

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100020041-3

28

1979

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JPRS L/8296

28 February 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA
(FOUO 3/79)



LATIN

AMERICA



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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET		1. Report No. JPRS L/8296	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.																																							
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA, (FOUO 3/79)			5. Report Date 28 February 1979																																								
7. Author(s)			6.																																								
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.																																								
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.																																								
			11. Contract/Grant No.																																								
15. Supplementary Notes			13. Type of Report & Period Covered																																								
			14.																																								
16. Abstracts The serial report contains articles on political and sociological developments in major areas of Latin America, as reported primarily from Latin American newspapers and periodicals. It also includes information on major segments of Latin American economy, geography, culture, and ethnography.																																											
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors																																											
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	___ Guatemala																																										
17c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K																																											
18. Availability Statement For Official Use Only. Limited Number of Copies Available From JPRS.			19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 47																																							
			20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price																																							

FORM NTIS-88 (10-70)

USCOMM-DC 40320-P71

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JPRS L/8296

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ARGENTINA

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA LABELED DISCRIMINATORY

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 28 Dec 78 p X Supplement

[Article by Raul Fain Binda: "Messianism and Errors"]

[Text] Relations between the United States and our country reached their most delicate point during 1978. Finally, Washington significantly changed its attitude, becoming more moderate. At the time of greatest tension, the following criticism pointed out the Carter mistakes that Argentina must not imitate.

Jimmy Carter, an almost unknown politician, launched his campaign for the presidency of his country with the promise to inaugurate a new style and to impose a new government policy. For him, one objective made no sense without the other.

Since 20 January 1977, critics of the President point out primarily his inexperience as the cause of a long list of mistakes, among which the following may be cited:

--His ingenuity in presenting to the Congress reform projects whose complexity and political connotations have paralyzed them: legislation on energy, fiscal reform, public service reform, etc;

--His haste in underestimating the authority achieved by Congress during the period of the great crises of Vietnam, civil rights and Watergate;

--His ignorance or lack of consideration for the complex lines of communication and negotiation between the White House and the Capitol;

--His "ill-considered" pressure on bureaucrats and representatives of important economic interests.

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This list appears to blame the President for lack of political realism. But not all those who can recite it perfectly belong to the Republican Party or are potential rivals in official quarters.

In the foreign policy plan the militant defense of human rights has colored almost completely the complex web of issues confronted by the United States. It is inevitable, in addition, that it awaken contradictory reactions: strictly reasoning, one cannot loudly demand sanctions against the Soviet Union for its treatment of dissidents without recognizing along the way the legitimacy of sanctions against other, more sympathetic countries. But, at the same time, just such a discrimination must be pointed out in the American attitude, since certain countries whose strategic location is vital to the United States have not been made targets of the new policy, or at least not with the virulence and energy applied to the military governments in Latin America.

American observers find, among the apparent contradictions of Carter, a unifying concept which gives sense to his entire policy, and to all his supposed mistakes: that is what Sheldon Wolin, of THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, calls "the particular version of Protestantism" professed by the President. "Purification," writes Wolin, "is inseparable from redemption. To be born again is to be cleansed, purified, 'clothed in fine linen, clean and white, since fine linen is the virtue of the saints.' The call of Jimmy Carter (...) is a call to clean virtues." It is clear that most of the political virtues, according to this interpretation, are "dirty" virtues, which the President scorns. A clear example of this way of interpreting life and politics was the dismissal of Bert Lance, the budget director and a friend of Carter. Nixon, if such had been the case, would have asked for Lance's immediate resignation, or would have defended him as an accomplice. Carter, on the contrary, lost several popularity points by defending his friend to the limit. If we continue to apply Wolin's observation, we will understand the President's loyalty to his group of Georgians and his wrath toward politicians and bureaucrats in Washington--true moneychangers in the temple.

This messianic attitude, if we are to understand all its implications, must be related to the power of the United States, whose characteristics force one to consider whatever policy is drawn up in Washington, however erroneous and unjust it may be.

It has been said repeatedly (Vice Adm Cesar Augusto Guzzetti pointed it out in his time as the Argentine position) that the United States has a right to deny credit to whomever it wishes. What it cannot do is back up its attitude with observations which amount to interference in the internal affairs of our country and an obvious violation of Argentine sovereignty. The history of international relations, of course, is the history of confrontation between nations, and on many occasions the defense of one sovereignty violates another. Diplomacy is the art of reconciling that traditional contradiction between interference and sovereignty. However, in the case of the State Department the method chosen is that of discriminatory

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confrontation with certain countries. It is necessary to be distrustful in order to find suspicious the alacrity with which Carter ceased to pressure and scold Brazil, his favorite target before reaching the presidency? The case of Chile is clearer, since the regime of Augusto Pinochet relaxed with noteworthy speed.

The State Department distinguishes, then, among just persons, recalcitrant sinners and repentant sinners. But, at the same time, it appears to be considering a new category of countries outside of its church, consisting of those who are censured, but not sanctioned. Control of exports to the Soviet Union (material for oil exploration and a computer for TASS) can be considered irrelevant and demonstrates, in any case, the American reluctance to apply sanctions to Moscow in view of its bias. In addition, Washington is very much aware that a true economic sanction will be a sanction against American products: the rebellion of the farmers in the Midwest when limiting sales of grain to the Soviet Union was discussed last year is well remembered. Clearly, any business firm can survive without the Argentine market, but it will be capable of conspiring against the President if it is forbidden the Soviet...or the Brazilian [market].

Stanley Hoffman, in an essay for FOREIGN AFFAIRS, analyzed the decline of American power, and he attributes it to the following factors: The increase in the number of countries in the international scene, the growing economic interdependence, the increase of Soviet power and, basically, the American inhibition provoked by internal political and social phenomena: the struggle between the presidency and the Congress, the fears of the economic interests of losing ground overseas, resistance to accepting the old role of international policeman and juggler of repressive regimes, etc.

Logically, a superpower will not renounce its leadership mission. If it encounters difficulties with one policy, it will try another, which inevitably will contain some errors. But the difference between a medium-sized country, like Argentina, and one like the United States, is that the latter can be mistaken much more often. Washington made a mistake in firing the level-headed Terence Todman, who was sincerely committed to the defense of human rights, and at the same time to the balance which demands that certain considerations and subtleties of a political and strategic nature be taken into account. If he had drawn up State Department policy, if he had won in the game of politics, the United States would have expressed its concerns to Argentina firmly, but without having had recourse to the whip.

The United States' advantage is that it has a wide margin in which to correct its mistakes. Now it has chosen a traumatic revival of interdependence, and it is applying the traditional, as well as new, elements of economic and political pressure. Its final objective, of course, is to come out victor in the confrontation with the Soviet Union, or at least to keep it under control. For this reason it is abandoning the military governments and giving shelter to the civilian, betting on a political gain. The results of the recent elections in Bolivia and Ecuador are, in part, the result of this new attitude.

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But it is one thing to pressure Bolivia and another to pressure Argentina. This difference is what Terence Todman, more subtle than the other bureaucrats and members of the State Department--more subtle, of course, than Carter himself--warned about.

Clearly, no one expects Carter to dedicate all his energies to trying to understand the specific problems of each country. This is why he has collaborators and ambassadors. Raul Castro himself affirmed that the Argentine image has nothing to do with reality. His testimony was not enough to convince the State Department.

Argentina cannot permit itself the luxury of error. Censured by the leading power of the West, which can lead to similar attitudes in other countries, it must choose the way indicated by its dignity and sovereignty, dispelling any doubt which, in good or bad faith, tarnishes the Argentine image in the eyes of a country which should be our friend and not our teacher.

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ARGENTINA

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS REPORTED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 26 Nov 78 pp 59-64

[Text] Over half a hundred Spaniards are being persecuted by the Argentine regime. Although all indications are that the visit by Their Majesties will be occasion for the release of half a dozen of them, for the great majority nothing is going to change, because it has not been known for years now whether they are in prison or have been executed.

Perhaps Carlita Rutilo, a pretty little 3-year-old Peruvian, with blue eyes and still a jabbberer, would like to see the king and queen of Spain, Juan Carlos and Sofia, when they ride down the streets of Lima amidst hurrahs and banners. Surely she would be happy seeing the first king and queen to visit Peru.

