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TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 36/79)



WEST

EUROPE



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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NEW FORCE STRUCTURE, MOBILIZATION PLANS DISCUSSED

Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 pp 138-142

[Article: "The Fire Department"]

[Text] The New Crisis Planning of the Federal Army

In the future, the federal army should have a peacetime strength of only 340,000 men. Yet in a crisis situation, it could be doubled at a moments notice. The government's planning has set this at its goal.

The intelligence staff of the Bundeswehr looked irritated. Quite different findings were available to them via armaments analyses and satellite photographs than to the civilian Herbert Wehner, who recently went public with his battlefield verdict: that the conventional equipment of the Soviet army is defensive.

Wehner's vote implied that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his cabinet, with the opposing assessment, are blocking the negotiations between East and West on a troop reduction. It broket out in the open in the preparations for the German army reform, whith which Bonn wants to parry the increase field superiority of the Soviets, and it was assessed at the Hardt level as a political appeal "in the interest of the policy of detente" to temporarily dispense with an increase in defense readiness.

But a stop signal was lacking. Neither parliament nor the administration gave any evidence of the intention of giving up the new defense planning. And an adviser to the chancellor commented on the vow of the Social Democratic chairman to put the disarmament trend ahead of defense obligations: in a free interpretation of Hemingway and the scenario of the Old Man and the Army - it corresponds to the army which eats up the old man's peace of mind.

The federal army, which the SPD senior views as growing too strong, would, if based on the old structure, which is now being dissolved, be only conditionally prepared for defense. According to the latest NATO doctrine, it is in the front ranks with rather diluted American and British forces

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stationed here, and would have to bear the primary burden of a conventionally delivered attack from the east, until reinforcements could be flown in from overseas.

The Soviets demonstrated in 1968 the blitzkrieg strategy on which they operate, in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which went off according to the war plans. Paratroopers along with tanks and artillery were dropped in the extreme west of the operations area, set up at the rear of the enemy, drove against the heavy tank units coming from the east, and additional tank units were immediately brought to the border as combat reserves.

According to an expert evaluation of the German general staff, the armed forces and strategy of the Soviet army is anything but defensive. For Moscow is the only nation in the world which in peacetime relies on two classical branches suited to an operationa' campaign, so extensive in quality and quantity that no mobilization is required: without calling up reservists, the following can be sent into combat:

- Tank units with 50,000 modern combat vehicles;
- Five airborne divisions outfitted with heavy equipment.

With its classical order of battle, the federal army could probably stand up to a massive offensive thrust. The 33 brigades at the present time in the active army are trained in tank interception, and specifically, in a type of cooperation between rocket regiments and panzerpuls: the "hornets" have to deliver the first defensive strike with helicopters outfitted with antitank rockets, and whatever manages to break through runs into the defense positions of the German tank units.

But up to now, things were in pretty poor shape behind the front line. The territorial army, not recruited except in case of mobilization, was bare infantry, without any kind of heavy weapons - by nature nothing more than a watchman and security company. It also in essence had no other mission: it was to take up sentry positions in front of supply operations, depots and bridges. On one hand, it would have taken days with old structure to replenish the home defense troops from 10% active in peacetime with 90% reservists in case of a crisis. On the other hand, their combat effectiveness against heavy airborne units would have been zero. For, as an army general put: "one is powerless with rifles against tanks."

The army in the field in such a situation would have to split up in order to be able to fight equally towards the west and the east. Or would have to give ground in order to set up new defense positions in the interior of the Federal Republic, from which both attack formations - those from the air and those on the ground - are again launched against the east. But, the general objected: "The Federal Republic is not wide enough that we can afford to do this."

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Thus, in order to make the unhindered forward defense possible for the field army, as well as the interdiction of attacking units at the federal border, a completely new army structure is needed, which had already been envisioned under Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt. In this case, three plan points were to be observed. The federal army should:

- Retain its peacetime strength of 340,000 men;
- "In principle", not exceed the costs;
- In case of a crisis, be twice as strong in accordance with the alert plan.

When the plan had matured, it received the highest praise of the NATO military leadership. "It is a marvel of organizational technique," ran the commentary from Brussels. And previously reserved officers at the Hardt level added: "if it comes off this well, and hopefully we will not have to prove that in case of war, we could be satisfied."

According to the plan, the field army, over which NATO has exclusive dispositional authority in combat, has 36 brigades in the future instead of 33, with a brigade to every four combat battalions. Actually, one of the battalions is a "skeleton" force in peacetime, as they say in military jargon: it does not have the full rated strength and is built up quickly only in case of a crisis.

Above and beyond this, special units of the territorial army are formed, which are under German command: six so-called home defense commands, equivalent to active armored infantry brigades, which even peacetime have 50 to 60% of their actual strength and can be at full force in a few hours.

Where the personnel supply for the field army and the territorial army can come from so quickly follows from the mustering plan. The Bundeswehr has a quiet active reserve, 30,000 so-called ready reserves, emergency reservists in civilian occupation, which, as a communication of the defense ministry reads, "regularly trained with their home units." Their immediate call-up by the minister of defense is permitted by law even before a general mobilization.

After a mobilization, the remainder of the territorial army can be brought up to battle strength with reservists, and specifically to a level of:

- Six home defense regiments, which like the home defense commands are armored to support the German NATO units;
- 45 home defense battalions, stationed behind the front for area protection;
- 150 fully monitored home defense companies, which have to secure river crossings and roads;
- 300 security platoons, which watch over supply depots and important defense operations.

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If necessary, Bonn's defense planners could actually fall back on sufficient replacements, in terms of quantity alone: the Bundeswehr numbers 900,000 reservists, of which 600,000 are firmly planned for the case of war, 450,000 in the army alone. Moreover, the quality is extraordinarily high. "Our reservists, who report for training, perhaps differ in their haircuts from those liable for military service, but not in their level of performance," was the judgement of an army spokesman. And, "there are no shirkers among them."

In the future, there will be more exercises than before so that the level of performance is maintained. The army previously had 4,000 permanent positions for reservists among its 340,000. This made it possible to annually supplementally train 130,000 ex-servicemen with the active units. By this time, the number of reservist permanent assignments has been increased to 5,900 so that every year, 210,000 former soldiers could complete an exercise for at least 10 days.

The weapons also are in line with the new personnel structure, where the federal army has provided the following in the meantime: the newest and most modern go to the active field army, and the old weapons are modernized and are ready for outfitting the territorial army, as the planning of tank operations alone provides. The defense echelons have the following available:

- 1,800 of the newest type of Leopard II tanks as the operations force of the field army;
- 3,000 Leopard I tanks as an operational reserve of the fieldarmy;
- 800 American M 48 tanks, which has been rearmed with a new cannon, to provide armor for the territorial army to pursue penetrating tanks.

The abundance with which Bonn has provided armaments for its military forces allows, in terms of organization, for the formation of this strategic reserve. Most troops of the territorial army are lead as equipment units: tanks, armored personnel carriers and personnel vehicles await the crews in the case of mobilization. The smooth cooperation of those called up would not be questioned in case of mobilization: the alert soldiers know each other well, they have served together and been through reserve exercises in the same units.

Why the federal government is promoting the new army structure has been officially voiced by Defense Minister Hans Apel:

- The conventional defense force of the federal republic will be strengthened;
- Thereby, the deterrence of a potential aggressor is more effective;
- In case of an attack on the federal republic, forward defenses would be assured;
- And finally: the negotiating position of the federal government would be improved in a crisis.

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In this way, as it is said at the Hardt level, the Bundeswehr is in line with the thinking of the Bundestag and the federal government that an effective policy of detent is possible only with an enduring security policy. After all, "we probably all are working from the fact that defense readiness is also a form of peace assurance."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TRADE UNION LEADERS, RANK AND FILE SEEN AT ODDS

Crisis in DGB

Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 pp 295, 296, 299, 301

[Article: "The Crisis of the Trade Unions--Problem of the Base"]

[Text] There is a rupture between base and superstructure in the DGB [German Labor Union Federation]. The membership is no longer cooperating to the extent desired by the union officials. Wage policy, the main business of the unions, is increasingly at risk.

The German trade union leaders of late have found themselves exposed to a demand which they like to set others and dislike to hear themselves--the demand for self-determination. Their fellow members at the base are raising it in order to bring the supermembers at the executive levels into line.

Worked up over the miserable result of the steel strike in North Rhine-Westphalia, plant union representatives at Hoechst, Mannesmann and Thyssen demanded the immediate dismissal of their leader in the negotiations, Kurt Herb, and, on top of it, the voting out of office of Chairman Eugen Loderer and two other members of the executive of the Metalworkers Union. In addition the shop stewards demanded that the statutes be changed in order to give more say to the base.

The printers went even further. In the course of their wage dispute, they suddenly denied their support to their leaders. The wage committee of their union, where members and functionaries of the base are in the majority, rejected as inadequate the compromise with the employers about rationalization safeguards, approved under the direction of Chairman Leonhard Mahlein, making it necessary for new negotiations to be started.

Heinz Kluncker, the powerful chairman of the Public Service, Transportation and Communications Union, suffered a similar fate. In a stroke ballot, his longshoremen in the coastal towns did not yield to their boss's persuasion and rejected a solid wage increase, asking for more.

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Like Kluncker, Mahlein and Loderer, most of their counterparts in the other 14 unions of the DGB are experiencing a growing self-confidence of the membership, numbering a total of 7.6 million. It no longer accepts without contradicting whatever is being done at the top and is making its resistance felt, and this is not by any means only a question of an integral organizational conflict.

