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12 January 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 619



AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FRG LOAN TO BOAD--Lome, 22 Dec (REUTER)--Under an agreement signed on Thursday in Lome, the FRG Development Society, which is based in Cologne, granted a line of credit of 6 million German marks (approximately 1.15 million CFA francs) to the West African Development Bank (BOAD). The money is to be used to help finance industrial and agroindustrial projects in the member states of the West African Monetary Union. [London REUTER in French 1213 GMT 22 Dec 78 PA]

GHANA-BENIN TRADE RELATIONS--Trade between Ghana and Benin is on the upswing. Working within the joint cooperation commission, the two countries have frequently engaged in joint efforts over recent years. The Ghana State Transport Corporation began operating an international highway transport service on 2 November 1977, with three departures weekly from Cotonou (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday) and three from Accra (Monday, Wednesday, Friday). [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3222] 6182

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

UNITA BENGUELA CONTROL CLAIM DENIED--The Angolan charge d'affaires in Lusaka, Mr Andre Miranda, flatly denied rumors to the effect that the National Union for Total Independence for Angola UNITA controls large sections of the Benguela rail line. Replying to a news report by a BBC TV crew which spent some 4 months in Angola, Mr Miranda stated that "these reports are nothing but western propaganda; UNITA does not control a centimeter or even a millimeter of the rail line," he added. "Insofar as I know, the railroad is running from Lobito to the Zaire border. Our people are well organized and they will not allow something called to control a single segment of the Benguela line." Mr Miranda also branded as "false" a report that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was in Angola, stating that "the Angolan people would not let Savimbi operate out of Angola." Mr Miranda's denial was addressed to reports by BBC TV reporter Mike Nicholson, who arrived in Johannesburg on 25 November and who claims to have spend 110 days with UNITA troops in southern Angola. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3336] 6182

BELGIAN TECHNICAL MISSION--A Belgian party of experts will spend the week from 29 November to 6 December in Angola "to lay the groundwork for Belgian aid" to this country, the Foreign Ministry announced in Brussels. The idea, according to that source, is to provide the first concrete results of last September's visit there by Belgium's top diplomat, Mr Henri Simonnet. The mission includes officials from the ministries of Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, as well as experts on roads and port installations. Belgium has already made a commitment to help Angola in the expansion of its port at Lobito. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3336] 6182

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CONGO

FUTURE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS SAID TO BE GLOOMY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Nov 78 pp 98, 99

[Article by Sophie Bessis, "The President Issues a Warning]

[Text] Economic difficulties become more and more worrisome. However, exhorting the people to work will not solve the problems.

"The Congolese countryside looks barren and deserted," said President Yhombi Opango on 13 November after a tour of the country's major regions. He was commenting once again on the stagnation of agricultural production.

The problem is not a new one. Authorities in Brazzaville frequently bemoan the seriousness of the situation in this vital sector of the economy; a sector which is even more important because prospects seem scarcely brighter in mining, hydrocarbons and industry. Within the last few years, authorities have already encountered seemingly insurmountable problems.

The current president announced his intention to bring relief to the economic picture when he took office after the March 1977 assassination of Marien N'Gouabi. Although several steps have been taken, such as the creation in October of a stabilization fund for agricultural and forestry products, they have produced no tangible results. There is still a deficit in the trade balance in 1978. Food imports are increasing at an alarming rate. In 1977 they reached 10 billion francs CFA, or 20 percent of the total purchases from foreign countries. This was a serious drain on the country's reserve cash. Potassium has not been mined since July 1977 because of the disastrous floods.

The development of petroleum, which was supposed to solve all these problems, has been a disappointment. In the early seventies good prospects created a sense of euphoria: in 1972-73 the simultaneous rise in production and in prices hinted at possibilities of development on a grand scale and an ambitious plan was developed. By 1975, however, production had diminished. Disillusionment grew year after year. Anticipated investments were revised downward and authorities were confronted with the hard realities which they had momentarily forgotten because of the mirage of petroleum manna. In 1977 the volume of export diminished by 32 percent and development by 25 percent in comparison with 1976.

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Favorable Climate

Nevertheless, the Congo is far from being the least fortunate country on the continent. Climactic conditions are relatively favorable for agriculture. Forests, which cover 60 percent of the land, are an important resource: wood production, which had reached 500,000 cubic meters in 1977, could easily attain 2 million cubic meters a year. The country has good roads, which will be improved by the realignment of the Congo-Ocean railroad. The percentage of people receiving education is the highest in black Africa.

What, then, is the cause of this apparently irremediable slump? In truth, everyone has known for a long time just what the impediments to the economy are. Since the magic spell of petroleum has lost its power, these problems have come to the forefront again. Because agriculture has been the "poor relation" in every development plan since independence, there is now a growing shortage of food and agricultural exports. After having been almost entirely neglected, agriculture was hoisted to a priority position among other priorities in 1975. However, this sector has so deteriorated during years of neglect that a reversal of this trend is almost impossible.

Gloomy Future

"Budget-devouring" public officials have put development expenses on a short allowance. Also, it is common knowledge that a disastrously inefficient financial administration of national enterprises has monopolized a large part of public finances. In the area of agriculture, where the government holds 45 percent of the cultivated land, reorganization is promised regularly, year after year, yet diligence and efficiency have not yet been imposed.

One of the best examples of this situation is the SIA-CONGO, a sugar-producing complex with a 150,000 ton capacity. Present production barely manages to fluctuate around 25,000 tons a year. Current repair needs now require some six billion francs CFA and the government has asked for foreign aid to start the repairs.

Other types of agricultural exports have decreased over the last few years. The situation was slightly improved in 1977: the volume of coffee exports increased by 23 percent over the 1976 figure, sugar exports increased 14 percent, on the other hand cacao exports remained at the same level, but the enormous rise in world prices caused them to double in value.

Wood production seems also to have gotten out of its rut and has shown progress in the first half of 1978.

The mining and industrial sector, by its own admission, continues to decline. Unless there are new discoveries, petroleum production will not exceed 2.5 million tons per year from now until 1982.

Although there are a few timid signs of improvement, future prospects are gloomy. In spite of predictions that the Congo would produce all its own food by 1978, the goal is still far off even though several large projects have

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been set in motion. These efforts are hampered by existing structures, limited investment in rural sectors (most foreign investment is concentrated in mines and transportation) and lack of qualified administrators.

