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JPRS L/8359

28 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
FOUO No. 627



AFRICA



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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AMJN, NYERERE RIVALRY EXAMINED

Inevitable Confrontation

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 pp 22-23

[Article by anonymous author]

[Text] Calm and discreet, Julius Nyerere had hesitated a long time before confronting his hot-headed neighbor, Idi Amin. He finally decided to begin the conflict and seems to be on the verge of winning.

It is a mortal conflict between Idi Amin Dada, president of Uganda, and Julius Nyerere, Tanzanian head of state. Their troops have been facing each other for 3 months and, at the end of February, it appeared that the marshal-president--who has been in the world news for 8 years--was seriously threatened.

On 24 February the Ugandan city of Masaka, located 60 km from the Tanzanian border and 120 km from the Ugandan capital, Kampala, fell into the hands of the troops directed by Idi Amin's opposition and backed by Nyerere.

This rivalry between the two men is a particularly rare phenomenon. It is true that there was a confrontation between King Hassan II and President Houari Boumediene. But opposition between Algeria and Morocco has always been greater than any personal conflict.

This is not the case in East Africa. Here it is less a territorial or ideological dispute than an incompatibility of temperaments. What is there in common between the commonwealth's former boxing champion, who weighs more than 120 kg, and the respectable "mwalimu" (teacher) of frail form? Idi Amin is an intuitive person, devoured with ambition and devoid of all scruples. Nyerere is a humanitarian intellectual, eminently pragmatic. Therefore, all undertakings of the two men in domestic and foreign politics are marked by diametrically opposed measures.

A Moslem of modest beginnings and coming from an ethnic group near the Sudanese border, Idi Amin suffered from domination exercised within the army by the Langi and Acholi tribes. He bitterly resented the contempt displayed by the Christian aristocracy of the former kingdom of Buganda and the tradespeople of Asiatic origin. Coming into power in 1971, he does not wait long

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to satisfy his desire for vengeance. As early as January 1972, he massacres the Langis and Acholis and removes the Bugandans from the administration. Seven months later, he expels more than 40,000 Asians. He then persecutes the Christian clergy. Undoubtedly, some of these decisions are acceptable to the people and, for a part of African public opinion, exemplary. Idi Amin wanted only personal revenge. Nonetheless, he becomes the symbol of the struggle against privileges and foreign domination.

Much more than his rival, Nyerere is a progressive nationalist. His patriotism is embodied in the "cultural revolution," which enables Tanzania to develop its heritage: architecture, the arts, the national Swahili language enriched by a vocabulary borrowed mostly from the country's dialects. Contrary to his rival, Nyerere is a dyed-in-the-wool socialist whose dream is to transform Tanzania into a federation of community villages, "ujamaas." But, in contrast to Idi Amin, he detests taking drastic measures. His religious scruples and concern for efficacy impel him to favor persuasive methods rather than the use of force. He constantly searches for intermediary solutions (decollectivization of several hundred villages, denationalization of certain businesses) to deal with the citizens and adapt the goals he has set for himself to the dismal reality of a country which ranks among the world's poorest.

Is it any wonder that the expeditious methods of the Kampala master earn him more of an audience in certain circles than the slow plodding of the "mwalimu"?

At the Juncture

Like Tanzania, Uganda is at the juncture of Black Africa and the Arab world, of Islam and of Christianity. But the two leaders have led their countries in different directions.

A Moslem governing a country of Christian majority, Idi Amin felt himself insulted by the arrogance of certain Israeli officers who had installed several bases in Uganda in the 1960's. Moreover, he quickly grasped the political and financial advantage he could draw from a dismantling of these military installations, veritable sources of anti-Sudanese and anti-Arab subversion.

Suspicious Tradition

Four years before the 4 July 1976 Israeli raid on Entebbe, the Ugandan head of state had severed all relations with Tel Aviv. He sided with the Arab world and Palestinian Fedayeen--to the great satisfaction of his fellow countrymen and a number of his African peers.

In contrast, Julius Nyerere, a fervent Catholic in a country of Islamic majority, is the embodiment of a suspicious tradition in the black continent in regard to the Arab world. The humanist in him disapproves of the pro-slavery undertakings in which certain sultans of East Africa had engaged until the end of the 19th century. The tactician understands the advantage of anti-Arab



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propaganda among the black peoples of Zanzibar, for a long time dominated by the original dynasties of Oman.

With his neighbors of the Indian Ocean and of East and South Africa, the "mwalimu" has always striven to reconcile the politics of principle with the strategy of the possible.

He maintains the best relations with Rwanda and Burundi, small bordering countries which, with Tanzania, make up the Organization for the Administration and Development of the Kagera Basin. He cooperates wholeheartedly with nearby progressive governments (Seychelles) and with his "front-line" partners (particularly Mozambique and Zambia).

Moderate

On behalf of revolutionary solidarity, Nyerere discreetly supports various movements opposed to the governments of Comoro Islands, Malawi and Zaire. In Dar es Salaam he protects the Liberation Committee of the OAU and furnishes considerable military aid to the underground forces fighting against Rhodesia and South Africa. But, being realistic, Nyerere preaches moderation to the Rhodesian and Namibian guerrillas. To prevent either of those powers from gaining a foothold in Tanzania, he maintains equal balance between them.

Nyerere is benefiting from Chinese aid, which has particularly made it possible for him to build the railroad connecting Tanzania with Zambia (Tazara). He is accepting Soviet-Cuban military support. Lastly, he is maintaining very cordial relations with the United States and, especially, Great Britain, approving the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia.

Difference of Style

To be sure, Idi Amin has also carried out a nationalist policy which has safeguarded his freedom of maneuver with regard to his neighbors and the big powers. His methods are often peculiar and strike the imagination of crowds, as when he had himself carried in a closed litter by Westerners to symbolize "the revenge of the blacks." He willingly resorts to blackmail conducting a see-saw policy between the East and West, Libya and Egypt. Or to violence, to straighten out his former partners of the East African Community (Kenya and Tanzania).

As we can see, there is foremost a difference of style between Idi Amin and Nyerere--much more than a conflict in doctrine.

Only a few months ago, the two leaders seemed to be solidly installed in power. In a matter of time, one of them will perhaps have given up his position, for Julius Nyerere, normally patient, has been shocked by the invasion of the northern part of his country in November. For the first time, he appears quite determined to fight--on the field of battle--for lack of a boxing ring, as the Ugandan president wanted.

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For Africa and the whole world, there is a new stake involved: it is that of knowing whether a discreet idealist can win out over a cynical comedian.

The Schoolteacher's Revenge

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Francois Soudan]

[Text] "In capitalism we have a headache. In the construction of socialism we plan a headache, which does not make it more uncommon. Quite the contrary." These few lines in the form of a prophetic smile, the work of the Latin American poet, Roque Dalton, could undoubtedly been written by Julius Nyerere. "In 1967," he stated one day, "a group of young people asked me how long it would take for Tanzania to become socialist. I answered 30 years. I was mistaken: I am now sure that it will take much longer!"

This former "mwalimu" of 57 years of age, with slow and serious gestures, father of independence and Tanzanian head of state since 1962, is not unaware that his eyes will close long before he feels the effects of that aspirin which would cure his headache: socialism.

At a Snail's Pace

From Dar es Salaam, temporary and somewhat antiquated capital whose name signifies "house of peace," to Kigoma, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika passing via Dodoma, the future metropolis in the heart of the Masai plateau, no one will tell you that Tanzanian socialism exists. Especially not Julius Nyerere. It is true that 11 years ago, in 1967, there was the famous declaration of Arusha in which the "mwalimu" had revealed some of the essential principles of his political options: self-sufficiency on the subject of investment and consumption, collective forms of production (the well-known community villages, "ujamaas"), popular control of administrative and political organizations, reforms in education and health service and the like; but the Tanzanian plan is not designed for militants who are in a hurry, and "ujamaa" society advances at a snail's pace.

"Ten years after the declaration of Arusha," Nyerere wrote in 1977, "Tanzania is certainly neither socialist nor self-sufficient." And it even seems that the country is now regressing in this connection. Most of the retail businesses, nationalized in 1967, have been returned to the private sector. Many state companies, particularly in the distribution sector, are being subjected to measures aimed at improving their finances and profitability. A recent directive from the "Cham cha Mapinduzi," the country's only political party, spoke of an "intense fight against corruption." Even administrative decentralization, one of the key points of the declaration of Arusha, is now being disparaged: it is being accused of promoting more bureaucracy.

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A reversal has begun. It has taken the form of a rapid "decollectivization." Of the 8,000 "ujamaa" villages only two are still of the totally communal type; one of these is the pilot "ujamaa" of Mwendapole, about 40 km from Dar es Salaam. Moreover, this change is identical to that experienced--on a more modest scale--by neighboring Mozambique, to that now being experienced by Angola and to that which perhaps, tomorrow, will be experienced by China. However, these readjustments should not give one the idea that Nyerere has supposedly had a sudden change of viewpoint or policy. Foreign investors are undoubtedly better received at the present time than previously, but nothing basic in the socialism of Arusha has been altered: neither its internal democracy nor the constant criticism of positions taken.

## Pragmatism

Simply stated, it must not be forgotten that one of the fundamentals of Nyerere's thinking is pragmatism. Tanzania's Western admirers will perhaps gnash their teeth to some extent. The "mwaliimu" does not care: the West is of little interest to him and his headache is sufficient.

However, the West is very much interested in Julius Nyerere. This is true to the extent that his country is one of those which international financial organizations aid the most: in 1978 this aid came to about \$20 (4,500 CFA /African Financial Community/ francs) per capita. To be sure, the socialist bloc and especially China, which built the famous Tazara railroad, are also providing for the Tanzanian needs, but to a lesser extent.

However, for the Western institutions the Tanzanian case is somewhat gratifying: contrary to what is happening elsewhere, no attempt is being made to control the use of the funds, as it is taken for granted that they will not be diverted or wasted.

## Antithesis

To this confidence, often exaggerated, it must be said, is sometimes added a veritable fascination: for everything which Europe and the United States value in the fields of agronomy, sociology and African history, Dar es Salaam has become a sort of Mecca where one comes to take the pulse of an African socialism without pretense. Many subjective factors play a role in this relation: the fact that Nyerere is a fervent and practicing Catholic, the fact that his condemnation of capitalism and the neocolonial system is founded, above all else, on moral grounds ("Capitalism," he wrote in 1962, "is, more than anything else, an attitude of mind."), and the fact that the declaration of Arusha associated a whole series of subjects with the attribute of honor in circles of the Western liberal Left (self-management, self-sufficiency, agrarian reforms and the like). This noticeable image is particularly impressionable among members of the British Labor Party for whom Nyerere is the precise antithesis of Idi Amin: on the one hand, the exemplary legacy of the colonial era and, on the other, the shameful descendant.

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God and the Devil. Moreover, Nyerere is not militantly and violently anti-Western: his very practical sense of efficacy does not lead him to highflown diatribes at the rostrum of international organizations.

Respect

For example, he has never concealed his support for the Anglo-American settlement plan for Rhodesia and, in the eyes of many Western intellectuals, his nonalignment makes him the last representative of the genuine Third World.

Paradoxically, Nyerere is less known in Africa than in the Western world. Not fascination for the man but, rather, a sort of respect. Respect for one who has succeeded in instilling in his people a single African language: Swahili; respect for this modern leader still close to the traditional image of the chief, wise, deep-rooted and affable and whose power rests much more on collective opinion than on force. Respect, also, for this country which is attempting to plow socialism as one plows a furrow, a practical and austere socialism, not a socialism confined to books.