The trade unions, after all, also exercise public functions--for example, in checking on labor administration and social insurance. Via codetermination on supervisory boards, they affect plant policy. But, most important of all, they lay down conditions in wage agreements jointly with industry and at the same time decide about employment, economic planning and growth.

The course being steered by Loderer, Kluncker, Mahlein and others in wage policy depends on the internal constitution of the unions, however. If the leadership does not obtain a majority for its policy, the wage business becomes less calculable, and compromise is made more difficult. In order to insure reelection alone, the union leadership is likely to take a tougher stance in the next round.

This, as shown by Great Britain's bitter experience this past winter, costs the whole economy dearly. In the United Kingdom the union leaders had to bow to the resistance of the base and fight the wage guidelines of the government they had followed in previous years. Since Prime Minister James Callaghan and industry were not ready without ado to grant higher increases, a wave of strikes paralyzing production and economic upswing swept over the United Kingdom.

Though Germany has not been gripped by the English sickness, Otto Wolff von Amerongen, president of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce, thinks that following the steel strike the world of wages is not unscathed any longer. He says: "The unions have given reason for doubt in their sense of responsibility for the economy as a whole."

It was the base that prompted this doubt, because the labor struggle certainly would not have materialized if the Metalworkers Union delegates at their last union congress had not forced their Eugen Loderer to take action. In opposition to his declared stand, they saw to it that the 35-hour week was included in the list of wage demands for the coming three-year term of office of the executive.

Thus the 1979 wage round was the last opportunity for Loderer to do something to be able to report to the delegates to the 1980 union congress on activities by the executive aimed at attaining a shortening of the work-week. And without any action in this matter, the next conflict with the base would have materialized.

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The delegates, however, are not afraid of conflicts any more. The traditional reluctance against internal union criticism has waned. This is no wonder, because the younger generation in the DGB is gaining momentum. Already 17 percent of the members are no more than 25 years old. They live in a different realm of experience than the older leaders and members, who learned solidarity as a result of political persecution and suffering in the war and therefore placed external unity above all else in democracy as well.

This identification was matched by leadership personalities with great charisma such as Otto Brenner, the predecessor of Loderer as head of the Metalworkers Union. Generally these were able to present the members from carrying out disputes merely by warning that controversy weakened the fighting ability of the organization. If nevertheless the executive was threatened by defeat in a question of principle, an appeal by the chairman for solidarity would reestablish the equilibrium. In this way Brenner's action at the trade union congresses prevented the withdrawal of the Metalworkers Union from Concerted Action demanded by the delegates. At the 1968 congress he even managed to make them declare their just-passed withdrawal resolution null and void.

Legendary labor leaders were succeeded by sober pragmatists whose policy generally is drafted by staffs consisting of political scientists, sociologists and economists. Their specialized academic knowledge is in demand if only because the demands have grown which state, society and economy make of the trade unions--for instance, as a result of codetermination or labor management. These top representatives likewise require the previous advice of the experts whenever Chancellor Helmut Schmidt invites them for talks.

The reverse side of the medal is this: the greater the share in power, the greater the involvement of the trade union leaders in official economic policy, all the more so because more than three-quarters of the executive members of all DGB unions are SPD members. Of the 11 functionaries on the executive of the Metalworkers Union, 10 are active SPD members.

This affiliation with the government alienates the superstructure from the base. According to an analysis by leftwing Bremen Senator for Finance Henning Scherf, SPD, the union leadership oriented toward the SPD-FDP government cannot by any means depend on a majority of delegates at the federal congresses. Scherf estimates that only two-fifths support the policies of the executive, one-fifth are infiltrated by the DKP, and the rest are keeping a critical distance.

The fact that the policies of the higher-ups were satisfying fewer members was apparent from the 1978 so-called union barometer--an opinion poll commissioned by the DGB 14 times since 1963. The hand fell to an all time low. While the population again took a quite positive view of the need

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for trade unions--in other words, their legitimacy--the interviewers recorded a loss in support, particularly among those organized in unions.

For its area, the executive of the Food, Luxury Foods and Restaurants Union received information about this disgruntlement of the membership in an empirical study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The study, for example, revealed serious organizational shortcomings. Almost one-third of the members failed to receive invitations to attend events. The assessment from below: according to 37 percent of those organized, local paid officials attended only inadequately "to the real problems of workers in enterprises."

Such results are probably at least an indication that organizational matters are in bad shape in other unions as well. While such shortcomings are not denied at DGB headquarters in Duesseldorf, a tendency to attribute them to the strong increase in membership preponderates.

True, the unions are increasing their membership, but this is happening less because of class-consciousness than because of opportunism. From 1973 to 1977 the number of people organized in the DGB rose by 300,000. This upward trend continued last year. Today 35 percent of all workers are DGB members; in 1969 the figure was 30 percent. In the 1950's and 1960's there had been a constant loss in organization, with the DGB wasting away.

The turnabout in 1969, however, was no accident, according to the Munich social scientists Wolfgang Streek, Hermann Bayer and Eckbert Treu. In a study about "organizational-structural processes of change in West German trade unions" they reach the conclusion that (1) the opposition against unionization on the part of many entrepreneurs decreased after an SPD-FDP government took over in 1969 and (2) the rights of trade unions were expanded and strengthened by the Labor Management Act.

This has facilitated the recruiting of new members. Workers often are forced by circumstances to become or remain union members. The reason, according to the Munich analysts, is that through its influence on personnel planning a strongly union oriented works council can give preference to union members. They are given first consideration in employment and kept as long as possible when it comes to layoffs. This kind of membership then is the best job insurance, but the fact that it is not voluntary is cause for discontent among many members.

Whereas the negative freedom of association--in other words, the right not to join an organization--is also among the guaranteed constitutional rights, as determined explicitly by the Federal Constitutional Court, this "is often so only on paper," according to Herbert Borner, district director of the German Salaried Employees Union (DAG), the competitor of the DGB. Says Borner: "You can bet there are some subtle ways of inducing a person to join." For instance, in plants that are highly organized nonmembers are treated as outsiders until they give in.

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This is what is sustaining the DAG at present. It is receiving a great increase in membership from among the ranks of dissatisfied employees in the DGB. Federal Executive Karl Kaula reports that in the first couple of months of this year alone 3,500 persons switched to the DAG. His explanation is that the employees are resisting "being thrown into the same pot" as the other workers.

On the surface, this is a marginal phenomenon, but taken together such events explain the profound disgruntlement prevailing in DGB unions everywhere. The officials are virtually at a loss over it. On one side there is the majority of the membership, at a distance from the organization and only shaking their heads over the official wage policy; on the other side there is a committed hard line minority predominating at union congresses and forcing its line on the leadership.

This is what constitutes the present union crisis.

Farthmann on Wage Policy

Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 p 296

[Interview with North Rhine-Westphalia Minister of Labor Prof Friedhelm Farthmann: "Points of Dispute"]

[Text] CAPITAL: You come from the trade union movement, Mr Minister. What is it that you do not like about the politics of your former colleagues?

Farthmann: I have no basic criticism.

CAPITAL: Really? Even neutral labor market experts accuse the trade unions of a lack of solidarity in wage policy. While the veteran membership is being protected, the job risks are shifted to the shoulders of women, foreigners and handicapped.

Farthmann: This is not an accurate description. Of course the main body of the unions, the elite of skilled workers, is playing a special role in making policy. But so far there have not been any union measures at the expense of weaker elements. Precisely these weaker elements through base amounts have benefited over and above the normal wage percentages.

CAPITAL: This jeopardized jobs, because unskilled workers became too expensive. The machine does the job less expensively in the long run.

Farthmann: Any wage increase entails an increased effort toward rationalization.

CAPITAL: This is resisted by the unions with demands for safeguards against rationalization--another way of describing the breaking of technological progress.

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Farthmann: Of course, especially the FRG cannot forego technological progress. We must not delay or impede it. In fact, it often means humanization--for instance, when machines facilitate labor. On the other hand, rationalization can also be inhuman, depriving the worker of his professional and economic existence. This means that one must weigh the pros and cons.

CAPITAL: Such weighing often is done one-sidedly. As is shown by the agreement in the printing industry, safeguards against rationalization often go in the direction of employing a stoker with an electrical locomotive--to use a British parable.

Farthmann: That would make no sense. I think that so far competitiveness and the state of the technological development of our economy have not suffered from safeguards against rationalization. The unions are, however, aware that they must not tighten the screw too much, lest they drive the plants abroad.

CAPITAL: In the case of some plants, there would be reason for this to happen if the unions should manage, with an all-out effort, to obtain a 35-hour week.

Farthmann: At present a shortening of the workweek for everyone would indeed not be feasible from the point of view of employment policy, because it would cause an additional demand for highly skilled workers in industry which could not be covered by the present unemployed. I therefore feel that the problem is not a topical one at present.

CAPITAL: Will it ever become a problem?

Farthmann: One must act pragmatically. If there were a slump in the automobile industry or an oil shock, the situation would look different.

CAPITAL: But even without such dire straits the unions often provoke a strike for the sake of a percentage point. It is a question of minimal points of dispute.

Farthmann: The German unions' sense of responsibility is acknowledged throughout the world. It is, however, an old story that it is easier to distribute large than small economic growth. Wage policy is more difficult because the elbowroom for distribution is smaller.

CAPITAL: Judging by all that we know, that will not change.

Farthmann: I am therefore afraid of even tougher confrontations in the future. Then also the question of juster wages is being posed. Today's differences in income, for example, between unskilled workers and members of the board cannot be justified.

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Unions on Supervisory Boards

Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 p 299

[Article: "Alien Determination"]

[Text] The unions think in strategic terms, but the members find it difficult to follow suit. Therefore codetermination quite often causes problems with fellow workers in plants.

