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# INFORMATION REPORT

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1. [Redacted] government, was chiefly responsible for external and domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, and operated independently from the North Korean Labor Party, which had an intelligence section in its organization department, and from the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean army. The State Security nets which operated, before the war, in the ROK, such as those directed by CHONG Kwan-sik (鄭寬植), HAN In-sik (韓仁植), AN Yong-tal (安永達), and SO Won-sok (孫完錫), were not in communication with the Labor Party nets directed by SONG Si-paek (成始伯) and HWANG Yong (黃龍). There was probably some coordination or liaison between the operations at the highest governmental level, but in the field even the top agents were not known to each other, or were not supposed to be.
2. Most of the net chiefs of the State Security Bureau in the ROK before the war were chosen from among those who were violently opposed to the policies of the ROK government, and thus frequently the bureau became interested in insurrection and sabotage and often neglected the intelligence functions of its nets. An example of this was the use of HAN In-sik, known to the ROK government as CH'OE Kum-gyong, and his organization. After the war began in June 1950, however, guerrilla and sabotage operations were handled by the Labor Party organization in North and South Korea.<sup>1</sup> The Labor Party also dropped all work connected with the expansion of the party organization in the ROK and with general espionage activities to concentrate on the establishment of an organization that would assure supplies to guerrilla units in the ROK and furnish the information necessary to the guerrillas. The Security Bureau itself, beginning in 1951, relied less and less on these nets, which involved communications difficulties, and concentrated on numerical nets, which were instructed to report back themselves with the

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3. When the North Korean armies first occupied ROK areas in June and July 1950, the State Security Bureau had occupation authorities make an official announcement advising ROK police officials, members of the observation section of the police and their informants, and others connected with intelligence or counter-intelligence activities to surrender voluntarily to North Korean authorities. Their objective was to make use of all who were of any value by guaranteeing their safety and extending economic aid, eliminating the others who were useless as sources of information or were unwilling to cooperate. The headquarters of the SSB was established in Chokson-dong, Chongno-ku, Seoul and consisted of four offices, each of which was further divided into twelve sections.
4. The North Korean government did not expect the United States would or could effectively intervene in time to prevent the occupation of the entire Korean peninsula within ten days, the scheduled period for the operation. The arrival of United States troops and the failure of the North Koreans to complete the occupation on schedule caused a shift in the plans of the SSB, as well as of other North Korean government agencies, all of which had completely worked out programs of action. The first step taken by the SSB was to avoid the assignment of any overt missions, propaganda operations, to newly recruited South Korean agents chosen from those who voluntarily surrendered and agreed to work for the SSB. This step was taken so that these agents could be used in the event that the North Koreans withdrew north of the parallel. The second step taken was to execute or jail those intellectuals and officials who refused to cooperate.

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1.  Comment.  after the war began the North Korean Labor Party turned over its nets to the State Security Bureau. This procedure and the practice of recruiting SSB agents when possible from the Labor Party or associated front organizations probably explain why some of the persons mentioned in this report appear to have been connected in organizational activity with both the Labor Party and the SSB, in spite of the source's statement that the nets were entirely separate.

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