Nyerere is not speaking to the outside world; he is not proposing any universal theory and has never tried to begin a dialog with the West on this level. This militant nationalism, this socialism of lasting quality is a discreet process. To be known these days when one is a statesman, one must, first of all, "engage" in foreign politics. Nyerere is not a showy individual, but that has never prevented him from living up to his responsibilities: from the East to the Center, passing via South Africa, many of the continent's liberation movements have begun their operations from Tanzania. Nyerere is not one to arouse passion reactions. Moreover, he does not want to do so. But, nevertheless, for Africans he remains a head of state who is somewhat different from the others, if only for the fact that his regime is one of the rare regimes in Africa in which corruption and ostentatious wealth are not the principal characteristic of daily living: luxurious automobiles, such as the inevitable Mercedes, are not allowed to be imported into Tanzania.

Prior to the risks of his Ugandan offensive, the "mwalimu" had used the force of arms only once. In January 1964, a military rebellion by young officers supported by the unions drove Nyerere from his capital. A few days later, he returned to Dar-es-Salaam thanks to the intervention of British troops.

Migraine

Nowadays, when he reminisces in the presence of visitors, he always recalls those somber times with bitterness. This latest combat against the Kampala "dictator," this "purification task" conducted by the austere Nyerere is undoubtedly not, even if he considers it necessary, for the purpose of firing him with enthusiasm. The socialist migraine of the Dar es Salaam schoolteacher thus feeds itself on these memories: how much servitude is necessary to achieve freedom?

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'Big Daddy's' Last Round

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 pp 25-27

[Article by Francisco Vergara]

[Text] How has Idi Amin kept himself in power up to now? Is it only owing to an army which terrorizes a people hostile to the marshal-president? That is the most widespread answer and true to a great extent. But that is not the only factor. Despite his extortions, Idi Amin has acquired genuine popularity in certain strata of the population, and one cannot say that he represents absolute evil in the eyes of the 12 million Ugandans.

The problems of Uganda, potentially East Africa's richest country, did not begin with Idi Amin.

It is his predecessor, Milton Obote, who introduced violence into political life. Following a dispute with Parliament in 1966, he suspended the Constitution and had those who were opposing him arrested, five of whom were ministers in his own government.

It was he also who ordered the army to occupy the palace of the "Kubaku," the Bugandan king who was standing up to him. The monarch was very popular, and the manner in which Obote evicted him brought on a crisis resulting in the coup d'etat of 25 January 1971 and the assumption of power by Idi Amin.

Opposition parties were forbidden under Obote's reign. The army was composed more than 50 percent of two Nile ethnic groups from the North, the Langis and the Acholis, who represented 10 percent of the population. Milton Obote had been the target of several assassination attempts. He was even wounded at the end of 1969.

The Savior

In 1971 Idi Amin was welcomed as a savior. The Asiatic tradespeople who were frightened by Milton Obote's nationalization plans, the Bagandas who were dreaming of a restoration of the monarchy and the British and Israelis were jubilant. Only the Soviets considered that it was an "imperialist operation."

Everyone was mistaken. Obote's distrust in regard to London and Tel Aviv gave way to a militant hostility, and the timid measures relative to the Asiatics and traditional chiefs were replaced by a brutal defeat. Very quickly Idi Amin upset Uganda's ethnic, religious and social balances.

He launched a recruiting campaign to bolster the army, which numbered 6,000 men in 1971. Langi and Acholi soldiers were completely eliminated. The army increased to 12,000 men. Privates rapidly replaced the officers who had been dismissed. The new president gave special privileges to the original soldiers of the Western Nile and to Moslems.

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Nevertheless, this replacement of an elite group by another group contained a certain amount of rebalancing. The country was divided into 10 new regions which were no longer based on ethnic strains. In 1973 Swahili, which does not belong to any particular ethnic group, was proclaimed the national language.

Amin tried to eliminate the traditional chiefs. In 1973 their position became elective. In places where former leading citizens were reelected, Amin appointed members of the military to replace them. He developed a policy of direct contact with the "older inhabitants," thus by-passing the traditional chiefs. His provincial tours were very popular.

Decisions which caused indignation abroad toward Amin were welcomed with relief in Uganda itself. This was the case, for example, with the expulsion of the Asiatics, who were a privileged minority. Better educated and wealthier, they had refused to mix with the Ugandan people. The marshal's attitude toward them made him appear as a courageous leader in Uganda. Nevertheless, it had disastrous consequences for the economy.

#### Production Declining

The absence of skilled labor affected textiles, the sugar industry and transportation. Exports decreased considerably. The drop in production amounted to 30 percent for coffee, 50 for cotton, 32 for tea and 63 for sugar. The result was a serious deterioration in the living conditions of the urban population and especially of the Westernized Christian elite who joined the Langis and Acholis in offering opposition.

The property of the Asiatics was distributed among the Moslem military, which increased the bitterness of the vast majority of citizens. The repression of all these groups was brutal.

In the country, among the traditional peasantry, who account for 90 percent of the population, the situation was different. Although the cotton, coffee and sugar-cane crops lost ground, that of foodstuffs developed. Between 1971 and 1977 the production of corn increased 216 percent, that of rice 212 percent and that of potatoes 320 percent.

According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa: "Food production has been sufficient in general" due particularly to "the importance given to food crops."

#### Reduction in Income

An increase in food production per capita is an exceptional phenomenon in Africa. Moreover, in the case of coffee, although the volume of exports decreased, the unit export price advanced: from 1975 to 1977 it was multiplied 4 and 1/2 times. As a result, and owing to a sudden drop in imports, Uganda's trade balance remained largely on the surplus side from 1971 to 1977. The foreign debt decreased.

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In 197<sup>n</sup> the situation changed. The drop in the market price of coffee reduced Uganda's export income by half. The year 197<sup>n</sup> should be still more difficult. The president for life has had to reduce his army's privileges. During the last few weeks there have been rumors of considerable delays in the soldiers' pay. Perhaps it is this situation which decided Idi Amin's opponents to launch their offensive, an offensive whose objective is now very clear: to drive "Big Daddy" from his Ugandan kingdom.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DISPUTED ZAIRIAN INTERVENTION IN CAE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 65

[Text] Did some units of the Zairian army actually intervene on Saturday, 20 January, to restore order in Bangui during the violent demonstrations that shook the capital?

There are two conflicting theses. French government sources assert, without being willing to make a public statement, that the intervention did actually take place; a high Central African official, and travelers arriving from Bangui, are entirely of the same opinion. But seen from Africa, things appear different. Our special correspondent Siradiou Diallo, in Zaire in person, picked up items that call the intervention thesis in question again.

Thus, according to the high Central African official mentioned above, "the regular army, stationed in the capital, was quickly swamped by the young demonstrators on Boganda avenue, in front of the administration building, housing several ministries, including those of National Education and Higher Education. That is when Emperor Bokassa called out his Praetorian guard, stationed in the Palace of Berengo; it fired upon the crowd of high school and college students, killing and wounding several."

Clashes are then supposed to have occurred between the emperor's personal guard and soldiers of the Central African army, sickened by the repression of school children. Notified of this situation, Bokassa is reported to have decided to confine the army at Bangui to the Kasai camp, and appeal to French troops (which is categorically denied in French official circles).

According to this report, Bokassa is then supposed to have approached Zaire.

In Kinshasa, an entirely different version of the facts is given. The confusion is said to have arisen because of the presence at Bangui airport of two Hercules C 130-type aircraft belonging to the Zairian air force. They are supposed to have landed during the afternoon of Friday, 19 February. The first was returning from the United States, where it had been fitted with

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special equipment. It received the order from Gen Kikunda Ombala, chief of the Zairian air force general staff, to change direction after a stop at Dakar, and make a refuelling stop before meeting, at Gemena, in the north of Zaire, President Mobutu, who happened to be there because of a family bereavement. As for the second aircraft, it had on board some women bringing to Gemena various objects needed for the funeral ceremony. In Zairian circles, it is thought not impossible that the authorities at Bangui may have used the chance presence of these two military aircraft to scare the demonstrators.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK AFRICAN MARXISM, LENINISM TRACED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 5 Feb 79 pp 50-52

[Article by Jean Copans: "Africa and Marx"]

[Text] Latent Europeocentrism and New Tasks for African Marxists The dominant ideologies of the Western World attack, criticize or manipulate Marxism according to the relationship of the political forces at the moment. Bad faith may follow (apparent) benevolence. Thus we see the recent university consecration of Marxism in Europe, or even in the United States. These consecrations are nevertheless most often poisoned gifts, which result in the destruction or subtle weakening of the revolutionary charge and of the criticism of the established order, which is at the base of the theory developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Having said that, there still remain blanks, silences in the theory of Marx, which have permitted doubts to arise as to the universal value of its concepts and of its point of view. That is the situation in Black Africa. The relative weakness of the theoretical Marxist analysis produced in Africa and by Africans certainly has historical causes, which go back essentially to the vision spread by the dogmatism of Stalin, to the inexistence of a real Internationale after World War II and to the opportunistic and chauvinist colonial politics of the European Communists. Afterwards, the renewal of Marxism (toward the end of the 1950's) often took on sophisticated forms, transforming the confrontation of ideas into a theological debate (each faction against the other) or an "archeological" one (the rereading of the texts of only the founders). In short, Marxism has often remained bookish and much importance has often been given remarks made in very specific circumstances, even conceptions outdated by historical evolution and by the knowledge of various social formations.

Unfortunately, this Western practice of theoretical development has had repercussions at the level of forms of the assimilation of Marxism by African intellectuals. The approach consisting of an African reappropriation which would be, at the same time, a specific creation has not really taken place. One of the reasons for the "delay" (which also concerns the Western powers, who have to analyse Africa from this theoretical perspective) comes from the relationship of Marx to Africa and the way he took (or continued) the analysis by Hegel.

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This rereading, which is concrete, political (with respect to the struggles of the African masses and not European struggles, historically dated), is indispensable and it is entirely to the credit of the Senegalese economist and philosopher Amady Ali Dieng for demonstrating this to us in his recent collection of articles.<sup>1</sup>

But let him speak for himself, for the clarity of his study is undeniable:

"Marx chose to be interested essentially in the capitalist method of production, which, conceived and developed in Western Europe, has created the material and social conditions for the passage to a higher regime: communism. In these conditions, countries which have not known the development of internal capitalism, and on a large scale, could only occupy a marginal place in his work. The countries located in Africa, Asia, America and Oceania have only been studied as a function of the development of Western capitalism.

"Marx and Engels had not completely broken with the Hegel of "Lessons from the Philosophy of History"<sup>2</sup> on the problem of Asia. They were able to escape, thanks to the experiences of social struggles in Europe, and particularly in England, in France and in Germany, from German ideology and particularly from the ideas of Hegel. But they did not live through the social struggles in the countries of Africa, Asia and Indian America and thus become able to test seriously the ideas which were current in the cultivated circles of their period."<sup>3</sup>

Dieng in fact deals with two different subjects:

--the knowledge and the place of Africa in the work of Marx;

--the major problems of contemporary Africa, which present a challenge to logical Marxist analysis.

Just as the two preceding quotations suggest, Dieng refuses both the fetishism of Marx (a theory perfected and closed once and for all) and the trap of African chauvinism (which would justify itself through a demagogic anti-Europecentrism). The honesty and effectiveness of this analysis leads to a new political psychology. Dieng invites his comrades to an intellectual adventure: the Marxist tradition as it exists is not up to the level of the historical requirements of the present development of African societies.

