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23 July 1979

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 19/79)



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CIVIL DEFENSE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL TRAINING METHODS MANUAL DISCUSSED

Moscow UCHEBNO-METODICHESKOYE POSOBIYE PO PODGOTOVKE RUKOVODYASHCHEGO I KOMANDNO-NACHAL'STVUYUSHCHEGO SOSTAVA GRAZHDANSKOY OBORONY in Russian 1978 pp 1-17, 167-168

[Book by workers of RSFSR CD Staff and Courses under General Editorship of Lt Gen D. A. Krutskikh. Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: UCHEBNO-METODICHESKOYE POSOBIYE PO PODGOTOVKE RUKOVODYASHCHEGO I KOMANDNO-NACHAL'STVUYUSHCHEGO SOSTAVA GRAZHDANSKOY OBORONY
(Training Methods Manual for the Training of Civil Defense Supervisory and Command Personnel). Recommended by USSR CD Staff as a training aid.

Editor: Lt Gen D. A. Krutskikh

Publisher: Voenizdat

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Information on Authors:

The manual was developed by workers of the RSFSR CD Staff and Courses under the general editorship of Lt Gen D. A. Krutskikh.

Brief Description:

The manual presents overall requirements and recommendations on the organization and methodology for conducting classes with supervisory and command personnel of civil defense. It provides the content of the basic topics of the training program at CD courses of union republics (without an oblast structure) and oblasts (krays, ASSR's) and of the training program for nonmilitarized CD formations.

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It is intended for instructors of classes with CD supervisory and command personnel of cities, rayons and national economic installations.

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Introduction:

The Soviet Union's vigorous foreign policy activity, aimed at ensuring peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, is having an enormous effect on the entire national situation.

Implementation of the peace program developed by the 24th CPSU Congress and the program of further struggle for peace and international cooperation and for freedom and independence of nations adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress is an object of special concern to the Communist Party and Soviet government.

The historic Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, called at the initiative of the socialist countries, was of substantial importance for establishing the course for detente among states with different social systems. The very fact that this conference was held in Helsinki reflected in the most obvious manner the changes which have occurred on the continent in favor of peace, democracy and socialism.

The conduct and results of the Conference of Communist and Working Parties of Europe held in June 1976 in Berlin were an important contribution to the cause of the struggle for peace, security, cooperation and social progress.

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But considering that successes in the struggle for peace are accompanied by the stepped-up activity of enemies of detente and the forces of reaction and militarism, which are striving to recreate the "cold war" times and return the world to the policy of balancing on the verge of nuclear catastrophe, the CPSU CC and Soviet government are devoting proper attention to strengthening our country's defenses and improving its Armed Forces and Civil Defense.

Successful accomplishment of the numerous complex tasks assigned to Civil Defense (CD) depends to a significant extent on the training level of its supervisory and command personnel, the primary missions of whom are:

Thorough study of CD principles and duties of supervisory and command personnel;

Instilling practical skills in planning, organizing and conducting measures for defense of the populace and for increasing the stability of work by installations and sectors of the national economy in wartime, and in organizing and directing the rescue and emergency reconstruction work (SNAVR) in centers of destruction (contamination), areas of natural disasters and locations of industrial accidents;

Studying the system of CD training and instilling skills in organizing and conducting integrated installation and command and staff exercises, exercises with nonmilitarized formations, and classes with formation personnel and the populace;

Studying the capabilities of equipment in the inventory of nonmilitarized formations and instilling skills of its proper use in conducting SNAVR;

Instilling moral-psychological steadfastness and confidence in the reliability of methods and means of defense against mass destruction weapons.

The training of supervisory and command personnel is performed primarily right at the national economic installations,* at CD courses, in training institutions for advanced skills, and by independent work.

The success and quality of trainee preparation depends on a proper choice of the methods and forms of training.

The method of training is the work method of the supervisor and trainees. Each training method consists of interrelated elements--training techniques.

The following primary training methods are used in training different groups of the populace: explanation, discussion, demonstration, exercise (practice), practical work.

*Subsequently "national economic installation will be termed "installation" for brevity.

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Explanation is the method used for verbal presentation of the provisions of regulations, manuals, guidance documents and the material, technique or action being demonstrated which allows a revelation of their meaning. It usually is combined with other training methods--exercise and demonstration.

The discussion is the method used for systemizing, deepening and reinforcing the trainees' knowledge. It is combined with the explanation and a demonstration of visual aids.

The demonstration is a training method based on exemplary performance of a technique or action or the showing of films or other visual aids. It may be accompanied by a brief explanation.

The exercise (practice) is a method of multiple repetition by trainees of one and the same techniques (methods) and actions performed to achieve high expertise.

Practical work is a training method used for improving the trainees' knowledge and skills in performing their functional duties as part of CD control entities and formations.

The form of training is an expression of the organizational aspect of training. It covers the composition and category of trainees, class structure, place and duration of classes, logistical support, and the role of instructor and trainees in the class process.

The most widespread training forms are group classroom activities, practical classes, group exercises, special tactical problems, staff practices, command and staff exercises, special tactical exercises, and integrated installation exercises.

The group classroom activity allows employing different methods in the course of one class (explanation, demonstration, discussion, exercise and so on) with the use of visual aids.

The practical class helps reinforce the trainees' theoretical knowledge and their development of practical skills in planning and conducting CD activities, using individual and collective protective gear, and working with instruments and special equipment.

The group exercise is a form of training command personnel on the terrain, on maps and on terrain models, with all trainees acting the part of one specific appointment.

The special tactical problem is used in special training of CD formations. Here the teams and groups are made cohesive and matters of their coordination are worked out. It is held against a specific tactical background, usually in training compounds or in full-scale sectors. Operating techniques and methods first are practiced by the elements, and then as a

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complex within limits of established norms. Command personnel improve skills in controlling subordinates' actions in the problem.

Staff practice is a form of training for workers of CD staffs and services and for command personnel of CD formations. It usually is held on maps or diagrams by the exercise (practice) method.

The command and staff exercise (KShU) is a form of joint training for supervisory and command personnel, staffs and services. It is held so that commanders (chiefs) receive skills in controlling CD personnel and facilities in practice, usually under integrated topics, with communications facilities and with a move to control points. Separate formations may take part in it.

The special tactical exercise is a type of special formation training which permits each formation to practice its specific missions under conditions of a changing situation; to make subunits more cohesive; for personnel to improve practical skills in performing work; and in addition, for command personnel to practice skills in directing formations.

The integrated installation exercise is the highest form of training for command personnel, control entities, services and installation CD formations. All supervisory and command personnel of the installation, a maximum number of CD formations, workers and employees (kolkhoz members) not included in formations, as well as student youth and the populace not engaged in production or the sphere of services take part in it under a single concept and plan. The entire complex of missions is worked out most fully at integrated installation exercises and the installation's degree of CD readiness is identified.

I. Fundamentals of Civil Defense

1. Role and Place of Civil Defense in Overall System of Defense Measures

The role and place of civil defense in the country's system of defense measures are determined primarily by the nature of modern warfare and its features.

A future war, if imperialist states succeed in unleashing it, will bear an acute class character and become a decisive armed clash of two opposing social systems--capitalism and socialism. A majority of the world's countries will be drawn into its orbit.

The acute class character of the war will predetermine the irreconcilability and decisiveness of its political and military objectives. The warring sides will strive not only to deliver maximum destruction on armed forces, but also to undermine the most important administrative-political and industrial centers and entire economic regions of the enemy.

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This war will be conducted chiefly by strategic nuclear weapons: inter-continental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation, and nuclear-powered strategic submarines.

The unlimited use of nuclear weapons will predetermine the exceptionally destructive, annihilative character of the war. An even more dangerous situation may take shape if the enemy uses chemical or bacteriological weapons.

After employment of mass destruction weapons large territories may be contaminated by radioactive, toxic chemical and bacterial substances. This will involve considerable losses among the populace and will complicate the conduct of rescue and emergency restoration work.

There will be no substantial difference between front and rear in a modern war. Losses will be suffered not only by personnel of the armed forces, but also by the civil populace.

The probable enemies' possession of modern means of armed warfare allowing the delivery of attacks not only against armed forces, but also against objects situated in the deep rear made it necessary to organize a defense of the populace and economy throughout the country's territory and required creation of an organization capable of elaborating and conducting measures for defense of the populace, physical assets and national economic installations against mass destruction weapons.

USSR Civil Defense, created in 1961, became such an organization in our country.

USSR Civil Defense is a component of the system of statewide defense measures and is designed to provide protection of the populace and national economy against enemy mass destruction weapons and other means of attack and to conduct rescue and emergency reconstruction work in centers of destruction (contamination) and areas of natural disasters.

Civil Defense was set up on the basis of Local Air Defense (MPVO), organized in our country in 1932. The difference between CD and MPVO lies chiefly in the scale of protective measures. Civil Defense encompasses our country's entire enormous territory, while MPVO was given missions of defending the populace and national economic installations against enemy bomber aviation only in zones of its effective employment. The tasks of defending against mass destruction weapons which CD must accomplish are incomparably more complex than defense against conventional means of destruction.

Under wartime conditions, civil defense will accomplish protection of the country's rear together with the armed forces. Victory over the enemy depends to a significant extent on the rear's firmness and reliability of its functioning. While the Armed Forces will defend the rear by active means--by destruction of the attack weapons themselves (missiles at launch

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positions, aircraft at airfields and submarines at sea) or by intercepting means of destruction on the way to the target, CD will perform defensive measures in protecting the rear and has to achieve a maximum reduction in the effects of destructive factors of modern weapons on the rear. USSR Civil Defense Chief Arm Gen A. T. Altunin states that "we have very convincing and extensive facts showing that with a good organization of civil defense and skillful implementation of a large complex of statewide measures for defense of the populace and the economy, it is possible to achieve a significant reduction in the pernicious effects of the use of mass destruction weapons."*

The role of CD is revealed with extreme clarity in its missions, the scope of which may change both in content and in methods of accomplishment depending on the situation.

2. Civil Defense Missions

Civil defense missions are varied, capacious and complex in their content. They can be divided into three groups.

The first group includes missions of defending the populace. These missions are the primary and basic missions of civil defense.

Ensuring the security of Soviet citizens has been at all times and will be the primary objective of all defense measures of the Soviet state. Success of accomplishing the other civil defense missions depends on successful accomplishment of missions in defense of the populace. V. I. Lenin pointed out in the first years of Soviet power: "The first productive force of all mankind is the worker, the toiler. If he survives, we will save and restore everything . . . but we will perish if we do not save him."**

Within the CD system, defense of the populace is accomplished chiefly by sheltering it in protective structures, dispersing and evacuating it and providing it with individual protective gear.

Providing the entire populace with protective structures (refuges, anti-radiation shelters) is accomplished in a differentiated manner depending on the importance and location of the city, rayon, populated point or national economic installation.

Dispersal and evacuation of the populace are carried out to safe areas of the countryside.

Provision of individual protective gear to the populace also is important.

*Altunin, A. T. "Civil Defense Today," in the collection, "Lyudi i dela grazhdanskoy oborony" [Civil Defense People and Work], Moscow, 1974, p 10.

**Lenin, V. I. "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 359.

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The second group of CD missions takes in measures aimed at assuring stable operation of installations and sectors of the national economy under wartime conditions, i.e., at maintaining their capability to produce established types of products in the amounts and product mixes prescribed by appropriate plans. For installations and sectors not producing physical assets (transport, communications and so on), stability of operation is taken to mean their capability to perform their functions during a war.

The third group of CD missions includes measures involving the performance of rescue and emergency reconstruction work in centers of destruction (contamination), and in zones of catastrophic flooding, natural disasters and sites of major industrial accidents.

The primary objective of SNAVR is to rescue victims and give them necessary assistance. Without the successful performance of this work it will be impossible to adjust the work of national economic installations and sectors affected by mass destruction weapons or to create normal conditions for vital activities of the populace of cities and rayons which have suffered.

3. Civil Defense Organizational Structure

The civil defense organizational structure is determined by the system of state organization in the country and by the structure of entities of state authority and state control. It provides for the performance of missions assigned to it both in peacetime and in wartime without substantial changes of the structure, forms and methods of work established in peacetime.

Civil defense is set up on a territorial-production principle. Its management is carried out both through the soviets of workers' deputies and through ministries, departments and establishments.

CD organizational structure includes management, staffs, services and forces of civil defense.

Management consists of civil defense chiefs at all levels who are directly responsible for carrying out CD measures.

Civil defense chiefs are the following:

Chairmen of republic councils of ministers in union and autonomous republics;

Chairmen of executive committees of soviets of workers' deputies in krays, oblasts, cities and rayons, and chairmen of rural (settlement) soviets in those soviets;

Heads of ministries, associations and departments in sectors of the national economy, production associations and departments respectively;

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The heads of enterprises, organizations, establishments, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and educational institutions.

