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JPRS L/8619

15 August 1979

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 5/79)



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	PAGE
POLAND	
Opposition Figures See Government as Weak (Giovanni Russo; L'EUROPEO, 28 Jun 79)	1
ROMANIA	
Ceausescu Family Misadventures in Spain Reported (CAMBIO 16, 17 Jun 79)	5
Advances in Criminology Described by Head of Institute (Ion Angelescu Interview; PENTRU PARTIE, May 79)....	10
YUGOSLAVIA	
Defense System Outlined for French Audience (Dusan Jankovic; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jun 79)	12

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POLAND

OPPOSITION FIGURES SEE GOVERNMENT AS WEAK

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 28 Jun 79 pp 172-179 LD

[Giovanni Russo dispatch: "An Evening in Mickiewicz Street"]

[Excerpts] Warsaw--"Why does the government tolerate the opposition's activity?" Jacek Kuron had a kind of laughing fit: "A journalist from LE MONDE asked me that 2 months ago and I told him that it is not the government that is tolerating the opposition, but the opposition that is tolerating the government. It was a paradox, however, which the journalist took literally. In fact there is some truth in my reply. The government could eliminate the opposition, which here is an organized and large-scale movement, albeit still a vanguard one, which manifests itself in very ramified legal and illegal forms, but it would have to arrest at least 4,000-5,000 of the most famous intellectuals and artists, students and workers. It is simply too weak to be able to permit itself to do so."

"For several months," Kuron said, "I have been continuously followed by two plainclothes policemen and every night, even now, two police cars are parked on either side of the road where I live, but only until the morning. The telephone suddenly developed a fault 3 days before the pope's arrival: somebody came and pulled out the wires. Of course it was the police."

Kuron showed me the latest issue of the KSS "KOR" COMMUNIQUE and the monthly NEWS BULLETIN, consisting of some 40 duplicated pages. It is the paper which publishes information and documents on the economic, social and political situation and of which they print 6,000 copies, but which has a much greater circulation. "In Poland the economic crisis is profound (there is a \$16 billion deficit with the West), the plan is not working, agriculture is in a catastrophic state and there is a shortage of essential medicines. This is one of our worst moments. This has also caused a crisis within the party, which cannot control the political situation. There is a clear gap between the government and society."

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Adam Michnik and Barbara C., who is editor of the literary magazine ZAPIS, to which the best known writers (Woroszyński, Bochenski, Kazimierz Brandys and Baranczak) contribute, confirmed these assessments.

"It is a mistake on the West's part," Michnik said, "to confuse the albeit important phenomena of dissidence in the USSR and the other Eastern bloc countries with what happens in Poland. Here it is now an opposition movement centered on the Workers' Defense Committee. And it enjoys great support among the population."

"Kuron is right," Michnik observed. "The government could eliminate the opposition only by means of many arrests; but the need to maintain good relations with the United States and the fear of a scandal in the West prevents it from moving on to repression--apart from the fear of an explosion, which the USSR wants to avoid at all costs in Poland. The existence of an opposition linked to such a strong church explains why the party was unable to ban the pope's visit. But everything can be explained by the weakness of the leadership group within the party and the government. The leadership group is experiencing its gravest crisis since Stalin's era: it cannot carry out repression, but neither can it carry out the reforms which would be the only way to prevent economic disaster. The tragedy for those in power is that the price of reforms is a drop in living standards, a price which, in political terms, they are not in a position to pay."

One person who does rule out any changes in the leadership, however, is an intellectual, an influential party member. His opinion is shared, moreover, by the Catholic opposition, if that is the right name for the intellectuals and groups centered on the journals ZNAK (THE MARK) and WIEZ (THE LINK), albeit for different motives. He spoke to me with a disconcerting sincerity, which revealed both the identity crisis being experienced by many communists and the shock caused by Karol Wojtyła's 8 days in Poland.

