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Director of Central Intelligence

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Wednesday 24 January 1979

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
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	Т	op S	Secr	et			
							25X1
Contents							
Situation Reports							25X1
Iran		•		•	•	•	. 1
Briefs and Comments  Thailand: Indochina Relations .	• •	•	•	•	•	•	. 5
Israel-Lebanon: Cease-Fire Agreeme	ent		•	•	•		. 6
Morocco-Mauritania: Troop Withdra	val	•					. 7
Italy: Communists' Options		•	a	•	•	•	· 25X1
North Korea - South Korea:  Pyongyang's Proposal	• •	•	•	•	•	•	. 9
Peru: Relations with Neighbors .		•	•	•	•	•	.11
Hungary-USSR: No Raw Material Agre	гет	en:	t.	•		•	.12
UN: Committee on Disarmament		•	•	•	•		.13
Scandinavia-Vietnam: Freeze on New Special Analysis	<i>ο</i> Α	id		•	•	•	.13
NATO: Reactions to Guadeloupe				•			.14
Overnight Reports	• •	•	•	•	•	•	.17
<sub>i</sub> 25X1	T	op S	becr.	et			25X1

		<b>∠</b> 5 <b>X</b> I
	Top Secret	
	SITUATION REPORTS	
	IRAN	
	Military and police forces closed Tehran's in tional airport late last night Washington time, and lice officials indicated that the airport would reshut until Sunday. There was no immediate official firmation that the closing was intended to prevent planned return of Ayatollah Khomeini on Friday. It is likely to widen further the differences between Minister Bakhtiar's government and the military on one hand and the opposition on the other.	nd po- emain al con- t the The move n Prime n the
	No other military actions were reported in the Tehran area, and it is not certain whether the section of the section of the Tehran domestic radio service stopp broadcasting early this morning.	curity er
	Bakhtiar was planning steps to seize the init from the opposition before Khomeini's intended ret Progovernment demonstrations were being organized Tehran and other cities; they could lead to more sbattles with antigovernment forces.	urn. in
25X1		
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20/(1	moderate religion leader Ayatollah Shariatmaderi believes he has Kho agreement to consult with other Islamic leaders be he announces the formation of his Islamic Revolution Councilan announcement that would provoke the mi	omeini's efore onary
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	cont	inued
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		Top Secret	25 <b>X</b> 1
	The Shah's Activities		25X1
25X1	The Shah evidently is moving to in the Iranian situation.	take a stronger	role
25X1	the Shah will return to Eg he can use it as a staging point.  The Shah undoubtedly is in touch tary and SAVAK officials in Iran and of the coup plotting under way. He p if Prime Minister Bakhtiar's governme with Khomeini, the military will invi turn to restore order. If the Shah e tary to seize power on his behalf, the line officers will mount a coup would increased.	with senior miprobably is awarobably hopes to the state of the state o	25X1 li- lie lhat deal re- lii- hard-
	Many Iranians would blame the US the Shah to return or for a military behalf.  Sadat views the Shah as a close may hope that from Cairo the Shah will ence events in Iran during the coming return to Egypt, however, could gener political and religious extremists.	takeover on his personal friend l be able to in months. The S	25X1 and aflu-
	During the Shah's recent stay in distributed leaflets denouncing him as Last month, a series of minor demonsts were mounted by followers of the constructions are stated by a leading government-appointment.	s a tool of the rations reporte ervative Muslim ions of support inted religious	cCIA. dly for
	The US could also be the target of ated by the Shah's presence. Ambassad that, as the situation in Iran has defined has been a marked increase in suspicion toward the US on the part of orthodox who apparently believe the US is host:    CIA Late Item-	dor Eilts repor teriorated, the on and animosit Egyptian Musli	ts re Y ms
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	BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
	THAILAND: Indochina Relations  Thai leaders, reluctant to antagonize either China or Vietnam, are maintaining a neutral position on the
	conflict in Kampuchea. Because of the unexpected scale and speed of the Vietnamese invasion, Thailand initially seemed prepared to accept Vietnam's takeover as an accomplished fact. There are tentative signs, however, 25X1 that Thailand may develop a more cooperative attitude toward Pol Pot's resistance movement.
25X1	Thai leaders have shown little enthusiasm for Chi-25X nese suggestions that Pol Pot's forces could be resupplied through Thailand.
	Small arms, ammunition, and other items required by the Kampuchean resistance could easily be transported covertly across the Thai border. 25X1 25X1
	Thailand, although critical of Vietnam's actions, is unlikely to lock itself into an openly anti-Vietnamese stance. Thailand recently signed a previously negotiated shipping agreement with Vietnam to demonstrate its desire to continue developing bilateral relations.
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Cease-Fire Agreement

