves as occupying a temporary refuge, which they intend to maintain as a symbol of the hopes of all freedom-loving Chinese. As long as Taiwan remains outside the Bamboo Curtain, they insist, the hopes will not die.

A SELECTED READING LIST
Memories concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les arts, les moeurs, les usages, etc., des Chinois, par les missionnaires de Pekin, 16 vols., Nyon, Paris, 1770-1791.
CHAPTER 8
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

Through the centuries of their history the Chinese developed a unique and satisfying system of government. Although modifications and adaptations did occur, the Chinese relied upon an imperial pattern of government from the time of the elimination of formal feudalism in the third century B.C. until the Revolution in 1911. One of the most striking qualities of this traditional system was the amazing stability of its institutions. This stability is easy to understand if one remembers that the Chinese system of government was far more than the formal organization of government offices. The Chinese lived primarily under the domination of nonpolitical agencies, and their strong cultural tradition was the main force behind popular conformity to a set pattern of behavior. Although the formal system of government was elaborate, many of the primary functions of government were performed by informal institutions.

It was thus possible for the Chinese to be fully conscious of their identity with a great tradition and culture without at the same time developing a sense of nationalism associated with the state as an institution. The Chinese believed that they were the center of the world, that their culture was superior to all others, and that other people would readily recognize this fact once they came in contact with China. Through most of their history, moreover, the Chinese found little reason to question their superiority. China was the most developed area of Asia, and most of the surrounding peoples came to recognize many of the virtues of Chinese culture.

The formal system of government in China was adapted to a belief in and reliance upon cultural traditions. The government rarely assumed the role of making policies that would alter the traditional patterns of the people's lives. Rather, it sought to reinforce these patterns, and to meet any crisis with a pragmatic solution that would not disturb the old values. The government relied heavily upon indoctrination of the people in traditional values and attitudes, and tried to interfere as little as possible with the day-to-day life of the masses. In short, the people were taught to accept and conform to a pattern of rule that did not necessitate constant and overt control by recognized government authorities.

The important role of tradition and cultural values should be kept in mind in discussing the formal organs of Chinese government. Many of the latter were carefully defined and were recognized as possessing great power. But it was primarily the informal pattern of behavior that actually controlled the masses of the people. This is not to say that the formal structure of government was unimportant, since it maintained and strengthened the traditional values and attitudes. Thus, what is significant in the formal ordering of the government was the way in which the Chinese succeeded in developing institutions that supported the basic attitudes of the people and ensured their conformity with these patterns of behavior.
The Emperor

The imperial system of China was a monarchy in which the Emperor and his court was the central institution. In theory the Emperor was supreme, and there were no established bounds to his power. He was an "oriental potentate," and no written rules or constitution prescribed his authority.

In actual practice, however, there were many institutions and traditions that put restraints upon his behavior and authority. He was called upon to represent the traditional ideal of what a leader should be. He was, therefore, expected to embody in his behavior the traditional Chinese concepts of the good and virtuous man.

It is difficult to imagine a culture in which the leaders do not appear to represent in their actions what that culture considers to be good and upright. In Chinese culture, however, it was particularly important for the leaders to appear in such a light, because of the explicit recognition the Chinese gave to the theory of "rule by example." According to this theory, the most effective method of ruling men is to set an example to be followed by government officials and then by the general population.

The Emperor was supposed to achieve an ideal: that of a highly humanistic leader who is also an authoritarian father for his people. He was thought to possess the highest virtues and skills important in governing men. In theory he was the best scholar in the land, and capable of examining the candidates for the highest government posts. Not only was the institution of the Throne devised to uphold the Confucian tradition; the individual members of the bureaucracy had a personal tie to the Emperor, since all commissions down to the level of local magistrate were, in form, the appointments of the Emperor. As the personal head of the bureaucracy, the Emperor was portrayed as exemplifying all the better qualities of the scholar and literati class.

The Emperor also had to symbolize moral rectitude, since he had certain semireligious functions to perform. It would be too much to characterize the Chinese system of government as being a form of theocracy, since it did not rest upon a purely religious theme. Nevertheless, the Emperor did perform activities characteristic of high priests. He was deemed to be the Son of Heaven. As such, he had the responsibility of mediating between Heaven and man. He was called upon to carry out specific rituals, which would guarantee that Heaven would look with pleasure upon the Chinese people. Moreover, his personal behavior and the policies of the government were expected to be in accordance with the wishes of Heaven.

The great stress placed upon the moral actions of both the Emperor and the leaders of the government was reflected in the traditional Chinese interpretation of history. This interpretation assumed that it was possible to explain good and bad political and social developments in terms of the morality of the leaders. This tendency to interpret broad developments in terms of the morality of a few individuals was further reinforced by the Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven. This theory, which emerged early in China, held that the Emperor could rule in the name of Heaven so long as he adhered to the precepts of Heaven and good government. When he faithfully carried out the Mandate, Heaven could be expected to support the activities of man. Acts of nature such as floods, droughts, and famines were interpreted as expressions of displeasure at the personal or public actions of the Emperor, and of the failure of the Son of Heaven to mediate successfully between Heaven and his people. In the mind of the public, therefore, the government could properly be held responsible for untoward acts of nature, partly because it had presumably failed to devise policies that would cope with those acts, but also because it had presumably failed to adhere closely to the moral precepts of good conduct.
The theory of the Mandate of Heaven was applied especially during periods of revolt, when the groups seeking to depose the ruling dynasty would assert that the Emperor had lost the Mandate to rule in the name of Heaven. The very presence of a revolt was often sufficient to raise in the public mind the question whether the government might not have lost its claim to legitimacy.

It has been argued that the concept of the Mandate of Heaven was a theory that justified revolution and the overthrow of the Imperial family if and when the Emperor failed to fulfill his function, i.e., to rule according to the demands of good government. However, it is doubtful whether the Chinese were ever taught by their official ideology that revolution was permissible. Rather, it appears that the theory was used to justify the actions of leaders of revolts retrospectively: to explain how it was possible for the succeeding dynasty to claim that it, too, had the sanction of Heaven behind its rule. All changes from Imperial family to Imperial family came as the result of violence and conflict, but it was always possible to claim that the new group had obtained power because of the displeasure of Heaven with the actions of the previous Emperor. Once the new dynasty was established, it claimed that its leaders would faithfully follow the traditions of good government and described itself as morally accountable to Heaven.

Thus the Chinese Emperor's despotic qualities were tempered by both ethical and religious considerations. At the same time, however, the Chinese for the most part expected (and accepted) much in the way of arbitrary acts of authority by their governments. The Chinese did not develop institutions that could effectively check or challenge the arbitrary authority of the Emperor except at times when the court itself was politically weak.

**Administration**

Administration, in traditional Chinese government, depended upon a remarkably well organized bureaucracy whose leading officials were the immediate advisors to the Emperor. At the apex of the bureaucracy was the Grand Council, which was responsible for making policy and advising the Emperor. The principal administrative functions of the government were carried on by six boards or ministries: civil office (appointment of officials), finance, rites or ceremonies, war, justice, and public works. In addition there were a number of minor offices, including the censorate, the historiographer's office, and the Imperial academy of literature.

Most of the business of government, as conducted by the bureaucracy, went forward in terms of written records, so that a tremendous flow of documents from all the offices, departments, and bureaus was the lifeblood of the bureaucracy. As a result, the Chinese developed a special style for the writing of documents: each document had to be couched in special terms, according to whether it was intended for a superior, an inferior, or an equal in government hierarchy.

The development of and reliance upon written records and communications made it possible, from a quite early date, for Chinese administration to be effective over a large territory and a huge population, and profoundly influenced the type of man used in administration. The prerequisite for entering government service was a thorough command of the difficult Chinese written language, which could be obtained only through extensive training and education. Appointees rose to the higher positions by developing special and distinctive skills that were based upon the content of classical education. Thus the hallmark of the Chinese officials became education, and the concept was developed that the educated man possessed the qualities for being a leader of men. In theory, at least, Chinese officials did not hold their posts because of personal connections, wealth, heredity, or claims.
to mystic powers like those associated with priests. Chinese officials were recognized as deserving their posts because of their skill in handling certain tools regarded as necessary in government.

This basic skill was a fundamental factor in upholding the prestige of the official class. The Chinese bureaucrats were not mere administrators. As a group they represented a way of life based upon the concepts of the scholar, gentleman, and connoisseur of the arts. They were thought of, and thought of themselves, as embodying the ideal of the higher culture of traditional China. For this reason it is perhaps preferable to refer to Chinese traditional officials as scholar-officials, mandarins, or literati, and not employ the narrowly functional term of bureaucrats.

The relation of the mandarins to the rest of the population was not simply that of rulers to subjects. They were recognized as upholding a philosophy and a system of values which were considered to be valid for and acceptable to the entire population. They were regarded as individuals who were superior in terms of values that the people not only believed in but also considered to be the best test of a man's worth. Thus the status of a member of the mandarin class was not limited by the legal definition of his office in the government; it included all the prestige associated with the scholar and the refined gentleman. This meant, among other things, that the actions of officials could not be effectively restrained by legal means and that, in their relations with the people, the mandarins could be highly arbitrary and authoritarian. The individual citizen could not be assured that if he carefully followed any particular pattern of rules he would be able to avoid interference on the part of officials.

There was no clear demarcation of the rights, duties, and obligations of either officials or private parties. Individual security and well-being could therefore best be guaranteed by obtaining the personal confidence and support of individual mandarins. Ordinary people negotiated for such confidence and support on a personal basis, with officials, but the officials clearly occupied the position of advantage and superior power in such negotiations. Recourse was had, therefore, to means that might be considered devious, since they generally included various forms of payments to the personal accounts of the official, and this helped to contribute to what has been called a system of "rule by corruption." (It should be noted that the salaries of officials were far from adequate to cover the costs they were expected to incur. Thus many payments to officials, although not sanctioned by law in any way, were generally recognized as being standard procedure.) In any case, the art of successfully seeking favors came to be highly prized.

The tremendous prestige of the mandarin class in Chinese society was further accentuated by the fact that leaders in most forms of endeavor sought to obtain government posts. Most of the honors open to individuals could best be sought by following the path of government service. These included the obtaining of wealth, of social prestige, of respectability, and of recognition for such skills as writing and painting. Thus most of the famous writers and artists of traditional China were members of the mandarin class and held government posts. The result was that the governing class almost automatically included most of the recognized leaders in most fields of endeavor. This tended not only to give a common background and attitude toward life to the more prominent men in the society, but also to minimize competition or tension among them. The general stability of the total society was greatly enhanced by the fact that the ruling group included the leaders and experts in all the more highly recognized fields of activity. All groups that had any form of power recognized by the culture were, so to speak, represented in the government, and there could be little in the way of competition between government and private activities.
The bureaucracy, as the central core of both the government and society, was expected to perform numerous public functions. In general, these activities further strengthened the essential status of the mandarin class and minimized any radical changes that might threaten the traditional values of the society. A large number of these activities were of a kind usually associated with government. The civil bureaucracy had, for example, primary responsibility for providing for the defense of China and even for the planning and conduct of military operations. It was also called upon to resolve internal conflicts and tensions, and maintain order in the society. The local officials not only had the task of detecting any violations of the general peace, but also that of serving as judges and mediators in all disputes.

The mandarins were also charged with responsibility for certain activities unique to the Chinese system of rule. They performed certain rituals and ceremonies that were felt to guarantee supernatural assistance to the people—for example, during the New Year season, and in connection with planting and harvesting.

Although the Chinese never developed a precise theory of the government's role in the economic life of the society, the government did, both directly and indirectly, influence economic development. The most extreme examples of this were the monopolies the government maintained in certain activities such as the production and sale of minerals, wine, and salt. Moreover, many taxes were collected in kind, so the government played an important economic role in the acquisition, transporting, and distributing of certain goods, and thereby well-nigh dominated certain markets.

In order to transport such items, operate the administrative system, and maintain defense communications, the government was obliged to develop an extensive network of roads and waterways. Financing such activities resulted in the levying of taxes on goods in transit, and put the government in position to further control and influence the development of private trade and commerce. The fact that the government often engaged in such economic activities helps to explain the failure of capitalism to develop in traditional China. Large-scale economic enterprises were invariably controlled by the government, and even small private traders found they could best carry on their activities by obtaining personal support from officials or by themselves seeking appointment in the government service.

Since the economy of traditional China was of a relatively simple agrarian order, the government could deeply affect the activities of the farming masses by its twofold function of maintaining the irrigation system and collecting taxes on agricultural produce. (In some areas of the country over 50 percent of the farm land depended upon irrigation.)

Examination System

The key to the bureaucracy's ability to hold its central position in the society was its method of recruiting new members. The Chinese were the first to develop an elaborate and formal system of recruiting governmental officials on the basis of merit and open competition. This was accomplished through a system of formal written examinations, in which the candidates had to compete successfully if they were to find employment in the bureaucracy.

Although the system did not function at all times entirely upon the basis of the merit of the candidates, the important point to grasp is that the ideal of open and free competition was generally accepted. This meant, as pointed out previously, that those who held government posts were recognized as possessing skills that could be acquired only through training, power being acquired through merit and not as the result of wealth, heredity, or personal influence. That these other factors often entered into the awarding of posts is
not to be doubted, but not in such a fashion as to keep the mandarins from maintaining the general impression that merit was the sole standard for realizing official status. The very fact that the mandarins sought to maintain it obliged them to avoid being openly cynical about the process of recruiting and promoting officials. Thus even during periods of widespread corruption genuine efforts were made to maintain the fiction of impartial examinations.

Preparing for the entrance examination required, as already noted, extensive training, which only the more fortunate could afford. This greatly restricted the number of persons who could expect to become candidates, although in many cases the exceptional sons of poorer families were helped to finance their education—the clan or even the village providing the funds in the hope that they could, if successful, bring honor and material advantage to their sponsors. Such cases, of course, helped to keep alive the notion that any bright and capable young man could hope to enter the mandarin class.

The content of the examinations was such as to require the successful candidate to have a full command of the traditional corpus of knowledge. In particular, he was required to be well versed in the Chinese classics and in Confucian doctrine. Although much of the knowledge required had little relation to the problems of administration and government, it provided some guarantee that all officials would hold the traditional values in high regard, and any tendency toward unorthodox behavior would be restrained by their common background. Education thus became a force that led to orthodoxy in society as, for other but similar reasons, it preserved the purity of the Chinese language.

The traditional Chinese notion that any man who is well educated can, regardless of what his special training may have been, turn his hand to anything and do it well deserves mention here. The classical education was regarded as making a man competent to solve any and all problems that might appear, and it so regarded itself. Reliance upon it for purposes of recruitment helped, therefore, to incorporate this view of the matter in Chinese culture.

When it came to solving actual problems, the officials were, to be sure, expected to proceed in a pragmatic and common-sense manner. So long as radically new problems did not appear, the government found little difficulty in operating on the basis just described. It was only in modern times, with the advent of the West, that the Chinese mandarin's traditional answers proved clearly incapable of meeting China's needs.

Law

The Chinese pattern of law illustrates the extent to which Chinese political and governmental institutions and practices, while presupposing a generally accepted pattern of values, permit a pragmatic approach to problems. From one point of view Chinese law is an extensive body of moral precepts and ethical principles paralleling the basic concepts of Confucianism. From another point of view it is a body of procedural rules and practices attaching great value to recorded precedents. To a considerable degree, therefore, the Chinese system of law is based on custom, by no means all of which has been set forth in rules of law. Nor is this surprising. Through much of Chinese history there has been no formal legislative body responsible for enacting laws of general applicability, so most of the rules and regulations that have been promulgated have appeared in administrative decrees, issued in response to specific practical problems.

Judges are expected to canvas the merits of the case before them in terms of the generally accepted values of Chinese society, and then seek a solution that will strike a balance between abstract justice and whatever is needed to achieve a compromise between
the parties. Law has always been thought of as a type of mediation between individuals, and not as primarily a means of upholding abstract principles of justice. The wisdom of the judge and his appreciation of the traditions of Chinese have not, in other words, been expected to subordinate themselves to the detailed provisions of written enactments — to the rule of law as the West understands it. The assumption is, rather, that if the judges and government officials are good and if they understand and make wise application of Confucian principles, they will be able to reach humane solutions of any conflicts that arise, and that these solutions will be better than any that might be gotten out of abstract rules and regulations.

The fundamental concept of Chinese legal thought has been, then, the need for harmony in the relations between men living together in society. Chinese legal theory does not assume that the law either can or should be used to protect the interests of the individual against others or even against the government. Rather, law is a tool of the state, which the latter utilizes in performing its duty to maintain harmony among the populace and support the authority and prestige of the government. But it, and the penalties it imposes, are not the state's major tool for this purpose: punishments are valued primarily as reminders to the public of the importance of being influenced by the moral example of the officials, and not for what they accomplish directly. The Chinese often quote Confucius in this connection: "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given by punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given to them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover they will become good."

Thus there has never developed in China a body of legal experts, whose task it is to advise either the government or private persons as to the role and nature of law, and the duties and limitations it imposes. The government has never been thought of as limited by purely statutory considerations, or the individual as entitled to protection and redress in strict accordance with written rules.

Political Process

Political life in the old China, as indicated, revolved around the bureaucracy, and took its tone from the attitudes and behavior of the mandarins. One consequence of this was a marked orientation toward tradition, which was visible in all phases of politics and government. Not only was the behavior of individual officials dictated by tradition; the very process of formulating policies for the government faithfully followed patterns derived from tradition and precedent, those policy alternatives that appeared to hug the path of tradition being always those most likely to be adopted by the decision-makers. Oral debates among officials, equally with the memoranda they exchanged, were matters of marshaling historical examples for and against the policy proposal in hand. The traditional way of doing things was, of course, also the way of least resistance; but as a point of positive doctrine the mandarins held that it was, as a matter of course, the best way. This remained true even after China had had time to develop so great a body of tradition that it was often possible to claim the sanction of orthodoxy for each of two contradictory policies. For the main body of tradition was always held to be that of Confucianism, and, when contradictions appeared, appeal could be taken to the spirit rather than the word of the Confucian tradition.

The close association of politics and Confucian philosophy had as one of its results politics and ethics becoming synonymous for the Chinese mind. Political behavior was regularly tested by ethical standards, and the best official was assumed to be the pro-
found student of ethics. All policies and actions of the government had to rest upon
ethical principles and address themselves, at least in appearance, to the support of moral
goals.

One of the central themes of Confucian thought was that which put a high value on the
search, by individuals and by government, for harmony in human relations. It was this
emphasis on harmony which imparted to the traditional ideology its orientation toward
humanistic values, and led to insist the best state was one in which all elements of society
were in harmony with each other and with nature.

The correct method of achieving harmony in human affairs was to make sure each
individual had a clearly understood station in life, and fulfilled the functions and duties
attaching to that station. Disharmony and confusion could arise only if individuals and
groups behaved in a manner contrary or inappropriate to their recognized status. Thus
the power of morality was mobilized on behalf of order and stability in society, thus being
the very heart of the authoritarian ideology that dominated traditional Chinese society.
Conformity and orthodoxy, demanded in the name of ethics and morality, protected the
existing political order and the mandarins' status within it.

It follows that there was no place in traditional Chinese social and political life for the
advocate of change. Even those who championed what were demonstrably proposals for
reform did so in the name of sound orthodoxy; the stifling of doubt about traditional values
was regarded as an essential function of political authority. Confucianism undoubtedly
had its pragmatic side, but this was not permitted to get in the way of upholding and
perpetuating the basic values of Chinese society. And on the other side, the devotion of
Confucius that he could not be concerned with metaphysical questions was quoted against
those who sought to influence government policy by raising questions about basic values.

Another aspect of the humanism emphasis in Confucianism was its insistence on
government by men rather than government by laws. Only human attitudes and feelings,
it was assumed, could adequately guarantee just and effective government; or, to put this
a little differently, abstract rules and regulations were assumed to be too harsh and
impersonal to be relied on for the effective regulation of human relations. The process of good
government was thus indistinguishable from the process of recruiting good officials. The
natural leader was the upright man, and moral uprightness was achieved through education.
But being upright was not a matter merely of behaving in an approved manner: the upright
man possessed a quality that the Chinese called "inner sincerity" that permeated all his
relations with others. According to strict Confucian theory this quality of inner sincerity
was the only truly effective check on the actions of government officials, and the ultimate
test of an official's behavior was whether or not he had shown himself to possess this quality.

In actual practice, however, the reliance upon "inner sincerity" as a check on the
behavior of officials meant that Chinese government could develop no effective techniques
for holding its officials fully accountable for their actions. There being no objective test of
sincerity, it was always easy enough for a minister to confess his mistakes and ask and
receive indulgence; it was recognized that to err was human and that, for small errors at
least, a man's superiors should bear with him.

This gave rise to the political technique of playing the role of the sincere official, i.e.,
predicting that one was sincerely and deeply committed to the principles of good conduct,
regardless of whatever particular acts one might have been guilty. The issue of sincerity
reappeared ad nauseam in public statements, private memorials, and arguments, and the
sincerity of individuals was hotly debated.

The absence of techniques for holding officials strictly accountable was paralleled by
a persistent refusal to make use of precise directives and orders in controlling lesser officials.
The usual practice was to direct an official's attention to a problem, and leave him to devise
his own plan for dealing with it. Officials thus enjoyed great freedom of action, which was not likely to be restricted unless and until something unfavorable to a given official was brought to the attention of his superiors, and even then the restriction was not likely to take the form of instructions to do such and such in this manner rather than that one. All this had, unavoidably, the effect of actually encouraging officials to act in a highly independent manner. On the other hand, custom, usage, and the test of “reason” definitely kept their independence within practical bounds.

The Confucian emphasis upon the concept of propriety permeated the entire governmental process. The fact that the “upright,” “noble,” and “correct” man was thought of as the man with a highly developed sense of propriety made for continuous preoccupation with manners and ritual. The official was expected to behave in accordance with the correct patterns in all situations, and others made careful note of how successfully he followed the prescribed formalities. This led to a state of affairs in which the form of an action often took precedence over its content. In the writing of official reports and documents, for example, strict care was taken to ensure that every detail was in accordance with the established standards, and the fate of a given proposal was likely to be more deeply influenced by the form in which it was set forth than by facts or logic.

Another dominant feature of Chinese politics was the constant search for compromise solutions. For one thing, Confucianism put great emphasis on the concept of the Golden Mean in human relations, and the general disinclination to hold people strictly to the letter of any rule or regulation further encouraged the tendency to find some middle ground in any issue that would leave as many people happy as possible, or at least minimize dissatisfaction on the part of all concerned. The ideal solution was not that which adhered to any concept of abstract justice, but rather one that would mediate between the conflicting points of view. This issue among officials tended not to be pushed to a point that might be embarrassing to somebody, or place him in an exposed position. The recognized method for resolving conflict was to elaborate a compromise solution that would not result in lessened prestige for anybody. This feature of Chinese politics is tied up intimately with the importance that the Chinese, especially perhaps Chinese officialdom, have always attached to not “losing face.” Most cultures encourage the individual to seek prestige, and not shame or embarrass himself, but the Chinese undoubtedly are far more preoccupied with this matter than most other people. This point can hardly be overemphasized. One way to put it is that the Chinese have made the role of “face” explicit, while other cultures have not. In any case, the fact that everyone was concerned to save face encouraged the search for compromise, i.e., face-saving solutions, and the constant emphasis on compromise solutions tended to re-enforce the tendency to put face-saving considerations above all others.

The fact that the political process went forward within a bureaucratic framework had certain demonstrable effects on Chinese political thought and behavior. For one thing, it minimized group competition for power, so that through many centuries the Chinese never developed any institution remotely comparable to the political party or to the pressure groups which in some countries have always attempted to affect government policy from outside the latter’s own ranks.

The competition for political power in China, in other words, took place within the government, and revolved around individuals, not organized groups. There was little in the way of competition even between different departments of the government; officials were transferred freely from office to office, and no department was staffed with specialists who had a vested interest in its bureaucratic future. In a word, political competition in China was between individuals and/or the personal but, at most, loosely organized followings of individuals. There was a great deal of “palace politics” and “office politics,”
but the issues were personal, and not political in the usual sense of the word. What mattered most, as shall be seen again and again, was whom one knew, and who were one's friends and champions. And this tended to re-enforce the identification between political and personal morality. Since the politics mandarins engaged in were personal politics, they could readily appreciate the focus of Confucianism upon the moral qualities of rulers.

Informal Patterns

As has been indicated, traditional Chinese society was not ruled by the formal institutions of the Imperial government exclusively. To a considerable extent, the day-to-day life of the majority of the people, their conduct and their personal relations, were regulated by institutions the reverse of formal. The pattern of that phase of social control is the subject matter of a later section. It is necessary to discuss here certain institutions which, though not themselves governmental, affected or were in one way or another geared into the process of formal government.

Secret Societies

From the earliest times secret societies and orders played an important role in China. Many of them possessed the major characteristics of local governments, even claiming and exercising the power of life and death over their members; and most of them discharged, at one and the same time, functions that Westerners would associate with, variously, the religious orders, the social fraternities, the benevolent associations, and the locally oriented political pressure groups. They did not, during periods of relative political and social stability, have much impact on the over-all political life of the nation as a whole; insofar as they were political pressure groups, they were not only locally oriented, but confined themselves, for the most part, to merely protecting their members against possible loss or injury from the policies and actions of local officials, and thus did not seek to influence government policy and decisions. More concretely, the secret societies concerned themselves with obtaining for their members special favors from and special treatment by local officials. Instead of seeking to bring about a change in a government policy regarded as detrimental to the interests of their members, they sought to induce local officials to exempt their members from the execution of such a policy. The societies thus operated at the level of the application of policies rather than at the level of formulating policies. They often expended quite considerable sums on influencing favorably local officials.

During periods of general political crisis, however (when the power of the central bureaucracy was in decline), the secret societies often assumed a more aggressive role, and on more than one occasion were instrumental in overthrowing one dynasty and replacing it with another. Once an effective bureaucratic machinery had been set in motion, however, they were always content to fall back into their less active role. At no time did they attempt to "follow through" and control the policies of the new regime. Because of their record of political intervention during periods of revolt, the secret societies were officially regarded as suspect by whatever regime happened to be in power, and were carefully watched as potential sources of revolutionary activity. Some dynasties sought to control or eliminate them.

Trade Guilds

Another institution which brought people together to forward limited and specific objectives not of a specifically political character was the trade guild or association. Like the secret society, the trade guild did not attempt to influence the government policy, but did attempt to protect its members from injury by it.
The guilds maintained strict discipline over their members. They laid down directives on such matters as the hiring of apprentices, the length of service, and the type of training to be required of an apprentice in order for him to become a journeyman. They also controlled market prices, imposed standards for quality, and determined who could enter what markets. They were generally successful in causing compliance throughout each trade or industry. Most of them operated in terms of an economic philosophy that looked with favor on monopoly, and tended to discourage competition.

To some extent the trade guilds did influence the noneconomic activities of their members. Many, for example, had their own special gods and ceremonial rituals. And it is interesting to note that the kind of discipline they exercised over their members gave them a further though unintended political function over and above that of influencing local officials: they were ready-made instruments for government regulation of production and commerce, and Chinese governments often made use of them for this purpose.

Provincial Clubs

The provincial clubs, of which there were examples in most of the large cities of China, were protective societies organized by people from one and the same province living in one and the same city, and thus reflected the strong sectional loyalties that have always characterized the Chinese. They also tended to re-enforce these sectional loyalties, by reminding individuals of their identification with a particular region. In general, the provincial clubs operated like the other societies mentioned here, purely defensively as far as their relations with government were concerned, at most attempting to influence the appointment of local officials and local policies affecting their members.

Clan and Family

In all cultures, the family performs important functions in the social control of individuals. In China, however, family early assumed an importance from this point of view that it has never enjoyed in any Western society. The general functions of the Chinese family are treated in another section; herein is a consideration of a few of its political and social implications.

The crucial role of the family involved, among other things, its performing functions that would otherwise have had to be performed by public institutions, especially government. Above all, the fact that members of one and the same family felt, and acted in terms of, a sense of family unity in their dealings with one another, made it possible for the family to resolve (or prevent) disputes by informal and ad hoc methods, and thus to take part of the burden of preserving order from the shoulders of the government. It meant also that the individual's first loyalty belonged to a group present and visible, which could materially influence his well-being, so that he had little reason to develop a feeling of loyalty or obligation to such remote groups as, e.g., and most particularly, the nation. (It is not surprising, therefore, that the most effective nationalist appeals in China have always run in terms of the Chinese people being one great family, and the Emperor as its father.)

The fact that the demands of family loyalty militated against the development of a sense of nationalism on the part of the Chinese did not set the government, as the rallying point for nationalism, against the family. On the contrary, the government always gave its support to the traditional view of the family's proper role. It early learned to use people's loyalty to their family units as a means of making the power of government effective, so that it did not need to try to replace family loyalty with loyalty to the nation and its governing institutions. It did this by holding the family accountable for any violation
of regulations by their members, and giving official support to the view that the individuals were responsible to the family. Under traditional Chinese law, for example, it did not matter whether the particular individual who had violated a regulation was arrested; some other member of the family would do equally well, since it was in any case the family itself that would be held responsible. And, this being the case, the family had to regulate the behavior of its members, and perform many of the chores of social discipline usually associated with governments.

The rule of the family in regulating individual behavior was formalized, on a higher level of generality, in the pao-chia system. Under this system, which dates back to the formative period of Chinese history, six to fifteen families were brought together to form a chia. Above the chia stood the pao, which consisted of about six to ten chia. Both selected the elders, i.e., leaders, who were to act for them. The pao was held responsible for the actions of the individual members of its constituent families, and the chia was held responsible for the actions of the leaders of its constituent pao.

Each pao-chia system was, on the one hand, a mutual aid society that protected the interests of the families concerned and worked out informally any problems that might arise between families. It was, on the other hand, an instrument that the government, in the strict and formal sense of the term, could use to maintain strict control over the people without having to resort to the police power and the apparatus of administration.

Village Government

The family and the pao-chia system enabled the Imperial government to leave local affairs to themselves, so that in the typical Chinese village there was almost no evidence of external control of any kind. The village, either through pao-chia or through elders of its own, not only carried out local government but also did most of the local chores connected with the functions of provincial and county government. They received orders and regulations from the provincial or county officials and saw to it that they were complied with; so long as they were complied with, the provincial and county officials had no need to act locally, and, for the most part, did not. In taxation, for example, the procedure was to inform the village leaders what the quota for their village would be for the coming year, and leave the elders to raise the required sum in their own way.

Concept of Authority

The traditional system of government by bureaucracy and informal institutions produced in the Chinese a distinctive attitude toward authority, and with it a whole set of assumptions concerning the nature of authority, how it should behave, and how it was likely to act. These became basic to Chinese thinking about government and politics, and conditioned the actions of both rulers and subjects.

Although Chinese governmental institutions have undergone profound changes in recent decades, there is reason to believe that most Chinese continue to hold the traditional attitude toward authority, with slight modification. Now, as in the past, most Chinese have developed their concept of authority through experience in the family, and the Chinese family has only recently, much too recently to have affected the attitudes of any adults, entered a period of fundamental change. Thus even the most "modernized" Chinese, who consciously discard the old attitude on rational grounds, probably continue, in greater or lesser degree, to act and, on the unconscious level, feel in terms of it. The moment is still far away in China, assuming it will ever come, when it has ceased to be an important factor in Chinese politics.
The following is a summary of the traditional attitude toward authority. (1) Official authority is omnipotent: (a) there is no recognized and approved method of questioning
and/or expressing doubt about authority; (b) authority cannot admit to mistakes or
failures— it can modify or even reverse its policies without giving reasons for doing so.
(2) Authority is stern, strict, and exacting, but not inhumane: it is the strict, demanding,
and unemotional father, who nevertheless has the best interests of man and society at
heart. (3) Authority plays favorites: (a) authority operates in terms of rewards and
punishments— naturally, the rewards go for the most part to its favorites; (b) it is always
advisable to seek the favor of authority, since, in the future, authority may have an opportunity
to do one a hurt or a service; (c) authority cannot be expected to be impartial and
impersonal—it is highly sensitive to favorable treatment, and has a long memory.

(1) Authority is corruptible: (a) it is possible to negotiate with authority, but one
negotiates with it on its terms; (b) authority knows how to appreciate material things —
it is not offended by "gifts" if they are proffered tactfully. (2) Authority is civilized;
but it can be roused to anger: (a) authority has all the qualities of the cultured person —
it can nevertheless be brutal when it is irritated; (b) it is best never to act in a manner that
might offend or rouse the anger of officials, for many of them have quick tempers; (c) when
it is undisturbed, authority can be counted on for dignified and civil behavior. (4) Authority
has mystical qualities, but is fundamentally of this world: (a) it can perform rituals that
can appease and gratify mundane powers; (b) it does not operate through magic, and
is not endowed with supernatural powers — but it is responsible to the supernatural.

(7) Authority is pompous, majestic, and haughty without being considered hollow:
(a) it is luxury-loving, and surrounds itself with opulence; (b) it does not have to be retiring
or modest — on the other hand, it is expected not to be boastful; (c) splendor on the part
of officials is a part of the nature of things, and is not evidence of corruption. (8) Authority
is not heroic or martial: (a) the qualities associated with military leadership and the "man
on horseback" are not cultivated by the literati, and thus are not to be associated with
real authority; (b) bravery, in the sense of reckless daring, is not for the bearers of authority,
but for the foolhardy; (c) courage, as evidenced in the patient, long-suffering, and virtuous
official, is associated with authority. (9) Authority and morality are intimately
associated: (a) authority is responsible for the morality of the people, and thus attempts,
quite properly, to uphold general moral standards; (b) it claims the prestige that attaches
to moral rectitude, and, quite properly, applies sanctions on behalf of morality; (c) any
violation of general moral standards is the rightful concern of public officials — they
have the obligation to punish the violators.

(10) The standards governing the conduct of authority are of a general and imprecise
character: (a) public officials are expected to be morally correct in all their behavior, but
correct behavior on their part is not a matter of obeying exact rules or regulations; (b) adherence
to ritual and correct form are indications of correct ethical behavior — the only
precise test for official conduct, therefore, is the ability to adhere to ritual and form. (11) Authority is traditional yet pragmatic in its thinking. The apparent contradiction between
adherence to tradition and a pragmatic attitude toward problems is resolved in the following
manner: (a) all solutions are to be found within a framework of tradition, but the particular
solution selected must be satisfactory from a pragmatic point of view; (b) all pragmatic
solutions must be rationalized in traditional terms; (c) tradition, although it possesses
mystical qualities, is itself fundamentally pragmatic, since it is the product of extremely
wise and practical men. (12) Authority is omniscient and wise: (a) he who has
authority may be assumed to possess skill in handling problems in any and all fields;
(b) wisdom and authority are synonymous. Individual men in places of authority may

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appear to be lacking in intelligence, but their very status is a guarantee of wise decisions; (c) no detail is too small for authority to concern itself with — in giving attention to small details authority gives evidence of its omnipotence and profound wisdom.

(13) Authority is supremely endowed with the powers of "common sense". (a) officials are entitled to operate in terms of a "common sense" form of empiricism, and in doing so they arrive at "reasonable" solutions and decisions. (b) the concept of "reason" does not include systematic and logical formulation of rational theories of a general nature. On the contrary, theory, if it were relied on, might lead to conclusions that would threaten the traditional values. (11) Authority has continuity, is stable: (a) all offices and posts have the prestige of age, and changes in officeholders do not affect the stability of the posts they hold. Emperors and dynasties come and go, for example, but the Dragon Throne has a permanent quality; (b) fathers have the power of authority because they are in a link between a continuous past and a continuing future for the family. (15) Authority has no objection to privacy so long as it does not lead to action: (a) the individual can enjoy privacy and indulge in contemplation — authority can interfere with this freedom only when it threatens to lead to action detrimental to the authority; (b) authority recognizes the right to leisure and to entertainment, and even supports leisurely and entertaining activities.

Patterns of Loyalty

The traditional culture of China put great emphasis upon considerations of personal allegiance and loyalty as opposed to considerations of an impersonal character. In general, however, considerations of loyalty were expected to affect only those relations that were immediate and a part of everyday life. Abstract relations were not thought of as involving considerations of loyalty or obligation at all. The traditional pattern of allegiance in China can but be understood by fixing attention on what persons an individual was expected to be loyal to. The following outline should make this clear.

Objects of Allegiance

1. Family: (a) all considerations of loyalty begin in the family, and the members of a family are expected to put their loyalty to each other above other loyalties and obligations. Only in the most unusual circumstances is it permissible for outside loyalty to take precedence over that within the family; (b) within the family the quality of allegiance varies — there is a culturally imposed correct form for each particular relationship. Thus, the obligation of the children to the father is the highest loyalty, and the ties between two brothers impose greater obligations than those between a brother and a sister; (c) any act that violates the bonds of family unity can bring shame to all the members of the family. One refrains from committing such an act, whatever the personal cost this involves.

2. Teachers and Mentors: (a) the relation of teacher and student is a basic human relation, involving loyalties that can, on occasion, supersede certain family loyalties; (b) the relation is reciprocal: the student owes a life-long debt to his instructor — the master is expected to further the interests of all his students whenever he is in a position to do so; (c) although originally developed out of the relation between the classical scholar and his teacher, the pattern of student-teacher ties applies to all situations in which one man instructs or imparts skills to another. Thus, in the field of military affairs an officer is expected to have a life-long sense of obligation to his first tutor and instructor.

3. Friends: (a) the ties of friendship carry with them profound mutual loyalties, which any act of friendship is expected to intensify; (b) the older the acquaintance the stronger the obligations of loyalty — older friendships are never to be subordinated to
more recent ones; (c) the fact of sharing experiences develops obligations of mutual loyalty. In particular, classmates have an obligation to each other that does not diminish with time; (d) the demands of loyalty that friendships entail include the obligation to make personal sacrifices for one another, even when these are highly distasteful and/or damaging.

4. *Capostraticida*: (a) the individual is expected to feel a deep sense of belonging to a province, section, and city, and thus of loyalty thereto; (b) the individual's loyalty to his province, etc., is also loyalty to other persons who "belong" to it. He is expected to give them preferential treatment, and can expect the same from them.

5. *Superiors and leaders*: (a) allegiance to one's official superiors is personal, and extends beyond the realm of official functions; (b) loyalty to one's superiors is not coterminous with the superordination-subordination relation. If the superior is transferred, his immediate subordinates are expected to remain loyal to him (thus it was often necessary to change the rest of the members of a staff when there was a new chief official appointed); (c) leaders can expect their subordinates to be loyal to them throughout their life time. A relevant consideration in the appointment of a civil or military leader is, to whom does he owe allegiance, and to whom does allegiance owe him? (Thus officials were known and evaluated in terms of the personal cliques to which they belong, and it was taken for granted that they would not violate these personal bonds.)

6. *Office but not government*: (a) one does not owe a deep loyalty to the state or its symbols. However, one is expected to feel loyalty to particular offices or posts with which one is concerned; (b) an official is expected to develop a loyalty to his office. This includes loyalty to the tradition of the office. Subordinate officials are expected to be loyal both to their superiors and to the particular office or post those superiors occupy; (c) in military organizations, the individual's primary loyalty is to superior officers, but a man also develops a loyalty to the particular unit to which he belongs.

The following general statements about loyalty, as traditional Chinese culture conceived it, will further clarify the pattern of allegiance previously outlined.

1. *Loyalty was in the main loyalty to people*: (a) situations demanding sentiments of loyalty usually involved personal relationships. One could fare loyalty only where it could be reciprocated in terms of positive feelings or acts; (b) the culture did not demand loyalty to such things as flags, banners, or other symbols. Symbols as such did not have to be treated with reverence, although there was an obligation not to damage them; (c) a man was not expected to be personally committed to any particular ideal. One could defend the intellectual views of, for instance, one's master, but this was a demonstration of loyalty to him, not to the ideas themselves; (d) such symbols as were recognized were, for the most part, associated with a personage, not some abstract concept.

2. *Obligations of loyalty were permanent*. Once an individual recognized an obligation to be loyal he was expected to remain faithful to it throughout his life. One did not outgrow such an obligation either with the passing of time or with change of status.

3. *Loyalty patterns had continuity*: (a) some loyalties were actually handed down from generation to generation. A father's obligation to be loyal in certain circumstances was assumed by a son upon the father's death. A son was expected, in any case, to respect his father's loyalties; (b) one was expected to respect the two one's family had recognized in earlier generations. Thus one had a sense of loyalty to one's ancestral home even if one had never even visited it.

4. *Loyalty was closely associated with status*: (a) the loyalty pattern was highly stratified, i.e., it ran in terms of relations between superiors and inferiors, not of relations between equals; (b) the inferior was expected to show devotion — the superior was expected to defend and forward the interests of the subordinate.
5. Loyalty was demonstrated by adherence to form and ceremony: (a) the bonds of friendship, for example, were often formalized in special ceremonies between the parties. It was also common for people to make formal declaration of their loyalties; (b) even among classmates it was common to make feelings of loyalty explicit.

6. Loyalty and obligation were closely associated: (a) a personal obligation could develop into a long-lasting loyalty; (b) a grant or gift of material assistance created a loyalty and a permanent obligation on the part of the recipient.

7. Feelings of trust tended to be confined to relations in which loyalties were present. One could count on another's behavior only in those relations that involved loyalties. One could place the greatest trust in relatives, for example, but not in strangers.

TRANSITION PERIOD

Revolution of 1911

The West brought to China new ideas and new proposals for solving old problems, while at the same time creating problems which had been unknown in traditional Chinese society and which, in due time, produced both military and political undaundings on the Manchu regime. A few words now must be included about a further new development associated with the final decades of the Manchu dynasty, namely, the emergence of readily identifiable new social, political, and economic groupings with ideas or interests that made them potential foes of opposition to the Manchus, and also potential rallying points for the kind of nationalism that was about to become an important factor in the Chinese situation.

The New Merchant and Commercial Class

The business contacts of the new merchant and commercial class were for the most part with the West, and its operations, in any case, were outside the traditional framework of Chinese customs and institutions. The Government, as the protector of that framework, made it difficult for this new class to do business in the way and on the scale it wished.

The New Student and Intellectual Groups

The new student and intellectual groups were composed of individuals who had turned their backs on much of the classical education that had played so important a role in the traditional order in favor of Western knowledge and ideas. These groups represented a net loss to the maintenance of the old order, which, relying heavily upon its ability to recruit and hold the loyalty of the old order of intellectuals— and thus the government—was weakened by the disinclination of the new student and intellectual groups to serve it. The time also came when these groups represented active opposition, demanding a fundamental change in the Chinese system of government that would bring it more in line with Western theories and practices.

Chinese Émigrés

Many émigrés, quite naturally, were in close contact with Western developments, and came to feel that their own country was backward by comparison. Some of them had a further, practical reason for wishing for changes in China, namely that the Chinese government was too weak to protect the interests of its nationals living abroad.
These new groups were united in demanding a new nationalistic consciousness in China that would, they believed, strengthen the country in many ways and bring it into line with other, especially Western, peoples from the standpoint of coping with the realities of the twentieth century world. Their nationalistic tendencies brought them into opposition to the Manchu dynasty purely aside from the other reasons they had for opposing it; no nationalist could accept gracefully the fact that the ruling dynasty was an alien one that had conquered China as recently as 1611, and that it had consistently discriminated against Chinese in favor of Manchus.

The new groups, however, really had nothing in common except their general dissatisfaction with the old order, a strong anti-Manchu feeling, and a greater or lesser Western orientation. This was to have important consequences over the next years, for it meant that the elements that prepared the way for the revolution, though agreed on the need for a change of regime, lacked even the beginnings of a common body of ideas — ideas as to the shape a new regime in China should take, or as to what it should do once it had taken shape. Indeed it seems probable, in retrospect, that ipso facto, given their divergent interests and loyalties, they were incapable of agreeing on either a form of government or a postrevolutionary program of action. The cement that held them together, insofar as they were ever together at all, was the personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. With great singleness of purpose he labored to build a movement out of opponents of the Manchus, and no questions were to be asked as to what the individuals and groups joining the movement wanted over and above the overthrow of the Manchus. Dr. Sun personally appears to have favored at this time a republican form of government, tempered by certain adjustments to the traditional system in China. But through the period when the revolution was being prepared he did not attempt to bind the movement to any concrete plans, presumably because he knew only too well what raising such questions would merely divide his followers.

Attempts at Republican Government

The unavoidable result of the failure on the part of Dr. Sun and his followers to develop plans for the postrevolutionary period was that when the revolution unexpectedly occurred (on 10 October 1911) they were not in a position to seize and hold power. The Tung Ming Hui, as it was called (at later became the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party) had little or nothing to contribute except the notion that under a republican form of government most of the country's problems would somehow solve themselves, which no one was likely to mistake as a recipe for governing China. Even the organizational and propaganda work that might have helped the republican institutions to function successfully (e.g., by explaining to the masses how they work) was beyond its capacity.

Nor was any other single group ready, in any meaningful sense of the word, to take on the responsibilities of government. Not even the one group (aside from the unorganized revolutionists) with any prospect of winning political power -- the military elite or rather, the various military leaders in command of armies out over the country, each with forces personally responsible to him was in position to back up his claim to political favor with military strength.

How powerful the military were going to be in the new regime became clear when the most powerful of the military leaders, Yuan Shih-k'ai, was named the first president of the republic. Even Dr. Sun Yat-sen appears to have acquiesced in Yuan's accession to the presidency — partly because Dr. Sun was far more concerned about getting a republican form of government established than about its personnel and program, and partly because
of a conviction on his part that the major problems of the moment were economic. Thus he was content with a post that made him responsible for the development of the nation's railroads and made no attempt to dominate the political scene.

It was soon evident that Yuan Shih-k'ai intended to use the presidency merely as a steppingstone, and to establish himself as the emperor of a new dynasty. Even Dr. Sun and his followers now began to see, too late to do anything about it, that the presuppositions for a republican system of government did not yet exist in China, and would not come into existence until the Chinese people had been taught the essentials of republican government. For the moment, certainly, only considerations of military power could determine the residence of political power. Revolts did break out in opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai's announced plan to mount the Dragon Throne and re-establish the imperial system of government, but it was obvious that whoever had superior military force would control Chinese politics.

Yuan Shih-k'ai died in June, 1916. Conceivably, China might now have had an opportunity to make its first experiment with a genuinely republican form of government. But what ensued upon Yuan's death, again because of lack of preparation on the part of the elements that wanted a republican China, was a period of competition and civil war between several war lords and thus a period during which even a unified central government was out of the question.

The war-lord period must not, however, be dismissed as a mere temporary phase, without consequences for the future. It destroyed many features of the traditional pattern of government in China, and added new elements that have continued to be present in Chinese politics ever since. During this period violence came to be the essential characteristic of Chinese politics. It was not only that heretofore military figures were to dominate Chinese political life; heretofore any individual or group that sought to influence political affairs in China would either fail or win influence through military power. The scholar and the bureaucrat were now to give way to the army leader. And the politician who sought power must first obtain the support of armies.

Ever since the war-lord period the major political decisions in China have turned upon considerations of military power. Even for the masses of the people the issue has been not so much whom one believed in as who was likely to be victorious on the field of battle. For the people as individuals, it was always better to be found on the side of the winners in the struggle for military power. In a word, in any major political 'ash the people have tended ever since the war-lord period to support whatever group seemed most likely to win.

Another consequence of the war-lord period was a widespread conviction that China should be ruled by a single group with a clear monopoly of political power. The war lords had so successfully checked and balanced each other's power that, as has been pointed out, a strong central administration was out of the question. Henceforth every intellectual would tend to dream their dreams in terms of a political life in which a single group would have undisputed responsibility for the administration of the government. They would be blinl to the dangers of one-party rule, and disinclined to believe in the virtues of an open, democratic competition for power. Henceforth they would seek "efficient" government, even if it meant rule by a small group, as the only (in their view) realistic alternative to power so divided that no group could carry out a decisive program.

THE NATIONALISTS

Rise of the Kuomintang

As Chinese politics became more and more dominated by considerations of military power and violence, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers became increasingly impotent in controlling the course of events. In 1917, however, Dr. Sun finally broke with the Peking
government, and established a separate regime at Canton, which, though it was never any stronger than its local military leader, did become the rallying point of elements dissatisfied with the policies of the war lords.

Not until 1923 was Sun Yat-sen able to establish an actual government, and then it was little more than the government of the city of Canton, by no means a free hand even against the leading military commander in that part of China. In that same year, however, on 20 January, Sun received assurances of assistance from the Soviet Union. (On that date he and A. Joffe, the Comintern representative in Asia, signed a document stating that China was to count on the support of Russia, but that it was not itself ripe for Communism.)

The first result of this agreement was the arrival in Canton of a group of Russian advisors, among them Michael Borodin and General Galen, who were to help reorganize the Kuomintang with the Russian Communist Party as a model. In the course of their stay they imparted to the Kuomintang two ideas that were to have a lasting effect on its destiny: first, that a political party that has effective discipline and strict control within its own organization can exercise a control over political developments quite out of proportion to its numbers, especially when the opposition is disorganized or lacks decisive control over all of its own elements; and second, that the Kuomintang must create an elite military academy, to turn out loyal officers for its future army. The first director of the resulting Whampoa Military Academy was Chiang Kai-shek, and it was through the relations he established in that capacity with the new corps of officers that Chiang was able, in the long run, to build up his own political power.

The Soviet Union, thus committed to assist the Kuomintang, called upon the Chinese Communist Party to collaborate with the Canton government. The Chinese Communist Party, developing initially out of Marxist study groups among college professors and students, had held its first organizational meeting in 1920, and its first congress (in Shanghai) in July 1921. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, though refusing to sanction the idea of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, ruled that individual Communists could become members of the Kuomintang if they were prepared to accept its discipline. Many of the Communists disliked the idea of joining a movement headed by non-Communists, but, as always in the Chinese Communist Party's history, the wishes of the Comintern's leaders proved decisive. At the Third Congress of the Party, held in Canton in June 1923, it was resolved that the Party would support the Kuomintang, and that its members would, as individuals, accept the leadership of Sun Yat-sen.

The resulting coalition between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists was never smooth and harmonious. From the beginning the Communists' first loyalty was to their own leaders and to the objectives of the Comintern International; also from the beginning, non-Communist element in the Kuomintang distrusted the Communists, and suspected them of exploiting the alliance as a means of increasing their own influence. There was, however, little open conflict between the two groups while the Kuomintang was still isolated in Canton and the Russians were there to advise it.

Sun Yat-sen died on 12 March 1925, and control of the Kuomintang passed, temporarily, into the hands of a triumvirate consisting of Chiang Kai-shek, a military leader considered to be slightly left of center, Hu Han-min, a scholar who had long been an associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and who, because of his commitment to many of the old values of traditional Chinese culture, was considered a right winger, and Wang Ching-wei, an ambitious, militant radical who was considered the leader of the left wing of the Kuomintang (he was to become the leading Japanese puppet in China during World War II). The continuing struggle for power among these three and their followers and the constantly growing tension between the Nationalists and the Communists were the major political facts of the ensuing years.
In 1927, when the Nationalist Armies moved out from Canton to unify the country, the tensions between the Communists and the Nationalists at last broke out into the open. In the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek was at the head of the armies that were to conquer the Southeast and, ultimately, take Shanghai. The Second Nationalist Army, which moved north into Central China and eventually captured Hankow, was under the direction of the Russian advisors and included, together with some left-wing elements of the Kuomintang, most of the Chinese Communists. Upon reaching Hankow, this group decided to move the Nationalist capital from Canton to Hankow in the hope of eliminating Chiang Kai-shek and thus preparing the way for Communist domination of the new government. Chiang responded by establishing another government at Nanking, and it seemed for a time that the coalition would dissolve into two warring elements even before the Northern militarists had been eliminated. No final showdown ever occurred, however, because just at the moment when it seemed most inevitable, the Hankow regime came to grief over its own internal problems, particularly the question of what role the Chinese Communist Party was to play in its councils. This latter issue (and, within the Communist group itself, the issue as to what policy the Party ought to adopt in the matter) came to a head when Borodin, acting on orders from Moscow, instructed the Party to take over control of the government, by force if need be, and proclaim itself the Soviet Government of China. When this decision of the Kremlin was made public, the non-Communist elements at Hankow broke with the government, and left the Communists no alternative, finally, but to quit Hankow and move into the mountainous areas of Kiangsi. Here they were to rebuild their party and develop their own army before bidding again for power in China.

Period of Supremacy

With the collapse of the Hankow government, Chiang Kai-shek's Nanking regime, with the Kuomintang Party as its backbone, could plausibly be called the central government of China. At the time the Nanking government had been established Chiang's armies had little or no foothold north of the Yangtze. But it was now clear that the new Nationalists were the strongest force to appear in China since the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai.

The ideas and ideals of Sun Yat-sen became the formal ideology of the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun had distinguished three stages in the realization of his concepts of government. First, there was to be a period of political unification, to be accomplished by the Nationalist Armies. Next there was to be a period of "political tutelage," in which the Kuomintang Party would be responsible for the government, and assume the obligation of preparing the people, through education, for the day when democratic government would be possible in China. The third period would find China being governed in accordance with Dr. Sun's doctrine of the Three Principles of the People, or the San Min Chu I.

The three principles were of People's Nationhood (Min-tun), People's Power (Min-ch'üan), and People's Livelihood (Min-sheng). The first of the three, People's Nationhood, was little more than an affirmation that the Chinese people were of a single race and constituted a single nation. It had just been used as a slogan for unifying popular forces in the struggle against the Manchus. After the Revolution, however, and more especially after 1924, it took on new meaning, and thanks to the treaties signed by the Imperial government, became a challenge to the favorit positions enjoyed by the Western Powers. Under the Nationalists, certainly, the principle of nationhood was understood as a mandate for the elimination of "unequal treaties" and all other manifestations of Imperialism in China.
The second principle was an affirmation of the ideals of Western democracy, especially that of popular control over government as concretized in Dr. Sun's concept of the Five Power Constitution.

The principle of the People's Livelihood is somewhat more elusive than the other two. It had overtone of what might be called non-Marxist Socialism, the central idea being the need to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people by any and all means that would not compromise the in-dependence of the country. The resulting economic program would include a kind of land reform, but as a general proposition Sun thought in terms of China's industrial development as the principal means to the end he had in mind. The Nationalists accordingly welcomed industrial enterprises financed by private capital, thus moving very far away from the socialistic emphases in their philosophy, but simultaneously took the view that the government should itself participate in or even conduct numerous economic activities. These extended beyond the fields (communications, transportation) that the governments of some capitalist countries have claimed as their own, to include such activities as government operation of factories and spinning mills.

Although the Kuomintang generally remained faithful to the ideas of Sun Yat-sen in its official program for the Chinese people, it never had much opportunity to translate the latter into reality, because it was kept too busy fighting off successive threats to its tenure of political power. When, in 1928, the Kuomintang announced that it was entering the second of the periods or phases mentioned, that of "political tutelage," it did not mean that the party had, or even thought it had, already unified China under a central government and so completed the first phase. Not until 8 June 1928, in point of fact, did the Nationalist forces enter Peking, and even at that time their power did not, in the north, extend far beyond the main cities. Manchuria remained under the personal control of the "young Marshal" Chiang Hsi-chiang, despite the fact that he had declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. In the year following their entry into Peking, the Nationalists were obliged to put down a revolt by the two strongest military leaders of the Northwest, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang. Next it was the turn of two Kwangsi commanders, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who revolted in an attempt to withdraw the Southwest provinces from the control of the Nanking government. Then, in 1931, came the greatest challenge of all, when the Japanese launched their invasion of Manchuria, from which, two years later, they began to move into North China. By 1937 the Nationalists' conflict with Japan had assumed the proportions of a large-scale war, which was to go on until Japan's capitulation in 1945.

Organization of the Government

When the leaders of the Kuomintang undertook the task of organizing the central government, they had to struggle with the same difficulties that had stood in the way of their carrying out the policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Nevertheless, after numerous draft constitutions had been proposed, they ended up with a form of government which, in general, parallels that which Dr. Sun had envisaged.

The present Constitution, which forms the legal basis of the Nationalist government in Formosa, was adopted by the National Assembly on 23 December 1916. Many constitutional lawyers feel that it is the most satisfactory constitution ever produced in China.

Under the 1916 Constitution, the government receives its powers from the people through the agency of the National Assembly, which is elected on the laws of both geographic regions and vocational groupings. The National Assembly elects the President and Vice-President, and functions as the constituent power, amending the Constitution and
Fig. 1—Organization of the National Government, April 1947
voting on amendments proposed by the Legislative Yuan. In addition, it is empowered to impeach the President and Vice-President. It meets only once in three years, unless extraordinary sessions are called. Each of its delegates serves for a six-year term. Under the 1946 Constitution the powers of the President are greater than they had been under earlier constitutions, despite the fact that the Nationalists, fearing domination of the government by one man as in the case of Yüan Shih-k'ai, had at one time been determined to restrict the President's authority. The powers of the office are so great, in fact, that the President would not need to violate any provision of the Constitution in order to reduce the government to one-man rule. The Constitution provides only one possible check on him, i.e., the Legislative Yuan is nominally free to reject his appointments to key positions.

The 1946 Constitution follows Sun Yat-sen's idea of a five-power or five-yuan system of government, distributed among Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control, and Examination Yüans.

The Executive Yuan is responsible, under the direction of the Prime Minister, for the administration of all government ministries and certain special commissions. At present, the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist government on Formosa includes 14 ministries and 5 special offices and commissions. The most important of these are the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Finance, Communications, Education, and Economic Affairs.

The Legislative Yuan is a full-fledged parliament, responsible for passing legislation and approving the budget. It may also propose amendments to the Constitution, which must, however, be approved by the National Assembly before going into effect. Its membership also is elected from both geographic and vocational constituencies.

The Judicial Yuan controls the courts and oversees the administration of the law-enforcement agencies. It appoints the members of the Supreme Court, and of the lesser courts as well.

The Control and Examination Yüans were unique contributions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and represent his attempt to carry over into a modernized form of government certain features that had been characteristic of the traditional Chinese system. The Examination Yuan, which organizes and administers examinations for prospective civil service appointees, constituted a recognition of the value of impartial, competitive examinations as the key to fitness for holding governmental positions. It was also a product of Dr. Sun's belief that the administration of the examination function should be on an equal plane with the other functions of government.

The Control Yuan also has a long record in Chinese political history. Originally it had been responsible, as an independent office, for seeking out and investigating any irregularities that might exist anywhere in the bureaucracy. Its purpose was to uphold the latter's integrity: no official was exempt from its scrutiny. In its modern form, the Control Yuan has, in addition to the traditional investigatory functions, the responsibility for approving presidential appointments to high nonpolitical posts, and for supervising the Ministry of Audit, which audits all the records of the government. The members of the Control Yuan are elected by the provincial and municipal assemblies.

Although in theory the five Yüans are of equal power, they have never been so in practice. The relative power of the five Yüans and the Office of the Presidency has varied from time to time, but, in general, the Executive Yuan and the Office of the Presidency have dominated the government, while other Yüans have wielded little more power than certain ministries of the Executive Yuan.
The Nationalists have, in general, tried to continue the Chinese tradition of government by bureaucracy. In order for such a system of government to function smoothly, however, there must be broad agreement within the society on the objectives of governmental policy, and the distribution of political power must be stable and clear. Neither of these preconditions has ever been present in modern China and, as a result, the bureaucracy has not been able to operate effectively.

**Role of the Kuomintang Party**

The Kuomintang was able to speak for the new middle class in China in that it accepted as both necessary and desirable some form of social and economic change. It took the position that these changes, some revolutionary in character, should be the product of evolutionary development rather than of strict and sudden implementation of a doctrinaire program. In particular, the party emphasized the need for industrial and commercial growth as a means of rounding out the largely agrarian economy of traditional China. This, it held, would both increase China's power and relieve the agrarian problem that had plagued the country increasingly for decades. The principal groups actively supporting the Kuomintang were the new industrialists, the rising skilled-labor groups, the merchants who were not tied to the traditional economy, the landlords, the students and intellectuals, and, in general, people who looked to the West for guidance and inspiration.

The Kuomintang leaders had learned well from their Soviet advisors the importance of creating a party organization that could be used to command political power; the one they created had the structure of the Communist Party of Russia as its model. While, therefore, great energies went into discussion and drafting constitutions and setting up the offices of the central government, the center of political power in Nationalist China always remained outside the government and in the Kuomintang. As in the USSR, major policy decisions were first fought out in the party and then presented to the relevant governmental organs, whose task was merely that of implementing them. Moreover, no one could expect to be appointed to a high official post without prior indoctrination by the Kuomintang.

At the present time, the National Congress, which represents the various local party offices at the top of the party hierarchy, its primary function is to elect the Tsung-t'ao or Director-General, the man who controls the party apparatus. Chiang Kai-shek has held this post since 1928 and, for the reasons noted, has largely dominated the Chinese government through these years.

Chiang in his capacity as Tsung-t'ao is advised in policy matters by a Central Advisory Committee, which he chairs. Under this committee, there are numerous sections and departments, supervising activities in their special fields. The most important of these include the Information Department (covering political propaganda), the Youth Department, the Secretariat, and the Overseas Affairs Department.

The party organization, like the National government, has provincial branches and local party offices at the hsiin or county and municipal levels. These offices recruit new members, organize the local party membership, and serve as centers through which the party distributes information about government and politics. Furthermore, like the local representatives of the Communist Party in the USSR, they act as a check on the government officials in their area.

The Kuomintang, then, has always had many of the organizational characteristics of a Communist Party: it has many typically Communist organizational practices as well. Just as good Communists are taught to worship the doctrines of Marx-Lenin and Stalin, so the Kuomintang sought to instill in its membership a crusading faith in the tenets of Sun
Fig. 2—Kuomintang Party Structure, 1951.
Yet, however, for a number of reasons, the Kuomintang has never achieved the degree of disciplined control over its membership that characterizes Communist parties. This explains in part why the Kuomintang at no time had an effective monopoly of political power in China.

The fact that party discipline was weak within the Kuomintang made it not so much a political party in the usual sense of the term as the arena in which the struggle for power among competing groups in China went forward. So intense and continuous was this struggle that none of these groups ever really got itself in position to use the party machinery as an instrument for accomplishing its own purposes. Rather, Kuomintang policy always represented a balancing out of numerous conflicting points of view, and thus were never vigorous or decisive. Chiang Kai-shek's personal power derived, in the main, from his skill at bringing about this balancing out of interests and at neutralizing extremist elements; for this very reason, however, he did not himself have a free hand about party policy decisions.

**Cliqués within the Kuomintang**

As has been pointed out, the Kuomintang looked for support to the rising Chinese middle class, whose members, in general, subscribed to a relatively homogeneous set of broad propositions about their country's future. This basic homogeneity did not, however, prevent the formation of cliques which, whether for reasons of political ambition or on account of differences about concrete policy, competed with each other for power. Thus the history of the party is the story of a constant struggle between these cliques, with different ones coming to the top at different times. And, likewise, the policies that the party followed at any given time depended on which clique happened to be riding high at the moment.

Chiang Kai-shek minimized the danger of any effective threat to his position in part by his skill in playing off these cliques against each other, and in part by surrounding himself with groups on whom he could always count for complete loyalty. The most important of these was the Whampoa Graduates, a group of military officers who had received their training at the Whampoa Academy during the period when Chiang was its director. Some had been skilled commanders while others appear to have had little military competence, but as a group they have mutually supported each other and have generally loyally justified the faith that Chiang has placed in them. They have had considerable influence in the Army, and, as a result, at times they have weakened the military power of the Nationalists by placing their clique above the interests of the total army.

Other of the more noted groupings within the Kuomintang include the Kwangsi Clique and the CC Clique. The first of these consisted of the personal followers of the Kwangsi commanders, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen. Ever since their revolt against Chiang in 1930 they have had somewhat less power than the other military commanders. However, they have been extremely popular in the province of Kwangsi and have built up a following in other quarters as a result of their reputation as skilled commanders and politicians who have not conceded to every wish of Chiang Kai-shek. Li Tsung-jen was elected Vice-President of the Nationalist government in 1948 over the favorite of Chiang Kai-shek because many Chinese felt that he could appeal to the liberal element which the American government sought to support in China.

The CC Clique took its name from the two brothers who led it, Ch'ên Li-su and Ch'ên Kuo-fu. During World War II this group appeared to be increasing in its relative power and, since it was characterized by many American observers as the "right wing" of the
Kuomintang, this development contributed to the tendencies of some to charge that the Kuomintang was becoming a reactionary force.

Since the Nationalists have moved to Taiwan (Formosa) there has been a drastic reduction in the numbers and strength of the various cliques in the Kuomintang. Individual men still have personal followings, but the mutual danger to all has tended to minimize the splitting up of the party into separate factions. At the present time the main standard for evaluating political developments within the Kuomintang is how close individual men are to Chiang, and not so much the development of separate political power groupings. Thus, those who are not in the inner circle of the Generalissimo do not appear to be positive political forces capable of overtly influencing policy.

**Politics During World War II**

When the Japanese first moved into Manchuria in September 1931, the central government at Nanking backed by the Kuomintang had not as yet achieved its goal of uniting China. Nanking's control of Manchuria was little more than nominal, but the influence of the central government in this area was increasing. This was one of the factors which caused Japan to conquer these northern provinces, for otherwise there appeared to be a high possibility that Chiang Kai-shek would eventually be successful in unifying all of China. The Japanese aggression emphasized the necessity of increasing China's power by accelerating the program of uniting the country.

As the Nationalists turned to the problem of building up Chinese power in the face of the Japanese attack, the question of the Chinese Communists again became critical. As long as large areas of China were controlled by the Communist Party there was little hope that China could be united in its efforts to stave off the threat of Japan. During the years 1934-1935 the Nationalists conducted large-scale military operations against the Communists which resulted in driving them out of their mountainous retreat in Kiangsi and finally forcing them to resettle in the northwest. The Reds were substantially weakened, but the campaigns failed to eliminate them entirely.

By 1936 the Chinese Communists were isolated in the northwest area in the province of Shensi, and the Nationalist troops responsible for containing them were the armies of Chang Hsüeh-liang who had been driven out of Manchuria in 1931. The commanders of these troops had little heart for their task as many of them felt that the most urgent objective should be the reconquest from the Japanese of their home provinces. This attitude was intensified by the Communist propaganda which began as early as 1933 to call for a "united front" against Japan. In December 1936, Chiang Kai-shek visited Sian to inspect the operations against the Communists, but on his arrival at the capital of Shensi he was "arrested" by Chang Hsüeh-liang. The Chinese Communist representatives, who were immediately called to Sian, first demanded the execution of the Generalissimo, but on orders from Moscow they changed their demands and pressed instead for a "united front" under the leadership of Chiang himself.

After Chiang Kai-shek was released on 25 December 1936, the way was opened for negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists for an entente directed against the Japanese. During the early months of 1937 steps were taken in this direction, and with the commencement of open hostilities after the Japanese attack at the Marco Polo Bridge, outside of Peking on 7 July 1937, the negotiations for a "united front" were accelerated.

The final agreement of the Nationalists and Communists was the product of this series of negotiations. The agreement can be summarized under the following points: (1) the Communists would place their armies under the over-all direction of Chiang Kai-shek in
the operations against Japan; (2) the Communists would abandon their policy of seeking
to overthrow the Kuomintang by force, and would cooperate with the Kuomintang in
achieving the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; (3) the Communists would eliminate their
Soviet governments and would adopt a democratic form of government which would
respect the people’s rights and support the machinery of the national government; and
(4) the Communists would end their propaganda for bringing about class struggle.

It was clear from the beginning that the entente was based upon expediency in the
face of the Japanese threat, and that there was little in the way of mutual trust or confidence.
By 1935 the relations between the Communists and the Kuomintang were clearly showing
renewed signs of deterioration. The Kuomintang found that under the slogan of the
“united front” the Communists were in fact seeking to expand their propaganda. In
addition, the Chinese left armies had floated the agreement to submit to the command of
the Nationalists, and these armies, through their guerrilla activities, were rapidly expanding
the area of political control of the Communists.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought about a radical change in Chinese
politics. With the entry of the United States into the Pacific War victory over Japan
was assured. No longer would the cooperation of the Kuomintang and Communists be
a critical factor in defeating Japan. For the Chinese the central political question was no
longer the possibility of expelling Japan from the country, but rather it was the far more
critical one of who would have control over China after the defeat of Japan. American
policy, on the other hand, was based on the single objective of defeating Japan and involved
postponing any fundamental considerations of the postwar alignment of power in China
until after this prime objective had been accomplished.

The Chinese never felt as the American government did that the war in the Pacific
was between two clearly defined groups—the Japanese and their enemies. For the
Chinese the war was, at the minimum, a four-way struggle for power. Japan was still
clearly the national enemy who would have to be defeated but it was obvious that Chinese
power would never be the key factor in this defeat. As the danger of Japan was increasingly
neutralized by American seapower, the contest for power between the Nationalists and
the Communists was intensified. The numerous semi-independent military commanders
comprised a fourth element seeking to gain power for the postwar period. Some of them,
for reasons of expediency, had associated themselves with the Japanese, Nationalists, or
the Communists. Others maintained relative independence of all these main groups until
near the end of the war.

The Americans held that all available power should be thrown into the defeat of Japan
and considered any holding back on such a complete commitment as traitorous, corrupt,
and generally immoral. However, the various Chinese groups involved viewed the defeat
of Japan as only a Pyrrhic victory if it were to result in their particular group losing its
relative power in the postwar political scene. Since American contact and influence in
China was limited primarily to the Nationalist government, American pressure was applied
to force the government of Chiang Kai-shek to devote its entire energies to fighting the
Japanese and to repress its efforts to counteract the expansion of Communist power. Such
pressure was naturally not welcomed by the Chungking government. In its view the
Communists were more dangerous than the Japanese. Should the Nationalists overextend
themselves in fighting the Japanese, they asserted, the Communists would certainly seek
to move in and take over total control of China. For the Chungking government every
American suggestion as to military strategy against Japan was first weighed in terms of
its implications for the postwar power of the Kuomintang.
Chinese-American relations were further strained by the fact that the representatives of the United States in China were not in full agreement as to the most desirable policy to follow. The Chinese were quick to capitalize on these differences in order to push their own ideas.

The two principal American views on strategy against Japan were those expounded respectively by General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire L. Chennault. General Stilwell pushed constantly for large-scale commitments of Chinese troops to fight against the Japanese. He felt that all internal conflict between the Chinese should be eliminated and went so far as to advocate giving American aid to the Chinese Communist armies if these troops would be employed against the Japanese. Naturally these views were welcomed by the Chinese Communists. In addition, Stilwell felt that the main effort of the Chinese armies should be directed toward the recapturing of Burma which would reopen a direct land supply route to western China and eventually make possible extended campaigns on the Asiatic mainland against Japan.

General Chennault, through his service to the Chinese government as commander of the American Volunteer Group ("Flying Tigers"), had established very cordial relations with the Chungking government. His views on how the war should be fought made him acceptable to the Nationalists. General Chennault felt that the best way to prosecute the war in China was to rely heavily upon air power and employ Chinese troops mainly to defend the American air bases in China. To General Chennault the most economical way to defeat Japan was through the application of air- and seapower rather than through extended land campaigns on the mainland of Asia.

General Stilwell's position on this matter was strongly backed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, General Marshall, and the chief State Department representatives in China at the time. Chiang Kai-shek steadily resisted the joint pressures from all these sources, even under the threat that lendlease aid would be cut off from China. The relations between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek steadily deteriorated until, in August 1944, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to remove him. Not only were relations between the Chinese and General Stilwell reaching the breaking point, but also there was the clear possibility that the Nationalist government might drop out of the war rather than submit to the political and strategic demands of its allies.

When Stilwell was removed, Mr. Clarence Gauss, the US Ambassador, resigned and General Patrick J. Hurley was appointed in his place. With the appointment of Hurley, the United States undertook to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists. Initially, Ambassador Hurley was hopeful that it might be possible to bring the Communists into the central government, and that the Communist and Nationalist Armies might cooperate in the war against Japan. However, after a series of negotiations with both factions Ambassador Hurley became disillusioned about the intentions of the Chinese Communists and felt that they were committed to a policy only of maximizing their own power.

With the defeat of Japan the struggle for power in China became far more intense and open. Both the Communist and the Nationalist armies sought to recapture the territories held by the Japanese during the war, and civil war marked this race to power. In November 1945, Ambassador Hurley resigned with the warning that American policy was not being effectively carried out by the members of the Foreign Service, and that there was a real danger that the Communists would seek to dominate all of China through civil conflict if necessary. American policy turned once again to efforts at mediation when, on 27 November 1945, General of the Army George C. Marshall was appointed US Ambassador to China and President Truman's Special Representative there.
The Marshall Mission to China lasted until 8 January 1947, and although it did for a brief period achieve a temporary cessation of hostilities, the basic conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists was far too deep and intense to be settled through a policy of mediation aimed at a coalition government. To the Nationalists, the American assumption that the Chinese Communists, faithful adherents of world Communism under the direction of the Kremlin, could cooperate in a democratic form of government appeared to be highly unrealistic. They felt that the danger from the Communist quarter was far too real to justify any policy lacking solid guarantees that, should the Chinese Communist turn out to be less benign than some were picturing them to be, the cause of the non-Communists would not be irrevocably compromised. For the Communists, all American demands for mediation and compromise could lead to the strengthening of their power since American pressure for compromise could only be applied to the Nationalists.

A detailed survey of American policy in China during the war and immediate postwar years would reveal that the United States vacillated between unconditional aid to the Nationalists and demands for compromise with the Communists accompanied with restrictions on assistance to the Chinese government. For the two Chinese elements the period was one of constantly seeking further power and of unqualified distrust of each other. For both the Kuomintang and the Communists, the attitude of the American government was always a key factor and regardless of what the United States did, it had implications that directly affected the relative power of each group.

With the ending of the Marshall Mission in January 1947 the scene was set for the final civil war for control of the Chinese mainland.

THE COMMUNISTS

The Chinese Communist Party today holds the monopoly of political and social power in all the areas under Chinese Communist control. All major as well as most of the minor decisions affecting the control of men in these areas are made by the Party. Although the Communists have employed other instruments of control, they have at all times preserved the integrity of the Party and have never permitted these other institutions to escape from the domination of the Party. The various “people’s organizations” and the formal government of the “Chinese People’s Republic” serve only as instruments which the Communist Party manipulates for the achievement of its objectives. Thus, even though all of the important officers of the formal government are held by members of the Communist Party, it is through the organization of the Party that they make the fundamental decisions and not as members of an independent organ of government dominated by individual members of the Party. The Chinese Communist Party is thus a “state-above-the-state,” and there is no law higher than the Party.

Since the first Party Congress in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party has been in every respect a “Marxist-Leninist Party” and has assumed for itself the historic mission of carrying out a Communist Revolution in China. In its role as “leader and vanguard of the Revolution,” it has sought to control and dominate all “revolutionary elements.” According to the definition used by the Chinese Communist Party, only those groups which it controls are “revolutionary” and thus acceptable, and all groups or individuals it does not control are labeled “reactionary” and “counterrevolutionary.” Thus, through its propaganda it has sought to create the impression that only those groups which it feels that it can dominate are “progressive” and “dedicated to the people.”

As a part of world Communism, the Chinese Communists have at all times been faithful to the strategic objectives of the international movement. Although the relations of the Chinese Communist Party to the Kremlin have varied at different periods, the
history of the Chinese Communist Party is that of the fulfillment of the objectives of Moscow. At times the Kremlin has employed Russian advisors to direct the Chinese Communists; at other times it has appointed or dismissed the native Chinese leadership; and on still other occasions it has taught the Chinese Communists the techniques of obtaining power and then left them to work out the immediate tactical problems for themselves. The Chinese Communists give full credit to Stalin and the Communist Party of the USSR for the guidance and ample necessary for their rise to power and have now declared their confidence that Premier Molotov will continue the policies of Stalin.

**Organisation of the Party**

In the formal organization the Chinese Communist Party is a direct copy of the Russian model. Not only have the Chinese applied the same titles to the various offices in the Party structure, but the Party organization operates in the same manner as the Communist Party in Russia.

In theory, the highest organ of the Party is the National Party Congress, which is a body of representatives from the lower levels of the Party supposed to meet every three years. However, the timing of such meetings is subject to the decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and actually the intervals between meetings have been highly irregular. The representatives at the Congresses are handpicked by the controlling bureaucracy of the Party, and they are called upon to listen to reports of high Party officials and approve changes in the constitution of the Party. The Party Congress is at times called upon to support changes in the tactical "line" of the Party. In general it can be said that the Congresses are used by the leaders of the Party as a means of informing the rank and file of developments in Party affairs, and to give to the organization the appearance of adhering to democratic procedure. Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of the National Party Congress.

Directly under the National Party Congress in line of authority comes the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, again under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung. Nominally the Central Committee decides all policy questions and supervises the operational agencies of the Party. In theory this agency should be extremely important but in actual practice the Central Committee only enforces the decisions made by the Central Political Bureau (Politburo), the members of which it is supposed to elect.

It is in the Central Political Bureau or the Politburo that the real power of decision is located. Thus, although in theory the Politburo is under the Central Committee which in turn is under the Party Congress, the actual control of the Party is in the reverse order. The Politburo makes the decisions for the Central Committee and the Central Committee runs the Party Congress.

At the present time the Politburo consists of thirteen members who are the most powerful leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and thus of the "Chinese People's Republic." Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of this body just as he is of the two larger bodies. The Politburo operates in great secrecy and it does not make direct formal public statements of policy but, rather, uses the other organs of the Party to announce any particular decision. Any important matter which affects the Party is discussed by the Politburo and it determines not only the policy objectives of the Party, but also the functions and

*Dates and places of meeting of the National Party Congresses — First: July 1921, Shanghai, Second: June 1922, Canton, Third: June 1923, Canton, Fourth: January 1925, Shanghai, Fifth: May 1927, Hankow; Sixth: August 1928, Moscow, Seventh: April 1945, Yenan (Puchih)
the administration of the Party. Any major decision of either the Party or of the government is approved by the Politburo and it assumes the responsibility of making decisions in matters involving all phases of Chinese life.

The responsibility for administering the lower levels of the hierarchy of the Communist Party is in the hands of the Central Secretariat, whose chairman is also Mao Tse-tung. In theory the Secretariat is directly under the Central Committee and is equal to the Politburo. The Secretariat functions through a large number of "committees" and "departments" each of which is responsible for some phase of Party life and activity. Among these are committees for the training of new members and committees for directing "mass organizations," such as youth groups, women's movements, and labor movements.

As the Party moves down from the national level it has its regional or provincial organizations as well as its local "cells." Depending upon the importance and the number of members involved, the local organizations have many of the same subdivisions found at the national level under the Secretariat. Thus, there is a secretariat in each of the local groups and possibly one or more "departments" or "committees" which are responsible not only to the local leadership but also to the comparable national agency. The organization of the Communist Party is a rigid hierarchy in which it is possible for the top decision-making group, the Politburo, to insure that its decisions are faithfully carried out through a chain of command that reaches down to the smallest "cell" group. Discipline is rigidly enforced not only by select men at each level of the organization, but also by each superior level over its immediate subordinate group. A further guarantee of rigid adherence to discipline is the use of parallel chains of command which check on the activities of the members at all levels. Thus, in addition to the hierarchy of the various secretariats at each level, there are the hierarchies of the numerous "committees" and "departments" which, through their own chain of command up to the Central Secretariat, can report on the activities of the secretaries of the local party organization.

Membership in the Party

The official figure for the total number of members of the Chinese Communist Party as of 1950 was 5,800,000. This makes the Chinese Communist Party one of the largest of any national parties, but it represents only a little over one percent of the total population of China. During the immediate postwar years membership expanded quite rapidly as the Party found it expedient to accept members without fully checking on their qualifications. By making it relatively easy to join, the Communist Party was able to gain greater support from the public. However, once power was achieved this policy was dropped and a program of reinvestigating the qualifications of members was introduced. This resulted not only in a reduction in the rate of recruiting new members, but also, through the dropping of members, in an actual decrease in the size of the organization.

The theory behind limiting the size of the Party is that it is possible to carry out political policies far more effectively with a small, well-disciplined and thoroughly controlled organization than with a large and unwieldy group of men. The Communist Party is thus composed of a relatively small elite placed in positions to dominate all phases of political life in the country. As long as this elite remains small it is easy to insure its discipline at the hands of an even smaller dominant leadership.

Membership in the Chinese Communist Party gives the individual certain rights and privileges denied the ordinary citizen. Within the area of his jurisdiction and responsibility he may exercise petty tyrannies over his neighbors, friends, and fellow workers. In the local scene he may be above the law and he may serve as the direct representative of the
authorities in maintaining control over the private lives of the people. With these powers there are added responsibilities for he must seek to remain in good standing with the Party authorities, and he may face serious deprivation for violations of Party discipline.