But Carlita will not be in the country where she was born, at that time. She must now be in Buenos Aires or in some other place in Argentina. Pedro Paramo prepared the report.

Like her grandmother Matilde, Carlita is Spanish and lives in Madrid. Like as not 26 November 1978 would be an unforgettable date for her, if she could go to the Buenos Aires Ezeiza Airport and could see, through the shakos and rifles of the guard, even only in passing, the king and queen of Spain surrounded by generals and protected by other military officers of the great Argentine nation, amidst notes of martial music.

But Carlita will not go to Ezeiza, either, nor will she see the king and queen on the streets of Buenos Aires, and 26 November will not be a key date in her life, because Carlita was kidnaped by the Argentine Police or Army on 29 August 1976, at 1015 hours, at the border post of Villazon-La Quiaca and she has not been heard from since. At that time, she was 9 months old.

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Hundreds of photocopies of her terrifying biography have become moth-eaten since then in every philanthropic agency in the world, in addition to the headquarters of the democratic political parties in half the civilized world, all incapable up to now of snatching this little girl from the power of the Argentine Military Junta. Belgium has given Carlita a visa and asylum and Amnesty International has sponsored her.

She Saw Her Mother Tortured

Nevertheless, the ones most directly responsible for her fate, like the government of Peru, seem not to want to know anything about Carlita. "I have written several letters to Jose de la Puente Radil, Peruvian minister of Foreign Affairs, and I have not obtained an answer," Matilde Artes, her maternal grandmother, an actress who won the Golden Spike in the 1969 Valladolid Festival for her acting in the film "Sangre de Condor" [Condor Blood] said disconsolate. "Even the Red Cross and other agencies have intervened before the Peruvian authorities. Accordingly, they cannot say that they are unfamiliar with the story."

A tragic story that began in Oruro (Bolivia), when Carlita's mother, Graciela Rutilo, a student leader of Argentine nationality, was arrested on 2 April 1976 for supporting a mining strike. Carlita witnessed, suspended face downward, the torture sessions to which her mother was subjected.

Between 23 and 28 August, an Argentine Federal Police commission went to Bolivia to torture Graciela during the night with an electric current. The handing over and final disappearance of mother and daughter is said to have come immediately. Almost a month later, Carlita's father, Enrique Joaquin Lucas Lopez, of Uruguayan nationality, was riddled with bullets by the Bolivian Police and Army on the streets of Cochabamba.

The Argentine authorities denied having received Carlita and her mother from the Bolivian authorities, but Matilde Artes got hold of a telex message in which the Bolivian Government reports the extradition. The International Red Cross subsequently verified the authenticity of this telex message and ascertained that the surrender had been carried out.

On 7 November this year, Matilde Artes and other members of the Committee of Solidarity with Family Members of Prisoners and Missing Persons in Argentina (COSOFAM) were received by personnel of La Zarzuela [royal residence], who confirmed to them that they had in their possession an extensive report on Argentine repression prepared by the Red Cross.

The report is headed by a list of 33 Spaniards kidnaped and missing from 1975 to the present time and six more of His Majesty's subjects who have been rotting in the prisons of the Videla regime for 3 years now, awaiting trial.

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The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], UGT [General Union of Workers], PCE, CCOO [Workers Commissions] and UCD [Democratic Center Union] have also received visits by these COSOFAM pilgrims, in the last few days, in search of a hope.

It is estimated that the Military Junta has imprisoned, tortured and caused the disappearance or assassination of between 25,000 and 30,000 persons, according to data from various international agencies. It is difficult to know how many of them are Spaniards or children of Spaniards who can choose and easily obtain Spanish nationality.

It is estimated that there are a million passport-holding Spaniards, in Argentina, and almost 400,000 more who have renounced their Spanish citizenship but who can regain it at any time.

Just Like Home

"The king and queen are going to find themselves there just as if they had not left Spain," an Argentine who succeeded in leaving that hell 2 years ago said. "In Buenos Aires, concretely Galicians from Galicia (we call all Spaniards Galicians) boast that that is the largest Galician city in the world. But I am afraid," the Argentine stated, "that they are going to see a sad overseas Spain in mourning. Videla and his men have respected nothing."

Ramon Garcia Ulloa, one of the "missing persons" on the list that the Spanish authorities submit periodically to the Military Junta and from which they receive only silence in reply, is a Galician from Galicia.

Ramon was born in a small town in Lugo, in 1920. At the age of 13 years, he emigrated to Argentina in search of work and a decent living. There, he married and had three daughters. After 40 years of sacrifice, he became owner of a dry-cleaning establishment in which the whole family worked and a building with three flats at number 1732 Neuquen Street, Buenos Aires.

The Police and the Army went there at 0300 hours on 6 October 1976 to take him away.

About 40 persons arrived in various automobiles. They surrounded the building. They tore the door down, pulled him out of bed and carried him off in pajamas amid shouts of protest by his wife and mother, Asuncion Ulloa, an 83-year-old woman.

"We never heard from him again," his daughter Susana, 31 years old, now in Madrid, said. "My mother and my husband left no stone unturned. They had interviews with all possible authorities and habeas corpus petitions were filed. Nothing. The Spanish ambassador at that time, Perez Hernandez, pulled every string. Nothing. We wrote to the United Nations, to the Red

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Cross, to Amnesty [International]. Nothing. In February last year, we received some bad news: a friend of a friend of one of my uncles -- you know how those things are -- who apparently worked in the secret services reported that they had killed him within 5 days. But we were never able to verify it."

Motives? Ramon Garcia Ulloa never concerned himself with the country's politics. In spite of the fact that he spent the greater part of his life there, he did not want Argentine citizenship, because he never had any problems from being Spanish, according to what his daughter stated.

"I believe that they arrested him because of us," Susana stated, "I was a student leader in the Law School from 1969 to 1973, and another sister had friends among the Peron Youth organization. But we never had the slightest contact with violent groups. Nevertheless, I believe that these were the causes. Shortly before they took my father away, at the end of September, they kidnaped one of my sister's friends, also Spanish, Ernesto Fernandez Vidal, who lived around the corner, and they demolished his house. Then," she confessed, "we thought that they might take her away and she went to live with other friends. We never thought that they might choose my father or my mother as victims."

In spite of the fact that the names of Ramon Garcia Ulloa and Ernesto Fernandez Vidal are on the report that was in La Zarzuela 2 weeks before the beginning of the trip by Juan Carlos and Sofia, Susana Garcia has lost all hope of seeing her father again.

The Basque Carpenter

Morena Lareu, who has also found asylum in Spain, is somewhat more optimistic, but not much. Her father, Julio Eduardo Lareu, 51 years old, son of Carmelo Lareu, Basque, who emigrated at the beginning of the century, has also been a victim of the present Argentine regime.

He is another of the "missing persons." The story of his "disappearance" begins at noon, last 29 May.

Twelve armed men burst into his carpenter shop at 2775 Deheza Street, Buenos Aires.

They shoved him into an ENCONTEL [National Mail and Telegraph Enterprise] (telephone company) truck waiting at the door.

Six of the assailants stayed in the place for about 6 hours interrogating the workers at gunpoint. Customers who arrived went to enlarge the group of hostages.

That night, his wife went to the police station to submit two complaints: one for the disappearance of her husband and another because, in spite of

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the late hour, there were people in the carpenter shop. The police told her cynically: "Don't worry. It is not a question of robbers or guerrilla fighters. It is an Army (commando) operation." Only the walls of the carpenter shop were left.

"On the same night, I gave birth to my third son," Morena said. "I have a very confused recollection of what happened after that. I know that my mother immediately filed a habeas corpus petition, but without any result. We were already familiar with the steps that had to be taken and, unfortunately, with the results."

She went on to say that "a year before, on 30 May 1977, they had kidnaped my sister Electra and his husband, Rafael J. Belaustegui, whose grandparents were Spanish. That was horrible. My brother-in-law's entire family 'disappeared'. Three brothers with their wives and children. I believe that what happened to my father is connected with what happened to my sister. We never heard from them again, although we resorted to everyone. Fortunately, my little nephew Antonio, 1 year old when his parents were taken away, appeared. My mother found him unnamed in a children's institution -- they call them that -- paid by the Ministry of Social Welfare, at the end of a month. My father had taken him in and was living with them."

