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23 July 1979

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 642

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SIGNIFICANCE OF UNCTAD MEETING EXAMINED BY HABIB BOULARES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 May 79 pp 23-24

[Text] The international economic community resembles a school class in which one is not permitted to flunk rich people's children. Thus one is obliged to wait until all the partners have attained the same degree of comprehension of the problems so that the entire class can go on to the next grade.

During the 1960's, when it had become obvious that the international monetary system was out of adjustment, the Third World did not succeed in making international opinion admit that the entire economic order was involved. It required the gaping hole wrought in Western defenses by the Arab oil embargo to make them agree to link problems together. Further, it must be recalled that the United States waited until September 1975 to accept the principle of a dialog. But, at the same time, the developing nations (DN's), who did not have any alternative structure to propose, were satisfied with proclaiming the necessity of establishing a new international economic order (NIEO), which they made the catch-all for their grievances, both old and new.

Since this time, the North (Western, industrialized nations) and the South (populous, diversified but united, nations) have met around several negotiating tables in order to set up--thus far in vain--adequate ways and means of establishing the famous NIEO.

From the viewpoint of the Third World, that amounted to saying: regularize the staples market (by an integrated program of which the Common Fund for financing buffer stocks represented the pivot); throw open world markets to the manufactured products of the DN's; stabilize export earnings of these same DN's; increase the volume of transfer of resources to the South; reform access-to-technology procedures; and one will have established an NIEO!

From the viewpoint of the industrialized West, that resembles a poker game between a rich man and a poor man, the poor man saying to the rich man: "You lend me some money and I will play with you; if I win, I keep

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the winnings; if I lose, you cancel my debt." This was, of course, not true, but it is how the Third World's proposal was perceived. It was obvious that a new order could not be erected solely on the basis of the satisfaction of grievances, no matter how legitimate these might be, without taking into account the interdependence of all the political and economic problems outstanding, and, especially, without the partner who is summoned to give ground knowing exactly where that might lead him. Astonishing as this may seem, the international community took 5 years to reach this conclusion! The interdependence and the reform of world economic structures are the key words of the fifth session of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) which will be held in Manila from 7 May to 1 June 1979 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE Nos 958 and 959). Not only is a special point (point 8) given over to "appropriate plans and measures to facilitate structural transformations in the international economy," but the majority of the other points refer to it. There are many reasons for this. From one negotiation to the other, it has been perceived that it was not possible to solve any problem without taking into account the influence it had on all the other sectors. If different formulas were put forward for each question under debate, no overall plan offered a coherent picture of the desired international economy. Everything transpired as though one wanted to change all the parts of a defective motor without knowing whether the spare parts could be joined together to produce a new motor which would work.

As a gross simplification of the packed agenda of the Manila meeting, it may be said that this new proposal provides a degree of interest in the present session. It is, indeed, the only thing of interest in the debate. The enthusiasm and combativeness the Third World formerly showed have in fact given way to disappointment, to a general feeling of weariness engendered by the inanity of the efforts they have heretofore put forth.

This was clearly visible in Arusha (Tanzania) when the Group of 77 met from 6-16 February 1979 to coordinate a common position of the Third World with regard to the problems inscribed on the agenda of the current session of UNCTAD. Only 80 countries out of the 118-odd members that make up the group got around to sending delegates. And, if one excludes the part relating to the Common Fund for the stabilization of staples, which no longer has any purpose since the conclusion, last March, of negotiations concerning it, the "Arusha Program" seems to be wading in a mass of technical details concerning trade, finance, and transport. Thence the impression of a lack of mobility one gets from the Arusha meeting. The goal of the struggle is not as clear and forthright as in the past. And, when the DN's write into their plan of action the necessity, for example, of creating multinational companies on their own behalf, that is enough to baffle the layman, who has been bombarded, into the bargain, by leaks concerning cracks--which exist--in the presumedly united DN front.

However, the picture is not as bleak as it seems at first glance. First, we have recorded an impressive evolution of ideas on essential points:

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interdependence of problems, the global aspect of the economy or geographic interdependence; the need the industrialized countries have of the DN's markets; the existence of solutions for true cooperation between the DN's and the industrialized nations, as the Lome Convention, in spite of its shortcomings, illustrates; and, finally, the utility and possibility of developing economic, financial, and scientific exchange among the DN's. This is considerable progress when one thinks of the groping which has gone on during the last 10 years.

Secondly, a serious and in-depth examination is going to begin, perhaps, after the Manila meeting, into what form a new world economic order might take. For it is useless to continue to plead the interdependence of economic problems (production, industrialization, commercialization, finance and currency) and the interdependence of regions (the needs both sides have of markets, the solidarity of interests and the complexities of multi-lateral relations), while at the same time continuing to reason within the narrow framework of the national economic units. Europe has made progress on this road. But Africa too has begun, since the first of this year, to be interested in a worldwide--albeit splintered--view of the problems of development. In this respect, the contribution of the "Arusha Program" is very important, especially with regard to cooperation among the DN's.

Under these circumstances, the stakes are much higher than during the 1974 proclamation of a new international economic order. For if 1974 was the year of fist-pounding on tables, it is now time for the Third World to contribute effectively to the definition and the establishment of a true new world order.

This is, when all is said and done, the fundamental theme of the Manila Conference, as Gamani Corea, UNCTAD secretary general, emphasized: "The conference should strive to assure: recognition, by the international community, of the vital need to operate transformations in the present structures (of the world economy)...the evolution of rules and principles governing international economic relations and the creation of an appropriate framework of negotiations with a view toward carrying out decisions made in common agreement."

If this triple goal were not reached in Manila, one would then effectively enter upon a period of lack of mobility in the Third World, a period of the accentuation of divergences within it and an aggravation of the world crisis.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BENGUELA RR WOES DISCUSSED, DOUBTS ON REOPENING EXPRESSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jun 79 pp 61, 63

[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Drama of Benguela"]

[Excerpts] Dilolo, Zaire-Angola border, Saturday 11 November 1978--Decorated with Zambian, Angolan and Zairian flags, a heavy train loaded with copper ore started out toward the southwest. Some applause, a deafening noise of squeaking metal: the Benguela railroad was reopened, after more than 3 years of paralysis. Officially at least, for though it seemed obvious that this time the decrepit little train would reach the Angolan port of Lobito without too much mishap, nothing proved that another one could travel this 1,300 kilometers of rail tomorrow.

The three ministers of transport present for the event were doubtlessly not unaware of this: rarely can an inauguration have been so discreet. It is a fact that 6 months later, despite denials and technical meetings, the Benguela railroad is still not operating.

It is a vital artery, but one that has been unuseable since August 1975 and the troubled times of Angolan independence. There is a twofold reason for this. The 90-percent owner of the Benguela railroad, the British company Tanganyika Concessions, which today has become Tanks Consolidated Investment (controlled by a consortium of London banks: Barclay's Rothschild, Baring and Midland Bank), withdrew almost all of its technicians from the line starting in July 1975, and since then has made no dividend distributions to its stockholders. In view of the nonpayment of the company's debts, the Angolan government has refused to nationalize it.

Acts of Sabotage

But there is something more serious: the Benguela railroad traverses, for almost its entire length, provinces (especially Bie and Huambo) which were controlled by UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola, hostile to Agostinho Neto's MPLA) during the civil war of 1975 and where Jonas Savimbi's movement still has sympathizers. From their bases in northern Namibia to which they have withdrawn, the men of UNITA, strong with South African legis-

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tical support, are today carrying out acts of sabotage against the Benguela railroad's installations by small commando groups. The railroad for them is a strategic target of the first importance: so long as it remains paralyzed, there will be proof of their existence in the field.

Imminent Reopening?

On the real reopening of the Benguela railroad depends the existence of a real front line in the face of the white regimes of southern Africa. After declaring for a long time that the railroad was operating normally, and then admitting that it was doing only local traffic, the Luanda authorities are today aware of this necessity. The big military offensive of August-September 1978, which reduced most of the pockets of UNITA resistance inside Angolan territory, was intended mainly to "clean out" the provinces crossed by the Benguela railroad. And in Luanda it is hoped that settlement of the Namibian problem will cut UNITA off from its last support: South Africa.

For 4 months, Cuban assistants have been busy repairing the bridges sabotaged and establishing a surveillance system along the railroad, even if it is impossible to keep a check on the entire 1,300 kilometers of way. Agreements have been made with Belgium and Portugal for training of Angolan railway technicians and with the European Community for the granting of a loan for modernizing the equipment.

On 9 March, at the conclusion of an Angola-Zaire-Zambia tripartite meeting held in Luanda, an "imminent resumption of international traffic" was officially announced. Is this "resumption" really to be believed? The imminent reopening of the Benguela railroad has been announced so many times for 4 years. It depends on many external factors which in fact cover all of the political situation in southern Africa. It will doubtlessly be necessary to wait for more than a little flag-bedecked train before believing that this "Benguela story" has come to an end.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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CABRAL'S ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION--It is reported that Luis Cabral is trying to reconcile the two poet-presidents, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Agostinho Neto. The main thing that the chief of state of Guinea-Bissau must do is persuade his Senegalese counterpart, who refuses to recognize the Luanda regime, which in his eyes is guilty of coming to power by means of the Cubans and of having refused to come to an understanding with UNITA and the FNLA [Angolan National Liberation Front]. Neto, for his part, is said to be willing to forget the support given by Senghor to his enemies. Luis Cabral is counting on the good relations which he maintains with both in order to succeed with this difficult reconciliation. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jun 79 p 28] 11267

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ANGOLA

FLEC OFFICIAL: CABINDA OIL FUNDS USED FOR SUBVERSION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Jun 79 p 1565

[Article: "The Cabinda Opposition Is Trying Hard to Arouse Public Opinion"]

[Text] Francisco Xavier Lubota, who presents himself as the new president of the Front for Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), which is opposed to President Neto's regime, and who declares he was elected to this post (after numerous resignations within the movement) at a general congress last March, is presently striving to "shake the indifference of the Western and African countries." After going to the United States in 1978, Lubota held a press conference in Paris on 30 May. He was then to go to Belgium and Switzerland.

He gave the following details at his press conference in Paris. Of the approximately 300,000 inhabitants of Cabinda, enclaved between Zaire and the Congo, attached administratively to Angola, and considered the "African Kuwait," there are 150,000 refugees living in Zaire, 50,000 in the Congo and 50,000 in the bush, including--according to him--7,000 fighters. On the other hand, there are 8,000 Cuban soldiers in the enclave to protect the installations of the American company Gulf Oil and "perpetuate the Angolan grip" on this oil-rich territory.

"The Gulf Oil Company continues to pay the communist government of Angola more than \$1 million per day for exploitation rights to the oil that it extracts from the Cabindan reserves," Lubota added. "This money," he said, "is used not only to sustain the regime swamped by the Soviet-Cubans, but also to finance the Marxist terrorist activities in all of central and southern Africa. It is a stupid and short-sighted policy."

The president of the FLEC also declared that his movement occupies a third of Cabindan territory (out of a total of 10,000 square kilometers), and that 80 percent of the population is French-speaking and 20 percent is Portuguese-speaking. "The Cabindan people have been anti-Angolan for a long time," he said. "We want our independence and we want to exercise our right to self-determination."

Lubota was accompanied by his chief of staff, Colonel da Costa, who for his part considers that "without the Cubans," Cabinda would have been independent

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for a long time, "even within 15 days." The colonel also declared that the FLEC obtains information "from certain Cuban military personnel who do not want to stay in Cabinda," and that "some deserters are said to have been executed."

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ANGOLA

FNLA OFFICIAL'S SABOTAGE CLAIMS DENIED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 189 11 Jun 79 p 37

[Article by AC: "More Provocations!"]

[Excerpts] Nearly four years ago, under the leadership of the MPLA led by Dr Agostinho Neto, Angola seized its independence. Neither attacks by South African and Zairian forces, nor provocation and sabotage by organizations teleguided, armed, and financed by international imperialism (FNLA, UNITA, FLEC [Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave]) had succeeded in breaking the liberating momentum of the patriotic revolutionary forces.

But while the Angolan regime was consolidating its foundations, developing national reconstruction, and diversifying its international relations, destabilization attempts continued, though never seriously threatening it. South African armed incursions and assaults, air bombardments of the southern border regions, assassination attempts, press campaigns by certain western and African newspapers in the pay of neocolonial regimes: nothing was spared the young Angolan republic.

Thus, too, puppet groups, the identity of whose protectors is very well known, move around all over western capitals, here holding press conferences (Lisbon, Paris, Washington, etcetera), and there interviews, with the aim of proving the effectiveness claimed for their terrorist actions*. Witness the assertions of an FNLA member, Vaal Neto, according to whom his organization is supposed to have attacked oil installations at Soyo, in the province of Zaire (in Angola), and killed five Cuban officers. Now, not only were the installations never attacked, but there is not a single member of the internationalist Cuban forces in that province nor in the entire northern territory of the country.

*After making these statements, Vaal Neto was expelled from Portuguese territory.

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ANGOLA

UNITA PRESENCE IN PARIS MAY MAR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 189 11 Jun 79 pp 41, 42

[Unattributed article: "Paris-Luanda: Clouded Atmosphere"]

[Text] Despite repeated assurances by French diplomatic circles, in particular by Minister of Foreign Affairs Francois-Poncet, to the Angolan ambassador in Paris, Luis d'Almeida, and despite the genuine improvement in relations between the two countries, the case of the UNITA representative in France, John Marques Kakumba, threatens to give rise to fresh difficulties. Indeed, because of his dubious commercial activities in Europe, Kakumba had been expelled from Orly airport upon arrival in France a few months ago. But he came back recently, armed this time with a diplomatic passport, designating him as honorary Senegalese consul to Lichtenstein, with residence in Paris.

When questioned, French authorities asserted that they knew nothing about the matter. But John Marques Kakumba most certainly had arrived in Paris, and had telephoned several friends and acquaintances. His activities continue to be conducted from his "office," 15 avenue Victor Hugo, where a full time secretary is working.

The representative of the puppet organization led by Jonas Savimbi is therefore continuing his activities from Paris, whence he sends communiques to various newspapers and press agencies about the so-called "victories" of his movement, which as everyone knows is financed and armed by the racist South African authorities, with the support of certain African and European governments. This situation justifiably irritates official Angolan circles, who are wondering if President Giscard d'Estaing's official policy is not being thwarted by some of his secret services.

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BENIN

COMMENTS ON FRENCH-BENINESE RELATIONS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp 27-28

[Article by Ginette Cot: "Time to be Realistic: Benin is Not the 'Latin Quarter' or the 'Sick Child' Any More"]

[Text] The official visit of French Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley to the People's Republic of Benin last 7 to 9 May -- a visit rounded off by the first meeting of the French-Beninese grand commission, instituted by the general agreement on cooperation on 27 February 1975 -- certainly marks a turning point in the relations between the two countries.

Relations, as is common knowledge, had seriously deteriorated, especially on the political level, after the imperialist armed assault on Sunday, 16 January 1977, under the leadership of Colonel Bourgeaud, alias Colonel Maurin, alias Bob Denard, in which numerous other French mercenaries took part. It is also remembered how Paris shilly-shallied over agreeing to replace the then ambassador of France to Cotonou, Mr Meadmore, who was involved in organizing the assault that took place, with the complicity of certain states that are vassals of the Elysee.

Even though cooperation between the two states was not broken off, it nevertheless suffered some noteworthy blockages. Now that the People's Republic of Benin is seriously and perseveringly involved in building a solid economic base, and now that proofs abound that the regime installed on 26 October 1972 is deeply rooted among the masses of the people, it seems that the need for a more realistic policy is starting to be understood in Paris.

For, though two years after the mercenaries' landing, anything seems possible once more, it is on one condition: that everything take place with full respect for the road chosen by the People's Republic of Benin and the objectives on which it has decided. Also on condition that the consequences of the 16 January 1977 attack be effaced and reparation made for them, and that Paris have fully learned its lesson from the failure of its gunboat policy and its vain attempts at recolonization.

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Though the People's Republic of Benin concretely confirms its intention of instituting honest, loyal, mutually beneficial cooperation, it is definitely not about to get down on its knees. From the start, in any case, President Kerekou has made a point of setting the tone. And to remove, if indeed any still existed, all ambiguity.

As he received Robert Galley on 8 May, the Beninese head of state was to state, specifically: "There is no question that the relations of friendship and cooperation existing between our two peoples and our two states are very old and are even sometimes tinged with paternalism, which is inadmissible between two sovereign, independent peoples. It is the existence of this paternalism, and its incorrect interpretation which have created among us, in Benin, since our country's accession to nominal independence on 1 August 1960, a situation of political instability, economic stagnation, and socio-cultural alienation."

And it is precisely to put an end to this neocolonial situation, which earned Benin the ironical nicknames of Africa's "Latin Quarter" or "sick child," that the national armed forces intervened on 16 October 1972.

After recalling the attack on 16 January 1977 and the public statements by Bob Denard, who by his own account is preparing to make a fresh strike at the People's Republic of Benin, on the instructions of his masters, President Kerekou emphasized: "In view of the silence of the French authorities concerned, after such statements by a French citizen internationally known as a mercenary, we Beninese wonder if this armed assault for colonial reconquest of our country did not have the moral and material support of certain high ranking authorities in the hierarchy of the French state." It is also noted, President Kerekou recalled, that "all the official steps undertaken by the Beninese government with the French government, with a view to extradition of the French mercenaries, so as to have them tried by the Beninese courts concerned, have not received any favorable response to date."

Economic Projects

Has this speech been heeded?

In any case, the visit by Mr Galley and his delegation has given rise to some meaningful comments. And the first meeting of the "grand commission" has produced some important results. For example, the French intervention program (of which the substantial increase in volume for 1979 and 1980 has been noted) has been stopped, and the principle of pluriannual planning, taking into account future years, has been accepted.

In the domain of economics, several projects have been discussed: extension of the Cotonou-Parakou railroad as far as Niamey, in Niger; extension of the autonomous port of Cotonou, on which work started in May, with 90 per cent participation by France; installation, starting in 1979, of a

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telecommunications ground station that will enable television to cover the whole of the national territory.

In the domains of culture and scientific research, the question of training instructors and researchers -- Benin's priority goal -- and the prospect of interuniversity agreements have been debated, as well as all the issues connected with orientation of the new school. In addition, the means to be implemented for the promotion of human exchanges between the two countries have been specified. The two parties, describing the results achieved as "an important step toward a fresh impetus in the multiform relations woven by history between the two countries," agreed to meet again next year.

A "Most Serious Partner"

It should also be noted that the final communique closing Mr Galley's official visit condemns all armed assaults on African countries and the activities of mercenaries. In addition, after three years' absence from Benin, Michel Van Grevenynghe (former French ambassador to Cotonou, where his attitude had been appreciated) who directed the work of the "grand commission" for the French party, stated that he was struck by the changes that have come about in the country. "Firstly," he said, at a press conference, "the seriousness with which public affairs are conducted is beginning to be noticed. The same concern is noted in the way business is conducted. We consider Benin one of our most serious partners in this respect, and we are very appreciative of this aspect of our relations, knowing that the decisions made by the Beninese authorities are followed by results. We have also noted that the people has set to work, in accordance with the government's wish, along the lines laid down."

This is something that should prompt people yearning for colonial reconquest to be more prudent. But though realism seems to be prevailing in Paris, duplicity in French politics and the dissensions rife in high circles are too well known for people to be swept away by excessive optimism. And, though everyone here rejoices in the new course of things, vigilance is still indispensable. And it is by the evidence of facts and the answers to the questions asked by President Kerekou that people will judge the sincerity of the signs of goodwill exhibited by Paris.

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BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

RAILROAD PROJECT STUDIED--Botswana is seeking a maritime opening on the Namibian coast. A proposal is presently under study for building a rail line between enclaved Botswana and the Atlantic, across the Kalahari desert. Up to now, international traffic has been handled by the South African ports. The Commonwealth fund for technical cooperation would participate in the financing of the project. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jun 79 p 27] 11267

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BURUNDI

PRESIDENT BAGAZA GIVES INTERVIEW TO PARIS MAGAZINE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Jun 79 pp 45-47 LD

[Interview with Burundi President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza by Siradiou Diallo: "Priority to National Unity"--date and place not specified]

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: At the age of 33 you are the youngest African head of state. You may even be the youngest head of state in the world. Is that an advantage or a handicap?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: It all depends on the way you look at it. Given the burdens of the job, youth can be an advantage in that when you are young you have more energy for working, traveling in order to stay in contact with your people and understanding young people. However, there are disadvantages too, if only because you do not have the experience which older heads of state have. There are situations which you do not fully anticipate. Most current problems are the result of former actions or decisions which older heads of state know more intimately than young men like me.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you not rather intimidated when you meet heads of state some of whom are twice your age?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Intimidated? Not exactly. I am more impressed by people like Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor, Giscard d'Estaing.... However, more important than that, I would say that it is not always easy to reach an understanding with older leaders. We do not speak the same language.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What language do they speak?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: They are still speaking the language of the cold war with all the ulterior motives, calculations and distrust which that implies. Some behave as if they were at open or veiled war with the communist world. The others behave in the same way toward the capitalist world. Perhaps they are right. However, it so happens that my generation does not really believe in confrontation between the communist and capitalist worlds. It seems to me that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate more than confront each other now.