Distinction must be made between the rank and file of the dues-paying Party members who carry Party cards and the Party "cadres" who give full-time service to the Party. The Party cadres are paid by the Party. They are thus professional revolutionaries who have no other life outside of Party work. The cadres serve as the bureaucrats of the Party organization, staffing the various commissions, departments, and secretariats. They also serve as the political commissars at the Army and Field Army level in the "People's Liberation Army."

For Party members there is a constant danger that they will be found to have deviated from the Party "line." The most serious crimes with which a member can be charged include "sabotage," "espionage," and "reactionary tendencies." There appear to have been relatively few occasions when the Party leaders have found it necessary to level such strong charges against members who have fallen from grace. The most common charge upon which a member is ousted is that of "opportunism." This includes accusations that the member joined the Party only to further his personal advantage when it appeared that the Communists were to be the "winning side." The charge also covers cases where the member is held to have used his status in the Party to further his personal interests. The charge of "opportunism" almost invariably brings with it the ousting of the member and may result in more serious punishments. Another serious charge is that of "defeatism" which covers the crime of expressing the opinion that possibly the Party has not been following the wisest course of action. "Defeatism" also covers the error of suggesting that Soviet Russia may not have the full interest of China at heart or that Russian support has not been all that it should have been.

Minor reprimands which may carry no direct punishments or may only result in demotion within the Party include the following: (1) "Communism" — the issuing of orders and commands without carefully checking to see that the orders are fulfilled; (2) "Bureaucratism" — the performing of paper work in a routine manner without demonstrating either initiative or vigilance; (3) "Dogmatism" — slavish adherence to theory without regard to the problems of application. (4) "Empiricism" — concentration on the practical problems of administration to the extent of disregarding theory.

Organization of the Government

The government which was officially established in Peking on 1 October 1949 is one of the important instruments which the Chinese Communists have employed in controlling China. Although the establishment of the government was announced at this time, and many of the more important offices began to function immediately thereafter, the Chinese Communists have not as yet set up all the offices planned in the official blueprint, and the Party continues to dominate the country through other agencies. In addition the Communist Party maintains an authoritarian and paternal control over all the activities of the formal government.

In theory the new government of China is a coalition government since groups other than the Communist Party are represented and non-members of the Communist Party hold some of the offices. However, all the elements which have taken part in the government have either been under the full and direct control of the Party or have been willing to support all its objectives and hence have not attempted to challenge the monopoly of power held by the Communists.
Fig. 3—Organization of the Communist Government (The Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic)
Not only is the relationship of the Party to the government much the same as it is in Russia, but the organization of the government also follows the Soviet Russian model.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

In theory the highest governmental organ of the Chinese People's Republic is the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This body, made up of 682 delegates, met in Peking from 21 September to 30 September 1949, and unanimously adopted the entire program prepared for it by the Communist Party. In particular, it approved the three basic documents which came the nearest to being what might be termed the constitution of the new government. These included the Organic Law of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Common Program of the CPPCC.

According to its own Organic Law, the CPPCC is supposed to meet triennially, subject to the decision of the National Committee of the CPPCC. At these meetings it has the power to revise the Organic Law, elect the Central People's Government Council, and review and hear reports on general government policy.

The CPPCC has a National Committee which is to-meet semiannually and which directs all the activities of the main body. Mao Tse-tung is the Chairman of this committee and thus holds the post of highest prestige in the formal government.

Local committees of the CPPCC are to be established which will have the function of building up public opinion in support of the government. However, the Communists have not felt the need to use such groups and at the present time only a few of them appear to be in operation.

Central People's Government Council

This body, which is formally elected by the CPPCC has the responsibility of directing the state at home and representing it abroad. It is expected to meet every two months, but since it does not publicize its meetings it is impossible to tell how active it has been. Mao Tse-tung is also the Chairman of this group and under him there are 6 vice-chairmen and 53 members. However, through the National Committee of the CPPCC it is possible to alter the size or the membership of the group at any time.

The Central People's Government Council has legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It enacts the laws of the land and also has the power of final interpretation of these laws. It approves the government's budget and issues decrees for the administration of the bureaucracy. It also has power to appoint or remove all the top officials of both the central government and the local governments.

In its formal organization the Central People's Government Council might be expected to command a great deal of power in the rule of China, but in actual practice it appears to be employed only as the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party and to give an appearance of legality to the decisions of the Politburo.

Government (or State) Administration Council

This body, which is elected by the Central People's Government Council, comes the closest to being a cabinet for the government. It is the highest executive body of the state administration and is responsible for the work of the bureaucracy. It is led by Premier Chou En-lai who is concurrently the Foreign Minister. Its size and composition is not set

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by law, but it includes the premier, a vice-premier, a general secretary, and the heads of all
the ministries and commissions of the government. It meets once a week and has the power
of issuing administrative decrees, deciding on questions of conflicting jurisdiction between
ministries, and supervising the activities of all the ministries and commissions of the govern-
ment.

The Administration Council has divided all the ministries, offices, and commissions
under it into four groups which are each headed by a committee directly responsible to the
Council. The most important of these is the People’s Supervision or Control Committee
which has under it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Information (propa-
ganda agency), and the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs. The People’s Supervision
Committee also serves as a general “watch dog” of the entire administration of the govern-
ment and the limitations of its powers are not clearly defined.

The Political and Legal Affairs Committee is responsible for the maintenance of order
in the country at large and for all the local governments. The most important ministries
under it are those of Interior (responsible for local government and law enforcement),
Justice, Public Security (secret police), and the Commissions of Legislative Affairs, and
Nationalities Affairs (minority groups). The Finance and Economic Committee has under
its jurisdiction such important ministries as Finance, Trade, Heavy Industries, Railroads,
and Agriculture. The fourth subdivision is the Culture and Education Committee which
is responsible for domestic propaganda. The most important ministries under it are
Cultural Affairs, Education, Public Health, the General Office of the Press, and the General
Office of Publications. It is through this commission that the Communists have exercised
their policies of “thought control” and censorship.

People’s Revolutionary Military Council

This body, although nominally under the jurisdiction of the Government (or State)
Administration Council, is a highly autonomous group which is separate from the adminis-
tration and has no civilian checks on its authority. Mao Tse-tung himself is the Chairman
of the Council. The People’s Revolutionary Military Council is responsible not only for
all military policy, planning, and organizing of the military establishment, but it also has
great powers in the civil administration. The Communists, in their rise to power and
during the period before the formal establishment of the Government, relied almost exclu-
sively on the Army as a means of controlling the civilian population. The Army thus
developed the machinery for civil control and has continued to function as a governing
force even after the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China was
established.

It was through this Army administration that China was divided into six Administrat-
ive Areas that have replaced the old political divisions of the provinces. These areas are
each controlled through a Military and Political Committee which is directly responsible
to the local field commanders in the area. The divisions are: (1) The Northeast People’s
Government Committee, (2) The East China Military and Political Committee, (3) The
Central Military and Political Committee, (4) The Southern Military and Political Com-
mittee, (5) The Southwest Military and Political Committee and (6) The Northwest
Military Committee. The Northeast People’s Government division, which includes
Manchuria, is no longer considered to be directly under military rule and thus, nomi-
nally, it is considered to have reached the stage of civilian government. However, the Army is
still the dominant instrument of control in the area.
In actual practice the Communists have relied upon the People's Liberation Army as the most efficient instrument of government. Thus, although in the Communist's formal description of their system of government the Army does not compare with the government in importance, in reality it is fully as important in government as are the official agencies of the central government itself.

**Techniques of Control**

The Chinese Communists have dedicated themselves to a program of completely making over Chinese society on the Marxist-Leninist model. Not only have their formal statements of ideology indicated this objective, but all their actions have been directed to the realization of such a form of society. Many features of the traditional Chinese society have been exploited in the effort to develop a new Communist society. China has long known its own traditional authoritarianism, and the Chinese have been accustomed to political control by a bureaucratic elite. However much these traditions may have facilitated the establishment of the Communist pattern of control, it has still been necessary for the Chinese Communists to apply many new and radical techniques for the control of men.

For the carrying out of this major program of remaking the society the Communists have devised a system of "wheels within wheels" in which the Communist Party serves as the central axle. It thus dominates the movements of an elaborate hierarchy of organizations which, in the end, controls almost all phases of life in China. In essence, the Communists, through the structure of the Party, the formal government, and the Red Army, have established the most thorough-going bureaucracy that China has ever known. It is estimated that, excluding the rank-and-file of the military establishment, there are between ten and fifteen million people in this total bureaucracy. This group of the population, which includes almost all of the politically active and conscious individuals, is thus brought under the direct control of the Communists. Direct discipline is applied to all these members of the bureaucracy to insure that they carry out the wishes of the Communists. In addition, they are controlled by their realization that, should they fail in their tasks, they would risk losing their official status and with it their preferred position in the society. The strict hierarchy makes each member of the bureaucracy responsible to a particular superior, and thus the Communists try to assure that these ten to fifteen million key persons in the society will always seek to please the Communist leaders.

The size of the bureaucracy is designed to make it possible for the Communists to employ official controls over many of the minor phases of people's lives. Thus, the Communists have been able to establish checks on the freedom of movement within the country. For anyone to travel or even to change his domicile within a city it is necessary first to receive official approval. By limiting the freedom of travel and carefully checking all those who are permitted to use the transportation system, the Communists have been able to limit public knowledge about general conditions in the country. These restrictions have limited the effectiveness of the time-honored Chinese system of obtaining from travelers information and rumors about conditions in other sections of the country.

The bureaucracy also exercises political control through its direction of economic affairs. The government's control of much of the economy prevents the development of independent economic groups which might threaten the power of the Communists. In addition, the controls placed on the still surviving private businesses are so extensive and pervasive as to leave the individual merchant at the political mercy of the state. The process of land reform has brought the peasant under complete control of the Communists. The detailed government records compiled in the process are now used against peasants.
both for tax purposes and in connection with government demands for numerous services to be rendered to it. The peasant who was formerly at the mercy of the landlord now finds himself victimized by an all-pervasive government whose basic philosophy assumes the complete subordination of the individual to the state.

Other techniques of control employed by the Communists include an absolute monopoly of all the mass media. (For a full treatment of this subject see the Chapter entitled “Mass Communications.”) All newspapers are forced to adhere to the Party line and may print only the official news. The publishing field is directly controlled by the Party; only literature which meets its approval can be published or sold. This control over all the sources of general information makes it extremely difficult for opposition within the country to express itself. The Communists justify such practices by claiming that these sources of information “belong to the people and thus cannot be used by any enemies of the people,” a justification which assumes that the “people” and the Communist Party of China are one and the same thing.

In addition to these formal techniques of control which depend upon the coercive power of the state and the secret police, the Chinese Communists employ many methods which are more indirect and subtle. In general, there seek to create an atmosphere in which opposition to the Communists is not only difficult but is made to appear immoral and contrary to the interests of society.

One such method is the “volunteer system” in which acts that are in fact commanded by the government are publicly represented as the spontaneous expression of the desires of the people. It is interesting that, while the Communists seek to establish government control and planning in almost every phase of life, they still desire to make it appear as if their policies were the product of the undirected and freely expressed wishes of the people. The most obvious reasons for this is the Communist feeling that they must at least pay lip service to the ideas of democracy, and that by claiming that certain actions are the work of “volunteers,” they may temper the harsh aspects of direct and totalitarian control.

A much more subtle but possibly more important effect of the “volunteer system” is its effect in making the individual feel that everyone else is “in on the show” and that therefore he too should join. Thus, the announcement that students are “volunteering” to leave their classrooms to serve the new government, or that merchants are buying bonds on a “volunteer basis,” is merely an effort to make the individual who otherwise might not take part feel that he is standing alone against the tide of public opinion. The use of the “volunteer system” in Korea should not be interpreted as solely for external consumption or as a ruse by which the Communist government attempts to escape responsibility.

As long as all the channels of information assert as one voice that the people are “volunteering” to support government policies and are spontaneously demanding action, the individual is made to feel that he is alone in his reservations and that it would be impossible to seek out others who might be opposed to the trend of “public opinion.” This policy, combined with the known acts of terror of the Communists and the generally unsettled conditions in China during the last decade, tends to create a high sense of personal insecurity in those who are not actively a part of the Communist movement.

The Communists have combined with the “volunteer system” the technique of “public confessions” in which individuals are made to stand up before groups of people and confess their previous sins and “dangerous thoughts.” The public confession serves several purposes. It clearly indicates the Communist insistence that no individual may have a private life and that any hidden thoughts or past actions are sources of danger to the citizen unless he exposes them to the public. The public confession thus complements the volunteer system in isolating the individual who might be lagging in his support of the
new regime. However, the public confessional does include a path to security since, through the act of completely exposing one’s self, the individual may obtain redemption. Thus, those who have gone through the process of confessing their previous crimes usually announce that they now feel like a reborn individual as they have lost the old sense of uncertainty and insecurity. The public confessional is a spectacle which, for the observer, may tend initially to increase his own sense of insecurity regarding his still hidden thoughts, but which may then drive him to seek security through joining in the process of admitting those “guilty” thoughts or acts. Given the traditional reluctance of the Chinese to discuss his private affairs, there can be little doubt that for the individual to go through an experience of this order means that he has broken with all that went before. It should be noted that not the least significant function of the public confessional is to provide the authorities with material for dossiers on the individual which can be used at a later date if the confessor loses the favor of the regime.

In order to isolate the opposition, while giving a sense of personal security to those who fully identify themselves with the “cause,” the Communists also use mass organizations. The Communists have provided these mass organizations for all levels and functions in the society, with groups representing the youth, students, professional occupations, workers, peasants, and women. These official mass organizations are set up for all the important elements in the society in order to prevent the people from forming their own independent informal groups. Any organization not controlled and recognized by the Communists would be immediately labeled “antirevolutionary” and would be eliminated by the state as a threat to the “people.” Thus the Communists attempt to monopolize the right to organize, in order to minimize the possibility of organized opposition.

The common feature of all these techniques of control is that they offer the individual the highest hope of personal security if he faithfully follows the direction of the Communists, and even the thought of opposition appears to involve great personal risk. The Communists have consciously sought to increase the sense of isolation and helplessness of the individual while holding up the promise of a degree of personal security only if the individual behaves according to the wishes of the Communists.

**Political Symbols**

The widespread use of terror and police measures should not be interpreted as meaning that the Communists rely entirely upon coercion. In fact it would be more accurate to say that they have used coercion in large part as an auxiliary for their program of persuasion and indoctrination. They count, that is to say, on the constant threat of coercion to produce a climate conducive to the acceptance of indoctrination and to reduce the people’s disposition to call into question what the propaganda says.

The type of symbols employed by the Communists and the role that these symbols are expected to play is the real key to the Communist technique of political control. And although there is a new “correct” propaganda line for nearly every issue that arises (which, since the Communist apparatus monopolizes all the mass media in China, becomes effective overnight), it is possible to make some generalizations about the Communist propaganda in terms of the slogans it uses and the purposes they serve.

1. **Identification.** The Chinese Communists have striven to identify their movement with the masses of the people and to create the impression that they are the only qualified and trusted leaders of the people. They have sought, to this end, to show not only that they alone understand the problems of the masses, but also that they speak just as the masses would if they were capable of articulating their feelings and opinions. In Communist propaganda, the symbol “the people” does not have the vague and generalized
reference that one might infer from all this. The Communists have always made it clear that only certain groups are entitled to consider themselves as included in "the people." The component groups, as of this writing, are the "peasants," the "laborers," the "intellectual workers," and the "progressive women." Before the Communist take-over on the mainland the term "people" was so defined as to take in also the "petty bourgeoisie" and the "national bourgeoisie" (i.e., the small merchants, the traders, and the larger merchants not primarily engaged in international trade and finance).

The Communists have sought to make good their claim to be the "leaders of the people" by "organizing" the groups mentioned, and giving their activities great prestige. The Party manifestly controls and dominates the actions of these groups and, in any case, reserves for itself a complete monopoly of political decision-making. They have, nevertheless, succeeded in making large numbers of people feel that they are taking part in the political process. Through skilful manipulation of their new organizations and adroit exploitation of cleverly conceived propaganda slogans, the Communists have been able to create the impression in the minds of many that they are genuinely active in the making of political decisions. Many elements who have never felt politically significant have thus been made to believe not only that they have an interest in the perpetuation of the regime, but that they are actually helping to determine the course of political developments. Large numbers of people, in consequence, are today emotionally committed to the policies of the Party, and effectively blinded to the fact that the Communists exercise exclusive control over political developments. And even those who are not so blinded are, in considerable numbers, taken in by the Communist assertion that their policies, however determined, are "in the interests of" the masses of the people. Both these groups of people are probably decreasing in number today.

In their writings and their more sober public pronouncements, to be sure, the Communists have always made it eminently clear that the identity and structure of the Party must not be "submerged" or lost in the undefined masses — that, in a word, the Party leads the masses but can never be controlled or directed by them. The Party, in other words, is by no means taken in by its own propaganda about popular participation in the political process.

2. Expectation. The Communists make no secret of the fact that they desire to transform each and every phase of life in China, to carry out a Marxist-Leninist revolution, and to pattern that revolution on the Russian example. The Communist propaganda, however, tends to be vague as to the precise outlines of the future China. Emphasis goes rather upon the evils that are to be eliminated, which from their point of view has the advantage of focusing attention on matters that have immediacy and reality for the propaganda audience. Their propaganda, without being specific about anything, conveys the impression that everything the "people" objected to in the old society will be done away with. The Communists capitalize on all the discontent and frustrations of the population in general, while avoiding such disagreeable questions as whether or not their own objectives might create new problems and tensions. In short, instead of expatiating on the virtues of the new world they propose to establish, they emphasize the negative goal of eradicating all the evils and injustices associated with China's past.

Another characteristic of the Chinese Communists' use of symbols of expectation is to be found in their habit of identifying themselves with the future, and the air of certainty with which they proclaim that they will as a matter of course dominate the "next stage of history." They claim to have not only a key by means of which they can infallibly predict the future, but also the determination and power it will take to make the future behave as they wish it. Thus they describe themselves as the "wave of the future," attribute to
themselves a monopoly of all that is "progressive" and "revolutionary," and point to their omnipotence as the guarantee of their triumph on an ever larger scale. (Thus, they imply, one should join them, if for no other reason than knowing which side one's bread is buttered on.) The opposition is depicted as being "feudal," "reactionary," and "decadent," all three of which terms, of course, represented itself as belonging to the past and thus helpless face-to-face with the inevitability of Communist domination of the future.

3. Identifying the Enemy. Much Chinese Communist propaganda is devoted to attacking and vilifying the "enemies of the people." In spite of their indisputable hegemony over the mainland, not to speak of the Red Army's monopoly of force, their propaganda speaks constantly of the "threat" of "counterrevolutionary" groups: "reactionaries," "imperialists," and "Kuomintang agents," who are conspiring against the people" and, in the absence of vigilance on the latter's part, likely to succeed in their designs.

The "enemies of the people" theme is kept alive to facilitate attribution of any failing of the new regime to the real or apparent scapegoats: "Kuomintang agents," "saboteurs," or "former landlords." The propaganda at one and the same time stresses their record of liquidating such groups as do exist; this keeps alive the idea that such groups or individuals are capable of threatening the policies of the government, and whenever difficulties arise blame is placed with these real or imagined elements.

However, a far more important function of this theme is to remind everyone that those who gain the disfavor of the regime might at any moment be charged with being "enemies of the people." The Communists have quite carefully not specified all of the qualities of an "enemy of the people" but, rather, have left the idea vague enough to cover all kinds of acts and thoughts. This contributes to a sense of uncertainty which stifles original ideas or actions because of the fear that they might be considered to be reflecting "counterrevolutionary" qualities. Such vague evils as "manifesting qualities of cultural imperialism" can be defined so as to encompass numerous crimes. Thus, the constant attacks on the "enemies of the people" become threats to everyone reminding them that they must at all times give unquestioned support to the Communists or face the consequence of being anglered out as a "dangerous element."

4. Morality. The Chinese Communists, for all of their demands that the Chinese society be radically changed, still speak in highly moralistic terms which are not entirely unmeaningful to those Chinese brought up under the old order. Even the emotional themes involving concepts of struggling, fighting, and violence are handled in a highly moralistic fashion. The Communists emphatically declare that they are on the side of ethical and moral purity, and that they are violently opposed to all forms of corruption and degeneracy. There is an earnest and almost Puritan quality that runs through all of their propaganda which leaves little room for humor or the recognition of human frailties. The Chinese Communist newspapers are deadly serious in their treatment of all subjects and there is no longer any space given to lighter and more informal subjects. The Communists have decreed that there is no place for the frivolous, casual, or socially sophisticated in the new order.

To a large extent this expresses the feeling of the devout Communist that he must dedicate his entire life to carrying through the objectives of the moment. However, the seriousness of the Communists also appears to appeal to the strongly moralistic qualities of Chinese culture and personality. Thus, as the Communists attack and destroy many of the old cultural patterns and taboos, they make it clear that they are only doing this in order to establish a new form of morality which will have all the self-exacting overtones of the older system. Confucianism must be eliminated but it is to be replaced by a system of
ethics which will be more demanding. It should be noted that this emphasis upon morality serves to further the traditional Chinese emphasis upon social conformity, and to make all opposition not only politically unwise but morally and ethically wrong.

A SELECTED READING LIST


CHAPTER 9
EDUCATION

Since this chapter is intended to be a survey of the development of China's educational system from the beginning of Chinese history until the present day, it has seemed advisable to break the story into periods of manageable length. The following division has been adopted: (1) From the earliest times to the rise of the Ch'in dynasty in B.C. 221; (2) From the Ch'in dynasty to the rise of the Sui dynasty in A.D. 589; (3) From the Sui dynasty to 1862 (when Western ideas first began to influence China's educational system); (4) From 1862 to the removal of the Kuomintang Government from the mainland in 1949; (5) From 1919 until the present.

EARLIEST TIMES TO 221 B.C. (CH'IN DYNASTY)

In dealing with this period in Chinese educational history, one must be careful to distinguish between fact and fancy, for both have deeply influenced subsequent development. So far as they are known, the following are facts.

Facts

Of education prior to the Chou dynasty nothing is known. Knowledge of Chinese society under the Chou dynasty is also far from complete, but it is sufficient to give one some idea of the important role played in it by a certain type of formal education. It was a feudalistic society, in which there was a sharp distinction between patricians and plebeians. The plebeians were the nameless people whose only duty was to form the land and whose status was tantamount to that of serfs, for the lot of the peasant has never been a very happy one in China. No provision was made for giving the plebeians any formal education; however, the duties and privileges of the patricians were such that each generation had to assure the next a certain amount of education.

First of all, the patrician had religious duties; there was no special caste of priests to perform them for him. He had to be taught the ritual code according to which all sacrificial ceremonies should be conducted. At many of these ceremonies music and dances were performed, and about these also he had to be taught at least enough for him to understand their significance. Since contact with spiritual beings was held to be possible only through the medium of writing, the earnest-minded patrician saw to it that his sons received some training in the art of writing. Again, the patrician's chief worldly duty was his duty to go to war when called upon to do so by his superior, ideally in the name of the king, so that members of this class required training in archery and chariot driving. Archery contests came to play a very important role in social life, both at court and among the lower-ranking patricians. A patrician, finally, could be appointed to an official post; and this privilege became the strongest factor in making the patrician's education truly liberal.

Government was not taken lightly in those days. When the Chou established their rule they introduced what seems to have been a new idea, the concept of the "Heavenly
Mandate." With this concept they legalized their newly acquired position as kings: Heaven having taken the mandate away from the Shang dynasty to give it to the house of Chou, the kings of this house ruled over China as Heaven's appointees. On the other hand, Heaven could withdraw its mandate (as it had withdrawn its mandate from the Shang dynasty) at any time, whether for inefficiency, inapace or misconduct; the best guarantee against this, the surest way of being a good king, worthy of the mandate, was to follow the example of successful ancestors. Consequently the reading of historical texts and of other types of literature pertaining to antiquity became a very important item in the curriculum prescribed for a royal prince. And in due time this same kind of material was used to instruct the young patricians who were to enter the civil service.

Besides all this, the young patrician was taught how to be a good patrician in daily life; he had to know the rules of correct behavior in his relations with his parents and other kin, with his superiors, and with his equals. Knowledge of poetry, for example, was highly prized as a social and cultural asset.

When one comes to the last couple of centuries of the Chou dynasty, he at last has enough reliable information to form a picture of the educational system. In brief, it was as follows: When a boy reached the age of ten he could enter a district school, where he stayed for nine years as a boarder. Courses were divided by semesters; in spring and summer there were outdoor classes (in archery and chariot driving), and in autumn and winter indoor classes (rites, music, writing, etc.). The eldest sons had the right to go to the "Royal College," where the king's sons received their education. This at least was the system in the royal domain; and it appears to have been copied by the feudal lords in their states, where similar institutions were called "State Colleges."

Fancy

The fanciful picture of education in ancient China, drawn by the pious Confucian scholars of the Han dynasty, is rather different. From the legendary days of the venerable Emperors Yao and Shun there was an institution of higher learning in the capital, and there were preparatory schools in both the capital and in outlying districts. Both were public schools. Upon the recommendation of the local officials, talented students from the preparatory schools were sent to the capital, there to attend the "university" and be trained to fill the high official posts to which they were appointed upon their graduation. According to Chinese tradition, the early rulers were constantly searching their entire realm for talented men. By establishing this system of universal education, they assured themselves of a regular flow of such people. In later days scholar-officials never missed an opportunity to point these things out to the Emperors, who could hardly question the wisdom of the ancient sage-kings. Thus it came about that an historical fiction ultimately gave rise to the well-known examination system, which was such an influential factor in the development of education in China.

Both fact and fancy agree on the point that scholarship and education were major concerns of the official class, and that teachers and scholars, though dependent on the higher ranking patricians, had a place in the political hierarchy. Toward the close of the period, private teachers, who gathered about them their own circle of disciples, are not infrequently mentioned in the records. To this class belonged most of the great philosophers of the period of the Warring States. Confucius himself was traditionally regarded as the first private teacher. It should not be inferred, however, that the private teachers represented a tendency to distinguish between a career in education and an official career. On the contrary, the private teachers constantly endeavored to gain official recognition and to obtain, for themselves and their students, official employment.
CH'IN TO SUI DYNASTY (A.D. 559)

CH'in Dynasty

Under CH'in Shih Huang-ti's rule there was no place for the multitude of private teachers who had played so prominent a role in the development of thought during the period of the Warring States. In education, as in so many other fields, uniformity became the rule. Unorthodox schools, which might provide people with tools for criticizing the ruler's laws and decrees, were prohibited. Indeed, these laws and decrees were considered the only worth-while subjects for study, and government officials the only teachers competent to teach them. Once a man had mastered them, he had established his claim to be the kind of recruit that the CH'in rulers wanted for their civil service.

Not even CH'in Shih Huang-ti, however, was so bold as to believe that the knowledge of past generations could be completely dispensed with. What he did was to store it in a place of its own, the Imperial Library; he put in charge of it a body of scholars known in Chinese as po-shih, the nearest English equivalent of which is "professor." The latter were chosen, it seems, for their extensive knowledge of matters past and present, and one source says there were seventy of them. It is known they had students assigned to them, but unfortunately, neither the number, nor how they were selected, nor what manner of educational institutions they attended is known.

HAN Dynasty

Under the Han dynasty, Confucianism was again in the ascendancy, and China's educational curriculum was revised. As far as the government was concerned, the aim of education remained the same as under the preceding dynasty, to get a steady flow of good civil servants. But a quite different yardstick was adopted for measuring qualifications for civil service employment. The Confucian virtues, such as filial piety and brotherly love, were assumed to be a candidate's highest qualifications. The future official was to be an embodiment of these virtues, and, as such, a teacher of the people; he was to select, and recommend for employment, all persons he encountered who excelled in these virtues. Often the emperor himself would issue a call to search high and low for such candidates and bring them to the capital, where they would be invited to write essays on topics furnished by the Emperor; those who wrote excellent essays were given official positions. That is how Tung Chung-shu, one of the great Han Confucianists, first attracted Han Wu-ti's attention. In Chinese this system of selecting and recommending persons for civil service employment is called hsin-chia; it was the forerunner of the examination system established by the Sui dynasty.

The backbone of this scheme of selection and recommendation was quite an elaborate school system. All instruction was built around the Confucian canon, believed to expound the Confucian virtues more clearly than any other text. Specially prepared textbooks, less difficult and less profound than the canon, were used in the elementary schools, but their function was merely to carry the pupil to the point where he could begin to handle the full text. At the university (lai-tchih), which was the apex of the system founded by Han Wu-ti at the urging of Tung Chung-shu, there were, from 130 n. c., distinct professors for each of the five classics (Book of Odes, Book of Documents, Book of Changes, Spring and Autumn Annals, and Book of Rites) then constituting the Confucian canon, and students began to be assigned to each professor. The university had its ups and downs during the Han dynasty, but generally seems to have flourished. By the days of the Emperor Shun-ti (A.D. 126 to 141), its physical plant included 210 buildings with a total of 1850 rooms, and it had an enrollment of 30,000 students. Its fame was so widespread that even the Iluns sent students to it.
Prospective students were selected and recommended either by the minister of education or by local officials. Candidates had to be eighteen years or older in order to qualify, though boys who showed extraordinary abilities were sometimes exempted from the rule. The punishment for a recommendation, proved to be undeserved, was banishment to the frontier region. Toward the end of the Han dynasty higher ranking officials were granted the privilege of sending their sons to the university without such a recommendation, and consequently the general standard fell considerably.

A student could select any one of the five classics as his “major” subject, and each student stood a part-written and part-oral examination after one year (later two years) in residence. Students who were successful in the examination were admitted to the civil service; those who failed were required to present themselves at a subsequent examination unless they had failed in every subject, in which case they were dismissed from the university. There were no tuition fees, but students had to pay for their own board. Poor students supported themselves by performing menial tasks for their wealthier contemporaries.

Education on the elementary level was left in the care of local officials. Very notable in this connection was the career of Wen Weng, prefect of Szechwan. When he undertook his duties as prefect toward the end of Ching-tu’s reign (156 to 141 n.c.), Szechwan lay virtually outside the orbit of Chinese civilization. Yet by the end of his term of office the name of Szechwan was being linked with those of Chu and Lu, which at that time were the states reputed to be the centers of Chinese culture. His achievements as an educator evoked laudatory comment from the Emperor, and an imperial decree declared them an example to be followed in all other commanderies and states. The result was that colleges were established in all the regional capitals, at which young men were trained for local official posts according to Confucian precepts. Later, schools were established in smaller administrative areas as well. There were of two types: elementary, each in charge of a single “Master of the Classic of Filial Piety,” and secondary, taught by a “Master of Classics.”

This system of education was, of course, far from being universal in the modern sense. It was not the government’s intention to provide educational facilities for every child. Yet it was universal (and democratic as well) in one respect: every male person, with very few exceptions, had a formal chance to be selected and recommended for training on the basis of his personal abilities measured against the Confucian ideals, regardless of wealth or class. The system’s weakness, from the standpoint of equality of opportunity, lay in the fact that the management of these schools and the business of selecting and recommending students were in the hands of members of the bureaucracy. Given the strong family ties by which every Chinese is bound, favoritism unavoidably entered into the appointments. In actual practice, money also played its part. It is said that wealthy people often offered sums of money to have their sons accepted as students even in the college founded by Wen Weng.

An interesting departure from this purely Confucian system of education began with the establishment (A.D. 178) of an “academy of arts” by the Emperor Ling-ti. As a lover of the fine arts, Ling-ti forced through his scheme for such an academy over protests and remonstrances from Confucian quarters, and instructed his top-ranking officials to send talented persons there to study.

There was a great deal of private teaching during this period, both on the elementary and the advanced level. The elementary private schools were called “halls of writing.” A contemporary author writes about them as follows: “I went to the Hall of Writing when I was eight years old. In our school there were over a hundred boys. If you had done
something wrong you had to sit with your shoulders bare, and sometimes, if your writing was ugly, you got whipped." Private schools on the advanced, i.e., academic, level were conducted by venerated masters of Confucian lore, many of whom used a monitorial method of teaching: they interpreted the classics to their most advanced students, who instructed the less advanced students. Both in education and scholarship the private teachers played a role the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated. They performed an essential educational function even under the Han dynasty, and in the turbulent centuries following the fall of the Han dynasty, when the public school system had become only a faint shadow, it was they who kept alive the flame of scholarship and pedagogy.

More than one ruler, through the centuries in question, attempted to transform that faint shadow into something more substantial, and to use it for his own purposes. None, however, succeeded, for one reason because of the high mortality rate among Chinese scholars, and for another because of the limited power they were able to exercise. China was continually plagued by internal strife and invasions from the north, and it was not until a.d. 589, when the house of Sui reunified China, that the peaceful conditions conducive to the development of an educational system were again to prevail in China. One other factor deserves mention here. The period embraced the years during which Buddhism and Taoism, adopting a negative attitude toward all forms of worldly education, became established in the country and built up huge clerical organizations.

The state of education at the beginning of this period is described by a Chinese source as:

From the year a.d. 100 until a.d. 220 the world was disintegrating, and people did not care any longer. With the framework of society crumbling, the Confucian doctrine crumbled even more. Then, by the year 227, the new ruler [i.e., Ming- ti of the Wei dynasty 227 to 233] began anew to seek a way out. He had it announced throughout the provinces and commanderies that all those who wished to study should be sent to the university, to restore the old stone tablets, and to provide for the salaries of the professors. He appointed several hundred students. In the decade from 227 to 237, about a thousand students were admitted. The professors had to be located, and subsidies had to be provided for the Newtonian education. By this time there were some thousand students at the university. Under such circumstances the professors all became in the end very negligent, offering nothing for the instruction of the students. Also, the latter had come originally only to escape military service, and finally there were none who had even the ability to study. In winter, they arrived, in spring they left, and so it went year after year. Not ten out of a hundred passed the examinations. Around a.d. 215, 6 out of 100 of them just followed each other's lead in gorging themselves on food and then retiring to take a rest. Alas, indeed, scholarship had sunk to a low level.

Post-Han Period

Under the Han dynasty, the public school system and the hsiao-ch' an system had been closely integrated, but through the upheavals and disorder that accompanied and followed the fall of the dynasty, the hsiao-ch' an system failed to draw talented people into the civil service. In an attempt to remedy this situation a new system was introduced at the service of the Emperor Wei Wu-ti (220-227), its actual author being the Emperor's Minister of Rites, Ch' en Ch' an. Under the new dispensation, officials were chosen in nine grades, and an official was appointed for each province and commandery whose continual task was to examine the merits not only of candidates for civil service positions, but also of civil servants on active duty. On the basis of his reports, officials were demoted or promoted and candidates were appointed at particular grades. These examiners were the chung
chêng, "the men unbiased and just." How this system might have worked in the absence of corruption will never be known; it is certain that the chêng-chêng proved susceptible both to the glitter of gold and the thickness of blood, so that it was soon a popular expression that "the poor do not figure in the higher grades, nor the rich in the lower grades."

The system was finally abolished by the Sui, though the classification of officials in nine grades was retained. While it lasted this classification was a serious barrier to the development of an educational system.

In a.d. 270 a new school was established that was called huo-ta-hsiu, which is usually translated "Imperial Academy." Its literal meaning is "school for the sons of state," i.e., the sons of the highest officials in the capital. Its record of accomplishment appears to have been modest, but it is worthy of note because China's highest educational institution from the T'ang through the Ch'ing dynasty was called by the same name.

From a.d. 429 until 618 China was divided by the Yangt'ze into two portions, north and south. In the south, the efforts of some of the best thinkers were working toward a synthesis of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and in consequence, non-Confucian ideas and materials played a much larger role in education there than in the north. Educational activities in the south reached their high point of achievement under the Liang dynasty (502-556), a family with a genuine spark of literary genius. (Its members showed a keen interest in culture: Emperor Yu an Ti, for example, gave lectures on Lao Tsu.) In general, students in the south seem to have been chosen on a more democratic basis than in the north.

Two imperial decrees of the year 414 indicate both the undemocratic nature of public education in the north, and the extent to which non-Confucian doctrines, especially Buddhism, were frowned upon. The decrees speak for themselves:

We hereby decree that sons born to kings, dukes, and down to ministers and the dignitaries under them, shall all go to the university. Sons of men skilled in the various types of manual labor, of artisans, and of servants, shall all learn their father's or his elder brother's trade. These people are not allowed to establish schools in private. The penalty for disobedience is death for the teachers, and extinction for the patrons and their families.

The ignorant people, lacking proper knowledge, is deluded through its belief in magic and black art. Privately people support magicians and hide away all kinds of books on sorcery, geomancy, astrology, etc. Also, Buddhist followers call up supernatural appearances on the strength of vain assertions made by barbarians from the west. These things are not conducive to the universal acceptance of Our government's transforming influence, nor to the propagation of pure virtue in the world. From kings and dukes down to the common people, all those who privately support within their homes Buddhist priests, magicians, and gold and silversmiths (employed for the manufacture of religious objects), shall hand these persons over to the authorities. . . . The penalty for disobedience is death for the magicians and priests, and extinction for the patrons and their families.

SUI DYNASTY TO 1902

The outstanding feature of this period, for present purposes, is the examination system, which was first established under the Sui, was taken over and improved by the T'ang, and was retained with only minor changes by succeeding dynasties. The Chinese term for the system itself is k'o-chê.

Civil Service Examinations

Following is a general outline of the civil service examinations of the period, drawn from available historical data regarding the T'ang dynasty, and from Prof. Robert des Rotours' Traité des États.
There were three types of examination: (1) Doctoral; (2) Selective civil service; (3) Record-of-service.

**Doctoral Examinations**

Of the many types of doctoral examinaion, the most important were: (a) examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (chin-shih: "accomplished scholar"); (b) examination for the degree of Doctor of Classics (ming-ching); (c) examination for the degree of Doctor of Law (ming-ja); (d) examination for the degree of Doctor of Lexicology (ming-tsu or ming-shu); (e) examination for the degree of Doctor of Mathematics (ming-tuan).

Both the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Classics, much more highly regarded than the other degrees, were created under the Sui dynasty. Candidates for these degrees were tested first on strength of memory (i.e., given quotations from the classics, for which they were expected to provide the context), and then were given questions that required them to write a number of essays. The candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was asked, over and above the performance called for in the two parts of the examination just mentioned, to write two compositions in a style and on a subject prescribed by the examiners. A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Classics was required to answer orally ten questions about the general meaning of passages from the classics. In both examinations, originality was less important than erudition; the surest way to success was to make copious allusions, not only to the Confucian classics, but also to other works of literature, especially the ancient Taoist texts.

Doctoral examinations were held once a year in the capital, Ch'ang-an (now Sian), under the supervision of a vice-president of the Ministry of Rites. No one could be admitted as a candidate unless his candidacy had been proposed in one of two ways. There were those presented by teachers in the college or university where they had been studying; and those who had been presented by prefects. Candidates of the latter group are called hsiang-kung, which means literally "tribute from the provinces." It was part of the provincial prefect's duty to present talented men as specimens of his prefecture's human resources, just as he had to present specimens of its natural resources. Indeed, in the typical official presentation of tributes from the provinces, the hsiang-kung took precedence over other tributes from the prefecture. One, two, or three hsiang-kung were presented from each province each year (three from the larger provinces, one from the smaller).

A candidate from a province needed to be recommended by the magistrate of his district in order to present himself to the head of his prefecture. The prefect then examined all candidates' qualifications and selected the best among them to proceed, after having been duly feted, to the capital. Any magistrate who recommended an unworthy person, or who failed to recommend a person of real talent, was subject to severe punishment.

Candidates who passed the doctoral examinations became mandarins of either the eighth or the ninth grade, depending on the type of doctoral examination they had passed and on the marks given them. They did not receive appointments in the civil service as a matter of course. In other words, the mandarins were not necessarily officeholders.

**Selective Civil Service Examination**

In order to enter the civil service it was necessary to pass a selective civil service examination. These examinations also were held once each year in the capital. Although only mandarins were eligible to take them, there were other ways of becoming a mandarin than by passing a doctoral examination (For example, one could become a mandarin by
being related to the emperor, or by being the son of a mandarin. In a roundabout way, it was even possible to buy the rank of mandarin. Candidates were grouped according to rank as mandarins, examined on style, logical reasoning, bearing, and speech, and classified according to excellence of conduct, talents, and merits. Positions were subsequently assigned to them on the basis of their standing in the examination, taking into account, as far as possible, each candidate's personal preferences. This list was then checked and rechecked and, finally, confirmed by the Emperor. Normally there were more candidates than available posts, and it was usually necessary for a man to come up for the examinations three or four times. This costly delay in getting started on an administrative career could be circumvented by passing one of two special, more difficult, examinations which carried with them immediate appointment. All positions mentioned were temporary. At the end of a term of duty, each incumbent had to submit to an examination of the kind described to obtain a higher post. Only after a man had achieved the rank of mandarin of the fifth grade—a fact, incidentally, of which the Emperor himself had to be notified—was he finally exempted from this procedure. Not everybody, of course, reached this rung in the hierarchic ladder.

**Record-of-Service Examination**

Record-of-service examinations were conducted every year, on the basis of which officials either were promoted to a higher grade in the mandarin hierarchy or granted a raise in salary. These, however, were not examinations in the same sense as the doctoral and selective civil service examinations; they were analogous to the efficiency ratings of modern civil service systems. Heads of administrative departments in the capital and prefects in their local capitals published the records-of-service of their subordinates each year, and their reports, after being checked and rechecked by the central authorities, were finally placed before the Emperor. For mandarins of the third grade and up, the report was made directly to the Emperor.

**Bureau of Higher Education**

This, in brief, was the examination system under the T'ang dynasty. The public education system was tied into it at every possible point, beginning with the most important single educational entity, the Bureau of Higher Education (in Chinese, kuo-t'ung-chien, which means, literally, Intendance of the Sons of State). The Bureau was not a teaching institution but an administrative organ in the Ministry of Rites, and the following institutions of higher learning looked to it for supervision:

School for the Sons of State (wei-t'ung-hsüeh), with a faculty of five professors (po-shih), five associate professors, four assistant professors, and an enrollment of three hundred students. As the name implies, it was a school for the elite of the empire; the students were all sons of high-ranking officials, thus sons of mandarins of at least the third grade.

School of Higher Learning (t'ai-hsüeh) *with a faculty of six professors, six associate professors, and a student body of five hundred. The students were chosen from among the sons of mandarins of the fifth grade or above.

School of the Four Gates (si-min-hsüeh) † with a faculty of six professors, six asso-

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* The term t'ai-hsüeh has been mentioned as the Chinese equivalent of "university." It is often advisable to use different translations for one and the same Chinese term used in different periods, because of the Chinese tendency to keep on using a name long after the reality it stands for has virtually disappeared.

† This institution derived its name from the fact that it originated as a group of schools, one inside each of the four principal gates of the capital, during the T'ung Wei dynasty (536-581). The four were soon brought together in a single school.
icate professors, four assistant professors, and an enrollment of 1300 students, which made it by far the largest of China's educational establishments. Five hundred of the students were chosen from among the sons of mandarins of the seventh grade or above, while the other places were reserved for commoners of remarkable talent.

College for the Propagation of Literature (kuang-wen-kuan), which was established in A.D. 750 to provide educational facilities for those who were preparing themselves for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It was staffed with four professors and two associate professors. The number of students who attended it is not known.

School of Law (fa hsueh) with a faculty of three professors, one associate professor, and fifty students.

School of Lexicology (shu hsueh) with two professors, one associate professor, and a student body of thirty.

School of Mathematics (suan hsueh), with two professors, one associate professor, and a student body of thirty.

Enrollment in the last three schools mentioned was open to the sons of mandarins of the eighth and ninth grade, and to the sons of commoners. Upon completion of their training, the students presented themselves, duly endorsed for this purpose by one or another of the faculties, for the examinations for the degree of Doctor of Law, Doctor of Lexicology, or Doctor of Mathematics. Branches of all the schools were maintained in the eastern capital, Lo-yang.

Aside from these seven schools managed by the Bureau of Higher Education, there were a few educational institutions supervised by the central authorities. Among them were the College for the Advancement of Literature (kuang-wen-kuan) and the College for the Aggrandizement of Literature (ch'ung-wen-kuan), managed respectively by the Imperial Chancery and by the Staff of the Crown Prince's Palace. These colleges did not differ in their curricula from the school for the Sons of State, but only very closely related to the Emperor, the Empress, the Empress Dowager, and sons of top-ranking officials, such as ministers, were accepted as students. But, therefore, were small; the College for the Advancement of Literature had thirty students and the College for the Aggrandizement of Literature, twenty. Because of their exalted position, these students were exempted from the regular doctoral examinations; they were given special examinations, similar in character to those for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy or of Classics, and the standards they were obliged to meet were perhaps not as high as those for candidates in the regular examinations. One feature of the special examinations was that the student could opt for an historical text instead of the usual two classics. Only at a relatively late date did this become possible in the regular examinations for the degree of Doctor of Classics.

Another government office with educational responsibilities was the Office of Higher Medicine (t'ai-i-shu), under the direction of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (t'ai-ch'ung-san), which manages a School of Medicine (t'i-hsueh), with one professor and one associate professor of medicine with a combined allocation of forty students, one professor and one associate professor of acupuncture with twenty students; one professor of massage with fifteen students; and two professors of exorcism with ten students. Mention must be made of the elementary school (hsiao-hsueh), supervised by the Department of the Imperial Library (mi-shu-t'ai-ting), which instructed the sons of the Imperial Family and of outstanding high officials prior to their enrollment in the College for the Advancement of Literature, the College for the Aggrandizement of Literature, the School for the Sons of State, or the School of Higher Learning.

In 711 a school was established, much to the chagrin of the staid Confucianists, for the teaching of Taoist doctrine. It was called the School for the Aggrandizement of
the Occult Lore (ch'ung-hsin-hsueh), and was organized under the Bureau of Sacrifices, which, like the Bureau of Higher Education, formed part of the Ministry of Rites. The main school, with one hundred pupils, was at Ch'ang-an, but there was a branch in Lo-yang that could accommodate an equal number of students. Entrance requirements were the same as those for the School for the Sons of State, and a special examination was instituted, at the same time, as the school, for the degree of Doctor of Taoism, to carry with it the privileges enjoyed by a Doctor of Chiehshih.

The prefectural and district schools were left to the care of local administrations. The number of students at these schools varied from eighty at the prefectural school in the Capital to twenty for the district school in a small-sized district. Students were selected by local magistrates, without regard, as far as legal theory was concerned, to social status. A graduate of such a school could either apply for hsiao-kung for his prefecture, or he could seek admission to the School for the Sons of State, the School of Higher Learning, or the School of the Four Gates (his selection depending on his father's social status). Each prefecture had its school of medicine and, after A.D. 741, its school of Taoism.

Academic Life

Prior to the T'ang dynasty, students paid no tuition, though each was expected to offer his teacher a complimentary present as an expression of high respect upon their first meeting. Under the T'ang, the custom was set aside in favor of a system of prescribed gifts, to be offered by the student upon entering a school. Students at the School for the Sons of State and those at the School of Higher Learning offered three rolls of thin silk; those at the School of the Four Gates offered two rolls; and those at the School of Law, Lexicology, Mathematics, and local schools, offered one roll. There were also gifts of wine and meat. Three-fifths of these gifts went to the professors and two-fifths to the associate professors, over and above their official salaries. Although the gifts can be regarded as a form of tuition, they were not used to defray the cost of running the schools.

Students entered the central schools when they were between fourteen and nineteen years of age (in the School of Law, from eighteen to twenty-five years). For the local schools there are no comparable figures, but it is known that graduates from these schools had to be under twenty-five years of age to qualify for entrance to the School of the Four Gates.

The school year was divided into periods of ten days, one day of which was a day of rest. At the end of every ten-day period there was an examination, and at the end of the year students were examined on what they had been taught throughout the year. Those who failed three successive annual examinations were dismissed, as were those who had attended school for nine years (six years at the School of Law) without having been accepted as candidates for the doctoral examinations. The student had two one-month vacations each year, the first in the fifth month (it was called "vacation for cultivating the fields"), and the second in the ninth month (to give students the opportunity to get their winter clothes). Any student who had been accepted as a candidate for a doctoral examination but who chose to continue his studies instead was permitted to do so. (A student at the School of the Four Gates who wished to continue his studies was transferred to the School of Higher Learning; one at the School of Higher Learning was transferred to the School for the Sons of State. This does not mean that these schools were on different academic levels. It was merely a question of honor.)

It is not too easy to gain an insight into the life of a student at the capital, but the following composition may be helpful. It was written by Han Yu (768–824), a leading writer of his day and at one time president of the Bureau of Higher Education.
Biography of Ho Fan, Student

It is more than twenty years ago that the student Ho Fan entered the university. At the annual examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the perfection of his studies and the nobility of his conduct were mentioned with praise by his fellow students, none of whom dared to put himself in a class with Ho Fan. Together they went to talk with the professors. The professors sent a report to the president and vice-presidents of the Bureau of Higher Education. These, in turn, listed in writing more than ten instances of brilliant behavior, and sending this list on to the Ministry of Rites they brought it to the Emperor's knowledge. Students in the capital who, in writing or in speech, enhanced Ho Fan's reputation, were too many to be mentioned here, and legion were the high-ranking officials who knew Ho Fan. None of them, however, worked in the Ministry of Rites. The officials in the Ministry of Rites were, on the whole, persons with whom Ho Fan had no affinity of mind, and because of this he was unsuccessful.

Ho Fan was a native from Huai-nan.* Both his father and his mother were still alive. When he first entered the university he went home once a year, but his parents stopped him. After that he went home every other or every third year, but again they stopped him. For five years he did not go home. Being a man of undiluted filial piety, he himself was unable to suppress his passionate concern for his aging parents, and one day he took leave from his fellow students to return to the prefecture of Ho to support his parents. The other students could not stop him, so they locked him up in an empty building. At that time there were more than a hundred teachers connected with six different branches of the university, and they, from their side, spoke with Mr. Yang Ch'ung, vice-president of the Bureau of Higher Education, about Ho Fan's dutiful behavior, requesting him to order his reinstatement as a student. At the time the post of president of the Bureau of Higher Education was vacant, and it so happened that Mr. Yang was leaving for the prefecture of Tao.† Ho Fan's reinstatement was not effected.

Mr. Ou-yang Chan remarked: "Ho Fan was a person of human-heartedness and courage." Someone else said: "While Ho Fan attended the university, the students did not set contrary to duty. If one of them had lost a parent and had no way to go home for the burial, he consoled himself, with that person in his loss and treated him with fatherly love. A kindness, be it great or small, he would by all means try to repay. Is not this what you mean by his human-heartedness? But Ho Fan's inner strength gave way under his feelings of pity, his deportment gave way under his affections. I, for one, am not aware of his courage."

Mr. Ou-yang Chan: "When Chu Ts'ao rebelled,‡ the students at the university were all going to join him, but when they came to Ho Fan with a request for his initiative, he bared them sternly with his face in serene composure. The scholars at the university did not join the rebellion. Was this not proof of his courage?"**

T'ang Dynasty
Prior to the T'ang dynasty, professors (po-shih) had the two-fold duty of advising the Emperor and of offering instruction to the scions of the empire. With the expansion of the educational system under the T'ang, however, the professors began to teach full-

* A province stretching from Hankow eastward to the seacoast, between the river Huai and the Yangtze.
† In Anhwei, north of the Yangtze, 15 miles upstream from Nanking.
‡ The School of the Sons of State, the School of Higher Learning, the School of the Four Gates, and the Schools of Law, of Medicine, and of Mathematics.
§ This happened in 752. The prefecture of Tao was situated in the southern part of Hunan province.
¶ In 753. Chu Ts'ao was in control of Ch'ang-an until the next year, when he suffered defeat and was driven away.
** According to the Hsin T'ang-shu, ch 191. Ho Fan studied at the university for twenty years. This seems very long indeed, but both our sources are in agreement. He must have been one of those students who preferred to continue their studies instead of going up for their doctoral examination when judged ready to do so.
time, and as of the year 740 another arrangement was made for the advisory function. This was in the form of an advisory board charged with responsibility for providing answers to any questions the Emperor might put to it about cultural matters, and was called the han-ta-yuan, the Hanlin Academy (han-ta means “forest of writing-brushes”). A great number of comprehensive scholarly works were written under its supervision, some of them as late as the Ch'ing dynasty.

During the latter part of the T'ang dynasty, Buddhism (especially Zen-Buddhism) began to concern itself with education. Long before this, Buddhism had become very influential in China, and had established monasteries all over the country. In time, some of these monasteries became repositories of Buddhist texts, from which it was a brief step to the offering of instruction in Buddhist lore. For example, a book on rules for the management of monasteries, dating from as long ago as the eighth century, shows that the educational function had, even at that time, become a recognized part of the management problem. Buddhist novices were taught, among other things, how to read, a privilege that very few commoners could hope to enjoy. Moreover, since the art of block printing was not applied to the production of books until the first half of the tenth century, books remained scarce in China until a very late date, so the Buddhist novices, having learned to read, enjoyed more opportunities than most to acquire genuine learning from the texts within their monasteries. Novices, furthermore, were plentiful, if for no other reason than that many of the monasteries had acquired the ownership of large tracts of land; becoming a novice usually meant an improvement in one's economic lot.

The role of the Buddhist monasteries' educational facilities in attracting scholars prompted a number of far-sighted Confucianists to create comparable facilities under Confucian auspices. At first this was merely a matter of granting earnest students permission to use Confucianists' own private libraries, and assisting them in their studies. These facilities were called shu-yuan, i.e., "library," but as their instruction developed the same term came to mean "academy," as it certainly did by the time of the Southern T'ang dynasty (937 to 962) when it occurs in the name of the White Deer Academy (p'ai-tu shu-yuan). The latter was located near the White Deer Grotto, on a hill south of Chi-Chiang in Kiangsi. Through a deed of land this Academy derived an independent income, and there is no doubt that it considered itself an educational institution, not a repository for books. Under the Sung more and more shu-yuan were established, at first on private initiative, later on instructions from the government. These academies came to play a role quite similar to that of the private schools run by Confucian scholars during and after the Han dynasty. It was in the shu-yuan that the exponents of Neo-Confucianism propounded their theories to the students and, taking advantage of the atmosphere of quiet detachment, did their thinking. The name of one of China's greatest thinkers, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), is connected with the White Deer Academy.

Sung Dynasty

The Sung rulers, recognizing that an independent source of income is a great advantage for a school, set aside lands not only for the support of the government schools in the capital, but also for the support of local schools. The Confucianists, spurred on by the constant friction between themselves and the Buddhists, directed the Emperor's attention to the latter's rich monastic land-holdings; and in 1151 a decree was promulgated authorizing the expropriation of those lands as a means of getting the wheathal to establish more public schools.

Another important innovation under the Sung's was the practice of dividing students into three groups comparable to that between freshmen, sophomores, and seniors. This
made it possible both to regularize the curricula and, since thereafter each freshman and sophomore had to pass an examination before he could enter the next higher class, to raise scholastic standards by weeding out incompetents. Seniors who passed the final examination were made eligible at once for official positions. In the year 1079 the number of freshmen, sophomores, and seniors at the university (t’ai-hsū), into which the Sung had combined the School for the Sons of State and the School of Higher Learning of the T’ang, was two thousand, three hundred, and one hundred, respectively. The weeding out process was clearly at work!

The Sung did more for the development of regional schools than any preceding dynasty. An order issued in 1014 provided for the establishment of schools in the prefectures and districts, with the sole proviso that each district school must have at least two hundred students. An order of the year 1027 decreed that elementary schools were to be established in all the prefectures and districts and set the age for entry at ten years or over. Prior to this date, the care of local educational institutions had been a concern of the local administration. Now special educational commissioners were appointed in the different prefectures.

From the time of Tung Chung-shu’s proposals on education to Emperor Han Wu-ti, the Confucians considered the domain of public education their special preserve, which it was their duty to guard with a watchful eye. China’s traditional system of public education became, in effect, a part of the Confucianist cult. At prescribed times, for example, students and teachers alike were expected to withdraw to the Confucianist temple for worship. In present-day Peking, the Confucian temple stands next door to the Hall of Classics, well within the confines of the former t’ien-t’ai-chien. The prevailing atmosphere throughout the system became one of illiberal orthodoxy, and this, in turn, made for a creeping atrophy of creative effort. It was impressed upon the mind of every student that the classical texts were the definitive achievement of human thought, to be consulted and followed on all matters much as the average person in our day would consult the dictionary on a point of usage.

From a fairly early date, therefore, there were expressions of dissatisfaction with the large percentage of automatons that the educational system, in combination with the traditional examination system, sent into civil service positions. Only one official appeared, however, who had both the courage and the vision to try to do something about this problem. He was Wang An-shih (1021-1030), social reformer and, at one time, Prime Minister. Although he did not dispute the value of ethical training which the educational system offered, he was determined to allot space in the curricula for the study of contemporary problems, to reduce the importance of mere plagiarism of the classics, and to change the examination system accordingly. Also, he was fully conscious of the opposition he was going to encounter, and therefore sought to make his reforms more palatable by incorporating his ideas in commentaries on classical texts. For a short while his texts were used in the schools, but the orthodox garb in which his ideas were dressed did not deceive the Confucians, who soon found means of removing Wang An-shih from office.

Everything then settled back into the old channels.

The educational system was, however, an efficient vehicle for the transmission of Chinese culture, and, as such, won deserved fame among the peoples surrounding China. Even as early as the T’ang dynasty it was attracting a considerable number of students from such places as Manchuria, Korea, Japan, and Tibet; and the tales these students took back with them from China greatly increased the reputation not only of China’s educational institutions but of its culture as well. In due time this reputation was reflected in the fact that each of the barbarian tribes who successively overran parts of North China during the Sung dynasty attempted to restore or maintain the existing educational establishments.
The Mongols

The Mongols, more self-confident and assertive than the other barbarian tribes, did, however, inject some of their own ideas in the Chinese educational system. (Besides being more race-conscious than the barbarians who preceded them as conquerors of Chinese soil, the Mongols ruled over a larger area of China for a longer period of time than any of their predecessors.) They succeeded, for example, in establishing schools for the teaching of Mongol lore and of those aspects of Chinese culture in which they themselves were particularly interested. However, in reorganizing the educational system they were just as pragmatic as all their other governmental transactions: for example, they retained the School for the Sons of State (kiao-tzâ-hsâch) under the Bureau of Higher Education (kiao-tzâ-chien) for the training of the traditional type of Chinese civil servants. But they also established a Mongol Bureau of Higher Education with a Mongol School for the Sons of State (at which, however, a Mongol translation of a Chinese history book was used for instruction), and a Mohammedan School for the Sons of State, offering instruction in the languages spoken by the Mohammedan peoples.

The Emperor Jen-tsung (1312-1320), of the Yüan (Mongol) dynasty, also restored (greatly modified) the examination system. Examinations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy were held in the capital every three years, under the Emperor's personal supervision. The candidates normally numbered about a hundred, and came, as they had formerly, largely from the provinces, where they had undergone preliminary selective examinations for the degree of chü-jên ("recommendee"). Both as students and as examinees persons of Mongol or Turkish extraction enjoyed special privileges. The tests to which they were subjected, for example, were decidedly easier than those for the Chinese; and a Mongol Doctor of Philosophy was accorded the sixth rank in the mandarin hierarchy, while his Chinese counterpart was accorded the eighth rank. (Ambitious Chinese sometimes tried to eliminate this handicap by presenting themselves as candidates under Mongol names.)

A Chinese graduate or Doctor of Philosophy was eligible for appointment to a teaching position in a provincial, prefectural, or district school. These schools did not feed students to the School for the Sons of State in the capital. Only sons or close relatives of members of the Mongol guard and high court officials could attend the latter, which was a self-contained unit with its own elementary school, high school, and college. In theory, at least, the academic level for the local schools was about the same as in the School for the Sons of State.

At the provincial level there were Mongol as well as Chinese schools, medical schools (medical science was much encouraged by the Mongols), and so-called yin-yang schools, where instruction was offered in such diverse subjects as soothsaying, astrology, exorcism, as well as pure astronomy. The yin-yang doctrine had great attractions for the shamanistic Mongols.

Strict legislation was enacted to assure all these schools, and the chü-yüan as well, permanent ownership of arable land as an independent source of income. The number of schools at the end of the thirteenth century was, according to "The History of the Yüan Dynasty," over twenty thousand, although this may be an exaggeration (The first Emperor of the Ming dynasty made the statement that the schools created by the Mongols existed in name only.)

Ming Dynasty

Under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the examination system and the public education system were completely integrated. Legal provision was made for schools for boys fifteen years of age and above in the proportion of one school for every group of twenty-five
families. (These schools did not prove popular, in part because well-to-do families had been accustomed to providing their sons' private tuition at this level.) The district, subprefectural, and prefectural schools were given a fixed number of students (twenty, thirty, and forty respectively), all to be supported by the government; and provision was made for the holding of entrance examinations in the local capitals. From that time forward the term shù-yüan ("student") was interchangeable with the term hsin-shāi ("flowering talent"), which had hitherto been used for persons who had passed the examinations in the provincial capitals. The latter became a career milestone comparable to the B.A. degree, and was the first step on a long and arduous road toward a position in the civil service.

A student spent a minimum of the nine years studying the classics, the standard histories, and laws and ordinances before he could be accepted as a candidate for the degree of chū-jên, which might be called the equivalent of the M.A. degree. Examinations for this distinction were held at intervals of three years in the provincial capitals. (A candidate who failed was sent back to his school. A candidate who failed repeatedly could retire upon reaching the age of fifty, at which time the degree of chū-jên was granted him on an honorary basis.) The best of the chū-jên were permitted to go to the capital to submit themselves to the rigorous examinations for the degree of chìn-shāi, Ph.D. The best among the chìn-shāi were appointed members of the Hanlin Academy. The others received appointments in the regular civil service.

The Imperial Academy (in Chinese kuo-tâ-chien, the term applied to the Bureau of Higher Education under the T'ang) became under the Ming a kind of national university, replacing the elaborate system of central schools of the T'ang dynasty. Its students, like those in the local schools, were supported by the government; and by the year 1421 its student body numbered 9000, an impressive figure when one remembers that, because of the local schools, it enjoyed no such educational monopoly as the central schools had enjoyed under the T'ang. Each prefectural school sent two "best students" to the Imperial Academy every year; each subprefectural school three every two years, and each district school one every year. Sons of high officials accounted for most of the remainder of its student body. (A chū-jên who failed to pass the examinations for the degree of chìn-shāi was permitted to enroll in the Academy while awaiting the next examination.) Upon completion of his studies, an academy student could, like the graduates from local schools, become a candidate for the degree of chū-jên. From the Ming dynasty on, the accepted principle was that nobody could enter the civil service without passing this examination.

Clearly, the Ming rulers' major contribution in the field of education was the establishment of the local schools out over the country. The motivation underlying the government's interest in education remained that of training recruits for its own bureaucracy, but the Ming, unlike their predecessors, believed that this could best be done by ministering to the Chinese people's need for educational facilities. One interesting by-product of this belief, however, was a conviction on the part of the government that it was providing all the educational facilities the people required, so that there was no need for private initiative in education. Thus the Ming did not give the shu-yüan the kind of support they had received from the Sung and Yuan rulers; there was no arrangement by which students from these schools could register as candidates for the degree of chū-jên. Indeed, by the year 1338 the emperor was ordering that all the shu-yüan be destroyed. Although this policy never became completely effective, it did greatly inhibit the growth and activity of the private academies. Against this, however, must be set the fact that the Ming rulers tried, even if only on a small scale, to spread knowledge of Chinese culture and institutions among a wider segment of the populace by opening the local schools to people who
were not interested primarily in an official career. Such supernumerary students did not receive government support; but if a position became available among the ranks of the regular students they could apply for it, and there came a time when a certain number of supernumerary students were allowed to compete for the degree of chu-jen at the triennial provincial examinations.

In addition to accomplishing a major decentralization in the field of education, the Ming also instituted some minor reforms. They took control of the local schools away from the administrative officials and entrusted it to centrally appointed educational commissioners. They offered students in the Imperial Academy opportunities for interim employment in a government bureau, so that they could begin to acquire administrative experience at a relatively early age. (At first such student-officials were appointed only after they had attended the Imperial Academy for ten years. By the latter half of the fifteenth century, however, they were being permitted to substitute, for years at the Academy, years of study under a private tutor, and this led to great abuses, e.g., to the appointment of student-officials who had spent less than a year at the Imperial Academy.) Finally, although the Ming government provided everything the students it supported required, from books and beard and lodging to separate quarters inside the compound of the Emperor's palace for the wives of married students, it also imposed on them a very strict disciplinary code, of which the following paragraphs are an adequate sample:

- When assembled to eat, students shall conduct themselves with propriety and dignity, and with proper respect for their food and drink. Shouting and clamoring, standing up and sitting down during the meal are not allowed, nor is it allowed to force on one's own initiative one or more of the cooks to prepare meals outside, and recklessly to spend the government allotment in food. Offenders will be severely sentenced.

- A student who has been working in a government office shall, upon finishing such work, return forthwith to the Academy to continue his studies. He shall not, when being thus away from the Academy, avail himself of the opportunity to engage in some other business. Offenders will be severely sentenced.

- Any serious complaint, either against the military or the civil branch, can be voiced by farmers, laborers, merchants, or shopkeepers, but no student is allowed to do so.

- Recalcitrant and unruly rascals who violate the school regulations shall be reported to us by the president. Whatever the case, no mercy will be shown. With their whole family they shall be transported to malarious districts, where they shall serve either as soldiers, or as subordinate officials, or as magistrates. Hereafter the school regulations shall be strictly enforced. If, as has happened before, unregistered persons put up anonymous posters in which they defame the teachers, let all persons come out with it, or hand the culprits over in bonds, in reward for which they shall receive two pieces of silver. As for posters that have been put up before this, if there are persons who know about them, let them either turn informant, or hand the culprits over in bonds, in reward for which they, too, shall receive in like manner two pieces of silver. The criminals themselves shall be sliced limb from limb and their heads shall be impaled in front of the Academy; all the possessions of their family shall be confiscated, and its members transported to malarious districts. This is an Imperial order.

These were not idle threats. In 1391, for example, the student Chiao Lin was executed and his head impaled in front of the Academy because he had slandered his teachers. In 1385 the Academy had as its president Mr Sung Na, who enforced the school regulations with great harshness and exercised extreme frugality in allotting food to his charges. The time came when the students were on the point of starvation; yet when the Emperor learned that one of the assistant professors had enlisted the aid of the secretary of the Ministry of Officials in an attempt to oust the president, he had both the assistant professor and the secretary executed.
The Ming retained the medical schools and the yin-yang schools they had inherited from the T'ang, but abolished the schools of law, lexicology, and mathematics. These subjects were subsequently taught in the regular schools. They also created an Imperial College of Astronomy, which took its place in the cluster of specialized schools in the capital.

Despite the lip-service paid to the principle that civil service positions could only be held by those who had passed the necessary examinations, certain hereditary rights to such positions continued to be acknowledged. Officials in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy were permitted to send their sons to the Imperial Academy without their having satisfied the entrance requirements. Wealth, too, sometimes opened the door to persons who could not otherwise have qualified, especially during the latter half of the Ming dynasty and through the Ch'ing dynasty.

**Ch'ing Dynasty**

The Ch'ing dynasty, until it was forced by external circumstances to adopt a different course, followed the general policy of maintaining existing Chinese educational institutions with only minor changes. However, the Ch'ing expanded the examination system to proportions entirely out of line with the educational facilities offered by the government. The earlier practice had been to select the best among the hsii-ts'ai and send them to the Imperial Academy, and to call such of these as came from the provinces kung-sheng ("tribute students"). The Ch'ing continued to grant the title of kung-cheng to outstanding hsii-ts'ai, but the large majority of the Ch'ing kung-sheng were not students at all. The term came to denote a rank in the examination system, intermediate between hsii-ts'ai and chu-jen, which exempted the holder from the ordinary hsii-ts'ai's obligation to subject himself to the exacting, time- and money-consuming examinations that were held every three years in the local capitals. Many of these kung-shengs remained "tribute students" for the rest of their life, holding down permanent positions in local administrations.

The schools tended increasingly, under the Ch'ing, to be sheer training schools for the bureaucracy. Scholarship for scholarship's sake was frowned on. The Emperor Yung-chêng drove this point home in an Imperial decree: "It should be borne in mind that in subsidizing students it is not our aim to encourage useless scholarship, but rather to instill into the people that respect which it owes to its rulers and to its ancestors."

Like the Mongols in earlier days, the Manchus had a racial problem to deal with. They adopted strict precautions to prevent themselves from being assimilated by the Chinese culturally as well as purely ethnically, and set up special schools in the capital to instruct young Manchus in Manchu lore and in archery and horsemanship. (Some of the students at these schools also received instruction in Chinese.) These schools, moreover, were under much more rigorous supervision than the Imperial Academy.

The real halls of learning during the Ch'ing period were the shu-yuan, which generally fared better, particularly in protection, under the Ch'ing dynasty than under its predecessor. In 1733 they ceased to be private institutions and became full-fledged government schools. The Emperor Yung-chêng ordered all governors-general to establish shu-yuan in their provincial capitals, and the institutions increased greatly in number. Their students were thenceforth selected by educational commissioners attached to the governors-general's staff. The Emperor decreed, at the same time, a ban on private lecturing, thus making no secret of the political character of the government's motives in reorganizing the shu-yuan.

The two things that most impressed foreign observers during this period were the examination system and the universality of China's elementary educational facilities. The day came when an M.F. rose in the British Parliament to advocate the adoption of a
system of civil service examinations based on the Chinese model. There was an elementary school in practically every Chinese village. The establishment of such schools was encouraged by the government, and the usual practice was for the local authorities to locate and recruit the teachers. In every other respect, however, the schools were private institutions, and reflected a local determination to give children the benefits of an education, although by present-day standards the quality of the instruction offered left much to be desired. The students learned their lessons by rote, and used for the most part materials far beyond their comprehension.

1862–1919 (REMOVAL OF NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT)

Contact with the West

China's traditional philosophy had accustomed the Chinese to see the world as an area with China as its center, and in which things change not along a straight line but within a closed circle. Although this point of view cannot be called static neither was it likely to encourage progress. It was certain, therefore, to clash sharply with the dynamic philosophy of the Western world when and if it came in contact with it — as, largely under duress, it finally did. The outcome of this clash was, furthermore, easily predictable: the superiority of the West in "this-worldly" matters, especially, has obliged the Chinese to try to assimilate as much as possible of Western civilization in the shortest possible time. The resultant neglect of Chinese culture has brought in its wake a feeling of inferiority on the part of the Chinese, less important than those of Western ideas and Western technology. This goes a long way toward explaining some of the Chinese behavior in recent years, and has contributed to a marked impoverishment of the culture of the world as a whole.

As the vehicle of culture par excellence education was more immediately influenced by contact with the West than was any other Chinese institution. Indeed, the whole history of Chinese education during this period can be understood only if looked at in this perspective.

Missionaries

The prelude to the great changes that were to take place after 1862 dates from the seventeenth century, when Catholic missionaries like Matteo Ricci and Johannes Adam Schall von Bell made a deep impression on the Chinese. Their scientific knowledge, especially in the field of astronomy (although Copernicus was still considered a heretic), attracted a considerable number of Chinese students. When, in 1701, a Papal decision ruled that Catholic doctrine and the Confucian rituals for the veneration of ancestors were incompatible, the Chinese government promptly banned the Catholic missionaries; with them went the only contact China had with Western thought and Western science. Not until 1812, after the signing of the treaty of Nanking, did Catholic and Protestant missionaries again come to China. This time they came in numbers, so that there were sufficient personnel to establish schools as well as churches for the dissemination of the Christian faith and, along with faith, the Western knowledge of which the Christians were the bearers.

The early-day missions had no established educational policy. The schools they maintained ministered primarily to the needs of the new converts, most of whom were drawn from among the humbler classes. The mission schools, nevertheless, gave the
Chinese their first taste of Western education. From these early schools spread the facts and ideas that, as time passed, were to open wide crevices in the structure of Chinese society.

Influences of the West

The Treaty of Tientsin (ratified in 1860), which created, among other things, the Chinese Foreign Office, contained a clause stipulating all dispatches from foreign countries were to carry Chinese translations for the first three years after which the Chinese would receive dispatches in the language of the originating country. This meant that the Chinese government had to start training its own personnel to translate Western languages. In 1862 a school was established for this purpose in Peking, called the T’ung-wén-kuan, and two years later it was expanded to include a department of science and raised to the rank of a college. In 1868 Dr. W. A. P. Martin became its professor of international law, and the following year he was appointed as its first president.

Two disastrous wars with the West, and the resultant ignominies heaped upon China (e.g., the treaties of Nanking and Tientsin), had convinced a number of high-ranking Chinese that China urgently needed young men trained in the sciences of the West. By establishing the T’ung-wén-kuan, the government had officially recognized this need, but there was still enough opposition to the whole idea to prevent any major steps from being taken for another thirty years.

Internal Efforts

The efforts of three viceroys, Taeng Kuo-fan, governor-general of Kiangnan and Kiangsi, Li Hung-chang, and Chang Chih-tung, deserve mention here. The first, Taeng Kuo-fan, enlisted the services of the first Chinese who graduated from a foreign university, Yung Wing (1829–1912). Yung Wing was born on Pedro Island, four miles southwest of Macao, and in his childhood attended the first missionary schools to be established in Macao and, later, in Hong Kong. In 1847 he sailed for America to attend the Monson Academy at Monson, Massachusetts, from which he was graduated in 1850. He spent the next four years at Yale University, where he earned his way by managing a boarding house and acting as librarian for one of the university literary societies. He took his degree at Yale in 1854, and returned to China in the autumn of that year. Ten years later he returned to New England, to execute a commission from Taeng Kuo-fan to purchase machinery for what was to become the Kiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai. By 1867 the Kiangnan Arsenal had as an annex its own mechanical school.

Chang Chih-tung set up a similar arsenal in Canton during his governor-generalship of Kwangtung-Kwangsi (1881–1889). This arsenal also was used as a training school for military and naval personnel. Later, having been transferred to Wuchang as governor-general of Hubei-Hunan, he organized the Government Mining and Engineering College at Wuchang.

At about the same time, Li Hung-chang was planning the establishment of a university in Tientsin (A spacious building was finally constructed for this purpose, with funds contributed by both Chinese and Westerners; but for the time being no further steps were taken.) Li Hung-chang also associated himself with a group of persons who were urging the Throne to include physical science and mathematics in the list of subjects covered by the traditional examination system. Although the proposal met with a great deal of opposition in official circles, it was finally adopted in the year 1887, when an Imperial decree made it possible for persons trained in the sciences to receive official recognition for their
expertise and enter upon an official career. (At first, the decree produced little in the way of practical results, for the simple reason that no examiners were available who were familiar with the new subjects.)

Yung Wing's name also comes up in connection with China's first educational commission abroad. The plans for this commission were worked out in the early seventies by Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and a few other high officials after consent had been obtained from the Emperor. They selected 120 students averaging twelve to fourteen years of age for the project, whom they divided into four equal groups to be sent abroad, one at a time at intervals of one year, for 15 years' training. Because of his experiences abroad and the fact that he was known to have been thinking in terms of such a project, Yung Wing was appointed assistant Commissioner. The post of Commissioner went to Ch'en Lan-pin, a member of the Hanlin Academy known for his devotion to Chinese learning (Yung Wing was suspected of "pro-foreignism" – he had become a naturalized American citizen in 1832.)

The student groups were taken to the United States, as planned, through the years 1872-1875. The commission established a headquarters in Hartford, Connecticut, and the boys, as they arrived, were farmed out by twos and fours to live with New England families and pick up what they needed to know in order to take care of themselves in American grade schools. They did very well from the first, taking to their new environment and, all too quickly from the standpoint of the project purpose, acquiring American ways and neglecting their native customs and the Chinese education. (Yung Wing appears not to have been worried about this, but Ch'en Lan-pin was greatly disturbed.) Reports of this development went back to Ch'iao, however, and gave rise to much unfavorable criticism. One result of this was that Li Hung-chang withdrew his support from the project. In 1881 the mission was ordered abolished, and the students directed to return home. For the moment, at least, Chinese conservatism could breathe more easily.

**Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895**

The blow needed to defeat the conservatives was dealt by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, from which many Chinese drew the following moral: Japan, another Oriental nation and, moreover, one the Chinese had always regarded as second-rate, had been able to inflict a defeat on China only because it was well on the road to Westernization. Opinion shifted sharply on the whole Westernization issue. The Emperor Kuang-hsi became interested in Western learning himself, and let it be known that he was reading translations of Western books. The missionary schools and colleges and such other schools as were teaching Western language and science were swamped with applications for admission. Two sorely needed institutions of higher learning were launched: the Peiyang University in Tientsin (which Li Hung-chang had planned a full decade before) and the Nanyang College in Shanghai. The new attitudes on education are epitomized in Chang Chih-tung's famous book *Exhortation to Learning* (Ch'ian-hsih Chi'rên) in which he set forth a project for a modern school system and advocated numerous educational reforms subsequently put into effect. The book was published in 1895 and enjoyed a tremendous vogue.

**The "Hundred Days' Reform"**

The year 1898 was also that of Emperor Kuang-hsi's "Hundred Days' Reform," in which he was advised by K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927). The K'ang Yu-wei, with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1920), Tan Shu-t'ung (1853-1898), and other progressives, organized a reform party whose objective was to transform China into a modern nation under a constitutional monarchy. The party seized upon Chang Chih-tung's *Exhortation to Learning*
as its educational platform. The "Hundred Days" began when Kang Yu-wei's arguments won over the Emperor himself, and the reform, such as it was, took the form of a series of decrees, among them one stressing the importance of scientific studies, one providing for modern district schools to be housed in temples, and one providing for a University in Peking. Indeed, in retrospect, the reforms were rather too far-reaching than otherwise, for they produced an anti-Western reaction so powerful as to make them self-defeating. It was, moreover, this reaction that finally led to the Boxer uprising, which, because of its sheer folly and rashness, finished off the anti-Western conservatives, the most influential of whom paid for it with their lives. The Empress Dowager, key figure in the reaction, learned a lesson from the uprising and its consequences. Soon she was advocating the very reform measures that she had been busy defeating only a short time before. The drastic, organized reform of the education system suddenly became practical politics.

Emigration for Education

The first problem attacked was China's conspicuous shortage of persons with Western-type training. This clearly called for a government program for sending students abroad. Young men who could afford it were already going abroad in considerable numbers without government sponsorship; some, indeed, had already returned and were making their influence felt both in the professions and in business. Japan was the nearest and easiest place for such young men to go, and, after the Japanese victory over Russia, there was a veritable flood of Chinese students into Japan. (In the course of a few years returned students from Japan were taking an active part in the work of progress and reform all over China.) Evidently, however, the number of families able to finance a son through several years of study at a foreign university was small by comparison with the country's need for trained personnel. In recognition of this, an edict promulgated in 1901 recommended that provincial governors select promising young men to be sent abroad to study, and that their expenses be defrayed by the provincial governments. This was followed, in 1905, by a decree suggesting a larger number of students should be sent to Europe and America. At the same time, Chinese ministers abroad were instructed to give special attention to the needs and welfare of such government-sponsored students as might come to the countries to which they were accredited, and, in general, to treat the students as if they were their own sons. Finally, it was decreed that any student returning to China with foreign training might present himself with his diploma before the governor and educational commissioner of his province for examination; if he were found satisfactory, he should be recommended for appointment in the bureaucracy. (This applied to private students as well as government-sponsored students.) By 1907 the number of students who thus presented themselves had grown so large as to call for a nation-wide system of control and examination.

In a number of countries, e.g., Japan, America, France, Belgium, Germany, and England, Chinese students soon became so numerous that the regular legation staff could not handle them. Each of these legations soon found itself with an "educational bureau," made up of officials who could devote full time to the students' problems. Soon, too, competitive examinations were established in the various provinces to determine which students should be sent abroad, and regulations were drawn up to govern such examinations. By 1907 one of these examinations (in Kirgsu Province) was being thrown open to women. By 1910, according to one estimate, over 2500 government-scholarship students and at least 5000 private students (150 of them women) were receiving training in Japan. In England there were already 140 government-sponsored and 150 private students; in
Belgium, France, and Germany, respectively, 70, 80, and 60 government-sponsored students, plus an indeterminate number of private students. The number of Chinese students in the United States in the same year was estimated to be not less than 600. (The United States had returned to China over ten million dollars in Boxer Indemnity funds, and China had gratefully committed itself to sending 100 students to the United States each year for four years, and 50 students each year thereafter for twenty-eight years.) The first group of these students had been selected (by competitive examination in Peking) in 1909. Later, only persons who had taken a preliminary course of training at Tsinghua College in Peking were accepted as applicants.