In the case of Antonio there was luck. Not so in the case of Carlita, the little Peruvian girl who was unable to see the king and queen and the case of thousands of Argentine children, also victims of the Military Junta's repression.

Although there are no accurate figures on children affected by the military regime, Sister Yvonne, a French Foreign Missions nun devoted body and soul, in Paris, for a year now to the cause of these innocent children, has confirmation that around 400 children were born in Argentine prisons and at this time their whereabouts is unknown. "The possibility that their fathers or mothers will see them again are nil," she says.

Sister Yvonne lived in Argentine 24 years and was arrested on 14 October 1977, together with Sister Alicia Domond. They were released 24 hours later. Two weeks after that, Sister Alicia and Sister Leonide Duquet, also of Foreign Missions, were kidnaped and have not showed up again. Their case, aired spectacularly by the French press and authorities, stirred up angry protests all over the world.

Prison, a Maternity Ward

"Children born in prison receive the same inhumane treatment as their parents," Sister Yvonne states. "They lack milk. They suffer from the cold and all kinds of discomfort in an unhealthy environment. They can be with their mother for only 4 months. Then they wind up in an orphanage where they are not registered with their name or in a black market of children

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for adoption. Their true identity is never known and, as time goes on, it is impossible to identify them."

Sister Yvonne is also gathering information on the vexations undergone by them when their parents are arrested or kidnaped. "Methods identical with the ones applied to adults are applied to them. They are interrogated subtly. 'Who lives in your house with you?' they ask them. If the children say, for example, 'Papa, mama and an uncle who has just come from the interior', it is most likely that they will watch the family and search the house. There are cases of children tortured to snatch this kind of confessions from them and of children obliged to witness their parents' torture for the purpose of finally depressing the prisoners' morale. Just as they did with Carlita."

Children and "missing persons" are cases of slight hope. Steps taken by the Spanish authorities achieve nothing. When they discuss the topic, they encounter constant shrugs on the part of the Argentine Government.

From 1976 to the present time, the activities of the Spanish Embassy in Buenos Aires have obtained the release of 41 persons, all Spaniards, with the exception of three or four.

Whenever a case of the "disappearance" or arrest of a Spaniard comes to the knowledge of the representatives of Spain, a visit is requested immediately -- in the case of prisoners -- and an attorney is made available to the affected parties. But most of the times, an attorney is of very little use, because there are no trials. "I spent 3 years in the Sierra Chica Prison, awaiting a trial that never came," J.M.C. stated to the correspondent of CAMBIO 16 in Oviedo, "in which I would have had to answer for possession of political propaganda."

J.M.C. is a young Andalusian who was taken to Argentina when he was 4 years old. He has a Spanish passport and wants his name concealed, in order to prevent problems "for my family members down there." He was released by intercession of the Spanish Embassy, Luis Yanez of the PSOE and Claudio Sanchez Albornoz.

Sierra Chica

A small Spanish colony hoping that the trip by the king and queen will serve to accelerate their release is interned in Sierra Chica. This group consists of Jesus Maria Cabanas, Fernando Saleza, Antonio Hermida Sanchez and Floreal Canalis, all of them, with the exception of the last-mentioned, awaiting trial for years.

The four succeeded in circumventing prison censorship and in getting out a communique so that the Spanish people may learn the conditions in which some of their fellow citizens, held in Argentine prisons, are.

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The message, written in very small, clear handwriting, narrates the conditions to which the 600 political prisoners lodged in U-2 of Sierra Chica are subjected. "Medical care is deficient and in most cases is limited to prescribing a medicine without examination or merely by consulting on the symptoms. Corporal punishment, cold water showers, insults and all kinds of violations of the most elementary human rights are common here."

Priest in Prison

A priest from Palencia, Javier Martin Doce, released and expelled from Argentina last 28 August, is thoroughly familiar with the Sierra Chica penal institution, in which he spent over 9 months.

"Health care in U-2 does not exist," he said. "While I was there, a fellow prisoner fell seriously ill. 'Hang yourself,' they told him in the infirmary."

Javier Martin Doce is now in Madrid hoping that a surgical operation will correct the strabismus that a stay of over 3 years in small cells caused in his left eye. His story can be the story of any of the Spaniards or Argentines who have undergone persecution by the Military Junta regime. Of course, the story of the more fortunate ones, because he is alive and free to tell it.

Father Martin Doce was ordained a priest in Palencia, in 1964, and went to Argentina 2 years later through the Organization of Hispano-American Sacerdotal Cooperation, to the diocese of Lomas de Zamora, a suburb of Buenos Aires.

In 1970, he and five other priests obtained authorization from the bishop to work as laymen. They were worker-priests in an area with serious social problems: poverty, unemployment, lack of decent housing. They made contact with neighbors' associations.

"On 26 April 1975, Police personnel appeared at my house," Martin Doce relates. "They covered my head and the head of another priest living with me and took us out by force. Lying on the floor of an automobile, they took me to a building that I am sure was not a police station. They took off my clothes and applied the goad to me -- an electric prod -- all over my body for 2 hours. When I informed them that I was a Spaniard and a priest, they increased their cruelty to me. Then they took me to a police station, where they kept me for 8 days with constant interrogations on the basis of blows, insults and psychological torture."

From the police station, he went to the U-9 penal institution, in La Plata, and then to the Sierra Chica U-2. His testimony on this prison agrees with that of Spaniards still imprisoned there.

"When the military coup occurred, on 24 March 1976, the prison regime became considerably more cruel," Martin Doce went on to relate. "In September,

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apparently, at the request of the diocesis, they concentrated 12 of us priests in the La Plata U-9. The transfer was brutal. They beat us constantly with fists and rifles and frightened us with simulated shooting.

"Physical punishments were on the order of the day or night, depending on the mood of the watch officer, in the La Plata Prison. Cries of beaten prisoners would be heard in the early morning in every gallery.

"Fear, which they took care to keep constant among the inmates, must be added to all this constant degradation. Fear even of freedom. In January 1977, they took out several fellow prisoners, including a newsman, Dardo Cabo, to transfer them to Sierra Chica. They killed them by applying the ley de fuga. Normally, in transfers they ordered you to prepare your 'mono' -- your belongings -- beforehand, but the officer told this group not to do anything. That they were not going to need it."

Father Martin Doce narrated these events in a monotone, without emotion. "In April, an attorney from Zarate, a specialist in cooperatives, went out. They put him out of the prison at midnight. He had not walked 50 meters when they fired four shots in his head and left his body on the street. In that way they kept the prison population in constant anguish.

Old Men Driven Mad

"They say that there are no concentration camps. Nevertheless, shortly before I was released, a dozen persons arrived at the La Plata U-9 coming from the north. Among them, there were old men over 65 years old. Some of them were helpless. They were never able to explain where they had been for years. They were all mentally disturbed and at night shouted frightfully. Even the jailers felt sorry for them. One of them, who had been arrested in Tucuman and had been taken for a ride hanging from a helicopter, was in such a state that when they offered him his release he refused to sign it."

In September 1977, Javier Martin Doce was sentenced to 4 years in prison for illegal association. With the aid of the Spanish Embassy, which made an attorney available to him, he was successful in having the judge decree his release on parole last April, when he had served two-thirds of the sentence.

Nevertheless, the National Executive Body (PEN), over the judicial sentence, kept him in prison until 28 August when they transferred him handcuffed to the Buenos Aires airport. For the first time, it granted a pardon.

It is believed, among the family members of Spaniards in prison in Argentina, that they will all be released by means of further pardons, before the king and queen land in Buenos Aires, in a "gesture of magnanimity and good will" by the Military Junta.

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But there will be no pardon for those half a hundred Spaniards or children of Spaniards kidnaped, or for Carlita and other innocent children unrecoverable by their parents, or for the hundreds and hundreds of grandchildren of Spaniards for whom the Madrid authorities can do very little, or for the tens of thousands of Argentines victims of repression.

In Argentina, a prison almost 3 million square kilometers in size, torture and murder continue.

Spaniards, Victims of Videla

Abadia Crespo, Dominga and Felicidad. Kidnaped on 3 November 1977, in the town of Boulogne Sur Mer (Buenos Aires).

Alonso Cifuentes, Gloria Maria. Kidnaped on 29 June 1977, in Mar del Plata (Buenos Aires).

Arrouge Fidalgo, Ernesto. Arrested on 30 March 1976, in La Plata. Trial in La Plata Court Number 3.