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JEUNE AFRIQUE: You do not distrust either communism or capitalism?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: I regard this view of the world as rather old-fashioned. The Soviet Union and the United States no longer confront each other in order to dominate the world. They prefer to discuss with each other and distribute spheres of influence amicably rather than with guns.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Surely one of the reasons for your lack of distrust is that you cannot cherish any supremacist ambitions?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Of course. A small country like ours could not try and dominate anybody. We cannot even try to become leader of a group of African countries, still less of the Third World. We are completely neutral. This is obviously not the case with other countries which cherish, secretly or not, ambitions at regional, African or Third World level. It is understandable that such countries should act as if the cold war were still going on and fight or defend themselves against others. However, since that is not the case with us we will refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn into battles which are not ours. We are and will remain neutral.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: One of the problems facing you is that of national unity. During its 17 years of independence Burundi has experienced a series of tribal-type tragedies. Do you think you have overcome this problem once and for all?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: If I were to say yes you would not believe me, would you? To be honest, this problem has not been solved. We are still a long way from overcoming the scourge of tribalism. We have to have the courage to admit that. These are problems which have lasted for generations and we are trying to solve them gradually. However, you know that with underdevelopment at all levels, including the mental level, the problem is growing worse and more complicated. Therefore it is impossible to be protected from new disturbances.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless tribal antagonism seems to have been overcome at the level of cadres and intellectuals.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Not completely. Cadres and intellectuals who do not have the means of voicing their opinions or who do not dare to say what they think resort to their ethnic group and hide behind tribal antagonism to satisfy their ambitions or assert their viewpoints. Moreover, I think this phenomenon is common to all African countries.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How can Africa overcome this terrible scourge, which is a serious handicap to national unity and economic development?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: It is extremely difficult. Intellectually this problem may seem to be solved or easy to overcome but in practice it is

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not so easy. We need time. I think that national unity can only be forged in the melting pot of a national party. At all events that is what we are trying to do in Burundi. We think the party is the only adequate framework in which all ethnic groups can merge and educate each other to build national unity. Our belief is strengthened by the fact that our party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) has survived all our country's upheavals.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: UPRONA is due to hold a congress soon. It will be the first time that such a congress has been held during your presidency. How much importance do you attach to it?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: This congress will be crucially important. Indeed since we came to power the country has been ruled by a transitional government, the only program being the elements contained in the 20 November 1976 declaration. That shows you the importance we attach to this congress since it will enable the members to express their views on the institutions and the party program and to choose their leaders.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Why are you consulting the members now when you did not do so when you took power?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Unfortunately, it was impossible before. However, we think the time has now come to consult them, to find out what they want and to change things taking their wishes and aspirations into account. After the congress we will emerge from the transitional period with a stronger basis and start following a program and a line defined and accepted by the whole country.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Burundi suffers from a serious handicap: it is landlocked. How are you dealing with this?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: There is no solution to this problem unless we extend our country to the sea! We have neither the means nor the desire to conquer our neighbors! All we can do, and are doing, is to negotiate with them to obtain easier passage for our merchandise across their territories. To this end we are in constant contact not only with our immediate neighbors Rwanda, Zaire and Tanzania but also with Kenya, Uganda and even Angola. We need to cooperate with all these countries because we must diversify our routes,

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you satisfied with the way in which Burundian goods pass through the ports of Mombasa and Dar es-Salaam?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Far from it! We suffer enormous losses due to the fact that the goods which we import sometimes stay in these ports for months and are damaged and sometimes even vanish. The truth is that our Kenyan and Tanzanian neighbors have still not mastered the techniques of storage and management required for running a big merchant port.

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JEUNE AFRIQUE: What was your position during the armed conflict between Uganda and Tanzania?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Naturally we could not remain inactive. If only because we knew that the war was bound to have repercussions on us. Therefore, we sent emissaries to Uganda to try and persuade President Idi Amin to abandon the war and settle his conflict with President Nyerere by negotiation. He did not heed us. When the fortunes of war changed camp we tried the same mediation with President Nyerere. We did not meet with any more success on that occasion. I must say that our economy suffered a great deal from this conflict.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Fortunately it did not last long.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: You think not? The conflict is not yet over for us. The Tanzanian trains which usually transport our goods south are still requisitioned by the Tanzanian army. They are all going north toward the front. We have reason to believe that this will be the case for several more months.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: During the Kigali summit in May Burundi moved from mere observer status to full membership of the Franco-African conference. Why?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: We took this decision as soon as we received the assurance that we could work informally within the conference and that it had no rigid character. Indeed we do not share President Senghor's view that this type of summit should be structured. However we thought it was extremely useful to be able to meet other African leaders on this occasion and exchange ideas and experiences with them, provided the conference did not take the form of a new organization with rigid and constraining rules. This point was conceded to us. That meant that we no longer had any reason to remain an observer. We became a full member of the Franco-African summit. You have to be consistent. It is a question of honesty.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: After years of suspicion and quarrels Belgian-Burundi relations seem to have improved.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: That is correct. Our relations with Belgium are developing well. Before there were suspicions, as is usually the case between ex-colonies and ex-colonisers.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you explain this development?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: You know, in time everything is settled. Perhaps the improvement in our relations can be partly explained by the fact that the old Belgian and Burundi leaders who always saw things in a colonial spirit have vanished from the political scene. I think that the present leaders in both countries are less marked by memories of the colonial period. They have fewer complexes and are less traumatized.

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The Belgian leaders no longer try to impose their way of thinking on us. And we are less sensitive. We now discuss all questions relating to cooperation in a direct and honest way and in a calm and relaxed frame of mind.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is France trying to supplant Belgian influence in your country?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: I do not think so. We cooperate loyally with both countries. But we have never felt that France was trying to seize the lion's share. Moreover, I think France has a lot to do in the countries formerly under its jurisdiction. It is too much in demand in these countries and in Zaire to show much interest in a little country like ours. In France's domination strategy, supposing it has one, Burundi must count for almost nothing.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo recently demanded that the organization should have an armed force in order to be able to intervene more effectively in case of armed conflict between two African states. What do you think of the idea?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: As you know the African states have so far refused to place their arms at the disposal of liberation movements in order to liberate countries still under domination. Similarly nobody is very enthusiastic about the intervention force. I would like the OAU to have one. I think it is useful that our organization should be able to intervene at times. It would be the only way in which it could take effective action in certain stupid conflicts between fraternal states.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: It will not be easy to set up such an army.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: Of course, the means of organization and financing, the conditions governing intervention, command and so forth will have to be discussed. However, I think the OAU has an increasing need for a tool of this type. I think that such an army should exist and be based in a country recognized as neutral and recognized as neutral by everybody so as not to alarm anybody.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you think such an army would have prevented the conflict between Uganda and Tanzania?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: In view of the nature of the conflict it would have been difficult to use such a force. Do not forget that Marshal Amin Dada's regime was special and there were few people who dared defend it openly.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: The Sixth OAU Summit which is to be held in Monrovia in a few weeks' time is likely to be the scene of serious clashes if only because of the Chai conflict and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

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Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: The government installed in N'Djamena could suffer the same fate in Monrovia as it suffered at the Franco-African summit in Kigali. Unless it expands to include the other political elements it is not likely to be accepted.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is Egypt facing the same fate?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: I do not think so. If problems exist Egypt is encountering them in the Arab league but not at African level. Do not forget that the OAU has always supported Egypt. Why should we condemn it now and moreover expel it?

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Some states could ask the OAU to expel Egypt for having signed a separate peace treaty with Israel.

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: No, the Arabs cannot ask that of us. They know how far they can go with us. At most they can ask us not to support Egypt any longer but they cannot ask us to condemn it still less to expel it from the OAU. It is unthinkable.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Will you hand power back to civilians one day?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: That is a classic question! Allow me to tell you that power is indeed in civilian hands. In a government with some 20 members only three are soldiers including myself. The UPRONA party--our country's leadership body--is almost entirely in civilian hands. However, when the time comes we will give them complete power. However, the idea of an army is not quite the same in Europe as in Africa.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: What distinction do you draw between African and European armies?

Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: These two types of army should not be confused. I do not think there are any real armies in Africa. The army as it exists in Europe has a folklore, traditions, a mentality and a behavior which are totally different from civilian life. That is not the case in African armies. There is not and cannot be any real military power in Africa because the Africans do not like military discipline as such. African soldiers cannot form a different class from civilians. That is why any soldier who tries to govern as a soldier without taking account of the civilians or even going against them is doomed to fail. Just look at what happened in Uganda.

JEUNE AFRIQUE: Do you ever intend to organize parliamentary and presidential elections aimed at giving Burundi constitutional leadership bodies?

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Jean-Baptiste Bagaza: After the party congress which we intend to hold between now and the end of this year there will certainly be elections, I think that the Burundi people will be asked to choose their president and deputies freely by next year. Therefore, the country will have normal democratic institutions. Believe me we are seriously contemplating an election. It will be carried out without delay and without trickery.

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CAPE VERDE

CAPE VERDE PRIME MINISTER GRANTS INTERVIEW

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp 38-39LD

[Augusta Conchiglia Interview with Cape Verde Prime Minister Pedro Pires:
"Our Political Action Will Always Be Influenced by the Thought of Our Party's
Founder Amilcar Cabral"--date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] What stage has the process of unification with Guinea-Bissau
reached?

Pedro Pires: At the Second Intergovernmental Conference which was held at
the beginning of the year we took a number of decisions aimed at working
together to plan our future. These decisions related in particular to con-
crete aspects such as the development plan of each country which should
promote a growing economic complementarity. Despite progress in air and
sea links, trade is still difficult. In both countries production is low
and there is a lack of commercial activity. However, we are trying to over-
come these problems because the conditions for complementarity do exist. At
the moment we import wood from Guinea and export salt and bananas to it.

At a government and party level, however, exchanges have developed--all
ministries have permanent joint commissions and we are, furthermore, con-
sidering the possibility of jointly recruiting technicians. Guinean farmers
have been visiting Cape Verde to exchange information. Our respective mass
organizations and our institutions, including our national assemblies, keep
in touch. We must consider the process of the formation of such unity. But
we must neither progress too fast nor proceed inordinately slowly. The rate
and form of progress in this direction will undoubtedly be determined by the
coordination of the two countries' economic development.

[Question] Have relations with other former Portuguese colonies now been
established on bases more concrete than in the past?

Pedro Peres: We believe that is in the interest of all concerned to main-
tain a special relationship among all of us. Obviously, there are many
affinities between us which are a result of our joint history as Portuguese
colonies--especially the adoption of the same official language--and, above
all, of the fact that we have fought against a common enemy at the same time.

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Furthermore, close personal relations exist among militants and leaders of our countries which go back to the beginnings of the anticolonialist struggle movement.

The leaders of former Portuguese colonies will soon meet to discuss whether it would be advisable to create a joint organization. We do not support this idea, because I personally believe that even though it is in the interest of all of us to unite, a permanent coordination organization of this kind would not be viable. Even though it is quite obvious that we should develop our economic and political relations, it is more obvious that we should all retain independent views. We believe that these relations are even more fundamental because they should be seen in the present context which is marked by a search for a new world economic order. We believe that in this context we must start by insuring cooperation among Third World Countries. It is with this end in mind that we maintain good relations with our neighbors--Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Niger and so forth.

We developing countries suffer from a complex--we try to obtain everything we need from developed countries. But it seems obvious to me that we could fulfill many of our needs by developing cooperation among ourselves. Let there be no mistake about this and let no one assume that we do not want to take advantage of mankind's achievements wherever they have taken place. On the contrary, we are especially conscious of the fact that international cooperation is of great importance for our development. This has been demonstrated by the fact that we maintain relations with most countries in the world.

[Question] It is true that your foreign policy is very dynamic and that you have developed cooperation links with most countries....

Pedro Pires: It is the international prestige achieved by the RAIGC during the liberation war which has facilitated our task. Furthermore, we have received considerable aid because we have been able to convince our interlocutors of our fundamental lack of resources which has been aggravated by the long period of drought from which our country has suffered. We have tried to further increase our party's prestige by utilizing rationally and honestly means placed at our disposal. Finally, we also believe that there is no reason why we should reject any aid from any government provided no political conditions are attached to it.

[Question] Are you nonetheless not afraid that neocolonialism could be extended under the cover of international cooperation. At least by means of dependence in the technological sphere?

Pedro Pires: Such a danger will undoubtedly exist until we become economically independent. Progress toward the stage of complete independence has not yet reached the point of no return. However, we are waging a struggle

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for the country's liberation, and we fully realize how diverse the mechanisms of foreign domination can be. Furthermore, we must insure that the country does not suffer as a result of cultural influences exerted by economic systems inconsistent with the interests of the people. And the liberation struggle must be waged with the knowledge that interdependence among different countries is increasing daily. However, we must know how to control it and insure that it does not affect the personality and options of all concerned.

[Question] From which countries do most of the cooperants come?

Pedro Pires: Definitely from Portugal, with whom we maintain very good relations in many sectors, principally the economic, commercial and cultural fields; the same is true for technical assistance.

[Question] An OAU commission will soon be reviewing the situation deriving from the landing of South African planes at the Sal International Airport...

Pedro Pires: The OAU commission is supposed to propose to us some solutions which constitute an alternative to the present situation. It is widely known that the airport is practically the only source of revenue for the Island and that it is vital to it in present circumstances. If the OAU would be able to compensate us for the financial losses resulting from our breaking the existing contract with the South African Airline, we are ready to renounce these agreements, which, at any rate, have been inherited from the time of the Portuguese colonization.

Our country is very poor, we are not ashamed to admit it, but it is this poverty which mandates our policy. We have even discussed this issue with a representative of the South African Liberation Movement, the ANC [African National Congress] with which, needless to say, we maintain good relations. And he understood our reasons....

However, we make it a point of proclaiming that Pretoria will never impose its conditions on Cape Verde, no matter what their nature.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

FRANCE SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION REGARDING BOKASSA

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp 25-26

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "The Bankruptcy of the Bloody Emperor"]

[Text] "Papa Bok" the Amin Dada of the French speakers is accused by Africa and with him all his supporters and protectors...

Finally exposed in broad daylight, after the revelations of Amnesty International about the "bloody night" of April and the resignation of Sylvestre Bangui, ambassador of the Central African Empire, Bokassa's record appears overwhelming. The readers of AFRIQUE-ASIE will be the last to be surprised*: Since its foundation, their publication has reported--with mixed feelings of shame and anger--the comic or bloody escapades of a dictator who is following in the footsteps of Amin Dada and who allows the western media to cultivate a simplistic image of Africa, halfway between the ridiculous and the uncivilized.

It is an old story: Jean Bedel Bokassa, enlisted at 18 years of age in the colonial army, holder of 15 French decorations after the 1939-1945 war and battles in Indo-China, rose in the ranks in the Central African Republic, until he became chief of staff, then--by means of a coup d'etat in 1965--president of a small country, to be sure, landlocked and poor, but which seemed destined for a better fate, if it had not been saddled with such a dreadful leader.

Previously, then as today, Paris was behind Bokassa and "Papa Bok" repays it well. De Gaulle is his father and he mourns

*See more particularly AFRIQUE-ASIE Nos 79, 125, 135, 145 and 183

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his disappearance; Pompidou will be his "friend"; Giscard is now his cousin or his "relative." Jean Bedel Bokassa remained a French "patriot" as they no longer exist today in the mother country; he kept his French nationality; he bought for himself, thanks to sums appropriated from the state budget, a chateau at Villemorant, in Sologne, a villa on the Cote d'Azur and a cafe restaurant in Loir-et-Cher. In spite of a few trivial misunderstandings, he does not conceive of another major ally for his country than the old colonial power, promoted all at once to adviser, military overseer and provider for the Central African budget's difficult last days of the month. Finally when the former Quartermaster sergeant--who became "marshall" meanwhile--got the idea of being crowned "emperor," it is in France again that he sought his model: Napoleon, his eagles, his uniforms, his calashes, his court etiquette!...

France's patience with its Central African protege has never flagged: it has ignored all the scandals: from the "bloody ball of Bangui" in August 1972, to the January and April 1979 massacres; from the successive failures of an economy and a budget drained by the unbridled excesses of the emperor or his court (who are all good businessmen) to the extravagant expenditures of the coronation. Paris which already supplies the country with 12 billion CFA francs annually, by way of official cooperation, has never failed to distribute, in addition, gifts to maintain friendship--for example, a "Super-Caravelle" in 1976 immediately christened "the Baraka of 13 April"; or 100 vehicles and 35 horses brought by plane in 1977 for the coronation; and especially France never fails to pay the debts at the right time, so that the officials, military or paymasters do not rebel against their master, who is slow in paying their salaries.

President Giscard d'Estaing, "honorary citizen of the CAR" moreover had selected Bangui to organize there his first trip to Africa as chief of state. He took advantage of it--as he did before for 10 days in August 1978--to hunt big game or elephants on the Ndele Reserve, pretending he does not understand the many gibes, which these repeated safaris of another age bring him in France. And when the French newspapers spoke out in December 1977 to criticize the pomp and absurd expense of the coronation, a cooperation minister appeared to tell them that "criticizing this ceremony was practicing racism."

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Silence and Discretion

But there is something else: The Central African Empire, however ridiculous it may be, has deposits of diamonds and especially uranium. It also has a frontier with constantly unstable countries: Chad, Zaire. It is quite useful to France that the emperor has approved, in recent years, from the recesses of his Napoleonic palace, all the French government's belligerent campaigns in Africa, beginning with the Kolwezi, "cleanup" operation.

It is affirmed in diplomatic and military circles that Bangui-- which was, like the former Fort Lamy, one of the bases of the French Army under colonization--could resume this role of a stop on the royal highway of interventions, which runs from Europe to southern Africa, passing through Zaire.

All these reasons are enough to explain that aside from a few isolated publications, like ours, it was possible to enjoin silence. The emperor's escapades were the price to pay, in the best of cases, for maintaining a presence: it was suggested to the foreigners on the spot that they attribute it to a congenital madness of the Africans, all a little bit extravagant, is it not so? As for the rest, it was enough to control communications channels: watch the telex; increase the surveillance of cooperation workers, students and officials; regularly purge local reporters; expel possible press correspondents...All that is one of the easiest assignments for specialists.

Thus after the imposing pageantry of the coronation in December 1977, a veil of modesty again covered the former Central African Republic. One wanted to forget how Jean Bedel had flogged some thieves himself in August 1972, before forcing the crowd to file past their corpses, or how he treated Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary General--who was astonished at these manners--" of a pimp, farmer and imperialist." For Marshall Bokassa, future emperor, like Amin Dada, was adept at ambiguous language, when it suited him: He also condemned "the western exploiters," when the opportunity appeared, even having the French Embassy in Bangui stoned one day, and taking his part in a rather unexpected campaign of insults against Jacques Foccart, former chief of the Gaullist "unofficial secret agents." Nevertheless he took cover under the European umbrella. He sent commercial missions to South Africa and sucked the blood of his people as few wicked foreign capitalists know how to do!

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One wanted to forget the succession of governments, constantly modified; the anarchy in assigning portfolios, where Bokassa had gone as far as to take upon himself six departments, in addition to his supreme responsibilities; the appointment as prime minister of the celebrated Mrs Elizabeth Domitien (150 kilograms, numerous plantations after her marriage to a European settler) and her departure--after she had advised "Papa" against becoming emperor, as he began to conceive the idea in 1976.

One had to handle adroitly financial disasters of all types: embezzlements, commitments for fantastic expenditures, corruption etc.--to the point where Bokassa had gone so far as to publish big notices in the European press with his signature, warning the public that Central African diplomats should not be believed on their word, when they mentioned money and that he himself had decided to personally sign all checks involving the state or a nationalized company! It was necessary to wink at the president's chaotic family situation: at the true and false "Martine" from Vietnam; "Prince George," his grandson expelled from the country, only a week after being appointed minister of state; or at his thirtieth legitimate child, immediately baptised "Prince Saint-Jean de Bokassa de Berengo de Bobangui of Central Africa," at the same time that a holiday was decreed in his honor!

The Bloody Weekend

It was advisable to cover up the attempted assassinations (including the one organized by the battalion chief, Okrou, his own son-in-law in February 1976) and the imprisonment of ministers. It was also better to forget that, converted ostentatiously to Islam at the end of 1976 and taking on that occasion the name of Salah Eddine (fighter for the faith), he had given up this name the following year, for reasons of imperial expediency--"Salah I" not being Napoleonic enough--and how he afterwards got involved in the shady dealings of a former Israeli general who became all-powerful in Bangui.

It was even suggested to forget the coronation itself, whose retroactive splendor compared with the agonies of the daily lives of his imperial majesty's subjects, had seemed all the same outrageous to most observers. And it was advised to overlook with it, the etiquette of the court of Berengo, the series of imperial decrees, the "dual government" (which indicated a difficult arrangement between the "emperor's "advisers" and the remaining ministers in Bangui).

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But the secondary school students, whose freedom of expression was feared as well as that of the common people, and whom their emperor always considered a pack of scoundrels, kindly remembered themselves to the dictator and managed to get some publicity abroad.