Ambassador Lewis last night reported from Tel Aviv that Israel and the PLO have agreed to halt the five-day old artillery and rocket exchanges along the Israeli-Lebanese border. If a cease-fire is maintained, it could bring at least a temporary end to the worst period of shelling, terrorist incidents, and other military ac-25X1 tions in the troubled region since the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon last spring.


Lebanese Prime Minister Huss told Ambassador Dean in Beirut late last night that PLO leader Arafat had ordered Palestinian forces to stop firing. Huss asked that the US pass word of the cease-fire order to the Israelis. Israeli Defense Minister Weizman, who agreed to arrange the cease-fire to become effective as of 2300 EST last night, said he noted that the situation along the border had been quiet since late yesterday afternoon.

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A cease-fire may require some time to take hold. Arafat apparently told Huss that, while he had issued the command, word had not yet filtered down to all Palestinian units. It is possible that some Palestinians will not comply.

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MOROCCO-MAURITANIA: Troop Withdrawal	
Moroccan King Hassan is beginning to withdraw the nilitary forces he sent to Mauritania in 1977 to help	
fight Algerian-backed Polisario Front guerrillas. The	
withdrawal is likely to proceed cautiously, allowing	
Hassan time to assess the attitude of the post-Boumedien	ıe
regime in Algiers and that of the guerrillas toward ne- gotiating a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict.	
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Three basic considerations now make a negotiated settlement more attractive to Hassan: the apparent de-	
cision by Mauritania's military leaders to abandon the	
struggle against the Polisario; the death of Boumediene,	,
who made the Polisario cause a matter of personal	
prestige; and the evaporation of popular enthusiasm in Morocco for a military solution.	1
2000	
Hassan seems to recognize that keeping Moroccan	
forces in Mauritania in the face of the Mauritanian Government's requests for their departure would only	
further damage relations. He may also now believe that	
the political costs of using Moroccan forces to block	
a formal unilateral peace between Mauritania and the guerrillas would be prohibitive. 25X1	ı
guerrillas would be prohibitive. 25X1	
The de facto truce between Mauritania and the	
Polisario, moreover, has largely eliminated the need for Moroccan troops to protect Mauritanian rail lines and	:
industrial sites. As a result, Hassan's military	
commanders may have urged disengagement in Mauritania	
in order to free additional Moroccan forces for service in the Moroccan-controlled sector of Western Sahara,	
where the querrillas remain very active.	
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Moroccan forces were sent to Mauritania under	
agreements concluded with the Mauritanian civilian regiments that was ousted last July. There are now 8,000 to 9,000	
Moroccan soldiers in Mauritania and in the Mauritanian-	
claimed part of Western Sahara. 25X1	
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ITALY: Communists' Options

Communist chief Berlinguer's advisers are urging him to ask by tomorrow for a summit meeting of the five parties comprising the Andreotti government's parliamentary majority. Berlinguer would apparently use the meeting to set the stage for Communist withdrawal from the majority--and blame the Christian Democrats for failing to live up to the five-party parliamentary accord.

