

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070032-8

25 JULY 1979

(FOUO 11/79)

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1 OF 1

JPRS L/8587

25 July 1979

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 11/79)

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USSR REPORT  
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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL

U.S. Foreign Policy Reliance on Nonmilitary Pressure (G.A. Trofimenko; VOPROSY ISTORII, May 79).....	1
Formation of Anti-Imperialist Front Examined (Jano Berecz; ZA YEVROPU MIRA I PROGRESSA, 1977).....	25
Gromyko Foreword to New Edition on USSR Foreign Policy (VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA, 1978).....	45

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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RELIANCE ON NONMILITARY PRESSURE

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 5, May 79 pp 59-77

[Article by G. A. Trofimenko, chief, Foreign Policy Department, Institute of the United States of America and Canada, professor in USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy: "Means and Methods of U.S. Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Nations implement their foreign policy with the aid of a certain aggregate of means and instruments of influencing the international situation and other nations which are in a direct or indirect interrelationship with them (through third countries and international organizations). The principal means of implementing the foreign policy goals traditionally employed by a bourgeois state are coercion (punishment) and recompense (reward, support) -- the "whip and honey cake" or, as the Americans say, "the carrot and stick." In other words we are speaking on the one hand of means of exerting pressure by force in the world arena and, on the other hand, means of gaining the favor of another nation by satisfying to a certain degree the interests of the latter. Operating by methods of pressure and conciliation in their various combinations, a given bourgeois nation seeks to achieve an international situation which is most favorable for itself. Of course the capability to influence the world situation depends to a substantial degree on the military-economic and demographic potentials of a given nation, the disposition of class forces, political and moral authority, the purposefulness and consistency of its foreign policy.

Means of foreign-policy influence can be grouped into the following types: military, carried out by means of direct utilization of armed forces; economic; political, which is expressed in a country accepting various foreign-policy pledges, in concluding alliances, in actions through international organizations, overt and covert influences on political parties and other mass organizations of another country, etc; political-psychological, which specifies employment of a broad aggregate of means, from foreign-policy propaganda and other forms of ideological influence (including religious) to the threat of force; physical nonmilitary action (not involving utilization of armed forces (such as: one country cutting off a river which subsequently crosses the territory of another country and constitutes a vital source of fresh water to the latter (recently there has been frequent

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mention of possibilities of controlling climate and weather for hostile purposes -- so-called geophysical warfare<sup>1</sup>); cultural, expressed in influence of the way of life of one country on others (it consists of a great many different components both of a material and psychological character and requires decades or even longer periods of time). All the above-mentioned types of influence can be utilized not only for compulsion (as methods of exerting pressure by force) but also for stimulation (as a means of gaining the favor of another nation or rewarding a favorable policy).<sup>2</sup> For example, the armed forces of one country can be utilized both against another country and to support that country. The same thing can be said as regards the majority of other types of influence. Also conceivable is a situation where deliberate encouragement by one country of certain foreign-policy steps by another pursues not so much the goal of consolidating its position as the Machiavellian purpose of involving the latter country in what is essentially an adverse situation, which promises a political gain to the country which encourages such behavior. In addition, foreign-policy strategy also specifies a situation where encouraging influence is exerted for the purpose of deception: not in order actually to push another country toward the supposedly encouraged type of action but rather to turn it away from such action, increasing the degree of its doubts about this excessive (deliberately displayed) interest on the part of the encouraging country precisely in a given course of action by the encouraged country, etc.<sup>3</sup> Of course the above typology of kinds of foreign-policy influence is to a certain degree of an arbitrary nature, for as a rule none of them is implemented in pure form. This is connected in large measure with the peculiarities of the foreign-policy process, when a given external political influence may, for example, initially occur only in the form of psychological threat, and subsequently is expressed in material action. In addition, as U.S. writers emphasize, "at the motivation level political and economic factors are frequently so closely interwoven that they cannot be separated from one another," since politicians frequently "have more than one set of reasons for their actions and see the internal relations between different categories, which often prove to be separated with a scholarly analysis."<sup>4</sup>

In addition, an influence proper, which may be formally assigned to a given type specified above, usually exerts a multiaspect influence on the country against which it is directed. For example, a sharp escalation of the arms race by one side which is in a confrontation relationship with another at first exerts only a psychological influence on the adversary, since there is nothing but an increased threat in such an action as stepping up military preparations. Subsequently the other party, however, beginning to respond to an apparent (or even imagined) threat, makes a number of military-technical decisions which directly influence the state of its economy, its political relations with the adversary, the attitudes of the public, etc. Such a policy in turn ricochets back, and a complex foreign-political "action-reaction" node is formed, which proves to be especially complex when not two but many nations are involved in the actions and reactions to them. In other words, the energy of a foreign-policy action of one kind can, just as physical energy, transition to a second and third type: purely psychological action can be transformed in the final analysis into economic and political action, and vice versa.

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There exist specific means (instruments) for exercise of each of the above-named types of influence. For example, export of capital, government foreign loans and credit, foreign trade (including various customs duty and other restrictions and encouragements), embargo, various types of economic, scientific-technical and management assistance, participation in international technical systems or programs, allowance or prohibition of foreign vessels in coastal zones, etc, can be utilized to implement economic influence. Frequently one and the same means can be utilized to exert different types of influence. For example, military forces are employed directly for combat operations, but also to exert psychological pressure on another country; various covert operations mounted in other countries pursue the objective of exerting direct political influence, and can at the same time aim at creating economic chaos, create a climate of nerves, etc.

In addition to means, there exist the channels through which a means is transmitted: communication between statesmen, political leaders, journalists, tourists, public statements made through the mass information media, demonstrative displays (for example, concentration of troops along the border of another country), direct employment of armed forces, etc. To a substantial degree unification and "crossing" of types of influence and instruments of influence in the process of external political interaction takes place due to the specific features of the channels through which it takes place.

Diplomacy is the principal channel.<sup>5</sup> Diplomacy is defined on the one hand as the channel of communications proper, that is, a network of establishments specially organized for establishment of political contact between countries, and on the other hand -- the process of implementation of external political influence through the activities of these establishments and their representatives, utilizing for implementation of a nation's foreign policy the broadest group of possible types and concrete instruments of influence.

Contacts between nations in our time, however, are not limited to diplomatic channels alone. Governments have the direct possibility of communicating with each other and the peoples of other countries with the aid of a system of communications which is becoming increasingly diversified and elaborate.<sup>6</sup> A country has a right to undertake demonstrative actions of the nature of "signals," and it can be assured that they will definitely reach the opposite party (parties) not through diplomatic channels (if the latter are deliberately ignored) but through the mass media.

The United States from the moment of its birth utilized the entire aggregate of types and means of external political influence, although naturally during the first decades of existence of the American state, when its economic and military potential was small, in its foreign relations it counted primarily on political and political-psychological means of influence. Upon entering the stage of imperialism at the beginning of the 20th century, the United States began more increasingly vigorously resorting to military-force modes of action in the world arena, which are traditional for imperialism.

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At the end of World War II the United States, which did not directly suffer in the course of military operations, found itself in a uniquely favorable condition in comparison with all the other powers. The United States came out of the war with increased economic might. At the same time it acquired for a certain period of time a monopoly over a totally new kind of mass destruction weapon -- the atomic bomb, a qualitatively new instrument of military force, which presented the opportunity directly to accomplish strategic missions. The new "self-sufficiency of force" of U.S. imperialism also impelled the United States to embark upon a "cold war," which was a U.S. attempt to resolve questions connected with the historical rivalry between the two systems -- capitalism and socialism -- "from a position of strength." The United States essentially set as its goal not simply to adapt to the new postwar international situation, at the same time influencing it in its own interests to the greatest possible degree, but to shape the entire international political environment in light of its stated hegemonistic goals. This was a maximal task, which also demanded maximal utilization of all instruments of foreign policy, particularly openly force types of influence. Under these conditions the traditional art of diplomacy proved to be devaluated for a certain period of time, brought down to the level of a third-degree channel for transmission of so to speak technical, little-important external political information. The main problems -- in the haughty opinion of the U.S. leaders -- were to be resolved by means of unambiguous, brazen demonstrations of U.S. strength.

A second characteristic feature of U.S. postwar foreign-policy practices was the joining of economic pressure (on all countries) with a threat of military force against the socialist nations. What was being threatened was the employment of nuclear weapons. Both during the brief period of nuclear arms monopoly and after loss of this monopoly position in 1949 (when the United States viewed itself as possessing a substantial superiority in nuclear weapons arsenal, and in particular strategic means of delivery), Washington politicians believed that the mere threat of employment of this "absolute weapon" would be sufficient to ensure resolving any world problem on totally U.S. terms.

One more feature of U.S. foreign policy practices is replacement of traditional diplomatic talks and dealings with the "potential adversary" with the language of signals, which did not require direct diplomatic contacts between the two parties. These signals were expressed in shows of military force and other actions which, it was assumed, should be comprehended by the other party without any additional explanations given through diplomatic channels. Construction of a new military base in a given country, redeployment of U.S. troops stationed abroad, refusal to permit a given trade deal between a Western firm and Soviet organizations -- all this was a unique language of power gestures which were supposed to replace the traditional methods of communicating one's intentions or concerns to the other party via diplomatic channels. But U.S. leaders attached particular importance to so-called political utilization of military forces. According to people at the Brookings Institute in Washington, who



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made an extensive study of this subject, "political utilization of armed forces takes place when one or several components of regular armed forces undertake physical action as a deliberate attempt by a government to exert influence or to prepare to exert influence on the specific behavior of individuals in another country without drawing these forces into a protracted conflict."<sup>7</sup> J. F. Dulles characterized precisely this kind of utilization of armed forces as "balancing on the brink of war," emphasizing frequent U.S. utilization of pressure of this kind.<sup>8</sup> Within the framework of this approach (which does not consider employment of armed forces for purely military purposes) the authors of the above-mentioned study listed 215 unambiguous cases of political utilization by the United States of its armed forces during the period from 1 January 1946 through 31 October 1975.<sup>9</sup> Thus the frequency of "political utilization" by the United States of its armed forces (according to patently understated figures)<sup>10</sup> comprised during this period more than one incident every two months. The "peaks" in show of force utilization of armed forces occurred, according to the calculations of these same authors, in 1946-1948 and 1958-1964.

Finally, one additional feature of U.S. foreign policy of the "cold war" period was the exceptionally high degree of ideologization of this policy. Unquestionably an ideological component is always present in the foreign policy of any nation, a component linked with the class character of the state. Precisely the intentions of the ruling class (classes) find primary expression in the principal goals and interests pursued by a given nation in the world arena. However, in the "cold war" initiated by U.S. imperialism, it was a question not simply of national policy in a class hue but rather the fact that foreign policy proper in all its manifestations was the handmaiden of anticommunist ideology. But the fact that the U.S. national interest does not always coincide with the ideology of anticommunism was graphically demonstrated by joint U.S. and Soviet participation in the antifascist coalition. In the 1950's and 1960's U.S. policy vis-a-vis the USSR was determined not by the traditional American doctrine of "enlightened selfishness," which presupposes scrupulous analysis and consideration of the long-term consequences of undertaken actions but by petty considerations to the effect that everything which is to the detriment of the enemy will automatically be to the benefit of the United States. Guided by this principle, U.S. diplomacy in the 1950's and 1960's committed so many errors and made so many miscalculations (from the viewpoint of a retrospective evaluation of U.S. conduct by the U.S. ruling class) that beginning in the mid-1970's some U.S. theorists went to the other extreme, proceeding to claim that relations with the Soviet Union allegedly are unrelated to the majority of problems facing the United States.

The policy of military-force pressure carried out by the United States in the world arena during the course of a quarter of a century following World War II as the principal means of influencing other "centers of power" went through a number of stages. Any general synthesis or "cataloguing" of these stages is difficult, since U.S. power policy contained specific peculiarities in each region, and the dynamics of its changes from region to region and in respect to individual countries cannot be reduced to some general typology or

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chronology. If we consider trend, however, as was stated above, at the first stage following World War II means of military-power pressure were for those "decision-making" American officials the principal and most effective means. Considerable hopes thereby were placed on the nuclear arms threat in the confrontation with the "principal adversary" -- the Soviet Union.

In a study<sup>11</sup> based on valuable and until quite recently classified official sources, M. Sherry, professor of history at Northwestern University, demonstrated that as early as 1943 the leaders of the U.S. military complex began to place special emphasis in the plans they were elaborating for postwar armed forces organizational development on development of the Air Force, and particularly long-range bombers, as the principal means of "detering potential adversaries," the USSR in particular. Later, at the end of 1945, after the United States had already dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities and was intending to utilize this fact to "deter" the USSR, the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee designated 20 specific Soviet cities as targets "suitable for atomic bombing."<sup>12</sup> "The committee," writes Sherry, "recommended that an atomic attack be undertaken not only in the case of an imminent Soviet attack (on the United States -- G. T.) but also if the adversary's success in the area of industrial development or science gave reason to assume acquisition of the capability "ultimately to attack the United States or to defend against a U.S. attack."<sup>13</sup> It follows from these same classified materials presented by Sherry that the threat of a nuclear attack on the USSR was to serve as the principal instrument of U.S. "diplomacy." As the author notes, "cold war" psychology developed in the United States even prior to initiation of the cold war, and essentially this psychology of "maximum military preparedness" served in large measure as generator of that policy of hostility toward the USSR which engendered the "cold war."<sup>14</sup>

Incidentally, the psychology of "maximum military preparedness" was not shared by a number of prominent U.S. political leaders, including President F. D. Roosevelt, as has now been shown in many studies by U.S. authors.<sup>15</sup> But unfortunately those leaders who held the opinion that it was necessary to continue in the postwar period a policy of cooperation with the USSR were becoming increasingly isolated. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 led to a regrouping in the U.S. political leadership whereby persons blinded by the illusion of U.S. omnipotence and possessed by the idea of a global messianic mission assumed the reins of power. During H. Truman's first term in office (1945-1948), the task of maximum utilization of the nuclear monopoly for the purpose of establishing a "world order" unilaterally favoring the United States was discussed in detail in a number of government documents. They strongly stressed the necessity of establishing and maintaining a "position of strength" which would enable the United States to settle world problems unilaterally.<sup>16</sup> In addition, as it is now becoming clear, during this period various U.S. Government agencies drew up at least a dozen plans for military attack on the USSR with employment of nuclear weapons. One of them, code-named "Dropshot," prepared by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949, was recently made public in the United States.<sup>17</sup> The date 1 January 1957 was adopted as the approximate date of initiation of war against the Soviet Union. The plan called for mounting massed nuclear strikes on population and industrial centers of the USSR. The air attack was to be backed up by operations mounted by ground and naval forces of the United States and its allies.

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Elimination by the Soviet Union of the U.S. atomic monopoly in 1949 by developing Soviet nuclear weapons forced the United States to revise its views on nuclear weapons as a probable instrument of practical politics. The task of sharply increasing the U.S. nuclear arsenal was stated, in order to consolidate and strengthen the "position of strength" and to dictate to the adversary the desired conditions of a "world order." This task was clearly expressed in a top-secret study conducted by U.S. leaders at the end of 1949 and beginning of 1950 and formally worked up as a National Security Council document. The contents of this document (NSC 68) were declassified on 27 February 1975 by U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger.<sup>18</sup> The document proceeded from the position that U.S. objectives in the world arena and even the means of attaining them remained unchanged: "Dedication to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we endeavor to achieve them by means of a 'cold war' strategy."<sup>19</sup> It was emphasized thereby that "we cannot expect any lessening of the crisis if changes in the nature of the Soviet system do not occur and until such changes occur."<sup>20</sup>

Document NSC 68 noted that U.S. capabilities in the area of political and psychological influence are only "potential." Instruments of economic and military force are more realistic and more usable. "One of the most important ingredients of power," the document stated, "is military strength.... Without superior aggregate military strength in a state of combat readiness and rapidly mobilizable, a policy of 'containment,' which in fact is a policy of deliberate and gradual compulsion, is not more than a policy of bluff."<sup>21</sup> It further emphasized: "If the United States builds thermonuclear weapons faster than the Soviet Union, during the course of a corresponding period the United States will be able to step up pressure on the USSR."<sup>22</sup> Specified thereby is first-strike use of nuclear weapons by the United States under conditions where "there is no alternate method with which we can achieve our objectives."<sup>23</sup> However, being not fully confident that even U.S. preemptive employment of its entire nuclear arsenal would lead to defeat of the USSR,<sup>24</sup> the authors of NSC 68 placed their principal cards on a strategy of pressure on the Soviet Union and the negotiating table from a position of "new U.S. strength," in order not only to force the USSR to accept imposed terms of an international order but also to achieve change in the internal order in the USSR. "The objectives of the United States and other countries in talks with the USSR," the document noted, "should be formal terms which would promote consolidation and further strengthening of our position, and Soviet adaptation to the new political, psychological and economic conditions in the world.... In short, our objective should be to secure... a gradual retreat by the Soviet Union and to accelerate this process, making (for the Soviet Union) negotiation a more advantageous alternative than the resort to force."<sup>25</sup> In other words NSC 68 proposed a course of action whereby the "potential enemy" would agree to capitulate without war, under the pressure of a "position of strength"!

Until such a time as the United States would make an appropriate advance in building up its armed forces (practical implementation of the recommendations of NSC 68), that is, approximately to the mid-1950's, talks and diplomatic contacts with the USSR were to be "merely a tactic" (and this was

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stated quite frankly), aimed at calming public opinion in the Western nations (aroused by U.S. and NATO military preparations) and at dragging things out until that moment when the United States would be able to dictate its own terms to the USSR from a position of incontestable superiority. The D. Eisenhower Administration, when the President traveled to Geneva in 1955 to a conference of heads of government of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, and France, in fact attempted to implement all those same recommendations of NSC 68, as the United States was hoping, with the help of its Western allies, psychologically to exert pressure on the Soviet Union from a position of "peak of power," that is, until such time as the balance of power between the United States and the USSR became less favorable to the United States. Since nothing came of this strategy -- the United States failed to obtain any unilateral concessions from the USSR -- the U.S. leaders decided to re-examine the arsenal of U.S. instruments to exert influence in the world arena. The result was publication of the so-called "Gaither Report," which was prepared for the U.S. Government by a highly prestigious commission of prominent representatives of business, political circles and the scientific community, under the chairmanship of R. Gaither, then president of the Ford Foundation. This report, which exerted considerable influence on the strategy of the U.S. leadership in the 1960's, remained highly classified up to January 1973, when it was finally declassified (with one deletion).<sup>26</sup>

This report was sent to President Eisenhower several weeks after the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial satellite in October 1957, an event which could not help but point up the recommendations contained in the report. The report dealt primarily with the problem of antimissile defense of the United States under conditions where U.S. ruling circles recognized the fact that U.S. territory was vulnerable to a response nuclear missile strike in case of initiation of aggression against the USSR. Implementation of the report recommendations (after the change of administration in the United States when J. Kennedy became president) led, as we know, to a mass psychosis whipped up by official propaganda and expressed in feverish construction of backyard fallout shelters by private citizens. As regards instruments of U.S. influence in the world arena, the report in fact recommended as a means of strengthening the U.S. "power position" in the struggle against world socialism the spread of nuclear weapons by giving them to U.S. NATO allies (although legally remaining "under U.S. safeguarding"). The authors of the report, continuing the line pursued in NSC 68, were of the opinion that the next advance in the area of increasing the invulnerability of U.S. nuclear systems (in particular, placement of a substantial portion of total strategic bombers on advanced-stage combat alert) would give the United States concrete military, political and psychological advantages prior to the time Soviet deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles would nullify these advantages. This period (the authors of the report specified it as 1959 and the beginning of 1960) was to constitute "the best time to negotiate from a position of strength, since the military status of the United States in respect to Russia may never again be as strong."<sup>27</sup>

As we know, it was precisely in this period that there occurred a number of U.S. displays of military force, beginning with the landing of U.S. Marines

8

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in Lebanon in July 1958 and ending with the flight of the U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory in May 1960. During that same period the Eisenhower Administration also began planning intervention against Cuba, a plan which was actually implemented by the following, Kennedy Administration in April 1961. Attempts to utilize the alleged "position of strength" to apply pressure on the USSR in talks which were held in 1958-1961 failed to produce the desired result, which in the final analysis forced the Kennedy Administration to conduct a thorough review of instruments of external political influence and to establish a new hierarchy of such instruments. The U.S. strategic nuclear missile system continued to play the role of central force background for vigorous action. However, under conditions of an altered balance of power, a direct ("central") clash with the USSR began to be considered undesirable in view of its potentially suicidal consequences for the United States.

