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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 46/79)

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ARMORED DIVISION MECHANIZED, ENGINEER REGIMENTS DESCRIBED

Armored Division Mechanized Regiment

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 70-71

[Article by Colonel Edmond Jeancolas, commanding officer, 35th Infantry Regiment, Belfort: "Mechanized Regiment: Mobility and Firepower"]

[Text] The armored division's two mechanized regiments are its multi-purpose elements. They each have a powerful array of antitank weapons, their own organic reconnaissance and support units and are capable of conducting a wide variety of operations without reinforcement. They are always employed as part of the division. That employment usually involves preparing and facilitating the employment of the division's tank regiments and completing their action. The mechanized regiments' capability to perform this mission was recently substantially enhanced through reorganization and such new equipment as the AMX30 [battle tank], AMX10 [armored personnel carrier], VAB [Forward Area Armored Vehicle], Milan [antitank missile], 120-mm mortars, 89-mm LRAC [antitank rocket launcher], FAMAS [5.56-mm assault rifle], etc. The mechanized regiment's power and its effectiveness in a meeting engagement with enemy armor stem especially from its two AMX30 tank companies. This means that in coping with the major threat, namely the armored threat, the armored division's commanding general will be able to retain longer and more often his tank regiments for employment in the more decisive phases of an operation.

Forces Tailored to Missions

The mechanized regiment is organized into:

- a. Two mechanized companies equipped with AMX-10's. Each company has four mechanized platoons and one Milan platoon.
- b. Two tank companies equipped with AMX30's. Each company has three tank platoons and one mechanized platoon.

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c. A headquarters, support and service company (CCAS) consisting of a reconnaissance and intelligence platoon (SER), a heavy mortar platoon (SML) and a security platoon.

This variety of equipment gives the regiment its versatility, in other words its capability of simultaneously combating enemy:

a. Tanks: particularly with its 20 AMX30's, 16 Milans and 55 rocket launchers.

b. Infantrymen on foot: with its 700 5.56-mm rifles, 44 20-mm guns mounted on VTT's [Armored Personnel Carriers], and six 120-mm mortars.

c. Aircraft: with all of its 64 20-mm guns.

Moreover, all of the regiment's major combat vehicles have a good amphibious capability or can deep ford waterways while completely submerged, and can fight at night and in a contaminated environment.

The diversity and effectiveness of the mechanized regiment's equipment and personnel give it a broad range of both offensive and defensive capabilities oriented most particularly toward antitank and night combat operations in difficult terrain or in an urban area.

Enemy armored vehicles are destroyed by the regiment's infantry by means of an interlocking system of various antitank weapons having complementary effects:

a. Dismounted infantrymen are employed in close combat utilizing their rockets, mines and grenades.

b. The Milan missiles, either grouped at regimental level, or kept at company level, or attached to a mechanized platoon, are employed against enemy armored elements at greater distances. But the nature of the terrain and the time required to place the Milan in firing position may still limit that antitank missile system's effectiveness.

c. By their long "reach," firepower and self-protection, the AMX30 tanks add another dimension to the regiment's antitank capability and can conduct sudden, intensive and localized counterattacks. Heavy mortar fire can be closely integrated with artillery fire in this type of combat action.

The introduction of IL (light intensification) and IR (infrared) night driving and fire control devices means that, in addition to the traditional night operations by infantrymen on foot, armored vehicles can now satisfactorily displace or infiltrate along trails to within 1,000 meters of the enemy and effectively surprise him in well-prepared attacks on point targets.

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Difficult terrain is the mechanized regiment's preferred combat terrain. The mechanized companies open the way for the tanks and reduce entrenched enemy troops.

When faced with an obstacle such as a stream or river, as soon as the necessary reconnaissance in close liaison with the engineer is completed, infantrymen from the mechanized companies cross on inflatable boats or conduct a deliberate crossing on board the amphibious AMX10's, and quickly establish a security perimeter on the far side. The supporting AMX30 tanks then cross on pontoon rafts or ford the stream submerged and secure the maneuver space needed to allow the main body of the division to cross.

Lastly, in an urban area, the mechanized regiment may be assigned the task of securing an axis or an important intersection. This type of combat necessitates employment of infantrymen on foot and with supporting fire from the tanks. But the relatively small number of dismounted infantrymen the regiment can provide--about 250--limits its capabilities in such operations.

In summary, therefore, the mechanized regiment, heavily armed with anti-tank weapons, can conduct shock-action producing attacks day and night against point targets. When it is absolutely necessary to employ the regiment's infantrymen in a dismounted role, they are dismounted as close to the objective as possible and supported by all available weapons. This is the only way to maintain the tempo suited to the armored division.

#### Single Mission

The mechanized regiment, supported by artillery and usually reinforced with an engineer unit, is generally employed in the first (attack) echelon with a single mission. This mission may be:

- a. In the offense: gather tactical intelligence, seek and destroy the enemy's antitank weapon systems;
- b. In the defense: slow up the enemy's advance by delaying action, counterattacks, and if required, establish a defense in place.


Its scheme of maneuver is essentially mobile and characterized by brief and repeated attacks or sweeps. The maneuver develops rapidly while remaining bound to the terrain as closely as possible. The regiment engages the enemy on a front of some 5 to 6 kilometers in a zone of action which often extends from 12 kilometers in width.

In combat, it usually deploys homogeneous units operating within compartments of terrain suited to their weaponry, but it can deploy mixed units commensurate with the mission and terrain, for instance, on the approach march and in combat within wooded or urban areas.

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Some 15 years after the advent of the AMX 13 family of armored vehicles, the mechanized infantry is now beginning a new stage in its history.

Yet while attention focuses mainly on its improved mobility and firepower, the mechanized infantry does not overlook the fact that its effectiveness depends mainly on the valor of its foot soldiers who must retain the infantryman's traditional qualities of endurance, determination and initiative.



[Key on following page]



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Key:

1. About 1,000 men including 250 infantrymen
2. 20 AMX30 tanks, 44 AMX10 VTT's [Armored Personnel Carrier] six 120-mm mortars
3. Headquarters, support and service company
4. Tank companies
5. Mechanized companies
6. Headquarters and support platoon
7. Reconnaissance (scout) and intelligence platoon
8. Heavy 120-mm mortar platoon
9. Security platoon
10. Headquarters platoon: one tank, one VTT
11. Three tank platoons, three tanks each
12. Mechanized platoon: three VTT's
13. Headquarters platoon: one VTT
14. Four mechanized platoons, three VTT's each
15. Milan [antitank missile] platoon: eight Milan launchers, four VTT's

Armored Division Engineer Regiment

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 74-75

[Article by Colonel Rene Soulier, commanding officer, 9th Engineer Regiment, 6th Armored Division: "Help our Mobility, Hinder the Enemy's"]

[Text] Turning to his engineer officer, the division commander asks him: "What support can the engineer furnish the scheme of maneuver I have just formulated?"

This question could be viewed as a sign of concern or condescension, depending on the mood of the division engineer officer. Actually, the question would reflect a purely intellectual attitude which holds that the action of a combat support element is merely juxtaposed with the action of the infantry-armor combined arms team.

The real procedure is altogether different. In fact, if an optimum economy of force operation is desired, it is essential to integrate engineer action into the scheme of maneuver in the same way as the action of other combat arms, and do this during the planning stage.

The armored division's effectiveness depends essentially on the rapidity with which it maneuvers, its firepower and its ability to change posture frequently. These characteristics cannot be fully effective unless throughout the period of combat operations the division retains its freedom of movement while the enemy's freedom is impeded.

Consequently the armored division engineer regiment's two primary missions are: help enhance the division's mobility, and take measures to hinder the enemy's mobility. Its organization was designed on the basis of its equipment which gives it new capabilities infinitely greater than

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those it had in the past. In addition, the highly diversified range of its equipment\* gives the regiment the flexibility of employment enabling it to be a full-fledged participant in the different types of divisional combat operations.

Highly Efficient Equipment

The regiment's major items of equipment are assigned to either its combat units or grouped within the specialized platoons of the support company.