Last January was a weekend of riots. The regime found itself openly defied, for the first time, in its "imperial capital," because it had forced the secondary students to wear a uniform which would distinguish them from the nonstudents--that is, from the street loafers. "Le Paysan" Supermarket and the textile products company--belonging to Bokassa or "Empress Catherine"--were attacked, as well as several French establishments. To restore order, Bokassa requested the intervention of Mobutu, his Zairian ally, who sent to Bangui a company of the 301st Paratroop Regiment with its cadre of French advisers. When the emperor's troops were confined to barracks because they had run out of ammunition, the Zairian paratroopers cleared the city with mortar fire, producing who knows how many victims and who will ever know? Mobutu, "brother" of the emperor came to repay him for his favor of the previous year: had not Bokassa sent a contingent to Shaba, called the Inter-African Neocolonial Force to support Zaire...

During this period, silence or almost silence reigned in Paris. It would be the same in April after the "bloody night": at least 30 children or students were stoned to death; 20 were suffocated.

Several weeks were necessary for clear evidence to surface: the young people were arrested at random; Bokassa went to the Ngaraba central prison, etc. Questioned closely during the Franco-African Conference in Kigali, the emperor denied everything: "I am a great Christian, baptised at Frejus, confirmed in Lourdes...Moreover, my people raised me to the high rank of marshall, then emperor...Marxism-Leninism wants to destroy my empire..."

But the regime was already splitting dangerously. France, the Ivory Coast and Senegal--leaders of the moderates had to allow an investigative committee in Bangui. The Paris government promised to temporarily freeze military aid to the empire to appease French public opinion. And Ambassador Sylvestre Bangui, whose resignation created an uproar, travels all over Africa to explain why he decided, in his turn--and although belatedly--to join the opposition. Meanwhile, a possible alternative solution is being studied in the quiet of the Elysee offices. One is never too discreet...

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

SYLVESTRE BANGUI SAID TO SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Jun 79 p 16

[Article by J.M.Z.: Sylvestre Bangui: What Now ?]

[Text] "Mon general, bravo!" cried all the Central Africans living abroad. Finally! a representative of his majesty, Sylvestre Bangui, said no. The Zola-style "I accuse" fell like a bomb just when agreement had been reached to say that the Bokassa affair had dominated the French-African summit at Kigali.

The stage was undoubtedly set. Shortly after the coup d'etat in 1966, the Central African monarch, then a colonel, less and less tolerated the presence of his companion in arms, then quartermaster of the armed forces. Unable to place his Quartermaster under arrest, Bokassa opened an embassy for him in Ottawa. Later Sylvestre Bangui, promoted to the rank of general, would learn what "diplomatic exile" was, far from public or private affairs. Although sidelined, the ambassador remained loyal to the Bokassa regime.

What is it today that is driving the man who is just a former Central African ambassador and the new leader of the Ubangi Liberation Front which he himself founded? Is the former diplomat getting ready to go underground?

While many have applauded the initiative of Sylvestre Bangui, it is also true that there is surprise in some Central African circles over his "on the whole moderate, even contradictory" intentions vis-a-vis crown. It is true that whereas the ambassador has sharply condemned the repeated murder of children, he has still not called upon the emperor to step down. "I favor a constitutional monarchy," he has said. But the empire already has a constitution under which Bokassa should be a constitutional monarch. Isn't the ambassador merely demanding that the constitution, heretofore ignored, be enforced, or are there other motives involved? According to some Central African oppositionists, Mr Bangui's position might give Bokassa the chance to make overtures--which would still not mean much of a retreat--enable the ambassador to reap the benefits.

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One might also consider another theory under which the restoration of the constitutional monarchy would sanction setting the emperor gently aside and bringing to a conclusion the abolition of the empire. France would not be hostile to the latter solution, which would preserve its interests in Central Africa and might satisfy its other allies on the continent.

Sylvestre Bangui plans to visit the African heads of state. Will he receive encouragement? There is little likelihood that the wisemen of Africa will give him their endorsement. In the African tradition, the preference is for things to be handled in the family. Too visible an effort abroad in Africa would be regarded with disfavor.

In the midst of all this confusion, what has become of the men whose names circulate as possible candidate?: Yangango Maidou (prime minister), Malendoma (member of the board of directors of Air Afrique), Ange Patasse (former prime minister)? Will they accept Mr Bangui's leadership? For the moment, none of them has said. But perhaps other initiatives will occur to eclipse the "bomb" dropped by Bokassa's former ambassador.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE

FOREIGN REAL ESTATE OWNED BY BOKASSA NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Jun 79 p 14

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Retrests for an Emperor"]

Text In 1968, 2 years after his coup d'etat, when Jean-Bedel Bokassa met General de Gaulle, he asked for two things: the Legion of Honor and a bistro on the Riviera. De Gaulle refused him both despite their modesty. This has not prevented Bokassa, after appropriating almost everything in Central Africa, from making his fortune in France.

He has four homes there: El Patio, a luxurious villa on the Riviera; the Bel Air, a huge home near Romarantin; a villa in Yvelines; and last but not least the Villemorant chateau in Sologne, a veritable museum piece surrounded by hunting grounds. Bokassa always goes there with great pomp and at times is surprised not to find a French Government minister on hand when he gets off his plane to go to Tours. It is near there in the village of Neung-sur-Beuvron that Bokassa has decided to live and in early 1979 bought a cafe-bar-restaurant, the Montangue.

He also has several properties in Switzerland in the region of Berne where he owns the embassy itself, plus a large building in Khartoum in Sudan. These properties enable him to lead an extravagant life.

The Super Caravelle bearing his name (he also has a Corvette decorated by Hermes and a Mystere 20) often flies between Bangui and Paris. Bokassa's chef comes regularly to shop in the Rungis markets (caviar and salmon by dozens of kilos, champagne by hundreds of cases). To recover his expenses, the emperor offers travelers half-price fares on the imperial line. Departure dates are announced over the imperial radio.

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ETHIOPIA

REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY SITUATION IN 1977 AND EARLY 1978

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Jun 79 pp 1615-1617

[Text] The recent quarterly bulletins of the National Bank of Ethiopia yield basic elements in the situation of the country in 1977 and, for certain sectors, during the first few months of 1978.

The population of Ethiopia was estimated at 30 million inhabitants for 1977, a year which was difficult on the political level and was characterized economically by a deficit in the balance of payments which, for the three preceding years, had showed a surplus.

Despite a favorable export situation, thanks to the high price levels reached by coffee on the world market, this deficit is the result of the state of war which led to a drop in production, disruption of the main foreign transportation routes, a reduction in investments and finally, increased financial needs which could not be met except through recourse to bank credit, the source of the rise in prices and the increase in the monetary mass.

On these two points, the situation did not yet seem to have been improved in the first quarter of 1978, while it was too early to estimate the trend in the balance of payments.

In addition, the damage caused by the war was estimated at the beginning of 1978 at one billion birr for the Harrar region alone.

The most recent economic accounts for Ethiopia are those for the 1975-1976 fiscal year (1 July 1975-30 June 1976). They show negative growth for the domestic products at current prices in 1974-1975 and a slight resumption of growth in 1975-1976.

* On December 31, 1977, an SDR [Special Drawing Right] was equivalent to 2.533 birr or 5.715 French francs, and that 1 birr was equivalent to about 2.25 francs.

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Gross National Product at Current Prices
(In millions of birr)

	1973-1974	1974-1975	1975-1976
At factor costs.....	5150.8	5103.5	5588.1
Annual growth rate (%)... +	11	- 0.7	+ 9.5
At market prices.....	5514.8	5997.7	6040.8

At constant prices, using 1960-1961 as a base, the situation is comparable, but the per capita gross national product is far from the maximum reached in 1972-1973: 150.1 birr.

Gross National Product at Constant Prices (1960-1961)
(In millions of birr)

	1973-1974	1974-1975	1975-1976
At factor costs.....	3936	3939.5	4047.6
By category:			
Agriculture, forestry, fishing.....	1940.1	1905.6	1964.1
Other productions.....	633.7	624.3	605.8
Distribution.....	612.7	611.6	630.5
Other services.....	749.5	801	846.9
At factor costs per capita	148.7	145.4	145.6

Farm Production

Farm production accounted for 48.5 percent of this last gross national product figure. On the whole it has failed to increase because of circumstances; after several years, want continues to prevail in the Wollo (Dessie) following the 1977 drought, affecting a half-million peasants. The insufficiency of food production and the precarious nature of transport facilities have been among the causes of the cost of living increase.

Coffee production, after reaching a maximum of 109,000 tons in 1975 (coffee inspected by the Coffee and Tea Development and Marketing Authority) suffered its most serious drop in 1977. There was recovery in 1977-1978, with the considerable increase in prices during the first half of 1977 being followed by a drop which became even more notable at the beginning of 1978, as the table below shows.

* The assessment of exportable production by the International Coffee Organization showed 62,900 tons for 1976-1977, 79,900 tons for 1977-1978, with an estimate of 75,900 tons for 1978-1979.

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	Coffee Subject to Inspection (in tons)	Exports (in tons)	Average Price Per Kilogram (in birr)
1974.....	80,324	55,666	--
1975.....	73,674	55,363	2.68
1976.....	80,123	71,425	5.56
1977.....	71,589	49,960	10.81
1st Quarter 1977.....	39,878	30,121	10.8 (See
1st Quarter 1978.....	58,891	40,432	8.6 Note)

NOTE: Average price for first quarter.

Sugar production remained more stable than coffee production, but exports were considerably reduced in 1977, while imports remained very weak as before.

	Production Sacked (in thousands of tons)	Exports
1974.....	120.5	9.7
1975.....	124.9	23.9
1976.....	124.8	15.8
1977.....	124.7	4.7
1st Quarter 1977.....	46.3	1.6
1st Quarter 1978.....	51.2	--

An agreement was signed with Havana calling for the building of new sugar mills and the training of Ethiopian personnel in Cuba.

Cotton production on the state farms was considered good in 1977-1978, and the production estimate was 62,400 tons, a figure in excess of the needs of the local plants, assessed at 21,000 tons of cotton fiber.

There is no indication given as to other types of production, but the reference to exports of certain farm products shows the decline seen since 1974, except for oil cake for cattle, as the result of the increase in domestic grinding activity.

Exports of Ethiopian Farm Products
(In tons)

	1973-1974	1976-1977
Sesame Seed.....	84,174	18,558
Leguminous Crops (lentils, beans).....	143,886	75,465
Cotton Fiber.....	6,364	2,791
Oil Cake for Cattle.....	68,743	94,733
Hides and Leather.....	11,801	8,114

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The Manufacturing Industry

Other production categories accounted for 15 percent of the gross national product in 1975-1976. Among these categories, manufacturing production accounted for only 4.2 percent, craft production and the small and medium-sized enterprises for 4.7 percent, construction and public works for 4.9 percent, and water and electricity for 1.2 percent. The central statistical office of the Ethiopian government established an index of manufacturing production activity, with the base year 1969-1970 equal to 100. Its development and that of certain categories was as follows:

	1974-1975	1975-1976	1976-1977
Index of manufacturing production as a whole.....	127.4	124.4	124.4
Including:			
Food Industries.....	144.6	126.8	129.9
Textile Industries.....	120.7	126.5	118.2
Chemical Industries.....	125.0	113.9	120.5
Construction Materials.....	104.8	66.7	88
Metals.....	93.9	76.5	86.6

The majority of the industries, according to the June 1977 index, held steady (textiles) or showed a decline (above all, chemical industries), except for leather and beverages. A number of industrial projects, in particular in the textile, oil and soap, flour milling and food pastes and paper pulp sectors, were in the process of completion.

Electricity production increased gradually, above all that from water sources (in millions of kilowatt hours):

	Total Production	From Water Sources
1975.....	391.0	311.7
1976.....	408.9	363.0
1977.....	427.6	374.8
1st Quarter 1977.....	104.4	91.9
1st Quarter 1978.....	108.8	95.0

Consumer Prices

The index of retail consumer prices in Addis Ababa increased substantially beginning in 1975, but showed a relatively limited rate of growth in 1977.

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Retail Price Index in Addis Ababa (1963 = 100)

	Average Annual Index	Variation (%)
1974.....	159.7	--
1975.....	170.1	+ 6.5
1976.....	218.7	+28.5
1977.....	254.9	+16.6

The cost of food products was the main cause of this increase, as the index for the month of December for the three last years shows.

	General Index	Food	Housing	Clothing
December 1975.....	185.8	197.2	191.9	197.0
December 1976.....	236.6	270.9	233.0	207.4
December 1977.....	270.8	303.8	293.2	230.6
June.....	291.9	338.7	287.7	241.3
Percentage variation between December 1977 and June 1978	+ 7.8	- 12.4	- 2.1	+ 4.6

The difficulties in transportation, particularly where the Djibouti railroad was concerned, aggravated the capital's supply problems. However, intervention by the cooperatives and the state, as well as strengthened price control, contributed to reducing the increase at the end of 1977.

Foreign trade

According to the customs statistics, the foreign trade balance beginning in 1975 was not favorable, but an improvement occurred in 1977 thanks to coffee prices.

Ethiopia's Foreign Trade
(In millions of birr)

	Imports CIF	Exports FOB	Balance
1974.....	590.2	547.3	- 42.9
1975.....	647.9	648.4	- 179.5
1976.....	729.5	572.8	- 156.7
1977.....	727.8 (excluding	688.6	- 39.2
1st five months of 1977...	322.8 crude oil	311.2	- 11.6
1st five months of 1978...	273.0 imports)	248.7	- 24.3

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Imports by main sectors were as follows, taking into account that oil products must be subjected to an adjustment beginning in 1977:

	1975	1976	1977
	(in millions of birr)		
Oil products.....	141.5	110.9	40.3
Textiles and clothing.....	46.5	77.2	119.1
Automotive vehicles.....	75.3	90.1	96.2
Machines (including aircraft).....	76.8	127.7	80.3
Electrical equipment.....	30.5	35.0	53.9
Metals and metal products.....	44.9	35.8	50.8
Chemical products.....	96.3	78.6	54.6
Food products (including animal products and beverages).....	27.2	42.6	39.9
Other products.....	112.8	131.6	193

Despite the situation in agriculture, imports of food products remained relatively minor. In 1977, on the other hand, we see a substantial increase in textile imports to meet the urgent needs of the population. There was also an increase in electrical equipment, metals (because of the resumption of construction), and vehicles, and a decrease where machines (the airplane purchases having been made in 1976) and chemical products were concerned.

The trend for the first five months of 1978 was comparable, but showed a recovery in imports of machinery.

The countries of origin of the imported goods were widely diversified, with Japan, Italy and the United States in the leading positions.

Value of Imports by Ethiopia by Country of Origin
(In millions of birr)

	1975	1976	1977
Japan.....	75.9	91.3	128.6
Italy.....	69.0	64.5	81.1
United States.....	47.3	76.3	73.5
FRG.....	63.1	64.8	65.6
United Kingdom.....	48.8	46.9	46.7
South Korea.....	2.1	2.6	33.5
Rest of the world.....	341.7	387.1	298.2
Total.....	647.9	729.5	727.8

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Eastern Asia, including Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and Singapore, as well as the two countries listed accounted for 27.5 percent of the imports in 1977.

The contribution of Saudi Arabia is not shown in this table, because while it already came to 29.5 million birr in 1977, it will doubtless have to be increased when the adjustment on the value of oil products has been calculated.

French sales to Ethiopia came to 16.5 million birr in 1977, as compared to 27.6 in 1975 and 16 in 1976. France ranked ninth, after Holland.

The CEMA countries increased their sale in 1977 (26.8 million birr as compared to 24.2 in 1976), the USSR and Czechoslovakia being the main suppliers.

Coffee has for a long time been the leading export in terms of value, accounting for 75.4 percent of the total exports in 1977. All of the products exported were farm products, the main ones being as follows:

	1975	1976	1977
	(In millions of birr)		
Green coffee.....	152.3	324.6	519.3
Hides and leather.....	34.4	55.4	47.4
Leguminous products.....	64.8	55.8	43.4
Oleaginous grains.....	84.9	31.2	17.5
Oral cake for cattle.....	5.6	10.8	9.4
Fruits and vegetables.....	7.5	7.7	7.5

Sugar, live animals and grains practically ceased to be exported in 1977. In the first five months of 1978, the situation was similar, with an increase in the exports of hides and leather, but a very substantial reduction in exports of fruit and vegetables, because of the interruption of railroad transportation.

The countries to which these exports were consigned are very numerous, because of the very wide range of nations which are consumers of Ethiopian Arabica coffee. The GDR thus moved up to the position of Ethiopia's second most important customer, after the United States, in 1977, but it no longer appeared on the list of consignees for the first quarter of 1978.

France purchased goods worth 21.2 million birr from Ethiopia in 1977 (11.7 in 1975 and 20.5 in 1976), including coffee worth 12.7 million and hides and leather worth 2.7 million.

Exports to the CEMA countries totaled 104.8 million birr. Excluding the GDR and its exceptional purchase of coffee, these countries, led by Poland, were mainly interested in hides and leather.

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Value of Ethiopian Exports by Country of Destination
(In millions of birr)

	1975	1976	1977
United States.....	93.2	189.4	177.5
GDR.....	--	--	99.8
FRG.....	57.0	35.1	59.4
Saudi Arabia.....	63.6	43.0	59.5
Japan.....	40.3	40.2	47.9
Italy.....	20.8	40.0	33.2
Djibouti.....	53.5	49.4	33
Rest of the world.....	140.0	175.7	178.3
Total.....	468.4	572.8	688.6

Ethiopia's trade with other African nations accounted for only 2.3 percent of the import total in 1977 and 7.2 percent of the export total. The situation can be assessed from the following table.

Ethiopian Trade with Other African Nations
(Main countries involved, in millions of birr)

	Total	Djibouti	Kenya	Egypt	Mauritius	Malawi
1975						
Imports.....	14.2	0.9	8.8	0.1	--	1.5
Exports.....	108.6	53.5	8.9	41.9	0.4	--
1976						
Imports.....	10.5	1.4	8.3	0.3	--	--
Exports.....	78.5	49.4	0.3	29.6	2.3	--
1977						
Imports.....	16.9	1.3	11.8	0.3	--	1.2
Exports.....	49.5	33.0	1.3	10	0.9	--

Thus we can see an increase in the weak flow of imports from Kenya and difficulty in maintaining a profitable export flow to the Republic of Djibouti and Egypt. This situation seems to have deteriorated further in the course of the first quarter of 1978, particularly with regard to trade with Djibouti.

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ETHIOPIA

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY SITUATION REPORTED FOR 1977 AND EARLY 1978

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 pp 1681, 1682

[Text] Continued from preceding issue.

The Balance of Payments

In 1977, after three years of surplus, Ethiopia faced a significant deficit in the balance of foreign payments. This is shown in the following table:

Ethiopia's Balance of Foreign Payments			
(In Millions of Birr)			
	1975	1976	1977
Goods and services.....	-178.8	-199.7	-287.7
Merchandise.....	- 88.7	-132.9	-173.7
Services (transportation, lending, travel, etc.).....	-106.8	-104.3	-135.1
Investment income.....	- 24.1	- 3.2	- 6.9
Governmental transactions.....	+ 40.8	+ 40.7	+ 20.6
Net transfers.....	+ 82.7	+131.0	+114.0
Movements of capital.....	+129.7	+111.8	+ 68.1
Long term.....	+148.3	+138.3	+ 71.5
Short term.....	- 18.6	- 26.5	- 7.4
Errors and Omissions (net).....	- 26.2	- 13.1	- 28.2
Balance.....	+ 7.4	+30.0	-133.8

Despite the favorable situation of coffee, exports of which were not sufficient to compensate for increased imports, the deficit in the balance of

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trade increased, at a time when contributions of foreign capital were appreciably diminishing, as well as transfers from abroad.

The general situation was obviously aggravated, which disrupted transportation and decreased production. In 1978 an effort was made to increase coffee exports and diversify its destinations, and on the other hand to decrease non-essential imports; in that way the balance of visible transactions was to be improved.

In 1977 the situation brought a decrease of 136,700,000 Birr in foreign holdings (-20.6 percent). For fiscal year 1977-1978 the decrease was larger: 332,800,000 Birr (42.3 percent).

The Monetary Situation

Available information makes it possible to analyze the monetary situation for the period 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978. As for the other tropical African countries of the Northern Hemisphere, the final quarter of the calendar year is the most active, taking into account as it does the harvests and purchases by producers.

Fiscal year 1977-1978 was characterized, in relation to the year before, by a significant increase in actual currency (+19.2 percent), chiefly due to the circulation of paper money (23.1 percent) and to a lesser extent to demand deposits. The total monetary assets thus increased by 14.6 percent, and this situation is due to the fact that following monetary operations carried out from September 1976 to January 1977 an appreciable shrinking of those assets occurred. The situation in December 1976 caused these data to appear:

By virtue of duplicate currency, domestic credit substantially increased in 1977-1978, by 49.9 percent, whereas foreign reserves, for the National Bank as well as for commercial banks, decreased.

