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
1. Following the maneuvers of autumn 1951, the Soviet Pioneer Corps has been moved to Komsomolsk (5C-35N, 137-02E) on the Amur River. Penal detachments of the Soviet Army, which also participated in the maneuvers, have been sent to Karaganda (47-50N, 73-10E), in the coal mine district of Kazakstan, and the Alma-Ata steel works. Soviet infantry divisions have returned to their bases near Kaliningrad.
2. Units of the Czechoslovak Fifth and Eighth Divisions were sent to Ceske Budejovice in southern Bohemia for reorganization.
3. The poor handling of logistic support during the autumn maneuvers resulted in orders for the mass production of the heavy truck MAZ-525 to be given to the Minsk Automobile Works on 15 February 1952. The MAZ-525 truck has a capacity of 15 tons, a 300 hp. Diesel motor, and hydraulic lifting equipment. Armor plating is installed around the driver's seat, and similar armor will be placed on the 1950 models. The production of this truck is under the direction of Ashot Pogosov, Deputy Minister of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises.
4. It has been established that the autumn maneuvers were not for the purpose of studying mass deployment toward western Europe. The Politburo was opposed to any moves of such international importance. The need for general readiness of Soviet troops in case of an emergency in Asia also restricted Army General S.M. Shtemenko's plans for widespread maneuvers.
5. There was a division of opinion in the Politburo with regard to the extent of the maneuvers, Molotov wishing them to be on the largest possible scale, to impress and frighten the West, while Malenkov insisted on the necessity of restraint to take advantage of the peace propaganda, which is achieving good results.
6. Both Soviet and satellite military experts are satisfied that the autumn maneuvers demonstrated that the Soviet Army will be "irresistible" if fully deployed.

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1. The autumn maneuvers were considered satisfactory in demonstrating the efficiency of a holding action by minimum forces with minimum reserves, using defensive fire power. The same restrictions will not be imposed upon the maneuvers being prepared for late summer 1952. Mass deployment of Soviet and satellite armies forward for an invasion of western Europe will be studied, and will be keyed in with the political activity of the Politburo.

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