Reforms, 1901-1910

Another problem attacked early in this period was that of what to do about the old examination system, and the relation between it and the educational process — based on the idea that the purpose of education was to prepare a man for an examination that will admit him to the public service. The reform movement cut the gordian knot of the examination system by abolishing it in 1905. This was done despite its reputation for being traditional, on the grounds (set forth in a petition by Yuan Shih-k'ai and others) that retaining the system would violate ancient custom, since in early antiquity recruits for public office had all been taken from public schools. However, the idea that education was a matter of training future officials did not disappear overnight. Rather, the reform movement disposed of it by indirect action — by buckling down to the hard business of establishing a national school system that would, in practice, train people for functions other than that of government servants.

The key developments during this period then were: an edict, issued in 1901, providing that all shu-yuan were to be turned into modern universities or colleges modeled after the Imperial University in Peking, thus providing each province with an up-to-date institution of higher learning; the establishment of middle schools in every prefecture; and the establishment of higher primary schools in every district, and lower primary schools throughout the country. The course of study in these institutions was to include Chinese classics, history, principles of government, and Western sciences. In 1903 a commission was appointed, with Chang Chih-tung as a member, to draw a detailed plan for a national public school system. This commission's report, which included even, for example, suggested regulations concerning discipline and curricula, as well as proposals on how the necessary schools were to be established, ran to four volumes, and became the authorized program for educational changes throughout the empire. The accompanying chart outlines the proposed new educational system.

As conceived by this commission, the aim of the lower primary schools was to give to children above seven years of age the knowledge necessary for day-to-day adult living; to inculcate in them the foundations of morality and patriotism, and to promote their physical welfare. Model (or what we would now call pilot-plant) schools were, according to the plan, to be established at the earliest possible moment by the government: at least two in each small district, three in each large district, and one in each large village. Students in these schools were to pay no tuition.

Higher primary schools were to be established in cities, towns, and villages, at least one such school to be maintained by the government in each of these territorial divisions. In these schools tuition was to be charged, in an amount to be determined by local conditions, most particularly by the community's ability to pay.

The middle schools were to provide higher general education to children between the ages of fifteen and nineteen. The higher schools were to offer students a choice among
three different courses of study: a course that would prepare them to enter university departments of Chinese classics, political science and law, literature, and commerce; a course that would prepare them to enter university departments of science, agriculture, and engineering; and a course that would prepare them for admission for medical training. In all three courses, great stress was placed on foreign languages. Finally, the chin-shih kuan or school for Doctors of Philosophy was to offer to the old style Doctors of Philosophy (chin-shih) an opportunity to study Western learning.

The scheme went into effect in 1905. A Ministry of Education was organized, and a year later it established provincial boards of education, each with its centrally appointed commissioner of education, and local bureaus of education, each with a district inspector appointed by the commissioner of education. The rate of progress from 1905-1908 to the fall of the Manchu dynasty is shown in Table 1.
In the years 1903–1910 the number of students attending modern schools increased from 1274 to 1,525,534.

The old educational system had virtually ignored the existence of females; the new system never did, even in its beginnings. (Mission schools for girls had existed for many years, but had never received much support or been taken very seriously. The first modern school for girls under Chinese auspices had been founded in 1897, at Shanghai.) Official provision was made for both primary schools and normal schools for girls as early as 1907, and the relevant facilities developed rapidly over the next years.

**TABLE 1**

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SCHOOLS
(1905–1910)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Governmental *</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private *</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>4,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,779</td>
<td>4,529</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>8,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>12,310</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>19,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>11,515</td>
<td>20,321</td>
<td>4,016</td>
<td>35,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>12,888</td>
<td>25,088</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>43,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>14,301</td>
<td>32,251</td>
<td>5,783</td>
<td>52,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Supported by the central government.  
* Maintained by local public funds.

The Republican Government

No account of this period of Chinese educational history would be complete if it failed to mention the growing political consciousness of Chinese students that accompanied the foregoing developments. As new schools were founded and old ones expanded, the campuses became hotbeds of political discussion and activity, which very early took the form of organized student intervention in political affairs. (This remains an important factor in Chinese politics, even today.) The students seized upon every political crisis and issue to hold mass meetings, the upshot of which was invariably advice or protest to the government. The authorities, both civil and academic, sought to discourage these demonstrations, but they did this so ineptly that they fanned the flames rather than put them out. The students became attached to the revolutionary ideas of Dr. Sun, whose cause, far more than any other, benefited from their agitation. Dr. Sun often said, in later years, that what was happening in the field of education was the chief factor in the successful overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of the republic.

However that may be, the revolution and the unsettled conditions it created throughout China slowed up the expansion of educational facilities in many parts of the country. Educational planning, to be sure, went forward apace, but the reality always lagged far behind the blueprint. This was not because of any faltering of enthusiasm for education; in the very first year of the republic the government announced its basic aims in the field of education, weaving into them, as opportunity afforded, the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat-sen. Education should, it proclaimed, make young Chinese into good citizens of the new republic; it should be practical; it should emphasize military virtues. On the cultural side, the government continued, education should attempt to foster the social virtues.
In the first years of the republic, the practical and military aspects of education were emphasized at the expense of its intellectual and civic aspects. Ch'ı-ch'ao's influence was primarily responsible for the subsequent reversal of this trend. Education, he held, should concern itself above all with the national cultural heritage as a symbol of national unity.

The influence of the American educator John Dewey is discernible here in the encouragement of good citizenship as one of the basic aims of education. His influence also made itself felt, in time, in the field of popular or mass education, where it was Dewey's teachings that inspired such pioneers as Dr. Yen Yang-ch'ıu (James Yen).

The temporary educational policy outlined by the provisional government in 1912 put great stress upon the diffusion of knowledge through quasi-educational institutions and activities; e.g., public lectures, newspapers, and libraries. It urged provincial governors to foster these activities through their local officials and such private groups as might wish to help.

Upon the election of Yüan Shih-k'ai as President of China, a new Ministry of Education was formed, and a few months later the Emergency Central Educational Conference met in Peking in July and August 1912. Guided by the recommendations submitted by this conference, the ministry set about to reorganize the educational system and its administration into a more effective organ of the new republic. The reorganization plans were revised in 1922, and again in 1932. Always, however, a sharp distinction was maintained between higher education and secondary education, and between secondary and primary education, for each of the three was, for programing purposes, treated principally as a separate and distinct problem. There is, therefore, good reason for taking them up separately, getting clearly in mind the developments in one field before passing along to another. This survey will begin with the year 1912 and end with the establishment of the Communist regime. The period may be divided, in accordance with Kuomintang doctrine, into three subperiods: (1) the period of military government, lasting until 1928; (2) the period of One Party Tu tu le, from 1928 until the beginning of 1948; and (3) the period of Constitutional Government, which started in the early spring of 1948 with the adoption of the new constitution. This division should be kept in mind in reading the following sections.

Primary Education

Primary education was, in principle, the concern of local authorities, but general directives on the subject were issued from time to time by the central government. The latter also drew up a succession of plans for primary education, of which at least the following must be kept in mind: (1) The Plan of 1912; (2) the Plan of 1920; (3) the Nationalist Government Plan of 1927; (4) the Adult Education Plans of 1928–1929; (5) the 1938 Law on local administration of primary schools; (6) the "General Regulations Governing the Implementation of People's Education" of 1910; and (7) the Post-war Five-Year Plan of 1946.

All these plans had as their general objective the most rapid possible increase in the number of children in elementary schools, and all rested on the premise that the way to accomplish this end was to expand the number of trained teachers and to multiply school facilities. (None of the plans, however, neglected the problem of providing elementary education for illiterate adults.) The best possible measure of their success, therefore, is statistics regarding the percentage of children of school age who were attending school at the beginning and end of the period, and at various intermediate points. Between 1912 and 1932 the percentage appears to have remained fairly constant. Between 1932
and 1914, however, it rose from 21.8 percent to 76 percent. (The number of students attending elementary classes for adults rose from 206,021 in 1933 to 1,146,254 in 1935 — not a conspicuously large number, in view of the large number of illiterates in China.) This increase is particularly impressive if the reader bears in mind the number and difficulty of the problems facing the government through the years in question: the shortage of trained teachers; the chaos created by the almost incessant civil war between the Nationalist government and the war lords or Communists; and the sheer impossibility, in the context of the civil war, of raising adequate funds for education.

The most conspicuous change the republican government brought about in the primary school curriculum was to eliminate classical materials in favor of materials relating to everyday Chinese life, with the result that the curriculum came to be much the same as that in Western countries. This meant that new textbooks had to be written, printed, and distributed, itself an immense task. Most of them were printed under government auspices — in part because privately published textbooks had to be approved by the government before they could be used for instruction. Some foreign observers have complained that the textbooks of the period were intensely nationalistic and, all too often, politically and socially tendentious. The nationalistic emphasis does appear to have been strong during the first decade of the Chinese republic, i.e., while the unequal treaties were still a major issue; but that emphasis gradually diminished when, under the impact of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (the "Literacy Revolution"), "popular education" became the vogue. (Professor John Dewey visited China at this time, and was listened to attentively in many quarters.) The new intelligentsia played a crucially important role in this movement on the side of popular education. One of the most conspicuous single figures in the movement was a Chinese graduate from Yale known as Dr. James Yen, who began his work on behalf of literacy during World War I among the thousands of Chinese laborers in France. He and a colleague, both of them free only after working hours, and using only readers and textbooks they had themselves compiled, taught more than 5000 illiterate Chinese how to read. Yen was so gratified at the result that he went back to China to pioneer in the field of mass education. Like the American Johnny Appleseed, he visited rural village after rural village, planting wherever he went the seeds of knowledge that he felt his country needed, and enjoining his students to continue the good work among their neighbors. As time passed his work received increased recognition and increased support both from the government and from private sources.

From the year 1923 on Dr. Yen directed the activities of the newly established "Chinese Popular Education Promotion Society," which has done signal work on behalf of literacy in China. Until 1926 this society confined its activity to the cities; after that, it undertook an intensive program of rural education directed at the major illas of the Chinese countryside: ignorance, poverty, disease, and lack of public spirit. It provided training in language, hygiene, livelihood, and citizenship, using schools and private homes as the centers of the educational program. For language-training purposes, it compiled lists and dictionaries of basic characters and basic terms, published a one-thousand-character text for city dwellers, another one-thousand-character text for peasants, and a third one-thousand-character text for general use. It hurdled the barrier of rural apathy in the only way possible, i.e., by training that the needs of farmers are not the same as those of city dwellers, and appealing to the peasants in terms not of the needs they ought to have but those they did have and feel. The society also published home-study reading materials, thereby filling the very real gap created by the shortage of teachers; it also published its own weekly newspaper for farmers. As for training in "livelihood," it carried modern agricultural techniques to the peasants' homes by developing a mobile training...
school, and by carrying out its own agricultural experimental program, first in Hopeh and, after the Japanese invasion, in several provinces of Free China.

The increase in number of students at public primary schools in this period was accompanied by a decrease in the number of students attending other primary schools. This was largely a matter of the absorption by the public schools of children who, without them, would have been sent to mission schools for other than religious reasons. (The foreign missionary organizations had been far more evangelical in their primary schools than in their institutions of secondary and higher education, and large numbers of Chinese who had not embraced the Christian religion had disliked the primary schools for that reason.) Non-mission private schools of the modern type continued to thrive; indeed, throughout the period the best school in nearly every Chinese community was a school run under private auspices. Such schools made a great contribution to China's educational development, if for no other reason than that they enjoyed opportunities for experiment that were necessarily denied to the government schools.

Secondary Education

The institutions of secondary education included middle schools, normal schools, and vocational schools, all three of which figured in the plan for China's educational system drawn up by the Imperial Government in 1903. When the republican government took over, it maintained the major aspect of the Imperial Government's program, but in 1922 it took steps to bring the whole secondary education system more in line with American models (the previous practice had been to imitate Japanese models). The middle schools were divided into junior and senior middle schools of three years each (the so-called 3-3 plan for middle schools), and the central government adopted the policy of providing normal and vocational curricula in the middle schools themselves. This eased the financial burden of maintaining middle schools, but in the opinion of some authorities was an unwise deviation from the 1903 program. Many counties could not afford a middle school with so ambitious a curriculum, and would have been better off with a junior middle school plus simply a vocational school. After 1931, many county middle schools were converted into vocational or rural normal schools. When the educational system was reformed in 1932, the mutual independence of the three types of secondary schools was reconfirmed.

From the standpoint of source of income there were three kinds of public middle schools: national, provincial or municipal, and county. The national middle schools were few in number and were, for the most part, connected with national institutions of higher education. Since there was no comprehensive plan for the regional distribution of secondary schools, the majority of middle schools, and of normal and vocational schools as well, was concentrated in the wealthier provinces, particularly in the big municipalities. Not until 1938 did the Ministry of Education promulgate a set of regulations for the distribution of institutions of secondary education calculated to remedy this state of affairs by dividing each province into school districts on the basis of population figures, financial condition, cultural level, and communication facilities.

The course of study in the middle schools included Chinese, English, history, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, botany, hygiene, drawing, music, manual work, and physical education, with standards in each of these subjects set by the ministry to which all teachers had to conform. Prior to 1920, little attention had been given to standardization. The middle schools often actually competed with one another in their course offerings by providing all manner of elective courses, particularly in the social sciences and literature. This chaotic situation prevailed increasingly from 1922 to 1929, and resulted in a grave deterioration of secondary education.
After the inauguration of the Kuomintang central government, however, the Ministry of Education called on specialists to work out standards for each of the subjects to be taught in the junior and senior middle schools. These standards were decreed at intervals through 1932 to 1934. Henceforth all subjects in the middle school curricula were specified (i.e., the elective system was abolished), and their function was narrowed down to that of preparing students for higher forms of education. English was offered throughout the three years of the junior middle school (formerly it had been a third year elective), with vocational subjects, which were now abolished, as options. In the senior middle schools a choice was offered between a course of study with emphasis on science and one with emphasis on literature, the latter including more instruction in Chinese, English, and logic and less in mathematics and related subjects. The weekly schedule of instruction was reduced from 33 to 31 hours for the junior middle schools, and from 31 to 30 hours for the senior middle schools.

A large proportion of the country's private middle schools were managed by foreign missions. (Private corporations and persons were not permitted to establish normal schools, and therefore concentrated their efforts on middle schools.) They were often able to offer courses that Chinese middle school teachers were not equipped to teach, and many of them, in consequence, achieved a standard of excellence well beyond that of the Chinese public schools. Parents (Christians and non-Christians) who intended to send their children to one of the excellent missionary universities or colleges naturally preferred to have them attend the mission middle schools as well. Thus while the pupils of mission primary schools tended to be either the children of Christians, or waifs and orphans, the mission middle schools drew pupils from good families of all creeds.

Even during the war against Japan the secondary schools continued to expand at a rapid rate. In 1937 there were 3261 middle schools (of which 255 were Christian middle schools) registered with the Ministry of Education, with a total of 627,216 students. In 1943, in Free China alone there were 3455 registered middle schools, with an enrollment of 1,101,087 students. Although these totals include both normal and vocational schools, they are nevertheless indicative of the rapid rate of progress that was maintained through these extremely difficult years.

After the establishment of the republic, the 1903 system of normal schools was reduced to two types: normal schools, which were institutions for secondary education, and normal colleges, sometimes called higher normal schools, which were institutions of higher education. The former, normal schools, were supported by the provincial governments. They offered a five-year course, and under the 1922 school system their curriculum was divided into a lower and a higher grade, each covering a period of three years, to make possible their integration with the middle schools. When the law on normal schools was adopted, it stipulated that students must be graduates of junior middle schools, and their course of study at the normal schools was accordingly shortened to three years. Both because of shortage of funds and because of the crying need for teachers, special normal courses of only one year's duration were authorized, to admit graduates of senior middle schools and senior vocational schools. This was also done for kindergarten teachers' training classes of two to three years' duration, admitting graduates of junior middle schools. When the Outline for enforcing compulsory education was adopted in 1935, one of the chief stumbling blocks was the persistently acute shortage of elementary school teachers; it was accordingly decided to authorize the counties to establish short-course normal schools offering four-year courses and admitting primary school graduates, and to permit one-year normal classes, admitting junior middle school graduates, to be attached to normal and middle schools.
Simultaneously with the creation of middle school districts in 1933, normal school districts were marked out, each to have one normal school for men and one for women. This was done as part of a general program by which the government hoped to boost the efficiency of the normal school system, provision being made at the same time for the establishment of simplified normal schools and village normal schools. The expenses incurred in the training of normal school students were to be borne by the government, but it was stipulated that normal school graduates were, in return, to serve for a period of three years as teachers in whatever localities might be designated. District educational authorities were urged at this same time to arrange for summer sessions for primary school teachers.

Two types of vocational schools were contemplated in the school system adopted in 1912: one to give a three-year course for graduates of lower primary schools, and a second to give a three-year course for graduates of higher primary schools. Under the provisions of the 1922 plan, vocational schools could be attached to middle schools in accordance with the pattern set up for normal schools, with local authorities being given considerable freedom to vary the length and nature of the courses dependent on local needs. This led, unavoidably, to a vocational school system that entirely lacked standardization and coordination. The one general statement that can be made is that private educational societies accounted for most of the adult students in this field. A change began to take place in the early thirties, with the promulgation of the law on vocational schools. This law provided for the establishment of junior vocational schools offering one- to three-year courses for graduates of primary schools between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and of senior vocational schools offering three-year courses for graduates of junior middle schools and five- or six-year courses for graduates of primary schools. Each school was to offer a single course of study: agriculture, industry, commerce, or home economics; and each was to provide such workshops, factories, and/or experimental farm stations as would facilitate practical work on the part of students. Consequently, many of these schools were established in places where they could cooperate with local factories and business houses, experimental farms or agricultural stations, etc. The number of vocational schools, estimated in 1937 at 494, fell sharply during the first years of the war, but by 1941 it had risen to 332 and increased steadily after the war became an allied effort. It is interesting to note, in connection with the vocational school program, that factories and mining concerns employing more than 200 and 500 men respectively were required to maintain supplementary training classes.

**Higher Education**

After the founding of the Chinese Republic, the 1903 system of higher education was reformed with a view to establishing universities, technical colleges, and higher normal schools. The universities were to have schools of liberal arts and sciences, law, commerce, agriculture, engineering, and medicine; and there were to be technical colleges of agriculture, industry, commerce, law, medicine, pharmacy, navigation, and foreign languages.

Certain changes in the system brought about by legislation in 1922 have come in for bitter criticism on the grounds that they sought to expand higher education at the expense of standards. Among other things, the 1922 legislation authorized universities consisting of a single college, it converted higher normal schools into normal universities, and, under special conditions, it permitted technical schools to be established offering a minimum of three years of instruction (any technical school offering the same period of instruction as a university was granted university status). The same legislation, however, included other measures which are regarded as healthy changes: the instruction period for universities
was set at four to six years; and the preparatory departments of universities and technical schools were abolished. Of the universities established as a result of the 1922 legislation some at least were so ill-planned and under-financed as not to deserve the name.

In 1929, the Nationalist government introduced two basic laws, one on the organization of universities and one on the organization of technical schools, which put unprecedented emphasis on scientific training. The need for this type of training is shown by the ratio between students being trained in liberal arts and those being trained in science, which, as of that year, was 73.4 to 26.6. Under the new laws a university was to consist of no less than three colleges, one of which must be a college of science, agriculture, technology, or medicine. An institution not qualifying in this regard was to be known as an independent college.

Since 1929, then, there have been three types of higher educational institutions: universities, independent colleges, and technical schools. Definite entrance requirements, common to all the schools within each category, were laid down by law, as were common standards for degrees. A credit system was adopted with the stipulation that it was not to be used as a means of lowering existing standards regarding the period of time required for any type of training. Finally, the laws prescribed that no institution of higher learning could be established without a certain minimum amount of funds.

The following years witnessed the consolidation and reorganization of the system of higher education in accordance with these legislative measures. A number of independent colleges were integrated into universities, some institutions were abolished, and a number of new schools were established on the basis of need and location. Some institutions established research schools, to work in cooperation with the Academia Sinica, China's highest organization for research (an agency of the National government). Graduate studies were fostered at a number of institutions of higher learning, under the general limitation that only institutions with an annual budget of more than one million dollars (Chinese), adequate library and laboratory equipment, and faculty members qualified to conduct research, could offer graduate programs.

The outbreak of war in 1937 sharply arrested progress in China's system of higher education. Its universities, colleges, and technical schools were concentrated, even more than its institutions of secondary education, in and around the larger cities in the eastern part of China — precisely the part of China that the Japanese overran almost immediately. Many of these schools had sufficient notice of the invasion to move some of their staff, their equipment, and their students to such remote inland places as Kunming and Chengtu. This exodus, indeed, assumed epic proportions. 'Not only did it save a large part of China's investment in higher education, but it produced the highly beneficial result of interesting educators and students in the peoples and resources of parts of China that scholars had hitherto virtually ignored. The war, so to speak, helped bring the western provinces into the government's program of modernization, and to give them at least the beginning of a modern system of education.

Soon after the war the universities returned to their former campuses, which, especially those of the national universities, had suffered much damage under the occupation. Vast sums had to be spent on rebuilding and on buying new equipment. The government not only made funds available for these purposes as generously as could have been expected in the difficult circumstances of the postwar period, but it also adopted toward students a policy analogous to that which underlines the G. I. Bill of Rights in the United States. Practically all the students at national universities were, in consequence, soon being sup-
ported by the government — on a low level of subsistence, to be sure, but one adequate to enable thousands of young men to pursue their studies who might otherwise have been entirely unable to do so because of inflation of the currency.

Some 50 percent of China's institutions of higher education were privately sponsored. Of these, a considerable number were supported by boards of foreign missions in countries other than China, and compared favorably with universities in any part of the world. Recognizing the value of private universities, colleges, and technical schools, the government had begun to make grants to them in connection with its expansion program for higher education in the thirties. (One of the first private universities to receive such a grant had been Yenching University, located in the vicinity of Peking.)

When war broke out in 1937, China's institutions of higher education showed a total enrollment of 41,922 students. In 1916 (the first postwar year) the enrollment was 12,022. The number of students attending private institutions had increased by nearly 100 percent to 42,000, and the number enrolled at public institutions had more than quadrupled to over 87,000.

Table 2 shows the number of institutions of higher learning in China in 1934 and 1948:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Independent Colleges</th>
<th>Technical Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An Evaluation of Republican Efforts

The course of events in China since 1911 has followed the path not of evolution but of revolution. It has not only transformed China's social structure but, to a considerable extent, it has also altered the outlook and way of life of China's millions, and has posed educational problems far more difficult than those faced in the same period by other countries. The revolutionary leaders who established the Chinese republic in 1912 attempted to cement China's basically agrarian society, formerly ruled by an absolute monarchy, into a modern industrial society under a democratic republican government, which was to dedicate itself to the goals enunciated in the Three People's Principles. In a sense the revolution merely began in 1911. Only 38 years after that beginning, in 1949, there was declared in China a "People's Republic," which was to carry through another revolution in accordance with a pattern set by Marxist ideology. China's educational program was now put under entirely different directives and aimed at an entirely different set of objectives; the communists promptly seized control of the educational system and turned it to their purposes. Thus, for purposes of evaluating the pre-Communist republic's achievements in the educational field, the period 1911-1949 is a closed chapter.

Since democracy is possible in the long run only if it is rooted in an articulate citizenry, it can be argued that the major task of education in China after 1911 was to reduce and finally eliminate illiteracy. As is shown in the survey of primary education, this task was
far from accomplished by 1949— even taking the statistics furnished by the Ministry of Education at face value, which, because the ministry had a vested interest in making the results look as good as possible, would be inadvisable. One need not go far afield to discover the major reason for the failure: primary educational facilities over the country as a whole remained hopelessly inadequate throughout the period. The task of creating primary schools was assigned to the local authorities; the control exercised by the central government in many parts of China was weak at best, and establishment of the schools was for the most part left to the discretion of local authorities, who in any case did not have access to the funds needed to carry out an adequate program.

The school lands set aside by the imperial dynasties had long been preempted by the local gentry, and treated as the latter’s own property. The people, moreover, had been quick to associate themselves with the Kuomintang, which, though hard pressed through much of the period, never attempted to curb their position of dominance in local affairs. They were not likely to propose, nor let anyone else propose with any effect, the introduction of a fair system of taxation for educational purposes, since this would have obliged them to pay most of the costs of educating their less fortunate fellow citizens. According to Chinese tradition (on which of course most of these landholders had been brought up) a man’s first obligation is to his family, and his second to some group, usually a guild, which is bound together by common interests and common dangers. Since there was little security under the law, people could protect themselves only by participating in such groups. Geographic units like the county had never been regarded as representing a community of interest, or as a proper focus of loyalty and obligation. As a general proposition, there was little or no public spirit on the local level; where, despite all this, local schools did get themselves established, they tended to be financed by nuisance taxes, a considerable share of which were collected from people of scant capacity to pay. In spite of legislation forbidding their assessment, therefore, tuition and fees had to be charged at practically all public schools in order for the schools to meet expenses. Not until 1944 did the Central government attempt to stop this practice.

Thus in spite of the high regard in which learning was held in China, many people deeply resented both taxes for educational purposes and tuition fees. They reacted to the latter in particular by not sending their children to school at all—the more readily since child labor continued to be at a premium throughout these years, and since the economic condition of the masses of the people did not improve or at any time seem likely to do so. The average Chinese seeks education in an attempt to improve his lot, and if he feels that improving his lot is out of the question, his incentive for seeking education is, to say the least, considerably reduced. In the larger towns and cities, where there was what might be called a middle class, and in the municipalities that had relatively reliable sources of income, the state of education was notably better than elsewhere, but only 10 to 15 percent of the Chinese people lived in such places. In short, it can be said that the conditions were simply not present from 1911 to 1949 for the successful introduction of universal primary education on a six-year or even a four-year basis. The republic’s achievement in this field must be evaluated with those facts in mind.

The second great task of education in a democratic society is to teach the people their rights and duties under a democratic form of government. This is the area in which the republic’s educational program failed most conspicuously. The failure may be attributed, in part, to the same factors that blocked the republic’s anti-illiteracy program, especially the shortage of primary schools. This chapter, however, is equally concerned with secondary and higher education, and other contributing factors must be mentioned.
Democratic government as the West knew it was completely alien to the Chinese people; the best form of government they had ever dreamed of was a benign paternalism. What they had actually known, for the most part, was government by absolute autocrats, many of whom were bent on self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. For the common man, therefore, contact with governmental authority had traditionally meant trouble of one sort or another; his normal reaction had always been to have as little to do with it as possible. The political thinkers who propounded the new democratic ideas that underlay the republic had simply taken them over lock, stock, and barrel from the West, and had made no serious effort to adapt them to the framework of Chinese society. They had merely taken it for granted that a democratic system of government, having worked well in the West, could work equally well in China. This, of course, was to ignore the historical background against which democratic government had risen in the West, and, most particularly, the types of experience that had prepared certain Western peoples for participation in self-government. The Chinese reformers, if they had been taking these things into account, might have considered the possible necessity of achieving certain basic economic and social reforms before attempting to change Chinese political structure. In this context, it is not surprising that democratic institutions, when they were suddenly introduced after 1911, did not “catch on.” The Chinese people were not ready for them — or, by the same token, for a program of civic education appropriate to them. If such a program had been introduced in the school system it would undoubtedly have found itself operating in a vacuum. In any case, no real effort was made in this direction, and still less was there any attempt made to provide the kind of civic education that would have helped create the presuppositions for a democratic system.

The reformers did toy with John Dewey’s notion that the “school is society,” i.e., that the school should train people in the kind of problem-solving they would be called on to do in actual community living, and some educators believed that this notion, if generally applied, would hasten China’s democratization. But little was accomplished along these lines. Purely aside from the fact that students were few in number, the life they led in school bore little relation to the life of the Chinese people. Many students, upon graduating, felt hopelessly out of place in the world at large: one result of this feeling was that graduates tended to crowd together in the larger cities, where they generally saw only each other and kept themselves isolated from the rest of society. The kind of schools China needed were institutions that, besides teaching children the usual academic subjects, could have served as centers for intensive efforts at reforms in agriculture, economy, and hygiene. Such schools would have earned the respect and confidence of the people, and could ultimately have inspired trust in the government itself.

The third task of democratic education is that of preparing the individual student to earn a living, as well as preparing the student population in general to participate effectively in raising its country’s standard of living. By 1919, it could not be said that under the republic China had made much progress in either industry or education, and the question arises of how much of the blame for this failure rests on education? Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to review some basic facts. Eighty percent of the Chinese people were engaged in very intensive agriculture. Individual landholdings were very small, and the farmers’ cash income very low. Chinese agriculture did not produce the surplus needed to finance improved methods of agricultural production, let alone to provide for the kinds of training needed to use the new methods of production and thus modernize the country’s agriculture.

Similarly, urban populations could not be trained for the varied types of skilled work required by an industrial society, when China could not afford tools, machinery, and factories to employ even a very small portion of its population. During the war, when Ameri-
can equipment was flown into China, emergency courses in the handling and maintenance of machinery were offered for uneducated Chinese at Chungking, Kunming, and elsewhere, and proved highly successful. In the Chinese educational system vocational training was offered exclusively at the level of secondary education; yet, wartime experience indicated that it could be successfully offered at the primary level. The secondary schools also attempted to prepare students for careers in administration and education. There was, however, little demand for administrative personnel in business enterprise over the country, and most students trained for administrative tasks had to find employment in government offices, for which there was never any shortage of applicants. The shortage of primary school teachers, on the other hand, remained acute throughout the period, although normal school training could have had free of charge at the expense of the government.

There were several reasons why the inducement of free normal school training did not prove particularly effective. The very poor, who, other things being equal, might have responded in large numbers were generally unable to send their children even to a primary school. With many people of the “middle class,” the advantage of a free education weighed less than the accompanying obligation to serve as teachers for at least three years in localities designated by the government, which carried with it the prospect of possible exile to some rural village far from the comforts of city life, in exchange for the small salary of a school teacher.

Mention has been made of the Chinese predilection, revealed in the record of Chinese university life, for the humanities rather than the sciences, the opposite of Western emphasis. This is not a matter of the Chinese being tremendously concerned with things of the mind, but derives, rather, from the almost universal belief that manual work, or anything connected with it, is beneath the dignity of the scholar. In traditional Chinese society scholars occupied the highest rung on the social ladder, farmers the next, and artisans the third; and it is clear, in retrospect, that the attitudes inherited from that society operated, especially in the early years of the period being considered, to hold down enrollment in departments of science. For a long while both private enterprise and the government were constantly short of engineers and scientists while the nation had more persons holding degrees in the liberal arts than it could possibly use.

In a backward country like China which is attempting to “catch up” with the outside world, there is always the danger that blind admiration for supposedly “higher” forms of society will lead, in the educational system especially, to grave neglect of valuable elements in the inherited culture. This certainly happened in China under the republic, with two highly undesirable consequences. (a) The modern educational system introduced into China by the reformers failed, precisely because it did not purposefully foster the indigenous cultural heritage which would appeal to the people. (b) By the same token, it tended to establish a sharp differentiation between the majority of the Chinese people and that small minority who had tasted the fruits of contemporary science and knowledge. The educated, once out of school, did not feel at home in their surroundings; for the most part, therefore, they concentrated in the larger cities, where they could keep in touch with the kind of things they had learned at school. The very separateness of their way of life tended to deprive them of a sense of purpose within Chinese society, making them view themselves as square pegs in round holes. Some observers hold this sense of futility accountable for the popularity among the educated of an extreme nationalism that led them into all manner of absurdities. The only remedy for this would have been to give the national cultural heritage an honorable place in the nation’s educational system, and thus have kept the gap between the educated and the uneducated as narrow as possible.
EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Communists, at least according to their own professions, want the people to think, and thus they put great emphasis upon discussions and experiments in which students and teachers take part on a practically equal basis. At the same time, Communist doctrine assumes that almost all problems can be completely solved on the basis of such data as happen to be available, and that only one "correct" solution to any problem is possible. Once the Party has studied a problem and decreed the only possible correct answer, therefore, no one is entitled to a different opinion. This fundamental tenet means that each time the solution to a problem is so decreed, the field in which free thought and discussion are possible becomes smaller by just that much. (Evidence from the USSR, where the Communists have ruled for more than thirty years, seems to indicate that in the long run the field in which free thought and discussion is possible becomes increasingly small.) A large part of the education offered in today's Communist-dominated schools, and almost all of what is offered through pseudo-educational media such as discussion groups, is not education but sheer indoctrination, interlarded with deliberate misinformation, particularly about the capitalist countries. The ultimate educational objective of the Communist authorities is to convert the Chinese into reliable and gullible automatons, devoid of all capacity for independent thought.

Middle and Higher Education

If the preceding statements are clearly applicable to mass education under Communist rule, they are even more applicable to what passes for middle and higher education in present-day China. The Communist view is that these forms of education should be available only to members of Communist cadres. Graduates of middle and higher schools become, in a sense, leaders in their communities; it would, therefore, be foolish to let anti-Communists graduate from them, or to miss any opportunity to steep in sound doctrine the Communists who do graduate. Thus the so-called common courses at today's universities, even those in subjects like current affairs, Marxist philosophy, and Chinese revolutionary history, serve primarily purposes of indoctrination; they are, furthermore, required of all students and account for about 30 percent of the curriculum. (To some extent the Kuomintang had prepared the way for this sort of thing - government schools under the republic had likewise been rigorously controlled, courses in Kuomintang ideology had been compulsory, and student activities and organizations had been subject to constant restriction and repression.)

In line with the Marxist axiom concerning the unity of theory and practice, the Communist authorities encourage both students and faculty to devote a considerable part of their time to educational activities among the people. The nature of these activities varies greatly, depending on the locality and the background and field of study of the students. This policy has the dual advantage of drawing within the field of Communist indoctrination activities a considerable segment of the population of the larger towns and cities, where most of the institutions of higher learning are located, and of training the students as future cadre members. Such off-campus activities necessarily go forward at the expense of academic standards, which the available evidence indicates are quite low at the present time.

Reorganization

Communists have also reorganized the schools themselves in accordance with principles of "new democracy." Under the Kuomintang the administration of schools was always in the hands of individual executives. The Communists have set aside this policy in favor of committee rule. On the committees sit representatives of teachers' organiz-
tions, student organizations, and organizations of nonteaching employees. Committee rule gives the students an amount of power they never had before, and, while it appears to have led to some excesses, the students on the whole have shown considerable restraint in using it and the system undoubtedly tends to bring teachers and students closer together. A less healthy aspect of all this emphasis on organization is that the Communists, when they need to, can play the organized groups off against one another. The Communists were well aware that in many cases the sympathy with which they were received by the intelligentsia was because of disgust with the former régime, that no amount of mere indoctrination would change this kind of sympathy into heartfelt surrender to Communists' ideals, and that numerous intellectuals would reserve their judgment on the régime until the Communists had shown what they were going to do. There were also, of course, educated people, many of them engaged in educational work, who in their hearts rejected Communism but who were vitally needed because of their specialized skills. At first, therefore, the Communists had to let the schools operate much as they had before the take-over and content themselves with introducing changes gradually and piecemeal.

This apparently liberal policy confused many observers, although it is the policy every dictatorial government adopts that has yet to consolidate its power. Genuine totalitarian control is established gradually; first in minor matters of interest to minor groups, then over major matters, with objecting groups being eliminated one at a time, until finally everybody is cowed into submission. Unless this process is halted in the beginning stages, there is no stopping it.

That, then, is the policy the Communists have adopted since they fell heir to a system of schools they could not staff with adequate personnel of their own. Once the idea of organizing had been accepted by the majority of students and teachers, and the desired organizations were actually under way, it was easy to use them to eliminate those few who openly dared to oppose or refused to join them. In the case of teachers who were irreplaceable because of their particular skills, the usual policy was, and still is, to allow them to continue in their posts temporarily while, at the same time, forcing them into the position of social outcasts. By now, however, most of the former non-Communist staff members taken over with the schools have been weeded out, at least from the institutions of middle and higher education.

The Communists hastened conversion of the school staffs by means of an extensive program of indoctrination of teachers in summer schools and night schools. The knowledge of what was happening to "reactionaries" was enough to force the reluctant to attend these courses, while the faint-hearted, together with those who at least knew which side their bread was buttered on, were soon vying with one another in confessing former sins and temporary lapses, in professing their fervent belief in the new doctrines, and in denouncing colleagues and associates. Thus both fear and greed were mobilized on behalf of the Communists' ultimate educational objectives.

The publication of new textbooks has been undertaken by the Communists in a characteristic manner. Communist doctrine has now penetrated nearly every activity of the human mind, and this calls for new books in literature, history, and all the social sciences, and even courses in physics, chemistry, biology, and higher mathematics.

The term "education" is also applied by the Communists to indoctrination courses conducted under the supervision of political commissars in the Army, and under the guidance of cadres in factories, bureaus, etc. These courses devote a certain amount of time to teaching elementary reading and writing, and to urging people to attend night schools in which these subjects are taught. They contribute to the Communist drive against illiteracy, and, since this drive has been by no means unsuccessful, are not irrelevant from the standpoint of mass education.
A SELECTED READING LIST


Zi [Hau], Etienne, *Pratique des examens litteraires en Chine*, pp. iv, 1894; pp. iii, 1898, Shanghai.
CHAPTER 10

LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

Very few Americans can hope to have a firsthand knowledge of Chinese literature; only those who have made a thorough study of the Chinese language are in a position to enjoy the continuous stream of literary works which has flowed down through the centuries written in a style difficult to understand even for the Chinese with an average education. The curious reader who tries to explore this literature can only do it through the help of translations. Some of the more important novelists and poets have been translated into English, though few retain the spirit and idiom of the original. And if the reader looks to Chinese literature in the hope of finding a body of writings conforming to the ideals and achievement of Western literature, he is likely to be disappointed. While it is true that Chinese literature employs the usual forms of poetry, drama, the novel, and the essay, in China some genres usually receive an undue proportion of attention from men of letters. Among these the essay and poetry stand out; the novel or drama did not receive critical sanction and encouragement until quite recent times.

European nations were fortunate in having available Greek and Latin classics and the Bible in the development of their literature at the time of the Renaissance: the Greco-Latin, the Hebraic, and the Germanic represented different cultures and world-views which gave variety and scope to literary expression. In China, the most important foreign cultural influence came in the form of Buddhism two thousand years ago, but at that time Chinese culture had already taken shape under the dominance of Confucianism and Taoism, and its literature could already boast of the Confucian canon, and of poets, philosophers, and historians.

The rich mythology of Buddhism helped to kindle Chinese imagination and supplement indigenous folklore; in the course of time this element was duly reflected in vernacular literature, but the courtly and official insistence on Confucian teaching gave a character to Chinese literature which was unmodified throughout the dynasties.

TRADITION

In its beginnings, Chinese literature depended on religion and mythology; it was only through the embodiment of belief and myth that poetry and drama could articulate Chinese racial aspirations and attain levels which were not merely didactic or practical. Two of China's earliest and greatest writers, the Taoist philosopher Ch'ang T'ao and the poet Ch'ü Yüan (305-278 B.C.), drew heavily on mythology. Ch'ang T'ao made use of a series of fables and myths to illustrate his points; he exhibits a mental agility and a fertility of imagination not in evidence in the works of later prose writers. In Ch'ü Yüan's poetry we find a number of myths that flourished in Southwest China at that time but later ceased to function as a vital factor in poetry. His poetry was preserved in the collec-
tion Ch'ü Tse-t'u, which assigns to his authorship Falling into Trouble (Li Sao), Nine Hymns (Chiu Ko), Heavenly Questioning (T'ien Wen), Distant Wandering (Yuan Yu), and Nine Declarations (Chiu Chang).

Ch'ü Yuan lived a life of court disfavor and exile reminiscent of Dante; in Li Sao he pictures himself on an imaginary journey through Heaven and Earth and describes his sorrows at not being properly appreciated. In the course of his journey the poet meets gods, legendary kings, wizards, and celestial ladies. His other poems also indicate the presence of a rich mythology, which can now be only partially reconstructed. It is unfortunate that Chinese civilization so early developed its political and ethical bent, and that the mythical forms of knowledge and belief were so early discouraged. The later poets could not, as Ch'ü Yuan could, transmit their feelings in terms of mythology; they tended to express their feelings less obliquely.

The establishment of Confucian orthodoxy in the Han dynasty not only fixed the Chinese way of thinking but also its artistic expression. Confucianism is an ethical system which incorporates little of the older mythology. Confucius eulogized the Golden Age with its mythical kings; but to him Yao and Shun were not so much glorious heroes on the order of Theseus, Beowulf, and King Arthur, but exemplary monarchs to whom later rulers should look. Even to the legendary Yu, the hero who saved China from the Flood, incredible deeds of prowess were not attributed; in the Confucian conception, he was a conscientious worker for the people, who did not even go home to see his wife when at his job. No doubt popular myths flourished along with the official interpretation, especially those about Yu and the Creation. Such early compilations as the Shan Hai Ching testify to the richness of the folk imagination; but they at best constitute a minor tradition, and were not made use of by the courtly writers. Allusions of a mythological character are, however, frequent and remain a staple in the classical style in both poetry and prose.

The impoverishment of myth under Confucian rule was counterbalanced by the continued popularity of Taoism and Buddhism, which satisfied the popular hunger for the supernatural and for a more detailed picture of cosmology. It is typical among post-Han writers that few are orthodox Confucians; their writings exhibit some blend of Confucianism with Taoism and Buddhism. It is essential to the health of their art that they are not completely dominated by the practical approach. The early advent of rationalism in the age of pre-Ch'ien philosophers was one reason why China did not have the epic poem.

In the absence of a living mythology, the Chinese early developed a fondness for history, which becomes prominent in their art from the time of the Warring Kingdoms. The Spring and Autumn Chronicles, a commentary on the Confucian classic Tao Chuan, is a rich example of terse narrative. Sai-ma Ch'ien (1135-90 A.D.), the compiler and author of Historical Records (Shih Chih), is China's greatest historian and also its greatest prose writer. A liberal portion of his history is devoted to the lives of kings, generals, and other eminent men, and set an example for the twenty-three other dynastic histories to follow. These Twenty-four Histories are documents of incomparable richness and detail for which there is no parallel in the West.

Effects of Education

Before attempting a brief history of Chinese literature, something should be said about the nature of the education that Chinese men of letters almost uniformly received through the T'ang to Ch'ing dynasties. The basic motivation of that education was to obtain official employment and the status of a scholar. In China's large rural society, an official career was the only career open to the scholar other than farming or simple retirement. The examination system made it imperative that every aspirant should possess a thorough
knowledge of the Confucian classics and their commentaries, an adequate knowledge of Chinese history and literature, a command of calligraphy, and an ability to write prose and verse according to certain prescribed forms.

The initiation of a Chinese boy in the Confucian classics (an assorted collection of philosophy, history, and poetry) was not unlike an English schoolboy's initiation in Latin in later centuries. The language in which the Confucian canon was written was completely different from the spoken dialect. The preparation for a literary career, therefore, was incidental to the preparation for an official career. The advantage of such an education was the uniformity of culture which it produced; its defect lay in its lack of capacity to achieve periodical revolutions in thought and sensibility. It fostered a minor talent with which China was especially rich — that talent which attains a certain level of excellence in style but essentially lacks an individual vision of life, and so has nothing important to say that has not already been said more adequately. Minor talent sticks to conventional forms and sentiments. It is this stable monotony of reiterated sentiments which accounts for the florid quality of the prose and poetry of later dynasties, and caused the incursion of vernacular elements into the really significant creations.

Poetry

Poetry has been the art most continuously practiced by Chinese men of letters since the earliest times. It is traditionally believed that Confucius chose out of the available folk and court songs three hundred and five pieces bearing the title Book of Poetry (Shih Ching). The Book of Poetry represents the culture of North China. It has a simplicity of appeal and a freshness of feeling that contrasts violently with the obscurity and sensuous quality of the Ch' in Tu's. In spite of the quaintness of their language, the best folk songs can be read with genuine pleasure. They are lyrical poetry without sustained moment; each line consists of four characters and refrains are frequently used. The main line of Chinese poetry (shih) included a short composition consisting of lines of regular length. The Han yüeh fu (songs associated with the Bureau of Music) and the folk songs continue in this tradition, and by the end of the Later Han dynasty five-word poetry became an established genre and had distinguished practitioners.

The form of verse used by Ch'ü Yüan, with its greater elasticity of structure and freer movement, became in the Han dynasty the fu — a kind of prose-poetry making use of a rich vocabulary of description. It celebrates the courtly occasion and expresses public emotion. In the absence of a living mythology, it has constant recourse to allusion; in a sense, it serves as a kind of thesaurus at a time when the compilation of dictionaries was still an incipient art. The Fu of Two Capitals by the historian Pan Ku, and the Fu of Three Capitals by Chang Heng, are justly famous for their rhetorical display of the glories of court and palace. The fu was mainly descriptive, though in later hands it also was capable of handling private emotion. Thomson's blank verse poem, The Seasons, with its poetic dietion and panoramic presentation of nature, is the nearest parallel in Western poetry to the fu.

The shih came into its own in the times of Wei and Chin, and the founder of the Wei dynasty, T'ao T'ao, and his sons, also, wrote distinguished poetry. The five-word poetry in the hands of T'ao Ch'ien and the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove was remarkable for its philosophic contemplation of nature and its sense of superior detachment. Its inspiration was apparently Taoist. In the time of turmoil and chaos, men of letters became skeptical of the values of Confucian ethics and found the Taoist philosophy more congenial. This poetry is usually called ku shih (Ancient Poetry), as distinct from the poetry written according to more strict prosodic rules first formulated by Shen Yu (111 513) Regulated
verse, or lu-shih, is the term applied to poetry written in five- or seven-word lines, with an
eight-line stanzas, following a prescribed and invariable rhyme-scheme. Both lu-shih and
ku-shih were produced in great quantity in the T'ang dynasty, the Golden Age of Chinese
poetry.

The T'ang poetry has been translated into European languages in great quantity,
and the names of Li Po, Tu Fu, and Po Chü-i are familiar to Westerners who are otherwise
unacquainted with Chinese literature. Westerners who give exclusive attention to this
poetry may, however, acquire a false picture of Chinese poetry; while the T'ang Period
is unexcelled for the sheer copiousness of its product and the uniform high quality of its
achievement, it does not supersede the achievement of pre-T'ang poetry, with its meta-
physical quality. The reader of John Donne and George Herbert will perhaps find the
poetry of T'ao Ch'ien and Yüan Chi more congenial than the T'ang poetry, which is preva-
ently Romantic. Sung poetry lacks the spontaneity of that of the T'ang Period; but its
learned and allusive character adds to the range and tone of Chinese poetry.

It is hard to characterize Chinese poetry for people who have not read it in the original.
To read it in translation is to miss its full flavor, and not to realize the compactness of
statement of which Chinese poetry is capable. It is elliptical and concrete to a degree not
possible in English poetry. The nature of the Chinese language permits the omission of
conectives, articles, and prepositions which are necessary in English for coherent state-
ment. In Chinese poetry, therefore, the characters mainly consist of nouns and verbs
and their modifiers, so that the degree of compression it achieves is something that cannot
be put across in any other medium. To approximate its quality, one must think of a poetry
that achieves the music of the French Symbolists along with the power of statement of
the best couplets of Pope. Because of its brief compass, the Chinese poem does not excel
in didactic or narrative discourse. It is nearly always lyrical. The successful poem creates
a mood, and mobilizes nuances of feeling and range of tone to arrive at a universal state-
ment on the basis of a specific personal occasion. The antithetical elements in lu shih,
especially, through the violent association of disparate experiences, give the feeling a general
application.

The reader of English poetry is used to the long poem; he can point with pride to
such achievements as The Faerie Queene, Paradise Lost, and The Prelude. There are no
such poems in Chinese; even poems of such moderate length as Prothalamion, Lycidas,
and Michael are rare. Po Chü-i's Song of the Everlasting Wrong is considered long, though
it has only about a hundred lines. The average poem consists of four to eight lines; the
nearest parallel to such poetry in English is the poetry of Ben Jonson, Marvell, Landor,
and the later Yeats. In such poets we have an urbane grace, the restraint, civilized emo-
tion, and the extreme weightiness of statement that are in some ways akin to Chinese
poetry. In Jonson, Marvell, and Landor, this grace lies in the fusion of classical learning
and wit. In the Chinese poets, there is the fusion of bookish inspiration and simple sensuous
experience. The poet remembers what earlier poets have written, but is undismayed in
his contemplation of nature. He also represents the clash of the Confucian acceptance
of life and the Taoist urge to escape from duties and responsibilities. There are poets, like
Tu Fu, whose attitude is dominantly Confucian; but it is not an accident that most poets
from T'ao Ch'ien to Li Po to the Ming and Ch'ing poets have Taoist elements in their
make-up. The sense of the transience of life, the Epicurean pleasure in wine and women,
the horror of vulgarity and officialdom, the sense of mystical harmony with nature, all of
which figure prominently in Chinese poetry, are Taoist sentiments.

The themes in Chinese poetry are not many: friendship, love, nature, and the minor
shocks and pleasures of life. Since Ch'ü Yuan, no poet has attempted to embody his
vision of life in a systematic statement, whether in allegorical, story, or autobiographical
form. By Western standards, the Chinese poem is necessarily a minor poem; the complexities of a poem eight lines long are not to be compared with those of a poem that has plot, dialogue, and character. So one must estimate the quality of a Chinese poet only in terms of his total work; whether he has something significant to convey and achieves unity and personal quality in the use of imagery and symbols. Seen in this light, the best Chinese poets can measure up to the European poets. A poem by Li Po is a minor work, but by taking into consideration the whole of his work one discovers a world-view, a unique way of using language, and a predilection for certain words and images which give it genuine quality.

The major poets of China, then, are those who significantly add to the range of feeling and mood. The later poets are inferior, not because their technique is immature but because they do not have anything new to say. The diverse and rich achievement of English poetry of the last four centuries partly reflects changes in beliefs, manners, and changes in the social and industrial structure which made periodic shifts in idiom and sensibility a necessity. But in China, in spite of the recurrent dynastic changes, there were really no major changes in belief and in the mode of economic production — in the way of life — which impelled the poet to alter the older mode of perception. From Han to Ch'ing, there were the same rural scene, the same mountains and rivers, the same courtly civilization centering in the capital. The structure of society rested on the same basis: the life of the scholar went the predetermined round of a literary education, an official career either in the capital or the remotest parts of China, and retirement. His sensibility registers the occasions of joy in nature, ad among friends, the sorrows of parting, disappointment, and death, the imagined melancholy of the courtier or housewife in her moments of wistful longing and of sanguine desire. In times of war and foreign invasion the poet became acutely aware of social injustice, of poverty and oppression, of a vague or strong patriotic sentiment. Though the metrical form changed from time to time because of vernacular influence and because of the use of different musical accompaniment (notable here are the emergence of t'ai in the Sung Period and that of Ch'ü in the Yuan Period), the sensibility did not receive new stimuli nor the benefit of a new current of ideas. In an extremely stable civilization it is hard to preserve the vitality of art, which tends to become mechanical and derivative.

No account of Chinese literature is complete without a brief survey of T'ang poetry. This poetry is usually divided into four periods: Early T'ang, Golden T'ang, Middle T'ang, and Late T'ang. Li Po and Tu Fu, writing during the reign of Ming Huang (Hsüan Tsung), belong to the Golden Period; Po Ch'i, Yüan Ch'ü, and Han Yu to the Middle Period; and Li Shang-yi, Tu Mu, and Wên Ting-yüan to the Late Period. A recent critic compares the four periods to the four seasons of the year. This is a broad description, but it is a valid one on the political level and indicates that this poetry never departs from natural and seasonal emphases. From the early freshness of Wang Wei, the painter-poet, to the obscure and wintry feeling of Li Shang-yi, it covers a great variety of moods from which the later poets seldom depart.

The earlier reign of Ming Huang (Hsüan Tsung) represents the apex of T'ang prosperity. The Emperor's favorite, Yang Kuei-fei, is the symbol of gaiety and luxury; but with the revolt of An Lu-shan a period of civil war began and the dynasty never recovered its greatness. Li Po and Tu Fu represent the two sides of the picture: the former responding to the perennial inspiration of nature, the beauty of women and the intoxication of wine; the latter to social injustice, suffering, and war. Li Po often employs lines of unequal length, and is unexcelled in the four-line poem called ch'üeh-chü. Tu Fu is the master of li-shih, skillful in the use of antithetical couplets. Because of his social consciousness and erudite quality, Chinese scholars usually think Tu Fu the greater poet. However, no
genuine re-evaluation of the Chinese poets has been undertaken in the last forty years, so that one cannot report the exact standing of one poet with respect to another in the Chinese tradition, nor the standing of Chinese poetry in relation to the poetry of other nations. Some modern Chinese poets have discovered the greatness of Li-Shang-yi and his spiritual affinity with much of the best modern European poetry. A work of reappraisal should be done here on a large scale with a view to discovering what the poets have to offer to modern man.

The vernacular impulse has periodically asserted itself, and thus infused new blood into Chinese literature. After the glory of T'ang poetry, a new song-form arose to rival the prestige and popularity of shih. This form, ts'al, is characterized by lines of unequal length, and prescribed rhyme and tonal sequences occurring in a large number of variant patterns, each of which bears the name of a musical air. Before the literary men took it over, ts'al was sung by courtiers to musical accompaniment. In the hands of the poets, it still retained its colloquial language and strong erotic quality. By exquisitely modulating words to an intricate metrical pattern, ts'al exploits the musical quality of the monosyllabic language to its utmost capacity. The late T'ang poet, Wen T'ing-yen, was its early exponent, and it was the dominant poetical form in the five dynasties and the Sung dynasty. Li Yu (937-978), the last Emperor of a small dynasty, recorded the frustration of his romantic and political life in a number of exquisite ts'al poems. The Sung poets who wrote mainly in the ts'al form include Liu Yung, Chou Pang-yen, and the poets Li Ch'ing-tea. The other Sung poets who distinguished themselves in both shih and ts'al are Ou-yang Hsiu, Su Tung-p'o, Wang An-shih, Hsuan T'ing-chien, and Lo Yu. The school of Su Tung-p'o and Lo Yu was noted for its expansive moods of adventurous and patriotic feeling.

Essay

Since the novel developed at a later stage, the prose literature of this period in China mainly consisted of essays and historical writing. Though tales had been written in the literary language since the T'ang Period, the narrative did not share the essay's place of eminence. The prestige of the essay must appear as a strange phenomenon to Western readers, unless one remembers that, like poetry, it is usually a short composition and a deliberate artifact with a rich, ornate, and even artificial quality. Not unlike Ju, it was a kind of prose-poetry. The restrictions imposed by this kind of regular prose, however, were hardly conducive to systematic philosophical or didactic discourse.

The great T'ang Confucianist, Han Yu, broke away from this tradition and initiated the Ku-wen movement, which had many distinguished followers, including Liu Chun-yen, Ou-yang Hsiu, and Su Tung-p'o. The style of ku-wen was modeled after that of Mencius, the pre-Ch'in philosophers and Ssu-ma Ch'ien. In the hands of Han Yu it was an efficient vehicle for moral discourse, but it became also in time an instrument for recording intimate personal happenings.

By the time of Ming dynasty, the familiar essay became a distinct genre from the didactic essay. Any scholar could write an essay; many were especially tempted to indulge in this form because of its prestige and because of the facility it offered to creative instinct without the arduous labor of genuine literary creation. In translation, these essays are flat and betray their essential limitations as a literary genre. Few Chinese prose writers were impelled to give an imaginative reconstruction of experience through the use of plot and character, and except for some neo-Confucianist philosophers like Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming, few displayed a capacity for sustained argument and discourse. For genuine prose literature, we should turn to the more significant development of the novel.
Novel

The man in the street could not enjoy the poetry and prose of the literary men. He did not have the education to appreciate the style; and, in any case, he wanted colorful action and vivid characters, which were provided more amply by the professional storytellers and, later, by the drama. The storytellers have been a mainstay of popular entertainment down to present times. The Chinese have a keen interest in history, and the storytellers developed definite cycles of history, which played up to this interest. Many hua-pen or prompt-books, printed in the Sung dynasty, are preserved, and later storytellers added to the huge repertoire. The first novels were compilations of these stories by literary men who preferred to remain anonymous. The names of some of the Yüan and Ming novelists are known, but very little about their personal lives.

The periods stressed in storytelling are for the most part periods of turbulence: the Period of the Warring Kingdoms, that of the founding of the Han dynasty, the Period of the Three Kingdoms, the Period of Sui and T'ang, that of the founding of the Sung dynasty, etc. Other minor cycles deal with the fortunes of a particular official and his followers. Pao Ch'eng, the upright statesman of the Sung Period, for instance, is a center around which heroic exploits and detective episodes have been gathered. The Period of the Three Kingdoms is especially vividly imprinted on the popular imagination. Almost every schoolboy in China has some knowledge of Liu Pei, Chu-ko Liang, Ts'ao Ts'a-o, and Kuei Yu. This is because their stories are retold by old to young, are presented on the stage, and are embodied in excellent literary form in San Kuo Chih Yen-i or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms.

The author of San Kuo, Lu Kuan-chung, is a great novelist who is able to impose design and structure on the mass of historical events. He has a fine gift of irony: though his historical perspective indicates that Liu Pei was justly entitled to inherit the Han dynasty, he depicts him as a hypocritical person. Kuei Yu's prowess is intentionally exaggerated, to exhibit his pride and limited intelligence. These fine points, however, are usually missed by the lay reader, and in popular imagination Kuei Yu is the military saint of China.

San Kuo was written in a kind of plain wen-yi, i.e., the literary language; the second great Chinese novel, Shui Hu Ch'uan, or Water Margin, was written in pai-hua, i.e., the colloquial spoken language. For this reason, the advocates of pai-hua usually prefer Shui Hu Ch'uan to San Kuo. This is, however, a mistaken judgment: Shui Hu, manifestly a compilation of heroic sagas, lacks the organic structure of San Kuo. It tells of the bandits who gathered around Sung Ch'ang at the end of the Northern Sung dynasty. Some of the cycles are brilliantly told. The nearest approach to them in Western Literature in virile quality and the existentialist assertion of the characters is the Icelantic family sagas. But the latter part of Shui Hu, after the heroes have gathered around Sung Chiang, becomes rather dull: there is no variation in the pattern of the episodes. The masculine viewpoint of this novel is curious: there is hardly a woman character who is not an adulteress who meets death at the hands of Wu Sung or Shih Hsiu. The English translation by Pearl S. Buck is entitled All Men Are Brothers. Both San Kuo and Shui Hu, representing types of historical romance and rogue saga, have many successors which exhibit a less fine control in style and structure but have vitality that is pleasing to young and old alike.

The rise of vernacular literature was not solely the work of storytellers: Buddhist missionaries and priests also had a hand in this development. In the days when Buddhism was new, the missionaries relied on tales and apologies to hold audiences inseparable of following abstract expositions of doctrine. The translation of Buddhist text was directed at a popular audience, so the vernacular element was necessarily introduced. By the
time of the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Buddhism was so adapted to and fused with native Taoist traditions that a definite mythology, partly Buddhist and partly Taoist, was formed, and fictions making use of these elements added to secular history.

The most famous work in this genre is the Record of a Journey to the West (Hsi yu chi). The author, Wu Ch'eng-en (ca. 1500-1580), made use of earlier sources but was mainly responsible for the invention of a prodigious number of adventures and for the introduction of a fine comic and satiric tone. This novel had its base in authentic history: the seventh-century pilgrimage of Hsüan-tsang to India to obtain sacred texts. Around this journey the author wove a huge number of fantastic and humorous incidents that have no Western parallel except perhaps Cervantes and Bunyan. It is interesting to find the mixture of legend and history in the account of the birth of Hsüan-tsang and of Tang T'ai-tsung's descent into Hell. The hero of this novel is the Stone Monkey, who accompanies Hsüan-tsang on the journey and overcomes monsters and evil spirits in the way, sometimes with celestial assistance. In the allegorical scheme he represents human intelligence and cunning undergoing the purgatorial act; he is supernaturally powerful, but still requires divine guidance in times of crisis. Another guide for Hsüan-tsang on the journey is the Pig, which represents human sloth and sensuality. He provides comic relief to the Monkey in his blundering efforts to cope with supernatural opponents. Though recent scholars have insisted on the satiric character of this novel, the allegorical reading still stands, and the novel is the richer for its inclusion of diverse elements. The English translation (partial) by Arthur Waley is entitled The Monkey.

In the Ming dynasty another type of fiction came to maturity which depicts the domestic lives of ordinary men and women. It was inevitable as fiction developed that the novelists should consciously try to depict ordinary life in realistic terms. The best novel in this genre from the Ming Period is Chin P'ing Mei. The author takes an episode from Shui Hu -- the murder of Wu Ta and the adulterous relation between Hai-men Ch'ing and Pan Chin-lien -- and develops it into a dispassionate study of the carnal aspect of human life. The novel has been considered pornographical; it excludes nothing from its description of ordinary life. But to read it as pornography is to miss the point; the author nowhere attempts to excite the reader, and the accumulation of detail in the sexual passages finally produces, with the death of Hai-men Ch'ing, a sense of disgust which is unforgettable, and which makes the novel able to stand comparison with the novels of Flaubert and Joyce.

The finest Chinese sensibility, however, is revealed in the Ch'ing novel by Tsao Chan and Kao Si, the Dream of the Red Chamber (Huang Lou Meng). It is a work that ranks among the world's greatest novels, and one that certainly has no peer in China. To approximate its quality, one can only refer the Western reader to the works of Proust and Henry James. Though the Chinese language makes it impossible to compose carefully modulated long periods, Huang Lou Meng conveys the sense of delicacy and finesse of feeling that are present in the works of the two Western writers. No critic, however, has been able to describe the imaginative quality of this novel in critical terms. The earlier commentators saw in it many allegorical meanings, while modern critics tend to regard it as an autobiographical novel, and thus focus attention on the love story of Pao Yü and Tai Yü. Both accounts of it are incomplete. In the novel there is a definite use of symbolism and a definite reliance on the Buddhist philosophy. The authors state their point subtly in mythological terms in the first chapters, and the gradual tracing of the love tragedy and of the decline of fortune of the once illustrious family only reinforces the mood of disillusion, the theme that is implicit in the whole novel. It is not an accident that the
sentimental hero, with his entanglements in the world of passion, is seen in the end as the dedicated monk. The novel is a coherent work of art, with symbolic dimensions of meaning developed within a definite religious framework.

Short Story
Having offered this brief account of some of the great Chinese novels, one may pass along to some examples of the short story, a genre which was established in the T'ang dynasty in the form of ch'uan-ch'i, usually a very brief narrative written in a highly literary style. The most popular representative of this form is the Ch'ing collection of stories with supernatural elements—P'u Sung-ling's Lia-cha Chih-yi (the title of Herbert Giles' translation is Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio). Many stories in the collection are based to a considerable extent on folklore, from which we can reconstruct Chinese traditions regarding the ghost, the sorcerer, the vampire, and the fox-fairy. The book has as its unifying theme the loneliness of the Chinese scholar and his need for spiritual companionship. This need is treated in numerous stories about the scholar and the fox-fairy. In a typical tale, the lonely scholar meets a fox lady and falls in love with her. They live idly for a time, but because the fox is not a real woman, the scholar suffers physical exhaustion from their union. Reluctantly the fox woman has to go away. Sometimes a Taoist priest intervenes. There is a sense of desolation in the dénouement of such stories that is reminiscent of Keesa's La Belle Dame sans Merci and Lamia. They are a special kind of love story, expressive of a deep psychic need.

Satiric Novel
The Ch'ing dynasty witnessed the resurgence of a critical spirit, of which the typical manifestation in literature is the satiric novel. In the field of scholarship, it manifests itself in the study of the Confucian canon on a philological and historical basis. It is not true that Chinese men of letters had only scorn for popular fiction. In the Ch'ing dynasty many literary men were actively writing fiction, and one original critic of the period, Chin Sheng-t'an, is able to speak of the author of Shui Hsu in the same terms as of Chuang Tzu and Ssu-ma Ch'ien. He discerns in these writers a quality of imagination that is lacking in the average poetry and prose. The best satiric novel is the Unofficial History of Officialdom (Ju-lin Wei-shih) by Wu Ch'ing-tzu (1701-1754), which exposes the corruption and hypocrisy of officialdom and the hollowness of Confucian ethics and decorum. The author changes his characters constantly, so that the novel has no coherent plot. It nevertheless achieves a peculiar structure of its own. By the late Ch'ing dynasty, a general awareness of governmental corruption and inefficiency prompted many novels to be written in the satiric tradition. So the novel already promised to become the country's major literary form even before Western influences began to be felt. These influences were to direct the course of Chinese fiction along altogether different lines.

Drama
The Chinese drama, which came to maturity only in the Yüan dynasty, does not have so many masterpieces at which to point as does the novel. This can be accounted for partly by its origins and partly by the vagaries of popular taste. Chinese drama is essentially lyrical drama, with emphasis on verse speeches and singing, to which the audience listened without caring about the dramatic structure of the play. The ch'ü, whether as an independent form of entertainment or as incorporated into the play, represents a further extension of the ch'ü, it has a freer metrical movement and includes even larger colloquial elements. It is a further annexion to the world of passion, comedy, and pathos.

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under the domain of poetry. The drama in the West early profited from the criticism of Aristotle, and the concept of form and the unities were subsequently regarded as cardinal. In China there was no such criticism to guide the drama's development; like the novel, it took its themes from popular historical episodes and love stories. The dramatic, however, seldom imposed on this material any moral structure other than the simple contrast between virtue and vice or that between heroism and villainy. In consequence there was a conspicuous lack of genuine tragic feeling.

Moreover, the Chinese drama is a form of opera, and the attention is easily monopolized by the singing and acting, two areas in which it boasts of an arduous discipline and a long tradition. Even in its decadent form as Ch'ing Hsi (Capital Theatre), the singing and the graceful movements of the actors always give pleasure to the audience. The present form of drama introduces louder musical instruments to accompany the action, especially during the acrobatic representations of combat. The foreigner, however, is likely to be too distracted by the loud music to appreciate the subtleties of the acting and singing. In K'un-ch'ü, the dominant drama in the Ming and Ch'ing Periods, only string and wind instruments were used for orchestral accompaniment.

The foremost Yuan dramatists are Kuei Han-ch'ing, Wang Chö-fu, and Ma Chih-yüan. The play by Wang Shih-fu, Hsi Hsiang Chi (The Romance of the Western Chamber) is still widely read. Based on a story written by the P'ang poet, Yüan Chên, it tells of the courtship of Ts'ai Ying-ying by Chang Ch'un-t'ai. In attractiveness and grace, however, the heroine is overshadowed by her maid-servant Hung-niang. It is largely through her efforts that the lovers are able to meet clandestinely at first and, later, to unite in matrimony. Before their union Chang has to triumph over many difficulties, among them that of passing his court examination. This play set the pattern for most subsequent romantic dramas and novels, and always captured the Chinese public. The success of the formula is to be seen in its social context of marriage by parental arrangement. The Chinese girl, if she meets an agreeable young man, cannot afford to be cruel and capricious in her dealings with him. She avows her love frankly, and plot complication arises only in the lovers' effort to overcome the obstacles parents put in the way of marriage. To vindicate her choice, she urges her young man to go to the Imperial Examination: He usually proves successful in the ordeal and the lovers are finally united. This formula, however, has been rigorously rejected by modern writers.

The most famous Ming dramatist is T'ang Hsien-ts'ao, whose plays include Mu-tan P'ing (The Peony Pavilion), and who belonged to the K'un-ch'ü School. The best Ch'ing plays of this school are T'ao-hua Shan (Peach Blossom Fan), by K'ang Shang-jên, and Ch'ang-sheng Tien (The Palace of Everlasting Life), by Hsiung Shêng. They are all romantic dramas written in an exquisite lyrical style. Like The Romance of the Western Chamber, they are still widely read as literature. The librettes of the Capital Drama are written in a far more refined style, and become animated only when recited and sung on the stage.

MODERN

The preceding section has been a necessarily brief account of the traditional Chinese literature. Most of the titles mentioned are available in English translation, and the reader is advised to read some of them in order to get an authentic taste of an alien sensibility and culture. On the other hand, modern Chinese literature is almost completely different from the older literature. It is characterized by the universal adoption of the spoken language, or pai-hua, and by its imitation of Western forms. Mention has been made of the lack of change in sensibility and social structure as a deterrent to the continuous
The vital growth of Chinese literature by the time of late Ch'ing, the impact of Western civilization was too sudden and great to be readily assimilated and understood. The result, as far as literary expression was concerned, was a new crudity in technique and feeling.

Influence of the West

From the time of the introduction of Buddhism, there had been no cultural influence from outside powerful enough to upset the social structure and to import new elements into the religious and intellectual make-up of the people. Nestorian Christianity had made little impression on China, and had soon died out. The introduction of Christianity by Catholic priests in the late Ming and early Ch'ing Periods was very important, in that its missionaries were the indirect means of introducing China to Western art and science. But what occurred was merely a polite encounter which did not bear immediate cultural results.

The significant encounter came in the form of a series of wars with the European nations and Japan. This time China was shocked out of her complacency by discovering the superior technological equipment of the West. The consequent attitude was not one of curiosity and cultural exploration: what the Chinese felt was an urgent need to adapt and reform in order to exist at all. The emphasis was both political and technological. There was a Confucianist rearguard action from some quarters, but its protest was ineffective because it was drowned out by the louder voice for sweeping changes. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, one of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement and later the Trotskyite leader in China, stated that:

In order to support Democracy, we have to oppose Confucian rules of conduct, old ethics, and ideology; in order to support Science, we have to oppose old art and old religion. In order to support both Democracy and Science, we have to reject old culture and old literature.

There is a crudity in this statement: Democracy and Science are employed as magical terms with which to exorcise the old. Actually Confucianism is a body of thought which sanctions democracy, and traditional Chinese scholarship is a further manifestation of the scientistic spirit rather than its antithesis.

The great historian and scholar, Hu Shih, knows both East and West. But in thought he is a pragmatist, a disciple of Dewey, and indifferent to the Christian tradition in Western culture. Like all good Confucian scholars, he is an agnostic. Thus he exemplifies an essential fact regarding modern China: the aspects of Western civilization seized upon for imitation in the last five decades can be summed up in a single word—positivism. The Christian and humanistic traditions of the West have been curiously neglected.

It is only in the light of China's imperfect assimilation of Western influences that one can account for the tremendous success of Marxism in China. It is only logical that China's superficial, positivistic, scientific liberalism should later have yielded ground to Marxist philosophy, which prescribes a definite creed and program of action. This is not said with the intention of minimizing the importance of Christianity in the social life of China; missionaries and native preachers were very beneficial in training respectable citizens, but their influence has been subsidiary. It does not affect the intellectual, who superfluously views Western civilization primarily in terms of its development in the past hundred and fifty years. Thus the Christian understanding of life is hardly reflected in modern Chinese literature.

A great many prominent and respected authorities now hold that modern Western literature is significant only when it embodies, in some form, the Christian meaning of life, as with T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, and William Faulkner; or takes a spiritual stand in de-
finance of Christianity, as with D. H. Lawrence. Western literature which is purely secular
and interprets life in merely sociological and political terms tends to be insignificant. The
weakness of modern Chinese literature lies in this lack of spiritual content. It treats
evil as a sociological phenomenon, and nowhere emphasizes love, sin, and suffering in the
way they are emphasized in the great literature of the West.

Modern Chinese literature has little to offer to the reader with mature training in either
Chinese humanities or Western culture. It is largely sentimental; it reduces the com-
plexity of life to the opposition between justice and injustice, and does so in the most
simple Marxist terms. Insofar as this literature preserves a part of the finer Chinese
sensibility, or makes a successful adaptation of Western techniques, it merits some praise.
But modern Chinese writers are only imperfectly trained in Western literature and lan-
guages. Most of them know only Japanese or English, and though the influence of Russian
literature is now paramount, very few Russian works have been translated from the original.
Few modern Chinese writers have made a systematic study of Western literature from
Homer to the present. They have merely picked up certain authors who suit their aims,
and they are too much engaged in polemics to give adequate attention to literary con-
considerations.

The case of Lu Hsün is typical: after producing two volumes of short stories, which are
in a class by themselves, he was continuously occupied with translating or writing polemical essays. He made no further genuine contribution to Chinese literature, and the
indulgence he has received in Communist quarters since his death is really incommensurate
with the slim body of his creative writing. Such dissipation of energy not only compares
poorly with the performances of bourgeois writers like Henry James and Proust, but even
with that of writers in the USSR, who are accorded a higher official status.

The textbooks of modern Chinese literature tend to focus attention on the "new"
writers who wrote in the wake of the May Fourth Movement. This, however, gives only
a one-sided picture. The readers of the "new" literature belonged to the most powerful
and articulate class — the more radically minded high school and college students — and
only to that class. After graduation, they kept up with their reading; some even joined
the ranks of writers. Prior to the Communist success on the mainland of China, they were
always loud in their denunciation of the national government, and contributed much to
the bad reputation of the Kuomintang. Most of them were the victims of Communist
propaganda. The immaturity of the "new" literature is in part at least a reflection of the
taste of this group of readers. There are, however, other classes of readers, and the writers
who cater to their tastes should be noticed here because they represent the older literature
in its decadent forms.

Popular Novel

The satiric and sentimental novel was popular during the Ch'ing dynasty, and even
after the founding of the republic, it continued to attract a large audience. The chief
name to be remembered in connection with it is Chang Hén-shui, whose early novel,
Romance of Tears and Laughter ("Pi Hsiao Yin Yüan") was a best-seller. During the war years,
he continued to write fiction in Chungking, sometimes with patriotic overtones, but be-
cause he lacked ideological training, he remains in the older school. Many of the novels
published in daily installments in the big-city newspapers are also of the sentimental
school, but have scant literary merit.

The picturesque novel is also enjoying a tremendous popularity in modern China. In
recent decades, the emphasis has shifted from historical romance to a special type of ad-
venture story which glorifies the Taoist recluse and swashbucklers. Like detective fiction
and Western fiction in America, it constitutes a special genre with established conventions. The most adept swordsmen in such fiction are a sort of supermen, who could emit from their respective mouths or finger tips a sword-ray that could kill any enemy at any distance. When two such rays meet in the air and fight, the person with the weaker ray often has to forfeit his life. The most popular writer in this genre in the twenties was Pu Hsiang-sheng, whose major work, the "Chronicle of Strange Adventures (Ch'ing-tao Chi-ya Ch'uan)," ran to twenty volumes. The novel begins with a feud between two clans in Hunan Province, and includes many authentic stories and legends flourishing in Hunan. The supernatural element grows more and more prominent as the novel stretches from volume to volume.

In the forties a greater writer appeared under the pen-name Hui-chu Lou-chu. His masterpiece is the "Swordsmen in the Mountains of Szechwan (Shu Shan Chien-ya Ch'uan)," which is not yet finished and has already run into fifty volumes. According to those who have read him, the imagination of the author is truly staggering, and on the same level with Scott and Dumas. The mountain, O-mei, in Szechwan, is traditionally famous for its monks and recluses who have achieved a sort of supernatural power. The author supplements the folklore of this region with a fertility of invention unsurpassed in present-day China. He preserves the element of fantasy, which is noticeably absent in the "new" literature.

Familiar Essay and Anecdote

Another kind of writing still much indulged in is the familiar essay and anecdote. The literary men of earlier days, having perfected their prose style, entertained themselves and their friends by writing random thoughts, familiar events, and anecdotes about eminent people. Prior to the Communist success, many magazines and newspapers featured this kind of writing. Some magazines, founded by Lin Yutang, were devoted to humor and the familiar essay and boasted of several of the big names in modern literature who had turned "reactionary." Such writers, of course, did not have a positive program of political action to offset the dynamic current of Leftist writing. The best essayist in the group was Chou Ts'ou-chen, the brother of Lu Hsien, who combined his diverse interests in Greco-Roman culture, anthropology, and the philosophy of sex with a fine appreciation of certain elements in Chinese literature. His brother is now canonized as the literary saint of China. He himself, years after the war, was still serving a prison term under a sentence imposed on him by the national government for his collaboration with the Japanese during the occupation.

Anecdotage has secured a permanent place in the Chinese newspaper. In America, the personal element in newspapers is supplied by auodicated columnists. In China, almost every newspaper has a literary page, which features articles by its readers as well as those by more eminent writers. Such writings consist of gossip, reports on matters of ephemeral interest, and political and literary criticism. In Shanghai there was the perennial vogue of the "mosquito" newspapers, which cover the amusement world and social news of a sensational sort.

Break with the Past: The "New" Literature

The preceding account is intended to correct the picture of Leftist domination which emerges from a study of the more significant Chinese writers. The modern period in Chinese literature has often been called a Renaissance. It is true that a radical break from the past has been affected, but the period has not produced any writer who can be called truly great. Its literature, compared with that of the Italian or English Renaissance,
is insignificant. Even by Chinese standards, it has produced no poetry of any importance, and no novel on the order of the Dream of the Red Chamber. The drama, under Western influence, has gained in stage effectiveness, but it cannot equal the lyrical feeling of the older drama. Written under conditions of personal poverty, government persecution, and national turbulence, this literature testifies to the vitality and energy of its writers. But their energy was directed to negative rather than positive ends: the deliberate repudiation of the older ways of thinking and feeling. It aims at a complete break with, rather than assimilation of, the past. It is the Chinese mind violently disavowing its old self to meet new challenges. Literature, no longer an autonomous art, has become the instrument of reform. The old is indiscriminately identified with whatever is sterile and bad in Chinese culture. In the shrill words of Ch'en Tu-hsiu:

I am willing to brave the enmity of all the pedantic scholars of the country, and hoist the great banner of the Army of the Revolution in Literature in support of my friend Hu Shih. On this banner shall be written in big characters the three great principles of the Army of Revolution:

1. To destroy the painted, powdered, and obscenulous literature of the aristocratic few, and to create the plain, simple, and expressive literature of the people;
2. To destroy the stereotyped and monotonous literature of classicism, and to create the fresh and sincere literature of realism;
3. To destroy the pedantic, unintelligible, and obscurantist literature of the hermit and the recluse, and to create the plain-speaking and popular literature of a living society.

There are a great many dogmatic terms in this passage: for example, Chinese literature has hardly been "aristocratic" since the end of Han dynasty, and the presence of "classicism" in literature should mean the exclusion of the fustian and stalescent that Ch'en deplores.

Hu Shih is a far sounder critic: he rightly feels that every age should have its own literature and that the literature of the new age should be based on the use of the living language and living material of contemporary society. Hu Shih is the architect of the Literary Revolution, but he had little influence in the subsequent development of pai-hua literature. He did not have a great deal of creative writing to his credit except for an early volume of pai-hua poetry called Experiments, and an autobiography. His true greatness lies in his adherence to the tradition of the great Ch'ing scholars: the imaginative reconstruction of the times and thought of older Chinese literature and philosophy.

The practical and propagandist nature of modern Chinese literature can only be understood in the context of the Chinese feeling of national inferiority. The youth of twenty or thirty years ago was exasperated at the fact that China could not stand forth on an equal footing with Japan and the Western Powers. He was also tossed and puzzeled by the Chinese character. He saw in his nation's weakness not only the corruption and inefficiency of the government but, more importantly, the insidious Confucianist influence on thought and behavior, and the Taoist and Buddhist encouragement of superstition and a resigned attitude toward life. Much of the motivating power behind modern literature lies in the effort to liberate the Chinese mind from the clutches of so-called "feudalism."

The Western observer tends to attribute great merit to Confucianism: he sees in it the stabilizing force that binds a people together through the centuries in order, unity, and peace. The modern Chinese youth, by contrast, dislikes Confucianism with a vehemence that will not be readily understood: he sees in it hypocrisy and control — the ruthless overriding of the feelings of the young.
The attack on the Family System

The onslaught against Confucianism is primarily an attack on the family system. Even in the thirties and forties, the attack on the family is still the vital theme in the works of younger writers like Pa Chin and Tu So Yu.

If one rereads this literature of protest today, one feels that the issues introduced are very remote. One longs for that older order which has been thoroughly done away with through the continuous years of war and the more recent rigorous application of the Communist way of life. The old rituals and the feeling of piety are much finer things than the patriotism and class struggle which has supplanted them; now the aging father is no longer the figure of authority imposing his will on the young — he is rapidly becoming an economic dependent living out a cheerless existence. As in other nations, the intense glorification of youth tends to make the old look more and more inarticulate and impotent. Much modern literature, however, depicts the clash of the older and younger generations and retains an historical interest for what it tells us of the period of transition that China's social structure once passed through.

