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JPRS L/8335

14 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE (FOUO 16/79)









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BELGIUM

WARRING POLITICAL PARTIES THREATEN NATIONAL SURVIVAL

Analysis of Bi-cultural Problems

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18-22 Dec 78 pp 48-49

[Article by Lucien Rioux]

[Text] Following the elections, Flemish and Wallons must choose between compromise and their country's breakdown.

From now on should people talk about Belgium as a thing of the past? On Monday, the day this copy of the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR reaches the newstands in Brussels, Belgians will know the composition of their new parliament. They will have voted en masse--voting is compulsory in King Baudoin's country--but without enthusiasm. Elections were imposed on a population which obviously had no desire to vote and. although the new Assembly was given power to change the Constitution, no one expects it to perform a miracle.

As it stands, it would take a miracle to restore a semblance of unity to the country. Never has division been more apparent: the linguistic quarrel corrodes everything; it occupies the forefront of the stage; it overshadows and embraces all the other problems, including the crisis and unemployment: people are either Flemish or Wallons. French- or Dutch-speakers, rare are those who still feel Belgian.

We still had one "national" party—the PS [Socialist Party]—in Belgium. Last October, it split in two and the leaders of the two resulting factions—French-speaking André Cools and Dutch-speaking Karel Van Miert—are spending most of their energy verbally assaulting one another.

Is it all folklore? Certainly not. There are serious underlying causes for this daily "petty war." First, there is what Wallons call "Flemish imperialism." The Flemish were once the kingdom's outcasts, i.e., farmers thought to be uncouth and who sometimes left their own region to perform in Wallon steelworks the tasks which are now reserved for immigrant workers. Their language was held in contempt; their bosses—the bourgeois of Gand or Antwerp and the

foremen of Charleroi--only spoke French to them. No wonder the federalist concept--which seeks to give a certain autonomy to each community--was born in Flanders.

Today, that era is far behind. More prolific--perhpas due to the omnipotence of the Church--the Flemish are now far more numerous: they represent approximately 60 percent of the kingdom's population; they are also sharply wealthier than the Wallons: their per capita income for 1977 amounted to 237,392 Belgian francs as compared to 203,723 Belgian francs for the Wallons (the Belgian franc is worth approximately 0.15 French franc). That they are taking advantage of this supremacy is not surprising. However despite a slow beginning, the Wallon protest is becoming more pronounced.

This is due to Wallonia being a region in crisis. Its wealth was the product of a few heavy industries: coal mining, iron-smelting, textiles, some heavy machinery firms; as a whole, structures and equipment were relatively run-down. Mines are shutting down, the iron-smelting industry has seen a decrease in the number of its workers: 62,000 employees at the end of 1974, less than 48,000 as of January 1978. Unemployment has reached 18.4 percent in Mons, 15.9 percent in Liège, 12.9 percent in Charleroi while it is 7.2 percent in Antwerp, 8.7 percent in Bruges and 9.8 percent in Gand.

To be sure, the Belgian state helps Wallonia compensate its unemployed and settle problems of restructuralization. Whatever their leaning, Walloon politicians say it is "insufficient," while Flemish protest: "Should wealth due to Flemish efficiency help support an economy which has been outstripped and is incapable of resisting competition?" To which the Walloons reply: "The creation and modernization of Flemish industry was paid for by the Belgian state thanks to the wealth of the Wallonia of yesteryears." Those are undoubtedly serious problems, but federalism and a new allocation of national credits could offer a solution.

There is something more serious, i.e., the Brussels abscess. Brussels is a wealthy town (a per capita income of 337,639 Belgian francs for 1977) with a strong French-speaking majority--80 percent of its residents speak French--but, it is also an old Flemish city, located in the middle of Flemish territory and the Flemish want it as their capital. However, when they speak their own language in shops and cafes, they encounter much difficulty being served. To be sure, an administrative compromise was achieved: one Flemish employee is hired for each French-speaking one. A practice which sometimes leads to strange results: queues form in front of the "French" windows at the post office while the "Flemish" window has no customers; and Flemish teachers in Brussels teach classes of five or six students while their French-speaking colleagues must take care of 25 or 30 children. The system may appear ridiculous; it is expensive; it often results in recriminations from the French-speakers. It nevertheless works; it prevents serious incidents; and Brussels residents have gotten used to it. Bilinguism is now a reality.

The drama derives from the fact that, like all great cities, Brussels has residents who commute to neighboring communes. Some work in Brussels and live in

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suburbian bedroom communities. However, Brussels' suburbs are Flemish: only Flemish is spoken there; administrative texts are in Flemish, etc. Endless conflicts ensue.

French-speaking Brussels residents resent keenly the Flemish pressure in the suburbs of the capital. They feel in them as though they were second class citizens. They have no way of participating in public affairs even if—and it is sometimes the case in the communes in which they live—they are more numerous than the natives. A solution must be found. Volksunie proposes two: either a "geographical gerrymander" which would return to Flanders the Brussels quarters with a Flemish majority in exchange for communes with a French-speaking majority being reunited to Brussels; or a fictitious Brussels address for suburbian French-speakers, a move which would enable them to maintain their civil rights and receive administrative documents written in French. Those are spurious solutions, but, says Anton Van Overstracten, "typically Belgian, that is to say, based on a questionable and realistic compromise."

Compromises of this type are increasingly difficult to achieve. To be sure, those who still believe in the Belgian unitarian state, as it operated in years past, are rare, although some Flemish believe the time has come to take advantage of their number to impose their prevalence. However, the federal solution appears to be commanding recognition among the leadership of political parties. As early as 1974, regional organizations were being set up. Then, things went further. In the night of 23 to 24 May 1977, the leading Belgian parties—Walloons, Flemish and Brussels—signed the Egmont Pact (this agreement was signed in the Egmont Castle) which prepared the birth of Belgian federalism. Once again, it was an imperfect pact based on a compromise. It only gave moderate satisfaction to the federalist parties which had signed it (Flemish Volksunie and the Brussels French—speakers' Front) but it could appear as an incipient solution to the Belgian crisis. Belgium had become a country divided into three regions—Wallonia, Flanders and bilingual Brussels—each with its administrative organizations, its ministers and its own authorities.

Among the signatories could be found the whole-powerful CVP (Social-Christian Flemish Party), the leading Belgian political party. Prime Minister Léo Tindemans was the CVP leader; a rapid implementation of the Pact could therefore be expected. However, some of its leaders and members thought that too many concessions had been made to the Walloons. After procrastinating for a long time, Léo Tindemans allowed the project to become bogged down. Some of his government's ministers are now saying: "Because he is a dawdler incapable of taking a decision." "Because he thought the pact was inapplicable," assert his partisans. Be that as it may, the government's French-speakers began a strong offensive against him supported, moreover, by a great many Flemish partisans of the Pact, including CVP members (among them the party chairman, Wilfried Martens). Whence his sudden decision: without consulting his ministers, on 11 October, Léo Tindemans submitted his government's resignation to the king. His goal was to obtain more power for the prime minister and install a strong government in Belgium. A strong language made to measure for the Flemish voters enamored of order.

Such an attitude could only wake up Walloon and Brussels particularism. Lucien Outers, minister of cooperation and leader of the Brussels French-speakers' Front, declared: "French-speaking Belgium is in a state of self-defense." The French-speaking parties of the majority came to an agreement on a defense pact. The Wallon Rally--which for some years has been in the background (some of its members having joined the liberals)--began to stir with the arrival of journalist Henri Mordant, a television star, to head it. Finally, with due caution, people began talking about independence in Wallonia. Oh! Not clearly. Nobody wants to "break" Belgium and no one expects the birth of a front for the liberation of Wallonia which would practice terrorism like similar Irish or Basque movements.

Yet, some of Mordant's friends are wondering about the survival of Belgium and Jean Gol, a liberal leader from Liège who calls himself a "federalist and a Belgian of convenience," blurts out: "If irrationality were to triumph and lead to a total domination of the Flemish, I would obviously prefer autonomy to servitude."

And there it stands. Very few old-style unitarians remain. Obviously, there is the king: his crown is tied to the maintenance of the Belgian state; there are a few politicians like the bright socialist minister of foreign affairs, Henri Simonet, for whom the Belgian crisis has little weight as compared to world problems. Not many people listen to them. People rally instead around those who speak loudly about language and region. They are still calling themselves federalists; however, having experienced failure with the Egmont Pact, this time they have little inclination to making many concessions. In a negotiation—for negotiations must be reopened some day, the survival of Belgium depends on it—, they will discuss forcefully and yield with difficulty.