"Gierek will stay," he said. "Before Brezhnev dies, nothing can change in the party, because we have to wait and see what happens in Moscow. Even with Brezhnev as ill as he is, nothing can change in the Soviet party, because they do not know how to replace him without upsetting their internal balances. Our leadership group is very weak and isolated, and partly corrupt as well. Power without control (here it is the party which directly governs the state) is more damaging than power over which there is some form of control. But we have no alternative. Wyszynski knows that Gierek is the best possible thing for the Polish church and the pope knows this too (he is a stubborn man, but also a great diplomat). He has gone, but we remain herewith a population dissatisfied above all with the economic conditions. Not all Poles are rational when it comes to the USSR and John Paul II did well to say a few good words about them [presumably the Soviets] too at Auschwitz. The pope has left, but we remain here to safeguard our cultural and geographical entity. We must

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accept the reality: We must keep the Soviet soldiers, and another Czechoslovakia would be a disaster that not even the USSR wants, and indeed greatly fears." In a surge of confidence, my interlocutor continued: "In the socialist countries there is a profound economic and social crisis, but Poland is the most seriously ill because the contradictions are more grave and sensational between the industrial development which has been the greatest in the Eastern bloc and the transformations in economic and social life. The economic machinery has become very complex and the old political and administrative structures do not stand up. The level of production is low and we cannot manage to make the workers work. We do not know how to find a way out of this. Then there is a major ideological crisis. It is a wheel which turns in a vacuum, with rules belied by everyday life. 'War communism,' which could have suited Lenin's or Stalin's times, is still being implemented. Fine-sounding expressions are merely repeated, without people believing in them."

"People are dissatisfied," my interlocutor continued, "because they have to stand in lines for hours, sometimes from 0400 hours, to buy a little meat. But if we increase prices there will be a general strike and the government will collapse. We have already seen this in 1956 and 1970."

And indeed when the pope was in Poland, the following joke was current: "Now the Poles will find more meat, because the Russians do not eat meat that has been blessed." But let us return to the communist intellectual's confessions: "Now there will be calm for a few months, nobody will concern themselves with prices and the growing inflation. Everyone will have to absorb the effects of the pope's visit. But the problem has become more serious. Now the government is even weaker toward the church and the people. The working class already knew that it was strong after the success of its strikes. Now the others have also realized that they are a force, that they are the majority, and they will try to exert pressure to take every opportunity to wrest something more from the state. The party can make few concessions, however, and must stay in power, otherwise there will be a Czechoslovakia-type disaster."

WIEZ sells 7,000 copies and, if there were no restrictions on paper, it could sell at least four times as many. Its editor, Tadeusz Macowiecki, is the Polish Nicola Chiaromonte, with the same moral intensity, the same cultural and civil rigor. It is a spiritual similarity which strikes me. His face looks pained and severe. "For Europe," he said, "Poland is like the far side of the moon." [Quotation marks here and at end of next graf as published] Since John Paul II's visit something has profoundly changed, so that our present destiny, together with our historical destiny, has become part of the shared destiny of mankind. Do not expect everything to change politically here. That is an irresponsible forecast. It is true, however, that the political leadership knows that the result of this visit will strengthen society and not the leadership. Society's energy has been enormously revived.

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A hopeless apathy has been broken. It is not a matter of making the opposition groups more radical, but of increasing social pressure: only thus will there be any real changes. People have become aware of their own moral strength. We do not want to provoke a Soviet intervention, neither do we want things to stay as they are. Only by means of pressure from society can we change the situation without provoking a disaster. Following the pope's visit, every Pole realizes that he can speak out and speak out without fear. The invitation to the pope was not a victory for a liberal stance within the government, but for the strength of society. It was an event which will influence the entire socialist camp. But the church is strong because it is itself an element in this social pressure. It is a very long and very difficult process and there will be a long march. So believe us, we are a responsible, mature nation, not stupid, which has had many tragic experiences but which will never abandon the testimony of its own hope."

