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	The US will be expected to help ensure a conservative political climate in the Gulf, but unobtrusively so as to deny ammunition to Arab radicals; 25X1
	Area leaders will show stronger interest in security cooperation and closer consultation among themselves in recognition that their fates are linked. 25X1
25X1	How the smaller states ultimately adjust to the new uncertainties will be influenced by their regional political objectives, and by their perception of what threatens them most.
	Ideally, the small states want a Gulf free from big-power presence and rivalry, a balance of power among the larger Gulf states, and a conservative political climate that depends locally on Saudi Arabia and internationally on the United States. These views derive from the smaller states' weak position relative to larger neighbors, their monarchical form of government, and their fear of leftist subversion.
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25X1 25X1	
25X6	As is typical of weak govern-
25X1	ments, the smaller states can be expected to maximize their political options and avoid angering powerful neighbors, especially by bilateral alliances.
25X6	

25X1