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| SITUATION REPORTS | 25 X 1 |
| SITUATION REPORTS | |
| IRAN | 25X1 |
| the US Embassy in Tehra terday that retired General Jam has refu Minister of War in Prime Minister Bakhti and intends to return to London as soon After a meeting with the Shah, Jam report that the Bakhtiar government is a hopele Debate on the new cabinet in the lower h legislature has been delayed until Thurs will consider it on Friday. Meanwhile, military and police forces continues to demonstrations occurred yesterday in Tehand other cities. | sed to become ar's government as possible. tedly concluded ss proposition. ouse of the day; the Senate pressure on mount as violent |
| Jam's departure will severely weake the Bakhtiar government. Jam was the on figure in a cabinet consisting mostly of knowns. We believe Jam's departure will Bakhtiar's ability to deal with hardline cers who are pressing for a harsh crackd opposition. The chances that these offitempt to seize power have probably been | e prominent political un- also erode military offi- own on the cers will at- |
| The Shah's apparent unwillingness to power to control the military raises the that the Shah does not really want the B ment to succeed. The Shahor at least advisers like Ambassador Zahedimay in if Bakhtiar fails to restore order the s for a military crackdown. | possibility akhtiar govern- his hardline fact hope that |
| Demonstrations continued yesterday Mashhad, Esfahan, Abadan, and other citirioters burned eight theaters and up to estimated crowd of 10,000 listened to sp by political and religious opposition le | in Tehran, es. In Tabriz 100 stores. An eeches in Shiraz aders. |
| Continuing opposition activities ar siderable strain on military and securit | e putting con- y forces. |
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
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Attacks on individual soldiers by demonstrators and threats against officers and their families have contributed to a siege mentality within the military. 25X1

Concern by religious and political opposition

leaders that further provocations might lead to a backlash by military units has led them to take a more
cautious and conciliatory attitude toward the Army and
the police. Two leading religious figures--Ayatollah
Taleqani in Tehran and Ayatollah Dastgad in Shiraz-yesterday urged demonstrators not to take the law into
their own hands.

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


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| BRIEFS AND COMMENTS | |
| ARGENTINA-CHILE: Agreement on Mediation | |
| Argentina and Chile have accepted formediation of the Beagle Channel dispute. Montevideo the Foreign Ministers of the signed an agreement to this effect under papal emissary Antonio Cardinal Samore. controversy could still ultimately lead force, Samore's recent shuttle diplomacy made some progress toward a peaceful sol 25X | Last night in two countries the auspices of Although the to the use of appears to have ution. |
| In exchange for the Vatican mediati extracted from the two countries a promi to force, to return to the military deplisted at the beginning of 1977, and to a provocative actions. Presumably these ptend throughout the mediation effort. | se not to resort oyment that ex- bstain from any |
| These agreements appear to represent concession on the part of the Argentines sisted on a division of the disputed islation condition for mediation. The lack of sure is at least a momentary political victor President Videla, who has argued vigoroutic solution over the strenuous objection military leaders. These officers will a mediation to ensure that Argentina's mar the disputed area are respected. If the will be held strictly accountable. | t a significant , who have in- ands as a pre- ch a precondition y for Argentine sly for a diploma- ns of hardline losely follow the itime claims in |
| On the Chilean side, the mediation merely a further opportunity for foot-drued Chilean intransigence would cause th fail and rekindle demands of Argentine hamilitary solution. | agging. Contin- e mediation to |