Growth of Monetary Assets From June 1976 to June 1978

(In Millions of Birr)

	Paper Money Circulation	Demand Deposits	Total Currency	Quasi Currency	Monetary Assets
End of June 1976....	810.2	282.6	1,092.8	329.0	1,421.8
End December 1976...	547.7	235.0	809.7	449.9	1,259.6
End of June 1977....	696	299.7	996.3	471.6	1,467.9
End December 1977...	769.4	215.6	985.0	473.2	1,458.2
End of June 1978....	857.3	329.9	1,187.2	495.0	1,682.2

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Duplicate Currency				
(Credit: 1. To Government; 2. Private; 3. Total; 4. Net Foreign Holdings)				
(In Millions of Birr)				
	1	2	3	4
End of June 1976....	407.5	487.8	895.3	736.2
End December 1976...	445.1	494.7	942.1	649.3
End of June 1977....	443.1	525.0	968.1	786.6
End December 1977...	605.6	572.0	1,177.6	515.6
End of June 1978....	766.3	685.2	1,451.5	453.8

Thus there is a strong expansion of credit to the government, 731,300,000 of which was granted by the National Bank on 30 June 1978, to make up 78.7 percent of the total.

The credit operations of the commercial banks, excluding those dealing with government documents, were distributed as follows, according to economic sectors, on 30 June 1977: domestic trade, 99,900,000 Birr; industry, 78,100,000 Birr; agriculture, 54,400,000 Birr; building and public works, 77,100,000 Birr; personal loans, 8,800,000 Birr; foreign trade, 232,600,000 Birr (including exports, 109,500,000; imports, 123,100,000); total, 550,900,000.

Ethiopia's net foreign holdings were distributed as follows over a two-year period (in millions of Birr):

	Foreign Holdings of National Bank	Foreign Holdings of Commercial Banks
31 December 1976.....	615.3	34.0
30 June 1977.....	648.6	138.0
31 December 1977.....	447.5	68.1
30 June 1978.....	360.1	93.7

The favorable situation of 30 June 1977 was due to the rise in the price of coffee exports.

Finances of the State

Statistical information makes it possible to establish the state finances situation over the first nine months of fiscal year 1977-1978, that is, from

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July 1977 to March 1978, and to compare it with the same period of the preceding year.

Budgetary deficits brought about recourse by the Public Treasury to the banking credits pointed out above.

The government's domestic debt to the National Bank and other banks had increased as follows: December 1976, 655,000,000 Birr; June 1977, 648,000,000 Birr; December 1977, 837,000,000 Birr; June 1978, 1,019,000,000 Birr. On the latter date the debt was divided between the National Bank (731,300,000), the commercial banks (199,000,000) and various organizations (88,800,000).

Situation of Ethiopia's State Finances					
(Millions of Birr)					
	Total	Income Tax	Indirect Taxes	Taxes on Hydroelectric Power	Taxes on Comm., ext.*
Revenues:					
July 1976/March 1977....	557.0	81.7	105.5	18.4	351.5
July 1977/March 1978....	588.1	94.7	109.9	19.1	364.4
Expenditures:					
	Total		Ordinary		Capital
July 1976/March 1977....	627.4		495.0		132.4
July 1977/March 1978....	787.1		639.0		148.1
*[expansion unknown]					

The foreign public debt was the subject of an analysis which concluded that it increased by 8.2 percent as of June 1978, in relation to the preceding 30 June; 48 percent of this debt had to do with the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and its subsidiaries, and 24.6 percent with the United States. It was estimated as follows (in millions of Birr):

	Called in	Outstanding
1974-1975.....	134.7	767.9
1975-1976.....	140.5	843.1
1976-1977.....	127.5	949.4
1977-1978.....	97.7	1,027.6

Debts called in reached their highest level in 1975-1976 and then fell off, which curtailed the increase of Ethiopia's public debt.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

PLASTICS FACTORY LOAN--The Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development has granted a 6.5 million loan to Guinea for the construction of a plastics factory. This loan, which carries a 3 percent interest rate, is reimbursable in 12 years with a 3-year grace period. This amount was granted following a visit to Guinea by the director general of the Fund. During this visit, he had studied with Guinean officials the various means to finance the construction of the factory, whose total cost is approximately \$14 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1728]

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MAURITIUS

DIVISIONS OBSERVED WITHIN MAIN PARTIES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 May 79 pp 18-19

[Article by Herve Masson: "A Double Division"]

[Text] The Majority in Power, While the Opposition is Torn by Conflicting Groups.

Will it or won't it fall? The government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam has not fallen yet. It has stood up against winds and tides for 30 years. From "deputy minister" to "chief minister" in the days when Mauritius was still a British colony with great autonomy, Sir S. Ramgoolam, SSR, as he is called, has been prime minister since independence, during March 1968.

Trained by the British, introduced to parliamentary life, the Mauritian prime minister achieved the miracle of maintaining power while generally keeping parliamentary democracy in his country intact. With the exception of the difficult years of repression from 1971-1973, when democratic guarantees (freedom of the press, the right to assemble, the right to express opinions publicly) and certain unions were "suspended" and militants from MMM [Militant Mauritian Movement] were imprisoned without trial, Mauritius remains a free country where changing the government remains possible through the democratic, parliamentary and electoral process, without recourse to violence, where the multiparty system is not an idle word, nor is freedom of thought a joke. In this, the Mauritian regime is a remarkable example among the former colonies which have obtained independence over the last 20 years. SSR, then, was able to resist the easy temptation of personal power, based on a dictatorship and armed force. For this performance, homage is due him. Does that mean it is a model regime? Far from it. The Mauritian Government is probably the most corrupt in the world; in domestic affairs it has betrayed all the promises made during demogical election campaigns; the country is ruined and the people are angry. To stay in power after the elections of December, 1976, SSR's Labor Party had to once again form a coalition with the Mauritian Social Democrat Party (PMSD), of Mr Gaetan Duval, the former minister of foreign affairs until 1973, whose extreme right reputation could not be greater. The regime is ashamed of it, but, solidly attached to the democratic forms inherited from the

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West, the Mauritians will not do anything to overthrow it by force. They will patiently wait for the general elections in 1981, unless, because he is forced to, Ramgoolam resigns and calls for early elections, which is far from likely in spite of much pressure. The prime minister is certainly under strong pressure not only from the opposition MMM, but even and especially from its ally, the PMSD (which thinks it has plain sailing) and also from a very violent dissident group within the Labor Party itself. This dissident group, which had many members at the beginning of the current parliamentary session, now has only three: Mr Boodhoo, Mr Gungoosing and Mr Beedassy. Since the MMM itself has 32 deputies out of 70, it would be enough for the three dissident members to vote with the opposition, if two or three members of the majority were absent, to bring down the government. Last month, that could have happened, since the supplementary budget presented by the government had received only 35 votes, to 34 "no" votes, one deputy from the MMM (who was consequently expelled from the party) Jean-Claude Augustine, being out of the country because of illness. And this is the situation which explains the absence, which has been noticed, of Mauritian ministers in recent international meetings: the prime minister wanted to keep them at home so as to not lose their vote in Parliament. But the session is over and the ministers will be able to take their flights around the world. They are not needed in Mauritius any more.

It has been said that public finances are in very bad shape. Debt has reached one fourth of the GNP and the government has great difficulty finding lenders abroad; it is now turning to the progressive countries, particularly Libya, which explains the strange change of direction in its foreign policy, which was only recently still unconditionally aligned with the West. The budget will reach 2 billion rupees this year and the government does not have enough revenue: they talk of a deficit of 500 million!

The social situation is hardly more encouraging. Strikes follow one after the other, in the port and in public transportation (which is not running well). Since it is a hotbed of protest, the university has been closed and has remained occupied by the Riot Unit (local riot police). Elementary school teachers are threatening to stop work. Obligated to yield all down the line, the government is running up against more and more opposition from employers and from big business; the sugar oligarchy, only recently the strongest supporter of the regime, is angry and making threats. In this difficult context, dangerous, some say, Ramgoolam is said to have, they say, tried to negotiate a "national unity" government, with the MMM.

Is such a coalition imaginable? The secretary general of the MMM, Paul Beranger, has more than once denied the rumors. "There could be no question of a coalition with the PMSD, nor even with the Labor Party alone, after what that party has become," he affirmed. That seems in the eyes of some, to leave the door open to the Labor Party "which could change." Some observers think then that actually the secretary general and the leadership of the MMM are hoping for access to power in a coalition with the Labor Party alone. But they know that it would be a very difficult pill to make anyone swallow.

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What will the leadership of the MMM do then? No one can say. All that is certain is that in the present state of the party, in which the leadership is being strongly attacked, the rush forward might seem a lesser evil to the leaders. They might be tempted to believe that their presence in the government and the holding of key posts would give them the means to regain control of the middle ranks of the party. "Finding posts" for all of these current protestors might, in the eyes of the leadership of the MMM, lead them to stop their criticism. But the base, that popular base so violently hostile to the very idea of coalition, what would it do? How can it be convinced? That is the main difficulty that neither Mr Paul Beranger, nor his court seem capable of resolving for the moment.

Far from diminishing, the crisis within the MMM has undergone new developments. Resignations follow expulsions, each of them provoked by the severe criticism directed against the leadership of the party. Mr Paul Beranger, Aneerood Jugnauth, Kader Bhayat and Jean-Claude de l'Estrac, who are in fact the masters of the party (the other members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee are only there for appearances ('showcase' they say in Creole) tolerate no criticism and do not hesitate to exercise the deepest vengeance on those who contradict them. They are hated more and more and maintain their position only through pressure and political blackmail. Through rumors and gossip, also, say those who have been victims of their machinations. The scandal is now public, causing those who have traditionally supported the party to have second thoughts. The MMM as a result lost a special election for a replacement on the municipal council of Beau-Bassin-Rose Hill, its stronghold until now. The defection of several MMM councillors resulted in the loss of that city, the second largest in the country. The MMM now controls only two large cities (Port Louis and Vacoas) where it has however shown some signs of increasing strength. What happened at Beau-Bassin-Rosé Hill? The dissenting councillors said it clearly: they had enough of the De l'Estrac clique. In the case of Coonjan, who was threatened with expulsion, the leadership had to back down and send a delegation of comrades to the deputy to explain to him that there was no longer any question of expulsion, but that simply the "case would be studied."

The MMM, the progressive party in 1971-73, having become the social-democrat party in 1977-1979 is falling rapidly. How would it do if elections were held soon? They say it would lose about 50 seats. Faced with a majority and an opposition divided among themselves, the Mauritians don't know which way to turn. What will happen to that glorious Mauritian democracy in this context? Hasn't the time come for all the Mauritian progressives to become reorganized in order to breathe new life into the revolutionary struggle?

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

NEW ROAD NEAR COMPLETION--A road 150 kilometers long will link the rich agricultural district of Angonia with the rest of Mozambique's asphalted road system by the end of next year. Angonia is located near the border with Malawi, in the northwest province of Tete. It is the principal producer of potatoes and other agricultural products, but distribution of them to the rest of the country is very seriously impeded by the absence of a permanent road connection. During the rainy season, the track is frequently impassable. The new road, which represents an investment of \$6 million, goes from Braganca, on the Malawi border in the north, to the Zobue-Tete road. The northern part of the road is asphalted up to the town of Ulongue. The construction work, begun in 1973, was to have been completed in 1975, but was paralyzed by the departure, at the time of Mozambique's accession to independence, of the foreign supervisory personnel and technicians of the firm responsible for the project. Mozambican workers have since received intensive training to enable them to resume the work. Other factors have also contributed to the delay of the project--in particular, the supply difficulties with construction materials and the high cost of new equipment to replace the old equipment, which had totally deteriorated. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Jun 79 p 1565] 11267

GDR TEXTILE FACTORY ASSISTANCE--A textile factory equipped with 51,000 spindles and approximately 800 automatic looms will be built in Mozambique within the next few years with GDR assistance. It will be the largest and most modern textile factory in the country. Initial deliveries have already been made by the VEB Textima-Projekt Karl-Marx-Stadt company in regard to a weaving-school. Moreover, the company will undertake the training of qualified personnel for this factory. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1689]

GDR ELECTRICITY ASSISTANCE--Three transforming plants, as well as an aerial line of 110 kilovolts measuring 200 kms in length have been built by specialists of the VEB Energiebau Radebeul and VEB Otto Buchwitz Starkstrom-Anlagenbau Dresden companies in the People's Republic of Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1689]

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COOPERATIVE VILLAGES--Approximately 800 cooperative villages have been established in Mozambique since independence in 1975. This announcement was made by Job Chambal, director of the national committee for cooperative villages. However, he added that the greater part of these villages were still not organized on a collective life and production basis. The main task to be accomplished from now on is to establish the necessary conditions for the development of production in those villages already in existence and to subject living conditions to rigorous review before establishing other villages. Chambal added that the largest concentration of cooperative villages is in the Cabo Delgado province in the northern part of the country, while the smallest in the province of Inhambane in the south. Cooperative villages are considered the backbone of development in Mozambique's rural zones. On the one hand, the goal is to introduce collective modes of life and production in rural regions and on the other hand, to make possible effective government assistance in such fields as education and health, an undertaking which would be impossible in sparsely populated areas. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1689]

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NIGER

NIGER'S 3-YEAR, 5-YEAR PLANS DETAILED; BUDGETS GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1387-1391, 1395-1398

[Text] No modern nation can allow itself the luxury of making short shrift of its regular business and living from day to day. In the best of cases, the few countries which, out of negligence or incompetency, follow such a policy for any length of time are doomed to stagnation and in most cases, to regression and collapse. It is indeed difficult to keep national enterprises running or to achieve progress, when they do not know what supplies they need or are capable of handling or if they are not aware of their obligations or the needs they will have to cover more than only a few weeks ahead. Industry, like commerce, depends on reliable predictions, both with respect to supplies and marketing. Such predictions are possible only within the framework of a planned economy.

Moreover, it is difficult to obtain substantial financing from foreign investors, whether private or public, if backers do not know what such financing is to be used for.

Niger is now in an interim period. The latest 3-year program came to a close in December 1978 and the new 5-year economic and social development plan for 1979-1983 has not yet gone into effect (with respect to execution). Nevertheless, as early as June 1978, an order from the chief of state (78-52/PCMS/MP) concerned the establishment and makeup of the committees in charge of drawing it up and these committees are working ceaselessly, despite difficulties to be discussed later, to plan a solid, balanced development base within the shortest possible time.

Three-Year Program for 1976-1978: 65-Percent Completion Likely

The last 3-year program covered the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. By 30 June 1978 -- that is, 6 months after its completion -- a few details can be given about its completion. The percentages used are based on official estimates, taking "credits used and the performance of the sector" into account. However, some of the groupings were put together by our staff.

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The objectives to be achieved were divided by the planning departments into four major sectors to which one could assign a rate of participation (or importance) relating to the whole, particularly considering the credits provisionally allocated to each one.

By 30 June 1978, the proportion of cover of sectorial objectives initially planned makes it possible to figure the rate of completion of the overall program on that date simply by adding.

In the table below, Column A represents the initial importance attributed to the sector; Column B, the percentage truly covered by the end of June 1978; and Column C, the rate of completion.

	A	B	C
1 -- Rural production	33.6	15.45	(46)
2 -- Infrastructure, public works, hydraulics	46.8	32.78	(70.04)
3 -- Human resources	15.3	11.44	(74.8)
4 -- Industry, mining, commerce	4.3	2.06	(47.9)
	100	61.73	(61.73)

By the end of June 1978, the 3-year program apparently had a completion rate of 61.73 percent. It is logical to admit that at the time of its conclusion, the overall rate of completion with respect to objectives planned will be two-thirds.


Better Results in Human Advancement

First of all, one will note that the greatest effort anticipated by the planners involved the sector of infrastructure and hydraulics, to which nearly half of the provisional credits were allocated. Next came rural production, human resources and all the secondary and tertiary sectors.

Second, one will note that within the sectorial frameworks thus defined, it is human advancement that benefited from the highest rate of achievement (74.8 percent, meaning that three-fourths of the objectives had been attained 6 months before the close of the program). Next come infrastructure operations, public works and hydraulics and the secondary and tertiary sectors. The rural sector closes out the group, with the rate of completion reaching 46 percent of initial estimates.

These overall percentages are of some interest, but they are only averages resulting from combining the completion rates of branches that are often very different. It is therefore necessary to go further into detail.

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Key:

1. Three-Year Program, 1976-1977-1978, Execution (%) by 30 June 1978
2. Importance attributed to the sector
3. Sectorial cover
4. Rural production
5. Rate of completion
6. Infrastructure, public works, hydraulics
7. Rate of completion
8. Importance attributed to sectors by the plan
9. Cover by end of June 1978
10. Human resources
11. Rate of completion
12. Industry, mining, commerce
13. Rate of completion

Rural Production: Under 50 Percent

In principle, "rural production" covers four branches with different coefficients of importance (base figure of 100):

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Agriculture	64
Livestock raising	27
Rural engineering	4.5
Woods and forests	4.5

In the field of agriculture, the two major objectives were: an increase in market garden production and an increase in productivity of income crops.

The results obtained (45 percent of estimates) are inadequate except with respect to niebe. Local grain needs are not covered and export crops are stagnant. Certain "productivity" projects have experienced long delays.

It is quite likely that the little vigor noted in the field of rural engineering (only 25-percent rate of completion) had an unfavorable effect on agricultural development.

With respect to livestock raising, whose essential objectives were to rebuild livestock herds and improve yield, results are somewhat better (55 percent rate of execution) because the growth in herds sometimes exceeded expectations. On the other hand, operations involving grazing ranches, fattening lots, breeding centers and livestock feed plants had varying results.

The results for woods and forests were poor (25 percent), which must be considered a very serious matter. A country that is very rapidly turning into a desert cannot neglect reforestation.

Infrastructure, Public Works, Hydraulics: Roads Very Satisfactory

In the very important sector of infrastructure, public works and hydraulics, the (initial) importance attributed to the different branches was as follows (in percent):

Roads and bridges	41.9
Post office and telecommunications	13.2
Village and rural water projects (hydraulics)	8.8
Administrative infrastructures	7.7
Energy	6
Housing, city planning	4.9
Sanitation, sewer systems	4.5
Aeronautics, meteorology	4
Urban hydraulics	3.4
Secondary roads	3
River transport	2.1
Road transport	0.5
Rail transport	PM*
Maritime transport	PM

*PM = for the sake of the record

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With respect to roads and bridges, results are very satisfactory (85-percent completion).

On National Road 1, the Niamey-Dosso and Dosso-Madaoua sections were widened and work on the Tchadoua-Takeita section is being completed.

On National Road 9, the Maradi-Nigerian border section is completed.

On National Road 11, work on the Agadez-North-Zinder section was completed and the South-Zinder-Magaraia section is being repaired.

The Maintenance or the refilling of paved strips, financed by the FNI [National Investment Fund] or the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] is regularly done. On the other hand, work has not even begun on the road serving as an exit from the Maradi bridge from Goulbi de Maradi.

The secondary road program (2,000 kilometers) has not been begun. The main portion of the financing from the IBRD was not acquired in time.

Waterworks

Concerning village and rural water systems (55 percent completed), the systems for Goure, Dakoro, Tanout and Mayahi have been completed. Some wells have been drilled but the 80 wells in Damergou and the 619 wells in the so-called "human investment" project, the IH, were not drilled.

With a 95-percent rate of completion, the urban waterworks sector showed the most progress (expansion and reinforcement of the Niamey and Zinder water supply systems).

Concerning housing and city planning (75-percent rate of execution), proposed studies on housing legislation and policy were not completed, but 150 housing units financed by Saudi Arabia were built in the Faycal compound and the city of Akokan was provided with an administrative infrastructure. Concerning the latter, one should mention the construction, during the 3-year period, of buildings to house the ministries of Rural Development, Civil Service and Public Works.

Work on sanitation systems (35-percent completion) mainly involved Maradi. Work planned for Niamey turned out to be more costly than planned and its completion was delayed.

Satisfactory Results for Post Office and Telecommunications

The postal and telecommunications program shows a satisfactory rate of cover (70 percent) corresponding to the completion of the Panaftel Project, micro-wave relay equipment and telephone connections between Maradi and Dakoro, Zinder and Tanout, Niamey and Banibangou. However, there was a slow start

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on the equipping of the intraurban system and a failure to complete the telex central (600 lines) in Niamey, although financed by the BOAD [West African Development Bank], and the additional telephone programs planned for Niamey, Maradi, Zinder, Dosso and Tahoua.

In the area of electricity (65-percent execution), the first phase of the study for the Kandadji Dam is completed and six cities have been electrified (equipment or improvement): Zinder, Birni N'Konni, Dogondoutchi, Filingue, Tessaoua and Tillabery.

The aeronautics and meteorology projects were 75-percent completed: surfacing of the Agadez runway, technical equipment for Agadez and Tahoua, a study for expansion of the Maradi airport and the construction of an agro-meteorology center.

The river transport program (20 percent completed) was very poorly carried out. While studies for the Niamey and Gaya ports were completed, the Niger River was not marked with buoys and the purchase of barges and tugs for the Niger River Transport Company was postponed.

The road transport program, which was to receive few loans, was carried out 90 percent thanks to the completion of the Niamey technical supervision center.

Rail and maritime transport are included in the list of projects of the 3-year program only for the sake of serving as a reminder. Progress in this area can only confirm or follow the opening up of the territory. Various projects are being looked at: Kano-Maradi extension, Parakou-Dossou-Niamey extension, Niamey-Tambao connection. Choices have not yet been definitely made. Maritime projects will in principle be initiated only when the access way to the ocean has been chosen and established.

