

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080031-8

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JPRS L/8630

21 August 1979

Japan Report

(FOUO 24/79)



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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

'AKAHATA' COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE U.S.-JAPAN STRAINS

Tokyo JPS in English 0907 GMT 27 Jul 79 OW

[Text] Tokyo, Jul 27, JPS--AKAHATA reported on July 27 that precaution is rising within the Japanese Government that the economic relations between Japan and the U.S. will be strained again.

One of the reasons for this is that the recession has begun in the U.S. It is certain now that the U.S. will go into a period of stagflation, inflation and recession going at the same time. In this situation, the Foreign Ministry sources say, "there is a possibility that the strong dissatisfaction against the (Carter administration's) domestic economic policy in the industrial and political circles in the U.S. will be changed into a temper that will blow up against abroad, especially Japan."

As the presidential election will be held next year, the Carter administration may also conclude that taking tough attitude toward Japan will be beneficial to his campaign.

Under this circumstance, some Foreign Ministry officials say, "Japan must ask the U.S. to carry out an effective policy to cope with the problems of energy and inflation," although they are doubtful of the effect of the energy saving policy released recently by the Carter administration.

Another government source, on the other hand, said that it is important for Japan to carry out what should be done in the light of the international division of labor, demanding that an adjustment with the U.S. be made promptly, which requires sacrifices of the people.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JOURNAL REPORTS 'MINSK' IS NO THREAT TO JAPAN

Tokyo SHUKAN ASAHI in Japanese 29 Jun 79 pp 24-27

[Article by (Toshi) Suzuki: "Soviet Aircraft Carrier 'Minsk' Is 'To Be Used to Land on Hokkaido!'; But Actual Situation Is a 'Paper Tiger'; Assignment to Vladivostok Is Confirmed"]

[Text] It was confirmed on 18 June that the Soviet aircraft carrier "Minsk," reportedly assigned to the Soviet Union's Pacific fleet, had passed through the Strait of Malacca and it is now a reliable fact that it will stay a stone's throw away from Japan at Vladivostok. In the present day when tensions between Japan and the USSR are increasing, what meaning does the "Minsk" hold for the safety of Japan? Let us assay calmly the new aims of Soviet strategy in Asia.

There is a fable called "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." This series of uproars over the "Minsk" is not unlike that fable. At first in the middle of the China-Vietnam dispute this March we heard, "The 'Minsk' has appeared in the Mediterranean!" The uproar continued when it was sighted off the coasts of Angola, Mozambique and Mauritius: "It's the 'Minsk'!", "Heading for the Pacific!", and "Poses a Terrible Threat!".

Then on 18 June, it was finally confirmed that it had passed through the Strait of Malacca. In due course, it is certain to be assigned to the Soviet Pacific Fleet which is based at Vladivostok, a mere stone's throw away from the Japanese archipelago.

However, the reaction of the Defense Agency and of military experts towards this has been surprisingly cool.

"Of course, while it concerns only a limited area, it broadens their command of the air and sea and alters their power relationship with the U.S. 7th Fleet. Speaking frankly, if the area around Japan is unsettled, it will after all disturb us, but it is more or less a political presence one finds in peacetime, in other words, a kind of gunboat diplomacy, and it's not being taken as such a serious threat." (A member of the Defense Agency high command.)

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"It can be said there is absolutely no direct threat to Japan's defense." (Kyuta Mineo, military commentator.) "With the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet, said to be the most powerful in the world, the 'Minsk' poses no problem at all." (Hideo Sekino, military commentator)

Well then, is the "Minsk" which has caused this much commotion simply nothing more than a sheep in wolf's clothing? The answer is "No." On this point, Mr Mineo, quoting Soviet Navy commander Gorshkov, "Naval power will be used as a political tool," explains:

"Putting aside the pure military strength of the "Minsk," the passage of the "Minsk" through the Strait of Malacca signifies that Gorshkov-style world strategy has finally begun in the Pacific. We can perhaps say that the battle lines have been drawn up with the American navy, which until now has enjoyed an overwhelming strength in the Western Pacific. It is said that the waves in these rough seas can be felt all the way from Malacca to the Philippines."

In a greater sense, beneath that sheep's skin, the "Minsk" has another, unadorned, face, more powerful than that of the wolf, that of the ferocious polar bear "world strategy."

How is the area around Japan drawn in the Soviet blueprints based upon this strategy? Before [we answer this question], let us briefly look at the true nature of the "Minsk."

The USSR did not have a real aircraft carrier until 1967. The first was the helicopter carrier "Moskva," with a capacity of 18 anti-submarine helicopters. The "Kiev" was the next development, and was commissioned at the Nikolayev naval station on the north coast of the Black Sea in 1976. The "Minsk" is the second ship of this "Kiev" class, and according to "Jane's Fighting Ships," a third, the (Harikofu), is under construction, with ultimately six ships of this class likely to be built.