Cultural Co-existence Problems Re-analyzed

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 15-21 Jan 79 p 18

[Letter to the editors written by Antoine Leytens from Overijse, Belgium, and excerpted by the editors]

[Text] You have devoted some articles to the recent political crisis in Belgium (le NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, No 736). I regret that those articles shed only a small light for a person trying to understand a rather complex situation [...]. In my opinion, the basis of the problem rests on the fact that Flemish public opinion did not understand and, consequently, did not accept the terms of the agreements. The Flemish social—Christians' fault was to have underestimated that public opinion [...]. For the Flemish, any agreements—especially if it leads to important modifications in the structures of the state—must ensure a better equality between the two cultures, not only in the texts, but also in spirit [...]. In a country in which two cultures, and not only two languages, must coexist, it is important that mechanisms exist to ensure their being respected: these mechanisms can hamper some freedoms, it is the price of the Belgian "originality" which comes from Latin and Germanic thought patterns [...]. A person must be bilingual to hold public office in Brussels. Moreover,

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this is required of supervisory staffs in numerous enterprises, but the political system rejected the principle of bilinguism and the teaching of the second language is increasingly less efficient, particularly in the French-speaking section of the country! Belgium is not the only country having to maintain a delicate balance between afferent and efferent forces. It is deceptive to want to consider realistically any given factor without taking into account the whole situation.

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FRANCE

MAVERICK COMMUNIST KONOPNICKI INTERVIEWED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Feb 79 p 67

[Interview by Florence Portes with Guy Konopnicki, communist journalist, writer, pamphleteer, former president of the French National Student Union (UNEF)]

[Question] How is it that you slammed the door and stormed out of the PC a year ago, and today you are asking to be let back in?

[Answer] A million people go out every day to buy cigarettes. There are those who never come back, and then there are the rest. Statistically, the rest are more numerous; I am one of the most numerous.

[Question] Is the Party card still something special to you?

[Answer] With or without a card, nobody can stop me from living as a communist, not even Marchais. I found in the Party a faction with the same political sensitivity as my own, and I think that a good slogan for these days would be Mao's: "Let's shell headquarters." I wanted to back up that shelling with more concentrated fire on the rear ranks. I may well be charged with involuntary manslaughter when Marchais has his next coronary.

[Question] Are you serious?

[Answer] No, I'm the mountebank of politics.

[Question] Can one be a communist and a mountebank?

[Answer] You can certainly be a dirty dog and secretary-general of the Party!

[Question] Are you a communist out of family tradition and upbringing, or out of conviction?

[Answer] I keep on believing that this society is bad, and that we must change it. Up to now, all such experiments have been disasters. The USSR is an ocean of vodka and despair. In France, the PC looks to me like a miniature Soviet society with its Kremlin over on Place du Colonel Fabien, its centralized operation, and its ritual. Unfortunately, they don't even have vodka.

[Question] As you were growing up, which did you encounter first: Marx or Stalin?

[Answer] Pif the dog and Maroussia. "Maroussia Goes to School" is about a little girl in braids who used to play hopscotch at the foot of Stalin's statue. I think it was on account of her that I became a communist. But then when I was 19 and went to the USSR, I found that Maroussia had grown up, and that all she was interested in was getting western groceries. Teen-age Maroussia used to dream about the boutiques in Saint-Germaindes Pres. Of all my childhood idols, the only one that hasn't changed is Pif the dog.

[Question] What about life in the [Party] cells?

[Answer] Life in the cells is the right side. I feel right at home with that deep mass of communists. Most of the workers I know are sharper and better educated than Marchais.

[Question] Marchais again! You really do have it in for him!

[Answer] Marchais is a zombie, a living caricature of the Party apparatchik. He makes you wonder whether he wasn't manufactured by imperialist propaganda just to discredit all communists. So. But let's be serious. Marchais did have an intelligent line, which I often approved: he had it for as long as his adviser, Kanapa, was alive.

[Question] What must the CP do to change?

[Answer] It will have to change its operation, come to grips with reality, get over its centralist view of society and of the people's movement, and change its policy toward the socialist bloc.

[Question] What if it doesn't change?

[Answer] In Buzzati's "Désert des Tartares," there is a military strongpoint guarding a frontier where nothing ever happens, and people who go on repeating a futile ritual inside the fort. The Party can hang on in its present soap-box oratory function, as an anti-government force, without any prospects of getting into government itself, with a historic oscillation [in

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terms of votes by the eternal 20 percent. That's what it has been doing for the past 50 years. But if it doesn't change, it will eventually be just that, forever: a fine fortress that will never be used for anything at all.

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FRANCE

GDR SPY'S PENETRATION TECHNIQUES OUTLINED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Feb 79 pp 64-66

[Article by Gérard de Villiers]

[Text] The Friedrichstrasse railroad station was all but empty on the evening of 18 January. The unheated building was icy cold. The police officer in charge of checking the papers of passengers authorized to enter the portion of the platform where the West Berlin section would stop was chilled to the bone. The man who appeared before him, accompanied by a woman and a child, showed him not only his pass, but an officer's ID card from the People's Army. That cut the formalities short. East German citizens frequently go to visit with family and relations in West Germany. The two VOPOs opened the access gate for them, then shut it again behind the three. A few minutes later, the S-Bahn train stopped at the platform. The man, the woman, and the child boarded it. The doors slammed shut, and the cars began to move.

Lieutenant Werner Stieler, a spy-handler for the East German Intelligence Service, was safe, along with his spouse and their little daughter. One more spy story was beginning: in his briefcase, Walter Stieler was carrying dossiers on half a dozen of the agents he had handled. Those files were subjected to immediate analysis by the German Federal Republic's intelligence service. Among them was one particular name: Rolf Dobbertin.

Claiming to be a West German, Rolf Dobbertin was working as a physicist in the field of nuclear research, and had been employed in that capacity by the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) since 1963! He had entered France in 1958, carrying a West German passport. He was a brilliant man. He was also a "mole," an underground agent for the MFS, the East German intelligence system. Lt Stieler's file on him left no possible doubt. Word went out over Telex to the French Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) on the afternoon of 19 January.

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In cases like this, one usual procedure is simply to put the "mole" under surveillance, to keep an eye on his comings and goings. This time, though, Marcel Chalet, who heads France's Counterintelligence service, decided to arrest Rolf Dobbertin. The fact was that the MFS was aware of Lt Stieler's defection and had the names of the agents he handled. With advance warning, those agents might well slip away.

Along about 1900 hours, six DST agents knocked at the door of an apartment at 204 Rue de Tolbiac in Paris' 13th arrondissement. They arrested Rolf Dobbertin and his wife, Myluis. The two were taken to different places. Meanwhil, the DST had got some more information from the West German BND about the physicist's wife. She was born on 6 March 1938 in Bielefeld in West Germany, had never set foot in the DRG, had never been active in left-wing politics or in a communist party. She met Rolf Dobbertin in 1961 at the Alliance Francaise. Having come to France to perfect her command of the language, she fell in love with Dobbertin and married him on 30 October 1962, at the municipal office of the 17th arrondissement. At first she denied any knowledge of her husband's activities. Then, on the morning of 20 January, she cracked.

"Yes, I knew that my husband was a spy," she admitted. "He told me about it in 1969, after our son was born. He told me he had come to Paris on orders from his "central," with orders to infiltrate the CNRS, and that since 1963 he had been sending his East Berlin "central" copies of all the documents he had worked on, as well as such of his colleagues' documents as he could get his hands on, and reports on the proceedings of the foreign commissions with which he was associated by reason of his position as a thermo-nuclear physicist. I am not a communist myself, but, little by little, I.came to accept Rolf's ideas, and I helped him in his radio transmissions. After all, he was my husband, and the father of my son..."

That was all that was to be got from Mrs Dobbertin. Actually that was all she knew. The agents concentrated on Rolf Dobbertin. The watchmen at the modern building where he had lived for 5 years in a 4-room apartment knew nothing. The owner of the delicatessen across the street from 204 Rue de Tolbiac, who saw Mrs Dobbertin every day, had never noticed anything out of the ordinary. Apparently the Dobbertins' only recreation was to go for long walks in the forest of Compiègne, often taking their ll-year-old son with them.

Tirelessly the DST men went on with their questioning. They had 6 days to hold him. On the 5th day, 23 January, Rolf Dobbertin finally agreed to talk.

"Yes," he admitted, "I am an East German agent, a top-level professional, a 'mole'." However, he had held out long enough for any members of his network to dive for cover...

