

22 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: All National Intelligence Officers
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : DCI/NIO Meeting, 25 May 1978

25 MAY 1978
[Signature]

1. The subject of discussion at the Thursday, 25 May, DCI/NIO meeting has been changed. The subject of the meeting will be the question,


Are recent and current Soviet interventions abroad different in kind than earlier interventions reflecting increasing sophistication and hard-won experience or are there other more important influences, e.g. improved logistics and lessening concern for US interventions?

The meeting is now scheduled for 1100 in the DCI's Conference Room. As is well known this schedule is subject to change. Meeting time and place will be confirmed by telephone.

2. Many western observers are comforting themselves when viewing apparent Soviet successes in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, etc. with the knowledge that earlier Soviet interventions in such places as Guinea, Ghana, Egypt and Indonesia failed eventually. Other observers argue that at its root this view sees certain historical constants (Soviet ham-handedness" is sometimes raised to this stature) as preventing long-term Soviet dominance over a Third World country. They argue further that the optimists see the Soviets as either incapable of learning from past mistakes or see historic constants as beyond Soviet power to influence, and finally that neither proposition seems self-evident. A third group of observers would argue that recent Soviet interventions promise more success to the Soviets than past interventions not because the Soviets have grown more clever, but because the US has withdrawn from the field at a time when Soviet technical capabilities to intervene have matured.

3. Attached is a copy of William Luers' paper for a recent seminar which addresses Soviet policy in the Third World. It is forwarded not to endorse the views stated, but to provoke discussion. It is requested that each NIO consider the proposition under discussion within the frame of reference of his area of responsibility and be prepared to contribute to a broad discussion of it on Thursday. No formal presentations are planned. NIO/USSR will host the seminar.

Attachment




25X

MEMORANDUM The Director of Central Intelligence

Attached is a copy of my memo for the Thursday
DCI/NIO Meeting and a copy of the Luers paper you requested.

Leahy



Presidential Briefing Coordinator

Attachments

*Janet this is
File some miscellaneous
pieces where we
can see how
on it*

Bol

25 MAY 1978

Date 24 May 1978

THE U.S.S.R. AND THE SOURCES OF SOVIET POLICY

A Seminar Sponsored by the

Council on Foreign Relations and the
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
The Wilson Center

Honorable George F. Kennan, Mr. Winston Lord, Chairmen

SESSION VI: SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD AND THE USA

The U.S.S.R. and the Third World

William H. Luers
U. S. Department of State

May 19, 1978

THE U.S. - USSR AND THE THIRD WORLD

This paper is designed as a briefing on Soviet policy toward the Third World. In compiling this brief review I have tried to do four things:

- describe a few of the Soviet experiences that have shaped the diverse Soviet policies and involvement in the Third World.
- discuss Soviet economic and military programs in the Third World
- discuss briefly the recent Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa; and
- draw some conclusion as to the nature of current Soviet policy toward the Third World.

I have not addressed U.S. relations with the Third World or attempted to describe an appropriate U.S. response to Soviet activities. I leave the debate on U.S. policies to the discussion period.

PART I: PAST SOVIET EXPERIENCES

Soviet policy toward and engagement in the Third World most certainly has roots in Russian imperial history and in the early Soviet period. Ideology and State interests have competed for dominance in determining the course of Soviet policies. But it is not within the scope of this study or my competence to seek in Russian history for

clues to Soviet motives for projecting power into the Third World. Instead, I have chosen to discuss how Soviet experiences in the Third World since the mid-1950's might have conditioned Soviet policies of today.

After World War II the Soviets sought opportunities to take advantage of the dissolution of the colonial empires. Lenin had led them to expect not only an embrace from the former colonies but a significant trembling in the metropolises. The first major Soviet efforts in the Third World were eminently "Khrushchevian"--innovative, personalized, ideologically justified, ill-conceived and ultimately failures. The Soviets successful entry into Nasser's Egypt coincided with the new opportunities that emerged from the Bandung Conference (1955). Khrushchev recognized these opportunities at the 20th Party Congress (1956) saying that "the disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world historical significance." In the next decade Khrushchev professed to see the emergence of "national democratic states," mainly in Africa and Asia, headed by "progressive" or "revolutionary" democratic leaders who were not yet socialist but were perceived to be on the track toward socialist development. These charismatic leaders were honored in Moscow and their nations received the first significant Soviet economic assistance and military aid.