When will there be a real reversal in the economy? For the moment we must wait until the authorities do something more than declare intentions and issue exhortations. The people, who do not see an improvement in their financial situation or in the quality of their daily lives, are not eager to respond to such government directives.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

PRESIDENT MACIAS' ABUSE OF POPULATION DETAILED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Nov 78 pp 59-64

Text Son, what would you do if I gave you my gun?

I would shoot King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia three times. Then I would rip their hearts out and leave their bodies in the jungle to be eaten by all the predatory animals.

With this unusual conversation with two of his sons, according to Spanish teacher Teodoro del Valle, Macias Nguema, president for life of Guinea, began a few months ago one of his classes on "political instruction" for all of the children in the country. These required classes are given every Saturday of the year by the Guinean Chief of State.

The Guinean dictator's insults against Spain and its highest institutions are invariably the leitmotif of all of his public statements. Meanwhile, the Madrid Government appears to be turning the other cheek with its efforts to renew cooperation agreements with the Macias Government that expired on the 1st of November.

If this is accomplished, it would mean that the Equatorial Guinea dictator would receive some 800 million pesetas in aid. The money would be used to repair the Bata airport runway and to acquire three C-2K2 Aviocar from Spain to replace all of the Equatorial Guinea Air Lines (LAGE) planes--three "Convers"--given to them by Spain 10 years ago and which are completely unserviceable today.

Of course, this time Macias will have to wait. This is what a special mission from the Foreign Affairs Ministry told him last week. The group was sent on an urgent and difficult mission to Bata to explain to the Equatorial Guinea leader that Spain could not send the airplanes nor pave the runways at Bata and Malabo by 1 November, the date on which the previous cooperation agreement expired. Spain now has a Parliament and any expenditures are controlled by it.

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The special visit to Guinea by the diplomats led the Defense Ministry to dust off the old plans for evacuating Spaniards from the former colony.

According to Foreign Ministry sources, there was a very real danger that Macias would kidnap the diplomats or take some kind of reprisal against the 50-odd Spaniards living there when he learned that LAGE would have to stop its flights, because of the existing dangers, until Spain completely renovated the airplanes and resurfaced the runways at the Bata and Malabo airports.

PSOE Opposition

For the latter reasons cited above, Spain's Iberian Air Lines, whose weekly flight to Guinea constituted the former colony's only tie with the West, was about to stop all flights to Guinea in early November.

"If we continue the flights," a company official told CAMBIO 16, "it is because the Spanish Government is paying this airline's huge deficit, it is overlooking the unpaid bills left by Macias' ministers and they have assured us that the runways will be resurfaced."

The Foreign Ministry's special mission, however, did not tell Macias that the vote in the Chamber of Deputies on assistance to Guinea will be very controversial, even though in the end it will be approved because the UCD /Democratic Center Union/ and the AP /Popular Alliance/ have a majority in Parliament. The PSOE /Spanish Socialist Workers Party/ a few weeks ago was recommending that diplomatic relations with Macias' Guinea be severed "since any aid that Spain might give that country is not helping to improve our relations, it will not reach the people and, on the contrary, it helps to maintain a tyrant in power."

The socialists are right according to Amnesty International, the Human Rights League and the Council of Churches Ecumenical Council, organizations that are tired of preparing reports on the constant violation of human rights by the Equatorial Guinea dictator.

This situation has converted the former colony into an extremely poor and deserted country. In the opinion of Guinean writer Donato Ndong, "10 years of absolute power by Macias have led to a decrease in cacao production of from 50,000 tons to 3,000, to a decrease in coffee production of from 8,000 tons to 1,000 tons, to the departure of 160,000 Guineans, to the jailing of 4,000 people and to the forced labor of 30,000 others."

Of the nearly 400,000 inhabitants living in the former Spanish colony at the end of 1968 (the date it gained its independence), the most optimistic estimates indicate that the combined total of people left on the mainland (Rio Muni) and on the island (Fernando Poo) is no more than 80,000. "Entire cities on Rio Muni have disappeared," says Jose Maria Odena, another priest who was expelled after 8 years in Guinea, "because the inhabitants have left everything and fled to Gabon and Cameroon." "Those who have stayed behind," adds physician Sanchez Salvador, "have become Macias' slaves."

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On other occasions Macias Nguema's militia have expelled the people. "A year ago when Buandi, the director of the Central Bank of Guinea, attempted to flee to Switzerland with the nation's revenues," Teodoro del Valle recalls, "Macias jailed him first and then executed him. Not satisfied, days later his militiamen were raiding the town where Buandi lived, burning homes and killing those who could not escape."

Pregnant, No Less!

The Guinean leader's obsession with ruling a large population has led him to the incredible extremes of promoting prostitution among his people, including young girls 10 and 11 years old. "Since the people are leaving," said the recently expelled teacher, "last year he said that he did not want to see any woman over the age of 11 who was not pregnant. Government officials and members of the Fans tribe, to which the president belongs, have taken advantage of this statement to have sexual relations with women of the remaining tribes."

Missionary Jose Maria Odena recalls similar episodes. "Not long ago," he said, "he paraded a group of pregnant women through the streets of Santa Isable and on another occasion he said that any woman who worked in the government but did not want to get married was a whore. Male government employees were ordered to have several wives so that they could increase their number of children."

Luis Baguena believes that the radical drop in agriculture production cannot be explained without keeping in mind the expulsion of the Nigerians. "When Spain colonized Guinea," he explained, "there was no work force so that Nigerians had to be hired. In 1968 when Guinea gained its independence, there were on Fernando Poo 40,000 Nigerians as opposed to 20,000 natives. Macias, who is no fool, realized that they could organize an uprising so he made life miserable for them until they left."

Slave Gangs

"To replace them," we were told by a Guinean who did not wish to be identified, "Macias Nguema converted Guinea into a concentration camp and he sent his militia and the National Guard to arrest 30,000 Guineans on the mainland so that they could work as slaves."

"Since many of them did not want to leave their homes and wives in Rio Muni and move to Fernando Poo to cultivate cacao," Jose Maria Vinas continues, "the National Guard arrested at machine gun point, loaded them on trucks and without allowing them to say goodbye to their families they were sent to the island."

Since the country is still bankrupt, the Equatorial Guinean dictator has instituted forced labor so that everyone works in the fields. "On certain days," Jose Maria Odena states, "the post office, the telegraph office, the various ministries and even police headquarters are empty because Macias has ordered the workers into the fields to clear stubble with machetes."