At the CNRS consternation reigned. At the same time, they tried to play down the Dobbertin case. On 1 February Mr Jancel, head of research at the theoretical physics and mathematics laboratory in the 7th arrondissement of Paris stated: "The laboratory in which Mr Dobbertin worked is engaged only in basic research, purely theoretical stuff, having to do with quantum field theory and statistical mechanics. There is nothing in the least secret about this work."

That was a lie.

For 3 years, the DST agents discovered, Rolf Dobbertin had been working with experts on lasers, very high intensity light beams. They may well make it possible very shortly to build powerful weapons for use against spy satellites or for missile interception. A kind of "death-ray", if you will.

The inquiry led from one discovery to another. Rolf Dobbertin was also a member of the Applied Research Commission on the neutron bomb, the most advanced and most secret of French military achievements. The "mole" had been working at the very top level in the CNRS.

As the questioning went on, his real personality began to take shape. From 1955 to 1957, Rolf Dobbertin had been a student of mathematics and physics at Humboldt University in the GDR. He was brilliant and politically reliable: first a member of the Communist Youth Organization, then of the Communist Party of the GDR. When his studies were completed, he was contacted by ab MFS man. This is standard procedure in the Eastern countries, where spying is not looked on as a somewhat shameful line of endeavor, but as a duty toward the Communist Party. The best students are regularly recruited by the Intelligence Services. The officer who recruited Rolf Dubbertin harped on two sensitive strongs:

"You've got the intellectual qualities to become an ace in nuclear physics," he said. "Unfortunately, here in the GDR, we don't have the means to let you increase your knowledge. Why not go to a country where you can make some progress? And do us some good."

Rolf Dobbertin accepted without hesitation. He left the university for a training course at intelligence headquarters in Pankow. There he was taught the rudiments of clandestine broadcasting and of handling "microdots" -- reducing a message to the

size of the dot over an "i" for insertion into an otherwise innocent letter. In 1959, Rolf Dobbertin was ready. Officially, he "escaped" to West Berlin.

Within 8 days, West Germany gave him a passport. How could they chek out his background? Every week, dozens of refugees flee to the West. Most of them are real refugees. Rolf Dobbertin thus became a citizen of West Berlin. A brilliant physicist. A few months later, as part of the student exchange program between the FRG and France, Dobbertin found himself a job as a research worker at the Poincaré Institute in Paris.

He was getting closer to his aim.

He would reach it thanks to a meeting which may properly be styled troubling, since coincidences play very little part in the world of espionage.

Late in 1959, Rolf Dobbertin made the acquaintance of Jean-Pierre Vigier, a research worker at the CNRS and a member of the French Communist Party. They became friends, and Rolf Dobbertin moved to the CNRS in 1963, as a specialist in nuclear physics. His research there led him into the thermonuclear field.

And so the first phase of the mission entrusted to him by East German "Central" was crowned with success. Now all that was left for the "mole" to do was to dig his tunnels...

The MFS gave Rolf Dobbertin a free hand in making his career, but kept in touch with his progress through the information he sent in regularly. The "raw" intelligence he sent to East Germany was useful in the technical area. Furthermore, Dobbertin was plugged in to a lot of current projects headed by foreign research people. For 15 years, Rolf Dobbertin sent along all he found out.

Were it not for Lt Stieler's defection, he might be doing it now. His system was absolutely flawless.

First, the transmissions. In his apartment, they found a Grundig receiver that could pick up coded messages on short wave. These were usually series of numbers transmitted at fixed times over Radio Berlin, for example. Either in sound or in print, it could carry instructions on "dead" letter-drops. Drops were isolated places, such as a park, where someone would drop a mini-container, hiding it, for instance, at the foot of a tree. These containers held a capsule of magnesium. Should they be chanced upon by someone other than the "handler," the contents would self-destruct.

The containers were then picked up by Rolf Dobbertin's handling officer, whom Dobbertin did not know, as a matter of security.

Dobbertin's wife took care of other kinds of transmissions, in the form of microdots, which she produced with sophisticated photographic apparatus which was found in the couple's apartment.

Once a year or so, Rolf Dobbertin would make direct contact with Central. Somewhere abroad he would meet with a GDR officer who would subject him to an in-depth "examination," bearing both on the development of his contacts, of course, and on the security of his operations and on his future instructions. It is quite possible, too, that from time to time Dobbertin was visited in Paris by a GDR agent, a sort of "mole" inspector.

It is quite common for a couple to be involved in espionage. A single man is psychologically more vulnerable. A "mole's" life is made up of continuing constraints: everything is programmed. The wife usually takes care of close-up cover and of passing information. This makes it possible to "anchor" her, and thus avoid any leaks or indiscretions.

Rolf Dobbertin now is in no position to do any more harm. His wife is under surveillance. But that still leaves a question: Whom did all this information help?

To answer that question, you have to know a few things about the East European intelligence services. There is an intelligence pool involving East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. All intelligence gathered by the agents of any of these services is forwarded to the Soviet Union. In the KGB's First General Directorate, in charge of foreign operations, there is a Sub-Directorate "T", set up in 1963 to replace the old Department 10. Its primary mission is the theft of documents from the West on matters of nuclear research, missiles, space, and cybernetics.

For obvious reasons, the Soviets would rather sub-contract with their satellites. Each of the Eastern countries has its "client." France is penetrated primarily by the Poles and the East Germans. There are dozens of Rolf Dobbertins. Thanks to the division between the two Germanies, the GDR furnishes a large quota of spies. There is no way to distinguish between an East German and a West German. There is no way to check on the backgrounds of GDR citizens. Thanks in part to them, the Soviets have woven a capillary system that sucks up scientific secrets and works like a charm. Their prime targets are international agencies: the U.N., the ILO, the European Community, and above all the scientific institutes engaged in pure research. To the Soviet Union, such pilferage brings enormous advantages. For one thing, they save tremendous amounts out of their basic research budget.

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For another, they keep abreast of the latest Western discoveries, and this allows them to copy them. In 1964 Jean-Paul Suppert, another East German engineer and a member of the Soviet system, was arrested by the DST after having filched practically all the plans for the Concorde. His arrest prevented the Russians from obtaining some of those documents, which meant that the Tupolev 144, known in aeronautics circles as the "Concordeski," was never able to fly satisfactorily.

The year before that, Georges Pacques, deputy director of the NATO Press Office was arrested for handing military intelligence to the Soviets. In 1971, five East European diplomats, all of them "handling" officers, were expelled from France.... And the list goes on. In Switzerland, the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN) is also closely watched by spies from the East. Thanks to foreign research people on scholarships, the Soviets, with the help of their allies, can slip in "moles" who are a lot more effective than people recruited on the spot. And the longer the "mole" stays in one place, the more dangerous his work becomes, because people start entrusting him with more and more important secrets, some of which may be of vital importance to the Soviets.

But back to Rolf Dobbertin. One of his targets was to study the superdense plasmas which are formed during thermonuclear reactions. These are of some civilian and great military interest, and it is particularly difficult to study them. It requires vast technical and financial means, and makes it possible to drop certain lines of research that have proved unrewarding. The Soviets therefore attached great importance to the information Rolf Dobbertin was giving them, since it saved them the bother of launching costly programs that would turn out to be fruitless. That meant major savings of time and money.

Further, using a "mole" like Dobbertin cost them nothing, since he could get along on his legal salary...

Even so, one may wonder how a spy can be so successful. There are a lot of reasons, having to do with the scientific milieu and with our country.

First, take the scientists. There is a tradition of exchanging information which is not often free of naiveté on the part of Western savants, who are loath to look upon their fellows from the Eastern countries as what they are all too often: spies.

There are specialists of all nationalities in the scientific research agencies. At the CNRS, for example, there were in 1976 633 foreign research people (8.8 percent) of whom 48 were

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from Eastern countries. To protect secrets, it is necessary to classify certain areas, to confine access to them to research people who theoretically present no potential risk... Obviously, this is going to cause some problems in the area of scientific cooperation. Without going so far as all that, however, it ought to be possible to make some improvement over the present laxness. This laxness stems from the fact that we are a democracy where a horror of talebearing has become so grotesque that people even hesitate to report child abusers. Well, a spy... That laxness is of course common to all democracies — West Germany is always flushing out spics from the East — but it is heightened in our country by several typically French elements.

The leftist intelligentsia has for years constituted a rend of thought prone to favor everything that comes from communist countries, systematically denouncing the United States as imperialist and modestly overlooking the galloping imperialism of the Soviets and their countless violations of human rights. Insofar as I know, nobody has ever arrested a spy working for the Americans in France.