CD chiefs bear complete responsibility for the organization and status of CD and for accomplishment of all its measures. They exercise day-to-day leadership personally and through the staffs set up under them.

/Staffs/are control entities of CD chiefs and the organizers of all practical work on CD matters. They organize and conduct their work on the basis of decisions by CD chiefs and instructions of superior staffs.

/Civil defense services/are set up to conduct special CD activities, to prepare personnel and facilities for this, and to direct these personnel in conducting SNAVR and performing other missions.

Civil defense services are set up by decisions of the appropriate CD chiefs. They are guided in their work by instructions of the CD chief and, on special matters, by instructions of the superior service.

The following services may be set up depending on the availability of a base and local conditions: communications, medical, firefighting, engineer, radiation and chemical defense, municipal and technical, motor transport, protection of public order, logistical, trade and nourishment, livestock and plant protection, and others.

The base for setting up services consists of enterprises, organizations and establishments subordinate to the corresponding CD chiefs, and, at installations, the departments, shops, laboratories and so on.

The head of the organization (establishment) used as the base to set up a service is appointed chief of the service.

Services are not set up at small installations. Their duties are assigned to corresponding departments of the installation.

Under the direction of CD chiefs, services take part in planning and practical implementation of CD measures. They set up, outfit and prepare nonmilitarized formations of services and control their actions.

/Civil defense forces/ consist of military units and nonmilitarized CD formations. Nonmilitarized formations comprise the foundation of CD forces.

Nonmilitarized formations are set up at industrial enterprises, establishments, educational institutions, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other national economic installations. They are subdivided by purpose into general-purpose formations and service formations.

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General-purpose formations are composite detachments (teams, groups), composite work mechanization detachments (teams), and rescue detachments (teams, groups). They are intended for conducting rescue and emergency reconstruction work in centers of destruction (contamination) and can be used to eliminate the aftermath of natural disasters and industrial accidents.

Service formations are intended to conduct special measures and projects. They comprise reconnaissance groups (teams), communications groups (teams), detachments of medical aid teams (medical aid teams), firefighting teams, decontamination teams (groups), emergency technical teams (groups), refuge and shelter service groups (teams), and teams (groups) for protection of public order. In addition, livestock and plant protection teams are set up at sovkhozes and kolkhozes.

Installation formations are set up according to the production principle. They are manned with workers, employees, kolkhoz members, students, pupils and other able-bodied citizens by shops, sectors, brigades, faculties and courses.

The composition and technical outfitting of formations is determined based on their purpose, specific nature of production, number of workers (employees, kolkhoz members) at the installation, and presence there of means of mechanization used in CD interests.

Formation personnel are provided with individual protective gear.

4. Preparation of the Country Ahead of Time for Protection of the Populace and the National Economy

As it is generally known, combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the size and particularly the qualitative status of the Armed Forces, and combat capabilities of the Army and Navy comprise the basis of the country's defenses. But the country's defenses depend not only on the might of the Army and Navy, but also on the condition of the economy, science and technology; on the size and composition of the populace; and on readiness for modern warfare.

The timely assurance of the vitality of the country's economy and rear as a whole acquires particularly great importance under present-day conditions as never before. For example, if measures for increasing the operating stability of the national economy and for protection of the populace have not been carried out ahead of time, at the very beginning of a war this may lead to a sharp drop in industrial production, disruption of economic ties among individual regions, disabling of the transportation, control facilities and power systems, the destruction of cities, and to enormous human and material losses. As it is known, it is impossible to wage war without a reliably operating rear.

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What caused the special need for timely accomplishment of measures for protection of the country's rear under present-day conditions?

Present-day war may begin by a surprise enemy attack with mass use of nuclear missile weaponry. In this case the country may suffer very great human and material losses inasmuch as the measures which would allow a reduction of these losses will not be accomplished because of a lack of time.

CD must be prepared to accomplish defense missions under such very difficult conditions. It must carry out a complex of measures opportunely in peacetime for assuring protection of the populace.

There may not be the time needed to perform evacuation and dispersal with a surprise enemy attack. In this case the population can be protected only by sheltering it in protective structures.

Success in protecting the population depends on its degree of training in methods of protection against mass destruction weapons. There can be sufficient numbers of collective and individual protective gear, but if the people are not able to use it, this gear will have little effect.

Training of the populace in CD is obligatory. Its obligatory nature is dictated by the statewide missions of USSR Civil Defense.

An important and laborious CD mission is to carry out measures for ensuring operating stability of national economic installations and sectors in wartime. Accomplishment of this mission is achieved by preparation and conduct of measures ahead of time aimed at reducing possible destruction and losses with the delivery of enemy nuclear attacks; by increasing the reliability of the power supply, steam supply and water supply; by preserving physical assets and unique equipment; and by conducting firefighting and other measures.

For example, the underground placement of power, engineering and other lines increases their stability many times over in comparison with the practice of laying them along trestles and walls of buildings. But the shift of such lines underground cannot be accomplished during the brief period of the threat of an attack, let alone in a surprise enemy attack. Therefore a large part of measures to increase operating stability of national economic installations and sectors must be conducted in peacetime during the construction or reconstruction of installations.

Under present-day conditions, therefore, assurance of the state's vital activities in wartime and, in the final account, victory in war depend on the timely, comprehensive and purposeful preparation of the country's rear.

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5. Grouping, Echelonment and Composition of Civil Defense Forces

The assignment of a certain number of CD forces, i.e., their grouping, is provided for conducting rescue and emergency reconstruction work. The size and composition of these forces is determined by the scope and nature of possible work and conditions under which it is assumed the work will be conducted.

The grouping of forces must correspond to the concept of upcoming actions and ensure rapid movement of formations to centers of destruction (contamination), development of SNAVR in short periods of time across a broad front, its continuous performance, a build-up in efforts using subsequent shifts, echelons and reserves, the possibility of maneuvering forces and facilities during the work from one installation to another or to other parts of the city, and flexible control of CD forces.

Depending on the possible situation and assumed nature of SNAVR, the force groupings may consist of reconnaissance formations, traffic control detachments, and main body.

/Reconnaissance/formations reveal the situation formed as a result of the enemy's use of mass destruction weapons or as a result of natural disasters.

Reconnaissance groups or teams are employed to perform reconnaissance on movement routes of CD forces to the center of destruction (contamination) and directly in the center. The size and composition of these groups (teams) depends on the number of routes assigned for movement of the formations, the magnitude and importance of the SNAVR objective, and on the available personnel and facilities.

Reconnaissance groups (teams) are reinforced with specialists and, depending on the assigned mission, are provided with gear, communications facilities and means of transportation.

/Traffic control detachments (OOD)/ are intended to support the movement of CD forces to centers of destruction (contamination). Usually one OOD is assigned to each primary route, and it operates immediately behind the reconnaissance.

Composition of the OOD depends on the character and presumed scope of work along the movement route. It must ensure the repair of destroyed and damaged road sectors and bridges, organization of crossings and fords, arrangement of passages and organization of bypasses in obstructions, decontamination of passages in sectors of radioactive or chemical contamination, localization of fires along movement routes and approaches to SNAVR areas and, additionally, clearing routes of snowdrifts in winter.

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The grouping's main body/ usually consists of two echelons and a reserve.

The first echelon is intended to perform primary rescue and emergency reconstruction work at installations which continue their work in wartime. The second echelon is intended for developing the work front in centers of destruction (contamination) and, where necessary, for a partial or complete relief of first echelon personnel. The number of shifts in each echelon is determined based on the availability and capabilities of personnel and facilities, the scope of upcoming work, capabilities of transportation, and presence of lines.

The reserve is intended to accomplish missions which arise suddenly and to build up the efforts of the echelons at the most important work sites.

As a rule, locations for the grouping of CD forces intended to perform SNAVR are assigned near railroads, highways or dirt roads convenient for rapid movement to centers of destruction (contamination) or for maneuver to another axis.

Successful accomplishment of civil defense missions and the practical implementation of all its measures depend to a decisive extent on the political-moral status of the populace and primarily on personnel of CD formations. Well-organized party-political work is an important means for ensuring the high political-moral status of the populace.

The basis for party-political work within the CD system is the indoctrination of Soviet citizens in a spirit of utter devotion to the socialist Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, unwavering faith in the triumph of communism, conscientious performance of their patriotic duty and a high sense of personal responsibility for the homeland's security. The primary element in the Soviet citizen is his ideological conviction. It makes him steadfast, courageous, bold, resourceful, self-starting, persistent and capable of displaying self-control, discipline and a feeling of comradeship and mutual assistance at the necessary moment. All these qualities facilitate people's heroic conduct in the most difficult situation.

All party entities and party organizations are performing varied organizational and political work aimed at ensuring that the populace always is ready for immediate bold actions under all conditions.

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BOOK PROVIDES REFERENCE FOR POLITICAL WORKERS

Moscow SPRAVOCHNIK POLITRABOTNIKA in Russian 1978 pp 1, 2, 302-304

[Book by Vice Adm A. V. Komarov et al]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: SPRAVOCHNIK POLITRABOTNIKA (Political Worker's Handbook), 2d ed., supplemented

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The "Spravochnik politrabotnika" was prepared by a group of authors made up of Docent Vice Adm A. V. Komarov (director), Doctor of Historical Sciences and Docent Col L. A. Bublik, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Docent Col I. M. Butskiy, Candidate of Juridical Sciences and Docent Col G. N. Kolibab, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Docent Col N. P. Kuznetsov, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Docent Col A. S. Skachkov, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Docent Col M. N. Timofeychev, Col B. P. Yatsuba. Compiler A. V. Komarov.

Brief Description:

The reference contains documents and data needed by commanders and political workers in their daily work with personnel. Here they will find materials on the Communist Party, the Soviet Motherland, the USSR Armed Forces, and on the organization and content of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.

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The book provides material on countries of socialism, on armed forces of Warsaw Pact nations, on the aggressive essence of imperialism and other materials.

The reference is addressed to commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol aktiv of the Armed Forces.

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BOOK DESCRIBES COMBAT EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES' MISSILES

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Brief Description:

The primary weapons of ground forces under present-day conditions are considered to be operational-tactical and tactical missiles which destroy enemy personnel and equipment in the offensive and on the defense. Anti-tank guided missiles and surface-to-air missiles play no small part in combat actions.

The book tells about the history of these missiles' development, their design and their combat employment in the offensive and on the defense.

It is written from material of the open domestic and foreign press, while matters dealing with the combat employment of missiles are presented according to views of foreign specialists, also published in the open press abroad.

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The book is addressed to a broad range of military and civilian readers interested in missile weaponry.

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Introduction

The armed forces of a state must have well-equipped ground forces with high combat effectiveness for successful conduct of any type or scale of modern warfare. It is believed that their organization will be most advanced when it corresponds to the character of a war and the developmental level of weapons and equipment.

Accomplishment of many missions in combat and the difference in combat capabilities of varied weapons determines the breakdown of ground forces into combat arms and special troops and, within them, to units and subunits for all possible purposes.

Based on this, the composition of contemporary ground forces includes the following combat arms: motorized rifle, tank, airborne, missile troops and artillery, air defense troops, as well as various special troops supporting the actions of combat arms in the offensive and on the defense.

At the present time operational-tactical and tactical missiles equipped with nuclear warheads comprise the basis of ground forces' firepower, while anti-tank guided missiles and surface-to-air missiles are considered the chief weapons in combating tanks and the air enemy. Conditions of modern warfare demand that ground forces be able to successfully employ their own nuclear missile weaponry, effectively combat the enemy's nuclear missile capabilities, skillfully organize antitank and air defense, and accomplish other missions to win victory over the enemy.

Organization of effective air defense (PVO), which provides a reliable screen of friendly troops from air attacks, is considered a necessary condition for successful combat actions. At the present time, in connection with the specific nature of air defense, it is subdivided by foreign specialists into antiaircraft (PSO) and antimissile (PRO) defense.

The experience of the wars in Vietnam and the Near East had considerable influence on the development of ground forces' weaponry and equipment.

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Foreign military specialists note that these wars are "tactical guided missile wars," chiefly of surface-to-air and antitank missiles.

For example, this is why the U.S. Army command intends to give preference 'n the next few years to development of surface-to-air and antitank guided missiles. On the whole, however, as can be seen from reports in the foreign press, the basic trends in development of U.S. ground forces' weaponry and military equipment in the current decade are a concentration of efforts and funds on a small list of weapons systems, broad modernization of existing models and development of particularly important weapons systems regardless of their cost. Other capitalist countries participating in the NATO bloc also adhere to a similar policy.

The book examines missile weapons of ground forces of the capitalist states most developed in the industrial sense and the features of their design, operation and combat employment in the offensive and on the defense.

