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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY Greece

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SUBJECT Final Report of the Retiring Turkish Consul in Salonika

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The following is the gist of the final report made by the Turkish Consul in Salonika who has recently been transferred to another post.

1. In spite of the general initiative showed by the (Greek) army in the Gramos sector and the consequent notable victories, public order and security in my area (Olympos, Western Macedonia, Serres, and Chalcidice) have not shown any improvement. Guerrilla bands of 50 or 100 persons are always in action, and although they avoid clashing with the regular Army they nevertheless have orders to make continual appearances and in various ways to create diversions with the definite object of easing the position of Markos.
2. Even if the main body of Markos' guerrillas are annihilated, unless military measures are taken so as to prevent the reconstitution of the scattered guerrilla bands, the official Greek State will be found again face to face with an organized guerrilla movement.
3. In Chalcidice the activity of the guerrillas is more intense, because the existing military force in this region is slight.
4. In the Plassona-Olympos region there continues to exist a permanent guerrilla base in spite of the recent operation to clear them out.
5. The Serres region, which has a common boundary with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, forms a center of annoying difficulties for the Greek Army because the guerrillas when pursued by the Army (notwithstanding denials to the contrary) take refuge in Yugoslav territory through the Strumitza and in Bulgarian territory through the Demir-Isar, Petric, and other regions.
6. On the occasion of my departure I visited my Yugoslav colleague who, in the course of our conversation, told me the following:
 - a. As for the clash between Tito and the Cominform, Tito will emerge master of the situation, because the people of Yugoslavia have learned that Tito is working to make Yugoslavia politically independent. The Yugoslav people are outraged by the crude Russian tactics, and in discussions among the followers of Tito it is often said that the tactics of the Western Powers are often preferable to the tactics of Russia.

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- b. Among other charges the Cominform accused Yugoslavia of expansionist tendencies. Nothing could be more inaccurate. On the contrary the Bulgarians had proposed to Tito that he satisfy his aspirations in Albania either by annexation or following the Italian system of plebiscite, on condition that the Yugoslavs withdraw from Macedonia. The Bulgarians also proposed that Macedonia be proclaimed an autonomous independent state with its own foreign policy and with its capital at Skoplje (in this region of Macedonia would be included Salonika, while Chalcidice would be proclaimed an autonomous state with its capital at Polygyros. In the latter state would be included Mount Athos, with the privileges of the monasteries preserved, or Mount Athos could remain as at present, but not under Greek control). In return, Yugoslavia was to support the aspirations of Bulgaria in Western Thrace including Kavalla, and in time when the questions of the Dardanelles should be discussed, Yugoslavia would support the demands of Bulgaria for Eastern Thrace as far as Tsataltsa. The remaining territory of Eastern Thrace, including Istanbul, would be proclaimed an autonomous state under the Soviet Union, or under Russo-Turkish protection. Then the question of the Ecumenical Patriarchate would be definitely settled.
- c. These questions were discussed at Bled when the agreement was signed for mutual help between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, under the full initiative of Georgi Dimitrov. At that time Tito telephoned Moscow to find out how far Russia was in agreement with these views. The result was well-known; Dimitrov was reproved since it appeared that the Soviet Union had other plans not in agreement with the views either of Yugoslavia or of Dimitrov.
- d. It is time not only for us but also for you Turks and Greeks to find a way of becoming independent without waiting for help either from one side or the other. Our effort must be turned towards a mutually complementary economic policy.
- e. Markos, instead of agreeing with Tito who was and who could be a benevolent supporter, fell into the snare of the Albanians and Bulgarians and denounced him. Of course it was not possible for Yugoslavia to stop abruptly her moral help to Markos, because then people would have formed the opinion that Yugoslavia was putting pressure on Markos to cede the provinces of Florina, Kastoria, and Edessa.
- f. Markos today is in a very bad spot. His failure to obtain recognition was not caused by the fact that he did not have a capital but to the express statements of the Anglo-Americans and to Russian policy which, it seems, wants Markos "either dead or alive".

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- g. The threats of Enver Hoxha make no impression on us. They certainly caused us trouble in the question of oil, but the time will come when he will learn a lesson from his ingratitude.
- h. It is impossible for Yugoslavia to make an immediate turn towards the Western Powers, and Yugoslavia will not lift her hand against the Soviet Union either under the present form or under any other.


At this point I interrupted to ask, "What will the result be if Russia seeks to overthrow Tito in order to put in his place an agent who enjoys her absolute confidence?" His answer was: "This cannot happen, because then Yugoslavia will seek the immediate intervention of the United Nations and particularly of the Western Powers. These thistles which were ready to enter the present regime have already withered. We are following the activities of the so-called Yugoslavs here, who are rather Bulgarians. I believe that the Greek authorities are doing the same. They were the most sinister agents and supporters of the Bulgarian and German occupiers."

Another question: "In order to clarify your position with Greece why have you not agreed to the establishment in Yugoslav Macedonia of the Slavophones living in the Florina region, who amount to about fifty thousand, and who in my estimation are more Bulgarians than Yugoslav Macedonians? The better solution in fact would be to settle them in Bulgaria, or for Greece to remove them from her borders, and thus there would be no increase of the Bulgarian population."


To this question he gave the following answer: "For the present I do not see that there can be any discussion of this subject, but I find your views correct and I shall convey them to my Government for consideration."

- 7. Returning to the subject of Markos, I say that I do not see that there is ground for an understanding between him and Yugoslavia. My impression is that among the personnel of the Yugoslav Consulate in Salonika varying political convictions exist, and that they are awaiting the development of events before expressing them. I believe that the Greek authorities are aware of these differences of opinion among them.

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- 8.  "I am optimistic about the crushing of the guerrillas. I do not attach much importance to the nuclei of guerrillas acting sporadically. But I am not wholly optimistic about the internal development of the situation after the defeat of Markos. I do not see the man capable of bringing radical changes in the administration. So long as we remain in Greece we shall try to solve this problem satisfactorily for the Greek people and for our own interests....The Polk case keeps the Americans in Salonika stirred up, because the perpetrators still have not been discovered."

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- 10. My French colleague had the same views as the British.

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