Jean-Pierre Vigier, a former FTP officer and member of the French Communist Party (from which he has since resigned), Rolf Dobbertin's friend at CNRS, showed which way the wind was blowing 10 years ago. In an article that appeared in December 1968 in the Cuban magazine TRICONTINENTAL, Jean-Louis Vigier wrote, a propos of the new paths of the Revolution:

"There is no longer any legal parliamentary path to power, We must engage in extra-parliamentary political tactics, designed to dislocate the system and strike at the economic nerve centers of the production mechanism. This means the distribution centers for energy, for electricity, the technological centers, the computers, etc."

At that time, the GDR "mole," Rolf Dobbertin, had already been working for 5 years.

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FRANCE

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MAUROY'S SUPPORT WAIVERS BETWEEN MITTERRAND, ROCARD

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27-28 Jan 79 pp 30, 31

[Interview with Socialist Party's Number Two man, Pierre Mauroy, conducted by Franz-Olivier Giesbert]

[Text] [Question] It is difficult to understand you, Pierre Mauroy. First you team up with Michel Rocard and you sign an agreement which, if it were to obtain the majority at the Metz Congress, would lead to François Mitterrand's departure. Then, when Rocard announces that you are a candidate for the post of first secretary of the party--since you head the signatories--you deny it right away.

[Answer] I have been fighting for months for the renewal of the party majority --without exclusion--around François Mitterrand. I have not changed one iota. You must even admit that I have been repeating myself lately. Where do you see hesitations?

[Question] In your waivering between François Mitterrand and Michel Rocard as though you cannot decide which camp to choose.

[Answer] Let us recapitulate. After the elections, several party leaders began accusing Michel Rocard of "deviationism." It was obvious they had decided to exclude him from the party majority. Totally unwilling to follow them, I wanted them to meet with him for discussions. Impossible. Three times we found ourselves around the same table in what has been dubbed "meetings of verifications." Once there, discussions were impossible. We were up against a wall. Francois Mitterrand did agree to let us use two of his speeches as working background on which to base the leadership's motion. However, when, for the purpose of synthesis, Michel Rocard and I tried to bring into the debate the documents we had drawn with several friends (Jean-Pierre Cot, Françoise Gaspard, Gilles Martinet, Dominique Taddéi, etc) then, we found the door closed.

[Question] Because François Mitterrand believed you were challenging him by filing a joint text.

[Answer] The PS [Socialist Party] is no longer what it once was. It has entered adulthood. It would no longer allow discussions to be stifled. We had a series of proposals to make. Since the March defeat, the party has been been acting as though it were frozen. We think it should find itself once again and move forward, that is all. As a first step, debate was blocked, as though some people were afraid to discover convergent opinions among members. I now wonder if we are not running the risk of making the synthesis difficult by acknowledging—if not charicaturing—barbed references. The militants must say enough!

[Question] Are not you falling in an easy unanimism?

[Answer] What is now happening in the PS sometimes appears to me ridiculous as compared to our collective ambition. Look around us. It is obvious that France is entering an era of destabilization. Most forecasters are expecting a continuous increase in unemployement until 1984, to the tune of an additional 100,000 to 130,000 unemployed per year. Who can measure the risks of such a situation? Everything is possible within the next few years: a social explosion, but also the country having recourse to a strong and, obviously, "providential" man.

As for the world around us, it is completely destabilized. We see the old West at grips with three crises: economic, energy and demographic. We see the rise of new economic powers which, like Korea and Indonesia, are beginning to compete vigorously with our industry. Finally, we see the cooperation of China with Japan and the United States increasingly frightening the "Soviet bear." In this general upheaval, how can we quarrel desultorily instead of discussing knowledgeably?

[Question] Are you, therefore, a partisan of compromise at all cost, even a "lame" one, as Michel Rocard would say?

[Answer] Come now, the PS—the gathering of all the trends of socialism—is a permanent compromise! For the time being, it seems essential to me that our party escape sectarian temptations. Some people would like to push Michel Rocard aside as well as reject the Christians. In short, they would like to cut off some branches instead of grafting new ones. And this, at a time when the party is in the process of acquiring a certain political coherence. Take the submitted texts to be presented at the congress, they all refer to the Epinay policy even if they do not reach the same conclusions concerning the 1978 failure.

[Question] All the same, in their last petition in behalf of the first secretary, Mitterrand's partisans implied that, with you and Michel Rocard, the Epinay policy was in danger.

[Answer] Does it mean there is an Epinay nobility that is the sole keeper of the revealed truth opposite a third estate to which I belong? You must admit that I did accomplish something in the 1971 Epinay Congress. I renewed the union-of-the-left agreement I had made in the previous congress. I also fought

to enable François Mitterrand to reach the PS leadership. I did not have to regret it. I repeat, I am not questioning François Mitterrand's role! I have endorsed all the activities of the party since 1971.

[Question] What do you want then?

[Answer] To work in harmony with François Mitterrand, as we always have done over the past 7 years. It is obvious that synthesis remains possible, unless someone decides to establish a new type of party in which an elite would rule on everything and indicate the "right path" to others; unless we continue to be locked in rigid attitudes.

[Question] Why those rigid attitudes?

[Answer] Since the evening of 19 March, Michel Rocard has developed arguments which were not at odds with the party line and he has raised questions asked by many people. Did he speak too much? In any case, it would not be a sufficient reason to make him keep quiet and bring the party to withdraw upon itself—for it is the way declines always begin.

[Question] All the same, you still have disagreements with François Mitterrand concerning the union of the left for example?

[Answer] In my opinion, the PS must be prevented from becoming prisoner of a political party which, after causing the fall of the left, has no other ambition than to manage the opposition with a policy of electoral outbidding and class collaboration with the nationalist right. Consequently, it is imperative to relaunch the union by calling not upon the political machines only, but also upon the unions, associations and all extrapolitical groups. That is what I call the people's union. What makes you believe François Mitterrand thinks otherwise?

[Question] You are not on the same wave length that he is concerning Europe?

[Answer] These past few months, the PS has not been very European in its statements. However, it has not changed on fondamental issues. François Mitterrand remains partisan of Europe. Moreover, all the socialists of importance can only be European: since capitalism is becoming world-wide, the socialist answer must, at least, become organized at the continental level. Besides, I do not believe that renascent nationalism will have much future in the left. It is disconnected from everything and dangerous too. Protectionism leads to autarchy which brings in economic disorders. It always ends up the same way, with rationing and more police. I know it is François Mitterrand's conviction, and mine too.

[Question] All the same, you must admit that Michel Rocard and you favor less state control and more decentralization than François Mitterrand.

[Answer] Yes. It may be the only real difference between us. It has not been the subject of any debates, which shows the artifical nature of our current

divisions. I want a Socialist Party leaning more toward labor and I have a very decentralizing conception of socialism. In my opinion, the best way to govern is to administer less and to increase the centers of responsibility, for it will not be the PS ministers and cadres who, on their own, will bring socialism to France, but also the unionists, militants in tenants' associations, leaders of daily life activities—in short all the civilian society. Agreed... Then what? If Francois Mitterrand and I have this different approach, it is not new. I do not believe that it has prevented us from doing good work together since Epinay.

[Question] How do you react when you are told that, with Michel Rocard, you embody the right of the party?

[Answer] It is the traditional parlor game of those who have nothing to say. It is absurd. I will only note that, of all the socialist leaders, Michel Rocard is considered to be, according to public opinion polls, the most to the left and I am the spokesman of one of the party's federations most opened to workers, the heir to a long fighting tradition. Where was the French socialist movement born? Well, then...

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FRANCE

MITTERRAND, ROCARD, MAUROY ALLIANCES REMAIN UNCRYSTALLIZED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 27-28 Jan 79 p 31

[Article by Kathleen Evin]

[Text] "I am ready to seek all possible agreements, but we must speak clearly." On Thursday, 18 January, over T.F. 1, François Mitterrand implied that the "synthesis" among the various PS [Socialist Party] trends was still possible at the April congress, specifying, however, "without confusion." It was a firm—but rather amiable—answer to the barbs that Michel Rocard had directed against him 3 days before, during the "Cards on the Table" broadcast. A" that time, the Yvelines deputy had blamed François Mitterrand for refusing a political debate on fundamentals, due to "questions of precedence and procedure." With barbed "short sentences," as he is prone to do, he had added that, should François Mitterrand be placed in minority at the next congress, Pierre Mauroy would seek his succession.