Barreira Garcia, Serafin. Kidnaped on 7 April 1977, in Chivalert (Buenos Aires).

Caamano Uzal, Jose. Kidnaped on 23 December 1976, in Tigre (Buenos Aires).

Cabanas Navarrete, Jesus Maria. Arrested on 20 October 1976. Trial pending in the Azul federal court. Imprisoned in Sierra Chica.

Canalis Lasierra, Florial. Completed serving a 3-year sentence in April of this year, but it still held by the National Executive Body in the Sierra Chica penal institution.

Canovas Estape, Alberto. Kidnaped from his home, on 27 March 1976.

Carlos Salas, Eduardo. Kidnaped on 15 January 1977, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Garpintero, Pablo and Ricardo. Kidnaped on 9 November 1977, in Villa Ballester (Buenos Aires).

Cervera Noto, Luis Justo. Kidnaped on 20 May 1977, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Coma Velasco, Atlantida. Kidnaped on 12 October 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Coley Robles, Manuel. Kidnaped on 27 October 1976, in Quilmes (Buenos Aires).

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Chavarino Cortes, Gustavo Adolfo. Kidnaped on 18 November 1977, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Diaz Berdayes, Jose Felix. Kidnaped on 14 July 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Diaz Lopez, Alonso. Kidnaped on 14 July 1976, in San Fernando (Buenos Aires).

Fernandez Garcia, Antonia Margarita. Kidnaped on 4 May this year, in Mar del Plata.

Fernandez Vidal, Ernesto. Kidnaped on 23 September 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Garcia Ulloa, Ramon and his wife Dolores del Pilar Iglesias. Kidnaped on 6 October 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Antonio Garrido. Kidnaped on 7 August 1976.

Gimenez Amaya, Pilar. Kidnaped on 4 January this year, in Mar del Plata (Buenos Aires).

Gomez Aguirre, Manuel. Kidnaped on 14 May 1977, in Villa Teseis (Buenos Aires).

Gonzalez Eusebi, Lidia Edith. Daughter of Spaniards, 23 years old. Kidnaped on 15 September 1976, in Barrancas (Buenos Aires).^{1, 2}

Gualdoni Mazon, Juan Carlos. Son of Spaniards, 30 years old. Kidnaped on 26 June 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.^{1, 2}

Hermida Sanchez, Antonio. Arrested in November 1973. At present in the Sierra Chica penal institution. Trial in Cordoba Court Number 2.

Juan Gutierrez, Maria Magdalena. Kidnaped on 23 September 1977, in the town of Ramos Mejia (Buenos Aires).

Labrador Perez, Miguel Angel. Son of Spanish father. Kidnaped during a working trip in the provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Rios, on 15 September 1976.¹

Lareu, Julio Eduardo. Son of Spaniards, 51 years old. Kidnaped on 29 May of this year, in the city of Buenos Aires.¹

¹ May obtain Spanish citizenship merely by requesting it.

² Not on the list being processed by the Spanish authorities.

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Lopez Alonso, Celia. Kidnaped on 13 October 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Lopez Fernandez, Urbano. Kidnaped on 16 December 1976, in Villa Bosch (Buenos Aires).

Lopez Martin, Angela. Kidnaped on 25 September 1976, in La Plata (Buenos Aires).

Lopez Munoz, Luisa. Arrested on 13 September 1975. At present, in the Villa Devoto Prison, with trial in Cordoba Court Number 2.

Llorens, Manuel Maria. Son of Spaniards. Arrested in Tucuman, in June 1974 and imprisoned in the Rawson penal institution. In the middle of 1977, his wife, whose maiden name is Viale, was kidnaped.^{1, 2}

Llorens, Maria del Carmen. Sister of the above, 36 years old. Is in the Villa Devoto Prison, at the disposition of the National Executive Body (PEN).^{1, 2}

Llorens, Sebastian Maria. Brother of the above. Kidnaped in December 1975.^{1, 2}

Llorens, Teresa Fatima. Sister of the above. Arrested in Mendoza, in January 1975. Whereabouts unknown.^{1, 2}

Martin Martin, Julio Antonio. Kidnaped on 27 December 1975, in Tucuman.

Martinez, Angela. Arrested on 7 May 1976. Whereabouts unknown.²

Martinez Borbolla, Rocio, Schoolteacher, 33 years old, two children. Kidnaped on 16 June 1976, in the town of Haedo (Buenos Aires).

Munuzurri Barano, Juan Manuel. Arrested in 1975. At present, in the La Plata penal institution, with trial in San Isidro Court Number 4.

Ourens Toja, Jose Antonio. Kidnaped on 24 May 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Pena Sainz, Juan Roger. Kidnaped on 11 January 1976, in Mar del Plata (Buenos Aires).

Pinol Moncunill, Jose. Kidnaped on 15 November 1976, in the city of Buenos Aires.

Puerto del Risso, Norma Lidia. Daughter of Spanish father. Schoolteacher, 25 years old and mother of two children. Kidnaped on 11 September 1977.^{1, 2}

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Quesada Maestro, Jose. Kidnaped on 29 December 1977, in the town of General Rodriguez (Buenos Aires).

Requero Sanchez, Maria. Kidnaped on 29 December 1977, in General Rodriguez (Buenos Aires).

Salinas, Luis Antonio. Son of Spaniards, 24 years old. Arrested on 12 February 1976. At present in the La Plata Penitentiary.¹

San Emetrio, Cesar. Son of Spaniards, 50 years old. Kidnaped in La Plata, in August 1977.^{1, 2}

Sena Gorbea, Fermin. Kidnaped on 26 October 1976, in Beccar (Buenos Aires).

Souto Leston, Manuel Ramon. Kidnaped on 12 June 1976, in Lomas de Zamora (Buenos Aires).

Suan, Julio. Spanish priest. Date of disappearance unknown.²

Suarez, Raul. Son of Spaniard. Kidnaped on 25 May 1976, in Rio Ceballos (Cordoba). He was kidnaped together with his wife, Elba Rosario Puc'etta.^{1, 2}

Tapia Rodriguez, Enrique. Son of Spaniards, 25 years old. Kidnaped in May 1976.^{1, 2}

Valera, Baldomero. Son of Spaniards, 60 years old. Kidnaped on 3 October 1976, in Avellaneda (Buenos Aires).^{1, 2}

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ARGENTINA

TOP CENTRAL BANK EXECUTIVES' RESIGNATION IS RUMORED

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 28 Dec 78 p 1

[Article by Roberto Garcia]

[Text] The beginning of a reorganization in the top management of the Central Bank is expected to be announced within the next few hours. It is rumored in capital financial circles that "the Board of Directors is about to resign." To tell the truth, the rumor names four high officials, and it is not known whether they will resign as a group or individually.

It is no news to anyone that various rumors have been heard for some time in the vicinity of the almost inaccessible office of the head of that organization, Dr Adolfo Diz. Furthermore, the story concerning the resignations does not apply to him, naturally; on the contrary, the comings and goings, which he finds annoying, between the Central Bank and the Economy Ministry--it is known that he is one of the architects of Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz' policy--appear to make it a key part of the now less liberal plan of the head of the Finance Ministry.

The rumors concerning the resignations concern the Central Bank's vice president, Dr Christian Zimmermann, and Directors Francisco Soldatti, Jr., Juan M. Ocampo--also president of the National Bank--and Alfredo H. Esposito. Not all these resignations are for the same reason, given the differences these people have already had. But it is interesting to note the fact that yesterday there was still some conjecture as to how these officials would resign their posts: all at once or separately.

The rumors have reached such proportions that there is even speculation on possible replacements for the outgoing directors. Thus, it turns out, Dr Egidio Ianella--presently head of the Development Bank--is being mentioned as a possible successor to Ocampo as head of the Bank of the Nation, while his vacant post would be taken over by a present member of the BND [National Development Bank], Dr Cayetano Licciardo. As for the position presumably to be left vacant by Dr Zimmermann, rumors assign it to the present vice president, Dr Oscar Furlotti. Naturally, all these replacements must be viewed as purely hypothetical. As for the cause of the possible resignations,

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it cannot be found in differences with Dr Diz, except, it is clear, in the case of Dr Esposito. Therefore it is interesting to go deeper into the criticisms of Diz' actions by Esposito who, according to his friends, censured Diz for his complacency in going along with all the demands of the budget deficit--instead of acting as a prosecutor--and, basically, for his opposition to the issuing policy. That is, Dr Esposito, who has been linked more than once with Alvaro Alsogaray--contrary to what they say--would insist that instead of having recourse to monetary contraction, the Central Bank directorship prefers currency issue.

