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Extracts from "History of German Armament Inspectorate A (Paris and Northwest France)" Part II, 1 October 1940 - 31 December 1941.

Since June 1941, the Inspectorate has included the districts: Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne (these three comprise Greater Paris), Ardennes, Aisne, Somme, Oise (these four first administered from Laon, later from Amiens, and including 24,843 sq km), Eure, Orne, Seine-Inférieure, Calvados, Manche (these five administered from Rouen, and comprising 18,247 sq km), Eure-et-Loire, Cher, part of Liret, part of Loir-et-Cher (these four administered from Orleans and embracing 23,774 sq km).

In December 1941, orders to French firms in this area amounted to:

German Army	413,300,000 Reichsmarks
German Navy	183,400,000 "
German Air Force	371,900,000 " "
German Administration	41,300,000 "
German Private Firms	<u>707,900,000 "</u>
Total	1,717,800,000 Reichsmarks

This does not include orders to powder and explosives plants which were given out by the Wi Rue Stab (Economic Armament Staff).

Orders from German firms covered mainly: fine-mechanical turning, milling, drilling, and gear cutting work; automatic and turret work; tin and welding work; manufacture of forged and cast parts; processing of measures and simple machine parts.

As production increased, shortages of raw material and production material developed. Coal was a constant bottleneck. The Inspectorate instituted detailed controls in order to regulate scarce materials. Power supply, in particular, required urgent measures. The demand for electricity and gas increased not only through increased production at the plants, but also through the necessitated change from heavy fuel oil to ersatz fuels, such as gas. For example, in October 1941, the demand for power exceeded the December 1940 demand by 8,000,000 cubic meters of gas and 5,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity.

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Until October 1941, the gas supply corresponded roughly with the demand. In November and December 1941, the October rate of gas supply was cut by 10 percent, necessitating a curtailment of French civilian defense production in favor of the ordered armament program. In December 1941, power from hydroelectrical plants decreased due to lack of water. Power plants had only a 4-day supply of coal. In order to prevent a further decrease and to ensure a January supply, a "production vacation" was ordered from 21 December 1941 to 4 January 1942, i.e., only such work was to be done which did not require use of power. Only exceptions were coal mines and very few other public interest enterprises and armament centers.

If production until the end of 1941 did not quite meet expectations, the reasons are manifold:

1. After a short period of abundance in which materials were used without restrictions, a shortage of raw materials and production means set in which required changes and imports from the Reich, requiring additional rolling stock and delaying delivery dates.
2. Production conditions in France are less favorable than in Germany. French industry is less streamlined, less concentrated, less planned, and less equipped for mass-production than the German.
3. Indiscriminate removal of goods in short supply, particularly raw materials, of machine and other tools to Germany immediately after the truce weakened the productive capacity of the French industry. Sometimes machinery and raw materials had to be returned or reordered with long delivery dates.
4. Unfavorable living conditions decreased the productive capacity of the French workers. But despite inadequate food supply and enemy propaganda through radio, pamphlets, and whisper campaigns, their capacity is still satisfactory.

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Foreign orders for war material placed with the French armament industry were treated according to the political situation and the interest of the Reich in their fulfillment. Production and export of all Rumanian orders was approved. War material in production for Greece and Yugoslavia including advance payments on it by these countries was confiscated as war booty. A small armament quota was conceded to Finland and Sweden. Italian orders for optical equipment were turned down because the industry was fully occupied with German orders.

LABOR in Armament Enterprises

The enterprises administered by the Inspectorate included

on 1 Oct 40	about 65,000 men
on 1 Jan 41	about 83,250 men
on 1 Apr 41	about 171,710 men
on 1 Jun 41	about 203,700 men (district enlarged)
on 1 Oct 41	about 273,000 men
on 1 Dec 41	about 266,900 men

The hiring of French workers for Germany was hindered during the report period by the negative attitude of labor, passive resistance of management and the French authorities, and especially through enemy propaganda. In the beginning, certain organizational shortcomings contributed too, such as difficulties in transmittal of money, mail, etc. At first only unemployed could be hired, but during the second half of 1941, the hiring of employed workers increased steadily. This was caused mainly through the favorable reports of returning and vacationing French workers. From the area of the Inspectorate about 72,000 workers had accepted work in Germany toward the end of 1941, as compared with about 21,000 toward the end of 1940.

Toward the end of 1941, the administered enterprises occasionally suffered from a shortage of skilled labor, caused by ever-increasing relocations of plants from Germany. The OKW requested increased production with additional skilled labor and simultaneously an increase in the hiring

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of labor for Germany was requested. These requests were hard to reconcile. Increased production was limited by the fact that second shifts could not be organized due to lack of skilled labor. That brought up the question of retraining.