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Not even his closest advisers are immune from this treatment. "When he calls a minister in for a business meeting," Jose Maria Odena tells us, "the official is required to work for 2 hours on his farm before he meets with him. Any minister, military officer or high level government official who falls from grace has an even worse time of it because Macias, before executing them or releasing them, has them confined for several months working without pay on one of his private farms."

The Forbidden City

His anti-people and anti-middle class policy has antagonized everyone. Macias Nguema, according to all the sources consulted by this magazine, has no friends in the country. Even his own ministers hate him and many of them are only waiting for an opportunity to flee the dictator's grasp as the Minister of Labor recently did when he fled to Cameroon.

"Those who have not lost a brother, have lost a friend, their mother or father or have been publically humiliated," a Guinean exile who did not wish to be identified told us to summarize the situation of terror and hate. "We lived better under King Malabo's rule 50 years ago."

"His personal guard is composed of relatives trained by Senen Ochoa, one of the principal Cuban military advisers in Guinea," Teodoro del Valle told CAMBIO 16, "because Macias does not trust anyone."

"Since he always expects to be attacked," Manuel Amilibia adds, "he has forced farmers to cut down trees along a 30 meter stretch next to the roads he travels on. He has taken all rifles from the homes and he has also taken all weapons away from his own militia whom he does not trust."

The oddest aspect of all of this is, however, the "forbidden city" of Santa Isabel. "Since his fear of being killed is almost a visceral reaction," says Teodoro del Valle, "he has evacuated two-thirds of the city of Santa Isabel near the presidential palace and has built a fortress around it. Only Macias and his Fan supporters are permitted inside the forbidden city."

Fearing an invasion of Fernando Poo since an attempt has already been made by a group of fools, President Macias has not set foot on the island for 4 years. "His home," continues Teodoro del Valle, "is an enormous bunker that was built in Malambo, his hometown, by the Spanish company of Escuder and Galiana. To reach the home from Bata, one must go through 17 police checkpoints and the areas surrounding the Palace extending for several kilometers around it have been evacuated under protest."

Money Kept in Wardrobe

Macias, says missionary Jose Maria Vinas, like all Fans belongs to the Society of the Leopard and other similar sects. "These individuals," he explains, "tend to dress in leopard skins and they use the claws to destroy

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their human victims which are chosen for their intellectual ability or their dexterity and skills. Once their victims are dead they eat some of their organs in the belief that they thus acquire the victims spirit and his virtues."

Macias also keeps his wealth and part of the treasury in Malambo. "Since Guinea Central Bank Director Buendi attempted to flee the country with the nations revenues, the Equatorial Guineandictator keeps them in his home where he has ordered that all 100, 500 and 1,000 ekuele bills (the ekuele is worth as much as the peseta) be sent to his home," Manuel Amilibia said.

Only coins were left at the Bank of Guinea and that is why when Spaniards want to cash a check they take several bags along. "On most occasions," says Amilibia, "he returns with empty sacks because the bank, on Macias' orders, does not make payment even though the ekuele is not worth anything outside the country."

Therefore, to avoid being robbed by the President of Guinea, many Spaniards living there--who do not even number 60 according to the most varied sources from that country--prefer to keep their money at home. "Iberian Airlines, for example," says Father Jose Maria Vinas, "when we left Guinea was beginning to refuse checks drawn on the Central Bank and it kept its money in a wardrobe in its main office."

Food Brought by Colonists

Of course the Guineans do not miss the money. After their independence, Macias Nguema prohibited the consumption of "food brought by the colonists" including milk and bread and he suggested that the people eat what had been eaten centuries before: "yucca, dogbane and fried plantains."

The President does not exactly practice what he preaches and, according to Teodoro del Valle, "he is adicted to all the vices and food of colonist society, as he calls them, and from time to time he asks Spanish compaines that still maintain ties with Guinea to buy for him Rolex, gold pens and the latest European styled suits and shoes."

When he visited China a year ago, where he equated Spain with a shoe," Manuel Amilibia said, "he ordered Bolo, his official tailor, to make him 24 suits that he could wear at receptions and official ceremonies."

However, the ban on food introduced by the colonists is a real one throughout the country. This ban has given rise to a huge black market for essential goods. Those who profit from this trade are basically the government ministers and the Spanish businessmen with ties to Macias.

A bottle of Tres Cepas cognac, for example, sells for 60 pesetas in the Canary Islands while in the former Spanish colony it sells for 5,000 ekueles. "The sale of one of these bottles," says Teodoro del Valle, "allows a Spanish company to pay a Guinean worker, who earns 3,000 ekueles, and still have money left over."

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The Spanish businessmen who have Macias' blessings not only deny that they are making money on the black market but they also maintain, at least some of them, that they are fed up with Macias as well as with the Foreign Affairs Ministry which has not had full diplomatic relations with Guinea for a year.

"The Foreign Affairs Ministry," said an employee and relative of one of the owners of Escuder and Galiana, "today does not provide any protection for us here in Guinea much less for the repatriation of our property if that time ever comes. Macias knows this and he teases us about it. He considers us to be his boys, his servants whom he harrasses every chance he gets."

There are also those who say that the Equatorial Guinean dictator is not short of reasons since the Spanish Government has not complied with any of the economic agreements it signed with its former colony. Nevertheless, Macias has a very peculiar way of filling his nation's coffers, which are actually his personal property. He kidnaps Spaniards and then asks for a ransom and he also imposes arbitrary fines. To date the Foreign Ministry has done nothing to curtail these activities.

Having had enough of Macias, at the end of July the last six missionaries in Guinea arrived in Spain. Among them was Jose Maria Odena. They had been in prison weeks before and their religious order had to pay 4 million ekueles so that they could leave the country. "The charges which led to our imprisonment," Jose Maria Odena says, "alleged that we were Spanish spies and that we took advantage of the natives' confessions to obtain Guinea's secrets."

A month earlier the last group of nuns was repatriated. In this case Macias' reason for imprisoning them and asking for a ransom was that they were spying for Spain under orders from Queen Sofia.

The teachers sent to Guinea by the Foreign Ministry under a cooperation program found themselves in a similar situation. Macias, who saw spies everywhere, would from time to time suggest to his students of "political instruction" that they watch the teachers but not attack them. If the teachers were caught in some wrongdoing, it was to be reported to him and he would be responsible for seeing that "justice" was done.

The wrongdoing which Macias was looking for occurred when teacher Rafael Gueri attempted to help a Danish woman whom Gabonese authorities had given permission to enter their country. "That is why," Gueri recalls, "I was put in jail for 41 days. Even children 2 years old were thrown in jail and beaten until they died. I was released only after the Spanish Government paid 3 million ekueles."