Berlinguer is still reluctant to bring down the government and force an early parliamentary election, both likely results of the Communists' withdrawal. Other Communist leaders, however, consider the current situation intolerable, primarily because the government ignored their recommendations concerning several major policy decisions. Berlinguer's tough line apparently is designed in part to mollify rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the leadership's support of the government prior to the party congress slated for March.

Berlinguer's supporters have recommended that he launch an attack soon against Christian Democratic conduct in government, thus preparing the ground for Communist withdrawal. Some of his advisers want to avoid having the break occur in connection with the parliamentary debate beginning on Monday over the government's economic plan. They fear this would enable the Christian Democrats to accuse the Communists of ignoring Italy's most pressing problems.

For its part, the leadership of the Christian Democrats has reaffirmed its commitment to the current governing arrangement and its willingness to discuss differences with the other parties. The Christian Democrats, however, insist that these discussions focus on the government's economic plan rather than the makeup of the government.

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NORTH KOREA - SOUTH KOREA: Pyongyang's Proposal  As a counteroffer to South Korean President Pak's recent call for North-South talks, North Korea yesterda proposed a meeting of representatives of all political parties and mass organizations of the two Koreas. The North Korean proposal seems designed to convey a sense of flexibility, and it presents problems for the South A period of heightened tactical maneuvering by the two sides seems in prospect.  North Korea proposes that both sides begin a serie of actions to ease tension and that preliminary talks start in June to prepare for a meeting in early Septemb in Pyongyang or Seoul of various political groups. The North Koreans specifically invited Pak but as president of the Democratic Republican Party rather than as head of state.  North Korea may have calculated that resumption of a dialogue might accelerate US troop withdrawals, limit the amount of US compensatory military assistance to South Korea, and perhaps lay the groundwork for eventua contacts with the US. The North probably feels some need to counter recent publicity in the US over the sizable increases in estimates of its order of battle. It may also see its proposal as a means of keeping the initiative on the Korea question during Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's (Teng Hsiao-ping's) coming visit to the US.  North Korea's latest proposal presents difficultie for the Pak government, which may well believe that North Korea's plan is designed to undercut the legitimacy of the South Korean Government. South Korea, none theless, probably feels under considerable pressure now to avoid a premature negative reaction. If so, a periof heightened tactical maneuvering seems likely by both sides while they consider ways of addressing the issues that divide them.				25X1
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	for the Pak North Korea macy of the theless, pro to avoid a p of heightenesides while	government, which so plan is designed to be solved to be	ch may well yned to under overnment. Some considerative reaction.	believe that cut the legiti- outh Korea, none ble pressure now If so, a perio s likely by both
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PERU: Relations with Neighbors	
Peru's expulsion of the Chilean Ambastrong protest over Ecuador's alleged mala group of Peruvians are demonstrations of ening stance toward its southern and nort If continued, this new truculence, which from the growing assertiveness and influe line officers, could lead to increased te Andean nations, especially because this y the centennial of Peru's military defeat war of the Pacific.	treatment of f Lima's hard-hern neighbors. stems largely nce of hard-nsion among the ear will mark
The Peruvians on Saturday declared to envoy persona non grata to protest acts of committed by Chilean diplomats and naval last year. On the same day, the government airman convicted of helping the information.	of espionage personnel late ant executed a
Peruvian Army General Richter, who degovernment's forceful handling of a recenstrike attempt, led the push for firm act to become Peru's prime minister on 1 Februndoubtedly be determined to project an iness at home and abroad. He is supported of officers who think President Morales Efrequently been indecisive.	t general ion. Scheduled uary, he will mage of tough- by a number
Peru's responses are out of proporti level of the espionage incidents, and Chitaken the expulsion calmly. The Chileans acknowledged the spying charges, but they a much milder rebuke.	le has so far had tacitly
Peru has also lashed out at the Ecua had earlier arrested some seven Peruvians on charges of espionage. Peru charges th eans tortured the prisoners to extract mi mation, and in its formal protest has dem planation.	, apparently at the Ecuador- litary infor-
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HUNGARY-USSR: No Raw Material Agreement	
Hungary has been unable to persuade the increase raw material shipments to Hungary 85 plan period or to provide Hungary with a loan, presumably to finance increased purch USSR.	for the 1981- a \$1-billion
The USSR has offered to continue delive materials at the 1980 level and was noncommaloan. The Soviets, moreover, want to stop portion of their agricultural imports from hard currency and substitute transferable range in 1981. The USSR also has insisted to invest more in developing Soviet natural results.	nital about a paying for a Hungary in 25X1 rubles, begin-
Hungary, already heavily burdened by poil from the Middle East, will have added a problems if it cannot increase its purchase terials from the Soviet Union. Hungarian of port that a stagnation in deliveries of raw will hurt the next five-year plan, when the growth is expected to be only 3 to 3.5 perowith an average of over 5 percent in the 19 period. Other East European countries also ing to arrange such agreements with the Sov far have been unsuccessful.	nard currency es of raw ma- officials re- officials re- officials e rate of cent compared 076-80 plan officials re- officials re
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UN: Committee on Disarmament