An example: When the members of the board of the Ford Works assemble in Cologne, they are joined by the American Herman Rebhan, who arrives by plane. But he does not represent the parent company on the board; rather, he represents the workers--as secretary general of the International Federation of Metalworkers.

Recently Rebhan's deputy, Werner Thoenessen, has been regularly invited to board meetings in Stuttgart of Standard Elektrik Lorenz, an affiliate of the U.S. multi ITT. The Duesseldorf managers of Du Pont de Nemours, a German subsidiary of the U.S. concern of the same name, has to put up with his colleague from the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and Factory Workers, the Canadian Charles Levinson. And the board of the Hertie affiliate Bilka was joined at the end of April by the Swiss Heribert Maier, the secretary general of the International Federation of Private Industry Employees.

The choice of these four foreign leading officials, the first and so far only representatives on boards of German enterprises, is indicative of the new thinking and strategy of the multinational trade union federations. Concerns operating worldwide are to be brought under the control of international officials via national codetermination.

The unions are also pursuing this aim by forming international advisory councils for the multitis consisting of workers' representatives of important concerns and officials of the international. Such supranational advisory councils now exist in the case of all leading automobile and electrical, chemical and food industry enterprises. Their delegates regularly exchange information about working conditions and employers' concessions which are quite useful in their own talks aimed at achieving improvements. But so far the boards have refused to recognize the international advisory councils as interlocutors. Exceptions are the Dutch electronics multi Philips, the Swiss metal concern Brown Boveri, the food manufacturers Nestle and the French tire manufacturers Michelin.

The demand for concentrated action vis-a-vis the multitis has been more pressing as far as the unions are concerned ever since the industrialized countries registered high unemployment. Workers' demands are being blocked with the remark that production can be shifted. The governments of almost all European countries are competing for the installation of branches of

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international concerns--for instance, of an assembly plant of Ford, recently advertised openly by Ford with the request that at least 35 percent of the costs be granted by way of investment assistance. Many a government, Metalworkers Secretary General Rebhan suspects, moreover is likely to make its reply more attractive by promising to keep the unions out of the plant.

In countries with unemployment such things do not evoke any protest, much less international solidarity.

"The state of awareness is nothing to brag about," admits Dr Jutta Kneissel of the Metalworkers Union headquarters in Frankfurt. The union therefore forewent passing on the call for a boycott by the International Metalworkers Federation against South Africa to the plants, "because no worker would have gone along with it anyway." And the same attitude was adopted by the Dutch workers in the parent works of VFW-Fokker when it was a question of keeping threatened jobs in German plants.

Support being uncertain, the international unions are now going a different route--for instance, via German codetermination. Dieter Noth of the Commerce, Banks and Insurance Union is popularizing the action; foreign colleagues, he says, can view with their own eyes the German model of cooperation between capital and labor.

Union Payments

Hamburg CAPITAL in German May 79 p 301

[Article: "Death Payments, etc."]

[Text] Herbert Borner, district director of the DAG in Braunschweig, is benefiting from the toughness of the competitor Metalworkers Union. Ever since the latter began half a year ago in Lower Saxony to collect the statutory fee from its members, hardly a single day has passed without deserters calling on Borner. The DAG is more generous.

This shows that when it is a question of money things become serious for many union members. And although most union payments are tied to the amount the member pays in, the treasurers find it difficult to obtain the fees fixed by statute.

Basically, the fee depends on the income: the higher the income, the greater the fee that has to be paid in. The average is 1 percent of gross income per month. The fees leveled differ depending on whether they are geared to the fixed wage, as in the case of the miners, or to the actual income, as in the case of the metalworkers.

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Too much in any case, in the opinion of many workers. Thus for many workers the fees are the main reason why they are not unionized. This is the conclusion of a study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation about nonmembers in the field of the Food, Luxury Foods and Restaurants Union--also known as "knachwurts Union" among their fellow workers.

The realization that both membership and statutory payment of fees are needed increases in the case of a strike. Without financial assistance from the union, the people affected would have to rely on social aid or would have to dig into their savings. And here the union offers more.

According to a study by the German Economic Institute in Cologne, the strike payment per day amounts to double to triple the amount of the monthly union fee. Members of the Metalworkers Union, the Construction, Stones and Earth Union, the Commerce, Banks and Insurance Union and the Leather Workers Union, who pay in DM 20 a month, receive DM 40 a day. The chemical workers get DM 52, the woodworkers DM 60, and textile industry workers DM 65.40. In most unions there are also supplements for spouses and children.

With these payments German workers are protected better against the financial risks of strikes than are their counterparts in neighboring West European countries. In Italy and France, for example, there is no such thing as strike money. This is also reflected in the amount of strikes--in favor of the Germans. Whereas a strike does not cost Italian and French unions anything to speak of, German unions incur huge financial burdens in case of strike. The Metalworkers union computes the cost of a 1-week strike by 100,000 members as about DM 20 million. Since the time it was founded, it has paid out DM 450 million in strike payments.

While the metalworkers so far have not had to curtail payments, in the case of the printers union, weak in membership, the money did not even suffice for one labor struggle. Greatly in debt, the union had to cut strike support at its 1977 congress. Since then, the payment has been only DM 85.50 rather than DM 114 a day for a monthly membership fee of DM 30.

The printers will also have to forego many another payment in the future. The loyal service and old age bonuses have been eliminated. So, apart from support in labor struggles, there is left by and large only the legal support afforded to members in disputes with employers.

There is, however, also a trend toward reducing extras in other DGB organizations, what with financial straits often making it necessary to curtail payments. Only a rich union such as the OeTV [Public Service, Transportation and Communications Union], which seldom strikes, can continue to make payments as usual. Its 10 types of payments constitute the most expensive list in existence. It assists its members in emergencies, in case of

unemployment and illness, makes death payments and disburses loyal service and old age bonuses.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FIVE YEARS AFTER HIS ELECTION, GISCARD OPENS HIS HEART UP TO PHILIPPE BOUVARD

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 May 79 pp 35-37

[Text] I am sorry to disappoint you. The Elysee Palace is not at all like a palace from the Arabian Nights. It is an office building, and for all that, it is really not very efficient--one-third palace (national), one-third ministry and one-third barracks. The Republican Guards play the role of the young girls of the household. But even if the old gilt decorations on the ceilings have taken on a certain patina, the technocrats who prepare the president's dossiers have become considerably younger. The "new gentlemen" are more often 30 years old rather than 50. They are bright and svelte. Their lapels have no decorations and their waistlines have not been pushed out of shape by luncheons in town. In this hive of activity where no one ever raises his voice except the official greeter who is responsible for announcing visitors to the chief of state, everything is done in the name of one man, who in turn acts only in the name of 53 million citizens. Because the president is loath to make his visitors go down a winding corridor, one can only reach his study after going through the office of Francois Folge de Combret, the (now empty) office which Charles de Gaulle occupied for 8 years and where Valéry Giscard d'Estaing sometimes receives certain guests, and finally the room where his personal secretary and assistant work. Only then does one reach the holy of holies: a beautiful corner room overlooking the park, where everything is muffled, from the carpets to the noises of the city which are only heard as soft murmurs like a wave at the shore of the ocean. There is only the shrillish chime, every 15 minutes, of the famous Bardoux grandfather clock.

I am especially happy about this interview which will enable me to sketch the the personal assessment of the third president of the Fifth Republic after 5 years in office, because if the term of the presidency had been shortened--according to his initial desires--he would already be packing his bags. He explains very clearly why he once thought that the 7-year term was not the ideal period and why he now has decided not to change anything:

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--When I thought about this problem in the past, I wondered whether the confidence one puts in one's chief of state, and which is the source of his power, could last very long. Later on, I realized that in the exceptional times in which we are living, when political responsibility is heavy, time is too short to get things done if, for example, you take away from a 5-year term the months required for dealing with the various dossiers and the months preceding the next election.

Like his two immediate predecessors, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has a very high conception of his office. One could even say that over the last 5 years his job has been the prism through which he has observed the world, France and, at times, himself:

When one has a unique and distinct position with which no one can be familiar before having held the position--such as my position--one must not toy with it. One must respect it and treat it with care. Now, all countries where the term of the presidency is shorter than in France seem to regret it.

For the time being the job has a tendency to obscure the man. The president thinks that in his position one does not have the right to speak about himself until much later and that means when one is no longer in this position. This distance which he intends to keep from himself is also based on his feelings of certainty that he has virtually not changed over the last 5 years:

I believe that people change very little. When I look at old photographs of the childish faces of my classmates whom I run into sometimes nowadays, I do not get the impression that their features have really changed. Those who were cheerful still are, and those who were unhappy have not changed their ways.

In these 5 years which have gone by so fast that one may wonder whether problems do not speed up the passage of time, the president distinguishes two phases: a period of a year or two which is a period of getting used to the job (one cannot get a true idea of the highest office until one has done everything at least once) and the phase of full exercise of authority which--in his case--coincided with the outbreak of the first serious problems. How many hours a day does he work? It is hard to say:

The chief of state is not a bureaucrat. When I take part in the festivities honoring Joan of Arc in Orleans, is that work? When--as in the case of this evening--I resume a tradition which I had to give up for several months, and dine at the home of Frenchmen who have invited me, is that work? When I am talking with you, is that work?

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing does not use the telephone much more than his predecessors. But he has turned the gray phone on the left side of his desk into the number one instrument of his international politics. Even if he virtually never calls the members of the government--except in a crisis --he routinely communicates with foreign leaders:

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I often say to myself, "Say! I haven't spoken with such and such a chief of state for a long time," and I get in touch with him again to make sure of the progress of our joint plans.