Each section of the armored combat platoon is authorized:

- a. An armored combat engineer vehicle (EBG) derived from the AMX30 family and equipped with a power shovel, a winch, a mine and demolition charge launcher and a slewing crane.
- b. A forward area armored vehicle (VAB) serving as a personnel carrier.

Each section of the mechanized combat platoon is authorized:

- a. A multipurpose engineer vehicle (MPG, model F1) designed to clear routes not subject to direct enemy fire, maintain lines of communication, and prepare approaches to crossing sites at rivers and other obstacles.
- b. A VAB personnel carrier.

The support company has the following special-purpose equipment:

- a. In the obstacle crossing platoon:
  1. Four self-propelled close support bridges (PAA) capable of launching eight 20-meter spans, or 38-meter spans under exceptional conditions, and capable of carrying 40-ton tanks, hence the AMX30 battle tank.
  2. Light bridging equipment (MPF): eight rafts capable of carrying Class 14 loads (i.e., armored vehicles of the VAB or AMX10 category) or 90 meters of bridging capable of carrying Class 20 loads (i.e., vehicles of the 155-mm self-propelled artillery category).
- b. In the equipment platoon: earth-moving machinery, trench-digging vehicles and material-hauling vehicles.
- c. In the obstacle construction platoon:
  1. Four drills capable of boring 6-meter deep holes for demolitions in less than 1 hour.

\* The greater part of this equipment will be in service by 1981.

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2. Two land mine "buriers" and four land mine "dispensers," each with the capability of laying 500 mines per hour.

Capabilities Tailored to Missions

While the regiment's organic obstacle-crossing capability is limited to small obstacles (heavy equipment is maintained at corps level), on the other hand, the regiment's route clearing and repair capabilities are substantial in that there are 28 major items of equipment capable of doing such work: 16 EBG's, four grader tanks (with bulldozer blades), and eight MPG's.

The high-speed drills, the mine "buriers" and "dispensers," are all highly efficient machines which give the regiment a most satisfactory obstacle construction capability.

Although the engineer regiment allocates all of its resources to helping enhance the division's mobility, it can also operate simultaneously:

a. In the forward area: to clear the six to eight routes necessary to the advance of two to three armored or mechanized regiments.

b. In the rear area: to repair or maintain two to four main supply routes within the armored division's zone of responsibility.

With its obstacle crossing capabilities, the regiment can restore Class 40 crossings over eight short gaps. This class of bridging is sufficient to carry all the division's authorized equipment. The regiment's crossing capabilities are greater for lower class vehicles. The authorized MLF equipment allows some 50 Class 14 vehicles to cross within 1 hour.

Employed as a bridge over an obstacle with a maximum width of 90 meters, it can handle an average traffic flow of 150 Class 20 vehicles per hour.

As for impeding the enemy's mobility, the engineer regiment can attach its two armored companies to the lead regiments. These companies can then assume responsibility for construction of point obstacles (mined road blocks, abatis) on eight routes simultaneously. It can establish obstacles in line or in area patterns toward the rear for a defense in place or on a flank to cover the division. As an example, in 1 hour, the mechanized company, reinforced with the six mine-laying machines, can lay a 2,000-meter strip having a density of 1.2.

Lastly, the regiment's earth-moving machinery can perform certain organization of the ground tasks of limited scope, such as preparing field fortifications and gun emplacements on the final protective line, for example. The regiment can also form assault teams armed with special-purpose weapons (flamethrowers, special explosives) trained to participate in attacks on strong points or in street combat.

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#### Great Flexibility of Employment

Decisions on employment of the regiment fall within the province of the division commander who is kept constantly informed of the operational capabilities of the engineer troops by a liaison detachment. The regimental commander personally remains close to the commanding general whenever major planning and operational decisions are being made. In fact, it is of vital importance to have the engineer regiment's operational capabilities taken into consideration and incorporated in the scheme of maneuver.

One example will suffice to illustrate this principle. Assume that the scheme of maneuver adopted by the division requires holding an aggressive enemy on a final protective line for a definite period of time and that this operation necessitates the employment of two armored or mechanized regiments. By improving the defensive strength of the area with the mechanized engineer company reinforced by obstacle building and earth-moving personnel and equipment, it is possible, providing there is sufficient time, to employ only one regiment, and the second regiment can thus be assigned to another operation. Hence the engineer regiment's work makes a greater economy of force possible and, therefore, constitutes an important component of the division's scheme of maneuver.

The engineer commander deploys his troops and equipment in conformity with the priorities assigned him. It must be realized, however, that the regiment's units are "preoriented" because of the very nature of their equipment: the armored companies will be chiefly employed in direct support of the forward regiments whereas the mechanized company will rather operate farther back in the division area.

To give a quite simple illustration, the following deployment and missions of the regiment's units are highly conceivable:

- a. One armored company is attached to the leading regiments with the mission of:
  1. In the offense: facilitating their advance by clearing routes;
  2. In the defense: supporting the delaying action by emplacing point obstacles.
- b. The mechanized company is told to await further orders and will most likely be assigned such missions as:
  1. Repair and maintenance of divisional lines of communication;
  2. Establish obstacle areas (barriers) in the division rear or on a division flank;
  3. Support an obstacle-crossing operation.

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c. The second armored company intensifies the engineer effort in the scheme of maneuver:

1. Either in the forward area, by increasing the mobility of the leading units in the offensive phase or by strengthening the delaying action in the defensive phase;
2. Or on a flank, by participating in the division's covering force;
3. Or again in the rear area, by increasing the defensive strength of a final protective line established on a position vital to the scheme of maneuver.

The support company is generally assigned the mission of reinforcing the combat units.

The armored division engineer regiment's action is largely forward-area oriented in support of the division's scheme of maneuver. However, the division cannot be entirely self-sufficient.

In particular, for the crossing of large obstacles, the corps will have to either reinforce the division with the necessary troops and equipment or take over all or part of the crossing mission.

Furthermore, the corps will often have to coordinate its barrier plan with those of the divisions concerned so as to keep the overall scheme of maneuver coherent.


The gathering of terrain intelligence is the responsibility of all arms and services, and the corps of engineers in particular. Exploiting that intelligence is one of the responsibilities of the engineer commander at each level of command. The synthesis of such intelligence will enable the combined arms commander to take the terrain factor into account in formulating his scheme of maneuver.

The task of gathering technical intelligence is assigned particularly to the three DLRG's (Engineer Liaison and Reconnaissance Detachment) deployed as far forward as possible.

The continuous effort to obtain greater efficiency, and the priority given to the support of forward units made it necessary to extensively mechanize the armored division engineer regiment's units. In a brief, sudden, and hard-hitting engagement, the regiment's action will always be governed by the principle of rapid reaction and execution at the expense of the lasting character of whatever it builds, repairs, emplaces, etc.

With the advice of his engineer officer, and by employing the engineer regiment's capabilities to their maximum, the commanding general of the armored division will be able to retain his freedom of action as far as mobility is concerned, while at the same time thwarting his adversary's mobility.

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Key:

1. Simple organizational structure
2. Headquarters and service company
3. Support company
4. Armored companies
5. Mechanized company

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

WRITER GIVES VIEWS ON ERA OF 'TOTAL STRATEGY'

Paris STRATEGIQUE in French No 2, 1979 pp 61-81

[Article by Michel Garder]

[Text] In his historical novel, "August 14 " Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn quite properly notes that, unknown to the belligerents, the beginning of the Great War marked the advent of a new zodiacal era.

Setting aside the reference to the zodiac, we venture to share the view of the great writer, with the clarification that for us this era is one of total strategy.

As a matter of fact, 64 years ago the leaders of the two camps thought they were confronting a classical war for which they considered themselves to be normally, intellectually and materially ready. It could not occur to them that "the going to extremes," described by Clausewitz and accepted by the various war colleges, was not going to be limited to violence in the purely military sector and that the conflict was to degenerate rather quickly into a total war. No one--not even the strategists of the German General Staff--was in a position, in 1914, to imagine the essence of this inexplicable confrontation which ignored all the prohibitions and set its sights on the annihilation of the enemy as a "collective self" by striking at [civilian] populations in the same way as at his armed forces, by undermining national cohesion and by reopening the question of the foundations of his political-administrative order.

