Rhodesian Impasse: U.S. Counts on Split Among Guerrillas

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, April 19—In the aftermath of his inconclusive African trip, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance is planning American hopes in southern Africa on the assumption that Joshua Nkomo and his more flexible closest associates on the Rhodesian guerrilla leaders, to join in a negotiated settlement with the Salisbury Government. An analysis that Robert Mugabe, the other guerrilla leader, refuses.

American officials aboard Mr. Vance’s plane said on the overnight flight from Rhodesia that such a policy posed risks with no certainty of success. But it helps explain why Mr. Vance and his fellow mediators, Foreign Secretary David Owen of Britain, seem so intent on keeping even the flicker of interest in negotiations alive.

Once either the Patriotic Front, as the guerrilla alliance is known, or the Salisbury group absolutely rules out talks with the others, Mr. Nkomo and his Zambian-based guerrilla force will find it more difficult to break away from Mr. Mugabe, the more militant of the two.

This emerging strategy of seeking to split the guerrilla alliance was in the minds of American and British policymakers even before Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen embarked on their latest five-day mission.

Vance Found Mugabe Adaptable

As the result of two days of negotiations last week with the guerrilla leaders in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Mr. Vance now seems convinced that Mr. Mugabe will test any compromise in which the Salisbury Government of Ian Smith and his three black colleagues would have a fair chance of winning a free election.

Mr. Nkomo, a burly man and an experienced politician, pressed Henry A. Kissinger two years ago as the man most likely to become Rhodesia’s first black prime minister. He also joined last week with his willingness to seek a reasonable solution.

Mr. Vance’s view of Mr. Mugabe was shared by Mr. Owen, who frequently attended a meeting in London and more recently spun out the Salisbury Government’s official view that the guerrilla alliance had been prevented from attending a meeting of all the parties in the Rhodesian dispute if one was called and, more importantly, to accept the basic elements of the British-American plan for an imperial Rhodesian transition government and five elections.

In the actual discussions the mediators found the guerrilla leaders less conciliatory in their discussion of the mediation, the question of whether the African leaders would be impossible without Mr. Mugabe’s participation.

Reporters on Mr. Vance’s plane were told of an incident that underscored the difference between the guerrilla leaders. In their discussion with the mediations the question was raised about a general amnesty in a new Rhodesian government.

Mr. Mugabe began by saying there should be no amnesty for “war criminals” such as Mr. Smith and his black associates. But he was cut off by Mr. Nkomo, who said an effort should be made to forget the past and look to the future.

Vance to Meet CENTO Talkers

Mr. Vance spent the day in London meeting and preparing for a meeting of the Central Treaty Organization, a mutual defense alliance of Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, in which the United States also participates. Tomorrow he will fly to Zimbabwe for talks on the next steps.

American officials tend to believe that Mr. Nkomo and his colleagues have not bothered to press Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe on details of the plan. But the American leaders were embarrassed when Mr. Mugabe, in particular, took a hard position demanding that the guerrillas’ Patriotic Front dominate the police and a new government.

The American hope is that since the Patriotic Front is pledged to attend a conference of all parties, the Salisbury group will be reluctant to appear less forthcoming and will in the end agree to attend.

Deal Based on Nkomo’s Self-Interest

Then, the reasoning goes, under the cover of a general discussion, Mr. Nkomo might make a deal with the Salisbury group to accept elements of the British-American plan and to negotiate their differences, thereby forcing Mr. Mugabe to fight a guerrilla war with his forces alone or to join in the settlement, too.

But the scenario is based on an assumption that Mr. Nkomo would be willing to break with Mr. Mugabe and that the Salisbury group would show more flexibility toward the guerrillas than it has shown in the past. Mr. Nkomo in the past has proven an able politician and probably will decide what to do on the basis of what he believes is his self-interest.

But, for Mr. Nkomo to decide that it serves his interests to strike a deal, the Salisbury Government will probably have to be perceived as having enough domestic and international support to make its proposed settlement plan successful.

This, in turn, requires that the United States and Britain to avoid moving the impression of outright hostility to Salisbury. It also requires that Washington and London not appear to be on the side of the Salisbury group, for that would lend credence to the idea that in much of Africa that in the end the British and Americans will support racism.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R001200070024-6
Soviet General Who Lost Citizenship Asks Asylum

By ARNOLD H. LUBASCH

Pvt. G. Grigorenko, a retired general and prominent dissident in the Soviet Union, formally requested political asylum in the United States yesterday.