The book lays no claim to complete coverage of issues of the combat employment of ground forces' missiles. It merely presents those views and problems which are reflected in the foreign press at the present time. Therefore one should take a critical attitude toward the information on foreign models of missile technology given in the book, toward their combat employment and toward prospects for development, since in a number of cases this may be in the nature of advertising.

Chapter I - Ground Forces' Missiles

2. Modern Combat Missiles of Ground Forces

The experience of employing missiles in World War II showed the very great importance of these new weapons for military purposes.

This is why, at the demand of military specialists, the industrially developed capitalist countries began work to create combat missiles, particularly those guided in flight. This became possible thanks to the great achievements in the field of science and technology, particularly in radioelectronics, which is the basis of all automated systems. A qualitative leap occurred in automation as a result of the solution to important problems involving creation of facilities for registering changes in parameters of various processes. This permitted the application of new technical facilities which replaced man in performing a number of functions of mental labor.

At the present time the inventory of many states' ground forces include unguided and guided missile weapon systems.

The role of combat missiles in troop units has risen sharply under contemporary conditions and the range of missions accomplished by them expanded considerably. This is explained by their rapid qualitative development and an increase in combat effectiveness.

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It is apparent from foreign press reports that the general direction in development of troop missile weaponry is taking the line of an increase in mobility, an improvement in control systems, a substantial reduction in weight and simplification of missile design as a whole, an increase in flight range and destructive effect, and a decrease in the time of preparing missiles for launch.

A familiarization with the tactical and technical specifications of foreign ground forces' missiles will show that they do not all possess significant flight ranges. For this reason platforms (means of transportation) are required for accomplishing the necessary maneuver from basing points to the area of combat actions or which allow using missiles for direct support of troops or for their protection on the march. This relates above all to ATGM [antitank guided missiles], tactical missiles and surface-to-air missiles tied to an area of combat operations because of limited flight ranges.

With regard to operational-tactical missiles, they can destroy targets not only of tactical importance, but of operational importance as well, and their disposition does not involve an obligatory location in the area of combat operations. But still they are tied to particular theaters or important axes of combat operations because of their relatively limited flight range. Therefore there are special transport facilities for rebasing these missiles.

Foreign specialists believe that the effectiveness of troop missile weaponry depends largely on combat qualities of the platforms. Therefore, in developing new mobile missile systems, considerable attention is given not only to increasing the missiles' effectiveness, but also to improving their platforms, since both these factors are connected inseparably and supplement each other mutually.

Chapter II - Design of Modern Combat Missiles, Their Launching Equipment and Flight Control Systems

Missilemen are required to perform exceptionally precise work at combat posts and fulfill instructions, timetables and commands punctually. All this is inconceivable without a profound knowledge of the design and operation of missile equipment entrusted to them.

Let us familiarize ourselves with certain features of the design of ground forces' missile systems. We will need much of this information in examining the combat employment of missiles.

Ground forces' missile designs and missile launchers are quite varied, but they have many common elements typical of any missile or launcher. Their design largely is determined by the purpose of the missile system.

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Chapter III - Models of Ground Forces' Missiles

Despite the presence of tanks and fire support aviation, tactical and operational missions in combat operations and in defending friendly troops against air attack in ground forces of armies of the capitalist states are accomplished chiefly with the use of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, surface-to-air missile systems, antitank missiles and salvo-fire rocket systems.

This is why the missile weapons of ground forces are considered the basis of their firepower, and the effectiveness of their combat employment depends largely on the authorized organizational structure of units and subunits, which is improving all the while, and on personnel training.

4. Some Problems in Creation and Operation of Ground Forces' Missiles

A rapid resolution of problems arising in the creation and operation of missiles has a great influence on their combat employment. There is an attempt here to find optimum solutions allowing the accomplishment of difficult combat missions with least expenditures. This is why the aggressive circles of imperialist countries continue the active development and modernization of missile weapons without regard for the process of a relaxation of international tensions which is taking place. For example, decisions made in recent years by leaders of the NATO bloc provide for a further build-up in its military potential. In particular, NATO countries plan to carry out a major program for improving weapons and military equipment of ground forces, including missiles. The high demands placed on modern weapons systems provide for the solution to many complex problems both during their development and in the process of production and operation. For example, the foreign press stated that the tactical and technical requirements placed on the SAM-D ZRK [surface-to-air missile system] are so complex and diverse that this system has been turned into a "dry land dreadnaught." As a result there is a delay in development deadlines and a considerable increase in actual cost of development and production over the planned cost.

As a rule, a large number of firms take part in developing and producing a weapons model. Coordination of work among them involves great difficulties.

It is noted, in addition to this, that expenditures for the development and production of each subsequent weapons model are considerably higher than the previous one. For example, the foreign press pointed out that the cost of producing the same type of military product trebled from 1961 through 1971. The growing complexity in weapons models in turn leads to a considerable increase in expenditures for their maintenance and repair.

In this regard a number of NATO bloc member countries have been directing great attention in recent years to increasing the quality of military products manufactured, to increasing their longevity and improving other

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operating characteristics. Simplicity of maintenance and repair of weapons is considered one of the obligatory tactical and technical requirements. A special directive issued by the U.S. Defense Department containing principles for creation of new weapons systems emphasizes, for example, that tactical and technical requirements must be developed carefully in order to increase the service lives of these systems and to reduce the personnel used for their maintenance and repair.

A large number of full-scale tests of experimental models is performed under various climatic conditions for working out design engineering solutions during the process of creating a weapon. Much time is required to conduct full-scale tests, and so foreign specialists strive to replace them with laboratory tests. This allows some reduction in the overall weapons development times.

One of the problems facing weapons developers is to calculate the spare parts, tools and accessories necessary for their reliable operation.

It is also believed that high operating reliability of a weapon is determined to a significant extent by its manufacturing quality. Therefore one of the requirements which the United States in particular places on weapons production is their delivery with the first submission.

Much attention also is given to problems of weapons storage. For example, ATGM's and short-range SAM's are placed in waterproof packing. As a rule, military equipment is kept in special temporary or permanent depots.

NATO's managing entities decided to allocate functions among countries included in this bloc to accelerate the development process and preclude duplication in the creation of missile weapons. It is the practice to exchange personnel, a study of NATO country languages is arranged, and so on, to solve the problem of assimilating types of weapons and combat equipment.

Military specialists closely link a reduction in expenditures for operation of a weapon with its standardization and unification. The chief goal of measures taken in this area is to release additional funds and direct them for a further arms race.

The foreign press notes that the standardization of weapons is a difficult problem. The sharp competitive struggle and contradictions among monopolies within NATO member countries and among individual imperialist states, especially the countries of Europe and the United States, considerably hinder the implementation of plans for weapons standardization in general and for standardization of troop PSO, for example, in particular.

Military specialists of NATO countries are attempting to resolve this problem under joint bilateral and multilateral programs. The following forms are being used: an exchange of information on results of work being performed, an exchange of technology and of scientific and engineering

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cadres at various levels; joint financing and management of developments; joint production; transfer of weapons models for temporary use to conduct tests; and creation of associations for the period of practical fulfillment of individual programs. Work is being done in the area of standardization on the basis of lengthy interstate agreements which may be concluded by individual branches of armed forces and by firms in addition to governmental entities. For example, in 1964 ground forces' representatives of the United States, England, Canada and Australia signed the "Basic Agreement on Standardization," which formulates the program as a whole and regulates the countries' relationships. The basic form of coordination is the free and timely exchange of information on matters of interest to these countries.

The foreign press notes that the process of improving the structure of control of weapons system developments is continuing in NATO countries. Old entities are being deactivated and new ones created, their missions updated, and spheres of activity delineated.

Since 1972 NATO specialists have been keeping a register of weapons system projects which reflects the status of their development from the design study to production of a prototype.

Included in it in particular was the project for creating the improved "Hawk" ZRK. At the present time the FRG, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Greece have formed a European consortium to produce the improved "Hawk" ZRK.

It must be said that American specialists display considerable interest in west European developments of short-range ZRK's.

Appropriate firms provide them with available documentation on the basis of an agreement. In addition, U.S. military specialists are invited to system tests, while prototypes of weapons, including missiles with servicing personnel, are sent to American ranges for comprehensive tests.

Tests of the "Crotale," "Roland" and other ZRK's were accomplished in the United States. In 1975 American specialists granted certain NATO countries an opportunity to familiarize themselves with materials of the SAM-D tests (it now has been redesignated the "Patriot"). The FRG command believes that this system should be deployed in the Central European theater of military operations in the eighties. A certain number of these systems will be purchased for the Bundeswehr in conformity with West German long-range plans.

With regard to the activities of individual firms, some American firms have purchased licenses to produce the "Crotale," "Roland" and "Rapier" ZRK's.

In the opinion of NATO country specialists, an important aspect of standardization is the use of uniform methods for testing and monitoring weapons systems being developed.

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NATO specialists are attempting to delineate spheres of activity of states in the creation and operation of weapons for a more effective solution to the problem of standardization. For example, in 1975 responsibility for developing recommendations for standardization of surface-to-air missiles was given to the FRG, and that for air-to-air missiles was given to the United States. Special attention here is given to the so-called integrated approach to a solution to the standardization problem. It consists of work being done simultaneously at all levels, from the weapons system as a whole to individual units, modules (assemblies) and component elements. It is believed that in time this approach will permit a reduction in the number of PSO systems of armies included in the NATO bloc. It is also noted that it is possible to reduce the number of ZRK models and best solve problems of standardization by creating a single system for different branches of the armed forces, such as the navy and ground forces. In creating ZRK's, NATO's specialists are attempting to use the same system in armed forces of many countries. For example, the American "Nike-Hercules" ZRK is in the inventory of 13 countries, including nine NATO countries; the "Hawk" is in 17 (8 NATO countries); "Redeye" is in 6 (3 NATO countries); the British "Blowpipe" is in 3; and the "Roland" is to be accepted in the inventory of the United States, Norway and other countries in addition to France and the FRG. It is planned to use the latter system not only in the FRG Ground Forces and Air Force, but also in the FRG Navy.

NATO's managing circles believe that the new American "Stinger" ZRK, which is to replace the "Redeye," may become the standard weapon for ground forces of all countries of this bloc.

A modular approach in design permitted a sharp reduction in the overall number of spare parts needed in operating this system. For example, in the "Nike-Hercules" ZRK the number of spare parts amounted to 30,000, while there will be no more than 3,000 in the SAM-D system. It is assumed that operating expenses will drop threefold and the number of servicing personnel fivefold. This is very important for combat employment of missiles.

5. Modern Wars and the Role of Missiles Therein

Before moving on to examine the combat employment of ground forces' missiles in the offensive and on the defense, let us familiarize ourselves with certain views of Pentagon and NATO leaders in the area of preparing and waging various types of wars and employing nuclear missile weaponry in them.

The Pentagon has developed a new classification of wars in recent years. Judging from western press reports, American military leaders divide all wars into four types: strategic nuclear war, a nuclear war in a theater of war (western military theorists divide the globe into theaters of war which in turn are subdivided into theaters of military operations), a conventional war in a theater of war, and a conventional war in a theater of military operations (TVD) or in a limited part of one (a local war).

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With regard to NATO and European countries which are members of this bloc, they continue to adhere to a division of wars into two types: general and limited. If we compare this with the new American classification, the general war corresponds to a strategic nuclear war, while the concept of "limited war" includes nuclear and conventional wars in a theater of war and a conventional war in a TVD or in a limited part of one.

There are no fundamental differences here in evaluating the essence and character of possible wars or in defining the intensity and direction of military preparations. The course of the North Atlantic Alliance is reflected with extreme clarity in the pages of one of NATO's journals: "True detente with the East may be attained only from a position of power. . . . Our main objective is to achieve unquestionable superiority in the military field."

Let us briefly examine the essence and character of wars according to the new American classification. This is of some interest also because the Pentagon always has set the tone in the military-political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance in matters concerning military doctrines and strategic concepts. Sooner or later the NATO bloc officially took up the strategy which already had existed in the United States for some period of time.

In the views of Pentagon strategists, a strategic nuclear war can arise only between the coalition of imperialist countries and states of the socialist community and be waged with unlimited use of all forces and weapons at the disposal of the belligerents. For this reason it will be distinguished by an exceptionally intensive, destructive and annihilative character. Not only armed forces and military installations, but the entire territory of the belligerents will be subjected to the effects of the devastating nuclear and thermonuclear attacks. It is believed that even neutral countries inevitably will experience to a certain extent the consequences of such a war, since radioactive fallout sooner or later will occur within the boundaries of their territories as well.