How could it have been foreseen at the time that this total war, among other things, was going to facilitate the appearance of an original phenomenon: Leninist-Marxist totalitarianism which, building on the rubble of the former Russian Empire, was to formulate and implement a total strategy imposing upon the rest of the world a permanent conflict whose most dramatic episode is probably World War II and upon which the nuclear reality was subsequently to confer a new and agonizing dimension.

The fact of the matter is, unfortunately--for reasons that we will set forth later--there is very little interest in our times in the nature of this total

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strategy, when there is not quite simply denial of the reality and the influence it could exert upon the course of events through the situation of conflict which characterizes our era. In addition to that, we have become accustomed to using the selfsame term of strategy for any purpose whatever--and quite often in the wrong way--while at the same time limiting the study of so-called defense problems to the military sector. That is all the more regrettable because knowledge of the weapons of this original art, which total strategy represents, supplies a valuable key both for the understanding of the dynamism of contemporary history and for the elaboration of an interesting method in the sector of global futurology.

It is for this reason, continuing the work begun under the direction of General Beufre, that the team of researchers of the Total Strategy Study Group proposes to publish a series of studies on this subject, beginning at present with a brief overview of the basis, evolution and characteristics of total strategy.

#### From Total War to Leninist-Marxist Totalitarianism

Today, it is obvious to a serious historian that, without the unleashing of total war from 1914 to 1917, the Bolshevik putsch of November 1917 would have been unthinkable in Russia. On the other hand, it is less obvious for a large number of specialists that it was equally the total character of World War I which, in great measure, influenced the specific characteristics of Leninist-Marxist totalitarianism, facilitated the victory of the Reds in the civil war and conditioned the elaboration of the Bolshevik total strategy.

In support of these statements, let us recall first the essential characteristics of total war. The passing of classical war into total war was effected at one and the same time thanks to the cumulative utilization of the various aspects of technical progress in the military sector, properly speaking, and the incorporation in the strategic package of all the other resources: psychological, economic, financial, scientific and technical, envisaged henceforth not only as auxiliaries of the armed forces but also as weapons per se.

A double process was to result therefrom, in appearance a contradictory process of diversification of multiple forms of war, each having its own characteristics, and of integration of the latter in a totality to the degree that a total war was involved. Thus it is that in the military sector we see added to the classical concepts of ground and naval warfare those of air and submarine warfare, not to mention the subdivision of ground warfare into categories which at times are questionable, such as trench, movement, attrition or even "gas" warfare. As for the nonmilitary means, they give rise to psychological, economic, etc. warfare. From another standpoint, the integration of all these forms of warfare, required by the mandatory oneness of purpose of the very notion of total war--variously achieved, moreover, according to the countries--implied a new approach to the phenomenon which was summed up by Clemenceau's jest: "War is too serious a matter to entrust to the military." Of course, within this totality tending in the direction

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of inseparability, the strategist maintained a preeminent position, with the title of commander in chief; however, contrary to the Clausewitzian view, the supreme political authority--chief of state of government--superimposed himself totally over the strategist in the new and unformulated function<sup>1</sup> of super-strategy.

Thus total war was no longer like classical war, "the pursuit of politics by other means"; but it became "the radicalization of all means--including those of the armed forces--and their utilization by the political sector to attain objectives." Long before Mao Zedong's formulation, we witnessed the total subordination of the military to the political take place and, by way of consequence, the politicization of strategy, in the highest sense of the term.

Moreover, it was the lack of knowledge about this new rule of total war which was to precipitate in Russia--following the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II brought about by politically myopic generals and politicians with no notion whatever of strategy--the process of disintegration of a country which was far from being at the end of its resources.

After that, it was the use, by the total German strategy, of a political weapon, subversive par excellence, in the form of the dispatch to Russia of Lenin and his companions with the following consequences: acceleration of this disintegration, the precursors of a civil war against the rear of a demoralized army and finally the putsch of 7 November 1917 carried out, I might note in passing, not by the "revolutionary masses" but by part of the Petrograd garrison.

The beneficiaries of this putsch, Lenin and his team of professional revolutionaries, did not understand immediately, however, the nature of the phenomenon which had permitted them to seize power. Lenin in particular, who had read and annotated Clausewitz, still considered the conflict in progress to be a classical imperialist war which he hoped to transform into a revolutionary war. He had to have the lesson of Brest Litovsk and 3 years of civil war in the capacity of super-strategist with the benefit of the best brains of the former General Staff and the effective assistance of special services, which officially were revolutionary but animated by renegades from the Tsarist Okhrana and specialists from the former Russian SR [Socialist Revolutionaries] to form an explosive synthesis between the revolutionary dialectic and the precepts of total war.

The "proletarian" state for which he established the bases after the victory over the Whites and the "anarchic-leftists" was totalitarian from the outset as a revolutionary bastion taking on the conducting of the class struggle on a worldwide scale and by virtue of this fact incurring a capitalist encirclement preceding an almost inevitable general attack.

Later, this totalitarian aspect was strengthened even more to the degree that, with Stalin, the system was transformed into an integral idolocracy, with a living god at its head whose absolute power reposed first and foremost upon three pillars: the party apparatus--otherwise known as the "clergy"--the police and the army.

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Genesis and Evolution of the Total Bolshevick Strategy

As we have said, with the synthesis of the Leninist revolutionary dialectic and the precepts of total war, Bolshevick strategy went through three distinct phases before becoming the tool par excellence of a totalitarian superpower.

The first phase, which we can call romantic, lasted barely 2 years: 1919-1920. It corresponded to the illusions which the Bolsheviks had adopted with respect to the revolutionary situation that developed in Germany and Hungary after the 1918 defeat.

Consequently, a veritable total strategy general staff was established in Moscow, in the form of the Comintern; and there were plans to launch a vast offensive toward the West at one and the same time psychological and military, "passing over the dead body of imperial Poland, to light the torch of world revolution." This offensive took place even before the end of the civil war in Russia and ended in defeat at the gates of Warsaw. "We underestimated the national factor," Lenin, the internationalist, observed. It is a fact that the Polish proletarians did not see among the combatants of the Red Army of workers and peasants anything other than their traditional enemies: Russians who had come to their country not to liberate them but to subjugate them.

In the Kremlin, this plan to extend the Russian civil war to the rest of Europe and the ill-considered use of the Red Army as the vanguard of the revolution on the march was abandoned. A totally new strategy was developed.

This indirect revolutionary strategy was placed in operation from 1921 to 1929. It was based on the following view of the world:

--the capitalist countries are not ripe for socialist revolution because of the fact of their colonial empires. The plundering of colonial wealth furnishes super-benefits permitting the capitalists to give small increases to the workers, the better paid of whom become middle class and lose their class consciousness.

Consequently, it was a question of aiding the colonial or dependent countries to free themselves from the imperialist yoke to restore the will to struggle to the proletariat.

Moreover, the very existence of a proletarian state constitutes for world capitalism a danger which it cannot tolerate, above all if the state is successful in delivering appreciable blows against the imperialist system. Because of this fact, an attack by the forces of capitalism aimed at destruction of the proletarian state is inevitable over the more or less long term. It is important that this eventuality be delayed as long as possible by undermining the foundations of the enemy's system, by thoroughly exploiting its contradictions, by demoralizing its armed forces and by mobilizing the proletariat so that on the day the inevitable attack takes place, such an attack will be nothing more than "the reflex of a mortally wounded beast," the prelude to the final victory of the proletarian camp.

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The total revolutionary strategy imagined by Lenin with a view to attaining the above-mentioned objectives was characterized by the following original elements:

--it will place in operation all the psycho-political, economic, diplomatic, technical, etc. means, excluding direct recourse to the Red Army;

--the principal effort will be applied to the colonial or dependent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In each of these countries, in the absence of proletarians, bourgeois nationalist movements will be used as "fellow travelers." Thus it is that in China there is disdain for the young communist party, which was established without the support of the Kremlin by a group of intellectuals, to seek the alliance of Sun Yat Sen's Kuomintang;

--vis-a-vis the capitalist countries, a "defensive-offensive" attitude is adopted which Lenin described as "peaceful coexistence." In these countries, thanks to official and clandestine communist parties, there are available detachments of "devoted and active partisans," not to mention the ultra secret networks of Komintern agents. At the same time, there is skillful exploitation of the resentments of these defeated in 1918, first and foremost Germany. Thanks to the Rapallo treaty, Germany will be able to circumvent the prohibitions of the Versailles "diktat" by building arms factories in the USSR with instruction of the superior cadres of the Red Army by Reichswehr officers in repayment.