The wear and tear of power? He does not believe in it in the least:

Those who do not have power seem to hope that it will destroy those who do have it. But that is not true.

He feels that the loneliness one finds at the top stands out more. And not so much because one withdraws from his contemporaries, but because the position is too consuming to maintain all the social relationships that one had beforehand. If one goes by what he says, the main change lies in a different relationship with time:

When I was a student, I lived my life according to the seasons and exams. As a minister, I lived according to the year and the fiscal year. As chief of state, I must look ahead several years. But, as a human being, the most enjoyable time is the time measured day by day.

Does he sometimes enjoy exercising power? He closes his eyes. Obviously he has never asked himself that question. However, since he excels more than anyone else in the little game "answers to everything," he comes up with the answer in 10 seconds:

Enjoyment of power is very rare. But it does come about on two classic occasions. First of all, when I speak in public. Next, during large-scale national events when they are successful and lead to an expression of real collective emotion.

The drawbacks of power: There are many and they are generally at a rather pedestrian level:

What I miss most today is not being able to stroll about anymore, not being able to say to myself, "It is 5:30, a beautiful day, I am going to sit down at a sidewalk cafe and read my newspaper for a hour." It is an insignificant matter when one can do it. It is essential when one can no longer do it. When one is a minister, life becomes normal again when one leaves the ministry. When one is chief of state, one is never again "off" as the audio-visual specialists say.

Translate: never invisible again, always "on," always in the limelight. The smallest room becomes an echo chamber. Convinced that loneliness is henceforth his lot, he has remained aloof from the policemen responsible for his security:

On Sundays, we manage to go to Mass as the Madeleine. We walk back. The danger for chiefs of state does not lie in an impromptu walk, but rather a trip announced in advance.

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Has he given up seeing certain persons since he took office? The question has never come up because his friends have always been chosen outside political circles. Has the role of the president become more powerful since 1974? He denies it categorically:

My idea of running a government is that authority must be exercised along with all those who assume responsibilities and who have areas of jurisdiction, that cooperation among men is essential and that it is virtually only in cases of disagreement that one must worry about what is under whose jurisdiction.

The many changes on his team are merely because of his desire not to thwart the careers of his associates. As far as recruitment is concerned, he follows only one simple principle, and he is sometimes surprised that it is not a universal one:

First of all, I ask myself who is the best in his field, then I choose him for my team.

Five years of power have not changed his view of the French. Even though he sees them from on high, they are still of the same stature in his eyes. If anything, he places even more importance on them than before:

I do not have the impression that I know people better; but I have a clearer view of the political personnel. You know, I was voted in, and I often think that it is better for my personal equilibrium that I was voted in to this position by universal suffrage. When I think of the 13,396,203 Frenchmen who voted for me in 1974, I think of them as men and women, and not as votes.

When his popularity standing declines, he consults the polls with a touch of melancholy. When it rises, he has a reaction of anticipation and is already thinking about the next decline. This leaning toward future prospects breaks off abruptly as soon as it is a question of thinking about a second 7-year term:

I will only speak about that problem much later. The day one declares his candidacy, one is more a candidate than a president. Do you remember General de Gaulle at the end of his first term? Two months before the election, Georges Pompidou, his prime minister, did not yet know whether he would run. I do not see, as far as I am concerned, what interest there is in starting a campaign 2 years in advance. One must never forget that Providence also has its say in the matter.

Struck by the fact that one generally does not get to finish out his second 7-year term, the president attributes a good part of this discouraging fact to age and illness. Tan, mature, having completely eliminated the signs of fatigue which he at times showed during his first 2 years in the Elysee Palace, Giscard looks more like a man at the beginning of a

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career rather than someone at the peak of his career. Still, that is not why he refrained from keeping the promise he had made during his electoral campaign to periodically publish a report on his health:

I saw that those who did so caused stirring, questions and scoffing remarks. I think it is still too soon to do it in France.

His face is like a calm lake from which he has consciously eliminated all ripples. There is only an occasional smile, which does not mean that he is amused; or a thoughtful frown, which momentarily reduces the size of his forehead. How many daily exercises must he have done to fight against inner turbulence and learn the art of serenity:

That is a discipline I have cultivated for a long time. I am a true Aquarius, very emotional, very susceptible to on-the-spot impressions. This tendency runs the risk of damaging activities which should be carried out in an atmosphere of calm, especially since French political life is more turbulent than elsewhere.

Do people tell him the truth? Does what he must know manage to overcome the many barriers which separate him from the rank and file and thus sometimes from the event itself?

My associates do not lie to me, but there are not enough of them to bring me the whole truth, even though in my position it is extremely easy to get information. I remember that de Gaulle did not have a piece of paper on his desk and he was abreast of everything. I also recall that when I left the Ministry of Finance, I felt cut off from information for a while.

What he does know, he learns more than men than from reports he is given or newspapers placed on the coffee table near the window:

As a matter of self-discipline, I do not read the press very much, and when I do read it I look for information, ignoring praise or criticism. If I took into account everything that is said or written, rather than a solid line, I would only have a series of broken lines to offer.

He does not enjoy himself at the Elysee Palace which he considers to be more of a place of work rather than a residence, but he does appreciate this quiet spot, away from the footlights, where one has a respect for timetables, habits and customs. He is not any fonder of official trips abroad--despite what a certain segment of public opinion may have thought:

It is always a hardships, but it is part of the duty of French presence. France has diplomatic relations with 153 countries throughout the world. If one considers that it is a good idea to visit each one every 10 years, one must make at least 15 trips per year--without taking into account that a French president must visit all the African countries once during his 7-year term in office. But there is yet much to be done and I am surprised that we have, for example, so few relations with India, one of the most important countries in the world where no French president has yet gone.

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We are on the road to an easing of political tension:

The tone has changed. There is real dialogue going on now. When Francois Mitterrand came to see me the other day, I read him Brezhnev's statements on China. I am trying to be a French president. Well, France is a complex and sophisticated country.

Progress is also being made in the reduction of social inequalities:

It is a fact and it is a good thing that the two poles are coming closer together. There are still efforts to be made for the lowest-paid employees, but what is commonly referred to as discontent among the cadres is also undoubtedly a result of this reduction of social inequalities.

Being among the first generation of statemen to have to deal with the audio-visual realm on a daily basis, the president, who writes all his speeches by hand, often resorts to sounding them out loud as Flaubert liked to do. He forces himself to use short sentences, the sound of which he tests out, and which he refuses to memorize:

Substance must take precedence over memorizing. And besides, if the speech follows the rules of the theater, it has a tendency to become a role.

Aware that the forum today is no longer a city of 5,000 but rather a television channel watched by 15 million citizens, Giscard feels more and more that a speech which one cannot reply to is poorly received. In this area, too, he draws inspiration from the founder of the Fifth Republic:

I saw de Gaulle work for several years. I watched him. I noted the tiniest details. So nowadays, in difficult situations which are not necessarily the most spectacular, I wonder how he would act and what would be his reaction.

Is he glad that his son Henri has gone into politics?

He is merely satisfied that he is what he is and that he chose his election district on his own, like a big boy. What about his plans to write--novels in particular? The publishers will have to wait. He will not get back to that until "afterwards." And, as for "afterwards," I think that could be 9 years from now. When I left, I got the impression that the Bardoux grandfather clock was starting to grow impatient and that Raymond Barre, who was waiting for his weekly interview in the General's office, was looking at me in a funny way...

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TEXT OF ELLEINSTEIN SPEECH NOT MADE TO PCF CONGRESS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 18 May 79 pp 44-45, 69

/Speech by Jean Elleinstein, Communist Party Historian and Philosopher/

/Text/ He is still a party member but he can no longer speak out--neither in L'HUMANITE, nor at the congress which is meeting this week. Jean Elleinstein, Communist Party Historian and Philosopher, here publishes the speech which he was not authorized to deliver to his comrades.

Dear Comrades, I want to thank you for letting me address the congress although, I know, some of you are opposed not only to the ideas I have been developing but also to the way I am doing that, in particular, "in the opposition press, on radio and television," according to L'HUMANITE, on 5 May 1979. I have been a party member since 1944; I spent many years of my life fighting for a cause which I thought was just because it was intended to liberate man from the forms of oppression which weigh on him. Persecuted during the war because of my Jewish origin and forced to live under an assumed name at the age of 14, I then wound up in the Sante Prison because of my activities against the war in Indochina for several weeks and then I went underground for many months, from 1953 until 1954. I do not claim that I did more than others did. I held on to the ideal of my youth. But my experience over the past 35 years prompt me that, in the meantime, we still need democracy, even more democracy, and once again and always, democracy. This is why I am fighting in spite of slander and insults to which I am subjected. But I do have a certain idea of communism and this is why I write and speak out.