In the assessments of western military specialists, the United States sets aside for itself the main role in preparing and waging a strategic nuclear war, inasmuch as it has the overwhelming amount of the strategic nuclear potential of the capitalist world. Operational-tactical nuclear forces and general-purpose forces of the United States and its allies also will be used in the war in addition to the strategic offensive forces--the primary means for waging such a war. In the opinion of military theorists in the West, a strategic nuclear war should be short-lived. The probability is not precluded, however, that under certain conditions it may also assume a protracted character.

A surprise attack is considered the most effective method for unleashing a strategic (general) nuclear war. As Pentagon and NATO leaders assume, such an attack can considerably weaken the force of retaliatory nuclear strikes and

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provide for seizing the strategic initiative and sharply changing the situation and correlation of forces in favor of the attacker. Such a war also may arise as a result of an expansion (escalation) of a limited war.

The Pentagon believes that a nuclear war in a theater of war is possible in the European Theater of War above all, which includes three theaters of military operations: Northern Europe, Central Europe and Southern Europe. It is believed that the participating sides should employ only operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons (American military specialists associate both types in one concept--"tactical nuclear weapons," in which they include aircraft which are platforms for nuclear weapons in tactical, carrier-based and land-based aviation; "Pershing," "Lance," "Sergeant" and "Honest John" missiles; nuclear-capable field artillery; surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads; nuclear land mines; and torpedoes with nuclear warheads).

The Pentagon and NATO see the chief difference of such a war from a strategic nuclear war to lie in the political goals, which should be limited, i.e., they should not raise the issue of the very existence of the enemy's social system. In other words, the political goals must be defined so as not to force the enemy to employ all forces and weapons at his disposal or spur him to expand the boundaries of the war. It is believed that the use of nuclear weapons only in the zone of combat actions and only against military installations is a most important condition for preventing a nuclear war from developing into a strategic (general) nuclear war.

The European continent is considered to be the most probable area for such a war to arise.

A conventional war in a theater of war is an armed conflict with the use only of conventional means of destruction. As noted in the American press, it may be unleashed not only in Europe, but in Asia as well.

Under present-day conditions such a war is fraught with the threat of being turned into a nuclear war. Herein lies its chief distinction from past wars.

It is believed that the most probable method for unleashing such a war is a gradual expansion (escalation) of a local armed conflict arising in some one theater of military operations and its spread to all other TVD's of a given theater of war. Under these conditions it is planned to conduct offensive actions on axes where a favorable correlation of forces has been created for the coalition of imperialist countries, and defensive actions on other axes where the correlation of forces favors the enemy.

Responsibility for preparing and waging a conventional war in a theater of war rests both with the United States and with its allies in imperialist blocs.

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A conventional war in a theater of military operations or in a limited part of a TVD (local war) is viewed by foreign strategists as one in which conventional means of destruction are employed and only individual countries or regional alliances drawn into it must bear the primary burden. If the war is being conducted to accomplish objectives corresponding to U.S. interests, Washington may give economic and military-technical assistance to its allies and in some cases even support them with its Armed Forces, chiefly the Air Force and Navy. It is planned to make the decision on immediate participation of American troops in such wars with consideration of military-political, strategic and other U.S. interests and especially the capabilities of allied countries for independently achieving the goals of the war.

A local war is taken to mean combat actions which might develop on the territory of one or two small states as well as the armed invasion by one or more countries of another country (such as aggression by the racist YuAR [Republic of South Africa] against Angola).

The possibility of a conventional war arising in a TVD is assumed both for the European and the Asian theaters of war, and of a local war arising in any part of the globe.

As noted in the western press, Washington's new approach to a classification of wars and its desire to detail them to a greater degree have a political objective of no small importance--shift a considerable part of the burden and responsibility for preparing and conducting certain types of wars onto its allies while preserving a dominant role in NATO and other imperialist blocs; and, considering the bitter experience of the recent past, not to be drawn into unpromising military adventures further which do not directly concern U.S. interests of vital importance. Even now, based in part on its new classification of wars and on the strategy of realistic deterrence as a whole, Washington is seeking to have its West European allies sharply increase military expenditures and take a more active part in military preparations.

As noted in the foreign press, the new American classification contains clearly contradictory propositions from a purely military viewpoint. This is particularly noticeable in arguments about a nuclear war in a theater of war. On the one hand, the mission is assigned to achieve the set military and political goals through swift, decisive actions, and on the other, it mentions the need to employ forces and weapons to that extent which reduces to a minimum the danger of the war developing into a strategic (general) nuclear war. The experience of numerous wars shows with all obviousness that a military conflagration almost never was kept within previously outlined boundaries. Many foreign observers emphasize that there is no guarantee that the use of nuclear weapons, if only for tactical purposes, will not involve their immediate use on a strategic scale.

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One also cannot help but take note that the military-political leadership of the United States and NATO, as well as bourgeois military science as a whole, proceed in the definition of types of wars only from their military-technical aspect. They are silent about the issue of the sociopolitical essence and content of wars--the fundamental issue of genuine military science. This is understandable. Militaristic circles of western powers and the leaders of imperialist military blocs who nurture aggressive, expansionistic plans have not the slightest interest in revealing the true class essence and political content of the military adventures they are contemplating.

The military-strategic concept of target selection developed by the Pentagon leaders also draws attention to itself. It has become the theoretical basis for employment of nuclear missile forces in a nuclear war.

The concept of target selection provides for a multivariant employment of strategic offensive forces of the United States and its NATO allies. A special place in this concept is occupied by the variant of the so-called limited nuclear war, which provides for the delivery of a surprise mass attack only against military installations by strategic offensive forces.

But according to the Pentagon's present estimate, a strategic (general) nuclear war cannot be viewed under present-day conditions as the only variant of nuclear attack, inasmuch as an irresistible retaliatory attack would be disastrous for the United States itself and for its allies, as the Americans admit. By virtue of this, the United States has begun to seek a variant of a strategic nuclear war in which it would be possible to achieve global aggressive goals without the risk of its own destruction in the war.

The concept of a limited nuclear war during which strategic forces should be used "so as to limit the damage to both sides" participating in the nuclear conflict was such an alternative variant.

It should not be assumed that the Pentagon's leaders are concerned to "limit damage" specifically "to both sides." Their goal is different: to place the potential enemy in a position where he is deprived of an opportunity to deliver a crushing retaliatory attack against U.S. territory or at least to reduce the force of this attack to the maximum.

In conformity with the target selection concept, objects for delivery of nuclear attacks are considered to be strategic missile launch silos; strategic aviation at airfields, nuclear weapons stores, control posts of supreme state and military echelons, major troop groupings and other important military targets. The American press emphasizes that the possibility for delivering such strikes appeared only in recent years, primarily as a result of missiles being equipped with multiple warheads with a high hit accuracy. It is also believed that the capability of these forces to hit only the planned targets while avoiding extensive incidental destruction allegedly gives the United States an opportunity, in case a nuclear

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war breaks out, to "force the enemy" not to attack the cities of the United States and its allies and thus "prevent massive destruction even under conditions of a nuclear war." In other words, the transatlantic strategists are counting not only on persuading the potential enemy as to the acceptability of a limited nuclear war, but even to force him to conduct it on terms favorable to the United States.

The concept of target selection and its variant of a limited nuclear war are being advertised in every possible way and presented as a new and supreme achievement of military thinking in the West, allegedly responding to the spirit of the time and allegedly permitting a reduction of losses among the civilian populace to a minimum and prevention of all-out nuclear destruction. The falsity of such arguments by Pentagon "humanists" generated bewilderment and protests even among a number of American military specialists. For example, it was reported in the western press that "even if an exchange of thermonuclear strikes were directed only against military objectives, this would involve the death of tens of millions of people on each side and the destruction of a significant part of industrial potential, not to mention the destructive effect of secondary effects." And further, "it is impossible to picture how a war might develop only for the purpose of destroying land-based missile launch positions, considering the risk of its escalation and the enormous number of victims among the peaceful populace, without which it would simply be impossible to have offensive actions theoretically calculated for destruction only of military objectives."

The assertions of adherents of a limited nuclear war that it allegedly could be kept within previously outlined boundaries and could be made controllable also are completely groundless. It is clear to any person with common sense that any war unleashed by an aggressor during which nuclear weapons are used if only in limited numbers and against selected targets conceals the real threat of expansion and development into a strategic (general) nuclear war with all the disastrous consequences.

This is hardly unknown to the transatlantic strategists. It was not for nothing that, with adoption of the target selection concept, they did not reject the course of preparing for a strategic (general) nuclear war. They needed the variant of a limited nuclear war only to attempt to expand the range of combat employment of their strategic offensive forces. And so it was reported in the foreign press that the target selection program includes all possible variants for the delivery of nuclear strikes, beginning with individual attacks against a few Soviet targets and ending with the destruction of up to 80 percent of the USSR's military and economic potential.

The target selection concept also cannot be considered as something new in American military doctrine. The content of its primary variant (limited nuclear war) is a complete copy of basic provisions of the counterforce strategy or, as it also was termed, the strategy for excluding cities.

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The counterforce strategy was aimed at creating and maintaining those strategic nuclear forces in that degree of combat readiness which would give the United States an opportunity for delivering an anticipatory nuclear strike and achieving victory on this basis. Herein lay its essence.

But the counterforce strategy failed under the influence of the growing defensive might of the Soviet Union and fundamental changes in the correlation of forces in the world. In the face of reality, the Pentagon's present leadership is attempting to recreate the risky plans of its predecessors with the help of a new cycle in the strategic arms race and new strategic concepts. The essence of the target selection concept and of its primary variant--limited nuclear war--differs little from that of the counterforce strategy. The new strategic concept is even more dangerous, since it is based on more sophisticated and more destructive military hardware.

In conformity with the target selection concept, the United States is performing intensive work to improve nuclear missile weaponry, and not just strategic weapons, but operational-tactical and tactical weapons as well. Plans for their employment are discussed continuously at sessions of the NATO Nuclear Planning Committee. Thus it is impossible to miss the Pentagon's attempts to legalize use of nuclear weapons in conflict situations, and under conditions favorable to the United States, in the target selection concept with its primary variant--limited nuclear war.

It is believed that tactical and operational-tactical missiles with nuclear warheads now are the primary ground forces' weapons capable of destroying all targets and all installations within limits of their flight range. They have greatly increased the troops' combat capabilities in the offensive and on the defense.

These missiles permit troops to conduct operations across a broad front in the absence of a solid front line and at swift tempos.

In this regard western theorists have arrived at the conclusion that it will hardly be necessary now to concentrate masses of tanks, infantry and artillery in narrow penetration sectors.

The missions previously assigned to attack groupings will be accomplished by tactical and operational-tactical missiles.

They are capable of inflicting such damage on the enemy which would create a decisive turning point in combat actions and permit the ground forces to complete the rout of the main enemy groupings swiftly.

Because of their considerable flight range, missiles provide a different solution to problems of maneuver and concentration of fire on decisive axes. It previously was necessary to bring up troops and deploy them into combat formations and only then was an attack delivered with all available weapons to defeat the main enemy grouping. Under these conditions the effectiveness

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of fire concentrations on the enemy depended to a significant extent on the art of maneuvering forces and weapons. Now, however, it is sufficient to maneuver only missile trajectories, with such a maneuver of fire requiring only a few minutes, even with the broadest front of combat actions.

Features typical of missile units armed with tactical and operational-tactical missiles are considered to be their constant combat readiness, capability to deploy swiftly from the march for launching missiles, and the capability to move under their own power over great distances without losing combat effectiveness. Foreign specialists believe that the launches of such missiles have high accuracy and high effectiveness of action at the target.

NATO's military specialists plan to make use of ballistic missiles from mobile launchers for operations on land. It is believed that missile units with this equipment will be constantly in movement, changing positions in conformity with a special schedule. By such moves, the NATO leadership hopes to expand the operations zone for deployment of their aggressive groupings.

For example, the NATO command plans to girdle Western Europe, including England, with a missile system of three lines. It is planned to place the "Lance" and "Sergeant" tactical missiles on the first line, the "Pershing-1A" missiles on the second line, and M-X strategic ballistic missiles will comprise the third line. It assumes that neutron warheads for the ballistic missiles will allow a considerable increase in the offensive capabilities of NATO's ground forces and it cynically states that it would be considerably easier to advance through cities and settlements preserved intact where only neutron weapons were employed than across vast zones of destruction, obstructions and fires.

Such briefly are the views of the Pentagon and NATO leaders on the character and types of wars possible in the modern era and on employment of nuclear missile weapons in them.

Chapter IV - Combat Employment of Ground Forces' Missiles in the Offensive

In the past war offensive operations usually took place according to the following standard format. Some time before the offensive (from several tens of minutes to several hours) aviation and artillery conducted a powerful air and artillery preparation, then supported the attacking troops. Bombers would destroy objectives in the depth of enemy defenses. Actions of infantry and tanks on the battlefield additionally were supported by ground attack aircraft.

