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INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO. 135

COUNTRY Philippines

DATE DISTR. 14 Nov. 1951

SUBJECT Document Containing March 1951 Resolution
of Philippine Communist Party Political Bureau
on Chinese Bureau

NO. OF PAGES 3

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PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

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RECYCULATE 25X1X

REFERENCE COPY

The following report is based on a document containing a resolution of the Political Bureau (PB) of the Philippine Communist Party on the relations of the Party with the Chinese Bureau (CB), a liaison group originally designed to coordinate the activities of the Philippine and Chinese Communist Parties, which was dated 12 March 1951. This document was included with other documentary material which was captured by Manila Police Department officials in raids on HMB and Communist centers in Manila during late September 1951. SO-73911*, which this report supplements, was based on a summary of this document, and it referenced previous reports on certain persons and Party organs which appear in the document.

1. The CB is an organ of the CP functioning among the Party and masses of the Chinese in the Philippines. At present, however, although it remains nominally an organ of the CP, in reality it acts independently of the CP. (Since the arrests in Manila, this situation is inevitable, since connections have been out).¹
2. Such was not the case at the beginning. Before the Japanese War of aggression, the Chinese comrades in the Philippines were members of the CP in name and in fact. They belonged to different organs of the CP, and it was only because of the certain difficulties in language and underground work that they were forced to establish separate groups, but all the time, they were carrying out the policies and decisions of the CP. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines the Chinese Bureau remained a part of the CP in point of fact. Chinese comrades were members of different organs of the CP, from the national to the regional organs. There were others who were in the Army, organized into separate squadrons. During the early part of "Liberation" it continued its early relations. However, during this period, there already appeared signs of separatism among the Chinese comrades in the Philippines. They consistently refused to make their financial and organizational report to the CP. This, in spite of the fact that there was a Chinese comrade in the PB, elected to the CC by the Congress of 1945.²

Document No. 011

No Change in Class.

Declassified

Class. Changed To: TS S @

Auth.: HR 70-2

Date: 28 AUG 1978 By: 011

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3. The relations of the CP (as a whole) and (its part) the CB, progressively deteriorated from here on. The Chinese comrade in the PB left the Philippines without approval of the PB. Several other members of the CB followed suit without CP approval. This happened when the Chinese comrades in China were starting to get the upper hand in their struggle against CHIANG Kai-shek. Almost simultaneously there appeared in the Philippines an organ called "ORO" (the initial for Overseas Chinese Office), whose real identity, function and powers, the CP never got to knowing fully.³ During the Amnesty Period, the splitters, Castro, Lacuesta, and others utilized the issue of amnesty to get the support of the Chinese comrades in the Philippines in their splitting tactics directed against the CP. The ORO believed Castro and his group, and it wrote a memo to the PB castigating the PB for expelling Castro and his group and defending the latter, calling for a reconciliation of the two irreconcilable ideologies.
4. The PB wrote a memo to the ORO criticizing the ORO for its unscientific outlook, in making conclusions without factual foundations, and without even an attempt to ascertain the facts. They made conclusions based entirely on the gossip of Castro, and that the latter were expelled because of their opposition to the Amnesty. From then on, the relations of the CP to the CB has been anything but corrupt.⁴ The projected sending of Comrade Torres and P² to China to study, and the projected meeting of some PB members with a genuine representative of the CPC never materialized.⁶ The real reason behind this is still unknown to the CP. At present, the CB is functioning either by itself or as part of the CPC, and having some horizontal relations with the CP. Hence, the anomalous situation of the part functioning independently of the whole.
5. The present anomalous situation is a result of the historical background of the Chinese Party members in the Philippines. There were Chinese Party members in the Philippines (and consequently an organ) even before the establishment of a Philippine Party. Hence their organization connections started with the CPC.⁷ This fact, coupled with the victory in China, and the relatively higher degree of theoretical development of the Chinese comrades in China, developed in some Chinese comrades in the Philippines a certain degree of "Chinese" chauvinism. This phenomenon was already apparent even during the Jap occupation. Some Chinese comrades showed a marked superiority complex, which has been only too noticeable. This complex was developed from the fact that the CPC has really more theoretical and practical understanding of Marxism, and the Chinese comrades in the Philippines showed a greater grasp of the situation in the Philippines, especially immediately after the Japanese occupation in 1942. Such superiority in theory and practice was not retained, and some Filipino comrades caught up with their knowledge. In spite of this development, the Chinese comrade in the PB still pontificated that an Indian comrade dubbed him a high priest. This pontification, this appearance of superiority, is nothing but chauvinism. It is this chauvinist ideology of some Chinese comrades in the Philippines that caused the deterioration of the relations between the CB and CP.
6. It cannot be said that the CP is blameless. The gross negligence of many in the CP in underground work, the use of men like Bull⁸ (whose record of finance opportunism dates way back before the war), for contact with the CB, and the belligerent attitude of some Filipinos to the Chinese comrades in the Party, all contributed to incorrect relations.
7. In view of all the above, the CC decided to criticize the Filipino Party members for their gross negligence in underground work especially in their relations with the Chinese comrades. It also decided to criticize the CB (as an organ) for its chauvinism. It further decided that the CB remain a part of the CP, as the only correct organizational form up to the present; that the CB report regularly (every three months) to the PB or SEC⁹ on organizational and financial matters; that the PB or SEC formulate policies regarding the Chinese workers and Party members in the Philippines, after receipt of reports from the CB, and for the CB to execute such policies

