

Jul 1951

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 21 AUG 51

SUBJECT Anti-Communist Guerrilla Units in Kwangsi

NO. OF PAGES 4

PLACE 25X1C

NO. OF ENCLS. 2
(LISTED BELOW)

ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO. 25X1A

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.



25X1X

1. Anti-Communist guerrillas in Kwangsi are made up of the following elements:
 - a. Remnants of former Nationalist armies and peace preservation units of various hsien and ch'fi (districts), including hsien police units, self-defense units, and border guards.
 - b. Landlords and other farmers.
 - c. Former Nationalist military and civilian personnel, reservists, and intellectuals.
 - d. Local bandits and secret society members.
2. After the defeat of the Nationalist Central China Command in South Kwangsi, the 1 Army Group under HUANG Chieh (黄杰) and some Kwangsi natives in the 10 Army Group succeeded in withdrawing into Indochina. Over 150,000 men of the Nationalist 7, 46, 48, and 56 Armies, all natives of Kwangsi, and Nationalist irregulars of the five military administrative districts remained in Kwangsi. Some were captured by the Communists, but most retained their arms and slipped away to their homes or followed Nationalist officers to remote and mountain country to form resistance groups. Local irregulars of various hsien preserved their strength in some mountainous regions because Communist forces were unable to reach them and bring them under control. Among the Nationalist troops which fled to Yaoshan (109- , 23-) were a regiment of the 7 Army, two regiments of the 46 Army, and a regiment of the 56 Army, all at between 60 to 90 percent normal strength. Other troops assembled at Shihwantashan (108- , 22-) and on the Kwangsi-Indochina border.
3. Ruthless Communist control measures in Kwangsi drove many landlords and farmers to establish clandestine connections with the guerrillas and eventually to join them. Local intellectuals and leading citizens, under threat of being branded "enemy agents" for their non-Communist ideology, also joined anti-Communist units, as did members of secret societies who came under strict controls. Local bandits also attached themselves to guerrillas after the Communist conquest.

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSRB						
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI						

CONFIDENTIAL

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States.

Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008100430002

Document No. **2**

No Change in Class

VOID

Date Changed To: TS SC

Auth: IR 16-2

4. Guerrilla organization passed through several stages. The first, from December 1949 to March 1950, saw uncoordinated attacks by Nationalist remnants and local irregulars against Communist personnel and communications and supplies. Some of these elements went over to the Communists or were brought under their control, but many never surrendered. Groups which remained intact included:

About 4,000 men in Shihwantashan on the Kwangsi-Indochina border under YAO Huai (姚懷).

About 3,000 men in South Kwangsi under LO Hao (羅浩).

About 2,000 men in the Kweichow-Kwangsi and Hunan-Kweichow-Kwangsi border areas, commanded by CH'EN Yi-ts'an (陳逸善) and YANG Piao (楊標).

About 3,000 men in Fuchuan Hsien (111-06, 24-49), Ho Hsien (111-31, 24-23), and Kungcheng Hsien (110-40, 24-52) in eastern Kwangsi commanded by LI Jui-hsiung (李瑞雄) and CHOU T'ien-hsiung (周天雄).

About 1,000 men in northern Kwangsi, commanded by MA Chin-min (馬謹民).

About 2,000 men in the mountainous area of Tzuyuan Hsien (110-36, 26-14), commanded by T'ANG Shou-yueh (唐守約) and T'ANG Chieh-k'uei (唐介奎).

About 2,000 men in central Kwangsi, commanded by LIN Hsiu-shan (林秀山), and T'AN Li-t'ien (譚麗天).

60,000 to 70,000 armed men, in small bands of 100 to 1,000 each, in various hsien.

5. From April to June 1950, the Communist authorities in Kwangsi coordinated their mopping-up operations against the guerrillas with the Communist "Reorganization Committee." The guerrilla units, which had previously been uncoordinated and had operated independently, sent representatives to Hong Kong, where a guerrilla command was being formed. Intergroup liaison was arranged in Kwangsi. Before mid-June 1950, 45 guerrilla units aggregating over 100,000 men were in coordination with one another. After the Korean war began, Kwangsi guerrillas were able to develop still more, gaining gradual control of the areas surrounding Liuchou, Nanning, Wuchou, and Paise. They disrupted land and water communications, destroyed Peasants' Associations, killed Communist officials, and captured Communist food supplies.
6. By October 1950, guerrilla units in Kwangsi included the following:

- a. Over 10,000 guerrillas in southern Kwangsi to the Kweichow-Kwangsi-Yunnan border, in Yaoshan, Shihwantashan, the Kweichow-Kwangsi border hsien, and in Kuposhan between Fuchuan and Ho Hsien.

- b. 200,000 guerrillas with a unified command for various sections of Kwangsi, with the following commanders:

South Kwangsi: : LIANG Chao-chi (梁朝機) and WU Wen-hsiang (伍文祥).