Fully loaded, it has a displacement of 43,000 tons, an overall length of 282 meters, a speed of 30 knots. It has just one flight deck, 180 meters long, and compared to the backbone of the U.S. 7th Fleet, the carrier "Midway" (full load displacement 62,000 tons), is half the size. By Mr Sekino's estimate, her crew alone is roughly 1500 persons. Adding to this the necessary personnel for the aircraft, [the total] must be around 2000.

Effective Only Within Airspace Controlled by Land-Based Air Forces

What must be taken note of are the aircraft she carries, which, judging from Western photographs, amount to 20 or 30 craft, taking together the YaK 36 "Forger," the Soviet Union's first vertical short takeoff and landing craft (V/STOL), and the KA 25 "Hormone," its antisubmarine helicopter.

Furthermore, it is equipped with eight SS-N-12 cruise missiles with a reported range of 400 miles, which with guidance by the V/STOL would seem to permit the launching of a rather effective attack.

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However, and here that sheep-like facet emerges, for a fighter plane, the YaK 36 vertical takeoff engine is large, a burden on its performance, its top speed [being] mach 0.85, and its range 175 miles. It is no match for the F4J/N carried by U.S. aircraft carriers with a speed of mach 2.2 and a range of 500 miles. Moreover, there is a report from a Western source that during takeoff and landing tests aboard the "Kiev" with the YaK 36, the heat from the jet exhausts melted the flight deck, which [they then] repaired with a special rosin.

And yet on top of this, the flight deck is too short for non-VSTOL attack planes, and it lacks any complex equipment such as launching catapults or arresting wires for landings. In addition, because patrol planes cannot be carried, its early warning capability is poor. And since it must reduce its speed to the level of 10 knots in order for the V/STOL to take off or land, its mobility as an aircraft carrier is assessed as considerably limited.

Based on these facts, Mr Sekino says that in case the U.S. and Soviet fleets should clash at sea, "The U.S. Navy, making the most of its range, would spot the Soviet's movements without delay. First, the electronic warfare plane EA-6B would gather information on the Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAM) effective range and cause jamming. Soon after, attack planes and fighter-bombers would arrive and suppress the SAMs and electronic countermeasure system (ECM) with anti-radar missiles and the like; F4 or F14 fighter planes would rout the YaK 36's. It is certain that it would end in a lopsided victory for the United States, no matter which [factor] is considered, attack range, attack strength, or electronic warfare power."

In short, this means that the "Minsk" is not an attack-type, wolf-type aircraft carrier like the "Midway," "Constellation," and others.

It is said that unlike American and the other Western countries, who when they develop arms, first take into consideration possible multiple uses, the USSR ordinarily develops arms that satisfy single purposes, one by one. For example, compared to the F4 which is used by the Navy and Air Force for ground support and air control, the MiG 25 [was built] exclusively to intercept the planned American B-1 supersonic bomber.

For what operational purpose then was the "Minsk" built? Mr Sekino and Mr Mineo conclude, "for antisubmarine and/or for landing operations." One of the bases for this [conclusion] lies in the helicopters she carries. In the Far East region, the USSR attaches such importance to helicopters as a means of transport that a helicopter force is deployed which can transport 16 battalions simultaneously. "In a landing operation, the "Minsk" would first approach a landing spot and the YaK 36's would make a ground attack. After launching repeated attacks, they would effect an air-ground landing, with landing craft from the sea and helicopters from the air. If one might say so, there is a strong sense of [resemblance to] the American navy landing operations assault craft."

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Pointing out that the "Minsk" came into the Far East this time in the company of the assault craft "Ivanov," made especially for landing operations, Defense Agency officers state:

"It may be described as for localized ground invasion operations. This combination of both land and sea fighting strength is highly significant."

Aside from the aforementioned SS-N, she also carries heavy equipment which can be considered as support to a landing operation, such as a SUW anti-submarine missile, two MBU 12-barrel antisubmarine launchers, and fourteen 57mm twin-barrel guns.

The view of Mr Keitaro Hasegawa, a commentator whose "Will Japan Survive?" was serialized in this magazine, is unequivocal:

"The 'Minsk' is purely and simply an aircraft carrier for landing operations. Its antisubmarine helicopters are for the purpose of escorting the convoys at sea to landing points, and the V/STOL aircraft are not for air control but attack planes for bombing points on land. To put it another way, the 'Minsk' can be used effectively only within the air space controlled by land-based friendly air forces. In which case, in view of the present dramatic buildup of air forces in the [Siberian] Maritime Provinces and in the Kuril Islands, the bringing of the 'Minsk' into the Far East can be for no other purpose than for conducting a landing operation on Hokkaido."