Proportional Representation--A Rule for External Use

The preparations for the congress once again demonstrated the importance of the questions and criticisms of scores of thousands of communists and the ability of our party leadership to channel them, so as to create the illusion of quasi-unanimity in the party. That has to do with the rules of the operation of democratic centralism which date back to the Stalinist period and

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which they continue to use skillfully. To be elected a delegate in the section conferences, in the federation conferences, and to this congress itself, one had to be as a matter of fact in agreement with the resolution drafts and the statutes which the Central Committee submitted for discussion. A very precise directive was communicated to all organizations in the party leadership. As a matter of fact, this involved a majority slate which systematically dropped all critical communists, that is to say, any minority, regardless of who it might be. One of two delegates might get over the barrier which our leadership had put up against the minority but that is obviously very difficult. Proportional representation, which our party demands for the national and municipal elections, is a rule for external use, not internal use. A number of communists refrain from attending the congress preparatory meetings and some, I am sorry to say, left the party; they are often seasoned militants who however are discouraged by the methods used by the leadership. Others are afraid of the "ideological war" conducted inside the party against all those who challenge its orientation. At Arcueil, a student by the name of Yves Roucaute was even beaten up. Everywhere, people have been trying "to shoot us down morally" according to the correct term used by Helene Parmelin. In spite of the ideological and political pressures from the powerful party leadership apparatus, the minority nevertheless did express itself during a number of cell meetings, sector conferences, and federation conferences. The selection carried out through the methods of bureaucratic centralism are stifling the voice of this minority the higher up you go. Numerous down at the base, they are very rare at the top. It bothers me to disturb the quiet of these places and the serenity of your debates but I would like to underscore everything that is artificial in this unanimity which corresponds neither to the feelings of a number of communists, nor to the sentiments of a by no means negligible portion of the voters. Shaking the thermometer never lowered the temperature. According to the survey published by L'EXPRESS on 7 May 1979, 37 percent of the communist voters believe that our party's internal operations are not democratic while 44 percent believes that they are.

Dear Comrades, if we want to renew and transform our party, there is no other way than to democratize it; that means profoundly amending its operating rules and above all its practices. But our party is not committed along that road and this is what I find to be so dramatic.

French Communist Party Returning to its Old Demons

On top of this essential disagreement, there are others whose importance is no less great since they deal with the party's political orientation, its strategy, its attitude toward the USSR, the socialist countries, and the countries of Europe. For the past 25 years we have fallen behind quite a bit; in 1956, at the time of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the congress featuring Khrushchev's secret report on Stalin's crimes; in 1968 and thereafter, at the time of the May events and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1956, we began to realize that without however analyzing the reasons for this historical error. In 1968, there was no longer any question. Events undoubtedly are still too recent and the current leaders in our party, who

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in some way were hardly responsible for this situation, are still too numerous. It seemed to me that the 22nd Congress of the PCF /French Communist Party/, held in 1976, could have been a historical turning point after the signing of the joint government program worked out with the Socialist Party in 1972. I must however note that this is not the case. The PCF is returning to its old demons. It criticizes the Socialist Party without drawing any distinctions and it refuses clearly to state the need for a historical alliance without which the left cannot hope to become the majority in legislative, governmental, and presidential terms, as it is now in the communities, in the departments, and in daily life. Far from developing a real Euro-communist policy, the PCF is shutting itself off in a kind of Gallic communism which worries me even more since it runs counter to our internationalist tradition. The French communists are hostile to the expansion of the Common Market. The challenge the need for a European economic policy. The disagreement that have with the Italian and Spanish communist parties is not a secondary one. It involves the strategy of communism in the West, as a matter of fact. Having a real European policy presupposes an entirely new orientation for the PCF. Blaming the reasons for the crisis on Europe does not seem to be in line with the idea according to which the crisis is a national one. The structural reforms which in western Europe alone would permit a transformation of the economy and society in a socialist sense can be implemented only within a perspective of convergence among the socialist parties or the social-democratic and communist parties in Europe. They must take into account the economic facts of life and the complex problems which the crisis poses for the Western economy. We all have reason to defend the interests of the workers who are struck by unemployment but it would be illusory to think that only national solutions could reduce the crisis.

Prospects of 23rd Congress Seem Hazy

We have reason to fight against the policy of a government which manages neither to foresee nor to resolve the major difficulties which we are struggling with; but it would be useless to think that we could cut the price of gasoline or raw materials with words alone.

We must be a great fighting party, a great ruling party, and at the same time we must be the defender of national interest and we must be the unbiased and unreserved fighter for a democratic and socialist Europe where the weight of the people and the workers will prevail over that of the multi-nationals. The independence of this Europe will not prevent it from remaining a member of the Atlantic Pact. It will enable it to establish new bonds with the socialist countries of the Eastern Europe--who will remain members of the Warsaw Pact--and these new bonds can be useful for detente and for their real independence. On the part of the French communists, this requires an action that will be really independent of the Soviet Union. Although the resolution, which you may adopt, is correct in criticizing Stalinism, it nevertheless does indicate a definite retreat, compared to the 22nd Congress, regarding the socialist countries since it speaks of the "overall positive

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balance" which they supposedly reveal. I do believe that there are essential historical contributions of socialism in contemporary history: the October Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, Stalingrad, detente, the role of the USSR in international politics. But all of this must not make us forget the absence of political democracy in the USSR, the conflicts between the socialist countries, the economic difficulties of the USSR, and a certain number of features of its foreign policy. While our congress is being held, Orlov and Shcharanskiy are still in prison and so are Bahro in East Germany and Sabata in Czechoslovakia. Now, we have no scale to measure the positive and negative things. The important thing is to see the contradictions in the USSR and the socialist countries. Our line should be neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Soviet. But the resolution draft if anything leans toward pro-Sovietism and, in practice, the party leadership is going back to a policy which one thought might be condemned by the experience of these past 60 years.

The political prospects outlined by this 23rd Congress seem to be often hazy and sometimes even dangerous. You, the delegates to the congress, recommend union at the grass roots but once again you have to accept it with the socialists, once again it would be necessary for that union to be accompanied by a union at the top, without which the election victory of the left is nothing but a distant utopia for the third millenium. I think that one must not limit this union to the two major political parties on the left, that, on the contrary, we must expand it to include the community and cultural associations, the women's movements and the ecologists, the labor unions, while respecting their independence, the committees of all kinds which will give the people's movement a new dimension amid respect for political democracy. There are many who, in France, aspired to a new way of making politics and who, in practice, intend to conduct a real system of self-management.

Unity Feeling Persists in Electorate

The party leadership now claims that the joint government program was full of illusions. I would rather say that it did arouse hopes which the breakup of the left had cruelly disappointed. The feeling for unity remains deep, starting with our electorate. Let us not disappoint it this time and let us rebuild that union which was defeated at the very moment when it seemed to be winning in 1978.

The party must accept the nonaggression pact proposed by the recent congress on the Socialist Party. We must be united, as we have become accustomed to saying to millions of women and men who hope for a better tomorrow.

The party leadership defends itself by saying that this congress will not be a congress to close the doors but to open them. Well, let it prove that clearly. Let it propose a union with the Socialist Party on precise social and political objectives. The party must show that it is truly independent with respect to the USSR and it must adopt a consistent European policy, it must accept a democratic reform for the operation of our party which will facilitate debate, the horizontal circulation of ideas, as well as the necessary political and ideological confrontations.

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I know, unfortunately, that this is not the current orientation and I am afraid that this will only lead to the further weakening of our party, including on the electoral level, starting with the European elections. This is the policy of the party's current leadership and its methods which will be the cause of that, and not this "ideological war" which it talks about and which it sustains through its sectarian and stubborn attitude.

Comrades, excuse my frankness. I think that it would be wrong to conceal my thinking, to tone it down at a moment in our history as important as this one.

There are two possible lines of development. I think that the party is currently making the wrong choice and I have not lost hope that there will be a change in the heading over the next several years. The longer we wait to do that, the more difficult will it be, especially since this policy promotes the upswing of the Socialist Party. Beyond the auditorium of this congress, I would like to address all party members, all communist voters, in order to tell them that they have their role to play in this great battle which will not be won without this congress. The need for transforming and renewing our party continues to exist and it will have to be pushed through in spite of resistance from those who look to the past rather than the future.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NATION'S NUCLEAR DISSUASION POLICY DISCUSSED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 71-72

[Summary of press conference of Gen Paul Arnaud de Foillard at Armed Forces War College; date not given]

[Text] Nuclear weapons constitute the cornerstone of our national defense policy because their destructive capabilities dissuade any attacker more effectively than any weapon has ever done. And yet, can the ability we now have to dissuade be permanently ensured? For example, any sign of vulnerability leads one to think that the absence of war is far from being eternally guaranteed. It may therefore be indispensable to begin now to ensure our dissuasive capabilities by improving the military effectiveness of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Difference in Vulnerability Destroys Balance of Risks

Some of the factors that may lead one to question the stability of our dissuasive ability merit particular attention. While the element of technological surprise is scarcely likely, given the vigilance exercised in this domain, it nevertheless appears that the more advanced a society is, the more vulnerable it is. In this connection, one has but to remember the paralyzing effect which a few centimeters of snow have on a large Western metropolitan area.

The difference in vulnerability is also visible with respect to the geographical and economic organization of the countries involved. For example, the concentration of a large portion of the industry of the United States in the Great Lakes region and the congestion in the Rhine Valley are important factors affecting vulnerability, while the USSR and China have enormous space available to scatter their facilities.

Furthermore, the adoption of systematic protective measures can enable a nation to maintain the minimum operation of economic and administrative circuits, thereby giving the existing government the hope of holding on. It would appear that only the East is taking such precautions.

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Finally, the deterioration in their general situation may force certain nations to take risks which alone will guarantee the survival of their political system. For example, profound socioideological upheavals in the USSR or the asphyxiation of Western economies due to being deprived of sources of raw materials could cause the leaders of those countries to embark on a race and a formidable series of foreign military ventures.

These are subjects for thought. For 30 years, dissuasion has been maintained. It will continue to be maintained only if the proper conditions are provided, which, in addition to political problems, also poses the problem of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Major Role

Tactical nuclear weapons are an indispensable factor in the effectiveness of dissuasion.