The developing countries, which were emerging from the control of the old colonial powers, were becoming the field of struggle for consolidation of the position of U.S. imperialism, while economic and political-psychological devices were becoming the principal implements of action. Kennedy's principal innovation was a strengthening of the role of such methods of exerting influence on developing countries as covert operations and cultural influence. From 1961 through 1976 the United States carried out approximately 900 large-scale covert operations,<sup>28</sup> such as that which ended in defeat of an invasion force of armed Cuban emigrés in Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the struggle against the partisan movement in a number of Latin American countries, the murder of the head of the Saigon regime Ngo Dinh Diem, involvement in the overthrow of the presidents of several Latin American republics, the secret war by CIA mercenaries in Laos, CIA operations to bolster opposition to the S. Allende Government in Chile, operation "Phoenix," aimed at killing the leaders of the South Vietnamese resistance movement, etc. In addition, several thousand small operations were mounted. All these subversive and political-psychological operations were not simply improvisations by intelligence or the military, but were grounded on a solid "theoretical foundation." As early as 1965 information appeared in the Chilean press, and subsequently in U.S. newspapers, on a research project financed by the U.S. Army. This project, code-named "Camelot," aimed at "study and prediction" of revolutions in developing countries and "finding ways" to combat revolutions and insurgencies. Although following these scandalous revelations the U.S. secretary of Defense was forced publicly to declare that this project was being scrapped, it was subsequently continued under other names.<sup>29</sup>

The main emphasis in the area of political-military operations during the Kennedy Administration was placed on so-called counterinsurgency operations.<sup>30</sup> Direct U.S. intervention in Vietnam began in 1961 with utilization of special U.S. counterinsurgency units -- "Green Berets." Another Kennedy innovation was the dispatching of young Americans to developing countries for the purpose of strengthening U.S. cultural-psychological influence on the peoples of these countries. Kennedy skillfully utilized the idealism and enthusiasm of that segment of American youth who were disenchanted by the eternal chase after material prosperity and who sought to devote their energies to some noble cause, such as assistance to the poor in America. On 22 September 1961

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the President signed into law a bill establishing a special "Peace Corps" (which subsequently became a component of a broader organization -- "Action"), which recruited volunteers to travel to the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America for a specified period of time to serve as doctors, nurses, agronomists, teachers, etc. The principal task assigned these volunteers, however, did not involve their professional activities but was determined by the very fact of their presence in the remote areas of various distant countries and the formation there of a certain positive image of the American.

The strength of this program lay in the fact that such an image was created not artificially but spontaneously, since during the first years of its existence it was primarily genuine enthusiasts who went to work in the Peace Corps, persons desirous of doing "good deeds." This was unique missionary activity, but in a social rather than religious variant. At the height of the Peace Corps operations, in 1967, approximately 15,000 Peace Corps volunteers (approximately 90% of them 30 years of age and younger) were serving in 70 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>31</sup> In spite of the high cost of this program (15,000 dollars per volunteer per year), the U.S. Government vigorously promoted it, believing that these expenditures would be repaid many times over by creation of centers of American cultural-psychological influence in those parts of the world which are reached by practically no U.S. propaganda in its standard forms. More than 100,000 persons went through the Peace Corps in 16 years, persons who as a rule left behind a positive impression of the United States. There is much information indicating that in a number of countries the CIA attempted to use the Peace Corps for its own purposes. However, such utilization of the Corps merely discredited it and in principle led to undermining the very idea of such an undertaking -- cultural-educational influence in the interests of improving the U.S. "image" in the developing countries.

A certain new accent was also acquired during this period by such a traditional instrument of U.S. foreign policy as the economic lever. The U.S. Government, frightened by the scope and depth of transformations in the developing countries, began more and more vigorously linking economic aid to their governments with pledges by the latter to institute reforms directed toward strengthening the private sector and development along precisely the capitalist road. A typical example of this policy was the "Alliance for Progress" program for Latin America, announced by Kennedy in the spring of 1961. This program was elaborated by Washington in large measure under the influence of fear that the victory of the revolution in Cuba in January 1959 would cause a "chain reaction" in Latin America -- withdrawal of more and more countries from the system of U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere.<sup>32</sup>

The change of administration at the end of the 1960's and the coming to power of the Republican Party led to further strengthening of Washington's utilization of foreign policy implements. This was connected with a number of circumstances. As early as 1969, on the eve of his assumption of the post of foreign affairs advisor to President R. Nixon, Kissinger formulated the

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thesis that in the nuclear missile age military might is not translated automatically into political influence. "This does not signify," he added, "that impotence increases influence, but merely signifies that strength does not automatically guarantee influence."<sup>33</sup> Summarizing the lessons of the end of the 1960's for U.S. foreign policy, Kissinger wrote: "Our external political difficulties are frequently described as a legacy of Vietnam. But that most difficult ordeal of Vietnam was not the cause but merely a symptom. The end of the 1960's, which coincided with the Vietnam epic, signified an end to that period when America was incomparably more powerful than any other country, when we could settle problems unilaterally. The end of the 1960's marked first and foremost the end of an era when we could imagine that any problem can be solved once and for all and that the solutions, once reached, would enable us to cease our efforts in the arena of international politics."<sup>34</sup> Clearly indicated in this statement is acknowledgement that today the United States, in connection with changes in the world arena, must play a more modest role in the world community of nations.

Devaluation of military strength as a means of achieving U.S. foreign policy aims did not occur spontaneously or due to any subjective elements (for example, the coming to power in the United States of less aggressive leaders), but rather under the influence of the objective process of change in the balance of power between capitalism and socialism, the United States and the USSR. This process, in the quarter of a century since World War II, has led to a situation where it is now undesirable for U.S. imperialism (on the basis of purely selfish considerations of self-preservation) to initiate a conflict in which it cannot be assured in advance of victory. It is impossible to initiate a "test" of military forces in conformity with the classic Napoleonic principle ("first engage in a major battle, and then it will become evident") in the nuclear missile age due to the exceptional destructiveness of strategic weapons systems. Such a "test" (in the past threatening only the loss of a small part of the civilian population and a portion of territory for the losing side) can today, as U.S. Government leaders acknowledge, end catastrophically. Precisely for this reason Kissinger's formula that force cannot be converted into political influence should be viewed as a self-synthesis of the experience of U.S. imperialism under concrete historical conditions. Failure of the policy "from a position of strength," implemented by the United States during the "cold war" years led them to the acknowledgement, using Kissinger's own terms, of the "imperative of peaceful coexistence" of the two systems and the signing of Soviet-American documents formalizing and concretizing the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Under conditions where U.S. capability to employ military force in the world arena is fettered by the might of the Soviet Union, U.S. theorists seek to elaborate ways and methods of more active utilization of "nonmilitary factors of strength," for improving or at least maintaining the global position of U.S. imperialism. In principle the so-called strategy of interdependence, about which these theorists have recently written so much and which government leaders have been discussing, if it is reduced to the "bare essence" of the interests of Washington, is an intensified search for instruments of economic

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and other nonmilitary influence on the surrounding world (particularly on the developing countries) and maximalization of these instruments of influence, with a simultaneous endeavor to reduce to a minimum U.S. dependence on other countries or alliances operating in the world arena, at least to a degree where by foreign nations or blocs of countries cannot utilize it to exert "coercive influence" on the United States.<sup>35</sup> U.S. political scientists (and evidently government officials as well) proceed more and more frequently from the theory of "inequality of nations," explained not simply by the nonuniformity of their development but allegedly by internally inherent, organic factors. American theorists attempt to place this concept formally in the contemporary system of international relations, thus automatically placing the United States (and the entire group of developed capitalist countries) in a privileged community, which is "not obliged" to submit to the "tyranny of a new majority" of nations which have only recently actively entered the arena of world politics.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to the traditional economic instruments of influence realized in the form of export of capital,<sup>37</sup> economic "aid" from government to government,<sup>38</sup> etc, such instruments of power as indirect utilization of economic influence on other countries are occupying an increasingly more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy, that is, through international economic and currency-financial institutions which are under U.S. control. The result is the same: strengthening of the U.S. position in the world, whereby the one-sidedly American character of foreign-policy influence with the aid of techniques of this kind is concealed, becoming less apparent. And it is not surprising that under conditions of broad international condemnation in recent years of the racist Smith regime in Rhodesia, the Vorster regime in South Africa, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, etc, the United States has officially curtailed its government subsidies and assistance to these countries, while at the same time broadening aid to them through the International Reconstruction and Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations under its control.<sup>39</sup>

Various public organizations, universities, foundations, sociocultural establishments, etc are also widely employed by the government to implement the goals of U.S. foreign policy. These organizations frequently penetrate areas in which activity by the U.S. Government or foreign-policy edifice is in Washington's view undesirable. The following fact indicates the scope of actions by U.S. nongovernment organizations in implementing U.S. foreign policy: in 1974 just 90 U.S. private and public organizations gave assistance to 133 foreign countries and territories, spending 1 billion dollars on these activities, with two thirds of this amount obtained from private sources.<sup>40</sup>

Another instrument of influence which is being utilized on an increasing scale by the United States in regard to developing countries is the instrument of managerism. The United States is able very effectively to influence the economy and policies of these countries by adoption of American methods and principles of management and extensive participation by U.S. consulting firms in lending organizational-technical assistance to the various countries as well as increasingly more extensive training of native



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personnel (in the United States and locally) in American management techniques. "Achievements in the area of management and organization have essentially become a new instrument of U.S. expansion abroad, economic and political subjugation of other countries."<sup>41</sup>

Substantial opportunities for strengthening U.S. external political influence on many countries (including developed countries) are opening up by involving the latter -- through economic necessity -- in the latest U.S. technical projects, particularly in areas where the United States occupies a dominant position in the capitalist world: in the area of utilization of space hardware, including communications, navigation, locating natural resources,<sup>42</sup> in the area of establishment of an international computer data bank, exploration and mining of seabed resources, etc.

An important instrument of U.S. economic influence is export of products and items which represent the latest advances in the scientific and technological revolution. These goods are classified in the United States as "technologically intensive" items. They include computers, various robot machine tools, civilian airplanes and helicopters as well as spare parts for them, new chemical products and drugs, equipment for nuclear generating plants, scientific instruments, telecommunications equipment, equipment for offshore drilling, plus a number of others. The foreign trade balance in these items is steadily increasing in favor of the United States, in spite of the chronic U.S. trade deficit in recent years. U.S. domination in the "technologically intensive" goods market gives it an important additional instrument of external political influence on its partners, including developed capitalist countries. The same thing is indicated by trade in scientific-technical and management knowledge. In 1960 the favorable U.S. balance in this trade ran 575 million dollars, while in 1974 it reached 3 billion 400 million dollars.<sup>43</sup>

A special instrument of U.S. external political influence is export of arms and military equipment. From the end of World War II to the end of 1978 the United States sold 135 billion dollars worth of arms to 136 countries.<sup>44</sup> More than 1,000 U.S. companies are engaged in the manufacture and sale of weapons, including all the giants of the military-industrial complex. In the chase after profits and influence the latter sometimes even sells other countries new weapons systems which have not yet become operational in the U.S. armed forces.<sup>45</sup> Deliveries to other countries of the newest aircraft, electronic and missile systems lead to a sharp increase in the dependence of the purchaser countries on the United States, for learning to operate, and frequently utilization and servicing of these systems require a continuous mass presence of U.S. technical experts (alongside the fact that delivery of spare parts and special lubricants remains a U.S. monopoly).<sup>46</sup> At the same time, as was indicated by the events in Iran, the policy of imposing large consignments of the latest weapons on other countries can lead to highly unforeseeable results. The Iranian people rose up against the Shah's regime in large measure because at the same time as that regime was spending immense sums on purchase of arms (20 billion dollars in a period of 5 years),<sup>47</sup> the masses were continuing to live in poverty, and all their social needs were being ignored!

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The United States in turn, as a country which intensively consumes energy raw materials, has proven to be, as was graphically demonstrated by the 1973 oil embargo, vulnerable in face of unification of oil exporters and their utilization of deliveries of this raw material to exert pressure for political purposes. The situation involving the oil embargo and the subsequent fourfold rise in oil prices frightened U.S. ruling circles. In connection with this, feverish efforts were undertaken to diminish dependence on foreign sources of energy, particularly oil, efforts which have not yet produced any effective results. In addition, U.S. dependence on import of oil has in recent years not only failed to decrease but has become even greater.<sup>48</sup> As an emergency effort against the occurrence of unforeseen events, efforts are being undertaken to amass oil reserves in salt dome cavities along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico (by 1985 the United States plans to have stored 1 billion barrels of oil, in order to make up from this source if necessary the loss of 50% of oil imports for an entire year).<sup>49</sup>

Recently, under conditions of aggravation of the world food problem, U.S. strategists and politicians have been increasingly more frequently considering the export of food as one of the most important instruments of external political influence. In the summer of 1975 there appeared in the U.S. press a statement from a special CIA study on world food supply (prepared in August 1974) to the effect that "as holder of the bulk of the world's grain export reserves, the United States can once again acquire that primary role in world affairs which it possessed during the period immediately after World War II."<sup>50</sup> Numerous plans have been discussed in the United States on creating a cartel -- a "grain OPEC" -- consisting of the United States and Canada, as the two countries which in recent years have accounted for 90% of world grain exports,<sup>51</sup> in order with the aid of grain to influence more actively the policies of other countries, particularly developing countries.

As experience indicates, however, attempts to "exert pressure with grain" prove for many reasons to be much less successful than the oil embargo. In 1973, for example, the United States decided to organize a "food counter-embargo" against the oil-producing Arab countries undertaken in reprisal for Washington's support of Israel. On special instructions by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, the Congressional Research Service quickly prepared an analysis which indicated that these countries were not sufficiently dependent on the United States so that utilization of this instrument could produce any effective results. As a result of this analysis, it was decided to refrain from employing this instrument of influence on that group of countries.<sup>52</sup> But this does not signify that an instrument of this kind cannot be utilized by the United States in a different situation --- more favorable to that country.

Finally, we must mention in the list of instruments of U.S. economic influence which have recently been more and more vigorously utilized, so-called transnational corporations (TNC), which conduct business operations in many different countries. The annual volume of goods and services produced by TNC reached 500 billion dollars in the mid-1970's, and three fifths of this sum was generated by U.S. TNC,<sup>53</sup> which comprise approximately half of all

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international monopolies. The U.S. Government increasingly resorts to their services for exerting economic and political influence on other countries, utilizing the TNC not only as an instrument of influence but also as a highly effective channel for making its demands known to influential circles in other capitalist and developing countries. In recent years there have been instances where American TNC functioned almost independently as parties to international politics, of course relying thereby on support by the state.<sup>54</sup> The best known instance of this kind is the subversive activity by the U.S. TNC International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) in Chile (carried out in close contact with the CIA), aimed at overthrowing the Allende government.<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, in spite of the strong position occupied by the United States in the capitalist economy, in particular as regards developing countries, here as well the relative strength of the United States has become less than 15-20 years ago. In comparison with the 1950's there has been a sharp decrease in U.S. economic weight in the world capitalist economic system. All this complicates to a certain degree Washington's utilization of economic instruments to achieve "positive" goals, that is, to influence the formation of a new structure of "global interdependence" in such a manner that U.S. interests are taken into consideration to a maximum degree (although these instruments have in recent years been utilized by the United States in a highly intensive manner as an implement in the purely economic struggle in the capitalist world).

All these circumstances are one of the reasons why the administration of J. Carter, who entered office in January 1977, has decided to place special emphasis on instruments of ideological influence. The shift by the United States toward more vigorous utilization of ideological instruments began under Nixon. Appealing "for ideological unity" of the West, Kissinger and other theorists and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy at that time in fact were attempting to play on the sharpened class sensitivity of the ruling elite in the capitalist countries under conditions of strengthening of the position of leftist forces in those countries. Turning to the ruling circles of the Western European countries, U.S. politicians frankly told them: if you continue attacking the United States, in the final analysis the forces of the left will defeat you; let us be united.<sup>56</sup>

At the nongovernment level the idea of "unity of Western civilization" began to be developed by a "tripartite commission" established in 1973 and made up of businessmen, scientists, politicians and civic leaders in the United States, the countries of Western Europe and Japan, financed by Rockefeller funding and functioning as the "brainchild" of Z. Brzezinski. President Carter and at least 19 members of his new administration received their "ideological conditioning" on this commission.

The theorists, however, who were elaborating long-term U.S. strategy, were aiming their sights not only at like-minded persons in the bourgeois countries of Europe and Japan. They proceeded from an analysis of the broad

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social transformations which are taking place in the world, from the situation of détente, and endeavored to fit a new strategy of ideological struggle to the changed situation, first and foremost to the increased weight and significance of the developing countries in the world arena. U.S. strategists were aware thereby that the path of socialist development is attractive to many of these countries, involving extensive nationalization of national resources and centralized economic planning. It was acknowledged in the United States that no exhortations on the part of advocates of "free enterprise" would compel many developing countries to depart from the road of accelerated modernization on the basis of planning and state mobilization of resources. U.S. theorists asserted that therefore the United States should not frontally attack these elements and trends, planned economy, etc, but seek to place in contrast to the ideas of nationalization, centralization, and state planning the psychology of individualism, "freedom of the individual," etc, and from this position to undermine as much as possible the socialist elements in the policies of the developing countries. By stifling collectivism with individualism, manifestations of international solidarity on the part of various countries and movements by extolling the praises of separatism and nationalism, etc, U.S. theorists claimed, "the United States will in the final analysis regain its moral leadership among the nations of the world -- not through the force of its economic might or by force of arms, but by virtue of the merits of its ideological example."<sup>57</sup> This was a new philosophy of ideological struggle, a strategy applied to the situation of international détente, and therefore replacing primitive and negative anticommunist stereotypes with, so to say, "positive" ideals of individualism or, as U.S. theorists put it, "anti-authoritarianism."

The Carter Administration considered all these recommendations by the ideologists of the "tripartite commission" and the Foreign Affairs Council and began vigorously implementing them. In addition the Democratic Party is traditionally distinguished by more vigorous utilization of the ideological component in foreign policy, while a specific feature of the new administration was that its leader entered office on a platform of alluring humanistic declarations, in the spirit of traditional American individualism. This is why the ideological component received, when the Baptist President took up residence in the White House, such an "honored" place in U.S. foreign policy. While under Ford-Kissinger the United States in its foreign-policy propaganda placed principal stress on the "positive" values and individualist ideals of "Western civilization," under Carter-Brzezinski more attention began to be focused on the negative attitudes in socialist countries toward many bourgeois values of this kind. In the opinion of those U.S. strategists who direct the "human rights" campaign, such an ideological offensive should help them overcome the Watergate trauma, drawing attention to "shortcomings" which occur in other countries, and thus not only diverting the attention of the U.S. people away from the flaws of the American system with its bribery, corruption, violence and lack of worker socioeconomic rights, but also to make the masses more aware of the official foreign policy, sowing among the masses illusions of the "influence of the common man" on the shaping of U.S. foreign policy.