The only way for Marxism to become a truly universal doctrine is to show that the analysis of the social and historical formations of Africa can be made on the basis of the principles of dialectical materialism. This position is not as obvious as it seems because many African Marxists (French-speaking) "have been influenced by the ideology of the French Communist Party, which has not always had a correct attitude on the problems of the independence, the culture and the languages of Black Africa."<sup>4</sup>

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Not Infallible

It is too bad, perhaps, that in his analysis of the relationship of Marxism to Africa, Dieng restricted himself to the description of the works of Marx and Engels and of their non-rupture (unconscious) with Hegel. The influence of Lenin, of the Bolshevik thinkers of the Third International, the dogmatism of Stalin, the theories of Mao on classes in the colonial countries are merely new sedimentary layers placed on top of the involuntary Europeocentrism of Marx. And when we assess African Marxism, it is certain that the political constraints have played a greater role than the response of Marx to Hegel.

Nevertheless, it must be said that Marx, just as any revolutionary thinker, is neither totally competent nor infallible and that the point of departure of the analysis comes from the place given specific class struggles.

This timidity on the part of Dieng is even more noticeable in the second part, because he is content to criticize a certain number of works, without making a thoughtful, personal argument. Taking up first the nature of civilizations, he goes on to a reevaluation in glowing terms of the historical work of Sheik Anta Diop.<sup>6</sup> I confess that I do not entirely share this point of view, but Dieng rightly points out the revolutionary quality of the affirmation of Black civilizations in the face of a "profoundly Jacobean" Marxism. Dieng then examines the realities of negritude and of African philosophy. He agrees with or anticipates Hountondji on numerous points and explains that one must separate oneself "from those African intellectuals who strongly decry cultural assimilation, but who are the most consciously assimilated. What we reject is the naivete with which certain African intellectuals, who consider themselves as the castaways of civilization, hang on to any life-buoy, held out by any expert in negro-logy."

After the philosophers, it is the mathematicians and sociologists (in particular Majhmout Diop) who attract his attention. He wonders why Senegalese mathematicians have never become interested in the computing methods and mathematical thought of the various local populations, instead of singing the praises of pure and basic mathematics. As for the works of Diop,<sup>7</sup> they are both empirical and dogmatic and do not bring to bear a truly Marxist analysis on the history of classes in Senegal.

I would like to emphasize, in conclusion, one or two parenthetical comments by Dieng concerning the non-use and silence on African languages. The problem is complex and the banal generalities, for or against a single national language, often a foreign one, do not fundamentally solve anything. But the fact that all the philosophic, scientific, literary work is written in a foreign language is scandalous. Because, if we wish to speak to the masses, to put theory and practice together, we must transmit through writing (which poses the problem of the transcription of African languages)

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or orally (the new audio-visual methods can certainly be useful in this regard) this new critical thought. To quote Dieng: "The young African philosophers and scientists have before them the task of expressing themselves, of forging scientific and philosophical concepts in the languages of their countries. It is in this way that they will better be able to express the concerns of our peoples."

In spite of the uneven quality of this book, the contribution of Dieng is extremely valuable. His modesty, compared to the outbursts of an Adotevi or the subtlety of a Hountondji, is all the more effective. To denounce the consequences of the Europeocentric interpretation of Marxism on African thought was indispensable. To point out a few landmarks for the building of an authentic Marxism by Africans is more than useful.

We regret, certainly, the absence of a full-fledged program for the areas to be explored, concepts to be constructed, actions to be taken. But, first of all, the psychology must be changed, even the reflexes of the intellectual African, and there will never be too many studies of this sort, "to find ourselves in the apparent chaos contained in the history of our countries."

Examples of courage and intellectual honesty are much too rare in today's Africa to fail to bring attention to them and encourage them.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Hegel, Marx and Engels and the Problems of Black Africa," San Kare, 'Cabral-Fanon' collection, Dakar, 1978.
2. Here is how the greatest German philosopher spoke of Black Africa: "It is the country of gold, turned inward toward itself, the country of childhood, which beyond conscious history is enveloped in the darkness of night. The Negro represents natural man in all his barbarity and his absence of discipline."
3. And Dieng concludes: "Europeocentrism is not dead; it threatens the creative development of Marxism. The Marxists of the non-European countries must read the works of Marx and Engels using their methods of reading."
4. Let us point out on this point the excellent and well-documented book of G. Madjarian: "The Colonial Question and the Policy of the PCF (1944-1947)", F. Maspero, 1977.

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5. Dieng is the author of several original studies (on the social classes and the slave system of production in the cattle trade in Senegal, etc.)
6. "Negro Nations and Cultures" (1954), "Anteriority of Negro Civilizations" (1967), etc.
7. "The History of the Social Classes in West Africa: Senegal," F. Maspero, 1972.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SWISS DIPLOMATIC INTEREST IN AFRICA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Feb 79 p 36

[Article by Francoise Hubscher: "An Unusual Swiss"]

[Text] For the first time, a chief of the Swiss diplomatic service has set foot on Black African soil.

Until now, all Africans knew of the Swiss were its businessmen and its foreign aid personnel. "The Red Cross and the strong-box" were all they wished to be known for. Is this image going to change after the visit which took place from 14 to 28 January by the federal counselor for Foreign Affairs, Pierre Aubert, to five countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Senegal?

This is the first time in Swiss history that the head of the diplomatic service, upsetting just a little the stay-at-home habits of his compatriots, has set foot on African soil. "Switzerland," Pierre Aubert explained during his stay in Ouagadougou, "has never possessed colonies. We can therefore offer Africans completely disinterested aid, technical or financial cooperation."

Just the same, one can point out in Africa the very small share of the Swiss national product (barely 0.2 percent) which is devoted to aid for development in the Third World. "The Swiss are rich, but Switzerland is poor," answers Pierre Aubert. "The annual budgetary deficit of the Confederation is on the order of 1.5 billion Swiss francs (3.75 billion French francs)."

Did the explanations of the Swiss chief diplomat, who was pleased with the friendly reception he was given everywhere, convince anyone? In any case, Swiss industrialists certainly intend to profit from this trip, in their own way. They hope that after the trip of the federal counselor to Lagos, the stock of watches which were ordered and then blocked at the frontier, since the Nigerian government decided to impose quotas on its imports, will finally be delivered (watch sales amount to more than 50 million Swiss francs per year).

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Active Neutrality

They are also counting on the visit of Pierre Aubert to help them invest more easily in Cameroon and especially in the Ivory Coast, where they are already in second place, just behind France, with 5 percent of the capital of Ivorian industry. But they seem to miss the old days when Swiss foreign affairs were their private domain. They are especially afraid that the "active neutrality" called for by their minister will result in interfering with the good relations they have with South Africa.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

FRANCE UNABLE TO DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM BOKASSA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 pp 64,65

[ Article by Jean-Marc Zaidi: "Is the Crown Going to Fall?" ]

[ Text ] Emperor Bokassa has had some trouble because of the 20 January riots. But he has not lost power over it.

Does the explosion on 20 and 21 January 1979, which revealed the deep discontentment of a portion of the Central African population, endanger Emperor Bokassa I's regime?

Are changes to be expected at the head of the state, or at least, a weakening of the government? The alarm has been a sharp one, and the authorities in Bangui are not minimizing the seriousness of the events that bloodied the capital. On Friday, 26 January, one week after the demonstrations, the creation was announced of a "national committee" charged with paying civil servants' salaries and student grants. This measure, which incidentally confirms information according to which no salaries have been paid for several months, shows that the government is seeking pacification. Other decisions should follow, with the same goal. That does not of itself assure that all discontentment will come to an end. But if the recovery of control by the forces of order had not sufficed, the risks of new riots would have to be removed. With calm restored, there is no indication that Bokassa's throne is seriously threatened.

Spontaneity

The events of 20 and 21 January showed that the means of repression available to the government functioned with a certain "efficiency." Taking into account news items reporting clashes between Central African soldiers of the regular army and elements of Bokassa's personal guard (see inset), the emperor should however be concerned about it. The spontaneous nature of the demonstrations also favors Bokassa, since it is a sign that there exists no organized opposition.

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A short-lived parliamentary opposition, the Central African Democratic Evolution Movement, led by Abel Goumba, was banned in 1960, after elections in which it won 20 percent of the vote.

Since his accession to power at the time of the 1 January 1966 coup d'etat, Bokassa has successively eliminated all those who could represent a potential danger to himself, starting with his two inconvenient deputies, Col Alexandre Banza and Captain Malendomia, with whom he overthrew President Dacko. The latter is now an imperial advisor; some people wonder if he might not regain power some day. It is not very likely. His presidency, which did not leave the best of memories behind it, and his close association with the present regime, seem to rule it out. We should also add that even though he has no adversaries of any stature, the emperor has little trouble making up the teams which back him up in power.

Despite the successive eliminations which give political life its rhythm, there are always men who will accept, often with little conviction, ministerial responsibilities. Including some among former militants of the National Union of Central African Students (UNECA), an organization imbued with ideological currents, usually leaning toward the left. Once they are in power, they can do nothing. The slightest hint of opposition on the part of a minister provokes thunderbolts from Bokassa, whose touchy authoritarianism and impulsive reactions are well known.

These reactions by the emperor, "haunted by the idea of seeing a potential rival appear," his son, Prince George, told us, have also affected his relations with France. Under the presidency of Georges Pompidou, notably, Bokassa frequently accused the French services of plotting against him. He showed his ill humor by fostering relations with eastern countries (the Soviet Union, Romania) or by expelling French cooperators. The emperor used to go back on his "impulsive moves" later, as he did on his adherence to "scientific socialism" or his short-lived conversion to Islam on 20 October 1976 after a visit to Tripoli.

Despite the estrangements, Paris, which can be counted on for financial aid, continues to be Bangui's privileged partner. With Valery Giscard d'Estaing, relations seem to have improved markedly. France cannot dissociate itself from the empire, firstly because of its uranium, but also because of its location, between Chad in the North, which is still causing concern, and Zaire in the South, which is not yet on the road to recovery. Bokassa knows, moreover, how to play upon this aspect of things, by letting it be understood that he could find other allies. Did he not send an emissary to Colonel Qadhafi on 24 January? With no serious rival on the horizon, Bokassa can still count on France's support. That is probably his best trump-card. The financial aid he so much needed seems to have been granted. According to Prime Minister Maidou, who made an official visit to France and Belgium at the end of January, the talks were positive. The success of this mission will not prevent, in the good old Bangui tradition, a big ministerial shuffle,

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probably in February. With a new team in charge of current affairs, the emperor will be able to go back to his palace at Berengo and forget the unpleasantnesses on 20 and 21 January.

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CHAD

POSSIBILITIES OF NATION'S SURVIVAL DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 pp 433-436

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Chad's Survival and its Future"]

[Text] The political tension which had been hatching for several weeks in Ndjamenas ended by degenerating into an open confrontation between the men of Prime Minister Habre Hissain (Armed Forces of the North, or FAN, numbering over 1,000 troops) and the Chad National Army (numbering about 11,000 men plus 3,000 gendarmes commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue).

Quite severe street fighting broke out on 12 February, in the morning, in the capital of Chad. Their outbreak seems to have been caused by the proclamation of a strike by secondary school students. After opening fire on the national army soldiers, who returned it, Habre Hissain's men attacked and seized the radio building protected by gendarmes who withdrew. Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue then mounted a counter attack with the gendarmerie against the residency of the prime minister, in Chagoua. The prime minister was either absent or is said to have fled on time, while a Chad squadron was flying over the city, whose pilots, certain information notwithstanding, were neither participants in the French cooperative program nor members of the French military.