What in fact is the purpose behind posting the "Minsk" to the Soviet Pacific Fleet? Of course, the Soviet authorities remained silent, indifferent to the anxious Western countries as well as Japan, and the RED STAR newspaper of the Soviet Armed Forces only briefly noted, "A large number of naval officer cadets are aboard the "Minsk." This time, to be sure, the purpose may well have been the training of naval cadets, a test voyage, or practice maneuvers in the tropics. But when it comes to making Vladivostok the "Minsk" 's home port, something suddenly begins to smell fishy.

In 1969, the United States leased Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean from England and began to build a strategic outpost. In opposition, the Soviet Union directed its Baltic and Black Sea fleets toward the Indian Ocean and began to move its pieces to the area of the Red Sea, the Arab countries, and Sri Lanka. This strategy, including an increase in the number of buoys and nuclear submarines seems to have nearly reached completion by last year. On this, Mr Mineo observes, "At last, starting this year, they have advanced east of Malacca, with the aim of wresting strategic control of the seas in the Pacific from the United States," and he pointed out:

Interdiction of Sea Routes to China or Landing operations

"The United States holds control of the sea along the strategic waterway stretching from Thailand to Malacca, which might be called the first interdiction line, by means of nuclear submarines. With this as a trump card, while professing to protect military and economic interests in the countries

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of the region, it's aim is to strengthen its military power. Against this, the Soviet Union has for several years here had submarines coming and going, and has been contriving to break American control of the seas. We can say that the 'Minsk' is an extension of this scheme. The Americans have already positioned a second interdiction line along the Bashi Channel which connects the Philippines and Taiwan, but Soviet strategy-centered on the "Minsk," has also broken through here, in an attempt to secure free ocean passage to the Pacific Ocean.

Accordingly, the good natural harbors of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, Vietnam's military ports, assume great importance. If the Soviet Union were to woo Vietnam and succeed in turning Cam Ranh Bay into a base for the "Minsk," that would be the exact counterpart of the "Midway" Yokosuka relationship.

For one thing, Mr Mineo says that with Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang as bases, the Soviet Union's immediate goal would be to attack the Bashi Channel interdiction line, weakened by the withdrawal of the U.S. 2nd Army Division from Taiwan. [These bases] would provide multiple bases for the purpose of attacking the peak of the triangle, the Bashi Channel.

For another thing, it means that by turning Vietnam into a Soviet military base, the Soviet fleet could travel the seas freely, from the Black Sea, through the Indian Ocean, as far as Alaska, with no need to take along an oil tanker. To go even further, if at the same time, bases in Vietnam are built for the 50 reportedly newest and most powerful Tu 26 "Backfire" fighter-bombers (top speed mach 2.5, range 5500 miles) that have been stationed in the Far East since last year, [the area] almost up to Guam will truly lie entirely within their radius of attack.

Vietnam once permitted a Soviet navy cruiser to enter one of her ports near the end of the China-Vietnam clash. What attitude will she assume towards the "Minsk"? As long as the situation does not change, there is the convincing viewpoint that she will permit no more than refuelling or at most repairs, and that a complete military base is highly unlikely.

However, even though the West is only speculating now, when the Soviet Union does accomplish its strategic intent, there is no doubt that the world's military map will change totally. Mr Sekino and Mr Mineo forecast first a Soviet attack on China.

"In peacetime, they may use [naval power] as a political or diplomatic intervention force, but when occasion demands, they would probably completely interdict the import of material goods by sea into China. Depending on the situation, it is possible that there could be a landing made in coastal areas such as Lushun [Port Arthur] and Talien. Further, it is also very possible that as the international situation becomes tenser, should North Korea and the Soviet Union link up, utilizing the "Minsk" they could secure a sea route for a landing in North Korea and continue on to invade China.

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Depending on International Situation, a Direct Menace to Japan

It is not impossible that China could be completely surrounded by Soviet ground and air forces from the north and by the Soviet navy from the south and east. Defense Agency officials also say that this kind of encircling strategy is very probably the Soviet intent.

In the sense of shooting fish in a barrel, the Sea of Japan is in the same [situation]. There is the viewpoint that it is only a matter of time before this inland sea which during the Pacific War was dubbed "the Emperor's bathtub" by the American forces, will be called "the Soviet Sea." Mr Sekino, considering the fact that the Soviet Union already has 3000 fighter-bombers stationed in the Far East, analyzes [the situation] very severely thus:

"The Soviet Pacific Fleet is no problem if one [is speaking] only of a clash between fleets, but it becomes a completely different story if it has air support from ground bases, because the U.S. aircraft carriers' early warning planes, antisubmarine patrol planes, etc., which could be termed their lifeline, are tempting bait for Soviet fighters. Even should a second Korean war should break out, it is unthinkable that the U.S. 7th Fleet would plunge into the Sea of Japan knowing it would become fish in a barrel."

What is even more shocking is Keitaro Hasegawa's opinion that "the 'Minsk' is to be used to land on Hokkaido." Undergirding this view is the recent sudden increase in troops stationed on the islands of Kunashini and Etorofu. The Defense Agency has just confirmed that starting this month, 130mm cannons, 76mm howitzers, 23mm multi-barrel self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and such were brought in on three occasions.