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This theoretical position was bolstered by a number of practical actions, such as increasing financing for the subversive Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, in order to expand their facilities,<sup>58</sup> reorganization of the official propaganda edifice, strengthening of support for so-called "dissidents" in socialist countries, etc. At the same time the "human rights" campaign aims at undermining the mass support of Communist and other parties of the left in Western Europe, Japan and other countries belonging to the world system of capitalism.

Paying close attention to "nonmilitary factors of strength," the U.S. Government at the same time is continuing to bring to bear immense efforts in the area of military organizational development, in particular increasing strategic arms. Between 1967 and 1977 the U.S. Defense Department spent 115 billion dollars on new strategic programs, including 81 billion on offensive weapons systems.<sup>59</sup> According to approximate figures, one-fourth of the 750 new military systems in the process of development in the United States are strategic.<sup>60</sup> The approximate end cost of all major weapons systems, military reconnaissance and communications systems presently in production or in the process of development exceeds 300 billion dollars according to our calculations. In the future the U.S. military budget is to grow at a rate of 9% annually.<sup>61</sup> All this attests to the fact that U.S. leaders have by no means relegated the instrument of military force to a back seat.

Initiating a new round of escalation of the arms race, certain U.S. leaders hope to draw the Soviet Union into this escalation and thus to diminish our country's capabilities in the area of implementing a program for boosting the people's living standards. Of course just as in past years, plans by U.S. strategists to weaken the Soviet economy in this fashion will fail, because its planned character ensures much greater freedom to maneuver resources and incomparably greater efficiency in their utilization. In addition, U.S. economic potential is far from limitless. Revival of the concept of "economic exhaustion" of the Soviet Union and attempts to utilize arms escalation in order to exert psychological pressure on the Soviet Union are capable only of undermining the cause of détente, of increasing international tension, of aggravating socioeconomic difficulties in the United States, and thus proving to be "counterproductive" even from the standpoint of the long-range, root interests of the U.S. capitalist society.

At the same time such a policy undermines elements of cooperation (and corresponding instruments) of Soviet-American, and on a broader level -- international relations -- which have become expanded in recent years. And it is precisely broadening and deepening of these aspects of intergovernmental relations -- the path of détente -- which constitutes one of the main hopes of mankind for ensuring peace and security of peoples on a global scale.

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FOOTNOTES

1. An awareness by nations of the genuineness of a danger of this kind led to the signing in 1977 of an international convention banning military or any other hostile utilization of means of influencing the natural environment (for the text of this convention see "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye" [The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament], a collection of documents, Moscow, 1977, pp 64-70.
2. K. Knorr, an American scholar investigating the problem of "the power of nations," specifies two types of influence: "coercive influence" and "noncoercive influence." He defines the latter as the "ability of a society or its members, by means of actions either through the government or through various transnational channels, to exert influence on the behavior of another society without resorting to any hostile utilization of superior force, military or economic" (K. Knorr, "The Power of Nations," New York, 1975, page 311.
3. Such complex types of influence, which take into consideration not only the possible impulsive, natural ("normal") reaction of "players" to various stimuli but also the influence of the latter on the psychological motivation of the opponent (this process can be repeatedly reflected), are now being studied by the science of reflex control of the behavior of conflicting structures, based on general theory of adoption of optimal solutions.
4. "World Politics and International Economics," edited by C. F. Bergsten, L. B. Krause, Washington, 1975, page 5.
5. "Of all the factors which comprise the might of a state, the most important, in spite of its instability, is the quality of diplomacy," notes H. Morgenthau, "patriarch" of American political scientists, in a study which has now become a classic in the West. "All other factors which determine a nation's power are essentially raw material of which the power of a nation is produced. The quality of diplomacy of a given country unites all these diverse factors into a unified whole, gives them direction and weight and awakens their slumbering potential.... Implementation of international relations of a nation by its diplomats constitutes for a nation's strength in peacetime the same as is constituted for a nation's strength military strategy and tactics carried out by its military leaders in time of war. It is the art of utilizing various elements of a nation's strength to exert influence with maximum effect at those points in the international situation which most affect national interests" (H. J. Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace," New York, 1967, page 135).
6. Direct "hot" teletype and telephone communication lines are presently in operation between many countries, which enable the leaders of these nations to communicate with one another immediately in crisis situations. A direct line of communication between the governments of the USSR and the United States was set up in 1963.

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7. B. M. Blechman, and S. S. Kaplan, "The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Washington, 1977, pp 1-4.
8. See LIFE, 16 January 1956.
9. Blechman and Kaplan, op. cit., pp 1-6. U.S. aircraft carriers took part in 50% of all these actions; on the whole naval forces participated in 80% of all instances of this type.
10. As the authors stress, this figure fails to include not only cases of direct military utilization of U.S. armed forces but also their "routine" employment -- permanent stationing at overseas bases, prior-scheduled military maneuvers and visits, and assistance and support by such forces in various non-crisis situations (Ibid., pp 11-7, 8).
11. M. S. Sherry, "Preparing for the Next War. American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945," New Haven and London, 1977.
12. Ibid., page 213.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., pp 235-236.
15. A study by D. Yergin is particularly important in this regard. On the basis of a wealth of documentary material, he argues that F. D. Roosevelt followed the so-called "Yalta axioms," which postulated the possibility of continuing fruitful Soviet-American cooperation after World War II. Roosevelt believed that the genuine U.S. national interest was by no means in conflict with the interests of ensuring the security of the USSR, particularly since the principal efforts of the Soviet state were concentrated on postwar rebuilding of the nation's economy (see D. Yergin, "Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State," Boston, 1977).
16. For more detail on this see G. A. Trofimenko, "SShA: politika, voyna, ideologiya" [USA: Politics, War, Ideology], Moscow, 1976, pp 156-181.
17. "Dropshot. The United States Plan for War With the Soviet Union in 1957," New York, 1978.
18. See "Top Secret. NSC 68. Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950, Vol 1, "National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy," Washington, 1977 (henceforth "FRUS 1950"), pp 234-292. Kissinger evidently had special motives for publicizing document NSC 68, and particularly the complete, uncut text. This move by the then U.S. Secretary of State comprised one of the aspects of his efforts to defend himself against the criticism leveled at him in 1974-1975 in connection with the Watergate scandal. Representatives of the U.S. political elite connected with the

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Democratic Party, as well as various publications accused Kissinger of excessive "improvisations" in the area of foreign policy and of departure from the traditions and principles of a bipartisan foreign policy. By declassifying a fundamental document prepared by the Democratic Party's think tank, Kissinger wanted to show that his foreign policy was not in contradiction to the basic principles pertaining to U.S. objectives in the world arena, including in relation to the USSR, and the instruments of their implementation, which were specified by the Truman Administration as early as 1950.

19. FRUS 1950, page 242.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., page 253.
22. Ibid., page 267. These hopes, however, were not to come to fruition. The USSR beat the United States in development of a thermonuclear weapon.
23. Ibid., page 268. Specially emphasized in connection with this was the undesirability of the United States pledging to refrain from first-strike employment of nuclear weapons.
24. "It is doubtful that such an attack, even if it led to the total destruction of designated targets, would compel the USSR to seek a truce or hinder the Soviet Armed Forces from occupying Western Europe" (Ibid., page 265).
25. Ibid., page 274.
26. "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (the Gaither Report of 1957)." Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Congress of the United States, Washington, 1976 (although the document was declassified in January 1973, we do not know of any earlier publication).
27. Ibid., page 26.
28. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 21 November 1977, page 37. Of course the overwhelming majority of covert operations mounted by the CIA and other U.S. Government agencies since World War II remain classified. An attempt undertaken by 1974 by (R. Grimmet), a member of the Congressional Research Service staff, to compile a catalogue of all CIA covert operations which had become known, both in the United States and abroad, led to determination of only approximately 50 such operations during the entire postwar period (see "The Intelligence Community. History, Organization and Issues. Public Documents Series. Compiled and Edited by T. G. Fain in Collaboration with K. C. Plant and R. Milloy. With an Introduction by Senator Frank Church," New York and London, 1977, pp 695-706).



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29. In particular, at the beginning of the 1970's the American Research Prospects Agency (ARPA) planned a project code-named "Nimble," to study counterinsurgency techniques. This project was one of the new versions of "Camelot" (THE DEFENSE MONITOR, 8 September 1972, page 2).
30. "The irony of the state of affairs in the Western Hemisphere," wrote U.S. scholar I. L. Horowitz, "lies in the fact that the establishment of counterinsurgency units precedes in time the organization of any insurgent unit." In fact, he emphasized, the organization of "counterinsurgency" units, based on U.S. support, comprises an additional factor which causes popular discontent (I. L. Horowitz, "The Ideology of Hemispheric Militarism," "Sociology in Action. Case Studies in Social Problems and Directive Social Change," Homewood, 1966, page 346).
31. "Peace Corps Authorization." Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, May 6, 1977, Washington, 1977, page 18.
32. Presidential aide T. Sorensen wrote about these apprehensions on the part of Kennedy. Kennedy was constantly thinking about a new document which would modernize the "Monroe Doctrine" "as a declaration against further Communist penetration into the (Western) Hemisphere." However, according to Sorensen, the President realized that "the greatest dangers to Latin America... do not involve Cuba." "Illiteracy, poor housing conditions, unequal distribution of wealth, difficulties with the balance of payments, plunging prices on their raw materials, as well as local Communist actions have no relationship to Cuba," stated Kennedy in Miami on 18 November 1963 (Th. Sorensen, "Kennedy," London, 1966, page 592).
33. H. Kissinger, "American Foreign Policy. Three Essays," New York, 1969, page 60.
34. THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 October 1977.
35. "Ideal" relations of "interdependence," in the view of U.S. politicians and businessmen, are U.S.-Canadian economic relations, where the volume of sales of companies in Canada which are not less than 50% American-owned, comprise almost 50% of that country's gross national product, while the share of companies with participation of Canadian capital is barely 0.3% of the U.S. gross national product (figures for 1975) (see T. V. Lavrovskaya, "Integration Processes in North America: General Patterns and Specific Features," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 3, 1978, page 33).
36. See, for example, D. P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," COMMENTARY, March 1975; R. W. Tucker, "The Inequality of Nations," New York, 1977; H. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1977.

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37. From 1946 to 1974 the magnitude of U.S. foreign investment rose from 18.7 billion to 235 billion dollars (SShA: vneshneekonomicheskaya strategiya" [USA: Foreign Economic Strategy], Moscow, 1976, pp 90-91).
38. The total amount of economic assistance given by the United States from 1946 through the 1975 fiscal year to 134 countries and eight territories comprised, according to official figures, 170.3 billion dollars, not including the 161.4 billion dollars spent during this period by the U.S. Department of Defense on military assistance to South Korea, the Saigon regime and other U.S. allies in Southeast Asia and the Far East (Congressional Record, March 23, 1976, page S4088).
39. South Korea, for example, received 1.6 billion dollars in aid in 1976 (credits, guarantees, subsidies, etc) through 12 agencies, primarily international agencies (U.S.-controlled), but only 22% of this amount was subject to debate in Congress; Chile received 357 million dollars (only 21% through Congress); South Africa received 310 million dollars (nothing through Congress) (see INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN (Berkeley), Vol 4, No 4, 28 February 1977, page 3).
40. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976." Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, Washington, 1975, page 14.
41. "SShA: Vneshneekonomicheskaya strategiya," op. cit., page 147. For more detail on this instrument of U.S. influence see ibid., pp 146-159.
42. Fifty countries (as of August 1976) have participated in the U.S. program to study earth resources with the aid of Landsat satellites; 92 countries (among which the United States is dominant) participate in the Intelsat international communication satellite consortium (Worldwide Space Activities. Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Space Science and Application of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Session," September 1977, Washington, pp 92, 95).
43. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, December 1973, December 1975.
44. PRAVDA, 4 October 1978; THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 12 February 1976.
45. For example, in 1977 the United States contracted to sell to Iran seven of the latest and most advanced electronic reconnaissance and fire control aircraft (AWACS) for the sum of 1.2 billion dollars (AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 17 October 1977, page 20).
46. According to U.S. figures, in 1977 there were 30,000 U.S. military and civilian specialists in Iran, and 28,000 in Saudi Arabia (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1977, page 102).

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47. THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 5 January 1979.
48. In 1972 the United States was importing 29% of its oil consumption requirements, and approximately 50% in 1977 ("International Economic Report of the President," February 1974, Washington, page 107; WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 31 October 1977, Vol 13, No 44, page 1662).
49. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 17 May 1977.
50. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 2 June 1975, page 50.
51. Ibid.
52. It was determined that U.S. food exports (including meat and grain) to Arab countries average 1-5% of their total foodstuffs imports, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Algeria, whose imports from the United States comprised 12 and 16% respectively of their total food imports in 1972 ("Data and Analysis Concerning the Possibility of a U.S. Food Embargo as a Response to the Present Arab Oil Boycott." Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 29 November 1973, Washington, 1973, page 6).
53. L. P. Bloomfield. "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence." The Department of State Special Report, July 1975, No 17, pp 5-6; J. Diebold. "Multinational Corporations. Why Be Scared of Them?" FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1973, No 12, page 80.
54. For more detail on this see I. Ivanov, "The Transnational Monopolies -- Threat to Sovereignty," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 1, 1978.
55. For more detail on this see "Vneshnyaya politika stran Latinskoy Ameriki posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Latin American Countries Since World War II], Moscow, 1975, pp 490, 491. According to a statement by Senator F. Church, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during investigation of ITT activities in Chile "it was determined that the tie between ITT and CIA was so close that it was in fact impossible to establish where one began and the other ended" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1973, No 12, page 102; see also I. Grigulevich, "U.S. Imperialism Against the Chilean People," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 11, 1978).
56. Employment of this instrument of influence, alongside realization by the ruling circles that Western Europe (as the energy, monetary-financial and economic crises developed) of their relative economic weakness in comparison with the giant across the sea (in spite of an overall strengthening of the economic position of Western Europe and Japan in respect to the United States), led to intensification of centripetal

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tendencies in the capitalist world in recent years, as is indicated by certain nuances in the Atlantic policy of France, Italy, Spain, and other Western European countries.

57. B. Manning, "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1976, pp 283-284.
58. Each year the U.S. Congress appropriates 60-70 million dollars for the activities of these radio stations (see Congressional Record, 29 March 1976, pp H2465-2470). In 1977 Carter granted a request for a supplemental appropriation of 45 million dollars, "which would help them double their broadcast capabilities" (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 April 1977). According to official government figures, each year the United States allocates more than 300 million dollars in the federal budget for foreign propaganda ("The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977," Washington, page 73).
59. THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1977, page 22.
60. See "Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development and Active Duty Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strength," Washington, 1976, Part 4. Research and Development, pp 2479-2495.
61. See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 29 April 1976, page H3621.

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INTERNATIONAL

FORMATION OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST FRONT EXAMINED

Moscow ZA YEVRONU MIRA I PROGRESSA in Russian 1977 signed to press 17 Oct 77 Chapter 12 pp 296-317

[Chapter 12 "European Communist Movement and the World Revolutionary Process" by Jano Berecz, Hungarian People's Republic, from book "For a Europe of Peace and Progress," Moscow 1977-- for previously translated portions of this book see JPRS L/7811, 5 Jun 78, No 9 of this series pp 10-54]

[Text] The worldwide social transformation which is being carried out both within national boundaries and on a global scale is a characteristic feature of the contemporary epoch. As a result of the victory of independent national social revolutions, governmental power is passing from the hands of capitalists to the hands of the working class and its allies. A global conflict is thus being waged between the world systems of socialism and capitalism. The power-holding working class of socialist countries stands in opposition to the bourgeoisie which holds the position of power in capitalist states. The worldwide socialist system, the labor movement in capitalist countries and the national liberation movements in all of their manifestations are natural allies in this struggle. Thus, the worldwide revolutionary process of our epoch is being carried out via the struggle of three basic revolutionary forces with their opponent, imperialism.

The Great October Socialist Revolution inaugurated the epoch of change from capitalism to socialism in the history of mankind. The contribution of the USSR to the cause of general human progress will remain forever in the memory of workers throughout the world. Socialist countries having arisen as a result of national democratic revolutions have created, with the Soviet Union, a world socialist system determining to a significant degree the fate of mankind and have altered the alignment of forces in the world. The political, economic, cultural and

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social achievements of socialist countries, which persuasively and specifically demonstrate the advantages of a socialist structure over that of capitalism, are undeniable.

The process of revolutionary regeneration of the world issues into concrete international conditions with which it is found in close intercommunication and interaction. Its development directly influences change in the relationship of social and political forces in the world, and this as a matter of course entails changes in international relations. In its turn, international conditions exert influence on the world revolutionary process and on the development of liberation movements within national frameworks. The working class and its Marxist-Leninist parties, in determining specific ways and forms of accomplishing revolution in individual countries, therefore carefully consider both national and international conditions in addition to the status of class forces within a country, historical traditions and other characteristics.

The various developmental stages of the world revolutionary process clearly reflect the close interdependence of this process and international conditions. The Great October Socialist Revolution representing the height of the first stage broke the common imperialist system and extracted from it one country in which there began the building of socialism. Along with internal conditions in Russia in 1917, the need for accomplishing the revolution by force of arms was also occasioned by international factors. Then, in the period following the victory of the revolution, it was namely imperialist intervention which brought the first proletarian government to the necessity of carrying on armed conflict. Intervention and the blockade organized by imperialism and directed against the first socialist country created a condition of such nature that the defense and continuance of the revolution plus the annihilation of the internal enemy's opposition were possible only by giving first priority to a suppressed function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The second stage in the world revolutionary process came during the course of the formation of the world system of socialism and the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism. Thanks, primarily, to the over-all influence of generally favorable international conditions creation of a national democratic structure was accomplished not by force of arms but by relatively peaceful means, and the dictatorship of workers and peasants similarly developed through peaceful means into the power of the working class and of the working people. This peaceful route is the basic feature of socialist revolution in the countries of central and eastern Europe. In contrast to

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this, in several Asian countries the victory of socialist revolution could be ensured only via armed struggle for national independence and social progress.

In the contemporary world situation characterized by profound qualitative changes in the alignment of forces between socialism and imperialism, the interconnection of the revolutionary process with international conditions has a number of peculiarities.

During "cold war" periods the world capitalist system has been characterized by relative stability. The foreign policy of imperialism has first and foremost been determined by striving towards military superiority over socialist countries and by aiming for possible change of their social structure by forcible means. In such circumstances the world socialist system had to, and did demonstrate its vitality--the ability to defend itself against foreign reaction and internal counter-revolution. Moreover, the "cold war" situation exerted an obstructive and destructive influence on the international working-class movement, contributing to dissension in trade union and other mass movements and promoting the growth of anti-communism and social opportunism in capitalist countries. This circumstance was on the whole also unfavorable for national liberation movements. It created for imperialism broad possibilities for their forcible suppression.

At the end of the sixties and especially at the beginning of the seventies the failure of the imperialist "cold war" policy became evident. As a result of the joint activity of socialist countries and other progressive forces, and as a result of the successful realization of the Peace Program advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress, there came a period in which the international situation is more and more being characterized by detente and peaceful coexistence, and by cooperation among countries of different social structures. These changes were conditioned, first and foremost, by changes in the relationship of forces having several determining factors in our time. First, there is the uninterrupted growth of the economic and defense capability of socialist countries and the influence of their active peace policy on the international situation. Second, there is the rise of national liberation movements, and there is the anti-imperialist policy of progressive national democratic states. Third, there is a deepening of the general crisis in capitalism appearing in all areas of life in bourgeois society and fostering consolidation of the laboring masses' social and political struggle.