In the morning of 14 February the city of Ndjamenas appeared to have been split in half. The African districts were being held by the FAN while the modern administrative town by the national army forces.

In Habre Hissain's stronghold, in the northeastern part of the country, the FAN have reportedly encircled the national army garrison in Abeche, and occupied the entire city of Biltine.

The French forces stationed in Chad have at no point intervened. They would do so should the safety of the French be threatened, which was not the case on 14 February.

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The number of civilian victims in the capital is reported high. The situation remains confusing and contacts with Ndjamená difficult as a result of the destruction of the telecommunications station by Habre Hisséin's supporters. The article which follows is an effort to describe the Chadean political-economic development.

Two men were vying for power in Ndjamená. The ferment in the southern regions was enhanced by fights and the distribution of pamphlets. The French army is present in the capital and the main centers of the Sahelian Zone. Aozou and the former BET (Borgou-Ennedi-Tibeste) are in the hands of the Libyans and the Goukouni. The Ouassi, Batha, Salamat and Guerra are crisscrossed by rival gangs which claim to belong to an organization about which no one knows whether it is centered in Tripoli or Algiers, in addition to the personal underground which Mr Habre Hisséin has developed in the Biltine prefecture. There are patronages attributed or claimed to be attributed to the protagonists in the drama: Col Qadhafi to Goukouni, that of Gen Numayri, to Habre Hisséin, and that of Mr Senghor to Abba Siddick. Press correspondents bet on their "winning horse" and reject all others. One can see the difficulty experienced by French readers to find their way and see through such troubles the future of a country which is presented both as an artificial creation of colonialism and the key to the center of Africa.

Is it a question of the final spasms of a dying corpse? Or else, conversely, could the real Chad work through such upheavals, the nomad following his ancestral Sourhal, the merchant exporting his cattle to Nigeria, the peasant planting his cotton seeds and cultivating his plants, and harvesting and selling his crops? In a word, will the Chad of underground forces go through a simple event such as that of the "majors" which leave on the ground no more than shallow tracks which disappear with the first gush of wind?

Yet, a federal system seems to correspond only imperfectly to the essential features of the Chad. The two Chads, willingly discussed, the useful and the other, the white and the black, the Moslem and the fetishist or Christian, are based on the morals of a fable. Whereas the Southern Chad was administratively assimilated by the old colonial power, the Northern Chad remains a mosaic of Saharian, Sudan, and Nilotic populations among which move big Bedouin tribes coming from the Arab Peninsula and some Bororo Peuls.

The cement which keeps all this together is, unquestionably, the Islamic legal tradition. However, it is above all, a certain sense of statehood, a feeling of belonging to old political entities. Therefore, the restructuring could be undertaken only from the bottom. That is perhaps what Gen Malloum thinks about when he speaks of "an administrative and political reorganization, redivided, and decentralized." In fact, he speaks of a north-south federation, whose northern part would, itself, represent a federation. Unfortunately, this target would be difficult to achieve under present circumstances.

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Good and Bad Cards

It would be presumptuous to suggest, in the wake of so many other, a miracle prescription which would resolve the Chadean crisis. However, we could try to set up a local scale of values which would enable us to identify in this game the worst cards.

The south remains united and firm as it was in Gentil's time. It is also the only productive area in terms of a market economy or, at least, a controllable market economy. It is clear that in no case would France give its preference to the north at the expense of the south to the extent to which it intends to help to ensure the political balance in Central Africa.

Periodical information appearing in the press on the contamination of the south by the northern rebellion is pure fantasy and proves, above all, the ignorance of those who disseminate it. The truth is the opposite. The southern cities are the merchant areas inhabited by Bornou or Haoussa Moslems some of whom, in fact, have been affected by FROLINAT propaganda and have triggered some incidents such as the one in the course of which a French nun was killed several months ago in Moundou. However, the popular excitement is a reaction to these facts and the recently distributed tracts are a warning to the "brothers from the north" who are reminded, for the sake of calming them down, of the fire which destroyed their shops in Moundou in December 1971. The movement is spontaneous. The Ndjamena government has been able so far to suppress its violence. However, the movement could also be "taken into consideration" should the north-south rivalry become acute in the capital. The name of its supposed or probable leader is already largely familiar.

The trumps of the northern resistance, whether operating up front or vegetating in greater mediocrity in the distant bush, can only increase their fighting spirit lacking as they are of a legitimacy rooted in a political past. Such militancy is linked with the effectiveness of foreign support. From this double viewpoint the importance of Goukouni, an offspring of the Tibesti Derdei--who is not an emperor of the desert but, nevertheless, remains an authentic chief--could not be underestimated assuming that he does not venture too far from his own grounds. Mr Habre Hissein's clandestine forces are suitably armed. However, he profits most from his agreement with the chieftans of Tama and Zaggawa who use his forces to chase the other gangs from their lands and who give him legitimacy as he protects them.

Born of the breakdown of an official authority, such clandestine forces, in their totality, would be as fragile as that power if not supported by or profiting from the complicity of the existing customary tradition complicity. Since such support and complicity could be withdrawn at will, their influence could be determined only in terms of their stocks of weapons and munitions. Therefore, at any time they could find themselves in a position of inferiority should a rival gang affiliate itself with a supporter considered more generous and regular in his deliveries.

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These facts enable us to understand the difficulties facing Gen Malloum in the course of his long search for a suitable partner with whom to promote the pacification of the north, a search which took him from Khartoum to Shebha, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Libreville. The solution to which he finally resigned himself had the essential merit of weakening the forces of his opponent by rallying to the national cause an energetic man believed capable of understanding that, cut off henceforth from his old friends, his support could be based only on achieving perfect harmony with the representatives of the south. Our ambassador in Ndjamena, involved in this matter by virtue of French military support to Chad, spent, it is said, his mornings with Gen Malloum and his afternoons with Mr Habre Hisein.

## The Libyan Problem

Outside the borders we must distinguish between the support which Col Qadhafi gives Goukouni's FROLINAT, his own incursions on Chad territory, and the international recourse which Chad could eventually use against Libya. Support for Goukouni is evident and the latter has no intention of denying it, while pointing out that he does not approve of the seizure by his protectors of the Aozou Strip (100 kilometer wide and 2,800 kilometers long) and that, in the past, there have been shoot-outs between them, specifically at Oumchi, in 1976. True, this was at a time when he had not yet broken with Habre Hisein.

In fact, Libya has set up its own supply stores on Chadean territory, at Oumchi, Gouro, and Ain Galaka. The presence of its forces in the Aozou Strip is juridically indefensible. The old problem of the demarcation of the Chadean-Libyan border and the happenstances which complicated it, based on the Rome agreements of 7 January 1935, were, in fact, finally settled with the friendship and good-neighborly Franco-Libyan treaty concluded in Tripoli on 10 August 1955. Article 3 of the document unquestionably validates the Rome agreements which are not included in the list of valid international acts on the border, attended to the treaty, "recognizing" --the very word used in the text--the track of the borders as stipulated in the French version.<sup>1</sup>

Following a violent parliamentary debate, as the treaty called for abandoning our claims on Fezzan, the 6 December 1956 law authorized the president of the republic to ratify the treaty. The exchange of ratification instruments took place on 20 February 1957. Becoming independent, Chad subsequently proclaimed that the borders inherited from the colonization period were to remain untouchable. This position was reiterated with the Addis Abeba charter of 25 May 1963 which gave birth to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It was reasserted even more emphatically and concisely with the resolution adopted in the course of the conference of heads of states held in Cairo between 17 and 21 July 1974.

Therefore, it is totally illegal for Libya to continue to occupy a part of the territory. The reason for which the Chadean government did not present this question to the OAU or the United Nations Security Council,

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as Gen Malloum intended to do at the end of 1977, was to preserve the possibility, subsequently invalidated, of a reconciliation with Goukouni. Actually, Libya does not even argue against Chad's rights. Having spread the legend that President Tombalbaye had agreed to this occupation in the course of his visit to Tripoli in June of 1973--had such an agreement existed the question is why is it not produced by Col Qadhafi--it is satisfied, in fact, with the silent occupation of the area.

The presence of precious minerals in this area has been cited to explain the attitude. Interesting indications might have been found. However, the Aozou treasures are, more likely, of the same legendary nature as the Golcondian. Had they been extant, a joint exploitation would have led to a conciliation between the interests of the two parties better than could be accomplished with an interminable conflict. In fact, the presence of these forces symbolizes the claim of the Jamahiriya to exert alone an influence in the tradition inherited from the Senoussis in this Central African sector.

The legal aspect of the problem should be exploited. Asking an international court to condemn Libya, based on the solidity of its case, the Chadean government may not succeed in recovering what belongs to it. However, it would force, something which would be of greater importance to it, the various competing clandestine forces to adopt the type of position on a national problem which, if negative, would not enhance their status in the eyes of the population but which, if positive, would openly oppose them to Libya. The same choice would have to be made by their more or less acknowledged protectors. All in all, the operation would lead to a reconciliation within and outside the borders, to the establishment of a specific common interest base, and the development of new support making this base more solid.

## Economic Survival

Long before the rebellion broke out, Chad was characterized by the coexistence of three different economies. It was based on the one erroneously described as self-subsistence which, in fact, is self-subsistence in terms of food without being miserable. It is familiar with the notion of trade, with little cash changing hands, true, considering the value of the capital in terms of livestock, and involving anything related to the esthetic aspect of existence governed by immutable values: Tea, sugar, arms, and women's jewelry. It has always been difficult to control, and the isolation of the northern districts is less responsive than ever in this area to the activities of an administration henceforth limited to administrative centers.

Official statistics show fluctuations in the tonnage of food crops which seem quite controversial: 850,000 tons of various cereal crops in 1970, 650,000 tons in 1975-1976, and 550,000 tons in 1976-1977. Actually, there has been no famine in Chad and food gifts shipped by international organizations have been substantially lesser compared with those received by other Sahelian countries affected by the drought.



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On the other hand, conceivably, the presence of rival gangs in the northern plains discourages the population from engaging in farm work, fearing pillage and the extraction of booty. It would unquestionably be an exaggeration to depict the Volcan, Baglany, or the Third Army Clandestine Forces as models of integrity. However, there is general testimony to the effect that they are not short of money and pay for the food they requisition. This tends to prove that such food exists, that the rebellion is financially supported from the outside (not by Libya alone), and, finally, that the clandestine forces are aware of the severe disagreements they would be exposed to in terms of the environment in which they must operate, which is not exactly their own, should they behave like regular soldiers.

The next level is that of a market economy covering an extensive geographic area, for it is related to two adjacent countries. Exclusively African, from the seller to the intermediary and to the purchaser, using secret channels to avoid customs, avoiding all conversion to cash inside borders, the smuggling of cattle to Nigeria is equally difficult to assess. It is estimated as reaching annually 200,000 head of cattle, whereas the official slaughterhouses in Farcha handle 6,500 tons, or approximately 50,000 head, therefore, slightly over one-third of the amounts exported as frozen meat. Dried fish caught by the fishermen of Logone, Chari, and the lower Salamat is exported under comparable conditions to Cameroun and Nigeria in substantial quantities yet even more difficult to assess.

Finally, drawing the factual balance of Chad, we should not ignore the importance of "invisible income" brought through the wages of the Ouaddaian Chekalla thousands of which have migrated to the plantations of Sudan's Gezireh. This is a population migration which the insecurity prevailing along Chad's border areas has naturally only increased.