General Grigorenko, a smiling 70-year-old man wearing a brown suit with a striped tie, explained at a news conference in New York that he was seeking asylum because the Soviet Government had stripped him of his citizenship. He said he had been charged with damaging Soviet prestige with his open criticism of the regime.

The general gave his request to Maurice F. Kiley, the director of Immigration and Naturalization Service in Manhattan. Mr. Kiley said he would interview the general and evaluate the case, then decide on the request.

Hope for Eventual Return

At his news conference, held next to Mr. Kiley's office, General Grigorenko said he had been deprived of his Soviet citizenship two months ago while visiting the United States on a six-month visa.

His wife, Zinaida, and a son, Oleg, accompanied him to the United States, the general said. He said he had come to this country for a prostate operation and to visit another son, Andrei, who is an electrical engineer and permanent resident of Long Island City.

General Grigorenko, a wounded and decorated officer in World War II, said he hoped to return to the Soviet Union someday because "it is my fatherland, my friends, my fellow citizens and my earth, which I love."

The general spoke softly and with obvious emotion in his native Ukrainian. His words were translated by Lydia U. Savoyka, a counselor with the Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Catholic Conference.

Describing himself as "a man without a country," General Grigorenko said, "It is my right to live in my fatherland." He said he did not believe that the present Soviet Government would "last forever."

In 1961, he denounced "Stalinism" and began his repeated criticism of the suppression of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was subsequently arrested, deprived of his rank as a major general and confined in psychiatric hospitals for more than six years.

General Grigorenko said he has been speaking to industrial organizations and other groups in the United States, where his visa as a private visitor will expire at the end of next month unless he receives asylum.

Spain Stiffening Airport Security

MADRID, April 18 (Reuters)—Spain has bought security equipment worth $2.5 million to check air passengers and their luggage, Transport Ministry officials said today. The equipment will be installed at 11 airports, including Madrid's.
Intrigue

Furtive Meetings, Surveillance
Led to Espionage Indictments

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

Almost exactly a year ago a Vietnamese woman code-named "Keyseat" by her superiors at the FBI and CIA arrived in Paris carrying a flight bag filled with at least 49 classified U.S. State Department documents.

Two days later she turned the documents over to representatives of the Hanoi government, who thought she was working as a spy for them.

The Vietnamese in Paris were interested in the documents because they were just about to start talks with the Carter administration about U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The war had been over for two years, the Vietnamese were cooperating in the identification of remains of Americans missing in action, and they expected the United States to support their admission to the United Nations. The mood was hopeful.

But throughout April, May and June of 1977, as the diplomatic negotiations in Paris held the attention of the press, another quite secret drama involving the Americans and the Vietnamese was being played out on the streets of Washington.

Furtive meetings in a Dupont Circle cafeteria, a suburban shopping mall and the home of a well-known Vietnamese expatriate in Washington soon would come to the attention of President Carter and the highest officials of his administration.

Because of the way they chose to investigate what they believed to be a serious case of espionage, important constitutional questions have been raised. Attorney General Griffin Bell went to court to defend his actions and considerable attention has been focused on a trial, which is scheduled to begin May 1 in federal court in Alexandria. It will be one of the very few espionage cases to be tried in recent years and the only one to grow out of this nation's long involvement with Vietnam.

The attorney general first learned of the case the day after the opening round of talks in Paris was over, when he received urgent phone calls from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Chris-

See ESPIONAGE, A10, Col. 1
Furtive Meetings, Surveillance Led to Espionage Charges

Espysonage. From A1

By R. Edward and J. B. Director Chinese Writer,

They arranged a meeting for the next day, where Bell was told of an
all-night meeting called "Magic Dragon," which was the meeting's
intelligence investigation group. Vietnamese佐佐木 was a member of
the group, along with a Japanese reporter. They met at a
faux hotel in Hanoi's French Quarter.

The attorney general said it was possible
that he was tried during that April meeting to help find out
what was going on in Vietnam during the war.