Human Resources Sector and Education

The human resources sector was distributed as follows (base figure of 100):

Education	54.3
Health	29.4
Information	8.8
Youth, sports, culture	4.6
Population census	2.6
Community development	0.3

The record rates of achievement in primary and secondary education (95 and 98 percent) demonstrate the determination of the Niger authorities to develop to the maximum extent and without delay those structures involving the spread of education and basic training. Anticipated rates of school attendance were exceeded by 2 points (13/15 percent expected; 13/17 percent obtained according to official figures. Some 950 classrooms were to be

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built but 1,050 were in fact constructed. The only gap seems to lie in the delay concerning the construction of three regional inspectorships (west, central region and east).

In secondary education, the Illéla, Guidan Roumji, Bouza and Aguié CEG's [General Secondary Education School] were built, along with the Tahoua lycee and the Tchén-Tabaraden CEG (not planned but built in place of the Tahoua-II CEG). Other establishments not included in the 3-year program (Arlit, Kolo, Loga, Madarounfa, Zinder II, Douchi II) were opened to students in October and November of 1978.

The "Nigerization" of teaching personnel and the equipping of the University of Niamey continued. Two buildings were completed. Buildings to house liberal arts, health, education and agronomy have not been completed but they are nearly financed. On the other hand, there are not yet any sources of financing for law and economics. On the whole, the higher education program was 40 percent completed.

Literacy training (75 percent) is well underway. A training center for literacy teachers has been set up and by the end of 1978, 1,000 literacy centers were to be ready.

Investments in Health

There was a low rate of completion for information (20 percent). One achievement that might be mentioned is the departmental station in Agadez, while the one in Maradi operates in temporary facilities. Proposals to build a radio and short- and medium-wave radiobroadcasting center are being financed but they have not been completed. The training center for technical personnel in the field of information is operating but does not yet have any building. The proposal to build a national publishing house has been abandoned.

There has been a rather satisfactory execution of the health program (70 percent), made up of numerous small or medium-size investments (clinics, medical centers, PMI [expansion unknown], and so on).

In the field of youth, sports and culture (50 percent), one should mention construction of the Tahoua and Maradi stadiums and the electrification of the Niamey stadium, but the construction of the International Youth Center in Niamey and the Niamey Cultural Complex has not come about.

Objectives in Mining

The industry, mining and commerce sector is distributed as follows (in percent):

Mining	53.6
Industry	23.2
Tourism	23.2

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With respect to the mining sector, in which the program was 80 percent completed, one should mention that certain operations in which the private sector is very actively involved currently escape full examination. In the mining sector, the problem of financing research does not exist in the uranium area, where the SOMAIR [Air Region Mining Company], Imouraren, Djado and Akouta projects have continued. Of the three objectives planned: continuation of action aimed at developing known mining resources; continuation of research; and updating mining and oil regulations, only the last was not achieved.

The industry (nonmining) and tourism sectors, where 10 percent of the projects planned were completed, were the most neglected branches of the program.

For industry (not including mining), the situation is fairly understandable, since the country's landlocked nature does not allow the establishment of a substitution industry, the marketing of whose products would be hindered, moreover, by the inadequate means of the population and distribution difficulties.

In the area of tourism, the problem is more serious and will be dealt with in detail later. If the projects are not carried out, it is because the Nigeriens are not yet sufficiently motivated by this type of activity and do not have the leaders or qualified personnel to promote it and operate it.

Activity of Chamber of Commerce

In the field of commerce (40-percent completion), there were no overall, concrete actions between 1976 and 1978 aimed at overseeing the profession, regulating it or reorganizing trade circuits. On the other hand, one might note various specific actions whose results were varied.

Because of the drought, SONARA [Niger Peanut Marketing Company] could not achieve the expected results in the area of peanut marketing and had to expand its intervention to the niébe sector.

COPRO-NIGER [National Commerce and Production Company] was to become a national company, but 6.9 percent of the stock still belongs to private parties.

The Chamber of Commerce, headed with great competency and dynamism by President Souna, undertook specific action aimed at reorganization and the modification of statutes, structures and circuits and is getting ready to establish the structures needed to train Niger manufacturers and merchants.

The Development Bank of the Republic of Niger (BDRN) achieved its objectives with a rate of 90 percent and the government now holds 55 percent of its capital. The National Savings Bank and the National Agricultural Credit-Bank (CNCA) both fulfilled their objectives well. The establishment of a company to monopolize insurance services did not come about, but the Niger Insurance and Reinsurance Company (Leyma) opened its doors.

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Among the achievements of the 3-year plan, one must also mention the total elimination of the minimum lump tax (IMF) and the restructuration of the schedule tax and the general income tax.

The National Investment Fund (FNI) was not restructured as planned, nor was the budgetary year made to coincide with the calendar year.

Concerning budgetary provisions of the 3-year program, they were greatly exceeded (table in millions of CFA francs).

	Estimate	Estimate	Difference
1976	24,310.6	24,310.6	-
1977	25,998	34,175.6	+ 31.45%
1978	27,725	44,504	+ 60.52

Five-Year Plan 1979-1983, Work Underway

Work to draw up the Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan for 1979-1983 is underway. On 22 June 1978, decree 78-52/P CMS/MP concerned the establishment and makeup of the committees specially appointed to complete this task. These committees are seven in number. They are technical and advisory in nature and are under the direct authority of the minister of planning:

- 1) the Orientation, Coherence and Institution Committee, headed by the minister of planning (8 members plus the secretaries general of the ministries, plus the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the six other sectorial committees, totaling 30 to 32 persons, including the secretary general at the president and the permanent secretary of the National Development Council;
- 2) the Rural Production and Waterworks Committee, headed by the secretary of state for rural development (21 members, including the deputy chairman and the reporter);
- 3) the Mining, Energy and Industry Committee, headed by the secretary general of the Ministry of Mines and Hydrology (10 members);
- 4) the Infrastructures Committee, headed by the director of public works (16 members);
- 5) the Human Resources and Health Committee, headed by the secretary of state for national education (24 members);
- 6) the Commerce and Services Committee, headed by the secretary general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry (20 members); and
- 7) the Financial Resources and Cooperation Committee, headed by the secretary general of the Ministry of Finance (14 members).

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(Editor's Note: The above numbers include the deputy chairman and reporter of each committee.)

The Trade Union of Workers of Niger (USTN) is represented on all committees except Committee 7 (Financial Resources and Cooperation).

The Association of Niger Women (AFN) participates on committees 2 (Rural Production and Waterworks) and 5 (Human Resources and Health).

The Chamber of Commerce is represented on five committees (1, 2, 3, 4 and 6); the Development Bank of the Republic of Niger on committees 3, 6 and 7; NIGELEC [Niger Electric Power Company] on committees 3 and 6; and the Niger Foodstuffs Office on committees 2 and 6.

On the regional level, the structures in charge of drawing up the plan and organized and set up by the prefect of each department.

Difficult Work

These operations are particularly difficult due to the inadequate statistical data making it possible to follow up and measure the country's evolution over the last 8 to 9 years. The latest national accounts published actually date from 1969. Reasonable estimates were drawn up for the interim period. They constitute precious stepping stones for officials in charge of drawing up the development programs for the current 5-year period and who must take into account the lessons and experience of the past. International experts are giving their aid to the Niger Government so as to establish, at least beginning in 1976, base figures valid for every sector. It is obvious that rates of progress cannot apply to floating data and that it is impossible to know where one is headed if one does not know where one is beginning.

Given the current state of work on the 1979-1983 Five-Year Plan, it would be imprudent to claim to supply details on the objectives envisaged or even to try to define definite orientations. The final decisions depend on the political choices of the government and the proposals made by the committees, proposals that are constantly subject to revision. However, one can retain a number of reliable hypotheses officially put before the planners for their consideration.

Past Evolution of Niger

Niger's past evolution (production, foreign aid, consumption and investments) can be shown in the following approximate table, supplied by the BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States] for years 1963 and 1969 and the Ministry of Planning for 1975 (in billions of CFA francs):

	1963	1969	1975
Production	66.02	97.91	159.30
Foreign aid	0.32	6.59	24.10
Total	65.70	104.40	183.40
	60		

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Consumption	54.66	98.11	158.30
Investments	11.04	6.29	25.10

An examination of the above table enables one to make the following observations:

On the whole, if one expresses the figures in indexes (1963, base figure of 100), one obtains the following:

	1963	1969	1975
Production	100	148	241
Foreign aid	100	66.1	2,418
Total	100	159	279
Consumption	100	179	290
Investments	100	75	227

The increase in production, in constant francs, averaged 7.6 percent annually.

Foreign aid, which was somewhat negative in 1963, exceeded the figure of 24 billion CFA francs in 1975. However, it is not strictly accurate, from the accounting point of view, to group all such aid under the heading of foreign deficit, given the considerable importance occupied by transfers with no counterpart since 1968 or 1969.

Consumption increased between 1963 and 1969 much more rapidly than production (8.05 percent compared with 6.75 percent on an average per year). On the other hand, between 1969 and 1975, the situation was reversed (8.25 percent compared with 8.45 percent per year).

Investments, which clearly declined between 1963 and 1969 (7.94 percent of domestic production plus foreign aid in 1969, compared with 16.8 percent in 1963) are up substantially and in 1975, represented 13.7 percent of an overall mass 2.8 times greater than that of 1963.

Based on the preceding considerations, one must remember that at the beginning of 1976, the situation showed a substantial improvement with respect to production and that Niger had sizable outside aid (much without any counterpart). Consumption, which was very high during the first 6 years, exceeding domestic production in 1969, settled down and left a slight surplus in 1975. This domestic savings and increased foreign aid are channeled toward investments. The proportion of total resources invested (13.7 percent) is still too low, but the trend is encouraging.

Prospects for 1985: More Outside Aid

In an official document from the planning departments, one finds a continuation of the tables given above -- although the authors emphasize the hypothetical nature of the data and the conclusions. The continuation is for 1985. Here are the figures (in billions of current CFA francs):

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	1975	1985
Production	159.3	290.2
Foreign aid	24.1	0
Total	183.4	290.2
Consumption	158.3	226.6
Investments	25.1	63.6

The most obvious figure is the 0 included under foreign aid. Such a hypothesis is neither pretentious nor illogical. Already, when the Niger balance of payments was studied, it was mentioned. Naturally, the 0 is only indicative because it would be abnormal for Niger to cold-bloodedly refuse unrestricted free aid or limited foreign aid that is particularly advantageous. The 0 merely signifies that total financial independence vis-a-vis foreign countries is perfectly possible by 1985.

An examination of the other aggregate figures shows that during the decade between 1975 and 1985, production (according to the hypothesis expressed) would increase in current value by 82 percent (an average of 6.18 percent per year), total resources by 58.2 percent (up 4.63 percent per year), consumption by 43.15 percent (up 3.66 per year) and investments by 153.4 percent (up 9.9 percent per year).

Such figures and such percentages are reasonable given the current data and medium- and longer-term prospects. The average increase in production of 6.2 percent, given a starting base (1975) already substantially increased by the contribution of uranium, will imply quite a substantial contribution of the primary sector, while awaiting the more delayed participation of the still weak industry and productive services.

The portion left to consumption is rather small and such a low percentage will be attained and maintained only if economy measures and a fight against waste spending are allied with growing use of local products substituted for imported products.


The average annual rate of 9.9 percent is but a composite of percentages that increase regularly as resources are utilized. It should be noted that the position of investments among total resources will go from 15.75 percent in 1975 to 21.91 percent in 1985, which in the Niger context constitutes a remarkable performance.

Reservations

One must nevertheless view the above absolute figures and percentages with reservations. They constitute only an overall approach to the specific problems posed by Niger's development. It is highly unlikely that they will not be modified in the final documents of the plan. On the whole then, the data on domestic production in overall figures may very closely resemble those in the table below, but it remains to be determined, in setting

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estimates, to what extent the various sectors of the economy will help to constitute them and as a result, what annual rate of growth it would be reasonable to assign to them.



Key:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. Niger's Hypothetical Development (1975-1985) | 7. Consumption |
| 2. Resources | 8. Investments |
| 3. Billions of CFA francs | 9. Foreign aid |
| 4. Utilization | 10. Domestic production |
| 5. Total resources | 11. Investments |
| 6. Foreign aid | 12. Domestic consumption |

The rates of 11 to 12 percent have been cited for mining and public works building, modern crops and the manufacturing industry, 7 percent for energy, 6.5 percent for commerce, transport and noncommercial services, and 2.8 percent for the traditional primary sector (including livestock raising). However, there may well be serious underestimations for mining and building

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or a substantial overestimation for industry and modern crops. The work of the special committees will be aimed at reducing the margin of uncertainty and at determining possibilities and hopes in a more precise fashion.

The same will be true for the distribution of investments to be made, on the subject of which there are only estimates that are too rough to be included in this article.

Likely Orientations

Major priorities have already been decided upon and noncoercive orientations exist in most sectors of the economy. They will be examined in detail in the chapter devoted to the sector-by-sector study of the Niger economy.

Nevertheless, the following are the essential guidelines:

Rural production: improved diversification of crops; the establishment of cooperatives and the adoption of methods and means aimed at increasing productivity; organization of collection; revision of the export policy on meat and its domestic distribution; increased means for rural engineering; and improved efficiency of the Woods and Forests Department.

Infrastructure, public works, hydrology: completion of the paving of the major roads; continuation of the establishment of water supply systems for cities and villages; more drilling structures and better well maintenance; a special effort aimed at sanitation and sewage systems for major cities; completion of the Kandadji and "W" hydroelectric dams, completion of the SONICAR [expansion unknown] project and research in the field of nuclear energy; a special effort devoted to housing; the organization of road transport; continuation of river and rail studies; the establishment of a shippers council; the continuation of post office and telecommunications projects; and the construction of administrative buildings to house several ministries.

Human resources: an intensification of action concerning preventive medicine and mass medicine; a study concerning the establishment of health insurance in the future; improved attention to the needs of primary education (infrastructure and personnel); an improvement in secondary school infrastructures; privileged development of technical and professional training; a national effort to establish indispensable university infrastructures; maximum effectiveness of the literacy campaign; increased sports equipment; and the establishment of an international youth center.

Mining, tourism, industry: the establishment of the OPEN [expansion unknown] (already mentioned); the diversification and Nigerization of mining production; restructuration of ONAREM [National Mining Resources Office]; the continuation and building of hotel infrastructures; a reorganization of accommodations; the development of circuits; and the training of hotel personnel.

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Commerce: the drafting of a commercial code; and specific actions relating to the Chamber of Commerce, the National Agricultural Credit Bank, the National Savings Bank, Niger Credit, the Leyma Insurance Company, Automobile Credit, and so on.

Finally, with respect to public finances: making the budgetary and calendar years coincide; tax reform; the establishment of a real reserve fund; and the establishment of an audit office.

Operating and Investment Budgets

The evolution of Niger's budget is rather spectacular. Between 1970 and 1978, budgetary figures in current CFA francs increased by 368 percent for the operating budget and 1,222 percent for the investment budget (with respect to receipts).

One notes a sudden change in speed in 1975 and 1976, compared with the early years of the decade, which were marked by long stagnation. The increase in resources allocated to the National Investment Fund is characteristic. In 1978-1979, they are nearly eight and one-half times greater than in 1974-1975.

(Editor's note: It should be recalled that Niger's fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September.)

General Budget Receipts

Concerning the general budget, Niger's receipts are as follows:

- 1) Fiscal resources: direct taxes; indirect taxes; customs duties; registration and other related taxes; and miscellaneous taxes.
- 2) Miscellaneous proceeds: revenue from national lands; proceeds from services; and allocated resources.
- 3) Special resources: patrimonial resources; loan resources; and financial aid.

The participation of each of these categories of resources in making up the general budget varies from year to year. One can draw up the following table (in percent) for the three budgets from 1975-1976 and 1977-1978:

	1975-1976	1976-1977	1977-1978
Tax receipts	95.02	81	78.94
Various proceeds	4.66	12	15.57
Special receipts	0.32	7	5.49

For the 1978-1979 budget being carried out, the general provisions were drawn up in the budget (in billions of CFA francs):

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		Percent
Tax receipts	47.06	(82.93)
Various proceeds	9.25	(16.3)
Special resources	0.44	(0.77)
	56.75	(100)

The previous tables indicate that tax resources are by far the main source of revenue for the general budget. They can be broken down as follows (in percent):

	1975-1976	1976-1977	1977-1978	1978-1979
Direct taxes	32.04	30.8	32.05	34.99
Indirect taxes	19.45	18.2	18.23	22.03
Customs duties	43.52	46.3	41.41	36.18
Registration fees	4.99	4.7	8.31	6.80

Evolution of the Niger Budget (in billions of CFA francs)

	70-71	71-72	72-73	73-74	74-75	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79
Operating									
Estimate	12.39	13.16	14.15	15.22	20.18	26.66	35.98	48.49	56.75
Performance	12.08	13.05	14.03	15	18.04	26.05	35.87	43.68	--
Investments (FNI)									
Receipts	1.59	2.18	2.67	3.16	2.52	5.53	8	13	21
Expenditures	0.97	1.32	1.71	1.99	1.87	2.59	5.91	--	--
Attached budget from									
Operation of Public Works									
Equipment	0.5	0.6	0.65	0.83	0.86	0.82	1	1.2	1.61

Customs Receipts Proceeds Down

If one applies these percentages from the above table to the specific values of the different taxes and duties, one notes that between 1976 and 1979, the following evolution took place in current value: direct taxes, up 123 percent; indirect taxes, up 131 percent; customs duties, up 69.5 percent; and registration fees, up 178 percent.


Customs receipts are increasing relatively slowly, undoubtedly because of faulty organization. It is likely that fraud plays a major role in the decline in proceeds, but this is not the only factor. A continuing fight against this evil is essential, but the existence of long borders with certain neighboring countries and the presence on both sides of the borders of people having the same characteristics and affinities is a very serious

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handicap: An improvement in the productivity of customs stemming from a modernization of methods and a rationalization of services would be easier to achieve. Naturally, it is not a question of pushing control operations to the point where they would accentuate the already appreciable delays in deliveries or of inconsiderately increasing certain tariffs at the risk of unduly penalizing the Niger consumer. It is a matter of regulating and stimulating a sector which is essential to the development of the national economy and whose inadequacies and flaws have a profound influence on the volume and speed of trade with other countries.

**NSN - 12 LE BUDGET 1)
GENERAL DU NIGER**




Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Niger's General Budget | 6. Various proceeds |
| 2. Distribution of receipts | 7. Special resources |
| 3. Distribution of spending | 8. Public intervention |
| 4. Billions of CFA francs | 9. Government and departmental means |
| 5. Tax receipts | 10. Public debt |

(Note: This article was written before the order of 8 March 1979, which increased the general budget by 2,567,000,000 CFA francs, including 925 million for the FNI.)

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Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Evolution of Niger's Budget | 3. General budget (estimates) |
| 2. Billions of current CFA francs | 4. National Investment Fund (FNI) Receipts |

Receipts provided for by the 1978-1979 Budget under customs duties can be broken down as follows (in percent):

Customs duties	12.33
Import duties	27.81
Export duties	15.28
Lump tax	44.58


The production tax (44.34 percent), included in the "lump tax," plays a predominant role. However, it may be emphasized that statistical dues on imports and exports (14.69 percent, or 2.5 billion CFA francs for 1978-1979) could pay for information services and rapid, reliable control.

Prime Importance of Industrial and Commercial Profits Tax

The increase in the yield of direct taxes, especially of the income tax, is the logical effect of the country's sound administrative management, the remarkable activity of the assessment departments and the civic sense of Niger taxpayers.

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Key:

1. Customs receipts
2. Billions of CFA francs
3. Billions of current CFA francs

Niger's Customs Receipts (in millions of current CFA francs)

1961	1,786.6
1962	1,698.3
1963	2,456.7
1964	2,923.9
1965	3,462.6
1966	4,047.9
1967	4,226
1968	4,176.2
1969	4,106.9
1970	4,675.3
1971	4,773.9
1972	5,066.6
1973	5,529.6
1974	5,806.2
1975	8,206.6
1976	9,849.6
1977	13,170.2

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If one goes into detail, based on the 1978-1979 Budget, one will note that the income tax constitutes the essential portion of anticipated resources. The following list gives the percentage position (following the elimination of the IMF, the minimum lump tax) of the various direct taxes:

Industrial and commercial profits (BIC)	88.28
Wages and salaries	6.07
Other income taxes	3.7
Property, real estate tax	1.26
Patent and license tax	0.19
Apprenticeship tax	0.37
Joint venture control tax	0.13

The gap between resources stemming from the BIC and those from wages and salaries is enormous.

Every year, indirect taxes bring in more money because they are based on value and because the yield from taxes is all the greater when the cost of products or services to which they apply is higher. Two essential sources should be noted: turnover and uranium.

1978-1979 Budget: Indirect Taxes (in percent)

Turnover tax	49.68
Mining-uranium royalties	37.11
Tobacco, cigarette tax	4.82
Oil products tax	4.82
Tax on alcoholic beverages	3.38
Tax on matches	0.19

The excellent performance noted with respect to registration fees is linked to the favorable orientation of Niger's general situation. Some 56.5 percent of the anticipated resources under this heading are linked to income from dividends and interest (IRVM).

Miscellaneous Proceeds

Income from miscellaneous taxes is negligible. Three departments are productive: the supervision of dangerous, troublesome and unhealthy establishments; control of precious metals; and control of insurance organizations.