It is in this "theatre" of the capitalist countries that the Bolsheviks are attaining their best results, thanks to their strategy which at one and the same time is disconcerting to the civilian leaders and the military chiefs: too "military" for the former who persist in calling it "political," it is too "civilian" for the latter who call it "subversive action."

Both of them have stuck by Clausewitz and continue to distinguish peacetime from wartime, without understanding that the Kremlin is seeking to transform "peace" into a new kind of total war. In the psycho-political sector, this "war" gives rise, however, to a strange phenomenon: the appearance here and there of ultranationalist movements "of the left" which will subsequently be dubbed "of the right" for the purposes of the cause. In Italy, a movement of this kind went so far in 1922 as to seize power and radicalize the Italian monarchy. In Germany, on the other hand, an attempted putsch fomented by the small party of one Adolph Hitler failed in Munich. In the meantime, in the other "theatre," the offensive against colonial and dependent countries--after a few successes--produced a series of setbacks the most spectacular of which, in 1927, was due to the about-face of the new chief of the Kuomintang: Gen Chang Kai-shek.

In Moscow, after the death of Lenin in 1924, the power struggle absorbed a great part of the energies. It was not until 1929--at the instigation of Stalin who had emerged from the field of aspirants--that a new revolutionary

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strategy was adopted. This strategy was placed in operation from 1929 to 1954. Based on the principle that the economic crisis afflicting the United States during this period would unfailingly spread to Europe, a decision was made to direct the principal effort of the proletarian strategy against the capitalist countries while settling for maintenance of a medium level of agitation in Asia and Africa. Beginning in 1930, the "revolution" finally seemed possible; and it was in Germany that the Kremlin looked for decisive action. However, Stalin gave the order to the powerful German Communist Party to secretly support Adolph Hitler's NSDAP [National Socialist German Workers' Party] against the Social Democratic Party, pending a later change in tactics. This error in judgment permitted the National Socialists to accede to power by legal means and to install themselves in it afterward by other methods of which the German socialists and communists were the first victims.

Following this setback which in no way compromised his prestige, Stalin, who in the meantime had become absolute master of the world communist movement, finally came up with the definitive formula for a total strategy which was much more that of an empire with universalist aspirations than that of a revolutionary proletarian state.

Stalin, just the opposite of Lenin, was much more a monomaniac of absolute power<sup>2</sup> than of revolution. The USSR, of which he was at one and the same time the god, pontifical sovereign and emperor, was not for him "the bastion of the revolution" but the empire which was called upon, at the end of an inevitable world war from which it was to come out victorious, to impose its total hegemony upon the rest of the world.

The setback suffered in Germany--the responsibility for which, I might add, no one dared impute to him--confirmed for him the idea that a revolution could only be the result of a lost war. It was at the state level and not that of the communist parties that the principal thrust of total strategy was thenceforth to be directed. Total strategy would seek its fellow travelers among nations and not among political movements. From the outside, the Soviet Union would have to be seen as a state, if not a classical state at least one which totally accepted international rules. Hitler's Germany on that occasion served as his rationale. In countries where they officially exist, communist parties--while remaining totally subordinated to the Kremlin--are themselves to play the parliamentary game also. Moreover, the Comintern was no longer the General Staff of the preceding phases. Its prerogatives and resources had been transferred to the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Soviet Special Services. Its agents were, moreover, reduced to the role of agents of these special services.<sup>3</sup> Action in colonial countries was practically abandoned. The civil war in China was arranged by Stalin. The USSR parsimoniously aided the Chinese communists and maintained discreet contacts with Chang, while waiting for Japan to get bogged down in a deadend war in China, to the great satisfaction of the Kremlin.

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In 1935, the total Stalinist strategy could be defined as follows: "It is the art of imposing one's truth upon any enemy whatever by all possible means, including the armed forces as a last resort while attempting to prevent the enemy from being the first to resort to arms."

Naturally, it was up to Stalin himself to define the "truth" of the moment. It was in Spain where the Franco counterrevolution first gave him the opportunity of intervening on behalf of a legal government supported by a "popular" parliamentary front. Once again, he made several mistakes in judgment for which the republicans paid the price; however, the selfsame civil war permitted him to season numerous cadres of his army and conduct interesting experiments in the sectors of operational strategy and military tactics.

His earlier hope of seeing the outbreak of a war between the French-British and the Germans over Czechoslovakia having been dashed in Munich in 1938, he decided in the spring of 1939 to opt for Hitler against the bourgeois democracies. The German-Soviet agreement of 26 August 1939 surprised the latter and seemed to confirm the excellence of Stalin's strategy. The Soviet empire became larger, while the USSR remained on the perimeter of the European war.

The German attack on 22 June 1941 surprised Stalin and seems to have once again brought the total strategy into question. The enemy was the first to resort to arms and, what is more, the myth according to which the proletarians would never agree to participate in a war against the USSR vanished. In order to come out of the total war victorious, Stalin found himself reduced to the invocation of the "bourgeois" clichés--which were scorned by Lenin--of Russian patriotism, to reestablish the patriarchy of Moscow and accept massive material aid from the capitalist countries which had become his allies. Fortunately for him, his former ally, Hitler, made mistake after mistake; and abetted by the unheard of heroism of his soldiers, the citory caused Stalin's initial errors to be overlooked. Moreover, the "generalissimo" did not wait for German capitulation to take up at Yalta, in February 1945, the next battle in which his allies of the moment--if not fellow travelers--were to become enemies.

The appearance of the nuclear weapon in 1945 was to strengthen even further the deterrent aspect of the Total Strategy by keeping the current conflict at the level of "peaceful coexistence," and occasionally at a harsher level from which derives the term "cold war," occasionally somewhat more relaxed, which explains the world "detente."

That said, this confrontation at the world level over the last 34 years has involved three phases characterized by different configurations, each with a basic antagonism. Also, after the fashion of the Balkan wars at the beginning of the century, we can number these veritable World Wars as III, IV and V.

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From World War II to World War IV (1945-1969)

To understand the present situation, it is important first to briefly consider World Wars II and IV from which it derived.

World War III (1945-1969) was essentially an East-West confrontation with the Soviet Empire and the United States as the principal protagonists. It consisted of three principal phases:

--the first phase, which we can call the "Stalin phase," lasted 8 years: 1945-1953, and can be divided into two periods:

--from 1945 to 1949 we can summarize the confrontation by means of the following equation:

$$\begin{array}{l} (R + S) \longrightarrow \text{U.S.} \quad + \quad E \\ \text{Soviet Empire} \quad \text{United States} \quad \quad \quad \text{Noncommunist part of Europe} \\ \text{plus satellites} \end{array}$$

Stalin directed the principal effort of his strategy against the developed countries of North America and Western Europe, while engaging in diversions in Greece and the Middle East. These two diversions, moreover, were to result in setbacks. The diversion in Greece was to fail because of the Yugoslav "betrayal" and the Middle East diversion because of the spirit of independence of the young state of Israel which Stalin wanted to make a tool of his strategy.

--beginning with the fall of 1949, China became the ally of the Soviet thus the equation:

$$\begin{array}{l} (R + S) \quad + \quad C \longrightarrow \text{U.S.} \quad + \quad E \\ \text{Soviet Empire-China} \quad \quad \quad \text{United States} \quad \quad \quad \text{Europe} \end{array}$$

Stalin profited from this situation in 1950 to unleash a bloody diversion in Korea. The phase ended with the death of Stalin...and the interminable armistice talks in Korea.

--The second phase was that of the Collegial Directorate [Direction Collegiale] (1953-1957). It was marked by a bitter power struggle in the Kremlin, the emergence of China as the moral leader of the communist camp, the change in the principal strategic direction imposed upon Moscow by Peking and involving the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (whence the Suez crisis), "de-Stalinization," with its repercussions inside the USSR and within the Empire (explosions in Poland and Hungary), finally, a series of tactical Soviet pullbacks: recognition of West Germany, release of German prisoners, peace treaty with Austria and the consolidation of the Empire on the basis of the Warsaw Pact.