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU FAMILY MISADVENTURES IN SPAIN REPORTED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 pp 31-41

[Text] MUNDO OBRERO, the official organ of the Spanish Communist Party, has accused the Spanish press of insulting Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian chief of state:

Ceausescu, who was the official guest of Spain for five interminable days despite the continuous rudeness he displayed, is one of the protectors of Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the PCE, to whom the recently legalized party gave a 1940 Cadillac which he had to abandon because of the old vehicle's constant breakdowns.

According to the official organ of the Communist Party, "in Madrid, the fawning newsmen -- who talk like fishwives -- devoted themselves to insulting a foreign chief of state because neither he nor his wife subjected themselves to the hypocrisy and absurdities of the anachronistic Suarez diplomacy or the medieval customs of diplomatic protocol."

CAMBIO 16, which followed in detail the dazzling visit of Nicolae Ceausescu -- Dada Ceausescu, according to certain foreign ministries -- has been able to reconstruct what was the first visit to Spain by a leader from the East.

The first "station of the cross" began long before the arrival of comrade Ceausescu, when a number of officials from the Romanian security services requested entry visas, stating that they were engineers and not members of the police force. However, they were engineers who gradually worked their way into the entourage and made it a habit to ask for anything they wanted because otherwise, the comrade president might grow angry and when a leader from the East grows angry....

The second "station" on the long path of the cross was the eve of his arrival with the outright order that several suites at the Ritz Hotel had to be reserved in case the official residence -- the Versailles-like Aranjuez Palace that had been requested by the president himself -- should not be to the liking of Ceausescu and his entourage.

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Palace Layout

The third station involved the Spanish Security Services when they realized that the greatest interest of the Romanians lay in photographing everything, probably as a service to a third country whose identity it was not difficult to guess.

In their obsession with obtaining information, they even asked for details on the security system of Zarzuela Palace, the residence of the King, saying that they would like to have a small drawing of the layout.

At Moncloa Palace, they wanted to know who tasted the food of the head of the government. With more irritation than wit, Adolfo Suarez replied that it was the King.

The answer must not have been very convincing, for at lunch the next day, Ceausescu did not eat a bite. However, he made up for it when he arrived at Aranjuez Palace, ordering that he be served a complete lunch even though it was after 4:30 in the afternoon.

The Romanians brought their own telephone central and operator but they still tried to stick their noses into communications at the Barajas airport. At any rate, the warnings and clarifications of Spanish security officials and diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs went unheeded. Quite attentive, they would tell everyone that they understood, but as soon as they could, returned to what they were doing.

For the white-tie dinner, they absolutely refused to wear formal evening dress and blatantly forgetting the customs of all international diplomacy, refused to give a dinner in return. Naturally, Manuel Fraga took advantage of the Romanian move and also wore a dark suit to the Palace. The spectacle at the Royal Palace was a sight to behold: Half of the guests were in tails and bedecked with medals, while the other half were wearing plain street clothes.

That night -- or rather, in the wee hours of the morning -- the Romanian guests at Aranjuez Palace gave the cook the fright of her life when the president's security guards went to ask for meat and ham and cheese sandwiches. A whole squad of agents with radios closely followed the gastronomic undertaking while keeping one another up to the minute on work in the kitchen.

Service for Everything

The Palace administrator could not get over his astonishment, but the astonishment soon turned into terror. Hours after he thought that the nightmare had ended, he was calmly walking down the corridor of the presidential suites in order to see that everything was in order when, as he recalls, he was suddenly thrown to the floor with an expert judo move. Thereafter, not even the servants dared to walk through the halls. The Romanians themselves took care of the rooms.

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However, one of the most dramatic moments of the "Calvary-like" visit was during the scheduled trip to the Prado Museum. The illustrious guest, bored with the El Grecos and Goyas, decided after 20 minutes that he had had enough paintings and that he had to go to Moncloa. Unaware of the president's haste and with 40 minutes of the tour yet to go, the director of the museum tried in vain to explain hues and meaning. Ceausescu did not even stop before the canvases.