Amid these criticisms it is necessary to understand Esposito's alienation; as for the other three possible resignees, the stories are so varied that for the moment it is better not to become entangled in them.

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ARGENTINA

'TAM' TANK MODIFICATIONS, STATISTICS REPORTED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Aug 78 (Fourth Issue) pp 35-42

[Article by Javier de Mazarrasa]

[Text] During the past few years, the Argentine Army, which since 1945 has equipped its units with the near-eternal American World War II "M-4 Sherman" tank, has felt the urgent need to modernize its armored units through the introduction of new equipment that will satisfy the operational concepts of the armored units in terms of adaptation to terrain and weather and to the country's economic realities.

A first step was the acquisition of a license to manufacture the French AMX-13 light tank and of several American M-41 tanks and the VTT M-113, to be used as an infantry transport, as well as the execution of studies on European tanks, chiefly the AMX-30 and Leopard-1, as possible replacements for the Sherman "Firefly" now in use.

Other studies were simultaneously undertaken which, along with the process of industrialization completed over the past 20 years, have enabled Argentina to produce two new armored vehicles of specialized nature and advanced concept which can have an important influence on the design of future armored equipment.

These two machines — a combat tank and a troop transport — have made a favorable impression on observers from various countries and their technical and tactical specifications have aroused expectations and interest on the part of several South American, African and even Asian nations, thus enabling Argentina to appear on the list of tank-producing countries.

The manufacture of military vehicles is not new in this country; it goes back almost a half a century when a 3/4-ton armored car with a 90-HP engine and trucks for military use were designed and built in the 1930's.

Years later in the 1940's, the Argentine Republic designed its first and only medium combat tank, the 35-ton DL-43 "Nahuel," armed with a 75-mm gun and two 7.65-mm machine guns.

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Argentina's entire military production, which was otherwise very limited, was exclusively aimed at supplying its army.

The "TAM"

With its policy of modernization and supply of armored vehicles for national needs, the Argentine Army in 1973 set up the requisition for a new combat tank which was expected to supply its units in the 1980's.

This requisition, which combined the already determined qualities of a modern tank: "firepower, mobility and protection," established the following priorities and specifications for the new design:

A modern gun, 105 mm or larger.
Secondary armament consisting of two machine guns and flamethrower tubes.
Integrated fire-control system.
Range of over 500 km.
Maximum speed of 70 km an hour on paved roads.
Power-weight ratio of 20 HP per ton.
Weight no more than 30 tons.
Low silhouette.
Atomic, biological and chemical defense system (ABQ).
Crew of three to four men.

With these tactical and technical specifications plus operational, road infrastructure, weather and mountain terrain factors, design operations were begun which materialized in "Project TAM (Argentine Medium Tank)."

Once the project was outlined, the process of study, design and development was begun in 1974.

The development of a project of this magnitude requires highly capable research teams and an advanced technology in a great number of fields including anything from automotive mechanics to electronics via the no less important ones of structural design, armaments or optics or the setting up of a process for the manufacture of complex equipment consisting of hard-to-get materials, as well as a powerful industrial infrastructure.

While not all these prerequisites were lacking, some were and the need to shorten deadlines for getting the equipment into operation (a project of this kind requires from 8 to 10 years of work) led the Argentine Army to turn to countries with more experience in the manufacture of armored vehicles and establish various contacts which bore fruit in the form of a joint production contract with the German firm, Thyssen-Henschel, under the terms of which the latter would design and build prototypes of the TAM tank which would later be mass-produced in Argentina. The contract provided for the use of assemblies, subassemblies and elements already tested and used in similar vehicles.

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Thyssen-Henschel immediately went to work on the TAM project, which has been subdivided into two: the tank itself and the "VCTP" (combat vehicle and troop transport), both based on the same vehicle, which will naturally facilitate future logistics and maintenance operations.

Thyssen-Henschel chose one of its most successful and complex products as the basis for the new vehicle, its "Marder" VCI [expansion unknown], endowed with a turret of original design armed with a 105-mm gun and which has been subjected to slight modification of its armor to improve its ballistic protection and with a more powerful engine, resulting in a medium tank that combines the requirements for a tank that is up-to-date, heavily armed, lightweight, with a low silhouette and economically feasible.

These development operations, chiefly concerning the new turret, took the next 2 years to complete, resulting in the production of a prototype that was ready by January 1977, at which time it was sent to Argentina for testing and technical and tactical evaluation, a phase in which it has been intensely involved for over a year now, having been tested over more than 5,000 km of terrain of all kinds and under extreme weather conditions, for we must not forget that with its enormous land area Argentina has practically all kinds of climates, from tropical to arctic including temperate zones, as well as a variety of mountainous terrains.

The tests have enabled us to verify that all the technical and tactical specifications required by the Army General Staff have been met and even surpassed, thus assuring us of the resistance to wear of its parts and its excellent all-terrain and operational performance.

Simultaneous with the development of the TAM, tools, tool and die machinery and equipment have been produced and acquired and the installations for mass-producing the TAM as of 1979 erected. According to Army General Staff forecasts, 200 units will be produced and work has already begun on the storing of material and acceptance of bids for the manufacture of parts by Argentine industries in order to achieve a high level of national participation.

The internal distribution of the TAM comprises two large sections: the front, which is subdivided into the engine-transmission and drive assemblies chamber, and the rear, which consists of the combat and turret housing chamber. In the rear of the vehicle a little hatch opens for the crew to get in and for loading ammunition, between the radiators and the engine.

The driver sits in the far left front part of the vehicle, equipped for visibility with three periscopes plus a luminescence intensifying system for night driving with a range of 50 meters, complemented by two side-mounted rear-view mirrors.

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Armament

TAM's firepower is provided by a stabilized 105/51-mm English Vickers L-782 gun, the same as in the "Leopard," the M-60 and others, mounted in a turret designed and built by Thyssen-Henschel and constructed of laminated, welded chrome-nickel-molybdenum steel plates set at an angle calculated to reduce the effectiveness of armor-piercing shells to a minimum.

This turret, a fully symmetrical truncated pyramid, has a typical arrangement with the tank commander seated on the right, a dome provided with eight ports that assure visibility in any direction and a panoramic telescope with two magnifications (2x and 8x). The gunner sits in front of the tank commander, provided with a panoramic, front-mounted PERI-2 periscope that is horizontally and vertically adjustable as well as with a laser rangefinder which can be operated directly by the commander.

The loader sits to the left of the breech of the gun, provided with a round hatch in the roof of the turret and a small lateral hatch for loading shells and getting rid of empty shellcases. This member of the crew also has an adjustable periscope of the same type as the one used by the gunner.

In the rear of the turret there is a box for spare parts and auxiliary equipment which is accessible through a lid on the roof. TAM's radio antennas are located on both sides of this box.

TAM's secondary armament consists of a 7.62-mm FN [expansion unknown] coaxial machine gun and another AA [expansion unknown] of the same caliber and made optionally mounted on the roof of the turret in the command dome plus eight electrically fired flamethrower tubes located on both sides of the turret.

The main gun is fired by means of a fully integrated and stabilized system consisting of a ballistic computer, laser rangefinder, stabilized viewfinder and a turret-position indicator, a system that can be complemented with a light intensifier installed to the left of the gun.

The turret is operated by means of an electro-hydraulic and manual control with a 360° angle of rotation and the gun has a vertical range of from -7° to +18°.

Mobility

The TAM, which is outfitted with the improved "Marder" motor-driven assembly, has been designed for excellent mobility. One of the factors that provides this is the high ratio of power to weight which is on the order of 24 HP per ton and is made possible by its low weight of only 30 tons and 6-cylinder 90°-V MTU MB-833 Ea-500 diesel engine with a cylinder capacity of 22.4 liters, water-cooled, which develops 630 HP at 2,200 rpm with a specific special peak power of 720 HP/DIN and which is characterized by an almost constant torque of between 1,200 and 2,200 rpm.