There is a third level, that of a modern type market economy. It is based on cotton and, henceforth, other products such as oil (from cotton or peanuts), beer, wheat and, unquestionably, tomorrow, petroleum. Chad's "written" economy acknowledges exclusively this output, hence its apparent weakness in terms of a population numbering, in theory, four million people.<sup>2</sup> This is the only economy which feeds the state budget, 55 percent of whose revenue comes from customs fees, the balance coming from industry or trade taxes or indirect taxation. By virtue of the prevailing circumstances, the personal income tax which could have provided us with valuable information on the factual taxation power of the Chadeans, plays an infinitesimal role. Due to the lack of an up-to-date census, its distorted estimate could only represent a reason for additional trouble in areas unaffected by the rebellion.

Unless considered exclusively in terms of the recorded economic figures, the sum total of the official gross national product would be 100 billion CFA, or approximately 25,000 CFA per capita. Such figures would provide insufficient estimates concerning self-subsistence and the movement of uncontrolled goods. Unquestionably, it is here that we should look for an explanation for the astounding resistance of the population to current adversity.

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### Cotton

As the base of this "recorded" economy, cotton would account for about 7 billion CFA (50 CFA francs per kilo for white cotton, or 90 percent of the crop, and 25 CFA francs for yellow cotton) for 1978-1979. In terms of value, it accounts for 75 percent of exports and for 10 percent of the internal state budget revenue. The Fund for the Stabilization of Cotton Prices and the Coton-Tchad mixed economy company are the only Chadean source for economic investments.

The National Office for Rural Development (ONDR) is in charge of organizing the cotton growing population. Coton-Tchad is in charge of the picking, ginning, and selling the crop with the help of capital and technical aid supplied by the Compagnie francaise pour le developpement des fibres textiles (CFDT).

This is an unquestionable technical success, which deserves even more credit considering that the cotton crops have had to surmount the handicap created among the peasants by the authoritarian methods used to ensure their development preceding and immediately after World War Two. This success also contains an important moral element, having proved that the Chadean farmer could improve.

This is eloquently confirmed by a few figures. The marketed output, to begin with, rose from 46,800 tons of cotton seed in 1961--a tonnage whose low level experienced the fluctuation triggered by the departure of the colonial authorities--to 145,000 tons in 1978-1979 (estimate), with peak production of 148,000 tons in 1968-1969, and 174,000 tons in 1975-1976. Yields have equally shown an encouraging progression: From 150 kilograms per hectare in 1961-1962 to 510 for the last crop. The area cultivated with draft animals or mechanized facilities rose from 115,000 hectares in 1971-1972 to 195,000 hectares in 1977-1978; areas on which fertilizers were used rose from 3,695 hectares in 1961-1962 to 120,200 hectares in 1977-1978. At the same time, the use of insecticides rose from 280,000 to 1,124,000 liters. Finally, ginning yields rose from 36 percent in 1961-1962 to 41.6 percent today.

Was this technical success accompanied by a financial success? Unfortunately, cotton has remained a speculative crop whose rate experiences substantial fluctuations specifically in function of the American output and world consumption. The use of fertilizers and insecticides for productive crops is profitable only if it is converted, in terms of gross yields, into "traditional" crops through an additional increase in output whose sale price should be higher than the purchase price of the products used. Overall, this ratio has remained positive.

Over the past few years the converse development of goods, rising, and of staples, declining, has, nevertheless, greatly lowered the profit from Chadean cotton. Predictions for 1979 global consumption are more favorable

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compared with 1978 by about one million bales. However, this advantage is hindered by a better global crop compared with last year's and the existence of a higher stockpile compared with 1978. At worst, we could conceive, if not of the risk that the profit from cotton crops would be eliminated, of the necessity to abandon the use of fertilizers and insecticides. This would lower tonnages and, consequently, the farmers' income, unless they expand cultivated areas to compensate for this decline, which seems difficult.

Let us add to cotton growing the establishment of the Moundou-Koumra Cotton Extraction Complex, which opened in April of 1978. At the conclusion of the 1977-1978 campaign it had produced 2.6 million liters of unrefined oil or 2.4 million liters of refined oil, 60 percent of which was exported.

Other Agricultural and Industrial Activities

Rural development accounts for the majority of foreign aid, the only source, together with the Fund for the Stabilization of Cotton Price, for public investments. The South Chad Agricultural Development Project, jointly financed by this fund, the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] and the EDF, covers 280,000 projects and has four objectives: Production diversification, yield improvements, soil protection, and socio-professionally action in peasant areas.

The development of the lake polders is assisted by the FAC, the World Bank, USAID, and the FAD (African Development Fund). Agricultural water projects involving canals, collectors, and drainage and irrigation stations, are based on the establishment of family units of about one hectare each. Two polders totaling 1,200 hectares on which wheat and cotton are grown are already in operation.

Along with the United Nations development program, the USAID, and the Commission for the Basin of Lake Chad, the FAC is engaged in a long-term and multinational operation, for it involves Cameroun and Nigeria as well, in promoting livestock breeding. It applies to 200,000 breeders and 300,000 head of cattle for the three countries. Its purpose is to develop the best possible sanitary infrastructure, a more satisfactory management of cattle drives, a more efficient exploitation of the cattle, and a more developed form of farming and livestock breeding combination.

The Societe nationale sucriere du Tchad (Sonasut) developed, through the initiative of a French private group and in association with the state, an agroindustrial complex whose first section spreads over 1,500 hectares. Its facilities were opened in Sahr in March 1978. This is an extremely fast implementation of the project, the agreement protocol having been signed in 1977.

In the infrastructural area, following the repairs and expansion of the Ndjamenia Airport in 1976 and the various projects for the straightening and study of roads, a major project is underway: The Moundou-Guidjiba

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Axis (304 kilometers, 116 in Chad) totaling 17.1 billion CFA, jointly financed by the World Bank, the FED, the Saudian funds, the African Development Bank, and the Bank for the Development of Central African States. The financing of another project covering the Bongor-Lai Axis (198 kilometers), estimated at 1.9 billion CFA, is currently underway.

Finally, let us point out that the satisfactory start of a tobacco industry (16 million packs in 1978), the Moundou Brewery (140,000 hectoliters), the building of a new rice-hulling plant in Lai and, finally, the building of a small refinery which will be linked through a pipeline to the Kanem Oil Deposit. The installations will become operational in 1981. With a 150,000 ton processing capacity it will ensure Chad total petroleum independence. This would be an appreciable saving of foreign exchange for a country where a liter of gas-oil sells currently for 85 CFA francs in Sahr.

Hopes for the Future

For these reasons, the ratio between output and the population seems obviously disproportionate. In terms of strictly orthodox financing, the servicing of the foreign debt being below the 20 percent fatidic ceiling of foreign resources, would be admissible if the gratuitous nature of a large percentage of the foreign aid granted Chad did not distort its meaning. Actually, it is the ratio between a budget of 17 billion CFA, running a chronic deficit ranging from 2 to 3 billion, and the annual foreign aid (27 billion CFA) which shows best the imbalance of the Chadean economy. Over one-half of this aid comes from France. True, 50 percent of it goes to military support. One-third of such expenditures are borne by the Chadean budget itself. Therefore, the factual ratio between the civilian budget and economic, technical, and financial foreign aid is, in fact, 11.4 billion:20 billion CFA.

In the case of any other country living on this basis one could think in terms of bankruptcy and of a fictitious existence or else in terms of the fact that financial efforts deployed by others to ensure its development would be disproportionate in terms of its possibilities.

The truth is less severe and more complex. The profitability of aid granted Chad should increase in terms of the official structures which account for merely a part, not only of the potential, but of the factual activities of the country. Nor should a realistic look at things ignore the strategic importance of the Lac Basin whose occupation by an aggressive power could have most disastrous consequences on the effectiveness of the efforts to promote the development of African resources and the possibility for a balanced economic dialogue between that continent and Europe.

Whereas it is true that, geographically, Chad is the African keystone, conversely, it is not accurate to say that as a state Chad was a purely artificial creation of the colonizing power. Had that power really wanted

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to shape for its sole convenience a political geography, it would have failed. In fact, it made use of the conflicts existing among African political entities to impose its alliance, followed by its military supremacy, imposing on the whole a cash economy based on the satisfaction of its own economic requirements. Nevertheless, numerous political entities survived and traditional trade mechanisms have not disappeared. The profound reason for Chad's troubles may be found, in all likelihood, in the error of the government which promoted the independence and which could not have avoided it, of wishing to play, without having the means, by forcing it, the game which the old colonizer himself had learned, meanwhile, to moderate.

In the same way that Chad's real economy cannot be seen through official statistics, its political future would not be decided on the basis of the rivalries which merely scratch its surface. It goes on living beneath figures and communiques. Its unity will be gained on the basis of the immutable unities which compose it and its possibilities will be really determined the day when these two images of a single country, the recorded and the one based on custom, will finally coincide.

FOOTNOTES

1. On this subject we refer to the accounts by Bernard Lanne on "The Frontiers of Chad and Libya," submitted as a paper for the diploma of the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales (1977). Mr. Lanne has submitted on the same topic an important report to the Academies of Overseas Sciences, in 1978.
2. The figure is based on the extrapolation of polls taken between 1960 and 1963 in urban and rural areas. The breakdown of medical facilities over most of the country makes such extrapolation clearly doubtful.

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CHAD

REAL CONFLICT SAID TO BE BETWEEN MEN OF THE NORTH

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 18

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Is the Rupture in N'Djamena Irreparable?"]

[Text] The shadow of Goukouni creeps in between President Felix Malloum and his prime minister, Hisssein Habre.

Armed vigil in N'Djamena. The lack of trust between President Felix Malloum and his prime minister, Hisssein Habre, became public knowledge at the end of January. On both sides, provocation seems to have been sought.

First it is Hisssein Habre, the former resistance fighter, a man of the North and a Moslem, young and spirited, having Mahamet Salah, chairman of the National Council, and theoretically the third most important person in the state, arrested. Mr Salah is beaten up by the prime minister's men, members of the FAN (Armed Forces of the North) for "spreading false information."

Next it is Felix Malloum, a level-headed man, a career soldier, a Christian, imprisoned in President Ngarta Tombalbaye's time, taking retaliatory measures against certain friends of Hisssein Habre.

The tension reached its height on Sunday, 28 January, when a round of rifle fire in the very middle of the capital resulted in two dead and several wounded. That is Hisssein Habre's FAN men, say some people. No, it is the police, still faithful to Malloum, retort the others. The situation has deteriorated so much that civil servants and state organizations are beginning to take sides with Habre or Malloum. The head of state, notably, denounces the ATP (Chadian Press Agency), the official agency, which is supposed to have spread "tendentious rumors intended to sow panic and dissension."

Though the rupture is only hanging by a thread, neither Habre nor Malloum, nevertheless, has dared take the decisive step. For two reasons:

1: the control that each of the two men has over a portion of the

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army, the police, and powers of decision is only partial. Both have to reckon with other forces that are not under control, and the powerful resistance fighters who condemn them both.

2: France, whose financial and military aid is a deciding factor, and which sponsored the reconciliation of Felix Malloum and Hissein Habre, has signified its displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the two men, which would play into the hands of enemies of a "stable and moderate" Chad.

Though France's approach has been discreet, the president of the OAU, Gaafar el-Nimeiri, its ambassador to N'Djamena -- on behalf of the Sudan -- and the charges d'affaires of Egypt and Saudi Arabia have intervened with both men. To defuse the crisis. In this connection, some people are talking about a "holy war feeling" said to be prompting the Moslems in the North.