Colonists Names

Father Jose Maria Vinas found himself in a similar situation several years ago. He was thrown in jail, he told CAMBIO 16, because he was baptizing

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natives with names used by the colonists. He would have to pay 1.5 ekueles to obtain his release.

Businessman-farmer Manuel Amilibia was fined, according to his story, "because he met with one of Macias' ministers without a tie although he had been working on [Macias] farm." However, a few months ago another businessman received an even greater surprise when he was fined 200,000 ekueles on his arrival at the Malabo airport because he was carrying shoes wrapped in a newspaper. "To Macias' political police," said the businessman who preferred to keep his identity a secret, "the corpus delicti was the newspaper in which the shoes were wrapped because they saw it as clandestine Spanish propaganda being smuggled into the country."

However, the Spaniards are lucky because they can complain. Those who cannot do so, according to the Anti-Macias Front (FAM), are the 10,000 who have been killed or have disappeared during the 10-year regime of the Equatorial Guinean dictator.

The FAM's latest report, made public on 12 October, the 10th anniversary of Guinea's independence, contains a list of 533 people for whom there is available concrete proof that they were tortured and murdered by the regime of the former Spanish Public Works employee, Macias Nguema.

Among those included on the list are 29 ministers and high level officials and the 160 EGB professors, reporters, doctors and government workers. This leads us to conclude that repression primarily has been aimed at the nation's best trained people.

"The list is not complete," says Manuel Amilibia who lived in Guinea for 37 years and is now exiled in Spain. "My friends who numbered over 500 are all dead and most of their names do not appear on the FAM list."

In addition to everything else, the document contains a frightening section: the names of 37 children and women who were tortured and killed by Macias' militia in reprisal for the alleged crimes committed by their parents whom the dictator could not bring to "justice."

Beaten to Death

This account is reaffirmed by the attitude of a great number of the Guinean exiles in Spain who refused to make any statements to CAMBIO 16 because their parents or brothers and sisters were still in the former Spanish colony and "Macias would unleash his wrath and insanity on them."

The end came for the 10,000 people whom some sources say died at the hands of Macias not before a firing squad or by hanging but rather as a result of being beaten. "In June 1977," said Spanish priest Jose Maria Vinas who was expelled from Guinea several months ago, "I was in a Macias jail for 5 days. I met seven political prisoners that were near death. Each day each one was beaten 50 times with a stick."

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"It is only natural," says Luis Baguenta, "that in Guinea the people not only die because they are beaten but also because they are hungry. Because without a minimum of supplies, which Macias does not have, 4,000 prisoners cannot be kept in jail."

Whether death results from beatings or starvation, the killings in Guinea are not a thing of the past. On 12 October Macias Nguema ordered 32 Guineans executed to commemorate the 10th anniversary of that country's independence. Among those who were killed, according to CAMBIO 16's sources, were National Guard Lt Jose Moro, former chief of the San Carlos (now Luba) military outpost and reporter Severo Moto who studied at the Church of Madrid's School of Journalism.

Those Who Remain

Things being as they are, it is not unusual that a few months ago the PSOE asked one of its deputies, Manuel Marin to be exact, to conduct a thorough investigation of the Guinea problem so that the subject could be discussed in the Chamber of Deputies. The government, which initially asked that the matter be discussed behind closed doors "because of the possible reprisals against Spanish citizens still in the former colony," finally managed to avoid a debate by invoking "reasons of state."

The deans of Spain's diplomatic service felt that action of this nature by Spain could be interpreted by the young African nations, that are sensitive about the former European colonialist powers, as a form of aggression by Spain against a former colony and it could undermine the gains made by Spain at the Khartoum Summit with respect to Spanish control over the Canary Islands.

Despite everything, the opposition is poised and ready to fight because the PSOE favors a radical curtailment of aid to Macias. "Everything that reaches Guinea," says teacher Teodoro del Valle, "becomes Macias personal property. The Chinese and Russian food has made its way to Gabon and Cameroon in exchange for foreign currency. Teaching materials donated by Spain have found their way to the ministers libraries or are sold to the public in stores owned by the President. The medicines donated by the Congo, Lybia, Zaire and Spain have become the object of speculation by ministers and other high government officials."

"While hunger and disease are taking their toll of the population," concludes Teodoro del Valle, "the gamma globulin donated by the European countries is sold for 2,000 ekucles on Fernando Poo and only on someone's recommendation."

Lt Col Luis Baguena also does not understand. "A month after we left Guinea, Macias asked for money to pay the National Guard and we asked him to provide us with a budget."

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According to the sources consulted by CAMBIO 16, there are no more than 50 Spaniards still left on the former colony and this includes Iberia's maintenance crews and the workers of the Escuder y Galiana, Mallo, Tok, Fleitas, Sampaka, Cabanillas and San Cristobal companies, the only ones left in Guinea. "I really do not know," concludes Father Jose Maria Odena, "why we are still there. Unless we have been ordered by the Americans to stay there to offset the communist influence of the Cubans, Soviets and Chinese."

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GHANA

BRIEFS

GHANAIAN-BRITISH TRADE--Trade between Ghana and Britain for the first three quarters of 1978 came to 173.7 million pounds. Britain bought 92.3 million pounds worth of goods from Ghana, and sold Ghana 81.4 million worth, thus putting Ghana 10.9 million in the black. Cacao headed the list of Britain's buys at 77.8 million pounds worth. Ghana's purchases from Britain consisted primarily of machinery and transport equipment (42.2 million pounds worth, 15.8 million of that for highway vehicles), specialized machines (10.8 million) and miscellaneous other equipment (3.1 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3322] 6182

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GUINEA

SKEPTICISM ON TOURE OVERTURES IN THE WAKE OF PARTY CONGRESS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 935, 6 Dec 78 pp 110-112

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "There Has Been No Overture"]

[Excerpts] No surprise in the 11th Congress of the Democratic Party of Guinea. The regime continues as is. Rapprochement with France is confirmed.

"When a person is a dictator, he continues to be one." This terrible official statement was made by an African head of state after the PDG [Democratic Party of Guinea] congress, which closed in Conakry on 22 November 1978. One of several ways of noting the timidity characterizing President Ahmed Sekou Toure's decisions with regard to political prisoners. If there were any releases, they were accomplished under cover, secretly, at random stops by those military trucks that were said to have released a few nameless prisoners on the streets of Conakry at night. About 60, according to some sources; about 20, according to others.