More specifically, the onslaught is launched against marriage by parental arrangement. The joys and pains of courtship were not much stressed in the old literature. The sense of freedom afforded by the release from parental control gave rise to a flood of love stories, enjoyed to the hilt by the adolescent readers. In the twenties, the love stories of Chang T'ae-p'ing and Yü Ta-fu testified to this demand. Yü Ta-fu was a student in Japan during his formative years; there he lived a life of dissolution among the courtesans. He did, however, develop a sense of guilt which partly redeems his exhibitionism. His works include Ch'en-lun (Sinking), T'ie-chi Chu-chung (Nine Diaries), Mi-yang (The Lost Sheep). The reader of the decadent literature of the West will not find Yü Ta-fu very exciting. But he is typical of one type of revolt against the customary good form and restraint to which the students in the twenties sympathetically responded. Chang T'ae-p'ing, the prolific novelist, is more of a commercial writer.

Lu Hsün

The awareness of the old and new, not in the personal exploration of passion but in the subtle clashes of ways of thinking and feeling, is best revealed in the short stories of Lu Hsün, collected under the titles of Outer (Wu-han) and Hesitation (P'ang-huang). A third volume, Old Stories Retold (Ku-shih Hsia-p'ing), deals with Confucius, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, and other Chinese sages and heroes; but his effort to introduce them in contemporary settings and caricature is seldom successful. Lu Hsün is known for his iconoclastic attack on the Chinese tradition, but he had had an excellent old-style literary education, and his best stories reveal a wistful longing for the old ways. Thus he gives to such characters as the gentle K'ung I-chi a dignity that seems pathetic in its modern setting.

The difference between Lu Hsün and the later writers lies in his recognition of this sense of dignity in people of inferior station, without which society must disintegrate. The maidservants in The Dream of the Red Chamber have that dignity. In Lu Hsün's story, Divorce, one sees the irony of the situation as the heroine tries to prevent the annulment of her marriage. Her husband has taken up with another woman, and asks for a divorce. The woman refuses on the ground that she is his lawful wife, married according to proper rites. She goes to her father to her husband's home to vindicate her rights, though she is finally awed into submission by the august presence of the local dignitaries. The tone of the story is complex, because the woman clearly has not developed any social

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consciousness that might enable her to see the anomalousness of her position. She sticks to her virtue, name, and dignity in the station of wifehood. Lu Hsun subtly exposes the absurdity of her situation, not in terms of protest but in terms of irony.

Lu Hsun's *The True Story of Ah Q* is the only piece of modern Chinese literature that has been translated into many different languages. It has a rich humor that is genuinely Chinese, and it effectively embodies typical Chinese failings in the life of its hero—superiority complex, smug sense of superiority, and capacity for rationalization. But in structure, *Ah Q* is decidedly not Lu Hsun's best work. The theme of revolution introduced in the latter part of the book is not really integral to the life of the hero. He has only a vague knowledge of what revolution means, and with his shrewd instinct for self-preservation he is not a man to be mechanically led to death by external forces that are incomprehensible to him. The irony at the end does not have the dramatic force necessary to give his death the quality of inevitability.

Lu Hsun's best stories are grounded in childhood memories: in his return to his native town after an absence of many years in Japan and Peking, he is exposed to the shocking contrast between the traditional ways of living and the standards of value he now holds. In *Benediction*, Lu Hsun describes a countrywoman who, at the death of her child and two successive husbands, tries to seek consolation in the future life. In an accidental encounter with her, the author unintentionally confirms her belief in reunion with her people in the after life and thus causes her suicide. This gives him a sense of guilt for his share in the death of the woman. The beliefs and ideals of the woman are not ridiculed, but are treated with respect and compassion.

In *In the Restaurant*, Lu Hsun tells of a casual encounter with an old schoolmate, now a disillusioned schoolteacher, without prospects in some far-away province. Once he had been an active student leader; now he is too much weighed down by life to protest. Though he has lost the sense of piety for his departed kin, he returns to his hometown, in obedience to his mother's wishes, to remove the bones of his younger brother from a flooded place and to give some velvet flowers to a girl he remembers. The girl turns out to be dead. From one point of view, the schoolteacher's absorption in the mere fulfillment of deeds of piety indicates the failure of his courage. But it also indicates the presence within him of higher principles, which are above the mere clash of old and new ideas.

In the story *Soap*, Lu Hsun gives a satiric exposure of one type of Confucian gentleman who, beneath his lip-service to filial piety, is just an average sensual person. The gentleman buys a cake of soap for his wife, but as he tells of a girl he passes in the street, the wife senses that his buying of the soap has been motivated by unconscious libidinous desires. The gentleman praises the piety of the girl in tending her blind grandmother, and reports a conversation he has overheard: "Ah Fa, don't think this baggage were dirt. If you buy two cakes of soap and scrub her body nice and clean, she will be quite something." In these stories Lu Hsun reveals a fine sense of irony that is missing in his numerous imitators.

Lu Hsun was not a Communist; in his stories and essays he was moved by a burning desire to disinfect China of its sickness, sloth, and corruption. Because he commanded a large audience and had great prestige, the Leftist writers worshipped him, and in the last years of his life they forced him into a position of leadership. The most cursory examination of his early writings will reveal, however, that he is a rugged individualist and that he is opposed to any authoritarian system of government, even one by the proletariat. His later conformity to Marxist principles actually atrophied his literary powers. In 1930 he was one of the founders of the League of Leftwing Writers of China. His writings then merely consisted of brief polemic essays and translations. In spite of their biting tone and trenchant style, these works have only marginal importance in the history of Chinese literature.
literature. Nominally the leader of Leftist writers, he became their tool and instrument. Lu Hsün must have resented from his grave the face of his canonization by the later writers.

Ideological Origins of the Literary Revolution

In order to understand China's Marxist writers in the thirties, one must trace the divergent ideological origins of the Literary Revolution, which reflected a crude assortment of European literary movements from the Sturm-und-Drang of Goethe to the so-called neo-realism of the post-Gorky Soviet writers. The New Youth group, comprising Hu Shih, Ch'ên Tu-hsien, and other Peking professors, expounded the scientific liberal tradition of the West. The New Youth magazine, for example, published more social and political criticism than works of pure literature. An allied group, the Crescent Moon Society, had as its leader Hsi Chih-mo, a returned student from Cambridge and the first popular pai-hua poet. He represented the Anglo-American tradition, which has become less and less articulate in the later development of Chinese poetry and fiction. Hsi made translations of Wordsworth and Shelley, and in his own poetry showed a strongly Romantic influence. His adaptations of English meters is not completely successful, and since his death (in an airplane crash), there has been no effective exponent of the Anglo-American tradition among Chinese writers.

The Creation Society and Kuo Mo-jo

A more dynamic group was the Creation Society (1920-1929), founded by Kuo Mo-jo, Yu Tsu-tu, Ch'ên Fang-wu, and other returned students from Japan. During the twenties, the society published the Creation Quarterly, the Creation Weekly, and the Creation Monthly. Its guiding spirit, Kuo Mo-jo, was a man of prodigious energy who after 1925 turned from a Romantic individualist into a Marxist Socialist. His change in political outlook was symptomatic of the coming Leftist dominance among Chinese writers. By then the Literary Revolution had been won: pai-hua had been universally adopted, although the ideological conflicts among the writers concerned had gotten nowhere. The Creation Society, later in its career, moved from the Literary Revolution to the so-called Revolutionary Literature. Lu Hsün's conversion to Marxism further consolidated the Leftist front. One should remember that at that time Soviet Russia was looked upon by most people without suspicion, and that, under the misguided influence of Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang actively cooperated from 1921 to 1927 with the Communist Party on behalf of national unity. Always the ardent idealist, Kuo Mo-jo actually joined the Kuomintang and Communist forces in their northern expedition against the war lords in 1926-27. Though his works, considered individually, do not achieve high literary distinction, Kuo's literary career illustrates the mistaken idealism that typified Chinese men of letters in this period.

Kuo's writings range from poetry, drama, fiction, and essays to studies in archaeology and ancient Chinese history. He translated Goethe's Faust, War and Peace, and the novels of Upton Sinclair, who is, therefore, the contemporary American writer best known in China. Kuo's researches in archaeology are a landmark in Chinese scholarship, though his interpretations of ancient Chinese history and the earlier Chinese philosophers, based upon a Marxist approach, have yielded results that are highly debatable.

In the field of fiction Kuo's role has been insignificant, because his imagination does not find sustenance in contemporary subject matters. In poetry he represents the Whitman school of free verse. While the earlier writers of pai-hua poetry, like Hsi Chih-mo and Wen I-fo, used Western meters to replace the overstrict Chinese prosody, Kuo wrote
in an expansive, self-assertive style that has since proved to be more popular. His early poetry, collected under the title Goddess, makes use of Western and Chinese myths, and is full of rhetorical gestures. The poem Hound of Heaven begins in the following manner: “I am the hound of Heaven;/I have swallowed the sun;/I have swallowed the moon;/I have swallowed all the stars;/I have swallowed the whole universe;/I have become I.” This, of course, is pure rant. His plays, which mainly treat of episodes in Chinese history, are certainly inferior to the works of younger contemporaries such as Ts’ao Yü.

His most important and certainly most readable work is a series of autobiographical ventures: My Childhood, Before and After the Revolution; Black Cat; Ten Years with the Creation Society; and The Northern Expedition. They are now republished in two volumes under the titles of My Youth and the Chronicle of Revolution. Many Chinese writers (Hu Shih, Pu Chin, Yu Ta-fu, and Shen Ts’ung-wen) have written brief biographies, but Kuo’s autobiography is both more detailed and more illuminating concerning the dynamic currents and personalities of his age. The first volume traces his life in Szechwan: his inceint revolt against feudalism in family and school, his friendship, his disillusionment from school, his nominal marriage to an ugly girl with bound feet. The second volume tells of his life in Japan, his literary friends and projects, his association with the Creation Society, and, finally, his impressions of the Northern Expedition. The section on his literary life contains invaluable material on literary history, and traces the gradual but inevitable progress of Marxism among Chinese writers. The section on the Northern Expedition is disappointing, because Kuo fails to give a unified account of the campaign. What he records is merely impressions of events, and of such prominent figures as Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.

Kuo’s autobiography stops at 1927, but the unwritten portion of his career is equally interesting. Immediately after the Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek made a successful coup d’état against the Communists and the Leftist elements in the Kuomintang. It was a courageous step on Chiang’s part, because even at that time Russia’s designs on China were apparent. In taking it, however, Chiang permanently antagonized the intellectuals, as is shown by the subsequent increasing sympathy for Communism among writers. As a prominent Leftist writer and political worker, Kuo was unable to remain in China after the purge. He and his Japanese wife went to live in Japan, where he did archaeological research work on the oracle shells and bones. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he made a dramatic return to China, to become once again a leader among the writers in the interior. He wrote at that time a few plays, such as Ch’ü Yüen and K’ung-ch’iao T’an (The Peacock’s Gall-bladder), which are typical of the historic-patriotic plays produced at that time. In 1947 he toured the USSR as a sort of cultural ambassador, and in 1910 composed an ode on the seventieth birthday of Stalin, so bombastic in tone that it seemed to be a caricature of his old style. At present he is reaping his profits as a loyal worker for the Communist Party: he is vice-premier of the State Administration Council, chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, and head of the Academy of Sciences.

When, in its later period, the Creation Society advocated revolutionary literature for the proletariat, it was reinforced by the Sun Society, under the leadership of Chiang Kuang-ts‘u and Ch‘en Hsing-ts‘un. Chiang Kuang-ts‘u, a vigorous writer for the Communist cause, died (at the age of thirty-one) in 1931. His colleague, Ch‘en Hsing-ts‘un, has written historical plays and books on vernacular (pai-hua) Chinese literature.

The Literary Research Society and Mao T‘un

Though the Creation Society was romantic in its early leanings, the Literary Research Society espoused from the very first the cause of realistic writing. Its leaders were novelist
Mao Tun (real name: Shên Yêng-ping), short-story writer Yeh Shao-chün, and scholar and editor Chêng Chêng-to. Their organ, the Short Story Magazine, published some of the best Chinese fiction of the twenties, together with translations of Russian works and those of the lesser European nations. Though certainly Marxist in its basic orientation, the Literary Research Society remained objective enough to permit non-partisan writers like Lao Shê, Pa Chin, and Shih Chê-ta'un to contribute to its magazine.

The leader of the Literary Research Society, Mao Tun, is the most respected novelist in modern Chinese literature. His works are unequalled as conscientious, dialectical studies of social and political conditions in China. Like Kuo Mo-jo, Mao Tun did political work during the period of Kuomintang-Communist Party collaboration. His experiences during that period became the material for his first important work, the trilogy Eclipse (Shih), which includes the novels Distillation (Wei Mi), Uncertainty (Tung Yo), and Pursuit (Chê Ch'i). Projected against the background of the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, this trilogy describes the lives of young people coping with reactionary elements and consumed by doubt and uncertainty.

On reading them over, one is struck by the fact that Chinese youth in the twenties was much like the “lost” generation in the novels of Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Huxley, and Waugh of the same period. Animated by vague ideals, they engaged now in promiscuous sexual relationships, now in political and social reform. Part of the significance of Eclipse lies in the fact that while Mao Tun now has definite Leftist sympathies, he has not let his ideology warp the outlook of life he had during those turbulent years. The resulting vision is a nihilistic one, transcending the various feudalistic, capitalistic, and proletarian conflicts embodied in his characters.

Mao Tun’s second major work is Tzu Yeh (The Twilight), a romance about China in 1930. It is a more ambitious piece of writing than Eclipse, but in it Mao Tun is less successful in abstracting from his ideological preoccupations as he dissects the industrial and financial society of Shanghai during the stormy year when the Nationalist Army was fighting both the advancing Communist forces in Changsha and Wu-han and the war lords in the North. The chief character is Wu Sun-fa, a well-intentioned industrialist who, in order to make his factory a going concern, engages in speculation in the feverish Exchange Market and ends up in bankruptcy. His household, colleagues, and rivals are described in great detail. Factory strikes, Communist terrorist activities in the country, and the frivolous love-life of both young and old are all worked into the scheme. Much of this material is merely documentary, and is not integrated into the structure of the novel. The underlying materialist interpretation of history is discernible throughout, as Mao-Tun shows how the characters are conditioned by the feudalistic or capitalistic environments in which they live.

In some of the episodes, symbolism is subtly used for propaganda purposes. The father of Wu Sun-fa leaves his home for Shanghai, holding a Taoist tract in his hand. Suffocated by the warmth and perfume of his daughters-in-law and granddaughters, he dies immediately on reaching Wu’s residence. At the end of the novel, the Taoist tract is soaked in water as rain pours in through an open window. Both the book and the old man are indicative of the inability of the old mentality to exist in the modern age.

In another episode, the blackguard son of a country landlord becomes a member of the Kuomintang. He carries home with him a volume of Three People’s Principles (San Min Chu I). Later he discovers that his infant son has urinated on the book. This is subtle propaganda to discredit the Kuomintang; it is as if an atheist writer should describe the horror of the pastor on discovering his son urinating on the family Bible. In spite of
its relative complexity, The Twilight tends to reduce its characters to black and white, and
the author’s evident sympathy for the factory worker and the peasant becomes a summons
to hysteria and dissenion.
Mao Tun continued to write realistic and documentary-stylo works during and after
the Sino-Japanese War, though these new writings did not compare in scope and power
with his two earlier works. His superiority over the more propagandistic Communist
writers lies in the fact that he manages to produce the illusion of objective reality. He
uses the Marxist point of view without overtly stating it in didactic terms.
Representative of his newer work is the short novel Rotting (Pia-chih), which relates the
trials of a young woman working for the Kuomintang Secret Police in wartime Chung-
king. It is a first-person narrative, cast in diary form. As usual, Mao Tun is adept at
portraying decadent official types and innocent and sophisticated young people moving
in a circle of corruption and intrigue. The heroine has had many love affairs, and, as she
works for the secret police, she becomes increasingly disillusioned. The diary traces the
reawakening of her conscience when she is assigned to work on a Communist prisoner who
turns out to have been her first lover. Her job is to get the names and addresses of his
fellow Communists. She lives with him once again, and pretends to spy on him. After
her lover has been killed, she is assigned to work among college-students. There she meets
an innocent girl, a fellow worker for the secret police, from the clutches of Kuomintang
power. In doing so, she presumably loses her life, since the diary breaks off at this point.
Mao Tun uses his fine dialectical mind to expose the corruption of the old regime and to
convey a sense of the hopefulness of the new. Like Kuo Mo-jo, he toured the USSR after
the War, and now enjoys high prestige in Communist circles.

The Kuomintang and the Intellectuals

This account of the leading cliques and writers only partially suggests the consolid-
ation of divergent literary attitudes and movements in the solid Leftist front in the late
twenties. In the absence of more satisfactory documentary evidence, the spread of Com-
munism among Chinese writers would be difficult to trace. By the thirties, in any case,
most writers had become Leftist. Those earlier leaders of the Literary Revolution who
did not conform to the party line, e.g., Hu Shih, were thoroughly discredited. Other
writers, like Chou Tsou-Jhen and Lin Yutang, were labeled reactionaries. Leftist writers
not only controlled most of the magazines and literary supplements of the newspapers, but
persecuted relentlessly all writers who did not conform. The editors of the magazine
Hsien Tai (Les Contemporains), Shih Ch’et-ian and Tu Ii-hing, reacted against the League
of Leftwing Writers, and styled themselves “the third group.” They entered a plea
against the atmosphere of hysteria and literary polemics and asked for the freedom to
write. The Leftist writers, led by Lu Hsin, attacked them in essay after essay, and de-
clared there could be no third group in the struggle for the dominance of the proletariat.
In short, young writers of the thirties had either to stop publishing or follow the fashion.
And the group of mediocre writers who did flourish at that time were all pretty much alike
in their Marxist approach to life and their treatment of subject matter.

The greatest failure of the Nationalist government lay in its inability to win over the
intellectuals. Compared with the efforts of the Communists at propaganda, its own
efforts were stupid and blundering. It was not resolute and dictatorial enough to suppress
all dissenting voices (as the Communists are today doing so effectively in the mainland of
China), and it was not sincere enough to let the people know about its predilection. In-
stead, it pursued a policy of half-hearted suppression and cloaked its weakness in grandilo-
quent and empty words, which only further alienated the intellectuals and the student group.
The Kuomintang had the traditional respect for students, and fervently wished for their cooperation in the task of national defense and reconstruction. It should be noted that before the Sino-Japanese War, students in the national universities paid only a token tuition of about two or three US dollars; during and after the war all students in national universities were exempted from tuition and furnished with free room and board. Yet it was the students who were most swayed by Communist propaganda, and most resolute and active in denouncing and discrediting the government. In 1918, immediately after the war, Wên I-to, a Communist agitator and distinguished minor poet of the twenties who had turned professor of Chinese, was assassinated by the Kuomintang Secret Police. This caused such a furor among the students that the deceased Wên promptly became a literary hero on a par with Lu Hsün. This illustrates the ill-advised character of the Nationalist government’s policy. It should either have left Wên I-to alone, or have had him indicted according to due process of law. To be sure, many an intellectual has been shot by the Communist authorities, without its provoking even a murmur.

"Undirected" Talents: Pa Chín, Lao Shí, Shén Têng-wén

There are a few writers who, while not orthodox Marxists, have escaped the open antagonism of the Communists, because their work either treats of the lower social classes or is sufficiently Leftist in tendency to include trenchant criticism of the "feudalistic" and capitalist elements in Chinese society. Free from persecution, these writers reach a wide circle of readers, and are able to present their individual vision of life without distorting it in the direction of class struggle theory. The more eminent of them are Pa Chín, Lao Shí, and Shén Têng-wén.

Pa Chín is an anarchist, with a burning humanitarian zeal to do away with injustice and cruelty. His style, compared with that of Mao Tun and Lu Hsün, is flat and crude, but he is an extremely powerful writer and is widely read among the young in China. His most popular novel, Chía (The Family), is typical of his work; its characters are either defying parental control or submitting to it. Largely autobiographical, it tells of the three brothers of the Kao family in Szechwan. The eldest, Chüeh-hsin, represents compromise; he is aware of the cruelty and injustice of his elders, but he places his destiny in their hands and makes a mess of his life in his effort to be docile and preserve the crumbling structure of the family. He gives up his beloved cousin Mei without a struggle, and marries another girl. (Mei dies of consumption, and Chüeh-hsin’s wife of childbirth.) His younger brothers, Chüeh-min and Chüeh-wei, represent enlightenment and revolt, the former being concerned with individual happiness, the latter (spokesman for the novelist himself) with revolution. All the characters are projected on a more or less allegorical level, but the novel is mechanical in structure and is characterized by great cruelty of feeling, a pervasive atmosphere of sentimentality, and a lack of any positive ideals except social protest. The popularity of The Family indicates the existence in contemporary China of an immature and uncritical audience, who welcomes propaganda if it takes the form of sugar-coated fiction. The fortunes of the three brothers are further traced in the novel’s sequel: Ch’un (Spring) and Ch’iú (Autumn).

Lao Shí is known to Western readers through the English translation of Lo-t’o Hsiang-tsz (The Ricksha Boy). Because of his indifference to ideological problems, he is perhaps the most readable of the novelists writing in China today. He stems from the English tradition rather than from that of the Soviet writers, and has a great flair for humor, which he uses to illuminate the incongruities of the Chinese character. Reread today, his early humorous novels such as Chao Ts’ai-yüeh and Lao Chang t’i Ché-hsüeh (The Philosophy of Old Chang) often seem merely facetious, though there are occasional passages that are
reminiscent of Dickens. In his later work he controls his use of humor, and the result is somewhat less trivial. The Richaka Boy is a fine realistic study of the life of a Chinese coolie, though its plot is rather thin. His new work Ssi Shih T'ung T'ang (Four Generations in One House), not yet completed, bids fair to be his masterpiece, though now that he is writing under the Communist rule Lao She is compelled like everyone else to adopt a Leftist point of view.

Shên Ts'ung-wên is a prolific writer. In his Autobiography he tells of his childhood and his life as a soldier. Most of his stories are based on his memories of soldiers and peasants, and of the mountains and rivers of Hunan. They often have an idyllic quality that is refreshing by contrast with the sweeping ideological concerns of other writers. His best known story is Pien Ch'en (The Border City) which tells a simple love story of country people. Shên writes in a lucid colloquial (pai-hua) style, and some of his work ranks very high in modern Chinese literature.

The New Drama

Among the younger writers who rose to fame in the latter half of the thirties, the most dynamic is certainly Ts'ao Yü, the leading dramatist of contemporary China. Like Pa Chhin, he adopts a Leftist point of view without insisting on orthodox Marxism, though this is less true of his later work like Peking Jen (Peking Man) than of his earlier writings. Contemporary Chinese drama in no way approximates the spirit and style of the older drama: it has its roots in Ibsen and the problem plays, whereas the older drama was lyrical and poetical. There have been several attempts to reform the older drama, but no dramatists have succeeded in using it to treat of contemporary problems. To much greater extent than that of the novel and of poetry, in other words, the development of the new drama involves the successful adaptation of the Western form. The early experiments were decidedly crude, and the plays of Ibsen, Wilde, and Shaw, though translated and presented on the stage, met with no marked success. The first playwrights, T'ien Han and Hung Shên, wrote several plays of no great merit.

The new drama became genuinely popular only with the phenomenal success of Ts'ao Yü's first play, Lei-yü (The Thunderstorm). It has all the characteristics needed to please a Chinese audience: its plot is highly sensational; fate broods over the tragic action; it depicts a variety of the conflicts between old and young and rich and poor that have become the staple theme of Chinese fiction. In the play, the conflicts between father and son and employer and factory worker, together with the incestuous relationships between brother and sister and step-mother and son, are successfully manipulated to lead to a dénouement in which nearly every important character meets death. The Chinese audience had never before seen such melodramatic virtuosity on the stage.

Ts'ao Yü followed up his initial success with a second sensational play, Jsh-ch'ü (The Sunrise). This time the scene is laid in Shanghai, and the play emphasizes capitalist and bourgeois decadence of all kinds. Ts'ao Yü uses a laborers' worksong as musical accompaniment for the play, and the symbol of the sunrise to indicate the kind of hope denied to the banker, broker, society girl, and petty bank clerk.

Ts'ao Yü's third play, Yuan Yeh (The Wilderness), is regarded by many critics as his best. Employing the theme of revenge in a primitive village setting, it exhibits a considerably greater genuine dramatic power than his first two plays. His ideological preoccupations come to the fore again in Peking Man. Two dominant symbols are used: the Peking Man with his primitive strength is presented as typifying the assertion of love and hatred that would redeem the old China, and the coffin of the patriarch of a decaying family is presented as the symbol of death and failure. The anthropologist and his daugh-
ter, with their positivist scientific spirit and their repudiation of Confucian ideals, are depicted as the hope of China. The dialectical underpinning of the play is along Marxist lines. The theme is similar to that of The Family, and it is no accident that Ts'ao Yu has also made a play out of this novel. He has also made a successful Chinese adaptation of Romeo and Juliet.

During the war years, both in the interior and in Shanghai, there was a great demand for plays. To meet it, many European plays were adapted and many original plays written. The more competent playwrights who appeared at this time were Wu T'ai-kung, Hsia Yen, Yean Ch'ung, and Sung Chih-chieh. The drama boom during the war years reflects the popular demand for entertainment at a time when Hollywood movies and traditional drama had ceased to be so readily available. The drama is today largely a propagandistic instrument of the Communist government.

Poetry

Compared with the drama and the novel, modern Chinese poetry has neither distinguished practitioners nor a popular following. Mention has been made of the earlier experimental poetry of Hu Shih, Wên I-to, Hsin Chih-mo, and Kuo Mo-jo. The later poets, in general, followed the lines laid down by Wên and Kuo; only a few have attempted, without much success, to create a pai-hua (spoken language) poetry comparable in density of expression and feeling to the older Chinese poetry. The influence of the French Symbolists and of Eliot is largely responsible for these attempts. Ho Ch'i-fang, Pien Chih-lin, and Fong Chih have tried to recapture fluidity of feeling while maintaining rigidity of form, but their poetry, stemming as it has from academic circles, has never been popular. Ho Ch'i-fang early forsaken his aestheticism, moreover, to become a Communist worker in Yenan (P'u-shih) and write in a more popular style: he is now an important Communist official. The school of poets following Kuo Mo-jo has even less literary merit. There is no discipline involved in writing free verse of this sort, and its practitioners usually stress popular sentiment rather than individual emotion. During war time, Kuo's followers, e.g., Tsang K'o-chia, Ai Ch'ing, and T'ien Chien, turned out a steady torrent of patriotic and propagandist verses that bear no significant relation either to the Chinese tradition or to the best contemporary poetry of the West.

COMMUNISM: LITERARY THEORY AND PRACTICE

So far, only writers have been considered who had achieved fame before the Sino-Japanese War. With the outbreak of that war, there began a third phase of modern Chinese literature, which can no longer be discussed in terms of personalities, because the relevant literary output has become increasingly uniform in character and Marxist in approach. Before the war, the Communists were engaged in a struggle for survival, and did not have time to expand their cultural and propagandist activities. Most Communist writers lived in Shanghai or Hong Kong, and were cut off from life in the Communist-held areas. This was a disadvantage because, not being free to engage in overt propaganda, they had to express their ideas obliquely, which often enriched the literary quality of their works. The irony of Li Hsüan's polemical essays and the objective quality of Mao T'ung's novels would not have been possible under the Communist government.

When the Communists pledged themselves to join the anti-Japanese front, they had a breathing space during which they could not only build up their military strength but also consolidate and enlarge their gains through intensive propaganda. In the Nationalist-held interior, Communist propaganda continued to make headway among students and in-
intellectuals by appealing to them in terms of patriotism. In the Communist areas, definite steps were taken to build a positive Communist culture. In speech after speech, Mao Tse-tung stressed the necessity of building a new culture based upon the idea of the rising proletariat and the displacement of the feudal, semi-colonial, semi-capitalist culture of Nationalist China. In 1942, Mao addressed a group of cultural workers in Yanan (Pinyin) on the tasks and responsibilities facing them. This series of talks was later published as a pamphlet entitled The Dialectics of the New Literary Movement. Since it is regarded as the bible for all Communist writers, note must be made of its main ideas.

Mao Tse-tung

Mao begins by asking what the new literature stands for. It stands, he replies, for the proletariat classes and the Chinese Communist Party. Literature that flatters the privileged classes and promotes feudalistic and capitalist interests is to be positively discouraged. Until recently, he continues, Communist writers in the Kuomintang areas have addressed themselves primarily to the petty bourgeoisie (the students, clerks, and small officials), and have exposed for them the feudalistic and capitalist decadence in society. Insufficient attention has been paid, he insists, to the peasants, workers, and soldiers who represent 90 percent of Chinese population. The new literature should be primarily designed for them, and only secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie. How can this be done, asks Mao, writers and cultural workers still retain bourgeois attitudes and have hardly any genuine and intimate knowledge of proletarian life? Clearly the one way out is kung-kai ("to learn"). Having armed themselves with sound Marxist ideology, cultural workers should go to live among the proletariat, and share their emotions, thoughts, ways of living, and speech. Only thus can they produce works that will be understood and accepted by the people.

Mao then turns to the problem of technique. When addressing the petty-bourgeoisie, he asserts, the writer can deal with the subtler feelings and use a large vocabulary. But when he speaks to a proletarian audience he should, in the interests of intelligibility, avoid using advanced techniques and difficult vocabulary. The propagandistic and educational content of a piece of writing should be readily comprehensible. The immediate task, in short, is the democratization of literature rather than improvement in its quality, since the latter can await the day when the people have become better educated. The function of literature is utilitarian: to effect, consolidate, and glorify the proletarian revolution.

The negative approach of the Communist writers in Kuomintang areas is, therefore, no longer adequate. In view of the steady extension of Communist influence and territory, the constructive aspects of the Communist regime should henceforth be emphasized.

This new literature for and of the proletariat should not, says Mao, be judged by literary standards primarily; ideological considerations should take precedence over literary ones as a matter of course. If a piece of writing contains feudalistic or capitalist elements, then the higher its literary quality the more pernicious its influence. Thus a piece of writing that embodies correct ideology is to be preferred, however inferior its literary quality, to one that carries a wrong message. At the same time, Mao is aware that tiresomeness is not one of the constituents of successful propaganda, and he warns all writers against work projected on the didactic or textbook level. They should take the old folk forms of art, song, music, dancing, and storytelling, and pour new ideas and feelings into them. Where this is done the latter will meet up with far less resistance on the part of readers.

When one examines the state of publication in Communist areas, whether during or after the war, one can see that Communist writers have been faithfully following these injunctions. In fact, Mao, for the most part, was merely formulating authoritatively ideas...
that had been in the air for a long time. Communist writers even in the thirties had been concerned with the problem of enlarging their audience to include the peasant and factory worker. Some had advocated abolition of Chinese ideographic writing in favor of a system of Latinized Chinese characters that would enable even the illiterate to read after a brief course of training. All agreed that the peasant and soldier were to be given greater prominence as the subject matter of poetry and fiction.

In the late thirties, there appeared a new group of writers who specialized in peasant life: Ai Wu, Sha Ting, Wu Tsu-hsiao, Ou-yang Shan, and Nieh Kan-nu. (All these writers have emerged since the war as important Communist writers.) Anti-Japanese feeling ran highest just before the war, when some young Manchuriens who had escaped from Japanese control cashed in on public sentiment by writing about guerrilla warfare in Manchuria. Most of them had seen active service with guerrillas, and had worked with Communist volunteers. Among them were Hisao Ch'ih and his wife Hisao Hung, Tuan-nu Hung-hiang, Lo Feng, and Shu Chi'm. Most of them spent the war years in Communist territory, and except for Hisao Hung, who died during the war, and Hisao Ch'ih, who has been silenced for his heretical views, these so-called Northeastern writers today constitute an important group of Communist writers.

The migration of men of letters from Shanghai and Peking into the interior of China during the war made possible an unprecedented literary exploration of the life of the backward inland Chinese. This coincided, as a result of the demand for a "Literature of National Defense," with a widespread literary glorification of the soldier and guerrilla forces. In both the Nationalist and Communist areas, therefore, there was a shift of interest from bourgeois introspection into the individual and family to a somewhat idyllic presentation of the soldier and peasant. The individual psyche, never a dominant preoccupation of modern Chinese writers, further reeded in importance as a theme of literature.

Under Mao's official encouragement, proletarian tendencies in literature have become the dominant current. Present-day writings, in consequence, fall into two categories: original poems and stories about the peasant, soldier, and worker; and adaptations of folk songs, dramas, and storytelling. In both categories, the writer has ceased to be an individual. In reading the earlier pai-hua writers, however inferior their literary ability, one at least found each had something different and personal to offer. Now literature and the arts are a government-controlled activity, with explicitly defined aims and functions. The writer's first task is to observe the ideological requirements. He must justify the historical mission of the proletariat and demonstrate the inevitable collapse of feudal and capitalist society. He must glorify the Communist Party. For example, though everyone knows that the Communist contribution to the war against Japan was negligible, he must make it appear that the Communist forces were responsible for the victory.

There are prescribed ways of treating types of people. If the writer writes of the village, he must depict the enlightened peasant as industrious and courageous, the ignorant peasant as willing to reform his old habits, and the landlord and his henchmen as wicked people who deserve to be severely punished. If he writes of a village under Japanese control, he can seldom get away from the stereotype of the enlightened peasants helping the Communist guerrilla forces and of the bad officials and landlords as tools of the Japanese. A literature that, as a matter of course, glorifies the proletariat and condemns other classes is not, of course, a literature that seriously probes the meaning of life. Seeing everything as either black or white so simplifies life that one can hardly avoid the grossest types of sentimentality. Moral issues arise only when characters are exhibited as mixtures of good
and evil. When the idea of class struggle replaces individuals deciding between right and wrong, reality is invariably caricatured. Because of the naiveté of its ultimate assumptions, this new writing is not really literature but propaganda.

Considered as propaganda, the Communist writers can be complimented on the industry with which they turn out an endless flow of writings which are remarkably alike in their reiterating application of standard themes. A representative list of war novels and collections of war stories published in Communist areas during the war would include: The Old Warrior, The Iron Rade of Soldiers, Little Hero, The Brave Men, The Little Trumpeter, The Unconquerable People, Total Retreat, With Our Own Blood and Flesh, The Mine, The Red Flag Waves Triumphantly, and Behind the Enemy Front. A similar list could be made of stories and novels about peasants.

Art vs Propaganda

The question arises here: How effective is this literature as propaganda? Mao Tse-tung seems to make a fundamental mistake in urging all writers to write about the peasant and soldier. The proletarian is not necessarily interested in stories about his own class; most factory workers, on the record, greatly prefer an escapist movie with action and spectacle to a movie about capital-labor relations. There is a deep human need for relaxation to which the Communist way of life does not minister, and to which, on Mao's principles, Communist literature cannot minister either. Finally, though there is a vigorous literary movement in China, most proletarians are still not in a position to read the stories and poems designed for them. Communist literature, therefore, is read by people who have had at least a primary school education. The prominent woman Communist writer Ting Ling, after conducting a survey in her literary journal Wei I Pao, reports that most of its readers had found proletarian writings dull and hard to follow, and that their favorite authors were still Pao Chin, Chang I-hong-shui, and the erotic novelist Feng Yu-chi. Chang and Feng do not even belong to the school of writers stemming from the May Fourth Movement, and Pao Chin, though a fighter against the tyranny of feudalism in Chinese society, is not an orthodox Marxist. (Another survey, conducted by the same magazine, shows that the citizens of Peking nostalgically prefer Hollywood movies to both the native and the Russian cinema products.) Ting Ling admonishes her readers to discard their bourgeois tastes, and devote themselves to proletarian literature in a more serious way.

The surveys mentioned show that propagandistic literature has, so far, not been very effective. But literature is only one item in the regime's program of intensive propaganda and indoctrination. Everything—from movies to radio to comic strips—is state-controlled. The small citizen cannot escape the pressures on him. He has no choice but to resign himself to what little entertainment he can get from what he sees, reads, or hears.

However, if current fiction and poetry have only a limited appeal, the regime's cultural workers have been much more successful in bringing new content into the ballad, dance, and play, and thus adapting folk art to their purposes. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of such activities in the lives of today's Chinese masses. Before the Communists came to power, popular drama and story-recitals had been an autonomous activity, which the government had neither hindered nor encouraged; now they are the government's principal means of reaching the masses and maintaining its hold on them. The popular vogue of yangko, a kind of dramatic skit combined with a certain Northern variety of music and dance, has been phenomenal. Every schoolboy and girl has been taught yangko musical airs and the appropriate bodily movements, with the result that any newsworthy event, any not-too-complicated propagandist story, can now be staged
on the street before a mobile audience. The same thing has happened to other forms of folk entertainment. Even the Capital Theatre, most of the repertoire of which dates back to the Ch'ing dynasty, has been moved over into a vehicle for Communist propaganda. New librettos have been prepared and old librettos revised so as to bring the entire repertoire in line with the new ideology. Such famous performers in Peking Opera as Mei Lan-fang, Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu, and T'ien Fung-yu continue to play to capacity houses in the big cities. Each of these artists, moreover, has his own immense following in the population, who can hardly fail to be influenced by the propaganda he is disseminating.

Exploitation of Traditional Forms

The utilization of traditional entertainment forms has had a reciprocal impact on the development of poetry and prose. Storytellers in China have been reciting ballads and epic stories, with and without musical accompaniment, ever since the Sung dynasty. Modern Chinese literature had previously learned little from the storytellers (the techniques it employs have been mainly of Western derivation). Today, in the effort to write prose and verse narratives that will reach the proletarian class, numerous writers are imitating their techniques. The Communist pioneer in this line of work is Chao Shu-li, whose lively colloquial stories, such as The Marriage of Hsiao-t'ieh-ts'e and The Verses of Li Yu-tsa'ai, all lend themselves to recitation before an illiterate audience. These stories follow the inevitable propaganda line, but manage to preserve some traces of rustic fun in their portrayal of country types, and thus have a quality which is missing from most Communist stories. Chao Shu-li, together with Lao She and the poet T'ieh Chien, is now editor of the literary magazine Shuo-shuo Ch'ang-ch'ang (Stories and Ballads), which is devoted to colloquial-style storytelling. Lao She, who has a sharp ear for folk speech, is especially successful with ballads. The group's prose stories, punctuated at regular intervals with verse stanzas, clearly involve a regression in technique from such models as Da Maupassant and Chekhov back to a more primitive form. But this imitation of anonymous medieval art has made possible, apparently, the first successful experiment in popular reading for the proletariat. It is the first branch of pai-hua literature since the May Fourth Movement that has deliberately turned its back on Western models in favor of the native tradition.

The stories and ballads in Shuo-shuo Ch'ang-ch'ang can lay no claim to literary distinction; they are interesting primarily as evidence of the deliberate lowering of the level of appeal in connection with the regime's bid for popular favor. The story Chin So and the ballad The Reformation of the Sing-Song Girls are typical. In the former, Chin So is a good-natured peasant working for a villainous landlord. He is very stupid, and even appears at times to be a willing victim of landlord exploitation. A village widow, who happens to be the landlord's mistress, flirts with him, but he sets his heart on marriage. He buys with his own money, and takes for his wife, a refugee girl from a famine district. The landlord soon has designs on the girl and, through the assistance of the widow, has her drugged and raped. The girl makes a great deal of trouble over this, and the landlord tries to kill both Chin So and his wife. Luckily Chin So escapes, to return years later as a Communist soldier. The landlord is sentenced by a people's court, and receives his just punishment.

The Reformation of the Sing-Song Girls describes the trials of two young girls and their final liberation under the Communist government. K'uei-tsun is maltreated by her stepmother. Together with Chin-hua, an orphan girl, she escapes to Chang-chia-k'ou (Kulgan), and goes to work as a waitress in a restaurant. Chin-hua's brother, who is Kuei-tsun's lover, accompanies them on the journey, and is captured by a Kuomintang press gang. The girls find lodging in a hotel, the proprietor of which finally sells them to a brothel,
where they are manhandled and have no choice but to entertain the customers. Before long, they both have syphilis. When the Communist Army comes to liberate the city, Kuei-tsun, having believed all the bad reports she has heard about them, flees. She is adopted as a daughter by an old couple in another city, given fine clothes, and taught to sing and dance. Behind this apparent benevolence, however, there is only villainy, since the old couple soon sells her to a house of prostitution. The Communist Forces again come to her rescue, and this time she does not flee. Under the Communist regime, she is rehabilitated — she learns a useful trade and has her syphilis cured. Her lover, meantime, has deserted the Nationalist Forces and joined the Communists. Chin-hua is already a factory worker, and has a Communist soldier boyfriend. In the end, the two couples marry.

Both stories are highly contrived Communist propaganda, which strive to get across the point that the Communist government is the friend of the oppressed, and to point to the vileness of the landlords and other feudal elements in the Chinese society. The maiden in distress has always been a popular theme in folk stories, and in this ballad there is a satiric strain that is clearly intended to tickle the popular palate.

Few Communist writers, to be sure, are engaged in the kind of experimentation just described. Most still use the orthodox forms of poetry, short story, and novel. The big names in present-day literature are Kuo Mo-jo, Mao Tun, and Ting Ling, all three Communist writers who had attained fame in the twenties. Kuo is an important functionary in the government, too busy to publish anything except occasional articles, though he is known to be going ahead with his autobiography. Mao Tun, besides being head of the Department of Cultural Affairs, is co-editor of Hisiao Shuo Yich K’an (Fiction Monthly) and Jen Min Wen Hsueh (People’s Literature), China’s two leading literary journals. He is still busy writing, and portions of his new panoramic novel about the war period, Tuan Lien (Discipline), have appeared in print.

Ting Ling was once a daring woman rebel, whose first husband was shot as a Communist by the Nationalists. She has lived for many years in Communist territory. Her recent publications include When I Was in Ya Ts’un, a collection of short stories, and the novel On the Songkan River. In style she is more disciplined than that of the younger Communist writers, and sometimes she succeeds in writing about life in the pre-Communist areas without dragging in ideological issues. Her story, “Night,” included in When I Was in Ya Ts’un, depicts the weakness of a Communist official walking home at night after an interminable committee meeting. His wife is much older than he, and their relationship is an unhappy one. On his way home he has jokes with a newly married fellow-worker, and sees a pretty girl leaning against a door. When he reaches home and sees his wife, the idea of deserting her crosses his mind. During the night, he helps his cow give birth. A girl, a fellow Communist worker, watches him . . . not, the reader is told, for the first time. Suddenly a feeling of tenderness rushes over him and he goes to sleep in his wife’s arms. There is genuine poignancy in this story; unlike most Communist stories, it inculcates no feelings of hatred, and it is projected on a fairly civilized level.

Almost none of the big-name writers has left Communist China. Lao She is attaining a position of genuine leadership through his vigorous experimentation with ballad poetry. Pa Chin and Ts’ao Yü are both recognizably restive; neither had been an orthodox Marxist, and it is evidently taking them time to adjust to the new situation. The National Committee of the Association of Writers and Artists lists, as of 1919, over a hundred names, most of them familiar ones. Although not all the older writers are actually writing, leadership has not yet passed to the younger writers, i.e., those who began to publish just before or during the Sino-Japanese War.
The active younger writers today are: in the short story field, Ai Wu, Cheu Erh-fu, Ou-yang Shan, and Liu Pai-yü; in poetry, Ai Ch'ing, T'ien Chien, and Tsang K'o-chia; in the drama, Hai Yen, Yuan Chun, and Sung Chih-ti. Some of these, like Cheu Erh-fu and Liu Pai-yü, were in Communist territory during the war years; some, like Ai Wu and Hai Yen, worked in the Nationalist interior. It is useless to try to distinguish between these writers in terms of merit or even style; in all essentials they are almost alike, with the same Marxist approach, the same proletarian subject matter, and the same propaganda emphasis.

The best Communist-area works published during the war are perhaps the following: Kao Chien-ta, a novel by Ou-yang Shan dealing with the cooperative movement; Chung Ku Chi (Planting the Seed), a peasant novel by Liu Ch'in; Chiang-shan Ts'yun Shih Jih (Ten Days at Chiang-shan Village), a novel about land redistribution by Ma Chia; and Pai Chou-en Tai-fu (Dr. Bethune), Chou Erh-fu's fictionalized biography of the Canadian physician Dr. Norman Bethune, who first served in the Spanish Civil War and later worked for the Chinese Communists.

The most prolific of the Communist writers who once lived in the Nationalist areas is Ai Wu, who, as has been mentioned, had been writing about peasant life even before the war. Ai Wu was a native of Szechwan, and had seen much of Southwest China before he started to write. His recent works include two autobiographies, eight novels, one novella, and several collections of short stories. The novel Shan Yeh (The Mountain Region), which depicts a war episode in South China, is considered the best novel written in 1918.

Russian Influence

The preceding account indicates that the most popular genres in Communist literature are the novel and short story about the peasant and soldier. This is in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's demand for proletarian literature. If one looks at contemporary Soviet literature, one finds the same subjects predominating in it as well, though the fact that Russia is highly industrialized makes the factory worker an equally important hero as the peasant. Stories about the heroic Russian resistance against the Germans are also much in vogue.

Translations of Soviet authors are the chief foreign literature read by Communist Chinese writers today. As a result of this one finds a strong Soviet influence in the new Chinese writing. In terms of the Chinese tradition, however, the peasant story can be traced to Li Ihsan and Shen Ts'ung-wen, and the prototype of much war fiction is Heino Ch'un's Village in August, first published in 1935, about a small band of guerrillas stationed in a Manchurian village. (It is available in an English translation.)

Village in August is so poorly constructed that it can best be described as a series of sketches. Under its vanish of often violent realism, there is a core of sheer sentimentality. The characters, for example, are simple, idealized "types" representing courage and villainy. The most dramatic episode in the book is that about Seventh Sister Li and her soldier lover Boi T'ang. The village in which the guerrillas are stationed is attacked by superior Japanese forces, and the guerrillas pull out. On the road Boi T'ang finds Seventh Sister Li just being raped by a Japanese, her child dead beside her. He feels he cannot leave her as she is, and stays with her, only to be killed. Recovering consciousness, Seventh Sister sees what has happened, puts on T'ang's uniform, and takes up his rifle to join the guerrillas. She is wounded, and dies in a hospital. This episode plays on the conventional themes of love, loyalty, and courage. It undoubtedly aroused anti-Japanese feelings in the readers, and thus had a certain value as propaganda. All the more recent war novels are also covert propaganda, using stock themes and simple characters.
The case of Hsiao Ch'ûn is illuminating in another respect. He has been an established writer ever since the publication of Village in August. During the war he was an active worker in Communist territory. After the war he was appointed editor of the newspaper Wen Hua Pao, in Harbin. Like many an idealistic youth, he was attracted to Communism because of his patriotic zeal. Back in Manchuria, where he could see the horrors of the civil war at first hand, the atrocities involved in land reform, and the imperialistic behavior of the lordly Russians, he wrote editorials against continuation of the civil war and against a too-friendly attitude toward Russia. An early protegé of Lu Hsun, he quoted passages from the master in support of his opinions. For his pains, he was deluged with abuse and attack from the entire Communist press. He Indices at once into silence, and his subsequent fate is unknown. A collection of the attacks on him has been published under the title Hsiao Ch'ûn's Thought: A Critique. Few writers in Communist China are likely to miss the point, or try to follow Hsiao Ch'ûn's example. He stands as a warning to all cultural workers who might be tempted to claim a modicum of freedom. What the Communist government expects of them is collaboration in perpetuating a lie, and a sterile literature is the unavoidable result.

SUMMARY

In view of the large mass of writings published in Communist China, it is interesting to notice what Chinese men of letters profess to think of it. The general opinion is that it leaves much to be desired. Looking over the leading literary journals, Hsiao Shuo Yîch K'ûn and Wen I Pao, one is aware that great efforts have been made to raise the level of current literary output. While much of the criticism is ideological, a substantial portion is still devoted to practical problems of the craft: how to write poetry, how to handle characters in a story, how to embody the typical in the particular, etc. Seasoned writers are solicited for advice to young writers; literary criticism and theory are constantly translated from the Russian. Hsiao Shuo publishes in each issue a critical symposium on one contemporary work of literature and discussions of literary problems occupy even larger space in Wen I Pao. All this registers dissatisfaction at the present state of writing and the need to improve it. One important factor, of course, is the general decline of literary standards among the younger writers. Earlier writers, like Lu Hsun and Kuo Mo-jo, all had had sound education in the older Chinese literature and, since they were the first to adopt Western forms into Chinese literature, had to read extensively in Western literature in their quest for ideas and techniques. The younger writers are men with only the average high school and college education, which did not encourage study of classical Chinese. They are also poorly trained in foreign languages, and, since they have a considerable body of pai-hua literature in front of them, they feel little urge to seek out Western models. They are unaware of the existence of the significant modern writers, like Proust, Joyce, Eliot, and Yeats. The modes of feeling and technique represented by these writers are thus not available to them. Since they are also cut away from the Chinese tradition, their resources are narrow and their perspective limited.

Evaluation of Present Efforts

A more important reason for the decline of letters is the very unanimity of purpose and approach. The current insistence on proletarian subject matter leaves the writers no choice. Most of them are men and women with a petty-bourgeois background, who if they were encouraged to write of their bourgeois experience could at least draw upon memory and imagination. Obliged as they are to turn away from the self and weave idyllic romances about the soldier and peasant, they write without conviction. They cannot come to grips with reality because they must write according to the Marxist ideology, which is a distortion of reality. The Communist critics are, therefore, wasting their time
as they puzzle about how to avoid stereotyped characterization, and create particular characters that are also universal. It is impossible to create characters at once particular and universal, like Hamlet and Falstaff, unless one is prepared to forego the theory that certain classes are always in the right and certain others always in the wrong. The love and understanding that must inform all the characters in a good book is inoperative as a matter of course when a large portion of humanity is viewed with the eyes of hatred and vengeance.

The Chinese men of letters, in a word, have lost the virtue of disinterestedness. The vice of the older literature was its merely decorative quality; the vice of the new is its insistence on affecting events. Even before literature became part of the propaganda machinery of the Communist Party it had been regarded, as we have seen, primarily as an instrument of social reform. Today, writers are so occupied with ideological and practical concerns that they cannot possibly attain a state of critical detachment.

The only exception to the foregoing generalization in recent years is the novel Wei Ch'en (The Besieged City). Its author, Ch'en Chung-shu, is the most learned man in present-day China. The son of a famous Chinese scholar, he is equally well trained in Chinese and Western literature. He has a prodigious memory, and reads fluently Greek, Latin, Italian, French, and German. After a sojourn in Oxford, he taught for a while during the war in the Combined Southwest University in the interior, later returning to Shanghai, where he wrote his novel. Its prose, characterized by a complete rejection of the current journalistic style, successful assimilation of Western idiom and imagery, and revitalization of the language, certainly represents the finest achievements in pai-hua literature. His novel is picaresque and satirical. It traces the journey of a returned student to the interior of China. The story centers upon the student's courtship of a girl, their marriage, and his disillusionment. Around this theme are woven many fine comic and satiric episodes about literary men and professors. In this respect, the novel has a certain kinship with The Unofficial History of Officialdom. In his collection of short stories, Jen Shou Kuei (Men, Beasts and Ghosts), Ch'en Chung-shu further attacks the mediocrity and obscurantism of the academic group. Here, however, the element of humor and satire is often achieved at the expense of story structure. It is a great relief, nevertheless, to turn to him after the oppressive monotony of most recent writings. Ch'en is hardly a writer to be sanctioned by the Communist regime; he will probably be wise enough to keep quiet. At present he is directing a project that is translating the works of Mao Tsetung into English, which is quite a come-down for this talented satirist.

Tradition and the Future

The lover of China is less likely to shudder at the synthetic quality of current Chinese letters than at the fact that the success of the Communist Party among men of letters antedated its political success. In the past, Chinese scholars were the defenders of sanity, of wisdom, and of a moderate and benevolent type of government. Today they must plead guilty to having given prior and blank-check support to a regime of violence and despotism. A genuine renaissance of letters, moreover, will come only with the overthrow of the Communist government. By that time the intellectuals may have learned their lesson and may try, as they have not done since the Literary Revolution, to understand the Chinese culture of the past and to levy upon the spiritual heritage of the West. A nation cannot deliberately break with the past without inviting crudeness in feeling and thought, as witness the deterioration of pai-hua because of the perpetuation of clichés and uncouth terminology made necessary by the demands of Communist propaganda. The language will continue to deteriorate unless the writers somehow check its deterioration by aiming at precision of statement. It is only through the efforts of good writers that a
language can be saved from cant and journalese. Future Chinese writers must study
the older literature carefully if for no other reason than that only by training in it can they
learn to write well.

The older literature can help in other ways. In pai-hua poetry, there is not even an
established system of prosody. The older poetry was quantitative, in that the rhythm of
each line of verse depended on the tone and length of each of its words. In pai-hua poetry,
this system is usually replaced by the much looser stress system, which permits as many
as three or four words under each foot. The result is that in modern poetry the line is
much longer than the traditional five- or seven-word line. Such poetry is much too easy
to write, and tends to discourage precision of meaning and economy of language. Much
still has to be learned from the older poetry before an artistically sound new poetry can
come into being.

The literature of the past should be studied above all because it embodies the older
civilization and the older sensibility. Current "scientific" education has made Chinese
youth despise their heritage. Its typical product is a barbarian who can claim no kindship
with the past, and his ancestors. Only through study of the old philosophy, literature, and
history can he develop historical perspective and learn that the mode of civilization charac-
teristic of the twentieth century is only one of many possible ways of thinking and feeling.
Unless he can develop a humane, tolerant attitude on this point, he is at the mercy of a
positivist absolutism antibiblical to literary creation.

The repudiation of the old in the past five decades was motivated by a desire to imitate
the West. As a result of the emphasis on science and technology, however, Western culture
was never thoroughly studied for its own sake. What was stressed was the mood
and temper of thought consonant to technological advancement. The first great trans-
lator of Western works, Yen Pu, significantly chose to work on Adam Smith, Herbert
Spencer, and Darwin. Hu Shih popularized the philosophy of pragmatism. Sun Ya-sen
based his Three People's Principles primarily on nineteenth century thought: nationalism,
democracy, and socialism. After that came the dominance of Marxist philosophy. One
would have thought that, with their traditional emphasis on cause and effect, and on the idea of the great chain of being that unites the Emperor and the meanest
peasant, the Chinese would be the last people to accept the idea of the class struggle.
That this idea has now taken root in China testifies, above all, to the lack of knowledge of
their tradition and to the superficiality with which the Chinese have studied Western
culture. Chinese writers of the future must correct both these deficiencies.

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CHAPTER 11

COMMUNISM AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Past History

Never before in the history of China has there been such intense activity in the field of mass communications as under the present Communist regime. Many scholars have attempted to compare and contrast the pattern of Communist success on the mainland of China with the pattern of dynastic succession that has been repeated so often in the past. The Nationalist government can be said to have “forfeited” the “Mandate of Heaven” when it proved itself incapable of coping with the disorders of the postwar period.

The Communists themselves had been in large part responsible for the confused situation with which the Nationalists had failed to cope. Like previous rising dynasties, the Communist regime owed its success to the combined support of the literati and the lower classes. However, there was no precedent for a situation in which a new dynasty owed whatever confidence and support it enjoyed to intensive propaganda and obstructionism by a group of professional revolutionaries over a long period of time. In earlier Chinese history, each change of dynastic rule was followed by a period of persecutions, sometimes mild, sometimes severe. This was also true under the change to Communism, but there was no precedent for the notion that an intensive program of mass education and indoctrination could be one of the main tasks of the new regime. The Mongol and Manchu dynasties, to be sure, made it their business to immunize and conciliate the literati. But they set in motion no over-all ideological program for the people at large, and both dynasties, as they became more stable and accepted, tended to relax the vigor even of their measures vis-a-vis the literati.

In the eyes of the people of China, there used to be only two kinds of government: good government and bad government. Good government was invariably Confucian government. After years of misrule under an old dynasty, the people instinctively turned to a new one in the expectation of bettered living conditions. This new dynasty had little or no need to paint the evils of the old regime, and proclaim its own virtues. Both were taken for granted. The short-lived Mongol dynasty, which deliberately preferred foreigners to the Confucian literati for government service, was, to some extent, an exception; its initial reign of terror and massacre surpassed, where it struck, that of the present-day Communists. The other dynastic changes, in any case, followed the same pattern: the continuity of Confucian tradition in the art of government made ideological education unnecessary. The literati carried the responsibility for government and administration; the illiterate peasants tilled the land and reaped the crops. The duties of both were clearly defined and clearly understood. After the change of regime as before it, both went right on doing what they had always done, and would have done had the regime not changed.
The criteria by which the goodness or badness of a government was evaluated under the Confucian tradition were highly pragmatic. Either a government had shown "sincerity" and "ability" in laboring on behalf of the people, or it had not. Modern ideological notions like the class struggle and economic determinism were far removed from the Chinese mind, and there were no theoretical or doctrinal grounds on which a government could justify its "right" to rule, or disprove retrospectively the "right" of its predecessor to rule.

The change came, or at least began, not with the Communist regime but with the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1912. The republican form of government needed some basis other than the traditional monarchical and paternalistic ideas, and found them in nationalism and democracy. The ideas, however, were not present in the minds of the people and would not be unless drilled into them; the whole machinery of running a republican government also had to be explained.

Recognizing the immense difficulties that would have to be faced in the course of transforming Confucian China into a democracy, Sun Yat-sen had mapped out two transitional periods that would have to precede adoption of a genuinely constitutional government: the military period and the period of political tutelage. (It was, indeed, only upon the eve of the National government's collapse on the mainland that the constitutional government was finally declared.) The propaganda and indoctrination activities that both the situation and Sun Yat-sen's doctrine called for were never pressed very vigorously. Officials and people continued to cling to the traditional assumptions about ruling and being ruled. In turn lured by the success of Communism in Russia, of Nazism in Germany, and by capitalism's vitality in the United States, the Kuomintang government pursued no long-term consistent policies in the education of its people. Attempts at Westernization kept company in republican regime policy with equally feeble attempts at preserving the externals of a Confucian code, and neither set of objectives was backed up with an intensive program of political education and indoctrination. Even in the struggle against Japanese aggression, when it came, it was in terms of patriotism, not ideology, that the Kuomintang government attempted to rally the Chinese people.

The Failure of the Kuomintang

The weakness and inactivity of the Kuomintang was in part due to the failure to carry out Dr. Sun's plans. Mostly, however, it was due to the Party's not having an ideology to communicate. The San Min Chu I (Three Peoples' Principles), which it had inherited from Dr. Sun, was a watered-down mixture of nineteenth-century nationalism, democracy, and socialism, plus traditional Chinese political theory. Sun Yat-sen had been neither a coherent thinker nor a man with a definite position, as may be seen from his reaction to the success of Communism in Soviet Russia, and his responsibility for the early Kuomintang collaboration with the Communist Party. The San Min Chu I was weak in philosophical foundation: on one level it was a primer on politics and civics; on another, an impractical plan for grandiose national construction. On neither level did it offer for the unconverted any body of doctrine that lent itself to domestic propaganda purposes. Nor was that all; the San Min Chu I might, other things being equal, have been more acceptable to the Chinese than Marxism-Leninism precisely because it did represent no radical departure from traditional ideology. But in its actual conduct of affairs the Kuomintang government paid little or no heed to the teachings of the San Min Chu I. It represented the severance of ideology from practice. Practice was determined by contingent external and internal factors, which again did not lend themselves to the uses of domestic propaganda.

A further word is in order about the consistently half-hearted propaganda policy of the Kuomintang government. Instead of trying to mobilize all educational, cultural, and government workers behind the San Min Chu I and Kuomintang policies, the Nationalist
government contented itself with censoring and suppressing anti-Kuomintang propaganda. Even here it failed to act with the kind of vigor that might have put real difficulties in the way of Communist propaganda when it at last got under way. At no time did the Nationalist government have any more than partial control of education and the press, or cease to adopt an attitude of laissez-faire toward other media of communication: radio, theater, movies, book and magazine publication. The Communists then had their work all cut out for them when their chance came as it did during the war years, while they were still nominally part of the coalition government. In this respect, as in others, the discredit into which the Kuomintang finally fell reflected its failure to utilize the mass communications with vigor and purpose.

**Communist Opportunism**

The turning-point, then, insofar as it came during the republican era, was a matter of what the Communists did while waiting to seize power rather than of what the Kuomintang did. As early as the late twenties they were busy using the techniques of propaganda to win the intellectuals to their cause, to forward their organizational drive among urban workers and students in Kuomintang areas, and to speed organization of the peasants in districts already Communist. These propaganda efforts were to pay huge dividends when the time came to “liberate” these groups. The Communists are now engaged in similar efforts vis-a-vis the masses in general, which is the intention of the writers to analyze and describe in the present section.

**Communist Theory**

The Communists’ concern about ideological indoctrination in China is easy to understand. Entirely apart from the ideas on this question they inherited from Marx and Lenin under Kuomintang rule, new ideas had indeed been introduced into China. But traditional ideas and traditional modes of behavior, all of them clearly incompatible with Communist ideology, stubbornly refused to disappear. These the Communists had to eradicate, because their regime, committed as it is to definite notions of right and wrong, correct and incorrect, true and false, cannot tolerate any other ideology within the sphere of its influence. Imposing a ready-made ideology from above is, in a sense, the course of least resistance, as compared to, for example, merely maintaining a more or less free market for ideas, which is, insofar as it did anything in this regard, what the Kuomintang had done. It is easier to call upon others to accept a truth of which one regards oneself as the sure and exclusive possessor, than it is to call upon them to attempt, independently, a critical evaluation of competing culture. To put it little differently: the search for truth is an arduous intellectual process, so that any system that attributes to itself absolute certainty will have immense attraction for the lazy minded and semi-educated. It excuses them from the necessity to think, and it gives them something for which to live and work. The Communists know this, and in China are making the most of it.

Now that it has the support of a safe majority of the intellectuals, the Communist government is rebuilding its indoctrination program among the masses. This, it must be agreed, looks at first blush like a genuine effort to benefit the people and raise their cultural level. Under the Kuomintang regime elementary education had made great strides, but 80 percent of the population were still illiterate when the Communists took over. The Communist study program thus puts itself forward as, first of all, an attempt to remove illiteracy while at the same time providing mass education and entertainment. This interest in popular culture, even if it is simulated, as it almost certainly is, could hardly have failed in a country like China to win the people’s gratitude. The fact that a certain inci-
dence of literacy and "culture" is an operational necessity for Communism since the Communist philosophy works through concepts, and since concepts can most easily be conveyed via communication, is lost on the masses.

The aim of Communist propaganda in China is precisely to uproot and destroy the animal self-sufficiency, individualism, and piety of the Chinese peasant, and to put in its place a new mentality, susceptible to jargon and group influence, and therefore easily manageable in the interests of the government. Already symptoms of this new mentality are apparent in every class of the Chinese people. However, there are also indications of waning enthusiasm among the people in Communist China.

COMMUNISM AND COMMUNICATION

The Totalitarian Pattern

In the totalitarian state all media of communication are state controlled. In the democratic state most communication media are commercial enterprises. In the United States, for example, newspapers, publishing companies, radio networks, and movie studios are primarily run under private auspices. For the most part, they "sell" the American way of life, and at one time or another cooperate with the government on this or that specific program. They are not, however, obliged to do propaganda work for the government, in the sense of being subjected to punitive sanctions if they do not. In Soviet Russia, by contrast, all these industries are, as a matter of course, distributors of government propaganda. The Communist way of life, avowedly materialistic and utilitarian, runs to some extent counter to natural sentiments and feelings, so that the atmosphere of assurance about the underlying doctrine has to be artificially re-created each day by huge networks of indoctrination and recreation.

Communist China's mass communications system is now approaching the Soviet pattern; indeed, the fact that Communism is not yet firmly established in China makes, in some respects, for greater not lesser emphasis on the selling of ideology than one finds in the USSR. The basic premise is that everybody during every waking hour, whether he is at work or play and whether he is aware of what is happening or not, should be moved a little closer toward becoming a thoroughly cooperative participant in the total production or war effort. The technique used is, avowedly, that of behaviorist conditioning, the end result of which is that a person accepts what he is told as truth, and is to think only in certain predetermined channels. Readers of Brave New World and 1984 know where the technique logically leads; and if it has not yet done so in China, this is because in that country it runs up against a deeply ingrained traditional heritage of skepticism and lack of enthusiasm for impersonal causes. In short, Communist indoctrination tactics and procedure have not yet been able to transform the Chinese into automatons. But unless some internal or external force upsets the Communist government and its propaganda machinery, the moment may not be far away when the Chinese people will have been completely brutalized, and will have been cut off from the old cultural traditions that have preserved some of its sanity and good sense up to the present time.

Governmental Control and Policy

Government in Communist China, then, is not merely an organ for legislation and administration. It is a machine for the manufacture of consensus, whose end-product, if it functions as intended, will be an artificially created will of the people that corresponds as a matter of course to Communist policy. The People's Government includes, to be sure, a variety of democratic groups, but the power of making decisions rests, indisputably, with the Communist Party. The non-Party members who hold top positions in the government
are to all intents and purposes indistinguishable from the Party members. Kuo Mo-jo, for example, who is Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council and Chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, is not a Party member, but he had been one of the most zealous promoters of the Communist cause long before he occupied any important post in the government. Even the so-called democratic parties are merely pro-Communist factions of the Kuomintang, which, in any case, have no choice but to "cooperate" with the Communist Party; i.e., they have no bargaining position from which to insist on policies of their own. There is, then, no question of the propaganda machine's being used even marginally, to sell policies that are not Communist.

The Central Committee

The Central Committee of the Communist Party, in any case, makes the major decisions on propaganda and assigns missions pertaining to both propaganda and education to the government's Department of Propaganda. The Central Committee is the higher deliberative organ, making its decisions felt through its various well-disciplined Party offices; the Administrative Council of the government is responsible for implementing the Committee's decisions, and seeing to it that they effectively reach every class of people. Within the administrative apparatus, the tasks of "education and culture" are apportioned among the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Information Administration, the News Administration, the Publications Administration, and the Academy of Sciences—all directly under the Administrative Council. A special Committee on Culture and Educational Affairs is maintained within the administrative apparatus to direct and coordinate the work done in these ministries and administrations.

The Ministry of Culture

Among all these ministries, the Ministry of Culture is that which performs the major functions relating to propaganda. It consists of the following: Arts Bureau, Science Popularization Bureau, Social Cultural Enterprise Bureau, Bureau of Dramatic and Vaudeville Reform, Liaison Bureau for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Central Institute of Drama, Central Conservatory, Central Institute of the Arts, Central Institute of Literature, and Chinese Opera Research Institute. The very titles are a sufficient indication of the extent of the Communists' ambition to reform and control the cultural life of the nation.

In addition, the government maintains centralized communications agencies. The publication and distribution of books, for example, is for the most part entrusted to the Hsin Hua (New China) Bookstore. The distribution of domestic news, similarly, is entrusted to the NCNA (New China News Agency); except for foreign news, most of which is supplied by Teo, all the news appearing in Chinese newspapers comes from NCNA. There is similar centralized control of education, broadcasting, the film industry, etc.

The Common Program

The cultural and educational policy behind this rigid government control of all media of communication is outlined in the Common Program adopted during the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in September 1949:

Article 41: The culture and education of the People's Republic of China are now democratic, that is, national, scientific, and popular. The main tasks for raising the cultural level of the people are training of personnel for national construction work, liquidating of feudal, compradore, fascist ideology, and developing of the ideology of serving the people.

Article 42: Love for the fatherland and the people, love of labor, love of science, and the taking care of public property shall be promoted at the public spirit of all nationals of the People's Republic of China.
Article 43: Efforts shall be made to develop the natural sciences so as to place them at the service of industrial, agricultural, and national defense construction. Scientific discoveries and inventions shall be encouraged and rewarded and scientific knowledge shall be popularized.

Article 44: The application of a scientific historical viewpoint to the study and interpretation of history, economics, politics, culture, and international affairs shall be promoted. Outstanding works of social science shall be encouraged and rewarded.

Article 45: Literature and the arts shall be mobilized to serve the people, to enlighten the political consciousness of the people, and to encourage the labor enthusiasm of the people. Outstanding works of literature and arts shall be encouraged and rewarded. The people's drama and cinema shall be developed.

Article 46: The method of education of the People's Republic of China is the unity of theory and practice. The People's Government shall reform the old educational system, subject matter and teaching method systematically according to plan.

Article 47: In order to meet the widespread needs of revolutionary work and national construction work, universal education shall be carried out, middle and higher education shall be strengthened, technical education shall be stressed, the education of workers during their spare time and education of cadres who are at their posts shall be strengthened, and revolutionary political education shall be accorded to young intellectuals and old style intellectuals in a planned and systematic manner.

Article 48: National sports shall be promoted. Public health and medical work shall be extended and attention shall be paid to safeguarding the health of mothers, infants, and children.

Article 49: Freedom of reporting true news shall be safeguarded. The utilization of the press to slander, to undermine the interests of the state and the people, and to provoke world war is prohibited. The people's broadcasting work and the people's publication work shall be developed, and attention paid to publishing popular books and newspapers beneficial to the people.

The Propaganda Machine

The government evidently cannot carry out such a program merely by controlling communications alone. It must also organize the workers in cultural and educational enterprises, and actively mobilize them behind the program's purposes. The total Communist propaganda machine is thus engaged, on the one hand, in supervising and controlling all media of communication, and, on the other, in the active training and organization of personnel.

During Kuomintang days, there was no government pressure on cultural and propaganda workers to organize. Such organizations as did exist were as often as not Marxist (e.g., the League of Left-wing Writers in the early thirties). In the cultural and entertainment world of the time, characterized by sharp opposition between the old and the new, the progressive writers and cultural workers were mostly Leftists and thus vehemently opposed to Kuomintang policies. The old-school artists, writers, and actors stuck to their decaying traditions, and were mostly nonpolitical. In neither group were there voluntary propagandists for the Kuomintang. Both for this reason and because they were organized, the Communist and Leftist cultural workers had a fairly free hand; they were able, for example, to monopolize the book market on the high school and college level.

The Communist government had, in other words, merely to universalize a pattern that the prerevolutionary Leftists bequeathed to them, and they have already extended it to all the art, literary, entertainment, and scientific workers in the land. The All-China Federation of Art and Literary Circles, for example, today includes virtually every known name in China's art, literature, theater, and music worlds. (Its Chairman is Kuo Mo-jo; its Vice Chairman, Mao T'ung and Chou Yang.) Yet it convened its first meeting immediately after the founding of the People's Republic, that is, as recently as September 1949.

The Federation has seven divisions: literature, drama, music, fine arts, cinema, dancing, art, and opera reform. Only a few intellectuals and artists have left China for Taiwan (Formosa) and Hong Kong since the Communists came to power, so that to say it includes nearly every known name in its several fields is to say also that it includes many non-Communists and nonprogressives. Along with those of progressive theater and movie workers,
one finds such renowned names in Peking Opera as Mei Lan-fang, Chou Hsin-fang, Cheng Yen-chou, and such representatives of second-rate local entertainment as the star of the Shao-hsing opera, Tuan Hsi-feng. Along with modern cartoonists are such exponents of traditional Chinese art as the 90-odd-year-old Chu Pai-shih. All this indicates more than anything else the nature and extent of the coordinated indoctrination program that the government intends to carry through. The pattern extends also to the amateur level: there are educational opportunities and recreational outlets for workers, peasants, students, soldiers, and the urban population in general.

The counterpart of this active propaganda approach is frequent popular demonstrations of loyalty to the Communist government and party. The Kuomintang did not minister in any way to the desire for learning and for creative expression among the less educated. As this chapter will make abundantly clear, the Communist government has succeeded in turning that desire to its own ends. During the period of the liberation, it undoubtedly evoked demonstrations of loyalty from the people that were without precedent, and that contributed greatly to the initial consolidation of the regime. The Communist government sees to it that not only the party, government cadres, and the professional educational and cultural workers, but various other categories of people are so organized as to participate directly in such demonstrations. The All-China Federation of Labor, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the All-China League of Democratic Youth, the All-China Federation of Students, the Committee for Defense of World Peace, are all popular organizations of which it makes good use in this regard.

To this, however, one must add that these efforts now appear to be reaching the point of diminishing returns, and that, even from the beginning, the indoctrination program, despite what is said about people's demonstrations, had no easy sledding. The reasons for this are very simple. If the Communists had chosen to devote themselves to the building of an independent and strong China, the Chinese people would have rallied overwhelmingly to their support and would, moreover, have freely accepted such ideological training and hard labor as the Communists might have demanded of them in the name of that objective. In point of fact, however, the Communists did not make that choice. Rather, they have made it their business to construct a new social order in China, and to do the bidding of the Soviet Union in the sphere of foreign policy, both of which visibly militate against cooperative effort toward national reconstruction; both have greatly complicated the Communists' task in domestic propaganda. The reader will readily understand this if he imagines himself trying to explain to a Chinese peasant why the men power and resources that have gone into the Korean War would not better have been used to put the Chinese domestic economy on a reasonably sound footing. The Communists' response has been to double and redouble the size of their propaganda campaigns: as they have done, for instance, in the face of popular indifference to their "Renew the US-Aid Korea" slogan. In a word, the Chinese Communists are deeply committed to a program of radical social change and to the support of Soviet Russia in international politics; as large numbers of the recipients of their domestic propaganda clearly see, they are not only not dictated by Chinese interests, but actually work against them. And they are having great difficulty, in consequence, in selling their slogans, despite the extreme technical excellence of their propaganda.

Targets of Propaganda

The purpose of contemporary Chinese Communist propaganda, then, is to help make China over into a Communist state, able to take its place in the fraternity of Communist nations under Soviet leadership. This, in a nation that is largely illiterate and, above all, practical-minded, cannot be accomplished by disseminating the doctrine of dialectical
materialism. Marxism-Leninism, as far as popular propaganda is concerned, is merely a matter of teaching people to distinguish between "enemies" and "friends." The US, the Kuomintang, and the exploiting classes are "enemies" of the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union is "friend." This is a major emphasis of Chinese Communist domestic propaganda.

In Mao Tse-tung's *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, China is described as a feudal, semi-colonial country under imperialist domination. Establishment of the New Democracy, the phrase he used to designate the transitional period prior to the full adoption of Communism, calls for the liquidation of all feudal, colonial, and imperialist forces, so that any person (or class) who supports or connives with these forces is an enemy of the people. According to the earlier, more generous definition, "people" included the working class, the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and Chinese (as opposed to foreign) capitalists. More recently, the definition has clearly changed so as to exclude the remnants of the last-named group. The enemies of the people include Kuomintang officials and agents; those also have collaborated with Japanese and/or American imperialism, landlords, corrupt merchants, and industrialists.

The organ responsible for popularizing the Soviet alliance is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Its chairman is the leading Communist theorist, Liu Shao-chi. Founded in October 1919, it now has 3,000,000 members, and 1,700 branches throughout the country. Its headquarters in Peking presides over a general effort to familiarize the Chinese people with the facts about the Soviet Union, most especially its alleged cultural and scientific achievements.

A word must be said about each of the two groups within China receiving the brunt of the Communists' propaganda onslaught — the "landlords" and the "counter-revolutionaries." The landlords must not be confused with the socio-economic class that this term suggests in the United States. Land cultivation in China is intensive, and landholdings, by American standards, extremely small. In consequence, the landlords were a weak group, even from a strictly economic point of view, long before the Communists took over. During and even before the war income from the land was meagre at best, and lagged far behind the rapidly rising costs of living. The countryside was, moreover, constantly being overrun — first by bandits, then Communist troops, then Japanese troops — so that the landlords could not count on any return from their holdings. Many of them moved during these years into cities, and sent their sons to college, with the result that many of the latter turned their backs on the land in favor of some business or professional activity. Under the Communists, the landlords' position has taken a sharp turn for the worse, if for no other reason than their dependence on the services of tenants and agricultural labor, both of which are increasingly difficult to find. In short, the landlords are a condemned group quite independently of the campaign of hatred and extinction the Communists are waging against them; this should be borne in mind as one reads of the public trials in which they are accused of heinous crimes, vilified, abused, and finally given the death penalty. Yet all propaganda media continue to depict the landlords as rivals of the Renaissance Italian aristocrats, with an infinite capacity for oppression, usury, rapine, and indiscriminate cruelty. They continue to be executed in large numbers, and yet their alleged victims, the peasants, fare no better than before, and, with current tax levels and current practices regarding the requisition of foodstuffs, cannot hope to fare better within the foreseeable future.

As for the counterrevolutionaries, variously called reactionaries, Kuomintang agents, or running-dogs, this is merely a catch-all category for all actual or potential, real or supposed, opponents of the regime. Most so-called counterrevolutionaries are, when appro-
handed and tried, given the death sentence; the remainder, except for a negligible few who go free, are given a conditional death sentence, i.e., two years of hard labor during which they are to reform themselves (if they fail to show improvement at the end of two years, they will be put to death). In this group belong, of course, the active guerrillas, and all who have taken part in uprisings against the Communist tyranny. The guerrilla forces on the mainland have now been decimated, but local uprisings continue in spite of the ruthless punishment meted out. The South Chinese, noted for their independent spirit, have been the most constant offenders against the regime, and have suffered, in consequence, the most severe retaliatory measures.

The main target of propaganda attack is the United States. In all propaganda the US is pointed out as the chief enemy of China. Since historical evidence with which to back up this charge is difficult to marshal out of the past, the propaganda writers concentrate their efforts on recent happenings, where they have a free hand in the matter of interpretation. The instances of US aggression on which they chiefly rely are three in number: the Korean War, the Japanese treaty and the rearrangement of Japan, and US intervention in Taiwan (Formosa). Of these, the most profitable from the Communist point of view has undoubtedly been the second. Japan is China’s traditional enemy, and now that the US is clearly helping Japan, it can be made to appear that the US has always been behind Japanese aggression in China.

On the positive side, the propaganda output emphasizes the changes on glorification of the worker, the peasant, the Communist soldier, and on the apotheosis of Stalin and the Chinese Communist leaders. The primary propaganda aim of the Communist government is achieved just to the extent that the majority of Chinese see themselves as the “people,” recognize the Communist Party as their benefactor, Soviet Russia as their ally and brother, and willingly cooperate with the government in promoting production and exposing and denouncing all reactionary and saboteur elements as their enemy.

**Books**

**Introduction**

The average Chinese adopts a much less critical attitude toward the books and newspapers he reads than his counterpart in countries where education is more or less universal. The Communists’ only quarrel with this is that the readers are too few in number; hence this emphasis on primary and supplementary education, which may be described as a conscious attempt to mass-produce readers whose critical faculties are so undeveloped that they will believe whatever they read. As for the intellectuals, i.e., those with developed critical faculties, the Communists handle them by keeping them busy manufacturing propaganda, the ideal state of affairs, from the Communist point of view, being one in which everybody is either a victim of propaganda or a maker of propaganda. The professor may very well harbor anti-Communist thoughts, but he is expected to turn out articles after articles testifying to his belief in Communism. Though no believer in Communism, he must see to it that his public utterances show him to be a loyal supporter of the present government and its political tendencies. This makes it possible for the Communists to pour out a constant stream of publications, capable of supplying the ideological needs of all educational levels of the population. Their confidence in verbal propaganda as the most effective means of indoctrination, is, apparently, unshaken by the fact that it has not, thus far, been particularly successful.

The traditional educational system in China was such that a man either received thorough grounding in the Confucian classics, or he received no book learning whatever. It was only with the creation, in republican China, of a “modern” educational system that
the country began to develop a class of people subject to ideological influences and yet untouched by traditional wisdom. Members of this class, who may be described as the half-educated, are for various reasons deeply conscious of the importance of creating a strong and independent China, but have never had any opportunity to develop the faculty of judging and thinking for themselves. They are eager to learn, but able to think only in strictly utilitarian terms. Communist propaganda has, in general, had its easiest conquests among this class; in part because for a considerable period during and before the war, most nontraditional books published in China were Leftist in tendency, if not positively Communist.

The Chinese do not particularly object to bad binding, paper, and type. It is, therefore, easy to manufacture books and pamphlets in China at low cost, although in the past the more respectable publishers have, in general, not chosen to do so. The largest book firms in China, the Commercial Press and the Chung Hua Book Company, for example, once published fine reprints of the best editions of Chinese classics, and numerous books on academic subjects that could not possibly have a large sale, making up their losses on these books by profits on the government-approved textbooks they published for school and college use. (The Kuomintang organ, the Cheng Chung Book Company, published, besides government-approved books, studies in Kuomintang ideology.)