Tanks would occupy lines of attack during the air and artillery preparation. With the beginning of the offensive infantry and tanks would assume the attack from the initial line right after the moving barrage or successive fire concentrations of artillery and would destroy the enemy in close combat.

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A deeply echeloned defense would be crossed in succession. An operation would be conducted in several stages. It is typical that operational success always would be preceded by tactical success. A penetration of enemy defenses would be performed by powerful troop groupings attacking on several axes, and more rarely on one. After the enemy's tactical defensive zone was penetrated, mobile combined units (tank, mechanized and horse-mechanized) would be committed to the breach and would maneuver to encircle and destroy the enemy. In the depth of the operational defenses, lines would be breached from the move or after preparation in short periods of time. The attacking troops thus gradually took the entire zone of terrain within the boundaries of the attack.

The necessary amount of time was given for preparing each operation. Staffs of formations and combined units usually had an opportunity to study the situation thoroughly and submit proposals to the senior commander, who would make his decision on the basis of these data and assign missions to subordinate commanders. The latter in turn would prepare decisions and make them known to persons who were to carry them out. This procedure for preparing an operation also is of some importance at the present time.

But the outfitting of troops with nuclear missile weapons caused a genuine revolution in military affairs and in troop combat operations. As a result, commanders and staffs at all levels were required to take a new approach to resolving all problems of conducting an operation and a battle.

Nuclear missile weapons created great capabilities for offensive operations by ground forces. According to modern views of foreign military specialists, an attack by highly mobile groupings against an enemy who has assumed a defense or who is hastily setting up a defense, as well as against attacking enemy troops, is the primary method of armed warfare at the operational level. Use of nuclear missile weapons permits the creation of innumerable zones of continuous destruction and radioactive contamination.

It is believed that under present-day conditions the belligerents in land theaters will attempt to conduct primarily offensive actions. The presence of maneuverable motorized infantry, tank and airborne troops as well as long-range means of nuclear attack allows the accomplishment of such operations. In a number of instances they will consist of meeting engagements and battles developing simultaneously to a great depth.

Operating methods differ widely at the operational level. Troops may attack under various conditions: on wooded terrain, in deserts, in jungles, with the crossing of water obstacles and so on.

It has been noted that any offensive operation in the final account has to be concluded during operational pursuit with destruction of the enemy (or his capture) and the troops' movement to the final line.

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Under favorable conditions, mobile reserves at the disposal of the defending troops' command element may be employed for delivering powerful counter-attacks. Foreign military specialists believe that positional warfare will be the rare exception. Fast-moving maneuverable engagements and battles taking place to different depths of the zone of combat operations will come to replace traditional operations of the last war.

The appearance of nuclear missile weaponry gave the attacking side real opportunities for realizing the most important demand of modern operational art--simultaneous fire pressure to the entire depth of the enemy's disposition.

Let us examine some issues in the combat employment of operational-tactical and tactical missiles as well as ATGM's and SAM's in troop offensive operations as they are interpreted by military specialists of the leading capitalist states.

Chapter V - Combat Employment of Ground Forces' Missiles on the Defense

Foreign military specialists note that nuclear missile weaponry fundamentally changed the character of defense actions. In their opinion, the troops' alignment in the defense must be dispersed laterally and in the depth. A linear alignment is considered improbable. Operational-tactical and tactical missiles permit covering the intervals between troop groupings with powerful nuclear missile strikes.

Defensive combat actions at the operational level are based primarily on the might of operational-tactical missiles. Air support, the firepower of defending troops and skillful construction of defensive facilities have a great influence on the outcome of armed warfare. Comprehensive use of engineer vehicles permits the creation of field works which considerably reduce troop losses to enemy nuclear strikes.

Defending troops must exhaust the attacking enemy during combat actions and create favorable conditions for assuming the counteroffensive.

It has been noted that modern defenses are organized with consideration of the broad use of nuclear missile weapons and swift, maneuverable actions of highly mobile troop groupings. Continuous positions and defensive zones with a heavy concentration of personnel and weapons in them will not be able to withstand the actions of the attacking side. Groupings of defending troops dispersed laterally and in the depth occupy key areas on decisive axes. The intervals between these groupings are supported by the fire of operational-tactical missiles, front aviation and artillery.

Both an antimissile and antiaircraft defense is organized. To this end the troop combat formations, including deployment areas of missile troops and airfields of front aviation, must be well camouflaged and reliably screened by troop PSO weapons.

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Foxholes and trenches organized in the antinuclear sense are prepared to protect personnel and combat equipment against destruction by nuclear weapons. Combat against tanks is supported by the use of various antitank weapons, primarily antitank missiles.

It is believed that the success of a defensive operation will be determined to a considerable extent by the delivery of anticipatory nuclear missile strikes and aircraft-delivered nuclear strikes against enemy nuclear weapons, against troop groupings during their deployment, and against operational command posts, airfields, lines of communication and other objectives. With proper employment, nuclear weapons, and primarily operational-tactical missiles, will allow a substantial weakening or even disruption of an offensive being prepared by the enemy. American field manuals provide for maneuverable defense and defensive actions of containment.

The nodal character of a defense and high rates of advance of enemy attack groupings may create conditions in the depth of the defense for combat actions with an inverted front. Some defensive troop groupings may be encircled, but under all conditions the defending troops will attempt to conduct decisive actions to disrupt the enemy's offensive and create favorable conditions for assuming the counteroffensive.

In an area defense, the greater part of personnel and weapons is deployed in the first echelon to hold the most important terrain sectors. The second echelon of troops increases the depth of defenses and is employed to restore lost terrain sectors. In defending an area, troops are in a relatively immobile state and so are vulnerable to nuclear weapons.

Under conditions of the threat that nuclear weapons will be employed, an area defense includes the forward defense area security zone, the forward defensive sector and the sector where reserves are located. Allocation of troops, weapons, means of troop PSO and means of support within the defensive area depends on the nature of the terrain and composition of the forces. Of all elements of the defense, foreign specialists attach primary importance above all to antitank and antiaircraft defense.

A mobile defense is assumed when the number of mechanized troops and tanks is sufficient and the terrain and air situation favor the conduct of active operations in the form of counterattacks. Foreign specialists believe that one should also resort to a mobile defense under conditions of a nuclear war, since the defending side preserves troop mobility and freedom of action. A mobile defense is used in the form of counterattacks in nonnuclear combat actions in the presence of limited forces operating across a broad front.

In the opinion of foreign specialists, the primary mission of troop defense in a TVD consists of destruction of the attacking enemy and creation of conditions for them to assume the offensive subsequently. The U.S. Army field service regulations, which had a great effect on operational views of

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its NATO allies, provide for two types of defense: an area defense and a mobile defense.

The area defense relies on firepower and favorable conditions of terrain prepared in the engineering sense, and is based on the retention of key sectors. American field service regulations provide for organization of an area defense when there are insufficient armored combined units in a TVD or terrain hinders their maneuver, and when the enemy has air supremacy, thus limiting the employment of the main attack forces.

Conclusion

The CPSU's political course as outlined by the 25th congress provides for a continuous strengthening and development of the USSR's economic and defense might, an improvement in socialist social relationships, and our Motherland's further advance toward communism.

While offering a decisive rebuff to all intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism, the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries are seeking a further development of changes in the international situation favoring peace and social progress, a transition to a stable, productive cooperation among states, and turning detente into a continuous, irreversible process which encompasses all continents in attaining practical success in disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament.

Great successes in relaxing the international situation have been achieved in the world in recent years. A leading role in this noble cause belongs to the Soviet Union, which offered and is offering specific proposals for halting the race both of nuclear and conventional arms and for disarmament down to and including general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union became one of the initiators in developing such important agreements as treaties prohibiting the tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space and under the water, and on the nonpropagation of nuclear weapons; conventions on prohibiting and eliminating bacteriological weapons; agreements on measures to lessen the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war; and other documents.

These documents are major acts along the path toward a reduction and, in the final account, elimination of the threat of outbreak of a nuclear war and toward creating a system of real guarantees for international security.

But they do not fully eliminate the dangers that war will break out, since imperialism remains as before with its aggressive aspirations.

And so long as the threat to peace exists, the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact will take all necessary steps to strengthen their defenses and ensure international security.

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This in no way, however, contradicts the agreements which have been adopted.

The struggle for peace continues. Moreover, it requires the presence of powerful armed forces capable of conducting successful combat actions against any aggressor. One of the branches of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces is the Ground Forces, which are largest in size. They are equipped with first-rate military equipment and weapons, have an organizational structure which fully corresponds to the nature of contemporary combat actions, and are always ready to perform the missions assigned them. Our Ground Forces have left armies of the foremost capitalist countries far behind in the quality of basic types of weapons of armed warfare. They have the best missiles, artillery, tanks and other weapons and equipment in the world. L. I. Brezhnev said during his visit to the Red Banner Pacific Fleet on 7 April 1978: "We are improving our defenses for one purpose: to defend the achievements of the Great October reliably and to safeguard firmly the peaceful labor of Soviet citizens and of our friends and allies.

"Personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy serve this noble goal."

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Written from materials of the foreign press, the book presents contemporary methods for analyzing and synthesizing linear, discrete and nonlinear automatic systems of military application. It examines the creation and evaluation of optimum systems according to various quality criteria with consideration of random interference.

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The book familiarizes the reader with fundamental provisions of the theory of weapons combat effectiveness as applied to ground artillery firing. It provides firing effectiveness factors and approximated methods of their evaluation for use among the troops.

V. A. Gorbunov, "Effektivnost' obnaruzheniya tseley" [Effectiveness of Target Detection], 10 pages.

The book provides a classification of surveillance systems according to various factors and examines methods for evaluating the effectiveness of radiotechnical surveillance facilities as sources of data for contemporary automated control systems. It provides an analysis of movement and relative position of target and observer in different situations of search and detection, and examines principles of rational positioning of search and detection facilities.

A. P. Verzhikovskiy et al., "Kratkiy slovar' po radioelektronike" [Concise Radioelectronics Dictionary] (2d ed., revised and supplemented), 40 pages.

The dictionary contains around 4,000 terms and their meanings in radar, radio communications, radio navigation, television, remote control, radio-metrology, sonar, infrared engineering, and on individual elements, units and assemblies of radioelectronic gear.

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On the basis of the methods of queueing theory and mathematical programming theory with the use of electronic computers, the book provides practical recommendations for substantiating decisions made in military affairs.

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The book familiarizes the reader with methods of designing ballistic guided missiles with RDTT [solid fuel rocket engines] used primarily in the initial stage of designing a missile system. It shows the significance of these methods for substantiating decisions which go into the development of a missile and for clarification of the possible values of its specifications.

A. N. Romanov, "Trenazhery dlya podgotovki operatorov RLS s pomoshch'yu EVM" [Trainers for Radar Operator Training using the Electronic Computer], 6 pages.

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The reference contains information on means of enemy air attack, an estimate of their movement parameters, physical features and methods of combat employment, detection systems, and principles of their construction. It gives the missions and structure of air defense troops, status and prospects for development, fundamentals of the theory of building weapons systems, characteristics of air defense arms, and fundamentals of their combat employment.

The book provides information on automated control systems and the enemy's means of radioelectronic suppression.

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BOOK DISCUSSES USSR CONSTITUTION AND DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND

Moscow KONSTITUTSIYA SSSR I ZASHCHITA OTECHESTVA in Russian 1979 signed to press 13 Sep 78 pp 1-6, 45-65, 125-28

[Annotation, Table of Contents, Introduction, excerpt from Chapter 2, and Conclusion of book by Prof Col Justice P.I. Romanov and Lecturer, Col Justice V.G. Belyavskiy]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: KONSTITUTSIYA SSSR I ZASHCHITA OTECHESTVA (The USSR Constitution and Defense of the Homeland)

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Brief Description:

This book, written by Prof Col Justice P.I. Romanov and Lecturer Co Justice V.G. Belyavskiy, Honored Jurist RSFSR, discusses the legal principles of military duty embodied in the Constitution, the military oath and other laws of our country.

The authors examine in the light of Leninist ideals, CPSU decisions and the points of the new USSR Constitution, defense of the socialist homeland as one of the most important functions of the Soviet popular state, a business of all the people, the sacred duty of each and every citizen of the USSR; they examine the fundamentals of the legal status of military personnel and show how Soviet servicemen carry out their constitutional duty to maintain the Armed Forces in a state of continuous combat readiness, guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to the aggressor.

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This book is intended for a general audience.

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Introduction

Adoption of the new USSR Constitution -- the Fundamental Law of the world's first socialist state of all the people -- was an event of world historic significance. Constituting a concentrated sum of the entire 60-year development of our society, it convincingly confirms that the ideas of the Great October Revolution and the behests of V. I. Lenin are being successfully and unswervingly implemented. The Constitution reflects the greatest achievements of the Soviet people and statutorily consolidates a new point reached on the road to communism -- the building of developed socialism. At the same time it opens up before the Soviet people magnificent prospects for the further development of society and has become a new and powerful implement in the building of communism.

