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1952

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AMC Form 9F
(Rev 2 Apr 51)

Air Force-WPAFB-O-29 JUN 51 293M

Supersedes AMC Form 9F, 7 Jun, 49
which will be used.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

AFDOP 000.92

29 Dec 52

SUBJECT: (U) Effect of "Flying Saucers" on Air Defense Operations

TO: Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Ohio
ATTN: Air Technical Intelligence Center

1. On 23 October 1952 in a meeting with General Maxwell, Air Force Secretary, Research and Development Board, Office of Secretary of Defense, data was requested concerning the effect of the phenomena of "flying saucers" on the air defense system. This data was desired to assist in determining whether or not research and development should apply additional effort in analyzing this problem.

2. As a result of this meeting, the Air Defense Command was requested to submit their thoughts on the "flying saucers" phenomena.

3. Attached for your information and any action deemed necessary are copies of the letter to Air Defense Command and their answer. Copies of the Air Defense Command correspondence have been forwarded to General Maxwell and also to Lt. General Craigie, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/Thomas R. Ford
THOMAS R. FORD
Colonel, USAF
Asst Chief, Operational Plans Div.
Directorate of Operations

2 Incls

- 1. Cy ltr to ADC, dtd 27 Oct 52
- 2. Cy 1st Ind from ADC, 24 Nov 52

C O P Y

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

AFOOP-OP 000.92

27 Oct 52

SUBJECT: (uncl) Effect of "Flying Saucers" on Air Defense Operations

**TO: Commanding General
Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado**

1. The phenomena of "flying saucers" has been reported many times both as visual and radar sightings.
2. Your comments are desired as to the possible effect the sightings of this phenomena could have from an operational point of view on the air defense system.
3. In addition, your comments on the following are desired:
 - a. What is the radar operator's reaction to this phenomena? Is he able to recognize and reject the echo as not an aircraft?
 - b. Is it likely that some operators have observed a "flying saucer" and rejected the radar response and not reported the fact?
 - c. Does a radar response from this type phenomena confuse your radar operators?
 - d. Has Air Defense Command any concern in respect to the "flying saucer" phenomena?

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/James C. Jensen
J. C. JENSEN
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Operational Plans Div.
Directorate of Operations

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CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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HQ USAF AFOP-OP 000.92, Subject: (Unclassified) Effect of "Flying Saucers" on Air Defense Operations

ADDOF-C 360.3 (27 Oct 52)

1st Ind

24 Nov 52

HQ AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Director of Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. DCS/I, this Command, has compiled numerous reports of flying objects sighted both visually and by radar. Air Technical Intelligence at ADC has been assigned the basic responsibility for the analysis of the phenomena and a complete file is not available at ADC, nor has a complete analysis been attempted here. We are, however, vitally concerned with any phenomena which degrade the quality of operation of the AQW system. Radar tracks which do not conform to the characteristics of current aircraft would certainly fall within this classification.

2. A preliminary investigation of "fast tracks" was undertaken by ADC in May 1952. It was concluded that a high percentage of "fast tracks" then reported was occasioned by mutual interference between radar equipments. An article was prepared for the August 1952 ADC Q&E Digest to describe the phenomena of fast tracks generated by mutual interference, the methods used to identify the tracks as such, and suggested remedial measures which should be taken. The mutual interference problem will grow as the number of our radar increases and continual education will be necessary to alleviate the situation.

3. It is difficult to assess the effect of observing unusual track phenomena on the operator. As his training and experience increase he learns to recognize conventional aircraft tracks, interference, jamming and equipment malfunctioning. The introduction of unexplained phenomena will always cause some confusion. In each case, the confusion will be compounded by the necessity for submitting reports required by higher echelons. Even highly trained operators have been known to miss actual targets. Certainly the chances are much greater that a target will be missed which does not conform to the conventional pattern.

4. The flying object reports indicate many, very slow, erratic targets which could be attributed to weather phenomena, weather balloons, experimental balloons, blimps, etc. A greater number indicates speeds ranging from 700 to 2500 knots. At present we have no alternative at our radar stations but to determine if mutual interference exists and to make the required reports. In the 1955-56 period, we anticipate that interceptors and guided missiles available for air defense will be capable of intercepting targets while flying at speeds of approximately Mach 2. We also anticipate that enemy

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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ADDP-C 360.3, Subj: (Uncl) Effect of "Flying Saucers" on Air Defense Operations; 1st Ind to HQ USAF

guided missiles will have speeds of Mach 2 or greater. At that time, fast tracks, radial or otherwise, will call for defensive action at once. If unusual fast track phenomena of the type now experienced persist during that time interval, it could result in an unnecessary expenditure of our guided missiles and inefficient utilization of our manned interceptors.