With respect to miscellaneous proceeds (16.3 percent of the resources in the 1978-1979 Budget), the receipts anticipated make up some 45 percent of the revenue from national lands, 40.5 percent of fines and proceeds or transfers of services, and 14.5 percent of allocated receipts.

The most important items (in percent based on the total category) are as follows:

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Domain

Income from dividends and interest	42.7
Fines and penalties	5.27
Special resources	30.94
Allocated receipts (taxes on operations of the IDA [International Development Association], the KfW [Reconstruction Credit Bank], and the ADB [African Development Bank])	14.45

In estimates concerning fines and penalties, one notes 350 million CFA francs in customs confiscations.

Resources anticipated under special resources are negligible. The main items, which are very modest, come under taxes from collectives and public establishments and aid funds (the KfW, the IDA, the ADB, the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]). Nothing is expected in 1978-1979 from loan resources. For a very long time, this possible line of receipts has remained untouched by Niger.

Distribution of General Budget Spending (in billions of CFA francs)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Pub. Debt	0.6 5.56%	0.62 5.67%	0.4 3.36%	0.44 3.36%	0.38 2.66%	0.66 4.31%	1.64 6.75%	1.86 5.44%	2.30 5.3%	2.75 4.85%
Op. Exp.	8.08 74.81%	8.55 78.15%	9.05 76.12%	9.65 73.61%	10.64 74.62%	11.11 72.52%	14.8 60.88%	17.87 52.3%	19.55 45.05%	23.96 42.22%
Pub. Int.	2.12 19.63%	1.77 16.18%	2.44 20.52%	3.02 23.03%	3.24 22.72%	3.55 23.17%	7.87 32.37%	14.44 42.26%	21.54 49.65%	30.04 52.93%
Total	10.8	10.94	11.89	13.11	14.26	15.32	24.31	34.17	43.49	56.75

General Budget Spending

The distribution of spending in the general budget between 1970 and 1979 is shown in the preceding table.


For the three main categories, one will note a very different evolution.

With respect to the general budget as a whole, the public debt occupies a very stable position (average of 4.96 percent for the 10 years used in the table). This is a particularly low rate, far lower than what one finds in most other African countries. The increase in service on the debt in current value between 1970 and 1979 is 348 percent. It is higher than that of operating expenditures (up 197 percent), but far beyond that of public intervention (up 1,317 percent).

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NSN-14

**Le "fonctionnement" 1)
& les "interventions publiques"
au sein du Budget général
du NIGER**



Key:

1. Operating Expenditures and Public Intervention in Niger's General Budget
2. Operating
3. Intervention

Since 1975-1976, two very different types of evolution have been evident in operating expenditures and public intervention. While previous to that time, the latter made up only 72 to 78 percent of the former, there has been a spectacular reversal in the situation, depicted graphically in the chart above. Since 1978, interventions have exceeded operating expenditures in value and such interventions are for the most part made up of investment spending.

Between 1974 and 1979, the proportion of investments among public interventions seems to be as follows (in billions of CFA francs):

	Pub. Int.	Invest.	Percent
1974	3.24	0.77	23.77
1975	3.55	0.85	23.94
1976	7.87	3.8	48.28
1977	14.58	8.42	57.75
1978	21.55	14.11	65.48
1979	30.04	22.21	73.94

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Consequently, between 1975 and 1979, the position of investments compared with total public interventions went from under 25 percent to nearly 75 percent. It is a phenomenon to be emphasized because it has never before been noted (with such intensity) in any African country.

Operating Expenditures

The so-called operating expenditures are normally divided between two categories: government and departmental means. Here they will be placed together, under a single heading, but divided into four sections: personnel, equipment, transport and housing (1979: budget):

(Billions of CFA francs)	1976	1977	1978	1979
Personnel	8.03	9.26	10.9	12.53
Equipment	4.4	5.66	5.57	7.97
Transport	1.9	2.18	2.52	2.82
Housing	0.47	0.55	0.56	0.63
Total	14.8	17.65	19.55	23.95

Growth in current values between 1976 and 1979 is as follows: personnel, up 56 percent; equipment, up 81 percent; transport, up 48.4 percent; and housing, up 34 percent.

Considering the monetary devaluation, transport and housing expenditures were substantially reduced and those for personnel were barely maintained.

Personnel spending (12.53 billion CFA in 1978-1979) mainly involves: National Education, 32.3 percent; Interior, 13.25 percent; National Defense, 10.4 percent; Health, 9.62 percent; Rural Development, 8.09 percent. This spending makes up nearly three-fourths (73.91 percent) of the total.

The main consumers of equipment are: National Education, 20.98 percent; Health, 15.39 percent; National Defense, 9.35 percent; Foreign Affairs, 6.8 percent; Interior, 6.45 percent, but 22.8 percent of the equipment expenditures come under common charges.

Transport is broken down as follows: common charges, 20.49 percent; National Defense, 19.43 percent; Rural Development, 9.91 percent; Health, 9.37 percent; Interior, 8.48 percent; Foreign Affairs, 6.46 percent; National Education, 4.89 percent; and Finance, 4.75 percent.

Housing expenditures, which are relatively low, are almost exclusively common charges.

Public Interventions

Public interventions are broken down into seven categories depending on their purpose. Their distribution between 1974 and 1979 (budget) is shown in the table below.

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If one deducts from the overall budget the 21 billion CFA francs allocated to the FNI, one notes that for 1979, the ministries with the most funds are the following (in billions of CFA francs):

Ministry of Finance	6.76
National Education (not including higher education)	5.79
Civil Service, Labor and Public Works	2.97
Health and Social Affairs	2.67
National Defense	2.61
Interior	2.46
Rural Development	1.64
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	1.43
Planning	1.13

Public Interventions (in billions of CFA francs)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
International interventions	0.3	0.45	0.54	0.56	0.78	1.14
Political interventions	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.1	0.12	0.13
Administrative interventions	0.61	0.54	1.8	2.26	2.78	3.24
Social interventions	0.31	0.39	0.68	0.89	0.92	0.93
Infrastructures	0.87	0.96	0.92	2.29	2.79	2.35
Investments	0.77	0.85	3.8	8.42	14.11	22.2
Economic interventions	0.3	0.3	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05
Total	3.24	3.55	7.87	14.58	21.55	30.04

These figures give only a rough idea because 3.55 billion CFA francs in common charges are not broken down and the 21 billion CFA francs in FNI investments are not taken into consideration. However, they do make it possible to see the excellent position of National Education and Health, which is constantly improving.

National Investment Fund

The National Investment Fund (FNI), whose increase in allocations has already been mentioned, mainly receives its resources from allocated receipts, patrimonial resources, loans, contributions and various types of financial aid. Actually, the FNI is funded by the general budget: 21 billion for 1978-79.

The FNI expenditures can be broken down between: direct interventions, 14,936,700,700 CFA francs; participation or other types of interventions, 6,063,300,000 francs, or a (rounded) total of 21 billion CFA francs (before the order of 8 March 1979).

Direct interventions include a very large number of sectors, but they can be classified in the following manner (for 1978-1979, in millions of CFA francs and percent):

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Natural resources development	1,377.6	9.22
Roads and bridges	1,459.6	9.77
Other material infrastructures	853.6	5.72
Human infrastructure operations	5,331.3	35.7
Administrative infrastructure operations	5,527.3	37
Productive equipment	234.6	1.57
Miscellaneous	152.7	1.02
	14,936.7	100

In operations to develop natural resources, it is the hydraulics sector (858.6 million CFA francs) that is the best endowed. It is followed by rural engineering (377 million CFA francs). Other allocations are low, mainly those for woods and forests (35 million CFA francs).

Work concerning roads and bridges is varied but mainly involves four major projects: the Zinder-Birni-Kazoe-Kelle-Goure road, 350 million; the Dosso-Sabongari road, 350 million; National Road 24, 166 million; and the North Zinder-Tanout road, 100 million.

Other infrastructure operations are dominated by the improvement of the runways at the Tahoua and Agadez airports (400 million) and sanitation projects for the facilities of the Republican Guard (190 million).

Investments for Human Infrastructure

Among projects to be carried out under this heading, a very large proportion is reserved for education (3,250,300,000 out of 5,331,300,000, or about 61 percent). Such work mainly includes: high school and professional education, 1,576,000,000; primary education, 1,515,000,000; higher education, 105.3 million. Literacy training received 50 million francs in credits and television for education, only 4 million.

Health received 973 million, mainly allocated for the construction of hospitals. The Dosso Youth Festival absorbed 300 million out of the 630 million allocated to the Youth, Sports and Culture sector. Another 100 million are to finance the construction of an auditorium in Niamey.

Information received 478 million, including 140 million for the N'Guigmi retransmitting station.

Administrative infrastructures drain off a large percentage of the investments, distributed as follows (in millions of CFA francs):


Office of President, National Court, CND	
[National Development Council], Planning	958.6
Rural Development	914
National Defense	898
Interior	735.6

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Public Works, Mining	703.7
Finance, Civil Service, Economic Affairs	580.5
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation	421
Justice	316
Total	5,527.4

Most of the above credits are to cover construction or property.

NSN - 15 **Les investissements** ¹⁾
du FNI (1978 / 1979) : 21 milliards CFA



NB. — Les 6 063,3 millions de « participations et autres interventions » ne sont pas repris dans le graphique ci-dessus.

- Key:
- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| 1. FNI Investments: 21 billion CFA francs | 5. Human infrastructure |
| 2. Development of natural resources | 6. Administrative infrastruc. |
| 3. Roads and bridges | 7. Productive equipment |
| 4. Other material infrastructures | 8. Miscellaneous |

Note: The 6,063,300,000 francs in participations and others interventions are not shown in the above chart.

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Productive equipment involves the purchase of agricultural machinery costing 234.6 million CFA francs.

Participations and other interventions of the FNI are classified as follows (in millions of CFA francs):

Equipment subsidies	783
Startup or balancing subsidies	330
Local financial participation	2,711.8
Participation in intergovernment or international operations	2,238.5
Total	6,063.3

Among the most important operations, one should note the following (in millions of CFA francs):

Fokker purchase	227
Agricultural training operation	270
Livestock feed plant	170
New brickworks construction	200
Participation in construction of an international-class hotel	800
Tillabery sugar project	600
Grain silos and SONICHAR	511.8
SONITEXTIL [Niger Textile Company]	500
Boeing hangar	300
Konni agricultural waterworks development participation	700
Participation in IBRD-IDA telecommunications project	368
Saudi loan counterpart	300

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NIGER

NIGER'S GNP, TRADE BALANCE DISCUSSED

Gross National Product

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1376-77

[Text] While the concepts of gross national production, of gross national product, of national revenue are difficult to determine in the countries of the Third World where statistics are sometimes scarce, they often constitute the most valid source to which one may resort in order to trace the development of those countries or to determine the "standing" of their inhabitants.

Difficulty in Determining the Gross National Product [GNP]

As for Niger, the matter is more delicate. The most recent complete and published national reports regarding this country date back to 1969, and reconstitution of the series linking the end of the last decade to the present period is practically impossible. However, some reliable estimates are available--but difficult to confirm--from international financial organizations that have sent experts on several missions to Niger.

According to departments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the World Bank, the market price of Niger's gross national product went from 101.7 billion CFA in 1970 to 163.5 billion CFA in 1976, that is, an overall progression of 60.8 percent, countered by a marked regression in 1972 and 1973 as a result of the effects of the drought.

World Bank estimates for 1977 are on the order of \$770 million (about 190 billion CFA), but they must be accepted with reservation.

For 1978, unofficial data from financial circles in Niamey in December 1978 reported some much higher figures. It did not seem prudent to include them

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in the present study. It may nevertheless be emphasized that if those figures were to be confirmed, the gross national product for 1978 would be 50 percent higher than that of 1977. Well, in spite of the energetic stimulation provided by the exploitation of uranium to the Nigerian economy, such an enormous progression is very difficult to accept, and especially to explain, at the level of the distribution of basic aggregates.

Thanks to the IMF, there are some reasonable estimates concerning this distribution from 1970 to 1976. It is noted that the production of the rural sector (including self-consumption) during that period occupies first place by far (average proportion, 49.2 percent, the result of compensation for annual participation ranging between 44.4 and 55.9 percent. The trend of primary production during those seven years remained steady and even relatively improved.

The mining sector from which there had been no appreciable participation in the GNP in 1970, furnished 3.7 billion CFA (2.3 percent) in 1976.

The other sectors--except trade--are generally regrouped, which manifests difficulties encountered by the experts in very precisely defining the competition with regard to contribution by the manufacturing industries, construction, transports, noncommercial services, and even of the administrative sector.

With prudence, one may offer the following average participations (with reservation), with mention of the apparent 1970-1976 development:

- Agriculture, cattle breeding, fishing, forestry: 49.2 percent (very slight progress).
- Mining: 1.4 percent (net progress).
- Manufacturing industries: 9.8 percent (small progress).
- Construction: 3.7 percent (small progress).
- Transports: 5.8 percent (appreciable progress).
- Commercial services: 8.8 percent (small progress).
- Administration: 5.5 percent (stagnation).
- Trade: 15.8 percent (small progress).

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Progress of the Mining Sector

It is important to specify that the above description and the graphics that concretely depict the statistics do not represent the present situation at all. For example, it is obvious that the mining sector has developed considerably between 1975 and 1979. Well, the participation that has just been furnished corresponds to the 1970-1976 average and includes two years of negligible competition (100 million CFA in 1970, 200 million in 1971). The average established for the five-year period cannot help but reflect the effects of the first two years.

The construction and transport industries are in full development because uranium is far from being a stranger.

The situation regarding services, most likely with the inclusion of the distribution of energy and of water, and perhaps the production of electricity, is certainly progressing appreciably, taking into account the evolution of a demand oriented towards comfort and modern facilities.

Agriculture has long remained in first place in the economy, without losing its relative position in the least. If one regroups the production of the 1970-1972 yields on the one hand, and of the 1974-1976 on the other, one obtains the following annual yields: 53.4 billion CFA/69, 1 billion CFA. In relation to the average annual GNP calculated for the same two periods, these figures represent respectively 49.3 and 50.1 percent participation, which makes it possible to note (see table) "very slight progress."

The contribution of the mining sector and the increase in certain other aggregates (transports, construction, services, and perhaps trade) have probably occasioned in 1977, and especially in 1978, an appreciable regressive movement in the relative participation of agriculture. The peanut crisis has also precipitated this process.

The Changing Economy

This phenomenon is normal and even encouraging, because it seems to testify to the change that Niger is experiencing. This country, in effect, thanks in particular to uranium, no longer has an economy that is solely based on the primary sector--usual sign of underdevelopment--and is progressively heading toward a more balanced situation in which the three traditional pillars (primary, secondary, tertiary) will compete to assure it a basis that is at the same time more solid and more comfortable.

It is customary to state the gross national product (GNP) by inhabitants. The IMF calculates it each year, beginning with the GNP (Gross National Product), determined through its research and demographic data that are very

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close (for Niger) to the official estimates. According to this organization, one may conclude that in 1970 the Nigerian per capita GNP was about 25,680 F CFA. In 1973, it was very clearly below that figure (24,050 F CFA). In 1974: it represented 26,800 F CFA; in 1975: 28,815 F CFA; in 1976: 34,590 F CFA and; in 1977: (perhaps) 39,010 F CFA.

49,000 F CFA per capita GNP in 1980?

These figures are furnished with reservation (especially the last), but seem to correspond to the remarkable evolution of the overall economy of the country. Most of the unofficial reporters encountered this past December in the Nigerian capital have stated that they were convinced of rapid progress in the overall GNP and in the per capita GNP during the forthcoming years, and this in spite of climactic and parasitological hazards. An annual average increase of about 12 percent had been envisaged for the five-year period for the overall GNP. This progress would be between 9.3 and 9.4 percent of the per capita GNP, which in 1980, when the population would approach the 5,500,000 inhabitants mark, would provide a per capita income of about 49,000 F CFA, that is, two times that of 1973.

Niger will no longer, then, as in this period, be one of the 10 poorest countries in Africa. In 1973, it was in 46th place in regressive importance in the list of 53 African countries for which the World Bank furnished the per capita GNP. In 1982, in all probability it will occupy 28th or 29th place and, toward 1985, could be among the first half of the ranked countries. It is true that, among the countries indexed by the World Bank, some of them, such as Ceuta and Melilla, the Seychelles, Sao Tome, or the Cape Verde Islands, have fewer inhabitants than Niamey or Zinder or have an area smaller than that of an arrondissement, which removes from their per capita GNP, too flexible and too sensitive, a great part of their significance.

In fact, the per capita GNP, which may serve as an element of comparison for developed countries having a homogeneous structure, is not significant in any of the Third World countries. Disparities in Africa and, in particular, in Niger, are often enormous. The above mentioned 1973 ministerial report furnishes a striking example:

- Average annual wages of a Nigerian laborer: 106,602 F CFA.
- Annual average salary of a Nigerian employee, level of engineer: 1,397,823 F CFA.
- Annual average salary of a European upper level employee: 2,935,982 F CFA.

Between the salary of a basic Nigerian worker and that of a Nigerian engineer the relationship was from 1 to 13. It went from 1 to 27.5 in the European upper level staff. Well, a salaried employee in Niger is a privileged person in the work world, even when he is paid the SMIG [Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wages]. In fact, if all Nigerians of active work

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age in 1976 had received a salary equal to the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage, the per capita GNP would have reflected, at least this year:

$$\frac{99,820 \times 218,000}{4,727,000} = 46,035 \text{ F CFA}$$


Since per capita income did not reach 34,600 F CFA, one must infer that many Nigerians lived in very modest circumstances, between almost total destitution and the famed minimum interprofessional guaranteed wage.

Most Incomes Are Very Low


The cases of individuals living completely outside the economic circuit (self-consumption only) are very rare, not to say nonexistent but, in the rural areas, it often happens that the money resources of peasants are limited to a few thousand francs (CFA) per year--long set aside for the most part for the payment of taxes. Even if the suppression in 1978 of the minimum tax sum (IMF), already reduced by half in 1977, had some untoward repercussions at the production level (by no longer obliging a farmer to increase production in order to satisfy tax requirements) it has constituted, on the part of the CMS [Supreme Military Council] a humanitarian act and a wise measure. The peasants from now on will have to pay only 350 F CFA each year for an arrondissement tax for uses that concern them directly. It is certain that, having passed a period of initial passivity, imputable to relief, the rural people will again find reasons to produce, if only to become integrated into the evolutionary process to which they had been barred up to now.

The indirect, but quite considerable, advantage that an examination of the per capita GNP represents resides in the fact that, in a country in which the demographic progression is known, the rate of increase in resources which in theory each inhabitant could have makes it possible to measure the degree of progressive enrichment of the nation as a whole. Even if the national wealth is, in the immediate present, poorly distributed among the persons who create it, its increase constitutes, at least in countries with good management and where waste is prohibited, an improvement factor which each member of the community, within a short term period, or a longer term period, will derive a benefit. This is especially the case with Niger, since international observers are unanimous in acknowledging the good management of the present Nigerian government, its keen awareness of national priorities, its desire for efficiency, and its determination to devote all of the country's resources to the improvement of man and country.

(1) **Le produit national brut nigerien**



(4) **Participation moyenne au PNB par secteurs, au cours de la période 1970-76**
(estimations officielles)



- Key:
1. Nigerian Gross National Product
 2. 1970-76 IMF figures
 3. 1977 IMF estimates
 4. Average GNP by sectors during 1970-76, inclusive (unofficial estimates)
 5. Primary Sector: Agric., cattle breeding, fishing, forestry

6. Trade
7. Mfg. industries
8. Noncommercial services
9. Transports
10. Administration
11. Construction
12. Mining

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Favorable Trade Balance

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Jun 79 pp 1378-79

[Text] An examination of the trade balance and of the balance of payments shows that for several years these resources have been very appreciably increasing. An examination of budgets shows that the distribution of credits allocated to operation, as well as to investments, is sound and corresponds--within the limits of possibilities--to the true needs of the country.

Without infringing on a more detailed study regarding trade exchanges, a study in which a special chapter will be devoted to that topic, it is useful to emphasize that, according to multicopy reports on foreign trade in 1976, published officially and gathered through our efforts in the Directorate of Statistics in Niamey in December 1978, the year 1976, with 31,979 million CFA in exportations compared with 30,383 million CFA in importations, for the first time in the history of the country presents a positive trade balance (105.25 percent), whereas during the first 5 years of the decade the rates of imports covered by exports were regularly negative: 1979, 68.06 percent; 1971, 88.52 percent; 1972, 85.24 percent; 1973, 95.28 percent; 1974, 62.42 percent; 1975, 76.55 percent.

Other figures (called "provisional estimates") were furnished for 1976 and 1977 in the middle of 1978. They are schematic and surprising: in 1976, FOB exportations, 36.9 billion CFA; CAF importations, 48.3 billion CFA; cover rates, 76.4 percent; 1977, FOB exportations, 46.9 billion CFA; CAF importations, 60 billion CFA; cover rates, 78.8 percent.

Favorable Balance in 1976

Although the figures contained in the multicopy reports also are temporary and subject to later correction, because of their detailed presentation by chapters and topics we considered them as preferable to overall data. Even though they are not offered with positive guarantees of exactness, we have chosen them and they alone will be used in this present study.