--Finally, the third phase coincided with Khrushchev's rule and ended 1 year before the inglorious fall from power of the latter (1957-1963).


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During these 6 years, Khrushchev' vainly sought to impose Soviet rule upon the Chinese, to consolidate the Empire, to extend its influence in the Third World and to break up the Atlantic Alliance by presenting the United States and its partners with a series of irreversible concessions. To attain this last-named objective, he attempted to arrange a decisive summit conference, using as leverage first the Berlin problem (1958-1961) and then Cuba (1962).

This package of maneuvers resulted in a series of setbacks, the most serious of which was that of Cuba in October 1962 and in a "de facto" armistice between the USSR and the United States in the form of the Moscow accords, in August 1963, and the definitive break between China and the USSR.

World War IV (1963-1969) essentially set China against the two superpowers. This led to a certain amount of East-West "detente" and increasing tension between Peking and Moscow. At the outset, China directed its strategy toward the developing countries of the southern hemisphere, to draw into its camp the revolutionary nationalisms of the Third World. At the same time, Japan--up to then under U.S. influence--adopted a position of some aloofness and began an extraordinary process of economic penetration while waiting to become a great political-strategic power.

The conflict equation became:



The symbols appearing in the two sets of parentheses indicate growing misunderstandings, on the one hand between the United States and its European allies and, on the other hand, within the Empire where a satellite--Romania--was attempting to preserve its relative independence.

The Chinese offensive bore fruit in 1964 and culminated on 14 October of that same year in the fall from power of Khrushchev and his replacement by a new collegial directorate. However, in 1965, Peking in turn experienced a series of setbacks which were in part rooted in the "Cultural Revolution." At the beginning of 1966, Soviet strategists resumed the initiative on the occasion of the Havana Conference. The USSR got a foothold in South Yemen and Somalia. The Black Sea fleet assigned a permanent squadron to the Mediterranean and utilized the port facilities offered to it in that area by Syria, Egypt and Algeria.

The symbol  $\pm$  also appears between C and N; however, the cultural revolution plunged China into semi-chaos bordering on a generalized civil war. But the USSR demonstrated its inability to exploit these difficulties and, on the contrary, in 1967, had a series of serious setbacks: stirrings among the satellites, defeat of its Arab allies in the June 1967 war, refusal of Romania to break diplomatic relations with Israel and, finally, the fall from power of Novotny, in December in Prague.

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The year 1968 began very badly for Moscow. In Czechoslovakia, the process of liberation intensified and resulted in "the Prague Spring." In Poland, there was a veritable student revolution; finally, in the USSR itself "dissidents" from all sides time and again defied the regime.

However, the Soviet oligarchy profited from the fact that all of these difficulties coincided, on the one hand, with the "cultural revolution" in China, and, on the other hand, with the American stalemate in Vietnam and a difficult presidential campaign in the United States. Thus Moscow was free to settle the student problem in Poland--thanks to Moczar--to strike a heavy blow against its own dissidents and to put an end to the "Prague Spring," in August 1968.

The Passage from World War IV to World War V (1969-1978)


The year 1969 was a watershed beginning the passage from World War IV to World War V. It was marked in particular by the coming to power of President Nixon, the unsuccessful attack on Leonid Brezhnev in January in Moscow, a dangerous escalation of Sino-Russian antagonism and the Libyan revolution.

Having come to power, Richard Nixon established a veritable strategic general staff in the White House and, for the first time in the history of the United States, drew up a veritable total strategy which was to disconcert both the USSR and his own allies. His strategic plan can be summarized in three points:

--to give the United States complete freedom of action at the world level and, to this end, to progressively withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam, while at the same time reinforcing the South Vietnamese, and to also make an effort to settle the problems of the Middle East as soon as possible;

--to set up the United States as the arbiter of the world situation by profiting, on the one hand, from the dependence of Western Europe and Japan upon the military might of the United States and, on the other hand, the Sino-Soviet antagonism;

--to this end, to create two triangles of which the common apex would be the United States:



The triangle of the allies: U.S. - E - J was to assure the hegemony of Washington over its own camp in exchange for the protection given the Europeans and Japanese.



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To form the triangle of adversaries: U.S. - (R ± S) - C, it was necessary to get a foothold in Peking (this was done in 1972) and then to prevent the Chinese and Soviets from fighting one another, by launching U.S. business in search of the markets of the two communist powers.

The attack on 23 January 1969 against the person of Leonid Brezhnev--perpetrated by Lieutenant Illyine (who was found to be insane a short time later) had important repercussions: on the one hand, an appreciable strengthening of the role of the KGB within the Soviet system and, on the other hand, the rise of the secretary general himself above his colleagues in the "collegial directorate."

At the same time, the escalation in Soviet-Chinese antagonism was accentuated and culminated in March 1969 in a highly explosive situation. For the first time, in Moscow as in Peking, there was really thought of a total war between the two former allies. Only discreet pressure from the U.S. administration prevented a catastrophic solution to their differences.

However, with the Libyan revolution, there appeared in the person of Colonel Qadhafi a leader of a new kind on the international scene. At the beginning an unquestioning disciple of Colonel Nasir, after the disappearance of his master in the fall of 1970, he utilized all the resources of his country to reestablish, under the aegis of Libya, a pure and hard Islamic line designed to sweep modernism liberalism and atheism out of all Muslim countries. The passage from the equation of World War IV to that of President Nixon's strategic plan lasted 3 years and culminated in a situation of equilibrium in the spring of 1972, as the result of the trip by the chief of the White House first to Peking and then to Moscow. Thus what was to become "World War V" got its start with a vision quite close to real peace.

World War V

Of course, at the time President Nixon managed to progressively construct his system of the two triangles, the war in Vietnam had not yet ended; and the situation in the Middle East continued to be highly explosive--despite the disappearance of Colonel Nasir.

However, in the spring of 1972, the beginning of a reconciliation between China and Japan was observed. Encouraging talks took place between the two Koreas and, in Vietnam, progress was made toward a peaceful solution.

Thus, what we are calling "World War V" started with a short phase of equilibrium; and, in January 1973, President Nixon felt that he could speak of an "era of peace."

However, his illusions were of short duration. The Watergate scandal, a few months later, shattered the White House general staff and forced the president into a hopeless fight against Congress, the press and the public opinion of his country.

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In the meantime, in the Kremlin, the military--with Marshal Gretchko--and the Chekists--with Yuri Andropov--found themselves represented in the Politburo. However, reactivation of the total Soviet strategy did not immediately follow. Apparently, it was even against the wishes of Moscow that a few months later a new blow was struck against the "Pax Americana" on the initiative of Colonel Sadat who, in concert with the Syrians, unleashed the October 1973 war, with the corollary use of "the oil weapon" by the Arab countries.

A plan devised by President Nixon was in total disarray. Europe was divided; Japan was groping.

The year 1974 was catastrophic for the United States; and World War V, in full evolution, did not lend itself to convenient equations. The irreconcilable Soviet-Chinese antagonism alone remained.

The Arab countries, united for the time being, took advantage of the situation to mobilize the Third World with a view to having the "Palestinian reality" recognized in the UN. For its part, NATO found itself affected by two simultaneous crises: on the one hand, the dramatic events in Cyprus culminating in a serious Greco-Turkish crisis and the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and, on the other hand, the Portuguese revolution.

It was in a depressing atmosphere of general incomprehension that President Nixon was forced to leave the White House and turn over the reins of power to his vice president, Gerald Ford. It seemed that everything would fall apart; and thus the first 6 months of 1975 were no less catastrophic for the Western world, and that without the total Soviet strategy playing a predominant role.

In the Middle East, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was not able to achieve his goals. In the meantime, in Southeast Asia, the communists scored victory after victory by definitively overwhelming Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. However, the Kremlin concentrated its efforts on the preparation of the Helsinki conference which was held at the end of July 1975 and from which the Politburo expected we know not what miraculous results.