The objective situation is that already, equipment amounting to almost a whole regiment of Soviet motorized rifle units has been brought in. Further, two divisions of marines, that may be called a landing spearhead, have been posted on the farther-out Sakhalin, and still more, there is the fully equipped 6th Airborne Division in Khabarovsk. Of course, this viewpoint is based on the premise that "the American forces, including the U.S. 7th Fleet, will not take a hand," and is such a rather frightening prospect likely? However, "It is very possible that if by some chance something happened in Europe, part of the U.S. 7th Fleet would head there, or else its strength would be cut as it moved to the south to [provide] a standby supply line to Europe via Hawaii, Australia, and Lombok. If that should happen, the area around Japan would be left with a great gap [in her defenses]. (Mr Mineo)

When we hear this kind of talk, we realize with a shock that it is not an account of some fantastic dream but is tinged with the touch of reality. Even if we double and triple the possible ramifications of our "Supposing...", an extreme situation will blow them all away, as the history of war up until now has proven. Right now, perhaps we must just say that the stormy waves of the Pacific are rising higher than they ever have before.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

BUSINESS LEADER INTERVIEWS USHIBA, DISCUSSES JAPANESE FOREIGN RELATIONS

Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Jun 79 p 7

[Sunday Special Series: "Interview with Japan's Chief Negotiator in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations with Yoshiya Ariyoshi, President of Nippon Yusen Kabushiki-gaisha and Chairman of BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Council)]

[Text] Nobuhiko Ushiba: graduate of Tokyo University Law School, 1932; entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was Director of the Economic Affairs Bureau, ambassador to Canada, vice-minister, and ambassador to the U.S.; from 1977, minister in charge of foreign economy; from 1978, government representative in charge of Tokyo Round (Multilateral Trade Negotiations); born in Tokyo in 1908.

Yoshiya Ariyoshi: graduate of Tokyo University Law School, 1925; after joining Nippon Yusen, served at the branch offices in England and Germany; President of Nippon Yusen, then Chairman, and, since June 1979, consultant; in March 1979, became the first Japanese Chairman of BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Council); born in Tokyo in 1900.

[Ariyoshi] Of course, for Mr. Ushiba, there is no difficulty coming to an understanding with foreigners. Rather, on the contrary, you are sure to throw 90 percent of your energy into persuading the Japanese of the foreigners' thinking. (laughter)

[Ushiba] Well, well, it seems you understand me.

[Ariyoshi] In my experience, for example, when I attend a shipping alliance conference, it is like fighting with real swords because I am representing the company and am to obtain navigation rights. At those times, it is entirely futile if I don't proceed with full authority. It is a miserable thing to attend such a conference without the authority to yield much now and obtain the future in its stead, or, to yield the left and take with the right. One can't do anything if one is depending on instructions by telegram for everything from the home office. But in Japan, full authority is usually not given to the person out in the field.

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[Ushiba] That's right. To be sure, it is not readily given in Japan. (laughter)

[Ariyoshi] Not giving it throws a wet blanket on the situation. So, I think it is difficult to act.

[Ushiba] In my case, I generally disregard directives. In the past, relatively reasonable directives came, but because today's directives poke around in all directions, the person receiving them cannot understand what the person sending them is thinking. (laughter) The results are better if they are disregarded. (laughter) Though, one will be at a loss if not enough understanding is arrived at with the home country.

[Ariyoshi] What kinds of difficulties do you undergo with the problems of the partner country in the negotiations?

[Ushiba] There is the feeling that recently, no matter where, each ministry is lined up side by side. The U.S. is so; in the past, if one was talking only with the State Department, afterwards it (the State Department) generally controlled (others). When you go to Congress, there are the congressional leaders. And if you speak with them, generally it was settled. Nowadays, all are lined up side by side. The other party in the negotiations is not the government, but sometimes the White House, sometimes the Congress. Even in Japan, there are complaints when something is not readily passed even though the prime minister says fine. And nowadays, such countries as the U.S. are just so.

[Ariyoshi] That is something the Japanese cannot understand. In the U.S. Congress, each congressman acts as his own spokesman on many things. Such as, oranges and cherries. Each for himself speaks with a loud voice.

[Ushiba] Each congressman proposes bills for passage. So there are many bills that are shelved. Even though there are many bills on import limitations proposed, most are shelved. But, in Japan, it is reported simply that the U.S. government proposed the bill. Even a person who thinks he knows a great deal about the U.S. errs in that area.

[Ariyoshi] That is one thing the ordinary Japanese does not understand.

[Ushiba] I think one more great difference is that there is neither a communist party nor a socialist party in the U.S. Therefore, there are almost no party disputes that move Congress. And, the scope of movement is conservative---it is conservative from left to right. Consequently, there is always the coloring of protective trade within that conservative coloring. Different from the past, this is an era where there is much interest in what comes in from a foreign country. And then, there is difficulty by reason of the fact that exports have become an exceedingly grave concern for the U.S.

