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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. The Yugoslav Government is confident that it has the internal Yugoslav situation under control, except in Macedonia. Here the nationalist sentiments of a young people tend to prevail over other considerations, and the Macedonian intellectuals give practical expression to these feelings, in which both right and left are joined. This takes the form of excessive demands in favor of Macedonian economy at the expense of national economy; insistence on an economy as independent as possible from that of the remainder of Yugoslavia; and much more actual sabotage than in any of the other Yugoslav republics.
2. The Government reports that these acts of sabotage are committed by Bulgarians who cross the frontier illegally but they are merely the irresponsible expression of the nationalistic spirit which prevades the majority of Macedonians.
3. This nationalist feeling is not entirely a result of Bulgarian propaganda for an independent state of Macedonia. The feeling is stronger among the leaders of the Macedonian Communist Party than appears from their public pronouncements. Another reason for the nationalist feeling is the suspension of the Five-Year Plan for Macedonia which was intended to bring about a complete transformation of the backward economy of Macedonia, nor have the changes which have taken place yielded the results which were expected. The figure of 2,400,000,000 dinars for the value of Macedonian production does not mean very much since it is based on the industrial production of 1939, and on the value of the dinar at that time.
4. Production from the large Tito metallurgical works has always been far below expectations. There has been a constant shortage of technicians and skilled workers, and those who came from Slovenia and Croatia have never adapted themselves to their surroundings. The large works at Veles, which were partly refitted with new Czech machinery, were after two and a half years virtually reduced to a heap of scrap metal because of the negligent

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way in which the machines were cared for. The rice-polishing factory in Strumica has received the same treatment and is now in the same condition as it was at the end of World War II. Experimental rubber plantations and cotton fields are things of the past.

5. Progress has been made, however, in the electrification of Macedonia. The production of electrical energy is now eight times greater than it was before the war. The textile industry has also show good results, particularly the artificial silk factory in Titovo Veles, and products have been successfully exported.
6. The basic need for the Macedonian economy is the greatly increased agricultural production of special plants for industrial needs, and this has not been achieved.

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