This interlude permitted the Americans to get their second wind. Under the aegis of General Haig, a general staff for total strategy was reconstituted in the White House. In the Middle East, Henry Kissinger's efforts were finally crowned with success. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan openly supported U.S. policy.

#### The Kremlin's Strategic Error

These modest U.S., however, could not turn the situation around. At the end of 1975, the USSR found itself in a position of strength, all the more so because China, where Chou En-lai was living out his last months, was the scene of a bitter power struggle for the succession of a Mao who was nothing more than the shadow of the former great Helmsman.

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Following their Helsinki "victory" which subsequently gave them more headaches than satisfaction, the Kremlin strategists unleashed a large-scale maneuver deriving from an overall plan responding--it seems--to the following concerns:

--to take advantage of the weakening of the United States which was shaken by the repercussions of Watergate and paralyzed by the 1976 presidential campaign, the divisions affecting Western Europe and the laid-back political role of Japan on the international scene in order:

--to win back and consolidate the positions lost by the USSR in the Third World, particularly in Asia, the Middle East and Africa;

--to continue the isolation and encirclement maneuver vis-a-vis China;

--to disassociate Europe from the United States and, at the same time, to prevent the formation of a political and military European community;

--to reach a series of agreements with the United States on strategic arms officially assuring parity between the two superpowers, but in fact culminating in sufficient Soviet supremacy to insulate Moscow from a situation like the Cuban missile crisis in 1963.

In the meantime, within the Empire, it was a question of maintaining Moscow's hold on the "sister countries," of reestablishing the psycho-political monolithism of the totality and of continuing the strengthening of the military and economic potential of the USSR, thanks in part to the technological and financial support of the capitalist countries attracted by the prospects of the Soviet market.

This overall plan was, of course, perfectly logical. It was still necessary to correctly determine the principal direction of the new strategic maneuver. In our opinion, it is there that the Soviet strategists made a serious mistake by setting up the combination "Middle East-Africa" as the principal theatre, while being forced to take massive action in Asia.

The origin of this mistake in the first place was the fact that Moscow was not always able to accept the idea--and this in spite of the 1969 events--that the principal enemy of the USSR was China. Prisoners of their legend of champions of anti-imperialism, the Soviet oligarchs, steered in this direction, moreover, by Fidel Castro and their progressive Arab clients, were thus induced to take priority action in a theatre which was of much greater interest to the United States and Europe than China.

It is very possible, moreover, that the KGB, whose decisive role in the system we pointed out above, was the origin of both the questionable strategic choice and the type of actions taken in connection therewith.

As a matter of fact, these actions were to be different from the previous operations at one and the same time as regards their scope, their incisiveness and the fact that at times they involved direct recourse to the Soviet armed forces.

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In the Meantime China...

By concentrating their efforts on a theatre which should have remained secondary, Soviet strategists had gravely sinned against the basic imperative of every strategy. Added to this sin was a subsequent and no less serious error in the psycho-political sector, namely that, in their hatred for the Chinese, the Japanese would never dare to sign an accord with them which would upset Moscow. What is more, the diplomats and Chekist Muscovites in this matter were going to cumulate faux pas and gaffes by needlessly humiliating the Japanese and literally pushing them into the arms of the Chinese.

At the same time, these selfsame specialists showed that they were incapable of exploiting the post-Maoist stirrings of the fall-winter 1976 to the benefit of the USSR.

In the meantime, China, which was able to recover a certain degree of equilibrium, had in 1977 started a vast psycho-political and diplomatic counteroffensive culminating in a series of tangible results, such as Sino-Indian rapprochement and a veritable friendship treaty with North Korea.

Thus the essential pieces in the isolation and encirclement maneuver against China were transformed in neighboring countries into friendly intentions. Since Bangladesh had already normalized its relations with China; and Pakistan had no reason to break its ties of friendship with the latter, while Burma was not hostile to China, there no longer could be talk of encirclement.

However, embarked on their great African adventure supporting Neto in Angola and participating in the imperialist campaigns of the communist armies of Colonel Mengistu and obsessed by the course of events in the Middle East, the Soviet strategists were unable to compensate for these setbacks except for a coup d'etat in Afghanistan and consolidation of their positions in Vietnam and Laos.

What is most astonishing, however, is the fact that these strategists were successively surprised on 12 August 1978 by the thunderbolt of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, on 17 September 1978 by the Camp David accords, and on 16 December 1978 by announcement of the diplomatic recognition of China by the United States, with the corollary of the triumphal trip to the United States by Deng Xiaoping.

The Iranian Interlude

However, this series of setbacks was to be offset for the Kremlin by the sudden acceleration of the revolutionary process in Iran. There, too, initially Moscow had been taken by surprise; however, that surprise was of short duration. Having a large subversive and well-structured organization at its disposition on site, the USSR was in a position to benefit from the

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opportunity offered and attempted to influence the revolutionary process to its advantage. In accordance with a proven method, the maneuver was to take place at two levels.

Discarding its clandestine operation, the Tudeh was able to present itself as a responsible political party offering its support to the building of an Islamic Republic within which it intended to play a part. At the same time, the KGB benefited from the placing of the "SAVAK" and the special military services hors de combat and from an almost total freedom to infiltrate everywhere--including the armed forces "in the process of democratization" and the new "Islamic police."

Thus, in the period of 3 months, the imposing pro-Western bastion represented by the Iranian Empire was moving in the direction of transformation into a neutral Muslim state in the process of falling entirely within the Soviet sphere of influence. However, this unquestioned success, obtained at one and the same time at the expense of the Western countries and China, seemed also to include several potential dangers for the USSR itself. Among these, we might note in the first place the risks of a spread to the Soviet Muslim republics of Iran's religious conflagration or the possible development of generalized chaos in the Iranian-Afghan situation with contagious effects for the nonnative populations of the USSR and, finally, the economic consequences for the Caucasus of a prolonged halt in the deliveries of Iranian natural gas.

The Chinese Reply

This Soviet success in Iran, combined with Vietnam's challenge to China, caused Peking to take direct action against this inveterate ally of the USSR. This time it was no longer a question of a quick-strike operation, as against India in 1962 but of a real war--that is, of a new approach to total strategy, which had up to now excluded "gambles." By taking the risk on this occasion or resorting to force, the Chinese strategists apparently were aiming at a triple objective:

--to take their revenge on the Vietnamese leaders who had caused them to lose face by invading Cambodia;

--to strike a blow at the prestige of the USSR which reportedly was dissuaded directly by the Chinese nuclear potential and indirectly by the United States;

--to precipitate the evolution of World War V in the direction of an equation in which the Soviet Union would finally find itself isolated, to wit:

C + J + U.S. + E → (R ± S)

As we write these words, the situation still has not been clarified. Of course, no country openly supports China; however, condemnations of its

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action are coming principally from the allies of the USSR. Japan does not wish to see itself pulled into a fatal situation by its new ally. The United States is still holding to its previous script, even though the events in Iraq are inciting it to stiffen its position vis-a-vis the USSR. Europe, not being a political entity, cannot finally have any serious influence.

However, one may well wonder whether, in time, the risk taken by Peking will not permit the Chinese to attain their objectives by driving the Soviet Union into a dramatic choice:

--to effectively resort to force;

--or to attempt a real opening toward the West, and that in a position of weakness.

Of course, it is no less possible that China will not be able to attain the results expected and that, under the combined pressure of its new friends, the United States and Japan, and its "communist enemies," it will be forced to withdraw, thus giving Vietnamese propaganda an opportunity to claim victory.

In such an eventuality, which would be effectively equivalent to a serious defeat, China could very well experience a new domestic crisis with consequences that are difficult to foresee.

That said, whatever the outcome of this Sino-Vietnamese war, one thing seems certain to us, namely that World War V has now entered an excessively critical phase. As a matter of fact, Moscow is convinced that since the end of the last year a real alliance exists between the Western countries and the Sino-Japanese pair and that the total Chinese strategy is manipulating the totality against the USSR. For lack of ability to repudiate its own view of the world, which would have permitted it to detach the United States and Europe from their disturbing Asian allies, the Muscovite oligarchy can only intensify the struggle at the world level.