The Romanian was in such a hurry that when he arrived at Moncloa Palace, it still looked like a desert. Since there was no one at the door to receive him, an usher had to take him into the reception room. In view of the usher's concern, no one even wanted to sit down and the atmosphere was not relieved of its tension until a smiling and conciliating Suarez appeared.

Mystery at Moncloa

And yet, incredible things were happening at Moncloa Palace. While in the Council of Ministers' chambers comrade Ceausescu droned on and on about national independence and the equality of nations, the other Romanians filling the other rooms of the palace shut themselves up two by two and went at it tooth and nail. At the same time, two security officials, dauntless of face and carrying their own black square bags, were seated on a bench right at the very door of the room where the official talks were going on. When the officials refused to give up their privileged place, Spanish security officers decided to counter the attempts of the Eastern officials.

In the end, it would appear that they decided to "comb" the area in order to ascertain whether anyone had "forgotten" anything.

That night, everything was nearly normal at Aranjuez except for the fact that Santiago Carrillo and Duran Farrel were summoned at the same time (the one who waited was Santiago Carrillo, naturally) and there were protests over the noise that a train whistle made as it went from the station to the Spanish capital.

Valencia was a tragicomedy. To begin with, the band played the old Romanian national anthem. Moving right along, after the visit to the city hall and in view of an obvious desire to go shopping, the mayor insisted that the president's wife should go to the Corte Ingles and practically did not allow her to get into the presidential car. In the midst of the greatest confusion, it was finally realized that the Corte Ingles visit had only been planned a half hour previously and that at the last minute, the president's wife had decided to accompany him.

At the Lois Factory where bluejeans are made, the guests were offered a glass of orange juice, but Ceausescu waved his hand and a faithful servant -- acting as both a lackey and bootblack -- brought out his own lemonade. The gentleman guest had his drink and there was none for anyone else.

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The First Lady (who is the second ranking official in the hierarchy of the Romanian Communist Party) soon decided that she wanted to go to the beach. It took a great deal of patience and artfulness to convince her that the beaches of Valencia were very far away and that it was not worth the trouble.

Upon leaving the helicopter that took them to Sagunto, the faithful servant playing the double role of valet and bootblack saw with horror that his master's shoes were dusty, and to the astonishment of the Administrative Council, which was moving toward the plane to extend a smiling greeting to the visitors, he knelt down at the president's feet. Whipping a handkerchief out of his breast pocket, he cleaned them like a professional.

To put a finishing touch on the sweltering day, at a luncheon given at a hotel on the outskirts of the city, the security forces would not allow air conditioning to be used. No one should have been surprised that the president availed himself of the opportunity to leave suddenly, postponing the coffee, after-dinner drink and cigar for another time.

Toledo was a complete disaster. The tour of the city began at the cathedral. The president seemed to be in another world when suddenly, upon getting out of his car, he found himself face to face with two actual medieval churchmen in red robes and white lace, their caps on their heads, who greeted him effusively, despite his sleepy look. To give him time to compose himself, they introduced him into the sacristy. But Roman vengeance was not long in coming. Only a few minutes later, the Romanian president decided to cut the visit short when the bewildered guide was explaining the delicious nuances of "The Burial of Count Orgaz," which is a marvel of.... It was a little after seven. In a quick conspiratorial meeting between the civilian governor, the mayor and other Spanish officials, it was decided that they would have to fill up time until nine, the hour appointed for the official dinner at Fuensalida.

There then began a frantic mobilization of Spanish imagination in order to mark time. The president was taken to a handicrafts workshop in Toledo, two stops were made at the synagogue, he was taken around the city, the monuments were praised.

Finally, the party went up to the room where the president carefully washed his hands, but in a few seconds, he was already at the reception. In a moment of supreme inspiration, someone showed him how to put together and take apart the Cetme of one of the civilian guard escorts. The civilian governor then took the bull by the horns and told him that they could not leave there before 8:45. But what a miracle! Ceausescu smiled, tamed down and to the great horror of some and the surprise of others, asked for two beers and a piece of freshly fried sausage.