Actually, strategic dissuasion does not ban all forms of war or aggression and, as a corollary to that state of affairs, all or nothing, a strategic arsenal alone does not constitute an effective means of defense. The role of tactical nuclear weapons is therefore that of providing the nuclear threat -- in itself absurd -- with a sensitive or rational nature, that is, credible and therefore, effectively dissuasive. Nevertheless, one must emphasize two factors which are essential for an understanding of the use of tactical weapons.

The damage caused by tactical use of nuclear power must remain rationally acceptable by the adversary and quite obviously, by friends as well.

The use of tactical atomic weapons makes sense only if it is closely linked to the unleashing of strategic power which eliminates all possibility of a reasonable continuation of fighting, thereby procuring the benefit of the equalizing power of the atom.

It is consequently not necessary to have a nuclear arsenal making it possible to compete with that of the possible adversary.

Naturally, as soon as there is a halt in fighting, brought about by the use of tactical nuclear weapons, any meeting around a table would take into consideration the actual situation in the field at the time of discussions. In the face of a conventional adversary unable to compete in terms of the ratio of forces, which would mean losing an important advantage of dissuasion at the outset, it would appear that we would then be forced to rely on the military effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons.

Let us add that in order to meet any lightning offensive with the aggressor blocking any response by taking the tactical nuclear initiative as soon as the objective sought is realized, it is necessary to organize our defense as soon as possible and undeniably, everything that happens in West Europe

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concerns us. However, the current situation, which does not put us on the front line, provides us with freedom of action which, due to the very uncertain nature of our reaction, favors the dissuasive element of which we should not deprive ourselves.

Military Effectiveness of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

That is our current conception of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. But just as in the case of strategic dissuasion, problems are posed that might involve the seed of a chain reaction on which we must reflect. The difference in vulnerability to a strategic nuclear strike increases the risk of conflict, as we have just seen, and once the conflict has begun, it becomes much more difficult for the victim to force the attacker to stop by wielding a threat whose execution would -- since strategy is linked to tactics -- lead to consequences more harmful to the victim than to the adversary. Nevertheless, it would not appear that we can now deem that the enormity of the strategic nuclear threat has been decreased significantly by the existence of a difference in vulnerability between the adversaries. It is necessary, however, to seek to make the most of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, insofar as any indication of a lack of determination in the vigor with which they are used could provide the aggressor with the advantage bestowed upon him by a smaller degree of vulnerability. In the field of tactical nuclear weapons, one must in a sense be able to take greater risks in order to compensate for handicap of vulnerability to the effects of strategic weapons.

For its part, nuclear proliferation is unavoidable in the long run. India and countries in the Near East and Latin America now appear to be close to this nuclear repute. Such proliferation will include an intensification of the risks of local nuclear conflicts, bringing about a profound change in the balance of influence. It will lead to a spreading of the use of nuclear weapons, which involves the formidable risk of the unleashing of such weapons. Nations will then be forced to become hardened to the effects of nuclear weapons, which will constitute a powerful factor in destroying dissuasion.

The effect of such a general tendency is once again the need to master the tactics and techniques militarily effective in the use of nuclear weapons.

New Weapon: Neutron Bomb

In recent years, the miniaturization of weapons has made considerable progress and a new type of neutron weapon has emerged. In the opinion of some observers, this weapon could restore absolute control of the battlefield, since neutron weapons can neutralize the action of any traditional force.

This is an important advantage given to the defensive forces and considering the risk of a loss in value of strategic weapons brought about by our increased vulnerability to the previously mentioned strikes, it is tempting to think about basing our defense on a neutron battle.

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However, one must immediately note that a nuclear confrontation of this type would require: the establishment of a nuclear-neutron battle corps whose cost we may not be able to bear; and the availability of large numbers of conventional forces, if only to prevent the adversary from seeking refuge in highly populated areas in which, quite obviously, the use of neutron weapons would be impossible without risking turning the previously mentioned nuclear tactic on ourselves because by definition, the attacker can only be the adversary.

Finally, in such an atmosphere of violence, the ability to prevent the use of tactical and strategic weapons from going beyond extremely vague limits cannot be absolutely guaranteed.

It is therefore a matter of a burdensome and very dangerous defense policy. We may one day be forced to resort to it due to a deterioration in the general situation which we were unable to avoid, but it does not seem necessary to anticipate such an eventuality. In our current situation, the benefit of being able to dissuade stronger enemies and the fact of not being forced to burden our general economy with the need to have a military system subjected to the requirement of a favorable ratio of strength constitute advantages that it would be insane to give up.

It therefore appears indispensable to maintain the close links between tactical nuclear action and the threat of strategic reprisals. The fact nevertheless remains that our doctrine, which in its current form takes the military effects of tactical nuclear action less into consideration than it does the political significance, could in the near future be brought to put more emphasis on these effects and to seek to increase their value.

The difference in vulnerability threatening us results from our economic and geographic organization, from the impasse reached with respect to measures of protection or civil defense against atomic attack, and mainly from the very nature of the liberal consumer society that we constitute. We are in a situation in which the promptness of the defensive reaction and its initial military effectiveness are undeniably necessary assets. Anything that can improve the operational value of our forces therefore now appears to be desirable. Since the limits of our conventional possibilities are contained in the existing ratio of forces, it seems indispensable to explore all possibilities in the domain of tactical nuclear weapons. But while this improvement is highly desirable, one must not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of the tactical sequence remains halting the attack under penalty of death.

Biographical Information

Div Gen Paul Arnaud de Foiard was born on 9 September 1921 in Meudon. Most of his career has been in the Foreign Legion, where he was the commanding officer of the 2d REP [expansion unknown] in Mers-el-Kebir and then in Corsica in 1965. In August 1972, he was given command of the 1st Airborne

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- Brigade. From August 1974 to November 1975, he held the post of chief of staff in the General Secretariat of National Defense. In 1975, he became commanding officer of the 11th DP [expansion unknown]. Since 1 September 1977, he has been assigned to the post of director of the army's advanced military training and commanding officer of the Armed Forces War College. General Arnaud de Foillard has been awarded the Legion of Honor and the Military Medal on an exceptional basis.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

COMPETENCE OF GROUND FORCES NCO'S OUTLINED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOUR'HUI in French May 79 pp 52-53

[Article by Maj Jean-Paul Marrot:* "Men and Women of Their Time: The Infantry Non-Commissioned Officers"]

[Text] "In our army as, unquestionably, in other armies, the NCO's corps has always been a keystone. There are three major reasons for this:

"First, holding a hinge position, the NCO's take part both in the decision making process, a responsibility which they share with the officers, and the execution of decisions;

"Furthermore, within self-contained units which are the natural crucible of all true military life, they have a length of service far exceeding that of the officers or conscripts. Therefore, they provide the best guarantee for stability;

"Finally, holding contact positions, they are the closest to the men and the realities of daily life as a result of which they are the most familiar with it and able to follow its evolution, inform, and advise."

*Saint-Cyr graduate, Vercors year, Maj Jean-Paul Marrot chose the marines after graduating from the Ecole d'application. He has been successively platoon commander in the 3rd RPI Ma [Marine Paratrooper Regiment], the 6th RPI Ma, and the 33rd Marine Regiment, as well as company commander in the 22nd Marine Regiment. He is a staff college graduate and has a staff college certificate in superior scientific and technical military teaching (humanities). He is currently serving with the bureau of personnel of the army's general staff where he is in charge of problems related to non-commissioned officers.

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Whereas this excerpt of one of the initial general directives issued by Army General Lagarde, the army's chief of staff,¹ clearly indicates the privileged position held by the NCO corps, it also emphasizes the difficulties which their function involves.

In a world characterized by the accelerated change in techniques and ways of thinking, and in which the evolution of the men and the weight of existing realities are becoming more and more demanding with every passing day, the NCO's would be unable to fulfil their primary mission unless they were, simultaneously:

People directly in touch with reality;

Soldiers, experts in their craft;

Commanders, knowing how to command as well as serve.

Direct Contact with the Men

Rooted in the deep French soil from which they come and to which most of them go back to start a second career,² the 63,000 non-commissioned officers in the army are, above all, men and women of their time.³ They reflect the multiple aspects of their age through their geographic and social origins, level of scholarship and training, reasons for their enlistment, experiences, aspirations, and opinions.

This diversity may be equally found in their working environment: distributed among the 19 armies or services, the NCO's serve in 17 specialized branches, subdivided, in turn, into 79 basic skills. Whether employed as specialists, instructors, technicians, administrative services cadres, or commanders of small combat, support, or training units, they are part of the same statutory corps, the army NCO's.

The army makes the blossoming of their personalities possible: any display on their part of a liking for effort and perseverance, and a feeling of responsibility and honesty gives them a healthy, balanced, and varied life made possible by virtue of the diversity of their assigned tasks, the human solidarity and warmth which develop in the course of team work, and the opportunity to surpass themselves, favored by their direct command of men and a broad margin of initiative and assumption of important responsibilities.

Soldiers with Extensive and Continuous Knowledge . . .

Initially trained in school,⁴ or in self-contained units, the NCO's, whatever their arm, service, or specialty, begin by learning their craft as soldiers, for their authority is based on their competence.

Suited to the missions they will be entrusted with, the basic training offers the NCO's the indispensable military, technical, physical, intellectual, and human and moral arature.

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Whatever their future employment may be, they must possess the necessary knowledge for the handling of facilities, materiel, and personnel, in order to carry out combat missions, and the physical shape which will allow them to withstand the effort which will be required and push back the limits of fatigue. They must be sufficiently broad-minded to understand and have an opinion of the world surrounding them, for being able to know their men, and for insuring their active involvement.