Listening to him, one of his former assistants who has shifted to the Mauroy team, said angrily: "Michel cannot talk 5 minutes without making a blunder. Three months of work destroyed in one minute."

A blunder, is it a fact? Undoubtedly, if one believes the reaction of Pierre Mauroy who declared on the very next day that he remained a firm partisan "of the renewal of the present majority, without exclusion, if not expanded;" he felt the synthesis was "indispensable;" and "the sooner the better." That was proof that Michel Rocard's strategy did not coincide exactly with that of the mayor of Lille. What is Pierre Mauroy seeking? To preserve the party's unity by keeping Mitterrand in his position as first secretary, even if he sees him more as a "constitutional monarch" than as an "absolute monarch." What is Michel Rocard's goal? To propose to the party a true political alternative to François Mitterrand. To bring this about, Pierre Mauroy must become first secretary.

For the time being, the two halves of the former PS majority appear to have approximately equal influence in the party: between 30 and 40 percent, according to estimates. The 400 signatures gathered by Mauroy-Rocard motion was matched by the 500 signers who answered the call sent by François Mitterrand's

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partisans in his behalf. Taking or leaving a few, each aligns the same proportion of young elect, old notables and business leaders.

While some of Pierre Mauroy's partisans have joined François Mitterrand-like Michel Sainte-Marie, deputy of Gironde, or the elect of the South's wine region--a few faithful of the Nièvre deputy joined the Mauroy-Rocard team: Jacques Badet, mayor of Saint Chamond; Alain Vivien, Seine et Marne deputy; Georges Frèche, mayor of Montpellier; and François-Régis Bastide.

On 11 February, it will be François Mitterrand's turn to propose his own contribution to the leadership committee of his party. On that date, if the synthesis does not take place—which appears likely—it will be a real electoral campaign which will open within the PS, each camp trying to obtain the most votes in order to begin negotiations under the best circumstances.

Claude Estier, one of François Mitterrand's intimates, declared recently: "But in order not to compromise the chances for synthesis in Metz, this electoral campaign must not get out of hand." Will the socialists conclude a pact of non-aggression for internal use on 11 February?

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FRANCE

MITTERRAND SEEN RETAKING INITIATIVE IN PSF

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Feb 79 pp 20-22

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Determined"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand again takes the initiative—in public, where he presents himself as "presidential material;" in his party, where the alliance between Mauroy and Rocard is already splitting.

As in the case of Jacques Chirac last week, Francois Mitterrand made a comeback last Tuesday—in the same manner—by means of a press conference. The president of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] had just been convalescence. The first secretary of the socialist party had been experiencing the symptoms of a career malady which had been becoming insistently apparent in recent months: a drop in his personal rating in the public opinion polls and in his own party, concurrently with a rise in the prestige of Michel Rocard in the public view and among the socialists.

Therefore Mitterrand's aim on Tuesday was recovery--in the public view and in his own party.

with respect to the public, it was important to revive that old attraction which for some 10 years had resulted in his being the only possible—if not undisputed—leader of the opposition. Mitterrand tried to regain his position through the language of a statesman, that of the presidential candidate that he was in 1974, and which he intends to keep.

His harsh criticism of the economic and social policy that is currently being carried out was addressed not to the government, "which is only a steward," but to the president of the republic. In his opinion it is "the Giscard plan," that is leading France to bankruptcy. And Mitterrand intends to oppose the policy of the chief of state with an "economic and social counterpolicy," to be published by the end of April, that is, after the Metz Socialist Congress. This implies that he still desires at this time to be the first secretary of the PS.

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Mitterrand calls on all Frenchmen as witnesses to his remarks concerning the president of the republic: the workers, victims of the industrial tragic occurrences in the Nord and in Lorreine, the managerial personnel, whose "anger" he justifies; and even the heads of concerns, whose anxie; in the face of an increased number of failures he understands.

In this connection, it is symptomatic that, except for some worldwide considerations—concerning China, the USSR, Iran, the American policy—to which every statesman must now devote some time, Francois Mitterrand caused his press conference to concentrate on economic and social problems. This is the loophole that Jacques Chirac's anti-European offensive of last week left open. It is also the matter concerning which the French are most sensitive.

After all, problems are what will determine the behavior of the voters on two future dates: the cantonal elections, "truly political voting which will ultimately be the real public opinion poll;" and the European elections, which obviously will measure more the relative strength of the French with regard to domestic policy than their pan-European fervor.

Intended for the public, Mitterrand's demonstration was meant also for militant socialists.

The PS is very weary after some six months of fighting at the top level. Both militants and the officials in charge are beginning to measure the possible consequent loss of prestige to the party as a result of those internal splits. Appeals from all regions of France for unity are multiplying.

Francois Mitterrand has heard them. Also he made sure that he answered the desire of militants when he was questioned about the internal struggles of the PS this past Tuesday:

"I admit that all of that had slipped my mind. It is true that those frictions are minor compared to the problems with which the French are faced and to which we must respond."

Clever point. Mitterrand seemed thus to present his possible challengers, Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard, as divisive persons, while he, himself, would assure the continuance of the party and its presence in the true political life of the country.

This apparent detachment on the part of Mitterrand, this willingness to rise above internal squabbles is the result of several convictions that he acquired while attentively observing his party during the past two months.

He now knows that unity among the various basic currents of the PS majority will be realized at the Metz Congress. He knows also that it will take place around him--and that for three reasons.

- . The pressure of the militants. It is intense. Pierre Mauroy felt it first. On his initiative, the Nord Federation, which he controls, and the Pas-de-Calais Federation, which Daniel Percheron heads, together launched an appeal for unity two weeks ago. Last week, the Loire-Atlantique Federation, headed by Alain Chenard (mayor of Nantes and close to Mauroy), also asked for the return of the majority that was leaving the PS. Whoever would henceforth go against this desire for unity of the base would risk provoking rejection at the Metz Congress.
- . Proportionate strength. It is just about fixed now. All of the estimates of percentages that could be collected by the various currents lead to the same conclusion that Jean-Pierre Chevenement, deputy from Belfort and leader of CERES [Center for Studies, Research, and Education], stated last week:

"No motion can be a majority by itself. Therefore a compromise is needed."

. As for Mauroy's attitude, Mitterrand now knows precisely where the mayor of Lille wants to go. A faux pas on the part of Michel Rocard made it known on 15 January.

That day, Rocard was the guest of the broadcast, "Cards on the Table," on channel 2. Confidently assured because of the support that Mauroy seemed to have accorded him when he signed the same declaration that he, himself, signed two weeks earlier, the deputy mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine said:

"The name of Pierre Mauroy is No 1 on the list of signatories of our declaration. He is therefore the candidate for the post of first secretary of the party...But I think that he would not have wanted me to say it in this manner."

Actually Mauroy was shocked by that statement. Once more Rocard tried to involve him more than he, himself, wished. After a telephone altercation with the mayor of Conflans, he made this correction:

"I say firmly, but amicably, to Michel Rocard: François Mitterrand is the first secretary of the party and I have always been for the return of the present majority without exception; indeed, for an even broader majority."

From that moment, Mitterrand knew what to expect of the subtle tactic carried out by the deputy mayor of Lille.

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First, the alliance concluded at the beginning of January between Mauroy and Rocard had surprised him. After having tirelessly advocated unity, Mauroy was suddenly choosing confrontation. That could mean two things: either a division of power had been the subject of an agreement between Mauroy and Rocard (to the former, the post of first secretary of the party; to the latter, the candidacy for president of the republic); or Mauroy had brought Rocard around only in order to obtain some concessions from Mitterrand.

Lee incident on channel 2 makes the matter clear. If Rocard wants to carry the confrontation to its conclusion, Mauroy does not want Mitterrand's downfall. The first secretary of the PS thus acquires two certainties. He will keep his office and the unity of the socialist party will prevail at the Metz Congress. The three-hour conversation on Thursday with the mayor of Lille doubtless strengthened this impression.

That does not mean that the battle is over. No one really expected any agreement from the meeting of representatives of the majority of the PS that was convened last Friday at the request of Mauroy and Defferre. Hopes are hardly any greater with respect to achieving a compromise between now and 12 February, the date on which the directive committee will meet in order to record the proposals for the congress.

The stakes with respect to this congress in fact remain intact. On 6 January, Mitterrand stated it precisely in one sentence (in an interview granted to LE MONDE):

"It is not in my nature to be a king of nonentities (neither a king, nor a nonentity)."