At one minute before nine, they arrived at Fuensalida. Manuel Clavero, minister of culture, arrived just in time, managing to save a presidential table which would have had to be changed if he had arrived seconds later.

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It was now evening and on the dark and lonely road running from Toledo to Aranjuez, the vehicles following the presidential car lost sight of the cortege at an intersection. Worriedly beating a hasty retreat, they discovered the cause: The presidential car -- but none of the twenty odd other vehicles -- was starting to shoot off sparks. There was a loud noise and the engine died.

The whole caravan came to an abrupt halt and the security officers raced madly to the scene, one of them running into a ditch. The officials in the last car ran to the automobile with their little black bags in their hands but it was a false alarm. The exhaust pipe had simply come loose and the driver put out the flames, nearly skinning himself alive.

In the midst of the lugubrious scene, the Ceausescu couple appeared to understand nothing of what was going on and watched in wonderment the strange commotion and confusion. They finally arrived at Aranjuez, where the night still reserved the strong tension of a possible meeting between Suarez and Ceausescu, which the Romanians held to be a question of honor, quite unlike the Moncloa affair.

No one knew anything and the Romanians began to issue threats: If there was no meeting, there would be no press conference. The telephone calls and tension continued until the next day at 9:30 in the morning.

Airplanes

On the following day, as if it were the finishing touch, a phone call during the visit to the Aeronautical Construction Company announced that there was a bomb in the plant. The Spanish security agents went into a cold sweat trying to deceive Ceausescu. However, the president had taken a liking to the planes and was enjoying himself more here than while taking in the paintings at the Prado. He calmly said that there was no hurry. When he was finally sneaked aboard a helicopter for Zarzuela Palace, everyone heaved a sigh of relief.

A separate chapter should be devoted to Nicolae Ceausescu, Jr., the third-ranking individual on the protocol list and the top man with respect to a lack of upbringing and manners. Suffice it to say that at the Palace dinner, while seated between Amparo Illana, wife of Prime Minister Suarez, and Silvia Arburua, wife of Marcelino Oreja, he refused to converse with them and spent his time looking at the ceiling and whistling. A serious incident nearly took place when the young Ceausescu, head of the Communist Youth in his country, began to make jocular, disagreeable remarks about Spanish protocol in the presence of several Spanish officials.

In short, when comrade Ceausescu finally took off for lovely Bucharest, the entire country could relax at last, except for the MUNDO OBRERO staff, which appears to be enchanted by the coarse manners of the East.

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9
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ROMANIA

ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGY DESCRIBED BY HEAD OF INSTITUTE

Bucharest PENTRU PARTIE in Romanian May 79 p 17

[Interview with Col Ion Angelescu, head of Institute of Criminology in General Inspectorate of Militia, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] We are in the office of Col Dr Ion Angelescu, head of the Institute of Criminology in the General Inspectorate of the Militia, for a short interview.

[Question]: Comrade colonel, what is the place and role of criminological science and technology in determining the truth in the most difficult cases?

[Answer]: Placing work in the realm of criminology on a scientific basis-- as Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, our supreme commander, required of us--presupposes the intensive utilization of the methods and means offered by criminological science, which is undergoing constant development as a result of the influence exercised by the contemporary scientific and technical revolution.

[Question]: Our readers would like to learn about the innovations and the current concerns of science in the field of criminology.

[Answer]: Mobile crime labs, installed on modern means of transportation, which belong to the county militias and the militia of Bucharest Municipality, permit the rapid dispatching to the crime site of equipment, devices, kits, instruments, and substances which are necessary for making investigations on the spot, for re-enacting the crime and for other penal prosecution activities.

Also, during recent years, we have been witnessing the more intensive use by militia cadres of methods of examination offered by criminological science, a fact which has increased their efficiency in the identification of the perpetrators of the crimes.