In the 1960's the Soviets received one disappointment after another: from the Congo crisis, to the disintegration

of the "Casablanca bloc" (Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR) and the ouster or shift in orientation of most of the "revolutionary democrats." Moreover, Soviet aid paled before programs of the U.S. and the former "metropolises". Their first parries into the Third World were inept and based on naive premises. The Soviets--like the U.S.--learned that the course of events in post colonial Africa and Asia was unpredictable, that their own ability to transform assistance into influence was limited, and that nationalism, economic and political underdevelopment and residual Western traditions in these new societies imposed major obstacles to Soviet objectives.

The second major experience that shaped Soviet policies toward the Third World was the split with China. As the break with Peking developed, Moscow sought to buttress its relations in the rest of Asia. India eventually became the center piece of that strategy after it split with China. During 20 years a relationship has developed with India which has been useful to both countries. By far the largest recipient of Soviet aid and one of the largest buyers of Soviet arms, India has managed effectively its dealings with the Soviets, who have grown to live with India's independence. The Soviets not only failed to promote communism in India, they most certainly preferred an independent non-aligned India to another giant communist competitor on the Asian continent. If the break with Peking led Moscow to establish a balanced state-to-state relationship with India, it also gave impetus to Soviet

- 4 -

efforts to compete with China nearly everywhere else in the Third World. Containment of Chinese influence has been one of the major motivating factors in determining Soviet policy toward the Third World.

The third set of experiences that most certainly shaped the Soviet view of the future arose from Soviet involvement in Cuba and Vietnam. Like Korea in an earlier period, the special factor of U.S. military engagement, with all the attendant risks of escalation and U.S.-Soviet confrontation, imposed special constraints on Moscow. Indeed, the prospect or the actuality of U.S. military action was perhaps the critical factor in the Soviet approach to such "national liberation struggles." At the same time, the experiences in Cuba and Vietnam underlined for Moscow the fact that their only effective tool to gain influence in the Third World was probably military assistance and arms transfer.

The Vietnam experience speaks for itself. Let me turn to Cuba. Moscow must have taken two important lessons from over 15 years of life with Fidel:

-- large scale military support to a revolutionary regime that is under fire can bring significant political influence but the sustenance of such a regime can be costly in economic terms (over \$9.9 billion since 1961).

- 5 -

-- the revolutionary and ideological zeal of a client communist state can be occasionally troublesome (Fidelismo in Latin America and the missile crisis in the 1960's) and occasionally supportive (in Africa and the non-aligned in the 1970's) for Soviet policy.

Whatever problems have existed in the relationship, it is clear that Cuba, over the past decade and a half has unlocked a number of doors for the Soviets in the Third World.

-- Cuba became the first and only major revolutionary/ communist regime in the Third World -- it received full Soviet support for the development of socialism and the irreversibility of the revolution.

-- Cuba became an effective and consistent supporter for the Soviets in the non-aligned movement through which many key decisions in international organizations are influenced and even determined.

-- Cuba gave the impetus to reactivating Soviet participation in Africa and, most importantly, provided the combat troops to make the military involvement effective.

Clearly the Soviets would like to find and support a few more Cubas--but not many since the venture can be costly.

Permit one digression from the Cuban experience. The Soviets had the Cuban experience in mind when they moved so cautiously with the Allende Government in Chile. By the time Allende became President of Chile (November 1970), the Soviets had dropped their pretensions to being the guiding force and guarantor of communist parties or the radical left in Latin America. Allende needed economic assistance on a large scale to survive. His quandry offered the Soviets a unique opportunity to demonstrate that peaceful transition to power was possible for Marxist parties and would be supported by Soviet economic might. Think of the implications of such an event for Latin America and for contemporary "Eurocommunists" wherever they are. Soviet restraint and reluctance was remarkable.

The aid was minimal. Allende was neither effective nor revolutionary. The Soviets never embraced him ideologically referring only to Chile's "revolutionary renovation" or "radical reconstruction."