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| SPAIN: King's Speech to Military |
| King Juan Carlos, in a speech to the military on Saturday, appealed for discipline and solidarity in the face of terrorism. In unusually explicit language, he denounced the lack of discipline displayed by some officers after the funeral mass late last week for the slain military governor of Madrid. Although the speech has eased tensions within the military, more occasional outbursts are likely, and discipline problems could grow if Basque terrorists kill more high-ranking officers. |
| The King also praised Defense Minister General Gutierrez Mellado, who has become highly unpopular among the military for his role in bringing needed reforms to the armed forces. 25X1 |
| Spanish media have termed the speech necessary and appropriate, and the King's intervention has probably given pause to many in the military who are unhappy with the government. Despite the continuing danger terrorism poses to military discipline, most key command positions are held by moderate officers who remain loyal to the King and are fully aware of the problem. |
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| NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Border Incursion 25X1 | |
| а | |
| small military force from South Yemen supported by tanks and artillery pursued a group of dissidents into the 25% | x 1 |
| southeastern part of North Yemen late last week and oc- | \ I |
| the South Yemenis withdrew, apparently yesterday, | |
| after mining the area. Border incidents such as this are | |
| likely to occur sporadically as long as the two Yemens 25% continue their subversive activities against each other. | < 1 |
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| Officials in Sana apparently decided not to contest the incursion into this remote area, probably in part | |
| because of the weakness of their armed forces. They | |
| have appealed to Jordan's King Hussein in hopes that he can moderate South Yemen's stand through approaches | |
| to Syria and Libya, both friends of the Aden regime. | |
| Any such effort by Hussein, however, is likely to fail. 25X1 | |
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| The North Yemenis also asked Hussein to help speed military assistance from Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials | |
| are greatly concerned about the border incident and 25X1 | |
| have indicated to the US Ambassador that they think a joint US-Saudi response is needed to deal with the | |
| deteriorating situation between the two Yemens. | |
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| South Yemen reportedly still holds North Yemeni | |
| territory it seized in November while supporting dissi- | |
| dents against the North Yemeni Government. | |
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| PERU: General Strike Threat | |
| Several leftist labor groups, inclufiluential General Workers' Confederation a three-day general strike today. More are not participating, at least for now, limit the strike's effectiveness or fore poned. Any widespread work stoppages wo economic and political problems for the ment. | , plan to start moderate unions which could e it to be postuld pose major |
| The left is trying to capitalize on growing frustration over the worsening etion. Last week's official price hikes rice, and bus fares seem to have provide centive for calling a strike, which labowarned could be extended indefinitely unmands are met. Previous general strikes closed the city of Lima. | ffect of infla- on gasoline, d the final in- r leaders have less their de- |
| The government is taking a tough li or hamper the strike, but stern measures the military's timing in implementing it turn power to civilian hands by 1980, a that has been under way for some months. Peru's major political party, which back labor group, see a chance to come to pow ficers return to the barracks. Party le loss of popular support, however, if the stand up to the government on bread-and- | could affect s promise to re- delicate process Leaders of s the moderate er when the of- aders may fear y do not soon |
| Prolonged or widespread work stoppa the already precarious economic situation copper production—a key earner of forein The strike could also damage Peru's shake financial standing by forcing the governaway from its agreements with the Internation. | n by disrupting gn exchange. y international ment to back |

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| NICARAGUA: Anniversary Protests | |
| The Somoza government and its opposed for a confrontation during protest activitin commemoration of opposition martyr Chamurder last January touched off events the civil warfare in September. The most like will be a youth rally this afternoon and to Chamorro's gravesite tomorrow. The Nahas warned that the march will not be all the organizers obtain a permit, which the clined to do. Other protests probably with a general strike of one day or more and dincluding a possible march on the US Embasslum organizations. Sandinista guerrillamore hit-and-run attacks this week and mademonstrations to try to provoke the Guarant 25X1 | atties this week amorro, whose nat led to the cely flashpoints a massive march ational Guard lowed unless by seem disinulations, assy, by Managua as are planning by use the |
| EGYPT: Economic Dissatisfaction | 25X1 |
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| price increases had significantly broader economic dissatisfaction and might diminist chances of surviving a serious policy set a collapse of peace negotiations—or a doto his leadership. We believe that the apublic reaction against the price increase volved only a few nonessential items—incontinuing vulnerability and underscores | sh Sadat's backsuch as mestic challenge apparently strong seswhich in- licates Sadat's |

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trying to improve the economy through basic reforms.

