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CONTRIBUTION TO NSDM 255

STUDY OF PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
CONCERNED WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES AND
TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

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B. Study of Possible Provisions for an International Convention
Concerned with Physical Security Guidelines

5. Postulated Positions of Other Nations
Regarding this Subject

Most countries of the world are expected to have no objection to the draft standards on physical security. There is recognition throughout the world of the dangers inherent in having fissionable material fall into the wrong hands, and most countries will be willing to take appropriate physical security measures to prevent such diversion. The PRC, however, will almost certainly not participate. There could also be problems with France and the Latin American countries. Although most countries would agree with the security standards, many would not agree to US or international inspections or enforcement of the standards.

WESTERN EUROPE

The energy crisis is leading to increased dependence on nuclear energy with attendant greater awareness of the possibilities of diversion, loss, or theft of nuclear materials. Many European countries are already sensitive to the problems of terrorism. Thus, it appears that the West European nations would gladly accede to such security measures.

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Many European countries would resent the implication that present security procedures are too lax, and this implication should be avoided. Nor should there be any implication that U.S. supply of enriched uranium to Western Europe is tied to acceptance of the security standards.

EURATOM, as the nuclear supply agency of Western Europe, presents a special problem. There could be objections on any agreement which excluded or superceded EURATOM. Standards promulgated through EURATOM would probably be more acceptable to the Western European countries than bilateral agreements between the various countries and the US.

Inspections or enforcement of security standards would probably be accepted, but grudgingly. The conduct of such inspections by an international organization such as IAEA would probably be more acceptable than US inspections.

Although France is concerned about the vulnerability of her nuclear installations, she will probably be more difficult to deal with than other West European nations.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviets are likely to be favorable to such an international convention. As a major economic power, the USSR recognizes its stake in world stability. Furthermore, the Soviets have a keen appreciation of the potential for abuse of

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nuclear technology. Moscow, therefore takes an active role in international efforts to limit opportunities for misuse of nuclear energy. The proposed convention would be consistent with such Soviet objectives.

The Soviet response could be conditioned by political considerations. Should Third World countries object strongly to the convention, Moscow might be reluctant to align itself as an overbearing superpower. On the other hand, should world reactions be favorable or neutral, and the PRC reaction adverse as expected, the USSR might support the convention even more enthusiastically in order to expose Chinese intrasigency.

As long as the agreement is self-policing there will be no conflict with normal, very tight Soviet and East European security. The Soviets would likely object to inspections.

The East European states will almost certainly follow the Soviet lead. They, like the USSR, are eager to reap the benefits of international nuclear cooperation.

ASIA

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) likely will not even comment on the proposed convention, let alone participate in it. The PRC has not participated in previous nuclear conventions because she feels they are dominated by the

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two superpowers -- the US and the USSR. Furthermore, Peking has made no public statement to indicate a concern in the area of physical security. Normal security in the PRC is probably much stronger than any which would be proposed intentionally.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Republic of China (ROC) will probably have no problem with the standards. Due largely to the threat from Peking, the ROC maintains high security standards anyway. In the expected absence of Peking, the ROC reaps the additional political benefit of being the "China" representative in such a convention. The ROC would probably object to inspections and consequent greater exposure of her nuclear facilities.

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INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

INDIA. India maintains high standards of physical security in its large and growing nuclear program. She probably would have no objection to the proposed standards, as long as the policing is internal. But she would object strongly to anything which involved inspections, disclosures or other infringements of her sovereignty.

PAKISTAN. Pakistan would be expected to enthusiastically embrace the international convention. In the wake of India's recent nuclear test, Pakistan is strongly in favor of any international nuclear controls which would afford greater protection to non-weapon states. Furthermore, Pakistan's nuclear program is still strongly dependent on outside support, and she would probably go much further than India in allowing inspections in order not to alienate world opinion.

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EGYPT. Egypt would probably accept the proposed standards. She probably also would allow inspection of the security arrangements on a periodic basis. The latter might be tied to a similar agreement on the part of Israel.

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa will probably support the convention on physical security. Although she has not signed the NPT, she supports the ideal of nonproliferation. South Africa has large uranium reserves and wants to enter the world market in enriched uranium. Furthermore, she needs international recognition to overcome her image as an international outcast, a result mainly of her racial policies. She is likely to object to inspections of security arrangements at nuclear facilities.

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LATIN AMERICA. The Latin American countries -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico -- might be somewhat reticent about accepting such an international convention. Terrorism is a definite problem in Latin America, and they would welcome technical advice on security procedures and systems. But they would be suspicious of a convention which would involve outside scrutiny of their facilities or enforcement of standards, or which would limit their own initiatives in their nuclear programs. Their response would probably be predicated upon the responses of other nations with similar, fairly small nuclear programs.

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