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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# INFORMATION REPORT

[Redacted] 17  
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COUNTRY Chile/USSR

DATE DISTR. 27 Jan 1949

SUBJECT Moscow Censure of Chilean Communist Party

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
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PLACE ACQUIRED Chile, Santiago

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. Prior to 28 December 1948

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



SOURCE

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[Redacted] furnished recently the following account of the difficulties confronting the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) at present:

1. The Cominform is now taking action against the Chilean Party, which is being accused of responsibility for its own political failure. All its leaders and their activities are being subjected to an examination by the Cominform. The findings of this latter group will be forwarded to Chile through Deputy Contreras Tapia, former Minister of Lands and Colonization, who is at present in Prague, Czechoslovakia.
2. The Cominform believes that the Chilean Communist Party had an excellent opportunity to take over the government, but did not know how to take advantage of it. It feels that the Chilean Party has destroyed the Chilean labor movement through its mistakes and intransigent attitude.
3. One of the most grave accusations is that the PCCh has "sold itself out politically". Moscow cannot understand how the Party, having had the keys to the government in its hands, could have lost them so rapidly, thus creating a difficult situation for the Soviet Union. Examples noted in Moscow of this "political sell-out" and bourgeois development are photographs of Miguel Concha, former minister of Agriculture, dressed in shorts at a picnic in Vina del Mar. Also cited are photographs of the ostentatious life of Pablo Neruda, and accounts of the social events attended by Chilean Communist leaders.

It is believed that this information was furnished Moscow by members of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago. The Embassy always held a pessimistic opinion of the Chilean Communist Party. The gravity of the accusations is increased by the report given to Moscow by returned Embassy personnel that the Chilean Communist Party had had control of all the vital industries in the country, such as copper, coal, and nitrate mining, to such an extent that no operations in these fields could be carried out without the consent of the Party. All of this control or influence gradually melted away, and now the Party finds itself outlawed from Chilean political life.

The Party line has been analyzed and the conclusion reached that not only

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were fundamental errors made, but Party leaders were guilty of a lack of foresight and ability. The Third International had had confidence in the PCCh and had considered it as a Party exercising a decisive influence in the country. It is now disorganized and its principal leaders are either under arrest or in hiding.

6. Moscow feels that the Chilean Communists need to receive instructions and orders from abroad. This lack of instruction caused the collapse, since the PCCh was accustomed to receive orders from such leaders who elaborated and laid down the policy of joint action with the other Communist Parties in America. The latest instructions received in Chile were given by Victorio Codovilla, one of the leading members of the Communist Party of Argentina. In Chile, Codovilla imparted instructions concerning the formation of the national union (Popular Front) in which it was hoped that differences between the leftist and rightist political groups could be smoothed out.
7. Codovilla forced Carlos Contreras Labarca from the office of Secretary General of the PCCh and opened the way for Luis Reynoso, who is the real power in the party of Chile. At the present moment it is believed that there are no contacts or liaison with the Communist Parties in other countries. Although Communist Party leaders in Chile have attempted to go to Buenos Aires, none are known to have got further than Mendoza. Codovilla himself has not been in Chile. Codovilla does not wish to take a hand in Chilean affairs at this time, since he believes any efforts would fail, and he has no desire to be blamed by Moscow for any failure which might result from his efforts.
8. As a result of this criticism from Moscow, Ricardo Fonseca will probably be removed from his position as Secretary General. At the present, he is said to be physically broken and unable to talk to people because of his highly nervous state. His possible successor is Luis Reynoso, the present Party Secretary of Organization.
9. While the matter is being studied in Moscow, the Communist Party in Chile is attempting to find a way out and is awaiting the results of the consultations concerning Carlos Ibanez del Campo, who, they hope, may become their salvation. As soon as a decision is reached in this matter, a definite line will be formulated and made known. Meanwhile, the Party is attempting to do something which will regain for it some of its lost prestige. One of these attempts was the hunger-strike in the Pisagua prison camp, which failed for lack of adequate preparation. However, the idea of a hunger-strike has not been abandoned. The Party is considering carrying out another such hunger-strike with the view of using it as a propaganda issue.

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