

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information Concerning Hwanghae Province

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
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1. North Korean planes were supposed to join the front-line combat after 1 April 1951. For that reason, airfields were prepared and completed by 31 March at various points, including Hwangju, Anak, and Sariwon in Hwanghae Province.*
2. On 2 February 1951, the Supreme Headquarters of the North Korean Army in Pyongyang sent the North Korean 6 Corps to defend Hwanghae Province. The corps, which at the end of 1950 had approximately 20,000 men, had 7,000 in February. Its headquarters was Haeju.
3. In a directive dated 20 December 1950, published and distributed on 1 April 1951, Kim Il-sung ordered propaganda in the North Korean army to stress the following:
 - a. Except during combat and on the battlefield, front-line troops are forbidden to kill civilians.
 - b. When the war ends, the losses suffered by the people will be indemnified by the so-called "democratic bloc" nations.
 - c. Even if there is no agricultural production in 1951, there is no danger of starvation in North Korea because Communist China has promised to supply food. Agricultural production of Kirin Province alone is enough to feed the North Korean population.
4. On 1 March, Major SON Sung-kwon (孫承權), aged 30, a political instructor in the North Korean Army Political Bureau, was called to the Army Political Bureau headquarters in Pyongyang and given orders to work in Hwanghae Province. SON, a member of the NKLP since 1946, had previously engaged in union and youth activities in Ch'angsong-myon, North Pyongan, and had been an instructor since 1949 in the local Youth Training Center there. He was informed that people's committees had been restored throughout the province but that staff workers had not yet returned to their posts. He and three other instructors were ordered to Uirang County to see that by 31 March the first sowing of wheat and potatoes

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has been completed and to issue propaganda aimed at stabilizing public sentiment and arousing public interest in the war effort.

5. Each instructor was to be responsible for two myon (township). He was to investigate all persons between the ages of 17 and 55 who could do farm work and to check all areas to be cultivated. He was then to allocate an average of 300 p'yong** per farmer. Because of the difficulty of obtaining potato seed, only half the land would be planted in potatoes, and seeds would be given to resident farmers. The remaining areas were to be cultivated by free laborers mobilized from the cities and from North Korean troops.
6. The propaganda campaign was to stress the following description of the war, with special attention to the statement that the offensive of November 1950 was aimed not at the ROK but at the American army:
 - a. First stage of the war: The war started because the ROK army invaded North Korea.
 - b. Second stage: North Korean troops were forced to retreat because of the intervention of 220,000 United Nations troops.
 - c. Third stage: The North Korean army drove south again with the aid of half a million Chinese Communist troops, later increased to a million.

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* [REDACTED] Comment. Construction of new airfields in the area around Sariwon has been reported independently by several sources.

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** [REDACTED] Comment. One p'yong equals 36 square feet.

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