The final irony of the Soviet decision not to support the Unidad Popular was that the very year (1973) that Allende was overthrown by Pinochet the Soviets were preparing to embrace warmly the return of Juan Peron as president of Argentina. No contemporary figure so epitomized the Latin American strong man of the right. But the Soviets clearly saw in Peron a man with whom they could work in one of the potentially wealthiest nations of the Third World.

- 7 -

Peron sought Soviet help for an economic and trade relationship that could prosper. He had a reputable background of independence from the U.S., and presented no ideological challenge to Soviet policy. Within a short period of time Soviet offers of credits and cooperation to Argentina exceeded those offered to Allende. Argentina under Peron became the largest recipient of Soviet aid in the Western Hemisphere after Cuba.

The fourth complex of experiences that has given a special spin to Soviet policies has been the Middle East. If the major Soviet security concerns lay to the East and West, the major area for the expansion of political and economic influence and for superpower competition in the Third World has been the Middle East. In the 1973 war, the Soviets were able to respond to Arab requests with an airlift of supplies and arms with the speed and dependability comparable to the United States. During that war over 800 military support flights were flown to Egypt and other

Arab nations. This was a new, more muscular Soviet behavior, an important manifestation of the Soviet Union's capacity and readiness to behave like the other superpower.

Finally, the most important factor in the development of Soviet attitudes toward the Third World has been the United States. The initial thrust into the Third World was to prevent the U.S. from drawing these newly emerging states into a system of anti-Soviet alliances. The Soviets developed a large scale navy aimed, in the first instance, at countering U.S. attack carriers and nuclear submarines. By the late 1960's, however, the expanding navy had taken on an additional rationale and had become an important factor in the Soviet presence in the Third World. More importantly, the entire shape of Soviet programs for developing countries increasingly resembled U.S. bilateral programs--lucrative arms sales to steady customers, selectivity in bilateral economic assistance and emphasis on trade opportunities.

An important aspect of Soviet economic policy toward the Third World which has not developed similarly to the U.S. is the

multilateral and institutional. The most remarkable phenomenon of the past decade has been the degree to which international financial institutions (IMF, IBRD, UNDP and regional banks), multinationals (banks and corporations) and international organizations (OPEC, UNCTAD, GATT, WHO, FAO, commodity groups, etc.) have dominated the outlook, energies and development of the Third World. To non-warring Third World states whose borders are relatively stable (all but sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Indochina) the dominant issues of the day (food, energy, development, trade, technology, health, education) are not dealt with bilaterally with superpowers but through an expanding international network in which the Soviet Union is inactive and largely irrelevant.

If the Soviets failed to follow our lead toward the internationalization of development programs and if they failed to commit significant resources to Third World economic development, they did learn too well from our military sales and assistance programs. The most disturbing aspect of Soviet relations with the Third World is their readiness to transfer significant quantities of military equipment buttressed by advisers and, in two recent cases, Cuban combat troops. It is in this area that Soviet policy has become most threatening and destabilizing.

PART II: SOVIET PROGRAMS AND PRESENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD

One method of measuring Soviet involvement in the Third World is to compile charts showing the expansion of Soviet diplomatic relations, the increase in military and economic assistance and the placement of more technicians in developing countries. According to this "penetrationist" school of Sovietology, the growth by increments of Soviet presence has resulted in a comparable increase in Soviet influence and power. What the "penetrationists" do not usually measure, however, is the comparable growth in the presence of other powers or the increasing capacity of Third World states to control Soviet inputs and manage or mismanage their own affairs.

Rather than compile such statistics, I have looked at the record and cumulative totals of Soviet economic and military assistance over the last ten to twenty-five years. From 1954 to 1976 the USSR extended a total of \$11,769 million in economic assistance, \$6.7 billion of it in the last ten years (Table I).

From a base of \$291 million in 1967, the value of Soviet aid commitments peaked at \$1.2 billion in 1971 and again in 1975, but dropped to \$390 million last year. Actual drawdowns on these agreements have remained remarkably constant over the decade at between \$300-700 million a year. Of the nearly \$12 billion in Soviet aid extended since 1954, only a little more than half or about \$7 billion has actually been used by recipient countries. (Cuba has received \$10 billion since 1961.)

Compare these modest figures to the scale of international lending. In 1977 alone, loans to LDC's were as follows: World Bank, \$7.3 billion, other regional banks (ADF, ADB, and IADB),

\$2.83 billion, US commercial banks, \$52.3 billion, and US bilateral assistance \$5.6 billion. As the resource flow to the Third World has expanded enormously over the last decade buttressed by the increased wealth of the oil exporting states, Soviet participation in this growth has been marginal and, except in a few countries, unnoticed.

Although instructive, the overall figures do not answer the fundamental question of just how much influence the ruble has bought. Excluding Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea, a look at the top 20 recipients of Soviet economic assistance since 1954 gives an indication of the relationship between lasting friendship and the ruble (Table II). Among the first five recipients, India is non-aligned, while Egypt, Turkey and Iran have close ties with the United States. Afghanistan has maintained a non-aligned policy--it is too soon to judge whether Afghanistan's new leadership will desire to preserve the previous balanced approach to international affairs. Algeria (6), Iraq (7) and Syria (9), have good relations with Moscow, but could hardly be considered Soviet pawns. No. 11 is Argentina, which for various reasons discussed earlier stands ahead of Chile (12). Other countries on the list, such as Somalia (14), Indonesia (15), and Ghana (40), are symbolic of traumatic reverses in Soviet relations with the developing world.

What is most evident in the pattern of recent Soviet economic assistance, however, has been the emphasis on developing closer economic ties with neighboring countries or countries in the near periphery, particularly in South Asia and the Arab world. Similarly, there has been a de-emphasis on ideology in economic

ties over the past decade. One writer has called this "counterimperialism."* At the 25th CPSU congress in 1976, Kosygin announced that Soviet cooperation with developing countries should take the form of a "stable and mutually advantageous division of labor." The purpose of such a policy was not just to win political and ideological influence. It was to establish long-term economic relations and broaden the base of Soviet economic relations with the world.

The Soviets learned that economic investments in nations with ideologically compatible leaders does not always prove effective. Moreover, proximity of some nations offered opportunities for longer term, more stable economic relations with even capitalist-oriented states. The Soviet Union began to give priority to its own longer term need to trade. Thus, the major stress of Soviet economic assistance in the past decade has been directed toward India, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Algeria. It is clear that the Soviets also hope that by establishing more stable economic relations with these countries hostilities could eventually be diminished and perhaps greater political (even ideological) compatibility achieved.

While Soviet economic assistance has been a relatively stable and minor factor in the evolution of Soviet efforts to seek influence in the Third World, their military programs and arms transfers have expanded steadily. Looking at Table 3, you can see that the value of Soviet military agreements have increased progressively over the past decade from \$525 million

* Richard Lowenthal in Problems of Communism

in 1967 to over \$4 billion last year. The value of arms deliveries grew from \$500 million to \$3 billion over the same period. Moreover, the record of Soviet arms transfers is a more reliable measure for determining the relationship with developing states. Looking at the top 20 list of Soviet arms recipients over the past decade (Table IV), one sees that the expected entries -- Vietnam (1), Cuba (9), and North Korea (8), appear in the top ten. Others in the group including Syria (3), Iraq (4), Libya (6) and Algeria (10), have close relations with Moscow and generally support Soviet positions. Only Egypt (2), India (5) and Iran (7) are either non-aligned or have closer ties with the United States.

In the second group of ten, the list of recipient countries presents a more varied picture. Among these are China (11), Somalia (13), Peru (14), Nigeria (17), Sudan (18), Uganda (19) and Guinea (20), most of which have distanced themselves from the Soviet Union. Only Angola (12), North Vietnam (15) and perhaps now Afghanistan (10), could be said to be close to the Soviets.

In 1976, the Soviet bloc had over 10,000 military technicians in Third World countries, less than 10 percent of these were from Eastern Europe--the rest from the Soviet Union. Most of these technicians were concentrated in Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Somalia. Military personnel from Third World countries have increasingly sought training in the Soviet Union. In 1976 over 4000 were trained in the Soviet Union. The countries indicated above plus Libya and Tanzania have the largest share.