So, that precisely is the situation: the present test of strength between Pierre Mauroy and Francois Mitterrand will determine under what conditions the first secretary of the socialist party will be continued in office.

Mauroy wants more "democracy" and "collegiality" in the management of the party. That would mean the elimination of the directive posts of several of those close to Mitterrand and the strengthening of the power of the deputy mayor of Lille. To counter that plan, Mitterrand proposes to henceforth promote to posts of responsibility "the generation of men that the party has produced." The prototype of these men may be found in the person of Jospin, currently national secretary.

The division of power at the Metz Congress will depend essentially on thw proportion of strength that will be made evident from now until then between Mauroy and Mitterrand. The battle thus continues, with intermediary lieutenants—each striving to withdraw supporters from the other.

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Thus there appear on the declaration of Mauroy and Rocard the signatures of persons formerly close to Mitterrand; while, conversely, Mitterrand's friends have obtained the support of former comrades of Pierre Mauroy for their declaration.

The Mitterrand offensive in Nord and in Pas-de-Calais—where texts favoring the first secretary appeared—has responded to the one that Mauroy had manifested in Bouches-du-Rhone in order to dissuade Defferre from unconditionally supporting Mitterrand. Charles-Emile Loo, national treasurer of the PS and first lieutenant of the deputy mayor of Marseille, has joined Mauroy.

In order to break down the unanimity of the feminine current which, headed by Francoise Gaspard, has rallied the positions of Mauroy and Rocard, Yvette Roudy produced her own declaration, favoring Mitterrand. And Edith Cresson, through regular attendance at all official demonstrations of the PS, manifests her support of the current first secretary.

Finally, an old comrade of Mauroy in Nord, Pierre Beregovoy (he later joined Mitterrand), has been given the responsibility of organizing the National Conference of the PS on Siderurgy on 10 February, for the purpose of affirming the presence of the party in the realm of serious social events—three weeks after Mauroy had manifested his concern over these problems in a meeting with Giscard d'Estaing and Barre.

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FRANCE

PCF'S 'ANTI-EUROPEAN' OFFENSIVE REVIEWED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Feb 79 pp 22

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Strategy of Outrage"]

[Text] The PC offensive, especially with regard to Europe, aims to quiet the mood of the militants.

A hard line in all directions: that is the line adopted by the communist party in preparing for its 23rd Congress, which is scheduled to meet this coming May. A central committee meeting Tuesday and Wednesday, a day of parliamentary study concluded Thursday with a press conference by Georges Marchais confirmed this.

The attack is now taking on the appearance of a caricature. Thus the secretary general of the PC presents Giscard d'Estaing as "a dictator," governing "alone" with the assistance of some "technocrats in the service of multinational firms." His option in favor of Europe is considered "to be a flight abroad," where "as always the bourgeoisie finds the supporters it does not have in France."

The socialist party, having implemented its famous "turnabout," is now "frankly to the right." And one would doubtless have to be one of the journalists whom Marchais last week on television characterized as "scoundrels and stooges" not to see that "the PC is indeed the only democratic party in this country." But it is true that information, itself, is also in the hands of the "totalitarian power."

"I am not proud of what is written in the papers," remarked Georges Marchais.

In addition to the caricature that the secretary general of the PC sketches of himself, this hardening in tone outlines the reply now furnished by the communist hierarchy to the profound disarray within the party that followed the failure of the left in the legislative elections. The European election, in particular, comes in time to silence the questionings that

became manifest at the communist base--chiefly among the intellectuals--with respect to the justice of the party strategy and even with respect to the necessity of agonizing doctrinal reviews. The general mobilization causes moods to be forgotten.

In fact the communist leaders are calling their militants to a vast anti-European offensive—beginning with a clever amalgam. In short, the Common Market is responsible for French industrial failures, for serious social events. And the European institutions, in the supranational perspective, are the ones that would enable Giscard Estaing to find a legitimacy at the level of the Community which would be lacking to him in France.

The communist party is alone. Union with the socialists is no longer sought: they are "abettors" of foreign seizure of national independence. The RPR? Its position is "ambiguous": it is part of the parliamentary majority and thus has full responsibility in the present situation.

On the other hand, the appeal to voters is stirring—to the socialists who cannot help but observe that their party has returned "to the old demon of class cooperation"; to the Gaullists:

"Like De Gaulle, I believe that French laws should be voted by the French parliament and not by foreign deputies," says Marchais.

In his solitary fight, the latter thinks he will surely win. He believes that he has observed that the partial elections already bear witness to rectification of his party. This offensive introduces another advantage: it may dominate the work of the congress and thus sidestep the internal problems that could be posed by the militants.

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FRANCE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON INTERIOR MINISTER BONNET

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 27 Jan 79 p 89

[Article by Christian Fauvet: "Christian Bonnet, France's Number One Cop"]

[Text] "A plodder who, day after day, plows his furrow." That is how Christian Bonnet, "France's number one cop," describes himself. A glance at his silhouette: small, dry, authoritarian. In one word, ordinary.

A brief biographical note: born in Paris, in 1921, student in the Free School of Political Science, manager of a fish canning company. His occupation took him to Morbihan, where he was elected an MRP [Popular Republican Movement] deputy in 1956.

But, in that year, the "plodder" had a stroke of genius, "the only one in his career," evil tongues say. The minute he arrived at the Palais Bourbon [Legislative Assembly], he joined a club of young deputies organized by another young successful candidate, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The furrow was open. At the end of the field, the ministerial paradise.

Meanwhile, Christian Bonnet engaged in politics. Without drawing attention to himself. The man is discreet and there is nothing visionary about him. No great plan, no brilliant speech. But he is a record man. His memory of facts and figures, his sense of realities make him valuable in the eyes of Giscard.

Nevertheless, he is conservative and makes no secret of it. He prefers plain liberalism to "advanced liberalism," with law and order at a premium. Sensitivity, he is rather a nationalist. The Gaullists know this and they have never made him one of their favorite targets. In short, he is an authoritarian man, which is not necessarily a handicap at Beauvau Square [Ministry of Interior].

In private life, he proves to be mordant, cheerful, witty. His gift as an imitator -- he excels in animal cries -- was the joy of newsmen and sometimes of the Cabinet. Ever since he has been boss of the policemen,

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some persons state that he has become "as cheerful as the grave." His job does not go very well with humor. Moreover, as a successor of Michel Poniatowski, whose blustering speech finally disturbed the head of state, Bonnet has made silence his golden rule.

Now here he is, today, thrown under the fire of current events by grumbling policemen. He will probably come out of it all right. He who states that he has only one passion -- service of the state -- is well aware that, for republican law and order, a demonstration by policemen is always a bad omen.

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FRANCE

POLICE MORALE PROBLEMS INVESTIGATED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 27 Jan 79 pp 84-86, 88

[Article by Jacques Renard: "What Do the Cops Want?"]

[Text] Policemen in the street ready to come to blows with other policemen. L'EXPRESS has conducted an investigation on this unrest that is being added to much other unrest, at present.

"Chief, you wouldn't happen to have a paper clip?" The chief has no paper clip. The policeman roams about the station, asking everyone for a paper clip. Seventeenth District Police Station, in Paris: 257 patrolmen, 41 sergeants, 5 officers, 1 deputy superintendent; 1 divisional superintendent. Tuesday 23 January, 2000 hours. A young lady who has just caused an automobile accident is taken to the station. The superintendent decides to make her breathe in a balloon. He looks for one for 5 minutes, in vain. He fills out a form and sends a policeman to get an alcotest device from the office two stories above. Five minutes. The duty supervisor telephones: "Can you send me down a balloon?" Five more minutes. Half an hour later, it is necessary to face the facts: there is no beloon in the whole police station. A policeman suggests: "All we have to do to wait for the patrol car to come in. They may have a balloon, but that would surprise me." One of the four station cars is broken down. "We know that it will not be repaired for 2 or 3 weeks. The central garage cannot give one meanwhile, there are none," Superintendent Jean Paul Roger said to Jacqueline Remy. In the middle of the station, a huge wooden table. The police officers are typing out their reports there on ancient typewriters. Two out of five are unusable.

Three minors are cooling their heels behind the desk. One must be 10 years old. Another is standing, with a hard, fixed, distant gaze. He had a fight with a police officer a short time before. "It is the present times," the sergeant remarked. "He is a victim of society!" a policeman stated, adding "Advanced liberal society!"

Curiously, Liliane Sichler, who is in the Fifth District Police Station, also discovers youngsters there. Tattooed, metal-tipped shoes and wind-breakers. The headmaster of the Lavoisier High School had reported a racket to the police. They came back with two young boys. They are not put in prison. They are going to be turned over to the Territorial Brigade.