Without speaking of Asia where the situation can only worsen, we must because of this fact expect a renewal of tension in the Middle East, new pockets of conflict in Africa and, above all, a serious crisis in Europe where it is highly probable that the USSR will be induced to take Romania back in hand and perhaps to even intervene in Yugoslavia. This would produce complications of the most dangerous kind to the point that the possibility of a Soviet power strike against Western Europe cannot be excluded.

Even though, at this juncture, that is an extreme hypothesis, it is not so improbable as it might seem at first sight--all the more so because the Western alliance is far from constituting a coherent deterrent entity.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, a dramatic development in the conflict now in progress could be modified by the consequences of a possible power struggle in the Kremlin, in the event Leonid Brezhnev and other leaders are forced to resign, for one reason or another.

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FOOTNOTES

Michel Garder, born in 1916, former superior officer of the BEMS [?Bureau of Superior Military Studies] and a close collaborator of General Beaufre at the French Institute of Strategic Studies. Now president of the Total Strategy Study Group (CESTE) and vice president of the Center for the Study of East-West Problems in Munich. Author of: "History of the Soviet Army," "Mao Zedong," "A War Unlike the Others," "The German-Soviet War" (a work which received an award from the Academie Francaise), "The Agony of the Regime in Soviet Russia" and "The Secret War of the French Special Services."

1. This was done in the USSR near the end of the 1920's by a former tsarist general, Svetchine, who moved into the service of the Bolsheviks. Considered one of the best Russian military thinkers, he was liquidated in 1937.
2. The consolidation of this power was accomplished like a war. The country was transformed into an internal theatre of the total strategy with its hecatombs and its death camps.
3. The comintern was dissolved in 1943.
4. We propose to deal with this problem in a special study on military strategy within the framework of total strategy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

CRAXI INTERVIEWED ON PIVOTAL ROLE OF PSI

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 7 Jun 79 pp 8-11

[Text] In this exclusive interview the Socialist leader explains how the PSI can become the critical fulcrum in the power relationships between Christian Democrats and Communists.

The Socialist Party Secretary has been the eye of the polemical storm in this election campaign, a hard one for the PSI which reportedly did not want early elections, and, failing postponement, is said to have wanted them to be held along with the European elections, at the very least. Communists and Christian Democrats have charged Craxi with purposely withholding commitment on his post-election policy plans. Pannella tried every way he knew to encroach on his turf. It looked to many political observers as if Craxi, except for repeating his demand that Andreotti must go after 3 June, were trying to leave both his options open: either a government with support from the Communists or a deal with the DC should the PCI choose to stay in the opposition. In this interview, granted to EUROPEO practically on the eve of the elections, Craxi takes his first clear-cut stand on the government: "We do not have the requisite conditions," he says, "or if we do, they are not yet ripe for an overall alternative to the DC."

[Question] You have suggested a "contract" with all the voters to guarantee 5 years of governability and stability. It has been argued that this was your way of announcing your candidacy for the office of prime minister. Should the PCI fail to get DC approval for its entry into the cabinet and, at the same time, the DC would not allow the PSI to head the government and offer guarantees for the reforms the PSI calls for, what position would you take?

[Answer] I suggested a "contract with the voters" so that one of our greatest parties could be made part of a serious search

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for and a serious commitment to stability and governability. I also added that, as is only natural, not everything depends on me, of course.

We are not going to stuff all the votes in a drawer, and we are not going to withdraw to the Aventine Hill and watch Italy drift rudderless. I have not announced my candidacy for prime minister. The DC has not offered me the post, and I think it will be very careful not to do so. If the voters fail to respond to the DC's plea for confirmation in a position of primacy and hegemony that has lasted 30 years, then we can raise the issue of a non-Christian Democrat leadership in government. It is more likely, in any case, that a non-DC candidacy will emerge from the confluence and agreement of the non-DC parties.

Should the situation after the elections remain rigid, as I fear it will, then we shall try to operate and to take an active part just the same, knowing that the margins will be narrow. If the voters count us out of the game, then we shall be out. But in that event, the situation will still be ungovernable. If on the other hand the balloting reflects a significant improvement over the current situation, then we shall move to the initiative. In any case, anybody who wants our votes will have to give us guarantees of changes -- changes in men, in direction, in domestic and international policy and in socio-economic policy -- and of verifiable consistency in government.

In a difficult situation, we can negotiate for our support in Parliament.

If the paths to broader cooperation should open up again, we can promise our direct participation in the government. The Communists are locked into a cut-and-dried position. We are not of that opinion. The Socialist pledge to make Italy governable and stable has been approved by the Party, and is not just a gimmick I invented for campaign purposes. The Party is also on record as refusing to go back to the center-left coalition, and as asking for a commitment from the entire left against the DC. Nowhere is it written that this commitment has already become an utter impossibility. It will be facilitated by a Socialist affirmation.

[Question] The PSI seems to be caught in a vise, with the PCI squeezing it from one side and the DC from the other. I know you have already been asked this question many times, but don't you feel it necessary to spell out once more, in a few very clear points, your position toward the DC and the PCI, so as to avoid any accusation or suspicion of ambiguity?

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[Answer] In the Italian political system, a bipolar trend and a bipolar structure have emerged. It was not this way at first, in the aftermath of WW II there were splits and errors within the Socialist movement. That, though, is spilt milk, and now we are in a completely different situation, but one which can nevertheless be changed, at least in the direction it will take.

It is possible to rebuild a Socialist force, a third force in relation to the ruling bipolarism, thus substantially altering the terms of the democratic dialectic.

The PSI has defended and will continue to defend its own identity and autonomy, and is making every effort not to slide, or slide back into a subordinate role in relation to the major parties. All this is of course very difficult. The major parties oppose any possible growth of the PSI. On this score as a rule, aside from differences of weighting to be found in both DC and PCI ranks, they are in complete agreement. They want to have the PSI alongside them in an auxiliary position. The PSI, on the contrary, is pressing within the left through a clarifying action to hasten the PCI's process of revision and international autonomy and is asking, for this reason too, that we begin working toward a new balance of power; from a position on the left it is moving to build up a force that can challenge the hegemonic role of the DC, the prevalence within its ranks of crippling contradictions and in many instances of strictly conservative positions, and moving to exercise effective influence on the relative majority party. We do not have the requisite conditions or, if we do, they are not yet ripe for an overall alternative to the DC. Ours is a democratic strategy, a strategy of progress. With a weak PSI, there will be in the long run destabilization not only of the PSI unable to maintain a policy of autonomy and of socialist initiative without broader support in the nation, but there will in fact be destabilization of the system itself. That would be a disastrous road to take. The only people who would drink to such an event would be those in the law-and-order bloc and those who can think only in frontist terms. Then again, a shaky majority behind a narrow government, such as the Social Democrats advocate, would merely heighten the tensions and turbulence in the nation a thousandfold.

Little by little, as we increase our capacity to look at issues with a broader view, a European and international view, we shall understand much better the anomaly of the Italian situation and the need to restore to the socialism movement the strength and the ability to influence it once had, but failed to use in the right way.

[Question] Pannella claims to have the same concept of the PSI when he says he wants a big Socialist Party to fight the hegemony of the DC and the PCI. Doesn't it seem to you that, once again,

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the PSI has paved the way to success for other parties (as it did for the PCI, for example, in 1976), in view of the fact that the Radicals, picking up Socialist arguments, seem now to be competing mainly with the PSI?

[Answer] We are more concerned with the major parties than with Pannella. We are not lashing out at them, except in legitimate self-defense. That defense becomes spirited when they tend to lay claim to values and achievements that belong to us, albeit not exclusively.

In this country, on issues of civil rights and women's rights, the Socialists have been the pioneers and the leaders of the battle. The Radical Party also makes use of non-Socialist arguments. There will be a great Socialist Party in Italy, too, and it will be centered first of all on the strength and momentum of the drive for renewal sparked by the PSI.

[Question] In Genoa you said that Andreotti must go and that you would reveal the reasons why he cannot be prime minister again after the elections, should the DC insist on backing him. Can't you tell the voters what those reasons are right now?

[Answer] I don't have the file in my drawer; since the DC is not pushing it, I'm not pushing it either. I shall tell the voters what I think in political terms. It is not true that, in a democracy, power erodes those who do not have it. This is true in a sick democracy, one that is depressed, bogged down in the sticky mire of patronage.

