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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

Political

1. Q. What is the proportion of convinced supporters of the Communist regime among government employees of your own rank and profession known to you?

A. I think that only about five of the approximately 1,000 scientist-professors teaching at the five polytechnic institutes in Poland might be convinced supporters of Communism. It is possible that even these five men are not really convinced but merely maintain the appearance because they find it expedient under the present circumstances. I might add that all of these scientist-professors are over 30 years of age.

Only about one-half of one per cent of all engineers who are over 30 years of age can be classed as convinced supporters of Communism.

The percentage of convinced Communists mentioned above does not include Jews. I am of the opinion that most of the Jews are supporters of the Communist system but I am not certain whether they are convinced supporters. Being very clever and extremely shrewd, they manage to align themselves on the winning side.

It is difficult to appraise the feelings and attitudes of the Polish youth towards Communism. It is possible that the percentage of convinced Communists among those under 30 years of age may reach even 10%.

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2. Q. Among these, what were the motives leading them to Communism?

A. It is not an easy matter to determine their motives. One plausible explanation may be the fact that they are idealists. It is definitely not their love for Russia that has inspired them.

The convinced Communists can be divided into two classes:

- a. The innocuous idealist who tolerates non-Communists and is not a denouncer.
- b. The rabid, harmful Communist who reports everything he hears.

3. Q. How do non-Communist technicians and others in state employ, known to you, philosophize regarding their own future and the future of Poland?

A. They are all waiting for a war. If that group and others like them did not entertain any hope of liberation - and war seems to them to be the only solution - and if they were convinced that this intolerable Soviet and Communist system was to be permanent, half of them would try to escape and the other half would commit suicide.

They are hoping for war even though they realize its horrible aspects. This hope must be fanned and maintained; otherwise, unspeakable despair will follow.

4. Q. Do your friends and acquaintances have definite views regarding the United States policy in Germany as affecting the possibility of future Polish liberation?

A. All of Germany is in a very fortunate position at present. Even East Germany, although loser in the war, is much better off than Poland. West Germany is faring unusually well.

Russia will never agree to a united, non-Communist Germany.

None of my friends ever considered the United States policy in Germany as having any effect on the possibility of future Polish liberation. This point was viewed as a separate factor. All my friends realize that the United States was forced into aiding West Germany in view of Soviet intransigency. The United States had no alternative.

The Poles would not like to see Germany built up as a separate, independent military power, one which would again pose a threat to Poland. However, they feel that if she is incorporated into the EDC, her sphere of authority would be relatively limited and, naturally, she would be less dangerous to Poland.

5. Q. What proportion of former PPS's (Polish Socialist Party) do you believe are still employed in the government service, and what proportion of these remain anti-Communist?

A. I am not prepared to answer this question. My impression is that in Poland where almost everyone is employed in government service, the former PPS members are relegated to relatively unimportant, menial tasks.

6. Q. What types of people are these former PPS members? What is their social background?

A. I cannot answer that.

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7. Q. How do non-Communists in the state employ identify one another, and by what means, if any, do they share their views with one another without incurring police detection?

A. The non-Communists usually know one another. Vigilance, keen observation, and many years of experience under a police system have developed a sixth sense in them. Certain remarks passed on occasion also serve as clues. For instance, it is generally accepted that a host invites to his small social gatherings only those people whom he trusts, that is, those in whose company all the other guests would feel free to discuss even delicate political matters. In introducing a newly-arrived guest, the host would say: "He is one of us." This would mean that the guest was a non-Communist or, if a Communist, could still be trusted.

Early in 1953, my wife and I attended a small social gathering in Warsaw. Present at that party was a Soviet civilian who once received the "Hero of the Soviet Union" award. Despite the fact that he was a Party member and even received that award, he proved to be quite anti-Communist.

It was relatively simple to check on new employees. Usually they came from other factories or institutions where they were known. Also, when a new employee was hired, trusted men in my factory would attach themselves to him, and by one means or another they were able to determine whether or not he was "one of us".