Soviet arms agreements last year were up considerably over the year before. A major increment of course came from Soviet sales to Addis Ababa of over \$800 million, but lucrative agreements were reached also with Algeria, India, Libya and Syria -- deals which together came to nearly three and one half billion dollars in sales. The main focus of Soviet military assistance has been in the Middle East, South Asia and more recently to sub-Saharan Africa. The only significant recipient of Soviet military assistance in Latin America has been Peru where the Soviets continue to emphasize military sales at a time when Peru is practically bankrupt and needs economic support which it can seek only in the West.

PART III: Soviet Involvement in the Horn of Africa

Angola was the first example of the most recent Soviet tactic in the Third World. There, the Soviets together with the Cubans, dramatically shifted the balance of power in 1975 by providing significant materiel and combat support for Neto's MPLA. In less than two months, the combination of Cuban troops and heavy Soviet military aid turned the tide in favor of Neto and permitted him to establish control in most of that country.

We next saw the Soviet-Cuban formula applied in Ethiopia: a development which needs to be seen, however, against the complex background of the Soviet presence and role in Somalia.

-- Over a period lasting a decade, the Soviet Union provided more than a billion dollars worth of weapons and technical assistance to Somalia, creating the military force which enabled Siad Barre to prepare and carry out the infiltration and subsequent invasion of the Ogaden.

--After 1976, however, the Soviets thought that the Mengistu revolutionary regime in Ethiopia might be added to Somalia as a client in the Horn. Mengistu's Ethiopia was ideologically attractive to the Soviets; perhaps reminding them of Castro's Cuba after the fall of Batista: a revolutionary leader preparing to reconstruct the social order of his country along radical lines using military force, in a siege atmosphere.

-- Somali irredentism over the Ogaden, however, had been a source of tension for decades, and ultimately proved to be the stumbling block for Soviet policy in Somalia.

-- Late in the summer of 1977, the Soviet government tried to dissuade the Somalis from large scale incursions into Ethiopia and sought to reduce the chances for open military conflict between the two countries.

-- This tardy Soviet effort failed. After having been ejected from Somalia, the Soviets turned their full support to Ethiopia which had broken its military relationship with the U.S. In responding to Mengistu's plea for assistance against invasion from Somalia, the Soviets abandoned for the moment any hopes of retaining a presence in both countries.

-- In the latter part of 1977, the Soviets supported the Government of Ethiopia with a large scale air and sea lift, sustained over a period lasting several months. This major operation, amounting to more than a billion dollars in sophisticated military equipment and tanks, together with an infusion of 10-15,000 Cuban combat troops, turned the tide of the military campaign. A notable feature of the effort (not seen in Angola) included the establishment of a Soviet command structure to coordinate the logistics and possibly the tactical movements of both ground and air elements of the Cuban and Ethiopian forces.

So much has been written about the aggressiveness of Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa that any further recitation

here will add little. Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was not uninhibited adventurism. Soviet policy displayed some self-limiting elements.

-- The Soviet government did apparently seek to dissuade the Somalis from invading the Ogaden.

-- The Soviets did not encourage and may have counseled against Ethiopian and Cuban troops crossing the border into Somalia.

-- Large scale retribution against the Somali population in the Ogaden has not yet taken place, although we do not know whether Soviet advice is in any way responsible for this.

-- Thus far, the Soviets and the Cubans seem to have been reluctant to commit their own personnel to military operations in Eritrea, and have called for a political solution to the secession problem there. The Soviets will probably not restrain their Ethiopian clients, but the question is whether they and the Cubans will choose to remain aloof.

-- There is some evidence that Soviet policy in black Africa operates under a loose OAU constraint, in the sense that it aims for and perhaps is limited by a need for legitimacy in the eyes of other regional powers. The Soviets have deliberately sought to avoid involvements which would open them to the charge of participating in the adjustment of African boundaries by force. The Soviets follow

closely the lead of the front line states on the Zimbabwe and Namibia issues.

To conclude, looking at Soviet objectives and intentions in the region, one can draw certain tentative conclusions:

-- As early as 1976, the Soviets had seen in the Mengistu revolutionary government an ideologically promising regime which might establish them in Africa.

-- Once ejected from Somalia, Soviet support for Ethiopia was kept within limits consistent with OAU policies on territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

-- Soviet operations in Ethiopia vividly demonstrate their possession of a logistical force and command structure which, in conjunction with Cuban manpower, can be used to intervene in politico-military disputes far from the Soviet homeland: a message to the U.S. and others that the Soviet Union regards itself, and is prepared to take the prerogatives of a superpower whose interests are far flung, and which must be accommodated in the resolution of regional conflicts it deems important to its interests.