The best sellers in pre-Communist days were mostly works of fiction and topical journalism published by smaller firms like the Communist Shen-yao Bookstore. There was a considerable number of these small presses in China, and they published a good deal of material that appealed to students and to serious-minded adults. Translations of Russian works, for example, were quite popular: novels like Silently Flows the Don, Days and Nights, and Cement, have all been translated into Chinese not once but several times. As far as the intellectual reading public was concerned, the Communist government inherited a situation very much to its liking.

The "Great Books"

Since the Communist government is engaged in ideological education of the masses, rather than of the intellectuals, book publication at present makes scant appeal to the latter. Moreover, the books published in Communist China, both fiction and nonfiction, are mostly propaganda. A recent survey shows that 20.7 percent of the books published by the Xin Hua Bookstore are works on ideology and politics clearly intended to indoctrinate, and only 18.9 percent are belles-lettres, even if propagandist fiction is included along with books on literature and the arts. The fact that books on political subjects sell better than fiction is, to be sure, not surprising. In China today there is a great demand for "learning," and any Chinese unacquainted with Marxism feels that he must do something about it, which usually means starting out with some introductory works on ideology. Just as in Nazi Germany Hitler's Mein Kampf was a best seller, so books by Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders are widely read in present-day China. As for the cadres and Party members, whose need for correct ideology is, on the Communist view, even more acute, twelve basic books on Marxism-Leninism are prescribed:

As required reading, these books are much in demand. Recently it was authoritatively estimated that three million copies of them were available on the shelves of bookstores.

**Publishing Houses**

The history of the Hain Hua Bookstore, today the largest Chinese enterprise engaged in printing and distributing books, shows very clearly what has been happening to the book-publishing industry since the Communists took over. As recently as 1938, the Hain Hua Bookstore was a small bookshop which had been established by five Communist cadres in Sui-pei, Shensi under the name Northwest Resist-Japan Bookstore. It greatly expanded its business during and after the war, and by 1951 had 887 branches, with 30 printing shops comprising about one-fifth of China's total printing capacity. Plans for the Hain Hua Bookstore’s 1951 operations called for the sale of 317,000,000 volumes to the Chinese public, no less than 100,000,000 of which were to deal specifically with the Resist US-Aid Korea Campaign. Even if one bears in mind that the books it publishes run, for the most part, from twenty to eighty pages, these figures are impressive. (The figure for the Anti-US-Aid Korea publishing effort confirms, however, one point about the resistance the Communists have run up against in this phase of their propaganda.)

Another important publishing agency is the International Bookstore, founded as recently as December 1949 as a subsidiary of the Soviet International Book Company. It distributes books and periodicals, in both Chinese and Russian, that have been printed in the USSR for distribution in China. Its output in Chinese is, for the most part, translations of Soviet books. Between December 1947 and February 1950 it reportedly sold 772,116 books and 601,252 periodicals.

This vigorous Communist penetration of the book-publishing field has been accompanied by a program of systematic suppression and destruction of books printed before the liberation. The larger book firms, like the Commercial Press and Chung Hua, have been virtually eliminated as competitors of the Communist presses. They were allowed to retain in their deposits only a fraction of the twenty thousand titles they were publishing, and even these are to lapse as soon as the present stocks have been sold. The rest of their stock was converted into pulp. This kind of vandalism is without parallel in all Chinese history, at least since the legendary burning of books by the First Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty, in the third century B.C. Nor has any serious attempt been made to replace the destroyed items with Marxist-slated books on the same or at least comparable subjects, especially Chinese history and culture. Most of the books being published in Communist China have no scholarly pretensions whatsoever; they are designed to fill propaganda needs, and do not profess to be designed for anything else. Along with books on political and ideological subjects, there is now, therefore, a huge output of literary and journalistic work glorifying the Party, the People's Liberation Army, the peasants, and the workers, and vilifying the Kuomintang, landlords, the United States, and other imperialist and reactionary “element.” People with developed literary tastes are, to say the least, unlikely to read any of this flood of publications for any purpose other than that of seeing what the Communists are doing. This is partly the result of what writing under a Communist regime does for an author's spontaneity and inventiveness; it is also partly the result of the very hatred the regime breathes — a hatred that colors even the love it professes for the proletariat. Literature that traffics in clear-cut alternatives between heroism and villainy degenerates unavoidably into melodrama, and thus cheapens its heroes. Communist literature rarely rises above this level.
Literary Weaknesses

One of the common themes in current Chinese literature is the promise of happiness for China's peasants once the land reform has been effectuated. One might expect that since the issue of so-called land reform is no longer in doubt, there would begin to be produced an intelligent dialectical treatment of the relation between landlord and peasant. But what the literature in fact does is to present the landlord in the blackest colors possible: he oppresses his tenants and peasants, he rapes women, he keeps concubines, he smokes opium; as often as not, he formerly collaborated with the Japanese-controlled puppet government in its attempt to suppress the Communist guerrillas. Of course the fact that he is made out such a complete villain, devoid of humanity, makes him, propagandaistically speaking, less effective than he might be for the Communists' own purposes. The first test of literature is that it should be interesting, and most of the literature turned out in Communist China, despite its heavy mixture of didacticism, is dull.

Leading Communist critics are not unaware of these shortcomings of China's current literary output. But their dissatisfaction with the literary workers is restricted at every possible opportunity. The makers of literature must, they are told, develop a correct ideology, and master the elementary literary skill needed to put things across. It might be argued that the remedy is not more criticism, or even "self-criticism," but on the Communist cannot apply: to set the writer free to write about things they know and for which they care. When the present-day Chinese writer puts words on paper, he has and need have only one concern: to produce a concoction that will meet the approval of the Party Chief. As indicated previously, it does not make a difference whether the writer is a genuine Communist or a time-server; the one turns out an end-product that is just as banal and superficial as the other. Only the sadism demonstrably serves a propagandaistic purpose; it habituates the reader to cruelty and injustice, and diverts his attention from his own state of frustration.

Standard Themes

The standard themes of this literature are: the heroism and prowess of Communist soldiers and cadres in the Anti-Japanese War; the War of Liberation; the Korean War; the evils of the Kuomintang and the Japanese and American imperialists; the delights of pastoral life in the People's Liberation Army and among the liberated peasants; the liberation of women from feudal forces; and the production achievements and happy life of the country's industrial workers. The once-popular theme of conversion on the part of intellectuals and petty-bourgeois (most Leftist writers were of petty-bourgeois origin and could write about this from personal experience) is now discouraged since the peasants and workers have crowded the petty-bourgeois off the stage.

Posters, Comic Strips, and Picture Books

Although the anti-illiteracy movement in China is extremely vigorous, the number of people who can read is still a small minority of the total population. In their determination to influence directly the masses of the population, the Communists have increasingly oriented the publishing industry toward the requirements of the illiterate and semi-literate, that is, toward posters and cartoons, comic strips, and picture books. Slogans were the mainstay of official Chinese propaganda even in the days of the Kuomintang, which made a great to do of shooting them during rallies and pasting them on walls and in other conspicuous places. The Communists are past masters at this sort of thing, but, unlike the Kuomintang, they place their main emphasis on pictures, especially pictures that can be counted on for immediate visual impact. During every parade and in
every office building people see, for example, portrait after portrait of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin. Similarly, caricatures of Chiang Kai-shek, of the star-and-striped Uncle Sam, of Truman, Acheson, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Dulles are in every magazine and newspaper and on every poster. Chiang Kai-shek, by Chinese standards a more handsome man than Mao, appears as a bald-headed pugnacious goon with contorted features. The Voice of America has been heard up to ridicule in a cartoon of Truman breaking wind before a microphone. The Communists know that among the less educated such racial and ideologic humor is for cleverness and draws genuine laughter.

Comic strips have a much longer history behind them in China than in the US. Forty- or fifty-page comic books, with a picture and an explanatory caption on each page, were the staple attraction of street circulating libraries in China as long as the end of the Ch‘ing dynasty (1912). Often fifty to a hundred volumes are required to tell a single complete story, and the pictures are crudely drawn; but their regular consumers — the ricksha pullers, the apprentices, the small children, and the housewives — object neither to their bulk nor to their crudity, and find them immensely entertaining. In their early days, most picture books recounted historical romances and adventures; practically every dynasty had its rich cycles of heroes and heroines, so that materials were never wanting. Later, popular novels and movies were made into comic strips. The Communist government early recognized the propaganda potentialities of this medium, and launched a new series of picture books for the street libraries. Instead of armored and plumed warriors the ricksha-puller now has the Liberation Army; instead of Taoist monks, he is served up as heroes, landlords, peasants, and workers. The new books have less appeal than the old ones, which, like their American counterparts, "shot the wild" on variety of incident and on adventure. The Communist stories, by comparison, are stereotyped and monotonous — necessarily, since there are few directions in which the plot of a Communist story can move — while the old stories, helped along by the fantasy and superstition the Communists deplorably, could run into almost innumerable serials. Unless Communist artists devise new ways of interesting the "readers," China's masses will continue to yearn for the old-type strips.

Textbooks

The area in which totalitarian control over publishing is producing the most far-reaching consequences is that of textbooks for use in the public schools. In Kuomintang days, textbooks were compiled by the editorial boards of the major book firms, under the nominal supervision of the Ministry of Education. Their major vice, it can safely be said, was dullness. The history textbooks, for example, set down dry fact after dry fact, without any attempt whatever at over-all interpretation. Textbooks on Chinese literature were mere anthologies of classical and modern prose and poetry, completely innocent of ideological or critical tendency. The Communists have completely changed all that. The textbooks on social sciences and the arts, for example, have been completely rewritten to embody the Marxist viewpoint. If the subject is world history, this is a feasible enterprise. But no thorough Marxist reinterpretation of Chinese history yet exists, so that the writers of texts on Chinese subjects are still, so to speak, feeling their way. Their chief whipping-boys, up to the moment, are the many monarchal rulers in China's past who used the services of the bureaucratic literati. Their chief heroes, whom they have seized upon in an attempt to prove the existence of the class struggle in Chinese history, are the leaders of and participants in the peasant rebellions of other days. This has run them into some difficulties: The successful peasant rebels, e.g., the founders of the Han and Ming dynasties, invariably aligned themselves with the literati once they were in power, and became the perpetuators of "feudalism." The unreserved praise of the Communist historian goes, therefore, only
to the peasant rebels who did not succeed: Huang Ch'ao at the end of the Tang dynasty, Li T'ai-ch’ung and Chang Hiein-chung at the end of the Ming dynasty, and Hung Hsiao-ch’uan, the leader of the Taiping Rebellion. According to official Chinese history, of course, all of these were unscrupulous bandits and killers, and the Communists are having a hard time, this late in the day, whitewashing their evil deeds. The line is, moreover, a dangerous one for a tyrannical regime to play with; in glorifying the rebels of the past, it may be teaching the lessons that will produce new rebellions if Communism continues to disparage the Chinese populace.

The Kuomintang history textbooks always had something to say about the positive achievements of Chinese civilization. The Communists make no such bow to the past, as may be seen in the way in which a current history textbook quietly dispenses with Confucianism:

K'ung Ch'iu was a petty aristocrat of the Lu State. He was well versed in feudalism. Not being very lucky in politics, he turned to teaching. He upheld feudalism and emphasized the class system. He urged the people to be loyal to the emperor, and was thus the mentor of conservatives and aristocrats. He had many disciples. K'ung Ch'iu was adored by various feudalistic emperors who came later, was looked upon as a saint, and was glorified as Kung Fu-tzu.

The point here is not that the Communists are the first Chinese political movement to speak ill of Confucius, for that sort of thing dates back at least to the May Fourth Movement. What is important is the reduction of an important and highly controversial figure in the history of Chinese thought to the status of a petty aristocrat at the service of something called feudalism, the smug superiority this implied toward all Chinese history and culture, and the willingness to ignore indisputable historical fact in favor of a preconceived formula.

The following passage from the same history text shows what China's youth are today being taught about the whole scholar class of the past:

The scholars sought a good life, and yet they despised laborers who lived by their own efforts. So the scholars went to work for the rich and the powerful, and in this way obtained fine clothes and luxuries for themselves, and were able to support all their families. Then, why should the rich and the powerful have favored the scholars? They did so because the scholars could draw up plans for their masters, proclaim their fame, and fortify their positions. If the masters did not treat their scholars well, they would have gone over to their enemies and have worked for them.

It was, in point of fact, the essence of the tradition to train scholars in the Confucian ideal of serving the people, but nothing is said about this whatever. Everything must be made to fit in with the Communist dogma that mere selfish interest, whether of an individual or of a class, determines all that happens in history.

The junior middle schools (i.e., the 7th, 8th, and 9th grades) offer world history and Chinese history, along with a course on the Modern World Revolution. In the senior middle schools, the students are taught from a Chinese Revolution Reader, a History of the Chinese New Democracy Revolution, a History of the Chinese Modern Revolutionary Movement, and three other books on Chinese history with more conventional titles. In all history books it is taught that just as the capitalist order replaced the feudal order, the socialist order will inevitably replace capitalism. The United States, as the only powerful capitalist country in the present-day world, comes under constant vituperative attack. The students, like the readers of the huge output of journalistic and literary work mentioned previously, learn to think of America as a land of capitalist luxury, fanatical war mongering, labor discontent, unemployment, and vice, though here as with the peasant rebels the war of the indoctrinator is not easy intellectually! There is at once the emphasis that the US is a “paper tiger,” i.e., not to be feared, and yet a center of world aggression whose challenge can be met only by heroic measures.
NEWSPAPERS

Communist China's newspapers and magazines, which, of course, are characterized by the same propaganda emphasis, make the same kind of bid for mass support of the current government programs.

Prewar Status

In the prewar period China, despite its high illiteracy rate, had a highly developed press, with a daily output impressive in quantity and quality. The leading dailies in Shanghai, e.g., Hsin Win Pao and Shun Pao were almost as thick as The New York Times. Shanghai alone had some twenty large-size newspapers, not including the big English-language dailies such as the China Press, North China Daily News and the US-sponsored Shanghai Evening Post. Hsin Win Pao and Shun Pao were commercial enterprises, rarely advocating policies of their own, neither supporting nor opposing the government, and devoting large amounts of space to advertisements. The main Kuomintang organ was the Central Daily News, published in Nanking. It was generally agreed that the best prewar newspaper was Ta Kung Pao, which was noted for impartial news coverage and astute editorials on world and Chinese events. It appeared daily in Tientsin, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Most dailies carried one-page or half-page literary sections offering readers a regular diet of humor, gossip, and fiction. By the time of the Sino-Japanese War, however, many of these literary supplements had taken on a leftist tinge that by no means reflected the views of the newspapers' owners and managers. An example is the famous "Liberty Section" of Shun Pao. Cities like Shanghai had tabloid papers, devoted to sensational news and to goings-on in the amusement world.

During the war all these newspapers shrank in size, in part because of a paper shortage, in part because of rising production costs. After the war, most of the big newspapers moved back to their former homes in Shanghai, Nanking, Peking, and Tientsin. In Manchuria and other Communist areas, there developed a rash of Communist newspapers.

Present-Day Publications

The leading Communist newspaper at present is Jih Min Jih Pao (People's Daily News), published in Peking and distributed throughout China. Another important party organ in Chih Fang Jih Pao (Liberation Daily), published in Shanghai and other important cities. Each city and hien (prefecture) has its local papers, but these mostly follow the pattern of the two big dailies.

During the period following the Communist take-over, the Chinese newspapers devoted very little space to news. Rather, they served as gazettes of government regulations and orders, and devoted their editorial and literary supplements to ideological indoctrination. The Communists soon discovered that these practices discouraged circulation; people expected to find international and national news in their newspapers, and, when given the opportunity, showed they wanted it even in the distorted form in which it is supplied by the NCNA and Tass. At present the newspapers pretty much conform to prewar patterns.

Article 49 of the Common Program reads: "Freedom of reporting true news shall be safeguarded. The utilization of the Press to slander, to undermine the interests of the State and the people, and to provoke world war is prohibited." The first of these sentences must be read in the context of the second, which is nothing if not caustic on all points except one, namely, that the decision as to what constitutes slander or what will undermine the interests of the State will be made by the government, so that "true news" is news that the government declares true. The press, in short, is free only in the very special Communist sense of this term, which excludes all criticism of the government except on minor details of
program enforcement. The freedom even operates retroactively: a newspaper frequently "apologizes" to the public when it discovers it has printed "erroneous" news and commentaries, or carries a statement from a department store or theater apologizing for its having used "wrong" advertising techniques by exploiting the latent bourgeois sentiments of its potential patrons. In short, before the new regime came into power, one could get a pretty clear picture of what was going on both in China and in the outside world by comparing reports from the United Press, Reuters, and Tass. Now the Chinese read only government-approved news, and no Chinese can be expected, or himself expect, to know what is happening in China and the rest of the world.

The statistics about present-day Chinese newspapers are extremely confusing. According to a survey made in 1950, there are 624 newspapers, of which 165 are dailies and 216 Army publications. A further survey, by no means exhaustive, made in May of the same year, indicates that 150 of these dailies have a total circulation of 2,500,000 copies, which is quite small, given China's vast population. As of October 1951, Kuo Mo-jo reported that there were 475 newspapers above the village level, 1,000 newspapers on the hsien (prefectural) level, and newspapers within the armed forces with an aggregate yearly circulation of some 7,000,000, again a small figure. Even if it is assumed that the population is still 80 percent illiterate, there should be at least 60,000,000 potential newspaper readers in China. It should not be surprising to learn that the propaganda officers of the Communist Party have of late been expressing concern over the people's "indifference" toward the Party's newspapers. The Propaganda Department of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party reported that Jien Min Jih Pao, which had been expected to sell 63,919 copies in that Administrative Area by the end of 1951, had been selling only above 46,000 copies. In Shanghai the comparable figures were 17,320 and 8,400 respectively. Chih Fang Jih Pao, with a projected circulation of 143,500 in East China by the end of 1951, was selling only 105,200. Furthermore, these totals include copies delivered to various government and Party offices, where ordinary people have no access to them.

Propaganda

The chief thing to be said about Communist newspaper propaganda is that it goes forward within limits that make it impossible for it to be very interesting. One knows what the day's newspaper is going to say before one picks it up: all the Soviet-bloc countries are heading for peace and prosperity, and all anti-Soviet countries are heading for calamity and disaster; the United Nations is losing the war in Korea; and the 1953 production and crop records in China will exceed those of 1952. This explains the popular indifference mentioned previously, which is fully confirmed by the measures the Communists have adopted in their attempt to get their newspapers read. For example, organized newspaper-reading meetings have been set up in many cities, so that 70 or 80 people gather in a room at regular hours to listen to some Party officer read the day's news aloud. In Ku-shih Hsin, Honan, 176 officers read daily to 42 different groups with an aggregate audience of 3,000. In rural areas, news bulletins and "blackboard" newspapers are set up in public places. Still another well-known method of news communication is the so-called "living newspaper," news events acted out on the stage, which was very popular in the Communist areas during and after the Sino-Japanese War in Communist areas. Like the Yangko folk-dance, however, the "living newspaper" is waning in popularity. The government is also making a concerted effort to reduce the concentration of newspaper reading in city areas. Formerly, almost no newspapers reached the rural areas because no peasants could read. Now the Post Office is regularly delivering newspapers even to remote corners of China. Two million copies of
132 newspapers are currently being distributed by mail every day, and newspapers are being published in the languages of national minorities such as Mongolian, Uighur, Kazakh, and Korean.

**MAGAZINES**

Even by its own prerevolutionary standards, then, China's newspapers are in a bad way. The situation with respect to magazines, which have been much in vogue in China for some thirty years, is less clear. Innumerable magazines, some short-lived, some that survived for many years, were chucked between the beginning of the May Fourth Movement and the Communist take-over. Despite a few Chinese counterparts of the movie and confession magazines in the US, moreover, the Chinese magazines tended to be highly literary and/or political in character, or at least tried to be. A considerable group of Leftist writers aimed their output at them, and gave them a tone of intensity and seriousness out of proportion to their actual level of literacy and intellectual excellence.

**Popularity with Students**

The popularity of newspapers with the students was partly a matter of their reflecting the students' avid interest in politics. Most American college students exhibit a greater interest in social activities than in national affairs. With the Chinese, the reverse is true. Even prior to the Communist success on the mainland, parties, dances, and sports played a negligible role in student life; the center of interest was always ideological and political. The magazines, especially the "progressive" ones, made it their business to stimulate this enthusiasm for politics and ideology, which characterized not only the students but the petty bourgeoisie as well, and thereby gained great influence in both quarters. Before the war, the magazine Sheng Hua (Life), edited by the late Communist journalist, Tao Pung, had for example a great following, and regularly published a large number of Leftist fiction writers (Ai Sa-chi), Hsu Yu-chih, Chin Chung-hua, and certain writers who specialized in Soviet-oriented political analysis. The prewar Tu Shu Ts'ao-chih (The Study Magazine) devoted itself to the dissemination of Marxist ideology, though it maintained a thin pretense of objectivity.

**Current Types**

As far as magazines are concerned the Communists found the ground well prepared for them. Except for those specially designed for workers, peasants, and children, the current magazines are much like those that flourished before the take-over. The political and literary types still dominate the scene. The magazine with the biggest circulation is Hsiu Hsia (The Study Magazine), established in September 1919. It features essays in political analysis, articles on Marxist ideology, and translations of Soviet works, and is designed to supplement the twelve "indispensible" books of the Communist cadres. Because it is projected on a relatively difficult intellectual level, it now publishes an elementary edition for beginners. Ai Sa-chi is a regular contributor. The articles he has published in it have recently been collected under the title, Study Ance.

The offices of the literary magazines are located in Peking and Shanghai, though the British colony of Hong Kong remains to this day an important center of Chinese Communist literary activities. The leading magazines published in Peking are: Literary Gazette (Wen I Pao); People's Literature (Jen Min Wen Hsia); Stories and Songs (Shuo-shuo Ch'ang-ch'ang); and Plays. Shanghai's leading literary magazine is Fiction Monthly, edited by Mao Tun and his associates. All these magazines feature original writings, translations, criticism, and works by established writers and beginners.
Literary

Immediately after the "liberation," the number of literary magazines was much greater than today. In 1951 the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Art and Literary Circles decided to merge some of the smaller magazines with larger ones, thus tacitly admitting that there was not enough publishable material to go around. The circulation totals of the existing magazines are not known, but available evidence strongly suggests that both readers and editors are dissatisfied with their contents, which are dull and stereotyped, as they must be if they are to serve the propagandist aims laid down for them. The Leftist literature of Kuomintang days, written under constant pressure and devoted to criticism of the regime and the government, had produced a genuine ferment among its readers. What the magazines are publishing today lacks the vitality and sense of urgency and, above all, the relevance to what readers are actually interested in, that might enable it to generate such a ferment today. Readers are given articles glorifying the Party and the regime and apologetically the peasant and the worker. Such criticism and/or self-criticism as get in are directed elsewhere than at high government policies or Marxist dogma, their sole function being to correct deviations from the Party "Line." One result of all this is that the magazines cannot perform the function to which they lend themselves most readily, i.e., getting across propaganda without their readers knowing it is propaganda.

In an effort to widen the scope of its propaganda drive, the Communist government is channeling great energies into the publishing of cartoon and pictorial magazines. An American journalist in Hong Kong reports having seen a Cartoon Propaganda Reference Book, which gives detailed instructions for illustrating typical propaganda themes and for drawing typical Chinese, Russian, or American faces. The Cartoon Monthly, the major publication of the type indicated by its title, reflects the lack of training of the available Chinese artists in the techniques of visual satire, and is poor by Chinese as well as Western standards. There are several picture magazines, all clearly modeled on the comparable publications in the USSR and, like the politico-literary magazines, dull and repetitious.

Scholarly Journals

Directly under the Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs is the Academy of Sciences, which publishes a variety of scholarly journals which were expected to contribute to the national effort at reconstruction, but which are not, apparently, being put to propagandist uses. The Academy has 14 separate institutes of research, each of which has an annual or quarterly bulletin of its own publishing the latest research findings of its members. But both research personnel and research equipment are notoriously in short supply, and the researcher's isolation from the work of colleagues in other countries necessarily depresses the level of excellence that current Chinese research can hope to maintain. The Academy is, therefore, unlikely to publish scientific works of much importance.

The remaining media of mass communication are the drama, vaudeville, the movies, broadcasting, the dance, art, and music. The Communist government is making increasing demands on workers in all these fields, which it regards as doubly important because of China's high illiteracy rate.

Drama

Introduction

Drama is the traditional form of Chinese entertainment. Almost every province in China has its own opera and its own traditional dances and songs which, as natural expressions of the region's culture, readily communicate to anyone brought up in it. In a province such as Kwangsi, where there is a variety of dialects, one finds not so much a regional theater
(using this term in a broad sense, to include all the items mentioned) as numerous local varieties of theater. The Kuomintang did not attempt to control popular entertainment; most of its regional products still embodied, as of a recent date, the ideas and sentiments of the Ch'ing dynasty, though some modern influences had crept into them.

The three major forms of drama center around Peking and the Hwang (Yellow) River Bell, Soochow-Shanghai and the Yangtze River Belt, and the Kwangtung Belt, and thus conform to the three major divisions in dialects.

Folk Dancing
Because of the court patronage it enjoyed during the Ch'ing dynasty, and its resultant rich heritage of acting and singing techniques, the Peking Opera is easily the most distinguished opera in modern-day China (it is interesting to note, in passing, that its influence has never penetrated the Kwangtung area). In Northwest China one finds that the folk dance and folk music have remained at a primitive stage of development. The Communists, while living in the Shensi, Shansi, Kansu area during the war years, picked up and exploited the native forms of dance and drama there, and have given them nationwide currency as symbols of the Communists' sympathy with the peasants and their stand on behalf of the people. The most popular form of dance adopted was the Yangko, which consists of a simple, rhythmic three steps forward followed by one step backward. Quaint, colorful costumes are worn when the dance is performed, so that the participants contrast sharply — and favorably — with the drably clothed spectators. Another dominant dance form adopted by the Communists is Yao Ko (literally, waist-drum, a reference to the swaying of the waist to the simple beat of the drum).

Before and immediately after the liberation, the Yangko and Yao Ko were extremely popular. Huge Yangko parades marched down the streets of industrial cities, and short plays and "living newspapers" were staged to Yangko music and rhythms. But the Yangko is too unsophisticated for the modern Chinese; the townpeople, used to more complex forms of entertainment, have always regarded it as a temporary fad. Thus when Yangko dances were staged in big cities like Shanghai, elements of burlesque were often introduced into them, for the most part unintentionally. But the dance had served well the purpose of the Communists during the period of liberation: the peasants, workers, students, and women all found in it a common way of expressing emotion and enthusiasm. Western-styled social dancing had been introduced only in certain limited social groups, and in most places in China there were few means of collective fun-making except feasting and the theater. The Yangko was primarily a communal art, and so facilitated mass gatherings in both city or village. Encouraged by its initial success with the Yangko, the Communist government is now reaching out to reform all dramatic and vaudeville art in China.

During the Kuomintang days the traditional emphasis upon the ideals of loyalty, filial piety, and chastity continued unmodified in folk drama and vaudeville. The Communist government could hardly be expected to overlook the potential usefulness of these media for purposes of Marxist indoctrination. It has, accordingly, attempted to overhaul the repertoire in all forms of operatic drama so as to make every item a vehicle for Communist ideology. All theatrical workers, moreover, have been organized and given ideological indoctrination courses.

Opera
One cannot emphasize too strongly the skill with which the Communists have exploited the traditional Chinese theater. Consider, as an example, the Peking Opera. Most of its standard favorites were plays exemplifying the traditional virtues. These plays had stand...
the test of time because those virtues, given the values and preferences of the Chinese people, were over a long period accepted as the virtues. Many of them have been banned by the present regime. An outstanding example is The Fourth Son Visits His Mother. Yang Chi-yeh is a great general of the Sung period who, with his sons, is stationed at the border to guard against invading tribes from the North. His fourth son is captured one day, and given in marriage to the princess of a foreign tribe. After a lapse of eighteen years, hostilities are renewed. Yang Chi-yeh's widow and his sixth son lead an expedition against the tribes into which the fourth son has married. The latter requests permission from the princess and her mother to go see his mother and wife in the enemy camp. He goes by night, and returns at dawn. The play has the noble simplicity of an episode out of Homer, and points up the ideal of filial piety against a background of great dramatic pathos. According to Communist theory, however, the fourth son is clearly a coward and a traitor to his country and, in any case, his blustering filial piety should not be represented on stage. Many plays of this character have had to be reworked before they could be cleared for performance.

In another play, Kuan Yü is depicted as a Chinese military hero, rich in the virtues of loyalty and generosity and, at the same time, proud, individualistic, and aloof. Under the Communist scheme of values, however, individualism and affection from others are undesirable characteristics, so that the revised Communist version does not put Kuan Yü forward as a hero at all. Instead, the agents of Kuan Yü's downfall are presented as liberators of the people.

Even comedies do not escape the Communists' revisionist zeal. The Roaring Dragon Flirts with a Phoenix depicts the courtship of a restaurant waitress by a Ming Emperor. The role of the Emperor was traditionally assigned to the Chinese equivalent of the romantic tenor in Western opera. The Communists assign it rather to the clown, thus emphasizing the fact that the Emperor is a low villain because he takes liberties with a commoner. Neither dramatic propriety nor dramatic effect appear to be taken into account in all this: besides being transformed out of all recognition, the plays are immeasurably cheapened and degraded. The only plays that can be produced unchanged are those that are deemed to embody a "revolutionary spirit," e.g., plays based on episodes from the novel Water Margin, many of which deal with popular attacks on landlords and corrupt officials. (Some new plays, e.g., Forced to the Liang Mountain and Three Attacks on Chu Chia Village, have been adapted from this novel.)

A Chinese Opera Research Institute has been established for the express purpose of revamping the old repertoire and training new actors. Habitual theater-goers are naturally shocked by the changes in plot and atmosphere of their favorite pieces. But the better-known actors still have enormous drawing power at the box office, and, in the absence of better entertainment, the theater will probably continue to be patronized because of them.

It is difficult to understand, given the remoteness of Chinese Opera from real life, why the Communists are taking all this trouble to rewrite it—especially since the Ballet and even Shakespeare are tolerated in the USSR. But the answer lies, undoubtedly, in the Communists' determination to turn everything to a positive, current propaganda purpose, and to see to it that wherever people turn for relaxation and amusement they shall encounter the new ideas and new values. How far this determination goes may be seen from what has happened to China's storytellers and minstrels. With their repertoire of feudal historical sagas and sentimental romances, both types of entertainment have always been very popular in North and South China. Now both have been organized, and new stories are replacing the old. The new stories, with correct content as far as the regime is concerned, do not have the same appeal as the old. But the close, face-to-face relation between story-
teller and audience is not one that the regime's propagandists can afford to pass up, so the storyteller can either learn how to peddle his new wares or go out of business. In order to survive in present-day China's mass communications one must make propaganda.

Western-style drama had reached its peak of development in China during the war years, when a series of fine plays by Ts'ao Yu had made the Chinese audience conscious of the artistic and entertainment values of the spoken drama. The playwrights used both historical and contemporary events, and produced mainly plays that were vehicles for patriotic and/or antiagression sentiments. Ku Mu-jou's play on the poet Chu-hi Yen and Ts'ao Yu's *Metamorphosis* are conspicuous examples of the kind of thing that was produced on a fairly large scale and became extremely popular. The spoken drama flourished even in the Communist areas, though the plays produced there were less elaborate; many, indeed, were merely skits.

**Propaganda Plays**

The postwar drama did not have much drawing power, partly because Hollywood movies and other forms of entertainment were again available. The spoken drama should, however, be thought of as one of the vital means of communicating experience and ideas that contemporary China has at its disposal. If honest plays that express genuine emotion or tackle genuine problems are not being produced, as they are not, it is because of the propaganda responsibilities that the Communists have imposed on the playwright as on other writers. Most new plays are the products of collective authorship, because an ideologically correct play requires the deliberation of many minds as a guarantee that the end product will be unexceptionable from the standpoint of Marxist doctrine. A genuine tragedy, a problem play, a timely and amusing comedy — all these are equally out of the question. Most current plays are either melodramatic (to play up the corruption of the Kuomintang, the evil influences of the imperialists and reactionaries), or didactic (calculated to point up the virtues of the worker, the peasant, and the Communist soldier), and all are on about the level of *East Lynne* and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

The most famous example of postwar melodrama is perhaps *The White-Haired Girl*, a play by Ho Chin-te and associates, which has enjoyed a much success wherever it has been produced. First produced in the Communist areas as long ago as the early forties, the play was primarily a propagandist's indictment of exploitation of the peasantry by the landlords. As in most melodramas, the symbol of the sufferers is a beautiful, innocent girl, the mortgage-holder is the landlord, and the hero who saves the family home is the People's Liberation Army. The play, laid in a small farming village near the mountains of Northwestern Hopeh, between 1935 and 1939, is said to be based on actual facts. Happy One, the seventeen-year-old daughter of a widowed farmer, is eloped by her father to the landlord as compulsory payment of a debt. In the landlord's family, Happy One is first the victim of constant mistreatment, then is raped, then finds herself pregnant by the landlord. A few months later her mother decides to sell her into a brothel, and she attempts to kill herself but is prevented from doing so by another servant, who helps her to escape. From that day onward her one aim is to get revenge for herself and her father. She takes refuge in a mountain cave, where she gives birth to her child and then maintains a precarious existence over several years by pilfering offerings from a lonely mountain temple. Her deficient diet plus the fact that she never sees the light of the day, causes her hair to turn white, so that the people of the locality, who occasionally get a glimpse of her, begin to call her the "white-haired immortal fairy." The Sino-Japanese War breaks out, and the landlord turns into a Japanese puppet official. But the Eighth Route Army guerrillas reach the village, and among their ranks is none other than Happy One's peasant lover. The guerrillas organize the
peasants, and the lover rescues Happy One and her child from the mountain cave. The final scene is a public trial of the landlord conducted by the enraged peasants. Happy One appears at the trial to give her testimony, and as the curtain falls the trussed-up landlord and his henchmen are dragged away to be executed.

The plot, in other words, follows the usual melodramatic pattern without much originality or imagination. The play's one virtue lies in the fact that it successfully incorporates traditional song and dance elements into modern-style drama. The Communists, not forgetting the traditional association between the theater and music, appear to have included these elements as bait for those who were theater-goers in the more or less remote past. The music, to some extent anyway, seems to redeem the crudity of the plot. Professor Derk Bodde, of the University of Pennsylvania, reported after a stay in Peking during 1919 that "seeing [The White-Haired Girl] was an exciting and memorable experience," which suggests that there must be something in the acting, the atmosphere, and, most especially probably, the music, that communicates in a way that the plot could not passably do. The orchestral music, according to Bodde, is an immense improvement over the Peking Opera. Now charming, now poignant, it includes none of the falsetto singing of the traditional Chinese opera, but, since much of it is based on Chinese folk music, it is not Western. As in Chinese opera, certain motifs are associated with certain characters. The orchestra is a combination of Western string instruments (violin, cello and contra base) with the native  er hu (the Chinese type violin), flute, drum, gong, and wooden clapper. In some themes the Western instruments predominate; in others, the Chinese. The result, remarkably successful, is a new music genre for China. The thing that reminds one most of the old-time drama is the use of drum, gong, and clapper to punctuate and accentuate the movements of the actors — sometimes a highly effective device, as when the percussion instruments burst into a crescendo of fury during a pursuit or a scene of violence. In short, the play, despite the realism of its plot, resembles a stylized ballet because of the music. When the actors are not singing, they move about the stage with the rhythmic steps and gestures that are used on the traditional stage.

The successful combination of Western and Chinese musical elements and the retention of symbolic acting both help account for the vogue of The White-Haired Girl. Numerous short plays with songs and music have been produced during the years since the play won its popularity.

An example of current didactic drama is the play The Question of Thought. Through its four dialogue-laden acts, the play depicts the process by which a group of typical unreformed students undergo thought reform in the North China People's Revolutionary University. One is pro-American, one a landlord's son, one a former Kuomintang army officer, one a subdued clerk, and one a pretty girl whose mind is on trivialities and boyfriends. The group goes through long periods of agonizing conversations (democratic discussion groups) until, in the grand finale, all have become true Communists, full of hatred for the United States and full of love for the Soviet Union. It is not badly done, in the sense that members of the audience with the same background as the characters in the play are likely to recognize their own problems and may well be influenced by the solution it offers.

Another type of current play is direct propaganda, whose primary purpose is to win popular support for government programs. The collectively-written Song of the Red Flag, for example, is a play about "emulsification" drives among factory workers. The heroine, Ma Feng-chih, is "uncooperative," at the beginning of the drive; moreover, the various groups of workers engaged in increasing production are bickering among themselves. But once she is fully indoctrinated, Ma becomes a labor hero, besides which her group wins the red flag.
The play hardly pretends to be other than trivial or to offer anything to the audience except propaganda. But when it was first produced in Shanghai it ran for three months, and was considered a hit. The death of good plays in China cannot be doubted when even such poor material as this is well received.

Theaters are still not numerous in China: excluding movie houses, there are about 160 theaters in 18 major cities, unevenly distributed. In Shanghai alone, for example, there are 10 theaters for Peking Opera, 30 for Shao-hsing Opera, 9 for other dialect operas, and a few legitimate houses for Western-style drama. By comparison with the number of theaters, the number of theatrical troupes is quite large: there are, according to Communist sources, 400 entertainment troupes, with 40,000 members. Many of these troupes make one-night stands in small towns and villages, performing either in the open or in some large public building.

The “Living Newspaper”

Before turning from the theater, mention should be made of the Communist phenomenon called the “living newspaper.” Most editions of the living newspaper are plays like *Truman Dreams of Hitler* and *The Dance of the Devils* (the devils being Truman, MacArthur, Chiang K’ai-shek, et al.). But some living newspapers are quite elaborate. Take the play *Resist US and Aid Korea*. This play, first produced in April 1951 by students and faculty members of the Shanghai People’s Dramatic Art School working under the direction of the noted playwright and director Tao Lin, has no less than 50 scenes and 33 settings. The “plot” consists of a series of episodes in the history of American aggression against China during the past fifty years. In the prologue the American John Foster helps Japanese Premier Kato browbeat the Chinese envoy Li Hung-chang to sign away Taiwan to Japan. In the epilogue Foster’s grandson, John Foster Dulles, is seen plotting a separate peace with Japan. In between are four episodes illustrating America’s cultural and economic aggression against China and the invasion of Korea. However much the historical facts are distorted, the use of authentic historical personages like Foster, Dulles, and Leighton Stuart is clever in the extreme, and the point, that the US is always collaborating with Japan against China’s integrity and security, is not likely to escape any member of the audience.

Movies

Even more than the theater, the movies are proving to be a highly effective medium of propaganda in China, where the vast number of cities, towns, and villages calls for a medium that requires few personnel. The Chinese took an immediate liking to Hollywood movies when they were first introduced back in the days of Fairbanks, Pickford, and Chaplin. Many Chinese are named after movie stars; except for top-ranking government officials, the movie stars are the American celebrities Chinese public knew best as recently as the late forties. Even today most high school students, if shown pictures of Gary Cooper, Bob Hope, and Betty Grable, would immediately identify them by name.

China’s taste in movies runs to “spectacle” pictures, musicals, comedies, tender romances, tragedies with pretensions to artistic quality, and action pictures with animals and scantily dressed women (e.g., the early Tarzan movies). In a word, Chinese taste in movies roughly corresponds to American taste; the large box office successes of 1951 (e.g., *Quo Vadis*, *An American in Paris*, *Show Boat*, *A Place in the Sun*) would be sure of an enthusiastic reception in China if they were permitted to be shown there. The only types of cinema the Chinese do not like are what we might call “sophiatlented” comedy and drama, which call either for a knowledge of English or a knowledge of United States society and culture, and certain Hollywood productions that, for cultural reasons, the Chinese react
to negatively. (They like Bob Hope, but have never taken Bing Crosby to heart because his casual American manner baffle them and his films usually lack the lavish musical numbers that the Chinese delight in.) There seems no doubt that the Chinese turn to Hollywood movies, when they are available, primarily out of escapist motives — to savor the technicolored luxury that they cannot have in their drab daily lives. (The Communists in their campaign for the suppression of American movies, have largely asked their case on the view that the effects of exhibiting sex, gangsterism, and "bourgeois decadence" are pernicious.)

The Chinese film industry, despite keen competition from Hollywood movies, has continuously expanded over the last thirty years. People who have had a high school or college education usually prefer the Hollywood variety to the Chinese, but the Chinese masses, having no English, tend to avoid all Hollywood products above the level of spectacle films and slapstick comedies. Only technical incompetence and the lack of capital and talent, therefore, keep the local products from virtually monopolizing the local mass market. However, it cannot compete with Hollywood on such things as lavish historical and musical spectacles, and therefore has always concentrated on historical romances and highly sentimental love stories, preferably those with a sad ending.

Even before the Sino-Japanese War, in part because Leftist writers dominated the literary scene and controlled the stage, there were "progressive elements" among the personnel in the movie industry who wished to bring it in line with the current developments in fiction and drama. Not a few Leftist plays and novellas had been made into movies. Even after that war the top drawing-cards were still historical romances, domestic tragedies, and such bourgeois comedies as *The Barber Takes a Wife*.

After the Communist success on the mainland, the movie industry was nationalized and transformed into a propaganda machine. (Under the Nationalist government, the studios had been privately owned except for the Nationalist Central Studio, which produced some documentaries and propaganda films which were largely unsuccessful.) Through 1948 and 1949, the Communist government took over the film studios in Ch'ang-ch'ung, Peking, and Shanghai one by one, and reorganized them as the Northeast Film Studio, the Peking Film Studio, and the Shanghai Film Studio — all under the direct control of the Bureau of Cinematographic Art of the Ministry of Culture. Though a few private movie studios are still permitted to operate, and even given Bureau financial assistance, they are, for all practical purposes, indistinguishable from the government studios since the commercial, escapist-type product is now strictly prohibited.

The veteran movie director Ta'a Ch'u-sheng, writing in 1950, stated that during that year the government studios would produce 25 feature pictures, 17 documentary films, and one feature-length color film, and the private companies in China and Hong Kong about 50 films. Soviet talent and capital have been called in to boost both the quality and the quantity of the product. The 1950 color documentary *The Victory of the Chinese People*, for example, was the joint project of the Soviet Documentary Studio and the Peking Film Studio. (Actually, it was filmed in China — with Chinese help — by a team of 25 Soviet specialists led by Leonid Varnamov, four-time Stalin Prize Winner.) As one would expect, the former importations from Hollywood have been completely replaced by films imported from the USSR, though there is evidence that Chinese movie-goers continue to feel a certain nostalgia for the earlier fare. Some Soviet films shown recently in China are: *Lenin in October*, *Lenin in 1918*, *The Stone Flower*, *The Young Guard*, *Song of Siberia*, *The Country Teacher*.
As in every department of cultural activity, the movie industry stresses glorification of the worker, peasant, and soldier, and vilification of the Kuomintang and the forces of "reaction." Some of the better films shown in 1950 were "The Bridge, Daughters of China, New Heroes and Heroines, Shenggan Concentration Camps, Red Flag on the Green Cliff, The People's Fighters, The White-Haired Girl and The Song of the Red Flag." (The last two of these were based on the stage hits mentioned earlier.) Great progress is reported in the making of propagandist documentaries. The color-documentary "The New China," which has been shown in many countries outside the Iron Curtain, appeared briefly in New York in the spring of 1952.

Communist statistics indicate that Chinese films are reaching a much larger audience than in the past. In the first half of 1951 cinema audiences reached 110 million, which amounts to 73 percent of the 1950 figure. As of 1952, there were 3,000 workers employed in the government-owned studios and the movie theaters, of which there were 107; both of these figures have no doubt since increased. Films presumably continue to be projected in rural and small-town areas in improvised locales; no less than 700 mobile screen teams were organized in 1950 alone to show films to workers, peasants, and soldiers, either at special low prices or without admission charge. The arrangements for distributing films have been speeded up; the documentary "Peace in Kora, An Assia Korea," it is reported, was shown simultaneously (December 1951) in 11 cities throughout China.

It seems a safe guess, however, that real commercial successes able to draw large audiences and send them away enthusiastic must be very rare (Statistics of attendance at films shown free or at nominal charge to groups that are "urged" to attend, of course, throw no light on the question). Since escapist entertainment is taboo, it requires infinite ingenuity to whip up a story that generates excitement without straying from the Party "line"; and the tendency is to use stories of naked and transparent simplicity. The line between correct and incorrect ideology is, moreover, hard to draw sometimes, and most movie makers tend to play it safe by repeating hackneyed themes praising the worker, the peasant, the People's Liberation Army, etc.

One of the better recent films (released by the privately owned Kung Lun Studio in the spring of 1951) is "The Life of Wu Hua," directed by the veteran Sun Yu. Wu Hua is, a celebrated beggar of the late Ch'ing dynasty, is keenly aware of his lack of education. He saves up the money he begs from rich people, and finally is able to found a charity middle school in Shantung. Wu Hua's heroism and nobility of motive have always been cherished by the Chinese, and the film was highly praised everywhere it was shown, as a success story about a beggar who dedicated himself to education of the poor. Only at a surprisingly tardy moment did the Communist authorities discover the film's "subversive" tendencies. The Peking "Jin Min Jih Pao," daily organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, formally launched an attack on the film in its editorial column 20 May 1951. While Wu Hua was a good worker for the people, he was, it seems, also a victim of "feudal" and "bourgeois" ideology. Instead of being respectful and humble to the rich, he should have adopted an attitude of militant hostility. In short, his scrupulousness about his daily activities was an insult to the proletariat. The picture was immediately withdrawn from circulation, and the director and all the reviewers who had praised the film published formal apologies in the press for the way in which they had misread the people. There could be no better illustration of the difficulties that those concerned with movie production and the "cultural workers" are up against in contemporary China. As long as they turn out mediocre and routine products, they get into no trouble, if they strive for originality and/or
aesthetic significance they do. (The blast against the Wu Hsiün film was, in point of fact, the point of departure for a widespread "self-remoulding" movement among intellectual and cultural workers, of which more shall be written in a later section.)

Hong Kong, at least until recently, has remained a major center for the production of Chinese Communist films. (Like the prewar International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai, it was already a rallying point for Communist and other types of Leftist writers, musicians, etc., before the Communist take-over, and was used as a safe base from which to attack the Kuomintang government and depict the alleged corruptions and sufferings of the proletariat within China.) By the end of 1951, however, the British authorities in Hong Kong were beginning to clamp down. In December of that year, for instance, six Communist movie workers, including director-writer Saú-ja Wên-sên and actors Liu Chi'ung and Shu Shih, were deported to China proper, to the accompaniment of predictable outbursts of vehement protest from all Chinese Communist literary and art circles. The six movie workers announced that they would soon be back in Hong Kong, thus implying that Britain would soon be forced out.

RADIO BROADCASTING

Introduction

Radio broadcasting has never thrived in China. In the US, where it has, it is primarily supported by commercial interests, and is part of a general effort to keep the consumers amused and at the same time interested in brand names, etc. In China, neither the manufacture nor the retail of goods has reached a stage of development in which brands, purchasable at every store in every part of the country, play a significant role. Advertising goods over the radio is not yet feasible — to say nothing of the way in which advertising, in order to be effective in China, would have to vary from region to region and social and educational class to social and educational class. In America, radio entertainers like Jack Benny, Arthur Godfrey, and Milton Berle go over fairly well in all parts of the country. In China, each province has its own music and theater traditions, just as has its own spoken accents and its own styles of cooking. In short, nation-wide networks like NBC and CBS would be much less valuable in China than in the US, though it is the declared ambition of the Communists to build a Central People's Broadcasting System at the earliest possible moment.

Pre-Communist Activities

Prior to the Communist success on the mainland, broadcasting activities were limited to the great commercial and industrial centers. A place like Shanghai, for instance, would have only 40 to 50 broadcasting stations competing with one another. In China, where most people live without electricity and modern plumbing, a radio set is a great luxury. As recently as the time of the Sino-Japanese War, according to Communist data, there were only 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 receiving sets in the entire country, and the larger cities accounted for almost all of them, with Shanghai well out in front of the others in total number of sets and number of sets per thousand of population. The Shanghai broadcasting stations operated from early morning to midnight, featuring recordings of Peking Opera, of Western and Chinese songs, along with innumerable advertising plugs, news, and local artists, especially Shanghai-type storytellers. Some of the city's shopping centers became veritable beehives of competing signals because each store had its own loudspeaker and sought to attract customers by turning it on full blast. Shanghai also had its American, German, French, and even Buddhist stations.

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During the occupation, the Japanese attempted to register all the receiving sets in Shanghai, and to remove the apparatus for tuning in short-wave stations from all they located. The Communists, since the take-over, have imposed equally rigid controls; it is now almost impossible for a Shanghai resident to tune in a foreign station. For the moment at least, therefore, the efforts of the Voice of America and the Voice of Free Asia are largely wasted, though Communist propaganda continues to show official concern over the danger of American broadcasts being heard in Chinese homes. The number of receiving sets must be decidedly smaller than in the past if for no other reason than because new ones have not been obtainable in sufficient quantities; the old ones, whose average age is considerable, have had to go unrepaired as parts wear out because replacements are unavailable. This does not mean, however, that the audience has necessarily shrunk to the same extent; trade unions, popular organizations, schools, People's Liberation Army units, and industrial establishments have been buying receivers and installing them where people can gather to listen. But all one can do in guess on this point; if there has been any audience research the government has kept the results to itself.

Most radio stations in prewar China were commercial and local (covering a territory of very small radius). The Nationalist government had only one station sufficiently powerful to reach the whole of China — the Central Broadcasting Station, which first set up in Nanking and moved, for the period of the war, to Chungking. Even it had a comparatively weak signal, and was difficult to receive outside the country.

**Central People's Broadcasting System**

The Communist government has set up a Central People's Broadcasting System. It is the outgrowth of the Hsin Hua Broadcasting Station, which was organized in September 1915 in the face of extreme technical and supply difficulties. The station remained a small one through the war years. Not until 1949 was a genuine expansion of radio broadcasting facilities undertaken. Under the People's Broadcasting System program, 58 stations were set up in 1949 and 1950, and more than 108 long-, medium-, and short-wave transmitters are now in operation. Radio personnel has increased from 150 in 1947 to more than 1,000. The 58 stations are scattered all over the country: 10 in North China, 15 in the Northeast, 5 in East China, 7 in Central-South China, and 5 in the Northwest. All of them are under the supervision and guidance of the Broadcasting Administration Bureau of the Press Administration. Besides the publicly operated stations, there are 32 privately-run stations still operating. 22 of them in Shanghai and the remainder in Canton, Chungking, Yung-hsien (Nungpo), Peking, Tientsin, and Tientsin. This, especially in Shanghai, is a considerably smaller number than existed before the take-over.

The Central People's Broadcasting Station stresses national news and information bulletins, adult education, and "cultural" recreation in its national programs. Radio Peking, the voice of the government, offers daily news and commentary programs in foreign languages: (Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan, Japanese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, English, Spanish, and Burmese) and in such Chinese dialects as Amoy and Cantonese. This is rather remarkable in view of the scarcity of skilled linguists.

The other publicly run stations are operated by municipal and provincial governments. They also emphasize news and adult education programs. Recorded music appears still to be the main program-filler.

One new feature is the teaching of the Russian language by radio. Russian is evidently replacing English as China's major foreign language, so that Chinese who wish to get ahead in the world have welcomed radio lessons in the foreign language of the future. Such statistics as are available indicate that approximately 40,000 people are taking daily Russian
lessons by radio. In Peking alone, more than 12,000 people bought the textbooks for the Russian radio lessons, and more than 4,000 persons are participating in radio study groups.

Special programs are provided for workers, for women, and for the soldiers of the Red Army. As in the Soviet Union, children's programs receive special attention. There are many programs with audience participation, students and workers especially. When events of national importance are broadcast — public trials, demonstrations, and speeches by top government officials — people are often compelled to listen. Clearly, however, they cannot listen on receivers that do not exist, and so long as radio sets remain scarce, radio cannot hope to blanket a national audience as it does in other countries. The current neglect of entertainment values in radio output, as in all Communist cultural activities, will also continue to limit the Chinese radio audience.

FINE ARTS

Music

The remaining media of communication to be considered fall in the general category of fine arts and music, two fields in which modern China has conspicuously failed to make important contributions. China, though it boasts of a few legendary musicians of consummate skill, has had no great composers. Most of its opera and dance music are of communal origin. There were no court musicians with status comparable to that of the court poets of the past, though the earlier dynasties did often extend fairly generous patronage to music and musicians. The Bureau of Music in the Han dynasty was outstanding in this respect.

Because of its folk origin, Chinese music runs to airs that are simple and monotonous. When, for instance, Chinese ballads, operas, and poems are recited, they are accompanied with music, but the regular practice is to use only a few musical patterns to accommodate the successive stanzas, so that there is nothing comparable to the large variety of distinct tunes used in Western opera and musical comedy.

The Chinese have to some extent adopted Western music over the years since they first became acquainted with it, but they excel, if at all, as performers, not composers (they have developed some passable pianists and violinists). Only with the introduction of the movies much later, did Western-type popular songs catch on. The songs in Chinese movies are mostly sentimental blues, incorporating some of the traditional Chinese ballad styles. The song *Rose, Rose, I Love You*, which was quite popular during 1951 and was introduced in America in that same year, is an example. Musically, such songs are decidedly inferior to Chinese operatic airs, with their broader range of tone and emotion and their more exacting demands on performers.

It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that what now serves as the Chinese Communist National Anthem was taken from a song in a 1932 movie called *Children of the Storm*. This song, with music by Nie Erh and words by the playwright Tien Han, was entitled *March of the Volunteers*. The movie itself was not particularly successful, but the Chinese public, with the Battle of Shanghai still fresh in its memory, seized on the song with great eagerness, so that every school boy and school girl was soon singing "Arise, all ye who refuse to be slaves." Nieh Erh, incidentally, became a Communist in 1933, and subsequently wrote such popular tunes as *The Dockers' Song*, *The Open Road*, *The Road Builder*. On 17 July 1935, when he was 24 years old, he drowned, but he had already become so important that the anniversary of his death has been ordained a Festival Day of Music to commemorate his accomplishments, just as 5 May, the anniversary of Ch'ü Yüan's drowning, is Poets' Day.
Another "people's composer" was Heisen Hsing-hai, who had considerably better musical training than Nieh Erh, and who has two symphonies, six instrumental compositions, and 150 songs and instrumental works to his credit. His masterpiece was called Yellow River Cantata, but the source of his popular acclaim was a series of patriotic songs that had wide currency during the anti-Japanese war. In 1940 he went to Russia to study Soviet music, and died in 1945.

The mantle of Nieh Erh and Heisen Hsing-hai has fallen on no one in present-day China; but these two men set the pattern for the kind of music the Communists want written for the masses: wooden declamatory verse set to loud sing-song airs, with themes typically glorifying the People's Liberation Army, the peasant, and the worker, or, worse still, adulating Mao Tse-tung. The latter is immortalized in song after song as the salvation of China, the benevolent father of the people, the comrade-in-arms of Stalin, the rising sun of the East. Songs relating to the volunteer action in Korea against American aggression have been produced in quantity, and are worked into the programs for maozai gatherings of all kinds. The publishing industry is now doing a brisk business in books of songs.

Painting

In spite of the glorious tradition it inherited from the past, Chinese art has suffered a gradual decline and now has little hope of recovery. Most artists, like most artists' patrons, live in the cities, far removed from the mountains and waters and natural scenery that are the dominant themes in Chinese painting. There are a few old masters, such as Ch'i Pai-shih, who are still painting but are now very aged. Hua Pei-hung (Peon Ju) and Liu Hai-shou, both of whom studied in France, introduced new themes and moods into Chinese painting on their return from that country, and their brush paintings are probably the best things modern Chinese art has to show, particularly in comparison with its drawings, cartoons, and decorative products about which the less said the better. Newspaper advertisements, for instance, are uniformly poor and unattractive.

Cartoons

In prewar days, China had no cartoonists to compare with the artists working for The New Yorker, and no comic artists of national stature, except perhaps the cartoonist Yeh Tien-yu, now a Communist collaborator, who once achieved popular success with his comic characters Mr. Wang and Little Ch'en, the first a lanky, good-natured Chinese, and the second a typical round-faced, bespectacled urban business man. Cartoons are in great demand in China, as are posters, comic strips, and all kinds of picture-books. Soviet woodcuts were introduced into China in the nineteen thirties and the Communist artists took them up at once as a form of "people's art."

For decorations within the home, the Chinese have always preferred pictures of women in full attire and of historical personages. These have now been replaced by cheerful pictures of life in Communist China, in which one may discern at once some elements that are very remote from tradition, e.g., life in the USSR. Thus while the Communists have officially repudiated the family system, these pictures show that the Chinese ideal of three or four generations under one roof is still very much alive, the smiling grandpa, the contented mother and father, the rollicking youngsters, would all be quite familiar to a nineteenth century Chinese who never heard of Communism.

The keynote of the current New Year pictures being turned out in vast quantities to crowd the old-style pictures off the walls, is the happiness and prosperity of the peasants. Magazines often reproduce oil paintings, usually of some historic moment in the development of the Chinese Communist Party: for example, the meeting of Mao Tse-tung and
Chu Teh when they merged their forces. In all this, as in current Chinese literature, one finds the simultaneous simplification and glorification of reality: the peasant more contented than any peasant could possibly be, the ever-so-erect and ever-so-brawny worker and soldier, without a hint of the grime, the violence, and the callousness that characterize the contemporary scene as it actually is.

EDUCATION AND PROPAGANDA

Communist Emphasis

There are, as is well known, sharp limits to how far one can go in misrepresenting reality in propaganda and yet hope for it to be effective. So long as the peasant, the worker, and the soldier in China continue to live lives of drudgery compensated by little in the way of rewards, songs, literature, movies, and plays suggesting that their lives are not like that, it is unlikely that the desired propagandist results will be produced. Recognizing this tactfully, of course, the Communist government emphasizes "active" not "passive" propaganda. By "passive" propaganda is meant all propaganda of the "pause-then-refreshes" type, which tells one that if he will try such-and-such a commodity he will enjoy it. It is extremely effective in commercial selling, but in all likelihood only with goods that people do enjoy — which leads to "active" propaganda, the purpose of which is to persuade people that it is their duty to accept or buy a commodity whether they like or enjoy it or not. In other words, "active" propaganda plays on higher motivations than mere personal preference.

Such propaganda is not new in China. In prewar days the Chinese were constantly told that it was their patriotic duty to buy goods made in China. Everybody knew that US goods were of better quality and Japanese goods cheaper, but China was facing a huge deficit every year because of its high level of imports, and the level of imports could be brought down only if people quit buying foreign goods and consider it their duty to buy domestic products. The "selling" of Communism in China has been of this general pattern. In short, the Communist government produces as cheerful and gay a picture as it can of the glorious achievements and happy prospects of the regime, but practically it relies for its support not on that picture but on the gospel that Communism is the right thing for China; that however much the Chinese may be suffering, however poor they are, they ought to help the Communist government carry out its program, because that program is right. This explains in large part why the Communist government gives such great emphasis on education; nothing but proper indoctrination can produce the type of loyalty that will remain faithful to the Communist cause even under the most unfavorable conditions. Or, to put it a little differently, the government does not try to "sell" Communism in the "pause-then-refreshes" sense, it works, rather, to use indoctrination, force, and moral persuasion to win acceptance for it. In the end, Communism wins by convincing people that truth and right are on its side; they must prevail, and prevail they will.

The Communist government, similarly, does everything in its power to punish and render impotent the so-called enemies of the people, and to win the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals over to its cause. But it never forgets that adults, particularly educated adults, have memories and can make comparisons, and are, therefore, potential recalcitrants in Communist society. It welcomes their confessions and their affirmations of loyalty to its programs and ideas, but does this, so to speak, with its fingers crossed; for there is no way to tell how many converts, and which ones, are lying. Like Hitlerite Germany and Soviet Russia, therefore, Communist China places its real hopes on the young, i.e., on those who have never really been exposed to the influence of the forces of "reaction." Only they can become the cadres in which the Party can have complete confidence. Placing hopes on the
young, however, as in the past analysis, a matter of placing hope on the process of education, and on the institutions in which education is imparted. And, since a line is difficult to draw between education of the young and education of the overly ignorant and misled, it becomes a matter of placing hope on education for everybody. Accordingly, pressure is now exerted on all workers, peasants, business-men, and even professors — to take training at one of the numerous institutions of learning springing up throughout China.

Never in all the previous history of China did education enjoy so high a priority.

**Techniques of "Education"

One must remember, however, that the Communists do not draw the distinctions between education, culture, and indoctrination that are still in vogue elsewhere. In liberal Western societies, education is a business of confronting the student with a variety of views from which he is to choose, and training him to think for himself as he goes about choosing. In Communist society, education speaks with the voice of authority: truth is "there," absolute, unchangeable, the purpose of education is to cause the student to learn that truth and come to terms with it, so that his future thinking will always conform to it. It combines the discipline of Catholic education with the evangelism of old-style Puritanism. Given students who are young and unspoiled, the Communists are convinced they can succeed in China no less than in the USSR; and with other students it is at least worth trying.

With the intellectuals, and others who have reached a stage of maturity, the Communists employ primarily the methods of the Protestant revival — the continuous application of psychological pressure, the purpose of which is to reduce the victim to a condition of helplessness. The main point to grasp is that in Communist China all education is primarily political. Even instruction in science is regarded as inseparable from instruction in the ideology for which it should be used. Similarly, the steps children go through in order to acquire their basic knowledge of reading and writing are regarded — and treated — as inseparable from the steps by which they acquire an ideology. The point can, to be sure, be overemphasized, since all systems of education start from some assumptions which are more or less ideological. The 1690 New England Primer begins with "In Adam's fall, we sinned all," which is a basic tenet of Puritanism. The traditional three-letter primer for Chinese schoolboys begins: "Man's original nature is good," which is a basic tenet of the philosopher Mencius. What one cannot overemphasize is the all-pervading ideological atmosphere in which Chinese schoolchildren now spend their waking hours, or the rigor of the "conditioning" to which their thoughts and behavior are subjected. First herein, then, is an account of ordinary education for younger students, and then an account of life at a revolutionary college. The educational programs for soldiers, peasants, and workers will be discussed in a later section.

**Education of Youth**

Ordinary schools for younger students, in sharp contrast to adult educational institutions, do not appear to have increased greatly in number since the take-over, partly because there is a shortage of eligible teachers in Communist China. The experienced teachers, of whom there are all too few, are not all active. Many must complete political training courses before they can be trusted in the classrooms again, and the loyal Communist Party member, though unobjectionable ideologically, may well be so unlearned as to reduce the teaching process to sheer farce. In short, there are not nearly enough people with both adequate Communist training and competent knowledge of a subject matter to staff the ordinary schools Communist China needs; ergo, standards in these schools, far from improving since the war, have steadily deteriorated. The shift to emphasis on Russian language,
for example, reduced the study of English without compensating gains in the study of Russian, because the number of people who can teach Russian is negligible. With certain changes in personnel and curricula, the private schools, except those in which Kuomintang influence was especially pronounced, were mostly allowed to open after the take-over. After the liberation of Shanghai, for instance, out of 261 middle schools in the city only the Kuomintang-directed Chung-cheng, Blue and White, and Youth Middle Schools were ordered to cease operation. However, all the mission schools and colleges that have survived have severed their mission connections and become completely controlled by the government.

Like the Nationalist government, the Communist government finds itself unable to provide compulsory free primary education. Practically speaking, the tuition for most schools is probably even higher than in the past: when people are taxed to such a point that they can barely subsist, they have nothing left with which to pay any tuition. Formerly children were sent to school on the theory that they would later be able to support their aging parents; sending them to school was a kind of insurance against the hardships of old age. This theory is clearly invalid in a Communist society; what one does by sending one's children to school is to risk disrupting the unity of the home. Not infrequently, children have been known to inform against their parents. (A relatively innocuous but notorious case is the open denunciatory letter addressed to Hu Shih by his son, which was widely published some time ago.) The new education, in other words, is breaking up the old Confucian system of loyalty; the students learn they are primarily the instruments of state, and are consistently encouraged to report any reactionary activities on the part of their parents. Every well-disciplined student, therefore, is a Communist agent praying into the doings of his family, relatives, and friends.

The old dividing lines between primary school, middle school, and college have been maintained. But the primary school now has a five-year rather than a six-year curriculum, with a subject-matter emphasis that can be clearly discerned in the account of the overhauling of textbooks. Other changes largely pertain to school administration and pedagogic method. In colleges and middle schools, administration has become more democratic, each institution being run by a committee rather than by a president and deans. Professors, government and Party officials, and students are all represented on the committee; in a sense, therefore, the students now have a say in administrative affairs. Since, however, each committee has its Communist majority, the students' freedom is only nominal, and what the committee system does is to enable Party decisions and policies to penetrate every corner of student and faculty life. Thus there is less emphasis than formerly upon studying books and upon the competitive examination system, and everywhere one turns one encounters something modeled on political processes in a "people's" democracy; the students give their own marks, the teachers subject themselves to criticism by students.

Similarly, things reminiscent of political processes in a "liberal" democracy have disappeared; in Kuomintang days the students were constantly organizing demonstrations, rallies, and strikes against government policies and measures, which, if nothing else, were spontaneous expressions of their own feelings and their determination to affect events. Although there were frequent clashes between students and the police, it was never a question of the government's repressing student opinion as such. Today no student would dare to try to organize a demonstration save in favor of the government. If, for example, the majority of students felt that Chinese participation in the Korean War is morally wrong and delays construction tasks the nation badly needs, the last thing they would dare to do would be to say so and try to influence others to their way of thinking. The students are free to organize, to propagandize, to agitate, to demonstrate, but only for the regime and the government.
The Use of Group Discussion

Another new departure is the use of group discussion — especially in courses in history and political theory — as the pedagogical method appropriate to Communist society. When there is discussion, everybody is expected to participate; any sign of reluctance on the part of any student is regarded as proof that the student lacks revolutionary fervor. As the student participates, moreover, he must practice both "criticism" and "self-criticism." He must watch his classmates, analyze their conversation, their behavior, their ideas, their way of using their time, and criticize them in the light of the ruling standards. He must also constantly train himself in vigorous all-out self-examination. The zeal the Communists show in both these matters approaches religious fanaticism. An average middle school student has a busy day: he rises early in the morning and does not get home until seven or eight o'clock in the evening. Besides his classes, he must attend an endless round of meetings and discussions, he must do his stint of manual labor, and he must turn up at movies and plays — all this, on a diet which is undeniably insufficient, and at an age when rest and continuous replenishment of energy are prime necessities.

Statistics

According to its own current statistics, the Communist government is expanding the program of primary education for school-age children. Kuo Mo-jo, in his report on cultural and educational activities at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council, stated that China now has 440,000 primary schools with more than thirty-seven million pupils. This would mean that since the eve of the Sino-Japanese War the number of students has increased by over 100 percent, and now includes almost half of the children of school age. In certain localities in Northeast and North China, he added, 70 to 80 percent of the children of school age have been drawn into the schools, and, of these, over 80 percent are children of workers and peasants. These figures, for the reasons given, are almost certainly an exaggeration. But since propaganda depends for its effectiveness upon mass literacy, and since the Communists are clearly determined to make their propaganda effective, it seems probable that the number of children attending school has increased substantially.

According to Kuo's report, China now has 195 institutions of higher education, with an aggregate enrollment of 128,000, comparable figures for 1945-46, according to Nationalist government records, were 207 and 129,221. As of 1951-52, there are 507 technical schools for the training of intermediate technical cadres with an aggregate enrollment of 110,000; 65 normal schools for the training of elementary school teachers with an aggregate enrollment of 165,000, 4,013 ordinary middle schools with an aggregate enrollment of 1,290,000, one-fifth of whom are senior middle school students. Again, according to Nationalist statistics, the 1945-46 showing was much better. Seven hundred twenty-four vocational schools with 137,010 students; 902 normal schools with 215,609 students, 4,266 middle schools with 1,195,874 students.

The People's Revolutionary University

The Communists' "people's" Revolutionary colleges avowed purpose is to transform old-type students and intellectuals into new-type cadres who will put all their talent and energy into serving the people. The main categories of students are college professors and school instructors, exceptionally promising cadres, backward Party members, "vanguard"-type industrial workers, and students at other colleges who are regarded as needing a special indoctrination course. This means, among other things, that the students vary greatly in educational level. The normal course of study appears to take six months of a student's full-time effort.
The North China People's Revolutionary University in Peking is typical. It opened in March 1949, and has had from 6,000 to 8,500 students each term. The students are divided among four departments: one for those sent from other universities for ideological processing; one for intelligence personnel from the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Communist Army; one for members of various professional and vocational groupings (including teachers and professors), and one for Party members regarded as having bungled their tasks or done poor work. Each department is divided into ten classes, and each class into nine groups of from 20 to 23 students, each of which is assigned a faculty member, who is known as the Comrade or "the able Party member." The basic unit of the school, then, is the group, though for study and discussion purposes it is further divided into "sections," each with seven or eight members.

The site of Ke-lo, or Revolutionary University, is an old barracks, once used as a training center for Kuomintang troops. Each group — 20 to 23 students — shares a single dormitory, and works as a unit through the academic day. The "able Party member" is always about, noting in his records the speech and actions of each of his charges. Time off to oneself is out of the question, and any person who is constitutionally unfit for group living is sure to find the strain intolerable. The dormitory is not pleasant, and the food is extremely poor: every student gets two meals daily, each consisting of a plate of vegetables and Chinese millet (kaoliang) without so much as a cup of tea. Every two weeks, he gets a ration of two ounces of meat. At the beginning of each term men and women students are kept apart, but as the course proceeds they are encouraged to mix. There are no restraints as far as sexual deportment is concerned; one suspects, indeed, that the training has as one of its purposes the emancipation of the student from such outworn notions as sexual purity and fidelity. The daily round is dull and no spiritual or aesthetic values are stressed, so that sex is the only amusement left for the students. Not infrequently, therefore, the women students become pregnant by the end of the term. Marriage between a pregnant student and the man who has made her pregnant is frowned upon.

The school work is not heavy. One — but only one — of the professors, Ai Se-chi, has written a number of successful popular works on dialectic materialism, and enjoys a reputation as a leading authority on Marxism. He delivers a weekly lecture before the entire student body. Speaking with a microphone in front of him, and a four-loudspeaker public address system to multiply his voice, he delivers weekly lectures of four to seven hours in length to the entire student body, with such titles as "Labor Creates the World," "Ideas and Class Property," "The Clara Foundation," "Internationalism," "The History of the Chinese Communist Party," "The History of the Chinese Revolution," "Modern Chinese History," and "A Brief History of the Imperialist Invasion of China." The titles suggest that the lectures add up to an outline of history, especially Chinese history, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism. The students take notes, and much of their week's work is devoted to discussion of Ai's latest lecture topic. These discussions are the faculty's only means of measuring each student's progress so no one is permitted to just sit and listen. Students are often assigned to perform manual labor, such as road-repairing, presumably to give them a first-hand acquaintance with the dignity of labor. Every day brings, then, an exciting round of discussions, games, manual labor, and compulsory attendance at movies and plays. Apparently there is no corpus of technical information students are expected to absorb before graduation.

As the student advances in his general grasp of Communist ideology, he receives more and more personal attention in the form of inquisitions concerning his thoughts, his life history, and his family. This goes on until the student shows himself deeply convinced that his past life has been wrong and sinful, just to the extent that it was influenced by non-
Marxist ideals. One cannot sidestep the ordeal by just confessing to past wrong-doings and sinfulness in general: one must be specific, which calls for a lot of thought to the matter, and one must be sincere — one must really mean it. Or, to put it a little differently, the Communist authorities have by no means overlooked the possibility that students will try to go through the formality of confessing without meaning it, and they have surpassed themselves in inventing a technique for seeing to it that this does not happen.

The essence of the technique is to reduce each student to a state of nervous exhaustion or paralysis in which insincerity becomes a luxury he cannot afford. He is brought to a point of mental strain where he must believe what he is writing or saying or he will go crazy. The Communists have discovered, is possible only when the mind is in control of its faculties and when one's deep emotional sources are untapped. The technique is a stepped-up version of that which underlies an American small-town revival meeting.

Not infrequently the advisor asks the student to turn in his diary, which accordingly is written in the knowledge that it will be read by the authorities. One might expect, from this, that the student would merely fill his diary with Party-approved sentiments, but the machinery is so devised that he cannot get by with that, because he will find himself living in a spiritual isolation that is deliberately intended to be unbearable. Life, the authorities know, has meaning for the individual under pressure only if his conscious and unconscious thoughts are in step with his daily actions and that the man who rejects Communism but lives in an all-Communist atmosphere, where he must behave like a Communist, will ultimately find himself under such tension that he will embrace Communism voluntarily in order to reduce the strain and recapture some meaning for his existence.

The final examination in the Revolutionary University is not, then, a test of one's grasp of Marxism as something to be learned and thus known. One has only to show that one can now give an accurately critical and sincere account of one's life and family — especially a sincere account — which shows that the student is eager to take up his new duties and renounce his past, with all the ambitions and affections upon which he has lived. Time after time a student's self-criticism are rejected; and each time he must go back over the entire ground; rethink every detail, test his own sincerity at every point, and then rewrite. This goes on until the time comes for graduation. The majority "pass," but a good many are required to stay on in school and a few, having been declared incorrigible, are sent to the People's New Life Labor Schools, which is the Chinese Communist Party phrase for slave labor camps.

**Student Reactions**

The mental strain under which these personal confessions are extracted cannot be exaggerated. One student tells of the experience:

The students became terribly upset and very unhappy during this period. Girls often broke in tears, weeping aloud under this constant probing into their thoughts and the internal struggles brought about in their mental system. But they weren't the only ones to collapse. Men did also. They went more than the girls, it seemed, but they were under greater pressure. Girls had fewer social contacts, politically speaking, and so comparatively less pressure was put on them. Some tried to escape from what seemed an insoluble problem by leaping into the quietude of Kuang Ming Lake within the grounds of the Summer Palace. Some tried other ways of committing suicide.

Quite a number of suicides occur, it seems, before each commencement.

The same technique is applied, less intensively, at almost all the middle schools and colleges. In preliberation days, the Communists often charged that there were Kuomintang agents working among the college students. However that may be, it seems beyond dispute that today every faculty member is a Communist agent and that the overriding objective
of education itself is to transform all students into Communist agents. Communist agents, chosen with an eye to their capacity to become student leaders, call the tunes on all student activities. The resultant politicalization of the academic world has, moreover, snowballed ever since the take-over, and there are now signs that the interminable rallies, parades, and yangko dances are defeating their own purpose and making the students indifferent to the regime.

The reasons for this reaction, which is in sharp contrast to that in the early days after liberation, appear to be as follows. Most Chinese students are conscientious; they really want to learn and then place their knowledge at the service of their country. The present all-pervading political emphasis cuts deeply into their time for study, and the more conscientious they are, the more likely they are to regard it as conspiracy against their learning anything. The continuous fall in living standards during the first two years of Communist rule has also played its part. Most of the students come from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois families whose interests have suffered severely under Communism, and, despite the Communists' efforts to eradicate the sense of family loyalty, the students continue to think largely in family terms, and resent what the regime had done to persons close to them. While cases can be cited of sons who have denounced and accused their parents, they should be regarded as exceptional.

A further — perhaps the most important — reason for the growing indifference of the students is the job situation they know they will face when they leave school. The student in the pre-Communist period, however much he might participate in idealistic political movements, became practical on leaving school. Whether in the civil service or in industry or business or in one of the professions, he thought first — and was expected to think first — of himself and his family, and to go after attractive work with a good steady income. Even the Kuomintang government, in consequence, came in for sharp criticism among students because job opportunities upon graduation were so poor. Under the present regime, to be sure, one has no trouble getting a job, but one has no individual choice as to what job it is and, worse still, one is expected to live up to one's idealism of student days and think first of interests other than one's own.

Upon graduation, the student now awaits orders. When the orders come they are likely to be for some remote corner, and nobody is in the slightest interested in whether one would prefer to stay in a big city and enjoy the comforts. One may be instructed to volunteer for service as a soldier in Korea, or to perform some technical function in the war effort. Partly because of the traditional exemption of the scholar class from direct participation in actual combat, the students feel entitled to something better — and less tyrannical — than being hustled off to Korea. And they feel it all the more strongly because service in Korea is known to be a dangerous business, where even if one escapes enemy bullets one may perish or at least lose one's health from exposure, poor medical attention, and poor food. Thus the conscription of medical personnel to Korea is looked upon with great disfavor by most doctors and medical students, and part of what is at the bottom of their attitude is that they would like to have a practice of their own.

The Communist answer, of course, is that this is bourgeois selfishness; but there is still a great deal of it in the Chinese professional and middle classes, which easily communicates itself to their counterparts in the student population. As more and more students see what is involved in the fact that their future is in the hands of a government they cannot control or influence, and that they will be expected not only to talk but to act on the premise that the days of the profit motive are over, more indifference and even open antagonism will probably result. The Communists may have better success with the primary school children, because they are more pliable and do not carry pressing individual problems into their training — as today's college students undoubtedly do.
THE NEW REGIME: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Overcoming Opposition

The growing discontent among students is shared by other classes of people, especially businessmen, merchants, private industrialists, and intellectuals, and, despite all the good things they hear said about them in propaganda, peasants and workers also. The let-down in enthusiasm since the early post-liberation days has, to be sure, proceeded at a more rapid pace than is likely to be sustained. Nearly everyone now sees that the tight totalitarian controls under which they are living have not been compensated for by any betterment in living conditions, and are not going to be -- there is little left about which to get disillusioned. There can be no doubt that all classes in China suffered economically during the first two years of the new regime.

The Communist government has public opinion moving against it, and in this sense has on its hands a very different propaganda problem than that which confronted it at first. Its way of attacking this problem has been, at least until very recently, two-fold: (1) to monopolize still further China's communications network, and further intensify its hate drives to maintain at least the semblance of uniformity of opinion, and, failing that, to provide itself with scapegoats for its own failures; and (2) to gain more and more control over various classes of the "people," by imposing upon them a schedule of work, education, and recreation. The end result is that the "people," if not out of gratitude then out of sheer fatigue, find themselves without the will to complain or the power to resist. This fatigue, moreover, helps the regime by providing further arguments for rapid collectivization of all farming, industry, and commerce.

The "Anti-Corruption" Movement

By the end of 1951, most of the landlords and reactionaries had been liquidated, and the government, in order to divert the general feeling of discontent away from the self, was obliged to invoke a new scapegoat. The readiest victim was the business and industrialist class, which had already been drained of much of its wealth but until now had not been subjected to much in the way of physical indignities and/or disgrace. At one time, indeed, Mao Tse-tung had classified the "national capitalists" as a component of the "people" (see his New Democracy).

This class, however, took only part of the new onslaught, for it was also toward the end of 1951 that the "anti-corruption movement" put the heat on rank-and-file government officials and Party cadres, a large number of whom were indicted for bribery, bureaucracy, and profiteering. Some were promptly dismissed from the Party and given prison terms, though comparatively light ones if one considers the large number of persons who have paid with their lives for what most people could call lesser infractions. Since hitherto the Communists had always prided themselves on their bureaucratic integrity and incorruptibility, this was a fairly surprising move. Yet, truly Communists, some of whom had even shared the trials of the Long March and the rigors of the civil war were now accused of having decided that the time had come for them to rest on their laurels and use their positions for personal gain.

But the Chinese Communist Party's anticorruption movement must not be thought of as merely another example of the purges Communist states stage from time to time to safeguard the purity of their ideology and practices against bourgeoisie tendencies on the part of individuals to seek personal comfort and wealth. The movement did bring about such a purge, but with this difference: the denunciations of petty officials were used as a springboard for further persecution of middle-class businessmen and industrialists. Party and government officials, it was alleged, were being deliberately and systematically seduced.
by the businessmen and industrialists in a rearguard action to reinstate capitalism. The real heat was put on the remnants of the propertyed class. In big population centers like Shanghai and Nanking, trucks mounted with loudspeakers moved out through the city every day, and stopped before shop after shop and home after home to broadcast threatening messages to the intended victims. "Mr. So-and-So, we have discovered your crimes. Come down and confess."

Any merchant or industrialist can plausibly be charged with one or more of the five major offenses: bribery, fraud, profiteering, maladministration of government information, or tax evasion, since no merchant or industrialist could conceivably pay all the current taxes and levies and remain in business. The sentence, when the time comes to impose it, varies all the way from a fine, through confiscation of business and property and/or imprisonment, to the death penalty. The latter, however, is used only in a minority of the cases, the aim apparently being to squeeze every cent out of the businessmen and industrialists, and reduce them to a condition of genuine poverty, before taking their lives. Kuomintang reports state that in the first three months of 1952 a sum amounting to sixty million US dollars was exacted from businessmen and industrialists.

