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Jack Anderson

Hoover, Bugging and Deniability

Apparently the old television series, "Mission Impossible," was all too accurate about the practice of government leaders ordering unlawful missions and disowning their underlings if caught.

There is reason to believe, for example, that past presidents knew more than the record discloses about the dirty doings of the Central Intelligence Agency. Now we have obtained secret evidence that the late J. Edgar Hoover played the same game.

Some of his former officials face prosecution for illegal break-ins, "black bag jobs" and buggings that the powerful FBI chief may have secretly ordered. The evidence indicates he carefully covered his own tracks to avoid personal embarrassment if his agents were caught.

On the record, Hoover placed in the official files memos and orders ostentatiously taking a firm stand against unlawful tactics. On Jan. 6, 1967, he notified two of his top aides that he would not approve requests for illegal planting of listening devices on private premises.

"I have previously indicated that I do not intend to approve any such requests in the future," he declared, "and, consequently, no such recommendation should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes also surreptitious entrances of any kind, will not meet with my approval in the future."

Obviously, this was intended to persuade future historians that Hoover scrupulously obeyed the laws he was supposed to enforce. Any evidence to the contrary naturally would not be left lying around. But this much is known:

- Under pressure from then-president Richard M. Nixon to disrupt left-wing extremists, the FBI continued its criminal trespassing and eavesdropping until Hoover's death in 1972.

- Virtually nothing went on in the close-knit FBI that escaped Hoover's notice. Even veteran colleagues feared to take any major action without his being informed. Almost every paper clip had to be accounted for.

- The late William C. Sullivan, a member of Hoover's inner sanctum, told a federal grand jury that in 1970 he relayed instructions from the FBI director to field agents that they should employ "any means necessary" to bring the extremist groups to book. He said Hoover cautiously avoided directly mentioning wiretapping, electronic listening and other forbidden acts. But Sullivan said, within the context of the discussion, the tacit approval was so clear "it needed no interpretation from me." Sullivan resigned in 1972 in a bitter break with Hoover and died recently in a hunting accident.

- Although interdepartmental documents attest to Hoover's disavowal of unlawful practices, an in-

triguing internal report was circulated after Hoover met with then-CIA chief Richard M. Helms and other intelligence officials. The memo admitted that the FBI was conducting "microphone surveillance" of 13 extremists, including the home of Black Panther leader Huey Newton. It is virtually impossible to plant a microphone in someone's home without trespassing.

- After Hoover's death, the Justice Department disclosed to a closed-door Senate investigation that 14 "subversive targets were the subject of at least 238 entries" by the FBI continuing until April 1968. This would have been more than a year after Hoover's final disavowal. Our sources are emphatic that none of these would have been initiated without Hoover's sanction.

- When the Watergate gang came up with a proposal to crack down on Nixon's political enemies by violating their basic rights, Hoover was credited with opposing the nefarious campaign. But a memo to then-attorney General John N. Mitchell from the FBI chief pledged cooperation. "Despite my clearcut and specific opposition," Hoover wrote, "the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases."

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36. [] LIAISON Betsey Keyes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff, called asking for copies of the DCI's speeches in Columbus, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan. I told her that I would attempt to locate copies and get them to her. During the remainder of the day there were more calls on the subject concerning past speeches. It turns out that one of the DCI's February speeches had not been passed to the Committee, but this is being rectified and all future speeches will be forwarded to the Committee.

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37. [] LIAISON Accompanied Joe DiGeorgio, GAO International Division, to a meeting with [] PCS/Terrorism. The purpose of this meeting was to enable GAO to obtain hard copies of intelligence reports that they had already read in the field. The clinker is that the GAO teams that are traveling in the Latin American, European and Far East areas are regionally stationed in Panama City, Frankfurt and Honolulu/Bangkok respectively. Logically enough they want the intelligence reports sent to the regional areas. The totality of the GAO arrangement had not been clarified previously, although there had been previous meetings with DiGeorgio and the entire program is based upon a letter (February 9, 1978) from Comptroller General Elmer Staats, GAO, to Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI. [] will look into the possibility of providing copies of the intelligence reports to the GAO regional units for their review.