The UN Committee on Disarmament convenes today in Geneva for its first session since being renamed, reorganized, and expanded to 40 members. Algeria will be the first to serve as the Committee's chairman, a rotating position that has replaced the permanent US-USSR France, represented by Foreign Minister cochairmanship. Francois-Poncet, will participate for the first time since 1960. China will not be represented but has reserved the right to take its seat. There are indications that the USSR and its allies might challenge this arrangement; the "Group of 21" developing countries and the Committee's Western members apparently will support China's request. A limit on the use of chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be the main topics of discussion. 25X1

#### SCANDINAVIA-VIETNAM: Freeze on New Aid

Scandinavian countries, which in earlier years supported the Hanoi regime, probably will complete projects now under way in Vietnam, but will delay future economic aid until Vietnam withdraws from Kampuchea. Parliamentary debates are scheduled this week in Sweden and Norway where public anti-Vietnam sentiment has been growing. Swedish Prime Minister Ullsten said the pace of Vietnam's withdrawal will influence decisions on future Swedish aid. A Norwegian Foreign Ministry official said Norway will consider halting current projects if Vietnamese forces threaten to cross the Thai border. The Danish Government also has decided to freeze additional aid to Vietnam, including \$30 million that had already been budgeted for that purpose.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS	
NATO: Reactions to Guadeloupe	25X1
The concern and suspicion being vogovernments that were excluded from the mit was intense last week. Some represente health of the Alliance's consultatives tension within reasonable bounds trustis at stake.	e Guadeloupe sum- sentatives said ive processwhich
The concerns of the excluded member by what they considered to be an inadequate the summit at the meeting of the North on 9 January. The meeting last week of participants to talk about aid to Turke begun at Guadeloupealso served to heims the criticism was directed at all four that participated in the summitthe US and West Germany.	quate briefing on Atlantic Council the Guadeloupe eya discussion of the states
Canada's Permanent Representative session on 16 January by observing that tion process had been in a state of dec Guadeloupe summit, but that Guadeloupe worse. NATO Secretary General Luns was said NATO consultations had "failed" in and went on to point to the increasing stricted multilateral consultations as failure.	NATO's consulta- cline prior to the had made matters s more direct: he recent months number of re-
Luns also noted that developments Iran had been ignored in NATO forums an cern over the lack of consultation abou situation in Spain. Luns warned that u ance was more than a technical defense support would decline.	nd expressed con- nt the present nnless the alli-
	continued
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The smaller NATO members always have guarded their right to play a full role is strongly objected to any attempts by their ners to establish distinct and exclusional ships. In large part, this is because Alship provides the smaller states with more security from aggression.	n NATO and larger party relation liance member than physic	rt- - er-
Membership also gives them a sense of security, an opportunity to make their viola chance to play a larger role in world as Guadeloupe summit has revived and heighter that the Alliance might become a two-tier which their influence would be diminished when issues that directly affect them are fore.	ews known, a ffairs. The ned their for system in at a time coming to	and e ears
The divisions within NATO between the the small members could have an impact with pean Community. In the weeks ahead, the tricipants at Guadeloupe will find it necessince the other members of the EC that the account of their partners' interests as we own.	thin the Eur European par ssary to cor ey have take	r- n- en
Canada places special importance on sultative process, and the Canadian reprethe lead at the NATO meeting last week in the NATO "big four." He explained that be is not a member of the EC, "NATO is the set to Canada for this type of consultation."	sentative to criticizino ecause Canad	ook J la
The Canadians fear that the decline of consultative process could leave them isolathe Alliance. There may also be domestic the strong Canadian stand. The Canadian preted the timing of the announcement of meeting-on the eve of Prime Minister Tructo Parisas a snub by France.	lated within reasons for press inter- the Guadelow	r - upe
	contin	her.
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Although the Italians were relatively quiet at last week's NATO discussions, Italy is more sensitive to questions of "presence" and "consultation" than other members of the Alliance. As the largest of the small powers, moreover, Italy expects to be included in the councils of the larger powers. Its exclusion from Guadeloupe, coming just as the government was seeking to develop public support for joining the European Monetary System, is likely to figure in any future domestic disputes over EC and NATO issues.