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The engine is cooled by a sealed circuit provided with two water pumps and two radiators located in the rear of the vehicle on both sides of the access hatch, each equipped with hydraulically-operated fans, whose air intake vents are on the roof of the vehicle.

Engine power is transmitted to the tank by means of an HSWL-194 hydro-mechanical transmission that consists of a hydrodynamic torque converter combined with a "high-speed" mechanical clutch, a torque inverter, an automatic or manual four-speed shift (with planetary gears and direct drive), a hydrostatic steering system and hydrodynamic brakes.

This transmission allows the TAM to accelerate rapidly and to constantly maintain a fairly high level of power since the engine runs at a high rate of speed. It can also be started with the gearshift lever in any position it may be in, thus preventing the vehicle from stalling if the driver makes a mistake in handling it.

The hydrostatic steering system, aided by a servocontrol, provides the tank with supple and comfortable and exceptionally fast steering, enabling the TAM to move effectively over winding stretches and with the engine running at top speed.

Another factor to be considered with regard to the vehicle's mobility is its suspension and running gear which in the classically designed TAM consists of six exceptionally long laterally oscillating arms with a potential stroke of 330 mm, supported by large-diameter torsion bars in order to obtain a shock-absorbent suspension and avoid excessive pitching of the vehicle. This system is supplemented by four hydraulic shock absorbers on which the two forward and the two rear wheels on each side rest.

The running gear is composed of six aluminum double support wheels with a rubber belt, three double return rollers and a laterally and mechanically operated rear tension wheel. The drive wheels, mounted forward and fairly high and which permit the TAM to get over vertical obstacles as much as 1 meter high, are powered by the engine by means of two final-drive reduction gears set in the drive-wheel housings which engage the engine gears by means of a 45-cm-wide steel chain equipped with rubber shoes, easily replaceable, manufactured by the Diehl Company and especially suitable for rolling over snow, mud or ice.

Protection

The parallelepiped armor shell, built of a special chrome-nickel-molybdenum steel and thick enough to resist the impact of ordinary 20- or 25-mm shells on its sides and with a front end capable of withstanding standard subcaliber projectiles, is angled at 75° in front and 32° on the sides. Both the front and lateral surfaces are completely smooth, which facilitates resistance to pressure waves caused by atomic explosions, also making it easier to decontaminate the tank.

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Naturally, the TAM is provided with a device to protect it against ABQ weapons which permits the crew to remain in a contaminated area for 8 hours. The incoming air, with a rate of flow of 3 cubic meters a minute, passes through a system composed of two ABQ filters and is maintained in the combat chamber at a pressure of 30 mm of water over that of the outside air, thus preventing radioactive dust from getting into the vehicle. It is also provided with a double-circuit heating system, one a hot-air system for the combat chamber serving as a heater for the crew and the other a hot-water system to preheat the engine.

TAM communications are taken care of by two SSM-25 transmitter-receivers, one intercom with four control boxes and optionally with an outside telephone, while the power is supplied by a group of six 12-volt batteries with a capacity of 400 amperes per hour and which are charged by a 9-kw, 2,200-rpm alternator mounted on the engine.

The TAM has a range of 520 km guaranteed by 600 liters of fuel stored in three tanks, a range that is increased to 900 km with the addition of the two 200-liter outside tanks attached to the rear end. It develops a top speed of 75 km an hour which, thanks to the torque converter, can be applied in either forward or reverse gear.

While all other powers follow the trend toward increasing weight and complexity, with the subsequent rise in cost, Argentina has chosen an economic and lighter (30 tons) tank but one with a firepower equal to that of most tanks in use, marked by a unique general configuration except for the new Israeli "Merkava" tank which has its combat chamber in the rear mid part of the vehicle.

The perfection of this design concept will provide the Argentine Army with two vehicles, the TAM and the VCTP, with similar specifications and the subsequent tactical and logistical advantages, constituting a "family" for which other members are at present being developed: a 120-mm mortar carrier, a 155-mm howitzer, a command car, a recovery vehicle and a bridge-laying tank.

These vehicles, which will make it possible to remodel Argentine mechanized units in the next few years, are also of interest to other countries on the American continent, chiefly Brazil, which find themselves in similar circumstances and are also joining hands on a policy of updating and self-sufficiency, which could mean mass production and, what is more important from the operational standpoint, standardization of equipment among the different South American armies.

Technical Data

TAM: Argentine Medium Tank

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Dimensions and Weights

Overall length	8.12 m	Track	2.62 m
Body length	6.79 m	Chain width	.45 m
Width	3.25 m	Combat weight	29,500 kg
Overall height	2.42 m	Engine weight	1,880 kg
Body height	1.75 m	Transmission weight	1,167 kg
Ground clearance	.44 m	Motor-driven assembly weight	3,210 kg
Contact with the ground	3.9 m	Specific pressure	.77 kg/cm ²

Mechanical Specifications

Engine: MTU MB-833 Ea-500, diesel, 6 cylinders in a 90°-V configuration, cylinder capacity 22.4 liters, 630 HP at 2,200 rpm, water-cooled, right front mounted.

Compression ratio: 19.5:1

Power-weight ratio: 24 HP per ton

Fuel consumption: 115 liters per 100 km

Transmission: Hydromechanical HSWL-194 with hydrodynamic torque converter. Four-speed manual or automatic gear box.

Suspension: Six torsion bars and four lateral hydraulic shock absorbers.

Running gear: Six aluminum double-support wheels with rubber belt, three double return rollers, rear mechanical tension wheel. Forty-five-cm-wide steel chain with rubber shoes.

Armament

Main: 105/51-mm L-7A2 gun, stabilized.

Angle of fire: Horizontal: 360°; vertical: from -7° to +18°.

Secondary: One 7.62-mm coaxial FN machine gun
One 7.62-mm AA FN machine gun, optional.
Eight flamethrower tubes.

Performance

Range: 520 km; 900 km with auxiliary tanks.

Speed: 75 km per hour maximum on paved roads, forward and reverse; 3.5 km per hour minimum.

Longitudinal slopes: 60%

Lateral slopes: 30%

Ditches: 2.5 m

Vertical obstacle: 1 m

Ford: 1.5 m

Turning radius: In first, 6.5 m; in second, 13.5 m; in third, 20 m; in fourth, 30 m.

Fuel: 600 liters of diesel oil in three tanks; 400 liters in outside auxiliary tanks.

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Equipment

Aiming and sighting devices:

Integrated fire-control system consisting of ballistic calculator, laser rangefinder, stabilized primary viewfinder and turret-position indicator. Panoramic telescope with two magnifications (2x and 8x) for the tank commander. Two PERI-Z-12 periscopes for the loader and gunner. Eight ports for the tank commander and three for the driver. Luminescence intensifiers for firing and night driving.

ABQ defense:

Consisting of two filters. Airflow at the rate of 3 cubic meters per minute and overpressure of 30 mm of water.

Heating:

Double circuit, hot water for preheating engine and air for combat chamber.

Radio:

Two SEM-25 transmitter-receivers and intercom with four control boxes. Optional outside telephone.

Crew:

Tank commander, gunner, loader and driver.

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ARGENTINA

COMPLEXITIES SURROUNDING RIVER PLATE BASIN ISSUE REVIEWED

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 15 Jan 79 p 7

[Article by Estela Araujo: "The River Plate Basin Conference Has Revived Some Basic Issues";

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the River Plate Basin has provided an opportunity to review the various factors involved. There were two other presences at the conference: one objectively real that had not been invited (Itaipu) and one not yet objectively real (Corpus). These were the two magic words on which the conference focused its attention.


On 20 October near Itaipu, President Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay and President Ernesto Geisel of Brazil depressed the lever that triggered the explosion of 58 tons of dynamite, thereby diverting the Parana River into the artificial channel through which it will flow until the project is completed. The explosion was still reverberating inside the walls of the Hotel San Rafael of Punta del Este when the ministers of foreign affairs of the five countries of the River Plate Basin assembled for their conference.

The Parana--seventh longest river in the world (4,000 kilometers)--was diverted along a 2,000-meter stretch. It was, and will continue to be, the central axis of the River Plate Basin.

The basin comprises an area of 3.2 million square kilometers and includes the Parana, Uruguay and Plate rivers together with their tributaries. It extends across five countries and represents 37 percent of the total area of Argentina, 19 percent of Bolivia, 17 percent of Brazil, 100 percent of Paraguay and 80 percent of Uruguay.