8. Q. What is the social background of new Communist personnel being brought into technical professions and services to replace non-Communists such as you?

A. The head directors are usually men selected from the ranks. They have no engineering training but are ordinary manual workers who are rabid Communists. They are the titular heads of factories.

The technical directors were also chosen from the ranks. Uneducated and lacking engineering training, these technical directors were less qualified for their positions than were the head directors for theirs. The head directors were mere overseers of the factory whereas the technical directors were supposed to be very conversant with engineering techniques. The consequences of manning the posts of technical directors with unqualified men were reflected in the output; production results were poor.

In order to improve operations in the factories and thereby increase production without, however, offending the Communist plant officials, especially the Communist technical directors, the government changed the title of technical director to that of chief engineer. This change meant that the holder of that position had to be a graduate engineer. These positions are filled by pre war-trained engineers like me, by people who, as a rule, are non-Communist.

Eventually these pre war-trained engineers will be replaced by the new crop of young men who are now being trained; but the government will still have to rely on the old, experienced engineers for quite some time.

The post war engineering graduates stem from various social backgrounds. I do not think that the social background of an engineer plays any important part and can be used as an index.

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Economic

9. Q. What are the hiring procedures, wage scales, and the cost of living in Poland? Give specific examples identifying industry, city, etc., relevant to the information.

A. Every job applicant, whether white-collar worker or manual worker and whether seeking employment in a government or in a private enterprise, must first apply at the State Employment Office. After he has been registered at the Employment Office, he is not allowed to choose his employer, even if he had previously received a promise of employment from a given employer. The Employment Office assigns the job applicant as it sees fit; the prospective employee has absolutely no choice in the matter.

Naturally, some state firms have priority; when certain technicians or skilled workers who are needed by these firms apply at the Employment Office, those applicants are sent to those priority-holding firms without any further ado. Among those firms are: Radio Factory T-3 in Warsaw, the Passenger Car Factory in Zeran, the Swierczewski Mechanical Factory in Warsaw, and two or three others. The smaller, though still important, firms like the one in which I worked, must apply at the PKPG for a special consignment of people for designated periods of employment (one year or so); this PKPG-approved application is then submitted to the employment office. Even then it is not possible to hire anyone of your own choice; only by operating through acquaintances at the Employment Office can you be fairly certain that the person you selected for employment and sent to the employment office will be assigned to your firm. Quite often a firm has to resort to ruses and tricks; for example, I might want to hire a mechanic who I know is highly qualified but whom the employment office normally would not assign to me. The applicant and I would concoct a non-existent job title, such as specialist in electro-heating guards or covers (osłona elektro-grzejna); the applicant then goes to the employment office with the appropriate request. Because no other firm but mine needs that type of specialist, this applicant is assigned to me without any difficulty.

Frequently the "specialist" titles are illogical, nonsensical, and "pulled out of the thin air" ("wyssane z palca"), but the knowledge of the officials at the Employment Office is not on a level which would enable them to detect falseness and trickery.

After an applicant is assigned to a given firm by the Employment Office, he then must submit to the personnel chief of that firm his application, biographic data, certificates from former places of employment or from school, and two photographs. He must also fill out an eight-page questionnaire in which he describes in detail the life of his parents, relations by blood and by marriage, children, etc. The personnel chief, after first checking on the applicant with his former place of employment and determining his political outlook, submits all the documents to the management of the firm.

Following a check and approval by the director, the applicant is hired on a probationary basis. The probationary period for a white-collar worker is three months. During this period either side can dissolve the work contract after a two-week notice. The probationary period for a manual worker is two weeks; during this period either side can dissolve the work contract at any time, without rendering any notice of dissolution.

The periods of notice of dissolution remain the same even after the completion of the probationary periods.

Besides this system, there is the system of contracts involving specified periods of employment; this system, however, is for seasonal workers only.

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Wage Scales

10. One of the most complicated questions in Poland is that of wage scales. There are many systems and types of scales; they are constantly undergoing changes and amendments. Almost every ministry has its own wage scale. It often happens that one institution has a different wage scale for similar or related positions (for instance, office workers in the bookkeeping and the correspondence sections).