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and decisions unconditionally; that the CB take immediate steps to facilitate direct connections of the PB or SEC of the CP with the CPC, in order to coordinate our national liberation struggle with all liberation movements and proletarian movements the world over.

8. Comradely relations should exist among all Party members irrespective of nationality. The spirit of nationalism should be urged, and the spirit of internationalism should always guide Communists in all their activities.

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1. [REDACTED] Comment. CP refers to the Philippine Communist Party. The reference to the arrests in Manila is to the Government raids on Communist centers beginning in October 1950 in which principal members of the Political Bureau, as well as other key Party leaders, were arrested.

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2. [REDACTED] Comment. This person, apparently a Chinese leader of Chinese Communist Party activities in the Philippines, cannot be identified.

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3. [REDACTED] Comment. These initials are believed to refer to a group known as the Overseas Relations Office (RO), to which reference is made in the Communist documents captured during October 1950. [REDACTED] which is based on a document containing an official history of the Philippine Communist Party.

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4. [REDACTED] Comment. This statement apparently should be read as a condemnation of the corruption which did in fact exist.

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5. [REDACTED] Comment. Torres is a pseudonym used by Casto Alejandrino who was described [REDACTED] as Chief of the Party Military Department and thus a member of the Secretariat. Although the person referred to as F cannot be positively identified, according to the documents captured in October 1950, F was used to identify Federico Bautista who was one of the captured Communist leaders who was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Manila trial of May 1951.

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6. [REDACTED] Comment. CPC here apparently refers to the Chinese Communist

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[REDACTED] which this report supplements and the reports which it references.

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8. [REDACTED] Comment. The pseudonym Bull appears in the documents captured in October 1950. However, the person using this name cannot be identified.

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9. [REDACTED] Comment. SEC here refers to the Secretariat of the Philippine Communist Party.

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[REDACTED] *.

[REDACTED] Comment. The material in this resolution was included in the documents which were captured in the Government raids on Communist centers in Manila during October 1950. All available documentary material on the subject of the Chinese Bureau was summarized in [REDACTED] (May 1951).

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Since the ideas it contains were covered in the October 1950 documents, it is possible that Political Bureau approval of the resolution was delayed for some time following its preparation.

The resolution contains certain locutions and constructions, as well as a style of writing, that would seem to indicate that it was prepared by a Party leader of experience and ability. Although many of these ideas have been expressed by Jose Lava in his writings, it cannot be identified as his work.