North Kwangsi : CH'EN Ping-nan (陳炳南).

Central Kwangsi : LO Hao-chung (羅浩忠).

East Kwangsi : LI Jui-hsiung and HSU Wei-wei (徐威衛).

Yaoshan area : LI P'i-ch'eng (李丕承) and HAN Meng-hsuan (韓蒙軒).

Northwest Kwangsi: WU Chung-chien (吳中堅).

Southwest Kwangsi: WEI Chieh-po (魏介伯).

Kweichow-Kwangsi border : YANG Piao (楊標).

7. Between November 1950 and February 1951, the Communists sent over 100,000 regular troops and additional militia into Kwangsi for all-out mopping-up campaigns against the guerrillas. Operations reached their climax in January and February 1951, simultaneously with the large-scale arrests and executions of "Kuomintang agents" and former Nationalist military and government personnel. In the anti-guerrilla campaigns, the guerrillas suffered heavy losses, since their command was not well unified and they were short of supplies. They were mostly, in late February, spread out according to plan out of the reach of the main Communist attack waiting to strike effectively at Communist forces and to receive supplies and equipment.
8. Guerrilla plans for more effective use of their capabilities include the following suggestions by CHANG Jen-min (張任民), LO Hao-chung, and HSU Ch'i-ming (徐世明):
- a. Establishment of communications networks: The guerrillas feel that signal communications are necessary because of the strict Communist controls. Most of their signal supplies have been lost or damaged, however, and the two radio sets remaining in the Yaoshan area require repairs and parts. For signal connections, the guerrillas plan radios at Liuchou, Wuchou, Kweilin, Nanning, Lungchou, and Paise, within the cities if that is feasible but otherwise at the nearest guerrilla base. Until the radio network can be implemented, communication is to be maintained by couriers operating through these stations.
 - b. Unification and streamlining of designations of guerrilla units: Various Kwangsi units are known as armies or columns or detachments, without clear indication of their connections; the only common term in these titles is "Anti-Communist National Salvation." These designations should be coordinated.
 - c. Breaking up of units into squads and platoons to facilitate operations: The intensive Communist anti-guerrilla campaign brought an overwhelming force into Kwangsi, with all guerrilla areas surrounded, every crossroad guarded, and troops in every village. Small Communist contingents are sent out on four to six day expeditions against the guerrillas. To counter these restraints, the guerrillas should be organized in small groups of not more than twenty men, for increased mobility.
 - d. Development of principles of organization and combat: In order to preserve their strength and at the same time expand their activities, the guerrillas should seek cover by working on farms or in business among the populace. Loyal officers should be assigned for liaison clandestinely from the command but, for the sake of security, there should be no lateral communication. Liaison officers should commit guerrillas to combat operations only at the most opportune moment and then should assemble them secretly for a raid and disperse them to their original positions immediately after the mission.
 - e. Principles of combat: The following are suitable for guerrilla activities:
 - (1) Avoid the enemy's strength and strike at his weakness.
 - (2) Raid larger groups of enemies but outnumber the enemy in single combat.
 - (3) Ambush, raid, and disrupt communications.
 - (4) Wrest the initiative from the enemy, spread away from enemy concentration, and counter enemy strength in cities with guerrillas in rural areas.
 - (5) Make quick attacks on exterior lines but fight long defense battles on interior lines.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-1-

- (6) Use guerrilla and mobile tactics, sometimes combined with positional tactics.
 - (7) Don't be distracted while fighting; take no chances while attacking; withdraw from an engagement without running; and on the defensive avoid conventional tactics.
- f. Establishment of bases: In Yaoshan, Liuwantashan (109-59, 22-38), Shihwan-tashan, and Kuposhan on the Hunan-Kwangsi border, and in the mountainous regions of the Kweichow-Yunnan-Kwangsi border and along the Kweichow-Kwangsi border of the Taningshan (108- , 23-), some major bases should be strengthened and those destroyed should be rebuilt. Secret bases to serve as alternate bases should be established in remote vantage points not under effective Communist control.
 - g. Training of troops: Guerrilla troops must be trained constantly to study Communist tactics and work out counter-measures and to improve morale and combat techniques. If possible, there should be training in handling weapons. Each man should be trained for sturdiness and endurance.
 - h. Arms, ammunition, and medical supplies: Guerrillas have secured some of the supplies they require from raids on Communists, but they should also, for real effectiveness, receive outside aid.
 - i. Improvement of the over-all command: Essential personnel for operations and organization should be placed in sufficient numbers in the departments of the over-all command for Kwangsi to make it as effective as possible.
 - j. Establishment of a main liaison office at Hong Kong: A special commissioner at Hong Kong is needed to maintain contacts and exchange information required for the guerrilla command in Kwangsi. Such a position should preferably be agreed to in advance by the Hong Kong government.

ATTACHMENT A: Strength and Location of Anti-Communist Guerrillas in Kwangsi.

CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY