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
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JPRS L/8279

15 February 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL  
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 2/79)



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INTERNATIONAL

PETROVSKIY DISCUSSES SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 10, Oct 78 pp 79-96

[Article by V. F. Petrovskiy: "The Role and Place of Soviet-American Relations in the Modern World"]

[Text] The Great October Socialist Revolution fundamentally change the world system of states and the structure of international relations that conformed to it. The appearance on the world scene of the first socialist state marked the end of the undivided dominance of imperialism. The historic conflict, the competition between socialism and capitalism, became the basic content of international relations. "The mutual relations among peoples, the entire world system of states," V. I. Lenin emphasized in 1918, "are determined by the struggle by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states which are headed by Soviet Russia"<sup>1</sup>.

The new system of international relations that arose as a result of the October Revolution has not remained unchanged. The relationship of forces within the framework of that system has been steadily changing in favor of socialism. Whereas, after the victory of the revolution, the Soviet state was encircled by the capitalist countries, the combined forces of which considerably surpassed the might of the Soviet state, at the present time imperialism not only has ceased to be the undividedly dominating force: it is opposed by the community of socialist countries, the national-liberation movement that has grown up, and the organizational force of the working class and all the workers. On this basis there has been a thorough reorganization of the entire structure of international relations in conformity with the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

A decisive role in the transformation of international relations has been played by the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole. Their growing international authority and prestige, the steady reinforcement of the economic and military potential, and the relationship of forces which is changing in their favor are being used by the socialist countries for the sake of the reinforcement of world peace and security.

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In the foreign-political activities of the Soviet state throughout its history, an important place has been occupied by Soviet-American relations. Their scope and importance are measured primarily by the fact that we are dealing with two tremendous states in the modern world which personify opposing social systems, countries the relations between which are substantially important for each of the sides, which inevitably reflect and, to a considerable degree, exert an influence upon the condition and tendencies in the development of international relations as a whole.

Soviet-American relations lie in a major sector of the peace strategy that has been consistently carried out by the CPSU and the Soviet government. With the development of relations between the USSR and the United States the party links the solution of the fundamentally important question of the further paths for the development of the conflict between the two systems, the prevention of worldwide thermonuclear warfare.

The recognition of the historical inevitability of the class struggle between the two social worlds, a struggle having an antagonistic nature and therefore precluding any ideological reconciliation or coalescence (as is asserted in the West by adherents of the theory of "convergence" and "ideological disarmament"), by no means presupposes the inevitable waging of that struggle in forms of military force and does not necessitate any acuity of international crises and conflicts that would be greater than previously. This situation has been repeatedly explained in documents issued by the CPSU and the Soviet government. Extreme means of coercion (war, aggression, colonization) as forms of the struggle between states were legalized in world politics by the social system that was based on private ownership and exploitation. But with the arrival of socialism on the world scene, there was an unprecedented expansion of the opportunities to eliminate those forms completely from international life, to achieve the true consolidation of peace on our planet, and to eliminate the threat of war. Guiding the conflict between the two systems into the channels of peaceful competition in the name of the elimination of the threat of war -- that is the task that the party views as one of the most important ones. The CPSU, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said, strives to see that the historically inevitable class struggle between the two systems -- the capitalist and the socialist -- in the sphere of economics, politics, and, obviously, ideology "is directed into channels that do not threaten any wars, dangerous conflicts, or uncontrollable armaments race"<sup>2</sup>. The creation of the optimal conditions for the contest between the two systems within the framework of peaceful coexistence and cooperation for purposes of preventing a global catastrophe and discontinuing the arms race is inseparably linked with the nature of the relations between the USSR and the United States.

The opportunity for the development of Soviet-American relations along the path of business cooperation manifested itself in sharp relief as early as the birth of the Soviet state. On instructions given by Lenin, the Foreign Trade Commission attached to the Economic Policy Committee of the VSNKh

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[Supreme Council of the USSR National Economy] in May 1918 prepared a detailed concrete plan for the development of economic relations between Soviet Russia and the United States. Distinguished by its realistic approach, that plan stipulated reliable guarantees assuring the completely equal nature of the Soviet-American ties<sup>3</sup>. With the head of the Red Cross mission in Soviet Russia, Colonel R. Robins, acting as intermediary, the plan was made known to U. S. President W. Wilson<sup>4</sup>. And if the Soviet-American relations, despite the existence in late 1917 and early 1918 of the prerequisites for their development on a businesslike constructive basis, took an unfavorable turn in mid-1918 and the United States became an active participant in the armed intervention into Soviet Russia, the responsibility for that is borne by the American ruling circles, among which the persons who got the upper hand were those who were attempting to resolve the "Russian question" by military means. If one speaks not about the ideological differences evolving from the differences between the social systems, but, rather, about relations between states, we do not see any contradictions, any conflict of national interests, that would make impossible the maintaining of normal relations between the USSR and the United States. Throughout the history of the joint existence of both states, there have never been any wars between them, with the exception of the U. S. participation in the foreign intervention against Soviet Russia in 1918-1920, which was undertaken for the sake of stifling the socialist revolution, that is, for ideological, class reasons, and by no means for reasons of U. S. national interests.

The main lesson in Soviet-American relations consists in the fact that, in our age, there does not exist any other realistic basis for the maintenance and development of relations between the USSR and the United States than the principle of peaceful coexistence. To the extent that Soviet-American relations corresponded to that absolutely fundamental principle, they benefited the peoples of both countries and the welfare of international peace. The most important and most brilliant example of Soviet-American cooperation was the participation of both states in the anti-Hitler coalition, when their common interests and the interests of world peace were determined by the task of defeating fascism. In our day, such a key task is the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of the threat that such a war could arise. This is the chief goal, but, obviously, it is not the sole one, and it is not isolated from the other constructive tasks of international policy, such as the complete development of mutually advantageous and fruitful cooperation in the economic, scientific-technical, cultural, and other areas.

The history of Soviet-American relations teaches us that the platform of peaceful coexistence requires not the rejection of the ideological struggle, but the introduction of propagandistic activities into definite framework, which precludes falsification and slander, the incitement of hatred and distrust, the use of subversive means and methods of "psychological warfare." With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States in 1933, both states (on the initiative of the American side!) pledged that they would not only refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, but would also abstain themselves and restrain all persons and organizations under their "direct or indirect control, including



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organizations receiving financial aid from them, from committing any overt or covert act capable in any way of damaging the calm, welfare, order, or security" of the other side (in this regard, direct mention was also made of "agitation and propaganda")<sup>5</sup>. That agreement, formulated through the exchange of letters between M. M. Litvinov and F. D. Roosevelt, remains in force to this very day.

Soviet-American relations traveled a difficult path from the intervention and the 16 years of U. S. nonrecognition of the Soviet state to the situation when, in the American political establishment there are now, in essence, very few who deny the importance of the maintaining of peaceful relations between the USSR and the United States, the importance of the reduction of the danger of a military confrontation between them. A large amount of credit in this regard belongs to the firm and consistent foreign-policy line of the Soviet state, which, using the objective processes in international development and the major shifts in the placement of the world's political forces, has been striving consistently to recognize not only in words, but also in deeds, the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The fundamental views of the Soviet Union on the question of relations with the United States were contained in the ideas and practical activity of the founder of our state, V. I. Lenin. From the very moment of its birth the Soviet authority, in addition to the rebuff given to the aggressive reactionary circles of imperialism, proclaimed its readiness to develop normal relations with the countries of different social system. Lenin, formulating the concept of peaceful coexistence<sup>6</sup>, emphasized that socialism, by his very nature as the social system expressing the fundamental interests of the working class and all the workers, has a self-interestedness in preserving peace between peoples and states<sup>7</sup>. The principle of peaceful coexistence which was formulated by Lenin expressed the essence of the consistently democratic program for the development of international relations with which the the country of the first victorious socialist revolution arrived on the world scene. The Soviet Union has never excluded the United States from the sphere of its policy that was aimed at the carrying out of that principle. Moreover, Lenin's numerous statements on this question attest to the fact that even then he attached special importance to relations with the United States as the most highly developed and most typical country of modern capitalism.

The ideological implacability with respect to imperialism did not prevent Lenin from making a realistic evaluation of the place and role of the United States in the world system of states. In his "Letter to the American Workers," which contains a politically acute description of imperialism, Lenin at that time noted that "America has occupied first place among the free and formed countries with regard to the high level of development of the productive forces of human united labor, and to the application of machines and all the wonders of modern technology"<sup>8</sup>. His approach to the problem of Soviet-American relations was profoundly scientific and dialectic. In the complicated set of questions pertaining to Soviet-American relations

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he treated economic ties as a completely separate entity. In October 1919, in reply to a question asked by a correspondent of the American newspaper, THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, "What is the position of the Soviet government with respect to a state of agreement with America?", Lenin gave the following precise and unambiguous answer: "We are decidedly in favor of a state of agreement with America -- with all countries, but especially with America"<sup>9</sup>. Later, on 18 February 1920, in an interview granted to (K. Wigend), a correspondent with Universal Service, an American information agency, in response to the question "Is Russia ready to enter into business relations with America?", Lenin again stated, "Of course Russia is ready, just as with all other countries"<sup>10</sup>. Lenin attached much greater importance to the economic ties with the United States, in that, in addition to their mutual advantageousness, he saw in them a stable basis for developing relations of peace and cooperation between the two countries<sup>11</sup>.

At the same time Lenin came out decisively against U. S. attempts to use the negotiations with Soviet Russia for the purpose of interfering in its internal affairs, for the purpose of gaining unilateral advantages. In connection with the negotiations between the representative of the RSFSR, M. M. Litvinov, and the representative of ARA, an American aid administration, (U. Brown) relative to the practical implementation of the food assistance promised by the ARA to the areas of Soviet Russia that were encompassed by starvation, Lenin warned against attempts on the part of definite U. S. circles to use the economic difficulties of the Soviet state in order to interfere in its internal affairs and to force upon the Soviet state unacceptable aid conditions. "Be on guard, keep trying to discern their intentions, don't let them get too cocky," Lenin telegraphed to Riga on 11 August 1921<sup>12</sup>.

The Leninist approach lay at the basis of the unceasing efforts on the part of Soviet diplomacy during the 1920s and the early 1930s to normalize the relations with the United States. The Soviet position, in expanded form, was set forth in connection with a note from the U. S. Secretary of State B. Colby, dated 10 August 1920, to the Italian ambassador in Washington, in which the U. S. government categorically rejected the recognition of the Soviet state and which in essence, represented a manifesto that had as its aim the implementation of a policy of hatred and boycott with respect to Soviet Russia. In reply to Colby's note, the RSFSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, G. V. Chicherin, on 10 September 1920, sent a telegram to Soviet plenipotentiary representatives abroad. In it he stated, "Mister Colby has made a serious mistake if he assumes that it is only with the proviso that the capitalist system dominates in Russia that it possible for normal relations to exist between it and North America. We feel, on the contrary, that it is in the interests both of Russia and of North America to establish between them even now, despite the opposition of their social and political systems, the completely correct and loyal peaceful, friendly relations which are necessary for the development of commodity exchange between them and for the satisfying of the economic needs of both sides"<sup>13</sup>.

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Carrying out the Leninist line for the establishment of normal relations with the United States, the Soviet government inevitably took into consideration the international aspect of those relations. As can be seen from the foreign-policy documents of that period, the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that "the restoration of relations would serve to the benefit not only of both countries, but also, to a considerable degree, would contribute to the restoration of the economy of Europe as a whole, as well as to universal disarmament"<sup>14</sup>.

The importance of the establishment of Soviet-American relations from the point of view of raising the chances of the preservation of peace (and that took on particular importance under the conditions of the centers of aggression that had sprung up in the Far East and in Europe) was especially stipulated in the exchange of notes between the U. S. president and the USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs on 16 November 1933. Those notes substantiated the jointly shared conviction that "from this day on, our nations will be able to cooperate for our mutual advantage and for the protection of universal peace"<sup>15</sup>. A very typical fact is that, in the course of the first meeting with U. S. Ambassador W. Bullitt on 15 December 1933, the Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov persistently conveyed the idea that "the most important area in which the Soviet-American cooperation should operate is the matter of the consolidation of the peace." "Two such countries as the USSR and the United States," the head of the Soviet government emphasized, "can do much to preserve the peace, and can, to a considerable degree, paralyze the efforts that are directed against the cause of peace"<sup>16</sup>.

The Leninist principles pertaining to peaceful coexistence, even after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States, continued to constitute the basis of the political line of the Communist Party and the Soviet government with respect to the United States. Consistently adhering to that line, the 23rd and 24th CPSU Congresses posed as their task the combination of the firm rebuffing of the tentative but aggressive efforts of imperialism, and the consistent, constructive course aimed at the confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence and lack of compromise in ideological struggle, with a readiness to develop mutually advantageous relations with states of an opposing social system, including the United States. The 24th CPSU Congress, in advancing its Peace Program, formulated the task of normalizing the relations with the United States in the broad context of the international policy of the Soviet Union, as an organic and extremely important part of foreign-policy activities aimed at the fundamental reorganization of the entire system of international relations.

The recognition by the United States of the principles of peaceful coexistence would create the conditions for putting an end to the Cold War, to its pernicious effect both upon the relations between the USSR and the United States and upon the international situation. Constructive Soviet-American cooperation in all spheres, but particularly in the solution of vitally important world problems, has been called upon to give additional impetus to the policy of detente, in which a substantial role is played by Soviet-French

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cooperation, the new nature of the relations between FRG [the Federal Republic of Germany -- West Germany] and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In the long-term view the Soviet-American cooperation would contribute to assuring that the process of detente takes on a global irreversible nature.

At the same time the CPSU also took into consideration the substantial importance of the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the bilateral view, inasmuch as the matter at hand was the ties between two powers possessing highly developed scientific-research potential and highly trained scientific-technical personnel.

In order to complete the decisive turn toward the normalization of Soviet-American relations, the Soviet Union did not have to change its foreign-policy course. But in order for the political leadership of the United States to make the transition from the Cold War policy to negotiations with the USSR, it was necessary for them to make a rather radical re-evaluation of their foreign policy, which, after World War II, had been oriented at a confrontation with the USSR. A factor of decisive importance in the re-evaluation of values was the recognition by the U. S. ruling circles of the lack of prospects and the lack of sense in relying upon nuclear force. And, of course, the fact of the matter is not in that these means of conducting warfare proved to be excessive for the attainment of foreign-policy goals. The history of the United States convincingly attests to the fact that imperialism never stops before the application of force in the name of implementing its plans. The political leadership of the United States arrived at the idea of the necessity of reducing the danger of nuclear war as a result of their recognition of the fact that the same nuclear force that the United States has is also possessed by the Soviet Union, which, in the United States, is considered at the present time and for the foreseeable future to be the "chief opponent" in all respects -- political, military, economic, and ideological.

The USSR and the United States, H. Kissinger said on 12 May 1975, in a speech at the International Relations Council in St. Louis, Missouri, "are confronted by a problem that has had no precedent in history: each of these powers has armaments that are capable of destroyed civilized life. Therefore, no matter how we may compete with one another and no matter how we may ideologically oppose one another, no one of the two powers can attempt to force its will upon the other one without taking an inadmissible risk"<sup>17</sup>. Also linked with the recognition of the danger of a mutually annihilating nuclear war is another important conclusion -- the conclusion that it is necessary to preserve the strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States. Speaking before the conference of producers of raw materials and food products in Birmingham, Alabama, on 14 August 1975, about the fact that "never before in history have the weapons of war been so stupendous, so dangerous, and at the same time so unsuitable for promoting the achievement of political goals," H. Kissinger emphasized, "we have no more important task than the maintaining of the strategic equilibrium, since we would

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otherwise be threatening our own survival<sup>18</sup>. The realistically-minded wing of the American politicians did not limit themselves to stating the fact of strategic balance. They made a much more far-reaching conclusion to the effect that any attempts to destroy that balance would fail to have a significant, or, more importantly, any long-lasting effect. In the event of its being disturbed, the balance would inevitably be restored, but only at a higher level of development of nuclear weapons.

The recognition of the existence, in the person of the Soviet Union, of a force that was militarily and economically the equal of the United States, caused the re-evaluation of the views concerning the place and role of Soviet-American relations in the system of the foreign-policy priorities of the United States. A considerable number of the realistically-minded American bourgeois theoreticians have taken the position of recognizing the primacy, in U. S. foreign policy, of relations with the USSR. It is extremely symptomatic that, in addition to well-known figures of liberal persuasion (M. Shulman, G. Yost, (R. Hillsman), R. Rosecrance, (J. Hertz), A. Rappaport) and the "revisionists," persons who began to come forth in favor of the primacy of the Soviet-American relations in the early 1970s also included representatives of the conservative wing ((J. Gavin, U. Kintner)), and, to a certain degree, H. Kahn) who, in the past had been known for their skeptical attitude with regard to the possibilities of cooperation between the USSR and the United State. Business considerations and political realism forced those individuals, despite their political objections, to take into consideration the importance for the United States itself of the changes in Soviet-American relations and the renunciation of the heritage of the Cold War.

Considering the Soviet Union and the United States to be the mightiest powers in the modern world and recognizing the great influence of the relations between them upon the state of the international situation as a whole, American bourgeois theoreticians frequently write about the two "superpowers." It is telling that the term "superpower," which was introduced into the U. S. political lexicon in 1943 by the current director of the Institute of War and Peace, at Columbia University, W. Fox, was used until recently only as applicable to the United States, thus emphasizing the notorious "American exclusiveness." The introduction of the concept "two superpowers" meant the renunciation of the traditional ideas concerning the "exclusiveness" of the United States and the recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union is capable of successfully opposing the United States. At the same time, in promoting the concept of "superpowers," the American authors, by virtue of the class nature of their political philosophy, do not make any distinction between the socioeconomic systems in the USSR and in the United States and, in effect, equate them.

Currently the wide use in American bourgeois literature of the terminology that was mentioned obviously plays into the hands of Peking and its efforts to slander the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. In its foreign-policy documents the Soviet government has repeatedly emphasized that the recognition of the special responsibility borne by the USSR and the United

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States for the guaranteeing of world peace does not have anything in common with negotiations concerning a particular kind of compact or condominium between the two "superpowers." "There are a few people," L. I. Brezhnev said at a meeting in Washington with American senators in June 1973, "who call our countries 'superpowers,' putting a specific meaning into those words: as though some kind of compact is being arranged, at the expense of the interests of other countries. . . . But are we really to think that what was achieved by the state of agreement in Moscow and what we are discussing today harms, in even the slightest way, any other countries? On the contrary, the positive shifts in Soviet-American relations have the most favorable effect upon the overall situation, improve the international climate, and strengthen the peace and international security"<sup>19</sup>.

The recognition of the new situation in the world, in particular the increase in the authority and might of the Soviet state, represents a long and painful process in the foreign-policy thinking of the U. S. ruling class, and was accompanied by a modification of the foreign-policy doctrines and concepts that were created during the Cold War period. Having come to the conclusion that the modern world is politically multipolar and militarily bipolar, American bourgeois foreign-policy thinkers, instead of plans for the reorganization of the world in accordance with the American model (Pax Americana) and the creation, for this purpose, of a "world government," have begun to propose plans for an "international structure" based on concepts of "interdependence" and a "trilateral community" of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Instead of guardianship over the allies, these concepts stipulate a partnership based on the "division of responsibility." Instead of the Cold War and "containment" with respect to the Soviet Union, they stipulate competitive coexistence and "regulated rivalry." In addition to military force, factors that were announced as important components of state might are scientific-technical potential, ideology, and diplomacy. The United States' new foreign-policy doctrine, which was proclaimed in 1969 and which is known as the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine, on the one hand, preserved as a basic task the guaranteeing for the United States of the leading position in the capitalist world, the protection of the interests of American capital, "whenever and wherever they are threatened, in any place on earth"<sup>20</sup>, and, on the other, proceeded from the premise that, under the conditions of the new placement of forces in the world and the arising of approximately nuclear parity, the period of the confrontation by force between the two world social systems should give way to a period of negotiations between them, and the complete dominance of the United States in the capitalist world should give way to the "division of responsibility" with its allies in various blocs.

The appearance, at the beginning of the 1970s, of realistic principles in the foreign-policy thinking of the United States did not signify, by any means, their automatic extension to the entire American system of foreign-policy concepts and principles. Remaining basically class-oriented and imperialistic, the U. S. foreign-policy ideology provides no opportunity for bringing U. S. foreign policy into complete conformity with the real-life situation. It causes inconsistency and a zigzagging in the foreign-policy

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course of the United States with respect to states with a different social system. At the same time the transition of the U. S. political leadership to positions of a realistic approach toward relations with the Soviet Union, the recognition of the fact that the natural situation is not the balancing on the brink of war, but, rather, negotiations concerning questions of dispute, served as one of the prerequisites for major shifts in Soviet-American relations.

In 1972-1974, important work was done to reorganize Soviet-American relations. As a result of four Soviet-American summit meetings<sup>21</sup> a solid political and legal basis was laid for the development of mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the United States on principles of peaceful coexistence. The system of Soviet-American treaties, agreements, and other documents which was created at that time, reduced, to a considerable degree, the danger that a nuclear war would arise and created the necessary prerequisites for further efforts to lessen, and in the long view to completely eliminate, the danger of a new world war.

A document of fundamental importance, which continues to maintain its full force at the present time, is the "Principles of the Interrelationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," which were signed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U. S. President on 29 May 1972. As can be seen from the very name of the document, it contains a formulation and consolidation of the main principles that should guide both countries in their interrelationships. The primary attention in the document was concentrated on the problems of peace and the elimination of the threat of war. The key situation in the "Principles of the Interrelationships" is the state of agreement to the effect that the USSR and the United States "will proceed from the common conviction that, during the Nuclear Age, there does not exist any other basis for the maintaining of the relations between them, than peaceful coexistence." The consolidation of that principle in the document represents a great political achievement. The "Principles of the Interrelationships" are the first joint Soviet-American document in treaty law in which that principle found its official recognition on the part of the United States. Another principle of fundamental importance that was substantiated in the "Principles of the Interrelationships" is the one that states that the USSR and the United States "will do everything possible to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the arising of a nuclear war." Those words contain the formulation simultaneously both of the very important mutual pledge and the goal of the constant joint efforts in the major area of Soviet-American relations.

The importance of the document "Principles of the Interrelationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America" is not limited to these important principles. They also formulate such a critically important principle of interrelations between the two countries as the principle of identical security. "The recognition of the interests of the security of the two sides, which is based on the principle of equality," is viewed in the document as a necessary prerequisite for the

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"maintaining and the consolidation between the USSR and the United States of relations of peace." There is an exceptionally great amount of practical significance in the principle of identical security for the successful solution of the specific questions of limiting and discontinuing the arms race and the other questions that arise in the course of the corresponding Soviet-American contacts. The "Principles of the Interrelationships" stipulate that the USSR and the United States will continue steps for the purpose of limiting armaments both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, and will undertake special efforts to limit strategic arms, concluding, when such becomes possible, the concrete agreements. A substantial aspect of the "Principles of Interrelationships" is the confirmation in that document of the duty borne by the USSR and the United States, as permanent members of the Security Council, to do everything that they can possibly do to prevent the arising of conflicts or situations that are capable of increasing the international tension, and to promote a situation in which all the countries will live under conditions of peace and security, without being subjected to interference in their domestic affairs from without.

These and other principles contained in the "Principles of the Interrelationships between the USSR and the United States" characterize it as a document of great political importance, which combines within itself both a codification of the fundamental rules governing the interrelationships between the two great powers and a long-term program for joint activities in the interests of world peace and security.

The signing of the "Principles of the Interrelationships" by the highest leaders of the two countries laid a path for another very important document of detente -- the Agreement between the USSR and the United States Concerning the Prevention of Nuclear War. That agreement was signed on 22 June 1973 during a visit by L. I. Brezhnev to the United States and it was aimed at assuring the maximum reduction in the danger of the application of the most destructive of all existing types of weapons. The agreement went into effect from the moment it was signed, and has no date of expiration. The Soviet Union and the United States solemnly agreed that the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is the aim of their policy. The agreement stipulates that both states will act to prevent the arising of situations capable of causing a dangerous aggravation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations, and preclude the arising of a nuclear war between them, or between each of them and any other countries. In the execution of that aim, the USSR and the United States pledge to refrain from using the threat of force or its application against the other side, against the allies of the other side, or against any other countries in circumstances which could threaten the international peace and security. The USSR and the United States asserted that they would be guided by those considerations when formulating their foreign policy and in their actions in the field of international relations. The agreement stipulated that, if there should arise any circumstances that might look as though they were involving the risk of a nuclear conflict,

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the USSR and the United States would immediately begin urgent consultations with one another and would undertake all efforts to prevent that risk. An important peculiarity of the agreement consists in that it stipulates the pledges on the part of the USSR and the United States to develop their relations with other countries on the basis of the aims of peace. The agreement realistically lessens the threaten of a nuclear confrontation, and is aimed at the consolidation of the relations of peace between the USSR and the United States, and at the creation of the additional prerequisites for assuring that Soviet-American relations will act, to a greater and greater degree, as a factor for the consolidation of international security.

The document "Principles of the Interrelationships between the USSR and the United States" and the Agreement Concerning the Prevention of Nuclear War occupy the central place in the chain of measures directed at the elimination of the threat of war from the relations between states. Coming very close to them, in particular, is the Agreement between the USSR and the United States concerning the prevention of incidents on the open sea. Signed in Moscow in 1972, it has the purpose of creating the conditions that lessen the possibility of any unintentional conflict between the armed forces of the two countries.

In Soviet-American relations, an important place belongs to the problem of restraining the arms race, of limiting and reducing the nuclear-missile arsenals of both countries. And this is understandable: the detente in the political area cannot be lasting, stable, or effective if it is not supported by measures of military detente, by concrete steps to lessen the military tension. Trust between states, upon which, in the final analysis, so much depends in the plan for the prevention of the threat of the arising of a war, requires realistic and considerable proofs of the mutual readiness to come to an agreement about the limitation of the most terrible means of conducting warfare and about the intention to fulfill honestly and completely the agreements that have been achieved.

For the Soviet state and its diplomacy it has always been clear that, during the Nuclear Age, the path to the reinforcement of the relations of peace between the USSR and the United States lies, to a greater degree, through the search for mutually acceptable solutions for the limitation of strategic arms. In turn, the shifts among the U. S. ruling circles in the direction of realism and the recognition of the desirability of negotiations with the USSR for purposes of lessening the military threat opened up the opportunities for a mutual dialogue on problems of strategic arms. That dialogue began in the autumn of 1969 and, if one disregards short interruptions, it has been since then a constant element in Soviet-American relations. At the present time, the following are in effect in the field of strategic arms limitation: the Treaty on Limitation of Antimissile Defense Systems; the Protocol to that treaty; and the Provisional Agreement on Certain Measures in the Area of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms.

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The Treaty on Limitation of Antimissile Defense [AMD; Russian abbreviation PRO] Systems was concluded by the USSR and the United States in 1972 and has no expiration date. The essence of this treaty consists in that the USSR and the United States have mutually pledged to limit sharply the development in their countries of AMD means so as to prevent the extension of the arms race into that area. By the time that that Treaty was concluded, the United States not only had in existence, but also had begun to implement an extensive plan for constructing on the country's territory a network of antimissile complexes (the so-called Safeguard System), which, in particular, were supposed to provide cover for the areas where America's strategic offensive missiles located. It is understandable the carrying out of that plan could have far-reaching consequences, and could sharply incite the strategic arms race, both for defensive and offensive arms. Not to mention the many billions of dollars that would be swallowed up by the construction of the AMD systems, the extension of these systems on a broad scale could lead to a dangerous destabilization of the international strategic situation. The competition between the USSR and the United States in the area of creation of AMD systems threatened to aggravate the arms race even more. Therefore, an act of great state wisdom was the joint decision by the USSR and the United States to discontinue this channel in the arms race. The Treaty authorized each of the sides to have only two AMD complexes each, with the number of antimissile launch units in each of them not to exceed a definite quantity. In 1974 the Protocol to the Treaty on AMD was signed. By that Protocol, the number of complexes stipulated in the Treaty as being authorized for each side was reduced to one.

The Provisional Agreement on Certain Measures in the Area of Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms was signed in 1972 during the first Soviet-American summit meeting, after prolonged and complicated negotiations. The chief idea of the Provisional Agreement consists in that it prohibited the construction of additional fixed launch units for intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the ground and limited the launched units of submarine ballistic missiles, as well as modern submarines with ballistic missiles, to the number in combat strength and those in the stage of construction as of the date of signing of the Provisional Agreement. Expressing it in figurative terms, it "froze" the arsenal of ground-based and submarine-based offensive strategic weapons that had been created in both countries in the quantities that the USSR and the United States had at their disposal in the summer of 1972. The pledges taken by the two sides in the Provisional Agreement were a major step forward in the restraining of the arms race.

The AMD Treaty and the Provisional Agreement affect the very core of the military might of both countries. They firmly establish the equilibrium of the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States and create definite obstacles for the intensification of their nuclear opposition. The importance of these two acts of treaty law is not limited, however, to the framework of the purely military categories. The AMD Treaty and Provisional Agreement are acts of a great amount of political force, which convincingly demonstrate that the USSR and the United States not only must, but can jointly undertake concrete steps to lessen the military danger. The 25th CPSU Congress included

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the strategic arms limitation agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States among the most important joint Soviet-American documents. Their chief importance, the Report of the Central Committee emphasizes, consists in that, taken together with the "Principles of the Interrelationships between the USSR and the United States" and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, they "laid a solid political and legal basis for the development of mutually advantageous cooperation between the USSR and the United States on principles of peaceful coexistence. To a definite degree they have reduced the danger that a nuclear war can arise. It is precisely in that aspect that we see the basic result of the development of Soviet-American relations during the past five years"<sup>22</sup>.

The AMD Treaty and the Provisional Agreement went into effect simultaneously -- on 3 October 1972. Whereas the former of these acts has no date of termination specified, the latter, as is obvious from its very name, does have a limited effective period, stipulating, however, the pledge by both sides "to continue active negotiations concerning the limitation of strategic offensive arms." Their goal is to develop a new, longer-term, and more comprehensive treaty act which is supposed to replace the Provisional Agreement. The overall parameters of the future understanding were defined during the Vladivostok Soviet-American summit meeting in November 1974. As evolves from the joint decisions that were made at that time, the new treaty, unlike the Provisional Agreement, is supposed to touch upon not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative aspect of the offensive strategic arms.

The Provisional Agreement, as is well known, limits only the launch units of ground-based and submarine-based strategic missiles and does not pertain to the operational features of the warheads of the missiles themselves. And yet the appearance of rockets equipped with warheads that can separate and be individually guided [MIRVs] (such a missile is capable of striking not just one target, but a number of them) made very important the task of introducing definite "ceilings" for the number that each side could have. Correspondingly, a state of agreement was reached in Vladivostok to the effect that the Soviet Union and the United States would each have 2400 carriers of strategic weapons, including 1320 missiles each with separable warheads. Another important decision at that meeting was the state of agreement to the effect that the new treaty would deal not only with missile arms, but also such a component of strategic forces as strategic aircraft, which, in the Provisional Agreement, was not quantitatively limited at all. It was also agreed that the new treaty would be in effect until 1985 and that the USSR and the United States, before the expiration of that deadline, would begin negotiations dealing with the question of further limitations and the possible reduction of strategic arms.

In the new foundation of Soviet-American relations that was created in the process of detente, an important place is occupied also by the understandings dealing with other aspects of the problem of limiting the arms race and of disarmament (the 3 July 1974 treaty limiting underwater tests of nuclear weapons; the 28 May 1976 treaty concerning underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; the convention which went into effect in March 1975,

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banning the developing, production, and stockpiling of reserves of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and their destruction; etc.). In addition to the specific measures aimed at restraining the arms race, the two countries have concluded a considerable number of agreements dealing with bilateral ties, particularly 11 agreements in such areas as science and technology, space research, public health, the protection of the environment, and housing construction. In conformity with these agreements, at the present time 80 working groups are in operation, engaging in 300 projects. As a whole, the approximately 60 agreements that were achieved during the indicated period have created a definite infrastructure of relations between the two states, and have sectioned off the spheres where their interests coincide, primarily in the area of the reduction of the danger of a new war. At the price of a large amount of labor, efforts, and patience, the two countries have created a base of mutual trust that is necessary for the consolidation of the peace, the curtailment of the arms race, and the further development of detente.

In jointly adopted Soviet-American documents and in the statements made by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev, there is a formulation of the concept of the role and place of Soviet-American relations in the modern world. The basic elements of that concept can be summed up as follows. First of all, the state of Soviet-American relations, despite the certain shifts in the international system of states, continues to be an important factor that greatly influences both the situation in the world as a whole and the degree of danger that a global conflict will arise. Secondly, the serious importance that is attached to the condition of and the prospects for Soviet-American relations does not signify, by any means, that the USSR and the United States will have any special rights or advantages over any other peoples. Thirdly, the relations between the USSR and the United States are based on the strict observance of the legal rights and interests of "third countries," irrespective of whether they are small or large. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that all states, irrespective of their political and social system, must build their interrelations on the basis of the unconditional recognition of and respect for national independence, sovereignty, territorial inviolability, and the equal rights of all states, and must adhere strictly to the principle of noninterference. Fourthly, the USSR and the United States bear a special responsibility for the preservation and consolidation of international peace and security. That responsibility reflects the realistic position of the USSR and the United States as the most powerful and most influential powers of modern times. They have definite legal powers which evolve from the pledges taken by the powers who had been Allies and then the victors in World War II, as well as those rights with which they were endowed as permanent members of the Security Council. Fifthly, detente places additional duties on the USSR and the United States. It presupposes the existence, in the relations between the two countries, of a definite level of trust and mutual understanding, and requires the manifestation of restraint in interrelationships and the readiness to conduct negotiations, to regulate discrepancies by peaceful means, and to observe strictly the principle of rejection of the use of force or the threat to use force, either by means of nuclear weapons or by means of conventional arms.

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The concept formulated in 1972-1974 concerning the place and role of Soviet-American relations in the modern world has deprived of any justifications the speculations being made by Peking propaganda concerning a "compact between the two superpowers" and was met with understanding in the other countries of the world. The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, E. Gierek, said, "We consider the key factor in the process of detente to be the relations between the United States and the USSR. The dialogue between those two powers currently determines the overall atmosphere of international relations, and the saving of mankind from the catastrophe of a nuclear war. That is why both countries bear a special responsibility for peace throughout the world"<sup>23</sup>.

The practice of Soviet-American relations under the conditions of detente convincingly demonstrates that in those instances when, as a result of constructive negotiations with the participation of the USSR and the United States, it was possible to find a mutually acceptable balance of interests, the opportunity was opened up for the conclusion of important international agreements, including those linked with the solution of the most vitally important tasks in modern times -- the tasks of the curtailment of the arms race and of disarmament. As a positive example one can cite the cooperation between the USSR and the United States in the negotiations for the nonproliferation of nuclear arms and the ban on tests of nuclear arms. The consideration in the Disarmament Committee, with the active participation of the USSR and the United States, of the ban on military and any other hostile use of means for affecting the environment was completed by the signing in May 1977 of the corresponding Convention, representing a concrete step which, to a definite degree, narrows the sphere of preparation for a new war<sup>24</sup>. Also of constructive importance was the interaction between the USSR and the United States at various stages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Another important situation is that the detente, to a considerable degree, has contributed to the peaceful normalization of acute armed conflicts. In October 1973, because of the lack of an political normalization in the Near East, the fourth Arab-Israeli war flared up. The conflict took on an extremely fierce and acute nature and the sides participating in it suffered large losses of materiel and personnel. Success in extinguishing the military conflagration was to no small degree achieved as a result of the joint actions by the USSR and the United States. On 21 October discussions were held in Moscow between L. I. Brezhnev and A. A. Gromyko, on the Soviet side, and U. S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger. On 22 October the United Nations Security Council, at an urgency session called at the request of the USSR and the United States, adopted by 14 votes (the representative of the People's Republic of China did not participate in the voting) Resolution 338, which had been proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States and which contributed to the cessation of military actions in the Near East. In late 1973 a mechanism was creative for normalizing the conflict -- the Geneva Peace Conference on the Near East (its co-chairmen, the USSR and the United States).

The major turn in Soviet-American relations in the early 1970s, the successes in the policy of detente obviously could not fail to cause resistance on the

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part of those forces in the United States that do not want to reconcile themselves to the reorganization of relations with the USSR, to the detente, or to the necessity of taking into consideration the real-life situation in the modern world. In their mind's eye, the reorganization of international relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence, a reorganization that had been begun by means of the detente, meant not a constant process, but only a temporary phenomenon that the United States had been forced to resort to by virtue of the staggering events that had overtaken it. Having sensed a certain easing up after Vietnam, Watergate, the scandalous exposes of the activities of the CIA and other governmental institutions, and the economic crisis of 1973-1975, the rightist forces, during the 1976 electoral campaign, increased their activities. They unleashed noisy propaganda campaigns around the so-called "Soviet threat" and "human rights," which campaigns were intended to force a new round in the arms race, to slow down the rates of development of relations with the Soviet Union, and provide unilateral advantages for the United States.

In the course of disputes about detente which were extremely widespread in the United States, there arose the acute question of the place and importance of Soviet-American relations in the system of the foreign-policy priorities of the United States. The forces that were attempting to undermine the detente, to adjust it in the direction of unilateral advantage for the United States, and to turn the world toward unrestrained military rivalry, began intensively to emphasize the necessity of "rallying" the capitalist countries in the face of the social changes that were increasing in the world and in the face of the increase in the authority of the USSR; they demanded the promotion as the absolutely most essential factor the relations between the United States and other countries in the so-called "community of industrially developed (that is, capitalist) countries" at the expense of reducing the attention that was being devoted in the first half of the 1970s to the relations with the Soviet Union. The attempts to ignore the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs are not new. "At the dawn of the Soviet state," L. I. Brezhnev reminded us in his speech at the solemn session devoted to the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October, "Lenin warned the American leaders of that time that 'like it or not, Soviet Russia is a great power,' that 'America will gain nothing from Wilson's policy of pious refusal to deal with us, on the grounds that our government is not to his liking.' That was a justified statement half a century ago. And it is even more justified today"<sup>25</sup>.

Realistically-minded representatives of the political and academic circles of the United States recognize that, with the present-day correlation of forces on the world scene, there is no other, and there cannot be any other, acceptable alternative to detente and that therefore it is necessary to take a course of developing relations with the Soviet Union. The famous American historian and diplomat G. Kennan, who, in his day, had formulated the concept of "containment" which greatly contributed to the arms race, speaks from different position in his book "The Cloud of Danger," which was published in 1977. Decisively criticizing the opponents of the improvement of Soviet-American relations, he shows serious concern with regard to the

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steady increase in nuclear weapons and its proliferation, and in this regard he calls upon his country to hasten with the normalization and development of relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR, he states, is "the central problem in American foreign policy, a problem which, with regard to importance and complexity, pushes all others into the background and upon the approach to which many other aspects of American policy depend." Its chief task in the sphere of relations with the Soviet Union, in his opinion, lies in the "lessening of the danger created by the arms race"<sup>26</sup>. Speaking against the underestimation of the importance of negotiations with the Soviet Union, another prominent American scientist, S. Hoffman, in his book ("Burden, Balances, and Fetters") reminds his readers that without the participation of the USSR it is impossible to count upon the normalization of a number of acute critical situations, such as the Near East situation, and that the allies on whom it is proposed to switch one's attention are precisely those who are primarily interested in the state of Soviet-American relations, and their influence upon questions of war and peace<sup>27</sup>. A colleague at the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution, and Peace, at Stanford University, R. Wesson, remarks that during the past 60 years the Soviet Union has been transformed into "a power which is second with regard to the might of its economy, with a gigantic industry and collectivized agriculture. The Soviet Union achieved the largest victory in the history of the Russian people during World War II and created a military might approximately equivalent to that of the United States"<sup>28</sup>. It is also telling that another person who warns against the underestimation of the Soviet-American relations is such a prominent ideologist of the "community of industrially developed countries" as G. Ball.<sup>29</sup>

The debates which are currently under way in the United States on the question of Soviet-American relations reflect the struggle which is constantly present in American foreign policy -- the struggle between two tendencies in the understanding of the ways and methods of carrying out a policy in the Soviet area: the militaristically aggressive tendency, and the more restrained, relatively realistic tendency, which has behind it the interests of the various political forces and social groups within the ruling class.

As is attested to by the author of the book "Shattered Peace," which was recently published in the United States, Harvard University professor D. Yergin<sup>30</sup>, within the governmental apparatus of the United States during the formulation of a policy with respect to the Soviet Union there constantly occurs a collision between the so-called "Riga axioms" and the "Yalta axioms." By "Riga axioms" he has in mind the point of view of those American officials who received a diplomatic education in the anti-Soviet spirit in Riga in the 1930s and who feel that, inasmuch as the USSR is, so they say, a state whose policy is directed exclusively toward expansion, the lessening of tension in relations with it is tantamount to the lessening of American vigilance, which enables the Soviet Union to strive for unilateral advantages. Typical representatives of this point of view in the 1930s and 1940s, in the opinion of D. Yergin, were the American diplomats (L. Henderson, A. Kirk, L. Steinhardt, C. Thayer, E. Page, E. Durbrow). The "Yalta axioms,"

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defended by people who share the approach of F. Roosevelt toward relations with the Soviet Union (H. Hopkins, E. Stettinius, A. Harriman, and those who departed from the "Riga axioms," G. Kennan and C. Bohlen), proceed from the premise that the USSR has a self-interestedness in international stability and that therefore the United States is capable of creating incentives -- military and economic -- that can lead the USSR to the making of decisions that conform to the interests both of the USSR and the United States. "The Riga axioms," D. Yergin writes, "proved to be the 'victors' in the course of the 1945-1969 discussion. (A discussion which has much similarity to the present-day one.) The Riga axioms subsequently formed the basis of American policy and the initial positions throughout almost the entire period of the Cold War. For several years, at the beginning of the 1970s, the balance shifted in favor of the Yalta axioms, and that lay at the basis of the shift in the direction of detente. With the advent of the new administration to power, there was a renewed heating up of the struggle between these two rival sets of axioms with their extremely varied recommendations both with respect to supervision over armaments, and with respect to trade"<sup>31</sup>.

In recent time there have been noticeable signs that, in the struggle between the two tendencies in the approach to the Soviet Union, the people who are beginning to get the upper hand are the representatives of those circles which would want to undermine the detente and return the world to the Cold War, to new confrontations, and to unlimited military rivalry. The forces opposing detente are sufficiently impressive, and their composition is well known. They are, first of all, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex; they are their influential advocates in Congress, headed by Senator H. Jackson; they are the reactionary upper stratum of the AFOL-CIO trade-union association, headed by its president, G. Meaney and by its secretary-treasurer L. Kirkland; they are the Zionists, the counterrevolutionary emigres from the East European countries, and other reactionaries and anti-communists. The capabilities of the opponents of detente are sufficiently great. For example, the Committee on the Existing Danger, headed by former U. S. Undersecretary of Defense P. Nitze, includes retired diplomats, prominent jurists, scientists, military men, and businessmen. As the NEW REPUBLIC remarks, this committee extended an "offensive against the agreement to limit strategic arms. That offensive is well financed, has a good base, is distinguished by its inventiveness and refinement, and frequently is well thought-out"<sup>32</sup>. In the summer of 1978 a new, frantically reactionary organization -- the Coalition for Peace from a Position of Strength -- was created<sup>33</sup>. Under the flag of anti-Sovietism, it has united the "hawks," the reactionaries and anti-communists of all persuasions, renegades and traitors to the Soviet Union, and zealous enemies of detente and the development of international cooperation.

The goals of those who have blundered their way into the flock of "hawks" do not cause any doubts. The program for the new "coalition" is the further incitement of anti-Soviet hysteria with the goal of scuttling the detente, of inflating even more the arms race that is already dangerous for the cause of peace, of casting mankind back to the gloomy days of the

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Gold War period. It is not by accident that among the requirements included in the program of the "coalition" is the renunciation of the principle of equality in relations with the Soviet Union, the achievement of the all-embracing supremacy" of the United States, the return to the policy of operating "from a position of strength."

The unflagging struggle between the various groupings of the U. S. ruling class with regard to the question of Soviet-American relations cannot fail to have an effect upon the foreign-policy course of that country. Under the influence of the situation that had developed within it, the Ford administration in 1976 began to wind up, to a certain extent, its work of developing Soviet-American relations. It not only rejected the use of the term "detente," but also delayed the implementation of the understandings that had already existed. The Carter administration that replaced the Republicans in the White House in November 1976, responding to the pressure exerted by the rightist forces, at first attempted to distort those fundamental principles of the mutual relations that had been worked out during the previous years, and, in particular, to revise the Vladivostok understanding with regard to a new agreement to limit strategic arms. In the approach to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, it is noticeable that the circles which from the very beginning had been against such an agreement are doing everything to disrupt it, to untie their own hands for an uncontrolled arms race. Moreover, the Carter administration is showing a tendency to "coordinate" the promotion at the negotiations, and in general the fate of the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, with other problems that do not have any immediate bearing upon the sphere of Soviet-American relations.

Both the statements made by the president and other highly placed individuals, and the specific deeds of Washington, attest to the changes in U. S. policy which are dangerous for the cause of peace. Official statements inflate the myth of the Soviet "military threat," and remain silent about the fundamental documents of recent time -- the "Principles of the Interrelationships between the USSR and the United States" and the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War -- in which, with special force, the fact is emphasized that both powers made a choice in favor of detente, with all its concomitant pledges. In practical politics, the course being taken is one of inciting the arms race, of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union, and the limitation of the ties and contacts between the two countries. "In the situation complicated by the U. S. policy," the 17 June 1978 PRAVDA editorial entitled "Present-Day U. S. Policy" emphasizes, "the Soviet Union reconfirms its course aimed at the easing of the international tension and at the development of good, mutually advantageous relations with the United States, if the United States also desires that. For the successful forward movement in that direction, which conforms not only to the vital interests of both countries, but also to the interests of mankind as a whole, necessary factors are reciprocity and a responsible attitude toward world policy on the part also of the leaders of the U. S. administration."

The USSR consistently proceeds from the premise that the existence of broad areas of genuine bilateral self-interestedness in the development of

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constructive interaction creates the prerequisites for the further advancement in Soviet-American relations. Noting that the development and reinforcement of relations with the United States is one of the "primary tasks of our state's foreign policy," L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes that the Soviet Union and the United States "can do a great deal to prevent a new world war, with its catastrophic consequences, such as the history of the world has never known," that upon the USSR and the United States "much also depends in the solution of such complicated and vitally important tasks of worldwide magnitude as the protection of the environment on our planet, the mastery of space, the reproduction and intelligent use of the earth's power and food resources, and the struggle against mass diseases and the most dangerous ones"<sup>34</sup>. The Soviet government has invariably expressed its readiness to continue the development that has already been begun in the relations with the United States on the basis of jointly ratified principles of equality, identical security, noninterference in one another's domestic affairs, and mutual advantage. In a discussion with Senator E. Kennedy on 9 September 1978, L. I. Brezhnev expressed his conviction that "the normalization of relations between the USSR and the United States and the continuation of the course aimed at their improvement would correspond to the yearnings of the people of both countries; to the interests of the consolidation of international detente and peace throughout the world"<sup>35</sup>.

The history of Soviet-American relations convincingly attests to the fact that the interaction of our two countries in the interests of lasting peace and international cooperation is completely possible and realistic. This requires that the considerations that should be the decisive ones in Soviet-American relations are not the considerations of a situational or transitory nature, but, rather, of a long-term nature, which have been dictated by the concern for peace. That is precisely the line to which the Soviet Union has consistently adhered. And that is what the Soviet Union is, with complete justification, awaiting from the American side.

## FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 242.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [On Lenin's Course], Moscow, Vol 4, 1974, p 81.
3. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Documents of USSR Foreign Policy], Moscow, Vol I, 1957, pp 286-294.
4. See L. A. Gvishiani, "Sovetskaya Rossiya i SShA 1917-1920 gg." [Soviet Russia and the United States, 1917-1920], Moscow, 1970, pp 64-69; R. Sh. Ganelin, "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya v kontse 1917--nachale 1918 g." [Soviet-American Relations in Late 1917 and Early 1918], Leningrad, 1975, pp 195-200.

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5. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Moscow, Vol XVI, 1970, p 643.
6. See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 197.
7. See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 44, p 148.
8. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 37, p 49.
9. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 39, p 209.
10. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 40, p 147.
11. The position occupied by Lenin in 1918-1920 with regard to the question of Soviet-American relations decisively refutes the point of view existing in American literature to the effect that the Soviet government, during the first years of its existence, did not have a sufficiently complete idea of the importance of the relations between the Soviet state and the United States (see G. Kennan, "Russia Leaves the War," Princeton, 1957, p 31).
12. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR," Moscow, Vol IV, 1960, p 262.
13. Ibid., Moscow, Vol III, 1959, pp 176-177.
14. From a letter sent by the USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, to the USSR plenipotentiary in France. Ibid., Moscow, Vol IX, 1964, p 120.
15. Ibid., Vol XVI, p 341.
16. Ibid., pp 749-750.
17. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, May 1975.
18. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, August 1975.
19. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom," Vol 4, p 154.
20. Quoted in: A. Belov, Vl. Petrov, "SSSR-SShA: perestroyka otnosheniy" [USSR-United States: Reorganization of Relations], Moscow, 1976, p 14.
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USSR INDOCHINA STRATEGY ANALYZED

Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU [JAPAN MILITARY REVIEW] in Japanese Vol 14 No 1 (No 154)  
Jan 79 pp 34-43

[Article by Takio Yamazaki, international affairs researcher: "Commentary  
on Soviet Indochina Strategy"]

[Text] With the conclusion of the Indochina war which covered thirty years  
after World War II, it was expected that a period of peace would settle in,  
without any wars in Southeast Asia, and that peaceful coexistence would come  
about among the three socialist countries of Indochina and the liberal coun-  
tries of ASEAN (Alliance of Southeast Asian Nations).

In reality, however, Vietnam and Kampuchea are continuing a fierce "proxy  
Sino-Soviet war" (National Security Adviser Brezinski); and the situation  
has changed to one in which the Soviet Union, which is backing Vietnam, and  
China, which is backing Kampuchea, are in fierce conflict in Indochina, from  
which the United States withdrew.

With this kind of situation, China, while restraining Vietnam with a problem  
of the overseas Chinese, strengthened its containment of the Soviet Union  
by making a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan. But the Soviet Union  
strengthened its support of Vietnam in order to roll back this containment,  
and, at the same time, has aimed at closer relations with ASEAN.

In June of last year, Vietnam became affiliated with the Soviet-led COMECON  
(Council for Mutual Economic Aid); also, Party Secretary Le Duan and Prime  
Minister Pham Van Dong visited the USSR in November, and ostentatiously  
displayed the unity of the Soviet Union and Vietnam by issuing a joint de-  
claration.

Now the Soviet Union is reinforcing the fighting power of the Soviet Pacific  
Fleet which is based in its maritime provinces. There must be some purpose  
to this reinforcement of military power, and it would seem related to the  
strengthening of its support for Vietnam. But there is a concern that the  
development of such a state of affairs will influence the security affairs  
of our own country.

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### Soviet Strategy Viewed from Post-war History

If the post-war history of the Asian Pacific Ocean is taken in summary, the Pacific Ocean was under the control of the United States for a long time after the war, although the USSR supported the Chinese revolution and extended the "communist sphere" to the Chinese continent. The United States stationed many military bases in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries; and the security of the western Pacific was maintained by American naval power, as represented in the Seventh Fleet.

The Soviet Union changed this state of affairs and tried to push back even more American power from Asia. The strategy the Soviet Union employed to do this was to set up a rivalry between the United States and China. That strategy was inaugurated at the time of the Korean War in 1950.

The Soviet Union avoided any direct intervention in the Korean War, and wanted China, which had just established its Chinese communist government the year before, to send troops into the Korean peninsula to fight against the American army. Taking this opportunity, both the United States and China entered into a state of bitter antagonism; but this was allowed to happen by none other than the Soviet Union.

Also, the Vietnam war, which began in 1964, aggravated even more the Sino-American antagonism.

In order to get rid of this Sino-American antagonism, the American scheme to turn the tables in its own favor was the Nixon visit to China in 1972 and was the drive for the Nixon Doctrine which followed from the visit.

The United States withdrew 540,000 troops from Vietnam and reduced its military strength elsewhere in Asia as well. However, with the retreat of American military power, a "power vacuum" was created and the Soviet Union stepped in to fill that vacuum.

Likewise, Nixon's visit to China became an opportunity which allowed the communist parties of both China and Vietnam to become antagonistic toward each other. As the Nhan Dan magazine pointed out in August 1972, the Vietnamese communist party has harbored a feeling of mistrust, which is hard to uproot, toward the Chinese communist party which "gave an innertube to a drowning bandit". It was none other than the Soviet Union which gave enormous military aid to Vietnam, which further deepened its mistrust of China, and helped it obtain its victory in 1975.

Having done this, the Soviet Union acquired a "base" of power in Vietnam from which the United States had withdrawn. And Hanoi, which won a victory in the Indochina "liberation war" with Soviet aid, aimed at forming an "Indochinese Federation" with itself as the leader.

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The Soviet Union strongly supported Vietnam in this. Pro-Soviet Party Secretary Le Duan of the Vietnamese Communist Party visited Moscow in October 1975, and issued a joint declaration with the Soviet Union. But, so as not to give any room for Chinese intervention, it hurried with its unification of north and south Vietnam and, at the same time, removed all people of Chinese lineage from positions of responsibility in the party and the military. This became the source of the present "problem of the overseas Chinese".

Taking off on this "problem of the overseas Chinese," China unfolded a campaign of criticism against Vietnam. However, in opposition to this, the Soviet Union intensified its criticism of China, and, on June 29, Secretary Brezhnev made a definite statement that Vietnam is an "advanced base" in which socialism can put its trust.

The Soviet-led COMECON had formally decided on Vietnam's affiliation the day before, June 28. This was an indication that Vietnam, the important place in Southeast Asia, would be committed to the Soviet camp. Undoubtedly, Brezhnev's speech about "advanced base" was the result of these facts.

According to information from the United States Pacific Forces Commander Wiesner, it is said that the Soviet Union has already completely equipped a Soviet missile base in Cam Ranh Bay. It is also said that a Soviet naval base has been built on Cat Ba island, just outside Haiphong Harbor.

In short, the Soviet Union has changed to a situation which literally makes Vietnam, the important spot in Southeast Asia, an "advanced base". This is nothing less than a sound victory for Soviet military and diplomatic strategy.

#### USSR Strategy Plans for Asia and the Pacific

Thus, the Soviet Union progressively pushed into the Pacific and post-war Asia; and, with the retreat of United States military power, it acquired a base in Vietnam, thereby reinforcing its containment of China.

It seems there are the three following broad aims to this Soviet strategy. These are the elimination of American military power from Asia, the actualization of China-USSR reconciliation, and control of maritime traffic from their Far East bases to the Indian Ocean.

First, the elimination of American military power has shown great progress. The United States military power already has been withdrawn extensively from Indochina; and Thailand, which yielded to Vietnamese pressure, asked for the withdrawal of United States forces stationed in Thailand. The United States army pulled its presence out of Thailand in July 1976. Likewise, American troops are supposed to be withdrawn from South Korea as well. Consequently, the next important aim will be directed at the elimination of American military power in the Philippines.

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Secondly, the actualization of Sino-Soviet reconciliation is expected to be achieved by reinforcing its containment of China. The USSR's greatest desire is that China will yield to Soviet pressure and convert to the Soviet line; and then, Sino-Soviet reconciliation will be complete. With that, it would be possible to divert to Europe the 45 army divisions deployed along the China-USSR border. Therefore, the USSR is reinforcing its containment of China. By doing so, they anticipate that Soviet influence will gain power within China and that China-Soviet reconciliation will come about from the seizing of political power. Their containment of China has been showing progress. Vietnam, together with Laos, is deepening its leaning toward the USSR, especially since Vietnam has become an "advanced base" for the Soviet Union. Therefore, the next aim is directed mainly at ASEAN.

Third, the "control of maritime traffic" has become indispensable for supporting not only USSR strategy toward Asia but its world strategy.

As for control of maritime traffic, they want to have under Soviet control maritime traffic which goes through the Strait of Korea, heads south from the South China Sea, goes through the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean. In other words, it is to eliminate American control and establish Soviet control over maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

However, Southeast Asia is a great gateway for this maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. After all, whoever controls Southeast Asia can control maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

Southeast Asia consists of the three socialist nations and the five liberal nations of ASEAN. The USSR has acquired a base in Indochina. Therefore, the Soviet Union will try next to expand its influence to all of the nations of ASEAN from its base in Vietnam. That will contribute greatly to its attempt to contain China to the south, to cause American military power to pull back from ASEAN, especially from the Philippines, and to establish Soviet control of maritime traffic under the protection of Soviet naval power, which will use Soviet naval and air bases now in Vietnam.


Whoever Controls Oil Controls the World.

In the above manner, the Soviet Union has aimed at control of maritime traffic flowing from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. But, as a Soviet world strategy, that seems to have a close relationship with its strategy that aims at controlling the petroleum shipping routes which go from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to Western Europe and Japan.

The Soviet Union has attached great importance to the Indian Ocean where petroleum shipping routes pass from the Persian Gulf to Europe and to Japan. Since 1968, they have already put their naval power permanently in the Indian Ocean, and given it the duty of "checking" the petroleum shipping routes of the west.



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Key:

1. Treaties of friendship and cooperation
2. USSR
3. Manifesto or declaration of friendship and cooperation
4. cancelled
5. Bangladesh
6. Malaysia
7. Iran
8. Iraq
9. India
10. Turkey
11. Libya
12. Egypt
13. 2.0 million barrels daily
14. petroleum transport routes
15. 4.1 million barrels daily
16. Ethiopia
17. Angola
18. Somalia
19. 18.0 million barrels daily
20. Soviet Union expands circle of friendship and cooperation to all nations. (From 1971. Non-socialist countries are excluded.)

After that, the USSR made a military aid pact with South Yemen in 1969, and acquired a naval base in Aden and an air force base on Suqutra Island. On the other hand, South Yemen, which had received aid from the USSR, supported the PFLO liberation movement in Oman, a neighboring country, and threatened the monarchic government of that country. It also tried to threaten the security of the Strait of Hormuz, which is an important gateway for petroleum shipping routes.

Also, in August 1971, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with India, which received enormous Soviet support, crushed Pakistan in the third Indo-Pakistani war and made Bangladesh independent. In March 1972, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Bangladesh also.

Moreover, the USSR made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Iraq in April 1972, and supported pro-Soviet former Premier Daud with the change of government in Afghanistan, obtaining that country for the Soviet sphere of influence. They made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Somalia in 1974, completely equipping naval and air military bases in that coun-

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try. This became an important base for the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.

In April 1975, the USSR carried out "OKEAN" maneuvers, using the world seas as a stage. Likewise, they carried out naval attack maneuvers in the Indian Ocean, deploying many ships and aircraft. Moreover, the USSR air transported directly to Angola 20,000 Cuban troops for the Angola dispute, which had intensified since the end of 1975. At the same time, Soviet naval units escorted a fleet of ships, transporting to Angola large numbers of tanks and heavy weapons.

The USSR, making a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia in May 1977, sent Cuban troops to Ethiopia just as they did with Angola and their naval power escorted a fleet of vessels to the Eritrean port of Massawa.

Somalia, objecting to the USSR's assistance to Ethiopia, cancelled unilaterally its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in November 1977 and requested the evacuation of all Soviet military advisers and the return of bases being furnished to the Soviet Union. To counteract this, the USSR gave Ethiopia aid exceeding one billion dollars and 50,000 tons. And, they sent 17,000 Cuban troops and 2,000 South Yemen troops to Ethiopia, and unfolded a large scale assault against Somalia. Because of this, the Somalia side, which had brought the Ogaden area under its control, caved into this destruction. Somalia's President Barre suffered the degradation of a defeated commander.

The USSR, which lost the military bases at Berbera and the like because of Somalia's treachery, is trying now to request substitute bases in Eritrea. It is said that Ethiopia has already allowed a Soviet air base in Asmara and a naval base on Dahlak Islands outside Massawa Harbor.

Under these conditions, a siege strategy toward the Persian Gulf has intensified since April of last year. This can be seen in the coups d'etat that have occurred successively around the Persian Gulf areas, such as in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq and others. This also indicates how much importance the USSR attaches to control of the petroleum shipping routes to the western nations from the Persian Gulf.

The USSR is now supplying 80 million kiloliters of oil annually through a pipeline to the Eastern European nations, except Romania. But it seems that the oil production of the Soviet bloc has not progressed enough to meet increased consumption. Therefore, according to some sources, if the oil supply to Eastern European nations should stop in the 80's, it would mean that the Soviet control of Eastern Europe would collapse indisputably.

From this, it seems that the USSR has been deepening its interest in Persian Gulf oil. But the security of Japan, Western Europe and the United States hangs on the securing of the petroleum shipping routes leading from the Persian Gulf to the western nations. So it can be said that whoever con-

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controls the oil of the Persian Gulf controls the world.

Strategic Value of Indochina.

Thus, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to Indochina from its view of world strategy, especially control of maritime traffic from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. That is because the Soviet Union has discovered the great strategic value of Indochina.

First of all, Indochina, together with the Malaysian archipelago, constitutes the "rim-land" of the southeastern part of the Eurasian continent. However, since Indonesia and the Philippines are in the open seas off of this rim-land, that area becomes an important gateway, tying together the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean.

The shipping routes that go from the Pacific Ocean and pass through this region to the Indian Ocean can be squeezed into the general classification of the following four routes.

The first shipping route is the one that passes through the Strait of Malacca. For the Soviet Union, this route is the shortest route tying the Indian Ocean with the bases in their maritime provinces. In addition, Vietnam, which has become affiliated with COMECON, and Malaysia, which has advocated for Soviet "friendship and cooperation", are close to this shipping route. Therefore, the Soviet Union has the advantage of being able to request bases, as well as port privileges, from Vietnam and Malaysia.

The second shipping route passes through the Strait of Sunda.

The third shipping route is a route that leaves the Indian Ocean, and passes through the Lombok Strait from the Strait of Makassar.

The fourth shipping route is a route that goes through the Indian Ocean, passing through the Strait of Ombai from the Molucca Sea.

These last three shipping routes are a greater distance than the first shipping route, and need a mutual Indochinese agreement as well. Therefore, from the Soviet Union's perspective, it can be said that the first shipping route is much more advantageous, and the possibility of securing it is greater.

Secondly, Indochina has a great value from the perspective of containing China.


The USSR has pressured China from the north, deploying a military force of 45 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. In addition to this, Indochina has joined the Soviet bloc. If the Vietnamese army of 1.5 million men, which is the strongest military power in Asia (if one excludes China), decides to pressure China from the south, the containment of China would be

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solidified even more.

Third, there are great undeveloped underground resources in Indochina.

It is said that there are promising undersea oil fields in the Gulf of Siam and Gulf of Tonkin in Indochina. Further, it is anticipated that there are oil and natural gas deposits in the Red River delta area. Besides this, there are mineral resources of uranium ore, coal, iron ore, zinc and the like in the Phu Lang Thuong area.



Key:  
Vietnam's Mineral Resources

- 1. coal
- 2. iron ore
- 3. zinc
- 4. tin
- 5. copper
- 6. gold

It is said that, in exchange for project aid, the USSR aims at the acquisition of these underground resources. Toward this end, it sent to Vietnam a vice-minister level investigation team many times. The investigation team, led by the vice-minister of the Ministry of Geology, prospected for oil and natural gas for about one month last year in July.

According to another report, it was said that the aim which the USSR had in pushing for Vietnam's affiliation with COMECON was the control of its oil and mineral resources.

Fourth, Indochina is an advantageous base to expand its influence to the ASEAN nations.

After the "Indochinese liberation" in 1975, Laos and Kampuchea abolished their monarchies and became socialist countries. Laos deepened its leaning toward Hanoi, but Kampuchea intensified its resistance to Hanoi's leadership and, opposing Soviet-supported Vietnam, requested the support of China.

Vietnam has aimed at a Southeast Asia under the leadership of Hanoi, and advocated for a "Southeast Asian Common Market" in June 1975. That concept was extensive enough to include the ten nations of Southeast Asia. In short, Soviet-supported Vietnam is trying to extend its influence to the ASEAN nations in place of the Soviet Union. And, Vietnam has become a base for an ASEAN assault by the USSR.

Will Vietnam Become the Cuba of Asia?

On account of the USSR's strategy to make Vietnam an "advanced base", China has been put into a situation where it is threatened from two fronts---the

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north and the south.

China has experienced this kind of military threat three times: the first was when General MacArthur insisted on attacking Manchuria during the Korean War of 1950; the second was when the Soviet army assumed a posture of challenging a full-scale battle by sending tanks to the front. Therefore, this present crisis would be the third crisis for China.

This crisis materialized more last year. Namely, there was an incident in which the Soviet troops invaded the Ussuri River border on May 9. In the south, clashes by both parties---China and Vietnam---have occurred frequently at the China-Vietnam border. The Soviet navy carried out threatening maneuvers between Luzon Island and Taiwan at the end of June. It can be seen that Soviet naval power was "demonstrating" against China, by getting caught up in the China-Vietnam dispute. Further, there was an incident in which the navies of both China and Vietnam battled over Nanshan Island, about which both China and Vietnam are in dispute and which both claim as its own possession.

Under this state of affairs, China, putting up its full strength, has endeavored to organize an "anti-Soviet consolidated front". As is commonly known, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping expressed his "discourse on the big three worlds" at the United Nations natural resources assembly in 1974. That is, one must look for the source of all the evils of the world's wars in the hegemony principles of such large countries as the United States and the Soviet Union, who belong to the first world. But he made it clear for the first time that the existence of Soviet socialist imperialism as the more dangerous.

China has put itself in the third world against this dangerous USSR, and, involving the second world of the leading industrial nations, such as Japan and others, has begun calling for an "anti-Soviet consolidated front". In short, it can be said that China's discourse on the world became the yardstick to measure all acts as either "anti-Soviet" or "pro-Soviet."

Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong made clear his opposition to China in a discourse on the world that divides the world into five worlds at a national assembly just after the 1975 liberation. The first is the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union; and it has the greatest importance. The second is Laos and Kampuchea, which must be added to the "Indochinese Federation"; the third is all of the Southeast Asian nations that form the nucleus of ASEAN. The fourth is the non-aligned nations. And last of all, the United States, Western Europe, Japan and others; are mentioned as the fifth. In short, Vietnam's world perspective is a view which puts as its foundation a confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Whether something is "anti-American" or "pro-American" becomes the yardstick for measuring the suitability of all acts.

In other words, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong dealt a frontal counterattack

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against the "discourse on the big three worlds" by Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-ping. So, it is natural that the Soviet Union supports Vietnam.

The USSR allowed Vietnam to become affiliated with COMECON in June of last year. Secretary Brezhnev made it clear that he would support Vietnam resolutely as "brothers" and declared that Vietnam is an "advanced base" which socialism can trust. In short, the Soviet Union made clear its firm intention to add Vietnam to the Soviet bloc.

Under these conditions, China, which aims at forming an "anti-Soviet consolidated front", concluded a China-Japan treaty of peace and friendship on August 12 of last year. The Soviet Union repeatedly objected and warned against this Sino-Japanese treaty, which includes an "anti-hegemony article" hostile to the USSR. This has become a frequent undisguised threat, and is unparalleled as an intervention by a major country in the relations between two other countries.

But the China-Japan treaty was finally concluded, was formally ratified in October and became effective. The China-Japan treaty and the United States-Japan Security Treaty mean that there will be cooperation through the mediation of Japan. The USSR, seeing this as the establishment of an "anti-Soviet alliance" by the United States, Japan and China, is increasing its vigilance. This can be seen from the fact that Party Secretary Brezhnev had a conversation with First Secretary Tsendenbal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the Crimea on August 23. He declared that "recently, very negative elements have arisen in the Far East and Southeast Asia."

The Soviet view is that even though the anti-hegemony article may have been watered down, no basic change has taken place in the anti-Soviet character of the China-Japan treaty. Therefore, the USSR predicted that the status change important for Asia, which comes from the formation of this treaty, namely, the balance of power, will collapse. In order to offset this, the USSR has emphasized repeatedly that there is a need to change Soviet policy toward Asia. It can be stated that the substance of this policy has been able to bring about an important change in the Asian situation, as was pointed out by Vice-chairman Kowarenko of the USSR-Japan Society.

So, the predicted "roll back policy" of the USSR is asking to conclude a USSR-Japan good neighbor friendship treaty in order to restore the balance, and, secondly, is intensifying the military pressure against China. Third, it is to make Vietnam the "Cuba of Asia", and to try to assume the duty of "lead soldier" in its approach to ASEAN.

This kind of movement has already shown itself. Until now, the USSR, along with Vietnam, has not recognized ASEAN as an organization. However, IZVESTIYA recognized ASEAN as an organization for the first time on July 13. Vietnam's newspapers also advocated for a "Southeast Asian Neutrality Concept." Prime Minister Pham Van Dong himself made of tour of the ASEAN countries. As China states, their aim is to try to expand their influence within

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ASEAN as a "Trojan Horse."

Moreover, so as to support Vietnam's move, First Assistant Minister Fillyuvin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, while making a tour of the ASEAN nations near the end of October, made a statement of support for the peaceful character of ASEAN.

After this unified USSR-Vietnam approach to ASEAN, the USSR invited to the Kremlin an administrative-level party delegation, led by Party Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. It can be said without a doubt that their aim was to reinforce Vietnam's "Cuba status."

USSR Has Built a Bridgehead in Indochina.

The USSR entered into its "roll back policy" as predicted. The Soviet Union made a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Vietnam on November 3; and with that, the USSR built a "bridgehead" with which to impede China's inroads into the Indochinese peninsula.

The core of this USSR-Vietnam treaty of friendship and cooperation is the article on "emergency deliberations," whereby it was decided to mutually support each other when either party, i.e., the Soviet Union or Vietnam, is exposed to a threat of attack. This article, which makes cooperation important from a military viewpoint, has a high degree of strategic substance.


In June of last year, the Soviet-led COMECON recognized Vietnam's formal affiliation. That indicated that Vietnam has already been included economically in the Soviet bloc. However, to offset that, China made its China-Japan treaty. Moreover, China made clear its plan to cancel the "Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty." The powerful "roll back policy" had begun with the Soviet-Vietnam friendship treaty.

Now, full-scale hostilities by troops of both China and Vietnam, which began in October of last year, have been repeated at the China-Vietnam border. Also, their uncanny move, centering around a "dry season large-scale offensive" has continued into the Vietnam-Kampuchea dispute. Kampuchea's Vice-premier Ieng Sary, who made a speech at the United Nations in October of last year, stated that Vietnam will use again several army divisions, stationed in foreign territories, in its dry season offensive. In this case, Laos is clearly indicated as the foreign territory. It seems that about four army divisions of Vietnamese troops are stationed in Champassak Province on the southern extremity of Laos.

In addition to this, Vietnam includes in the "Kampuchean Liberation Front" Kampucheans residing in southern Vietnam, amounting to about 150,000 men. They have formed a "Kampuchean People's Liberation Army" from among these, and sent out into Kampuchean territory well-chosen guerrillas and political

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saboteurs. They are using this dual front strategy to intensify internal disturbances in Kampuchea. In short, Hanoi is using exactly the same kind of strategy against Kampuchea as they used for the conquest of South Vietnam in the past.



In this way, if Vietnam uses Lao territory for troop movements, it is possible that China will expand its troop movements into Lao territory to counteract them. China built 600 kilometers of road in northern Laos, adjoining Chinese territory. And, it would seem that if they were to use this road, they could easily enter Thailand and at the same time, threaten Vietnam from the rear.

Key:

- |                          |                   |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Chinese Roads in Laos | 17. Ou Dom Sai    |
| 2. China                 | 18. Nam Pak       |
| 3. Yunnan Province       | 19. Vien Sai      |
| 4. Lai Chau              | 20. Houei Sai     |
| 5. Boun Neua             | 21. Sam Neui      |
| 6. Hat Sa                | 22. Muong Beng    |
| 7. Vietnam               | 23. Ou River      |
| 8. Mengla                | 24. Laos          |
| 9. Phong Saly            | 25. Pak Tha       |
| 10. Myo                  | 26. Muong Sen     |
| 11. Dien Bien Phu        | 27. Pak Beng      |
| 12. Burma                | 28. Mekong River  |
| 13. Ba Ten               | 29. Luang Prabang |
| 14. Muong Khoua          | 30. Jarres Plains |
| 15. Muong La             | 31. Thailand      |
| 16. Luan Nam Tha         |                   |
- - - - Roads built with China's assistance  
 (600 kilometers completed)  
 - - - - Under construction

With this, there is a danger that the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict will spread to all of Indochina, engulfing Laos. If the USSR backs up Vietnam and China backs up Kampuchea, there is a possibility that it will develop into a Sino-Soviet clash, making Indochina the stage.

The ASEAN nations are exceedingly afraid that it will expand to such a situation. In particular, the feeling of crisis is very acute in Thailand,

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borders Kampuchea. In particular, if Kampuchea cannot withstand a large offensive from the USSR-Vietnam union, and, if a pro-Soviet/pro-Hanoi government appears upon the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, certainly this would be the actualization of an "Indochinese Federation" at which Hanoi aims. Then, the pressure on Thailand would suddenly increase from the USSR and from Hanoi.

Thailand is a country where two coups d'etat have occurred since 1976, caused by the Indochina shock. It is a country which requested a complete evacuation of United States troops stationed in Thailand, because of Vietnam's pressure. In the event that Thailand offers the air bases at U Thapao and elsewhere to the USSR, because of pressure from the Soviet Union which has solidified its "bridgehead" in Indochina, the Soviet Union would be able to control maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca by using its bases in Thailand and Cam Ranh Bay.

However, the appearance of such a situation would not only threaten the South China Sea route for transporting natural resources to our own country, but would have such a great influence that it would destroy the strategic balance in Asia and the Pacific.

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FEDOSEYEV ADDRESSES SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' THEORETICAL CONFERENCE

Moscow VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR in Russian No 11, 1978, pp 88-91

[Article by L. S. Yagodovskiy, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Text] An important place in the rapprochement of the countries of socialist collaboration is occupied by steady intensification of scientific contacts and the development of joint research activity. In recent years, creative relations of specialists in social studies of the fraternal states have obtained an ever-greater scope. Multilateral problem commissions are functioning, international research teams are successfully working, the number of joint publications is increasing, etc. All this required the creation and improvement of stable organizational forms of regulation of the expanding collaboration. Therefore the Conference of vice-presidents of the academies of sciences of the socialist countries for the social sciences was formed as a permanent institute.

The Third Conference was held in Budapest on 18 to 20 April (the first was held in Moscow in 1975 and the second in Warsaw in 1976). At this meeting, organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, there were representatives of the academies of sciences of Bulgaria, Viet Nam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The delegations of scientists were headed by Professor M. Bachvarov, Academician Zh. P. Pakh, Professor Vu Kkheu, Academician W. Kalweit, Professor J. A. Bustamante, Academician Sh. Bira, Academician J. Szczepanski, Professor Ceterchi, Academician P. N. Fesoseyev and Academician Z. Snitil. In the delegations, side by side with the directors of leading academic institutes, were responsible workers of the central committees of the fraternal communist and workers' parties, and also representatives of scientific research centers under the central committees of those parties and higher educational institutions.

Before the conference work was started the leaders of delegations and representatives of central committees of the fraternal parties were received by M. Ovari, Politburo member and secretary of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, who later participated in the plenary sessions. Academician F. Marta, general secretary of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, participated in the work of the conference.

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The conference was opened by the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Academician J. Sentagotay.

It has become a tradition to start such meetings with an exchange of opinions of urgent theoretical and methodological problems of marxist-leninist social studies and of information about the most important investigations being conducted in the fraternal countries. At Budapest those questions were discussed in connection with discussion of the report "Social requirements and the social sciences," presented in the name of the Hungarian delegation by Academician M. Sabolchi and corresponding members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences K. Kulchar and D. Ranki. The elevation of the role of science in today's world was spoken of in the report, and not was made of the growth of influence of the social sciences, which are called upon to explain complex and at times contradictory shifts in the contemporary development of mankind, determine the main directions and establish more precisely the specific paths of social development in the very near and remote future.

The participants in the conference stressed that before the social scientists of the socialist countries, who use as a basis a genuinely scientific, Marxist-Leninist methodology of cognition of reality, enormous prospects are opening up in the prediction of the social development of their countries, the socialist camp as a whole, and also the movement of all mankind toward peace and progress. At the same time they face exceptionally urgent problems. The communist and workers' parties of the fraternal states are presenting the social sciences with ever-growing requirements with respect to comprehensive generalization of the international experience in the creation of a new order and thorough analysis of the processes occurring in the world. On that basis, social scientists are obligated to contribute maximally to the solution of complex practical problems in the area of the building of socialism and communism with consideration of such general regularities of social development as the specific national conditions of each fraternal country, and also of tasks in the further reinforcement of world socialism.

In the speech of the head of the Soviet delegation, Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, a characterization was given of the main functions of the social sciences in the countries of socialism. The main functions, the reporter noted, are the cognition and theoretical interpretation of the mechanisms in the establishment of a communist formation, and also of the processes of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism and the development of the world revolutionary liberation movement. P. N. Fedoseyev stressed that bourgeois social studies, because of its class limitedness, is unable to give an objective analysis of the internal connections and basic trends in the world social development. Its role is reduced to the recording and some systematization of facts and their interpretation from positions of apology for the capitalist order and the struggle against real socialism. The decisive advantage of Marxist-Leninist social studies consists in the fact that they are capable of giving and are giving an objective picture and reliable knowledge of the social processes being accomplished in the world and of the driving forces and directions of the world social development.

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A no less important function of the social sciences in the socialist countries is the development of recommendations and proposals for the solution of urgent problems of economic and social development, state and cultural construction, international relations and foreign policy. The reporter emphasized that bourgeois social studies are in a position different in principle. Although they can give and are giving other prescriptions for the economic and social development of capitalist states, the effect of those recommendations is extremely limited, since in the final account they have the purpose of slowing down social progress and preserving the foundations of capitalism. The enormous advantage of Marxist-Leninist science is that it is called upon to contribute to the revolutionary renewal of the world and the acceleration of social progress.

Finally, the functions of the social sciences in the countries of socialism include the further theoretical development of socialist ideology, the solution of socio-political problems and the development of ethical standards intrinsic to our society, and the denunciation and criticism of bourgeois ideology.

During the discussion of the report the participants in the conference examined urgent problems of the economic, political, historical and other social sciences, questions connected with the conducting of sociological investigations, with the analysis of the development of the sphere of consciousness, with study of the most acute worldwide problems, etc. Much attention was given to the growing role of the interdisciplinary, complex approach to the investigation of social processes.

An organic continuation of that discussion was the discussion of the report of Academician Z. Snitil (CSSR), devoted to the activity of the Multilateral Problem Commission on "Questions of the Ideological Struggle in Connection With the Coexistence of Two World Systems." The delegates of countries participating in the work of the commission spoke of the great importance of the problems being worked out by it. Emphasizing that in the contemporary world the ideological struggle is conducted in all directions of the social studies, they noted the need for further intensification of coordination of the activity of all problem commissions on social sciences and of attention to ideological aspects of the investigations being conducted by them.

Also discussed was the question of improvement of the forms of collaboration of scientists of the fraternal countries within the framework of that commission. The speakers discussed the need to create a small number of international research teams capable of working fruitfully and unifying the representatives of different branches of science. In the resolution adopted on that question it was stressed that the main task of such teams is the preparation of joint scientific reports and fundamental monographic works on very urgent actual problems of the ideological struggle. This recommendation of the conference of vice presidents undoubtedly will contribute to improvement of the activity of other multilateral problem commissions.

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One of the major items on the agenda of the conference was the consideration of the first results of implementation of the long-range program of multilateral collaboration of scientific institutions of the socialist countries in the area of the social sciences, and also proposals for its further improvement. W. Kalweit (GDR) presented a report on that question. The reporter and all those who spoke in the discussions of the report noted the positive importance of the program, which was developed at the first conference of vice presidents. That program was approved by the First Conference of Presidents of Academies of Sciences of Socialist Countries (Moscow, February 1977) and at the Tenth Conference of Representatives of Academies of Sciences (Sofia, November 1977) was included in the general program of multilateral scientific collaboration of scientists of socialist states.

The discussion showed that the long-range program as a whole is being successfully accomplished. This applies primarily to joint research being done within the frameworks of multilateral problem commissions. Noted especially is the activity of one of the oldest commissions -- the Commission for Problems of History of the Great October Revolution and Subsequent Socialist Revolutions.

Joint investigations of social scientists in the report period were also conducted outside the framework of the permanent commissions; scientists of the fraternal countries, in particular, investigated the very urgent problems included in the long-range program, within the framework of the so-called goal projects. Work was very successfully done on the creation of the collective monographs "Razvitoy sotsializm--obshcheye i spetsificheskoye v yego stroitel'stve" ["Developed Socialism--the General and the Specific in its Construction"], "Sotsialisticheskiy internatsionalizm kak printsip mezhdunarstvennykh otnosheniy sotsialisticheskikh stran" ["Socialist Internationalism as the Principle of the Interstate Relations of Socialist Countries"], and also on a brief history of World War II and on the preparation of a Common Slavic and a Common Carpathian dialectological atlases. A comprehensive analysis was been made of questions in the development of socialist democracy. An international conference devoted to the crisis of bourgeois democracy was prepared and successfully held.

In connection with the formation of some new multilateral commissions, and also in connection with the need to refine the purposes and time limits for certain joint work and other organizational questions, the Conference of vice-presidents of the academies of sciences of the socialist countries considered it advisable to introduce certain changes in the effective long-range program.

Questions of the further development of the long-range program for the period after 1980 were settled at the same time. It was emphasized that qualitative aspects of the scientific relations of social scientists of the fraternal countries, aspects connected with elevating the level of joint research, must be advanced more and more to the foreground.

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Problem commissions in the area of the social sciences have received orders to present by the end of 1979 to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences drafts of the plans of their work for the following five-year plan. For better coordination of such plans and exchange of experience, a conference of representatives of problem commissions will be held in Warsaw in 1979. Together with them the academies of sciences participating in the conference of vice-presidents must send their proposals relating to changes in the list of the main directions of multilateral collaboration and in the list of target projects. All these materials, after they are summarized, will be examined at the fourth conference of vice-presidents. On the basis of those recommendations the final working plans of the multilateral commissions for 1981-1985 will be approved and the working plans for new target projects will be adopted.

The participants in the conference exchanged information about preparations for a number of major international congresses on the social sciences. The great scientific importance of such forums was noted, and also the importance of the exchange of information about the course of preparations of the scientists of socialist states for them.

Also discussed was a proposal to establish an international prize of the socialist countries for the most valuable joint research in the area of the marxist-leninist social sciences. A working group was formed for the preparation of proposals regarding the prize.

On the basis of the report of the director of the publishing house of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, D. Bernata, there was discussion of questions of mutual collaboration in the publication and distribution of literature on the social sciences. The speakers mentioned the positive results achieved in that area. Note also was made of the need to further improve the mechanism of publishing the results of joint research done within the framework of the long-range program (their joint or parallel publication).

The work of the conference proceed in a businesslike, friendly atmosphere and concluded with the signing of a joint protocol. The next, fourth conference of vice-presidents, at the invitation of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, will be held in Prague in the first half of 1980.

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NATIONAL

SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 11, Nov 78 pp 3-17

[Article by N. A. Shchelokov: "Questions of Strengthening Law and Order and Legality Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism"]

[Text] Developed socialism is a natural stage of the development of the communist formation and marks the high degree of maturity of social relations, when there is "full scope for the action of the laws of socialism and for the revelation of its advantages in all spheres of social life and the organic integrality and dynamism of the social system and its political stability and indestructible internal unity."<sup>1</sup>

Economic, sociopolitical and moral relations have reached a high degree of maturity in the society of developed socialism. The conditions have been created for the maximum satisfaction of Soviet people's material and spiritual requirements and the all-around development of their capabilities and citizens' participation in controlling all the affairs of society. The designs of the founders of Marxism are embodied in practice: "a society organized on communist principles will afford an opportunity for its members to comprehensively employ their comprehensively developed capabilities."<sup>2</sup>

The particular features of the new type of personality, who combines lofty ideological-political, moral and professional qualities and adapts his goals and interests to the interests and goals of society, are being revealed increasingly fully under the conditions of mature socialism.

At the same time socialism is waging a resolute struggle against the old, outdated traditions and customs which are alien to the standards of communist morality and which are a serious encumbrance in the building of communism.

Overcoming the harmful vestiges of the past in people's minds and conduct, socialism has proclaimed: ".../The development/ [these and subsequent words in slantlines in italics] of the best models, traditions and results of the /existing/ culture /from the viewpoint/ of the world outlook of Marxism and the living conditions and struggle of the proletariat in the era of its dictatorship."<sup>3</sup>

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The development of socialism has objectively given rise to an increase in the role of social control as an integral system of influencing the members of society aimed at an improvement in the organization of their activity and mutual relations within the framework of the accepted rules in Soviet society and the social and moral values expressing the interests of all of society.

Socialist law and order represents a system of social relations emerging as the result of the realization of the demands of socialist legality, that is, of precise and unswerving observance of Soviet laws by all citizens and officials. The USSR Constitution has recorded this most important principle, prescribing that the Soviet state and all its organs operate on the basis of socialist legality and the citizen's rights and freedoms (article 4).

Soviet people's constantly growing awareness, culture and civic responsibility and their intolerance of antisocial manifestations are exerting an increasingly great influence on all spheres of the life and development of our society. "The higher our society ascends in its development," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has observed, "the more intolerable the deviations from the socialist standards of morality, which are still encountered, become. Money-grubbing, private-ownership tendencies, hooliganism, bureaucratism and indifference to man contradict the very essence of our system. In the struggle against such phenomena it is essential to make full use of the opinion of the labor collective, the critical words of the press, methods of persuasion and the force of the law--all the means at our disposal."<sup>4</sup>

There is fundamental significance under these conditions in inculcating in the population intelligent social requirements, including the universal requirement of stable law and order, unswerving observance of Soviet laws and other normative precepts and the day-to-day custom of solving conflict situations and collisions in people's mutual relations on the basis of the legal rules in force and of harmoniously combining state, public and private interests.

Law and order is stable and durable only when the individual is entirely on its side and incorporates it in his value principles and orientation. In accordance with the USSR Constitution (article 65), each USSR citizen is obliged to respect the laws and legitimate interests of others, display implacability toward antisocial acts and contribute to the utmost to the maintenance of public order.

The legislative consolidation in our state's Basic Law of the principle of all USSR citizens' assistance in the maintenance of law and order is a natural result of the development of the socialist society. This is a qualitative leap forward in the public consciousness at the stage of mature socialism. No other state and no other social-economic formation which existed prior to the socialism knew such active support for law-enforcement activity on the part of the population. This principle has assumed nationwide significance.



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The strengthening of law and order and legality is a complex social problem of many levels. This article examines only certain of its aspects: the role of the CPSU in the strengthening of legality and law and order, social prevention of penal offenses, the tasks of the law-enforcement organs under the conditions of developed socialism and the role of the social sciences in elaborating the problems of strengthening legality.

1. The CPSU's Constant Concern To Strengthen Legality and Law and Order

The CPSU devotes constant attention to questions of the strengthening of socialist law and order. This is manifested in the improvement in Soviet legislation, the alinement of the rule of law with the new level of society's development, the further improvement in the activity of the law-enforcement organs and the mobilization of the broad public masses for active participation in the maintenance of public order and the struggle against penal offenses.

The elaboration by party and government organs and the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the republic supreme soviets of laws on the most frequent problems of our life are of major sociopolitical significance. Their purpose is to bring the rule of law into line with the level of development reached by our society. New legislative measures have been adopted concerning such spheres of life which hitherto had remained beyond the framework of legal regulation as, for example, environmental protection. All this is contributing to the strengthening of law and order and the system of legality. The dialectics of the development of Soviet legislation are such that the timely change in legislation and the repeal of obsolete legal rules which have ceased to correspond to the changed conditions insure the stability of law and order. The very course of social development is advancing increasingly complex tasks, and the more complex the work, the more important are coordination, harmony, discipline and a state of legal regulation.

The law, according to K. Marx, does not have a history of its own; it reflects the system of social relations and law and order and is, as it were, a "copy" of the social organization. "Regulation and order," K. Marx wrote, "are precisely a form of the social consolidation of a given method of production and, consequently, its relative emancipation from pure chance and pure arbitrariness."<sup>5</sup> The consolidation, maintenance and development of social relations are achieved as a result of realization of the rule of law. The principal direction of the development of Soviet society's political system is the further spread of socialist democracy and the reinforcement of the legal foundation of state and public life. As L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized, the society of developed socialism has become the society of developed socialist democracy, which is recorded in legislative enactments.

The adoption of the USSR Constitution and the union republic constitutions was the pinnacle of the party and state's law-making activity. Our country's Basic Law and the constitutions of the union republics have recorded the conquests of developed socialism and represent the political and legal foundation of public and state life and an instrument of communist building.

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The USSR Constitution contains the sum total of real guarantees of Soviet citizens' rights and freedoms. The Basic Law protects the Soviet system against all attempts to take advantage of these freedoms to the detriment of the interests of society and the state and to the detriment of the rights of others.

In accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 12 December 1977 decree "The Organization of Work To Bring USSR Legislation Into Line With the USSR Constitution," active preparation is currently underway of the drafts of a number of legislative enactments which will take account of the new phenomena in public life.<sup>6</sup> The law of the USSR Council of Ministers and the law on elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet have already been adopted; laws on the USSR Prosecutor's Office, laws on the labor collective and on the procedure for appealing in court against the actions of officials which they have perpetrated in violation of the law and a number of others are being prepared. Much remains to be done to bring the fundamentals of criminal, criminal-procedure and corrective-labor legislation of the USSR and the union republics into line with the USSR Constitution.

Everything new and progressive is asserted in the struggle against the old and the outdated under the conditions of socialism. V. I. Lenin observed that any phenomenon, if viewed in its process of development, "will contain vestiges of the past, the fundamentals of the present and the beginnings of the future."<sup>7</sup> Antisocial manifestations have still not been fully eliminated from our life. The utmost development of communist principles presupposes an uncompromising struggle against vestiges of the past in people's minds and behavior and the eradication of these "remnants."

Among the causes of crime, an appreciable role is played by the influence of alien ideology--social-psychological principles and moral-everyday standards--this "culture medium" for the preservation of a variety of "vestiges" in the mind and behavior of individual unstable citizens. However, we cannot limit the range of contradictions determining antisocial behavior solely to the above-mentioned factors. Objective contradictions which, albeit of a temporary nature, are nevertheless directly or intermediately connected with offenses and crimes are inherent in socialism. These include: contradictions arising as a result of the fact that the satisfaction of certain personal requirements is temporarily limited or deferred at stages of the building of a new society; and contradictions engendered by shortcomings in the organization of public life, labor and the distribution of material wealth and the contradictions between the individual's personal aspirations and the needs of society as a whole.

The contradictions of the first group represent a consequence of an insufficient level of development of the production forces at the first stage of the building of communism compared with its higher phase and the existence of differences between city and countryside and between brain work and physical labor. V. I. Lenin wrote that "without sinking into Utopianism, it is impossible to believe that, having overthrown capitalism, people will

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immediately learn to work for a society /without any legal rules/ for the replacement of capitalism /will not immediately provide/ the economic prerequisites of /such/ a change."<sup>8</sup>

With the increased level of development of the production forces and the increasingly intensive erasure of the boundaries between city and countryside and brain work and physical labor the contradictions of the first group are playing an increasingly lesser role in determining antisocial acts. Soviet people's creative, constructive labor and the very process of communist building are creating a most important prerequisite of the liquidation of crime.

The contradictions of the second group are also being successfully eliminated in our day. The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent measures of the Communist Party and the Soviet state are aimed at increasing the role of the scientific control of social processes, the well-defined organization of labor and an improvement in the work of the state organs and public organizations.

The contradictions between the individual's personal aspirations and the interests of society are also being resolved successfully. The task advanced by the 25th party congress of a comprehensive approach to the political, labor and moral education of the working people is aimed at the elimination of those negative vestiges of presocialist relations which act from time to time in the role of factors contributing to the perpetration of antisocial acts. Far from all members of the society have yet learned to make their requirements commensurate with socially useful activity. The inability or reluctance to make one's claims commensurate with one's personal labor contribution conceal a cause of amoral behavior and, frequently, of crime. These phenomena are alien to the society of developed socialism, a daily and purposeful struggle is being waged against them and they must be completely eliminated.

In the struggle of the new against the old the contradictions sometimes assume the most acute form of socially dangerous manifestations--crime.

It is important that all citizens have a sound knowledge of legislation and the principles of its execution. A measure of increasing the public's knowledge of current legislation is the work currently being performed in accordance with the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress on publication of the "Svod zakonov SSSR" [Compiled Statutes of the USSR]. The knowledge of legislative enactments here should amount to more than just knowledge of the measure of liability for this offense or the other. A profound understanding of the socially conditioned character of the legal rules and their nature and an awareness of the possible consequences of the failure to observe legal rules create a firm foundation for the conscientious execution of laws in accordance with inner conviction. A law lives and operates only when it is executed unswervingly. It is obligatory for all--this is an unfailing principle of the socialist society. Officials and workers of the

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state and economic apparatus are primarily obliged to set an example of genuine respect for the law. The slightest deviations from the requirements of the rule of law motivated by the "insignificance" and "formalism" of these requirements and their "lack of correspondence to local conditions," "inexpediency" and so forth are impermissible under the conditions of the developed socialist society.

The activity of the state organs for the maintenance of law and order takes its course under exceptionally propitious conditions. The constant upsurge of the economy and the growth of the well-being and culture and the active participation of the working people in the administration of society and the state--the entire course of communist building creates the prerequisites for accomplishment of the task set by the CPSU Program: the liquidation of crime and its causes.

Dependable law and order is insured in our country. The liquidation in the country of professional and organized crime is an important social achievement. Since 1922 the country's population has grown by 120 million, while crime has been reduced by a factor of 3.5; in the last 25 years the number of people convicted of criminal offenses has been cut by a factor of 2.5

Our class adversaries are attempting to impose on socialist society the mentality and morality of consumerism and bourgeois living standards. Anti-Soviets are exaggerating to the utmost the hullabaloo surrounding the question of "human rights" and "freedom and democracy" which they have inspired, falsifying these concepts and ignoring the Leninist understanding of democracy under socialism as a democracy wherein for the first time in history the bulk of the population is raised up to the point of independent participation in the day-to-day administration of the affairs of society.<sup>9</sup> With the help of the mass information media the West is assiduously publicizing the "socialism with a human face" concepts and the ideas of "total permissiveness" and the anarchic counterposing of the individual and society, which are alien to Marxism-Leninism. Our ideological enemies are attempting to conceal behind this wall of noise exploitation and chronic unemployment, indifference to man and poverty--all the ulcers of the capitalist organism, which inevitably involve millions of people in the sphere of crime. The leaders of bourgeois states themselves acknowledge that crime there has assumed the proportions of a truly national catastrophe. Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was forced to observe: "Poverty, disease, injustice, idleness, ignorance and human squalor and crime go hand in hand. This is the truth. We have always know it. We cultivate crime, engender it and foster it. We should not be surprised that it is flourishing here!"<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, foreign guests visiting the Soviet Union remark on the purity of the moral atmosphere of the socialist way of life and the tranquillity of our cities' streets. Thus Mike Davidoff, correspondent of the DAILY WORLD, writes in his book "Cities Without Crises," which was published by the American International Publishers Publishing House in 1976, that the

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biggest impression on him was made by the fact that he could walk around Moscow's streets without fear day and night. He discovered for himself the joy of evening strolls in the fresh air, not having to keep warily looking around and not quickening his steps when he heard footsteps behind him.

Firm economic, political and legal guarantees of Soviet people's rights and freedoms and reliable protection of the interests of the citizen and the state represent the greatest social conquest of our society. And if the party and the organs of state are stepping up the fight against crime, this is caused by no means by extraordinary circumstances but by the new social possibilities of the developed socialist society and the citizens' increased intolerance of all antisocial manifestations and everything that hinders our advancement toward communism. The process of communist building is creating objective possibilities of the liquidation of crime. However, the realization of these possibilities will demand the planned efforts of the party, the state and the public organizations.

The law has a great role to play in the accomplishment of these tasks. Socialist law protects the economic foundation of socialism--socialist ownership--and the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens guaranteed by the USSR Constitution and raises them in the spirit of lofty communist ideals. A function of socialist law is the molding in Soviet citizens of the intelligent requirements of the comprehensively developed individual which conform to the level of the development of production and social relations which has been reached and the individual's objective possibilities.

The processes of dynamic socioeconomic development are reflected in the activity of the internal affairs organs. This has been expressed primarily in the reinforcement of trained personnel and its professional and cultural growth. Thanks to the Communist Party's attention and scrupulous concern, much has been done to improve the composition of the personnel of the internal affairs organs. An important role in the implementation of these measures was played by the decree determining the procedure of the staffing of the internal affairs organs with the best representatives of the working people recommended for service by the labor collectives and party and Kom-somol organizations. Today 75 percent of the militia privates and sergeants has complete high school education, whereas the figure was only 11 percent in 1968. The leading personnel, right up to chiefs of rayon and city internal affairs departments and corrective-labor institutions, consists of specialists with higher education. All investigating officers and the vast majority of officials of the criminal investigation department and of the organizations for the struggle against embezzlement of socialist property and other subdivisions of the internal affairs organs have higher and secondary specialized education. Today the MVD has 15 VUZ's, an academy and three scientific research institutes in which a large detachment of scientists--100 doctors and 1,200 candidates of sciences--work.

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The trends and regularities of social development dictate the acute need for the personnel of the internal affairs organs to be armed with diverse profound knowledge in the sphere of the social, natural and technical sciences.

The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that the party has devoted and will continue to devote constant attention to improving the activity of the militia, the prosecutor's office, the courts and the justice organs, which are standing guard over Soviet legality, the interests of Soviet society and the rights of Soviet citizens. "The party and the state," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev has said, "put a high value on the difficult and honorable labor of the workers of these establishments and are displaying concern to insure that they be replenished with trained, worthy personnel."<sup>11</sup>

## 2. Changes in Legislation and the Tasks of Improving and Reeducating Offenders

"...A question with which we are constantly involved," L. I. Brezhnev said in the CPSU Central Committee Report to the 25th party congress, "is /the question of improving our legislation and strengthening socialist law and order.../ The Politburo has entrusted the corresponding organs with the preparation of proposals on a further improvement in labor and administrative law and certain other laws in order that account be taken of the new phenomena in public life."<sup>12</sup>

In accordance with these instructions, in 1977 the USSR Supreme Soviet and the union republic supreme soviets made amendments to and supplemented union and republic administrative, criminal and corrective-labor legislation in force. Punishments not involving imprisonment were envisaged for a number of offenses, and punishment under criminal law for insignificant crimes was replaced by measures of administrative and social influence. The purpose of these decisions and legislative enactments is to step up work on preventing offenses and to increase the effectiveness of the struggle against antisocial phenomena. They mark a new stage in party and state leadership of the activity of the law-enforcement organs.

Back in 1919, during elaboration of the draft of the second party program, V. I. Lenin formulated the principal directions of criminal policy. In the synopsis of the section on punishments he wrote:

- "1) whence derived percentage of criminal conviction
- 2) "" of social censure
- 3) replacement of imprisonment by compulsory labor with residence at home
- 4) replacement of prison by educational institutions
- 5) introduction of comrades' courts (for certain categories, both in the army and among workers)."<sup>13</sup>

The changes in legislation reflect the extension of the differentiation of legal sanctions and, on this basis, the decisive increase in their educative effectiveness.

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The law-enforcement organs (the court, the prosecutor's office and the internal affairs and justice organs) are waging a resolute struggle against dangerous infringements of socialist law and order and insuring the inevitability of punishment for offenses. No one can count on being permitted to darken Soviet people's life by criminal actions with impunity and prevent them from enjoying the benefits and advantages of developed socialism.

L. I. Brezhnev has repeatedly emphasized that Soviet democracy and humanism have nothing in common with a liberal attitude toward those who break Soviet laws and the rules of socialist community life. Such is the party's principled line.

Each Soviet person must be confident that his rights, life and health and honor and dignity are reliably protected by the law-enforcement organs. All this sets the internal affairs organs responsible tasks and entrusts special duties to them.

The new legislation entrusts big and responsible tasks to the service set up within the system of internal affairs organs for the execution of punishments not involving imprisonment. Work on improving and reeducating those whose sentences have been suspended and those released on probation with their obligatory enlistment in work is assuming a fundamentally new character in our day, more attention is being paid to their work and day-to-day arrangements and there is an increase, in particular, in the role of the labor collective in the process of introducing offenders to normal labor and social-political activity.

It is impossible to conceive of making a reality of a legal possibility with the exclusion of the activity of the people implementing the legal enactments. The workers of the law-enforcement organs must be strictly guided by the new legislation and have a sound knowledge of the letter, meaning and spirit of the law. An important task of legal science is to reveal the objective regularities of law-enforcement activity and the conditions and factors contributing to or, on the contrary, hindering the effectiveness of the action of the rule of law. As is known, any legal rule represents a regulation of social relations determined by need and a logically formulated rule of behavior or prohibition. The real life of legal rules is manifested here in law-enforcement activity. We frequently encounter a subjective interpretation and defects in the legal conscience of individual citizens which prevent the correct implementation of the rule of law.

As an analysis of the results of a study of public opinion shows, certain citizens believe that it is sufficient to increase criminal liability for crime to disappear. According to the data of a sociological study of the process of discussion of the draft Basic Law of the USSR conducted by research assistants of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, from 20 to 39 percent of the representatives of different social groups

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who were polled demand more severe punishments.<sup>14</sup> Such views are also shared from time to time by certain workers of the law-enforcement organs. This is a profoundly mistaken opinion.

The experience of many centuries has proven incontrovertibly that reliance on the omnipotence of punishment under criminal law is illusory. V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that "the preventive significance of a punishment is by no means conditioned by its severity but by its inevitability. What is important is not that a strict punishment be handed down for a crime but that /not one/ instance of a crime pass undetected."<sup>15</sup> It is indisputable that an inveterate thief, murderer or malicious hooligan should be punished with all the severity of the law and that no kind of sentimentality is permissible here. And the people demanding more severe punishments undoubtedly have in mind malicious criminals and recidivists. But our attitude toward people who have accidentally transgressed and who have committed an offense which represents no great danger and who can be corrected without being isolated from society should be entirely different.

The changes in legislation represent the scientifically substantiated policy of our state determined with consideration of the conditions of the developed socialist society. The well-defined wording of the new legislative enactments reflects the essence of criminal policy at the current stage--a policy of the inevitability of liability and differentiation of the punishment, a decisive increase in its educative effectiveness and the labor collectives' active participation in the reeducation of offenders.

The labor collective is the micromilieu through which the relations of collaboration and mutual assistance inherent in socialism and lofty ideological-political and moral principles directly influence each individual. If there is a healthy social-psychological and moral climate in the collective, this collective is a good educator.

The vast majority of labor collectives is coping successfully with the difficult task of reeducating offenders. Only a negligible proportion of those released on probation commit crimes again. Where the administration of the construction site and enterprise, the public organizations and the labor collectives persistently and skillfully undertake educative work, where normal work and social conditions are created for those given a suspended sentence and where the internal affairs organs organize their work in accordance with the new tasks and requirements, normal labor discipline and due public order is insured.

The adoption of the new USSR Constitution and the union republic constitutions, the changes in current legislation in the direction of further democratization and humanization of criminal-law and corrective-labor policy and the well-defined differentiation of sanctions for offenses are designed to insure a stepping up of the active struggle against all negative phenomena and a further strengthening of socialist law and order on this basis.

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The struggle against offenses is not an end in itself and an isolated function of the state's law-enforcement organs under the conditions of developed socialism. It is a means of solving the complex task of the assertion of the socialist way of life, the shaping of a harmoniously developed and ideologically convinced, active builder of the new society, who is free of vestiges of the past, and of the creation of conditions most worthy of human nature and adequate therefor.<sup>16</sup>

### 3. Certain Problems of the Social Prevention of Offenses

The policy of the extensive prevention of offenses is pursued in our country in full conformity with the party's decisions.

Crime represents the sum total of various acts of individual socially dangerous behavior. The genesis of offenses is predetermined by a complex of social factors. This demands a principled approach to the organization of work on preventing crime. The main direction in the struggle against crime is the successful solution of the social and economic problems of the life of society and the improvement, on their basis, of social relations and educative, ideological work. The solution of the problem of the eradication of crime will naturally take a considerable amount of time for man's mentality is refashioned far more slowly than the material bases of his life. "Practically everything is of significance here: the right atmosphere in the family, skillful organization of the academic process, a health atmosphere in the labor collective, well-organized consumer services and much else."<sup>17</sup>

The second direction of preventive work presupposes an influence on the specific microsocial groups in which the negative phenomena are shaped and mature.

And, finally, the third direction is individual educational and preventive work with the specific vectors of antisocial morality and asocial principles. It consists of changing the system of a person's value orientations, overcoming antisocial views and molding a respect for the rules of socialist community life and Soviet law and order. Social control, with its measures of educative, social and state compulsion, including legal liability, are of considerable significance in this plane.

In accordance with these directions, a well-balanced system of the social prevention of offenses which incorporates measures of a general, special-criminological and individual nature has been created in our country. By measures of a general nature we understand implementation of the tasks of communist building, Soviet people's guaranteed political, moral and labor education and the shaping of a healthy moral climate in the individual's social environment (family, school, labor collective and daily surroundings). There is particular significance in this aspect in measures of intensifying educative work in the labor collectives, the elaboration and implementation of plans of the social development of the collectives and the elimination of shortcomings in the activity of the state organs and public organizations.

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Special criminological measures are another element of the social prevention of offenses. These include the decisions adopted by the Communist Party and the Soviet state on stepping up the fight against crime, improvement of the activity of the militia organs, prosecutor's office and the courts, daily study of the state of crime, the planning of measures to fight it, coordination of the activity of the state organs and the public in this direction, elimination of the circumstances contributing to crimes being committed and the generalization and analysis of law-enforcement practice.

A most important element of the system of social prevention is the supervision of persons inclined, to judge by their behavior, to commit offenses. It is closely connected with the measures of an individual nature which are adopted for specific instances of crimes or other antisocial acts. Measures of influence, provided for by the law, applied to persons who have committed crimes and measures to correct and reeducate them fall into this category.

Various forms of persuasion and compulsion, including measures to avert premeditated crimes at the early stages of their development and administrative supervision of certain categories of people who have served their sentence, represent another element of individual prevention.

Social prevention is an integral part of communist education, and the internal affairs organs participate to the full in educative-legal work.

The USSR MVD and the USSR Prosecutor's Office and Ministry of Justice in conjunction with the USSR Gosplan, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee, are drawing up a comprehensive plan of the prevention of offenses which is tied in with the annual, five-year and long-term plans of the national economic development of the republics, krays and oblasts. This is a big scientific and practical task whose solution will make it possible to create a planning foundation for the unification of the efforts of the party, soviet and economic organs, public organizations and working people's collectives in the fight against offenses. A broad circle of scientists--sociologists, economists, demographers, psychologists, medical workers, education organ workers and trade union and Komsomol organization workers--have been enlisted in the drawing up of comprehensive plans of the prevention of offenses. The social prevention of offenses is thus being raised to the level of all-state planning.

The efficacy of the entire system of the prevention of offenses is connected to a considerable extent with the work of the voluntary people's militias and the enterprise prevention councils and the system of public order-maintenance centers in residential microrayons. Prevention councils are currently operating at almost every plant, factory and enterprise in the country, and 32,000 public order-maintenance centers have been organized. The public order-maintenance centers are an effective form of influence of the party organizations, the public and the labor collectives on the state of law and order in the microrayon. An evaluation of their role and further development prospects must be approached from precisely these standpoints.

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The prevention of offenses in the domestic sphere is connected with the activity of the public order-maintenance centers. More than one-half of the homicides, aggravated assaults and acts of hooliganism are committed from domestic motives. The majority of domestic crimes is committed in a state of intoxication. Domestic life is the most conservative aspect of social relations and the one which is least susceptible to the influence of society.

This is explained by a number of reasons. First, vestiges of the past are more firmly retained and the tremendous force of inertia of the old habits, customs and prejudices and of the consumerist mentality alien to our society is displayed in the domestic sphere (the family, relations and the immediate social environment). Social continuity in the domestic sphere assumes a frequently stagnant nature for it is turned to the past and does not always adequately reflect the changed living conditions.

Second, in the domestic sphere, under conditions wherein for this reason or the other there is a weakening of ideological influence, an everyday consciousness based on worldly-empirical knowledge and practices begins to play the dominating role.

And, finally, in the system of social-psychological contacts the domestic sphere is distinguished by great emotional tension, and an appreciable role therein is played by psychological compatibility and unity of aims.

Social continuity is an intricate dialectical process which incorporates elements of rejection and retention of social experience, and these contradictions acquire particular poignancy in the domestic sphere.

The skillful organization of the professional work of the public and the militia in the residential sector is a topical problem. Intervention in the life of another family is undoubtedly a delicate question. It must be solved carefully, attentively and with the greatest tactfulness. The USSR Constitution guarantees the country's citizens inviolability of resident and the law's protection of their private life (articles 55, 56). No one has the right without legal grounds to enter another's residence against the will of its residents. For this reason preventive work in this sphere must be armed with subtle and sufficiently effective means of legal procedure and recommendations on effective pedagogical, psychological and moral influence.

The struggle against drunkenness is closely interconnected with domestic problems. The influence of drunkenness on crime is common knowledge. Drunkenness is a serious enemy in the domestic sphere and in the labor collective. G. S. Strumilin rightly believed that the "complete sobering-up of production" could additionally yield no less than 10 percent of the increase in labor productivity.<sup>18</sup> In-patient departments and narcotic centers for the treatment of inveterate drunkards are currently being set up with enterprise funds. Treatment in them has to be paid for and is combined with productive labor. This is producing positive results: thousands of people have returned to a normal life and productive labor.

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The prevention of juvenile offenses has always been a problem of great state importance. Addressing the 18th Komsomol Congress on 25 April 1978, L. I. Brezhnev said: "The party and the Komsomol are paying great attention to the moral upbringing of the young people. The assertion of the standards and principles of communist morality is impossible without a constant and persistent struggle against antisocial manifestations and spiritual poverty and its inevitable concomitants--drunkenness, hooliganism and violations of labor discipline. The concealed and, at first glance, not always noticed manifestation of immorality represent no less a danger. Indifference, dependence, cynicism and claims to obtain more than one gives society--such moral flaws must not remain beyond the purview of the Komsomol and, indeed, of our entire community."<sup>19</sup>

Attention to the problem of offenses among the young people does not mean that there are many such phenomena in our country. Their overall number is decreasing everywhere. But behind each offense stands the tortuous fate of a young person and a flaw in his ideological, labor and moral upbringing. Young people are our country's future and, consequently, the future of Soviet law and order. The state of legality and law and order in the future will depend to a decisive extent on how the education of the younger generation is organized today and on what social and moral values society implants in the young hearts. Soviet youth is actively participating in the building of communism. The country has cultivated a generation of people which does not know of wars, starvation and the deprivations of the war and immediate postwar years. Young people are studying and working in a tranquil atmosphere. Fundamental changes have occurred in Soviet people's material welfare.

However, we cannot fail to see that the absence of a systematic, beneficent educative influence could lead and, indeed, does lead to the point where a process of the inflation of public material values in the eyes of the younger generation occurs in certain families. A consumer attitude toward life and a nihilistic attitude toward labor and the rights and dignity of others emerges from time to time in a section of the youth.

As is known, the 25th CPSU Congress observed that the growth of material possibilities should constantly be accompanied by a rise in people's ideological-moral and cultural level, otherwise relapses into a philistine, petit bourgeois mentality are possible.

The Soviet secondary school is called upon to be a genuine center of educational work with juveniles in the microrayon. The practice of the operation of extended-day schools and whole-day schools is becoming increasingly widespread. The experience of their work indicates a promising outlook for this direction. N. K. Krupskaya vigorously advocated the extension of the school's influence on the shaping of the students' personality beyond the confines of class time and the conversion of evening schools into student clubs. Practice convinces us that this problem is becoming increasingly

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topical in our time. The operation of the extended-day and whole-day schools is of particular significance in the regions of Siberia and the Far East and of the construction of large-scale territorial-industrial complexes, of which the full employment of all adult members of the family is typical.

The introduction in the schools, vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums of lessons of moral education and the principles of legal knowledge has an important role to play in the education of juveniles. Study of behavioral ethics should permeate the entire system of instruction, beginning with the school's elementary grades.

The so-called unfortunate families require unremitting attention. It is precisely the children from these families which are particularly in need of a good patron and mentor. All such families should be the object of educative influence. Here it is necessary to display particular concern, attention and a sense of responsibility. Working juveniles must be surrounded with unflagging attention.

In 1977 some 60 percent of high school graduates began work in the national economy, 17 percent entered a vocational-technical school and 23 percent entered VUZ's and tekhnikums. Thus yesterday's students represent, for the most part, the reinforcement of the ranks of the working class and kolkhoz peasantry. It is the honorable and responsible duty of the labor collectives and the mentors of the working youth to foster therefrom a worthy replacement shift.

Soviet citizens' increased legal conscience and public activeness and their intolerance of offenses are creating real possibilities for the further activization of the unified front of the social prevention of offenses.

#### 4. Scientific Problems of the Further Strengthening of Law and Order and Socialist Legality

Utilization of the achievements of science is an important factor in the solution of the social problem of the fight against crime.

V. I. Lenin wrote that "history consists of the actions of individuals, and it is the task of social science to explain these actions..."<sup>20</sup>

The nature of crime under the conditions of developed socialism and its objective and subjective causes require comprehensive and in-depth study by the representatives of a number of social sciences: philosophy, sociology, political economy, social psychology and jurisprudence. What is needed is in-depth study of the causes and conditions of individual types of offense being committed and, the main point, scientific recommendations on their prevention.

Another typical problem is the personality of the offender. A study of the criminal's personality is impossible without the buttress of a firm

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theoretical foundation and without philosophical and psychological elaboration of the motives of personality behavior. In recent years Soviet and foreign philosophers and Marxist psychologists have published a number of monographical studies devoted to man's social essence, the interaction of the personality and the social milieu and public and individual consciousness, the role of the subjective factor in society's development, the freedom of the individual and the increase in his social responsibility under the conditions of the building of communism. These studies represent the methodological basis of a criminological study of the social nature of crime and its causes. The task is to continue the elaboration of the problems of criminal policy and of concrete recommendations on the paths and methods and means of increasing its efficiency. Law-enforcement activity in the sphere of the struggle against offenses requires the scientific development of a number of problems related to the sphere of the philosophical, economic and sociopolitical sciences.

Scholars specializing in the sphere of sociology and scientific communism could render considerable assistance in the formation and development of the science of control in the sphere of law and order. In particular, there is important significance for practice in the investigation of the problems of eliminating the causes of offenses in various tiers of society's social structure and of the influence of scientific-technical progress on the structure and dynamics of offenses and the formulation of legal procedures and scientific recommendations on enhancing the role of the labor collectives in the improvement and reeducation of offenders and the prevention of offenses. Economic science is as yet inadequately investigating questions of the protection of socialist property and sources of unearned income connected with shortcomings in the planning, production and sale of individual consumer goods.

An in-depth study of the factors influencing the criminal's personality presupposes a revelation of the social-psychological elements of the public consciousness. This approach enables us to comprehensively study the personality of the offender as a participant in specific interpersonal relationships and the vector of particular social-psychological traits and attributes and to reveal the social-psychological peculiarities of the formation of his personality.

The social-psychological approach could make a study both of the psychology of crime and the mentality of the criminal effective.

An important scientific problem of great significance for a further improvement in the activity of the law-enforcement organs is study of the essence, content and correlation of persuasion and compulsion at the current stage of the development of the socialist society. Study of these questions, which are of great significance in the educative process and in the improvement and reeducation of offenders, is as yet manifestly inadequate. It is a question of helping the person who has transgressed in the process of his improvement and reeducation. In all cases the attitude toward the offender

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should be based on the law and imbued with humanism. If society has set as its goal the reeducation of the offender so that he should not again commit crimes, it should implant in him a belief in the possibility of his finding his place in life. This is the heart of pedagogical optimism.

The role of pedagogics is growing constantly in the solution of the problems of strengthening law and order and legality. Studies have been galvanized markedly in this sphere in recent years. However, many relevant problems still await solution. In particular, it is important that psychologists and educationalists increase their attention to study of the questions of the illegal behavior of juveniles.

It cannot be denied that the most "neglected people," with whom the family, the school and the production collective were all unable to cope in the past, account for a considerable proportion of offenders. The internal affairs organs, whose sphere of activity includes these people, must reorganize their minds and behavior in a direction desirable for society. But for this they must be armed with sufficiently effective means of pedagogical influence.

Practice is setting legal science big and responsible tasks. It has to study comprehensively and in depth the interconnections and interaction of the law with social reality. Naturally, students of law must rely extensively on the data of social relations in all their complexity and multiplicity in their research.

The law-enforcement organs will only be able to solve the problems of the further strengthening of law and order and legality with the help of science. For this reason it is essential to undertake the purposeful study of the problems of law and order and the formulation of the corresponding scientific recommendations. It was with good reason that the 25th CPSU Congress mentioned the need for further study of the problems of the development of our statehood and the forms and methods of educational and ideological work. The comprehensive nature of these problems demands the enlistment of representatives of various branches of science in their solution.

The struggle against offenses is not a narrow departmental task. It is a partywide, statewide, nationwide problem. And it is being successfully solved in the society of developed socialism by social-political practice in alliance with science.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following Lenin's Course], Speeches and articles, vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 627.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4. p 336.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 41, p 462.

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4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," vol 5, Moscow, 1976, pp 537-528.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, part II, pp 356-357.
6. See VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR No 51, 1977, article 764.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 1, p 181.
8. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 33, p 95.
9. See V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 33, p 116.
10. R. Clark, "Prestupnost' v SShA" [Crime in the United States], Moscow, 1975, p 83.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," vol 5, p 543.
12. Ibid., p 542.
13. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 38, p 408.
14. See D. A. Kerimov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, "The USSR Constitution and Development of the Working People's Sociopolitical Activeness" in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 1, 1978, p 17.
15. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 4, p 412.
16. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 42, p 120.
17. L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," vol 4, Moscow, 1974, pp 95-96.
18. EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIYA PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTVA, No 4, Novosibirsk, 1974, p 38.
19. L. I. Brezhnev, "Rech' na XVIII s'yezde Vsesoyuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soyuza Molodezhi" [Speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress], Moscow, 1978, pp 17-18.
20. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 1, p 415.

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