I think that the new government must have new leadership. The current leadership is clearly tired and worn out. There is no punitive intent here. There is a need for change which we call attention to, as others have as well. Nor is it true that a name is indissolubly linked with a political line. Andreotti has lent his name to many different formulas and different political lines. One need only read the history books from 1947 onward and think back over the political events of recent years.

[Question] Felipe Gonzales was forced to resign from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) secretariat because the Party congress had reaffirmed the mass, class, and Marxist nature of the Party. The NEW YORK TIMES has stated that Craxi's grand design is to make the Socialist Party socialdemocratic. This is the very thinly veiled charge the Communists are levelling at you, and the one that cost Gonzales his job. Aren't you afraid of meeting a similar fate?

[Answer] Gonzales chose to resign; nobody asked him to do so. I do not believe that the differences that have sprung up within the PSOE are purely ideological in substance. European Socialism

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cannot, in any country, seal itself inside a shell of dogmatic ideology. There is no one true school and there can never be one official ideology. In this sense, Gonzales is right. As far as we are concerned, Marxists and non-Marxists coexist in the PSI. The same thing is happening in France, in Germany, in England, and in the other European countries. There is a dialectical pluralism that is the hallmark of European Socialist Parties.

The appellations of Socialist and Social Democratic have some historic value. They reflect a different path beaten by the labor and workers' movement in those European countries, and their diverse doctrinal influences. Today we are witnessing a marked rapprochement at the level of principles and programs among the various components of the great family of European Socialism.

The "Social Democratic" appellation is foreign to Italian tradition. Even Giuseppe Saragat, when he founded his party back in 1947, called it the Socialist Workers' Party, and did not adopt the present label until later. This is why we have to look and see just how much concrete, practical significance there is in these disparate denominations. There is no question but that we set out to build a modern Socialist Party in Italy, taking its inspiration from reformism and democracy, and its vocation from internationalism and Europeanism. Upon those foundations we have begun the course of renewal and modernization of the PSI. I have heard this and other accusations before.

In a world moving toward the 21st century, some forms of sectarianism are frankly archaic. It is water that has passed, and it will no longer turn the millwheel. For that matter, even the PCI, behind its "communist" label, is no longer quite sure what communism it espouses. It has no shortage of orthodox old-liners that make the same charges against it as it does against us.

Within the Party the platform I presented and defended at the congress and which I defend before the voters is at once ideological, political, and programmatic. and it is backed by a far greater consensus than superficial or ill-intentioned observers would have you think.

[Question] The PSI is taking strong positions against the construction of new nuclear power plants. Is it ready to make an anti-nuclear commitment a criterion for participation in possible majorities after the elections?

[Answer] In 1977, the PSI did not support the vote of approval in Parliament on the energy policy motion. Since that time, a number of important events have deepened our reservations and

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heightened our concern. I also share some views recently stated by our comrade, Manlio Rossi-Doria. In almost every country, nuclear programs have slowed down.

"The gravest problems connected with the safety of these plants have yet to be solved. The rising opposition to them among the peoples concerned is visible on every side. Furthermore, the vast development of research into utilization of other energy sources makes it possible to look at the energy supply problem from a different viewpoint. Well, as even the died-in-the-wool proponents of nuclear power have admitted, we know that the first power from new nuclear sources will not come until sometime after 1990. The government's proposed energy program, though, gives nuclear power top priority. We believe this program must be drastically revised. Before we go venturing off onto shaky ground we must devise and implement a broader-gauged strategy that will give us immediate returns, one focused on careful planning of consumption and on alternative energy sources.

In whatever negotiations may arise, we shall maintain a clear and very firm position on this issue.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

MOVE TO CENTER SEEN IN SOCIALISTS' PRECONGRESS DEBATE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Aug 79 p 24 LD

[Unattributed report: "Socialists Seek Their Center"]

[Text] The Spanish Socialist Workers Party's [PSOE] debate leading up to its extraordinary congress in September has now entered the home stretch. We are now a long way away from the clashes, criticisms and even insults in the press by representatives of the two wings--"moderate" and "radical," according to the perhaps too approximate and hasty classification of many sectors of the media--which represent the two opposing stances which emerged from the 28th PSOE Congress in May.

Several observers both inside and outside the party point out that the climate of "moderation" apparent in the three [as published] groups will facilitate something which these circles now regard as inevitable: Felipe Gonzalez' quintessential and unqualified triumph.

The clash between the radicals--represented mainly by Francisco Bustelo, Luis Gomez Llorente and Pablo Castellano--and the moderates who apparently supported Felipe and the members of his last executive took a surprising turn at the 21 July assembly of the Madrid Socialist Federation which is perhaps the most influential in the state because of its ability to "impregnate" other peripheral federations.

The surprise was apparently the defeat of the report called "The 59 theses" whose apparent leaders are Joaquin Almunia Barranco and Enrique Baron by Bustelo's radical report as a result of the pact among supporters of the "third way,"--a report presented by the Madrid municipal section, including Alonso Puerta, second assistant to the mayor, and national council chairman Carlos Revilla.

The resulting report was a document of synthesis comprising elements from each of the three reports presented at the debate, during which all the former radicalism of the 28th congress were considerably reduced.

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Thus Alonso Puerta and his collaborators in drafting and presenting the third path have, as a result of the importance of their stance, become masters of the situation and capable of shifting the balance in Madrid one way or the other. The same applies to the rest of Spain where, although 27 separate reports have been presented by the various federations, they all center on the three stances discussed.

While Bustelo, Castellano and Llorente's "radicals"--"hardliners" in the party's internal slang--have suffered considerably, this also constituted a blow for the representatives of the "59 theses"--the "Palmar de Troya people," as they are nicknamed in a clear reference to the Christian background of some of their leaders, former members of the workers syndical union--whose document was rejected or substantially modified at numerous meetings of provincial federations.

## Halfhearted Radicals

Nevertheless, in the opinion of all the socialist observers consulted by CAMBIO 16, it seems that the thesis which suffered most was the "radical" thesis, represented specifically by Bustelo. Although they have announced that they will present a list of candidates for the executive and have stated that the essential content of their critical report still stands, many sources are pointing out the "sudden moderation" affecting the radicals of the 28th congress. "I believe," Deputy Enrique Mujica, who represents the most moderate sector, told this paper, "that from now on the so-called critical sector should be called 'self-critical' because after all the noise they made at the 28th congress and after the holy crusade which they are conducting throughout Spain, they have so watered down their theses that there is now practically no difference between them and the so-called moderates. I have not altered my stance at all. They are the ones who have changed. They have observed none of their famous report to the 28th congress."

Enrique Baron, representative of the "59 theses," told CAMBIO 16 that "nobody defends the theses of the 28th congress anymore. The radicals have abandoned their toughest stances. They no longer talk about Marxism in exclusive terms or about the class party; they do not criticize the monarchy or consensus and they do not talk about the popular front. When they saw that they were forced to provide an alternative, they signed Alonso Puerta's ideological postulates and in the fields of culture, autonomy, strategy, the alliance policy and the economic program, they accept our postulates. They have gradually espoused our theses while lowering the level of their radicalism."

With regard to the setbacks being suffered by the "59 theses" report in some federations, Baron added: "We are satisfied and we believe that we are winning a great victory. Primarily because we were the first to face the consequences of our actions and this involves an element of risk, a weakening. We were aware of this. But we had a political and

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moral obligation to come out into the open and we were the first to do so quite clearly--not like others who are keeping silent and waiting until the end. There are many party leaders and parliamentarians who have still not committed themselves..."

Convergence Toward Center

Felipe, among others. The former secretary general indicated some time ago that he did not support any of the reports, though many socialists see his influence in several points in the "59 theses."

The socialist debate is producing a certain convergence toward the center in stances, with a moderation among the radicals and a modification of the moderates' most attractive aspects. As one socialist deputy told this paper, "This shift toward the center in the stances will make it possible for Felipe Gonzalez to triumph at the September congress. There is still one important step that must be taken and its characteristics will decide the outcome of the congress: this is the election and appointment of delegates, a step which will be taken in the first week of September."

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