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- In On 5 and 6 June 1952, the 320 Folithuro considered measures to be taken investibly after blocking of BOR zonal boundaries.
- 2. Fred Oelssner was called upon to report on the Propagandist Conference, held a few lays previously at the Marl Marx Partei Hochschule in Klein-Tachnow, for the purpose of providing all propaganda cadres with material on the new line of "na ional armed forces". Gelssner's report contained the following points: Even the well schooled propagandist corps had been pnable to produce the necessary reaction at first attempt. Exychological resistance against a public campaign to arouse militury enthusiasm was considerable, especially along SUD members. It would take some time to achieve a positive reaction from the DDR population to the call for "national armed forces". Usual propaganda media would not achieve the desired goal. Instead, rigorous security measures would have to be employed to prevent and uncontrolled discussion of the question. It was particularly important not to allow the job of making militarization tasteful to the teneral public to fail to the former army officer group. The DDR's National Democratic Party should not be given major resconsibility for the propagandistic preparation for "national armed forces". Since the organization and establishment of the forces would be the business of the "tested" Soviet Aray anyway, the whole task should be directed toward taking it clear to the German population that the Red Army was to serve as pattern and ideal. The strong sentiment among the population against the Red Army would have to be atticked through an intensve campaign emphasizing the achievement, deeds, and goals of the Red Army.
- 2. According to Oslssner's report, all of these points had been discussed at the Propagandist Conference, with the understanding, however, that the establishment of national German armed forces could not writ for the achievement of propaganda goals, since this would require a long period of struggle against tough resistance.
- 4. In the Folitburo discussion, it was continually emphasized that the military side of the problem of building up military units was a purely devict matter. A small top-level DOR government group would serve in an advisory capacity to the Soviet military shaff.

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