

This document contains information affecting the defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act 50, U.S.C. 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

FCD
303

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 15 October 1979 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Ambassadors in the United States. (R) (U) 10 Jul 1977



25X1A

COUNTRY Chile

SUBJECT Communist Party National Congress, Santiago, Chile

DIST. 10 July 1947

PAGES 2

ORIGIN

25X1A

SUPPLEMENT

25X1X



1. At the Communist Party National Congress held in Santiago, Chile, from 22 to 26 May 1947, certain meetings were held and resolutions passed, which were not announced to the public through the Communist press. These "secret" sessions were held primarily on the 23rd and 24th of May. [redacted] nothing of a truly secret nature was discussed in these meetings. A number of resolutions were passed which have not been released for publication. These include:

25X1X

a. Resolution to give greater importance to, and to work to a greater extent through, the Alianza de Intelectuales de Chile, using Angel Cruchaga Santa Maria as a front. Another person to be used as a front is Julio Berrenchea, a noted poet and writer, at present Chilean Ambassador in Colombia.

b. Resolution to propose a constitutional reform to take away some of the current broad powers of the President.

c. Resolution to continue work on organization of farm unions, using Cardinal Caro as a front, the latter having recently made declarations on the slave conditions of some 700,000 farm laborers.

d. Resolution to instruct all regional committees to organize for underground clandestine activities and to prepare for repressive measures in case these are undertaken shortly.

e. Resolution to begin a campaign through contacts in the armed forces, and through Communist Party members in all branches of the armed forces, to show that the United States is trying to gain control of the Chilean Army through the Truman plan.

f. Resolution to recommend to President Gonzalez Videla that Luis Alberto Cuevas not be permitted to become Vice President during the President's visit to other Latin American countries, as the Communist Party considers Cuevas to be an enemy of the people.

2. A secret session on the armed forces of Chile was extremely short, and confined to a proposal and discussion on a change in the organization and discipline of the Chilean Army so as to make it similar to the Russian Army. No names of Communist members in the armed forces were mentioned during the meeting, but it was confirmed that the Communist Party has active members in all branches.

Document No. 003

NO CHANGE in Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

WARNING NOTICE: THIS DISTRIBUTION LISTING MUST BE

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S

EXCISED BEFORE PUBLIC RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT.

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

REFERENCE CENTER LIBRARY

Date: 12 APR 1978

~~SECRET~~

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

90643

25X1X

3. [redacted] one of the significant features of the Congress was that the recent split developing in the Communist Party (see [redacted]) was quite pronounced. This division is splitting the Party into followers of Carlos Contreras Labarca and those of Ricardo Fonseca. [redacted] Fonseca's policy is one of trying to attract other leftist groups into the Communist sphere. He has been actively attempting to line things up so that the Socialist Party might be approached to join the Communist program in Chile. This policy of Fonseca's began as far back as when he was a Communist youth leader, and tried to form a "liberation of youth" movement with help from other leftist groups. Contreras, on the other hand, believes that the Communists should be the ones to join other groups, thereby gaining power for a few Communist leaders. According to Contreras, the Communist Party must do everything possible to gain power and get into the Government. [redacted] the strength of Fonseca is growing, while Contreras was relegated to secondary importance throughout the entire Communist Congress. In fact, in the final session of the Congress, in a speech by Galo Gonzalez, the most noteworthy item, not included in newspaper accounts of this speech, was a severe attack on Contreras Labarca. Gonzalez charged that Contreras, as Secretary General of the Party, had made many mistakes, and should retire from any directive post in the Party. He added that the Party was extremely grateful for Contreras' past work, and did not want him to leave the Party altogether, but he would have to answer a list of charges before the "Control Bureau."

25X1X

25X1A

25X1X

4. The possibility of repressive measures by the Government against the Communist Party, while mentioned in one of the resolutions passed in a secret session (see paragraph 1, d above), was not mentioned from the platform in open sessions. However, a great deal of personal discussion of this possibility took place among those attending the meetings. Members of the Central Committee are reported to have indicated that they expected such measures to be taken shortly. A need for more secrecy and greater security within the Party was stressed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

REFERENCE CENTER LIBRARY