It seems, then, that in 1976 Nigeria's foreign trade balance was slightly favorable (with a surplus of +1.6 billion CFA). This surplus should be maintained, and even increased, during 1977 and 1978, for which definitive figures are not yet available and for which the provisional data are uncertain or suspect.

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Proportion of Certain Exportations to the Total Value of Exports (percent)

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1976</u>
Gross products of the primary sector	79.87	64.77	32.81	26.74
Mining products	0.10	13.29	32.22	64.30
Other	20.03	21.94	34.97	8.96

It is well known that uranium is the basic reason for the above mentioned change. It is not only the chief reason, but the essential cause, as manifested by the following figures:

The Preponderant Position of Uranium

If one accepts the above percentages, calculated from official documents, one notes that, progressively, beginning with 1972, uranium exports from year to year have acquired a preponderant position. In 1975 they represented 47.2 percent of total exportations. The ratio of 64.3 percent in 1976 doubtless constitutes only a step toward greater participation in the years to come.

The recovery of the peanut industry and the rational exploitation of a restored livestock situation could occasion a reduction of those percentages, but that would appear improbable in the immediate future.

The positive nature of the trade balance cannot help but have a beneficial influence on the balance of payments. Well, the latter is already satisfactory ("too much so," even say some malicious financiers, accustomed to vory frequent negative imbalances in Africa).

Between 1973 and 1975 Niger, which did not make use of its rights to special funds during that period, recorded negative amounts for "goods and services," but "transfers without counterpart" and "movements of capital" were generally favorable to it (in billions CFA):

Balance of Payments

Source: BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States]

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Goods and services	- 9.74	-28.07	-15.48
Transfers and counterparts	+15.25	+24.85	+13.66
Balance of current payments	+ 5.51	- 3.22	- 1.82
Capital of nonmonetary* sectors	- 0.6	+ 8.15	+ 7.29
Net errors and omissions	- 4.03	- 3.97	- 5.21
Total Balance	+ 0.88	- 1.04	+ 0.26

* On this line the + sign represents a decrease of assets or increase in liabilities.

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The balance of payments for 1976, as presented in some publications, has not been considered here because it has been established at the level of "goods and services" on totally different bases from those that we have chosen. The "balance of merchandise" in this document shows a deficit balance of 7 billion CFA, largely countered by the positive balance of transfers without counterpart (+18 billion). The movements of capital show, without details, a little more than 11 billion in liabilities or reduction of assets, which results in a quasi-balance of the overall balance. Well, if one utilizes the figures of the "multicopy reports," in which the trade balance is positive, the balance of payments must show a positive balance of more than 8.5 billion CFA.

A Very Favorable Balance of Payments

If such a result, presented with reservation, corresponds to reality, it is absolutely exceptional and has not many equivalents in Africa. It is, however, the logical reflection of solid management through which useless expenditures are reduced, of an appreciable improvement in foreign trade, of the increased confidence manifested by foreign investors (on the public and private plane).

It must be mentioned that during this past decade the balance of payments in Niger has been greatly burdened, essentially by a constantly deficient balance of goods (even after an allowance for food assistance, enormous in 1974) and, to a lesser degree, remuneration for assistance services.

The transfers without counterpart are always very positive. In fact, the transfers for expatriates who worked in Niger between 1973 and 1975, with a deduction made for the return of the funds of Nigerians who worked abroad, reflected an annual negative balance of only 3.5 billion, whereas the average nonreimbursable aid made to the government has been 20.1 billion CFA.

Liabilities are increasing, but at a reasonable rate. The combination of these aggregates assures Niger the continuance of a positive supply of resources and of reserves: 392 million CFA in 1968; 1,215 M CFA in 1969; 3,330 M CFA in 1970; 3,392 M CFA in 1971; 1,984 M CFA in 1972; 1,111 M CFA in 1973; 1,225 M CFA in 1975...In 1974, by way of exception, because of the effects of the drought, Nigerian assets were negative (1,539 M CFA).

If in the future the trade balance regularly shows a surplus, which seems probable, Niger, already not very handicapped by foreign liabilities, will be progressively and rapidly in a position to finance from its own resources the integral development of its economy.

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A rather Small Foreign Debt

On 1 January 1978, the total foreign debt was about 70 billion CFA—a state debt of 63 billion and an endorsed debt of 7 billion.

These figures are very moderate and do not impose any very appreciable annual reimbursement problems on the Nigerian budget. In the 1976–1977 budget service for the debt (operational phase) represented only 5.6 percent of total expenditures, whereas in some neighboring countries the rate is 4 to 5 times higher. In the 1977–1978 budget (estimates), the "public debt"/"total budget" proportion is even reduced to 5.35 percent and, according to the 1979 financial law, to 4.85 percent.

It is to be noted that the Nigerian government has not yet borrowed in Euro-dollars. During the 1973 to 1976 period, the debt has had the following average structure (in percentages) with respect to its outset:

Assistance from governments	74.5
Assistance from international institutions	15.85
Assistance from various establishments	9.58
Suppliers' Credit	0.04
Financial organizations	0.03

Ample details will be furnished in a special chapter on foreign bi- or multi-lateral assistance and on Niger's cooperation with a great number of foreign countries. It is enough to observe here that this assistance and this cooperation are particularly important, and that this manifests the exceptional credit that this country enjoys in the world.

Considerable Increase in Public Investments

A thorough examination of the budget will also allow us to trace the distribution and the allotment of Nigeria's resources. Without going into detail for the moment, it is interesting to note that priority is given to investments. Proof of this is furnished by the index development of the three key positions of the budget beginning with 1970 (index 100):

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>
Public debt	100	73.5	275	435
Operation	100	119.5	183	242
Participation	100	136	354.5	970.5
Total	.87 100	121	225	404

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This table shows that the service for the debt has appreciably kept pace with the development of the total budget, whereas operational credits have experienced a very slow progression owing perhaps to a too great compression of expenditures for administrative personnel. In contrast to this, "state projects" have multiplied practically by 10 in a total budget that had been satisfied to merely quadruple. Well, state participation represents a major part of the investments (contributions to the National Investment Fund, profit sharing, credits for economic infrastructures, various economic appropriations, etc. In 1974 and 1975 investments represented 59.6 to 59.7 percent of total participation. In 1976, the proportion rose to 60.45 percent; in 1977, to 73.8 percent; and in 1978, to 78.2 percent.

The National Investment Fund, which is the chief source of public investments, with resources that in principle consist of specially appropriated receipts, of contributions from the General Budget, of foreign financial aid, and occasionally receipts from loans, has experienced the following evolution during the course of recent years: 1971: 1,558 million CFA; 1972: 2,176.3 M CFA; 1973: 2,671.6 M CFA; 1974: 3,164.2 M CFA; 1975: 2,523.7 M CFA; 1976: 5,532.6 M CFA; 1977: 18,423 M CFA; 1978: 13,996 M CFA. Article 11 of the 1979 financial law stipulates for this fiscal year: "The allotment from the general budget to the National Investment Fund is fixed at 21 billion francs" (21,925 M CFA since the 9 March 1975 edict, bringing the Nigerian budget from 56,747 to 59,314 million CFA). One has come a long way, it must be acknowledged, from the several hundred million at the beginning of the decade.

It goes without saying that the allotment of such significant credits for investments can take place only if, on the one hand, there are available resources and if, on the other hand, they are not used for excessive operational expenditures or for prestigious and luxury accomplishments that do not result in any revenue.

The continuation of this work will furnish ample proof that Nigerian public savings (because private savings are small, if not negligible) are used for purposes that have to do with the two main concerns of the CMS: the development of the country and, as a consequence, the progressive and rapid improvement of the standard of living of the Nigerian people.

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NIGERIA

FRENCH INDUSTRY SEES COUNTRY AS IMPORTANT MARKET

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 pp 1313-1314

[Article: "The Firms Present at the Franco-Nigerian Days in Lagos (21-25 May)"]

[Excerpt] The sizeable participation in the Franco-Nigerian Days in Lagos testifies to the fact that there is no doubting the constantly growing interest that Nigeria is arousing in France, and this despite the imminent changes which the country is going to experience on the political level with the establishment of the civilian regime. Furthermore, as has been emphasized by Claude Maurisset of the FIMTM [Federation of Mechanical and Metal-Transformation Industries], who was the real instigator of the event, this change of regime should not cause too much uneasiness. Nigeria, he said, is presently in the trough of a wave, and while the military authorities have in fact taken measures which brake the activities of investors and businessmen, these measures can only be temporary, because they present the risk of suffocating the country. Their aim is only to leave to the civilians as sound a situation as possible. General Obasanjo and his team are thus showing fair play toward the civilians; and perhaps they are also trying to avoid subsequent reproaches. In any case, their attitude appears to be understood both domestically and abroad. Abroad, proof of this can be seen in the great increase of expressions of interest by a large number of countries in this giant of Africa, of whose immense potential all countries from Great Britain to the United States, from Western Europe to Eastern Europe, are perfectly well aware.

The officials of the FIMTM believe that Nigeria will rapidly constitute an important market, and moreover one which is well-situated in Africa and is a strong promoter of technology transfer. Mechanical products presently represent 5 percent of the country's imports, with the public-works equipment. They consider that such sales will grow noticeably (they have already increased 34 percent between 1977 and 1978), on condition that they be given a certain added value. Moreover, it is from this point of view that countries such as Japan, the USSR, Poland and the FRG have begun to make sales.

Thus, on the occasion of the FIMTM press conference in Paris on 15 May, its general manager, Georges Imbert, made this emphatic point: "If we do not do

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it, Nigeria will develop without us." The industrialists of the mechanical industry see this as a 5-year challenge. "In the coming 5 years," Imbert continued, "activity on Nigeria will have a thoroughly priority character. It is an investment area which is going to require a lot of effort, doubtlessly the most important efforts that we will have to make in Africa."

Imbert noted regarding transfers of technology--one of the major themes of the Lagos event--that while they are being carried out with good technical expertise as regards the big projects, as represented by the Peugeot assembly plant at Kaduna, the same is not true for the transformation industries or, more generally, for the medium-size enterprises. Too often, as regards the latter, the know-how is considered only as a subproduct of the equipment delivered. And Imbert concluded: "In the coming 10 years, it is necessary for some thinking to be done in this area, and we, the mechanical industries, must take part in it, and it is necessary for France to want to be in the first rank." In this direction, the big companies in international trade that want to work more closely with the industrialists should be led to play an increasingly important part, so that the medium-size firms can truly be capable of giving added value to the products which they export.

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NIGERIA

FOUR MORE SUGAR FACTORIES PLANNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1733

[Text] Nigeria's sugar production, now estimated at some 72,000 tons, will be increased to 224,000 tons by 1984. To the present two factories will be added four more, including a joint venture with Swaziland, and not counting the Nigerian-Beninese project of Save, in the Republic of Benin.

The two present factories are Bacita and Ilorin in Kwara State. The former, the Nigerian Sugar Company, Ltd., farms 4,600 hectares of cane and plans to expand, based on the Oshun river basin project, to an annual production of 50,000 tons. A new production unit will be added. The second factory, Tate and Lyle Nigeria, Ltd., produces 38,000 tons per year (sugar cubes and syrups).

The three other national projects will be Numan, in Gongola State; Mokwa, in Niger State, and Edu, in Kwara State. The Numan project, the Savanna Sugar Factory, to cost 246 million naira, is to go into production between now and the end of the year, but its full capacity of 100,000 tons will not be reached until 1984. The project involves the federal government, the governments of Gongola, Bauchi and Borno states, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The Mokwa project, Sunti Sugar Factory, to cost 280 million naira, will be inaugurated in 1981. Initial production will be 50,000 tons, to be increased ultimately to 100,000 tons. Participating in the project are the federal government, the governments of Niger and Sokoto states, the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), and Sugar Consortium Pty, Ltd Australia, which recently replaced Tate and Lyle as technical partner. The Edu project, Lafiaji Sugar Factory, is still under feasibility study, which should be completed by the end of the year and the factory could go into operation in 1980.

We have no details of the Nigerian-Swazi project except that the Nigerian federal industry ministry has budgeted 2 million naira for 1979-1980.

Finally, the Nigerian-Beninese Save Project, to be constructed by the Belgian company ABR Engineering, is to have an annual production of 40,000 tons, which the two countries will share.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

ON TRADE WITH BRAZIL--At the end of April, the Nigerian federal commissioner for mines and power, Justin Tseayo, went to Brazil to negotiate possible cooperation in the area of electric power. We note in this regard that Nigerian production of electric power recently increased considerably with the placing in service of a new unit in the thermal power plant of Ugorode. This unit, with a power of 120,000 kw [kilowatts] (not 120 kilovolts, as erroneously printed), has raised this plant's power to 340,000 kw, and the other three units which are to be placed in service and which are reported to total 300,000 kw will raise it later to a level 260,000 kw higher than that of the Kainji hydroelectric power plant. The federal commissioner was also to take up in Brasilia the problem of increasing Nigerian oil sales to Brazil from 20,000 to 50,000 barrels per day. The director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Esto Marinko, was also expected in the Brazilian capital a few days later to study this problem in greater detail with the representatives of Petrobras. Brazil attaches great importance to development of its links with Nigeria, its No 1 trading partner in black Africa. This is also what had been stressed by the Nigerian federation's chief of staff of supreme general headquarters, Gen Musa Yar' Adua, on the occasion of his visit to this country in January. Trade exchanges between the two countries have increased quite sharply in recent years, especially as regards Brazilian exports to Nigeria, which went from \$57.2 million to \$233.5 million between 1975 and 1978. In the same time period, Nigeria's exports have stagnated and even decreased in 1978, totaling \$67 million as against \$90 million in 1977. The current imbalance could thus be corrected precisely by increased sales of Nigerian oil to Brazil. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1194] 11267

FRENCH BANK LOAN--The Nigerian Federal Government and the Paris National Bank (BNP) signed an agreement on 5 June for a loan of 500 million French francs. This first purchase credit agreement signed by Nigeria with a French bank reflects the current favorable atmosphere between Nigeria and France. It is intended in particular to promote French exports of equipment and technical assistance. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAU ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Jun 79 p 1608]

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JAPANESE METALLURGICAL PLANT--A Japanese source reports that the Nigerian Federal Government's agreement with Kobe Steel, Ltd. to construct at Katsina a metallurgical factory of 210,000 tons' capacity is for the price of 27 million yen. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1732]

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SEYCHELLES

'AFRIQUE-ASIE' INTERVIEWS SEYCHELLES PRESIDENT ON NONALINEMENT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp III-VI LD

[Interview with President Albert Rene of Seychelles by Simon Malley--date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] A few months prior to the summit of nonaligned countries in Havana, all sorts of maneuvers have been started to further weaken a movement which was created as a result of Third World peoples' determination not to become vassals of big powers, to make it abandon its real objectives and to deprive it of its content. Because the next summit will take place in Cuba in September and because Fidel Castro is to become its chairman for the coming 3 years, certain Western powers, China and some influential members of the group of nonaligned countries are already trying to reduce by any means the influence and authority of the chairman designate. They would like to subject him to some kind of tutelage, prevent him from revitalizing the movement which has virtually been stricken with paralysis since Houari Boumediene's chairmanship came to an end and, above all, prevent any action aimed at reasserting and consolidating the anti-imperialist and anticolonialist nature of the movement of nonaligned countries.

For instance, certain people have proposed that the chairman (Fidel Castro) be seconded (controlled) by three deputy chairmen, that the number of coordination committee members be increased from 25 to 35, that any other nonaligned country be allowed to attend its meetings as observer and that an emergency organization be created with a view to discussing and trying to resolve any conflict that might arise among nonaligned countries. In short, it is a question of depriving the office of the movement's chairman of the role entrusted to it since its creation which has enabled many heads of state actively engaged in the anti-imperialist struggle to play a crucial role in its consolidation.

Some other people have mentioned the possibility that people's China, which has dared to propose that the Havana summit exclude Vietnam from its ranks while pretending that it would be supported by North Korea in such a venture, might join the movement.

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It is an attempt at destroying the substance of the movement of nonaligned countries during the Havana summit, merely because the meeting will take place in Cuba and because Fidel Castro is to become its chairman.

Does this mean that a crisis has arisen? A crisis which might have serious repercussions not only in Third World countries but also for the balance of international forces.

"This is true," President Albert Rene told us, "and we are profoundly worried by it all. But first it should be stated that the existing situation is a result of the fact that many people have a mistaken idea about what in fact nonalignment is. They would like to make everybody believe that to be nonaligned means that you are neither on the side of capitalist countries nor on the side of socialist countries.

"But it is not so simple. In our view and in the view of Third World countries which have been subjected to the colonialist and imperialist yoke, a capitalist country can be nonaligned and so can a socialist one. We believe that nonalignment means refusal to be member of a military pact controlled by either big power. It means refusal to accept the imposition of any given policy, any precise strategy.

"Obviously, certain strategies can sometimes link up with one another if interests coincide. But what distinguishes an 'aligned' country from a 'nonaligned' country is the latter's determination to fiercely defend its independence, its total freedom as far as its choice of policy and action is concerned, its complete sovereignty and its refusal to allow any foreign bases to be installed on its territory.

"Therefore, why should socialist countries like Cuba or Vietnam not be accepted as nonaligned countries? The case of a capitalist country like the Ivory Coast is similar..,"

[Question] But what is the explanation of all these machinations just before the Havana summit in which, we are told, you will participate?

[Answer] I will certainly be there. In my opinion, the crisis which you have mentioned is due to certain external influences. Because we are going to Cuba, because Fidel Castro will receive us and because according to a tradition respected by the nonaligned movement the head of state of the host country is elected chairman, certain big powers are afraid that the movement might become something which, in any case, it should have always been, that is, a "diplomatic strike force" able to resist maneuvers and plots directed by them against Third World peoples. A "diplomatic strike force" which could even become a strong and dynamic economic and political strike force which would unite and mobilize all the forces of our peoples with a view to resisting any subversive maneuvers and aggressive acts to which we are constantly being subjected in Africa, the Arab countries, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere....

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Some other countries--members of our movement--are at variance with Cuba or disagree with it on certain international problems. They are now using these disagreements to call into question the fundamental concept of nonalignment or the way in which it has been implemented even though they have not done so hitherto. The aim of this is clear--efforts are being made to divide the movement and create factions within it by arousing distrust among certain leaders and questioning some peoples' intentions....

[Question] Do you think that you will be able to prevent these maneuvers from succeeding and if so how?

[Answer] It is difficult to foresee the course of events now. All that can be said at present is that all those who are united by a common desire and determination to breathe new life into the movement of nonaligned countries and launch a new offensive against the dangers threatening us should intensify their efforts with a view to warding off any attempts to disrupt the movement or weaken its authority. Faced with the challenges daily presented to us by the forces of aggression--whether on the part of South Africa, Israel, Rhodesia or their allies and protectors--the movement of nonaligned countries has a decisive role to play. Let us insure that it can fully assume its responsibilities....

[Question] In your opinion, to what extent is the Sino-Soviet conflict responsible for this situation? And how could the nonaligned countries mitigate its effects on the development of your movement? Are certain countries not afraid that it could be used to support one of these two powers against the other?

[Answer] Obviously, this conflict affects us directly. When two countries with which we maintain friendly relations and cooperate clash, it is only natural that we should suffer as a result. Try to image what the world would be like if the USSR and People's China were united! Try to image what immense benefits we Third World countries would reap from this. The present and potential aggressors against the African, Arab, Asian and South American peoples would think 1,000 times before attacking us!

Having said this, any crises and conflicts among nonaligned countries or between these countries and a socialist power make us naturally wonder who is right and whom we should support.

The Sino-Vietnamese conflict can serve as an example of this. On the one hand, Vietnam is member of the movement of nonaligned countries and is therefore entitled to support and sympathy on our part. And on the other hand, People's China is a friendly power and, furthermore, a socialist one. This is why in many Third World countries some people have defended China and some other people Vietnam whereas the majority has remained silent for state or short-term tactical reasons.

The role of the Soviet Union and that of China has been mentioned at one time or another but few people have said: "Let us forget about the Sino-Soviet conflict. Let us first think about Vietnam, whose people have

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suffered so much, have sacrificed so much during 40 years of a national liberation war in which the world's biggest powers--first France and later the United States--were engaged. Let us first think of the heroic struggle waged by the people who held out against Western aggression and won. They were bound to merit our sympathy and support..."

[Question] Do you not find China's attitude disturbing on the international plane? Are you not afraid that in alining itself increasingly with the positions of the United States and the most reactionary and feudal Third World countries it might eventually conclude a semi-official alliance with Washington? After all it attacked Vietnam, supported Pinochet, the Shah of Iran, Haile Selassie, Numayri, Mobutu and the most conservative West European regimes. It was hostile to many liberation movements in Africa and the Arab world when they were formed: the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique....

Did it not give financial and military aid to the puppets in the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and others?

[Answer] Of course I am worried. However, this feeling is mixed with some confidence in the more distant future. I think China is in the throes of what I would call convulsions. I visited Beijing and had long talks with the Chinese leaders. I told them my worries on many problems. I told them I did not understand their attitude on certain situations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For example, I do not understand their behavior with regard to the Polisario, Pinochet's Chile, Neto's MPLA, the Shah of Iran, Cuban internationalist aid to Angola and so forth.