In addition to classic criminological methods, other methods have fully proven their usefulness in the activity of the judicial organs. These include spectrography, infrared and ultraviolet spectrophotometry and atomic

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absorption, the chromatographic method, the technique of diffraction and fluorescence in X-rays, the technique of electronic microscopy and holography, ultramodern methods which are entering into the area of concern of our institute, which initiate a new stage in the examination of microtraces, anthropological and biological processes, in the intensive utilization of electronic computers, in the use of a vast range of possibilities offered by Romanian phonocriminological methods and by successful attempts to apply psychology in determining the truth.

[Question]: Can you summarize the most important results of the Institute of Criminology?

[Answer]: Since it is an interdisciplinary science, criminology should be viewed in close association with progress achieved in all other sciences. This does not mean that we, the criminologists, should not carry on basic and applied scientific research to work out our own methods. In the 1976-1979 period, the cadres of our institute and those of the county criminology labs devised some 131 criminological devices and methods, 25 of which were patented as inventions. Some 45 of these received prizes at the first national "Hymn to Romania" festival and more than 20 were presented at the second edition of this prestigious manifestation.

The specialized works compiled by the Institute of Criminology are very useful in training militia cadres, especially the "Practical Treatise on Criminology," the first two volumes of which have been made available to the militia cadres and other judicial organs.

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YUGOSLAVIA

DEFENSE SYSTEM OUTLINED FOR FRENCH AUDIENCE

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 43-45

[Article by Col Dusan Jankovic: "The Square of the 'Hedgehog' Circle--The Yugoslav People's Army"]

[Text] Col Gen Stane Potocar, chief of staff of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA], made an official visit to France from 17 to 20 April 1979.

On this occasion ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI is publishing for its readers an article by Col Dusan Jankovic, who examines the organization of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY].

As the joint tactical exercise "Golija 76" was ending, a group of foreign military observers arrived at the positions located near the village of Orlovi. Just then one platoon of soldiers was preparing for combat against the "blues" who were expected to appear at any moment.

"Our platoon, with 276 rifles, 5 machineguns and 20 antitank grenade launchers, from this slope has to stop the battalion of 'blues'," announced the commander quietly to his soldiers.

When these words were translated, one foreign military observer asked in amazement: How can that be? Thirty soldiers and approximately 300 weapons. Is it a mistake? An extra zero?

People Armed Equals Triple Military Strength

This "error" in calculation was quickly explained. The platoon leader in estimating his forces did not use the classic formula. If he had, he would only have had 30 weapons, which would hardly be likely to stop a battalion. However, he included all the forces in the area, in other words the 300 armed villagers, in his combat force. This is what really happened. When the battle began, the soldiers of the regional units, the partisans and the guards were in the trenches near the village, side by side with the soldiers of the standing army, and they all defended the village of Orlovi.

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This unusual calculation aroused uncertainty in much wider circles.

Last year during his visit to the United States, President Tito, speaking on U.S. television, revealed "the military secret:" In war time, the Yugoslav armed forces could field approximately 8 million soldiers. Military experts and journalists were astonished at "this incredible figure," because according to the usual standards, Yugoslavia could field 4.5 million soldiers at most. This represents 20 percent of the total population of 22 million inhabitants. The SFRY armed forces cannot be judged by the criteria valid for conventional armies. In Yugoslavia, the prediction of a great military classic is coming true; it stated that the country which could implement the "armed people" concept would double its military forces. This optimistic prediction has even today been surpassed: the number of people carrying weapons is three times larger.

A Modern Army

The standing army and the territorial defense comprise the Yugoslav armed forces. Their total strength in peace time has not been a military secret for a long time: in and outside the barracks, there are approximately 2 million soldiers bearing arms. In accordance with the principle "each citizen a soldier," approximately 1 million rifles have been distributed to the people in the last few years. This could only be done in a country whose political system ensures that the weapons in the hands of the citizens will be used only for the country's defense.

Of the smaller complement of these armed forces, let us say approximately one man in eight is in the barracks. The soldiers in the operational units form the backbone and the permanent element in the general popular defense. Although small in number in peace time, the Yugoslav People's Army because of its total striking force is classed as a modern European army.