-- The Soviets and Cubans now appear to be determined to retain a large military presence in Ethiopia, in order to serve as a prop for the Mengistu government, and presumably to help in shaping the course of Ethiopia's internal development, as they have been doing in the case of Angola. Conceivably, as noted above, the Soviets hope to develop a

- 19 -

relationship with Ethiopia rather like that they have had for so long with Cuba. Ethiopia of today may be like Cuba in 1961, but Mengistu is not Fidel and the size, diversity, and massive needs of Ethiopia will present the Soviet leadership with a formidable and perhaps overwhelming challenge.

- 20 -

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS - CURRENT SOVIET POLICY

Several conclusions appear justified from the foregoing:

The diverse, opportunistic and erratic character of Soviet involvement in the Third World suggests no basic commitment to Third World development or to a comprehensive engagement with Third World problems.

The force driving the projection of Soviet power into the Third World flows from Soviet state interests in a secure periphery and ⁱⁿ assuming both the role and image of a super-power. *In Africa the Soviets are responding to perceived opportunities to expand their influence.*

Ideology is a factor. The Soviet's generally opportunistic approach to the Third World and failure to engage in the "North-South dialogue" seems conditioned in part by Lenin's predictions that the crisis of imperialism arises out of the breakdown of relations between colonies and the metropolises. More importantly, in such cases as Cuba, Vietnam and perhaps Ethiopia where state and ideological interests coincide and reinforce each other, Soviet commitment is apt to be particularly high.

The Soviet decision to remain outside the major international financial and trade institutions and programs for resource transfers severely limits their capacity to influence and shape events in much of the Third World. This is particularly true in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.

Although the Soviets may find it in their economic and political interests to become involved bilaterally in developmental and trade questions such as they have with India and some nations near their borders, they seem disinclined and economically ill-equipped to participate in international institutions. They must sit out the North-South dialogue because it is precisely in that setting where they are economically outclassed and intellectually unsuited.

The most troublesome aspect of Soviet behavior in the Third World has been and is likely to continue to be their efforts to seek influence by stressing arms transfers, military relations and, on occasion, facilitating the introduction of Cuban or other forces into regional conflicts. At least in the short term, military power translates into political influence in parts of Africa. Mugabe and Nkomo, for example, are likely to be more intransigent when bolstered by the formidable and tested Soviet/Cuban force. For the same reason, Neto and Mengistu are likely to become more difficult neighbors. Most serious is the specter of deep racial conflict in Southern Africa in a situation where the front line states are backed by Soviet might. In a crisis situation, moreover, the presence or potential of Soviet power could again play an important, possibly critical, role in the Middle East.

There are some limits and constraints on Soviet power in the Third World. In much of the Third World where economic issues dominate and where borders and regions are relatively stable, Soviet military power is marginal or irrelevant. In

Africa, the Soviets are likely to try to be seen as working within ~~the OAU context or, at least, to prevent~~ ^{political limits which make difficult the} development of an OAU consensus against their involvement. To the extent that the Soviets ^{presence} becomes increasingly divisive ^{within the OAU} or ~~use the~~ ^{use of} their power, ~~excessively~~ ^{exceeds African tolerance} they risk expulsion or rejection from important regions in Africa. Most importantly, the great powers have consistently underestimated the capacity of countries in the Third World to assert themselves effectively against outsiders and to preserve their own national integrity. The developing Arab, non-aligned, and Western concerns over Soviet behavior are likely also to give the Soviets pause.

The Middle East remains for the Soviets the most critical area of interest in the Third World and the one where the potential for superpower confrontation is highest. Indeed, their adventures in Africa, in part, flow from their frustration in not playing a major role in the Middle East. There is a certain logic to the return of Soviet attention to Africa since it is the part of the world in greatest flux. But there is also a paradox in the Soviet return to Africa since it is the area of the greatest Soviet debacles. High risks in such a volatile environment are likely to lead to further setbacks. Soviet policy in Asia will continue to be conditioned by Moscow's obsession with China. In Latin America opportunism and hopes for increased trade mark a relatively low level of Soviet activity.