The relaxation of international tension, as an objective necessity in the relations of states with different social structures,

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exerts considerable influence on the world revolutionary process, revealing for its advancement new possibilities, the utilization of which in large measure depends on further extension of the interaction between all of its currents and parts. It is natural, therefore, that revolutionary forces of the entire world attach great importance to the struggle of European working people for peace and social progress and to the influence of their struggle on the over-all alignment of world forces, on anti-imperialist movements in other regions and on the international situation as a whole.

The European working-class movement is an integral and extremely important part of the world revolutionary process, in which it always played and continues to play a leading and most active role both because of its organization, militancy, ideological and political development and likewise on account of the fact that it functions in that zone of international relations and social contradictions wherein events largely determine the character of processes in the development of states and the class struggle on other continents.

The unification and coordination of efforts by all European communist and working-class parties and the development by them of a single program of action for ensuring security in Europe are an important contribution to the over-all struggle against the aggressive tendencies of imperialism. The European continent is a region where the two major social and economic systems come into close contact with, and oppose each other. Therefore, reducing the danger of an outbreak of war in Europe means introducing a decisive contribution towards averting a third world war and means limiting the possibility of European capitalist countries' being involved in the policy of aggression, conflicts and increasing tension in other parts of the world. "Needless to say," as believes, for example, General Secretary of the Peruvian Communist Party, Jorge del Prado, "the fortunes of Europe--in spite of the fact that this continent is experiencing realities different from those of Latin America--exert a vitally important influence on our own destinies. If the likelihood of war in the Old World becomes remote, there will be more possibilities for inflicting defeat on imperialism in Latin America."<sup>1</sup>

It was, namely, in Europe that world socialism, having at its disposal powerful bases, achieved the most favorable correlation of forces, and it was precisely there that it created an effective system for coordinating the actions of fraternal nations for the purpose of supporting revolutionary and democratic movements throughout the world. Especially strong there are the positions of the international working class and of



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revolutionary forces carrying out a constant offensive on monopolistic circles and using not only the west European proletariat but also workers of many developing countries. A weakening of these circles' influence within Europe means a simultaneous narrowing of possibilities for their economic expansion outside Europe.

Of great significance for all currents of the world revolutionary process is the fact that in the European working-class movement--more than anywhere else--the international solidarity of laborers, whose action is not isolated by regional limitations but embraces all democratic, anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces on the planet, is well-developed. Any sort of Eurocentrism is foreign to the European working class and its revolutionary avant-garde. They do not separate their interests from the interests of workers throughout the world, nor their struggle for the transformation of Europe into a zone of peace and progress from the struggle of all nations for worldwide social progress.

This position found vivid expression at the Berlin Conference of Communist and Working-class Parties of Europe. In its Concluding Document and in speeches by delegates it was dynamically emphasized that the solution to European problems cannot be isolated from the solution to all mankind's problems. European communists thereupon expressed their heartfelt gratitude to nations of other continents which are supporting the struggle of nations of the European continent for peace and social progress. In turn, they presented a wide range of requirements, the realization of which would lead to a democratic resolution of problems troubling people of developing countries--in particular, to the final elimination of colonial and racist regimes and to the termination of neo-colonialist exploitation of these nations by monopolistic capital.

European communist and working-class parties are unanimous in their appraisal of the historical significance of the union of three fundamental revolutionary forces of our epoch--worldwide socialism, the international proletariat and the national liberation movement. They thus regard their struggle for European peace, cooperation and social progress as a contribution to worldwide social progress. In the Concluding Document of the Berlin Communist Conference, it is explained: "Communist and working-class parties participating in the conference are convinced that the struggle for European peace, cooperation and social progress is an important contribution to the solution of political, economic and social problems throughout the world--a solution which requires equal participation by all countries. Positive changes on our continent are creating favorable condi-

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tions for national liberation efforts, for anti-war efforts, for relaxation of tension--and in other parts of the world, for national struggle against neo-colonialism and all forms of national oppression."<sup>2</sup>

The program of struggle advanced by the conference has a consistently anti-imperialist character. It includes both general democratic aims of struggle answering interests of the broadest national masses and also the class aims of the proletariat, whose defenders communists represent. This is a document conforming to the aspirations of all forces opposing imperialism and advocating peace, democracy and social progress. It represents an organic part of the general platform of basic currents in the revolutionary and liberation struggle--the constructive activity of nations building socialism and communism, the class struggle of the worldwide proletariat, and the national liberation movement--which have all merged into a single world revolutionary process bringing mankind a transformation of its entire life.

Communist and working-class parties in Europe are devoting much attention to ensuring the unity of working people's activities both within national and continental limits and also on a world scale. Opponents of proletarian solidarity actively oppose this aspiration, attempting to "refute" the Marxist-Leninist concept of interaction of the fundamental currents of the world revolutionary process and to counter it with all manner of Eurocentrist and geopolitical schemes put forth by bourgeois and social-reform theorists, and similarly, by ideologists of "leftist" opportunism. Characteristically, the main motive in this is an attempt to divide the international communist movement. It is well known, for example, what a great ballyhoo was raised even over so-called "Eurocommunism." It is a fact that bourgeois propaganda invented this expression for inciting conflicts by exaggerating differences between parties. Communists must repulse this maneuver also. Communist parties' natural policy differences confirm the need to strengthen solidarity and jointly expose the divisive maneuvers of bourgeois propaganda. The situation of international communist movements is characterized in our time, above all, by the development, rise and strengthening of the drive towards unity. Testifying to this is a constant increase in number of bilateral meetings and an entire series of successful multilateral forums as, for example, communist party conferences of Arab countries and of countries of Latin America and the Caribbean region. At these, communists jointly analyzed the most important features of the economic and social situation in countries of the given region and together defined goals. Among the many multilateral meetings, the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-class

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Parties, which discussed not only continental problems but also took note of general objectives through questions influencing the destiny of all mankind, was of particular significance.

Bilateral, multilateral meetings and regional, continental conferences have proven that in the course of friendly discussions and talks delegates of communist parties can come to agreement on all fundamental questions. Debate among fraternal parties does not exclude this.

At the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party our party advocated friendly, creative exchange of opinions among parties of the international communist movement. Fraternal parties of other socialist countries, also working under different conditions, apply general principles of socialist revolution and socialist construction. Confrontation conditions for parties laboring in the capitalist world are dissimilar and specific. Therefore, practical experience is different on individual issues, specific problems awaiting solution similarly differ, and opinions on methods of achieving a planned objective also do not always coincide. Their comparison aids in the independent development of strategy and tactics and in the determination of, and effective solution to national problems. The tried and true weapon of the international communist movement is, however, solidarity and joint action, the foundation of which is formed by a single world outlook, common interests of the international working class, and congruent ideas and goals of fraternal parties. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, J. Kadar, declared at a press conference during his visit to Rome in June 1977: "I am positive that mutual and complete solidarity, which no one will be capable of destroying, must and will be achieved among all communist and working-class parties of Europe regardless of whether they are working in a socialist or in a west European capitalist country."

Individual parties also have common tasks in addition to their own specific tasks. Only through joint actions can they provide the requisite international conditions for successful effort. Creative debate is likewise essential for their precise determination. In the interests of effective effort, development of international correlation of forces and international conditions must be analyzed together. It is necessary to study on a joint basis the maintenance of detente and its connection with social progress and the possibility of progressive forces' unity. It is necessary, jointly, to determine a program of effort and methods for solving the basic issues of our epoch and for consolidation and further development of the detente process with extension of detente to the sphere of the military and disarmament--that is, for the final elimination of the threat of

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thermo-nuclear world war, for peaceful coexistence of governments with differing social structure and for the expansion of mutually beneficial relations.

As far as issues basic to the communist movement are concerned, it is necessary to examine them jointly by holding common discussion of problems. Debate and friendly exchange of opinions cannot, however, call in question or even negate the efforts of revolutionary forces. Their value and the historical victories of the communist movement are unquestionable.

Friendly exchange of opinions can be conducted only on equal terms. One could hardly accept a situation wherein a representative of some fraternal party would groundlessly criticize socialist countries and in the bourgeois press question socialist countries' achievements while viewing any response to this as meddling. We consider debate and the inevitable exchange of opinions to be a mutual, bilateral and multilateral process. We discerningly take the position of Israeli Communist Party General Secretary E. Berlinguer, stated at the Berlin Conference when he declared, referring to criticism of the policy line of the Israeli Communist Party: "Although we do not share these critical judgments, we also consider their expression legitimate. Moreover, we would like debate on these important subjects to develop in the working-class movement--in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, of course, but at the same time more freely and openly."<sup>3</sup>

We acknowledge differences of position among parties of the international communist movement, but we deny that this necessarily divides them. Our class enemy, imperialism, would like to effect precisely this dissension. We consider it natural that fraternal parties operating in differing situations and independently determining their strategy and tactics should arrive by different routes at one and the same goal--the building of a socialist society, but we reject opinions and practice according to which this can be accomplished only by means of challenging and demeaning paths taken by others and questioning their validity. We are in concord with fraternal parties working under trying conditions in capitalist countries, struggling against monopolies and bourgeois dictatorship and fighting for social reforms answering the interests of an entire nation. At the same time we believe that solidarity must not be abused.

Friendly debate expressing mutual respect is a regenerative element of the international communist movement. The bourgeoisie, however, is aggressive and calculating, and it attempts to turn our debate against our unity. It incites anti-Sovietism by all means in its power. It would be a gross political error

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to imagine that anti-Soviet statements could substantially increase any communist party's influence on the working class. Anti-Sovietism is the most dangerous resource of the bourgeoisie which is trying to disrupt communists' unity.

Anyone who underestimates the historical course of socialist countries, ignores their gains, acts without purpose and against the interests of revolutionary forces in capitalist and developing countries, trying to shake their peoples' faith in socialism, is thereby impeding the struggle of fraternal parties working there.

V.I. Lenin, in perceiving the tendencies and prospects of international class struggle, saw the preparation for, and the victory of the universal socialist revolution as the evolution of various currents of the world revolutionary process stimulated by the struggle of the international working class. He indicated that the socialist revolution of the 20th century "cannot be anything other than an explosion of mass struggle by each and all the oppressed and dissatisfied." It is inconceivable "without revolts in small colonial nations and in Europe without the revolutionary explosions of part of the petty bourgeoisie with all of its prejudices..."<sup>4</sup> Justifying the great role of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process, V.I. Lenin wrote: "...The socialist revolution will not be only and primarily a struggle of revolutionary proletariats in each country against their bourgeoisie--no, it will be a struggle of all colonies and countries oppressed by imperialism, and of all dependent countries against international imperialism."<sup>5</sup>

These Leninist tenets were, moreover, directed against the views of those for whom the dialectical approach to the interaction of various currents of the world revolutionary process was alien. The general direction of world events in our day again and again confirms the theoretical rectitude and practical reality of the Leninist teaching concerning unity of all currents of the international revolutionary and liberation movement, and concerning the leading role in it of the working class--the main motive force of the social process and the deciding factor in the reform of human society on the basis of social justice, freedom, democracy and worldwide cooperation of nations. It is an indisputable fact that the stronger and more stable the positions of the international working class become, and the more the power and influence of the world socialist system are strengthened, the more are positive tendencies in world politics intensified, and the more hopeful become the prospects of nations' struggle for peace, national independence and social progress, and the better are social and political conditions for the achievement of age-old human ideals.

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The close cooperation of European socialist countries and of the communist and working-class movement with revolutionary and democratic forces of other continents demonstrates this interconnection in practice with complete clarity.

Above all, the enormous contribution which the working-class movement in Europe and its revolutionary avant-garde contingents have made in recent years towards strengthening the positions of socialism outside the European continent should be emphasized. Proletarian solidarity was displayed with great intensity in that comprehensive support rendered by governments in socialist collaboration and by European communist and working-class parties to the Vietnamese as they repelled imperialist aggression. The conference of the Political Advisory Committee of Participant Warsaw Treaty States convened in Prague in 1972 thus issued a statement in connection with the continuing aggression by the United States in Indo-China, affirming anew through it the determination of socialist countries to give all necessary aid to opponents of aggression.<sup>6</sup>

In the same year the Conference of Communist and Working-class Parties of European Countries was convened in Paris in support of the Vietnamese people and other nations of Indo-China. Its participants appealed to communists, the working class, city and rural laborers, to democratic and patriotic persons, to the younger generation, and to all who value the ideals of peace, justice and independence, to intensify joint actions in support of struggling Vietnam.

This solidarity made an important contribution to the historic victory of the Vietnamese people, who had successfully repulsed imperialism's biggest attempt after World War II to deal with a socialist state by force of arms and suppress a national liberation revolution. The national democratic revolutions in Laos and Cambodia, the peoples of which had determined as their final goal the building of a socialist society, were a great achievement for the forces of progress.

In a report at the 4th Congress of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, Le Zuan, declared: "The victory of the Vietnamese revolution is a victory for the forces of socialism, national independence, democracy and peace throughout the entire world, which gave us support in the fight against American imperialist aggression."<sup>7</sup>

Support based on the multilateral aid of socialist collaboration and on the solidarity of the European working-class and communist movement helped the Cuban people to pierce the imperialist blockade in the seventies and to strengthen the position

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of socialism in their country. As First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, F. Castro, emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, Soviet-Cuban relations, which "represent an example of internationalism, mutual understanding, respect and trust," played an especially great role.<sup>8</sup>

In their speeches at the 25th CPSU Congress all representatives of the international revolutionary movement stressed the enormous importance of the solidarity of the USSR and other socialist countries for nations' social progress. "The growing power of the Soviet Union," said General Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Laos, Premier of the Laotian National Democratic Republic, K. Fomvikhan, "contributes to the strengthening of the worldwide socialist system and heightens its role as a factor determining the course of human development. It deters the aggressive intentions of imperialists and serves as a powerful stimulus for the national liberation movement and the international working-class movement."<sup>9</sup>

The Premier of Laos is testifying to the fact that international solidarity of revolutionary and democratic forces now serves as a most important factor in the development of national democratic revolutions into socialist revolutions. In his speech at the October 1976 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev noted that "we have every reason to say that in the person of Laos the society of socialist states is being enlarged by still another member."<sup>10</sup>

By their practical and theoretical activity communist and working-class parties of Europe are in many respects furthering development of the communist movement in non-socialist countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such assistance takes various forms. These include acts of political solidarity and moral support of communists fighting, frequently, under the difficult conditions of underground activity, police persecution and mass repression. The solidarity of the European communist and working-class movement helped in freeing Luis Korvalan from the torture chambers of Chilean reaction, and it serves as an important factor in activating the struggle of progressive forces in the world against communist persecution in such countries as Indonesia, Paraguay, the Republic of South Africa and others. It also involves aid to small and as yet unconsolidated working-class organizations in several countries of Asia and Africa for setting up various forms of activity. And it is that aid which communist parties of other continents, assimilating the lessons of European communists' struggle for socialism, democracy, peace and social progress, receive.

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Communists of non-socialist countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America especially highly value the role of the CPSU and the Soviet State in the world revolutionary process. In a Declaration of the Conference of Communist Parties of Latin American and Caribbean Gulf Countries (1975) it was stated: "The Soviet Union and its Communist Party, having achieved remarkable economic, political and social success--by which the material standard and life of USSR peoples are being constantly heightened and rendered ever more well-provided--has always fulfilled and is magnificently fulfilling its proletarian and international duty. Not only did they save mankind from Nazism at the cost of 20 million lives of their own sons and daughters and at the cost of huge economic losses, but by their presence and steadfastness they also enabled those nations of Europe and Asia who had decided to follow the path of socialism to carry out revolutionary reforms without fear of imperialist repression..."<sup>11</sup>

Countries of socialist collaboration have at their disposal effective foreign policy resources and well-developed communications with all revolutionary forces for exerting an active, shaping influence on the world situation--short, however, of any "export of revolution." World reform such as would serve the interests of the working class and in the long run all of humanity is the goal of socialist revolution.

Socialism manifests solidarity with the international working class and with all progressive forces struggling against exploitation and all forms of oppression. Successfully solving the problems of creating a new social structure and forming a system of international security, socialist countries are thus improving international conditions for the unfolding of the worldwide revolutionary process. Practical socialism, however, not only indirectly but also directly aids the international working class and national liberation movements, giving them multilateral support.

## II

One of the characteristic features of the world revolutionary process in our time is the fact that it also includes developing nations which are freeing themselves from the yoke of colonialism and the national liberation movements.

The importance of liberated countries in international relations is growing. Socialist and developing states constitute a decisive majority in the United Nations and in many prominent international organizations. More than 70 percent of the population of the earth lives in just under 100 developing countries occupying approximately one-half of all the territory on the globe. Located there are the majority of energy supplies and

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supplies of other raw materials, and at the same time these are the poorest and economically most backward nations.

A most important distinguishing feature of new wave national democratic revolutions unfolding in developing countries is the fact that, with all their differences, they are as a whole directed against imperialism and are capable of creating important conditions for the transition to socialism.

In national liberation and democratic movements in developing nations the process of class differentiation has been intensifying more and more in recent years, and the struggle for the future path of development is turning more and more into a class struggle. On account of poorly-developed social conditions--the basic features of which are the dominance of Christianity and of small-ownership groups, relative underdevelopment of the working class and the significant role of such forces as, for example, the army--this class struggle is distinguished by a well-known peculiarity. The particular distinctive feature is a great tendency towards radicalism or, for instance, an extremely vague interpretation of goals and ideas connected with socialism.

At the same time it should be noted that in individual developing countries income from the production of oil has risen significantly in recent years in connection with the energy crisis in the capitalist world--a fact which has strengthened the position of the bourgeoisie. Relying on that position, imperialism is attempting to accomplish its goals and manage the situation in such a way that developing nations, if only a part of them, will choose not a socialist or a revolutionary democratic path of development but a capitalist path leading towards subordination to imperialism.

Under these conditions, it is the international responsibility of socialist countries, the international working-class and communist movement to further in every way possible the struggle of vanguard forces of national liberation movements for social and political reform and to help them determine a clear perspective and map a course leading to socialism.

The Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties outlined a specific program of action in support of the struggle of people of developing nations against neo-colonialism and for economic and social progress. This program includes the requirement of "creating a new international economic order; securing conditions for the economic and social development of all countries--but for the most poorly-developed countries first; organizing broad international cooperation which would support the people's of developing countries own efforts towards elimination of the gap between them and developed countries; un-

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restricted exercising by every nation of its right to independently take charge of its national riches; providing all states with access to the achievements of contemporary science and technology; establishing a just correlation between prices for raw goods and agricultural products on the one hand, and prices for manufactured articles on the other hand; broadly developing trade relations without any kind of artificial barriers and discrimination."<sup>12</sup>

This is the first time that the communist movement of Europe has put forth such a comprehensive program for these problems. The conference thereby made an important contribution to the further rapprochement and collaboration of present-day, primary revolutionary forces--world socialism, the international proletariat and the national liberation movement.

The role of the movement of Third World governments, which has now become one of the most important factors in world politics, was particularly singled out at the Berlin Conference of European Communists. This role, as was emphasized in the Concluding Document of the Conference, is that the Third World movement "makes an active contribution to the struggle for peace, security, detente and cooperation on an equitable basis, for the creation of a just system of international political and economic relations, and to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and all forms of domination and exploitation."<sup>13</sup> Addressing the conference, President of the Union of Yugoslav Communists, I. Broz Tito, emphasized in this regard: "Third World countries directly oppose imperialist policies and any kind of domination. Their struggle is an expression of the global progressive and revolutionary process characteristic of our epoch. This is a process of struggle against social and national oppression, against all forms of exploitation and subordination, a struggle for the consolidation of peace, security and equal cooperation among nations."<sup>14</sup>

The repercussions which the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties received from the worldwide revolutionary movement were profoundly natural.