#### Reconciliation

In fact, the real conflict is among men of the North. Hissein Habre does not seem to appreciate an appeal's being made, in the framework of national reconciliation, to Goukouni Oueddei, who holds the northern maquis, in the name of FROLINAT (Chadian National Liberation Front) and whose forces occupy over 50 percent of the country.

A possible rapprochement between Goukouni and Malloum could only take place at the expense of Hissein Habre, who would see his influence diminishing. The mere mention of possible negotiation between Malloum and Goukouni, which could be the forerunner of an end to the lengthy Chadian drama, has revived the appetites of all the splinter groups claiming to be part of FROLINAT. For example, small resistance groups, like FROLINAT-volcano, and FROLINAT-third army.

No-one wants to be left out of the big account settling among Chadians now outlined upon the horizon. But still, for the national reconciliation to be founded on sound, well-balanced bases, sectarianism and interpersonal conflicts must be left behind.

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CHAD

KAMOUGUE SEEN AS POSSIBLE NEW STRONG MAN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 p 17

[Article by A. D.: "Chad--The New War"]

[Text] For weeks now the regime in Ndjamenas has been paralyzed, President of the Republic Felix Malloum and his Prime Minister Hissein Habre have not spoken to each other, and the Council of Ministers has not met.

The paralysis has affected all state bodies. Each side has rallied military forces and media support behind it. However no one has dared to assume the responsibility of striking a blow. The interior of the country itself, more than half of which is controlled by Goukouni's FROLINAT, has felt the effects.

Lacking the power of decision in Ndjamenas, the prime minister has focused his efforts on the East, in the Biltine and Ouaddai regions, beyond the control of the central authority and Goukouni. It was to this sector that Hissein Habre withdrew in 1977 with his Armed Forces of the North (FAN), after tangling with Goukouni. These regions also offer an advantage: their population is halfway between that of the North and that of the South.

Wanting to be sure of a rear base in the event of a political defeat in Ndjamenas, the prime minister launched an offensive on 10 February to win control of Abeche (35,000 inhabitants, 4th largest city in the country). But this battle brought a new pretender to the central regime into the political arena--Lt Col Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue, a member of the Higher Military Council, former minister of foreign affairs, and present head of the police force. He too regards Abeche as his "territory," having on several occasions directed the destiny of the eastern region.

Will Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue be the new "strong man" of the country? In any case, he is playing a leading role in the present crisis thanks to his police, the largest armed body (6,000 men) and the best disciplined of any in the whole mosaic of combat forces in Chad. It was Kamougue's men who profited from further incidents, on 12 February, to attack the residence of Prime Minister Hissein Habre in Ndjamenas with extreme violence, using mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns.

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The battle began in the morning, with Chadian National Army (ANT) soldiers, loyal in principle to Malloum, fighting the FAN troops of Hisssein Habre. After the police arrived and joined forces with the ANT, they spread throughout various sectors of the city, causing panic among the people and killing a number of individuals. On 13 February, the city was cut in half.

Hisssein Habre is believed to have left his residence before the attack. Just prior to the incidents, according to some reports, he was preparing to publish a statement protesting the meeting of the Chadian Military and Political Committee, a body including supporters of both factions, which President Malloum had demanded.

The chief of state had sought this meeting after deciding that "the people of Chad were threatened by their fellow citizens." Nothing was settled, but Felix Malloum, and this is important, yielded to Kamougue, agreeing to give him heavy weapons previously the prerogative of the army. And this despite the fact that Kamougue had been suspected of plotting a coup d'etat just after Hisssein Habre took government office (August 1978), in which connection the chief of state took him violently to task. As a disciplinary measure, he was transferred from his foreign affairs post to the police. In extremis, France and Saudi Arabia had dissuaded him from attempting his coup.

Kamougue wanted the reconciliation with the FROLINAT to be affected through Goukouni, who in his eyes was the real leader of the rebels in the North, rather than Hisssein Habre. On 12 February, he abandoned his neutral position. Will he be tempted to play his own card or will he stand with President Malloum? This man emerging from the current crisis has experience and unprecedented drive. In 1971 he headed the national police force and, with the responsibility for the operations bureau, was second in command to the head of the army general staff. In command in 1973, then a lieutenant colonel, he became minister of foreign affairs in 1975 after the coup d'etat against Tombalbaye. Today there are some who expect him to impose his authority, to the detriment of Hisssein Habre, by reaching agreement with Goukouni.

Will Chad, battered and divided, find peace again thereby?

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CONGO

SASSOU NGUESSO, BACKERS SAID TO REPRESENT PCT LEFT WING

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 pp 32-34

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "The Victory of Sassou Nguesso"]

[Text] The Congolese had no idea the session of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) which began in Brazzaville on 5 February would hold such a surprise for them. President Yhomby Opango, who had in fact intended to ask for the resignation of the 36 members of the highest party body, was forced to submit his resignation. Something even rarer in Africa, which on this occasion was somewhat unexpected, was the fact that it was following the regular elections that the outgoing president had to yield to Col Denis Sassou Nguesso, long regarded as number two man in the regime.

The scenario perfected in advance by General Yhomby did not work, we were told by a leading Congolese political figure. The former chief of state had intended to make an assessment of almost two years of administration before asking those present to renew their confidence in him by entrusting him with the provisional political leadership with responsibility for preparations for the third congress of the PCT, which was initially scheduled for December 1978. He had no idea that two of the participants in the meeting had also decided to seek the same post. Thus he was greatly surprised to see two of the regime's star performers, Jean-Pierre Thystere Tchicaya, organization official of the party, and Colonel Sassou Nguesso, present their candidacy. It then became necessary to win a two-thirds majority. On the first ballot, General Yhomby, with 15 votes, held the lead over Mr Tchicaya, with 14 votes, while Colonel Sassou Nguesso trailed far behind with 7.

Furious at failing to obtain the necessary majority, General Yhomby then made an error, threatening the participants in the congress about the risks failure to elect him would mean for the country. The members of the Central Committee, from which Yhomby was excluded after Marien Ngouabi became president, were only awaiting this opportunity, it would seem, to proceed with the "agenda." The civilian candidate, Mr Tchicaya, then announced his withdrawal in favor of Colonel Sassou Nguesso. Thus the two military officers

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were pitted one against the other. And Sassou Nguesso was elected without difficulty, thus taking over from Yhomby. This was the end of the third act of a play in progress without interruption since the assassination of Maj Marien Ngouabi on 18 March 1977.

Suspicion

The former president of the republic was killed in his office on that date. The circumstances of his assassination have remained a mystery despite a trial which was widely publicized by the authorities (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 895). What is known, on the basis of the trial hearings, is that two commandos entered the office of the president of the republic. Marien Ngouabi was negotiating with Massemba-Debat, his predecessor, whom he intended, according to reports, to reinstate. It was within this context that an officer close to Massemba-Debat, Captain Kikadidi, was dispatched to Marien Ngouabi to invite him to a meeting with Massemba-Debat. Officers opposed to the reinstatement of the civilians in power are then believed to have intervened by having President Ngouabi assassinated, at the very moment of the arrival at his office of the emissary from Massemba-Debat.

The second act was their following trial, including the sentencing to death and the execution of six individuals. Meanwhile, Massemba Debat himself had been shot following a speedy trial. But the feeling of discontent had not been dissipated thereby.

General Yhomby and his government have always represented themselves as the heirs of Ngouabi, and references to the former chief of state have been landmarks along their route. Even today, the portraits of the last two Congolese presidents hang side by side in every office. Above his photograph, it says: "Eternal glory to Comrade Marien Ngouabi." However even these precautions were not enough to dispel the suspicion hanging over the military who took over in March 1977. An atmosphere of mistrust developed among them which led to the splintering of the coalition into several fiercely hostile factions.

The first evidences of their clash were to be seen just hours after the death of Marien Ngouabi. At that time, according to the official report, the presumed assassin was Captain Moutando, an officer close to Yhomby. A few hours later events took a dramatic turn: the name being mentioned was no longer the same. Now it was Captain Barthelemy Kikadidi. Meanwhile, the military had entrusted the exercise of power to Major Sassou Nguesso. He then passed it on to the most senior officer with the highest rank, i.e. Yhomby. Thus there was no lack of deals made during this interlude. From that to presuming that the exoneration of Captain Moutando was linked with Colonel Yhomby's taking matters in hand was only one step, which the Congolese opposition was quick to take.

Moreover, the vicissitudes surrounding the escape, capture and execution of Captain Kikadidi remain to be clarified. This condemned man revealed,

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just a few minutes before his execution, that contrary to the government version, the presumed assassin of Marien Ngouabi had never left the Congo and that the military knew this very well. It is even said that Kikadidi, wounded, was taken to the World Health Organization (WHO) camp in Brazzaville, where he was visited by such leading lights as Yhomby, Sylvain Goma and Sassou Nguesso. Nguesso, moreover, is reported to have been enraged to learn that Barthelemy Kikadidi had been shot, and to have demanded that he be buried with full military honors.

The least one can say is that there was latent tension between Sassou Nguesso and Yhomby Opango. The fall of Yhomby was doubtless a result of the political unease prevailing in the country. The schisms and ambitions of the men in power have created an atmosphere of chronic instability. For a number of years the Congo has lived in a continuing state of siege. Innumerable assassinations, conspiracies and purges followed the ejection of Fr Fulbert Youlou in August of 1963. Just recently two attempts on the life of the chief of state in Pointe-Noire failed, and there are some who say that they were the work of supporters of his predecessor.

Contradictions

Parallel to this, economic chaos has deepened such that the dimensions are catastrophic today. The inflationary rate is near 90 percent, while the majority of the factories are idling and some have closed their doors. Travelers from Brazzaville report amazing scenes: in lines hundreds of meters long in front of the paymasters' window, state employees are attempting to collect their three-months-overdue wages.

Political struggles have mortgaged the future for a long time. In the past, the party was all-powerful and the people's militia were the law. Today, it is not too clear where the authority is. A number of times General Yhomby has complained of being the prisoner of the party. In view of the dramatic turn taken by events, it is said, Marien Ngouabi had decided to put the authority back in the hands of Massemba-Debat. This maneuver was fatal to both men. Their successor did not even succeed in getting the machinery of state moving again.

The palace confrontations are paralleled by strange contradictions, inconsistent with the revolutionary rigor the merits of which are so loudly praised along the banks of the Congo River. For example, a plan for the building of 500 housing units in Moukondo, in the Brazzaville suburbs, it is reported, will be financed by South Africa.

Vengeance

Given this context, the representatives of the left wing of the PCT are likely to emerge the victors in the test of strength which developed in the Central Committee. Has it not long been thought, moreover, that Colonel Sassou Nguesso intended to appeal to Ambroise Noumazalaye? A former

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student at Toulouse, the man who was prime minister under Massemba-Débat was constantly at the side of Jean-Claude Ernest Ndalla, today in exile in Europe, the representative of a pure and uncompromising socialism and a great admirer of Fidel Castro.

It remains to be seen if he who wins the day can cure himself of that eternal malady, vengeance, which for more than 15 years has repeatedly taken the Congo back to the starting block.

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DJIBOUTI

FRENCH ECONOMIC AID REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 462

[Text] During the debate in the French National Assembly on the bill authorizing approval of the economic and financial cooperative agreement between France and Djibouti (signed on 27 June 1977, followed by exchanges of letters of 26 January 1978), the report presented by Mr Georges Gorse focused particularly on economic relations between France and Djibouti and foreign aid.

Economic Relations between France and Djibouti

These relations show a large deficit in trade exchanges to the detriment of Djibouti, offset by significant public assistance.