[Ariyoshi] My feeling about Japanese foreign relations is that Japan's negotiators with foreign countries change too much. For example, the Japanese

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carries a calling card with the title of bureau director or vice-minister. Because they all generally prepare calling cards like relatives of the prime minister, no one trusts their calling cards. (laughter) Abroad, they negotiate with Mr. Ushiba or Mr. Rockefeller. It is not good to change the person thoughtlessly, as does Japan.

[Ushiba] That is for sure. If possible, it is better to have the same person for a fairly long time in foreign negotiations.

[Ariyoshi] One more thing is that too many people go along. The idea of a summit is that, when necessary, the top people will open their hearts and do some back-slapping. However, when Japan is invited, very many people come along. Isn't that the reason why Japan was not invited to the four nation heads of government conference at Guadeloupe last January? (laughter)

[Ushiba] That point is a possibility. When the Japanese are there, translators are needed, and an atmosphere where short-sleeved shirts are worn and shoulders are hugged just doesn't happen. After all, Japan is somewhat heterogeneous.

[Ariyoshi] At any rate, we become tense in matters of importance to the State. (laughter) We do not open our hearts freely as do foreigners. The Japanese have a strong feeling that we cannot be careless even with one word or phrase. One more thing, Japan is a country with a strong group consciousness. Moreover, it is one race and one nation. All are in the group, and a fellowship consciousness as Japan is strong. Therefore, when we go to a foreign country, there is the feeling of "water and oil."

[Ushiba] There is almost no other place in the world where 110 million people are gathered together in such a small country as this and are all one race. It is an extremely unique existence.

[Ariyoshi] What is thought to be natural in Japan because feelings and values are the same, is often apt not to be natural abroad. Americans say that Japan is not open at all. So if Japan says, "we are open," they will say, "how many American directors are there in your company?" Japanese wouldn't even think such a thing. When such things are looked at from abroad, it is said that Japanese get together only with comrades. The National Railways family and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation family have a consciousness of being relatives.

[Ushiba] That group consciousness reflects a closedness. It is not said only by foreign countries that National Railways or Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation are closed. It is said even at home. (laughter) The area where they are hardest put to open the doors is in national relations. There is no one who thinks that foreign goods will come in that suddenly.

[Ariyoshi] After all, the contention of the U.S. is that the basis is the principle of reciprocity.

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[Ushiba] The principles of reciprocity and equality are Japan's weakest points. The U.S., Western Europe and Japan are the three pillars of the world economy, but the problems that occur are always problems between Japan and the U.S., and between Japan and Western Europe. Problems do not occur much between the U.S. and Western Europe. Such a situation is extremely distressing. That is, of course, because Japan is unusual. As for Japan being unusual, it would be alright if it were unusual by reason of being open, but it is unusual by reason of being generally closed. (laughter)

[Ariyoshi] Even though Japan itself thinks it is open, when seen from abroad, contrary to expectations, it is often said not to be so.

[Ushiba] Perhaps the group consciousness of the companies mentioned here is present. It is not so to the extent of being a government policy, but is the rule or the norm. This is well understood by the Japanese, but foreigners don't understand. It can be said that Japan's openness is progressing to a certain degree, and only minor problems remain. Those minor problems are the most difficult, aren't they?

[Ariyoshi] If there is that kind of talk, can't one just say, "oh yes," all of a sudden. (laughter) Afterwards, we are free to buy or not buy.

[Ushiba] West Germany is doing so. They object to the fulfillment procedures. They say they will buy anytime, and, in fact, they do buy various things.

[Ariyoshi] In such a background, there are complaints about Japan's black figures, and yet there are no complaints about West Germany's black figures. They are thoroughly open, aren't they?

[Ushiba] Actually, Erhart (former chancellor, 1963-66) was wonderful. The fact that in his time trade and capital transactions were entirely open is very fortunate for today's West Germany. Japan was as closed as possible to foreign investment. That is the biggest cause for Japan's bad reputation. Finally, since the 1970's, we have opened up little by little.

[Ariyoshi] Also, West Germany is helping the European Common Market.

[Ushiba] West Germany has had an excess of exports with the U.S., but from the U.S. perspective, the balance with the EC is looked at rather than the balance with West Germany. The U.S. has a slight excess of exports, and so, for sure, the West German black figures are hidden.

[Ariyoshi] The exchange control has finally been eased to some degree, but this is also a problem that is difficult to explain to foreigners. As for the actual problem, even though it is said that Japan's export exchange control is formalized, it is counterattacked with "your law is so strong that even the prime minister could be arrested."