"Magic Dragon," Bell said, had
been covered "a lot of work" and it wasn't
enough to put the Indians back in the United States with
information.

Bell said he was not shown the
documents during the meeting, and according to an FBI affidavit it was not
known who had those papers or who was
who. It was supposed to have taken place in Hanoi in
formation.

But Bell said recently he was

interviewed with the president of the United States
Secretary of State, the former president, and the

He said he was asked, "to prevent
destroy the book, and one way to do
it, he said, was to authorize a
question before the April 5th

"We've been trying to

This was not the first time

But within two days after the

the hotel manager called me up and

A man walked in the elevator. The

The agent watched as the
elevator moved up to the first floor

At about the same time as the

United States Attorney's Office,

The key to the case was

Approved For Release 20040708 / CIA-RDP81800988R00120007042-4

Approved For Release 20040708 / CIA-RDP81800988R00120007042-4
Soviet U.N. Official
Had Contact With FBI, CIA

By Anthony Marro
New York Times News Service

Arkady N. Shevchenko, the high-
ranking Soviet U.N. official who has
refused to return home, had been in
contact during the last several years
with intelligence officers of both the
FBI and the CIA, according to a for-
mer intelligence officer familiar with
the matter.

The officer would not elaborate on
the precise nature of the contact, but
said that it had involved “some de-
gree of cooperation” on the part of
Shevchenko, 47, and had been more
than a series of informal, casual con-
tacts.

In addition, it was learned from a
knowledgeable government source
that, as reported in the current issue
of Time magazine, Shevchenko has
offered to provide, for a reported
$100,000 a year, information about
whether a man who has cooperated
with the FBI in the past is a source of
legitimate information or “disinfor-
mation” planted by Soviet intelli-
gence agents.

Shevchenko, the undersecretary-
general for the department of politi-
cal and Security Council affairs and
the highest ranking Soviet citizen at
the U.N. Secretariat, refused a re-
quest from Moscow to return home
but has not formally sought political
asylum in the United States nor has
he resigned his post at the United Na-
tions.

Spokesmen for the FBI, the CIA
and the State Department all refused
eyesterday to comment on the report
in Time, which said that Shevchenko
had been talking secretly with U.S.
intelligence officers for two years be-
fore his defection.

One source familiar with the situ-
tion, however, said that there was no
question that contacts had taken
place in the past, and that Shev-
chenko had suggested recently that
he could provide important infor-
mation about a person the FBI be-
lieves has been a reliable source of in-
formation in the past.

This person, who is known by the
code name “Fedora,” has been re-
garded by the FBI as a “deep plant”
who has provided valuable informa-
tion in the past.

Others in the intelligence
community, however, have voiced
skepticism about “Fedora,” and
have suggested that he might be a
double agent, intentionally plant-
ing false information with the FBI at
behalf of the Soviet intelligence agency,
the KGB.

Although government sources
would not officially comment on this
yesterday, a person familiar with the
situation agreed that Shevchenko had
suggested that he could provide
information about whether “Fedora”
was a valuable asset to the FBI or, in
fact, a KGB plant.

Ernest A. Gross, a lawyer who
represents Shevchenko, said last
night that he was in no position to
comment on the allegations because
“they are completely outside of the
scope of my knowledge and respon-
sibility.”

He said that any comment on the
matter would have to come from the
State Department. Tom Reston, a
State Department spokesman, said,
“We do not comment on intelligence
matters.” Herbert Hetu, a spokes-
man for the CIA, said, “I just don’t
have anything to say about that.”
Soviet U.N. Official Is Reported To Have Met U.S. Agents in Past

By ANTHONY MARRO
Special To The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—Arkady N. Shevchenko, the high-ranking Soviet United Nations official who refused to return home last week, had been in contact with intelligence officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency for several years, according to a former intelligence officer familiar with the matter.

The officer, who did not elaborate on the precise nature of the contact, but said that it had involved "some degree of cooperation on the part of Mr. Shevchenko and had been more than a series of informal, casual contacts.

In addition, it was learned from a knowledgeable Government source that, as reported in the current issue of Time magazine, Mr. Shevchenko has offered to provide, for a reported $100,000 a year, information about whether a person who has cooperated with the F.B.I. in the past is a source of legitimate information of "disinformation" planted by Soviet intelligence agents.