Nevertheless, that PDG congress had given rise to hopes. Scheduled for September and postponed until November (from 17 to 22 November), it coincided this year with the celebration of a memory: the attack by Portuguese mercenaries and Guinean opposition members against Conakry, on one certain 22 November 1970. Especially the diplomatic overture initiated by Ahmed Sekou Toure on 18 March 1978, at Monrovia, on occasion of his spectacular reconciliation with his peers Leopold Sedar Senghor (Senegal) and Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) should find its consecration, this time, in a liberalization of the regime, according to assurances.

Before the congress, some friends, men in the confidence of President Sekou Toure, told us: "You newsmen are the ones who bring up a bit of scandal each time and thus prevent Sekou from taking positive decisions! By describing him as a dictator, you enclose him in a trap. Sekou Toure is not a man to bend before the wishes of newsmen." Others added: "You shall see. Sekou Toure cannot make decisions all by himself. He has pronounced condemnation by associating the people and the party in them. He can

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pronounce amnesties only by associating the people and the party in them. The 11th PDG Congress will be the opportunity for that." Apparently, the opportunity was missed. The most spectacular decisions did not even strengthen the diplomatic overture, with the exception of some kind words for France whose president will be in Conakry from 18 to 23 December.

Moreover, the 11th PDG Congress pleased the Guinean president's detractors more than it reassured his old friends. Even the foreign observers had to be satisfied with being given an ovation in the 28 September Stadium, in Conakry. Edgard Faure, the personal envoy of the French head of state, was honored by the accolade of President Sekou Toure, but he could see in his host only the "inflexible hero" of the first years of independence. Andrew Young, who was sent by the American president, left Washington on 19 November, according to the White House communique, "to represent his country in the festivities marking the 20th anniversary of Guinea's independence." While, officially, the Conakry festivities were the "commemorative expressions of the great victory of the people over the act of imperialist and Portuguese aggression on 22 November 1970." American discretion or diplomatic blunder, that kind of incongruity in concern seems to limit still more the understanding that may be had abroad of President Sekou Toure's "diplomatic offensive."

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GUINEA-BISSAU

POPULAR APATHY, 'BOURGEOIS' TENDENCIES MAR DEVELOPMENT

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 935, 6 Dec 78 pp 109, 110

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Old Wounds"]

[Text] The success of the socialist experiment in the land of Luis Cabral does not rule out divisions. The resumption of activity by the armed opposition has come along to emphasize this.

On Saturday 18 November, while leafing through the few pages of the the daily newspaper NO PINTCHA, officials and members of the PAIGC [African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde] had the impression of re-living a bad dream. A communique issued by the political bureau of the party announced, in fact, that for the first time since 1976, violent confrontations had just put FARP [People's Armed Revolutionary Forces] soldiers face to face with "groups of armed rebels" in the Bissalanca region, not far from Bissau.

It is true that these uncontrolled elements, for the most part former Guinean auxiliaries of the Portuguese Army who had been re-forming secretly in southwestern Senegal since 1974 and who were violently hostile to the PAIGC, had attempted frequent raids just to the beginning of 1976. Since then, following the agreements entered upon between Dakar and Bissau, it was believed that Senegal had put an end to their activities. The Senegalese Army had even arrested almost 300 of those opponents and FLING [Front for the Struggle for the National Independence of Guinea] (a rival nationalist liberation front of the PAIGC) had to close its offices in Dakar and dismantle its training camps on the border.

"Angolanization"

In fact, the region of the Casamance River, between Ziguinchor and Kolda, in southern Senegal, where several hundred of the 20,000 Guinean auxiliaries had taken refuge, is difficult to control, because it is covered with bush

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that is very dense at times. Therefore, small groups of diehards were able to form up again and to make raids again, starting in September 1978, against the border posts held by the FARP.

The problem of rehabilitating the soldiers used by the colonial army is also one of the most critical obstacles that the young republic has had to tackle. After disarming them, the Guinean authorities have preferred, up to now, to organize them and to incorporate them "under supervision" in economic activity by means of agricultural production cooperatives. Undoubtedly the PAIGC has some reasons for being on its guard. The miscarried attempt at a military coup d'etat on 11 March 1975 against President Luis Cabral (in coordination with the attempt by Gen Antonio de Spinola, in Portugal) was instigated by African former noncommissioned officers of the elite comandos of the colonial army.

Then, is Guinea-Bissau going to be talked about again in terms of insecurity and underground movements? Can it be that this small country with 560,000 inhabitants is slowly in the process of becoming "Angolanized"? For several years now, we had become so accustomed to seeing, in those 36,000 square kilometers of islands, of tall grass and of intermingled swamps the site of an experiment, of an original model of socialist development, fascinating and reassuring, that the dull crackling of firearms produces somewhat the effect of a cold shower. But there is no country free from conflicts and divisions. Why would Guinea-Bissau not follow the rule?

At this year end and in spite of these border skirmishes, Bissau is calm. So calm even that a pronounced feeling of boredom floats along the broad mango-lined avenues. Everything seems to be plunged in lethargy. This prolonged slumber of the 60,000 inhabitants of the capital stems, however, from a simple explanation: passive resistance. That is the second problem up against which the PAIGC leaders have been running for the last 4 years. Although it is, in fact, true that, before 19 October 1974, the party controlled almost three-fourths of the country, it was very far from having mobilized the majority of the urban population.

Wait-and-See Policy

Marked as much by the severe repression of the Portuguese as by the status of "assisted" to which they were reduced by the economic repercussions of the presence of the colonial army, the inhabitants of Bissau, just like the inhabitants of Bula or Bafata, have taken refuge in a complete wait-and-see policy, mixed with fear and distrust. This reticence is less evident at present than immediately after independence. But it is still there and the PAIGC -- which, fortunately, has not chosen a violent solution of the conflicts -- is counting greatly on the tireless activity of its rank-and-file committees (the Tabancas) to succeed in overcoming them.

There is also a complementary explanation for the wait-and-see policy of the city-dwellers: the ties uniting the lower middle class in the cities

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to the PAIGC leaders most of whom have come from the same social class. Some persons within the party are beginning to criticize this new leadership caste, born of a merger of these two groups.

During the Third PAIGC Congress, in November 1977, the hardcore of the party attacked the "new masters." A delegate pointed out that the watchword published as a large headline in NO PINTCHA for 25 November 1975 "When a leader begins to think about ensuring his future, he has lost his revolutionary spirit" had hardly been followed actually.

Of course, Luis Cabral drives his black Peugeot-504 himself and the minister earns officially only the equivalent of 2,500 French francs (125,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs a month, but there are many who believe that all the PAIGC cadres are far from being above all suspicion.

The most violent criticisms are expressed within the party's youth movement. The Amilcar Cabral African Youth (JAAC) does not hesitate to state that the middle class in office has found its "natural trends" again by opening up the country to the West economically and politically. The bete noire of these young dissidents, Francisco Mendes, principal commissioner (prime minister), was killed in an automobile accident on 7 July 1978. The members of the JAAC hope that his successor, Joao Bernardo Vieira, fresh from a Cuban military academy, will know how to change the direction of what they call the "rightist course" of Guinea's policy.

In fact, it does not seem likely that the hopes of these radicals can be materialized. An important turn was taken in 1977, when Guinea-Bissau called for international aid to relieve the dramatic effects of the Sahel drought. Ninety percent of this aid came from the West, especially from the Scandinavian countries and from the United States. Since then, there has been a succession of Western and Arab investments. France, the United States, Brazil, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Portugal (140 Portuguese cooperation personnel are working in Guinea-Bissau) are participating in the country's reconstruction.

Rural Population Support

The PAIGC leaders are counting greatly on the support of the rural masses for the success of their experiment. Their successful achievements are undeniable in the field of rural development. For the first time since independence, Guinea-Bissau has met its rice needs.

Armed opposition, internal conflicts, wait-and-see policy of the city-dwellers: accordingly, Guinea-Bissau is not free from problems. Even if the picture of a pilot laboratory and of a courageous cooperative society often drawn of this small country in the extreme west of Africa has to suffer from this.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

USSR AIRPLANES--Antananarivo, 26 Dec (REUTER)--TARATRA, the Malagasy information agency, reported on Tuesday that two "Antonov 12" cargo planes arrived at Antananarivo-Ivato International Airport and that the planes will be placed at the disposal of Malagasy officials for 1 year. The agency stated that each of these planes can transport 12 tons of merchandise. Observers believe that the planes may primarily be used to relieve the crowding at the autonomous port of Tamatave, the country's most important commercial port, where over 4,000 tons of merchandise are reportedly waiting to be distributed. A "Yak 40" airplane, a Soviet gift to Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka, was expected to arrive in Madagascar on Tuesday afternoon. [Text] [London REUTER in French 1340 GMT 26 Dec 78 PA]

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

1979 SUGAR PRODUCTION PROSPECTS--Mr Antonio Almeida Matos, Mozambique's director of foreign trade, says that the outlook for his country's sugar crop is better for 1979 than it was for 1978. Production plan quotas for the current year have been met for all refineries -- except for Sena Sugar -- which would indicate that they will be met for 1979 as well. This means that Mozambique will be able to boost its exports to around 100,000 tons. The 1978 plan quota of 85,000 tons was not met, since the Marromeu and Sena Sugar plants stood idle. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3336] 6182

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SENEGAL

OPPOSITION LEADER RAPS SENGHOR GOVERNMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Dec 78 pp 19-22

[Interview with Senegalese Democratic Party leader Abdoulaye Wade by Sam Essono]

[Text] [Question] The situation prevailing in your country, both on the economic and the political level, is a source of some concern for all Senegalese. Can you give us your party's view of this situation?

[Answer] The economic and financial situation of Senegal is hardly brilliant. Already in 1977-1978, treasury difficulties had caused the government to block 20 percent of the equipment credit allocation to each ministry. You can imagine the repercussions on the functioning of public departments.

While the trade balance deficit was 25 billion in 1975 and 40 billion in 1976, it reached the record figure of 80 billion CFA francs this year. As to the balance of payments, the deficit was about 27 billion in 1977 and a figure of about 60 billion is expected for 1978.

On the domestic level, we note a very clear trend toward a drop in the gross national product, above all in the farm sector, and inflation which is a source of concern in view of the wage freeze. All of this, as you can imagine, makes the life of the workers and the laboring masses difficult.

Under these conditions, it is easy to understand why the budget presented to us shows a lack of sincerity. Out of an estimated equipment budget of 35 billion francs, only 2 billion were allocated as an operations budget, and the country had to borrow 33 billion---practically all to pay debts, for of this sum, only 5 billion represent new expenditures. To this must be added a foreign indebtedness of 186 billion francs and fiscal pressure of almost 20 percent.

As to the measures designed to improve the treasury position, not only are they unpopular but they are but a drop in a giant bucket: At most they would yield three and a half billion in a year while the treasury needs

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6.5 billion every month to pay government employees, its representatives in the parastate sector, and obligations falling due. The contradiction is in fact insoluble, since, taking other resources into account, the monthly deficit falls little short of a billion and a half.

On the political level, it is not exaggeration either to say that the party in power, the PS [Socialist Party] is in decline, and is supported solely by the personality of Senghor. The crisis it is experiencing is very profound and is illustrated by the expulsion of Babacar Ba, the former minister of finance, who is charged with being the cause of the present difficulties.

To speak the truth, it is a matter of echoes of the struggle against the opposition, in which Babacar Ba was the main tool, for with the support of his party, he was supposed to use the state budget to combat us. There were three stages in this struggle. In 1976, in an effort to halt the expansion of our party and prevent us from holding our first congress in Kaolack, the PS waged a so-called campaign of demolition which cost, it is said, two billion francs. In this connection, the space devoted by the only national daily, the newspaper LE SOLEIL, to this operation, will remain in all our memories forever.

Then the elections were held, which cost, one suspects, a great deal of money. But before that, the PS had to pursue a goodwill policy designed to create, out of whole cloth, a political-business "bourgeoisie" supporting the regime. An irony of fate--with the elections over, some of those who profited from the liberalism of Babacar Ba to purchase expensive buildings or vehicles are now being pursued by the new minister of finance.

[Question] However, this economic situation has deeper causes. What in your view are they?

[Answer] Obviously, the PS will tell you that the drought is the cause of all these ills. Indeed, it may have played a certain role, but a large part of the responsibility therein falls to a government which, after independence, never had a precise overview of our economy, its potential and the difficulties which might possibly appear in its path.

In our party's program, priority is given to an agricultural plan with the development of crops designed to achieve self-sufficiency in foodstuffs rapidly. This presumes a water policy on a national level. If such an orientation had been pursued, we would have been less dependent for food on foreign countries today and the effects of the drought would have been less harsh.

To this must be added the errors in planning. Can you imagine that our development plans are implemented 50 percent, and in addition, their financing is extremely problematical, because it depends, to an average extent of almost 80 percent, on foreign funds, and thus on parameters beyond our control.

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I know very well that a number of African countries are pursuing more or less this same path. But we do not share this vision of development. Rather we are seeking balances such as that between food production and consumption, independence in the food sector for families, villages, and regions, production of our housing with local resources, instead of importing everything and seeking to rebuild Europe in Africa. Obviously, all of this presumes much independence of spirit and a revision of the value scales.

To achieve our goal, one must also speak of waste. You can have no idea of its scope since independence was achieved: Unrealistic projects aborted, swindles of every kind--only possible thanks to incompetence and indifference, and collusion with shady businessmen. This waste has cost us very dear, not to mention that it has led to the disillusionment of the people who daily receive promises of jobs and who see that nothing comes of it. Thus the responsibility of the government lies at the base of the situation. There are countries which have experienced weather problems comparable to those in Senegal but that has not prevented them from managing well, from being foresighted and advancing along the path of development.

[Question] Would you agree with us that in order to achieve this, the countries in question made a clear political choice, consistent with their national interests?

[Answer] Yes, a political choice which means first of all relying on oneself. We in the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] have absolutely no intention of basing the development of our country on foreign aid, or what has come to be called that.

I am certainly not preaching national self-sufficiency, but I believe that it is necessary to count on such permanent resources as the labor force and, more generally, local human and other resources.

[Question] When it comes to the world sector, your party has since its establishment been oriented in particular toward the peasants. Yet your program calls for the elimination of an organization such as the ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development].

[Answer] From the viewpoint of the government in 1960, the OCA, which became the OCAS, and then the ONCAD, was supposed to take the place of such trading companies as the SCOA [West African Trading Company] or the CFAO [French Company of West Africa] to guarantee the distribution of grain and thus obtain the profits formerly earned by the old colonial companies. The concept of the office thus was the result of seemingly correct reasoning, but only seemingly so.

The principal criticism we would make of the ONCAD is that it has become a mechanism for exploiting the peasants. This body purchases peanuts from the peasants at a very low price in comparison to the world market, resells them and pockets tremendous profits, which enables it to have a larger

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budget than the state in good harvest years. This credit, instead of serving as a fund for stabilizing peasant income, goes into the general budget to pay employees. In the final analysis, a favorable international price never benefits the peasant but the government employee, for this vast machine employs a multitude of scribblers paid 12 months of the year, while the peasant earns his income only once a year, at harvest time. It was not until last year, as a result of a virulent campaign waged by the PDS, that the price to the producer increased.

Thus the ONCAD is a mechanism for exploitation and transfer from one social category to another. What we want is to return to the peasant the product of his labor. The elimination of the ONCAD would be a brutal method, and in reality there is no question of elimination pure and simple. We would retain its function as an aid to the peasantry and we would also develop its role in the distribution sector.

In fact, the prices of consumer goods in the interior are too high. The cost of a sack of cement almost doubles between Dakar and Matam or Bakel. We think that in this connection the ONCAD has a role to play, and consequently, certain functions of this body will be retained or indeed developed. Parallel with this, we must also place stress on the cooperatives, which exist at present only in name, putting an end, naturally, to the principle of joint liability for debts, which is such today that if a peasant fails to repay advances to the state, the entire cooperative is required to pay for him. Now those with the heaviest debts are usually the political officials who cannot be touched, who borrow and make the peasants pay for them.

[Question] Let us return for a moment to the more pressing problem. After the transport workers' strike which completely paralyzed the country for 24 hours, how do you explain the loss of popularity the PS suffered with this social stratum, which has always supported the regime?

[Answer] It is true, until a still very recent period the transport workers were an effective bulwark of the regime. Because of their mobility, they are indispensable to the PS during the elections, since they usually see to the transportation of party members to the polling places and, when one realizes that some of the villages are 10 or 20 kilometers from these sites, one can clearly understand what they must mean as a support for the party in power. This is the reason that credit facilities for the purchase of vehicles were made available by the former minister of finance, in order to build support for the PS.

But this was a shortsighted policy, for the transportation sector in a country in the process of development is extremely sensitive and becomes saturated very quickly, as the long lines in front of the "seccos," the factories and the warehouses indicate. Thus today the transport workers find themselves in difficulties, since the products transported have not increased at the same rate of growth. Transport workers who have made payments for years are ready to let their vehicles be repossessed, for their paralysis

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costs dear, as do repairs. Thus you can currently buy a vehicle which costs between 5 and 10 million two or three years ago for a third of its price. After having repossessed a number of vehicles, the lending financial body, which found itself in possession of enumerable vehicles of which it had no way of disposing, is now begging transport personnel to take them back on new term contracts.

Parallel to this, there are certain practices which the truckers have condemned, in particular the "auto clinic." This is an establishment where each owner of a vehicle must submit it to a technical inspection against payment of sums ranging from 6 to 20 or 30,000 francs. But in the view of many Senegalese, this is nothing but a Mafia affair, a new plot to exploit them, for the company playing the role of the "vehicle doctor" would be a businessman in or closely linked with the government. They have moreover set up vehicle parts shops beside the "clinics," so that those receiving "orders" will not have to go far, and there is even to be a department for purchasing "condemned" vehicles.

On the other hand, the transport workers feel concerned and involved with the general situation, which has greatly deteriorated. In any case, this strike, which succeeded 100 percent, represents a serious indication for the regime.

[Question] From what you say, if one assesses the situation, one could presume that the opposition has a chance of winning power.

[Answer] Quite so.

[Question] Under such conditions, what does the PDS plan to do with a view to unity of the leftist forces, and what means are available to it for doing so, in view of the fact that it is accused of representing a royal opposition?

[Answer] We would obviously have liked to achieve unity of all the leftist forces for the building of a new Senegal, but if we had waited for such unity, we would still be at the point of discussing the sex of the angels. For this reason, we plunged into the struggle while launching an appeal to other forces. But we nurture no illusions and we are not seeking unity for its own sake. We do not think it would be politically wise to establish unity for the sole purpose of dislodging the Socialist Party and dividing up the ministerial posts.

The PDS urges unity, but unity based on a program. In particular, we must reach agreement on democracy, the multiparty system, and respect for freedoms, for we have a profound commitment to these things.

Because we do not favor the seizure of power by violence, but rather a democratic advance which is parliamentary as well, we are accused, or rather we were accused before the elections, of constituting a royal

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opposition. Now experience has shown that we have changed many things in Senegal without any blood being shed. In our circles, we believe that Senegal is capable of change by the democratic method.