5. We believe that it is imperative to determine the causes of unusual track phenomena before the threat possesses characteristics such as to cause mistaken identification and subsequent dissipation of our weapons for air defense.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

s/Robert M. Wynens
ROBERT M. WYNENS
Capt, USAF
Asst Adj Gen

COPY

14 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Flying Saucers Problem

1. At an informal discussion between DD/I, AD/IC, and Acting AD/SI, it was agreed that the saucer problem should be attacked by getting together the responsible individuals in the community to work out a program of research and intelligence which can then be implemented by them directly. The agreed program can then be forwarded to the DCI and possibly the Secretary of Defense and the balance of the National Security Council as an established program rather than waiting for a great deal of formal, high level paper pushing before taking action.


2. DD/I directed Acting AD/SI to contact Dr. Whitman and Gen. Samford to arrange an appropriate time at which this problem can be reviewed. Acting AD/SI to call on Dr. Whitman and review the background of our study before the meeting.

3. Subsequently, Acting AD/SI was advised that the most convenient days for this meeting would be Monday or Tuesday, 20 or 21 October. Those present would be:

Dr. Walter G. Whitman, Chairman, RDB
Gen. John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, USAF
Mr. Loftus E. Becker, DD/I
Mr. James Q. Reber, AD/IC

plus others deemed appropriate by the principals.

25X1A



CC: Chief, Opns/SI - 1 ✓
Chief, SAD/SI - 1
Chief, Prod/SI - 1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Operations/SI	NO. DATE
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1.	TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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	P&E		11/17			
	AHS		11/17	11/17	<i>[Signature]</i>	
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1952 NOV 20 12 42

OPS/SI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	AD/SI		
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FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	0/DD-1	RDC	6/10/67
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| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE |

REMARKS:

cc to AD/IC

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

RDB

NO.

C8664

DATE

4 Nov 52

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Exec.			10 Nov	JG	
				ACC	
				AS	- further discuss?
			11/13/52	KBW	Everything is fine.
					25X1A ACC
6. 25X1A					4 Sauerbrier and send Hermos to [redacted] for his info. AS
					Thermon sent [redacted] PHE, 11/13/52
					25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81R00560R000100020001-9



RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Becker:

Confirming our brief conversation in the hall the other day, I enclose a memorandum from General Maxwell on the subject. We will advise you when we receive the report referred to in this memo.

Sincerely,

WALTER G. WHITMAN
Chairman

Enclosure (1)

Mr. Loftus E. Becker
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

(This document may be declassified upon removal of Confidential Attachment.)

Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81R00560R000100020001-9



RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, RDB

SUBJECT: Radar Phantoms

STATINTL

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1. At our conference here the other day with Mr. Becker, [redacted] and General Samford, it was agreed that we would evaluate the radar phantoms from the viewpoint of the seriousness of the problem to the Air Defense Command.

2. Inquiries made to the appropriate sections of the Air Staff did not disclose any undue concern over the phantoms. I believe that this is because in war and in peace the problem of identifying the vast number of aircraft tracks seen by the Air Defense radars is a confusing factor of much greater magnitude. However, to make sure that we are not overlooking any important considerations, the Air Force has asked the Air Defense Command to study this problem and make recommendations.

3. This, then, is an interim report to you, because it may be several weeks before the answer arrives from the Air Defense Command.

*how
Dept of
Air
Academy*

4. Naturally there is general concern about the radar phantoms and the larger problem of the flying saucers because we are unable to explain a sizeable percentage of the reports. However, the consensus seems to be that a great deal of activity and study is going on in this field which will do much to clarify the situation. The subject of anomalous radar propagation has been under study for some time and will continue with appropriate emphasis. The Air Technical Intelligence Center, which analyzes "saucer" reports, will emphasize the radar confusion aspect. It is also my feeling that, whereas formerly this was a subject which scientific men did not wish to become involved in, it is now becoming "respectable" to study the subject and to discuss it publicly. If this trend continues and our astronomers and other scientists do turn their talents to the problem, I am sure that the answers will be expedited.

Alfred R. Maxwell
ALFRED R. MAXWELL
Brig. General, USAF
Air Force Secretary