The ever faster renovation of techniques and materiel requires a corps of highly skilled experts whose knowledge will be kept up through technical training. This acquisition of new knowledge demands of the NCO's, throughout their career, a sustained personal effort. In order to help them, a training system with the issuance of certificates whose earning determines their promotion, has been set up. Such examinations which require school training contribute to the enhancement of the image of the NCO.

Acknowledged Competence

The NCO's are well aware of the fact that their competence will give them the necessary command authority. Therefore, every one of them tries to develop as an expert or a specialist in a specific technique or function.

Within the army such competence, if proven, has never been contested.⁵ Frequently it confers on them an authority higher than their rank: a paratrooper general would respect the decision of the NCO jump master. Furthermore, this authority is acknowledged even beyond the limits of the institution as can be confirmed by the list of equivalences and confirmations.

Commanders Who Give the Example . . .

Holding within the command system the essential position we know, united with the hierarchy, the NCO fills an "office"; he has been assigned a mission and responsibilities. He is a commander. As such, he gives the example, he commands, he serves.

The NCO is the commander who "can cope." He is the perfect executant to be emulated by everyone.

Being both at the head of the men and behind a machine, he bears the responsibilities of being "first on the rope"; crystallizing with him the confidence of the men, he leads; it is he who executes orders the best. He is the model to be emulated. He is the heart of the basic cells and the basis of any structure.

Chiefs Who Command . . .

A current cliché notwithstanding, the NCO is not a simple link in the hierarchical chain: far from being one among many executants, he participates and contributes to the functioning of the entity. He exercises some of the responsibilities and initiative to which he is entitled by virtue of his competence.

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He is, therefore, the one who "knows how to make others do," he who, behind a missile launcher or a radar system, or heading a group or combat platoon, knows how to allocate assignments with maximum effectiveness.

Having the character and influence indispensable in decision making and, if necessary, punishing, as well as the open-mindedness and the qualities needed for establishing human contact, he commands for the sake of training and molding the young recruits, and frames and supports the units. He guarantees both rigorous execution and cohesion.

Broadly open to the changes in the current world, he knows how to adapt: he is responsible for a very large portion of the success of the effort undertaken by the army to change its life and command style and training methods: his role in the implementation of the current educational reform⁷ is fundamental.

Commanders Who Serve

To command has a meaning only within the framework of a joint undertaking.

As pointed out by the minister of defense to the students of the Saint-Maixent ENSOA [National Army NCO School], the hub of the corps, the assignment entrusted to the NCO's, which they share with the officers, "is the noblest and the gravest of all: to maintain and support the arms of France, obeying the laws of the republic and acting in accordance with the rules of military honor." This is what assigns them their duties and gives them their rights.

The duty of assuming full responsibility by virtue of both specific functions and his position in the general military hierarchy demands of the NCO two special qualities: competence and availability. In fact, it is clear that, being in direct and constant touch with the men, he cannot conceal any of his insufficiencies or eventual weaknesses. Furthermore, he must be ready to meet, specifically during periods normally used for relaxation and rest, the exigencies imposed by daily activities and operational requirements.

Modern man can and wants to understand the meaning and extent of what is asked of him. The NCO is not exempt from this social phenomenon. Therefore, very specific efforts have been made in recent years to supply him with the necessary information for commanding and to guide his individual efforts. The role of the NCO president which, in each formation, provides in this area a great deal of help to his comrades and to the corps chief has been extensively developed in particular.

Unquestionably, maintaining permanent and direct contacts with their men, more than anyone else, the army NCO's are both model executants and competent and available commanders.

The importance of their role and the increasing complexity of their tasks justify the interest displayed by the command in this personnel category.

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Their willingness to give to the entire corps its value and cohesion which make its strength has been specifically translated, ever since the promulgation of general directive number three, in 1975, in the decisions taken to enhance the professional standard of the corps, and promote within and without it the proper consideration owed the NCO's, encourage the best among them to serve longer terms for the sake of the good of our army, and promote the retraining of those who leave the service relatively young.

FOOTNOTES

1. General directive number three, dated 1 October 1975, on the actions to be implemented to the benefit of the NCO corps.
2. The average length of service of the NCO's is about 11 years.
3. The NCO corps numbers close to 6,000 women.
4. One-third of the NCO's come directly from self-contained units; two-thirds are trained in the following schools: Inter-Army School of Female Military Personnel, National School for NCO's of the Active Army, National Technical School for NCO's of the Active Army, and 10 schools for NCO's of the active army.
5. Thus, sergeant majors, regimental sergeant majors, and adjutants who obtain a commission are given directly the rank of lieutenant.
6. As of this point over 120 certificates have been endorsed.
7. The purpose is to promote an educational reform which would radically improve training results through the effective participation of contact cadres and the ranks in training for and implementation of their activities.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AIR FORCE NCO'S OUTLINED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 56-57

[Article by Col Jean-Paul Faraud:* "Another Image of the Fighter: NCO's in the Air Force"]

[Text] With a total manpower of about 100,000 men, the air force has slightly over 45,000 NCO's, all specialists. This high proportion of specialists is the consequence of the high technical level required in running the air force.

Their functions and qualities are, however, insufficiently known outside the service, for few among them openly participate in missions and demonstrations of the air force. The relative descretion of their role, their unusual level of specialization, and the high percentage of such cadres, unusual in armed forces, result in the fact that they are quite frequently considered as simple technicians in uniform, supporting a small number of operations for fighting personnel.

Yet, this image of the air force, totally ignoring the overall aspect of its mission, is quite remote from reality. The specific target of this mission is, in fact, indivisible from a number of specialized competitions which makes its implementation possible, demanding in all sectors and in all stages identical military qualities.

*Enrolled in the Air Force School in 1961, "Commandant Jeandet" class, a licensed fighter pilot in the United States in 1954, Col Jean-Paul Faraud has served in North Africa, flying Mistral's and T6's until 1960 and, subsequently, as an all-weather fighter pilot on Vautours until 1965. Subsequently he commanded the Aulnat Navigation Personnel Training School, held a number of staff positions and, of late, has commanded the air force in the southern zone of the Indian Ocean. He has a superior military teaching certificate (29th ESGA [Army War College] class), he is currently head of the bureau of general studies of the DPMAA [Main Air Force Munitions Depot].

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Therefore, one could not separate in the air force the military from the technicians but could only distinguish among the various military specialists, most of them NCO's.

Who are, therefore, these men and women¹ who make the corps of the air force NCO's?

A Great Variety of Skills--A Unique Mission

Divided between the two corps of "flying personnel"² and, in the case of the big majority, "non-flying personnel," the air force NCO's are a relatively young population, whose average age is about 30.

Recruited mostly at a level similar to that of the senior high school class, the NCO candidates of the non-flying personnel are directed toward one of the 17 groups of existing skills based on their level of scholarship, aptitudes, inclinations, and requirements of the air force. The range of choices is quite broad, since one-half of it covers technical areas (electronics, aircraft mechanics, aerospace equipment, air weaponry . . .); 15% deal with operations (control of aircraft in the air, security, communications . . .); about 30% deal with support skills (administration, management, informatics, secretarial work . . .).

For about one to one and a half years they undergo school training combining vocational training, quite frequently on a high level yet always practical in terms of overall military training, along with civic and moral training.

After their graduation and promotion as NCO's, they are assigned to an air force base where, guided and instructed by their elders, they assume the multiple functions which constitute the foundations of a modern combat air force. In addition to the pilots,³ navigators, and flying mechanics, there are:

Ground mechanics or armorers who maintain and check the condition of the airplanes, supervise their refueling or supply with other ingredients, replacement of ammunition and control of armaments guaranteeing directly the execution, effectiveness, and security of the missions;

Radar controllers who inform the pilots, control interceptions, and assure landings in all weather, and are equally responsible for the success and direct security of the flights which they frequently guide or, at least, observe;

The air commando fusiliers who insure the safety and defense of our air force materiel and our installations against all threats from the ground or the air play a prime role in the preservation of the size and credibility of our forces;

Maintenance unit specialists who periodically check and replace deficient or worn out parts of air or specific materials and who maintain the operational readiness of the air force;

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Transmission specialists who insure specifically air-ground communications, fire security personnel who protect the airplanes and, above all, the life of the crews in the case of an accident and participate directly in the efforts to safeguard our potential;

Finally, those who make the life of this community possible by supporting and administrating it play an equally very important role.

Skilled Professionals and Responsible Members of the Military Forces

These few examples make it clear that all air force NCO's directly participate, from their very first years of service, in the implementation of the flight missions of the air force.

These missions whose particular feature is that they can be successful only within very narrow time and precision margins, demand, in fact, a high level reliability of all the components of the weaponry system and of even the least bit of equipment, along with all human cooperation without exception. The same applies to flight safety which could be compromised by the failure of even a single specialist along this chain.

Therefore, whereas the actions of the non-flying NCO's are generally those of skilled professionals, their motivations must be, from the very beginning, those of responsible military personnel. They must be fully aware of their participation in the mission and of their essential role in its success and safety which demand of them a great degree of readiness, an acute sense of responsibility, and high level initiative and team spirit; those are, precisely, qualities typical of military cadres rather than of simple operational technicians.

They must display these qualities at all times, in predawn take-offs and nighttime repairs, during watch hours of the numerous units in a state of permanent alert and, frequently, under extreme working or weather conditions. In such times it is their sense of duty alone that enables them to exercise their competence always with the same confidence and efficiency.

Their sense of discipline is also manifested not only in the traditional aspects of military discipline but also by virtue of the exactingness they must always display in the implementation of their assignments, an exactingness characteristic of the air force by virtue of its stresses and risks.