The USSR Constitution rests on the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism and is based on the ideas of V. I. Lenin on the essence of Soviet constitutions and paths of development of the Soviet state. At the same time it makes a substantial contribution to creative development of theory and international practice of the building of socialism.

One can state that the author of the new Constitution is the Soviet people, who, under the guidance of the Communist Party, participated most actively in elaboration and discussion of this outstanding document of the present day. Its nationwide discussion and debate demonstrated to the entire world the moral-political countenance of the Soviet citizen, who considers the interests of the state and society to be his own vital business.

Fully expressed and statutorily formulated in the Constitution are the will of the Soviet people and the principal directions of Communist Party and Soviet Government policy on the most important, most fundamental questions pertaining to the development of our society. The Constitution formally states

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the fundamentals of the social system and policy of the USSR, the main tasks of the socialist state of all the people, the fundamental rights, liberties and obligations of citizens, the national-governmental structure of the Soviet Union, the system and basic principles of organization and activities of governmental agencies.

It is especially important to stress that the USSR Constitution, embodying Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland, established clear-cut legal principles of its organization under present-day conditions and reflected CPSU policy in strengthening the nation's defense capability. Unswervingly following Lenin's teachings, continuously developing and enriching them with theoretical conclusions, the Communist Party -- the guiding and directing force of Soviet society -- innovatively resolves problems of ensuring the defense might of the Soviet state, the combat readiness of army and navy. The Constitution proceeds from the position that continuous strengthening of the nation's defense capability and the might of the USSR Armed Forces is an objective necessity, one of the conditions for successful building of communism.

The Constitution has enriched Leninist teaching on defense of the homeland with new points possessing fundamental significance, corresponding to the present stage of development of the Soviet state of all the people: on the purpose of establishing the Soviet Armed Forces and adoption of a universal military service obligation, and on the constitutional duty of the Armed Forces to the people. The Constitution emphasizes the general national and popular character of defense of the socialist homeland, reflects its international character, and defines the main directions of activity of the Soviet state in the area of ensuring the nation's security and strengthening its defense capability. Synthesized in the Constitution is the experience of the party and state in the area of defense of the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people and organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The society of developed socialism is characterized by the total dedication of the Soviet people to the ideals of the Communist Party and by loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet people consider defense of the achievements of the Great October Revolution and the attainments of building socialism to be their most important obligation. This is reflected in the Fundamental Law of the USSR, which has incorporated the life-tested past constitutional provisions that defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of each and every citizen of the USSR, while military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honorable duty of Soviet citizens. These most important points form the basis of the USSR law on universal military service obligation, general military regulations, and the military oath.

The points of the Constitution dealing with defense of the homeland serve as a legal foundation for further development of legislation in the area of defense and improvement of Soviet military legislation. They are the

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foundation of that enormous ideological-indoctrinational and organizational work which is being done by military councils, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations to strengthen military order and procedure and to maintain a high level of troop combat readiness.

The Soviet people and army and navy personnel see in the Constitution a guarantee for further development and strengthening of the socialist system, its economic and defense might. Practical incorporation of the provisions of the Constitution will strengthen to an even greater extent our nation and the ideological-political unity of the people, and will promote successful accomplishment by the Armed Forces of their tasks pertaining to securing the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the historic achievements of socialism and world peace.

Constitutional provisions are of great indoctrinational significance. They help Soviet citizens and military personnel more deeply and comprehensively realize their sacred duty to the homeland, comprehend the necessity of defending it, as well as diversified activities by the CPSU and Soviet Government to strengthen our country's defense might. The provisions of the Constitution assist in elevating the political-moral state of military personnel, conscientious performance of their honorable duty in the ranks of army and navy, and mobilization of their energy toward accomplishment of combat and political training tasks as well as securement of a high degree of combat readiness.

The Communist Party demands that all Soviet citizens and Armed Forces personnel be rigorously guided in their practical activities by the provisions of our Constitution and that they implement them on a daily basis. "We want," stated CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "citizens of the USSR thoroughly to know their rights and freedoms, the ways and methods of exercising them, intelligently utilizing these rights and freedoms in the interests of building communism and clearly understanding their inseparable link with conscientious execution of their duties as citizens. It is an important task of party, government and public organizations responsible for Communist indoctrination of the workers to assist in this process, to help develop a high level of political culture in each and every citizen."*

* Brezhnev, L. I. "O Konstitutsii SSSR" [On the USSR Constitution], Second, Enlarged Edition, Moscow, 1978, page 58.

Strengthening the Nation's Defense Capability

Article 32 of the USSR Constitution, specifying the areas of activity of the Soviet state pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland, declares that the state shall ensure the nation's security and defense capability and shall furnish the USSR Armed Forces with everything they need.

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The function of defense of the socialist homeland in the contemporary period is so complex and all-encompassing that it literally permeates all government activity and is supported by all areas of government activity. The state, including the edifice of government, the economic system administered by the edifice of government, and all branches and sectors of the economy, science and culture are pledged by the Fundamental Law to ensure the nation's security and defense capability.

Our nation's defense capability is grounded on its economic, scientific-technical, spiritual and specifically military potentials. Implementation of the party-elaborated economic strategy and program of social reforms, on a foundation of unification of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of developed socialism, ensures further strengthening of the nation's defense capability.

Defense capability is determined first and foremost by level of economic development. In order to achieve a high degree of defense strength, our nation's economy should be capable of securing to a maximal degree all the material requirements of the Soviet society. At the same time it should produce everything requisite for defense, for increasing the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces, and should possess the capability of furnishing them with everything they need not only in peacetime, but also in case of conduct of military operations against an aggressor.

Of unfading significance in this respect is the general level of the country's economic development, volume of output of material goods as a whole, including for the needs of the USSR Armed Forces, as well as the level of development of those branches and sectors of the economy which work directly for defense needs.

It is quite obvious that the nation's defense capability also depends on the mobility of the nation's economy and the capability of shifting it rapidly to a war footing, setting up for production of the newest weapons and military equipment, corresponding to scientific and technical advances and the conditions of conduct of combat operations. Under present-day conditions the nation's defense capability is determined in large measure by correct, efficient distribution of productive resources, which would ensure their survivability in case of a military attack as well as uninterrupted supply of everything needed by the nation and its Armed Forces.

All this has been and is being considered by the Communist Party and Soviet Government in determining the directions of this country's economic development. This circumstance made it possible during the years of the prewar five-year plans and during the Great Patriotic War to furnish the Armed Forces with all requisite material means of combat. In spite of the fact that Hitler's Germany possessed a substantially more developed economy, the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, succeeded in setting up war production on such a scale that in many indices it surpassed the war production of the nations of the fascist bloc. Not only military but also economic victory was achieved over the aggressor.

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Our nation's economic and defense might has grown to an immense degree. As was noted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "never before has our country possessed such vast economic and scientific-technical potential. Never before has its defense capability been so solid, so reliable."¹ It will increase to an even greater extent as a result of accomplishment of the targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan. Comprehensive influence on strengthening the nation's defense capability will be exerted by accomplishment of the main task of the current five-year plan, which lies in consistent implementation of the Communist Party's course directed at boosting the material and cultural living standards of the people on the basis of dynamic and proportional development of societal production and increasing its efficiency, accelerating scientific and technological progress, labor productivity growth, and all-out improvement in the quality of work performed in all component elements of the nation's economy.²

The party's economic strategy for the 10th Five-Year Plan and the longer-term future, specified at the 25th CPSU Congress, the core of which is further increasing this country's economic might, expansion and radical renovation of productive assets, and securement of a stable, balanced growth of heavy industry, also specifies maintaining at an adequate level the defense capability of the Soviet state.

Continuous equipping of the Armed Forces with powerful weapons, combat equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies depends on development of various branches and sectors of the economy. Of decisive significance thereby is growth and development of industry, particularly those branches of modern industry which play a determining role in strengthening the defense might of our homeland. This applies first and foremost to heavy industry -- the foundation of the economy. As is emphasized in the CPSU program, one of the most important tasks of heavy industry is securement of the nation's defense needs.

The role of metallurgy in defense production is evident from the following example: according to calculations of foreign experts, 30,000 tons of steel, 1,000 tons of copper, and 500 tons of zinc and aluminum are consumed in construction of a warship displacing 35,000 tons.

Further development of metallurgy makes it possible to produce those items essential for defense, for the USSR Armed Forces. Ferrous metallurgy will produce 160-170 million tons of steel in 1980. In nonferrous metallurgy production of aluminum, copper and nickel will increase by 20-30% in the 10th Five-Year Plan, while titanium output will increase 40%. Production of alloying and rare metals will increase. Further development of machine building and the manufacture of modern equipment is of continuing importance for equipping the army and navy with modern weapons and combat equipment. Machine building output will increase by 50-60% in the 10th Five-Year Plan. Automotive production in 1980 will total 2.1-2.2 million units, including 800-825 thousand trucks, while tractor production will total 580-600 thousand units.³

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Development of nuclear machine engineering is accelerating, while production of instruments and automation equipment will increase by 60-70% and computer hardware by 80%.⁴ Radio electronics and the electrical equipment industry will experience further development. The chemical industry will produce needed substances and materials suited for operation under conditions of great speeds, pressure and temperature, which is very important for modern rocketry, aviation and radio engineering. Defense needs demand a substantial quantity of fuel and electric power.

Improvement of the missile, aircraft, tank and other branches of military industry will continue, as will their adoption of the most important achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. As is indicated by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "the economy, science and technology in our country is presently at such a high level that we are capable of rapidly building any weapon on which the enemies of peace would place their cards."⁵

Of great importance for the nation's defense capability is development of agricultural production, which should meet the food and raw materials needs of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces as well as the establishment of essential stockpiles in case of war. V. I. Lenin pointed out that "a solid food supply base is of primary importance for a solid, strong, army."⁶ In the 10th Five-Year Plan the average annual volume of agricultural production is to be increased by 14-17% in comparison with the preceding five-year plan.

Of considerable importance for the nation's defense capability is the planned further improvement in the capacity and quality of performance of the entire transport system and improvement in transportation links between this country's economic regions. Further development of means of communication, efforts to establish a uniform automated national communications network, increase in the total mileage of long-distance telephone links, and improvement of television and radio broadcasting, including with the utilization of artificial satellites, is of defense significance.

The level of development of science, including military science, is especially important for ensuring defense strength. The CPSU and Soviet Government devote daily attention to these matters. At the present time there are more than 1.2 million scientific workers in our country.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government are taking all measures to ensure that the task of ensuring this country's security and defense capability, reflected in the USSR Constitution -- a task which is comprehensive in character -- is carried out not only in the process of building the material and technological foundation of communism but also in the course of accomplishing other tasks in building communism -- improving socialist societal relations and forming a new man.

This is connected with the fact that the nation's defense capability is also dependent on the sociopolitical development of society and on moral-political factors. Moral-political and ideological unity of the Soviet people, their solidarity behind the Communist Party, unity of army and people, and

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friendship among the peoples of the USSR exert the most positive influence on strengthening defense. Of great importance is a further rise in the material and cultural living standards of our people and development of the Soviet way of life and socialist democracy.

In the final analysis success in ensuring this country's defense capability is determined by people, who accomplish the specified tasks. Total dedication to the homeland, courage, and staunchness of Soviet military personnel are also determined by those qualities possessed by the Soviet people.

International Character of the Function of the Defense of the Homeland

With formation of a world socialist system, the function of defense of the socialist homeland assumed a broader international character. It consists not only in defending our country against the aggressor but also in participation in repelling hostile intrigues directed against the nations of the socialist community and in carrying out international treaty obligations in the area of mutual defense.

The international character of defense of the achievements of socialism proceeds from the very essence of the socialist system. V. I. Lenin pointed to the necessity of uniting the forces of socialism: "...We who are fighting imperialism constitute an alliance which demands close military unity, and we view any attempts to disrupt this unity as absolutely intolerable, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism."⁷

In the contemporary period strengthening of friendship and cooperation among the socialist countries in all areas, including defense, as well as a fraternal alliance of the socialist armies have become an objective necessity. Creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization and strengthening of this defensive alliance constitutes an example of embodiment and further development of the Leninist teaching on defense of the socialist homeland.

One feature of exercise of the function of defense jointly with the other socialist countries is the fact that all our joint measures are based on international agreements and are carried out with the voluntary agreement of the brother nations by means of performance of accepted obligations. The will of nations is manifested in appropriate agreements and joint decisions, which determine the rights and obligations of the nations of the socialist community in the area of mutual defense against aggression.