- 23 -

An important test for future Soviet effectiveness in Africa will be in Ethiopia. Here, too, the Soviets face a dilemma. Should they be effective in assisting in consolidating Mengistu's power and establishing a Soviet client state on the Cuban model, the Soviets and a revolutionary client ^{will further alarm} ~~could risk alarming~~ Ethiopia's neighbors, including Black Africa. The Soviets could become not only a more controversial and feared intruder but they could also find a high economic cost in taking on some of Ethiopia's economic burden. Should the Soviets not make a major commitment to Ethiopia and seek instead to enlarge their role in Southern Africa they could find themselves in unmanageable conflicts and racial wars ~~for which they are ill-prepared~~ and they could risk losing their footing in Ethiopia as well.

In the ebb and flow of conflict and stability in the Third World it is often the perception of the power balance that is as important as the actual application of power or the importance of the conflicts themselves. Soviet perceived successes in the recent years in Angola, Ethiopia and possibly Afghanistan may be ephemeral. But these successes give encouragement to foreign adventures by a conservative Soviet leadership troubled at home feeling the need to legitimize its ideological credentials; give concern to America's allies and friends who are or consider themselves threatened by Soviet power; and bring into question the value and terms of detente between the superpowers.

TABLE I

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>(US \$ MILLION) EXTENDED</u>	<u>DRAWN</u>
1954-1976	11,769	6560
1967-1976	6,704	4315
1967	291	310
1969	494	355
1970	198	385
1972	802	430
1975	1,229	485
1976	875	420
1977	390 (prelim)	500 (prelim)

* * *

TABLE II

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1954 - 1976*
(By order to total value of aid extended)

Total \$11,769 million

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Value</u>
1. India	1,943
2. Egypt	1,300
3. Afghanistan	1,251
4. Turkey	1,180
5. Iran	750
6. Algeria	715
7. Iraq	699
8. Pakistan	652
9. Syria	467
10. Bangladesh	300
11. Argentina	245
12. Chile	238
13. Guinea	201
14. Somali	154
15. Indonesia	114
16. Ethiopia	105
17. North Yemen	98
18. Morocco	98
19. Sri Lanka	95
20. Ghana	93

*Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are not listed because of their special relationship to the Soviet Union.

TABLE IIISOVIET MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIESTO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(US \$ MILLION)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AGREEMENTS</u>	<u>DELIVERIES</u>
1955-1977	24,875	20,215
1967-1977	20,375	16,640
1967	525	500
1969	350	450
1970	1,150	1,000
1972	1,600	850
1975	2,000	1,685
1976	2,450	2,190
1977	4,000 (prelim)	3,000 (prelim)

* * *

TABLE IV

SOVIET MILITARY ARMS TRANSFERS
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1967-76
(By order of total value of transfers)

Total \$17,972 million	US \$ Millions
<u>Countries</u>	<u>Value</u>
1. Vietnam	2,481
2. Egypt	2,365
3. Syria	2,015
4. Iraq	1,795
5. India	1,365
6. Libya	1,005
7. Iran	611
8. North Korea	480
9. Cuba	355
10. Algeria	315
11. People's Republic of China	191
12. Angola	190
13. Somalia	181
14. Peru	165
15. Yemen (Aden)	151
16. Afghanistan	100
17. Nigeria	70
18. Sudan	65
19. Uganda	65
20. Guinea	50

ADDENDUM

To Paper Presented By William H. Luers

"The U.S. - USSR and the Third World"

Page 20

Add the following sentence to end of third paragraph: ...superpower. "In Africa the Soviets are responding to perceived opportunities to expand their influence."

Page 22

The first six lines should be revised to read:
"Africa, the Soviets are likely to try to be seen as working within political limits which make difficult the development of an OAU consensus against their involvement. To the extent that the Soviet presence becomes increasingly divisive within the OAU or the use of their power exceeds African tolerance, they risk expulsion or rejection from important regions in Africa. Most importantly....."

Page 23

First paragraph, line 6, should be changed to read "revolutionary client will further alarm Ethiopia's neighbors, including Black Africa."

Same paragraph, line 13, delete phrase "for which they are ill-prepared".