The Attack on Creative Artists

The literary and art workers are also under renewed attacks — this is an unexpected move on the part of the government since most writers had been Leftists or Communists even prior to the Communist success on the mainland, and have given every evidence of loyalty to the cause. The new attack, however, had to do not so much with their loyalty as with their effectiveness as propagandists, the premise being that if they are not capable of turning out good propaganda work they are not, however loyal they may be to the Party, fully discharging their duties. The authorities do not, of course, distinguish between good propaganda and good literature; in spite of themselves, therefore, they have adopted the essentially sound position that most of the literary work produced since the liberation is below the prewar level of excellence. The new writers are contenting themselves with products that are routine and stereotyped, and even the established writers like Mao Tun, and Lao She, are producing nothing comparable to their earlier achievements.

On the other hand, the authorities do not see, and are not likely to see, the real reason for this deterioration in the quality of China's literary output. Before the liberation, the Leftist writers wrote primarily as critics and protestants, and the Kuomintang criticized them out of indignation fired by ardent patriotism (which, incidentally, gave them a certain rapport with their potential readers). Now all possibility of criticism and protest is removed; no writer can do anything except praise the "people and their Communist rulers, and attack the reactionary elements." In short, when a writer saw corruption, tyranny, and injustice around him he could write about them, and choose his own ideological sanctions for what he had to say. He could write about real things, that he had really experienced, and communicate his own real feelings and ideas about them. Today a writer can do none of these things, so there is no reason to expect what is written to be other than mediocre. Both Russian and Chinese experience suggest, indeed, the possibility that good Communist literature can be produced only in the negative conditions of capitalist society; literature loses its bite and edge in the Communist state, and is reduced to a mere instrument of flattery.

The official explanation for the mediocrity of current literary output is, of course, quite different. It puts the blame not on the restrictive influence of the regime but on the writers' failure to grasp the essentials of Marxism. And the remedy, says the government, is easy to find: let the literary folk get busy and master those essentials, or, in other words, let them
enter whole-heartedly into the "study and self-remoulding" movement which the Communists have launched among literary and art workers. Immediately after the liberation, most college professors and school teachers underwent a short period of training, after which they promptly wrote essays in self-criticism recanting their earlier errors and showing themselves to be full-fledged Communists. The literary workers were mostly spared this ordeal, presumably because their support for the Communist movement had always been enthusiastic. The Story of Wu Hsien was the turning-point in this attitude; the uncritical praise the film received made it clear that most literary workers were still far from trained in ideology.

The "Self-Remoulding" Movement

The self-remoulding movement for writers and artists has put special emphasis on the study of documents, though not on the ponderous Marxist tomes one might have expected the Communists to select. The reading list rather, includes only the following six small items: (1) Mao Tse-tung, On Practice (July 1937); (2) Mao Tse-tung, Talks at the Yanan Round Table on Literature and Art (2 and 23 May 1942); (3) Peking Jen Min Jih Pao editorial of 20 May 1951, "Importance Should be Attached to the Discussion of the Motion Picture," "The Story of Wu Hsien"; (4) Four Decisions on Literature and Art of the CPSU Central Committee; (5) Zhdanov's reports on the Soviet Periodicals Star and Leningrad; (6) Stalin's Letters to Demyan Bykov (12 December 1930) as reprinted in the Peking Jen Min Jih Pao of 12 August 1951.

Anyone could learn all there is to know about these six items in a few hours, which, however, merely makes more emphatic their unconnected character as a grand directive to writers and artists.

The idea of an ideological remoulding movement of this kind was first expressed at the Third Session of the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council (23 October-1 November 1951). Shortly thereafter, the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles assembled, and formally resolved to take measures against mistaken ideologies, liberalism, the tendency to adopt other than the viewpoint of the working class, and the disregard of criticism and self-criticism among literary and art workers. The movement has since spread to the teachers and professors, who have stepped forward to pledge themselves not to renewed study of the documents and to renewed continuous practice of criticism and self-criticism. Many are attending revolutionary colleges; others are participating in field work of various kinds among adults.

Popular Support

Ultimately, even a Communist government in its most dictatorial phase cannot dispense with popular support; even persecution drives must be made to appear plausible, and likely to pay dividends, to the broad masses of the people. The continuing problem of China's Communist government is that it does not have, and is making scant progress toward getting, such support. The worker, the peasant, and the petty-bourgeois alike — the main components of the "people," if one eliminates, as the Communists now do, the "national capitalists," — find that their lot under Communism is harder work than ever with a smaller real income. It should never be forgotten that it is this problem, and not a concern about the writers and artists as such and for their own sake, that has driven the Communists to undertake the self-remoulding drive, for the problem is so urgent that no bals can be overlooked that might conceivably affect it. The regime needs support among the people; and what the writers and artists have produced hitherto is not getting that support. Therefore, the writers and artists must, so to speak, be retooled, to learn to give ordinary
people a sense of participation in a glorious and dignified enterprise which is worth while even if it does deprive them of the actual rewards of their labor. Unless the writers and artists learn to produce this material, it can safely be predicted that their troubles have only just begun.

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the regime really believes that the writers and artists, even with the professors and teachers thrown in, can win them the popular support their actual program is taking away from them. The Communists' big bets are on spontaneous demonstrations and evidence of loyalty that, by methods other than those of ordinary propaganda, can be caused to bubble up from the ranks of the soldiers, the peasants, and the workers. One can get a picture of these other methods most clearly by examining the daily life of the soldier, peasant, and worker.

**The People's Liberation Army**

The members of the People's Liberation Army enjoy a uniquely advantageous position in Communist China. Although they certainly do deserve the praise lavished on them by some early American sympathizers with Chinese Communism, they are by no means just another Oriental army. If not so courteous, brave, and cultured as the writers mentioned depicted them, their literacy and education is probably well above the average of the Kuomintang army of the past (though not above that in Chiang's best divisions), and there is no doubt that their observable behavior during the period of liberation, besides earning plaudits in the world press, did much to allay popular fears within China. Nor is that all there is to be said in their favor. By and large, they are conscious of their special position in Communist society and of the responsibilities it implies. They have, moreover, shown a genuine eagerness to make something of themselves: off-duty, they live a life more like that of students in other countries than that of soldiers: a life of study, work, and wholesome recreation, with a minimum of gambling and whoremongering.

The Army maintains a wide range of study programs, ranging from literary lessons to political discussion classes. Every soldier is encouraged to study ideology, to read newspapers and current literature, and to engage in singing, dancing, sports, and theatrical performances. Naturally, every effort is made to surround him with the regime's ordinary propaganda in part through such ingenious devices as "trench handbills," "rifle-barrel poems," "bulletinboards," "combat pictorials," and in part by detailing troupes of artists to serve right with the Army on a permanent basis. The latter perform an endless series of concerts, shows, and plays, which simultaneously entertain and propagandize the regular soldiers. The regular soldiers themselves, however, put on amateur performances of their own, and appear to take a genuine interest in so doing. A common form of entertainment is the so-called "soldier-acts-soldier" play, which is a theatrical representation of actual occurrences in daily Army life. Each unit gives its own play of this type, and attempts, once the subject matter has been chosen, to use as performers the soldiers who actually participated in the incident to be described. Such plays are not only good fun both for the actors and the audience; they also serve the useful propagandist purpose of commending model soldiers and educating backward soldiers. According to Communist reports, one unit organized 80 theatrical performances and trained 1,500 amateur theatrical personnel in a bare 60 days. All in all, they staged 111 performances, with 357 different programs. (One reads in the Communist magazine, however, that the "soldier-acts-soldier" plays tend to be stereotyped because of the lack of variety of material.)

Still other performances are given for People's Liberation Army members by ordinary theatrical troupes, musicians, etc., who are organized into special "culture trains" which make stops at a series of military installations. (So-called comfort missions, for example, are
sent regularly to Korea to entertain the "volunteers." [sic] Kuomintang propaganda insists that young women are regularly drafted to accompany these comfort missions, and there are widely circulated stories of the sexual orgies in which they are alleged to participate, and of their allegedly unavoidable infection with VD. In the light of the general Chinese Communist Party attitude toward sex, these stories are by no means improbable.

**Peasants and Workers**

There are similar educational and recreational programs to make the peasants and workers cooperative and conscious of their dignified place in the Communist regime. Most workers and peasants are illiterate, and are more aware of illiteracy as a brand of inferiority than illiterates in other countries because in China the positions of privilege have always been reserved only for the learned. The Communists know what they are doing, therefore, in offering them, in lieu of material rewards, opportunities to learn and encouragement to make use of them. Literacy classes and part-time schools for adults are, therefore, springing up everywhere. According to Kuo Mo-po's report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Committee, attendance at part-time schools for workers reached a total of 1,780,000 in 1951 and over 25 million peasants enrolled in 1950-51 in the 220,000 winter schools provided for them. Kuo predicts that illiteracy among industrial workers will be wiped out in three years and that among peasants in five or six years if the program continues at its present pace.

Three kinds of training are now available for workers: general educational courses, political training courses, and technical courses. From the literacy class in his factory, workshop or mine, the worker can proceed to a part-time primary school, thence to a part-time middle school. A select group of industrial workers and cadres of worker or peasant origin are permitted to attend a specially planned two- or three-year "concentration" elementary education course, go on from it to secondary-school training for a full four years, and, according to the present plan, will then attend universities or advanced technical schools.

For a number of reasons, plans of the kind described must be written down as pipe-dreams. The existing part-time schools provide only the most elementary types of instruction, and for that reason the regime can afford them, since from its point of view they will be better workers if they are literate, know something about Communist ideology, and command such simple technical information as is involved in their jobs. For the same reason, i.e., the elementary character of the instruction, the worker can afford the time for it and can "stand" it. But if and when it becomes really, instead of merely theoretically, a matter of having workers, following 8 to 10 hours work in a factory, 8 days after-day for year-after-year to learn things that are not elementary, it will be a different story both for the regime and for the worker. Few adults have the will and physical energy needed to maintain such a schedule. Of those who do, by no means all will have either the patience to stand being put through difficult materials, or the native intelligence to deal with them. As the material gets more difficult its relation to day-to-day activities becomes more tenuous, and under Communism one's wages do not go up pari passu with one's educational load. Nor, if the regime behaves rationally, can it afford such a program; there is a point of diminishing returns beyond which it becomes training that people do not need and from which there can be, consequently, no demonstrable returns. It seems safe to predict that the plans for workers' education will be scaled down as the years pass.

The regime, on the other hand, have something to gain from the training of workers and peasants who have middle school educations already, and of cadres of worker or peasant origin who have middle school educations, to take up posts of real responsibility. The
sent regularly to Korea to entertain the "volunteers." Kuo Min-tang propaganda insists that young women are regularly drafted to accompany these comfort missions, and there are widely circulated stories of the sexual orgies in which they are alleged to participate, and of their allegedly unavoidable infection with VD. In the light of the general Chinese Communist Party attitude toward sex, these stories are by no means improbable.

Peasants and Workers

There are similar educational and recreational programs to make the peasants and workers cooperative and conscious of their dignified place in the Communist regime. Most workers and peasants are illiterate, and are more aware of illiteracy as a breed of inferiority than illiterates in other countries because in China the positions of privilege have always been reserved only for the learned. The Communists know what they are doing, therefore, in offering them, in lieu of material rewards, opportunities to learn and encouragement to make use of them. Literacy classes and part-time schools for adults are, therefore, springing up everywhere. According to Kuo Mo-jo's report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Committee, attendance at spare-time schools for workers reached a total of 1,780,000 in 1931 and over 25 million peasants enrolled in 1950-51 in the 290,000 winter schools provided for them. Kuo predicts that illiteracy among industrial workers will be wiped out in three years and that among peasants in five or six years if the program continues at its present pace.

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The regime does, on the other hand, have something to gain from the training of workers and peasants who have middle school educations already, and of cadres of worker or peasant origin who have middle school educations, to take up posts of real responsibility The
People's University of Peking was founded (in February 1950) to meet precisely this need. It is divided into eight departments: economics, planned economy, credit and finance, trade, cooperatives, factory administration, law, and foreign affairs. The student has from two to four years to complete the curriculum of one of these departments. It is estimated that half of the university's 3,000 students come from the ranks of the working class. Significantly, its faculty has a considerable sprinkling of professors imported from the USSR.

Workers, like soldiers, are encouraged to express themselves through literary and artistic productions, especially those having to do with the theater. Plays written by workers, for example Wei Lien-chu's No Longer a Cuckoo, have received widespread attention.

Trade unions' and workers' associations have been created in all industrial centers. China now has a total of 5,130,000 organized workers, as compared to only 500,000 in 1945.

The regime has a large program in creating of "recreation centers" for workers. At present there are 26 "workers' palaces of culture," and 3,100 urban workers' clubs. The palaces of culture have excellent sports and recreation facilities, libraries, and spacious rooms for exhibitions of movies and works of art. They undoubtedly give the workers a feeling of importance they have never had. The Palace of Culture at Peking, for example, is located in a former Imperial Palace Building, and the one in Shanghai occupies what was once the Great Eastern Hotel.

On the other hand, nothing could be clearer than that all these recreational and educational facilities, set up ostensibly for the workers' welfare, are actually means of controlling them during their leisure hours. The worker lives his entire life in the artificial atmosphere of Communist "culture." The group pressure on him obliges him to participate in the various activities and, gradually, to transform his personality in accordance with them, whether he wishes to or not. In 1950, for example, 220 literary and artistic groups were formed in Shanghai, with 16,000 workers participating. The Shanghai Workers' Palace of Culture provides its members lectures, films, and classes in technical and political subjects, dancing, chess, and table tennis; if he wants to read a book, he has at his disposal a library of 70,000 volumes. The individual worker finds that everybody around him is doing one thing or another in the name of culture and progress, and he feels he must also do so.

The workers have been extremely active in support of various government campaigns. In March 1951, for example, 660,000 Shanghai workers participated in demonstrations against the alleged American rearmament of Japan. Such demonstrations should not, however, be taken as evidence that the regime has won over the workers. The Chinese Communist Party cultivates the workers for the same reason that, according to the Marxist, dictates employer behavior toward the workers in capitalist countries: namely, to speed up production and thus cut costs of production. Periodically, for example, workers are compelled to accept "voluntary wage-cuts." Great energies are poured into the promotion of emulation drives, in which one team of factory hands challenges another to outstrip it in production. Model workers, or labor heroes, turn up at convenient intervals who "voluntarily" assume a double work load, without regard to the consequences to their health. The model workers are feted and publicized, to encourage others to imitate them. Those who fail to participate in the emulation drives run afoul of public opinion, and are denounced as "backward elements." Up to the moment, at least, this method seems to work and, as far as costs of production are concerned, it perhaps produces some immediate results. But predictable long-term results are mounting tension for the workers and their permanent alienation from the regime.

The peasants have been given the same treatment — education combined with stepped-up exploitation — with a view to making them docile and hard-working supporters of the government. They have, however, proved less easy to handle than the intellectuals and
workers. Once the Communist promise of a happy and prosperous life as a result of land reform had clearly failed to be kept, discontent became general in the rural districts. This discontent has been kept alive from day to day by the traditional components of the peasants’ lot in China: heavy taxes, famine, disease, and epidemics. There have been, in consequence, numerous peasant uprisings; for example, in March 1952, a revolt occurred in a model village in Honan, in which armed peasants killed Communist officials, and considerable numbers of peasants were, in turn, killed by Communist troops. Such revolts have continued at intervals.

One might infer from all this that the Chinese peasants are in no mood for such frivolities as education and fun-making. But the Communist authorities deny this. According to them, the peasants are all eager to learn, to participate in group activities, and to cooperate with the regime in every possible way. They claim that membership in peasant associations in the Administrative Areas of East, Central South, Southwest, and Northwest China has grown to over 93 million. Military forces in the same areas, they add, have reached a strength of 7,562,330, and in the winter of 1950–51 the number of peasants attending winter school rose to over 25 million. In 1951, attendance at regular nighttime schools, again according to official statistics, exceeded 11 million, and 14,000 rural primary schools were set up in North Szechwan alone. Newspapers, as has been pointed out, now reach the rural areas by mail, and blackboard newspapers have become a standing feature in village life. In the East China area alone there are said to be more than one hundred thousand such blackboards. Movies are exhibited even in the smallest villages, and theatrical troupes make brief appearances in the rural areas. New cultural pursuits and practices have been encouraged, most particularly artistic, literary, and theatrical activities on the peasants’ part, and at least one peasant writer, Ch’en Teng-k’o, has been widely acclaimed. Having written two novels, Ch’en is now studying at the Central Literary Institute in Peking, where young writers of peasant, worker, and soldier origin are being trained. New peasant festivities are replacing the old ones. Both the winter schools and the nighttime schools are so planned as to get across the rudiments of Communist ideology. A new-type farmer’s almanac has been published, which instead of pandering to peasant superstitions, provides useful information about farming and hygiene.

PROPAGANDA AND REALITY

Reliability of Communist Statistics

All the statistics considered here are taken from Communist sources. They are not particularly reliable, in part because the Communists never hesitate to juggle figures to prove a point, and in part because the facilities for compiling accurate statistics do not exist in China. The statistical fact, moreover, is not the same thing as the actual fact, even if it is accurately reported. The number of winter schools now functioning in rural districts, for example, even if reported with strict accuracy, merely whets one’s curiosity. How many of them are functioning in reasonably adequate buildings? How many of them have generated, among the habit- and custom-bound peasants of their locality, any real interest in the kind of training offered? How many of them, in view of what one knows about China’s long-time shortage of teachers, are staffed with men and women who are competent to handle the subject matters involved. In short, the main thing wrong with Communist statistics — the number of workers participating in emulation drives, the number of peasants attending school, the number of intellectuals and students undergoing ideological reform — is that they tell things one knows to be untrue because they cannot be squared with facts of another order: the massacres, imprisonments and suicides, the seizures and liquidations of
private industrial and business enterprises, the large numbers of unemployed, the droughts, floods, epidemics, the ruthless behavior of the Communist cadres, the evidence of Communist tyranny, and mismanagement in general.

Communist spokesmen, be sure, talk knowingly of the price a country must pay in order to "advance" and become a full-fledged Communist state, and find it easy to justify even the evils which, unlike the droughts, floods, and epidemics, flow demonstrably from deliberate Communist policy. But this does not dispose of the contradiction between reality as the Chinese live it and the propaganda picture of reality with which the regime tries to make life tolerable for them. The contradiction is so great as to make it possible to accept confidently that the propaganda effort has, up to the present, failed with the broad masses of the people. For, despite the temporary surges of enthusiasm that it generates, it is based on certain fundamental tactical miscalculations that ultimately will catch up with it, and alienate the masses altogether. Concretely, the Communists have failed, in their propaganda, to make adequate allowances for the foreseeable psychological consequences of the fatigue and boredom their policies are calculated to produce, and of the hatred and fear they deliberately manufacture. A word might be written about each of these miscalculations.

The Facts

Most Chinese now live on a bare subsistence level, or worse; as a matter of simple biological fact, they do not get enough food to see them through their day's work. To ask them, therefore, to participate in a heavy daily round of activities after working hours, the Communists' method of keeping them under control, is simply to hasten the moment at which they will be unable to carry on at all. If one is dead tired at the end of the day's work, he does not want to go to the theater and be amused; much less does he want to take part in a parade and shout slogans. If he feels that the major reason for his fatigue is that he is not getting enough to eat, and the people who ask him to go to the parade and shout slogans are the same people who determine how much he gets to eat, his fatigue is, at some point, pretty certain to be compounded by resentment. In this context, the decline of Yangge dancing since the liberation is a fact of great significance; people are too preoccupied with the problem of making ends meet, to enjoy themselves. Malnutrition and overwork are taking their visible toll in many ways, not the least of which is the steady spread of epidemics and disease over many parts of China. Nor can the Communists think better of all this tomorrow or the next day and decrease the pressure on people — keeping them less busy after working hours, and letting them at least get some rest and relaxation. The government is, with good reason, so jealous of its power and so apprehensive about its stability that it simply cannot afford to leave people to their own designs. They must be "entertained" and, while being entertained, indoctrinated, and at such a pace that the entertainment soon ceases, unavoidably, to be fun because it consumes time and energy in the same way work does. To complain about the burden is, furthermore, to betray symptoms of "bourgeois mentality." Since work is a sacred and satisfying duty, as the Communists insist it is, a man does not, properly speaking, need to relax at the end of the day.

The Future

One must, to be sure, distinguish between the short- and long-term effects of this policy. The strategy of fatigue, of keeping everybody worn to a frazzle, does temporarily produce a state of unreflecting docility about the burdens imposed on them and the sacrifices exacted from them. But the predictable long-term result is that people will run out of energy to a point where something must give way. The day of reckoning cannot be sidestepped.
Similar considerations apply to the strategy of fear and hatred as the Communists are practicing it. In proportion as popular discontent grows, the government relies increasingly on people's organizations and their programs to bolster morale and counteract indifference; and the statistics of participation in these organizations might seem to indicate that the people have welcomed them. To draw this conclusion would be, however, to overlook the extent to which people participate because they are afraid not to, or because their feelings of resentment about their living conditions have been temporarily diverted from their real object and fixed upon the victims of whatever hate drive happens to be under way. If the people are wore off before than, the Communist solution is to drum up hatred -- for the US, for the Kuomintang, for the counterrevolutionaries, for the wicked landlords and merchants -- and then give people an opportunity to vent their hatred through their respective people's organizations. So long as it works, this method does indeed keep people acquiescing in the Communist regime. The trouble with it is two-fold. In the first place, at some point one runs out of scapegoats, or at least plausible ones, because they have all been eliminated. In the second place, there comes a moment — and this brings one to the strategy of fear — when everyone except the very poorest worker and peasant feels that his turn as the victim may come next. Hitler blamed the Jews for Germany's difficulties; for the most part, non-Jews did not have to be afraid. But in a country of homogeneous race and of uniform poverty like China, one cannot single out groups for persecution without creating great and widespread anxiety as to where the lightning will strike next. Practically the whole of China is today in the grip of that kind of anxiety.

In a word, nothing can be more certain than that the outward signs of enthusiasm for and conformity with the Communist government are largely expressions either of fear or of temporarily misdirected hatred. Both at work and at play, people are in effect saying to themselves: "This I do for the good reason that by doing it I may save my skin, or at least endanger that of my enemy."

Some critics have reproached the Chinese for not having had the courage to resist the tyranny described in these pages. The answer to this reproach is that in a police state revolution can be crushed so easily that courage of the kind in question is pointless. Everybody except, paradoxically, the group that is said to have benefited most from the regime, i.e., the peasants, who have expressed their discontent in small uprisings, has indeed tamely followed the Communist lead and performed whatever duties and tasks assigned them. For a long while, however, the Communists had on their side the sentiment for a strong and independent China, and it remains to be seen how much of the docility of the Chinese populace, up to a fairly recent date, was attributable to that fact. For the dominating considerations for obedience and collaboration are simply fatigue and fear, and the mood of the populace has shifted from spontaneous enthusiasm to external conformity, indifference, and even open hostility. It is, therefore, the next months and years that are crucial from the standpoint of a popular revolt on a scale sufficiently large to prevent the Communists' crushing it overnight. The regime can survive in the long run only if it is really possible for a government to last indefinitely without the confidence and support of the governed.

A SELECTED READING LIST
CHAPTER 12

HUMOR

INTRODUCTION

Western Perspectives

For over a hundred years now, businessmen, missionaries, journalists, and tourists from the West reporting on China have shown new facets of what they regard as a picturesque and at times intractable people. The temptation, for all these observers, has been to cater to the demand for the exotic and strange. They overlook the simple fact that the Chinese, like other peoples, are primarily engaged in satisfying basic needs such as hunger, sex, and affection, and that those of their characteristics that seem bizarre and inexplicable are due to enforced adaptation to circumstances beyond their control. Many foreigners report, for example, that the Chinese are insensitive to pain, noise, smell, molestation by noxious insects, and the spectacle of subhuman existence around them. But the Chinese are inured to these out of necessity rather than out of choice (the ready proof of this is that returned students who have enjoyed the benefits of modern plumbing in the United States are even more squeamish than the foreigner in China about filth and noise). The need for comfort is a permanent human craving; and, despite overpopulation, the majority of Chinese do manage to be comfortable.

In finding fault with other perspectives on China, the apologists for Chinese culture, both native and foreign, have taken pains to present their own picture of supposedly typical individuals. Their version, however, while justified by the historical examples supplied by philosophers, religionists, men of letters, and statesmen, is perhaps even more unrealistic about ordinary people in China. The type of epicurean Taoist gentleman, humorously tolerant of stupidity and superstition and infinitely resourceful in his enjoyment of life (tea, food, poetry, nature, and the company of charming women) — the type fondly depicted in the writings of Lin Yutang — once gained disproportionate amounts of attention from Western readers. This was easy to explain, this ideal Chinese gentleman somehow taught a lesson to the average American who in his perpetual rush and preoccupation with business had forgotten the minor pleasures and graces of life. Lin Yutang's trick was an old one. Voltaire and Goldsmith once used the Chinese gentleman to teach their compatriots about democracy and tolerance, only at that time the gentleman was depicted as Confucian rather than Taoist.

The genuinely distinguishing characteristics of the Chinese are those resulting from peculiar systems of religion and ethics and from long-standing usages regarding human relations. To the observer of fifty years ago, they had all the permanence of second nature; but in the subsequent steady replacement of old values and ideas by new, and in the resulting compromise, the task of social psychology has become increasingly difficult. No one should have the temerity to describe the Chinese without first breaking them down according to region, type, education, and occupation. Many foreigners were limited in their studies of these matters by imperfect knowledge and by a narrow range of acquaintance and observation. Carl Crow's Four Hundred Million Customers is a very shrewdly descriptive book,
But a more correct title for it would be The Buying Habits of Chinese in Shanghai and Vicinity, Especially with Regard to Foreign Goods. Many other foreigners have written books about the Chinese, making sweeping application of data obtained from their first-hand observations of their Chinese household: the cook, amah (nunno), coolie, and chauffeur. They do not know, however, that these frugal, ineradicable, and, by Western standards, often dishonest creatures, would have behaved very differently in the company of their family and friends.

Humor and Laughter in Human Behavior

Humor is one of the commodities which have been handled around by writers on the Chinese character. Some of them have endeavored, quite in vain it seems, to produce specious evidence of a particular brand of Chinese humor. Insofar as humor denotes a particular way of sizing up and relishing a character, situation or event, Chinese humor is different from American or British humor only to the extent that certain characters and situations, which are subjected to a humorous interpretation in China, are not so subjected in Britain or the United States. Either the British and Americans seldom meet with these characters and situations or they regard these characters and situations in a different light. And with due allowance for different social usages and customs, the characters and situations which humor feeds upon are more universal than some sociologists seem to believe.

It is sometimes not remembered that laughter is often an evidence of malicious self-assertion. Laughter was a sign of victory; physiologically it accompanied and aided in the relaxation of the nerves and muscles after a tense struggle or fight. In time laughter became associated with the external signs of injury in others—a broken nose, a black eye, or a maimed leg. The injured party with his telltale signs of humiliation was a potential enemy of no particular danger. This is ridicule; and it is still the typical form of laughter indulged in by children of all nations. With the transference of the field of combat from the physical to the intellectual, wit emerged. It is characteristic of any form of wit that it presupposes an opponent and an audience. The riddle, historically the oldest form of wit, is primarily a contest of cognitive skills.

Another form of laughter has as its imaginary enemy not the inferior object of ridicule but the powerful repressive forces of society. By ridiculing these forces of order and decency, one can let off steam and help preserve his mental health. Thus, while half of the American jokes consist in ridicule at the expense of the inferior, the other half are directed against the clergy, the bureaucracy, and the taboos regulating the behavior of the sexes. It is a tribute to puritanism that jokes about sex and human anatomy are so hugely enjoyed in this country.

Humor is the most civilized form of laughter because it treats its object of ridicule with affection. When a child tries to walk and stumbles, the smiling response from its mother is a sign of humor—ridicule tempered with love. The humorist, therefore, finds constant amusement in the weaknesses and pecadilloes of his friends and himself. Insofar as this is ridicule, the humorist holds himself superior, though he entertaining other aims than demolishing the enemy. The professional humorist engages the reader's interest by chatting about himself, often in deliberately fictional terms, and about his equally fictitious friends which the public has learned to love.

Chinese Laughter and Humor

This classification of laughter can be used to gauge the degree of humane refinement in Chinese laughter. The Chinese are a noisy people supremely gifted with the sense of the ridiculous, from this, many writers have drawn the conclusion that the Chinese are an emi-
nently humorous nation. This statement, however, can only be accepted if one adulterates the content of humor to include any form of childish laughter. Clearly it takes education to adopt the humorous attitude — to be generous and to free oneself, for however short a duration, from the combative instincts which impose seriousness and inhibit laughter. At the same time, to be humorous is to be condescending. The number of Chinese who can adopt the attitude of generous condescension cannot be large. Thus while the educated Chinese, in their intercourse with Westerners often strike the latter with their abundance of humor, the Chinese masses, with little humane education, are at best merely potential humorists because their laughter has not advanced into the stage of humor. Their laughter often echoes that of the caveman who has just finished thrashing his opponent. This can be observed in the daily social life of the Chinese and in the type of jokes and stories which they enjoy.

**Chinese Idiosyncrasies**

Despite the fact that the Chinese have been very scrupulous in the exercise of life or propriety, they have lacked instruction in the essence of courtesy, that is, a respect for privacy and idiosyncrasy. The Chinese still retain a childish delight in taking notice of any physical and moral deviation from the norm; their fellow creatures, so unfortunate as to be physically deformed and disabled, are usually objects of ridicule. Thus the blind, the deaf, the hunchback, the bald, and the pock-faced are laughed at openly. This sense of ridicule is also directed against persons who claim to possess special knowledge or power or who live an abnormal existence: the doctor, the teacher, the magistrate, the monk. The Chinese simply cannot believe that a monk can really abstain from sexual love or from eating the flesh of animals. Hence the numerous jokes about the amorous and meat-loving monk. In a sense laughter is a social corrective in that it unconsciously follows the Confucian maxim in checking both excessive zeal or holiness, and lax morals and indulgence. It also upholds the proper conduct for each person in his station so that the courtier or elevated gentleman is always subjected to ridicule because he forfeits sympathy by his lack of authority over his wife.

**ImmatURITY and Ridicule**

But the Chinese often go beyond the limits of corrective laughter to forms of extreme childishness. Thus any person whose dialect and dress deviate from those around him is an object of open curiosity. For many decades, the Westerner with his prominent nose and hairy body was stared at by the Chinese villagers. It is customary for the city dwellers to laugh at the men in the country, especially when the city dwellers, through no merit of their own, have learned to turn on and off the switches, and to get used to modern ways of living. In a city of sufficient self-importance like Shanghai, any deviation from the norm is a call for ridicule. Many comic emin men a living there solely by their ability to imitate and burlesque the dialects of Soochow, Wush, Yum-hsen (Ningpo), Nanking, or Shantung.

This childish, and often malicious inquisitiveness, goes at times so far as to preclude any possibility of humor and to cause extreme discomfort to the victim. English public schools have been notorious for their hulless. But in Chinese schools, almost every school boy is at one time or another the object of unwelcome attention. A student wearing a new gown to school will invariably receive impertinent jeering; thus some girls who have trunks full of new dresses at home would resolutely refuse to wear anything but blue cotton garments in order to avoid unwelcome publicity. Rarely does a person having a new haircut escape being reminded of the fact or being patted on the head by his fellow-students. A student seen with a date in a theater on Saturday will be an object of animated interest.
he will often be required to conciliate his tormentors by treating them to candies or ice cream. If his date happens to be his classmate, the furor created will reach even bigger proportions. Many sensitive girls, therefore, refuse to have dates in high school simply because they want to avoid this public exposure and the embarrassing consequences.

This public inhibition of the individual's right to do what he pleases is really the reverse of humor, which implies a more detached and tolerant view of other people's activities. Thus one may say of the average Chinese that he retains the unconscious naiveté of the child. Like the child, when his laughter is not purely negative — the ridicule or disapproval of other people's physiognomy, intelligence, or behavior — he takes delight in any demonstration of cleverness, in the form of mechanical ingenuity, verbal wit, or in a well-manipulated situation in which one person outsmarts another. Any Western gadget, properly exploited, finds a ready market in large Chinese cities, whatever its utility. Much of the ancient Chinese writing which passed for humor usually consisted of records of clever sayings and stratagems, which give the weak an edge over the strong. The earliest "humorists" whose lives are included in the "Historical Records" were court jesters who by farfetched analogies stereotyped their masters out of the path of folly. Because of the Taoist distrust of brute force, the Chinese came to admire cleverness; many of the comic folk heroes are not unlike Culenstiegel in their resourcefulness in cheating the stupid and putting one over on the smart. In popular fiction the beloved heroes are always infinitely resourceful in military and diplomatic stratagems. The way Chu-ko Liang obtains arrows from his enemies by launching into the river, during a foggy night, boats manned by straw men drawing the fire of enemy archers, is not exactly humor, but a kind of cleverness that is exhilarating to the Chinese mind. The reader shares with Chu-ko Liang a sense of triumph which is akin to laughter. Likewise, the Chinese heroes in adventure fiction are not merely men of prowess whom ordinary mortals could hope to imitate. An American boy tries to become a baseball player or cowboy hero; a Chinese boy, or for that matter, a Chinese adult, by reading about beings defying every law of mortal probability, turns away from combative cleverness to a region of comic fantasy and pastoral justice. The most resourceful of Chinese heroes, the Monkey in The Journey to the West, is in this sense a supreme comic creation.

Effects of Environment

The laughter of the Chinese masses is often childish and primitive; this is one of the reasons for ascribing to the Chinese race its perpetual youth. But more important than the lack of humane education in the inhibition of the Chinese sense of humor is the serious business of living in an overpopulated land. This is especially true since the impact of commercial and industrial civilization has thrown the people off their balance, and the old division of labor no longer obtains. Most people, even after high school, are not specifically qualified for any job; hence their only chance of securing a position is through exploitation of their relatives. Humor no longer rules where there is tension of any kind existing between a group of people. The avid kind of ceremoniousness with which a person in an inferior position defer to his superior, the kind of supercilious arrogance with which the latter treats the former, and the kind of external courtesy and covert distrust and jealousy among persons of similar rank aspiring for promotion are humor-eclipsing phenomena in a country where there is not a rice-bowl for everybody. This observation holds more or less true of every country, but this kind of tension is particularly noticeable in a city like Shanghai where the struggle for survival claims all one's waking faculties.
Modern Efforts at Humor

All this serious business of living, however, constitutes a source of "unconscious" humor to a good-tempered onlooker, foreign or Chinese. Life in a Chinese city where the new and old ways make for incongruous contrasts is a source of infinite fun; modern and medieval vehicles crawl at the same pace during the perpetual traffic jam, and people are alternately on guard and out of temper, using both the most polite and the most vile of language. In that sense China is a rich land of humor, not because the people have adopted the humorous attitude but rather because they can be objects of humorous contemplation.

During the thirties, when Lin Yutang re-emphasized humor in China, the nation suddenly became humor-conscious. Writers found no difficulty in caricaturing and ridiculing the two obvious national weaknesses and vices as embodied in typical characters like the warlord, the government official, the Confucian gentleman, the pot-bellied merchant, the self-important returned student, the petty clerk, the conscientious Leftist writer, and the country bumpkin. Most of the writers, however, stopped at the sketch or essay and did not create a sustained humorous vision of modern Chinese life. The early humorous novels of Lao Sheh and Chang T'ien-yeh, real today, often seem merely facetious and the element of contempt is too palpable behind the mechanical manipulation of simple humor. It is a pity that republican China did not produce a Dickens, for surely no comic novelist could have a richer field for observation than in the panoramas of modern Chinese life.

The Humorists

Who are China's humorists, then? Anyone who is sufficiently enlightened to see the hollowness of form and jargon, the absurdity of popular superstition and of schemes for national salvation, the incongruity of fact and pretension. By education and temperament, the scholar is equipped to fill that role, provided, of course, he is not too much concerned with personal gain or advancement. Lin Yutang inclines to think that all war lords and important officials in China are humorists; this observation is subject to criticism to the extent that humor must be disinterested. The Chinese war lords and officials are not disinterested: their tongue-in-cheek compliance with hollow forms and sentiments is not so much a product of humor as a camouflage to hide their more seedy dealings for power and wealth. Their thoroughly cynical realism is such that their humor is merely incidental.

The traditional Chinese humorists were usually retired officials and scholars unsuccessful in the civil examinations. Their attitude of detachment and their independent incomes helped them to enjoy the luxury of humor. A person concerned with pressing problems such as hunger finds it hard to see the ludicrous in his surroundings. The Poet T'ao Yuan-ming, who was one of China's subtlest humorists, said upon resigning a petty post that he "would not bend his back for five bushels of rice"; in fact he had already a nice little farm and could thus afford to take things philosophically. Evidence of literary humor in China was sporadic until the Ming dynasty when the scholars, disgusted with the official prescription for the eight-legged essay, turned to the familiar essay. The intimate relationship between literary genre and expression is such that, until the discovery of the informal style, genial self-expression was difficult to achieve in China. Folk humor, however, was excellently taken care of by the novel and drama, jokes, and anecdotes.

The Chinese scholar-humorist is invariably a Taoist hedonist. He has none of Dickens' extroverted interest in other people, but takes pains to describe the minor pleasures and disappointments in his own life. He is often a humorist merely in the sense that he takes a philosophical, tolerant attitude toward the world's follies, superstitions, and ambitions. He conceives happiness in terms of seclusion and is primarily interested in nature and in direct sensual pleasures such as listening to the wind among the bamboo leaves or sipping a good
A cup of tea made of water from a pellucid spring. He acts on the Taoist conviction that the complex human relationships are a big bother and that enjoyment of life comes only by stripping life to its bare essentials. His exploration of reality does not, however, take him to the realm of moral scruples and decisions, which challenges the greater writers.

Because humor enjoys a high place in social intercourse, its modern promoters often claim it for an analogous importance in literature. With few exceptions, however, the professional humorist is always a minor writer. He proceeds on the assumption that man is a lovable creature and concocts a literary formula which flatters the reader's sense of superiority. His world is as mentally snug as the world of women's magazines with its cute babies, cozy living rooms, and gleaming refrigerators. It is symptomatic of the modern age that, whereas satire has long enjoyed a classical literary status, the cult of humor was a comparatively recent phenomenon. Satire is akin to the trite view of life in seeing the bestial qualities in man which need chastisement and correction. Jonson, Molière, Pepys, and Swift all took a serious view of mankind and would not tolerate the smugness of the New Yorker, Punch, and their modern Chinese parodies. One explanation for the belated development of literary humor in China was the Confucian emphasis on satire and didacticism. The comic portions in the Chinese novels are always satirical rather than humorous.

Ceremony and Behavior

Humor is the antithesis of pomp, hypocrisy, and formalism. Its democratic message is that for the human animal all attempts to maintain honor and dignity are slightly ridiculous. It may even be said that man was at first led to the humorous viewpoint by his perception of the ridiculous in form and ritual. This is especially descriptive of humor in China, where there used to be so much stress on ceremonious behavior. An educated Chinese kowtowed to his elders and idols in good grace, though objectively he was capable of admitting that genuflection is a ridiculous posture. He could not, therefore, understand why the early British envoys to China should protest so strongly against kowtowing to the Manchu Emperor. In his view, the representatives of the British government should at least have the grace to put up with an old Chinese custom if they really wanted to establish trade relations with China; whereas the British considered kowtowing to a pagan monarch a serious diminution of their honor.

Long inured to ceremonies and superstitious practices, the modern Chinese have become suspicious of any government-imposed formality or cant. One of the Kuomintang's greatest failures was the institution of the Monday Memorial Service to Sun Yat-sen along the lines of worship in Protestant churches. On every Monday there used to be such services held in the auditoriums of government buildings and schools. After a mumbling recitation of Dr. Sun's last will, the assembly are then told to keep three minutes of silence to meditate on the martyrdom of the revolution and the state of national crisis. What is registered during that period of silence, actually lasting not more than one minute, however, is sheer boredom or vacuity of mind. This irreverent reaction to the memorial service existed because the participants were people of some education and had by long experience become weary of cant and hypocrisy.

The situation changes with regard to religious worship at home where the womenfolk and the older people still take Buddhist and Confucian rites seriously. Until recently, the code which established proper social distance between age and youth, father and son, was still rigidly maintained. The American boy is often encouraged to call his uncle's and father's friends by their first names. The Chinese boy is uneasy in the presence of his elders because he does not enjoy such freedom; he is expected to be quiet and docile and to be able to greet all his elder relatives according to an intricate nomenclature indicating age, rank,
and blood relation, which in itself is quite a task. The Confucian code regulating the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is particularly unsatisfactory. It compensates the older woman, who is naturally jealous of the transference of affection on her son's part, by imposing on the younger woman excessive duties and shows of regard. The resulting ceremony between the two is one of the most humorless aspects of Chinese life.

The viewpoint on honor is often the reverse of that on humor. Everyone now grants that dueling was one of the most stupid European institutions; to settle an issue by sword or pistol shot puts a high premium on honor to the exclusion of more realistic values. It is a tribute to Chinese realism and humor that since the end of feudal times, more than 2000 years ago, a rigorous code of honor has not been part of the Chinese social system, where more amiable ways of settling arguments prevailed. The Chinese equivalent of European honor is the conception of "face"—a more flexible commodity because it allows for the operation of humor.

"Face"

A person's "face" is the aggregate of his rights and privileges due to his age, rank, and wealth. A rich man has a bigger face than his chauffeur; and the latter, in turn, has a bigger face than the ordinary pedicab driver. A person loses face if by his own actions and the actions of other people he feels that his social position has been lowered and his integrity impaired. The face of a bank clerk is irrepairably lost if he is discovered as an embezzler. But most cases involving the issue of face are of a less drastic character and can be settled through proper social procedures. The temptation of a face-conscious Chinese is to act so as to overstep his privileges and rights and override ordinary considerations of law and justice. This is especially the vice of the influential who know that by their special position and wealth they can overstretch the skin of their face without ever breaking it. The Chinese soldiers often go to theater without paying for it. Somehow the right of free admittance is felt to be a special honor to the soldier; by refusing to pay, he deliberately exposes or imperils his face in order to make the theater manager take any action against him. The latter usually recognizes that the soldier's face is more important than the revenue due the theater management. In China, the face-giver is always the humorous person who allows for the human factors in a situation; the face-demander, being honorable, is the humorless person. The question of face will not arise if humor has been reciprocal. A quarrel arises when two parties are humorless. China will be much better off if there are more jest fights and law suits; the custom of pampering the wishes of the face-conscious person has led to many typical national vices.

Pride and Feelings

When the pride of a person is hurt, it is always very difficult for him to accept the situation with equanimity. The Western code demands that if a person hits you you should hit back. Many Westerners have observed the supposed cowardliness of the Chinese on the ground that a Chinese quarrel usually stops at the stage of vile language and rarely consists of blows and kicks. A system of vile language was invented to give humorous allowances for injured feelings. If a person of little face and less muscular strength is insulted, his only recourse is to grumble or shout, in front of his opponent or behind his back, using phrases reflecting on his health, reputation, and family. By uttering the typical Chinese curse implying that he has slept or is going to sleep with the bully's mother, he automatically assumes the position of father in relation to his opponent. This, admittedly, is only incompletely resolved humor; because, no matter how the victim laughs off the matter, his ego is still hurt. This humor of the weak is prevalent in China and is aptly caught in the symbol
of Ah Q in Lu Hsun's famous story. Ah Q is also made to symbolize China of recent decades, which in the face of foreign aggression and internal disorder, has taken refuge in various forms of "spiritual consolation."

THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMOR

To a detached observer, China is a land of rich unconscious humor. The average Chinese enjoys various forms of ridicule and laughter which do not have the dignity or charity of humor. Conscious Chinese humor seeks idiocy, irony, jest, and hyperbole. In situations where questions of honor and pride are involved, the Chinese often have recourse to partially humorous solutions such as face-saving and Ah Q'sm. Much has been written about different types of national humor; upon a closer examination, however, they can be adequately accounted for by different social conventions and usages. This is readily proved by the fact that slapstick comedies manufactured in Hollywood have a ready market in every nation in the world whereas sophisticated comedies whose appreciation requires a fuller knowledge of American manners are not so welcome. Charlie Chaplin, Harold Lloyd, and Laurel and Hardy were once household names in China because their antics appeal a universal language and exploit the fundamental risible situation of a small man caught in a situation too big for him. Humor also benefits from cultural contact. The influence of American humor and slapstick comedies is perceptible in Chinese magazines and moviemaking. The Physio-Psychology of Man

Though humor is universal, the observation that certain nations have more sense of humor and others have less is still a true one. This is not so much a matter of inherent racial disposition as of conscious guidance of character development by responsible educators and politicians. Modern physio-psychology classifies man according to three types: viscerotonic, somatotonic and cerebrotonic. In rough translation into lay language, they stand for the "belly" type, the "muscles" type, the "brain" type. The "belly" type, extravert and convivial, is the promoter of genial laughter; the "brain" type, while less inclined to conviviality, is not incapable of wit or humor. It is the muscular person who is the potential enemy of society because his chief interest in life consists in the exercise of power over his fellow-men. He is psychologically devoid of humor because he is incapable of admitting personal weakness or inferiority. In the traditional Chinese social order the aggressive tendencies of the muscular type were held under check and the types held up for imitation have always been the Confucian scholar, the Confucian gentleman squire, the Buddhist or Taoist recluse. Modern Germany, on the other hand, is relatively humorless. For the past hundred years it has been exploiting the aggressive tendencies of the muscular person and promoting a philosophy which sanctions their behavior in the supposed interests of the nation or race. The German people of the middle ages had quite a different philosophy and were quite a merry people.

The Tragedy of Modern China

The tragedy of modern China is partly the emergence of the muscular person into a position of dominance. In the face of increasing national humiliations, the traditional ideal of the Confucian scholar and gentleman has been discredited and in his place the national savior has been substituted as the hero. Now held up for admiration are the characteristics of the muscular person which at first glance appear un-Chinese: efficiency, militarism, and pliancy to discipline. The half-naked intellectuals, students, and politicians all find as the first requisite to national reconstruction the transformation of the Chinese character along the lines of "muscular" mentality. They are ashamed of the age-long inefficiency,
laziness, corruption, and irresponsible humor of the scholar, which withers idealism and kills initiative. Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to remodel the nation along muscular lines, however, clashed at every turn with deeply ingrained national habits of familial self-regard and inertia. And it takes the dictatorial methods and propagandistic cunning of the Communist leaders partially to impose a new order on China. As part of the price of this new order is the enormous amount of suffering and the surprising spectacle of the exploitation of the adolescent, gullible, savage aspects of human nature in a nation so old and so proverbially wise. Viewed from another angle, the new regime indicates the paralysis of humor in China.

But the habit of humor cannot be easily discarded. The Chinese on the mainland find momentary relief in exchanging witty remarks and cynical observations at the expense of the dead-serious Communist cadres. The weapon of humor is far from immediately lethal, but at least it raises a chuckle or smile and for a moment enables the victim of tyranny to view the Communist activities in the character of a terrible farce.
CHAPTER 13

MODES OF DRESS

EARLY PHASE OF THE REPUBLIC (1910-1930)

The Literati or Scholar-Official Class

The Chinese male (Fig. 5a) of this period — whether teacher, member of the gentry, or government official — wore a long, loose gown made of silk, linen, cotton, or serge, which opened down the right side. On either side of the gown there were high slits, revealing a pair of pajama-like trousers also made of silk or other cloth. Over the gown he wore a short black jacket, the Ma-kua, which opened down the front, with sleeves wide enough for the wearer to plunge his hands into them in cold weather for warmth and comfort. Both gown and jacket had high collars and, in place of the buttons, handmade “frogs” of cloth or satin. On his feet he usually wore homemade cloth shoes. The typical literary man walked with long steps, which caused the front and back flaps of the gown to swing rhythmically with each step. Sometimes he wore the “melon-cap” or skullcap, with a band or crystal or jade ornament on top. In cold weather he wore a long gown quilted with cotton or lined with fur.

His wife (Fig. 5b) wore a gathered skirt, usually made of silk, and a short loose-fitting coat elaborately trimmed with embroidery or braid. It also opened on the right, was fastened with “frogs,” and had a high collar. Her sleeves had a wide flare, and her homemade shoes were of embroidered satin. Her coiffure featured bangs, and she wore a chignon at the back of her head.

The son and daughter (Fig. 5c, d) wore clothes similar to their parents. In addition, the girl might wear a one-piece long gown with collar and flared sleeves, adapted from the Manchu costume of the Ch’ing dynasty. Instead of a chignon, the girl wore braids. The son’s hair was usually shaved, except for a single lock well forward on his head.

The Peasants and Artisans

Chinese peasants and artisans were clothing similar to his more educated brethren though less fine in quality. In the south, or in the north during the summer the peasant wore a loose short cloth coat, usually white or blue, which opened down the front, was fastened with frogs, and had a high collar and long sleeves (Fig. 6a). He wore either long trousers, which he rolled up when he worked in the fields, or short trousers of black or blue material. He used straw sandals as footwear, and on his head was a wide-brimmed bamboo and reed hat, to protect him from the sun. Artisans did not need a hat, and many wore cloth shoes instead of straw sandals.

In the winter, especially in the north, the peasant (Fig. 6b) wore a dark coat similar in style to that already described, and made so that it could be opened down the side in warmer weather. It might be cotton padded underneath, and cut so that several coats could be worn under it on top of another; or it might be lined with fur. His trousers were likely to be lined and padded too. The costume included sashes for tying the coat at the waist.
Fig. 5—Literate's, or Scholar-Official Class: a, official; b, wife; c and d, children

and the trousers around the ankles, as a protection against cold. His shoes were usually made of cloth, and they also, usually, were quilted. On his head he wore a fur-lined hat or quilted cap.

The peasant's wife (Fig. 6c) also worked in the fields, and wore clothes similar to her husband's—a short cloth coat with collar, fastened with "froggs" down the right side, cloth trousers, and straw sandals. Her usual head-dress was a cloth scarf, which she tied around her chignon, but sometimes she wore a wide-brimmed bamboo-reed hat. A plain apron was often tied around her waist.

The artisans' wife dressed in much the same way, with the same long trousers, but was more likely to wear cloth shoes. Young girls (Fig. 6d), whether on the farm, in the village, or in the factory, dressed like the wives of the peasants and artisans, but wore their hair braided in a pigtail without the cloth scarf. In winter, the women wore several layers of cloth coats, with or without cotton padding.

Children (Fig. 6c) of the peasants and artisans, in the rural districts and in the villages, likewise wore the two-piece coat and trouser combination. The boy's coat usually opened down the front and was fastened by "froggs." For the sake of both convenience and cleanliness, there were slits in his trousers. His head was usually shaved, except for one peach-shaped lock just above the forehead, and around his neck he was likely to wear a silver ring or lock, which was believed to have the power of protecting him from evil spirits. In winter he wore quilted clothing and homemade shoes.

The country girl, like her mother, was clad in a short coat and trousers, and wore her hair tied in two pigtails. Most parents did not think it necessary for her, like her brother, to wear a silver ring around her neck. She either went barefooted or wore homemade cloth shoes. In winter, she wore quilted clothes.
Fig. 6—Peasants’ and Artisans’ Dress:  
a, summer, male; b, winter, male;  
c, d, female; e, children
The Merchant Class

The merchant and shopkeeper (Fig. 7) wore long gowns, like the literati, though generally more tight-fitting and without the black jacket. They wore western-style felt hats, broad-brimmed and high in the crown, and their shoes were either of cloth or leather. Pajama-like long trousers were visible under their slit gowns.

![Merchant Class](image)

Fig. 7—Merchant Class,
Early Republic

1910–1933

The Soldier Class

An army officer of the war-lord period is shown in Fig. 8a. Note the stiff front visor of the cap and the tall black boots.

Figure 8b and c shows a soldier of the Nationalist government. Instead of the steel helmet he sometimes wears a cloth cap. Note the wrap-leggings and the coat, similar to those worn with the Sun Yat-sen uniform, with the turned-down collar and the four box pockets. Above his upper left pocket is his insignia. In the winter he wears the same uniform, but with cotton padding.

The soldier of the People's Liberation Army is shown in Fig. 8d. He is distinguished from the soldier of the Nationalist Army by the style of his cap, and by the red star just above its visor. His uniform also is padded with cotton through the winter months.

Figure 8e shows the present-day local militia or guerilla fighter. He is likely to be of peasant origin so he retains his peasant garb and merely adds to it his cartridge-belt.

Later Phase of the Republic (1930 to —)

The Literati

The "Sun Yat-sen uniform" (Fig. 9a) was worn by government workers, including civil employees and teachers, and was especially popular in unoccupied China during the Sino-Japanese War period. The turned-down collar, the tailored jacket (of cloth or serge) with
Fig. 8—The Soldier Class:  a, officer of war-lord period;  b, c, Nationalist soldiers;  
d, soldier of the PLA;  e, present-day local militia (or guerrilla) fighter.

Fig. 9—The Literati Class:  a, the "Sun Yat-sen" uniform (government workers and teachers);  b, student, Western-style;  c, student, modified Traditional;  d, wife of official;  e, woman, Western-style.
the four pockets, and the Western-style trousers with wide cuffs combined to give it an air
of formality. It was worn with leather shoes and a Western-style felt hat. On the left
upper pocket, from which pens and pencils usually protruded, was sewn the badge of the
bureau in which the wearer was employed.

Students (Fig. 9b) usually wore an informal and simple open-collared white shirt with
blue, black, or khaki pants, with cloth shoes or sneakers or, if they were fairly well off,
leather shoes. Their hair was worn "crew cut." A favorite costume of the more conserva-
tive college students was a long loose gown, worn over Western-cut trousers (Fig. 9c).
The wife (Fig. 9d) of an official or professor, and the young high school and college girl
(Fig. 9e), wear a modernized version of the long one-piece gown of the Manchu lady of
other days: a slim, close-fitting gown. Note the peculiar collar, and the "frog" fastening
the dress on the right side. The opening under the armpit is now closed by a zipper. The
collar is stiffer. The gown for daily wear is of convenient length with slits on the sides rising
just above the knees. As the neckline of the Western dress varies with fashion, so does the
height of the slit, the length of the dress, the length of the sleeves, and the height of the
collar. The girl student's dress is usually made of blue cloth. The modern Chincene woman
has also acquired the taste for Western cosmetics, including fingernail polish, French per-
fumes, and American lipstick.

For an evening affair, she may wear a longer dress, usually ankle length, in the same
style but of richer and flashier material. On her feet she wears high-heeled leather shoes and
nylon stockings if she can get them. Her hair is curled and hangs loosely to her neck. In
winter she still wears a padded or woolen dress but the same way. Over it, she wears an
overcoat, a sweater or jacket. On her arm is a modern purse. She does not wear a hat.

It is to be kept in mind that in this transitional time, while one sees ultra-modern
fashions on the streets of Hong Kong and Shanghai, in the smaller towns and cities the
women still mix their styles incongruously and are, on the whole, less well-dressed.

Peasant and Artisan

The dress of this class has remained unchanged.

Children

The most popular child's outfit today consists of blue cloth overalls and white shirt
for the boy (Fig. 10a) and a black or blue gathered skirt with a white shirt for the girl
(Fig. 10b). They both have short hair and wear sneakers, leather shoes or cloth shoes
depending upon their family income.

Another popular children's outfit is the Boy and Girl Scout uniform (Fig. 10c, d) which
is required for daily wear in many schools. With it, the children wear black sneakers. The
boy has a crew cut; the girl a straight bob.

Merchant Class

The local storekeeper's dress (Fig. 11) has changed little. However, a new class of
businessman has risen and is often seen on the city streets. This modern merchant has
adopted the Western suit, complete with tie, shirt, leather shoes, and felt hat. Many of his
belongings are imported. However, he is not quite as casual as the Westerner; his coat is
apt be shorter and overpadded at the shoulders, his pants overlong and wider at the cuffs.
As a rule, his suits are custom-made.

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Fig. 10—Children: a, b, daily wear; c, d, Scout uniforms

Fig. 11—Merchant,
Late Republic
COMMUNIST RULE, 1949 TO —

The coming into power of the Communists has produced a definite effect upon the people's dress. Conformity has become a distinct feature because of the emphasis upon uniforms (Fig. 12); and cheaper materials and simpler styles are used because of the program of austerity and economy.

Fig. 12—Communist Dress: a, b, military; c, d, workers

The official class and cadres (Fig. 12a) have kept the Sun Yat-sen uniform, which is padded for cold weather. On their feet they wear sneakers or cloth or leather shoes; on their head, the same characteristic cap.

Communist women (Fig. 12b) dress like their men. Cosmetics and wavy hair have disappeared, and straight bobbed hair sticks out from under the characteristic cap.

The rank-and-file production worker (Fig. 12c, d), whether he be factory worker, miner or locomotive driver, male or female, wears overalls and shirt, probably with rolled-up sleeves, cloth or leather shoes, and the characteristic cap. The woman's hair is short and straight. The same costume is popular with the children, who also wear uniforms.

The peasant garb remains unchanged. The foreign-style clothes of the modern business class are disappearing, as are the fashionable dresses of the modern women.
CHAPTER 14

ART MOTIFS

INTRODUCTION

Traditional Chinese graphic art centers around various subjects derived from the religion, folklore, and history of China. The artistic development of the oldest surviving civilization has produced a vast array of signs and symbols not found in the West. A plant, bird, animal, or the combination of these, bears a significance overlooked by the Westerner uninitiated in Oriental art. A combination of flora and fauna may represent a rebus or series thereof, creating a series of images in the Chinese mind. Too often Westerners merely project their own technical requirements into an analysis of Chinese art. But even when this is done, a careful survey reveals that Chinese art has achieved a level of technical development sufficient to satisfy the most particular of Western connoisseurs. Equally important, however, is an understanding of the symbolism of Chinese art. Once this symbolism is understood, a vast field opens, revealing the extensive areas of Chinese culture which lie behind these symbols.

The art of China is the result of heterogeneous influences. It has been influenced by such non-Chinese forces as Buddhism and nomadic cultures, as well as by such internal forces as animism and other native religions. China's philosophy underlies her artistic development. The spirit of the unseen world pervades Chinese art, and is seen in the symbolic interpretation of nature and her works. And since the art of the Far East is dominated by motifs developed in China's art, the best approach to Far Eastern art is through the study of Chinese art.

The following extremely abbreviated presentation of the chief symbols seen in Chinese art is but an outline; constant reference to the religion, philosophy, folklore, superstition, art, and culture of China is necessary for a full understanding of their meaning to the Chinese.

CALLIGRAPHY

The origin of Chinese graphic art is found in its calligraphy. In China, calligraphy was an art rather than a mere medium, and specimens by great calligraphers were treasured and handed down from generation to generation. Archaeological excavations testify that pictograms, which preceded ideograms, were in use probably as early as 2500 B.C.

The Fire Characters

The aesthetic value of calligraphy is well expressed by a Chinese who stated, "Language is the voice of the mind, calligraphy the painting of the mind. And both speak out unerringly as to whether the speaker or the painter is a high-minded soul or a man of low character." In this attitude was nurtured the growth of particular characters with symbolic
Fig. 13—Enamelled Porcelain Wine Jar in Shape of Shou Character
significance, a development well suited to a language composed of ideograms. Chief among these are the Five Characters, found singly or in groups on scrolls, or as decorative designs on porcelains, furniture, sculpture, and textiles. The Five Characters are:

Fu 快 — happiness, prosperity, felicity, blessings
Lu 禄 — honor, official emolument, prosperity
Shou 福 — longevity (see Fig. 13)
Ta'ai 福 — wealth, riches
Hei 福 — joy, good fortune

Traditional Characters

Other traditionally favorite characters, particularly used as shop signs were:

An 安 — peace, quiet
Hao 豪 — prosperous, progress
He 和 — harmony, cooperation
Yi 义 — mutual help, righteous
Chi 吉 — fortunate, lucky
Shun 善 — agreeable
Feng 学 — abundance, plenty
T'ien 天 — heaven, creator, faith
Chu 诸 — collect, maintain
T'ung 同 — cooperate, unite
T'ai 太 — expand, peace
Yuan 源 — fountain, abundant
Hsüang 祥 — lucky
Sheng 生 — prosper, growth
Heng 恒 — constant, permanent
Chang 常 — expand, growth
Ta 大 — grand, great
Kung 共 — mutuality
Yü 宥 — rich, plenty
Lung 龍 — prosper, growth

Although these characters are defined individually, they may be collectively defined with the meaning of permanence, prosperity, and luck. They were in high favor during the Imperial Period, but have declined in popularity during the republican era. The political rejuvenation of the twentieth century and the subsequent attempts at cultural reorientation, particularly the "brain-washing" under the Communist regime, have brought other characters and symbols to the fore. But it is inconceivable that the significance of the traditional is lost to the current generation in China.

There is a group of symbols which originate far back in Chinese history. Although to the Chinese most of them have a readily perceivable meaning, they are far more abstract than those related to specific deities or to flora and fauna. They also have a greater affinity to the primitive religions and philosophies of China and are thus induced with deep symbolic significance.

T'ai Chi (Yin-Yang)

No better example of this group of abstract symbols can be found than in the case of the T'ai Chi or Yin-Yang symbol. It probably originated as a graphic representation of the monistic integration of primitive Chinese philosophic dualism. Early Chinese thinkers...
classified the phenomena of the universe under two heads, the Yang and the Yin, involving respectively the male, positive, heavenly, and creative forces and factors; and the female, negative, earthly, and productive forces and factors. All the elements in the universe were included in these two groups, and around them was built a code of behavior and rules of conduct, as well as a systematic approach to the problem of man's adjustment to the natural world.

The Yang and Yin principles represent a monistic "first cause" or ultimate origin, which includes in itself both elements of primitive duality and gives rise to all the phenomena of nature. The T'ai Chi diagram shows accordingly a unified whole, the circle which depicts the harmonious coexistence and interaction of opposites under universal law. (See Fig. 14.)

![Fig. 14—Korean Flag with T'ai Chi Symbol and Four Trigrams](image)

**Pa Kua (The Eight Trigrams or Diagrams)**

Closely associated with the T'ai Chi symbol is the group of eight symbols known as the Pa Kua, the Eight Trigrams or Diagrams. This series of symbols began with the Yin-Yang principles and in Chinese metaphysics traced the development from the Wu Chi, Formless, to the T'ai Chi, the Supreme Ultimate. In legend, the mythical Emperor Fu Hsi evolved the Eight Trigrams by the aid of figures revealed to him on the back of a "dragon horse." Fu Hsi drew up a system of linear combinations to represent all the observed phenomena of heaven and earth. He began with the equivalents of Yin and Yang and eventually evolved the following eight different groups:

- **Yang** (male, positive, heavenly, and creative.)
- **Yin** (female, negative, earthly, and productive.)

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<td>Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>Thunder</td>
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FIGURE SUBJECTS

In a discussion of Western art it would be natural to begin by considering the theme of the human figure as an art subject. This is not the case in Chinese art where man does not assume such a predominant role. The Chinese approach is different, for man is considered only a part of the cosmic scheme where "Every being in the world, every manifestation of nature, every spirit, every god is an active part of the whole, of that great reality which is behind and beyond the flow of phenomena" (from the *I Ching*). The objective of Chinese art is to expand into nature toward the infinite; a development enhanced by Confucianism and Taoism with its emphasis on nature and the subordination of the individual.

However, this does not preclude the use of the human figure or scenes of everyday life as art subjects. Portraiture is in evidence, although it is directly related to ancestor worship and as such is not a part of a Chinese art collection, but is kept separate in the ancestral hall. (See Fig. 15.) Other related traditional subjects include such literary subjects as the "Eight Immortals of the Wine Cup" (Fig. 16) celebrated in the poems of Tu Fu, and mythological themes as the "Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove." There are, in addition, scenes of court life, women, and festivals. But the Chinese artist rarely presents a subject without an "inner meaning," and this skill in telling a story and pointing a moral without making his art didactic depends largely on the use of traditional symbols.

**Taoist Deities**

Although divisions may be made by religious categories, it must be remembered that many symbols have been interchanged from religion to religion and thus overlap. This will also be observed in the flora and fauna symbols. Among the popular figure subjects of Chinese art are gods and deities. While the strongest influence of Taoism is felt in the artistic creations dealing with the manifestations of nature, the various deities of the Taoist pantheon provide some of the most romantic subjects of Chinese art. Foremost among these is Hsi Wang Mu, daughter of Heaven and Earth and symbol of the Yin or female element in the universe. She is frequently portrayed with peaches, which are the symbol of immortality, and with the phoenix.

The so-called Eight Immortals and the symbols associated with them are also favorite themes in Chinese art. The leading figure of these eight is Chung-li Ch'uan or Han Chung-li. Fat and with a bared belly, he carries the peach of immortality, or a fan or feather to revive the souls of the dead. The personage pictured as a beggar with a pilgrim's gourd and staff is Li T'ieh-k'un, the patron of astrologers and magicians. The only purely feminine character of the group is Hsiao I'sien-ku, the guardian of housewives. She is emblematic of filial piety and carries a lotus blossom. La Tung-pin is a favorite of the literati, particularly when represented carrying a boy, for this portrays a desire for many children among whom will be scholars and officials. The sword on his back signifies the power to divert evil, and the fly-brush or whisk he carries symbolizes the power to fly through space and walk on clouds. Lan Ts'ai-ho is the genius of gardeners and is always equipped with a basket. Her sex is vague; pictured as a young person, she is presumed to be a female. The Immortal, Chang Kuo, is a patron of literature and is usually pictured astride a white mule which has magical powers. A child is often added to this couplet and hung in the bridal chamber to signify procreation. The remaining two Immortals are Han I'siang-ta, bearing a flute, and Tu'ao Kuo-chiu in court dress with cestanets. Both of these are worshipped for their philosophizing capacities. (See Fig. 16.)

The eight attributes of the Eight Immortals described also form a separate group of Taoist symbols. There are the fan of Chung-li Ch'uan, the sword of La Tung-pin, the pilgrim's gourd of Li T'ieh-k'un, the cestanets of Tu'ao Kuo-chiu, the basket of flowers of
Fig. 15—A Chinese Ancestral Portrait
Fig. 16—Plaque with Eight Immortals
Lan Ts'ao-ho, the bamboo tube and rods of Chang Kuo, the flute of Han Hsiang-tzu and the lotus flower of Ho Hsien-ku.

There are numerous other gods who are worshipped as military, literary, and other specialized deities. The primary concern here is to indicate the symbolism which appears with them. An excellent example is Shou Lao, the Taoist god of longevity. His particular characteristics are a spotted deer, a crane, peach, fan, and ju-i sceptre in the form of fungus, with the character shou (寿) embroidered on his robes. All these symbols signify longevity.

Buddhist Deities

Among the Buddhist deities represented in Chinese art is the goddess Kuan Yin (the Goddess of Mercy), shown sitting or standing on a lotus blossom, with a necklace of pearls signifying the Principle of Life. Some manifestation of the water of life is also present, and occasionally attendants who personify other elements. The Bodhisattvas and Lohans, also disciples of Buddha, are other Buddhist subjects in Chinese art.

Chief among the Buddhist symbols are the eight emblems of Happy Augury (Pa Chi Hsien) illustrated in Fig. 17, and also executed as a decorative design on the wine cup and saucer dish in Fig. 18.

FLORA AND FAUNA

The chief sources of Chinese art signs and symbols are found in bird, flower, and animal designs. The Chinese artist sees in the flora and fauna the manifestation of the soul of nature which is one with the soul of Man. There are several accounts of Chinese artists who virtually lived with certain flowers in order to learn best how they could truly represent their essence. They took the same infinite pains in the studies of blossoms as they did with their impressive landscape paintings.

Flowers

Flower designs are most common to painting, porcelain, and embroidery. Chief among the flower symbols are those connected with the four seasons. (See Fig. 19.) Spring is symbolized by the peony blossom which represents wealth, rank, and the Yang principle. The Cantonese call it the "Flower of Wealth and Honor" (Pu Kuei Hua). It is often coupled with the cock, another emblem of spring, but is also found grouped with the lion and peacock.

The flower symbol of summer is the lotus, one of the eight sacred Buddhist symbols, which has been likened in its symbolism to the Christian cross. Buddha, Bodhisattvas, and souls of the dead are depicted enthroned on the lotus. This dazzling white blossom floating in stagnant water is also considered a symbol of purity.

The chrysanthemum is emblematic of autumn and longevity. The Immortals and Taoists probably drank chrysanthemum wine to ensure longevity, and they are often depicted with the blossom in Chinese art works. Winter is symbolized by the plum blossom and is another favorite of the Chinese artist. It also represents purity and constancy. The plum, fir, and bamboo, collectively known as "the three friends," are the symbols of endurance and constancy as they defy the rigours of winter. In porcelainware, plum blossoms are depicted against a glazed underglazed blue background representing winter's ice, with the blossoms signifying the first breath of spring defying the wintry blasts. (See Fig. 20.)

The narcissus, also called "water fairy flower" by the Chinese, is in vogue during the Chinese New Year. It conveys an allusion to the immortality of the Taoists as well as personifying beauty and fragrance.
Fig. 17—Pa Chi-Hsiang. The Eight Buddhist Emblems of Happy Augury
Fig. 18—Porcelain Saucer Dish and Wine Cup
(Decorated in Colors and Gilding with Appropriate Buddhist Symbols)
Fig. 19—Lacquer Screen with Flower and Animal Motifs
Fig. 20—Blue and White Ginger Jar with Prunus Blossoms
Fruits and Seeds

Among the flora symbols are those portrayed by fruits or seeds. Most of these are symbols of fecundity. The pomegranate is such a symbol of fertility, its many seeds being emblematic of the desire for many children. It is also a Buddhist symbol of good luck. Melon seeds bear a similar meaning. The chestnut also expresses the wish for many children, as well as being a sign of good omen. Its name, Li-zi (李子), is a homonym for Li-li (李 Liverpool) which means to beget children.

Trees

Trees are also important floral motifs of Chinese art. The most utilitarian of these is the bamboo as evidenced particularly in the bamboo culture of South Asia. The Chinese portray the young shoots as growing within the grove during summer and from outside the grove during winter, thus assuring the parent plant the most desirable location and protection. From this description is deduced the principle of filial piety which the bamboo symbolizes. Its flexibility and endurance have also made it a symbol of endurance and constancy, in addition to having the power to drive off evil. It also expresses filial piety and culture. In South China, the bamboo is considered a symbol of summer. (See Fig. 21.)

The peach tree is one of the leading fruit trees honored by the Chinese. It is considered to be imbued with exceptional vitality and resistance to evil. The Taoists believe that the fruit and bark of the tree contain the essence of the elixir of life. Charms of peach wood are common and crutches and idols are also made from the wood. The blossom suggests a happy life and its flowering in early spring represents youth, the young bride, or a beautiful woman. The god of longevity is often shown with a peach, representing the revitalization of his youth.

With the bamboo, the pine and cypress are the leading favorites of Chinese painters. They are evergreens, unaffected by winter, and thus symbolic of endurance and longevity. The pine is often painted together with the stork which also symbolizes longevity. Artists have long been impressed by the great age and beauty of their gnarled roots and twisted stems.

The willow tree is a Buddhist symbol and water sprinkled with a willow branch is believed to have powers of purification. The goddess Kuan Yin is often shown grasping a willow branch. It is also imbued with power to ward off evil. A Taoist symbol is the cinnamon or casia tree. It is associated with the moon and hare, and symbolizes literary success, particularly at examinations.

Three trees signifying familial relations are the love tree or japonica, the jujube or buck-thorn, and the mulberry. The love tree is associated with a legend of marital fidelity and expresses marital happiness as represented by its intertwining branches. The jujube or Tao (桃) is a homonym for Tao (桃), meaning early, and expresses a wish for the early begotting of progeny by a married couple. Besides being artistically presented in its functional role, the mulberry is also symbolic of filial piety.

Among the other symbolic trees are the plantain, conveying grief and sadness with the mournful sound of rain on its leaves, and the umbrella tree which suggests integrity, high principles, and great sensitivity. Table-lutes are made from the wood of the umbrella tree. The fungus also comes in for recognition as another symbol of longevity and immortality, and the ju-i sceptre carried by the god of longevity is shaped in the form of the fungus.

Birds

Chinese art works often portray a bird or an insect in conjunction with the particular flower or tree which it frequents. The bird holds a peculiar position in Chinese spiritual and material life. The Occidental unversed in the lore or poetry of China finds it difficult to
Fig. 21—Fishing in an Obscure Retreat on a River in Autumn
comprehend the allusive subtleties which the Chinese associate with the different birds. The most commonly portrayed have come to have a definite, concrete significance. Occasionally their significance may be altered by other objects portrayed with them in a painting, embroidery, or on a vase.

Chief among the bird subjects is the phoenix or Peng Huang (鹏##), Peng being the male, and Huang the female. It is an imaginary bird with the composite physical characteristics of several other birds or animals and has the five traditional colors of black, red, blue, white, and yellow. Its mythical development probably originated from the red quail and pheasant. The appearance of the phoenix traditionally augurs prosperity and good fortune. As a sign of good omen, the phoenix represents a dual personification of the male and female principles, Yang and Yin, indicating the perfect harmony of these two elements. Consequently, it is common to find two phoenix or cock heads attached to ancient bronze vases. The phoenix often represents only the Yin or female principle, particularly when associated with symbols representing the Yang principle such as the dragon. As the counterpart of the Imperial Dragon representing the Emperor, the phoenix represented the Empress and was used extensively as a motif in the headdresses, jewelry, and silk brocades of the royal princesses. As one of the three supernatural creatures, it is often seen bearing the Immortals through space. This king of birds, and the most divine of them, is traditionally portrayed atop a rock near a magnolia and peach or mulberry tree. Chang Kuo-lao, one of the Eight Immortals, usually carries a phoenix feather in his hand as a symbol of immortality. The Buddhists have adopted this Taoist symbol, but redefined it to symbolize wisdom and energy. (See Fig. 22.)

The pheasant is another symbol of good omen and spring. However, it also represents an ill omen and death in some legends, but this is similar to the duality of Yin-Yang principles observed in the symbolism of other creatures and is relative to the duodenary cycle and equinox. It is otherwise associated with women as a fecundity symbol and embroidered on the ritual gowns of queens and princesses. Its feathers were used for official headdresses and are still preserved for this function in Chinese dramas.

The crane family, including the stork and related members, ranks second only to the phoenix in popularity among the legends and art subjects relating to birds. Although there are the yellow, the black, the white, and the blue varieties, the most favored is distinguished by its dark face and neck, a bare crimson patch on its bill and long black curved plumes which droop over its tail. It is a symbol of longevity and is often grouped with the fir and pine to emphasize this symbolism. A Taoist symbol, it is another of the steeds used by the Immortals and is found most often in attendance upon Shou Lao, the god of longevity.

Wild geese are also a favorite subject of the Chinese bird painter. The geese migrate south in winter, thus faithfully accompanying the heat or sun — the Yang principle. They also symbolize conjugal fidelity, since it is further believed that once separated from their mates, the geese never mate again. Among the bird symbols of the four seasons, geese represent autumn, the swallow the spring, the egret the summer, and the magpie or crow perched on the plum tree, winter. But as a bird symbol of conjugal fidelity and affection, the mandarin duck ranks supreme, for it is considered to be monogamous, peaceful, gentle, and affectionate; and the duck or drake reputedly will not survive the death of its mate. The nightingale (bulbul), with its white topknot is another symbol of marital happiness. Symbolizing longevity, it conveys the wish of a married couple that they may grow old together.

The cock or Chi (##) is a homonym for chi (###) which means fortunate. This fowl corresponds to spring, and like the phoenix, is one of the "birds of fire" symbolizing the sun and the south as it crows at dawn. The Yang principle is personified by the cock.
Fig. 22—A Chinese Embroidery with a Phoenix, Dragon, and Hsi Character
but when depicted in pairs, this principle is represented by a rooster while the opposing Yin principle is symbolized by the black cock. It is an emblem of courage, aspiration, and protection against evil, and is imbued with the vitality to call back the soul into the body of the deceased. Other qualities attributed to the cock are the literary ambition signified by the cap on its head, military spirit seen in its spurs, benevolence in its calling the flock together, and vigilance in its crowing the time of day.

The Chinese crow is regarded as a good omen in China and is often called the bird of joy. A gathering of five crows symbolizes the Five Happinesses of longevity, children, health, wealth, and peace. The three-legged crow, three being the male or Yang symbol, is another "bird of fire" symbolizing the sun, south, and Yang principle. The crow was held sacred by the Manchus in particular.

The bat occupies a similar position to the crow in Chinese art. Called Fu (蝠) in Chinese, it is a homonym for fu (福), happiness. Five bats also represent the Five Happinesses. (See Fig. 23) It is credited with long life and excellent sight and is used for certain medicinal preparations. When coupled with the stag, a rebus indicating official honors and happiness is formed.

Fig. 23—The Wu-fo or Five Bats Emblem

Hawks and eagles are also found in Chinese painting. Ying (鹰), the falcon or eagle, is a homonym for Ying (鹰), henry. The swiftness and vision of the hawk commanded admiration, but since it inflicts death as a bird of prey during autumn, a season falling under the Yin principle, it is also considered a bird of ill omen.

Another symbol of longevity is the dove or pigeon, supposedly attributed to its exceptional qualities of food digestion. It is also respected for its intelligence, endurance, and constancy in its activity as a carrier. The swallow and sparrow are two other small birds found in Chinese art, and are generally shown in association with the willow and bamboo, respectively. The swallow represents maternal care and domesticity, and the sparrow symbolizes loyalty. (See Fig. 24.)

Insects

Continuing his attentive study of birds and flowers, the Chinese artist also made a careful study of insects and represented them faithfully in their appropriate setting. The butterfly is one of the artist's favorite insects, and is emblematic of conjugal felicity and
Fig. 24—Embroidery Picture with Swallows, Cranes, and Willow Tree
sometimes of romantic love. The cicada is a symbol of resurrection, a symbolism inferred from its metamorphosis. Excavations of ancient tombs have revealed stone and jade carvings of cicadas which signify this symbolism. The voracious praying mantis, with its strange and obtrusive posture, has earned itself the symbolism of the warrior's courage and perseverance. The centipede, scorpion, and spider are the three poisonous insects which lose their venomous nature when combined with the viper and toad, also considered poisonous. When grouped together, these five creatures act as a charm against evil and serve as a symbol of good omen.

**Fish**

Another group of fauna used as an art symbol is the fish. The fish is a Buddhist symbol and the character meaning fish, 魚 (yu), is a homonym for 養 (yang), abundance and superfluity. As a subject of painting, fishing reflects the meditative aspects of such a pursuit, particularly by a scholar or recluse. (See Fig. 21.) Fish supposedly do not sleep, a virtue which is constantly praised before the Buddhist monk in the form of a drum or gong which he beats. Fish subjects in Chinese painting are largely confined to the carp, goldfish, and a few other freshwater species. Of these, the carp has the greatest significance. Like the salmon, it must go upstream to spawn, thus symbolizing vigor, endurance, and accomplishment. It is held up as an object of emulation to the youth of the Far East. The carp also symbolizes conjugal felicity when represented in pairs, and the congruent representation of such a pair is one of the Eight Emblems of Happy Augury of Buddhism. Another Buddhist symbol is the crab, which is emblematic of the sleep of death between reincarnations; a meaning derived from the presumed hibernating character of the crab. It is interesting to note that the symbolism attached to marine life in Chinese art is connected to Buddhism, but not to the other major religions of China.

**Animals**

The largest number of art symbols are derived from the animal kingdom. Animals probably best portray the "barbaric" influence on Chinese art of external, particularly nomadic, peoples. Two types of animals, the real and mythological, are portrayed by the Chinese artist, and both have their symbolic meanings.

The king of all animals is the dragon—a symbol common to the legends of many great civilizations. Differing from its European parallel which symbolizes the devil, the Chinese dragon is a symbol of beneficent government and of the Emperor himself. The artistic representation of the dragon is portrayed with great imagination, incorporating various anatomical features of other fauna. It was the Imperial emblem of China and the personal emblem of the Emperor. As a royal emblem the dragon was depicted with five claws; that used by commoners had only four claws. The national flag of Imperial China was a triangular yellow flag with a dragon. Understandably, the dragon symbol has been in decline since the rise of republican China. The dragon is closely related to water, consequently it is believed that floods and droughts are the result of recalcitrant dragons which must be bribed. The dragon is often portrayed by the Chinese artist in pursuit of a pearl of cosmic significance. This pearl is also believed to exist under the chin of the dragon.