The might of the military-political alliance of socialist nations is grounded on their ideological-theoretical unity, common political power, government and societal system, and common goals. The socialist economic system and socialist ownership of the means of production constitutes the economic foundation of the Warsaw Pact Organization. The economic base and industrial strength of the nations of the socialist community as well as development of the most modern branches of industry makes it possible fully to satisfy the defense needs of the Warsaw Pact member nations.

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The military organization of the Warsaw Pact -- the Joint Forces -- plays a most important role in joint defense of the achievements of socialism. The fighting men of the brother armies reliably stand guard over the peaceful labor of their peoples, providing them and the socialist community as a whole security against the intrigues of aggressors. The Warsaw Pact nations coordinate their military organizational development and military policy, development and technical equipping of their armies, incorporate uniform methods of training and indoctrination, and jointly elaborate current important problems of military science in order to accomplish common defense tasks. As was noted by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "in view of the continuing growth of military preparations of the aggressive NATO bloc, Soviet citizens, army and navy personnel will do everything possible to strengthen the fraternal defensive alliance and to maintain at an adequate level the combat readiness of the Joint Forces."⁸

Powers of the Highest Agencies of Government Authority and Administration in the Area of Defense

The highest agencies of government authority and administration in the USSR -- the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers -- exercise a unity of political, economic and military direction over defense of the socialist homeland. A most important role is played by the USSR Defense Council, which is headed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mar SU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.⁹ Their area of competence includes examination and resolution of all root questions pertaining to ensuring national security, strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet state, and development of its military potential. These activities include determination of the principal directions and ratification of plans for military organizational development, establishment of the military system of the state and the principles of organization of defense of the USSR. The highest agencies of government authority direct and coordinate the work of the entire Soviet edifice of government in such a manner that the interests of strengthening defense capability are considered when settling any matters pertaining to governing this country.

The USSR Supreme Soviet is an agency of government at the national level which enjoys total governmental power, including in the area of national defense. In this area it exercises all rights pertaining, pursuant to Article 73 of the Constitution, to governance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The USSR Supreme Soviet makes decisions pertaining to questions of war and peace, organization of defense, protection of the sovereignty of the Soviet state, ensurement of security of its borders, territorial integrity, and state security. The highest agency of governmental authority determines the military system of the state, regulates the universal military service obligation, and exercises direction of the Armed Forces. Ratifying current and long-range state economic and social development plans, it determines defense requirements, which ensure strengthening of the army and navy and increasing their combat readiness. The state budget specifies special

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appropriations for national defense in an amount which fully guarantees its protection. The USSR Supreme Soviet promulgates laws, decrees and other enactments, which establish the principles of direction and management of defense and the Armed Forces, the duties of various government agencies, public organizations, officials and citizens, and the procedure of implementing the universal military service obligation.

Of great importance for organizing defense of the socialist homeland is the Universal Military Service Obligation Law, passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 October 1967. Pursuant to the USSR Constitution, it establishes the principles of Soviet military organizational development and determines the principal questions connected with establishment and execution of the Universal Military Service Obligation. In this sense it constitutes the principal military law of the Soviet state. The formulations of its articles express in concentrated form Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland and Communist Party policy in organization of national defense and Armed Forces organizational development. This law serves as the legal foundation for issuing of other military-legislative enactments -- service regulations, statutes on military service, etc.

The Constitution endows the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet with considerable authority in the area of national defense.¹⁰ Its decisions, as the highest agency of governmental authority in the period between sessions, are binding on all agencies of authority (other than the USSR Supreme Soviet) and government administration. When necessary the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet makes changes in the country's legislative enactments, including on matters pertaining to defense and military organizational development, which are subsequently submitted for ratification to the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For example, by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 18 November 1971, a section entitled "On Warrant Officer Military Service" was added to the Universal Military Service Obligation Law. The powers of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the area of defense of the socialist homeland extend both to peacetime and to time of war and apply to organization of national defense as a whole as well as Armed Forces activities.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet forms the USSR Defense Council and ratifies its makeup. It appoints and replaces the top-echelon command of the Armed Forces. The Constitution empowers the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to declare in the interests of national defense martial law in separate localities or nationwide. Martial law is a special governmental-legal status established in an emergency situation and characterized by execution of special measures in the interests of defense of the USSR. It is temporary in nature and continues as long as there exists a military danger to the Soviet state.

At the beginning of and during the Great Patriotic War the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared martial law in a number of union republics and oblasts, as well as on all railroads, in maritime, river and air transport. At that time martial law was regulated by an ukase dated 22 June 1941. Measures specified by this ukase were directed toward mobilization of all

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manpower and resources in the interests of defense, reorganization of operation of government agencies, establishments, and enterprises in conformity with the conditions of the emergency situation, and toward ensuring resolute and merciless neutralization of subversive activities on the part of spies, saboteurs, provocateurs and other enemy agents. They were also directed toward clearing the home front of deserters, panic-mongers, hooligans, profiteers and other subversive elements.

In areas where martial law was declared all functions of government agencies in the area of defense, law and order and state security were assigned to the military councils of fronts, armies, military districts, and where these bodies did not exist -- to the top-echelon command of combined units dis-
positioned in the given area. Military authorities were granted the re-
quisite powers to employ emergency measures. They were authorized:

in conformity with existing laws and government decrees, to co-opt civilians for performance of compulsory labor in defense work, guarding rail lines, structures, communications facilities, power generating plants and other facilities, to fight fires, epidemics and natural disasters;

to commandeer civilian housing to quarter military units and es-
tablishments;

to commandeer vehicles and other property required for defense needs, both from government, public and cooperative enterprises and organizations and from private citizens;

to regulate the work schedule of establishments and enterprises, to establish general curfews, to restrict street traffic, and when necessary to perform searches and to detain suspicious persons;

to prohibit entry into and exit from areas declared under martial law, etc.

All agencies of government authority, state and public establishments, organizations and enterprises were obligated to assist the military command in every way in utilization of all local manpower resources for national defense needs.

In contrast to Soviet law, the establishment of martial law which is widely practiced by imperialist nations is of a totally different, antipopular character. To suppress the workers within a country and to enslave other peoples, the imperialists resort to declaring martial law, a state of siege, an emergency, etc. Total authority is assumed by the military, invested with unlimited powers to utilize the army and police against the workers and against the people. Martial law is utilized by the imperialist bourgeoisie as a means to combat the revolutionary movement of the worker class.

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V. I. Lenin wrote: "There is not a single country, even the most democratic, in which there are no loopholes or qualifications in their constitutions which enable the bourgeoisie to set the troops against the workers, to declare martial law, etc, "in case of disruption of law and order," but in actual fact in case of "disturbance" by the exploited class of its slave status and attempts to conduct itself other than as slaves."¹¹ Essentially martial law declared by imperialist nations constitutes a total denial of the democratic rights and freedoms of the people, conditions of open lawlessness.

During a period between sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium can declare a state of war in case of an armed attack or the necessity of honoring international treaty obligations pertaining to mutual defense against aggression. For example, in case of an aggressor attack against one of the socialist nations -- members of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The provisions of the USSR Constitution on grounds for declaring a state of war proceed from the peace-seeking character of Soviet foreign policy and once again stress the fact that our relations with other nations, as stated in Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, are constructed on principles of mutual repudiation of the employment of force or the threat of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes. This is fully in conformity with the spirit of international law and the Final Document of the Helsinki Conference.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is empowered to declare a general or partial mobilization in order to ensure defense of the socialist homeland. Pursuant to Article 101 of the Universal Military Service Obligation Law, when mobilization is declared all persons at that time serving in the Armed Forces shall wait for special orders, while persons subject to the military draft shall report to locations at the time specified in their mobilization orders, summons or in orders issued by rayon (city) military commissars. A mobilization induction order and subsequent induction orders in time of war shall be effected on the basis of decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers by orders of the Minister of Defense. Discharge of military personnel upon demobilization shall be carried out on the basis of ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet as well as by orders of the Minister of Defense.

The Constitution specifies establishment of military ranks among the powers of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It also awards top military ranks -- Marshal of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, chief marshal of an arm, army general, marshal of an arm (admiral of a fleet). The system of Armed Forces officer and warrant officer ranks was formally specified by ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 18 November 1971.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies general military regulations -- Disciplinary Regulations, Internal Service Regulations, and the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties of the USSR Armed Forces. Exercise of this authority plays an enormous role for the Armed Forces, for regulations

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are the foundation of military rule of law and are systematized, stable and inviolable codes of the fundamental rules of conduct and activities of military personnel. They regulate the various aspects of army and navy life and activities. Military regulations are based on Leninist principles of Armed Forces organizational development and CPSU policy on matters of military organizational development, political and military indoctrination, training of personnel and combat employment of troops, as well as strengthening of one-man command and military discipline.

Present general military regulations were ratified by ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 30 July 1975. Thus they acquired the force of law at the highest level. This underscores their significance for the Soviet Armed Forces, their solid foundation and their absolutely binding nature on all military personnel.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the text of the Military Oath¹² and the Statute on the Procedure of taking the Military Oath.¹³ The Military Oath is a sacred oath to the homeland by military personnel and is of enormous political, military and indoctrinational significance. The taking of this oath imposes on military personnel honorable obligations to carry out their military duty and also involves certain legal consequences and responsibility in case of violation.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet also ratifies the Statute on the Military Unit Colors¹⁴ and the Statute on Guarding the Borders of the USSR.¹⁵

Also falling within the competence of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is regulation of a number of most important matters pertaining to military service -- establishment of procedure of financial liability of military personnel for damage done to the state and ratification of regulations on officer's courts of honor, warrant officer and extended service personnel courts of honor, and comrade courts in military construction detachments.

Thus the most important questions pertaining to national defense and Armed Forces organizational development in conformity with the USSR Constitution are settled in the Soviet state by the highest agencies of government authority.

The Constitution and USSR Law on the USSR Council of Ministers assign a broad range of questions in the area of ensuring the nation's security and defense capability to the competence of the USSR Council of Ministers -- the highest executive and administrative agency of government authority, heading the entire system of government administrative agencies. Pursuant to Article 131 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers is empowered to settle all matters of government administration pertaining to governance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if they do not fall within the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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It takes measures to ensure state security, security of the borders of the USSR and Soviet territory, exercises general supervision over organizational development of the Armed Forces, directs and monitors activities of the Ministry of Defense as well as the State Security Committee and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the area of defense of the socialist homeland. The Council of Ministers takes measures to ensure the nation's defense capability, to furnish the Armed Forces with everything they need and to maintain them in a continuous state of combat readiness. It determines the structure, functions and competence of central military control agencies, and establishes on the basis and in development of the Universal Military Service Obligation Law the procedure of performance of military service by officers and warrant officers.

The USSR Council of Ministers determines the annual contingents of citizens to be inducted into active military service. USSR Minister of Defense orders pertaining to regular induction callups and discharges into the reserves of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers who have completed their term of active military service are issued on the basis of its decrees. The Council of Ministers specifies the number of specialists to be trained of induction-age young men in the DOSAAF and trade-technical education systems.

In elaborating current and long-range national economic and social development plans, as well as the budget, the USSR Council of Ministers provides for securing the needs of national defense. It ratifies Armed Forces supply schedules and standards, rations, pay and allowances for various categories of military personnel, supervises production of all requisite material means for providing defense and supplying the army and navy. Its area of competence includes establishment of pension provisions for officer personnel, warrant officers, extended service personnel and members of their families. It awards general officer and flag officer ranks (up to colonel general and admiral respectively) and can take rank away from officer personnel (except for army generals and marshals).

The USSR Council of Ministers directs Civilian Defense and specifies the corresponding powers and duties of government agencies, public organizations, and citizens.

The councils of ministers of the union republics take measures, within the bounds specified by the USSR Constitution, pertaining to ensuring the nation's security and defense capability and ensure observance of USSR laws pertaining to defense. They render every possible assistance in conducting induction callups to military service, training and mobilization, assist military commissariats, actively assist in improving the material, political and cultural state of military units, protect the rights and legitimate interests of military personnel and their families, supervise the activities of DOSAAF organizations, and engage in mass defense work among the civilian population.

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A responsible role in organizational development and strengthening of the Armed Forces, in their day-by-day direction and in practical execution of the function of defense of the socialist homeland as a whole is assigned to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the central military control and management agency. It exercises its powers nationwide, as well as beyond our country's borders as regards Soviet troops stationed pursuant to international treaties and agreements on the territory of foreign socialist countries.

The Ministry of Defense directs all branches of the Armed Forces, elaborates the plans and schedules of their organizational development, improvement in organization of troops, armament, combat equipment, all types of army and navy supply, direction of combat training, plus a number of other functions.