"The conference of 29 European communist and working-class parties, representing a more than 29 million-member army of communists, is a most important event in the life of the world communist and working-class movement," as was said in a leading article of the central organ of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, the weekly NEW AGE. "Its significance is not limited to the boundaries of Europe, where the struggle for peace, security, cooperation and social progress was raised to a new and higher stage and with each day gathers strength.

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It also spreads to all regions of the earth where the struggle of democratic forces against imperialism, neo-colonialism and fascism goes on."<sup>15</sup>

The Berlin Conference won high praise in a statement of the Conference of Communist and Working-class Parties of Arab Nations, convened towards the end of 1976. The conference emphasized the great importance of the solidarity with them of the USSR and other socialist cooperation states for social progress among these countries' people.

Saluting the successful completion of the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, General Secretary of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, Cheddi Dzhagan, declared that its Concluding Document "has a colossal stimulating influence on the struggle for freedom, peace and social progress in Latin America and in the Carribean Gulf."<sup>16</sup>

Communists of all countries proceed from the perspective of further strengthening of the interaction of present-day progressive forces, and from the necessity and possibility of consolidating the unity of fundamental currents of the world revolutionary process.

In the contemporary epoch, characterized by the unswerving growth of the forces of socialism and the working-class movement, by the weakening of world capitalism, by the violent development of the national liberation movement, the social reform role of the international solidarity of workers has increased immeasurably, its content has become more diverse, and new forms of manifestation have arisen. Intensification of the importance of proletarian internationalism is objectively conditioned by the huge extension of its social bases: by the formation of a worldwide socialist system and by the progressive proletarianization of society in developed countries and in countries still struggling for their freedom. As noted General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, G. MacLennan, in his speech at the Berlin Communist Conference, "Nowadays the concern of internationalism and of international solidarity--the basic principle of communists--also includes forces far beyond the limits of the working class."<sup>17</sup>

Proletarian internationalism's sphere of action has now widened to a world scale. It profoundly influences all historically promising tendencies in nations' social progress. In our time, proletarian internationalism is turning into an effective factor in the development of the revolutionary movement in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The ideas and principles of international working-class solidarity have especially great

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significance here for the unification of anti-imperialist forces and for the complete triumph of the cause of national freedom.

The strategy line of the international communist movement, aimed at widening the front of the anti-imperialist struggle has borne fruit and strengthened intercommunication between practical socialism, the working-class and democratic movement in capitalist countries and those fighting for national and social liberation in dependent and colonial states. Depending on the multilateral aid and support of socialist countries and on the solidarity of the communist and working-class movement, oppressed peoples could do away with the shameful imperialistic colonial system. The elimination of colonialism is a universally historic victory for the national liberation movement and is, moreover, one of the historic triumphs of proletarian internationalism.

Every great success for European communists and each of their achievements in the struggle for social progress, for the widening of its political influence finds vital response in developing countries and elicits enthusiasm among progressive forces and fear and confusion in reactionary and conservative circles.

The influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas on freedom-fighters, an influence which has now extraordinarily intensified as a result of the extension of communications between national liberation and communist movements, arouses particularly acute alarm among opponents of social progress. Under this influence progressive forces in developing countries are more and more realizing the limitation of a nationalistic approach to the solution of social development problems and are promoting democratic programs providing for the elimination of all forms of national and racial oppression, and for ensuring widespread democracy and the creation of a governmental system answering interests of the people. Under the influence of Marxism-Leninism in the ideology of the national liberation movement there has also arisen such an important principle as that of the unity of ideas of national liberation with problems of social progress. Along with demands for the elimination of traces of colonialism and for the strengthening of national independence, such goals as the accomplishment of agrarian reforms, the annihilation of feudal forms of exploitation and the elimination of domination by foreign capital have been advanced in the programs of a majority of leading national liberation organizations.

The influence of scientific socialism is similarly expressed by the assertion, in the ideology of the national liberation movement, of the Leninist idea concerning the need for unity of the

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forces of socialism, national liberation and the international working-class movement. The realization of this idea was an important factor in the victorious development of the struggle of oppressed peoples for freedom and independence and now serves to further the extension of national revolutions. Emphasizing this, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, A.F. Ismail, declared: "We steadfastly adhere to the principle of international solidarity with revolutionary forces, a constituent part of which we consider ourselves. This principle finds expression in our assiduous striving for unity with socialist countries, with the worldwide communist movement, with working-class parties in capitalist countries and with the world national liberation movement. Our relations with these forces are constantly being strengthened more and more precisely because of this position."<sup>18</sup>

The social advancement of former colonies is impossible without profound social reforms. This truth has already become obvious to progressive forces in developing countries. The example of such countries as Angola, Benin, Burma, Guinea, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and other states of socialist orientation indicates that national movements in developing countries are more and more branching out into movements directed against exploitative relations.

Under these conditions imperialists, compelled to retreat, are trying to reconstruct their strategy in relation to liberated states and to find such ways and means of penetrating them as would allow them to preserve and consolidate positions of capitalism there. The main tasks which they are setting for themselves involve taking control of the social and political development of liberated nations, undermining the alliance between socialist cooperation and the international working-class movement on one hand, and the national liberation movement on the other.

As before, armed aggression occupies an important place in the strategy of imperialism. In the contemporary world, however, colonial and imperialist methods of such kind are becoming less and less effective. The victories of the nations of Indo-China as well as the course of events in the People's Republic of Angola, which at the end of 1975 was subjected to foreign intervention undertaken by imperialism and South African racists, have convincingly demonstrated this fact. The just struggle of the Angolan people in defense of their country's independence was met with the support of progressive forces throughout the world. As the head of the delegation of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) emphasized at the 25th Congress of Soviet Communists, this solidarity and, above all, the aid of the USSR and other socialist countries played a truly

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decisive role in the victory of the Angolan people over colonialists, racists, imperialists and their local collaborators.<sup>19</sup>

The international solidarity of socialist states and of the communist and working-class movement of Europe with the anti-imperialist struggle of liberated countries is an indispensable and extremely important prerequisite to the further development of national revolutions. At the same time, those fighting for the freedom of Asia, Africa and Latin America are making a substantial contribution to the struggle of working-class masses in the capitalist countries of Europe. Thus, the successful national liberation struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola signified not only the downfall of the colonial policy of the reactionary regime in Portugal, but it also was one of the reasons for the rise of the anti-fascist movement in the mother country itself. In its turn, the democratic revolution which took place in Portugal in April 1974 greatly facilitated the achievement of independence by former Portuguese colonies.

Emphasizing the growing importance of mutual support by present-day revolutionary forces, President of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, H. Hukstra, in a speech at the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, said: "This shows how closely one is connected with another. In joint struggle it will also be necessary in the future to establish contacts and carry on exchange of opinions between communist parties and national revolutionary movements in other parts of the globe."<sup>20</sup>

Under contemporary conditions social contradictions have a global character. They are embodied in the contest between two world social systems, in the opposition of the international working class to monopolist capital, and in the sharp conflict between imperialism and the national liberation movement. All of the forms of struggle are in close interaction. In our time the dialectical unity of the internal and international class struggle has become especially close-knit and varied.

The relaxation of international tension intensifies the need for international unity of all revolutionary and democratic forces of the world. Both the problems of further development of detente itself and the objective conditions of the international class struggle demand this. The common character of liberation goals and the historical destinies of workers of all countries of the globe, the progressive nature of their fundamental goals and the presence of a common enemy--world-wide imperialism--form the basis of such unity. All of this makes especially urgent the problems of creating an interna-

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tional anti-imperialist front uniting all links of the world revolutionary and freedom movement in the struggle for establishment of lasting peace, national liberation and social progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted from PRAVDA, 14 July 1976.
2. Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, p 30.
3. Ibid., p 241.
4. V.I. Lenin, Complete Collection of Works, v 30, p 54.
5. V.I. Lenin, loc. cit., v 39, p 327.
6. See: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International Relations. Collection of Documents. 1972, pp 13-14.
7. Quoted from PRAVDA, 15 December 1976.
8. Welcome Address to the 25th CPSU Congress, p 40.
9. Ibid., p 217.
10. L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 25 October 1976, p 29.
11. Quoted from GRANMA, 16 June 1975.
12. Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, pp 32-33.
13. Ibid., p 15.
14. Ibid., p 206.
15. NEW AGE, 4 July 1976.
16. Quoted from PRAVDA, 12 July 1976.
17. Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, p 149.
18. Welcome Address to the 25th CPSU Congress, p 431.

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19. See: Welcome Address to the 25th CPSU Congress, p 403.
20. Conference of European Communist and Working-class Parties, p 171.

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**INTERNATIONAL**

**GROMYKO FOREWORD TO NEW EDITION ON USSR FOREIGN POLICY**

Moscow VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA in Russian 1978 signed to press 10 Nov 78, pp 1, 2, 472

[Second, revised and supplemented, edition of book on Soviet foreign policy with foreword by A. A. Gromyko; for excerpts from first edition and Gromyko foreword see JPRS 65459, 14 August 1975, No 666 of this series, pp 28-57]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union)

Authors: I. D. Ovsyanny (leader), Ye. Yu. Bogush, O. B. Borisov, V. A. Grachev, V. L. Israelyan, V. P. Nizhamin, S. V. Pokrovskiy, V. I. Popov, G. L. Rozanov, N. A. Samgin, A. I. Stepanov, V. F. Stratanovich and G. A. Trofimenko

Publisher: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury

Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1978

Signed to Press Date: 10 November 1978

Number of Copies Published: 175,000

Number of Pages: 472

**Annotation:**

The book is devoted to the consistent and persistent activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state aimed at the consolidation of peace and the extension of detente, a halt to the arms race and mankind's salvation from the threat of a new world war. Particular attention has been paid to the implementation of the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation

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and the Freedom and Independent of the Peoples put forward by the 25th party congress. The book may be used in the system of party studies. The authors are professors and assistant professors of the USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy.

Table of Contents:	Page
Foreword. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State--Powerful Weapon of the Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace and Social Progress	3
Chapter 1. The Scientific Nature of the Soviet Union's Foreign Policy	24
<p>Principles of the Foreign Policy of Socialism--V. I. Lenin's Brilliant Theoretical Inheritance--24. The Decree of Peace--27. Basic Principles of the Soviet State's Foreign Policy--30. The CPSU--Directing Force of Soviet Foreign Policy--35. The Peace Program of the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses--39. The new USSR Constitution on the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State--44.</p>	
Chapter 2. The Strengthening of the Friendship, Unity and Cooperation of the Socialist Countries--Main Direction of the USSR's Foreign Policy	49
2.1. Proletarian, Socialist Internationalism--Basis of the Interstate Relations of the Socialist Countries	--
<p>The World Socialist System--49. The New Type of International Relations--53. Combination of National and International Interests--58.</p>	
2.2. The USSR and the Collective Organizations of the Socialist States	63
<p>The USSR and CEMA--63. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization--69.</p>	
2.3. Development of Bilateral Cooperation	76
<p>Friendship Charters--76. The USSR's Cooperation with the European Socialist Countries--77. The USSR's Cooperation With the Socialist Countries of Asia--95. Soviet-Cuban Relations--101.</p>	
2.4 The Soviet Union and China	104
<p>The USSR's Role in the Victory of the Chinese Revolution--104. Soviet-Chinese Cooperation 1949-1959--106.</p>	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2.4. [Cont'd]

Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1960's--109. Soviet Proposals on Interstate Agreements with the PRC. The 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses on Soviet-Chinese Relations--113.

Chapter 3. The Strengthening of the USSR's Cooperation With the Developing Countries 120

3.1. The Leninist Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State With Respect to the Developing States --

The Basic Principles of Relations--120. The USSR and the Liquidation of Colonialism--123. The Increased Role of the Liberated States in World Affairs--127. The USSR's and the Developing Countries' Advocacy of Peace and International Cooperation--136. The USSR's Trade-Economic Relations With the Developing States--139.

3.2. The USSR's Relations With the Developing Asian Countries 146

The Consolidation of the Asian States' Independence--146. L. I. Brezhnev's Visit to India--149. The USSR's Relations With the Other Countries of South and Southeast Asia--153. The USSR's Relations With Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran--155.

3.3. The Soviet Union's Relations With the Arab Countries 160

The Sociopolitical Position of the Arab States--160. The Development of Soviet-Arab Relations--162. The USSR's Relations With the Progressive Arab States--164. Soviet-Egyptian Relation--168.

3.4. The Soviet Union and the African Countries 171

The USSR's Assistance to the African Peoples in Gaining Independence--172. The Soviet Union's Defense of the African Countries Against Imperialist Aggression--174. The Soviet Union's Support for the Struggle for the Liberation of Southern Africa--176. The Soviet Union's Support for Africa's Anti-Imperialist Unity--178. The USSR's Bilateral Relations With the African States--183.

3.5. The USSR's Relations With the Latin American States 189

Latin America: Time of Change--189. The Establishment and Development of Relations Between the USSR and the Latin American Countries--194.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

<b>Chapter 4. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist States</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>4.1. The New Stage of the USSR's Cooperation With the Capitalist Countries</b>	<b>--</b>
Development of the USSR's Political Relations With the Capitalist Countries--203. Economic Relations Between the USSR and the Capitalist States--206.	
<b>4.2. Soviet-American Relations</b>	<b>210</b>
Soviet-American Relations in the First Postwar Years --213. Soviet-American Relations Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations--214. The Start of the Turnabout in Soviet-American Relations--216. The Visit to the United States by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee--220. Development of Economic Relations--221. Soviet-American Relations 1974-1976--223. The 25th CPSU Congress on Soviet-American Relations--225. The USSR's Relations With the United States Under the New Democratic Administration--227.	
<b>4.3. Soviet-French Relations</b>	<b>232</b>
The USSR's and France's Mutual Relations in the First Postwar Years--232. The USSR and France--at the Sources of Detente--235. Soviet-French Cooperation--Real Factor of the Consolidation of Peace and Security--239. L. I. Brezhnev's Visit to France (1977)--245.	
<b>4.4. Relations Between the USSR and the FRG</b>	<b>248</b>
The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and the FRG (1955)--249. The USSR's Relations With the FRG in the 1960's--251. The 1970 Moscow Treaty--253. The Further Positive Development of Relations. L. I. Brezhnev's Visit to the FRG (1978)--257.	
<b>4.5. Soviet-British Relations</b>	<b>260</b>
From the History of Soviet-British Relations--260. Relations Between the USSR and Britain Since World War II--261. Soviet-British Relations at the End of the 1960's-Start of the 1970's--263. Soviet-British Relations at the Current Stage--264.	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4.6.	Mutual Relations of the USSR and Italy	269
	What Historical Experience Tells Us--269. The Turn-about Toward Cooperation Between the USSR and Italy --271. Soviet-Italian Relations--Important Factor of the Strengthening of Peace in Europe--273.	
4.7.	Soviet-Japanese Relations	275
	Normalization of Soviet-Japanese Relations--277. Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1970's--280.	
4.8.	The USSR's Relations With Other Capitalist Countries	286
Chapter 5.	The USSR's Struggle for Lasting Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe	294
5.1.	The Struggle of the USSR and the Other Socialist States To Secure Peace, Security and Cooperation in Postwar Europe	296
	The German Complex in Postwar International Relations --296. The USSR's Proposals and Actions To Consolidate Peace and Security in Europe (1952-1955)--297. The USSR's New Proposals on the German Complex of Questions--301. The Soviet Union in the Struggle for European Security in the First Half of the 1960's--303.	
5.2.	Making Europe a Continent of Lasting Peace and Cooperation--Command of the Times	306
	The Socialist Countries' New Proposals on Questions of European Security (1966)--306. The Start of Practical Preparations for an All-European Conference--307. The Foundation of European Security--Recognition of Territorial and Political Realities--309. The 24th CPSU Congress on Consolidating European Security--310.	
5.3.	The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Historical Significance	313
	Multilateral Consultations in Helsinki (November 1972-June 1973)--313. First Stage of the Conference--314. Second Stage of the Conference--315. Third Stage of the Conference. Its Final Act--317. Significance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe --320.	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5.4.	The Current Stage of the Struggle for Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe	322
	Implementation of the Helsinki Principles and Accords --Basis of the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe--322. The 25th CPSU Congress on Further Steps in the Interests of Securing Lasting Peace in Europe --324. The Proposals of the Soviet Union and the Other Socialist Countries on the Further Strengthening of Peace and the Development of Cooperation in Europe--325. The USSR's Struggle for a Settlement of the Cyprus Problem--328.	
Chapter 6.	The Soviet Union's Struggle for Lasting Peace and Security in Asia and in the Near East	332
6.1.	The Soviet Union and the Problem of Securing Peace and Security in Asia	--
	The Soviet Union--Bulwark of Peace in Asia--333. The Principles of Asian Security Proposed by the USSR--335.	
6.2.	The USSR's Efforts To Consolidate Peace in the Far East and in South and Southeast Asia	338
	The Soviet Union's Support for the Korean People's Struggle for the Country's Peaceful Reunification--339. The USSR's Assistance in Securing Lasting Peace in South Asia --342. The USSR's Assistance to the Vietnamese People in Repulsing Imperialist Aggression--346. The Victory of the Peoples of Indochina in the Struggle for Independence, Peace, Democracy and Social Progress--350.	
6.3.	The USSR's Struggle for the Liquidation of the Hotbed of War in the Near East	354
	The Soviet Union's Defense of the Arab States Against Imperialist Aggression in the 1950's-1960's--355. The USSR's Struggle for the Liquidation of the Consequences of Israeli Aggression--358. The Soviet Union's Support for the Arab Countries During the 1973 Military Crisis --360. The First Stage of the Geneva Near East Peace Conference--362. The Troop Disengagement Agreements--363. The USSR's Assistance in the International Recognition of the PLO and the Consolidation of the Anti-Imperialist Solidarity of the Arab Countries--365. Soviet Proposals for a Peaceful Settlement in the Near East (1976-1977)--368. Complication of the Near East Situation--369.	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 7.	The USSR's Struggle in the United Nations for the Strengthening of International Security and for Disarmament	373
7.1.	The USSR's Struggle Against Attempts To Make the United Nations an Instrument of the "Cold War" (1946-1959)	375
	The Soviet Union's Role in the Creation of the United Nations--375. The USSR's Struggle in the United Nations for Peace and International Cooperation in the First Postwar Years--378. The Soviet Union's Proposals on Disarmament Questions--380.	
7.2.	The New Situation in the United Nations and the USSR's Struggle for its Increased Efficacy in the Defense of Peace (1960-1970)	384
	The Soviet Proposal on General and Total Disarmament--385. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests--387. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--389. The Treaty on Demilitarization of the Sea Bed--391. The USSR's Proposals on Strengthening the United Nations as an Instrument of Peace at the 20th-25th Sessions of the General Assembly--393.	
7.3.	The USSR's Proposals at the 26th-32d Sessions of the UN General Assembly on Consolidating International Peace	395
	The USSR's Struggle for Implementation of the Declaration on Strengthening International Security--397. The USSR's Proposals on Prohibiting the Use of Force in International Relations--398. The USSR's Struggle in the United Nations To Liquidate Hotbeds of Tension, Colonialism and Racism--401. The USSR's Positions in the United Nations on Economic, Legal and Certain Other Questions--404. The Struggle of the USSR in the United Nations for the Extension and Consolidation of International Relaxation and To Forestall the Danger of Nuclear War--407.	
7.4.	The Soviet Union's Struggle for Disarmament at the 26th-32d Sessions of the UN General Assembly	409
	The Soviet Proposal on the Convening of a World Disarmament Conference--410. The Convention on Banning and Destroying Bacteriological Weapons--413. The Soviet	

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## 7.4. [Cont'd]

Proposal on a Reduction in Military Budgets--414.  
 The USSR's Proposal Prohibiting Alteration of the  
 Environment for Military Purposes--417. The USSR's  
 Initiatives in the Sphere of Limitation of the  
 Arms Race at the UN General Assembly 30th Session  
 --420. The USSR's Memorandum on Questions of Limit-  
 ing the Arms Race and Disarmament (1976)--424. Ques-  
 tions of Disarmament at the UN General Assembly 32d  
 Session--425. The Soviet Proposals at the UN General  
 Assembly's Special Disarmament Session--428.