Not Sought Political Asylum

Mr. Shevchenko, the Under Secretary General for the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the highest ranking Soviet citizen at the United Nations Secretariat, refused a request from Moscow to return home but has not formally sought political asylum in the United States nor has he resigned his post at the United Nations.

Spokesmen for the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and the State Department all refused today to comment on the report in Time, which said that Mr. Shevchenko had been talking secretly with United States intelligence officers for two years before his defection.

One source familiar with the situation, however, said that there was no question that contacts had taken place in the past, and also that Mr. Shevchenko had suggested recently that he could provide important information about a person the F.B.I. believes has been a reliable source of information in the past.

This person, who is known by the code name "Fedora," has been regarded by the F.B.I. as a "deep plant" who has provided valuable information in the past.

Others in the intelligence community, however, have in the past voiced skepticism about "Fedora," and have suggested that he in fact might be a double agent, intentionally planting false information with the F.B.I. at behalf of the Soviet intelligence agency, the K.G.B.

Although Government sources would not officially comment on this today, a person familiar with the situation agreed that Mr. Shevchenko had suggested that he could provide information about whether "Fedora" was a valuable asset to the F.B.I. or, in fact, a K.G.B. plant.

Ernest A. Gross, a lawyer who represents Mr. Shevchenko, said tonight that he was in no position to comment on the allegations because "they are completely outside of the scope of my knowledge and responsibility."

He said that any comment on the matter would have to come from the State Department.

Tom Reston, a State Department spokesman, said, "We do not comment on intelligence matters." Herbert Hutu, a spokesman for the C.I.A., said, "If I just don't have anything to say about that.""

One source familiar with the matter said that there was some question in the minds of persons in the intelligence community whether Mr. Shevchenko in fact could provide accurate information about "Fedora."

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
Special to The New York Times

UNIVERSITY, N.Y., April 17—The Soviet official here who refused a week ago to return to Moscow said so again last night.

The official, Under Secretary General Arkady N. Shevchenko, rejected a renewed request made by a high-ranking Soviet official at a meeting requested by Soviet authorities, according to Ernest A. Gross, the American attorney retained by Mr. Shevchenko.

Mr. Gross said the face-to-face talk was held in his Wall Street law office, the same meeting place used a week earlier when Soviet officials first tried and failed to induce Mr. Shevchenko to return home.

Mr. Shevchenko, who has again dropped in sight, has said only that he had "differences" with his Government and has not resigned his position as the highest-ranking Soviet citizen on the United Nations staff. Mr. Gross has insisted Mr. Shevchenko is not "in hid-
India's Aid to CIA on Listening Post Told

Got Information in '60s on Missile Developments, Officials Says

BY SHARON ROSENHAUSE
Times Staff Writer

NEW DELHI—India cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-60s to secure information about "missile developments" from a Himalayan mountain peak, Prime Minister Morarji Desai told Parliament Monday.

Although he never used the word spying or identified the People's Republic of China as the target of the Indo-American plutonium-powered monitoring device installed on Nanda Devi, there was little doubt here about Desai's meaning.

Reading a four-page statement, Desai said that in 1964 India and the United States decided at the "highest level" to cooperate on the listening device powered by plutonium 239.

He cited the "international situation, prevailing at that time," apparently referring to China's 1964 explosion of a nuclear device, only two years after China had humiliated India in a border dispute.

Desai's remarks represented the first official Indian government response to the article in the American magazine Outside, which exposed the CIA operation.

"After the news reports appeared a few days ago," Desai said, "we have assembled relevant details and background of these expeditions with reference to available record and in consultation with both the U.S. government and the Indian departments who were involved in this project."

A spokesman for U.S. Ambassador Robert F. Goheen, who met India's foreign secretary here Sunday, said that there would be no comment from the U.S. Embassy.

Desai's comments, in fact, contradicted several points in the Outside article written by Howard Kohin. The article has caused concern here over

the suggestion that the abandoned monitoring device could contaminate the Ganges River, which is sacred to India's dominant Hindu religious group.

"I see no cause for alarm on grounds of health or environmental hazards," Desai maintained although he also proposed that a committee of scientists "assess the problem."