Recently, a new and amended sixteen-group wage scale was introduced for white-collar workers in industry. This scale is again divided into three categories, depending upon the type of enterprise; the first category comprises the largest and most important enterprises. The less important ones fall into the second and third categories.

11. The highest salaries - a top of 1,700 zloty - are found in the sixteenth group. In addition to these salaries there are bonuses ranging up to 100% of base pay in the event of 100% fulfillment of a plan. For every percentage of fulfillment over 100% the bonus increases at the rate of 10% for every one per cent fulfillment over 100%. However, the bonus cannot exceed 150%, a figure representing 105% fulfillment of the plan. Therefore, one rarely reads or hears of a plan being fulfilled over 105%.

For failure to complete the plan there is a 10% cut in bonus for every unit of percentage under 100%.

12. The sixteenth wage group mentioned above and the 100% bonus apply only to chief directors. The directors on a lower level and those in the second and third-category factories receive a lower base pay but are still entitled to the 100% bonus. Section chiefs, foremen, and others in positions of similar rank are placed in a lower wage group and receive a maximum of 75% bonus. Lesser officials, comprising still another wage group, receive only 60% bonus. The lowest group, that is, group one, receives it seems to me, a maximum bonus of 200 zloty. Because there is no limitation to cutting the bonus in case of non-fulfillment of a plan, very often the employees receive nothing more than their base pay.
13. The officials and employees in the upper brackets pay a relatively high tax on their salaries. Computation of the amount of tax to be deducted is a very complicated matter because it involves a series of long tables, set up to take into account the civil status of the employee, the number of children he has, and the amount of pay he receives. For this reason special booklets are issued which contain tables facilitating the computation of tax deductions.

This tax deduction scale is used only by industry; besides this system, there is an endless number of wage rate systems and tax scales in other spheres of employment. There is a special one for contract work.

14. I would like to emphasize one point, namely, that the base pay of 1,700 zloty with a 100% bonus is the highest salary of an employee in Poland (with the exception of the members of the government and the members of the Polish Academy of Sciences - PAN - who receive, I think, about 4,000 zloty monthly). The lowest wage in Poland is about 250 zloty per month.
15. Manual workers constitute another type of employee and, of course, have another system of wages. The manual worker is paid by the hour. Basically, industry uses a nine-group wage scale for manual workers. The base pay, it seems to me, ranges from about 80 grosze

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to about 2.30 zloty an hour. With bonuses, various other premiums, and occasional raises, the hourly rate ranges from about 1.50 to about nine zloty an hour (excluding the supplementary pay of the brigade leaders, for dangers accompanying certain jobs, etc.).

16. Besides the hourly wage scale - a scale and system used rather rarely - there is the widely used system of contract work (akordowy). The pay here is determined strictly by the degree of fulfillment of a norm. This system is difficult to describe. It is possible, although very rare, under this contract system to earn as much as 7,000 to 8,000 zloty per month. The possibilities peculiar to this system are used for propaganda purposes or to accelerate the construction of the various propaganda-type achievements in Warsaw like Marienstat, Stare Miasto, or the Slask-Dabrowski bridge.

Generally speaking, wages earned in contract work are not high; the pay of helpers, for example, ranges between 250 and 350 zloty per month.

17. Naturally, these low wage scales result in a lowered standard of living in Poland. To a large degree these low wages are dictated, among other things, by the desire (and even the need) to restrict the buying power of the Polish population because of the tremendous scarcity of articles of daily use - not to mention luxuries - on the Polish market.
18. Assuming that the average earnings of a worker in Poland range from 700 to 800 zloty per month (in many cases it is less than that figure), one can imagine the hard and difficult situation of the people of Poland as regards their possibilities of obtaining sufficient food and clothing.

It is no wonder then that people in Poland often have more than one job and work long hours in order to earn additional income. In many cases people are compelled to steal, to make bandit raids, etc.