The unicorn is one of the Four Divine Animals and like the dragon and phoenix, is a chimera combining physical characteristics and attributes of other creatures. It is a symbol of virtue, integrity, nobility, good, and a sign of auspicious times. Embroidery work showing a boy astride such a beast is an invitation to the divine animal for the birth of a distinguished son, particularly of a scholar-statesman. The unicorn is closely as-
Fig. 25—Boy Astride a Unicorn
(A Chinese Embroidery with Other Bird and Floral Motifs)
Fig. 26—Lion with Sphere under Paw in Porcelain
sociated with Confucius, for legend states that it appeared to his mother at his birth. Although often represented in wood, porcelain, sculpture, and embroidery, it is rarely seen in painting. (See Fig. 25.)

The tiger is a Taoist symbol of endurance, courage, and strength, and paintings of it are used to ward off evil. The white tiger symbolizes the West and Autumn and represents the Yang principle particularly when paired with the dragon. It is also considered a symbol of good earnings and sculptures of it are found at the entrances of gambling dens. It is also portrayed as a god when standing erect and holding cash in its mouth or forepaws, or as a steed bearing the god of wealth.

The lion is a Buddhist symbol and is often found placed as a guardian of temples or used as decorative motifs on altars. It was adopted by the Chinese as a symbol of justice and the dignity of law and was placed in official premises or courtyards of magistrates. As a symbol of Buddhism, it personifies wisdom, boldness, and bravery and is represented sitting or standing on lotus blossoms. The lion is not an overly popular subject of painting, and is most commonly found in sculpture or in embroidery. Here it is commonly shown in association with a sphere symbolizing omnipotence under its paws, or floating in space amid sacred streamers. The sphere is sometimes hollow and pierced with peony patterns and the coin or cash symbol. (See Fig. 26.)

One of the Four Sacred Animals of the Taoists is the tortoise, which was later incorporated into the Buddhist pantheon. As a symbol of longevity it is often found coupled with the crane, another symbol of longevity. Its serpentine nature was enhanced by Confucius who credited it with carrying on its back the markings of the Eight Virtues. Chinese mythology also states that the geometric designs on the shell were presumably the basis for the character of the Chinese written language. The tortoise is often seen entwined by a serpent and symbolizes the North and Winter. This combination is also known as the “Sonber Warrior,” and may indicate a tactical military impasse in accordance with a Chinese axiom.

The horse is an emblem of speed, perseverance, nobility, rank, power, and wealth, and was reserved for the aristocracy in chass and warfare. The monopoly of the horse by this class gave it its particular symbolism. It was held sacred by the Manchus who proclaimed descent from it, and who perpetuated this legend in the cut of their sleeve cuffs in hoof-form and their plaited queues representing the horse’s tail.

The stag or deer is associated with a series of homonyms. (See Fig. 27.) Deer, Lu (鹿), is a homonym for lu (鹿), meaning blessings and wealth. The “hundred deer,” Pai Lu (百鹿), the “white deer,” Pai Lu (白鹿), “the cypress and the stag,” Pai Lu (柏鹿), are all homonyms for pai lu (百鹿), meaning a hundred blessings. The deer also personifies longevity and is often represented in the company of the Immortals.

The ox, and the water buffalo or bull, typify the peasantry. A herd-boy playing his flute astride the bull is one of the commonest representations of rural life. Some authorities interpret this as symbolizing the triumph of intelligence over force. Representations of the god of fertility and vegetation in the form of bulls are also widespread.

The only animal symbolizing filial piety is the sheep, for “Even lambs have the grace to kneel kneeling.” A picture of three goats or sheep conveys good wishes for the New Year, the animals here representing the last three months of the old year and the opening of the first month of the new year. They also personify the reviving powers of spring.

The elephant symbol is an importation from India. It is a Buddhist symbol for benevolence and is shown with lotus blossoms under its four hooves or carrying a Buddhist deity. Taoism also has adopted this beast as one of its symbols. The white elephant is more symbolic of universal sovereignty and the signs of heaven, and is often represented decorated with Taoist trappings and bearing Taoist symbols.
Fig. 27—Painting of Deer under a Pine Tree
Among the smaller animals are the monkey, squirrel, and hare or rabbit. The monkey is represented in Chinese art as a symbol of gentleness and benevolence. It is primarily a Buddhist symbol in which it is credited with powers of transformation and wisdom. A painting of a monkey bestows a desire for health and success and when represented with a bee, forms a rebus meaning "to be raised to the peakage." Although the squirrel is little seen in Chinese painting, it is a member of the duodenal cycle and presumably represents the desire for children. The hare or rabbit is much more popular as an art subject. In Chinese mythology its origin and affiliation is traced to the moon, where it is still believed to reside. In this role it is imbued with the Yin principle although a white hare is also believed to presage times of prosperity. It is a Taoist and a Buddhist symbol.

The cat and dog should also be mentioned, but these are seen in Chinese art only to a limited extent. Nor do the living creatures attain the popularity in everyday life as observed in the West. Although both are supposed to be imbued with both good and evil, when shown together the cat symbolizes the Yin principle and the power to work evil, the dog the Yang principle and the power to counter evil.

A SELECTED READING LIST


Siren, Oswald, *A History of Chinese Art*, 4 vols., pp. xiii, 75, pl. 103; xvi, 87, pl. 120; xvi, 75, pl. 123; xiii, 77, pl. 120; E. Bena, Ltd., London, 1929-30.


CHAPTER 15

ETIQUETTE

THE PATTERNS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

The great value and importance the Chinese attribute to interpersonal relations is reflected in the role that etiquette has always played in their day-to-day activities. The harmonious adjustment of personal relations has been achieved by maintaining rigid formal patterns of etiquette that define both the correct attitudes to adopt and the correct behavior to adhere to in all possible social relations. This has been both a result of the highly authoritarian setting in which the Chinese have lived throughout the known past, and a major cause of the perpetuation of that authoritarian setting.

Mode of Social Control

The traditional demand that the individual conform to socially determined correct patterns of behavior, which has always been backed up by severe sanctions, has served to regulate and order Chinese life in a way that has minimized the danger of widespread social conflict. By conforming to the rules of correct behavior, the individual achieved both personal security and harmonious relations with those about him, and acted in a way that preserved the basic values and attitudes of the traditional Chinese society. Etiquette, in a word, was China's principal method of social control, by which, at one and the same time, it maintained a high degree of social stability and offered to the individual the feeling of dignity and self-respect that comes to one who knows he is acting in a superior manner.

Violations of correct etiquette in Chinese society always met severe sanctions in motion. Ostracism of the offending individual was one of them, and it was regularly backed up by denying him both economic opportunities and political and social power. The assumed superiority of the Chinese over the outside "barbarian" was regarded as tied up with the former's conformity to the standards of etiquette. Any Chinese who consistently violated these standards, therefore, was in danger of being regarded — and treated — as himself a "barbarian."

Influence of Religion

Over and above the social and political pressure on the individual to strictly observe the rules of etiquette, there was the influence of religion. This can be discerned most clearly in the Chinese conception of Li, which is an infinitely richer word than etiquette. It used to be axiomatic with the Chinese that man exists by the bounty of nature, and continues to enjoy the protection of heavenly and earthly spirits only on condition that he behave in such a way as to fulfill his specific place in society and in the larger universal order. Li, therefore, comprises not only the rules of polite behavior and the ceremonies accompanying the natural cycle of birth, marriage, and death, but also acts of piety toward one's parents and ancestors, the spirits, and the Emperor. The early Western observers
spoke of the educated Chinese as an extremely polite and ceremonious people who were rather deficient in religious feeling. This way of putting it captures a part of the truth, but is fundamentally wrong: with most educated Chinese, the religious impulse was expressed in ceremonious behavior, and did not require any further outlet in asceticism, devotion, or prayer.

**Doctrine of the Gradation of Love**

A major tenet in Confucian philosophy is the doctrine of the gradation of love. It is based upon the empirical fact that some people, by blood or association, are closer to you than others, and that it is pointless to turn your back on these people in search of the dubious benefits of "indiscriminate" love. For the Chinese, the notion of loving humanity is mere words, while love grounded in mutual knowledge and understanding between persons is concrete and genuine. Confucian philosophy recognizes five basic relationships: king-minister, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, and friend-friend. By implication, this classification covers all possible forms of social intercourse.

There are, in the Chinese view, only three possible ways for an individual to stand in relation to another individual— as superior, as equal, as inferior. Chinese ethics and manners are built on this basic principle, although they inculcate the spirit of what the West calls brotherly love to at least the extent that, in the words of Mencius, "One should respect the elders of your equals as you respect your own parents, and care for the young of your equals as for your own children."

**The Central Idea of Manners**

The central idea of Chinese manners is to encourage and discipline the individual's good natural impulses with a view to making them habitual. For the son to be disobedient to the father or for the father to hate the son, the Chinese are taught, is to act "unnaturally." Such an act is, therefore, universally condemned, though the dutiful minister (or dutiful son) may admonish the king (or father) when the latter has adopted a course that he regards as foolish.

Chinese manners became rigid very early in Chinese history. Each generation, by perusing the classics, renewed its understanding of Confucian benevolence and courtesy, with the result that the early forms of etiquette were preserved, with modifications to fit them to new situations. In the long sweep of three thousand years, however, the original source of inspiration began to dry up, and, particularly among the less learned, the pedantic, and the nouveau riche, the tendency to emphasize the dead letter of etiquette and ignore its inner spirit began to assert itself. The Chinese novels of manners of the last seven hundred years provide ample evidence of this tendency. And the famous entire, *Unofficial History of the Officials*, depicts numerous types belonging to the ranks of the scholars, the officials, and the middle class gentry, and excoriates them for their boorishness, pedantry, hypocrisy, and cruelty.

**Tradition**

Tradition emphasized the scholar and farmer at the expense of the remainder of China's population, and excluded merchants and businessmen from exercising any decisive influence on the manners of the nation. Nevertheless, because money was a source of power, it did greatly influence the development of Chinese manners. The rich minority came to be looked on with adulation by the poorer classes, and thus found themselves in position to set the general standards of good etiquette and, at the same time, to win acceptance for distinctions and values that had no roots whatever in Confucian philosophy. (The vice
of Shih-di, or that behavior which is typical of the rich and powerful in their dealings with
the poor, is constantly chastised in Chinese popular literature.)

Courtesy

The word "courtesy," which is derived from the word "court," suggests that cere-
memonous behavior was first designed to maintain the symbolic and material importance of
the king, which was customarily justified on the grounds that the king is a father to his
subjects. (Analogical thinking is quite common in China.) The Emperor was at one
and the same time the Son of Heaven and the father of all of his subjects, and was re-
sponsible for their welfare; every small magistrate was the father of the people in his dis-
trict. The father-son relationship was thus given great prominence in Chinese manners,
and it is not surprising that filial piety was early erected as a cardinal virtue.

Filial Relations

The Confucian insistence on filial obedience transmuted what a Freudian would call
unconscious hatred for the father into a kind of awe, which a man continued to feel in the
presence of his father even when he was middle-aged and had children of his own. Given
his position of authority in the family, the Chinese father found it difficult to establish any
sort of intimacy with his sons. Situations abound in Chinese novels where the father flogs
the son to make a man out of him until the mother and grandmother, with tears in their
eyes, come to intercede in his behalf and dispute the father's authority. The classical
cases of filial piety were accordingly cases in which the object of devotion was the mother,
who received from her son the kind of self-effacing attention that was reserved for the lady
by her faithful knight in medi eval Europe. Filial piety in China therefore played the same
kind of cultural role as chivalry in the West, and had something of the same religious
character.

Relations Between the Sexes

For the Chinese, the relation between the sexes was theoretically based upon the con-
cept of Yin and Yang, which represented two complementary and equal sources. In
practice, however, women occupied a decidedly inferior position to the male, and the
forms of etiquette always required the female to show deference to the male. The mother
and the elderly female, alone among women, received special treatment. In practice this
meant that on formal occasions the men sat at the main table, where on occasion they were
joined by elderly or highly respected women. Younger females ate at a separate table and,
in any case, received their food only after the men had been served.

The Place of Women

For all the civilizing influences it has had in many directions, traditional China shares
with other Oriental countries a disregard for woman as an individual. Women had no
say in the choice of their husbands, and the system of courtship, which has always been
and still is the most exciting and vital aspect of Western etiquette, was almost unknown,
the common practice being premarital bargaining on a prudential and economic basis.
In primitive China, the ritual of courtship had had all the dynamism of a barbaric tribal
dance, but the Chinese instinct for voluntary mating disappeared as the principle of the
regulation of sexes came into the ascendency. (One consequence of this principle is that
China has no entertainment comparable to Western-style ballroom dancing.) Menescus
could speak of it as an ancient precept that it is improper for a man and woman, not mari-
tally related, to hold hands or touch each other in any other way. Teen-age boys and
girls were discouraged from playing together. The delicious, elaborate courtship that is ubiquitous in European literature from the Romance of the Rose to Proust is entirely absent even from Chinese literature. Failure to utilize the energy that every youth and maid have latent in them to put into the search for a life partner has deeply influenced Chinese character, which is in many respects immature and unsure of itself.

Courtship

The modern Chinese adolescent is an awkward human being, in large part because he is hungry for love. Traditional manners fail him completely when it comes to courtship, and his parents are in no position to offer him any guidance. Intensely virginal, the Chinese girl turns to Western novels and movies as a vicarious outlet for her sexuality and so prolongs her adolescent daydreams. Age-old habits of prudishness make the Chinese boy and girl shy away equally from any compromising situation like kissing or petting. This state of affairs of course cannot last indefinitely; as they grow older, they lose something of their youthful ardor, and acquiesce in the idea of marriage by parental or friendly arrangement. A young man and woman will be introduced to each other by a friend who knows both to be predisposed to the idea of marriage. They will perfunctorily date each other a few times. If they like each other tolerably well, they begin to think of marriage. Practical and economic difficulties of reaching an agreement to marry, rather than the problem of personality adjustment, constitute the final barriers to marriage. The Communist government, of course, is changing all this in the sense that one of its lares to youth is the offer of a freer sex life.

The traditional Chinese idea is that the body of a girl is held in sacred trust by her family until it is claimed by her husband on the wedding night. Nothing could be more offensive to a Chinese girl's sensibility than the type of amorous dalliance indulged in by young people in the West. Even after marriage, a Chinese wife would not permit her husband any familiarity in the daytime, at least not in the presence of a third or fourth person. No wife, however affectionate, would think of kissing her husband when he goes to work, or when he comes home from it. "There is an expression which says "a married couple are man and wife only in bed and out of the bed they should treat each other respectfully as guests."

To the Westerner, the absence of a prior courtship suggests an unnatural and strained marital situation. Actually, however, most families choose their daughter-in-law from a family with similar economic status and regional background. When "gates match and doors correspond," as the saying goes, there is less likely to be friction. Furthermore, the problem of friction often does not arise because in China a girl's education consists of intensive preparation for the joys, duties, and privations awaiting her in her life with her parents-in-law and her husband.

One of the earliest Chinese books on etiquette was Nu Cheh (Rules of Conduct for Women), by Pan Chao, a woman scholar of the Han dynasty. Its lasting popularity reflected the need for practical guidance on the part of each generation of girls as its members grew up and assumed the difficult role of daughter-in-law in a strange household. It stressed four elementary virtues: character, speech, appearance, and accomplishments. To be industrious and thrifty, to be soft and submissive in character, to be neat and orderly in appearance, to be soft and low in speech, to avoid gossip and carrying tales, to be able to cook, sew, embroider, and, for the upper class girls, to read and write — all these are necessary for the ideal wife.

The wedding day is an occasion of sorrow as well as of joy, since the bride has to part with her parents and move into a new (often a worse) environment. The bride, therefore,
is expected to burst into wailing as she enters the bridal sedan — a custom dictated by convention but based ultimately on the girl's violent emotions on this occasion.

Her education of self-effacement often develops in the Chinese woman a finer sensibility than is possible to the Chinese man. This, at least, is the impression one gathers from reading Chinese novels. The author of the *Dream of the Red Chamber* states explicitly that the motivating force behind this novel is his memory of many fine women, before whom he and other men should feel ashamed. This is not to say that Chinese men are other than refined in social situations, or other than genuinely loving and respectful toward their womenfolk. But the kind of courtesy toward women that is born out of the adolescent experience of love and that marks the European gentleman, is often lacking in Chinese men. (If born in a wealthy family, the Chinese man is likely to have been pampered a good deal.)

*Hospitality and Ritual*

Social intercourse in China has always involved an elaborate system of vocabulary and gesticulation that forces itself on the attention of every foreign observer. In an age of simple manners, Chinese etiquette often seems artificial, with its ceremony and its circumlocution. One manifestation of the new concept of courtesy is the disappearance of the once numerous courteous synonyms for the first and second person pronoun. This tendency is discernible in China as well as other countries, but China's rich repertoire of expressions with which to humble yourself and honor your guest still enjoys wide currency. Ordinary conversation between educated adults, at least, still retains a great deal of ornate phraseology, which, when translated into the vernacular, sounds quite ridiculous. (This is especially true in literary-style letter writing.) Many foreign writers on China have mentioned, for example, the expression "dull thorn" to refer to one's wife. This and similar expressions are, however, seldom employed at present. Modern manners put a greater premium on sincerity than on mere form, the assumption being that if you are merely keeping up a fiction, you had better stop doing the things it calls for. Similarly, the Chinese are gradually discarding their unrealistic, overelegant vocabulary.

To treat a person courteously means, for the Chinese, to put him at ease, and convince him of the sincerity of one's regard and amiable feelings for him. The traditional Chinese strategy for doing this is to honor his guest and delude himself with an utter disregard of realities. The entire intricate Chinese system of nomenclature, vocabulary, gesture, and table manners is based on this strategy. Making bows and scraping before the friend who has dropped in for a visit, serving him tea and cigarettes, applying the epithets "honorable," "high," "esteemed" to everything he possesses, giving him the seat of honor at dinner, opening the door for him when he leaves — these are the gestures of deference with which one indicates that he will spare no effort that might help make his guest comfortable. Every civilized nation no doubt observes one variant or another of these hospitable practices. What distinguishes the Chinese variety is perhaps its higher degree of officiousness, which may easily be taken for insincerity, or, to put it a little differently, the excessive humility on the part of both host and guest. The Westerner suspects the man who is too polite of having something up his sleeve. In English fiction, for example, honesty is often allied with a bluff, hearty character, and villainy with an apparently self-effacing character. Uriah Heep in *David Copperfield*, who is always humbling himself before his betters, is a good example. And the Western concept of the Chinese as inexecutable and probably up to no good results from misreading of his external courtesy.

Under the influence of modern ideas, the Chinese are gradually discarding the refinements just described, and are beginning to share the Westerner's distrust of excessive court-
easy. Such, however, is the force of tradition within the family that most Chinese adolescents must experience terrible growing pains as they acquire a set of manners and a vocabulary with which they can conduct business and get on in the world.

Dining

Banqueting is the principal form of Chinese entertainment. (Theater-going is a less formal matter for the Chinese than for Americans. Social dancing was unknown in China until the last decades, for the traditional discouragement of social intercourse between the sexes caused most Chinese girls to shun this form of entertainment.) The Chinese use every possible pretext to give a dinner—a wedding, a birthday, concluding a business deal, etc. Even a funeral is an occasion for a splendid repast. On such occasions the host still makes extreme apologies for the quality of the food, while the guests are expected to respond with praise as each dish is served.

The Chinese manner of eating is communal (the dishes are placed on a large round table, and are equidistant from those who are seated around it). The host has little to do in the way of serving except to urge his guests to eat more heartily (the Chinese practice is to proceed through the meal from the simpler dishes to the more expensive ones).

Drinking

Excessive drinking is frowned upon in China, and the fear of drunkenness is constant and real. Passing drinks during dinner is thus a game that must be played with great subtlety. The guest eloquently protests that he must drink no more, and the host offers and sees him to take another one.

Games

In earlier times, the Chinese participated in literary games during dinner. Nowadays, the commonest game is finger guessing: two people simultaneously shout a number, while indicating a smaller number by holding up the fingers of the right hand; when one of the players hits upon the sum of the numbers indicated, he wins, and the other player is required to empty his glass (Kan-p'et, “bottoms up”).

Respect For Age

The traditional Chinese respect for age and the aged was not sentimental: it assumed that older people have a right to be listened to in virtue of their experience and wisdom, and also a right, which the strong Chinese feeling for family obligation and the relatively unchanging cultural tradition in fact enabled them to exercise, to a degree of comfort and dignity unknown in the present-day world. This was so much the case that men often pretended to be older than they were: the man of thirty tried to look forty and the man of forty tried to look fifty. The fiftieth birthday anniversary was always a big event in a man’s life, since he was then in a position to expect his rewards and live a serene and happy life. The sixtieth and seventieth birthdays were occasions for even more festive celebration. With the steady economic deterioration of most families in China, however, the position of the old has been rapidly changing for the worse; the intellectual ferment of modern China has tended to speed this change. But in matters of etiquette the age-old habits of courtesy and deference to the old continue to be maintained. The sense of financial obligation within the family also remains strong. Parents are still provided for to the very limit of their children’s capacity to pay. The Communist government, to be sure, is rapidly destroying this respect of traditional piety, in part by fostering new and less concrete loyalties.
Influences of the West

Western etiquette has had an important impact on modern Chinese social life. In most circles today, the simple handshake has replaced the more ceremonious bow as a form of greeting, and genuflection is reserved for moments when one is paying homage to the gods or to one's parents and ancestors. The Western-style rimmed hat, similarly, has replaced the close-fitting scalp cap of the Ch'ing dynasty everywhere except in the village areas. Women still cling to their traditional dress, and refuse to wear any kind of headgear. But in other respects they have followed in the steps of their Western counterparts: they use lipstick and nailpolish, give themselves home permanents, and wear nylon stockings. On the Communist mainland, of course, these bourgeois tendencies have been sharply arrested.

A SELECTED READING LIST

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CHAPTER 16
SUPERSTITIONS

BELIEFS

In dealing with the unknown, unpredictable happenings in daily life, many Chinese find a ready and popular explanation for any ills and reverses they may suffer in the activities of ghosts or spirits in various guises. When disaster descends, they say, the gods or the ghosts must be angry. This kind of thinking is especially common among the uneducated — the peasants and coolies and artisans — whose livelihood is so dependent upon nature, and to whom drought and famine, flood, pestilence, or war often mean the difference between life and death. The educated, especially the young, may entertain this or that particular superstitious belief, but in general they are critical of the whole idea of ghosts and spirits. As the influence of modern science spreads in China, these beliefs tend to be less and less widely held. They vary from locality to locality, but underlying all of them are the same fundamental features.

Chinese superstitions are not traceable to any one source. They include elements from several different religious — Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism mixed with local folklore, mythology, and history.

The World of Spirits

Traditionally the Chinese have believed in the existence of a world of spirits that is a shadowy but real counterpart of life here on earth. These spirits are everywhere. They are in everything. All nature is animated. They are modeled after man's own image, and actuated by the same motives as are men. They can appear in human shape, and are subject to human passions. As there are good and evil people in this world, so there are good and bad spirits in the other world. The good spirits are protectors of men and the architects of happiness: they may bring bountiful harvests, fair weather, and rain when it is needed; they end droughts and famines and prevent floods; they cure the sick and bring souls that have departed from their bodies back to them; they help the spirits of the dead in the world beyond, sometimes they intervene, on man's behalf, to command, expel, and counteract the activities of the bad spirits.

Bad spirits disturb the order of the universe. They visit men with disease, cause plagues and epidemics, produce poisonous airs and influences, often accomplishing their purposes in conjunction with the vicissitudes of the seasons.

Kuei-shên

These spirits (Kuei-shên, as they are called) may be the souls of human beings, or those of gods and goddesses who have never inhabited a human body. They are in the heavens, in the sun, the moon, and the stars; they are in the wind and the earth — in the rivers, the lakes, the mountains, the hills, they are in rocks and stones, trees and plants, and animals and men. They are subject to earthly rules and conditions. They indulge in pastimes, marry, sin, and die. They can be bribed, flattered, cajoled, and cheated. They can be punished and killed.

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The belief in spirits may have originated in connection with the phenomenon of death, which is thought of as the departure of the soul from the body. The soul, it is thought, becomes a ghost at large, and its possible activities have long stimulated the Chinese imagination. Dreams, during which the soul is believed to wander away from the body and later return, are regarded as substantiating this theory. An elaborate cult has grown up according to which man has no less than ten souls (three hun and seven p'o). As all creation is the working of the two forces, the positive, or Yang, and the negative, or Yin, so all souls fall into one of two categories: the lower kuei or p'o souls, which come from matter and Yin and after death return to the earth; and the higher shen or hun souls, which after death depart to the source of light, and come from a heavenly, or Yang, source.

Through time, shen has become a widely used and comprehensive term for the minor deities. They are spiritual beings who are sometimes assigned to avenge wrongs against heaven or against one's fellow men; they are good, in any case, and, for the most part, harmless. Some of them are the ghosts of ancestors, of local worthies, of eminent scholars, of military heroes, who in heaven may assume the role of spirit officials and attain the rank of divine heroes and demigods. Other shen are the gods and goddesses that dwell in nature.

The kuei, though capable of good as well as evil, are connected with death and darkness, and are to be feared as well as respected. Human ghosts, especially those that are manifestations of the lower soul (or p'o), and certain types of imps, goblins, and devils, come under this heading. Especially to be feared are the kuei or spirits of people who have died violent deaths (the drowned, the murdered, the suicides), who wander about in space until they can get revenge. They can escape from their bad lot in purgatory only by stealing a human body and inveigling its occupant into the state from which they wish to escape.

Some kuei, or demons, are under the jurisdiction of certain minor deities, who in turn are part of the mysterious organization of the universe. They have to be accepted and made the best of.

There are also Miao-kuei, who are wicked spirits. They are not of human origin, and enact the role of tempters. Another uncanny being is the Yao, which includes practically all prodigies and monsters without specific names.

Greckly feared is a horrible demon spirit called the Chiang-shih-kuei (similar to the vampire), which remains with the body after death, inhabiting it and preserving it from decay (by preying upon other corpses or upon living people).

In both the shen and the kuei, however, the basic concept is that of the disembodied ghost, traceable to a specific human being who only gradually lost his specific world identity. The ghost of a man of local prominence in the course of time could become the T'u-t'ao-yeh, the local deity that inhabits the small temples and shrines in any village. In a city, he is the Ch'eng-huang. The temples are to the imaginary world of ghosts what magistrate's courts are to the Western world. To them are brought all complaints against the spirits along with all requests for ghostly assistance.

Saints and Gods

Ghosts of great heroes become saints or gods. The greatest of these is Chiang T'ai-kung, the protector of homes and shops. A fisherman by trade, later a powerful military general and Prime Minister under the Chou dynasty, he became, after death, Chief of the Generals of Hades, and thus Lord of the Demons. The latter consequently stand in awe of his name or picture when they find it posted over a doorway. He is the special patron saint of fishermen and manufacturers of soybean sauce (his surname being pronounced like the Chinese word for soy sauce).
The spirit of Kuan Yü of the Three Kingdoms, a brave and loyal man who eventually gave up his life rather than swear allegiance to an enemy prince, has become Kuan-Kung or Kuan-ti (god). He has three claims to divine status: he is worshipped in some places as the God of War, in others as the God of Literature, and in South China as the God of Wealth. Temples are to be found to him throughout the country.

Wen-Ch’ang-ti-ch’ien, God of Literature, has been worshipped, as one might expect, by the literati. This god is the spirit of Chang Yu, who was born in the T’ang dynasty in the Kingdom of Yu-hsü. As seen in pictures, he usually has as his attendants K’uei Hsiung and Chu I, who are called upon by the literati to help them succeed in examinations and in office.

Other deified heroes are the Four Heavenly Generals, Sai-tà-fen-chiàng, who are in charge of the gates of Heaven. They are the spirits of four successful generals, Generals Ma, Ch’ao, Wén, and Yu Fei. Other powerful spirit protectors are the spirits of Duke Yen, Duke Chu, and General Ts’ao.

Taoist and Buddhist Gods and Heroes

Some popular spirits or cult heroes are of Buddhist and Taoist origin. One of these, widely worshipped throughout China by people of all faiths, is Kuan Yin, the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy. She symbolizes motherly compassion and is the giver of children.

Another popular God of Taoist origin is Chang T’en Shih, the Heavenly Master, who is the greatest agent of exorcism, sorcery, and demon control. This god is the spirit of Chang Tao-ling, who lived during the Han dynasty, devoted himself to the study of mysticism and alchemy, and received from Lao Tsé a knowledge of charms and spells. Having finally succeeded in discovering the elixir of life, he ascended to the skies, to become Chief of Wizards and Vice-Regent of the Pearly Emperor in Heaven. He is sometimes confused with Chung K’uei, also an extremely potent exorciser of demons of Taoist origin. He is usually represented as a fierce and powerful giant, sword in hand, in the act of brushing off a demon he has underfoot.

Still another god whom everyone knows is the Supreme Judge and Ruler of Hades, Yen Lo Wang, the Buddhist Ruler of the Dead. Everyone will meet him after death and be judged by him with the great impartiality for which he is famous.

Perhaps the most widely worshipped of all the spirits is the Tao-chün, or Kitchen God, whose shrine is to be found in every home. There are more than forty different stories about his genesis, but he is generally credited to the Taoists. His duties are many, the chief one being to keep a record of the good and bad acts of the members of the family, in order to report them to the Pearly Emperor. He also distributes riches and poverty to the members of the family in whatever manner he deems wise.

Animiric Personifications

Thus, the Chinese worship and fear both the ghosts of the dead and the gods of different religions. They also seek protection from the forces residing within nature itself: the earth, the air, and the sky, the spirits in the Sun, and the Goddess of the Moon. An eclipse occurs when the Sun and Moon have done wrong, and the Heavenly Dog attempts to devour them (he can be frightened away by the beating of drums and songs and the clapping of cymbals). In worshipping Earth and Heaven and the Five Planets, the Chinese relate them to the Five Elements: Jupiter (Green Ruler of the East) with wood, Mars (Red Ruler of the South) with fire, Saturn (Yellow Ruler of the Center) with Earth, Venus (White Ruler of the West) with metal, and Mercury (Black Ruler of the North) with water. Each

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of a great many earthly tutelaries receives his due as well: the spirit of the Five Great Mountains, the spirit of the Groves of Forests, the spirit of the Five Great Directions (four corners plus the center), and the Five Seasons.

In the air, thunder is worshiped under the title of Chin-t'ien-lei-tau or Lei-tau-ta-ti. This spirit is a mighty charm in the hands of diviners and geomancers, for it controls the lightning. There is also a Goddess of Lightning (T'ien-mu-niang-niang), who can strike evil spirits. The Chief of the Gods of Water and Rain is the Dragon King. He is frequently appealed to, and in any case greatly feared, when there is a flood or drought. He is also the ruler of the Ocean.

Stars

Every person is believed to have been born under a particular star, which should be placated in case of that person's illness, since it determines the major events of his life. The star gods are beneficent and malignant, the more well known of the latter class being the Dog star, who is especially feared by pregnant women, since he is the cause of sterility and of children's diseases.

The Forces of Nature: Feng-shui

But aside from these spirits and gods the Chinese have worked out the most intricate and detailed philosophy pertaining to the ordering of nature by the principle of the Feng-shui, literally, wind and water. The idea behind this system is that man is the product of the forces of the universe. His institutions, his dwelling, and his burial place, accordingly, must be so arranged as to harmonize with these forces. The earth is regarded as a square block set in the midst of the sky, surrounded by water and by the twenty-eight mansions of the moon. The year cycle is dominated by the "breathings" of nature: birth in the spring, growth in the summer, drying in the autumn, death in the winter. The day also has its breathings. To avoid evil and bring blessings upon himself, man and his works must be carefully adjusted to the forces of the universe. The study of these forces enables man to choose the locations upon which their beneficent influences converge and to avoid those at which discordant powers are in conflict or evil influences at work. It has developed into a philosophy as well as a system of divination. Choices made after such study are the essence of successful living. Buildings to house the living and graves for the dead should both be situated only following consultation of certain carefully worked out principles. By guarding the spirit of the dead, we make sure that prosperity shall wait upon their living descendants.

The Chinese also believed that disembodied spirits or ghosts lodge themselves in a vast variety of objects we find around us, both animate and inanimate. An object that has been "possessed" in this way is accounted obedient to the will and nature of its ghostly personality. These fetish objects are endowed with powers over men, and can protect or harm them.

Animals

Certain animals, which inspire dread because of their sensory endowments and physical capabilities, may be taken as examples of this fetishism. Among them are the weretigers, the werewolves, the wereweedas, and the cocks.

The tiger, the most dreaded of all, is regarded as possessing a great many more or less magical qualities. He lives to the age of one thousand. He can destroy and expel demons. His claws make powerful talismans, and the ashes left by his skin when it burns can be worn as charms against sickness. Many gods are thought of as mounted on the tiger. Children
wear caps and shoes made in the shape of his head, and his picture is often affixed on the walls of houses to protect them against evil influences. It is believed, finally, that when a person has been devoured by a tiger he becomes a Chin-kung, and leads the monster to destroy yet other victims. The ghost of each victim becomes the tiger’s slaves, protects him against danger, and urges him to kill and kill again.

Belief in the werewolf is especially common in North China, among the Mongols. Like the werewolf, the were-tiger is possessed by a human soul, who brings havoc upon other human beings. More popular and numerous still are the tales centering around the werewolf. The fox demon is the terror of every household. Invisible by day, he plays mostly during the night. He has, among other faculties, that of changing at will into human shape and bringing evil down upon men: disease, insanity, and even death. The human shape most frequently taken by the fox is that of a pretty damsel, who plays the role of a temptress, though on exceptional occasions she is good and helpful.

The cock is endowed with the power of giving protection against fire. Some people, for example, paint the image of a red cock on the door of their houses, so that the latter will not burn down. The cock is also a great dispeller of demons: the crow, the wandering specters of the night all disappear. It is, finally, the usual sacrifice to the spirits and gods. Its image is on top of the coffin at a funeral, and the bride and groom share a cock made of sugar at a wedding.

The eagle, because of its powerful clutches and strong beak, is also an expeller of demons.

There are animals which are regarded as lucky because their names sound like words of good portent. Their pictures serve as good luck symbols on festive occasions.

The word for stag, for example, sounds like the word for honors and dignities. Its picture, or the character for its name, means good luck of that type when it is hung on the wall of one’s house.

The bat, for the same kind of reason, symbolizes happiness and felicity.

A fish dish at the New Year feast or at ancestral sacrifices symbolizes, again for the same reason, wealth or plenty.

Mythology has created four fabulous creatures possessing supernatural powers: the tortoise, the phoenix, the unicorn, and the dragon.

Divinities with a tortoise shell as old as 2,300 B.C. The legend has it that a tortoise with dragon writing on its back appeared to Huang Ti in the Yellow River. It became the custom for the imperial government to seek the Will of Heaven by consulting a tortoise shell. (Its back was believed to resemble the vault of heaven, and its flat belly symbolized the earth’s horizon.)

The tortoise, presumably because it lives a long time, is the emblem of longevity, and a stone image of it is often seen on graves. The tortoise is also believed to possess the faculty of giving added strength to river embankments, and thus is worshipped as a river god and protector of dykes.

The phoenix is believed to appear only in times of peace and prosperity, and to be, therefore, an omen of coming prosperity and blessing, and of the coming of a sage or a great Emperor. (It was worshipped, for both reasons, by the Chinese Emperors of the past.) It is supposed to come from the East, and to be the product of the Sun, or Yang, principle in nature. The male and female phoenix together symbolize conjugal felicity.

The unicorn or Chi-fen, like the phoenix, portends peace and prosperity. The birth of sages and great rulers has always been pressed by its appearance so that people worship it when they wish to obtain a wise and virtuous son. Pictures of it almost always
show it with a baby boy riding on its back. Such a picture is always posted on the bridal chair and in the bedroom of the young married couple.

The dragon, all through the history of the empire, was the foremost emblem of social and political prestige. It was emblazoned on the imperial banners and on all postage stamps, and even today it is embroidered on grave clothes and on the garments of exorcisers.

The dragon rises from the sea into the clouds and subsequently descends in the form of fertilizing rain. It thus symbolizes the processes in nature having to do with the evaporation and condensation of water vapor. Today dragon worship is seen mainly in the "rain-begging" processions in time of drought. The image of the dragon has a clay head, baked hard in the sun and painted in bright colors. The body is a coarse cloth bag stretched over a series of hoops, and is often over fifty feet long. The tail, which resembles that of a crocodile, is made either of wood or of mud. As the men carry it in the procession, they cause it to bow and prance to the beating of gongs and drums and cymbals, all of which symbolize thunder. Flag-bearers lead the procession, one part of which exposes the tablet of the T'u-ti-loo-yeh or Ch'eng-huang to the searching rays of the sun so that it will stimulate the T'u-ti-loo-yeh to expedite the fall of rain. The procession includes, finally, the water carrier, who sprinkles water on the ground and thus simulates a rain shower. The bystanders greet him with the cry: "Here comes the men! Here comes the rain!" People carrying incense sticks bring up the rear, and all agree that rain will come by nightfall.

Trees and Plants

Trees and plants also possess supernatural powers. Trees big and old are believed to have acquired great vital energy and, along with it, some mysterious spiritual force. The pine tree, for example, symbolizes longevity and immortality. The willow tree is believed to be capable of warding off wicked spirits and evil influences. The bamboo, with its abundant foliage, is like the pine a symbol of longevity.

The classical symbol of immortality is an old man stepping out of a peach. (Most of the divinities of Taoism are immortal because of having eaten from the peach tree.) The peach tree is a great expeller of demons. It suppresses evil influences and holds off specters. Medicine made from the peach leaves thus expels demons from the human body, and peach wood arrows shot at the "heavenly dog" are the best possible protection against him. Children wear a peach stone cut in the shape of a padlock as a charm to protect them against death. (The plum blossom is sometimes used in conjunction with the peach blossom to drive away evil spirits.)

Because of the great number of seeds contained in its fruit, the pomegranate is the emblem of fertility and of numerous progeny. This symbolism, like several of those mentioned above, is based on a pun: the word Tsū means "seeds" (for the pomegranate) and "sons" (for man). The association of ideas has become so deeply rooted that the pomegranate is now regarded as possessing the power to make a man capable of begetting children. The lotus, again due to its many seeds, is a symbol of numerous progeny. (The flower, the petals, and the fruit of the lotus are all sacred Buddhist symbols.)

The word for the jujube bears the same sound as the word for "early" or "soon." Jujubes offered at a wedding mean "quickly beget sons," which is considered a lucky phrase.

The Emperors used stalks of the milfoil or yarrow (shih-t'ao) in conjunction with the tortoise shell for purposes of divination. The ch'ang-p'u-t'sao or sweetflag, because of its sword shaped leaves and strong aroma, is believed to have the power to ward off
evil spirits. The artemisia or mugwort (qin), which also has a pungent odor, is nailed up during the Fifth Month Festival to counteract the influence of evil spirits. Ginger is added to medicines and drinks to serve the same purpose.

No other plant, however, has powers comparable to those of the ginseng, which is a component of many medical prescriptions in China. "It strengthens the five viscera, it sets at rest the vital shen and gives stability to the kueh and p'o. It puts an end to timidity, removes noxious influences and sharpens the eyesight, opening the heart and increasing knowledge and wisdom. And if consumed for some length of time, it renders the body light and prolongs life." The most valuable property of ginseng is the effect it supposedly produces on the vital organs of the body, for it is said to stimulate the procreation of children in both men and women.

Behavior

In order to preserve himself, as the preceding clearly shows, man must maintain good relations with the Kuei-shen. He must woo the good beneficent spirits, and enlist their aid against the evil spirits. The best way to woo such spirits, the Chinese believe, is through a perfect ritual perfectly performed. The Chinese do not worship evil for evil's sake, or elevate vices to the rank of deities, or pretend in their honor that vice is virtue. Demons are honored by way of precaution against evil. Indeed, when they are honored at all, the attitude of most practical-minded Chinese toward the worship of the gods is analogous to taking out an insurance policy. It is better to believe that the gods exist than that they do not. If they do not exist, no harm is done. If they do exist, and are neglected, they may be angry and vengeful. Now a word about how man sets the divine powers to work, and how he communicates with the supernatural world from day to day.

Communication with Supernatural World

The most common medium for communicating with these gods is pen and paper, as is evident from the wide use of painted images of the gods, from the Ma-chang (i.e., paper gods), and from the charms consisting of drawings and written characters.

Worship

A typical communicant is the Chinese peasant, in whose simple home there is invariably a sacrifice table or altar. The paper image of the god to be worshipped or the wooden tablet of the ancestor is placed at the back of the table, with the offerings immediately in front of it. The brightly colored paper god may be in a wooden frame or may be folded around a block of wood or cardboard. If the sacrifice is to be made to more than one god, as at New Year's, for example, their pictures occupy the area at the back of the table by turns. Pieces of paper inscribed with phrases that vary according to the taste of the particular family are set up on both sides of the altar table. They may say "Family shrine for offering license to all the Gods" or merely "Tutelary gods of the house." The most common household gods are the ancestral tablets, the kitchen god (Tao-ch'an), the guardian gods of the door, and certain famous exorcists like Chiang T'ai-kung, and Chung K'uei. In some families, the chief place goes to the Goddess of Mercy, or the Five Sages, or the Star God of Fate (Pen-ming-hsing-chun), or the God of Literature, or the God of Wealth.

On the sacrifice table there are always five indispensable articles: offerings of food and drink, candles, incense, yuan pao (paper money of various kinds), and strings of firecrackers. The sacrifice feast may be quite elaborate or it may be quite simple, depending
upon the family's financial status. There may be tea, wine, rice, peanuts, sweetmeats, chicken, pork, and fish. Two red candles stand on either side in tall pewter candlesticks.

Very often, near the chiao t'ang or household shrine, is a T'u-t'ui tablet, or a Wu T'ai P'ai (a five-character tablet) representing Heaven, Earth, Emperor, Ancestor, and Teacher. (Nowadays the word for country has mostly displaced the word for Emperor on the five-character tablet.)

At the time of worship, the spirit represented in the picture is thought to be actually present, having been attracted by the fragrant incense smoke, brilliantly lighted candles, and wafting aromas of the food and wine. The offerings are presented to the gods and goddesses, and each member of the household pays his respects to them. The money is then burned amidst the blaze and crackle of the firecrackers, that is, it is sent heavenward to be at the spirit's disposal.

Among the household gods Tse-o-chên, the Kitchen God, is the most widely worshipped. He is the agent of the government of the underworld, and usually occupies a niche in the kitchen all to himself. Like the ancestral spirits, he is worshipped twice a month. His two duties are to familiarize himself with the attitudes and conduct of the various members of the family and to report at the end of the year to the Pearly Emperor. Just before he goes to make his report, therefore, the family members bribe him with a royal feast, and then smear his mouth with syrup to make sure that he will report favorably. He is then placed in a paper sedan chair and burned.

Besides the kitchen god, the Spirit of the House, Chai-shên, is frequently appealed to to pay special attention or give special help to the home and family. There are also the Six Gods of the Six Directions, the Spirit of the Well, and the Spirit of the Latrine.

One great desire shared by all Chinese is to have the blessing of progeny. Pictures showing Kuan Yin or T'ien Hou (the Queen of Heaven) or Sung T'ai Niang-ning (giver of sons) with children in their arms are hung in the nuptial chamber.

If a child is granted, the god and goddesses of the bed are honored with sacrifices on the occasion of his birth. The child is promptly presented to the household gods, and protection of the child is thereafter the main concern. He is given the nickname of an animal, 'little dog' or 'little cat' or the name of a worthless slave girl, in the hope of deceiving the evil spirits who seek to injure precious male children. He may even be given an earring to wear for this purpose.

Outside of the home, the peasants worship at the village temples and shrines. There are for various deities great and small: the local tutelary, the local heroes, Buddha, Kuan-yin, Kun-ti, the white-faced God of Wealth, the black-faced God of the Plague, and the black-faced God of Justice.

Before the statue of Kuan-yin a woman may leave a small shoe, as a pledge of her trust in Kuan-yin's power to give her a son. She also lights a stick of incense, kneels on the ground and with hands clasped mumbles her prayer. When the expected child is born, a sacred banquet may be given to return thanks. (At the time of birthing, prayers may be offered to the Goddess of Accelerating Birth.)

People in different walks of life pay homage to different gods, and choose different days and occasions for doing so. At planting time, the farmer may offer simple sacrifices to the T'ien Sung Ti Mu, God and Goddess of the fertility of the fields. The merchant guilds hold elaborate celebrations for the worship of the Ta-ni Shen (God of Wealth). Loo-pan, the patron saint of carpenters, receives a sacrifice when the framework of a building is erected. He is also credited with having invented oars and boats, and is honored when a new boat is launched. Chang Pan, the genius of bricks and stones, is the mason's
patron saint, and is worshipped when the foundation of a house or a bridge is laid. The distillers of wine worship the Spirit-in-the-Wine. Even the bean curd peddlers have their gods.

As the people pay homage at the shrine, priests perform rituals and chant prayers to the accompaniment of gentle tapping on the "wooden fish" or bell. These are punctuated by the gentle striking of gongs and cymbals.

Charms

In case of serious misfortune, recourse is had to the Taoist priests or Buddhist monks. The chief medium here is the petition charm, a mandate or order issued under seal and written with a cinnabar pencil. Such charms are the principal means of catching, expelling, or killing evil spirits. They can imprison, torture, drown, behead, burn, or roast all kinds of specters and ghosts. A ready-made charm can be bought from a wandering priest, or in a temple; a special one can be written by a priest or monk, upon request.

Like the Imperial Orders of the past, they are written on yellow, white, or red paper, with a red pencil usually, and stamped with a multicolored seal made of peach wood. On them are intricate tracings or characters that tell about their efficacy, along with the name of the person for whose benefit the document is being executed, and the date. The seal is most often that of Chang Tien-shih, the chief exorciser. Often the charm bears, at the top, a rough sketch of a god. It normally begins with the word "Order," or "Command." If it is to operate with its full potency, thunder and lightning must be depicted on it in the form of a spiral from which there issue a lightning flash (two flashes make the charm even more potent). The sun and moon may also be represented, combined to form the character for light. The evil to be destroyed is generally placed at the end, and represented by various characters. The charm ends, as it begins, in the same way as an Imperial document, and an extra touch may be added to it by including the phrase "Quick as fire." The priests and monks blow on the pencil and pronounce potent spells while executing a charm. Offerings, meantime, have been arranged on the sacrificial table. Often one priest beats a drum while another rings a bell and chants formulas, and then they both kneel down and bow three times while muttering a prayer. The charm, finally, is burned, and its ashes rise to heaven. (Sometimes the ashes are mingled with wine, tea, or hot water, and administered as a specific against bad influences, diseases, and attacks by bad spirits.)

There are charms capable of commanding all evil demons to depart without delay; others that protect against fire; therapeutic charms (these transfer the disease to a paper substitute, and when this is burnt the disease vanishes); charms to cure coughs, stomach aches, or sore eyes; charms to stop an epidemic, even among cattle. There are other charms to assure safety at sea, to guarantee riches, to provide protection for a new building, to hasten delivery of a child, etc. Charms cure, in short, almost all the diseases the flesh is heir to and, over and above that, bestow felicity both here and in the hereafter. They bring good harvests, fair weather, and put an end to famine.

Charms may also be worn as amulets on one's person, posted over doors, placed under the eaves of a house, affixed to bed curtains, worn in the hair, or put into a small red bag and suspended from one's button hole.

Symbolic Objects

The Chinese also believe in the beneficent power of certain of their characters. The character  
(blessing) or  
(happiness) wrought in red brings good luck when pasted over one's gate.  
(longevity),  
(office), and  
(riches) are also characters of
this kind. The book of classics itself has the power to protect when placed under a pillow. Other symbolic objects used as charms are sharp knives and swords, both of which are effective at driving away demons. They are often seen in funeral processions.

Metallic mirrors are also mighty instruments for routing specters. The reflecting surface (most of the mirrors are ornamented on one side) is highly polished and so gives off a great deal of light, which is demon dispelling. These mirrors are hung over doors, and the bride carries one with her in her bridal chair.

Both fire and light are believed to be potent against demons, and noise is believed capable of frightening spirits and of attracting the attention of the gods. This explains the use of firecrackers and the ringing of bells when the presence of the supernatural is felt or desired.

The color red, being of Yang origin, is believed to scare away evil spirits. A red dot is painted on a child's forehead, and a red tassel tied to his hair. On New Year's Day, bits of red paper are pasted on doors and tools, and dog's blood and cock's blood are also used as charms.

A boy may wear a padlock (or a large silver ring) hung around his neck by a silver chain, the idea being that it locks him to life and prevents his spirit from leaving his body. When a man gets sick, goes insane, or dies, the explanation is that his soul has wandered away from his body, and the only remedy is to get the soul to return. There are several ways to do this. One common custom is for somebody to take the afflicted person's clothes, walk a certain distance away from the house, and shake the clothes in the air as he calls out the sick man's name. A helper must then shout the words: "Has come back?" Or the two may proceed to the local temple and burn incense and light candles before the temple god. One of them then calls out the name of the afflicted person, and the other replies that his soul is coming back. One of them may beat upon a sieve as he calls out, for the sieve is believed to have the power of catching evil spirits who are therefore careful to avoid it.

Iron nails that have been used in sealing coffins, pictures of the five poisons (the centipede, viper, scorpion, toad, and spider), old fish nets (which have the same properties as sieves), are all believed to be effective against evil spirits.

*Dissection*

It is possible to learn that which is hidden, most particularly what is going to happen in the future, by establishing communication with the spirits and gods. Because they are closely related to the mysterious organization of the universe, spirits and gods know the future, and can communicate their knowledge to man through oracles, dreams, signs, and omens. The stars are heavens, the earth, the air, the waters, the animals and birds, and even magically possessed human beings can also tell one about future events and thus enable one to act more wisely than would otherwise be possible.

*The Eight Diagrams*

There have been diviners in China ever since the beginning of history. The Science of the Will of Heaven is based upon signs discovered on the shell of the tortoise and on the stalks of the milfoil. The procedure was to pour ink over the shell of the tortoise, apply fire to it from underneath, and study the pattern in which the ink dried because it revealed the future. About 300 B.C. this procedure was abandoned in favor of the Pa Kua or Eight Diagrams, reputedly invented by Fu Hsi. These diagrams, which are symbols made by a combination of triple lines, some solid and some broken, were, in fact, invented by Chou Wsh Kung of the Chou dynasty. The basis of the system is eight, but by doubling and combining the symbols the number is increased to sixty-four. Each
of the eight diagrams has a special name with a symbolical and fanciful meaning applicable to the various events of life. This is described in detail in the *I Ching* classic, which has always been and still is the handbook of divination and the standard manual of fortune tellers.

**Fortune-Telling**

The "ling" or bell, the high-pitched notes from a stringed instrument, the tap of the blind man's stick — these are familiar sounds along the streets and alleys of China; for they belong to the fortune-teller. He will ask his client for his "eight characters" (two characters for the hour, two for the day, two for the month, and two for the year of one's birth). By studying the relation and interaction between these eight natal characters and the five elements (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water), the ten heavenly stems, the twelve earthly branches, and the cyclic animals, he is able to apprehend the shape of events to come. If a man was born in the year of the Dragon, in the month of the Pig, on the day of the Dog, and at the hour of the Rat, this is all one needs to know in order to determine whether good or bad things are in store for him. If a man proposes to begin a certain job on a certain day, the fortune-teller will inform him whether the animal he was born under is or is not inimical to the animal of that day. The Dragon, for example, is hostile to the Tiger, and it would be highly inadvisable for a man born in the year of the Dragon to start a venture of any kind on the day of the Tiger.

Similarly, if the eight characters of a prospective bride and groom do not agree, it would be disastrous to unite them in marriage. Neither can persons born under opposing animals be joined in a business enterprise.

Fortune-telling stands set up along the streets compete with the wandering blind man. The seers who occupy them are not blind; rather they read the future by carefully inspecting one's physiognomy, usually one's facial features. According to them, the ears, eyes, mouth, nose, eyebrows, forehead, cheeks, and chin correspond to the five sacred mountains, the four great rivers, the five planets, and the six stars. The shape of the ears and nose, the lines of the eyebrows, the cheekbones, the general shape of the face — each of these has its meaning with respect to the future.

Other fortune-tellers read destiny in the fingers of the hand, forecasting a happy or unhappy future or a long or short life for the client, and telling him what years will be auspicious or inauspicious, how many children he will have, etc.

At another fortune-teller's stand, the future is divined via the analysis of written characters. The client selects a character, and the fortune-teller proceeds to dissect it. He then invents new characters by combining its parts, and from these new characters he draws a favorable or unfavorable prediction.

Another type of fortune-teller is the professional geomancer, whose people consult when they are choosing a site, whether for a building or for a grave. The geomancers are believed to understand the subtle rationale of the earth's contours in its entirety, and also to possess knowledge about winds and precipitation, so that it is easy for them to say what sites lend themselves to what purposes. The siting of graves is particularly important, since if the dead are properly buried their ghosts will be contented, and will bring only blessings to their living descendants.

The man needing counsel may also proceed to the nearest temple and, kneeling before an idol, shake a bamboo tube full of bamboo sticks (50 or 100). Finally one of the sticks is allowed to fall to the ground, and it indicates what passage to read in a certain book. This passage provides the needed guidance.
Almost every home has its almanac. The farmers, for example, although they use it less than their counterparts in the past, still abide by it faithfully in their agricultural pursuits. The first Imperial Almanac was prepared by the first Emperor of the Yuan dynasty, and the present almanac is modeled upon it. One can turn to it with confidence for advice as to what should be done or avoided on lucky and unlucky days, and on days that are neither lucky nor unlucky.

Another method of communicating with the ghosts of one's ancestors or with the gods is to summon their presence as follows: Tie two sticks together so that they form an angle. Fixing a small stick perpendicular to them at the point at which they intersect, two persons hold this apparatus between them, resting the point of the smaller stick in a tray of sand, and proceed to concentrate. The ghost of the ancestor then descends and moves their hands so as to trace a message in the sand. (This ceremony also is accompanied by the burning of incense and candles.)

So much for the sundry ways of contacting the world of spirits. A word now about certain set modes of behavior that are part of everyday life in China, and are relevant to the topic.

Taboos

There are certain things one should not do — the taboos.

One’s name is believed to be the handle of one’s soul, so that an ancestor’s name carved on a wooden tablet indicates his actual presence. Thus a child never pronounces his father’s name, and children are called by nicknames in order to conceal their real names from evil spirits (which could grasp the handle and so possess their souls). This taboo is gradually weakening with modernization.

A man and woman who have the same surname cannot marry, even when there is no known blood relationship. Violations of this taboo are also seen with increasing frequency.

No member of a family can get married while the family is in mourning.

People in mourning do not attend a wedding. In some localities, they are not even permitted to enter other people’s homes, since they are the carriers of the Yin influence and may bring bad luck.

A woman cannot leave the home during the first month after childbirth. Men must not enter the room in which a child has been born. (This is the “bloodroom.”)

Words with an ominous meaning must not be uttered. On festive or mournful occasions inappropriate words bring bad luck. At a wedding, for example, no one must speak about childlessness. On birthdays, no one must mention funerals. The word for death is always avoided. A dead man is “not here.” Coffins are called “long life boards.”

One must never speak words of caution to someone about to set out on a venture, e.g., someone about to embark on a boat trip. To say to the latter “Be careful, don’t let the boat turn over” informs the evil spirits that the voyager is running such a risk. They are only too eager to see him in danger.

A man never walks under a pair of women’s trousers drying on the line.

A woman must never step over the handles of a ricksha, lest she bring bad luck to the ricksha boy.

While eating a fish dish on a boat, one must refrain from turning the fish over (the Chinese usually cook a fish whole), since that would forecast the turning over of the boat.
The call of the magpie forebodes joy, and is singularly suspicious if it is heard just as one is about to engage in some undertaking. The call of a crow has various interpretations (depending on the locality), but the popular interpretation is that it is an ominous omen.

Twitching of the eyelids forebodes good or bad. If you sneeze or have a flushed ear, it means that someone is talking or thinking about you. After sneezing it is suspicious to say "Good luck" or "Live to be a hundred years, a thousand years!" Dreams forebode that the opposite of what is dreamt will take place in real life. Encountering a coffin on the street (in a funeral procession) will bring good luck, as it symbolizes "Office and wealth" (a pun on the word for coffin, "Kuan ts'ai"). To encounter an empty coffin means "empty riches," and is something else again.

Perspectives

The superstitions that abound in a country as large and scattered as China are endless and demonstrate the thoroughness and richness of the Chinese imagination. But it must not be thought that the Chinese torture themselves with their fanciful realm of superstitions. From the time he can talk, the Chinese child's mind is indeed fed with stories of the antics and pranks of the ghosts, the fairies, the devils, the gods, the fox spirits, etc. But in the long run he makes of them occasion for pleasant amusements, for enjoyable social gatherings, and for a full belly.

A SELECTED READING LIST
Sheyock, John K., The Temple of An'g, and Their Cult, a Study of Modern Chinese Religion, pp. 205, pl. 22, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1927. (This work was reputedly published in Paris, 1931.)
CHAPTER 17

PROVERBS, AXIOMS, SAYINGS, AND SAWS

HUMAN NATURE

General
The feeling of pity is common to all men, the feeling of shame and dishke is common to all, the feeling of reverence and respect is common to all, and the knowledge of right and wrong is common to all. (classical)

仁義之行，人皆有之。義義之行，人皆有之。

仁義之行，人皆有之。是非之行，人皆有之。

Mountains and rivers may be more easily altered than man's basic nature. (popular, but of classical origin)

江山易改，本性难移。

If you plant melons, you will get melons; if you plant beans, you will get beans. (popular)

种瓜得瓜，种豆得豆。

Heaven-sent calamities may be endured; self-made calamities make living impossible. (classical)

天作孽，犹可违，自作孽，不可活。

Too many bakers spoil the broth. (popular; compare 'too many cooks spoil the broth')

老大多磨嫌。

One man carries two buckets of water (balanced on either end of a shoulder pole); two men carry one bucket of water (on the pole between them); by three men, no water is carried. (popular)

一个和尚挑水喝，两个和尚挑水喝，三个和尚没水喝。

The sheep-fold is mended after the sheep are lost. (popular, but of classical origin; compare 'locking the stable door after the horse is stolen')

亡羊补牢。

Practice produces skill. (popular)

熟能生巧。

Habit becomes nature. (popular)

習成自然.
Even sages have faults.  (popular)

那些者在山中者，有一百个。

Those who in battle fled fifty paces laugh at those who fled a hundred.  (classical; compare ‘the difference lies only in degree’)

五十步笑百步。

A mute eating genian keeps his troubles to himself.  (popular; used to describe a man suffering through his own fault)

哑巴吃黄连。

He wants a good home but one that will not eat.  (popular; compare ‘he expects too much’)

又要马儿好，又要马儿不吃草。

Family

Respect thy father and mother at home; what is the use of travelling afar to burn incense.  (popular)

花花父母，何必远烧香。

Brothers are one’s arms and legs.  (popular, but of classical origin)

兄弟如手足。

Man’s elbow does not bend outward.  (popular; compare ‘by instinct, man turns inward toward his own kith and kin, and should stand by them’)

人的胳膊不能向外弯。

Distant water will not quench a near fire.  Distant relatives are not as good as near neighbors.  (popular)

近水楼台先得月，远亲不如近邻。

Friends

That which touches vermilion becomes red; that which touches ink becomes black.  (popular, but of classical origin; compare ‘we become like those with whom we associate’)

近朱者赤，近墨者黑。

He who sends charcoal in a snowstorm is the true gentleman.  (popular, but of classical origin; compare ‘a friend in need is a friend indeed’)

雪中送炭真君子。

Love

Even a hero finds it difficult to overcome the powers of a beauty.  (popular)

英雄难过美人关。

In the eyes of her lover, she is Hsi Shih.  (popular; Hsi Shih was a famous beauty; compare ‘love is blind’)

情人眼里出西施。

Miscellaneous

Oil added to the flames.  (popular, meaning to aggravate the situation)

火上加油。
Beating a drowning dog. (popular, meaning everyone condemns the 'down and out')

打落水狗。

Half a catty and eight ounces. (popular; compare 'six of one and half a dozen of the other')

半斤八两。

Wearing a high hat. (popular; describes the man who enjoys flattery)

顶高帽子。

Puttering the horse's rear. (popular, meaning to flatter)

拍马屁。

In his attempt to put the horse's rear, he hit its leg. (popular; compare 'if flattery is not appropriately applied, the flatterer will get kicked')

为马屁拍在马蹄上。

BEHAVIOR

Wise

He, whom wealth cannot seduce, might cannot bend, poverty cannot move, is the great man. (classical)

富贵不能淫，贫贱不能移，威武不能屈，此之谓大丈夫。

Think thrice before acting. (classical)

三思而行。

To speak of good is not difficult; to do good is difficult. (popular)

言善易行，匿善为难。

Cover up the evil, disseminate the good. (classical; compare 'do not talk about other's defects but spread their virtues')

忠善而怨。

When a fault is known, it should be amended. (popular, but of classical origin)

知过必改。

Make plans for the year in spring; make plans for the day in the early morning. (classical)

一年之计在于春，一日之计在于晨。

The gentleman forgets past injuries. (classical)

君子不念旧恶。

The gentleman uses his mouth; the small man uses his fists. (popular; compare 'the gentleman verbalizes, the small man strikes')

君子动口，小人动手。

He who has the will, will succeed. (popular, but of classical origin)

有志者，事竟成。

Sweep the snow at your front door; do not mind the frost on your neighbor's roof. (popular, but of classical origin; this moral has come to be disapproved of in modern time)

名人自扫门前雪，休管他人瓦上霜。
It is better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of an ox. (popular, but of classical origin; compare \textquoteleft it is better to be a big fish in a small pond than to be a small fish in a big pond\textquoteright)


Unwise
covet small gain to lose great wealth. (popular, but of classical origin; compare \textquoteleft penny wise and pound foolish\textquoteright)

食小利失大财.

To try to be clever and show oneself to be a fool. (classical)

其巧成拙.

Eating and dressing do not impoverish a man. Unwise planning will keep him poor all his life. (popular)

吃不穷，穿不穷，算计不穷一世穷.

Would you use an ox knife to kill a chicken? (popular, but of classical origin; used to describe a situation in which a highly qualified person is given a task unworthy of him)

何以用中刀.

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

Without tasting the bitterest of all bitterness, one cannot be a man above all men.

(popular)

吃了苦中苦，方为人上人.

If one is born in sorrow and calamity, one will die in ease and pleasure. (classical; compare \textquoteleft struggling brings out the best in a man\textquoteright)

生于忧患，死于安乐

Compared with those above me, I have less; compared with those below, I have more. (popular)

比上不足，比下有余.

The family which stores up virtue will have an abundance of happiness. (classical)

积善之家必有余庆.

When drinking water, think of its source. (classical)

饮水思源.

When the water recedes, the stones will appear. (popular, but of classical origin; compare \textquoteleft truth will out\textquoteright)

水落石出.

Good is rewarded by good, evil rewarded by evil. If not yet rewarded, the time has not yet arrived. (popular)

善有善报，恶有恶报。若不报，时候不到.

Opportunities given by heaven are not equal to the advantages afforded by the earth; the advantages afforded by the earth do not match the blessings accruing from harmony among men. (classical)

天时不如地利，地利不如人和.
Life and Death

Life and death are predetermined. Riches and honor depend upon Heaven (popular)
but of essence: origin

生生死死，得失有天。

Just as wind and clouds come unexpectedly, so happiness and sorrow come to man
(popular: out of essence: origin)

天有不测风云，人有旦夕祸福。

Even whilst man sits at home, Heaven may send calamity upon him (popular, compare ‘man cannot escape fate’)

往者不可追，来者天不降

Whom Yen Wang dooms to die in the third watch, cannot live to the fifth (popular.
Yen Wang is the king of Hades)

口王箋三更死，女人破啇去天年。

Simple provision for the living is better than an elaborate funeral for the dead (popular, used especially in connection with parents)

孝之至不如養之盡。

Good Government

The people are the root of a country, when the root is firm, the country is at peace.
(classical)

民為邦本，本固邦寧。

Love one's subjects as sons. (classical)

愛民如子。

Propriety, righteousness, honesty, and integrity are the four binding principles for
the nation: if these four are not rigidly observed, the nation will perish. (classical, this
was the slogan of the New Life Movement, initiated in 1935)

愛國愛民，愛家愛族，愛親愛友。

Allegiance exacted by force is not allegiance from the heart, allegiance exacted by
benevolence is allegiance from the heart. (classical)

愛之力人服，協心服也，以愛之人服，心服也。

Bad Government

Officials may start a fire but the people may not light a lamp (popular, describing
oppression)

只許官府燒火，勿許百姓點燈。

Unmerciful rule is more fearful than a tiger (classical)

苛政猛於虎。

In the face of unrighteousness, it is the duty of the son to fight it out before his father,
and it is the duty of a minister to fight it out before his sovereign (classical)

故子不可不爭於父，臣不可以不爭於君。

War and Military Action

For every successful general, tens of thousands of homes lie, strewn under the sun

BRT

STAT
Life and Death
Life and death are predetermined, riches and honor depend upon Heaven. (popular, but of classical origin)
生死有命, 貧富亦有天。

Just as wind and clouds come unexpectedly, so happiness and sorrow come to man. (popular, but of classical origin)
天有不測風雲, 人有旦夕福祸

Even whilst man sits at home, Heaven may send calamity upon him. (popular; compare 'man cannot escape fate')
閨門不出戸, 雲從天下降

Whom Yen Wang dooms to die in the third watch, cannot live to the fifth. (popular; Yen Wang is the king of Hsiao)
閨王指定三人死, 獨人敢自到天明

Simple provision for the living is better than an elaborate funeral for the dead. (popular; used especially in connection with parents)
生者之貧不若死者之富。

Good Government
The people are the root of a country; when the root is firm, the country is at peace. (classical)
民為邦本, 本固邦寧。

Love one's subjects as sons. (classical)
愛民如子。

Propriety, righteousness, honesty, and integrity are the four binding principles for the nation; if these four are not rigidly observed, the nation will perish. (classical; this was the slogan of the New Life Movement, initiated in 1935)
五常之道, 四德之貞, 四德不貞, 四道乃亡。

Allegiance exacted by force is not allegiance from the heart; allegiance exacted by benevolence is allegiance from the heart. (classical)
以力致人者, 非心服也, 以德致人者, 心服也。

Bad Government
Officials may start a fire but the people may not light a lamp. (popular, describing oppression)
許州官放火, 禁州百姓點燈。

Unmerciful rule is more fearful than a tiger. (classical)
苛政猛於虎。

In the face of unrighteousness, it is the duty of the son to fight it out before his father, and it is the duty of a minister to fight it out before his sovereign. (classical)
故當不忠則子不可以不孝於父, 臣不可以不忠於君。

War and Military Action
For every successful general, tens of thousands of bones lie, strewn under the sun.
A scholar cannot reason with a soldier. (popular)

Nails are not made of good iron; soldiers are not made of good men. (popular; disapproved in modern times)

Know thyself, know thine enemy. Thus, in a hundred battles, one will have a hundred victories. (classical)

When the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold. (classical: used chiefly to describe military defense when one of two neighboring countries is threatened or lost)

A SELECTED READING LIST


CHAPTER 18
TRADITIONAL CALENDAR

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese old style calendar, unlike the Western calendar, is lunar rather than solar. It is made up of 12 lunar months of 29 or 30 days each, to which, because these months fail to make the required total of 365⅓ days in a solar year, an intercalary month (Jian ye) is added every two or three years to make good the annual deficiency. This intercalary month must be inserted seven times every nineteen years, in such fashion that the winter solstice always falls in the eleventh month, the summer solstice in the fifth, the spring equinox in the second, and the autumn equinox in the eighth. The eleventh, twelfth, and first months are never duplicated. Every two or three years, therefore, there is usually a second fourth, fifth, or sixth, etc., month.

The traditional calendar is not exclusively lunar, since it also involves a series of twenty-four sections (cieh), which fall every fifteen days. These are based on a solar reckoning. These sections are woven into the lunar calendar, and provide an accurate subdivision of the seasons. They are of particular value to the peasant, who follows them implicitly as a guide to the proper time for plowing and harvesting.

The twenty-four sections are still noted on the modern calendar, but they are not utilized or celebrated with festivities as they were in the past. They are still used as indicators of climatic changes and guides for certain seasonal activities. A comparison (Table 3) shows when they fall according to the Western and lunar calendars.

In the traditional calendar, the years are named according to the twelve signs of the Chinese Solar Zodiac, i.e., the twelve constellations by means of which the position of the sun is fixed every month. Each bears the name of an animal. “I belong to the year of the ox or rat or dragon or rabbit,” a man replies when asked his age.

The first day of the year falls on the day of the first new moon after the sun enters Aquarius. Thus it cannot be earlier than 21 January and not later than 19 February.

Table 4 is a concordance of the traditional calendar and the Western calendar from the year of the serpent in 1933 to the year of the monkey in 1956. The first column lists the months of the lunar calendar in each year. The second column lists the dates in the Western calendar upon which the first day of the corresponding lunar month falls.

The Western or Gregorian Calendar was officially adopted by the Republic of China. It was soon found, however, that the customs and festivals of the centuries could not be altered this simply. The people cling to their traditional festivals, which were based on the lunar calendar. They also cling to their traditional system of “sections” for seasonal activities.

Most of the traditional festivals are no longer listed among the national holidays of China. Nevertheless, when the day comes, they are remembered and celebrated in traditional style, although much less elaborately than in past days and also with some modern modifications.
The customs observed and even the character of the celebrations vary somewhat from locality to locality and from home to home, especially from the traditional home found in isolated interior areas to the Westernized home found in the big cities and ports. Despite these variations, the festivals mean something to everyone Chinese, rich and poor, conservative and progressive, and require celebration.

### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Western (Gregorian)</th>
<th>Chinese (Surname)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beginning of Spring</td>
<td>20 Feb</td>
<td>26th of 12th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rain Water</td>
<td>20 Mar</td>
<td>1st of 1st month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Waking of Insects</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>16th of 2nd month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Spring Equinox</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>1st of 3rd month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pure Brightness</td>
<td>20 Apr</td>
<td>17th of 3rd month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Corn Rains</td>
<td>20 May</td>
<td>3rd of 4th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beginning of Summer</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>15th of 4th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Grain Full</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>5th of 5th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Grain in the Ear</td>
<td>21 June</td>
<td>20th of 5th month</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Summer Solstice</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>15th of 8th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Slight Heat</td>
<td>23 July</td>
<td>20th of 6th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Great Heat</td>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td>8th of 7th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Beginning of Autumn</td>
<td>23 Aug</td>
<td>21th of 7th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Stepping of Heat</td>
<td>8 Sept</td>
<td>9th of 8th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. White Dew</td>
<td>23 Sept</td>
<td>25th of 8th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Autumn Equinox</td>
<td>8 Oct</td>
<td>11th of 9th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Cold Dew</td>
<td>23 Oct</td>
<td>20th of 9th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Front's Descend</td>
<td>7 Nov</td>
<td>11th of 10th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Slight Snow</td>
<td>7 Dec</td>
<td>11th of 11th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Great Snow</td>
<td>22 Dec</td>
<td>26th of 11th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Winter Solstice</td>
<td>6 Jan</td>
<td>12th of 12th month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Slight Cold</td>
<td>6 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Great Cold</td>
<td>22 Jan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following paragraphs describe the principal festivals, dating them according to the traditional calendar. The relevant customs and types of celebration noted are those generally found in Chinese homes.

Insofar as the descriptions relate to any particular locality, it is Peking, the traditional center of the culture of the North.

**Principal Festivals**

**First Month**

1st Day: **Yee Kon**

This is the greatest of all Chinese festivals — the New Year. It is the longest holiday in the year. It brings at least a three-day rest, and celebrations that usually go on for fifteen days. It compensates for the Saturdays and Sundays not taken off throughout the year, a luxury that most Chinese farmers and workers cannot afford. It is the day on which old debts should be paid off, and on which everything must be started anew. It is a time of reunion, when all the family is present. As the first day of the year, it is regarded as the root out of which the months, the year, and the events of the future grow.
What one does on this day has great influence upon one's life through the whole year. One must begin the year right, without toil or labor (even the sweeping and cooking are done the evening before). One must not, on this day, swear or blaspheme or quarrel or mention words of ill omen, such as "coffin" or "death" or "demon"; any of these things will bring one misfortune all the rest of the year. New Year is also everyone's birthday.

TABLE 4

CONCORDANCE OF TRADITIONAL AND WESTERN CALENDARS,
1953 TO 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lunar</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Lunar</th>
<th>Western</th>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13 Jan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5 Jan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14 Feb</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>15 Mar</td>
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<td>16 Apr</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>18 June</td>
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<td>1 June</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>19 July</td>
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<td>20 Aug</td>
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<td>30 July</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>21 Sept</td>
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<td>22 Aug</td>
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<td>22 Sept</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27 Sept</td>
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<td>4 Oct</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>31 May</td>
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<td>3 Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 Jun</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

since it is the day on which everyone becomes one year older. Old and young alike adorn themselves in new, brightly colored clothes, preferably red ones. Firecrackers are exploded throughout the preceding night, and, sporadically, continue to be heard throughout the day. Many of the ordinary sights and sounds of other days are absent on New Year's Day. There are few passersby in the streets, and no peddlers to shout their wares. Everyone's doorstep is littered with the red and yellow wrappers of spent firecrackers. All doors are covered with strips of paper bearing lucky phrases. The shop doors wish one "Success in all affairs" and "Great prosperity"; inn doors invite one with "May guests descend in clouds", "Good Harvest," say the streamers on the door of the farm hut, and "Open door, see joy" those in residences or houses. Beside the doors there are brilliantly colored
paper drawings of figures in full panoply of war — the gate gods, which protect the family against evil spirits. Pieces of red paper bearing the word "joy" or other lucky symbols are pasted on the wheelbarrows and hoes of the farmers and on the shoulder poles of the coolies.

In the early morning the young pay their respects to their elders by "kowtowing" or bowing, and by wrapping one hand around the fist of the other and pumping it up and down in the air while exclaiming: "Kung-hai! Kung-hai! Pai Nien!" (Congratulations of joy! Greetings of the New Year). In return, elders give them gifts of money wrapped in red paper (in the days when silver dollars were available, they were usually used for this purpose; later, when there was only printed money, crisp new notes were used).

Some people begin to pay visits to relatives and friends on New Year itself. Others do not venture forth until after the third day. There is always a "joy tray" in the parlor, fully laden with sesame-dotted candies for fertility, "early bear a son" dates, dried lichees and olives representing wealth, round dragon-eye fruit for complete family reunion, red bean sugar cakes in red paper wrappings for color, melon seeds, "long-life" peanuts, etc. This tray is presented to guests as they arrive, and kept in the parlor to be freely enjoyed. The guests, along with their New Year congratulations, leave money wrapped in red paper for the servants. Incense is burned before the ancestral tablet everyday for sixteen days.

During this festival, the Chinese eat a rich sticky rice cake. It is called the nien kao or year cake, and means luck because the two words nien kao also may mean "higher each year," that is, promotion to higher office.

For the first three days of the New Year, there is only merry making — chiefly theater entertainment, gambling, and feasting. The clicking of mah jong tiles, the merry shouts of people at table, changing of cymbals and the beating of drums — these are the familiar sounds at this time of year. All Chinese celebrations are accompanied by plenty of noise, the more noise the better.

8th Day: *Pi Wu* (Breaking of the Five).

On the second or third day, people light firecrackers and give offerings before a paper image of the God of Wealth. Only on the fifth day do all merchants and storekeepers finally reopen their shops. Some people start their New Year calls on this same day, and the married daughter often chooses this occasion to return to her parents' home for a visit.

Li Chi'un, the first of the 24 "sections," falls at this time. The almanac states that if Li Chi'un is clear it is extremely good omen, since the farmers' ploughing will be easy.

In ancient days, the Emperor performed at this time the ceremony of "Opening the Earth," the sign for the peasants to start their spring plowing.

Yü Shui (Rain Water), the second "section," comes about two weeks later. After the Yü Shui no more snow should fall, and rain showers are expected.

15th Day: *The Lantern Festival* — the official ending of the New Year holidays.

On this day colorful lanterns of every shape and description are hung over the doors of shops and homes. (In most cities, there are special fairs at which these lanterns are for sale.) There may be crab lanterns with moving claws, butterfly lanterns with fluttering wings, or dragon lanterns made of several rabbit lanterns that move on the ground on wheels, or dragon lanterns made of several dragon sections, each supported by a stick which someone must hold. Those holding the dragon sections perform a dance, in the course of which they twist the dragon into all sorts of positions. In the evening, lantern parades file through the streets, the big event here being an illuminated dragon pursuing a ball of fire. The beat of drum and cymbal and the crackling and sputtering of firecrackers fill the ear. This is the evening when everybody eats hall-like lotus rice flour cakes with delectable fillings.
**Second Month**

The 3rd section, Ch'ing Chê comes about 5 March. This is the "section" in which life begins in the insect world.

The 4th section, Ch'ung-fen (Division of Spring) marks the Spring Equinox. If there is rain at Ch'ung-fen, few people will be sick.

**Third Month**

The 5th section is the Ch'ing Ming (Spring Festival). It usually falls early in the third month (occasionally it comes late in the second), exactly 100 days after the winter solstice. This is the traditional tree-planting or tree day.

The principal ceremony of the day is the visit to the family burial place, the purpose of which is "to sweep the graves." All the members of the family carry willow branches with them on this occasion, along with offerings of food and money for their dead to use in the spirit world.

Many people take this occasion to go on a pleasant hike and picnic. After worship, the family either dines near the tombs or goes home for a feast of reunion. Here the offerings, whose spiritual condition the dead have already absorbed, are eaten by the living.

The 6th section is Ku Ya (Grain Rain), and comes around 20 April. This is the time at which millet and wheat are sown.

The 7th section is Li Hai (Beginning of Summer), which falls around 5 May. This is the end of Spring. From this time onward, there should be little or no wind.

The 8th section is Hsiao Man (Ripening grain), which comes around 21 May. It indicates that the winter wheat, sown in the Autumn of the previous year, is coming along, and should be harvested within the next few weeks.

The 9th section is Mang Chung (Make Haste to Sow Seeds). It comes around 5 June, and reminds the farmer that this is his last chance for sowing grain. Rain is needed at this time, so that the almanac says "Thunder on Mang Chung is a good omen."

**Fifth Month**

5th Day: Tuan Wu Chieh.

This is the second of the three big festivals of the year. There are several legends about this festival. The one that is most widely known alleges that this festival was instituted in memory of the statesman Ch'ê Yuan, about 450 B.C., who drowned himself on this day after having been falsely accused by one of the princes of the state. The people, who loved him, set up a courtier, made a special rice cake wrapped in leaves of reeds and, setting out in boats with flags and gongs, threw it into the river to provide food for his spirit. Ch'ê Yuan is the symbol of integrity and loyalty.

Out of this legend there has developed the practice of eating tsung tes, rice dumplings, wrapped in lotus leaves, and of staging dragon boat races, similar to the regattas of the West, to the rhythm of beating gongs and cymbals. Leaves of calamus and mugwort are hung beside all the gates as protection against whatever is unpropitious. Colored charms, wrapped in multicolored silk threads, are hung on the clothes and in the hair of the women and children, also for protection.

This day is the second reckoning day, when all accounts and debts should be settled. There is also exchanging of gifts among friends, with feasts and drinking of wine.
The 10th section comes around this time, *Heia Chiâ* (Arrival of Spring). This is the summer solstice, and the longest day of the year. It is the time when garlic, a very popular food in the North, is at its best.

The 11th section is *Heia Shu* (Slight Heat) and comes about 7 July. This indicates the beginning of hot weather.

**Sixth Month**

6th Day: this is a lucky day on which to "air and sun the classics." The common man suns his clothes and belongings.

The 12th section is *Tu Shu*, which falls about 23 July. The weather is at its very hottest; the almanac states that if it is not exceedingly hot, "the five kinds of grain will not be of good quality."

**Seventh Month**

The 13th section, *Li Chi’iu* (Beginning of Autumn) falls in this month. This is the harvest season.

7th Day: on this evening the Cowherd and Weaver meet each year on the Milky Way. When they were mortals, the Cowherd and the Weaver fell in love and got married. Once married, however, they neglected their duties, and were transformed into two stars separated by the Milky Way. At this season the end of the harvest is approaching, and women begin to turn their attention to spinning and weaving.

16th Day: this is the first day of the *Kuei Chiâ* (Festival of All Departed Spirits), which begins on the 15th and lasts until the 30th. It is dedicated to the unhappy spirits who no longer have human descendants to care for them. The family now visits and repairs its graves, as it did at *Ch’ing Ming*. Food, money, and paper reproductions of useful articles (furniture, clothes, conveyances) are offered up to the family’s dead, and to departed spirits in general.

