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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



The following report on the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) was prepared in the Chilean Investigaciones by order and for the guidance of its director general, Luis Brun d'Avoglio.

1. According to Communists supporting the present Political Commission of the PCCh's Executive Committee, the 7 November 1949 shooting affray in the Plaza de Armas of Santiago was an unforeseen result of the brief demonstration ordered for that day by the Party's Santiago Local Committee. It had been planned to have the Communists from the First and Eighth Communes meet in front of the central building of the University of Chile from where they would meet other marching groups. The main demonstration was to be held on Avenida Matta after which the Party members were to return home. Although general orders were issued in June 1949 that the Communists should defend themselves from police aggression, Party leaders had no intention of provoking an armed clash with the police. Although the Communists admit that the first shot was fired by a Party member, PCCh leaders have branded him as a anarchist and are attempting to identify him and obtain proof of his guilt with the intention of turning him over to the authorities.
2. Opponents of the present Political Commission maintain that the Commission has planned for a long time to provoke an incident in the hope that such would lead to serious trouble.
3. The outstanding leader of the Chilean Communist Party at the present time is Galo Gonzalez whose political policy is being supported by Volodia Teitelboim and Luis Peinoso but opposed by Carlos Contreras Labarca and his faithful followers. The Chilean government should not forget that during the time Contreras Labarca served as Secretary General, the Party helped elect three presidents and had 17 Congressmen, some cabinet ministers, ample funds, prestige, a vigorous press, and supporters in strategic positions throughout Chile. By handling the matter carefully, the government could have called attention to the Party's present difficulties and could have played on the differences between Contreras Labarca and Gonzalez with a view toward provoking a schism within the Party. This would have been possible because of the Party's unique situation today. It should not be forgotten that in the PCCh's last National Congress,

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the position of Contreras Labarca was so weak that it was believed he would be expelled from the Party. Salvador Ocampo Pastene, a man of political vision, defended Contreras Labarca and managed to swing the coal miners' votes in his favor. Even though Contreras Labarca's situation deteriorated after the Congress, it was not possible for Communist leaders to call another Congress because the Party had been declared illegal in the meantime. The Political Commission did not dare expel Contreras Labarca from the Party since it was feared that this would arouse the wrath of the coal miners. As a result, he and his followers were isolated and though they no longer had any rights within the Party they were given tasks to perform and were asked for financial contributions.

4. The government policy of persecuting the PCCh as a whole rather than certain of its leaders has resulted in a move toward reconciliation between the two factions. Consequently, the Party will soon be stronger than before.
5. The arrest of Graciela (Chela) Alvarez and her banishment to Concepcion was a desirable measure since she is strongly pro-Stalin and nothing can be done with her. However, the arrest of Jorge Jiles Pizarro was an error since he is hated by so many Party members. An even more grievous and potentially dangerous mistake was the search of the house and office of Raul Barra Silva, who is pro-Fito but who may collaborate actively with the Gonzalez faction if persecuted by the police.
6. If the present unselective persecution of the Communists continues, there is reason to fear that they may reach a state of desperation in which they may be used by anarchists to unleash widespread violence of incalculable harm to the country.

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