[Ushiba] In fact, Japan's capital transactions are still far from open. Recently, Europe and the U.S. have made demands concerning Japan's financial

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system. On that point, even if a bank fails in its business in a foreign country, no one gets together to offer relief. However, in Japan, since a policy, whereby financial institutions absolutely do not go bankrupt, is carried out, government intervention is indiscriminately great. Japan's banks are satisfied with that, but foreign banks that have come into Japan are dissatisfied that there has to be such rigid control. Still, they don't think about being helped by the Japanese government and the Japanese government hasn't thought about helping foreign banks.

[Ariyoshi] Japan is really an overprotected country, isn't it? The government's position is to help out no matter what.

[Ushiba] Rather, the government is officiously meddling. As a result of the government's increased intervention, the number of people who make their living dabbling in this activity increases the way a snowman does. That makes permanent places of employment; so it can't be stopped easily. The difficulty in administrative reform has its cause in this.

[Ariyoshi] But, when another look is not taken at the way the administration should be, not only will foreign discord increase little by little, but Japan itself will become unable to endure a "big government."

Our country's most influential authorities on international affairs and friends met together. As soon as Mr. Ushiba arrived, Mr. Ariyoshi, who was eagerly waiting, started questioning, and the talk quickly went to key issues. These two diagnosed the origin of economic friction between Japan and the U.S.-Europe to be the "fellowship consciousness" of the Japanese. It is said that the adverse tariff barriers are more in our hearts than in our system. If so, it will not be easy to dissolve the friction.

They met for the first time in 1937, when Mr. Ariyoshi was residing in Berlin and Mr. Ushiba was in service at the embassy in Germany. Indeed, it is said that they both knew each other's name because their grandmothers were close friends.

According to Mr. Ushiba, there are many people who attend the BIAC conference to hear Mr. Ariyoshi's richly witty talk. At the time Mr. Ushiba was ambassador to the U.S., it was written in a leading U.S. journal that he himself was a "five star of the Washington diplomatic circle."

Next week's guest will be Chairman Oki of the Japan Economic Research Center.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

EXPERT URGES GOVERNMENT TO SHELVE NORTHERN TERRITORY ISSUE

Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Jul 79 pp 277-286

Text Last year during the process of negotiating the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty fears of Soviet retaliation were voiced in some quarters. For instance, the view was expressed that the Soviet Union might withdraw its ambassador from Japan or tighten up in the fishing negotiations. At the most extreme there was even speculation that the Soviet Union might occupy Hokkaido.

In fact, these fears were groundless. Indeed, the Soviet Union has recently displayed new interest in improving Soviet-Japanese relations. The direct expression of this was the opening of the Soviet-Japanese administrative level conference on 14 and 15 May. The administrative level conference was a plan put forward by Japan at the time of Foreign Minister Sonoda's visit to the Soviet Union in January of last year. In the past the scheduled yearly Soviet-Japanese foreign ministers conference was often apt to be postponed, and even when held it resulted in nothing but fruitless confrontation over the northern territory issue. The plan was aimed at trying a different approach through a frank exchange of opinion and deepening of mutual understanding at the administrative level.

For a time the Soviets showed no reaction to this. However, on 9 May they suddenly indicated their acceptance. Thus it came about that Foreign Ministry Vice Minister Firubin and other officials came to Japan, and administrative level talks were held with Foreign Ministry Councilor Takashima and Japanese officials. Of course there was no progress on the northern territory issue. However, at the talks, in response to the Japanese statement that "our fundamental policy with respect to the Soviet Union is that we wish to develop friendly relations with the nation which is our most important neighbor," the Soviets responded, "We are in agreement with Japan's basic attitude concerning Japanese-Soviet relations, and there is a possibility of relations between the two countries developing to a new stage." There was also ready agreement to "meet next in Moscow."

Prior to this, the necessity of developing friendly relations toward the Soviet Union was mentioned in the U.S.-Japanese joint statement of 2 May released following the Ohira-Carter summit. And 9 May, the day on which

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the Soviets indicated their acceptance of the administrative level talks, was also the day on which U.S.-Soviet agreement on SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) was announced. It seems likely that the Soviet Union saw this as a good time to approach Japan.

If we look at the area of fishing, prior to the opening of this year's salmon and trout negotiations the Japanese worried considerably over "how things will go." However, when negotiations at last begin in April the Soviets displayed an unexpectedly pliant attitude, recognizing trout and salmon fishing on the open seas again this year, even through the conditions are more difficult than last year.

In the area of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation there was the appearance that "the Sino-Japanese treaty was a matter of no concern." The coastal trade talks of September of last year, the annual Soviet-Japanese trade talks in October, and the Soviet-Japanese Joint Economic Committee staff meeting in February of this year were each carried out extremely smoothly and in a friendly atmosphere.

However, if we wonder if conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty has had absolutely no negative impact upon the Soviet attitude toward Japan, of course that is not the case. The Soviet Union has taken the Sino-Japanese treaty and the normalization of U.S.-China relations with followed it as the conclusion of a quasi-military anti-Soviet alliance, and has increased its vigilance and tightened up its guard. The concrete expression of this is the posting of an entire brigade of ground forces, several thousand men, to Kunashiri and Etorofu, and the construction of bases there.