The article claimed the CIA carried out the mission with Indian operatives while keeping the project secret from the government of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Desai said the Indo-American cooperation began in 1964 but he was not specific on the date. Mrs. Gandhi did not come to power until early 1966, when the spying project apparently continued.

Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister and Mrs. Gandhi's father, died in office in May, 1964. He was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who died in January, 1966.

Desai's statement did not refer to any head of government by name, but he talked of authorities at the highest level.

The first expedition to Nanda Devi in India's northern frontier near the Chinese border, was made by Indian mountaineers.

An Indo-American expedition followed, Desai explained, and was "scientifically equipped with the device with a view to installing it at a height of 25,000 feet." 65 feet short of the Nanda Devi summit.

A blizzard forced the climbers to retreat. Desai said, "In the precipitate descent under very trying and exacting conditions, they had to leave the power-pack securely cached."

There was no effort to locate and retrieve the device in the winter. Desai said another expedition was mounted the next spring. Desai said that this was in May, 1966, when Mrs. Gandhi was in office. The climbers found that a major avalanche had occurred and that they could not find the device.

Desai said that searches on the ground and by helicopter continued until late 1968 "but without the equipment being sighted or detected by scientific means."

A new device was taken to the same area in 1967 and installed on a neighboring peak. Desai said, "This functioned normally for a while but was removed subsequently in 1968 and the equipment was returned to the United States."

He did not explain why the device was removed.

The operations were under "joint auspices" and the predominantly Indian personnel, Desai emphasized, had the "approval at the highest political level" of Indian government.

The feared danger from the plutonium-powered monitoring device was that the radioactive material might have leaked into the Himalayan snow and then entered the river system through headwaters of the Ganges.

Desai said water samples were taken up to 1970, "but no trace of contamination was detected."

He pointed out that tests carried out by the United States indicated that even under "extremely unlikely conditions of complete instantaneous fuel exposure to water, there is little, if any, possibility of pollution retaining unsafe."

"We understand that even in such an unlikely eventuality, a flow of 5,000 gallons per day would itself dilute the dissolved material to safe drinking water levels. It is also believed by scientists that the dangers of pollution on instantaneous exposure to air are also minimal."

The device likely was powered by a radioisotope thermal generator or RITG, which is a compact, low-power device. Several were planted on the moon by Apollo astronauts.

CONTINUED
An RTG consists of a small encapsulated slug of plutonium 238, which generates heat for electric power as it decays to rather less harmful uranium. Any device that could be carried up a mountainside would have to be too light to be powered by a nuclear reactor, which could present a far greater radiation hazard in the event of an accident.

Desai reminded the members of Parliament that India entered the joint effort at a time when the nation faced a "critical situation" in what the 82-year-old prime minister called "days of concern, apprehension and anxiety."
New Direction

THE NEW direction which Admiral Stansfield Turner is charting for the Central Intelligence Agency is fascinating—as long as it is kept within proper bounds.

As director of the CIA Turner is taking the position that intelligence which is generated should not necessarily be kept secret. Rather, it should be shared with the public. And he cited as an example that economic and political information gathered by the CIA could be useful to American businessmen.

That approach has a good ring to it. There's no question that a great deal of information which flows into the CIA would be beneficial to more than the military and diplomatic community. And it is logical that not all information should be kept in a highly classified state.

But the sticky part is delineating between what should be kept classified and what should be made public. The past CIA policy of keeping everything secret made it relatively easy to handle. There was no danger of the wrong information being passed around.

And it is elementary that any information which is made public will be public in a global sense rather than kept within the boundaries of the United States.

Thus those entrusted with deciding what should be public and what should remain secret must be carefully selected and their work carefully monitored. If that is done with the best interests of national security in mind, the Turner approach shows promise.

But as a postscript we do wish to correct one statement the CIA director is quoted as having made. He said that the traditional human CIA agent is needed "to know what someone's plans and intentions are."

It is basic in military intelligence that there is no way of knowing—with any certainty—what someone's intentions are. You can learn his plans. You can determine his capabilities. And from those capabilities you can project what courses of action he is likely to attempt.

But unless you can delve into the human brain you have no way of ascertaining someone's intentions.

We just thought we'd correct the director of the CIA—if he really said that.