Conclusion	439
Concise Chronology of the Main International Events (1945-1978)	455
Foreword: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet State--Powerful Weapon of the Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace and Social Progress	

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was born in the fire of October, carries within it the great energy and inspiration and spiritual strength and noble ideals of this most important event, which has illumined the entire 20th century and was the most abrupt and profound turning point in man's history. The path trodden by the Soviet people in six decades is one of intensive labor and selfless and heroic struggle for the loftiest goals which have ever inspired mankind. Under the leadership of the Communist Party our country's working people quickly turned our motherland into a mighty, highly developed state, which is marching in the vanguard of social progress. For the first time in history the Soviet people created a developed socialist society and are the first builders of communism, "...It may proudly be said," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev observed in summing up the results of the past decades, "that we stood our ground, endured and conquered."<sup>1</sup>

The USSR's Leninist foreign policy has made an impressive contribution to the Soviet people's creation of the new society. The objective historical conditions of the Soviet state's emergence and development and the nature and content of the era begun by the Great October logically determined the paramount significance of the external factor in the life of our country and the close connection of internal development with international problems. "...From the very start of the October Revolution," V. I. Lenin observed, "the question of foreign policy and international relations confronted us as a most important question."<sup>2</sup>

The foreign policy of the Soviet state is the fruit of the multifaceted, purposeful and persistent activity of the Communist Party--the leading and directing force of Soviet society. Following the Leninist traditions, the Communist Party, its Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo constantly keep questions of international life at the center of attention,



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daily direct the foreign policy activity of the Soviet state and insure the farsightedness, constructive nature and high efficacy of the steps taken.

Emphasizing that the socialist reorganization of society along socialist lines represents the greatest, most difficult transition, V. I. Lenin observed that "this is a new matter, historically unprecedented, which cannot be read about in books."<sup>3</sup> These words may also be applied in full to the CPSU's foreign policy activity.

The elaboration and scientific substantiation of the Soviet state's strategy and tactics in the international arena require the party's tremendous creative activity, which is also constantly increasing in scale and significance. Relying on a "theoretical understanding of the entire course of historical movement,"<sup>4</sup> its integrity and unity and, at the same time, its diversity and contradictoriness, the CPSU is paving the foreign policy way of the Country of Soviets on the basis of an in-depth Marxist-Leninist analysis of the course and prospects of world development and its leading trends and a precise consideration of the alinement of class forces, organically combining Leninist principles with a creative approach to reality. "Marxism," V. I. Lenin observed, "differs from all other socialist theories in its remarkable combination of complete scientific clarity in an analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with the most decisive recognition of the significance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary are creativity and revolutionary initiative of the masses..."<sup>5</sup>

The Peace Program advanced by the 24th and 25th party congresses is a striking embodiment of the CPSU's creative contribution to the enrichment of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations on the basis of a comprehensive scientific interpretation of the latest data of historical experience. The fundamental change in the correlation of forces in the world arena and the enormously increased might of world socialism, its cohesion and active-ness and its strengthening alliance with all progressive and peace-loving forces enabled the party to put forward as a practical task the realization of a cardinal turnabout in international relations from explosive confrontation to detente and the development of extensive mutually beneficial international cooperation on the basis of Lenin's principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

The foreign policy course of the Soviet state formulated at the 24th and 25th party congresses testifies to the gigantic increase in the possibilities of Soviet foreign policy, the global expansion of the sphere of its activity and the vital significance of its goals and tasks for the fate of all peoples and our entire planet.

L. I. Brezhnev performs an outstanding role in the elaboration, comprehensive substantiation and implementation of our party's Leninist course within the country and in the international arena. L. I. Brezhnev's numerous foreign trips and his meetings and talks with foreign statesmen have been exceptional significance in the consolidation of the unity and cohesion of the

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socialist countries and the strengthening of their beneficent influence on the course of international life, in untying the knots of tension in relations between states adhering to different social systems and in a fundamental improvement in the climate in international relations. The political documents signed as a result of these trips have become major landmarks in the life of contemporary Europe and in the reorganization of the entire system of international relations. L. I. Brezhnev's tremendous personal contribution to the party's titanic activity aimed at liquidation of the "cold war," the cementing of detente and the elimination of the danger of a new world war has earned him the profound gratitude of the Soviet people and high and deserved authority in the world communist and workers movement and among the broadest working people's masses of the whole world.

L. I. Brezhnev's works devoted to questions of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state are party documents of tremendous historical and political significance. Embodying a Leninist, class and truly scientific approach to international problems and imbued with the philosophy of historical optimism and a vision of the prospects of world development, these works represent a further development of the theory and strategy of the CPSU's international activity and arm Soviet foreign policy with accurate and correct points of reference. The very rich ideological property made up of the Leninist principles of the Soviet state's foreign policy enriched and developed in relation to the new historical conditions and the colossal experience of the international activity of the party and its Central Committee become the property of Soviet people, the international communist, workers and national liberation movement and the broadest circles of the progressive international community.

The Soviet state's foreign policy enjoys the undivided support of the Soviet people and their warm and unanimous approval, which was expressed, in particular, during the nationwide discussion of the draft of the USSR Constitution, which legislatively recorded our state's Leninist peace-loving course in the international arena. Accumulating the tremendous experience of the international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state, in a special chapter devoted to foreign policy and also in other articles related to the sphere of international relations the new constitution records the historic victories won by the Soviet Union and world socialism in the international arena and asserts in the sphere of international relations the great advantages of socialism and the social structure, political system and ideology of the new society and the profoundly popular character of socialist democracy.

Developing the Peace Program of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, the constitution charts the new boundaries and reference points of Soviet foreign policy for the future. It is aimed at a further intensification and consolidation of the positive trends in current international life, making detente a continuous and increasingly viable, universal and irreversible process and at extensive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the peoples and is demonstrating with new force the peace-asserting mission of socialism. In the laconic lines of the constitution the Soviet Union appears

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to all mankind as a powerful and indestructible bulwark of peace and a shining beacon illuminating for the peoples the historical path of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

The modern era is characterized by the sharply increased interest of hundreds upon hundreds of millions of people on all continents in the problems of the future, the problem of a guaranteed and lasting peace and the paths and prospects of social progress. In the example of the USSR and the other socialist countries the peoples of the world are being persuaded of the correctness of the forecast of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin that communism is the answer to the riddle of history. The Great October resolved the key problem of social development--the liquidation of private ownership and the relations of oppression and exploitation which it engenders--and proved the possibility of and need for a fundamental change in the political system of society and the replacement of the domination of the monopolies by the power of the working people. In deciding our country's fate, the great proletarian revolution in Russia thereby provided an answer to the problems which history had set mankind. "And the world-historical significance of the October Revolution," L. I. Brezhnev observed, "is precisely that it opened the path to the solution of these problems and thereby to the creation on earth of a new type of civilization."<sup>6</sup>

Having laid the highway to the creation of a new society--one of material abundance and the comprehensive and unlimited development of the human personality's spiritual wealth--the Great October also signposted the practicable and effective path for the solution of an age-old problem of mankind and for securing man's most important right--the right to live under peaceful skies. Imperialism, to employ V. I. Lenin's expression, signified the coupling of all states "in a single dirty bloody bundle."<sup>7</sup>

The Soviet state, which was created by the victorious socialist revolution, boldly opposed the imperialist policy of aggression and oppression and advanced a program of the all-embracing reorganization of relations between countries and peoples on the basis of the principles of peace and genuine democracy in its very first foreign policy act. Thereby the Great October, which V. I. Lenin regarded as the "first victory of the cause of the abolition of wars,"<sup>8</sup> also opened a new era in the development of international relations.

The victory of the revolution afforded the Russian working class in the shape of the Soviet state a powerful lever not only for raising a backward country to the heights of social progress in a few decades but also for active influence on the international situation and for opening to mankind an outlet from the chaos and wars engendered by imperialism. Proletarian internationalism--the fundamental principle of the ideology of the working class and its party which embodies the objective precept of the working people's struggle for their social and national liberation and for the building of socialism and communism--became the most important guiding principle of the state foreign policy of the Soviet country.

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Developing K. Marx's thinking that it is precisely loyalty to the invigorating principle of internationalism which is the guarantee of the complete victory of the socialist proletariat internationally, in the spring of 1918 V. I. Lenin expressed the inexorable confidence that "Soviet power, which has staunchly fulfilled all the obligations of the international solidarity of the workers of all countries in their struggle against the yoke of capital and for socialism, will continue to do everything in our power to assist the international socialist movement and to secure and accelerate the paths leading mankind to salvation from the yoke of capital and from hired slavery and to the creation of a socialist society and lasting, just peace among the peoples."<sup>9</sup>

The CPSU is invariably loyal to this behest of Lenin's. Six decades of Soviet foreign policy are the epic of the great international exploit of the world's first socialist state, the courageous defense of the conquests of the revolution and tireless struggle for peace and friendship among the peoples. The strong growth of the Soviet Union's economic and defense potential and its increased international influence and authority and the growing influence of world socialism on the course of history are now revealing possibilities for the fuller manifestation of the transforming and creative nature of the USSR's foreign policy. The organic unity of the most humane goals and at the same time the most urgent demands of our time--insuring peace and social progress--is a most important and inexhaustible source of the vital strength and efficacy of the Soviet state's foreign policy.

The profoundly progressive role of Soviet foreign policy as an active and effective factor of world development has been and is being manifested primarily in the accomplishment of its principle task--securing the most favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism in our country. V. I. Lenin also saw this as the Soviet country's highest duty to the world revolutionary movement.

Having breached imperialism's world domination for the first time in history, the young Soviet republic found itself encircled by states which were hostile in a class respect. Would the socialist republic, immeasurably weaker than its adversaries economically and militarily, withstand the pressure of the hostile forces of imperialism? Not only the fate of the revolution and the fate of our motherland but also the prospects of the progressive development of all mankind depended on the solution of the question.

At a price of tremendous sacrifices and deprivations the Soviet republic repulsed the campaigns of the interventionists and won for itself peace. "...Ahead," V. I. Lenin said in December 1919, "lies the main phase of that peaceful building which enlists all of us, which we desire, which we must perform and to which we will devote all our efforts and our whole life."<sup>10</sup>

The past decades enable us to evaluate in its entirety the world-historical significance of the unparalleled exploit of the party and people, who were able, despite the colossal difficulties and deprivations, to preserve and consolidate the Soviet state and make it an indestructible bulwark of peace, democracy and socialism.

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The fact that the USSR's Leninist foreign policy made a worthy contribution to the accomplishment of this exploit is now an open book for the whole world. Operating under exceptionally difficult conditions and in an atmosphere of the constant threat of attack from outside and anti-Soviet provocations, particularly following fascism's seizure of power in Germany, our country displayed iron endurance and adherence to principle and combined firmness in the defense of its state interests and the cause of peace with flexibility and realism. The annals of Soviet foreign policy abound in stirring pages describing the courage and stanchness of Soviet diplomats--these emissaries of the Soviet people--who skillfully and with an awareness of their high responsibility pursued party policy and displayed selfless devotion to the ideals of communism.

In World War II the Soviet Union was the main force barring German fascism's path to world domination, it bore the main burden of the war and played the decisive role in the rout of Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan. The Soviet people's everlasting feat of arms will be remembered down the ages forever. The fundamental shifts which occurred after the rout of fascism confirmed V. I. Lenin's brilliant perspicacity and the correctness of his forecast of the paths of the development of human society. They created qualitatively new conditions and opened new paths and directions for Soviet foreign policy's exercise of its revolutionary-transforming role. The Soviet Union's influence and authority strengthened immeasurably, and the scale and depth of the farsighted and effective impact of CPSU policy on the processes of world development and the entire system of international relations grew and are systematically growing.

The emergence of the world socialist system began a new stage in the development of the Soviet state's foreign policy. An entirely new phenomenon--the socialist community--a new type of international alliance and a new, unprecedented historical community of peoples and states--took shape and is developing. The Soviet Union is now an integral part of the world socialist system and the socialist community, and concern for the utmost consolidating of the positions of world socialism, the development of comprehensive cooperation with the fraternal countries and for the strengthening of their unity and cohesion is the principal direction of the activity of Soviet foreign policy. "Our country has become a part of the big family of socialist states," L. I. Brezhnev said in the report devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "Thus could anything be closer in the surrounding world to us Soviet communists and all Soviet people than this socialist family? We are doing everything in our power for its prosperity and for our common good!"<sup>11</sup>

The growth of the influence of the socialist countries and their increased beneficent influence on the course of world events currently represent the seminal directions of social progress. While demonstrating its superiority over the capitalist system socialism is thereby paving the way for the social renewal of the entire world. The rich and full-bloodied life of the community of socialist countries and their comprehensive and increasingly efficient

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fraternal cooperation, the basis of which is socialist internationalism, convincingly reveal the progressive nature of the new regularities ensuing from the fundamentally new type of relations between states. The creation of a society of mature socialism in the USSR, the building of developed socialism in the fraternal countries and the building in the future of communism within the framework of the entire family of socialist states make it possible to visibly conceive of the inspiring picture of the tomorrow of human society. The new relations which, thanks to the internationalist policy of the fraternal parties, have taken shape between the countries of the socialist states and primarily between the countries of the socialist community represent a big and important contribution of socialism to the life of the modern world. Acting as a powerful accelerator of the historical process, world socialism is bringing this future nearer for all countries and peoples.

The possibilities objectively inherent in socialism secure for it advantages in all areas of the historical competition of the two systems currently underway in the world arena. Socialism has firmly and irreversibly seized the historical initiative. Representing a new social formation, it possesses tremendous possibilities and reserves. But they are not realized automatically. Much depends here, as the 25th CPSU Congress observed, on the policy of the ruling parties and on their capacity for preserving unity, struggling against exclusiveness and national isolation and acting jointly in the name of the accomplishment of common international tasks. The fact that the course of the Soviet Union toward a strengthening of the friendship, unity and cooperation of the socialist countries is recorded in the Basic Law of the Soviet state as a constitutional provision is of tremendous significance in this connection.

As far as the USSR's positions in relation to China are concerned, our policy in this question was defined by the 25th CPSU Congress. "...With respect to China, as to other countries," L. I. Brezhnev declared from the congress platform, "we firmly adhere to the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in one another's internal affairs and the nonuse of force. In a word, we are ready to normalize relations with China on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence."<sup>12</sup> This position of ours holds good in full.

The sphere of mutual relations with the countries and peoples which were the targets of colonial exploitation by imperialism has from the first days of the victory of the Great October been a field of Soviet foreign policy's transforming and constructive activity gigantic in scale and significance. The basis of the Soviet state's policy in relation to the peoples of the East are the great ideas of internationalism and a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of national liberation movements in the modern era as an integral part of man's world-historical transition from capitalism to socialism. Back even in the days when the shackles of imperialism's colonial system fettered approximately two-thirds of the territory and more than 70 percent of the population of the earth, V. I. Lenin prophetically foresaw the tremendous revolutionary possibilities of the working people of the

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colonial countries and pointed out that "the socialist revolution will not be only and chiefly a struggle of the revolutionary proletariat in each country against its own bourgeoisie, no, it will be a struggle of all colonies and countries oppressed by imperialism and all dependent countries against international imperialism."<sup>13</sup>

The rapid development and successes of the national liberation movements in the postwar period were a triumph of Leninism. Having created an entirely new correlation of forces in the world arena, the emergence and consolidation of the world socialist system contributed to an enormous extent to the liquidation of the colonial system. The winning of political independence by formerly oppressed peoples had, in turn, the consequence of a further weakening of the positions of imperialism. History has confirmed the objective connection, which was disclosed and substantiated by Marxist science, and community of fundamental interests of world socialism and the national liberation movements.

The main tasks currently confronting the developing states are the solution of problems of economic and social liberation and the surmounting of age-old economic backwardness in the shortest time. Objectively this is leading to the suffusion of national liberation revolutions with increasingly profound social content and confronting the young independent states with the question of choice of the path of further development. A characteristic manifestation of the nature of the modern era is the fact that in a whole number of states liberated from colonial dependence these tasks are being accomplished in the interests of the broad strata of the working people on the basis of a socialist orientation.

The aspiration of the developing states to a strengthening of political independence and economic and social progress is, however, encountering stubborn resistance on the part of the forces of imperialism and local reaction. In its attempts to consolidate the dependent position of the young national states and perpetuate their economic backwardness imperialism is counting on finding a means of transferring to them a considerable proportion of the difficulties engendered by the contradictions and crises inherent therein and thus strengthening its positions and prolonging the existence of the historically doomed capitalist system.

The use of economic and financial levers, the instigation of religious-tribal civil strife and the provocation of fratricidal wars--such are the unseemly instruments of the policy of neocolonialism. The bitter clashes with the exploiter elements and their foreign patrons are leading in a number of cases to vacillation in the policy of the young states and sometimes even to the loss of positions which have been won and to regression.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is invariably loyal to Lenin's policy of strengthening solidarity with the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. In the annals of the peoples' struggle for national and social liberation that is not a single page which does not bear the imprint of

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internationalist solidarity and effective support on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. As everywhere, in the zone of the liberation struggle the Soviet Union appears on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence and treats the liberated countries as its friends and comrades in struggle. "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom," L. I. Brezhnev observed at the 25th CPSU Congress. "The Soviet Union seeks no advantages for itself here, is not chasing concessions, does not aspire to political domination and is not soliciting military bases. We are acting as commanded by our revolutionary conscience and our communist beliefs."<sup>14</sup>

A most important and major present-day problem determining the prospects of social progress and the fate of civilization itself is that of the consolidation of peace, a halt to the arms race and disarmament.

The Communist Party, its Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo constantly keep these questions at the center of attention and are engaged in activity which is titanic in scale and energy aimed at securing peaceful conditions for Soviet people's constructive labor and the consolidation of universal peace. The party's most important priority tasks in this sphere were formulated in the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples which was adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress. "The paramount significance of the cause of strengthening peace for all peoples and for their progress and their future," L. I. Brezhnev observed, "this is the historical scale with which it is alone possible in our age to approach an evaluation of questions of world politics."<sup>15</sup>

The inseparability of socialism and peace has permeated the activity of the Communist Party throughout the history of the Soviet country. The policy of peace is organically inherent in the socialist state, in which private ownership and exploitation have been abolished and the economic and social causes of war have been removed. The Soviet people have a vital interest in securing peaceful conditions for their constructive labor.

The appearance of the Soviet republic--the world's first socialist state--posed with the utmost acuteness the question: what will be the nature of the relations between states belonging to different social systems? Could they be relations of peace and cooperation or will they inevitably be reduced to armed struggle?