The decision to give the nonparticipants a second, more detailed briefing on Guadeloupe smoothed some of the ruffled feathers, but the smaller allies will be particularly vigilant in future instances in which they believe they are being ignored. Some concede that there are times when the four major NATO members need to meet alone, but they all insist that the smaller countries must be kept fully informed about what occurs. This is particularly the case where the interests of all NATO members are involved, as they were in many of the issues talked about at Guadeloupe and as they were in the discussions of aid to Turkey.

Current procedures for consulting with NATO--on the SALT negotiations, for example--will be strained as East-West negotiations on "Gray Area Systems" (primarily theater nuclear forces) approach. The rotational procedures in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, where such measures are discussed, could become a source of controversy as some members of the Alliance become concerned that crucial decisions will be made without them.

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	OVERNIGHT REPORTS	
	(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)	
	Iran	
	The Tehran domestic radio service resumed broadding its usual programs this morning (see Situation Report).	cast-
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	Saudi Arabia	25X1
25X1	The King is expected to remain at his desert hunting camp until the mid-February visit of Queen 2 Elizabeth II to Saudi Arabia.	5X1
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### China

Chinese dissidents report that authorities have ordered a crackdown--including imprisonment--on human rights groups and on unofficial contacts with foreigners. A Chinese source has also reported the arrest of at least one leader of the recent peasant march on the Chinese leaders' compound. According to a press report, a diplomat in Beijing (Peking) has speculated that the drive may be aimed at embarrassing Vice Premier Deng just before he visits the US. 25X1

#### USSR

Press sources--citing official Soviet accounts-report that the Soviet Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan are experiencing serious economic problems because of the interruption of natural gas deliveries from Iran. Soviet officials and newspapers have reported that industries and power and heating stations have switched from gas to heavy fuel oil in the cities of Baku and Other unconfirmed reports suggest a similar Yerevan. fuel emergency in Soviet Georgia. Until last October, the Soviets had been importing about 350 billion cubic feet of natural gas a year from Iran at a cost of \$1 million a day. 25X1

## Poland-France

The US Embassy in Warsaw reports that Poland has requested a credit from France to purchase an additional 400,000 tons of wheat worth about \$50 million. According to a member of the French Embassy, France will grant the credit. The total amount of credits Poland will receive from France this year is expected to reach \$150 million. 25X1

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