This festival has its roots in remote antiquity, but today is identified with the popular Buddhist festival of *Yu Lan Hui*, when for an entire month souls are released from Hell and are permitted to enjoy the feasts that mortals have prepared for them. On the last night of the seventh month they must return to their pit. All through this period Buddhist priests hold masses for them, and in the temples prayers and food are offered up for the lonely souls and destitute spirits, who thus attain a happier state and subsequently refrain from haunting the living.

On the evening of the fifteenth day paper boats are burned, to enable the souls of monks to save those who are suffering in Hell. In some parts of China, children parade the streets on this evening with lanterns in the shape of lotus leaves or with real lotus adorned with candles. Lanterns resembling lotus buds or little boats are launched upon the water for those who have been drowned. Pious fanciers imagine that the Kuei, or spirits, seize these votive lamps and, with them, the possibility of rebirth in human form.

The 14th section is *Ch’u Shu* (Limit of Heat), and comes around 23 August. The heat of Summer is over, though there may be a few more hot days. Harvesting of the early grain now starts, and rain is unwelcome.

The 15th section, *Pa Lü* (White Dew), comes around 8 September. The air is dry, and there is no precipitation of dew. This is the season for sowing.

**Eighth Month**

15th Day: The Harvest Festival.

This, *Chung Chi’iu Chiâ*, is the third and last of the big festivals of the year. By this time, part of the harvest has been gathered in, and the weather has turned exhilarating.
The moon occupies the center of attention during that festival, for this is the time of year when "the moon is especially brilliant" and is "at its roundest." The fullness of the moon symbolizes, as we would expect, the complete family. The Harvest Festival is therefore the festival of family reunion, or T'uan Yüan. Its distinctive offerings are round mooncakes.

The peasants, their heavy labors now over, pause to celebrate, and to worship their gods, especially the god of soil and of husbandry. Outdoor theaters, lion dances, and stilts parades all figure in the celebration. Gifts are exchanged — of live fowl, of wine, and of mooncakes.

In the evenings during this festival, people "pursue" or "reward" the moon. At the precise hour when the moon clears the trees and soars up into the higher heavens, obesience is paid to it with candles and incense, and each person makes his bow. A poster of the Moon Rabbit — pounding the pill of immortality under the sacred Cassia tree — must be hung on a tree in order for the festival to be complete.

There are many legends about the moon. The Buddhists believe that Buddha himself put the hare there, to serve as a shining example to all (the hare has offered himself as a sacrifice to Buddha). The Taoists also believe in the hare (rabbit) and give him the pill of immortality to pound, and put over his head the sacred Cassia tree, with its miraculous powers. Busy beside the tree is the woodcutter, who is forever trying to chop it down — in vain, since the tree mends the moment it is cut.

Another popular legend is that of Ch'ang I (the Moon Lady), who stole her husband's pill of immortality and then fled into the moon. Out of breath when she reached the moon, she grabbed up the outer covering of the pill, whereupon it turned into the Jade Rabbit and she herself was metamorphosed into the Ch'uan, the three-legged toad, presumably as a punishment.

Before the end of the festival, the Moon-Rabbit poster is burned, and its ashes are carried away by the wind. By no means all Chinese, to be sure, observe these ancient customs. But all participate in the feast, sip wine, nibble the symbolic mooncakes, and go on moon-viewing parties.

The 16th section y Ch'iu fen (Division of Autumn), which comes about the close of the Autumnal Equinox. If at Ch'iu fen there are many white clouds, the rejoicing voices will be heard everywhere, the Chinese say, because this means that the harvesting of the late crop will go well. Thunder and lightning at this time are regarded as a sign that winter rice will go up in price.

The 17th section, Han-lu (Cold Dew), falls around 6 October. During this season the weather turns distinctly colder, and the leaves begin to fall from the trees.

Ninth Month

9th Day: this is the festival of T'ing Kao (Mounting the Heights), which is also called Ch'ung yang chih.

In the 6th Century, n.c., during the Han dynasty, according to the legend, a sorceress warned a friend, a good man, of an impending great calamity on the Double Ninth, advising him to go into the hills. He and his family acted on this advice, and when they returned home in the evening found that all they had left behind had been washed away by a flood, which undoubtedly would have killed them had they not spent the day in the hills. On this day, accordingly, people climb mountains and nibble T'ing Kao cakes (the symbol of receiving promotion, i.e., climbing to higher office), which they wash down with sips of chrysanthemum wine.

A popular sport on this day is kite-flying. The sky, all day long, is full of kites of all shapes and forms.
This is the season for crab feasts, for chrysanthemum shows, and for cricket fights. The crickets, of which there are many varieties with many names, are bred for their fighting qualities, and carefully trained, so that a fine specimen may be very costly. On the day of the fight, each pair of combatants is matched for size and placed in the cricket pit. Their owners, by tickling their backs with a brush, excite them to great anger, so that they rush upon each other and keep on fighting until one or the other is defeated. Betas are made, as at a Western cockfight, and the spectators follow the course of the battle with eager attention. (Cock-fighting is a great boys' sport, so there are amateur matches to parallel the professional ones.)

The 18th section, Shuang ching (Frost Descends) comes about 23 October. Its meaning, as far as the weather is concerned, is what its name implies.

The 19th section, Li Tung (the Beginning of Winter), comes around 7 November.

The 20th section, Hsiao hesh (Little Snow), comes around 22 November.

The 21st section, Ta hesh (Heavy Snow), comes about 7 December.

The 22nd section, Tung Chih (Winter Arrives), comes around 22 December. This is the winter solstice (i.e., the shortest day of the year).

The 23rd section, Hsiao han (Little Cold), occurs around 6 January.

The 24th section, Ta han (Severe Cold), comes around 21 January. From this time on the weather will gradually become warmer.

Twelfth Month

8th Day: the Feast of La Pa Chou.

This festival is observed particularly in North China. Early in the morning, the women begin to prepare a thick congee or cereal, made of many (sometimes 30 or 40) and varied ingredients: whole grain, dried fruit, beans and peas, nuts, and various kinds of sugar. This is the La Pa Chou, that is the "eight of twelfth congee." When it is ready, part of it is offered to the Goddess of Mercy, the offering being accompanied by the burning of incense. Portions are then offered to the ancestral tablets, and only afterwards to the living members of the family. There are several legends in connection with this custom. One is that a poor mother, whose infant son had driven her to beg food from the neighbors, made the first congee — out of the handful of grain, fruit, and beans her neighbors had given her. Buddhists celebrate the La Pa Chou as a remembrance feast for their beloved Kuan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy, its specific reference for them being to the day she left to become a nun, and gathered grains and fruit for her last meal at home.

22nd Day (or 21th): New Year's preparations begin on this day, when sacrifices are made to the Kitchen God (Tao Ch'in), who is about to leave for Heaven to make his annual report on the behavior of each family during the year ending. He is also the guardian and the heavenly censor, who notes out longevity and wealth to the members of the family. He has a shrine in every Chinese kitchen — behind the cooking stove, where there is a little niche on which his picture sits, to be gazed on at New Year's. At the hour of his supposed departure on his journey, he receives offerings of food, especially sweet things: melons, cakes, candied fruits, and a particular white sweetmeat. His lips are smeared either with this sweetmeat or with honey, so that he will not talk too freely in the other world and will make what words he says sweet ones. After the family has feasted and all have bowed respectfully before his picture, the latter is burned, for the kitchen god is now on his way to Heaven, and will not be back for six or seven days. The ceremony ends with a salute of fireworks. This is the beginning of the "little New Year." There are further offerings to the several gods who have blessed the family during the year.
Through the next six days, China's streets are crowded as at no other time in the year, for this is the reason when everybody shops for New Year's, stocking up enough food to see the family through the holidays, when all the stores will be closed, and buying presents for friends. Gifts must be given in pairs or even numbers: two or four bottles of wine, two or four boxes of year cake, etc. Live fowl, sweetmeats, ham — all these are suitable gifts. Market prices soar, even haircuts double in price.

In every home, there is much food to be prepared and much scrubbing and washing to be done. Last year's lucky inscriptions must be scraped off, and new ones pasted up in their stead. In business homes, their mottoes speak of prosperity; in the homes of officials, they speak of high positions and honors; in the homes of common people, they extol the virtues of filial piety and reverence, and express a wish for wealth, posterity, longevity, joy, and good luck.

Since all debts must be settled before the New Year arrives, cash is much in demand. Debtors who are unable to pay up try to avoid their creditors, who are trying equally hard to locate them (if the debtor can avoid the creditor until New Year's Day, settlement of the debt will automatically be postponed until the next reckoning day).

An elaborate feast must be prepared for New Year's Eve, when the living and dead members of the family will alight present at a great annual reunion: chicken, duck, fish, ham, preserved eggs, meats, and vegetables dishes of every description — with an abundance of wine to wash it all down. When the guests are present, the various dishes are ceremoniously spread out before the ancestral tablets, as if the ancestors were there in the flesh; and it is only after the ancestors have partaken of the feast's ethereal essence that the household begins to eat its material components. The whole night is then given over to feasting and merrymaking, to the accompaniment of salvoes of firecrackers. Just before midnight, a new picture of the Kitchen God is placed in the shrine behind the cooking-stove, in token of his return from his journey, and the firecrackers pierce the night more insistently than ever.

Shortly before dawn, the main reception room is swept clean, and offerings of sweetmeats and paper money are made to Heaven and Earth. The head of the family lights three sticks of incense, places them in the incense burner, and kneels before the household gods and the ancestral tablets. (Paper money is burned and firecrackers shot off to notify the gods.) The remaining members of the household in order of generation and rank then imitate his example, and the younger members pay their respects to their elders. The New Year begins amidst mutual wishes of "Kung hsi! Kung hsi!"

A SELECTED READING LIST

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CHAPTER 19
MODERN CALENDAR

INTRODUCTION

This chapter shows the anniversaries and other dates that are commemorated in one way or another in Nationalist China and/or in Communist China. National holidays are marked with an asterisk. Some of the minor dates mentioned are honored only by special articles in the day’s newspaper or by special meetings and rallies of the groups specifically concerned.

THE CALENDAR YEAR

**January**

1st Nat.* New Year's Day. (The Nationalists observe this day both as New Year's and as the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, in 1912.)

8th Com. South Anhwei Incident, when the Communist New Fourth Army received a surprise attack by Chiang Kai-shek in the southern district of Anhwei Province in 1941. As a result, the New Fourth Army suffered very heavy losses . . .” (quoted from People's China).


**February**

The first three days of the lunar year, which usually fall in this month, are official Communist “Spring holidays.” Besides observing the traditional New Year's customs, the “people” in 1951 “contributed overtime in their work to send gifts to the war volunteers. Some workers made contributions and took New Year collections for Korea.” The traditional carvings, paintings, and scissor cuts of good luck symbols were for the most part missing. Communist posters and pictures having taken their place. Some typical captions on these posters and pictures were: “Greet 1951, the year of victory and plenty!” “Production brings prosperity!” “New title deeds!” “Pictures of military and labor heroes stood guard over peasant households instead of the old door gods.” (People's China)

The Nationalists do not treat these three days as official holidays, but the people in their territory celebrate them unofficially.

5th Nat. Farmers' Day.

7th Com. The “Two-Seven Tragedy” 1923, when the unionized railway workers on the Peking-Hankow Railroad were persecuted by the militia forces under the command of War lord Wu Pei-fu.

10th Com. Anniversary of the death of the Russian poet Pushkin, in 1837.

19th Nat. Anniversary of General Chiang Kai-shek’s launching of the New Life Movement at Nanchang, in 1934.

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STAT
Struggle-against-Colonialism Day.
Soviet Red Army Day, anniversary of the day in 1918 when the
Soviet Red Army halted Germany's attack on Petersburg.
Anniversary of the death of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, in 1937.
Anniversary of the revolt of the natives of Taiwan against Nationalist
rule, in 1947.

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY. In Nationalist China there are meet-
ing and exhibits which the women, working women especial-
ly, attend in large numbers. Consistent with its policy of champi-
nining the cause of women, the Communist government celebrates the day
in a more elaborate style. The following is a description of the celebra-
tion in Peking in 1950 (from People's China): Women in government
offices, state enterprises, and schools had a day's holiday. Exhibits of
mothercraft and photographs of the life of Chinese and Soviet women
were on view. A happy crowd was present, consisting of present women
from outlying districts, modern girls and girls of the Young Pioneers',
housewives and women in the People's Liberation Army, students and
government cadres. Gray-haired grandmothers (in greens and blues and
yellow pants and silk dresses) were distributing the Yangko dance
beneath the banner 'Peking's housewives salute International Women's
Day!' Snatches of songs, 'The East Is Red', and other popular tunes,
could be heard. In the afternoon there were yangko dances, skits, movies,
and newsreels. The biggest red banner read 'Women of all classes,
of all nationalities, all democratic parties, all religious groups, united under
the flag of great patriotism.'

Arbor Day, in memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Repub-
lic, who died on this day (in 1925). He had repeatedly stressed the
importance of forestation. The Communists mention his death but
do not treat it as a holiday.

Anniversary of Marx's death (in 1883).
Anniversary of Lenin's death (1924).

INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S DAY. Commemorates the birth of
Wang Jingwei, the first Chinese Communist leader, in 1900.
This is one of Communist China’s most important celebrations. The Nationalists recognize it but do not treat it as a holiday. The Communist regime momentarily overlooks the importance of austerity and indulges in elaborate celebration on this occasion. The Communists have a flair for dramatic and spectacular mass displays with brilliant color and action, and always show it in this celebration, the purpose of which is to promote activities for the welfare of the state.

On May Day in Peking in 1951 (according to People’s China) the red silk flags, red and gold banners, and handpainted portraits of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and Stalin, as well as other People’s leaders over the world, turned the square into a blaze of color. The citizenry turned out in force: more than 600,000 industrial workers, peasants, housewives, teachers, students, government cadres, cultural workers, silver-haired old men, great-grandmothers, and youngsters paraded past the reviewing stand. There were representatives of national minorities dressed in colorful costumes, young pioneers, with red scarves, and gaily-attired dancers.

The Peking demonstration started with twenty-eight salvos from the artillery. As the marchers in the parade moved into the square (T’ien An Men) with their red flags and portraits, the band played the National anthem and the stirring notes of the Internationale.

Textile workers exhibited charts showing how they had beaten their output target for the year by 25 percent. . . . The Peking Tramway workers carried placards indicating a 50 percent increase in mileage run in 1950. Steel workers and coal miners, with paper facsimiles of their pneumatic drills, were also in the parade. Peasants marched with banners promising to do their utmost in the spring sowing season. Tens of thousands of youths carried books and balls to indicate that they would study hard. On the rostrum, to greet the paraders, were the government and People’s leaders. To the accompaniment of firecrackers, songs and drums, the paraders shouted “Long Live Chairman Mao!” “Long Live the Chinese Communist Party!” “Long Live the Chinese People.”

Chinese Youth Day. Students in colleges and high school commemorate the national students’ and workers’ demonstration on 4 May 1919, in protest against the injustices of the Versailles Treaty.

The Communists celebrate the day because it signified the uprising of a new nationalism, of new classes, and of a new culture.

Poets’ Day. The Chinese honor the memory of Chu’ Yu’an, statesman-poet who died because of his belief in justice. (The traditional Yuan Wu Festival, also in his memory, falls on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month.)

It is also Learning Day, and the anniversary of Marx’s birth (in 1818).

Humiliation Day, the anniversary of Yüan Shih-k’ai’s acceptance of the twenty-one demands from Japan

Nurses’ Day, the anniversary of Florence Nightingale’s birth (in 1820).
30th  Com.  The anniversary of the "May Thirtieth Incident," a national strike of students, laborers, and merchants in protest against the murder of a Chinese factory foreman in a Japanese textile mill in Shanghai.

June

1st  Com.  Children's Day.
3rd  Nat.  Opium Suppression Day. On this day (in 1859) Lin Te-hau, Chinese official, confiscated many tons of British opium. Out of this event grew the Opium War.
6th  Nat.  Engineer's Day.
7th  Com.  Teacher's Day, the anniversary of a meeting (in 1931) of poorly paid teachers demanding justice and better treatment.
18th Com.  Anniversary of the death (in 1935) of Michurin, Soviet botanist.
25th Com.  Anniversary of the death (in 1936) of Gorky, Russian writer, and (in 1938) of Ch'ao Ch'iu-pai, Communist leader and Russian scholar.

July

1st  Com.  Anniversary of the founding (in 1921) of the Chinese Communist Party. The day was celebrated in 1950 by a rally, at which pictures of leading Communists (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh) were spectacularly displayed, and the workers voluntarily raised their production targets.
7th  Nat.  Anniversary of the outbreak (in 1937) of the Sino-Japanese War at Lu-kou-ch'iao.

August

5th  Com.  Anniversary of the death (in 1885) of Engels.
8th  Nat.  Father's Day.
13th Com.  Anniversary of the victory (in 1945) over Japan.
14th Nat.  Air Force Day.
27th Nat.  Anniversary of Confucius' birth. It is also Teacher's Day.

September

1st  Nat.  Journalists' Day. The Communists recognize this day, but do not treat it as a holiday.
9th  Nat.  Physical Culture Day.
15th Nat.  Anniversary of the "Mukden Incident," when Japan (in 1931) invaded Manchuria.
25th Com.  Anniversary of the birth (in 1881) of Lu Hsun, a well-known Chinese writer.
70th Com.  Anniversary of the birth (in 1849) of Russian scientist Pavlov.

October

1st & 2nd Com.* Anniversary of the inauguration (in 1919) of the People's Republic of China. In 1950 it was celebrated with a mass parade, with the artillery, the infantry, and the air force all participating. There were the usual yanko and waist-drum dances, and other spectacles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Nat.*</td>
<td>The Double Tenth, the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. In 1950 the Nationalists celebrated it (in Taipêh) with a rally and a parade. All organizations were represented. There were athletic demonstrations, skits, and a marathon race. There were festive decorations, feasts, and numerous entertainments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>Anniversary of the death (in 1930) of Lu Hsün.</td>
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<td>21th Nat.</td>
<td>United Nations Day and Taiwan Restoration Day.</td>
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<td>27th Com.</td>
<td>Anniversary of the birth (in 1855) of Ivan Vladimirovich Michurin, Soviet botanist.</td>
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<td><strong>November</strong></td>
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<td>7th Com.</td>
<td>Anniversary of the October Revolution (of 1917) in Russia.</td>
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<td>10th Com.</td>
<td>World Youth Day.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th Nat.*</td>
<td>Anniversary of the birth (in 1859) of Sun Yat-sen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Nat.</td>
<td>Air Defense Day.</td>
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<td>28th Com.</td>
<td>Anniversary of the birth (in 1820) of Friedrich Engels.</td>
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<td><strong>December</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Com.</td>
<td>Anniversary of a students' mass demonstration (in Peking in 1935) to demand resistance against Japan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st Com.</td>
<td>Anniversary of the birth (in 1879) of Stalin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th Nat.</td>
<td>National Renaissance Day, anniversary of the rebellion (in 1915) against Yuan Shih-k'ai's attempt to restore the monarchy.</td>
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CHAPTER 20

TRADITIONAL PERSONAGES: REAL AND IMAGINARY

GOOD RULERS; FOUNDERS OF DYNASTIES

Shun 舜 (legendary)

Yao and Shun were the two traditional sage kings of China. Though given idealized portraits by later philosophers and historians, they remain completely legendary figures. They were depicted as men of magnetic virtue, delegating their power to able ministers who inaugurated many regulations in government, education, and agriculture. More, supposedly, was known of Shun than of Yao. By the age of twenty, Shun had already attracted wide attention as an exemplary son and brother. His father, step mother, and half-brother tried several stratagems to kill him but each time he escaped unharmed. In spite of this, Shun continued to love his parents and brother. Yao heard of his filial piety and gave him his two daughters in marriage. Upon his death, Yao set aside his unworthy son and gave the kingdom into Shun's care. This democratic procedure was highly extolled by the later philosophers.

During the reigns of Yao and Shun, China was continually ravaged by floods. The Chinese philosophers never saw the contradiction involved in the imposition of one myth upon another, namely, that if the flood indeed raged during the times of Yao and Shun, affecting the livelihood of the population, they could not have been the ideal kings they were supposed to be. Yao hired Kun to drain off the flood from the kingdom; Kun bungled the job and was later executed by Shun. Shun appointed Kun's son, Yu, to take his place; after nine years of unremitting labor, Yu finally succeeded in guiding the waters to the sea. It was said of Yu that he never once entered his home during all that time even though he passed by the door and heard the cry of his infant son. Upon the death of Shun, Yu became the ruler of China, laying the foundation of the Hsia dynasty.

Li Shih-min 李世民 (A.D. 597-649)

The second son of Li Yuan, Li Shih-min entered the military service during the reign of the invincible Sui Yang Ti. Finding the country a prey to disorder he joined in a conspiracy against the ruling house, and in A.D. 618 succeeded in placing his father upon the throne as first Emperor of the T'ang dynasty. The consolidation of the Empire was due entirely to the efforts of Li Shih-min who, aided by his able generals, crushed the many rival claimants to the throne. His eldest brother, the Heir Apparent, jealous of his influence, conspired with a younger brother to assassinate him. Discovering the plot in time, Li Shih-min slew them both and ascended the throne in 627 as T'ai Tsung. The death of his brothers was T'ai Tsung's one deed of severity; otherwise he was unsurpassed among Chinese Emperors for his personal amiability and magnanimity.

His court consisted of an unexcelled array of brilliant civil administrators and generals. During his reign, the territory of the Empire expanded and smaller states were happy to pay tribute and homage. T'ai Tsung was beloved by all priests — Buddhist, Taoist, and
Christian. It was under his auspices that Nestorian missionaries were allowed to settle in Ch'ang-an in 630. And Hsuan Teang went on his famous Buddhist pilgrimage to India in 620. On one occasion T'ai Teang is said to have died and to have gone down into Purgatory, but to have recovered his life by the kindly altercation in the Book of Fate of a 13 into a 33 (Journey to the West). Li Shih-min's colorful early career in his campaign against Yang-ti and the rebels is depicted in the popular novel, The Chronicles of Sui and Tang.

Chu Yüan-chang (d. 1398)
The first Emperor of the Ming dynasty (dignitary title T'ai T'ao) was neither a sage nor a benevolent ruler; but his career is typical of those peasant rebels who at various times finally gained possession of the Empire. Born of poor parents, Chu Yüan-chang spent his boyhood as a Buddhist novice in a monastery at Feng-yang, Anhwei. Then he sought his fortune with an insurgent general, Kuo Tso-hsing, who was among the first to strike against the tottering Yuan regime. Upon the death of Kuo, Chu struck out on an independent path and soon controlled the Yangtze area. Like all founders of dynasties, Chu had many able men in his service. Among them were Liu Chi, the sagacious counsellor supposedly gifted with foresight, and the military commanders Hsi T'ai and Ch'ang Yü-ch'un. With their aid, Chu crushed his rivals and pushed the Mongols back to Mongolia. These colorful events are retold with much gusto in the popular romance known as Ying-ki Chuan or The Chronicle of Heroes.

Like Han Kao Ti, Ming T'ai T'ao became very cruel and suspicious after he mounted the throne in 1368 and put most of his trusted followers to death. Even Liu Chi and Hsi T'ai were poisoned. In some notorious cases, as with the trials of General Lan Yu and Prime Minister Hu Wei-yung, the number of his victims massacred exceeded forty thousand. In his old age he was definitely a maniac. But for the fact that he was the founder of a dynasty and did some good for the people, he could be counted among the tyrants. Lacking a sound education and of crude facial features, he was the victim of an inferiority complex; later physiognomists claim, however, that his distorted features were a sign of his good fortune, and in recent times portraits of Chu Yüan-chang have often been hung in the booths of Chinese fortune-tellers.

TYRANTS: WEAK RULERS

Chou Hsia 1122 b.c. (died 1122 b.c.)

As the last emperor of the Shang dynasty, Chou was the Chinese equivalent of Nero in his sensual extravagance and wanton cruelty. To please his infamous concubine T'a Chi, he constructed a vast palace of pleasure, known as Lu T'ai, in which naked men and women chased one another around the Lake of Wine and the trees hung heavy with delectable viands. To satisfy his curiosity about the anatomy of a wise man's heart, he ordered his kinsman and loyal minister, Pi Kan, to be disembowelled in the presence of the court. He invented the "roasting punishment" by which any official who had displeased him was fastened to a hollow copper pillar in which a fire was burning, and was thus scorched to death. He was finally overthrown by the Duke of the West, later canonized as Wen Wang, and his son Wu Wang, and perished in the flames of his palace. To the Chinese mind, Chou and Chieh, the last Emperor of the Hsia dynasty, represent types of extreme tyranny.

A popular romance Feng Shu Chuan embellished the story of Chou with quite inappropriate Taoist and Buddhist lore. In this fantastic tale T'a Chi became the incarnation of a fox spirit, and in the pitched battles between the armies of Chou and Wu Wang, many
supernatural beings took sides and fought against one another. Wu Wang's Commander in Chief was the octogenarian Chiang Ts'ao-ya, under whom served many warriors whose names have since become illustrious in the Buddhist and Taoist Pantheon. Hence even today the name of Chiang Ts'ao-ya is often invoked to frighten away evil spirits.

Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (259-210 B.C.)

This famous First Emperor was one of the most powerful figures in Chinese history. He mounted the throne of Ch'in at the age of 13. His early years were spent in warfare against each of the feudal states as had not yet been swallowed up by his own state. At length, in 231 B.C., he found himself master of the whole of China and proclaimed himself First Emperor, with the understanding that his successors were to be called Second, Third, and Fourth Emperors, etc. But this grandiose dream proved to be an illusion. At his death, rebellion caused by his dictatorial ways arose in every part of China.

Shih Huang-ti abolished the feudal system and proved in many ways a remarkable administrator. But he found the prevalence of a strong philosophic tradition incompatible with his iron rule; so he issued an edict for the burning of all books and buried alive hundreds of the literati and philosophers. For these two acts, he became the favorite target of attack by later scholars. Actually the sumptuous O-fang Kung, the palace at Hsien-yang which the Emperor built for himself, must have contained all the available Chinese books; it was only after the palace was burned by the insurgent general Hsiang Yu that the ancient writings became so scarce.

Shih Huang-ti regularly conscripted large numbers of men for slave labor; the most famous monument of his tyranny was the Great Wall in the building of which thousands of men were expended. To forestall revolution, he forbade the use of iron implements even for household purposes, so that the first rebels were said to have used bamboo poles in lieu of arms.

Shih Huang-ti built an elaborate mausoleum for himself, remnants of which can still be seen in present-day Sian. In his last days, he became very superstitious and searched after immortality.

Sung Hui-tung; Sung Ch'in-tung (A.D. 1101-1125; 1125-1127)

These two were the last Emperors of the Northern Sung dynasty, and Hui-tung, especially, was a typical weak ruler. While by no means a tyrant, and full of personal charm and artistic talent, he was completely unequal to state affairs — he was one of the finest Chinese painters of birds and flowers and a few of his paintings can be seen in American museums. But his artistic qualities were of little use to the nation at a time when both the Chin Tartars and Kitans were encroaching upon Chinese territory. Moreover he delegated his power to his minister, Te'si Ching, who belonged to the reform clique of Wang An-shih, but had none of Wang's integrity and zeal. By the advice of Tung Kuan, the Sung government allied itself with the Chins to crush the Kitans. But upon the defeat of the Kitans, the Chins became even more powerful and invaded China in two columns. Hui-tung then alienated in favor of his son, Ch'in Tsang. Both Emperors were taken prisoner and died years later under the custody of the Chins. Another son of Hui-tung, however, proved himself more capable and established himself south of the Yangtze as the first Emperor of the Southern Sung dynasty.

As a Taoist, Hui-tung spent vast sums on buildings for his assemblies of Taoist rectories. His corrupt reign gave rise to a host of bandits and robbers. A special group of these bandits under Sung Chiang was celebrated in the novel Water Margin.
GOOD MINISTERS; COUNSELLORS

Chou Kung (died 1105 B.C.)

Chou Kung or the Duke of Chou is the title under which Taou, fourth son of Wen Wang and younger brother to Wu Wang, is generally known in history. He was usually considered the ablest statesman of ancient China, inferior in wisdom and virtue only to Yao, Shun, and Yu and emerging perhaps in even greater brilliance than Wen and Wu. Upon the death of Chioang Taou-yen, Chou Kung was left chief counsellor and assistant to Wu Wang. He drew up a legal code, purified the morals of the people, and devoted himself wholly to the welfare of the state. He attached special importance to ceremonies and music. For this reason, Confucius, born at the time of the decline of the Chou culture, had special affection for Chou Kung. It was his ambition to become the Chou Kung of his time, educating the people in ceremonies and the virtues. Once in a moment of despondency, Confucius exclaimed, "Alas, how old I have grown! For a long time I have not dreamed of Chou Kung!"

Chou Kung aided his brother in establishing the feudal system; he himself was granted the principality of Loo. Once, when Wu Wang was seriously ill, Chou Kung made a petition to Heaven to take his life rather than his brother's, a record of which is still extant in the Book of History. This petition, supposedly, was instrumental in restoring the health of Wu. It was upon the death of Wu Wang that the virtue of Chou Kung shone even in greater glory. The son of Wu Wang, Ch'eng Wang, was only a young boy when he ascended the throne, and Chou Kung was virtually the Lord Protector during most of his reign. He suppressed many seditious movements among the discontented imperial relatives and to him was attributed the invention of the compass. The reign of the next king, Kang Wang, was also happy and peaceful, due to the beneficent influence of Chou Kung, and the phrase "the time of Ch'eng and Kang" is used to indicate a period of great peace and prosperity.

Chu-ko Liang (A.D. 181-234)

Chu-ko Liang is one of the most beloved figures in Chinese history. Even before the publication of the Ming novel, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, he had been the favorite subject of the storytellers, and evidence of his hold upon the affections of the Chinese people had been plentiful. In official history he is regarded as an able administrator but as somewhat less sound in military strategy. As popularly represented, he was the cleverest strategist of all time.

Self-styled the "Sleeping Dragon," Chu-ko Liang lived in retirement for a time in his youth. Three times Liu Pei solicited his services on visits to his cottage. As chief counsellor to Liu Pei, Chu-ko was responsible for the formation of the Kingdom of Shu Han and scored many brilliant military and diplomatic victories over Taou Ta'ao and Sun Ch'uan. Upon the death of Liu Pei, however, a somber cloud began to cast its shadow over the fortunes of Shu and Chu-ko Liang. Liu Pei's son was a feeble-minded person; and Chu-ko could not at once attend to military expeditions and domestic affairs. He exhibited a tragic devotion to the cause of his master, Liu Pei, by repeatedly undertaking expeditions against the able commander of the Wei Kingdom, Su-ma I, without achieving any notable victory. He also conducted several campaigns against the barbarian tribes west of Szechwan, eventually earning their undying loyalty. Handicapped by the want of able generals, Chu-ko in time lost much of his early success. After his death, the fortunes of Shu rapidly declined.

Chu-ko Liang is best remembered for his knowledge of human nature, his mechanical inventions, and the resourceful ingenuity with which he outsmarted Taou Ts'ao, Su-ma I, and the Wu commander, Chou Yu. Each of these brilliant men acknowledged Chu-ko's incomparable superiority.
Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-1872)

A native of the Hsiang-hsiang district in Hunan, Tseng Kuo-fan was the last of the Chinese statesmen in the Confucian tradition. He was graduated as Chin Shih in 1835, and held several civil posts before he went into retirement after the death of his mother. On reaching his home province of Hunan he found the region suffering from invasion by the Tai-p'ing rebels, and, in 1853, was ordered by special decree to assist the Governor of Hunan in organizing a volunteer force to fight against the rebels. This was the famous Hsiang Ch'ien or Hunan army which, under the command of Tseng and his able associates, Tao Tsung-t'ang, Li Hung-chang, and Peng Yu-lin, was able to continuously push back the Tai-p'ings until they were finally besieged in their capital city of Nanking in 1854. During this turbulent decade, Tseng Kuo-fan went from Hunan to Kiangsi, Anhwei, Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, actively pursuing the rebels. He received increasingly high posts until, upon the fall of Nanking, he was ennobled as Marquis. Though Western commentators made much of the services of General Gordon and his "ever victorious army," one must still consider the vanquishment of the Tai-p'ings as primarily a Chinese achievement.

Tseng Kuo-fan was a man of extreme rectitude. He not only conscientiously attended to his duties as an official but lived a life of integrity and probity, and counselled his family to live according to the same principles, avoiding ostentation and extravangence. His letters to his family are justly famous and reveal the fine points of Confucian sensibility. Tseng's younger brother, Kuo-ch' uan, was a governor of various provinces; his son, Chi-tse, was an important diplomat. The Chinese Communists, who eulogize the Tai-p'ings as the would-be liberators of the Chinese people from Manchu tyranny, brand Tseng as a traitor.

BAD MINISTERS; USURPERS

Ta'o Ta'o (155-220)

Because the readers of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms are usually partial to the fortunes of Liu Pei, the name of Ta'o Ta'o has forfeited popular sympathy and become synonymous with a bold bad minister and usurper. In actual fact, however, Ta'o Ta'o was a very able statesman, capable of generosity in spite of his shrewdness and occasional outbursts of suspicion, and a good poet in his own right. Like Liu Pei, Ta'o Ta'o first distinguished himself in the campaign against the Yellow Turbans. Later he leagued himself with other chieftains against Tung Cho who had practically usurped the power of the boy Emperor, Hsien Ti. Upon the death of Tung Cho, and many of his rivals, Ta'o Ta'o at first took the office of Prime Minister and then gave himself the title of the Prince of Wei, holding Hsien Ti as a mere pawn in his hands. However, after the death of Ta'o Ta'o and his sons, their descendants were equally maltreated by the Sa-ch'uan family, who had become all-powerful in the Kingdom of Wei. Ta'o Ta'o had more able generals and counsellors than Sun Chi-ch'uan and Liu Pei, he could have swallowed both except for his great defeat at the Red Cliff when the combined powers of Sun and Liu routed him from his attempt to cross the Yangtsze.

One story will suffice to illustrate Ta'o Ta'o's suspicious and unscrupulous character. In fear of his life, he once stayed at the home of an old friend of his father. This old man went out to buy some wine to cheer the young hero, while the family were sharpening knives in the kitchen in order to kill a pig to banquet Ta'o Ta'o. The old man's absence and the sound of knife-grinding made Ta'o think that they were plotting his death. So he killed the family; upon discovering his mistake, he left the place and met the old man returning from his errand. He also killed him.
**CH’IN KUEI (A.D. 1050-1155)**

The obloquy in which the name of Ch’in Kuei has fallen illustrates the Chinese attitude toward appeasement. After the kidnapping of the Two Sung Emperors, Kao Tsung, founder of the Southern Sung dynasty, established his capital at Hangchow. As his chief minister, Ch’in Kuei vigorously pursued a policy of appeasement toward the Chin Tartars by whom he had once been detained while on a diplomatic mission, and whose friend he had become. If the military power of the Southern Sung had indeed been weakening, the policy of appeasement might perhaps have justified. But evidence to the contrary was seen in the fighting ability of Yu Fei and his soldiers. Yu Fei scored victory after victory over the enemy and penetrated into Hunan. Alarmed over the prospect, Ch’in Kuei summarily recalled him and cast him in prison. Later he brought about his death without an open trial.

In the same year, 1141, Ch’in Kuei induced the Emperor to agree to terms of peace which included cession of all territory north of the Huai River, acknowledgment of vassalage and a yearly tribute. On account of these unpatriotic dealings and especially his treachery toward Yu Fei, Ch’in Kuei is even today an object of popular hatred. Iron statues of Ch’in Kuei and his wife, popularly known as the Long-tongued Shrew, stand in a temple near the West Lake (Hangchow) and tourists have no compunction at spitting at or even urinating upon them. Although he enjoyed imperial favor during his life, Ch’in Kuei was officially degraded fifty years after his death.

**HO SHEN (A.D. 1750-1799)**

Compared with T’ao T’so and Ch’in Kuei, Ho Shen is much less familiar to the Chinese public, but he typifies the one great vice of Chinese officialdom which did greater harm to the Chinese than the more notorious crimes of Ch’in Kuei: the abuse of official privilege to enrich oneself. Ch’ien Lung, during his illustrious reign of sixty years, was an Emperor worthy to be compared with T’ang T’ai Tsung for his encouragement of learning, consolidation of the Ch’in empire and maintenance of uninterrupted peace and prosperity. But his reign was followed by two centuries of confusion and decline; part of the blame could be put on gross corruption of the official class as represented by Ho Shen.

A Manchu of obscure birth, Ho Shen was at first a guard at the palace gates; his good looks, however, soon won him rapid promotion. During the last twenty years of Ch’ien Lung’s reign, Ho Shen was Prime Minister and Grand Secretary, enjoying absolute confidence of the Emperor and virtually annexing to himself all powers of government. Favoritism and corruption were the rule; Ho Shen did everything to spread his power and fatten his private purse. His son was married to an Imperial Princess.

Upon Ch’ien Lung’s voluntary abdication, however, Ho Shen’s power was resented by the new Emperor, Chia Ch’ing. He was soon indicted of twenty crimes and allowed to commit suicide. His confiscated wealth was exchequered to the throne, and amounted to the enormous total of 223 million taels (ounces) of silver. The effect of such glaring corruption was felt in internal rebellions and weakness in the face of foreign aggressions during the reigns of Chia Ch’ing and Tao Kuang.

**FAMOUS GENERALS; WARRIORS**

**Huang Yu (233-202 B.C.)**

For personal martial prowess, as contrasted with skill in strategy, Huang Yu is unequaled in the annals of Chinese history. In his bitterness against the Han monarchs, the historian So-ma Ch’ien romanticized his career so that, in comparison with the crafty Liu Pang, Huang Yu appeared a tragic character, honest-dealing and noble but lacking in intelligence and the nerve to enforce ruthless decisions.
Other evidences, however, show Hsiang Yu to be quite an unscrupulous and cruel person. The contention between Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu, not unlike that between Caesar and Pompey, was one of the most colorful episodes in Chinese history.

As the scion of a famous Chu family, Hsiang Yu raised a strong force during the reign of the Second Chi Emperor. Very soon he crushed the best Chi armies and entered Hien-yang, burning and looting the palace treasures. The only rival of his power was Liu Pang. Hsiang Yu's cruelty and treachery caused many of his able generals to join the forces of Liu Pang. During many encounters and diplomatic meetings, Hsiang Yu had Liu Pang at his mercy and could have killed him but foolishly let the opportunities slip by.

Liu Pang was not Hsiang's equal in pitched battles; it was said that the very sight of Hsiang Yu could rout a whole army. But by the use of superior military maneuvers, Hsiang Yu's forces were finally surrounded in the small city of Kui-hsia, in Anhwei Province. The battle there was something of a battle of Waterloo for Hsiang Yu. Upon the complete rout of his small forces, he could have escaped to his native land of Chi. But he was ashamed to face his own people and committed suicide. The night before the battle, he bade farewell to his favorite concubine, Yu Chi. A Chinese opera making use of this episode has been popularized by the well-known star of Chinese traditional opera, Mei Lan-fang.

Kuan Yu (died A.D. 219)

As the only military man to be deified as a god and to have temples built in his name in every part of China, Kuan Yu is familiar to every Chinese. His features and personal accoutrements have been standardized in pictures and statues. His portrayals show him as a man of tall and martial bearing, with a red face, phoenix eyes, and a flowing beard, invariably dressed in a green robe, reading his favorite book, Ch'un-ch'i'; or he is represented in action, astride his famous steed, the Red Hare, and swinging his long-handled "blue-dragon, crescent-moon" sword. But he won the hearts of the Chinese more for his loyalty, generosity, and righteousness than for his martial prowess. Liu Yu, the original owner of the "Red Hare," for example, was a much greater fighter on horseback than was Kuan Yu.

As the sworn brother of Liu Pei, Kuan Yu followed him throughout his chequered career. Pride and luck combined to gain him incredible renown. Thus he once made a banquet before all the chieftains that he would kill a famous general in battle before a warmed cup of wine could turn cold; and he, made good his boast. Ts'ao Ts'ao once took him into custody and showered him with gifts and honors to win him over from Liu Pei. But he never swerved in his loyalty and soon rejoined his brother. After the battle of the Red Cliff, Ts'ao Ts'ao and his exhausted generals were caught at a narrow path blocked by Kuan Yu and his soldiers. Although he easily could have killed Ts'ao Ts'ao, Kuan Yu let him escape as a repayment for his past favors. After Liu Pei was soundly entrenched in Szechwan, Kuan Yu was given command of the province of Ching (Hunan and part of Hopeh). Turning a deaf ear to the diplomatic overtures of Sun Ch'uan, the proud Kuan Yu was finally defeated and killed. In revenge, Liu Pei let Chu-ko Liang stay in Szechwan and made a personal expedition against Sun Ch'uan. Without his sage counselor, Liu Pei soon suffered a disastrous defeat, after which he fell sick and died.

Yang Yeh (A.D. Tenth Century)

An able general of Sung Tai-tsun, Yang Yeh was noted for his personal valor in his campaign against the Kitans. Finally, his forces outnumbered, and himself captured, he sought death by refusing to eat and drink. As a general, Yang was no more distinguished than a host of others. But, under the name of Yang Chi-yeh, he becomes a colorful figure in fiction and drama.
As represented in popular fiction, Yang was a trusted general of Chao K’uang-yin, the first Sung Emperor. By the time of Ta-li-tsung, he was already an old man. His wife and sons were equally devoted fighters against the Kitans. His first two sons died for the cause of the Sung. The fourth son was captured by the Kitans and retained as consort to one of their princesses; the fifth became a monk. Despite this record of unsurpassed loyalty and sacrifice in his family, Yang Chi-yeh incurred the enmity of the all-powerful minister, Pan Jen-mei (in history, Pan Mei), who pursued him relentlessly. The seventh son, the eldest fighter of them all, was deliberately murdered by Pan’s followers. Even the death of Yang Chi-yeh himself was witnessed by Pan, as his superior commander, sent him only a small detachment to fight against the Kitans. Forlorn in the last moments of his life, the old warrior came across a stone tablet erected for the unhappy Han general, Li Ling, and knocked out his brains against it.

After Yang’s death, the villainy of Pan was detected. Yang Yen-chao, the sixth son, continued to enjoy Imperial favor and was given command of the expeditionary forces against the Kitans. The son of Yen-chao, Tsung-pao, well-known for his romance with the beauty, Mu Kuei-yung, later also became a famous commander. Most of the colorful episodes in the Yang saga are enacted on the Chinese stage; the most famous of the group being “The Fourth Sun Visits His Mother.”

Yo Fei 钟 (A.D. 1103-1141)

As a military hero, Yo Fei holds a position secondary only to Kuan Yu in the affections of the Chinese people. A proper historical evaluation will, however, place Yo even above Kuan because Yo was not only a great general but a patriot in the true sense of the word. At his birth a huge bird flew over the house and screamed; hence his name Fei (to fly) and courtesy name P’eng-chou (roo-nosed). In his youth Yo Fei studied the classics and archery. In the early days of the Tartar troubles, he raised a troop of five hundred horsemen, with which he was said to have defeated a force of more than one hundred thousand. He then served as a lieutenant under Ch’ang Ch’un, and for his services in inducing a formidable leader of brigands to submit to Imperial authority was raised to the rank of general. In the following years he recovered a large extent of territory from the hands of various insurgent leaders and from Liu Yu, a puppet set up by the Chin Tartars. Then he encountered the Tartars and scored many victories until in 1111 Yo Fei penetrated to Chu-hsien Ch’en and threatened to recover the old Sung capital, Kai-feng. Meanwhile, the Emperor Kao Tsung had agreed to Ch’in Kuei’s policy of appeasement. Yo Fei and his son Yo Yin were summarily recalled and committed to prison. Ch’in Kuei wrote out with his own hand an order for the execution of Yo Fei, which was forthwith carried into effect; whereupon he immediately reported that Yo Fei had died in prison. In 1162 the Emperor Hsiao Tsung restored Yo’s honors and gave proper burial to his remains. In 1170 he was canonized.

Yo Fei’s most memorable saying was in response to the question of when peace would prevail in the empire. He replied, “When civil officials are no longer greedy of money, and military officials no longer fear death.”

REBELS, BANDITS

Huang Ch’ao 黄巢 (died A.D. 884)

After the rebellion of An Lu-shan, the T’ang dynasty was never the same. Huang Ch’ao was an insurgent leader notorious during the reign of Hsi Tsung. Immediately upon his fall, new rebels arose to usher in the turbulent era of the Five dynasties.

610
A native of Shantung, Huang Ch'ao was originally a well-to-do salt merchant, who was fond of harrying fugitives from justice. In 875 he collected a number of adherents, and east in his lot with the rebel Wang Hsieh-ch'iu. With the death of the latter, Huang became the leader of the movement.

In the last decade of his life (875-884), Huang Ch'ao ravaged most parts of China: Shantung, Honan, Hopeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In 880 he captured the capital, Ch'ang-an, and called himself the Emperor of Ch'i. In 882, the capital was temporarily retaken by Hsi Tsung. When Huang Ch'ao's forces had evacuated the capital, the citizens came out to the city gates to welcome the Imperial forces. Huang Ch'ao reacted this act so much that upon his return, he deliberately butchered 80,000 people in the city. Huang Ch'ao's forces went further West to loot Shensi and Kansu. Finally, however, to suppress Huang Ch'ao the T'ang Emperor hired the services of a Turkic commander, Li K'o-ying, famous in Chinese fiction and drama as an archer and father of numerous warlike stepsons. Huang Ch'ao fled back to Shantung and committed suicide.

Li Ts'ai-ch'ăng and Chang Hsieh-chung (A.D. 1006-1615 and A.D. 1606-1646)

In 1628, the first year of the reign of the last Ming Emperor, there was a great famine in Shensi. This, plus habitual bureaucratic oppression, soon inflamed the people to revolt. Li Ts'ai-ch'ăng and Chang Hsieh-chung both joined the revolt. Li at first served under his uncle Yao Ying-hsun who styled himself Prince Ch'uang; upon the latter's capture in 1630, Li took over the title. At first, Chang Hsieh-chung was Li's partner. But they quarrelled in 1630; from then on, Li ravaged the Hwang (Yellow) River area, Chang the Yangtze River area, penetrating as far south as Kwangtung and Kiangsi. In 1643, Li finally captured Peking, causing the pathetic suicide of the Emperor, Chung Ch'ing at Coal Hill. Afraid of the powerful Ming general Wu San-kuei, Li soon retreated to Shensi, establishing his capital at Sian. During the looting of Peking, Wu's favorite courtesan, Chen Yen-yen, had been captured by Li's forces. Passionately angry over the loss of the girl, Wu threw in his lot with the Manchus and soon captured Peking. Unable to resist the Manchu forces, Li fled to the South, and finally was caught and killed in Hunan.

Acting upon the prophecy that he would one day gain the throne of the Chinese Empire, Li was somewhat more humane than Chang Hsieh-chung. The latter was one of the maddest killers in the annals of Chinese history. Aware of the fact that he could not dispute Li's power in the North, he ravaged the Yangtze River area, merely for the delight of killing rather than for any constructive purpose to advance his own fortune. While Li was looting Peking, Chang was killing and looting in Szechwan. Solidly entrenched there, he styled himself the King of the Great West. His first royal act was to send four of his generals to supervise the massacres in every hien in Szechwan. He killed 380,000 Ming soldiers and militia in Szechwan; he once held a civil examination at his palace, during which all the candidates were killed. Tradition has it that he delighted in chopping off the feet of women so that in the end, the accumulated feet constituted a pile the size of a large hill. This sadist was finally killed by Manchu forces in 1646.

Hung Hsiao-ch'uan (A.D. 1813-1894)

A native of the Hua District in Kwangtung, Hung Hsiao-ch'uan is well-known as the leader of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. As a fortune-teller, he early took a perverted interest in Christian doctrines and joined the so-called Society of God, organized by Chu Chu-t'ao, of which he soon rose to be the head. In 1850, taking advantage of the big famine overtaking Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan that year, Li and his relatives and associates...
raised the standard of rebellion at Chin-t'ien-Tsun, Kwangsí. He styled himself the younger Brother of Christ and the Heavenly King with the avowed purpose of initiating the T'ai-p'ing Tien-kuo, the Heavenly Dynasty of Perfect Peace. Despite these pretensions, his followers were killers and struck terror into every province they ravaged. Because they were their hair long, they were popularly known as Ch'ang-mao (the Long-haired Bandits). In 1853 Hung Hsiu-ch'uan took Nanking; instead of going southward with his victorious army, Hung contented himself in the Yangtse delta, living a life of debauchery and ease. Meanwhile, the Ch'ing government was preparing for counterattack with a new army under the leadership of Tung Kuo-fan. Assisted by foreign volunteers like E. T. Ward and General C. G. Gordon, the Ch'ing soldiers were victorious in their march toward Nanking. Despite the resistance offered by the able T'ai-p'ing General Li Hsiao-ch'ang, Nanking was captured on 19 July 1851. On 30 June Hung had committed suicide.

GOOD OUTLAW

Lin Ch'ung 陈洪 (fictional)

Lin Ch'ung was one of the great heroes of the novel Water Margin. Although instructor to some eighty thousand soldiers in the art of using weapons, he was a peaceable man, slow to anger though vindictive when aroused. The young Lord Kuo, adopted son of the corrupt minister Kuo Ch'iu, had designs on Lin's beautiful wife. Twice foiled in the attempt to seduce her, he finally used the power of his father to send Lin Ch'ung to exile and planned to kill him on the way. After several instances of maltreatment and attempted murder, Lin was finally caught in a great fire in a hay field. Lin escaped, and thoroughly aroused, killed his enemies and joined the bandits at Liang-shan.

At that time, Liang-shan was occupied by the inept Wang Lan who was jealous of any intruder superior to him in prowess. During a banquet, Lin killed Wang, and assigned the place of leadership to Chao K'ai, a man noted for his liberality and benevolence. Under the reign of Chao K'ai, Liang-shan daily gained new recruits, mostly good men suffering injustice from the corrupt government. With the death of Chao K'ai by an arrow wound, Sung Chiang, nicknamed "Timely Rain," easily emerged as the leader. Lin Ch'ung, whose nickname was "Leopard-Head," distinguished himself in many military engagements under Shao and Sung.

Wu Sung 武松 (fictional)

This was the most fiery of all the bandits in the novel Water Margin. Ten colorful chapters of the book are devoted to his early career prior to joining the ranks of the Liang-shan heroes. He was famous as the single-handed killer of a ferocious tiger. Living with his brother Wu Ta, he sternly reprimanded the advances of the licentious Pan Chin-lien, wife of his brother. When Wu Sung was away from home on some errand for the local magistracy, Pan Chin-lien committed adultery with one Hsi-mien Ch'ing and poisoned her husband. Upon his return Wu Sung cut the heart out of the adulterous woman and sought out Hsi-mien Ch'ing in a tavern and killed him on the spot. After that, he went into voluntary exile and had many exciting adventures on the road. He was befriended by a restaurant keeper and asked by the latter to fight a local bully, Chiang Mei-shan. Chiang was not a match for Wu. Humiliated, Chiang submitted an official to kill Wu Sung on the road. Thoroughly enraged this time, Wu killed the would-be assassin and returned to the residence of the official where he was carousing with Chiang over their supposed success. Wu killed
Chiang, the official, and his whole family. After this adventure, Wu Sung disguised himself as a Buddhist friar, hence his nickname the Friar. Later he met with Sung Chiang and together they joined the bandit forces at Liang-shan.

**Huang T'ien-pa 黄天霸 (fictional)**

As the son of a famous outlaw, Huang San-t'ai, Huang T'ien-pa started off as an outlaw but later reformed and entered the service of Shih Po-ch'uan. Like his predecessor in fiction, Ping P'eng, Shih Po-ch'uan was a Ch'ing dynasty magistrate skilled in solving murder cases and in capturing robbers and bandits. The romance of the adventures of Shih, Shih Kung An, consists of a series of stories of detection and adventure involving thieves and robbers. Huang T'ien-pa was largely instrumental for the capture of these outlaws.

One of his early and most famous adventures was his encounter with a famous bandit Tou Erh-tun. Tou was once wounded by a sling shot at the hands of Huang San-t'ai. Years later, to avenge this shame and not knowing that Huang San-t'ai was already dead, he stole a famous steed from the Imperial stable, thinking that his old enemy would have a hard time to recapture it. Ping P'eng was duly assigned to this case. Huang T'ien-pa, then in the service of P'eng P'eng, went alone to seek out Tou Erh-tun in his mountain fortress. He impressed the old hero with his courage and eloquence. A day was agreed upon for a personal combat between Tou and Huang. The night before the day of the fight, Huang's friend Chu Kuang-tou stole from Tou his favorite weapon, a pair of steel hooks. Without these, Tou was not much of a fighter; and ashamed of his plight against Huang San-t'ai now that the old man was dead, Tou voluntarily gave himself up to justice and returned the steed to Huang T'ien-pa. This episode is the basis of a famous Peking opera, entitled *Stealing the Imperial Steed*.

**WOMEN RULERS**

**Wu Hou 吳后 (A.D. 625-705)**

Wu Chao came from humble parents but at the age of fourteen was taken into the harem of T'ai-tsung, the great T'ang Emperor. Upon T'ai-tsung's death, Wu retired to a Buddhist nunnery. She was brought back to the palace by the new Empress, who had been supplanted in her husband's affections by a concubine named Ilshao Shu. The Empress gave Wu Chao the task of undermining the favorite's influence; and this, being a very clever and beautiful woman, she easily succeeded in doing. Wu then set to work to get rid of the Empress; in the year 655 she succeeded and had the Empress killed. From that time on she gained complete ascendancy over the Emperor and was always present, behind a curtain, at councils and audiences. Thus Wu Hou (Empress Wu) wielded the actual powers of state throughout most of Kao-tsung's reign.

After the death of Kao-tsung in 684 she continued in power and deposed in turn two puppet Emperors, Ch'ung-tsung and Jui-tsung. In 690, as substantive Empress, she changed the name of the dynasty from T'ang to Chou. She ruled with a firm hand for twenty years until in 705, when, seriously ill, she was forced to abdicate and let Chung-tsung resume his throne. She retired with the title Ta-tien Ta-sheng Huang-ti, the Great Sage Emperor, Patterned after Heaven. Hence she is often spoken of as Wu Ta-tien.

Although she was given to favoritism and faced periodic court intrigues to oust her, Wu Hou was an able administrator. She did much to perfect the civil service examination system. Yet, on account of the Chinese prejudice against female rulers, she is commonly depicted as a licentious woman.
Ts'ai-hai Tai Hsiu

Mother of the Emperor T'ung Chih, secondary wife of the Emperor Hsien Fung, and aunt by marriage of the Emperor Kuang Hsü, Ts'ai-hai played a leading part in the last decades of the Ch'ing dynasty and was known to many Westerners simply as the Empress Dowager. Upon the death of Hsien Fung, Ts'ai-hai, as Western Empress, speedily put down a coup d'état and became the Co-Regent of the boy Emperor T'ung Chih. She, and the Eastern Emperors whose power was only nominal, administered the government until T'ung Chih reached maturity. Upon the death of T'ung Chih in 1875, she put Kuang Hsü on the throne, while secretly putting to death T'ung Chih's young wife who was pregnant. After that the hand of the Empress Dowager was even more conspicuous in domestic government and in foreign policy.

Although Ts'ai-hai was in some ways a capable woman, she was highly superstitious and made a fetish of personal ambition. Because of China's repeated national humiliations at the hands of the foreign powers, she became servile of all foreign nations and distrusted reform. She misappropriated large sums of money which should have gone to the building of a navy, and spent these funds for the erection of the I-ho Garlows. This helped cause China's defeat in her war with Japan in 1894. In 1898, the Emperor Kuang Hsü authorized a group of officials including Kang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, to make recommendations for a thorough overhauling of the government in the direction of modernization and constitutional monarchy. The Empress Dowager, with the strong backing of conservative elements, soon killed and banished the reformers and imprisoned Kuang Hsü. She then reverted to servile forms of chauvinism and encouraged antiforeign activities. In 1900, upon the occupation of Peking by foreign powers as the result of the so-called Boxer Rebellion, Ts'ai-hai and her court moved to Sian. But she continued to reign and Kuang Hsü continued to be her prisoner. In 1908, the Empress Dowager fell ill; but before her death, she had the pleasure of knowing that Kuang Hsü had been poisoned as she had ordered.

Ts'ai-hai was the great patron of the Peking opera; in her presence sang China's greatest actor-singer, T'an Hsin-p'ei.

FAMOUS BEAUTIES

Wang Ch'iang 王嫱 (First Century B.C.)

A celebrated beauty in the harem of Hsun Yüan Ti, Wang Ch'iang was bestowed in 33 B.C. upon the Khan of the Hsiung-nu as a mark of imperial regard.

The popular version of her story runs as follows: The Emperor Yüan Ti had so many concubines that he did not know them by sight. He therefore commissioned a painter, named Mao Yen-shou, to paint all their portraits; and in order to obtain pleasing likenesses, the ladies bribed the painter. Wang Ch'iang, the beauty of the harem, refused to do so, and as a result her portrait represented her as being ugly. Later on, when it became necessary to present a bride to the chieftain of the Hsiung-nu, Wang Ch'iang was selected because of her supposed ugliness. The Emperor saw her only when it was too late, and at once fell violently in love with her. The Emperor sadly staged a farewell for the beauty, who went on her way to become a queen among the Hsiung-nu and died a few years later. Supposedly, the mound over her grave remained always green, even when the country around was devoid of vegetation.

Another version states that the treacherous painter, Mao Yen-shou, deliberately went to the Khan of the Hsiung-nu to incite him to invade China and obtain possession of Wang Ch'iang, who fled herself into the Amur River rather than be carried farther toward the wild barbarian steppes. Wang Ch'iang is generally regarded as one of the four great beauties of ancient China, the other three being Hsi Shih, T'ao Shan, and Ch'ao Wen-ch'un.
Yang Kuei-fei (died A.D. 750)

Born as Yang Yu-huan, daughter of an official, Yang Kuei-fei became concubine to Prince Shou, eighteenth son of the Emperor Hsian Tsung, in 735. Three years later, upon the death of the reigning favorite of the Emperor, she passed into the harem of Hsian Tsung himself. He had been a capable and enlightened ruler; but, now in his dotage, he was completely infatuated by Yang's beauty and lived only to gratify her caprices. Poets like Li Po were asked to celebrate her beauty in verse; reams of curtseys were employed during the early summer in transporting from Fukien to Ch'ang-an supplies of the fruit called lieh-er, of which she was immoderately fond. In 745, she was raised to the rank of Kuei-fei and all her family basked in royal favor. Her cousin, Yang Kuo-chung, a coarse voluptuary, was raised to high office, and her three sisters were also taken into the Imperial harem, and endowed with valuable gifts. A favorite official of the Emperor, An Lu-shan, shared Hsian Tsung's revels, and the Emperor seemed unaware of the amorous dalliance between Yang Kuei-fei and An Lu-shan.

In 755, An Lu-shan broke into open revolt. In the next year, Yang Kuei-fei fled with the court to Szechuan. But the soldiers rose in revolt, declaring that they would not fight unless the Yangs were punished for their misdeeds. Rather unheroically, Hsian Tsung ordered the eunuch Kao Lieh-shih to strangle Kuei-fei, while her cousin and her sister perished at the hands of the troops. Disconsolate, the Emperor abdicated in favor of his son and died a few years later.

Contrary to the usual Chinese ideal of feminine beauty, Yang Kuei-fei's figure was anything but slender. Hsian Tsung's love for her was much celebrated in poetry and drama, and Mei Lan-fang has staged many new plays to depict the career of this surpassingly lovely woman.

FAMOUS FEMALE CHARACTERS IN FICTION AND DRAMA

Wang Pao-ch'uan 王保權

Not an historical figure, Wang Pao-ch'uan has become known to the Western public through the English translation of a popular Chinese play as Lady Precious Stream. She was the daughter of a Prime Minister who married the penniless Hoich P'ing-kuei, thus completely alienating her father and family. Under the command of his two brothers-in-law, Hsieh P'ing-kuei was soon sent to the front to fight the forces of Hsi Liang. Captured, Hsieh became consort to the princess of Hsi Liang and later succeeded to the throne.

Eighteen years after her capture, Pao-ch'uan was still living by herself, disdaining to ask help from her father. Then Hsieh came home in disguise to see his wife, after a rather disgusting scene during which Hsieh tested the virtue of his wife, they were happily reunited. Hsieh now proceeded to the court to shame his father and brothers-in-law. At that time, they were planning a coup d'état to oust the T'ang Emperor. With the aid of his army, Hsieh for-told their movement and brought them to their just deserts. They were spared death only at the intercession of Wang Pao-ch'uan. Hsieh, Pao-ch'uan, and the Hsi Liang Princess lived happily ever after.

Despite its quasi-historical setting, this story is essentially fictional. Wang Pao-ch'uan is much beloved because of her Penelopean qualities. The early career of Hsieh P'ing-kuei was modeled after that of the famous T'ang general Hsieh Jen-kuei, who also was separated from his patient and virtuous wife for eighteen years.

P'an Chin-lien 彭金蓮

A character in the novel Water Margin noted for her career of adultery and lasciviousness, P'an Chin-lien was a pretty maidservant in the household of a rich old man who hoped in vain to obtain her favors. In revenge, she sold her to the ugly dwarf, Wu Ta, a
vendor of tarts and pastries. Conscious of her own beauty, Pan only tolerated his company and soon caught the eye of a local wealthy play-boy, Hsi-men Ch'ing. To make things easier, Pan poisoned her husband. At this moment, Wu Ta's younger brother, Wu Sung, a tall stalwart man already famous for his single-handed fight with a tiger, returned home. Once earlier, Pan had made overtures to him, which were sternly rejected; now he, after establishing clear evidence of guilt, killed both Pan and Hsi-men. After that he went into voluntary exile.

The preceding account is taken from the novel Water Margin. Another novel, Chin Ping Mei, took this episode as a point of departure and elaborates on the domestic life of the voluptuary Hsi-men Ch'ing and his harem. In that novel, after the murder of Wu Ta, Pan became duty an addition to Hsi-men's household. Because of her rapacious sexual appetite, she had continual hold on Hsi-men's attention, though she had constantly to combat Hsi-men's many concubines, prostitutes, and mistresses. All in a case of complete dissoluteness, Hsi-men died in Pan's bed, completely exhausted. After this, the novel conforms to tradition to depict the return of Wu Sung to avenge the murder of his brother.

Lin Tai-yü 林黛玉

Lin Tai-yü, the heroine of the Ch'ing novel, Dream of the Red Chamber, is proverbial for her fragile beauty and self-pitying melancholy. Early bereft of her parents, she stayed in her rich uncle's home while yet a young girl. She grew up in the company of her cousin, Pao-yü, the spoiled grandson of the Chia family. Given to pitying herself as an orphan and afflicted with tuberculosis which Chinese medicine couldn't cure, Tai-yü was witty, poetic, and sarcastic. She was also very sentimental, as is seen in her habit of burying the dead leaves of flowers in the garden. While preferring Tai-yü to all his girl cousins, Pao-yü often quarreled with her. Another cousin, Hsieh Pao-ch'ei, who also lived in the family, was a rival for Pao-yü's affection. This cousin was beautiful and proficient in all the wifely virtues, less poetically intense than Tai-yü but more good-natured. Hsieh Mu, the grandmother, thought Pao-ch'ei a more desirable mate for Pao-yü and proceeded to arrange the wedding accordingly. Until the end, Pao-yü never knew which girl he was to marry. During the wedding night, the continual din of music and merry-making broke Tai-yü's heart, alone by herself in her chamber. This is one of the most dramatic moments in the novel. Distilled, Pao-yü soon forsake his family and became a monk.

Tai-yü and Pao-ch'ei represent two types of traditional Chinese girlhood, each attractive in its own way. Pao-yü had two faithful maid servants, Ching-wen and Hsi-jên. To many readers, Hsi-jên is the most charming girl in the novel.

POETS AND PHILOSOPHERS

Chuang Chou or Chuang Ts'ao 莊周 (Fourth Century B.C.)

Chuang Ts'ao (The Master Chuang) was China's beloved Taoist philosopher. His extant writings show a caustic wit and employ many fascinating parables. Because of his supposed skill in magic, many apocryphal stories have evolved around him, often unworthy of his attitude of philosophical detachment.

* Many other famous poets and philosophers are treated in the chapters on Literature and Ideology.
† For an exposition of Taoism see the chapter entitled, "Chinese Traditional Ideologies."

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One popular story runs as follows: One day Chuang Tzu passed by a woman who was fanning a grave. Being asked why, the woman replied that she promised her husband not to marry until the earth of his tomb was dry and that she was fanning the mound to hasten the process. Chuang Tzu felt bitterly the woman’s inconsistency and hastened home to his wife. He made believe that he was gravely ill, and before his death, extracted a promise from his wife not to remarry. Then Chuang Tzu transformed himself into the handsome Prince of Chu and courted her wife. Naturally, the wife fell victim to this stratagem and promised to marry him. Then the handsome prince suddenly fell sick and told the woman that only the brain of a live person or one just recently deceased could cure him. Frantically, the woman opened the coffin lid to get the brain of her late husband. Out sprang Chuang Tzu; the wife became so ashamed of herself that she committed suicide. Disillusioned, Chuang Tzu retired himself to his philosophical studies.

A popular Chinese opera based on this story is called *The Dream of a Butterfly*, alluding to one of Chuang Tzu’s philosophic riddles to the effect that, as he dreamed of himself turning into a butterfly one night, he was not sure whether he was dreaming of the butterfly or whether his own life was one extended dream of a butterfly.

Se-MA Hsiang-ju (died 117 B.C.)

A native of Ch’eng-tu, Szechwan, Se-MA Hsiang-ju early distinguished himself as a poet. On the death of his patron, he was for a time left destitute and returned to his native home. On his way, he stopped at a city in Szechwan called Lin-chiung where he was entertained at a banquet by a wealthy man, named Cho Wang-sun. At the dinner Se-MA had a glimpse of Cho’s beautiful daughter, Wên-ch’un, a young widow. He began to sing and play on his lute, which so captivated Wên-ch’un that she eloped with him that very night to Cheng-tu. Having nothing to live on, they soon returned to Lin-chiung and set up a wine shop. With Wên-ch’un herself, reputed to be one of China’s most beautiful women, waiting on the customers, business naturally prospered. Her father, at first angry at her elopement, now could no longer bear to see her in such a position of notoriety and relented. With this turn of fortune, Se-MA soon distinguished himself at the court of Han Wu Ti and wrote some of the most famous prose poems of his time.

The story of Wên-ch’un is the most famous case of romantic elopement in Chinese history; the phrase ch’in-foo (plucking a lute) is a synonym for refined courtship or seduction.

Pilgrims and Travelers

Hua-n Tsang 安世（A.D. 602-641)

A native of Honan, Chi’ien I (Hua-n Tsang was his religious name) became a Buddhist priest when only twenty years of age and in the year 623, during the reign of T’ang T’ai Tsang, set out for India to bring back copies of the sacred books of Buddhism. He returned after an absence of seventeen years and became the most famous Buddhist pilgrim in China’s history. T’ai Tsang conferred upon him the honorary epithet of T’ang Sun Tsang. The rest of his life was spent in translating and expounding the Buddhist texts brought back from India.

During his own lifetime Hua-n Tsang published the Record of Western Countries. The personal saintliness of his life and the exotic appeal of the places he visited soon prompted popular legends of Hua-n Tsang and his pilgrimage which were embodied in the Ming
novel, Journey to the West. In the novel, the early life of Hsuan Tsang reads like one of Shakespeare's last plays. His father, on the way to assume governorship of Chiang-chou, was thrown into the river by a villainous boatman, who lusted after his beautiful bride, daughter of a high minister. Because she was pregnant, she suffered humiliation from the boatman in order to save the life of the unborn child. The boatman reported for duty as the new Governor of Chiang-chou. Fearing that her present husband would kill the baby, the woman exposed it to the river. An abbot spotted the floating baby and brought it to the monastery. Eighteen years later, now a devout monk, Hsuan Tsang met with his mother and effect a happy reunion, his father having been cordially treated all these years in the palace of the Dragon King of the spirit world. The fame of this story reached T'ai Tsung, and thus, the legend, was Hsuan Tsang chosen for the arduous pilgrimage to India. On the way he met with eighty-one afflictions, which were successfully met by his faithful followers, among whom was the monkey Sun Wu-k'ung. (An account of Sun Wu-k'ung is included in this section.)

Ch'eng Ho (died 1433)
A court of Yunnan, Ch'eng Ho early distinguished himself as a military officer in the rebellion which set the Emperor Ch'eng T'ao on the throne. In 1405 he sailed from Wu-sung, near Shanghai, with a large fleet consisting of 27,000 men and 62 ships to cruise along the coasts of Cambodia and Siam; some to demand tribute, others to search for the vanquished Emperor Hui Ti, whom Ch'eng T'ao had replaced. In 1407 and 1412 Ch'eng Ho conducted naval expeditions to the countries of southeastern Asia, going as far as Ceylon, and inducing many states to send envoys back with him to China. Altogether Ch'eng Ho completed seven major expeditions and made contact with 30 states. The geographical coverage of his trips ranged from Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, India, the Persian Gulf, and Arabia, to the Eastern Coast of Africa. He gained much renown out of these expeditions and was known by the people as San Pao T'ai Chien.

The enterprising Emperor Ch'eng T'ao died in 1425, and the succeeding Emperors did not share his interest in expanded foreign relations. By the time of Ch'eng Ho's death, many states which had opened trade relations with China ceased to deal with her. The later terrorist activities of the Japanese pirates further confirmed the Ming Emperors in their isolationist policy and so Ch'eng Ho's expeditions did not establish China as a sea power. His adventures are elaborated in a romance called San Pao T'ai Chien's Expeditions to the Western Seas.

Creatures of Fantasy; Taoist Magicians

Sun Wu-k'ung
A monkey of supernatural powers, Sun Wu-k'ung was the faithful attendant of Hsuan Tsang on his pilgrimage to India. He is so important that he emerges easily as the hero of the romance, Journey to the West; an incomplete English translation of that work simply bears the title, The Monkey. According to legend the monkey was born of a stone egg in a distant continent. Because of his unusual prowess and cleverness, he soon became the Handsome King of Monkeys and obtained possession of Hsin-kuo Shan, the mountain of Flowers and Fruits. After a course of education with a Buddhist prelate, he became even more powerful and soon the Jade Emperor had to lure him to Heaven, tricking him by giving him the insignificant post of Keeper of the Imperial Stables. Furious at being tricked, he demanded and obtained the title of the Great Sage, Equal of Heaven. During
the annual Peach Party among the Celestials, the Monkey ate all the peaches, the latter being a fruit conferring immortality. The Jade Emperor sent his famous warrior, Yang Chien, to subdue him.

The monkey could transform himself into any of seventy-two forms, and he wielded a ponderous club, exalted from the Dragon King. Furthermore, each hair on his body, when plucked off, became a monkey. So Yang Chien could not conquer him; nor could any of the celestial generals. Finally the Sacred Buddha himself subdued him and placed him under a mountain. After five hundred years of punishment, the Monkey was finally released from his dungeon to guard Huán Tszang against all evils on his journey. The other sentient evil creatures accompanying Huan Tszang were the Pig and the river monster later dubbed the Sand Monk. The monkey, assisted by these two and at times invoking aid of the more powerful deities, helped Huan Tszang safely through eighty-one obstacles on the way. The many monsters and evil spirits he encountered include the Red Boy of the Fire-cloud Cave, the Demon of the Black River, the Ox Monster, and the Spider Spirit of the Gossamer Cave.

No Cha

The marvelous story of No Cha represents an Indian myth distorted to suit the Chinese taste. In the popular novel, Ping Sha Chuan, No Cha was the third son of Li Chung, a general in the service of Chou Hsin. The wife of Li Chung gave birth to a ball of flesh which rolled like a wheal. Li Chung cut it open with the blow of a sword and a baby emerged, with a magic gold bracelet on his right wrist and a piece of red damask around his belly. These precious objects belonged to Ta-i Chên-jên, who soon came from his Golden-light Cave to claim No Cha as his disciple. When seven years of age, No Cha bathed in the sea, and his red silk-piece shook the throne of the Dragon King. In the following scuffle, No Cha killed an attendant of the Dragon King and his third son. Later, to prevent the Dragon King from reporting his deeds to the Jade Emperor, No Cha peeled off some forty odd golden scales from the person of the Dragon King.

His turbulent career soon proved too much even for Li Chung to endure, and No Cha agreed to have his body disemboweled and disembodied in order to pacify the Dragon King. No Cha bade his mother to build a temple in his honor so that he could enjoy the incense and worship of the populace. But Li Chung, still angry with his son, burned the temple. No Cha returned to the cave of Ta-i Chên-jên, where the Celestial, by using the various parts of the plant, leaves, flower, and fruit of the sacred lotus, made a new body for No Cha. Now No Cha was even more of a wondrous lad, riding on a pair of fire-wheels and wielding a powerful weapon called the flame-tipped spear. No Cha now determined to kill his father, but a Taoist celestial finally came to the latter's rescue, bestowing upon him a pagoda which had the magic property of subduing No Cha. Hence, later in the service of Wu Wang, Li Chung was known as the Pagoda-bearing God. No Cha was also a prominent general in the campaign against Chou Hsin. His two brothers, Chi Cha and Mu Cha, were also doubtful champions.

La Tung-pin (born in a.d. 755)

Son of an official, La Tung-pin got his degree of Chih shih about the age of twenty but early forsook officialdom to become a votary of Taoism. Many myths and legends are associated with him. It was related of him, for example, that he made a journey to Lu Shun, Kiang-ti, where he met the Fire-dragon, which presented him with a magic sword that enabled him at will to hide himself in the heavens. During his visit to Ch'ang-an, he met
the Taoist Immortal, Chung-li Ch'nan, more popularly known as Han Chung-li, who instructed him in the mysteries of alchemy and the elixir of life. After overcoming a series of ten temptations, Lü was invested with supernatural powers and magic weapons, with which he traversed the Empire slaying dragons and ridding the earth of diverse kinds of evils during a period of four hundred years.

Thus, while an authentic historic personage, Lü very soon became the darling of the Taoist sect and a host of apocryphal stories evolved around him. He was one of the Pa Hsien, or Eight Immortals, of the latter-day Taoist mythology, who, as patron gods, gave prosperity and happiness to various classes of people. The eight are, in the usual order: Han Chung-li, Chang Kuo-lao, Lü Tung-piin, Ts'ao Kuo-chiu, Li T'ieh-kui, Han Hsiang-tzu, Lan Ta'ai-ho, and the female Ho Hsien-ku. Only three of the Immortals, Lü, Han Chung-li, and Chang Kuo-lao, were historical personages. The emblem of the Eight Immortals crossing the sea is commonly used in pictures and decorations. As popularly represented, Lü Tung-piin is a handsome man with a flowing beard, holding in one hand his magic sword and in the other a “cloud whisk” which enables him to fly in the air. A gay person, he is often engaged in harmless pranks and amorous dalliance with mortal women. He is worshipped by the barbers, and is also known by the title, Shu-nyang Tzu.

**Filial Sons and Daughters**

*Teang Shen* (Fifth Century B.C.)

One of the famous disciples of Confucius, Teang Shen was especially known for his filial piety. He was credited with the authorship of the Great Learning and of the Book of Filial Piety. He is also one of the Twenty-four Examples of Filial Piety. Since ordinary deeds of love and devotion to one's parents do not easily lend themselves to picturesque storytelling, this collection of the Twenty-four Examples often includes absurd stories, manifest with superstition and cruelty. Thus one Kuo Ch'un, unable to support his aged mother, proposed to his wife that they should bury their infant child alive. While engaged in digging a pit for this purpose, Kuo discovered bars of gold in the hollow, which enabled him to abandon his act of inhumanity. One Wang Hsiang in order to gratify the demand of his stepmother for some fresh fish during a severe winter, stripped himself naked and lay down upon the surface of a frozen river, whereupon the ice began to melt and a pair of carp sprang up voluntarily.

Several stories of Teang Shen's filial piety are related. One will suffice. While he was following Confucius as a disciple, one day his mother suddenly felt the longing to see him. As there was no way of reaching him, she just bit her finger. Thereupon, Teang Shen felt a twinge of pain in his heart and hurried home. This is one of the earliest known stories of mental telepathy.

*Hua Mu-lan* (Fifth Century A.D.; Second Century B.C.)

Among China's filial children, the daughters also took a prominent part. One of the best known examples was Hua Mu-lan. During the time of the Northern and Southern dynasties, wars were being constantly fought and conscription was imposed on young and old men alike. One day, Mu-lan's father was summoned for military service. Realizing that this would be the death of him as he was old and sick, Mu-lan dressed for her father's military garb and impersonated him in the ranks of the army, where she served for twelve years without betraying the secret of her sex and gained much renown as a soldier. Mu-lan is now often used as a patriotic symbol.
Another famous filial daughter was Tw'no O of the Second Century B.C. When she was fourteen, her father, a magician by profession, was accidentally drowned in the river near chao-hsing, Chekiung. After wandering for seventeen days on its banks in the hope of recovering her father's corpse, she threw herself into the river. Several days later her dead body rose to the surface, clasping in its arms that of her beloved father. Since then, the river has been known as the Tw'no O River.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ming Mu (Fourth Century B.C.)

The mother of Mencius was revered as one of the chief patterns of maternal wisdom. Mencius was still a child when his father died, so his mother had full charge of his education. Two famous stories were told about her. One was that she threw down her abode in order to guard his education from harmful influences. Having dwelt at first near a burial place, and again near a market, where the boy was led to mimic the scenes he saw enacted, she was not content until she had found a home near a school. Another story was that, once when the young Mencius was inattentive to his studies, as a practical lesson to her son, Ming Mu destroyed with a knife a piece of cloth which she was weaving.

Kuan Chung; Pao Shu-ya (died 645 B.C.; Seventh Century B.C.)

A typical statesman of the Ch’un Ch’iu period, Kuan Chung made his master Ch’I Huan Kung the first Pa (Lord Protector) among the feudal princes. As an able administrator, Kuan Chung was credited with the saying that propriety, virtue, integrity, and self-respect are the four cords of a nation and that when the four cords slacken the nation will decay.

When yet a poor young man, Kuan Chung was befriended by Pao Shu-ya who early discerned his abilities. When they were doing business together, Pao always let Kuan take larger share of the profits because he knew Kuan had to support his mother. To the Chinese people, therefore, Kuan and Pao constitute an ideal friendship not unlike that of David and Jonathan. Pao, especially, was considered the friend par excellence. When an usurper murdered the rightful prince of Ch’i, Pao espoused the cause of the heir Haiño P’ai; Kuan espoused that of the younger brother of the heir. Haiño P’ai finally ascended the throne as Huan Kung. Whereupon the younger brother sought refuge in the principedom of Lu. Pao sent a message to the Prince of Lu to the effect that Huan P’ai was too merciful to kill his brother but would appreciate the handing over of Kuan Chung. This trick worked on the Prince of Lu, who with the help of Chu and sent Kuan back. Haiño P’ai was going to appoint Pao as his Prime Minister but Pao declined the post and recommended his older friend Kuan. Pao gladly served under Kuan the rest of his life.

Hua T'o (died a.d. 200)

China's most famous physician and surgeon, Hua T'o, was reputed to possess phenomenal powers of diagnosis and cure. He lived during the time of the Three Kingdoms; and because of the popularity of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, his name became known to all Chinese people, and surpassed in fame even such renowned doctors as Pien Ch’iao of the Ch’un Ch’iu period. Hua T’o was skilled in the use of acupuncture and cautery. If a disease seemed beyond the reach of needles and cautery, he operated, giving his patient a dose of anesthetic which rendered him unconscious.
Many apocryphal stories are told of him. Once the great general Kwan Yu was shot by a poisonous arrow which put his life in danger. Hua T'o came to treat him. He cut open his upper arm and washed the infected bones clean while Kwan Yu concentrated on a game of chess. Upon the completion of this operation, Kuan complimented Hua on his skill, and Hua praised Kwan's stoical endurance.

Some time later, Ts'ao Ts'ao suffered from a severe headache, and invited Hua to cure him. Hua suggested that the only cure was to cut open the skull and operate on the brain. Ts'ao suspected an attempted murder, believing that he would die during a brain operation. So he cast Hua T'o into prison, where he died. Ts'ao Ts'ao, however, died soon afterwards.

While in this prison, Hua T'o was befriended by a jailer, to whom he promised to give his own precious book on medicine. When the jailer went to ask for the book from Hua's widow, she was just burning the book, bitterly over her husband's death. Only a few pages were snatched from the flames. Hence, no Chinese doctor since Hua T'o ever attained his kind of eminence.

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