The scientifically substantiated solution of this problem, which is currently a cardinal problem for the fate of mankind, was provided by V. I. Lenin. Having shown that the transition from capitalism to socialism occupies a prolonged historical period throughout which states belonging to two opposite social formations may exist on the globe simultaneously, V. I. Lenin formulated the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems embodying the objective characteristic of the developing of human society in the modern era. From the first day of the



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creation of the Soviet state this principle has been one of the fundamental principles of Soviet policy, and the Soviet Union is invariably guided thereby in its relations with capitalist countries.

Bourgeois governments for a long time ignored Soviet proposals on the establishment of peaceful relations and the development of business cooperation. In addition, the most aggressive circles, blinded by class hatred, aspired to portray the Great October Socialist Revolution as some historical "mistake" and even attempted to correct it--with the help of the bayonet. But neither the intervention nor the great war subsequently unleashed on us crushed the Soviet state or succeeded in diverting the Soviet people from their chosen path. In the postwar period the complete collapse of the "cold war" unleashed by the imperialists and the "from a position of strength" policy was convincing proof of the irreversibility of the gains of world socialism. The West's political leaders were forced to look truth in the eye and recognize that it is impossible to resolve the historical dispute between capitalism and socialism militarily.

The "cold war," which disrupted normal relations between many states and prevented the use of the best achievements of the human intellect for the good of the peoples and which was accompanied by the unrestrained growth of means of people's mass extermination, was not only a severe obstacle on the path of mankind's progressive development but frequently brought the world to the brink of nuclear conflict. It is apposite to remind of this again and again those figures of the West, particularly of NATO, who are not averse to returning the world to the "cold war" or something like it. Objectively, the ever increasing and accelerating process of the material preparation of a new world conflagration was the essence of the "cold war."

Man's salvation from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and the securing of conditions for his further progress required vigorous, large-scale measures. The CPSU assumed this initiative. On the basis of an in-depth Marxist-Leninist analysis of all the factors of contemporary social development and a precise consideration of the strong positive changes which had occurred in the alinement of class forces in the world arena at its 24th congress the CPSU put forward the Peace Program aimed at a radical improvement in the international climate and a fundamental reorganization of the entire system of international relations on the basis of democratic principles.

Interpreted by the peoples and realistic statesmen and politicians as an indispensable demand of the era, the Soviet Peace Program and the USSR's peace-loving proposals became a factor of tremendous mobilizing force. Relying on the might and activeness of world socialism and on its strengthening alliance with all progressive and peace-loving forces, the CPSU developed a "peace offensive" which was exceptional in scale and energy.

It is difficult to exaggerate what we have succeeded in achieving in this respect. The turnabout toward the relaxation of international tension, although there will be potential ups and downs in this tension in the future,

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has been decisive for the present state of affairs in the world. The real possibility of securing the necessary level of trust between states and shifting the competition and struggle between the two social systems into a channel which does not threaten mankind with military cataclysms has been proven, nevertheless. A sound foundation has been laid for the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the practice of international relations. The turnabout from confrontation to relaxation has opened to the peoples broad historical prospects of the consolidation of peace, social progress and the comprehensive development of economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

It is nevertheless impossible not to see the threat represented at the present time by the galvanization in the West of the forces of reaction and militarism. Aspiring to prevent the social progress and national liberation of the peoples and to preserve their privileges and fabulous profits from the production of the instruments of death, they have essentially developed an extensively coordinated campaign against detente. Kindling the hotbeds of military danger, destabilizing the situation in various regions of the world and whipping up the arms race to the utmost, the opponents of detente are attempting to return the world to the times of the "cold war" and nuclear "brinkmanship."

There are influential forces with an interest in a buildup of armaments and in inciting fear and hostility east of our borders also. They do not conceal here their hopes of extracting some advantage for themselves by setting other states and peoples against one another. As a result one process of the relaxation of tension is not under the present situation, with its complex interweaving of interests, guaranteed against delays and turnabouts.

The question now essentially stands thus: either the world will proceed along the path of renunciation of the use of force and along the path of disarmament and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation or it will be driven into the abyss of an uncontrollable arms race with the danger of an escalation of military conflicts threatening mankind with the direst consequences.

Persistent and consistent struggle for disarmament and for liquidation of the material basis of wars permeates the entire history of the foreign policy of the world's first socialist state. Relying on the fundamental propositions of Marxism-Leninism, this course expresses the Soviet people's profound interest in lasting peace and in the securing of conditions for the free development of all countries and peoples. As is known, back at the conference in Genoa--the first international conference in which the Soviet Republic participated--its delegation submitted a plan elaborated on the initiative of V. I. Lenin of a universal cardinal reduction in armaments. The Soviet Union has also put forward proposals on a universal or partial reduction in armaments in subsequent years.

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Under the new historical conditions which have taken shape as the result of the fundamental change in the correlation of forces in the world arena since World War II the Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries and utilizing its mighty economic and defence potential and its increased international authority, is waging a persistent, indefatigable struggle for a curbing of the arms race and for a reduction and, subsequently, the complete liquidation of the gigantic arsenals of death-dealing weapons, whose very existence is an enormous threat to the security of the peoples.

Historical experience indicates that a buildup of armaments has never led to a cementing of peace. The danger of such a policy has increased immeasurably in the nuclear-missile age, when the destructive power of the weapons is thousands of times greater than that of all kinds of arms employed in wars of previous eras. It is sufficient to say that a single modern nuclear warhead possesses greater capacity than the energy of all the explosives used by the states in World War II. V. I. Lenin's warning expressed back in 1918 that the development of military equipment could jeopardize the very conditions of the existence of human society resounds with new force today.

A halt to the arms race is a central clause of the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress. Striving for its implementation, the Soviet Union has presented a wide-ranging program which embraces all aspects of the problem and provides for both universal and complete disarmament and also concrete measures of a partial nature, depending on the degree of willingness of our Western partners to go along with their implementation. The Soviet Union attaches particular significance to nuclear disarmament and the tasks of the subsequent complete liquidation of nuclear means of warfare. The Soviet Union considers equality, renunciation of attempts to derive one-sided advantages to the detriment of the other side and a guarantee of equal security for all a fundamental principle of a solution of the problem.

Invariably displaying initiative and constructive approach and striving actively for concrete practical results in the disarmament sphere, the Soviet Union has made an impressive contribution to the elaboration and implementation of a number of important international accords aimed at limiting the production of certain types of weapon or banning an arms race in this sphere or the other. The proposals made by L. I. Brezhnev at the 18th Komsomol Congress on a complete halt to the further quantitative and qualitative growth of the armaments and armed forces of states with a big military potential were convincing new evidence of the firm resolve of the CPSU and the Soviet state to halt the stockpiling of arsenals of death.

The hackneyed myth of the "Soviet threat" is trickery fabricated to disinform public opinion in the West. The Soviet Union has never armed itself for the sake of armament and has never been nor will be the instigator of an arms race. Our successes in the military sphere are aimed merely at defending and securing ourselves and our socialist friends and allies against

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possible aggression. It stands to reason that in evaluating the requirements of the USSR's defense it is also necessary to take our country's geographical location into account.

The speeches of certain statesmen and bourgeois politicians in the Western countries, particularly the United States, have recently contained many words in favor of disarmament. But if one evaluates the state of affairs realistically, it is impossible not to recognize that the armed forces of the states have yet to be reduced by a single aircraft or a single tank. Liquidation of the physical means of warfare has not yet begun in practice. At the same time the development of military equipment and the elaboration of new types of weapons are sometimes proceeding more rapidly than the talks on disarmament. How can we fail to recall here the words of V. I. Lenin, who observed that "in politics people do not believe in words and do well not to believe...."<sup>16</sup> It has long been not words but concrete deeds which are needed in disarmament questions.

Particular responsibility in the modern world is borne by the Soviet Union and the United States, which could do much to reduce the scale of the threat of a nuclear conflict. The positive turnabout in relations between them which occurred in 1972 and which was reflected in a whole number of joint documents indicates that, despite the ideological and social difference, realistic bases for cooperation exist. The Soviet Union is firmly pursuing a policy of the further and lasting improvement of Soviet-American relations, whose development on a mutually advantageous and equal basis would correspond to the interests not only of our two countries but all peoples.

Unfortunately, the solution of the chief and immediate question in relations between the USSR and the United States--the signing of an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms--is being delayed. The reason for this is the vacillation, indecisiveness and inconsistency of the American leadership, whose positions are being negatively influenced by the the action of those forces which are attempting to frustrate detente and have their hands untied for an uncontrolled arms race. In evaluating the maneuvers of the opponents of detente, however, it is impossible not to see the danger that there could be missed the very opportunity for the conclusion of an agreement in a number of areas and, consequently, the opportunity for a subsequent transition to more far-reaching steps in the limitation of and reduction in strategic and other arms. Such a prospect could not, naturally, suit anyone.

The consistently peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and our country's aspiration to strive for unswerving progress along the path of military relaxation and the transition to real disarmament were expounded with tremendous force of conviction by L. I. Brezhnev in a speech during his visit to the FRG in May 1978. The Soviet Union sees as its most important goal in international affairs, L. I. Brezhnev observed, "defending and cementing peace--universal, just and lasting peace. Such is our unshakable policy. It is not dependent on any caprice of the international situation. It is legislatively recorded in the constitution of the Soviet Union. We are constantly pursuing this policy with all means. The work of Soviet diplomacy

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is subordinated thereto. It is supported by our country's entire public. We are developing all our plans with an orientation toward a peaceful future."<sup>17</sup>

Striking testimony to this approach is the very ample program of measures on disarmament questions submitted by the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly Special Session, which embraces both partial steps bringing closer the solution of this problem of world-historical significance and also general and complete disarmament, that is, a radical measure which, we are convinced, must sooner or later be implemented by mankind.

The main task, which our country put at the top of the list at the above-mentioned session, is securing a decisive breakthrough in the struggle for a halt to the arms race. The following are among the measures proposed by the Soviet Union: a complete halt to the further quantitative and qualitative growth of the armaments and armed forces of states with big military potential; a halt to the production of nuclear weapons in all their forms over a certain limited time; a halt to the production and the banning of all other types of weapon of mass destruction; a halt to the creation of new types of conventional arms of great destructive power; and a renunciation of the enlargement of the armies and an increase in the conventional armaments of the powers which are permanent members of the Security Council and also of the countries linked with them by military agreements. These also included the nonemplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they do not currently exist; a reduction in states' military budgets; and the aspiration to contribute to the success of the talks which are underway on limiting strategic offensive arms, the complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons tests, the banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles thereof, the banning of radiological weapons, the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms, primarily in Central Europe, and on limitation of the international trade in conventional arms and supplies thereof. Finally, these include the broadening of the circle of states participating in the operating system of international treaties and agreements on limiting arms and insuring the universal nature of these agreements.

Even a simple list of these measures shows that paths to the transition from the arms race and military tension to a radical easing of the threat of war do exist. It was with good reason that the majority of states either directly supported the Soviet proposals or expressed their favorable attitude toward them in one form or another. As far as the peoples are concerned, there is no people in the world which wants war; all peoples have a vital interest in peace, detente and disarmament.

By its proposals the Soviet Union has once again shown that since Lenin's days it has constantly pursued a policy of peace and a policy of preventing a world catastrophe.

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Categorically rejecting the misanthropic plans of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including the production and use of the barbaric neutron bomb, which wittingly assume the possibility of the annihilation of entire countries and peoples, Soviet foreign policy, which is profoundly concerned for the future of mankind, is doing everything to protect our land and pass it on to future generations in all its richness and beauty and not mutilated by the flames of a nuclear conflagration.

The Great October opened wide a broad expanse for movement along the path of the progress of all mankind. Having made millions of fighters for national and social liberation at all ends of the earth participants in the single gigantic battle for the revolutionary renewal of the world, it imparted exceptional depth and dynamism to the social processes occurring the world arena. The appearance of the planet's tomorrow, which was brilliantly predicted by the greatest Titans of thought--Marx, Engels and Lenin--is appearing increasingly manifestly in the stormy events of the era.

The time in which we are living will be remembered by generations as one of the most striking, complex and exceptionally crucial periods of world history. The sphere of international life has acquired tremendous significance in the development of countries and peoples. Suffused with the competition of the two social systems, it is developing under the sign of the main characteristic of the era--the constant and increasingly decisive irreversible change in the correlation of forces on a world scale in favor of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism.

The Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy, which is being pursued by the CPSU in close unity with the other socialist states, is performing an increasingly appreciable role in this historical struggle for man's salvation from oppression and exploitation, the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and for securing a lasting just peace.

"The world is changing and changing for the better literally before our very eyes," L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress. "Our people and our party are not passive observers of these changes. No, we are active participants therein. The labor of the Soviet people, who are building communism, and the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the international arena --all this is making a worthy contribution to the cause of social progress. And we can surely be proud of this. We can surely experience profound satisfaction in the strength of our ideas, the efficacy of our policy and the constructive energy of our people."<sup>18</sup>

Conclusion

The Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state is exerting a growing influence on international relations. Being at the forward edge of the struggle for peace, the USSR's foreign policy constantly remains a class, internationalist and anti-imperialist policy. As the experience of the

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60 post-October years testifies, the international activity of the Soviet Union maintains the continuity of the main directions of the struggle for peace, the freedom of the peoples and social progress.

The CPSU and the Soviet state are guided by the principles put forward by the great Lenin and are constantly developing and creatively enriching Lenin's inheritance. The CPSU Central Committee is paving the Soviet state's scientifically substantiated way in the world arena, developing the strategy and tactics and daily leading all foreign policy activity, which provides for the timeliness and farsightedness of adopted decisions and practical actions.

The international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in postwar years has been exceptionally intensive, strenuous and effective. The purposeful efforts for the solution of acute world problems were dictated by concern for the vital interests of the Soviet people, who are building communism, and the preservation of peace and by the need to liquidate extraneous features of the "cold war" and clear the path for extensive interstate cooperation. In consideration of this the CPSU has outlined concrete paths of a fundamental improvement in the atmosphere in the world and developed and enriched the theoretical principles of the foreign policy course under the conditions where real objective possibilities have emerged for a decisive breakthrough in international relations and the constructive discussion and practical settlement of accumulated world problems.

The successful implementation of the Peace Program has created favorable prerequisites for the development of an even more extensive and fruitful struggle by the USSR, the fraternal socialist countries and all democratic and anti-imperialist forces for the consolidation of peace and the organization of states' mutual beneficial cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The 25th CPSU Congress put forward new tasks whose solution is demanded by the interests of the security of the peoples and man's social progress. They are recorded in the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples, which is an organic continuation and development of the Peace Program.

People of good will have interpreted these programs as a practical path toward the relaxation of tension and toward insuring security. Their constructive nature has also been recognized by sober-minded statesmen of the Western countries, and the leaders of many liberated states have shown themselves solid with their most important propositions. Contributing to the positive development of relations between states with different social systems and stepping up the struggle of the progressive forces for the cause of peace and against aggression and colonialism and neocolonialism, the foreign policy programs of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses have become an important factor of an improvement in the international climate.

With the support of the entire people and in close cooperation with the parties and governments of the fraternal socialist countries the Communist Party

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and the government of the Soviet Union developed and are continuing a consistent struggle for realization of the international course outlined in them. The CPSU Central Committee regularly examines questions of this struggle at its plenums, unanimously approving in its decisions the activity of the Central Committee Politburo in accomplishment of the foreign policy tasks set by party congresses. The Central Committee plenum decrees "The CPSU Central Committee's International Activity Following the 24th CPSU Congress" of 23 November 1971, "The International Situation" of 19 May 1972, "The CPSU Central Committee's International Activity in Implementation of the Decisions of the 24th Party Congress" of 27 April 1973 and "The International Situation and the Soviet Union's Foreign Policy" of 16 April 1974 and the decisions of the December (1976) and October and December (1977) plenums summed up the results of the fulfillment of the decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses on foreign policy problems and outlined paths for their further implementation. At the same time new practical tasks were set for the further cohesion of the socialist community, the strengthening of the ties to the forces of national liberation and the conversion of peaceful coexistence into an indispensable norm of interstate relations. The party's international activity, L. I. Brezhnev said, at the Central Committee Plenum in October 1976, "proceeds under the sign of implementation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. We began to implement immediately, without hesitation, the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples adopted by the congress." The plenum noted with satisfaction the considerable successes in the further consolidation of the positions of world socialism, the new victories of the forces of national liberation achieved with the support of the USSR and other socialist states and the development of positive trends in relations with capitalist countries.

At the same time the Central Committee constantly emphasizes the need for constant vigilance and a readiness to repulse all intrigues of aggressive imperialist circles and consistent struggle against reactionary ideology and propaganda. "The CPSU and the Soviet state will continue to keep a vigilant eye on the intrigues of the enemies of peace and firmly and resolutely defend the interests of the Soviet people and the interests of world peace and the freedom of the peoples,"<sup>19</sup> the CPSU Central Committee April (1975) Plenum observed in its decree.

The activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the sphere of international relations has been comprehensively collated and further developed in the speeches, reports and articles and in the practical activity of L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. His speeches make an in-depth Marxist analysis of the phenomena occurring in the world arena, theoretically substantiate the foreign policy actions of the USSR and the socialist community and advance new tasks which ensue from the successful implementation of planned goals and the shifts in the world situation. Soviet people value highly L. I. Brezhnev's contribution to the achievement of the noble, humane goals

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of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state and his role in the elaboration and implementation of the Peace Program of the 24th congress and the Program of Further Struggle for Peace, which he expounded at the 25th party congress. With his inspired and impassioned struggle for peace L. I. Brezhnev has earned the gratitude of all people of good will, which was expressed in the conferment on him of the Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among the Peoples" and the award of the F. Joliot-Curi Peace Gold Medal. In June 1977 a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet unanimously elected L. I. Brezhnev chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Delivering the declaration on this question, M. A. Suslov said: "With his indefatigable struggle for the relaxation of international tension and for lasting peace and social progress Leonid Il'ich has won enormous authority and the respect of all upright people of the world. He worthily represents our party, the entire Soviet people and our great socialist state in the world arena. And it is significant that to international documents of vital importance not only to our country but also to the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation of the cause of peace is appended the signature of L. I. Brezhnev."

An event of enormous international significance, which exerted and is continuing to exert a profound influence on the situation throughout the world, was the elaboration and adoption on 7 October 1977 of the new constitution of the Soviet Union. This is determined primarily by the fact that the Basic Law makes a contribution to the theory and international practice of the building of socialism and enriches them with the experience of history's first socialist state of all the people. At the same time consideration of the practice of other socialist states made it possible to enrich the content of individual articles of the constitution. Reflecting the collective experience of socialist state building, it records the scientifically substantiated and proven reference points which could prove useful not only directly in the building of socialism but also on the approach paths thereto. It is observed with complete justification in the Asian, African and Latin American countries that the new Soviet Constitution contains much that is valuable for the liberated peoples, who are confronted by a choice of further development path and solution of the problems of strengthening the national states.

The constitution's international significance is also determined by the fact that it is influencing the course of the antagonism of the two world social systems, multiplying the magnetic force of the socialist example and graphically revealing the practical paths of the efficient and truly democratic solution of fundamental social problems in the interests of the working people.