We did not choose those two police stations. We had asked Police Headquarters for a station in the 18th or the 20th district, the 14th district or in the suburbs. They offered us the 17th and the 5th. Take it or leave it. Why? Because the premises have been renovated. No one should say that Paris police stations are ancient and even unhealthy at times.

"Everything is new," Jacqueline Remy notes, "but the walls are already impregnated with dirt. Inside, it is gray, dismal. They pointed out to me: 'You understand, we operate 24 hours out of 24.' With an unsatisfactory time schedule. 'When we are on "big rounds," 0630 hours to noon, 19 hours to 2330 hours, we barely have time to go home in the afternoon. We get up at 0430 hours and go to bed at 0130 hours. It is a problem,' a police officer said. Most of them live in the suburbs. The times of the Parisian cop in his janitor's quarters are over."

L'EXPRESS reporters and correspondents will make these remarks and many more, from one end of France to the other, in Marseilles, Lyons, Lille, Grenoble. The "unrest" of the police lies primarily there. Even if the causes are deeper, even if the crisis of society has no reason for sparing the police. The president of the republic stressed this on Thursday 25 January in the Cannes-Ecluse Police School. What is resented most directly? A lack of material means, poor working conditions, a feeling of ineffectiveness. Shared by the public. And, in the long run, a common feeling of insecurity. That is indeed why the banners of the "angry cops" proclaimed, on Saturday 20 January, between Bastille and Notre Dame: "The people's security depends on the security of the policemen." The traditional "The police with us" was answered by a "The public with us," less customary. And a "Bonnet, you are in an awful way, your police are in the street," to which we were not accustomed, either.

"A dangerous game," the principal private secretary of the minister of Interior, former Paris police chief Jean Paolini, told us. "These demonstrations run the risk of discrediting the police. And of increasing the spiral of the feeling of insecurity that asks for nothing more than to feed itself."

Priority to Security

Obviously, labor unions are exploiting the emotion created by the recent "repeated attacks against the police force." Henri Buch, secretary general of the Independent Federation of Police Unions, confided to Eric Schmoll: "The case history of the police has never been taken into account.

At the first opportunity, that was to blow up. We tried to give a more serious turn to the demonstration, which came from a spontaneous rank-and-file movement. The parade was to hit public opinion."

While the Paris Police Headquarters, which will definitely never be in agreement with organizers of grievances in the street, even if they are cops, contrasts his figures (1,500 demonstrators) with theirs (7,000), Christian Bonnet strove to dedramatize the atmosphere, in Europe 1 Press Club. Of course, he was far from forgetting the names of the five police officers killed on duty in 1978, but, overcoming his emotion, he noted that in 1976 there were 10 killed: nine policemen and one gendarme; eight in 1977: seven policemen and one gendarme; and, in 1978, five policemen and two gendarmes. He also pointed out that the rate of increase of crime and delinquency in Paris, which was 11.39 percent in 1977, was only 1.21 percent in 1978. He does not yet have figures for the entire country, but he thinks that they will follow the same curve. He is entirely happy. In Grenoble, the departmental director of urban police, Yves Souterene, revealed his estimates to Jacques Marie Bourget: a 10-percent absolute decline of crime. A tentative explanation by police inspector Serge Tocheport: "At all times priority is given to strict police work and safety."

In Lille, Francois Regniault obtained figures that are still confidential: a 2.06-percent decline. The high crime rate in the department of Nord, which has 2.5 million inhabitants, decreased 4.8 percent and armed robberies decreased 36.11 percent. The average crime rate increased 3.3 percent owing, primarily, to a 5.2-percent increase in burglaries. Delinquency declined 2.8 percent. Explanation by police chief Alex Gobin: "Wherever it has been possible to do so, we have taken officials out of the offices. Their mission is to be on the public streets and we established mobile security units."

In Marseilles, where the Saint Gerard massacre caused ten deaths, last year, the chief of police announced: "Although we hit the headlines with sensational cases that explain the appreciable increase in homicides, a trend to a stabilization of delinquency was confirmed in 1978 in Bouches du Rhone." The chief of Urban Investigative Police, Pierre Chatelain, was pleased to note that violent thefts decreased by 8.5 percent, and he told Jean Louis Eyssartel: "Those are the acts that give rise directly to the atmoshpere of insecurity among the public. Not settlements of accounts between shady characters. What is disturbing is when a handbag is snatched from you or when you are mugged for small amounts of money."

The unions dispute these statistics in general. Pierre Watreloos, secretary general of the National Plainclothesmen's Union, told Liliane Sichler: "Statistics are not everything. Petty crimes, like burglaries of cellars, have been eliminated. It is easy to make the figures go down by doing that."

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Another slogan of the demonstrators on Saturday 20 January: "No leave for prisoners." Shouts denouncing the laxity of the courts were still stronger on Monday 22 January, on Ile de la Cite, where the Independent National Police Union, established in 1951 by police inspector Dides and which, nevertheless, denies that it is of the far right, decided to go into the street: "Peyrefitte resign, Bonnet treason." Its members are afraid that the verdict of the flagrant crime court, which was trying at that very moment the four young independents from the Saint Lazare Station will be too lenient. A vain worry, it seems, because two sentences of 4 years in prison and two of 3 years, including one with 1 year suspension were pronounced early, on Tuesday 23 January.

"The courts are the cause of the unrest," a policeman in the 17th District Police Station, in Paris, said. "The police are disgusted by the courts." Another, in the 5th District Police Station: "I do not engage in politics, but, nevertheless, I have arrested the same lad four times in a month. The judges take us for fools." In Grenoble, Jacques Marie Bourget reports that Inspector Paul Costes is nicknamed "Moumou" by his colleagues, a doubled syllable of the name of a robber whom he has already arrested 15 times.

The problem is not specifically French. In the United States the cops talk about courts with revolving doors: no sooner in than out. Nevertheless, the number of persons detained in France increased by 4,000 in 5 years, going from 26,000 to 30,000, as many policemen as there are in Paris, crown included.

Three Years of "Flower Pot"

The other great topic of grumbling: the personnel strength. Most policemen believe that it is insufficient. Up to now, that was the opinion of every minister of Interior. Surprise: not the opinion of Christian Bonnet this year. "We have one policeman or gendarme for every 305 inhabitants. We are beaten, if I dare say so, only by Belgium, which has one for 303. There is one for 350 in the Federal Republic of Germany and one for 457 in Great Britain," he announced to the Press Club. L'EXPRESS made a count in four large cities: Marseilles and Lyons have one cop for 500 inhabitants. Grenoble has one for 600. Paris, where Jacques Chirac is demanding 3,000 more, has one for every 163 inhabitants! A record due in part to its rank as capital and to its being the headquarters of a number of international organizations. Nevertheless, when a head of state on an official visit mobilizes 5,000 policemen, "they take a third of my personnel from me, "Superintendent Saillard of the 5th District complains. And all those guards of prominent persons, of embassies, of official buildings!

At the bottom, they gripe: "On graduation from school, we serve sometimes 3 years as 'flower pots' in front of an embassy. That is no job for a policeman. Passersby laugh. We get bored. When I was on guard duty at the Elysee Palace, at the end of an hour, I said to myself: 'What am I

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doing there? What am I good for?' Then I counted the pikes on the Rooster Gate and I can tell you that there are 520 orange pikes on that gate."

Poor utilization of personnel? Christian Bonnet himself ordered the Office of the Inspector General to make a report on this subject. The conclusions are overwhelming. Almost 10,000 policemen are diverted from security tasks and 5,800 of these detachments — into administrative or technical services, sometimes into other administrations, or even in the private service of prominent persons — are completely unjustified. In the ministry itself, 43 officers and patrolmen are superfluous. Even supposing that Mesrine gets into the premises. A legitimate assumption, because the greenish-yellow guardhouse on Beauvau Square has, for its entire decoration, two maps of Paris — subway and bus routes — and, in a good place, behind the telephone, two photographs of the man most wanted by all the police forces in France, fullface and profile, wearing a mustache shaved off a long time ago.

The report listed 300 "privileged" employees as head waiters, cooks, footmen, gardeners. Jean Louis Eyssartel tracked down some in Marseilles. "Three policemen are regularly used in the police headquarters kitchens. Two more also take care of the gardens. "At L'Eveche -- the police headquarters -- policemen are employed in housekeeping tasks and are seen with mop in hand," a sergeant said.