Defense Agency officials are saying that "it can be concluded that this is not an offensive operation but is for the defense of the islands" (for instance, the briefing given by Defense Agency Chief Yamashita at the LDP gathering on 9 February). If this is true, it is not proper to call it a "retaliation measure." However, it is certain that it is a concrete Soviet "countermeasure" to the Sino-Japanese treaty. An additional, more fundamental countermeasure which must be pointed out is that the Soviet Union has taken this opportunity to display the reaction of rejecting even more decisively the Japanese demand for return of the northern territories.

For instance, according to New Liberal Club representative Kono who visited Moscow at the end of November last year and talked with Prime Minister Kosygin and other Soviet leaders, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet Shitikov told him at that time, "By the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty, Japan has backed itself into a situation in which there is absolutely no hope with respect to the northern territory issue."

At the same period as Kono's visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Poliansky said in an interview with MAINICHI SHIMBUN, "There is no Soviet-Japanese territorial issue. The Soviet Union has no intention of handing over a single stone, not to mention an island, to anyone" (MAINICHI SHIMBUN, morning edition, 24 November 1978). The northern territory issues has reached the state of there being literally no island of which to take possession.

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Soviets Seek Neighborly Cooperation Treaty

Well then, exactly what has been the history to the present time of negotiations for return of the northern territory since the joint Soviet-Japanese declaration resuming diplomatic relations and ending the state of war? I will try to present a survey in the following paragraphs.

The Soviet-Japanese joint declaration was concluded under the Hatoyama Cabinet in October 1956 and became effective in December. Concerning the territorial issue, it provided that "the Soviet Union will transfer Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. However, these islands will actually be transferred following conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty."

Originally the peace treaty was supposed to have been concluded at this time. However, the Japanese said, "not only Habomai and Shikotan. If you don't also return Kunishiri and Etorufu.," demanding the return of all four islands at once, and no agreement was reached. Thus, as provided in the joint declaration diplomatic relations were re-established and the state of war was ended, while conclusion of the peace treaty including the territorial issue was left to further negotiations.

In June of 1957 there was a statement by a generously minded Khrushchev that, "if tomorrow the Americans returned Okinawa to Japan, I would probably take to our government a proposal that Habomai and Shikotan should be transferred to Japan prior to conclusion of the peace treaty." Then party first secretary, he uttered this statement in an interview with ASAHI SHIMBUN Editorial Bureau Chief Hirooku.

However, with the conclusion of the new Japan-United States Security Treaty with the United States Government by the Kishi Cabinet in January 1960, the Soviet Government sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government giving as "conditions for the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan," besides the "conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty" as agreed in the joint declaration, the newly added statement that "all foreign troops be withdrawn from Japanese territory." Trying to alter the conditions for carrying out the agreement they had undertaken in the joint declaration with a single notification was altogether like the Soviet Union's heavy handed methods.

However, in January of 1972 during the time of the Sato Cabinet when Foreign Minister Gromyko came to Japan for the regularly scheduled Soviet-Japan foreign minister's conference, the Soviet Union agreed for the first time to the opening of negotiations for the concluding of a peace treaty. This was interpreted as a switch to a softer policy toward Japan by the Soviets in the face of President Nixon's visit to China in February.

In July of the same year the Tanaka Cabinet was formed, replacing the Sato Cabinet, and in September Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira visited China, and the Sino-Japanese joint statement concerning the normalization of relations was issued. However, in October Foreign Minister Ohira visited the Soviet Union and he and Foreign Minister Gromyko carried out the first round of negotiations for conclusion of a peace treaty.

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The following year, in October 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka visited the Soviet Union and issued a joint statement with Secretary Brezhnev agreeing to "continue negotiations for a peace treaty." Concerning the events of that conference, in response to the twice repeated insistence of the Japanese that "Prime Minister Tanaka 'wishes to affirm that the issue of the four islands is included among the unresolved issues to be resolved by the conclusion of the peace treaty,' the first secretary replied 'just so,' 'that is fine.'" However, the Soviets denied this, saying, "First Secretary Brezhnev made absolutely no statement that territorial issues remain unresolved."

Following this, under the Miki Cabinet, which took over in December 1974 after the Tanaka Cabinet resigned, Foreign Minister Miyazawa twice carried out peace treaty negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko, in January 1975 and January 1976. If the Tanaka-Brezhnev talks are included, there have been four rounds of negotiations since the Ohira-Gromyko talks in 1972. However, in no instance was any concrete progress whatsoever toward resolution of the territorial issue to be seen.