When a problem arises China does not examine the root of the matter. It is merely content to take the opposite side to the Soviet Union even if that harms the oppressed peoples of the Third World. The result is paradoxical. Beijing's attitude is this: if you are anti-Soviet you become Beijing's friend, if you have special relations with Moscow it will eventually regard you as an enemy.

Nonetheless, I do not think that China will really form an alliance with the United States. I think its present attitude is determined by its fear of the "great bear" and its desire to stand up to it. For China that is more important than anything else and hence it neglects Africa. That is also what led it to attack Vietnam--an aberrant operation which caused us great concern. Moreover, I do not think that such an operation was the best thing the Chinese leaders could have done if they wanted to prevent the USSR's alleged attempt to control the Indochinese Peninsula as they said they did.

[Question] Nonetheless, you mentioned your confidence in the future....

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[Answer] Yes, because we must trust the great Chinese people. Their hard-working nature, their acute sense of discipline, the enormous task they have accomplished and the success they have achieved since the triumph of their revolution are all factors which will eventually produce changes in Beijing's foreign policy.

[Question] Like Madagascar, the Seychelles earnestly want the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. This is also the desire of all the progressive parties on the other islands in the ocean. What is the state of your relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and France on this point?

[Answer] When we came to power 5 June 1977 we made a serious study of the situation. Of course, at that time we did not want any conflict with the great powers but we clearly told the Soviet Union and the United States that we were determined to pursue our efforts to have all the great powers' forces withdrawn from the Indian Ocean.

Last year we went further and warned them that we were about to take steps to start the region's demilitarization. For example, with regard to the warships anchored in our ports. When we broached this subject with Washington we were told that the United States must increase the size of its fleet in the region because the Soviet Union is doing so. We then suggested that the two powers should come here to the Seychelles to hold the secret meetings which they generally hold in their countries or in Europe so that we could be involved in their discussions and know what was decided. Of course we cannot fight the USSR or the United States. However, we can tell them what we accept and what we reject. For us the main thing is to establish a system of cooperation so that these warships no longer cruise round our islands but go away so as to avoid the risk of a world conflagration in which we would be the first victims.

[Question] What about Deigo Garcia?

[Answer] Diego Garcia is a different matter. It is much more serious and much more explosive. Diego Garcia is a naval air service military base which is right next to us. On this question we are categorical: this base absolutely must be removed. We are demanding much more than Mauritius: we think Diego Garcia must be given back to that country. I do not know whether that constitutes interference in Mauritius' internal affairs but the fact is that this U.S. base is a permanent threat to our security and independence.

[Question] What about France? After all, there is also a French military presence in the Indian Ocean....

[Answer] In my opinion the only peoples who have the right to be present in the Indian Ocean are the peoples of this region. On a strictly legal level France regards itself as an Indian Ocean country because Reunion is a "French department." However, I will repeat what I said in Paris:

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I think that this (French) presence is an anachronism which history will sooner or later remove. However, while the French presence constitutes a danger it is different from the danger caused by the presence of the two super powers whose confrontation could lead to a world conflict. Having said that, I cannot say whether France should or should not have a fleet here. I do not see what it is doing in the Indian Ocean and whom it is trying to protect. If France really wants to help the Indian Ocean countries it should give them ships, warships! However, I think that sooner or later France will be forced to follow Britain which considered that its presence here was too expensive. Sooner or later it will withdraw its fleet from our region. It would be in its interests to do so if it wants to remain Africa's friend. A real cooperation policy is not compatible with an undesirable military presence....

[Question] What are your plans regarding the NASA satellite detection station in the Seychelles?

[Answer] As you know the contract which was signed by the previous government binds us until 1985. That does not mean that we do not intend to raise the problem when the time comes. All I can say is that this station will not remain on our territory for long.

[Question] You mentioned the Middle East and North Africa.... What do you think of the recent separate peace treaty concluded between Cairo and Tel Aviv? What all-embracing settlement of the Palestinian problem do you envisage?

[Answer] During the recent OAU summit in Khartoum I spoke at length with President Al-Sadat. I tried to understand the reasons for his policy. All he told me was that he was acting "in the interest of peace." But what peace? Why have there been all these wars between the Israelis and the Arabs since 1948? Surely the fundamental reason for them was the fate of the Palestinian people who had been robbed of their land and their country? How can any "peace" be possible without finding a solution to this fundamental problem which is in keeping with the Palestinian people's aspirations? How could peace be insured by the restoration of a little piece of Egyptian territory while all those wars were fought to restore the Palestinian people's legitimate rights?

That is why I lost all my respect for Al-Sadat. It is true that from the day he expelled the Soviet military advisers and asked for U.S. intervention it was obvious that his policy with regard to the Palestinians and Israel was going to change. I must add that the separate peace treaty signed by Al-Sadat and Begin will not last very long, either due to an internal change in Egypt or to Israel's expansionist policy. Just look at what is now happening in the Middle East: constant and systematic Israeli attacks on Lebanon, raids inside Lebanon territory, threats against Syria, Jordan and so forth. How long do you think the Egyptian people will tolerate this situation? By signing this treaty Al-Sadat showed that he

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had become a U.S. slave. As far as we are concerned, we are firmly committed to supporting the Palestinian people and will maintain that unswerving support.

[Question] North Africa has witnessed serious disturbances recently: the liberation war waged by the Polisario, the death of President Houari Boumediene, the threats hanging over Libya....

[Answer] First, I would like to stress that Algeria is one of the few countries with which we have always had a deep affinity. Long before becoming independent we followed and studied its fight against, and victory over, the colonial forces. We have always felt we could learn from the Algerian people's struggle, its successes and failures. During my talks with President Boumediene we both felt that we shared the same ideology, the same convictions and the same fundamental options. President Boumediene understood the specific problems of the Indian Ocean islands and never had any hesitation in helping us. His death affected me deeply but I know that the Algerian people and the leaders they have appointed to run the state will consolidate the Algerian revolution's achievements.

I have not yet had the opportunity of meeting the new Algerian leaders but I am convinced that the ties of friendship, cooperation and solidarity which link us will be maintained and strengthened in the coming years.

As for the Polisario, our position has been clear since liberation. We think the West Saharan people have the right to run their own country. The liberation war they are fighting proves that they have a right to independence. Aside from the Saharans, all those now in the Western Sahara, whether Moroccan, French or Mauritanian are in fact invaders. Immediately after our 5 June revolution we were due to go to Lusaka to give our clear support for the independence of the Western Sahara and the recognition of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. When the Lusaka meeting was called off, following various machinations, the very day it was due to start we recognized the Saharan Republic.

[Question] Do you think that a peaceful solution is possible?

[Answer] Frankly, I do not think so. It is impossible to count on it as long as the present Moroccan regime is in power. That is why the Saharan people must fight until it has chased out all its aggressors. The support which Algeria has given to the Polisario is an act of great political courage and should serve as an example to the other countries which could help the Saharan people.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

FRENCH ATTITUDE TO INDEPENDENT HOMELANDS--In reply to a written question dated 24 March from Pierre Bas, deputy (RPR [Rally for the Republic]), the French minister of foreign affairs, Jean Francois-Poncet, declares (JO [Official Journal] of Debates, National Assembly--11 May 1979) that "there is no contradiction between the attitude adopted by France toward Angola [a country whose independence it has recognized] and that which it has taken toward the South African 'Bantustans' of Transkei and Bophutatswana. The People's Republic of Angola was admitted to the United Nations in November 1976. Furthermore, France was one of the first Western states to recognize its independence, and Franco-Angolan relations have recently been raised to ambassadorial level. The case of Transkei and Bophutatswana is totally different, and must be viewed with the framework of the South African system of apartheid, which France has always condemned. By practicing a so-called "separate development" policy, the South African government is aiming, in effect, at tying 19 million blacks, who represent 70 percent of the population of the Republic of South Africa, to 'national homes' which represent scarcely 13 percent of the country's area. These 'national homes' or 'Bantustans' are broken up and scattered throughout all of South Africa's territory. In these conditions, France has not wanted to appear to back the 'separate development' policy of the South African government by recognizing the factitious independence that it has granted to Transkei and Bophutatswana and that no state has recognized up to the present. It considers that the South African government will not solve the problem of coexistence of the white and black communities by maintaining the fiction of a territorial partition, which for that matter is far from equitable. It will be able to do so only by promoting participation by black South Africans in the prosperity and political life of the entire country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1324] 11267

'AIRBUS' ORDER--On 15 May, the South African national company South African Airways (SAA) received authorization to purchase a fifth "Airbus" airplane, the political correspondent of the South African newspaper chain ARGUS has announced. We note that SAA has been using four "Airbuses," purchased in 1975-76, on its domestic system for the last 2 years. According to the ARGUS group's correspondent, this decision was made by the minister of transport, Lourens Muller, on 15 May. A reliable source states that the South African

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company's fifth "Airbus" will be delivered in 1981. On 23 April last, Mr Lourens Muller had announced an imminent "Airbus" order by South Africa. [Text] [Paris, MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1325] 11267

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TANZANIA

REPORTER NOTES ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY SITUATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13, 20 Jun 79

[Article by Francois Soudan]

[13 Jun 79 pp 20-21]

[Text] Cost of Self-Sufficiency

Mwinyikunda Mwinyikandi is dead. He died this Friday afternoon 11 May, in the middle of a popular quarter of Dar es Salaam. Mwinyikandi did not know how old he was. He still remembered, merely, the time when the flags waving on the front of public buildings bore the German eagle. When Tanzania was called Tanganyika and when it was a German colony before becoming British, in 1918, and then independent 44 years later.

About 10 of his near relations mingle their sobs with the sputtering of rain on the sheet metal roof, around immaculate linen, along the somber walls of the house. A delegation from the party, their hands filled with armfuls of red flowers, is waiting in the shade, somewhat in the background, to be able to approach the old man. "Ndugu" (comrade) Mwinyikandi was dean of the members of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the Rally of the Revolution. Before his election as an honorary member of the CCM [Rally of the Revolution] (which resulted from the merger of the Tanganyika African National Union and the Afro-Shirazy Party, in January 1977), the old Ndugu had participated in every combat, in every hope: for independence, for socialism (a word whose meaning he was often not sure that he understood well), always at the side of the one whose yellowed chromo brightens the wall of his death chamber, Julius Nyerere. Does this Tanzania that Mwinyikandi has just left, with his face strangely calm, resemble his dreams? No, without doubt. And no one here will conceal from you that the long march of Arusha exists much more in the mind of the leaders than in the heart of the 17 million Tanzanians.

What concerns the little city dwellers in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Moshi or Kigoma at present is not the latest skirmishes in the war with Uganda or

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the feverish debates agitating the Dar es Salaam university students around the topic of "community authenticity," but rather supplies for the markets, the constant price rise, the dramatic lack of means of communication. At the end of May, the price of a liter of gasoline went from 3.85 to 5.05 shillings (a Tanzanian shilling [Tsh] = 50 African Financial Community francs = 0.50 French francs), and Iran, the principal supplier, has not yet resumed its deliveries of crude oil. The shops around Askari Square, the nerve center of Dar es Salaam, are almost empty and they decorate their displays with a few dusty cans of corned beef imported from Great Britain and Zambia, or a few rare bottles of South African whisky. Nevertheless, retail trade, which was nationalized at the beginning of the 1970's, has just been returned to the private sector, because of "management inability." But the rumor runs that the merchants -- most of them of Indian origin -- have recovered their petty bourgeois way of thinking by regaining possession of their shops. "They stock up to sell on the black market," a taxi driver grumbled. Remarkably organized networks are also flourishing in the black market in a parallel exchange of the national currency. Foreigners passing through are discreetly offered rates five to ten times higher than the official rate.

The 1976-1981 5-year plan, aiming at industrial development and improvement of productivity, will moreover, result in putting the private sector, to which it has granted very broad import authorizations, on its feet again. The embryo of Tanzanian bourgeoisie will undoubtedly be regenerated by this. Although a visible passion for business and ostentatious expenditures are not part of everyday living, there is a very definite feeling that the bourgeoisie is raising its head. Its privileged meeting places are the Dar es Salaam Tennis Club or the Simba Grill in the Kilimandjaro Hotel, where a suit must be worn for admission. Before the East Africa Community was dissolved, 2 years ago and the frontier with Kenya was closed, the Tanzanian bourgeoisie had the habit of getting away, on weekends from Dar es Salaam, the austere capital where they were bored, to relax and go shopping in Nairobi, the flashy show window of capitalism in east Africa. At present, they fly off to the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, whose shops sell South African products. More serious undoubtedly is the relatively recent establishment of prostitution networks -- still discreet -- that draw on the rural exodus for their source. It is whispered that certain high-level party officials are probably profiting extensively from it. Cynically speaking, the rates of the Tanzanian prostitutes are among the lowest in Africa.

Rural exodus is the most visible tie between the city, where 7 percent of the population of Tanzania live, and the countryside, the primary objective of Julius Nyerere's socialism. Especially since the semifailure of the "villagization" movement. The original aim -- to group all the rural population within community villages -- was quite often diverted by excessive zeal on the part of the party's "mission heads." Instead of explaining, all too often they preferred compulsion. Instead of encouraging voluntary, more operational, grouping, they imposed mass grouping. As a result, the

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1973 drought ended in a generalized shortage in the "ujamaa" [community villages], where the population was too large in comparison with the production capacity of the soil. At present, the great majority of the villages have been "decommunitized," with care taken, at the same time, not to disperse the rural population again. Village managers were appointed, responsible for managing the "ujamaa." The principle of collective self-management is growing fainter. In the Kilimanjaro region, the well-to-do coffee planters, who had never really accepted the Arusha Declaration and the 1970 "directives" and whose entire activity was directed toward markets in Kenya, are recovering a bit of their "spirit of enterprise." During the whole collectivization period -- between 1970 and 1976 -- almost one quarter of the coffee harvest in Moshi and Arusha went to the Kenyan port of Mombasa by smugglers' trails.

The development of petty capitalism, the backward movement on the road to rural collectivization, the sometimes brutal purging measures (like the dismissal of 9,000 civil servants, or 20 percent of the state's employees, in 1976) are not altering, nevertheless, the optimism of the Tanzanian leaders. Strengthened by solid successful achievements in the fields of literacy, health, nationalization of the banking sector or of self-sufficiency in food, confident in the operation of a sizable mining field (coal, iron, phosphates and natural gas especially), they explain their choice very clearly as follows: "We must provide ourselves with basic industries," an official in the Ministry of Interior points out. "If not, we shall never take off. We are well aware that, in order to achieve this, we must increase our dependence on foreign countries and allow the nation's private sector to develop. There will be further inequalities. But we shall master them. Self-reliance will beat that price. In half a century."

[20 Jun 79, pp 36-37]

[Text] War for Peace

Clicking of weapons in the night. Between the ink-colored shapes of two coconut palms swayed by the wind, a furtive, curious shadow crept a hairbreadth. The leading militiaman, barefoot, in battle dress, threadbare at the elbows and knees, threw himself flat on his belly and was irritated by his three companions. He shouted harshly "Stop!" The shape stopped, trembling. It was violently illuminated by a flashlight. Bursts of laughter. It was only Ndugu Peter, an old, half-crazy, stammerer. Everyone here knows him.

We are far, very far from the Uganda war and the mopping-up operations in the north of the former "kingdom" of Idi Amin. The coconut palms, the militiamen in the "night security patrol" and old Peter live in Kunduchi, 20 kilometers north of Dar es Salaam. Once night has fallen, the presence everywhere of paramilitary squads equipped with old rifles is the only visible trace of an armed presence on Tanzanian soil. Officially, the

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country is still at war, but nothing seems to have changed. Only public transportation and trucks, requisitioned a few months ago, have become scarcer. Odd groups congregate along the bus stops. No one protests. Tanzanians are accustomed to waiting.

Knowing how to wait has undoubtedly been the critical characteristic of the Tanzanian Army in its conflict with Idi Amin's troops. As early as November 1978, when the Ugandans occupied and devastated the Kagera salient, Tanzania's leaders established the objective of putting an end to the marshal. But the Tanzanian Army, in the image of its commander in chief, Julius Nyerere, is not an army in a hurry. Every leap forward in its march on Kampala was preceded by infiltrations of saboteurs and clandestine "explanation teams," responsible for preparing the Ugandan population psychologically. Every time, 24 hours before the start of a bombardment, powerful loudspeakers enjoined the peasants to evacuate the zone aimed at.

Without doubt, this patient tactic of people's war in the Chinese fashion explains the slowness of the Tanzanian counterattack -- over 6 months -- much better than resistance by Amin's soldiers. Each day of those 6 months cost, officially, \$1 million. Tanzania never would have been able to stand that expenditure without the discreet assistance of the United States, Great Britain and undoubtedly Egypt, but it will weigh very heavily, nevertheless, on the domestic development program in the next 5 years.

Have the people of Tanzania really understood what a high-level official called before me "the price of freedom of others"? No, undoubtedly not. Once more, they will have to bet on the long term. On the beneficial effects that the proximity of a rich and friendly Uganda and of a Kenya better inclined toward them may have on Tanzania's economy. For the present, this war that never mobilized the crowds is forgotten, erased by the daily concern to survive. Only the newspapers publish episodically a few letters from readers suggesting that "all the streets in our cities bearing the name of African traitors be changed" (an obvious allusion to the famous Libya Road in Dar es Salaam), or that "a grandiose monument" be erected near Kagera "to the glory of our brave liberation Armed Forces."

Nevertheless, the Tanzanians are undoubtedly the only ones in Africa who have really incorporated in depth the sense and the need for liberation struggles. A number of fighters for the continent's freedom have passed through Dar es Salaam, which has the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee in an old building of the Azania Front. The authorities -- Julius Nyerere is regarded as the leader of the five front-line states -- have systematically explained to the people the full significance of the attitude of solidarity. At the end of May, the only posters stuck on the walls of Moshi, Arusha or Dar es Salaam represented the photograph of Solomon Mahlangu, a young South African black, "assassinated by the Boer dogs." In the few first-class tourist hotels, the organ of the Rhodesian Patriotic Front, ZIMBABWE NEWS, occupies a good place in the middle of Mozambican and local publications. Moreover, part of Robert Mugabe's

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guerrilla fighters are training in the southern part of the country (Morogoro region), under the leadership of Tanzanian instructors.

"We have aided every country around us to win its freedom," Julius Nyerere stated recently, "but only two of them, Zambia and Mozambique, have showed us any gratitude." It should be pointed out, however, that relations with Zambia -- whose copper mines are connected with the port of Dar es Salaam by the Tazara Railroad -- have not always been idyllic. When President Kenneth Kaunda decided, at the end of 1978, to reopen his border with Rhodesia, Nyerere blocked all Zambian copper exports via Tanzania for 2 months as a retaliatory measure.

"Our friendship is not bought, it is merited," a leader of the single party confided. And when we observe the remarkable political stability of Tanzania, where no major incident (with the exception of the attempt at a coup d'etat in January 1964) has occurred to dispute the legitimacy of authority, it must be concluded that the relations maintained by the government with its people are based much more on consensus than on force.

There is one unmistakable sign: here there is no trace of a personality cult. Of course, no one dedicates to Nyerere a frenzied passion that he does not seek moreover, but the president is integrated into the landscape and life, like Kilimanjaro and the Indian Ocean. He is an integral part of the Tanzanian whole. A practicing Catholic, even though he hardly likes it to be said, Nyerere refrains intensely from any proselytism. When he was asked about the war with Uganda, he answered annoyed: "Most of the soldiers in my army are Muslims. Where do you see a war of religion?"

Episodically, rumors run about on a imminent resignation of the chief of state. But, at 54 years, the "Mwalimu" seems dedicated to perpetuity. Nevertheless, he has already provided for his succession in the person of the vice president, Aboud Jumbe, a plump Muslim who governs the associated state of Zanzibar with great moderation. Unless Edward Sokoine, the young prime minister from the Masai plateau, becomes "number 1-A," called on to replace Nyerere.

Sokoine's post was held, before 13 February 1977, by Rashidi Kawawa, who does not appear always to have been above any suspicion. Rumor did not treat the "depraved and corrupt habits" of his associates gently. This unfortunate experience, moreover, drove Nyerere to choose in Sokoine a man from the country, preserved from urban temptations. In fact, the "Mwalimu" has always mistrusted the city and what it represented. His socialism tends constantly to set the rural masses, which are his support strength, up against the uprooted persons in the cities, the uncultured unemployed and the petty bourgeois labor unionists.

The example of the Chinese cultural revolution, to which Nyerere has often referred, is obvious at this level. But the utopianism -- also very Chinese -- underlying the Declaration of Arusha has now given way to a lucidity

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rather rare in Africa. The newspapers show their readers the mechanisms of dependence involved by resorting to foreign loans and they try to make them understand why Tanzania is, in spite of all, quite obliged to accept aid coming from abroad. A daily even had the courage to explain why Williamson Diamonds, a national company working the Mwadui diamond mines in the Arush region and whose offices are established in the northern suburb of Dar es Salaam, had to have a large part of its production marketed by the South African De Beers company.

"It's fantastic what money can buy," an advertisement for a brand of luxury Tanzanian cigarettes proclaims. Just 2 years ago, this kind of insert would never have been published. Perhaps the sense of realism and lucidity inspiring the Tanzanian leaders at present has urged them to shut their eyes. But everyone knows here that dignity has no price.

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