There are those who do not believe so, because, they say, there is no good faith on the part of the adversary. Each is entitled to his analysis and understanding of the adversary's motives. And believe me, we are not naive. We know that had it been up to the Socialist Party, ours would never have won 18 deputies' seats in the last elections, although this figure does not truly represent our strength.

We participated in the elections and we campaigned honestly. Had we won the elections, we would have been governing Senegal today. Now as far as I know, a "royal opposition" never seeks to wrest power from the sovereign. Also, I think that this sally has to do with our party's early years, which was misunderstood then if I am to judge from what the various oppositions say now.

Now if we win power, remember that we never said that the PDS would govern Senegal all alone. And furthermore, if it comes to cadres, alongside each PS official we can place one from the PDS. Those who read what we write know that the PDS plans to guide the country in conjunction with all competent, honest and committed Senegalese.

[Question] However, during the recent elections, you appealed to the voters to participate en masse, convinced that you would be able to win the power according to the rules of the democratic game. Now the actual developments gainsaid this belief and showed the strength of an unofficial opposition.

[Answer] We were entirely mistaken and we are willing to admit it. But you see, I begin by crediting my interlocutors with good faith, even if I become a victim again. And you can be certain that in the future we will take all precautions so that this does not recur.

[Question] We would like to know at what stage your party is, and above all what your position will be on the law on political movements in the course of the next parliamentary session.

[Answer] Our party has completed the recruiting stage and is in the organizational stage, for the influx of members literally exceeded our capacity in this sector. Currently, our basic problem is staffing, as well as setting up the organizations affiliated with the party, for young people, women, and the elderly. The second goal will be making the militants aware of current problems. In particular we want them to understand what is at stake in the questions soon to be discussed in the national assembly, and for them to know that Senegal is at a crossroads. This is the kind of support of parliamentary action we will pursue in the weeks to come.

Concerning the law on ideological trends, the PDS has from the outset voiced its opposition to the arbitrary limitation of the number of parties and the idea of arbitrarily labeling them. However, we believe that it is not

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desirable to allow a multitude of parties to be established. In our view, two or three parties suffice, but we say that at the beginning it is necessary to allow all the politically significant groups to establish themselves as parties. In the medium range, by means of the elections which by their very nature polarize opinion, a reduction in the number of parties will occur of its own accord and mergers will moreover be facilitated. Upper Volta found a method involving letting all the parties compete in the elections, allowing only those proving most representative to continue to function. This is one method out of many.

If moreover, you are seeking through your question to learn what our attitude toward recognition of the RND (Sheikh Anta Diop's party, currently outlawed) will be, I would remind you that our periodical, LE DEMOCRATE, has always defended it. The political bureau of the PDS has repeatedly voiced this support and members of our executive secretariat even signed the petition demanding recognition of the movement.

But when it comes now to giving the political groups a hearing, the realities are there and facts are stubborn.

[Question] Since the Shaba affair, to speak of foreign policy, Senegal's diplomatic isolation has become greater. Its positions on the African scene are increasing opposed by various states . . .

[Answer] You are right. Senegal has experienced some diplomatic difficulties recently.

At the Khartoum summit meeting, the Senegalese position placed us in a minority.

Just after the Paris statement on the interAfrican force, our party took a stand and condemned the concept of such a force outside the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. This opposition was the subject of a resolution passed by our political bureau, which denounced the dangers of such a venture, moreover, which would risk launching an armaments race in Africa. For if the great powers are not for example ready to combat drought, they are on the other hand ready to supply us all kinds of weapons, even most sophisticated, and even on credit. After the ideological schism which divided Africa, we could only regret our country's becoming the cause of a new one, still more dangerous.

We also rejected the idea of creating a force to go to the aid of governments which have accounts to settle with their peoples.

All in all, we were happy to see that the Khartoum summit meeting reached a decision consistent with our view.

But as you know, despite the Neto-Mobutu reconciliation, Senegalese soldiers are still in the Shaba. In a statement to the national assembly, our party protested the idea of sending our soldiers there. But the PS majority

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won out. Following the Neto-Mohutu reconciliation, we asked that our soldiers be brought home and that diplomatic relations be established between our country and Angola, for it is a paradox for Senegal to be lagging behind Zaire and even France on this point. We think that the presence of Senegalese soldiers in the Shaba now constitutes a hindrance to the normalization of Senegalese-Angolan relations.

Again on the subject of the isolation of Senegal, there is the Sahara problem. Because of its geographic location, Senegal should have played a key role in the search for a solution. Not only was this not possible, but our country is not even a member of the OAU commission of five wise men entrusted with bringing the parties together. This exclusion is a challenge to our diplomacy.

Now all of this is due to the fact that Senegal was too involved in the conflict. The Senegalese government supported the theses of the "partitionists" in Morocco and Mauritania under the Ould Daddah regime. Still more serious, the facilities provided for the French Jaguars, which could have taken off from Dakar to bomb African peoples, had the result of placing our country in the eyes of the African public in the camp of the aggressors against the people of the Sahara.

I would remind you however, that the PDS was one of the first African parties to support the Polisario Front, as of its inception, in its demand for independence for the Sahara, and also to welcome El Ouali, its first secretary general. Since then our position on the matter has remained the same, and there is a regular exchange between our two organizations.

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TOGO

BRIEFS

TOGOLESE ECONOMY INDEX RISING--With the sharp increase in revenues from exports of phosphates, coffee, and cacao, Togo's economy is keeping up its healthy rate of growth. During fiscal 1977, it sold 14,100 tons of coffee (down 3,700 tons), 9,400 tons of cacao (down 3,200 tons), 7,000 tons of cottonseed (down 2,700 tons), 1,200 tons of karite (down 4,200 tons), and 1,300 tons of palmiste (down 6,200 tons). Continuing expansion of industrial fisheries will be furthered by the advent of the Arab-Lybian-owned Togo Fisheries Corporation (STAP-PECHE), which was founded this year. Phosphate production in 1977 came to 2.9 million tons (up 0.9 million); exports showed more diversification, particularly those toward East European countries. In industry, textile plants increased their output by 14 percent. The Togo Cement Company doubled its production capacity to 300,000 tons yearly to handle increased exports to Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, and Nigeria. The Lome refinery, built to process Nigerian crude, started operations in September 1977. It has a yearly capacity of a million tons of crude. [Text] Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Dec 78 p 3313-3314/ 6182

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