Once they have proved their professional experience by earning their superior certificate (after some 10 years of service), the NCO's are assigned the responsibilities of runway chief, control watch chief, or maintenance crew or security chief . . . instructing and training their juniors and the ranks. They advance on a parallel basis in the hierarchy, their promotions being based more on their dynamism, competence, and authority than on length of service.

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Becoming, subsequently, "master cadres" (after about 15 years of service), they may be entrusted with the command of small units (technical workshops, security, guard, or communications platoons . . .) or else important functions involving control, and training . . . under the command personnel.

At such higher levels which are the equivalent, in terms of substantial professional experience, to enterprise foremen, they must imperatively prove that they possess all the human and military qualities indispensable in exercising such important command responsibilities in terms of the air force mission. At that point they represent the contact cadres, the link between the command personnel and those who execute the mission which is the guarantee for success of any armed force.

The large number of air force officers coming from the ranks through various recruitment methods (Air Force School, Rang, and ORSA [Reserve Officers on Active Duty under Contract]) constitutes, in fact, yet another proof of all of their military qualities.

Professional competence, dedication, & feeling of responsibility and discipline are the essential characteristics of the air force NCO's.

As military specialists, virtually all of them directly participate in the execution and safety of aerial missions, even though in ways and means different from those of the traditional fighter. It is thus, far more than through their occasional participation in military activities or more orthodox exercises, that they demonstrate their military qualities. This is, in fact, the main reason for the esteem and the trust in them felt by combat crews and pilots.

FOOTNOTES

1. There are about 4,000 women NCO's.
2. There are about 1,300 flying NCO's.
3. Pilots trained as of this year will be promoted to officer rank after their graduation as is the case with other Western air forces.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MILITARY, GENDARMERIE NCO SCHOOLS CHARTED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 68-69

[Text] I. Army

Technical Training School	Diploma	Specialization School	Diploma	Length Training	Observations
National Active NCO School (ENSOA) (Saint-Maixent)	CM1 ¹	Interservice Schools, CI, ESALAT, EIS	CT1 ²	12-18 Mos.	CI: Center of Instruction ESALAT: Special Army Light Aviation School EIS: Interservice Sports School
Infantry Training School (EAI) (Montpellier)	CM1	EAI	CT1	12 mos.	
Armored-Cavalry Training School (EAABC) (Saumur)	CM1	EAABC	CT1	12 mos.	
Artillery Training School (EAA) (Draguignan)	CM1	EAA	CT1	12 mos.	
Surface-to-Air Artillery Training School (EAASA) (Nimes)	CM1	EAASA	CT1	12 mos.	
Engineering Training School (EAG) (Angers)	CM1	EAG & CIG ³	CT1	14 mos.	
Transport Training School (EAT) (Tours)	CM1	EAT	CT1	12 mos.	

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Active NCO Transmitters School (ESOAT) (Agen)	CM1	a) ESOAT and/or ESEAT b) ESEAT and CLEEM	CT1	16 to 18 mos.	ESEAT: Advanced Army Electronics School CLEEM: Foreign Language and Military Studies Center
Special Materiel School (ESMAT) (Chateauroux)	CM1	a) ESMAT b) ESMAT and ESAM c) ESEAT and ESAM	CT1	12 to 15 mos.	ESAM: Advanced Materiel Training School
National Army NCO Health School (ENSOSSAT) (Orleans)	CM1	ENSOSSAT	CT1	12 mos.	
Military Mountain Troops School (EMHM) (Chamonix)	CM1	EMHM and EAI	CT1	16 mos.	
National Active NCO Technical School (ENTSOA) (Issoire et Tulle)	CM1	ENTSOA	(BEP) ⁴ CT1	3 years	

1. [expansion unknown]
2. [expansion unknown]
3. [expansion unknown]
4. [expansion unknown]

Interservice Schools

School	Location	Requirements	Specialization
Interservice Sports School (EIS)	Fontainebleau	a) Active NCO from Saint-Maixent b) Naval officer c) Air Force officer	NCO physical training and military sports instructor
School	Location	Length Training	Specialization
Women's Military Personnel Interservice School	Caen	3 months	CM1

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II. Navy

School	Location	Period	Specialization
Midshipmen's School	Brest	1 year	
Engine Room Apprentice School	Saint-Mandrier	1 year	Mechanic
Petty Officers Deck School	Brest	1 year	Deck
Petty Officers Navigation School	Saint-Raphael	1-2 years	Navigation
Petty Officers Engineering School	Saint-Mandrier	1-2 years	Engineering

III. Air Force

Ground Personnel

School	Specialization	No. Weeks	Diploma
Rochefort ETAA (Air Force Technical School)	Radio-radar	46-52	Basic Special- ist's Diploma [All ground personnel]
	Airplane mechanics	23-35	
	Photo equipment	37-39	
	Electronic equipment	46-52	
	General technical	40-54	
	Construction	38	
Chambery Metz Rochefort	Electronics counter- measures	28-52	
	Transmitting	28-37	
Chambery Toulouse (National Civil Aviation School) Training at air bases	Control and sur- veillance of air activities	12-35	
Nimes	Air fusilier	12 ¹	
Evreux	Secretariat	14	
	Administration	17 to 19	
Saint Cyr	Meteorology	24	
	Photo designer	15	
Cazaux	Security, fire	19	
Bordeaux	Health	20	
Bretigny	Data processing	25	
Nimes - Apt	Dog trainer	12 + 10	

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Flight Personnel

School	Training	Weeks	Diploma
Jet Pilot			
Clermont-Ferrand Aulnat	Initial training	29	Pilot's license
	Parachute training at Pau	2	
Cognac	Basic flight training	34	"
Avord	Propeller aircraft	36	"
Transport Pilot			
Clermont-Ferrand Aulnat	Initial training	29	Pilot's license
	Parachute training at Pau	2	
Cognac	Basic flight training	34	"
Avord	Propeller aircraft	36	"
Helicopter Pilot			
Clermont-Ferrand Aulnat	Initial training	29	Pilot's license
	Parachute training at Pau	2	
Cognac	Basic flight training	34	"
Chambery	Helicopter training	30	"

1. Includes 2 weeks at Pau (parachute training). For specialists 1st class, an 8-week training period in Nimes only.

IV. Gendarmerie

School	Location	Period	Diploma
Gendarmerie Preparatory School (EPG)	Chaumont Chatellerault Montlucon	6 months	CAT ¹
Gendarmerie Training Center	Maisons-Alfort Saint-Astier Melun Berlin	6 months	CAT

1. [expansion unknown]

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

NEW SWEDISH SUBMARINES--Sweden will have a flotilla of three submarines specially conceived to operate in Baltic waters. The first of them, the "Nacken", was launched last April and is a very complex unit built with the help of computers. Smaller than its predecessors, thanks to technological advances introduced in this field, it will accommodate a crew of 19 men; it has a displacement of 960 tons, its length is 49.5 meters, its beam 5.7 meters and its draft 5.5 meters. The electric motors, diesel type, allow high speeds under silent conditions, while the torpedoes, remote control, are of two classes: for attack against surface boats and against submarines. In addition to these units, Sweden, who had not built submarines for 10 years, is projecting the replacement of its "Dracken" class submarines in the mid-1980's by a new generation tentatively called the "A17." They have also developed a submarine, the "Tijo 45," intended for export and which differs from those made for the Swedish army in that it is fitted out for longer underwater stays. /Text/ /Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Mar 79 p 5/ 9341

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COUNTRY SECTION

SWITZERLAND

NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT VEHICLE ADOPTED

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Mar 79 p 59

Text On 11 August, 1978, the Swiss Government Arms Agency and the Swiss enterprise Contraves AG of Zurich signed an agreement for the development of an anti-aircraft vehicle.

As is known, the federal council decided on 31 May 1978 to include the 35 mm "Oerlikon-Contraves" anti-aircraft vehicle in the processes of evaluation of anti-aircraft defense material for projecting mechanized units. This decision means that the Swiss industry, under the direction of Contraves AG, has been charged with the construction, simultaneously with other materials, of a prototype for testing.

This aerial defense system will be equipped with two Oerlikon 35/90 mm anti-aircraft guns, a Contraves-type guidance and radar instrumentation built either by Siemens or by Siemens-Albis, as well as other equipment, all of it integrated into a specially designed turret.

The main difference between the Swiss version and the anti-aircraft vehicle in service in Germany, Belgium and Holland, concerns the chassis, that is, the carrying vehicle itself. While the anti-aircraft vehicle of the 3 above-mentioned NATO countries use the Leopard-1 chassis, the Swiss conception has been designed so that the turret, including the anti-aircraft system itself, can be mounted without practically any changes on the modified chassis of the Swiss combat vehicle "Pz-68."

Concerning the construction of the prototype ordered, the problems that have come up due to the precision of the modifications, have already been solved, most of the work having been done at the Federal Construction Arsenal of Thun.

The Swiss anti-aircraft vehicle offers possibilities and benefits which are totally identical to those of the 35 mm (Gepard) anti-aircraft vehicle now in mass production in Germany under Swiss license as far as armaments and electronics are concerned.

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The speed inferred, in view of the urgency, has been possible due to the fact that in the summer of 1977, Contraves AG, Machine Tool Works Oerlikon-Buhrle Ltd, Siemens-Albis AG, Georg Fischer GF, SIG, as well as the Atelier de Constructions de Vevey SA, decided to perform the works preparatory to the development of a Swiss version of antiaircraft vehicle, under their own responsibility, and thanks to this preliminary activities, the ordered prototype will be completed in March of this year and delivered to the Swiss Government Arms Agency with the end of subjecting it to exhaustive tests.

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