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38. [] LIAISON Talked to Loch Johnson, on the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, about forthcoming DCI appearance before the Subcommittee on Oversight, chaired by Representative Les Aspin (D., Wis.), on 20 April 1978. He reiterated the areas set aside for coverage and I promised to send him a copy of the 13 April letter to the editor (Washington Star) by Russell Warren Howe setting forth the facts on the [] case.

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39. [] EMPLOYMENT REQUEST Received a call from Carol Wilhite, in the office of Representative David W. Evans (D., Ind.), requesting an employment (professional) package for a constituent. OLC Registry was advised.

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21. [] LIAISON Received a call from Jon Holstine, Minority Consultant, House International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. He noted that he had seen an article in the New York Times of Sunday, 16 April 1978, entitled "Soviet Press Agency Says China Has Expansion Policy in Asia." Holstine asked whether there was any foreign press play on this subject. He said perhaps he had missed it in the [] Daily Reports he receives. After checking with Lillian, Liaison, I called Holstine back and told him that there was a TASS news release of 14 April which would be in the 17 April Daily Report on the USSR which would be delivered to the Committee tomorrow. I also provided the page number. He was appreciative of the information.

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22. [] BRIEFING I spoke with Ellen Miller, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee staff, concerning her desire for an unclassified briefing on patron state support to terrorism. I explained the problems we had with such an unclassified briefing and suggested alternatives to follow. It was decided that she will come to the Agency for a meeting with terrorist experts with the full understanding that we may not be able to provide any information at all and may only be able to comment on the information she currently has.

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23. [] LIAISON Called Frank Sullivan, Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee, and called his attention to an article in the NID concerning Panama. He suggested that since he is reading the NID on a daily basis that we need not alert him to articles in the future. He did ask that we stay attuned to the situation and call to his attention any significant items on an early warning type basis.

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24. [] LIAISON Called Norvill Jones, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and discussed the situation with respect to [] staff member. I explained that in light of the allegations against [] that we feel the need to take some action with respect to [] clearances. Jones said that the matter was very sensitive to some Members of the Committee and that any action based on the general allegations that he is aware of at this point would cause problems. We agreed that since [] is on annual leave and doesn't currently have access to classified information that there would be no need to take affirmative action. Jones will advise me when [] returns to work so that we can make a determination at that point. I discussed the matter with [] DD/Sec, who suggested it be raised with the Director.

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NEWSDAY (Garden City, N. Y.)

17 April 1978

OWENS **Truth, Sometimes a Peacetime Casualty**

Richard Harris, a most thoughtful reporter, has just published an essay on Richard Helms. Belatedly, I have just read "The First Casualty" by Philip Knightley. The conjunction is unnerving.

Knightley's book is a taut account of war correspondence from the Crimean War through Vietnam. Its title is taken from Sen. Hiram Johnson, who said in 1917: "The first casualty when war comes is truth." Knightley documents the proposition again and again and again. War correspondents have historically been hobbled by military and governmental censorship, their own patriotism, and ignorance of the true shape of great events.

Richard Harris's meditation, in *The New Yorker*, raises the disturbing possibility that truth may be the first casualty in peace as well as in war.

Last Oct. 31, Helms, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, appeared before Federal District Judge Barrington D. Baker in Washington and pleaded *nolo contendere* to the charge that he had refused to answer material questions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in appearances in February and March of 1973. This charge was a misdemeanor. Four days later, Baker fined Helms \$2,000 (which was soon thereafter raised by CIA colleagues at a party honoring Helms) and sentenced him to one year of unsupervised probation.

Helms did not "refuse and fail" to furnish information as the criminal information alleged. He had furnished misinformation, lying like a trooper when he denied that the CIA had funneled money into Chile to try to keep Salvador Allende Gossens, a democratic Marxist, from becoming president and, once he was elected, from governing his country. From 1969 to 1973 the CIA had invested \$8 million in these enterprises, as Helms' successor has since testified.