19. The salaries of the teaching staff at the Warsaw Polytechnic Institute were as follows:

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| Rector | 1,700 zloty plus 500 zloty bonus |
| Professor | 1,700 zloty plus 300 zloty bonus |
| Associate Professor (Adjunct) | 1,300 zloty |
| Senior Assistant Professor | 1,100 zloty |
| Junior Assistant Professor | 800 zloty |
| Instructor | 600 zloty |

Social security and income tax deduction on a 1,100 zloty salary, for example, amounted to 75 zloty per month.

The monthly take-home pay on a 3,000 zloty total earning (1,500 zloty base pay and 1,500 zloty bonus for 100% fulfillment of norm at a factory) was about 2,200 zloty. The difference of 800 zloty represented social security and income tax deductions.

Difficulties in Raw Material Supply

20. Q. What is the situation regarding raw material supply, production, difficulties in meeting planned goals, etc., in each of the industries known to you?

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- A. It can be stated at the outset that in Poland today only three types of industry are operating on a normal basis and perhaps even above normal. They are the heavy industry (foundries), the coal industry, and the textile industry (cotton and rayon). Besides these, certain special factories, those producing for the military, are receiving a fair amount of supplies. Other industries which are supposed to satisfy the demands of the internal market in articles of daily use are not as successful in meeting their quotas (due to shortages in supply). It must be emphasized, however, that quite a number of factories engaged in very important work for the government in the armaments industry are also having supply difficulties, as for example, the Kasprzak Radio Equipment Factory T-3 or the Roza Luxemburg Electric Light Bulb (Tube) Factory, L-1, in Warsaw.
21. The basic difficulty in raw material supply is the fact that there is a lack of all kinds of nonferrous metals and iron. This, in turn, is reflected in a shortage of semi-finished metal products like screws of all kinds, especially the small sizes, wound wire, nails, rivets, etc. The difficulties are also evident in other semi-finished products and parts, as for example, good quality resistors for radios, electric measuring devices, and many others. The situation is not much better in the building (construction) industry. First of all, there is a tremendous shortage of lumber and, to a lesser degree, of other materials.
22. The supply difficulties mentioned above resulted in the fact that almost all materials in Poland were made available only on an allotment basis; at present, it is impossible to procure on the market anything necessary for production without a special allotment certificate from the PKPG. Several examples may serve to illustrate the situation:

In the spring of 1952 the Roza Luxemburg Factory, L-1, in Warsaw placed an order at the PPAE, located at 8 Brodnowska Street in Warsaw, for 60 spot welders which were to be manufactured according to the Philips specifications. These welders were to be used for manufacturing a new, special kind of light bulb (tubes) for the military, as provided for in Government Resolution # 804. The PPAE accepted the order for these welders and promised to complete the job provided that the necessary materials like angle iron, six millimeter sheet copper, and others would be furnished by the firm placing the order.

The Roza Luxemburg Factory promised to supply the materials immediately, either from its own stockpile or by requesting an allotment - charged to its own account - through the PKPG. The PKPG was not expected to pose any difficulties in view of the fact that these materials were important and were provided for by a government resolution. After overcoming a series of obstacles, after many automobile and rail trips, and after many conferences with even the highest levels of the PKPG and the ministries, it was finally possible to procure only 200 kg. of the necessary copper - and that only five millimeters thick instead of the required six millimeters - in April 1953, that is, over one year after the order was placed and six months later than completion date originally agreed upon. The welders were finally manufactured and delivered late in May or early June 1953.

I would like to point out the fact that we encountered colossal difficulties in trying to procure other needed materials for these welders; we had to devise ingenious methods and improvise constantly before we completed them.

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Another example may cast some light on the problems and difficulties with special materials like nickel. For example, nickel is very scarce in Poland. I learned in a conversation that late in 1952 the Roza Luxemburg Factory had sent two tons of nickel to the PKPG to be rolled and returned to the factory. The Roza Luxemburg Factory never saw that nickel again, even though nickel is the basic material for the production of radio tubes.