Currently, it is implementing an accelerated modernization plan, carried out on the basis of the 5-year plan (1975-1980). At the end of this period (in other words, next year) the total fire power will be considerably increased and will be largely based on the country's armaments and technical means of production (80 percent of the total armament). Our military industry can produce armaments and equip an infantry division from the semi-automatic rifle to the 203mm howitzer. In addition, we also produce more complex technical equipment, such as the "Orao"-model plane, the "Oranj" multi-tube rocket launchers, submarines, rocket-launcher boats, armored vehicles, etc.

Within the framework of modernizing the army, special effort is being made to improve the anti-aircraft defense system, antitank defense, and defense against air- or sea-borne units.

Millions of Soldiers Without Barracks

The territorial defense is several times larger than the standing army. It is called "the army without barracks," and in its ranks are more than

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a million well-trained soldiers equipped with modern weapons. Almost all soldiers in the territorial defense have completed their military service in the army except the young volunteers who are being trained in special training centers. Each commune, city, village or factory has its own territorial units which in recent years have made remarkable strides in their organization, their weapons and their equipment. The "depot detachments" of the past have been transformed into military units. As for combat readiness, the territorial units are able to take up positions as quickly as the units of the standing army since the former have the necessary weapons and equipment in their homes. All Yugoslavia is "covered" by echelons of this civilian army. The territorial units are no longer "ordinary infantry" equipped with rifles and light weapons, they also have artillery, boats, and even planes (it could be said that the aircraft that they have are not less in number than those of the air force). The striking force of these companies and battalions is considerable. For example, the antitank forces of the communes (500 in number) can successfully oppose several thousand tanks. Another "element" must be added to this appraisal: if each soldier in territorial defense carried an antitank mine in his pack (and it takes 500 mines to destroy a tank), four armored divisions would be disabled.

The armed forces are the backbone of the Yugoslav defensive strategy whose foundations were laid during the war of national liberation from 1941 to 1945. This concept of general, popular defense, named "hedgehog strategy" by its creator, Marshal Tito, means preparing the entire society for battle. In war time, the whole country would become a military camp, in which more than 13 million adult citizens, organized in military units would oppose the aggressor by armed struggle and other means. For this reason, right now in peace time the entire population is in training according to plans to be in a position to carry out war duties.

For some years, in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, an exercise called "Nothing Can Surprise Us" has been held in which, for example, last year 3 million citizens between the ages of 10 and 70 participated. Whole regions, cities and villages took part in this "battle" and each participant contributed to the defense effort--fighting, putting out fires, transporting the wounded, repairing tanks, putting up posters, digging trenches, etc. Similar exercises to determine the people's combat readiness are also being held in the other republics.

The War Plan Is Not a Military Secret

In recent years, armed forces training has gone beyond the conventional military games. Each autumn, when the army's combat readiness is tested, various institutions participate in the joint exercise. In addition, to standing army and territorial units, the security organizations, civil defense, communal assemblies, socio-political organizations and the economy also carry out various duties. The "Golija 76" joint tactical exercise in which about 10 communes took part demonstrated that the readiness of the "armed people" could be verified. It was an "image of war" in which all

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citizens, by every possible means, ever-ready, day and night, unceasingly defended every inch of territory. All military formulas become unworkable when there is an exhausting, long-term pressure to counter a blitzkrieg invasion.

To find the square of the Yugoslav "hedgehog" circle, we must begin with new mathematical axioms. The classifications used throughout the world for "very confidential" material has been removed from all the war plans. The classic rule about military secrets no longer applies, because preparing the entire country for defense means that millions of citizens have detailed information not only about their duties in the combat effort, but also about the YPA general staff's basic concept of Yugoslavia's struggle in war time.

Nonaligned Yugoslavia is building its defensive ramparts to win the "decisive battle" in peace time. By its "hedgehog strategy" it hopes to discourage any would-be aggressor who has drawn arrows on his operational maps pointing to its borders.

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