A) French trade with the Republic of Djibouti shows a large surplus for France, since French imports have dropped greatly since 1975 because of the political and economic events which have occurred in the area. The following figures are in French francs:

	1975	1976	1977
Imports	21,955,000	3,124,000	4,706,000
Exports	161,765,000	110,143,000	130,162,000

B) Public assistance from France in 1978 to the Republic of Djibouti (excluding military aid) can be evaluated as follows (in millions of French francs): economic aid (FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] investments), 7.3; technical personnel assistance, 64.6; other technical assistance, 6.8; social and cultural programs, 5.3; total, 84.

This total, which does not include assistance related to military technical cooperation and to the aides provided to set up the Djibouti Army, nevertheless represents 34 percent of Djibouti's national budget (247 million francs in expenditures in 1978) and 8.6 percent of the PIB [Gross National Product] (975 million francs), as estimated in 1976.

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In the area of investments, the FAC executive committee authorized financing of several projects for 7.3 million French francs during 1978: participation in financing an earth station for satellite telecommunications, 4.5; study of a pilot farm in Attar, 0.3; teaching college for elementary school teachers (first stage), 1; antituberculosis campaign and hospital equipment, 1.5.

Several projects are under study and should be submitted to the FAC executive committee in 1979, in particular the completion of the Attar farm and completion of the teaching college and of the Boulaos CES [college d'enseignement secondaire: College of Secondary Education].

Since Djibouti's independence, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation has not yet had to examine any loan application.

In the area of technical assistance, Djibouti has 502 jobs for technical assistants. As of 1 November 1978, the number of positions available was still only 360.

France is thus already responding, at least in part, to the urgent need for technical aid and training evident in practically all sectors. On the other hand, the portion devoted to investments remains modest, inasmuch as a development program or plan for Djibouti has not yet been worked out. However, the FAC expects to consider measures for enlarging and outfitting the port of Djibouti.

Although it is not economic aid in a strict sense, it should be mentioned that the cost of military cooperation amounted to 57 million francs in 1978. The pay of French troops stationed in Djibouti must be added to this, amounting to 270 million francs in 1978, which benefits the Djibouti economy either in the form of taxes or as expenditures.

With regard to the Addis Ababa/Djibouti railroad, whose legal status is not settled, the French Government is encouraging the quest for a solution favorable to Djibouti interests.

France's significant aid continues to be attractive despite the appearance of other public assistance. In fact, with the exception of the assistance granted by Saudi Arabia, other foreign aid remains limited and irregular.

Before its independence, Djibouti received foreign aid only from France and the European Development Fund [EDF]. Since 27 June 1977, the new nation has applied for a number of assistance programs, in particular with the specialized organizations of the United Nations, Egypt and oil-producing Arab countries, as well as with the United States. It has usually obtained positive responses which have resulted in the approval of numerous credits, currently representing a total of more than \$80 million. But those are commitments over several years, some of which remain uncertain.

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Only the contributions of Saudi Arabia on the bilateral level and those of the EDF on the multilateral level appear significant. Saudi Arabia has already dispensed \$10 million of the \$70 million which it has promised. Fulfillment of other commitments must be spread out over 3 or 4 years. In the case of the EDF, \$10 million has been allocated for 4 years, mainly to guarantee financing of project studies.

Other commitments have been made by Iraq, the Emirates of the Persian Gulf, the Development Aid Fund of the Arab League and UN agencies, which have already granted assistance to the Ogaden refugees. The United States and the FRG have not yet determined the programs which they plan to finance.

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DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

MIRAGES ARRIVE--About 10 "Mirage 3 C" fighter planes of the French Air Force were sent to Djibouti at the end of January. These aircraft, from the Creil (Oise) base, will guarantee Djibouti's air defense, in accordance with the defense agreements concluded between France and the new nation. They replace the "F 100 Super Sabre" planes of the French Air Force, which were practically no longer in use except in Djibouti. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 462] 11915

ISLAMIC AID--The Islamic Solidarity Fund has presented two checks in the amount of \$350,000 to the Republic of Djibouti. This gift, Djibouti foreign affairs minister Mr Moumin Bahdon stated, is intended on one hand to offset the effects of the drought which has recently affected Djibouti and, on the other, for the welfare of Djibouti youth. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 462] 11915

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IVORY COAST

MERCHANT SHIPPING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Feb 79 pp 40-41

[Interview with Lamine Fadika, minister of merchant marines by Siradiou Diallo: "A New Order for Merchant Shipping"]

[Text] The merchant marine was for a long time a domain reserved for the colonial shipowners. The Ivory Coast is one of the first African countries to have ventured into this sector. Since 1973 especially it has been feverishly active, at the regional level as well as within the ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries] or UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] framework, aimed at convincing the other African states of the need to promote a new international order for merchant shipping.

The man who embodies this new policy is no longer an unknown quantity: Lieutenant Commander Lamine Fadika, the Ivorian minister of merchant marine, a graduate of the Brest (France) Naval College and with a certificate from the Paris War College, was kind enough to talk over this issue with us.

[Question] The merchant marine was for a long time the special preserve of the colonial powers. What led you to break up that monopoly?

[Answer] We have been interested in that sector ever since the outline law in that it was in 1959 that the first ships flying the Ivorian flag were launched. But it has been only since 1974 that we have made the merchant marine a national cause. The rise in the price of hydrocarbons that year severely affected the open economies with respect to international trade, such as that of the Ivory Coast.

[Question] You were quick to make decisions.

[Answer] Yes. President Houphouet-Boigny then created two new ministerial departments, one responsible for trade, the other for the merchant navy. With respect to the merchant marine, imagine that every ton of merchandise we export or import covers an average distance of at least 7,000 kilometers in each direction, as opposed to 1,000 to 2,000 for the developed countries.

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Now, for the very reason that we are underdeveloped, we export the major share of what we produce and import the major part of what we consume.

[Question] In other words, the 1973 crisis played a revealing role.

[Answer] It brought out all of the factors of our foreign trade's imbalance. Since then the chief of state has given us the mission of consolidating our economic independence by correcting the imbalances. And in order to do so we believe that it is essential to establish a large national fleet. Hence the creation of SITRAM [Ivorian Maritime Shipping Company].

[Question] But in back of a firm such as SITRAM, aren't the old shipowners who became rich on the colonial routes continuing to exploit Africa?

[Answer] On that subject I am categorical: SITRAM is a 100 percent national concern. Of course until March 1976 it was a semi-public firm. And, even though the state was the majority shareholder, I admit that the decision centers were in Europe. However, we have achieved a policy of national independence, for which SITRAM was to serve as the spearhead, could not be conducted under those circumstances. That is why the government resolved to make SITRAM's capital 100 percent Ivorian, to transfer to the Ivory Coast all of the decision centers and to promote a very active policy for the training of national cadres.

[Question] Yes, of course, but what has really changed since the state's intervention?

[Answer] SITRAM now has a sizable fleet which is already handling 30 percent of our imports and exports to and from the European countries bordering on the Atlantic and on the North Sea which are our first trading partners.

[Question] The change resides at the level of the amounts of merchandise transported.

[Answer] The policy that has been implemented for 6 years is enabling us to attain a deeper knowledge of the maritime market's mechanisms as a whole in a sphere essential to our foreign trade. In addition, it confers upon us a decisive weight in determining the freight rates which affect us. This is why SITRAM's existence makes it possible for the Ivory Coast to economize and to earn more foreign currency than in the past.

[Question] Why does the Ivory Coast keep itself to itself in a sector so vital to all of the African countries?

[Answer] We have always sought to unite our efforts with those of the sub-region's countries. It is in fact thanks to this coordinating that since 1976 the freight rates for merchandise consigned to the area can be increased only with the agreement of our trading partners. Moreover, it was on President Houphouet-Boigny's initiative that a ministerial conference of

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the states of West and Central Africa was set up. Thanks to this cooperation, the abusive amnipulating of freight rates was terminated.

[Question] What percentage of the merchandise originating from or consigned to Africa is transported by ships flying a genuinely African flag?

[Answer] I do not have any specific figures in my head, but I believe that percentage does not amount to 5 percent. Which is very low. Imagine that Africa's total share of world shipping was less than 1 percent in 1976.

[Question] What is the share carried by the Ivorian merchant marine?

[Answer] Ten percent of our foreign trade is effected by sea. Our goal is to increase this percentage to 20 percent at least by 1981.

[Question] By developing its merchant marine as it is doing, isn't the Ivory Coast very simply aiming at replacing the traditional shipowners?

[Answer] Our merchant marine has as its essential goal defending the primordial interests of our development. So there could be no question of our fleet replacing foreign shipowners in the pillaging of African resources.

[Question] In this sphere as in others the pursuit of profits nonetheless leads to domination of those who are weakest.

[Answer] In 1977 SITRAM realized 750 million CFA [African Financial Community (monetary unit)] francs (15 million French francs) in net profits after amortizing its debts. This means that it is perfectly capable of providing for the shipping of our basic products under optimal market conditions. But SITRAM for all that is not exploiting and is not dominating any country, it has no imperialistic goal.

[Question] You have made yourself personally the precentor of a new international merchant shipping order. Isn't that a mere political slogan?

[Answer] The new international order that we are championing in the Ivory Coast has regrettably not become a reality. Between now and April 1979 we will see more clearly how things stand. It is on that date that the 5-year period for ratifying the code for the conduct of maritime conferences established by UNCTAD expires. If at the end of April 25 countries representing a quarter of the world's merchant shipping tonnage have not ratified the convention, well, that will be proof we have failed--for the time being at least.

[Question] Even at the level of your European partners linked with the ACP, isn't it possible to win out?

[Answer] Adherence by the countries of the European Common Market to the merchant shipping convention we recommend could of course provide a substantial boost. But we must not have too many illusions. The traditional

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maritime powers are at this time openly opposed to the convention. Just the same we do not despair of seeing good sense and justice prevail. In any event, the ACP states meeting in Bangui last year decided to include UNCTAD's code of conduct in the negotiations on the future Lome convention.

[Question] Does the Ivory Coast on its own have qualified men available to operate a merchant marine worthy of that name?

[Answer] We have given the training of men first priority in our merchant shipping policy.

[Question] And you think you are sufficient unto yourselves outside of any cooperation of a subregional or regional sort?

[Answer] Not at all. On the contrary, we have decided to join our efforts with those of the subregion's fraternal countries with a view to establishing an academy of sciences and technology of the sea in the Ivory Coast. An academy having as its mission the training and perfecting of cadres and merchant shipping personnel in all branches and at all levels. IMCO [Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization] (a specialized agency of the United Nations in the sphere of maritime navigation) is in charge of carrying out and supervising the educational and technical part of that project. It will be an establishment with a 750-student capacity (cadets and students) coming from all of the French-speaking countries of West and Central Africa. Its opening is anticipated in 1981.

[Question] All of that is being done with or against the old colonial ship-owners?

[Answer] Our maritime policy and in particular the organizing of our merchant marine is not directed against anyone. However, we are determined not to leave up to foreign interest groups the task of deciding for us and in our stead the Ivory Coast's policy in such a vital sector. What could be more natural than that this should lead in fact to a real setback for the traditional shipowners. But for all that we do not nurture any feeling of animosity against anyone at all.

[Question] Why doesn't the Ivory Coast envisage joining other African countries to create a multinational merchant shipping firm?

