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Dr. Vladko Macek's present personal plans are to remain in Paris until the end of summer 1947. At that time, if the Yugoslav situation looks more hopeful from his viewpoint, and by this he means if the Russian troops are withdrawn from Austria, Hungary and Rumania, he will move, together with Dr. Branko Poselj, his secretary, and other members of his entourage to Vienna or the American Zone of Austria, in order to organize and direct from there the Croat opposition to the Tito government. Under these circumstances Dr. Macek feels that the general Yugoslav opposition would have every chance of success.

In this connection, Macek is of the opinion that Tito's regime cannot be overthrown by democratic means but, barring the occurrence of a third world war, by a revolution nourished by outside forces. However, the success of such an overthrow depends upon the withdrawal of the Russian forces from its Eastern European satellite countries, and if Tito's army is fully mobilized the possibilities of success, according to Macek, are greater since there are many in the army who are discontented.

- 3. If, on the other hand, the Russian troops are not withdrawn and the current situation remains unchanged, Macek and his wife and children, together with Dr. Peselj, will plan to go to the United States. Dr. Macek seems reasonably certain that he will be able to obtain a visitor's or an immigration visa while Dr. Peselj on his part is already in possession of an immigration visa, this having been facilitated by the fact that his wife is an American citizen.
- 4. Dr. Macek has not yet envisioned the possibility of appointing an authoritative person or committee which would continue to represent the Croatian Peasant Farty on the Continent, and appears at the moment to feel that this is unnecessary and that he will be able to maintain his leadership even from the United States. In this connection, he has pointed to the precedent established by Georgi M. Dimitrov, Bulgarian Peasant leader now living in the United States. Dr. Macek appears to be somewhat leadth to designate Dr. Juraj Krnjevich in London as having full powers to represent him on the Continent, since he admits that Dr. Krnjevich is not trusted by the Serb political leaders in London or elsewhere, and does not see eye to eye with the more Yugoslav-minded elements of the CPP.

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- 5. On this subject Macek believes that the Serbs and the C, cats are bound to each other in such a way that they must live together in one nation. The only chance of success against Tito, he feels, depends upon a unified action of all the Yugoslavs. An accord between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes abroad is very important and will have an advantageous repercussion in the homeland, Macek thinks, since all the leaders of the opposition parties are living outside of the country. He also believes that the recent plan of the Catholic Church to draw Groatia and Slovenia into a bloc of Catholic States of Central Europe has been abandoned by the Vatican and that it now supports a united Yugoslavia.
- 6. Concerning the Ustashi members-in-exile, Macek stated that a number of them are abandoning Pavelich and seeking permission to re-enter the Croatian Peasant Party. Relations with those who have ultra-republican views are strained, but Macek does not look upon them as a dangerous element since they do not have the support of the people in the country. However, Macek does admit that the resistance group "Krizari" unfortunately has many Ustashi leaders among them. Although the activities of the "Krizari" are purely on the defensive side, Macek believes that they will serve as a basis for a large scale rebellion.
- 7. Dr. Macek has recently received the first message from August Kosutich (vice-president of CFP) in Zagrob since the latter's release from prison. This message reached him through the intermediary of Konievich, a member of the Yugoslav delegation to the Peace Conference, who at that time broughtDr. Macek a message from Dr. Dragoljub Jovanovich, and has now brought the message from Kosutich while enroute to London as a member of the Yugoslav delegation to the current Big Four conference on the German problem. In his message Kosutich underscored what he believed to be the futility of continued attempts to influence or modify the character of the Tito regime through Anglo-Saxon or other pressures from the West, 1.e., via Russia or neighboring Soviet satellite states. Dr. Macek's first reaction to this note was not favorable. During the early days of his stay in Paris he attempted to be perfectly correct in his dealings with the Russians by sending them copies of any notes which he addressed to representatives of the other Allied powers. He has never, however, received any recognition or response to these gestures.
- 8. Dr. Macek has still not received from the British a visitor's visa to the United Kingdom nor has it proved possible for the Sarb leaders in London to visit him in Paris to undertake the conferences which they have been planning. Dr. Milan Gavrilovich and other Serb politicians in London have written to Macek that while very eager to reach an a coord with him, they do not dare leave the UK since they have no guarantee that they will be allowed to return. The failure of the British to grant him a visa while appearing to agree in principle to do so, leads Dr. Macek to believe that the British are continuing to pursue an extremely cautious policy with regard to Yugoslavia. As another instance of this he cited the recent British action by which large Croat ship-owners in the UK were forced, following representations of the Yugoslav government, to turn over all their ships and the capital of their companies to the Yugoslav Government as part of the nationalization of the shipping industry in Yugoslavia. They received only 7 to 10% of their total capital as reimbursement. When at first they refused to comply, the British gave them to understand that the British themselves would turn over the ships to the Yugoslav government and they would receive no reimbursement whatsoever. Under this pressure the shipowners finally capitulated.

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