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| NIGERIA: Political Trouble in K | ano |
| Nigerian police officials a cerned over the serious conflict Kano State, according to the US has included several clashes bet political parties and has led to Major political violence is most as electioneering intensifies an closer to a scheduled changeover October. Similar situations are elsewhere in Nigeria, testing th to keep order and its resolve to government. | developing in northern Embassy. The trouble ween two Muslim-based a number of arrests. likely to occur here d the country draws to civilian rule next likely to crop up e government's ability |
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| SPECIAL ANALYSIS | |
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| IRAN AND THE WORLD OIL MARKET | |
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| Despite continuing turmoil in Iran, to market picture has changed little since a duction by other producers is up, and stocient to meet world demand through the wides not resume exports by spring, however will tighten, and stockpilers will occupy tion. The most important development has be tial production increase in other OPEC comember states would have increased their the fourth quarter of 1978 in any case be seasonal demand and speculative purchases of the oil price hike on 1 January. The Iranian supplies has further stimulated of from other OPEC countries. | November. Pro- picks are suffi- inter. If Iran er, the market the key posi- 25X1 een a substan- puntries. Most oil exports in ecause of high s in anticipation reduction in |
| In the fourth quarter of 1978, Saudi its production by about 1 million barrels planned levels. During November and Dece produced 10 million barrels per day, near sustainable capacity. Because December we tively mild, the Saudis were able to main loading rates. | per day over mber, the Saudis their maximum reather was relation high tanker 25X1 |
| Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, and other OPEC increased production by another 500,000 b and are also producing at near capacity 1 OPEC production increased by only about 1 200,000 barrels per day, slightly less th pected. | arrels per day evels. Non- 00,000 to |
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| Iranian Production | 20/1 | 25 X ′ |
| Iran now is producing less than 300, oil daily, compared with a normal production to 6 million barrels. It has exporsince 27 December. | tion of 5.5 | |
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| oil facilities, output probably will not | | |
| lion barrels per day for at least six we | | |
| lieve that 3 million to 4 million barrels | | |
| be produced within two weeks. This leve | | |
| continued high output by other producers | | |
| world demand and maintain stocks at rease through the winter. | onable leve. | |
| through the winter. | | 25 X 1 |
| Restoration of oil production to near sustainable capacity—6 million to 6.5 m per day—could take up to a year and wou return of foreign workers, particularly drilling and oil well maintenance. The the non-Iranians to resume work will be security at the oilfields. The Iranian over, will have to decide the role of for personnel as well as the level of petrole essary to meet new Iranian political, escial goals. Such goals could well dictain the future. | illion barred depend on specialists willingness conditioned leadership, reign petroleum output nonomic, and te lower output to the lower output to | n the in of by more- leum nec- so- tput 25X |
| If Iranian exports are completely shifthe winter, the oil market will tighten suppliers producing at capacity. The galand demand will be about 2 million to 3 per day. Competition for available supp sify, spot shortages of some oil product and spot market prices will rise. | even with or p between so million barr lies will in | ther upply rels nten- |
| Current world inventories—equal to sumption—would nevertheless remain adeq overall demand. If production shortfall | uate to mee | t |

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the winter, oil companies will have a difficult time rebuilding inventories sufficient for next winter. (This discussion assumes that Saudi Arabia will continue producing at its present high level. We believe this to be a reasonable expectation through the winter but increasingly uncertain beyond that time because of Saudi concern over technical problems in the fields.)

A key question is whether holders of stocks would release them to cover production shortfalls. If stockholders hang on to their inventories, as happened after the 1973 embargo, consumption cutbacks will be necessary. Thus far, middlemen and consumers have accepted the curtailment of Iranian exports calmly, but their mood could change quickly if a prolonged supply disruption appeared likely.

Some oil-producing countries might try to push up their prices unilaterally if there is a prolonged Iranian shutdown and subsequent market tightness. Moreover, should spot market prices rise, these countries would be especially sensitive to any indication of profiteering by middlemen. If the OPEC countries became convinced that oil companies and brokers were making excessive profits by reselling oil, even if the volumes were small, the price hawks among them could be counted on to lobby for a further boost in official sales prices beyond those set last month.

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

Thailand-Kampuchea

Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak told US Ambassador Abramowitz yesterday that his government will not intervene in Kampuchea or supply arms for guerrilla activity by the ousted Pol Pot regime. Kriangsak, obviously deeply concerned, said he hopes the US will issue a statement of support for Thailand, and he particularly urged accelerated delivery of ammunition, mortars, and F-5E aircraft, as well as an expansion of credits for purchasing weapons from the US. Ambassador Abramowitz believes that the Thai will display their usual caution and that they are thus unlikely to become involved in supporting anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea.

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North Yemen - UK

According to the US Embassy in Sana, North Yemeni President Salih called in the UK Charge on Saturday and expressed an urgent need for two squadrons of Rapier or Jaguar aircraft and an unspecified number of tanks. Salih also asked for British military training and training in antisubversion techniques. He acknowledged that North Yemen may have some problems in securing Saudi financing for this assistance. Salih was vague in his references to South Yemen's activity in the border area (see Briefs and Comments section). The US Embassy believes that the increasing pressure by South Yemen is pushing Salih to look in all directions for immediate arms assistance.

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Kampuchea-China-UN

Former Kampuchean leader Prince Sihanouk left
Peking today and is expected to arrive late this afternoon in New York, where he will ask that the UN Security
Council consider the Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea.
There has been no indication of displeasure from the
Chinese or from Kampuchea's ousted leaders over Sihanouk's
remarks against the Pol Pot regime during his press conference yesterday. The US Mission at the UN reported
last night that the Chinese are having problems in their
efforts to lobby for support for their Kampuchean allies;
this is their first effort to convene a Security Council
meeting.

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| 요. ^ 이 아니라 사람들이 함께 하였다. 요. 한 하지만 나를 하였다. 중요 있다. | | | | | |
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