The country with the smallest percentage of its area situated in the basin--the largest country in South America--has utilized the energy resources of the basin through the medium of several projects: Ilha Solteira, Jupia and Itaipu.

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The River Plate Basin: a marvelous energy resource
that must be exploited in a coherent and equitable manner

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The proximity of the Itaipu project (which is currently in a relatively advanced stage) makes it impossible for Argentina to construct the Libertad hydroelectric project--with an approximate capacity of 15 million kilowatts--and at the same time limits the feasibility of the Corpus project.

Here is what some Argentine experts have had to say:

Admiral Isaac Rojas: "Argentina should not construct a Corpus dam of less than 120 meters in height, so that it will be able to reactivate the great river and thereby its navigation, which today is partly paralyzed." (LA SEMANA, No 104, 25 October 1978)

Nicolas Boscovich: "It is not true that a Corpus of only 105 feet in height could produce energy at a cost equivalent to that of the energy which will be obtained at Yacyreta. In order for the cost to be 'equivalent' the energy would have to cost only half as much, and that would require the dam to be at least 120 meters in height." (LA OPINION, 30 September 1978)

Engineer Mario C. Fushini Mejia: "Carrying out the Itaipu project without Corpus would mean an enormous waste of this natural resource; by comparison, a Corpus 125 meters in height, plus Itaipu, could produce as much as 28 million net kilowatts per year." At another point in his statement he declared that a Corpus 105 meters in height cannot be built but believes 115 meters to be a viable height for the dam. ("La singularidad geografica guayense" [Distinctive Geographic Characteristics of the "Guayense" Region], Editorial Oikos, 1978)

In general, the technical reports contend that the minimum height of the Itaipu dam cannot be less than 115 meters. In the absence of a definitive decision, the foreign ministry gives the impression that it would agree to a height of around 110 meters. The proposal of the Brazilians and Paraguayans is for a dam of only 105 meters and 20 turbines.

In order to understand the issue of the turbines we must begin at the beginning.

The Itaipu Treaty

At the Seventh Conference of Montevideo (held in 1933), in which the countries of the River Plate Basin took part (the treaty was not signed until 1969), it was resolved that although the individual states had the "exclusive right to engage in utilization for industrial and agricultural purposes," the exercise of this right was made subject to "the condition that it not impair the equal right of a neighboring state."

The problem of the water resources of consecutive watercourses (a problem that dates back to Roman law) requires the establishment of international legal norms that will not transform every river that flows through more than one state into a latent dispute.

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At the Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers of the River Plate Basin a declaration was obtained concerning the utilization of the international rivers. It was approved on the basis of the legal principles asserted by Argentina and Uruguay, the downstream countries, and reads as follows:

"On the international rivers that consist of consecutive watercourses, and where sovereignty is not shared, each state may utilize the waters in accordance with its needs, provided such utilization does not cause perceptible harm to another state of the Basin." (Article 2)

The Brazilian thesis had been announced by that country's foreign minister in November 1968, as follows: "No country whose territory contains the headwaters of a hydrographic basin can agree--in matters relating to water utilization--to adopt self-imposed restrictions which are not based on its own technical requirements, and on its principles as established in accordance with its legal responsibility."

During the Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972, Brazil requested that Principle 20 of the declaration include a stipulation to the effect that "no state is obligated to provide information when circumstances are such that it has good reason to believe that its national security, economic development, or domestic action to improve the environment could be endangered."

Confronted with the threat of pollution deriving from Brazil's intention to establish "dirty" industries or chemical industries, Argentina--together with other American and African countries--opposed the Brazilian request, arguing that "states should provide the pertinent information." The proposed amendment was not included, however, and the matter was referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Before the U.N. took up the question, Brazil--realizing that it was losing the argument--opted instead for an agreement between the foreign ministers of the two countries. The text of the agreement read as follows:

/"Information should be provided, officially and publicly."/

An annex states that the above does not empower a state to "delay or obstruct programs, or projects, for the exploration, exploitation and development of the natural resources of those states in whose territory such programs and projects are undertaken."

Argentina had succeeded in winning acceptance for its thesis, but Brazil had obtained an annex sufficiently ambiguous to enable it to avoid having to fulfill the terms of the agreement.

It was in this context that Paraguay--which until that point had maintained a firm national policy and a foreign policy that oscillated between Argentina and Brazil--tipped the scales in Brazil's favor by pledging, in the Declaration of Asuncion, not to carry out a joint hydroelectric project but instead to manage Paraguay's entire economy in accordance with Brazil's interests.

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It is useful to review the text of the Itaipu Treaty, which was signed by Foreign Ministers Raul Sapena Pastor and Mario Gibson Barbosa on 26 April 1973:

Article 1. "The high contracting parties agree to carry out jointly, in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty and its annexes, the /hydroelectric exploitation of those water resources of the Parana River over which the two countries exercise joint sovereignty/, from--and including--the Salto del Guaira, or Salto Grande de Sete Quedas, to the mouth of the Iguazu River."

Article 3. [Article 2 omitted as published] "The high contracting parties shall create, with equality of rights and obligations, a binational entity to be named 'Itaipu,' for the purpose of carrying out the hydroelectric exploitation to which reference is made in Article 1."

Annex A. Consists of the Statutes of the aforementioned entity "Itaipu," covering the purpose, capital and administration thereof.

Annex B. Consists of a general description of the installations designed for the production of electrical energy.

I. Purpose. "The engineering works described in the present annex may undergo amendment or addition--/including the specifications with respect to heights and measurements/--if this is required by virtue of technical considerations that come to light in the course of the execution of said works. Moreover, if because of similar requirements /it becomes apparent that there is need for a substantial reduction in the height/ of the crest of the dam, consideration shall be given to the advisability of the execution of an additional hydroelectric development upstream, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned [sic] Preliminary Report.

II. "The normal maximum water level is 220 meters above sea level. This reservoir will inundate an area of approximately 1400 square kilometers (600 square kilometers in Paraguay and 800 square kilometers in Brasil) and will extend upstream a distance of 200 kilometers, up to and including the Salto del Guaira, or Salto Grande de Sete Quedas."

Annex C. Consists of a description of the financial bases of--and electric power services to be provided by--the Itaipu entity. This annex was hotly debated before its adoption.

The Paraguayan foreign minister made the following statement at a press conference:

"We have not undertaken Itaipu as a business deal. Itaipu is not a business deal, either for Brazil or for Paraguay. The fact that we shall realize millions of dollars is not important. Our objective is not financial profit. Our objective is national development: development in Brazil

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and development in Paraguay. If there is a derivative benefit in the form of dollars for the government's coffers, it is an incidental result. What Itaipu will generate is development." (From a statement made at the headquarters of the Association of Graduates in the Economic Sciences on 24 May 1973.)

LA TRIBUNA of Asuncion in its 26 May 1973 issue commented on this episode as follows: "This assertion by the foreign minister is by itself sufficient to invalidate completely the Itaipu Treaty, inasmuch as he admitted publicly that Itaipu is not, for Paraguay, a business deal. Selling 35,000 gigawatt hours over a period of 50 years for \$40 million is obviously no business deal. It is simply a gift."

ABC COLOR, in its 24 May 1973 issue, said:

"It is also the view of this newspaper that the treaty, as drafted by our foreign ministry, will bring us some benefits during the 7 years the dam is under construction (labor, rock, cement and so forth), but from the moment the very first kilowatt is invoiced after the project is put in operation, and for the next 43 years (until the year 2023), our country will be subsidizing--with the most valuable part of its natural resources--the economic development of Brazil by providing that country with half of the energy produced by the Parana River in that region, at a price which today already seems ridiculous."

On the subject of future revisions, the treaty stipulates:

"The provisions of the present annex shall be reviewed after a period of 50 years has elapsed from the effective date of the treaty, taking into account--among other considerations--the extent of the amortization of the indebtedness contracted by Itaipu for construction of the development project, and also the ratio between the respective amounts of power contracted for by the entities of the two countries."

There was a change in the number of turbines from the 14 (in Annex B III.5) to 18 in 1975 and subsequently to 20 in November 1978. This amounts in essence to an amendment of the treaty and can be construed as implying a revision of the treaty.