Difficulties Due to Poor Quality of Parts and Semi-Finished Articles

23. Another important factor causing production difficulties is the low quality of materials which are available - though not always - in sufficient quantity. Included in this group are silicon steel for transformers, malleable phosphoro-bronze sheets, white metal sheeting, sheet iron, bi-metallic sheets, enameled wound wire with poor, thick insulation, and many others. Also included here are semi-finished products like screws which are rolled beyond the required tolerance, and varnish which peels easily or does not dry. Among the finished products, frequently including manufactured appliances, are electric measuring devices, switches, and many others.

Difficulties with Supply of Tools, Machine Tools, and Equipment

24. The situation with respect to machine tools and tools in Poland is catastrophic. Especially scarce are the tools which are most often used but which because of their structural form break very easily; among these are die stocks M3, M4, and drills of less than six millimeters diameter. The same is true with grinding disks, electric soldering irons, etc. Very frequently the above-mentioned are of very poor quality.

Machine tools manufactured in Poland are not of the precision type; they are large and heavy. The materials used in the manufacture of machine tools are of poor quality (lack of proper type steel); the castings are not seasoned; the tempo of production is fast. All this results in a poor quality of machine tools.

The small precision-type machine tools are imported. They are apportioned by the PKPG and the Ministry of Machine Industry. It takes a year or longer to get the supplies and then, as a rule, a factory receives only 50% of its order. This also applies to factories which handle special production as well as to laboratories and other similar manufacturing firms. There is a tremendous scarcity of laboratory equipment and measuring appliances like simple thermometers, manometers, tensile-strength gauges, as well as electric wiring needed by factories and laboratories.

Personnel Difficulties

25. The situation regarding personnel is also far from satisfactory; the policy of the government and the Party aims at replacing older people, who as a rule are enemies of the Communist system, with young persons who are trained in Communist Poland. "The small fry", among both the skilled workers and the engineers, represent an inexperienced element which has distorted views and is unreliable and irresponsible. For this reason there is a difference of opinion between the technical management and the personnel office in the factories. Very frequently the young people are not hired because of the fact that their work often endangers the fulfillment of a plan or at least may lower the quality of production.
26. The above-mentioned shortages and deficiencies entail a series of problems and disadvantages; one of these arises from the fact that the factory director is held solely responsible for the non-fulfillment of a plan. The director cannot use shortage of equipment,

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people, and material as an excuse for its non-fulfillment. Naturally, this discourages men from accepting positions as directors. Because plans are rarely capable of being fulfilled and the problems are difficult to solve either through sheer luck or by super-human effort, the directors are often removed from their posts.

As a result of this policy, the factories find themselves with new chiefs and technical directors every few months. During the past three years the management at the Kasprzak Radio Equipment Factory and at the Roza Luxemburg Electric Light Bulb (Tube) Factory changed several times. Of course, each new director is supposed to be an improvement over the preceding one, but that is seldom the case.

This continual change in management has an unfavorable effect on the completion of plans; many times only 35% to 50% of the plans are fulfilled. This, in turn, means low wages and dissatisfied employees.

27. Low quality and quantity production results in conferences by the highest levels of the PKPG and the ministries which aim to improve the quality of production and to supply the scarce equipment. These conferences, as a rule, do not produce the desired results and end with the establishment of subcommittees to review the matter more closely. Often, not even such steps are taken.
28. This state of affairs has some very unfavorable effects. There is a steady flow from industry of older, skilled men who, confronted with unbearable working conditions and tremendous, oftentimes uncalled for, responsibility, try to find positions in scientific establishments or even in polytechnic institutes.
29. One of the most important and most difficult posts in industry is that of supply. That post may be held by one person or by a group of persons who are constantly criticized either for not supplying the requested materials on time or worse, for not supplying them at all. These supply agencies often resort to devious methods of procuring goods; sometimes they borrow from other agencies. Sometimes they use methods which would not be condoned by higher authorities.

As a point of interest I might mention that anyone caught borrowing or lending nonferrous metals or sending them to the factories without PKPG permission may be sentenced to five years imprisonment.

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