President Carter's Justice Department

ment had broken precedent to keep the press from learning in advance of Helms' Oct. 31 court appearance. Griffin Bell, the attorney general, has since contradicted Carter's claim that the Helms deal was put together without Carter knowing anything about it. And, as Harris has taken the trouble to demonstrate, virtually every journalistic organ in the country with anything approximating a national audience has agreed that letting Helms cop his plea was a wise act in the national interest.

There had, of course, never been any decision by the American public that Allende should be overthrown. There has never been a true national debate on the issue. The decision seems to have been made by Henry Kissinger with the concurrence of Nixon. Almost everything the government has said on the subject since can confidently be dismissed as lies.

These lies protect two profoundly important decisions, the decision to get rid of Allende, the democratically elected chief of a sovereign state, and the decision to avoid accounting to Congress for the overthrow. The second is the more fundamental, for the executive branch and the intelligence agencies it supervises are accountable to no one if not to Congress.

If lying on the Helms scale is only a misdemeanor, deserving of a suspended sentence and of a modest fine that Helms' old associates are proud to pay, then lying to Congress by a high executive official is a less serious offense than stealing a filing cabinet.

The Helms case is not like Watergate. Helms did not set about the overthrow of Allende for reasons of personal gain or aggrandizement. He did not lie to Congress to save his own skin, for there was originally no issue of personal culpability or of criminal prosecution: Getting rid of Allende was government policy.

He lied to protect the policy, which was still in effect when he testified. One of many questions Harris asks

about the case is this: "If we have an inner, secret government that cannot be controlled, has our political system been basically altered without our knowledge or approval?"

I wish he had spent more time on this question. It is the key to the situation. If Helms had no direct monetary or other mercenary interest in dumping Allende, he had an ideological interest, and others who concurred in his decision did have monetary interests. Harris notes that the military junta that succeeded Allende (after he had died in the takeover) paid \$125 million to International Telephone and Telegraph for a telephone system that Allende had seized without compensation. Dozens of other big corporations were threatened by Allende and relieved by his death. The U.S. government has since, in effect, reimbursed Chile's military government with millions in military and other aid, and in credit.

What, if anything, ITT was owed for the telephone system is a perfectly legitimate question. So is what role, if any, the United States should play in assisting ITT to obtain compensation. But these questions have hardly arisen on the national agenda. Instead, the U.S. government cast its lot with those who disliked Allende because of his politics and with those who had investments to lose if Allende prevailed.

This decision, despite the vastness of its consequences, was never publicly debated either. The U.S. role was denied even as it was being implemented. And it is still being denied, by an administration elected after explicitly rejecting such interference in the affairs of other nations. Despite his eminence, it is possible to see Helms as the fall guy in the scenario. He was following orders. But central to his defense, in and out of court, is that some government officials have a larger obligation than truth-telling, even to the Congress, and thus an obligation so large and unspeakable that lying and the evasion of accountability are warranted in its execution. This is a stunning claim to find favor in a democracy in time of peace. It raises unavoidably the question whose interests are served by federal agents placed above the law.

NEW YORK INTELLIGENCER

Don't Call Us, We'll Call You

Several employment offices of a rather unusual nature have opened recently in New York. They cater to a distinctly special category of job seekers: former CIA analysts and agents who have been axed over the past few months by Admiral Stansfield Turner. Saudi Arabian government representatives quietly opened a small office in Manhattan and let it be known they were looking for security specialists to train Saudis in protecting oil installations. Meanwhile, over at the Iranian Consulate, an office has been set aside for discreet interviews with former spooks who might be interested in training troops and SAVAK agents for the shah of Iran. Somewhere else in the city, certain Rhodesians have recruited several former clandestine agents for work in paramilitary units now engaged in the guerrilla war against African nationalists. The Rhodesian recruiters call themselves the "Crippled Eagles." They are not listed in the phone book.

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