According to the Brazilian press, Paraguay wants more energy and is putting obstacles in the way of an Argentine-Brazilian understanding with respect to the Itaipu issue. The question of the turbines has now been added to that of the height of the dam, but one should not forget the really basic problem, namely the navigability of the Parana River.

What Paraguay appears to be attempting to negotiate is a revision of the financial conditions of the treaty--conditions by virtue of which Brazil receives the "lion's share." /Paraguay can use the energy itself or sell it to Brazil at the stipulated price, which makes it the cheapest energy in all of South America./

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Utilization of this energy (as the Paraguayan Government announced on one occasion) would entail the participation of large sums of capital that can only be obtained from abroad. In any event, Paraguay cannot by itself exercise this option.

The signing of the contract for execution of the Middle Parana project on 20 November in Moscow, and the approval by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) of the largest loan ever granted to date (\$210 million)--for the Argentine-Paraguayan Yacyreta hydroelectric project--represent two new elements injected into the Corpus-Itaipu issue.

Paraguay should rethink its hydroelectric policy in the light of a Yacyreta project that will be initiated this year and is scheduled for completion in 1985.

/Paraguay has no reason to resign itself to selling--in exchange for a small Corpus--a little more of Itaipu's energy./

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BRAZIL

LAUNCHER, SATELLITE CONSTRUCTION FOR BRAZIL PROPOSED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 23 Dec 78 p 43

[Article by Pierre Langereux]

[Text] A mission from the National Center for Space Studies (CNES) which also includes some French industrialists will go to Brazil on 5-9 February 1979 to present the Brazilian government with various possibilities for space cooperation between the two countries. It will be a "technical presentation" on cooperation and a follow-up to previous French proposals for the carrying out of a joint space mission. Colonel Hugo de Oliveira Piva, director of the Brazilian Institute for Space Activities, recently announced that Brazilian authorities have just accepted the French proposal in principle.

Brazil is particularly interested in building a 120-150 kg satellite for practical use in ground observation and meteorology, a rocket for use in launching this satellite and a launching pad from which the rocket would be fired. The launching pad would be located in Natal where Brazil already has a small facility for launching atmospheric probes. The details of the project have yet to be settled, particularly insofar as the rocket is concerned. CNES has proposed using a liquid propellant first stage (cf. AIR & COSMOS no. 719).

Final acceptance of the French plan, Colonel Piva explained, will depend on negotiations undertaken with CNES on issues such as the transfer of technology, cost, technical characteristics and scientific applications. As far as transfer of technology is concerned, Colonel Piva stated that among the industrialized countries France and Germany were the most disposed to participate. In fact, Brazil has placed France and Germany in competition for the project to build launch facilities and a satellite. The United States has declined to participate.

It may appear surprising that France, which already has a well equipped launch facility in Kourou, French Guiana (Brazil's neighbor), would want to construct a foreign installation able to compete with it. Brazil however prefers to have its own firing pad rather than to use the CSG [expansion unknown].

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CUBA

ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO'S POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT EXPLORED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Dec 78 p 45

[Text] On 1 January 1979, when Castro's Cuba celebrates the 20th anniversary of the successful Cuban Revolution, the Madrilenian Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, a major with the Second National Front of Escambray in the fight against Batista, will be released.

Fidel Castro announced this news by phone to writer García Márquez. According to Fidel, by that date, there will be no more political prisoners in Cuba, except for 14 or 15 officials from the Batista era, accused of genocide.

Sentenced to 70 years in prison, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, in whom President Suárez took an interest during his visit to Havana, showed up a few days after this magazine related his revolutionary experiences and his activities against Fidel Castro. Over the past 4 years, since 1974, his prison was not known and his father, Carlos Gutiérrez Zabaleta, a former officer in the Spanish Republican Army, was being detained in Cuba by Castro's officials.

We now know that Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo was being held in the Combinado del Este Prison outside Havana, and he was able to see his father. The latest news from Cuba indicated that Eloy was undergoing a medical examination in the capital and Carlos Gutiérrez was awaiting his son's release to return to Spain.

The last contact of Major Gutiérrez Menoy with the outside took place one month ago when a contested committee of exiled Cubans was authorized by Castro's officials to visit the prisons for the purpose of obtaining the release of 46 political prisoners.

The interview with Eloy was broadcasted by the Miami television network and we publish some of his answers which shows that he totally shuns Castro's current policy of "reconciliation," in which some sectors of exiled Cubans are participating.

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As for his possible release, Gutiérrez Menoyo appeared skeptical: "The Cuban government is the one to release Cuban prisoners. I believe the final decision is in its hands."

He nevertheless seemed to be aware of the inquiries being made by the Spanish government. He said: "I heard that the president of the Spanish government inquired about me. That he reached some kind of agreement with the Cuban government in regard to this matter. Right? In that case, I cannot say anything about the result of these inquiries. I do not know it."

However, his pessimism surfaced when he told the interviewers:

"All right, look, I have conditioned myself to the fact that I will continue to serve my sentence. Therefore, I do not want to have any illusions concerning this matter."

The Government Decrees

Gutiérrez Menoyo--who for the past 13 years has refused to wear the uniform of the prisoners subjected to the "rehabilitation plan" and has lived in underwear ever since--seems to have very clear ideas: "If unconditional freedom is offered to me and it does not entail having to think differently from what I think today or relinquishing my principles or the ideals for which I fought, then, naturally, I will accept an unconditional release. Freedom with a single condition, no matter how small, I will not accept..."

On the subject of the liberation of political prisoners which is causing tension among the factions in exile, and the rights of the Cuban people, Gutiérrez Menoyo was categorical during the interview:

"I do not believe anybody is opposing the release of the prisoners. That is to say, I believe that on this point an error is being committed. There is not anyone who can be opposed to the prisoners being released after the years we have already served, right? And the sufferings we have endured. Now the problem is as follows: to hold a dialog with Castro's government, right? In my opinion, the question is that, on the subject of the prisoners, it is Castro's government which is responsible for the prisoners' release.

For example, in Chile, prisoners have been released. Neither the Chilean nor the exiled communities were convened to release the prisoners. The authorities simply met and granted freedom to the prisoners.

Reuniting a family is precisely the correct and necessary thing to do. We have been separated for a long time. No one then objects to a family being reunited. At this point, I do not need a dialog, I simply need an announcement from the government that, from such and such date, anybody can enter or leave the country. I do not need a dialog.

Now, there is a third issue which does require a dialog and questions could be asked on that subject, right? The problem of freedom in Cuba--freedom of

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movement, expression, press, religion and academic freedom--that is a series of questions which demand a dialog, do you understand? That is to say, I previously fought against Batista's dictatorship, right? Well, on the basis of that same principle, I have a right to object, I have a right to my opinions in this country. In that case, if the occasion for expressing an opinion, or the right to express it, is denied me, then, naturally, I must oppose the government. Right? Now the question that I will ask you--not you to me but I to you--is this: have conditions changed in Cuba? Can one express an opinion in Cuba? Are there rights in Cuba? If we can talk about that without any arguments, then I agree to a dialog."


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GUYANA

BRIEFS


CONTRACT FOR URANIUM PROSPECTING--Georgetown, 20 Feb (REUTER)--The Guyanese Government and the French firm Cogema signed a contract on Monday granting Cogema nonexclusive uranium exploration rights. Initial operations to determine the size of uranium reserves in Guyana's subsoil will begin in September. Guyana is already engaged in similar negotiations with Canadian and West German firms. [London REUTER in French 0633 GMT 20 Feb 79 PA]

'MIRROR' ON PRC ATTACKS--Georgetown, 19 Feb (PL)--The Guyanese newspaper the MIRROR today carries a long article criticizing China's policy and especially its recent attacks on Vietnam. After indicating the need to "oppose Maoist policies in and outside Guyana," the newspaper refers to the close ties and coinciding views existing between China and the United States. The MIRROR, unofficial spokesman of the opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) led by former prime minister Chedi Jagan, also denounces the anti-Soviet attitude of the current Chinese regime. It also says that the Chinese Government "is exporting the counterrevolution" as seen by its opposition to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, the Ethiopian revolution, the new Kampuchean Government and the Chilean people and as now seen in its aggression against Vietnam. [Text] [Georgetown PRELA in Spanish to PRELA Havana 1620 GMT 20 Feb 79 PA]

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
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
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
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
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
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