Christian Bonnet is also determined to do some sweeping. Starting in 1979, 1,100 of these policemen are going to be put back on the street. They will be replaced by administrative personnel costing almost two times less than a police officer. Good business, because the Blois program, providing for increasing the security forces by 5,000 policemen and by 5,000 gendarmes in 5 years, gives him funds for hiring 1,000 policemen in 1979. And he points out: "The real problem is one of training and utilizing personnel, of adapting the police to the new conditions of the modern world, much more than a problem of personnel strength."

The remedies? Improvement of training. Policeman training has been increased to 6 months instead of 5. It is short. Of the 3,681 policemen who graduated in the last two classes in 1978, 2,244 were city workers, 385 office employees, 270 civil servants, 253 trade employees, 238 craftsmen, 172 not gainfully employed, 78 students, and 41 farmers. Last year, there were 28,082 candidates; 4,211 passed. A 15-percent selection.

Why does one become a cop? "For stability," one said. "In my region, there was unemployment," another said. "Out of calling," a third said. General shrugging of shoulders: "You would do better to tell the truth."

The real solutions? "Time and money," Jean Paolini, Bonnet's principal private secretary, said. "Our 1979 budget shows a 21.1-percent increase. With regard to equipment, the increase is 66 percent, in comparison with 1978: 190 million francs are going to make it possible to renew one

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quarter of our automobiles and 197 million francs are going to give us 65,000 square meters of new buildings. Armament, data processing, communications are not neglected. All that goes in the direction of the policemen's grievances."

The Ministry of Interior is placing much hope on a gadget, a miniaturized transceiver costing 10,000 francs. Orders have been placed for 550. Objective: for each police officer on duty to be equipped with one. Effectiveness: "Imagine a holdup in the Latin Quarter. The gangsters' car is identified. It may pass by 300 traffic policement with full impunity, because they are not aware that it is wanted. With a portable radio, the vehicle will not go far," Jean Paolini pointed out. Deterrence: "Imagine two cops in the subway confronted by eight toughs. The uniform no longer makes them fall back. Draw their service weapon, no. The response must be appropriate. They would be shamed. With a radio, the policeman will be able to call for assistance. Less isolated, he will feel more safe. And he actually will be safe. Assaults will become infrequent."


The Gendarme's Uniform

The union members are pouting. They state that too many unkept promises are made to them. They are already nourishing more concern on seeing their colleagues in the Gendarmerie, provided with rogatory commissions and investigative police powers, encroach on urban areas.

Pierre Watreloos, of the Uniformed Police Union, makes the following accusion: "Gendarmes are seen arriving in Paris, changing clothes in the Gendarmerie Headquarters and pursuing their investigation in civilian clothes. This is forbidden by the 1903 decree. That removes all legal value from their reports, because they always start with the phrase: "We, gendarmes, wearing our uniform and acting in accordance with the orders of our superiors." The real fear of some is to see a police force under military status replace the civilian police force little by little. "The Gendarmerie does not have the right to express itself in its unions. Puting it in a privileged status would amount to throwing the police into silence."

The 76,000 French gendarmes are not complaining, in fact. "By military tradition, they are disciplined," LtCol Robert Amet, in charge of public relations, said simply. But Paul Katz came on a young gendarme who "would not hesitate to join a union, if he had to right to demonstrate in the street, if need be."

Uninhibited, he gave his name: "Michel Louvet. You may write it."



[Key on next page]

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Key:

- 1. Prime minister
- 2. Minister of Interior
- 3. Minister of Defense
- 4. Director General of the National Police
- 5. Director of the Gendarmerie
- 6. Five central bureaus
- 7. Four central departments
- 8. Central administration
- 9. Office of the Inspector General
- 10. Republican Security Companies11. Bureau of Personnel and Police Schools
- 12. Investigative Police
- 13. Air and borders
- 14. Urban police forces
- 15. Official trips and protection of prominent persons
- 16. Bureau of Technical Services
- 17. General Intelligence
 18. International police technical cooperation
 19. Territorial surveillance
- 20. 108,000 policemen
- 21. Security Police
- 22. Regional centers; pursuit groups and detachments (department); companies (district); detachments (commune or group of communes); 42,660 + 5,500 auxiliaries
- 23. Republic Guard
- 24. Sea Gendarmerie 25. Air Gendarmerie 26. Overseas

- 27. French Forces in Germany

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FRANCE

POLICE WAGES OUTLINED

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 27 Jan 79 p 88

[Text] Uniformed Police

Student, at the end of 6 months

Patrolman on probation

Patrolman and lance corporal

Sergeant

Senior sergeant

3,348 francs

3,348

4,729-5,025

4,729-5,472

5,742

These figures are applicable to unmarried police officers. A "special servitude" of 700 francs at the bottom of the scale and 950 francs at the top is included. It "compensates" for the right to strike lost by the policemen in 1948. A housing allowance is provided in Paris. Almost all policemen come from the provinces and few succeed in going back. Of 5,000 requests for transfer from Paris to the provinces, only 500 are approved every year, in accordance with a complicated system taking into account the family situation, seniority, the number of transfer requests already submitted. They are processed by computer. The slightest error in drawing them up entails cancelation and starting all over again.

A new patrolman receives a uniform allowance of 570 francs a year, but, on his appointment, he has to buy himself a winter uniform, a summer uniform, an overcoat, shirts, ties, shoes, or about 2,000 francs that will be withheld from his pay. He draws a Herstal or Unique 7.65 automatic pistol, two clips and 10 cartidges. Student -- minimum age 21 years, height 1 meter 68 centimeters -- training in 5 months of studies and one month probation. No diploma required. Competitive examination: intermediate level between elementary course certificate and first cycle elementary certificate

Plainclothesmen

Inspectors

Student inspector	3,393 france
Probationary inspector	3,691
Police inspector	3,940-5,724
Principal inspector	4,762-6,165
Divisional inspector	6,165-7,120
Chief divisional inspector	6,932-7,396

Recruiting by competitive examination, with high school diploma, equivalent diploma, or 4 years active duty for uniformed patrolmen. One year of school, at Cannes-Ecluse, near Montereau, in Seine et Marne. An inspector receives a pair of Massenote handcuffs and a Smith & Wesson 38 special (9 millimeter) revolver. The pay of plainclothesmen is increased by an 80-franc monthly allowance for expenses, called "pink bonds." Expenditures made by inspectors during their investigations are not reimbursed, but a system of bonus, paid by the Public Prosecutor's Department, brings them 30 francs for each arrest of a pickpocket, 250 francs for a burglar, 800 francs for an armed attacker. The PJ [Investigative Police] officers work in a six-man group, plus two "procedure men" (responsible for interrogations and procedure), under the direction of a chief, nine persons in all, who each collect the arrest bonus. An arrested pickpocket costs the Public Prosecutor's Office, in fact, 30 X 9 = 270 francs. If the investigation falls through, a blank is drawn.

Police Superintendents

Student superintendent (1 year)	4,523 francs
Probationary superintendent (1 year)	4,592
Superintendent	4,102-7,468
Principal superintendent	7,468-9,079
Divisonal superintendent	9,079-10,182

This pay may be increased by a certain number of "fees": attachments, adultery affidavits, funeral formalities. These amounts are paid to the Urban Corps of Police Superintendents Fund and are distributed in equal shares. For a large city, this bonus may amount to from 2,000 to 3,000 francs a month. The entrance examination is open to bachelors of law, or holders of an equivalent diploma, and inspector after 4 years' service.

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FRANCE

BRIEFS

TOP COMMUNISTS DISTURBED--The book by [Jean] Montaldo, "The Secrets of the Soviet Bank in France" (published by Albin Michel), has caused a stir among the communists. Several members of the [PCF] politburo and most of the members of the Central Committee discovered on reading it that their party has financial connections about which they have never been informed. Georges Gosnat, PCF treasurer, refuses to offer any explanation. [Georges] Marchais, to whom protests have been addressed, admits that "serious blunders" have been committed. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Feb 79 p 15]

FRENCH-PRC COOPERATION--The scientific and commercial cooperation agreements between France and the PRC, signed on 4 December in Beijing by Jean-Francois Deniau, minister of foreign trade, will be completed on 28 February by a protocol granting to Afnor (French Normalization Association) the right to establish a Chinese Normalization Office using the French association as its model. This document, which provides for sending French experts to Beijing and for receiving Chinese [experts] in Paris, will be signed by Francois Kosciusko-Morizet, the normalization commissioner. The document was drawn up by Bernard Vaucelle, director of Afnor. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Feb 79 p 15]

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