During 1941, the higher wages paid by the Organisation Todt and at German construction sites caused a labor shortage on the domestic French labor market.

The problem of French workers' wages has become more pressing in view of rising living costs. Wage increases ordered by the French government did not nearly keep pace with the increasing inflation.

One of the best and decisive safeguards of the German armament potential in France in view of the decreasing food supply was the establishment of plant kitchens in the armament plants. Delivery of additional food (meat, fat, vegetables, potatoes) depended on the organization of kitchens by the plants. A special incentive for the establishment of such kitchens was the fact that the Military Commander of France made available to these kitchens large quantities of captured food such as legumes, rice, coffee, chocolate, canned milk, etc. Until about the middle of 1941, supply of these plant kitchens with additional food was entirely adequate, almost lavish. On 30 June 1941, there existed 116 kitchens providing meals for about 62,500 out of a total of 91,000 workers. The increasing food shortage, at first met by new regulations, finally called for participation of the workers through contribution of their meat and fat rations. After incipient difficulties, the number of participants in plant kitchen feedings increased further. At the end of 1941, the area of the Inspectorate included 265 plant kitchens which took care of 124,000 workers out of 169,000.

COAL was at first plentiful, but as the winter of 1940 to 1941 was long and severe, the demand for coal increased as the French company began to operate again, and coal mining remained far behind prewar production.

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Thus a coal shortage began to be felt during the first months of 1941. Coal rationing was introduced. The coal allocation for the Inspectorate for April 1941 amounted to 42,000 tons, for August 1941 only 33,200 tons, despite the fact that the area of the Inspectorate had meanwhile increased. Toward the end of 1941, the coal shortage became a real emergency and for the last ten days of December a "production vacation" had to be ordered.

Heavy fuel oil (mazut) began to get scarce toward the end of 1940. In the spring of 1941, about 75 percent of all mazut-consuming enterprises, including all large enterprises, constituting a total of 95 percent of the monthly mazut demand, were ordered to change to other fuels. In August 1941 this change had, in general, been completed.

RAW MATERIAL shortages developed quickly. Since January 1941, the removal of raw material was regulated. But in September, at which time complaints about metal removal were passed on to the Wi Rue Stab, complaints still kept coming in.

Since September 1941, rather large quantities of steel from Germany had been arriving.

In October 1941, iron and cement became very scarce. Allocations for expansion construction were restricted to urgent cases. A great many planned projects had to be abandoned.

During the last quarter of 1941, shortages developed in new fields such as paper, and even the procurement of bicycles and bicycle tires for workers.

Since November 1941, difficulties had increased in the procurement of chemicals. New regulations for chemicals and paints were issued toward the end of November.

The raw material shortage, which increased heavily toward the middle of the year, attracted numerous offers from the black market. These prices, however, were much too high for armament calculations. Some of these offers could not be taken seriously anyhow. Strong measures by the Military Commander against the black market caused the cessation of such offers.

TRANSPORTATION functioned well. Car space was always adequate.

Transported to Germany were:

1 Oct 1940 - 31 Dec 1940	461 carloads of machine tools, motors, etc.
	647 carloads of raw materials (6,633 tons)
	10 trucks of machine tools
	13 trucks of raw materials (95 tons)
1 Jan 1941 - 31 Dec 1941	6,215 carloads (66,931 tons)
	545 trucks (3,444 tons)

The anti-German attitude of the French civilian population stiffened due to increasing propaganda, mainly by the Communist Party, the de-Gaulle movement, and English radio broadcasts. Defensive measures were expanded and loopholes eliminated, such as guards being recalled by troop units without the Inspectorate being notified, thus giving Frenchmen access to guarded objects, lack of identification control, etc.

Comparison of the area of the Inspectorate with others in occupied

France:	<u>Number of Administered Enterprises</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Inspectorate A</u>	<u>564</u>	<u>61.6</u>
" B	187	20.3
" C	<u>166</u>	<u>18.0</u>
Total	917	100.0

	<u>Orders in Million Reichsmarks</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Inspectorate A</u>	<u>1,702.4</u>	<u>72.3</u>
" B	519.7	22.1
" C	<u>132.4</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total	2,354.5	100.0

	<u>Labor Force of Administered Enterprises</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Inspectorate A</u>	<u>252,987</u>	<u>68.4</u>
" B	62,073	16.8
" C	<u>54,662</u>	<u>14.8</u>
Total	369,722	100.0

	<u>Number of Work-Hours (Nov 1941)</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Inspectorate A</u>	<u>9,865</u>	<u>66.7</u>
" B	2,500	17.1
" C	<u>2,405</u>	<u>16.2</u>
Total	14,770	100.0

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