The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces is the main agency of military control and management. It comprehensively analyzes and assesses the military-political situation, determines trends in development of means of waging war, organizes Armed Forces training, ensures constant Armed Forces combat readiness, directs military scientific activities, etc.

Direction of party-political work in the Armed Forces is exercised by the CPSU Central Committee through the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which occupies the status of a CPSU Central Committee department. It directs the political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the Army and Navy, applies party influence to all aspects of military life and activities, guides the activities of political agencies and party organizations aimed at improving combat readiness and strengthening military discipline and the political-morale state of personnel.

Serving within the USSR Ministry of Defense are the commanders in chief of the Armed Forces branches -- Strategic Missile Forces, Ground Forces, National Air Defense Forces, Air Force, and Navy, with their subordinate main headquarters, directorates, sections, and services. Military councils operating under the chairmanship of the corresponding commander in chief have been established to examine and settle questions pertaining to direction of the Armed Forces branches.

The USSR Ministry of Defense encompasses rear services management and control agencies, which unite the fuel, food, clothing and other supply services, as well as the military medical service. It also includes agencies managing and administering construction and troop billeting, and main (central) directorates handling special sectors (Central Finance Directorate, Main Personnel Directorate, etc).

The Main Armed Forces Inspectorate was established to monitor troop training and maintenance of continuous troop combat readiness.

There also exist control and management agencies of military districts, air defense districts, fleets, and groups of forces. Commanders of military districts are subordinate to the USSR Minister of Defense and the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces; commanders of air defense districts and fleets are subordinate to the USSR Minister of Defense, and the commander in chief of the corresponding Armed Forces branch. In the districts (fleets,

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groups of forces) there are military councils which examine and settle all important matters pertaining to troop (naval forces) life and activities. They are responsible to the CPSU Central Committee, government and USSR Minister of Defense for the state and combat readiness of the troops. Direct supervision of district troops and fleet forces is exercised through the corresponding headquarters, their directorates and sections. The political directorates of military districts (fleets) organize party-political work in the combined units and units, on naval ships, at military establishments and educational institutions within the districts (fleets). Through the district chief of rear services the commander directs the activities of supply agencies and monitors execution of housekeeping operations plans pertaining to meeting the material needs of the troops.

Combined unit and military unit control agencies consist of officials exercising command functions -- commanders of combined units and units, their deputies, their subordinate staffs and services. The political sections of combined units direct party-political work with personnel and organize it directly with the units and on the naval ships within the combined unit.

Agencies of military control also include garrison commanders (senior naval commanders) and military commandants, the authorities of whom are specified by the Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties of the USSR Armed Forces.

An important position in exercising the function of defense of the socialist homeland is occupied by local agencies of military administration -- the military commissariats. They are established by the USSR Ministry of Defense in conformity with the administrative-territorial division of the USSR and the union republics. Subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the military commissariats operate at the same time in a status equivalent to departments of the corresponding councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics, and executive committees of local soviets. Military commissariats are that link in the administrative chain which is closest to and in direct contact with the edifice of the local soviets. The principal tasks of the military commissariat include execution of measures pertaining to preparation for and conduct of mobilization, keeping records on manpower and economic resources in the interests of the USSR Armed Forces, preparation of young people for military service, performance of induction into active military service, etc.

Border troops are controlled and administered by the USSR State Security Committee through the Main Directorate of Border Troops. The Military Council of Border Troops was established in 1969. Party-political work in the border troops is supervised by the political directorate.

The activities of state security agencies are directed by the USSR State Security Committee, corresponding committees of the union and autonomous republics, and administrations of committees of union republics in oblasts, krays and large cities. They work at all times in close coordination with other government agencies, public organizations, and work forces.

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The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs directs internal troops, which comprise a component of the Armed Forces, through a main administration, and determines the organizational structure of these troops.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, as well as of union and autonomous republics, internal affairs directorates under executive committees of kray and oblast Soviets, and internal affairs departments under executive committees of city and rayon Soviets direct the activities of internal affairs agencies and the militia in the area of maintaining law and order: inviolability of citizens, protection of public property, keeping the peace in public places, maintaining the requisite conditions for normal functioning of government and public organizations and individual citizens. Rayon (city) induction commissions include the chiefs or deputy chiefs of militia sections (departments) of executive committees of rayon (city) Soviets. Militia agencies assist military commissariats in ensuring that citizens observe draft registration regulations.

Other ministries, agencies and subordinate entities also take part in exercising the function of defense of the socialist homeland. The ministries of education, higher and secondary specialized education, culture and health perform tasks of national significance in preparing citizens for military service, in boosting the educational and cultural level of the general population, in political, labor and moral indoctrination, and in physical development of young people.

Local Soviets and their executive committees devote constant attention to matters of national defense; their activities in this area are regulated by the Universal Military Service Obligation Law, by statutes, ratified decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and by other legislative enactments.

Kray, oblast, city, rayon, and rural Soviets ensure observance of the Universal Military Service Obligation Law by all officials and citizens, as well as by enterprises, establishments and organizations, assist in the induction of citizens into active military service and in organizing and conducting basic military training.

Local Soviets and their executive committees are obligated to display concern for the families of persons inducted into active military service and to take measures to ensure strict observance of laws pertaining to privileges and benefits to which they are entitled, and to monitor observance of laws pertaining to privileges and advantages to which citizens discharged into the reserves are entitled.

Soviets direct civil defense in their area. Executive committees exercise general supervision over preparing the civilian population, enterprises, organizations, establishments, educational institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhozes for protection against mass destruction weapons. The chairman of the Soviet executive committee serves as civil defense chief of the corresponding jurisdiction. Civil defense headquarters and services are

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established in each rayon (city): communications, medical, firefighting, police, etc. In addition to these, livestock and crop protection services are established in rural rayons.

Local Soviets also perform services in the area of military-patriotic indoctrination of the civilian population, dissemination of revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, develop patronage relations between work forces and military units, and assist in the work of volunteer defense societies.

Administrative officials of enterprises and establishments as well as educational institutions also participate in exercising the function of defense of the socialist homeland. Their authorities consist in organization and supervision of civilian defense, establishment of patronage relations with military units, and conduct of military-patriotic indoctrination.

Judicial agencies guard socialist rule of law -- the USSR Supreme Court, the supreme courts of the union and autonomous republics, kray and oblast, city and rayon people's courts, military tribunals in the Armed Forces, and prosecutor agencies -- the Prosecutor General of the USSR, prosecutors of the union and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, cities and rayons, and military judge advocates. Their activities are aimed at combatting attempts to harm the nation's defense and security, as well as combatting crimes and other law violations which can do detriment to national defense. They protect the fighting efficiency of the Armed Forces and take measures to prevent law violations and to eliminate their causes.

The Prosecutor General of the USSR and the military judge advocates subordinate to him exercise supervision to ensure correct and uniform application of laws in the Armed Forces. They guard the rights and legitimate interests of military personnel and their families, civilian workers and employees, as well as military units, establishments, educational institutions and enterprises. In all its activities the judge advocate's office promotes strengthening of socialist rule of law in the USSR Armed Forces and indoctrination of military personnel in a spirit of precise and unswerving observance of the Constitution, Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and orders by superiors.

Military tribunals perform their activities in the area of national defense by examining criminal cases pertaining to all crimes committed by military personnel, military construction personnel, as well as persons with a military service obligation during training activities, all crimes committed by officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel of state security agencies, as well as cases of espionage. They also conduct considerable indoctrinational work among military personnel. Military judge advocate's offices and military tribunals perform their tasks in close coordination with the military command, political agencies, the army and navy community.

Thus it becomes obvious in light of the above that daily implementation of the provisions of the new USSR Constitution as well as all Soviet laws pertaining to organization of national defense is of primary significance for securing defense of the socialist homeland.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Brezhnev, L. I. "Velikiy Oktyabr' i progress chelovechestva" [The Great October Revolution and Progress by Mankind], page 9.
2. See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], page 166.
3. See *ibid.*, pp 180-181, 183, 189-190.
4. *Ibid.*, page 189.
5. *KOMMUNIST*, No 3, 1977, page 18.
6. Lenin, V. I. "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 36, page 342.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol 40, page 98.
8. "60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [60th Anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, 1978, page 33.
9. During the Great Patriotic War the functions of highest political, economic and military leadership were concentrated in a special body possessing total government authority -- the State Defense Committee.
10. See articles 121-123 of the USSR Constitution.
11. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol 37, page 253.
12. Ratified by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 23 August 1960.
13. Ratified by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 30 July 1975.
14. Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 30 July 1975.
15. Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 5 August 1960.

CONCLUSION

The Message of Greeting from the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers to the men of the valiant Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy states: "The essence of our military policy is all for effective defense and nothing beyond that. The Soviet Union has never armed for the sake of armament, never has been and never will be an instigator of an arms race. Everything which the Soviet people are doing in the military area is being done in order to protect themselves and their socialist friends against attack, to prevent aggression. And today we have reason to be proud of what we have achieved in this respect.

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"The Soviet Armed Forces together with the allied armies are reliably guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the other peoples of the socialist community."*

This general line of our military policy is formally reflected in the USSR Constitution, both in the chapter "Defense of the Socialist Homeland" and in other articles of the Fundamental Law pertaining to activities of the Soviet state in the military area and in the area of foreign policy. The Soviet people are a convinced and consistent opponent of war. This is why the Constitution, fully in conformity with Leninist teaching on defense of the Socialist homeland and Communist Party military policy, formally states as law the humane and most just goals of establishment and consolidation of the USSR Armed Forces and establishment of a universal military service obligation. These goals are the following: protection of socialist achievements, the peaceful productive labor of the Soviet people, our country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

These provisions of the Constitution clearly lead to the conclusion that the cutting edge of defense efforts by the Soviet state is directed entirely toward the exterior -- against the intrigues of forces of reaction and aggression, against their insane, inhumane attempts to force on the world a devastating war. The dialectics are such that the Soviet people, building communism, should also think about their own security and should ensure an adequate defensive strength for their country, sufficient to bring any aggressor to reason.

Hence the fundamental provision stated in the Constitution that defense of the socialist homeland is one of the most important functions of the state, since without ensuring its firm security and defense capability, it is impossible successfully to carry out all its other functions -- economic, organizational, cultural-indoctrinational, protection of socialist property, etc, and it is impossible to carry out a vast program of improving the living standards of the people and securing comprehensive prosperity of the individual in a developed socialist society.

The USSR Constitution proceeds from the point that maintaining an adequate level of national defense is the business of the nation as a whole. It requires efforts on the part of all agencies of the Soviet state, from the highest level to local agencies, from ministries to enterprises, establishments and organizations, and is secured by all their diversified activities.

Proceeding from the national-importance character of the matter of defense of the socialist homeland, the Constitution proclaims that the state ensures the nation's security and defense capability and provides the USSR Armed Forces with everything they need. The obligations of government agencies, public organizations, officials and citizens pertaining to ensuring national security and strengthening the nation's defense capability are defined by the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

* "60 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," page 9.

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The Constitution also clearly and consistently embodies formally the Leninist idea of the popular character of defense of the homeland. The Fundamental Law proclaims that defense of the socialist homeland is the business of the entire people. This means that each and every Soviet citizen, wherever he may work or study, bears certain constitutional obligations to defend his country. All Soviet citizens should guard the interests of the Soviet state and promote strengthening of its might and prestige, not forgetting for a single moment that defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of each and every one of us.

Service in the Armed Forces and exemplary performance of military duties is the most vigorous form of participation by Soviet citizens in defense of the socialist homeland. It is for good reason that the USSR Constitution specifies it as one of our honorable obligations.

Fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy have always enjoyed exceptional affection and respect on the part of the Soviet people, and the military profession has always been viewed as one of the most prestigious. The USSR Constitution, assigning a worthy place to tasks of defense of socialist achievements, stating the noble and highly-humane mission of the Armed Forces, inspires all Soviet citizens to selfless military labor for the good of the homeland, to serious, thorough, and conscientious military training. Herein lies the enormous indoctrinational significance of the provisions of the Constitution on defense of the homeland.

Throughout their entire 60-year history, the Soviet Armed Forces have never been utilized for aggressive purposes. They have fought exclusively against those who threatened the freedom and independence of our homeland.

At the same time, in just the 30 years since World War II the United States has utilized its armed forces or has threatened to employ them a total of 215 times, and in 33 instances the United States has been on the verge of employing nuclear weapons. The aggressive and most powerful NATO imperialist military bloc represents a serious threat to peace.

Under these conditions constant combat readiness on the part of the Soviet Armed Forces to crush an aggressor is a realistic material factor capable of sobering the "hawks" of war and dispelling all illusions that they can commit aggression with impunity. Herein lies the historic mission of our Armed Forces -- to serve as a bulwark of peace and international security. Herein lies their sacred duty to the Soviet people, formally stated in the USSR Constitution.

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