The constitution is also exerting a tremendous influence on the international situation because it serves the cause of peace and the security of the peoples and the consolidation of the anti-imperialist solidarity of all progressive forces. The incorporation therein of a chapter legislatively recording the peace-loving nature of foreign policy confirms the USSR's resolve to strive for man's salvation from the horrors of war and the burdens of the

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arms race. The provisions of this chapter vividly reflect the class character of the Soviet state's foreign policy activity and its traditional support for the peoples' struggle for national liberation and social progress. Thus the constitution elevates to the level of a USSR state law that which constitutes the essence of the socialist state's foreign policy--its "concern for peace and the creation of international conditions corresponding to the interests of the struggle for national liberty and social progress and socialism and communism."<sup>20</sup>

An important practical step in implementation of the provisions of the constitution's foreign policy section was the Supreme Soviet's adoption in July 1978 of the Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion, Execution and Denunciation of the USSR's International Treaties. The need to replace the analogous law of 1938 was determined by the immeasurable increase in our country's treaty relations with the outside world. It is sufficient to mention that at present the Soviet Union is party to almost 10,000 current treaties and agreements. The content of these documents, which currently regulate our country's relations not only with the capitalist powers, as was predominantly the case before the war, but also with the fraternal socialist countries and also with the states which have arisen in place of former colonies, has become complicated and more diverse. The new law proceeds from the USSR's high-minded class approach to its international treaties and commitments. In assuming such commitments our country proceeds from the need to secure its political, economic and other interests as a socialist state and is guided by the interests of the entire socialist community. It also proceeds from the fact that international treaties are intended to be instruments of the policy of peace and the security of all the peoples and to serve the development of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation among all countries. The treaty practice of the Soviet Union is aimed at insuring that law and justice entirely exclude from international relations violence, aggression and imperialist tyranny.

The new law determines, in accordance with contemporary conditions, the procedure of the conclusion, ratification, execution, publication and registration and also denunciation of the USSR's international treaties. It determines that these treaties "are to be unswervingly observed by the USSR in accordance with the rules of international law." It is also emphasized that the USSR advocates the unswerving fulfillment of their commitments by other parties to bilateral and multilateral agreements also. Specifying the procedure of the publication of international treaty documents, the law confirms the invariability of the line proclaimed at the time of the emergence of the Soviet state aimed at the renunciation of secret diplomacy and secret agreements and at the pursuit of an open, honest foreign policy which rejects intrigue and backstage deals.

The changes for the better in the world, which have been termed the relaxation of international tension, are the chief result of the tremendous amount of work that has been performed in recent years by the CPSU and the Soviet state and the fraternal parties and countries of the socialist community.

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They are discernible and concrete and have been consolidated in many international documents, which creates a legal and moral-political barrier on the path of the devotees of military adventures.

This historical shift has been achieved primarily as a result of the consolidation of the positions of the USSR, the increased cohesion of the fraternal socialist countries and the comprehensive development of friendship and cooperation between them on the basis of socialist internationalism. "The main prerequisite of the effectiveness of our class-based international policy," L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes, "remains, of course, the successful development of our socialist community as a whole and of each socialist country." <sup>21</sup> Concern for the development of friendship and cooperation with the fraternal countries is the main direction of the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The regular multilateral and bilateral meetings of their leaders is a striking expression of the fundamental line aimed at the further consolidation and improvement of the alliance, friendship and cooperation of sovereign, equal socialist states rallied by common goals and interests and the bonds of comradesly solidarity and mutual assistance.

The consolidation of the general international positions of socialism is a most important result of the joint efforts. The Vietnamese people's victory over the imperialist aggressors and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, universal recognition of GDR sovereignty, the strengthening of Cuba's international positions and Laos's entry into the family of socialist countries serve as striking confirmation of this.

In the period July-August 1978 L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, had friendly meetings with G. Husak, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, E. Honecker, general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, J. Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee, E. Gierek, first secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee, N. Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, T. Zhivkov, first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the People's Republic of Bulgaria State Council, and Yu. Tsedenbal, chairman of the Mongolian People's Republic People's Great Hural Presidium. The leaders of the fraternal countries briefed one another on the tasks on which their parties and governments are working. Questions of the further development of bilateral cooperation, including the implementation of long-term economic programs and long-term specialization and cooperation, were discussed. The meetings convincingly demonstrated that the implementation of the plans outlined by the congresses of the fraternal parties is contributing to the broadening of relations between the socialist states in all the most important spheres--in politics, economics and ideology. The sum total of accords arrived at represent a new impetus in the coordination of actions both for the immediate and the more distant period. These accords will

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contributed to the planning and implementation of the impending five-year plans of the development of the economies of the community countries for the purpose of the greatest efficiency of the economy of each of them and the further consolidation of the world system of socialism.

During the exchange of opinions in the Crimea an intensified analysis was made of the current international situation on the basis of which the conclusion was drawn concerning the need for the socialist states' further active efforts to consolidate and intensify the relaxation of tension as the leading trend of international life and to supplement political relaxation with measures for military relaxation. The figures from the fraternal countries condemned the great-power policy of the Chinese leadership and stressed the need for the decisive repulse of the subversive actions of aggressive imperialist forces.

Having studied the results of the Crimea meetings, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo fully approved the work done by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and noted that "the talks are of importance for the further development of the fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation of the CPSU and the Soviet state with the communist parties and peoples of the socialist community countries."<sup>22</sup>

During the Crimea meetings the leaders of the fraternal countries resolutely condemned Beijing's great-power provocations against socialist Vietnam. Concerning this question, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo confirmed the "indestructible solidarity of our party, the Soviet state and all Soviet people with the heroic Vietnamese people, who are firmly defending the inviolability of their territory, independence and the right to undertake socialist building in their country without interference, threats and pressure from outside."

The actions of the present Chinese leadership are a serious danger to the cause of peace and socialism. Pursuing a great-power, hegemonist policy, Beijing is openly gambling on an exacerbation of international tension and aspires by all means to undermine the positions of the socialist community and all revolutionary and liberation forces. These aspirations were also expressed, in particular, in the speeches of Hua Guofeng, head of a Chinese delegation, during a visit to Romania and Yugoslavia in August 1978. PRC policy is supported by the most reactionary circles of the imperialist states. Evidence of Beijing's willingness not to stop at direct expansion for the achievement of its hegemonist goals is the flagrant pressure on socialist Vietnam, its inflammatory role in Kampuchea's military provocations against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its territorial claims on neighboring states.

A friendship and cooperation treaty marking a new stage in the development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations was signed on 3 November 1978 during a visit to the Soviet Union of a party-government delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam headed by Le Duan, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee, and Pham Van Dong, member of the Vietnamese

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Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and DRV [as published] premier. It embodies in full the principles of socialist internationalism, to which the diktat of relations between two equal, independent and peace-loving states is alien and whose friendship threatens no third country.

An important component of contemporary world development are the successes of the liberation struggle and the activity of the states which have arisen in the place of former colonies and semicolonies. The oppressed peoples, whose consciousness was awoken by the Great October Revolution, have, with the assistance of the socialist community and the world working class, liquidated the colonial system of imperialism in its classical form. Their efforts are now aimed at conclusive liberation from the oppression of imperialism and the liquidation of the system of neocolonialist plunder. In accomplishing these tasks many liberated countries reject the capitalist path of development and are setting as their goal the building of a society free of exploitation and directing their attention toward socialism.

Together with the fraternal parties and countries the CPSU and the Soviet state invariably follow the Leninist course of support for the anti-imperialist struggle and are extending cooperation with the liberation movements and developing states.

The Soviet Union welcomed the victory of the people's revolution and the birth of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As L. I. Brezhnev observed, the USSR will do everything "for the further strengthening of the traditional friendship with a good neighbor."<sup>23</sup>

The visit of a Soviet party-government delegation to Ethiopia (September 1978) was new testimony to the cementing of relations with Africa's progressive forces. An agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed. The USSR and Ethiopia condemned the great power, hegemonist and expansionist policy of the Chinese leadership and Beijing's interference in the internal affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Our country firmly supports the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israel's separate agreement with the Egyptian leadership under the aegis of the United States. The so-called "Framework of Peace in the Middle East" and "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" were agreed on as a result of the talks of A. al-Sadat, M. Begin and J. Carter at Camp David (September 1978). These documents envisage Israel actually retaining control over the West Bank of the Jordan and in Gaza, its occupation of the Golan Heights and also the deprivation of the Arab people of Palestine of the right to self-determination and the formation of their own state. The intention of the organizers of this deal is perfectly obvious: "to split the Arabs and counterpose them to one another and impose on the Arab countries separately terms of a settlement suitable to the aggressor."<sup>24</sup>

The Camp David agreement has aroused the profound anger of patriots of the Arab world. The conference of the leaders of Syrian, Algeria, Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the PLO in Damascus in September

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1978 declared their nonrecognition of any agreements reached on the basis thereof. The association of the conferees in a National Front of Steadfastness and Resistance, whose proclaimed aims are cohesion in the interests of economic and social progress, assistance to the unity of the Arab countries in the struggle for the liberation of all occupied land and the exercise of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, was confirmed.

A party-government delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic headed by H. al-Asad, who had talks not only as the leader of Syria but also on behalf of the other participants in the National Front of Steadfastness and Resistance, was in Moscow 5-6 October on an official visit. The joint communique stated "the Soviet Union's invariable solidarity with the Arab peoples waging a just struggle for liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression." L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin had a meeting with Algerian President H. Boumediene on 16 October. The parties condemned the Camp David deal and confirmed their position with respect to the conditions of a just and lasting peace in the Near East.

The events of recent years have fully confirmed the conclusion drawn by the 24th CPSU Congress that "the general crisis of capitalism continues to intensify." The struggle of the working class and all working people is broadening, and the masses' aspiration to fundamental changes is growing.

Attempting to suppress the revolutionary struggle, the imperialists are making extensive use, together with pressure, threats and repression, of the tactic of undermining the international solidarity of the working class and all working people. This makes the defense and unswerving observance of the principle of proletarian internationalism as one of the main principles of Marxist-Leninism particularly important. Entirely in accordance with this the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that abandonment of it would deprive the communist parties and the workers movement of a powerful and proven weapon. Confirming the Lenin Party's constant loyalty to this principle, L. I. Brezhnev said, addressing the communists and their allies fighting against the dictatorship of capital and for freedom, peace and social progress: "You can always be sure of our friendship, solidarity and support!"<sup>25</sup>

An important condition of the further intensification and extension of the process of international relaxation is the development of the USSR's relations with the capitalist countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Our country aspires to expand them in the direction of long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation in various spheres in the interests of strengthening peace. The attempts of aggressive imperialist circles to strive under the pretext of the settlement of existing problems of unilateral advantages to the detriment of the interests of the USSR and the fraternal countries and to take advantage of the broadening of contacts and exchanges for interference in internal affairs are being firmly rebuffed here.

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The in-depth scientific analysis of the question of the influence of detente on the class struggle which L. I. Brezhnev made at the 25th CPSU Congress is particularly relevant in this plane. He exposed the groundless assertions of bourgeois ideologists that the solidarity of Soviet communists and the Soviet people with the struggle of other peoples for freedom and progress contradicts detente. "This is either naivete or, rather, deliberate brainwashing."<sup>26</sup> Detente applies to the sphere of international relations and cannot rescind the laws of the class struggle. It cannot be thought that under the conditions of detente the communists will reconcile themselves with capitalist exploitation or that the imperialists will begin to support the interests of the working people. Providing for unswerving observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence, detente corresponds to the interests of the peoples of all countries. The fact that it is creating more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist building merely confirms that socialism and peace are indivisible.

Nor do the assertions of a leftist bent that detente, which is based on the peaceful coexistence of states of different systems, is aimed virtually at "freezing the sociopolitical status quo" and contradicts the interests of the revolutionary struggle have anything in common with reality. The profound revolutionary changes which occurred in the world in the 1970's under the conditions of the turnabout toward detente and its consolidation convincingly refute the fabrications as regards the "freezing of revolutions." Creating a barrier to the "export of counterrevolution" and imperialist interference in the affairs of sovereign states, detente is conducive to the cohesion and success of the forces struggling for national liberation and social progress.

With consideration of these fundamental propositions our party and state are persistently striving to impart to detente an irreversible character and for the expansion of business cooperation between states with different social systems. The successes achieved in this sphere have been most marked in Europe. Our country attaches importance to cooperation with France, Britain, Italy and the FRG and with all states with a different social system, large and small. The USSR is devoting great attention to relations with the United States, believing that they should be determined by considerations of a long-term nature dictated by concern for the consolidation of peace.

The events of recent times--primarily the decisions of the Washington NATO session on a further buildup of armed forces on a large scale and the U.S. Congress's approval of an unprecedentedly big military budget--attest new efforts by the military-industrial complex and the most reactionary imperialist circles to prevent the consolidation of detente and to push the world back to the times of the "cold war." At the same time these facts, as the CPSU Central Committee Politburo observed, "show with all clarity the true aims of the organizers of the racket in the West apropos the imaginary 'military threat' on the part of the socialist states." A negative influence on relations between countries with different social systems is also being exerted by the continuing attempts of the United States and certain other NATO countries to interfere in the socialist states' internal affairs under the

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flag of hypocritical sermons apropos imaginary "human rights violations" in the socialist countries and to put pressure on them by means of the discriminatory restrictions in the sphere of trade which were extensively, but fruitlessly practiced by Western governments in the "cold war" years. The Soviet Union rejects such a policy. On 25 August 1978 L. I. Brezhnev noted in a conversation with A. Hammer, a prominent representative of American business circles, good possibilities in the development of mutually beneficial trade-economic relations between the USSR and the United States. At the same time it was stressed with all firmness that relations in this sphere, as in others, may only be successfully organized and developed on the basis of complete equality and noninterference in one another's affairs. "The Soviet Union resolutely rejects any attempts by the U.S. Administration to utilize trade to exert political pressure. Such attempts will give their initiators nothing and could additionally complicate Soviet-American relations."

In a speech on 22 September 1978 L. I. Brezhnev observed: "Similarly, certain influential circles in the United States are deliberately provoking the Soviet Union, aspiring to exacerbate the situation still further. This, comrades, is a serious matter. We will resolutely resist attacks on the rights and interests of the Soviet state, but we will not give in to provocations."<sup>27</sup>

Detente has shown itself to be a vigorous process corresponding to the peoples' interests. But there has been a complication of the international situation because of a galvanization of the actions of reactionary, militarist circles. "International relations are now at the crossroads, as it were, leading either to the growth of trust and cooperation or to the growth of mutual apprehensions, suspicion and the buildup of arms--paths leading ultimately either to lasting peace or, at best, to a balancing on the brink of war. Detente affords an opportunity for opting for the path of peace."<sup>28</sup>

USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, had a meeting with U.S. President J. Carter in Washington on 30 September 1978. The Soviet position was set forth with the utmost straightforwardness: the USSR is for good relations with the United States, and it is not it but the United States which is to blame for the fact that a chill, if not worse, is felt in relations between them. The exchange of opinions on the problem of strategic arms revealed certain positive shifts in Washington's position, although insufficient for agreement on all issues. J. Carter again expressed a desire to meet with L. I. Brezhnev. It was said in response to this that L. I. Brezhnev is ready for a meeting of the appropriate documents are prepared, primarily a treaty limiting strategic arms, and if it will culminate in an important step being taken to the benefit of a deepening of detente.

L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, received U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance in the Kremlin on 23 October 1978. Having drawn attention to the



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negative features in Soviet-American relations which had appeared in recent times, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that the smoothing of relations between the USSR and the United States and a guarantee of their development in a line of ascent would correspond to the interests of the peoples of both countries and the aims of an intensification of the process of the relaxation of international tension and a strengthening of peace.

A principal direction of the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state is the struggle for disarmament. This struggle is directly connected with the task of supplementing political relaxation with military relaxation.

The Soviet Union has contributed to the achievement of a number of practical agreements on limiting the arms race and easing the threat of a world nuclear war. But the main work is still ahead of us. Our country has put forward and is defending in an acute struggle with the forces of reaction and aggression a constructive program of urgent measures in this sphere.

In August 1978 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo pointed once again to the paramount importance for the extension of the detente process of a halt to the arms race and the transition to disarmament and to the need to insure that the work performed at the negotiations on these questions, particularly the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic offensive arms and the Vienna talks on a reduction in armed forces and armament in Central Europe, be crowned with an impressive outcome.

Continuing the consistent policy aimed at an easing of and a halt to the arms race, in September 1978 the Soviet Government presented the initiative of discussion at the UN General Assembly 33d Session of the question "The Conclusion of an International Convention on Strengthening the Security Guarantees of the Nonnuclear States." The draft convention envisages that the states party to the future agreement would undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten their use in relation to the nonnuclear states party to the convention, which would renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and would not allow them on their territory.

In the general debate at the session at the end of September 1978 A. A. Gromyko, the head of the Soviet delegation, emphasized that the USSR is itself ready and calls upon "all other states to work indefatigably, within the United Nations also, to insure that all peoples are brought closer to a dependable peace and that the dam against war is impenetrable and insurmountable."

The urgent importance of the Assembly's approval of the USSR's proposals concerning a convention on strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear powers and also on the nonemplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they do not now exist was comprehensively substantiated. The Soviet representative noted our country's resolve to continue efforts on the implementation of the program of measures for winding down the

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arms race put forward by the USSR. The constructive Soviet position was supported by the delegations of the other socialist community countries and all peace-loving states.

Following Lenin's behests, the CPSU and the Soviet state are continuing the unflagging struggle for peace and international cooperation. Welcoming the heads of the diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow, L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, said:

"...there is essentially no country or people in the world with which the Soviet Union does not wish to have good relations;

"there is no urgent international problem to whose solution the Soviet Union is not ready to make its contribution;

"there is no hotbed of military danger in the elimination of which by peaceful means the Soviet Union does not have an interest;

"there is no type of armament, primarily weapons of mass destruction, which the Soviet Union is not ready to limit and ban on a reciprocal basis, in accordance with an arrangement with other states, and subsequently remove from the arsenals.

"The Soviet Union will always be an active participant in any negotiations and any international action aimed at the development of peaceful cooperation and the strengthening of the peoples' security."<sup>29</sup>

The Soviet Union's international position is currently stronger and more stable than ever. Our people have not known war for four decades. The wise policy of the Communist Party, the Leninist Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo and L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, take the credit for this. "Everything possible has been done to secure conditions of peaceful building in our country and in the fraternal socialist countries and for peace and the security of all peoples."<sup>30</sup>

The foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state is the concern of all the people. It is based on the economic and defense might of the USSR, the spiritual potential of our great motherland and the labor enthusiasm and full support of the entire Soviet people. Here lies the guarantee of its further victories.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 577.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 37, p 153.

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3. Ibid., vol 35, p 265.
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 434.
5. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 16, p 23.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 6, p 579.
7. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 37, p 153.
8. Ibid., vol 44, p 149.
9. Ibid., vol 36, p 123.
10. Ibid., vol 39, p 407.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 6, p 590.
12. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Material of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 11.
13. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 39, p 327.
14. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 12.
15. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 4, Moscow, 1975, pp 281-282.
16. V. I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 32, p 289.
17. "Vizit Leonida Il'icha Brezhneva v Federativnuyu Respubliku Germanii 4-7 Maya 1978 goda. Rechi, dokumenty, materialy" [Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's Visit to the FRG of 4-7 May 1978. Speeches, Documents, Materials], Moscow, 1978, pp 49-49.
18. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 3.
19. PRAVDA 17 April 1975.
20. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 6, p 640.
21. Ibid., vol 4, p 250.
22. PRAVDA 27 August 1978.

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23. "Poyezdka L. I. Brezhneva v Baku 18-25 sentyabrya 1978 goda" [L. I. Brezhnev's 18-25 September Trip to Baku], Moscow, 1978, p 30.
24. Ibid., p 29.
25. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 6, p 594.
26. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 33.
27. "L. I. Brezhnev's 18-25 September Trip to Baku," p 28.
28. L. I. Brezhnev, "Along Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles," vol 6, p 595.
29. Ibid., pp 368-369.
30. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," p 4.

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86

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