[Answer] In May 1975, at the time of the constituent meeting of the Abidjan ministerial conference, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny stated: "No country in our subregion can establish on its own a fleet completely meeting the vast and complex requirements of our foreign trade;" this means that we Ivorians are convinced that the future belongs to regional fleets.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

DUNLOP-MICHELIN RUBBER PROJECT--The Dunlop and Michelin tire companies have agreed on a joint investment of 21 million naira in a hevea plantation in Bendel state. It will be the largest of its kind under single ownership in all West Africa. The Nigerian Rubber Board has requested the ministry of land and housing to make the necessary land available for the project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 p 574]

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SENEGAL

PRESS SAID TO FEEL THREATENED BY PRESS CODE BILL

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 23

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado, special correspondent in Dakar: "The Senegalese Journalists' Grievance"]

[Text] One of the freest press bodies in Africa feels threatened.

From our special correspondent in Dakar

"This is not the minister of Information removing you, but Daouda Sow throwing you out." Without mincing words, the Senegalese minister of Information was "driving away" a journalist from the debate held in Dakar on 27 January on the theme of freedom of the press in Africa. Jacques Sy, a teacher at the Dakar school of journalism and a correspondent for the newspaper TAXAW, had just stated that he was speaking for his party, the RND (National Democratic Assembly, as yet unauthorized) in denouncing "the government's dealings with France, its refusal to play by the rules of the democratic game, and its intention of gagging the press of the nation."

A manifest digression from the theme of the debate, the first of its kind in Africa, the speech nevertheless served as an indicator of one of the greatest problems of the African press: the eternal confusion between journalism and political militantism. And Mam Less Dia, director of the satirical paper LE POLITICIEN and organizer of the debate, had chosen his moment well: a time when the rich Senegalese press feels threatened with being stifled.

Gag

As a matter of fact, there is a bill in preparation aimed at instituting a press code, but which the Dakar journalists -- including some close to the government -- are already calling a gag law or a villainous law.

Concern is aroused by two points. The first is the possible creation of a

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control commission, charged with "continuous checking of each publication's accounts" and preparing a quarterly report on them (article 25 of the bill). According to rumors circulating in governmental corridors, the objective is said to be the unmasking of organs subsidized by foreign governments. In particular, they say here, by Algeria, Iraq, and Libya.

Blackmail

Thus the collimator would be on LE DEMOCRATE, belonging to the Senegalese Democratic Party (the legal opposition), which in reality now appears only periodically; the RND's TAXAW, and former council chairman Mamadou Dia's ANDE SOPI.

Whatever the facts are, the accounts check envisaged is felt by many professionals to be dangerous interference that could lead up to the disappearance of several mast-heads; mast-heads whose diversity makes Dakar the undeniable capital of the African press.

Second source of anxiety: the intention ascribed to the government of trying to have all the texts in a publication inspected by a commission, and before printing. In fact this is by no means the case. The bill merely states (article 37) the time limits for depositing duty copies: before distribution, for the dailies; 24 and 48 hours, respectively, for weeklies and other periodicals. Nonetheless! The director of a publication printed in Dakar but distributed in the west of Africa, assured us: "The institution of these limits barely conceals the intention of censoring the press. For Senegal and its relative democracy, it would be a great leap backwards."

However, no decisions have been made yet, and Douda Sow did state, on 27 January: "There can be no discussion about a text which does not legally exist yet." The fact remains that the discussion has started so that there will not exist a text that would be like a strait-jacket for a press which until now has looked upon itself as the most free press in Africa.

Officials are of course disclaiming any intention of gagging the press. According to them, it is just a question of organizing and raising the moral standards of the press -- transformed, it is true, by some, into an instrument of all-directional polemics, defamation, or even political blackmail. According to information leaks, however, the government's concern really is in fact a political one. In a country where the constitution limits political comments to those of only the four authorized parties, the unaccepted opposition has found in the press an indirect way of expressing itself and creating new currents of opinion.

Bartender

The debate is then indeed a political one. And is indeed taking place among political cliques. The only ones left out of the business: the journalists. Which caused Mam Lous Dia to say: "My newspaper is not a party one, and I



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put all parties, authorized or not, in the same bag. But if this law is voted in, I give up. I will shut up shop, and not be a journalist any longer. I would rather be a bartender."

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SENEGAL

ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS OF PRESS CODE NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Feb 79 pp 29-30

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Which Causes the Press to Gossip"]

[Text] On 7 February, the government approved a Press Code bill. Sennen Andriamirado saw the confidential report that inspired the bill.

Planned since February 1976, the Press Code (see JA 944), designed to organize and to regulate the profession in Senegal, became a bill only in January 1979.

In the small world of the opposition of the underground and of the "independent" press--not affiliated with a political movement--it had at first been thought that the purpose of the bill was to prevent certain excesses. A publication, PROMOTION, since November 1978 had been the prime mover of those long debates that delight Senegalese journalists and political militants. Accused of libeling a good half dozen personalities, PROMOTION later lost all of the cases that were brought against it, which hardly militated in favor of its credibility. On 2 February 1979, the courts once more found it guilty of insulting a foreign chief of state, Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, whom the newspaper had implied was at the bottom of the fortune of a rich Senegalese businessman. "The PROMOTION affair, a thorn in the side, very nearly caused the government to give up its project of making the press toe the line," a Dakar colleague told us...But the director of a periodical--not suspected of having any antipathy toward the government, says: "The desire of the government to regulate the press has nothing to do with the PROMOTION affair. It is a very longstanding matter. Try to find out more about the Biondi report." That Biondi report--named after Jean-Pierre Biondi, technical adviser to the directorate that had responsibility for final editing--has become the Dakar press's Loch Ness monster. Everyone is talking about it. No one has read it. The government is not publishing it and it took some doing for us to obtain it.

The history of this phantom report goes back to the end of 1975. Democracy at that time was just groping about. The only authorized opposition party then was Abdoulaye Wade's PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]. On 27 November 1975, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf instructed a work group to draft some

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"specific proposals to better coordinate or express information."

Directed by Daouda Sow, minister of Information and Telecommunications, the group consisted of officials, for example, press professionals: Jean-Pierre Biondi, presidential adviser, was designated general reporter; Habib Thiam, deputy and director of the periodicals, ETHIOPIQUES and l'UNITE AFRICAINE; Ibrahima Dem, chief of the Presidential Press Corps; Obeye Diop, founder of l'OUEST AFRICAIN; Bara Diouf, director general of the national daily, LE SOLEIL; Saliou Fall, chief of Information; Justin Mendy, editor in chief of MONITEUR AFRICAIN; Assane Ndiaye, director general of ORTS (Radio-TV); and Cire Thiam, director of the Senegalese Press Agency.

#### Curtailment

On February 1976, the report on "Information in Senegal," was ready; the proposals were submitted to the prime minister. The last paragraph of the document reads: "This report ends with a final specific proposal: the publication by the Senegalese government of a pamphlet entitled, for example, the Senegalese Press Code, to establish in a basic text the Information Charter of a country that is sufficiently self-assured to be able to face today's world without apprehension." Three years went by before the timid appearance of a Press Code bill, nicknamed in advance the "Gag Law."

Precisely what threats do hang over the Senegalese press, in any case one of the freest in Africa? Actually, less from specific repressive measures than from the spirit that emerges from the famed Biondi report. The February 1976 work group based its proposals on concerns for which some give it credit: the inadequacy of the texts in force (law of 1881 in particular); bungling of the freedom of the press owing to lack of respect for professional ethics; anarchy in the proliferation of titles that prove to be ephemeral.

Other statements in the report are entirely of a political nature. Thus, the document criticizes (page 5): "the absence of any precise conditions for the effective control of the national press (...) by the public authorities (seizure). Actually, seizure is conceivable only in the case of a serious threat to law and order." The work group thus considered it necessary to make some proposals which, "without going back on the principle of freedom of the press, (...) would make it possible for the government to take better precautions against excesses and license of freedom." That was the germ of what the journalists now perceive as "threats against freedom of the press." There is a connection. It has inspired measures which, without aligning Senegal with the majority of the African countries in the matter of the press, are all the same disquieting for the future.

The direct and legitimate brainchild of the Biondi report, the Press Code bill, which is circulating now among the ministers while waiting to be submitted to parliament, as a matter of fact contains some provisions that are

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anodyne only in appearance; in particular, two committees are provided for, which might change many things.

#### Control

The first, the National Press Committee, is to be charged (art. 16 of the bill) with "ruling on the validity of the press organs." Composed of a judge, two newspaper representatives, two printers, and two journalists, it will judge, with full sovereignty, on whether an article is worthy of being published. In nonofficial Dakar press circles, it is stated that: "This committee will be easy to handle and to be manipulated. Only the judge will have some leeway. But the printers will be at the mercy of the government. They already have been given to understand, unofficially of course, that if they print this or that newspaper, they no longer will have the benefit of big state contracts."

The second committee, the one to "control publications," is also being considered beforehand as the future "performer of directed control-type jobs (see JA 946). Composed of three personalities (art. 24 of the bill), a judge, a representative of the Ministry of Information, and the director of the publication with the largest circulation, it "vouches for the continuing verification of the accountability of each publication and prepares a quarterly report of it; makes a semiannual review of the management of each publication and forwards it with its comments to the minister of Information; makes a periodical verification of the circulation of publications and publishes their results."

#### Codification and Regulation

If control of the actual frequency is not disputed, on the other hand verification of accountability is allegedly resented as an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of press enterprises. A Dakar journalist, while very close to the government, has nevertheless told us: "The government in reality wants the press that it controls to make a good impression. The newspaper with the biggest circulation is the daily, LE SOLEIL, in which the state has interests. The director of LE SOLEIL will therefore be a member of the committee. The latter will work as a small entity: a judge, an official, and a journalist with a quasi-official status will be the censors of the entire Senegalese press."

If the Press Code bill is adopted, there may be a general outcry from the independent press or that of the opposition. There is only one concession: the independent journalists acknowledge that the profession needs to be "codified and regulated." But they add that, "with respect to professional ethics, certain colleagues no doubt are open to criticism; but, here as in France, one begins by condemning bad newspapers and ends by gagging the good ones."

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That is doubtless why the Press Code bill also provides, and this is not its least disquieting aspect, that prior to distribution, all publications must make a preliminary delivery to the ministerial offices. Thus, control of each headline will serve as a safety measure and will make it possible to handle one of the major concerns of the Biondi report: the possibility of seizure before distribution.

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SOUTH AFRICA

## BRIEFS

FRENCH MARINE SUPPLIES--Marine materiel for civilian use supplied to the South African merchant marine accounts for the 40 percent increase in French-South African trade in 1978, according to the AFP bureau in Johannesburg. According to the latest available statistics on the first 10 months of the trade year, total trade exceeded by 192.5 million rand (962.5 million francs) the 1977 figure, which was estimated at 468.2 million rand, that is, a 41-percent increase. However, during the period January to October 1978, the French shipyards delivered to South Africa ships with a total value of 215.6 million rand (1.07 billion francs), in particular the container ship S.A. Heidelberg. These deliveries inflated the total French exports to South Africa to 427 million for January-October 1978 compared to 239.5 million for the entire 1977 trade year. Subtracting the marine materiel (which can be regarded as exceptional), French exports to South Africa during the first 6 months of 1978 totaled 211.4 million rand (1.05 billion francs). In the same period South African exports to France totaled 233.5 million rand (1.16 billion francs) compared to 228.2 million rand (1.14 billion francs) for the entire 1977. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Mar 79 p 647]

URANIUM TO BELGIUM--The Belgian Government on 1 February gave its approval and guarantee for a contract to purchase South African uranium valued at 5 billion Belgian francs (730 million French francs). This contract, which covers a 10-year period, was arrived at between the Synatom company and the South African Government. It was announced several months ago. A number of anti-apartheid organization addressed protests to the Belgian Government when the decision was announced. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 466]

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