During this time the Japanese demands for the northern territories were placed in an awkward situation in connection with territorial fishing waters. That is, in December 1976 the Soviet Union established a 200-mile limit for its territorial fishing waters, and in February 1977 released the gist of the actual lines drawn. This was based on the premise that the four northern islands were Soviet territory and the surrounding waters were included in the waters to which this applied.

In our country, the Fukuda Cabinet was formed in February 1976 replacing the Miki Cabinet, and was placed in the predicament of dealing with this difficult problem immediately after it was launched.

Ultimately, at the end of negotiations for the Soviet-Japanese provisional fishing agreement, which lasted 3 full months, from February to May 1977, an understanding was reached by inserting into the agreement a "shining" reserve clause stating that, "no provision whatsoever of this agreement may be viewed as impairing the standpoint or opinion of either government with respect to the several problems concerning their mutual relations." The Japanese had narrowly escaped a defeat.

Following this, in January of last year Foreign Minister Sonoda visited the Soviet Union and talked with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Mr Gromyko stated that, "the Soviet Union also wishes to conclude a peace treaty, but it cannot recognize the Japanese territorial demand for the return of all four islands at once. At this time we would like to proceed with negotiations for a neighborly cooperation treaty parallel to negotiations for conclusion of a peace treaty." and presented the draft of such a treaty. In response to this Foreign Minister Sonoda said that, "conclusion of a peace treaty based upon resolution of the territorial issue has precedence," and handed Gromyko a draft peace treaty providing for return of all four islands at once. Then each took the other's draft with the statement that, "we will not study it, but we will take it for now as a matter of etiquette."

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In July 1967 during the Sato Cabinet when Foreign Minister Miki visited the Soviet Union and talked with Prime Minister Kosygin, Mr Kosygin proposed to Mr Miki that, "we should each consider some interim measure until a peace treaty is concluded. The neighborly cooperation treaty is interpreted as the concrete Soviet plan for this "interim measure." The Soviets had probably been carefully calculating the timing of its presentation ever since.

The month following its presentation, that is, in February of last year, the Soviets unilaterally made the draft treaty public. Since that time they have been pressuring the Japanese, saying, "This treaty is the hand of friendship extended to Japan by the Soviet people. This time it is the Japanese who should make the next move." On the other hand, the Japanese Government had displayed a pliant attitude, stating that, "simultaneous discussion of the drafts of both the peace treaty and the neighborly cooperation treaty and the consolidation of both treaties may be possible" (reply of Foreign Minister Sonoda in the House of Councilors Budget Committee 21 December 1978). But with respect to territory, the government has not changed its attitude of "demanding the return of all four islands at once."

Kunashiri, Etorofu Renounced

Looking back on the history of negotiations for return of the northern territories to the present time I cannot refrain from having strong doubts concerning the ultimate propriety of the negotiating stance of the "demand for the return of all four islands at once" adopted by the Japanese. Mr Munenori Akagi expressed the same thoughts in this magazine two issues prior to this one (Munenori Akagi, "A Way of Associating With the Soviets"). As I will explain later, the reasons for my doubts are not necessarily the same, but in any case there seems to be a considerable tendency in Japan to look askance at the present government negotiating line.

The government has come to assert that "the 'Kurile Islands' renounced by Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty do not include Kunashiri and Etorofu" as the basis for its demand for the return of all four islands at once. While it is clear that Habomai and Shikotan, which are a part of Hokkaido, are not included in the "Kurile Islands" renounced in the treaty, the government has said that "the situation is the same with Kunashiri and Etorofu," and based upon this interpretation has demanded the return of all four islands at once.

However, in reality, the administration of Yoshida's Liberal Party at that time accepted the treaty on the basis of the interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are the Southern Kuriles, are included in the 'Kurile Islands' which have been renounced," and the Diet at that time accepted ratification of the treaty with this knowledge. Therefore it must be said that the government interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu have not been renounced" is contrary to the facts.

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The San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded in September 1951 at the San Francisco Peace Conference and became effective 28 April 1952 along with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. However, at the Peace Conference the Japanese plenipotentiary Prime Minister Yoshida spoke as follows concerning the northern territories issue in his speech accepting the treaty. "We cannot yield to the assertion of the Soviet Union's plenipotentiary that Japan seized the territory of the Kurile Island Chain and Southern Sakhalin by aggression. At the time of the opening of Japan the Imperial Russian Government entered no objection whatsoever to the fact that the two islands of the Southern Kuriles, Etorofu and Kunashiri, were Japanese territory. However, at the time the islands of the Northern Kuriles north of Urup were territory inhabited by both Russians and Japanese...Moreover, Habomai and Shikotan, part of Hokkaido, which belongs to Japan proper, have been occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union because at the time of the end of the war there happened to be Japanese military barracks on these islands."

This speech by Yoshida clearly states the fact that Habomai and Shikotan were not included in the "Kurile Islands" which had been determined as renounced according to the peace treaty. However, this was not stated with respect to Kunashiri and Etorofu. With the renunciation of the "Kurile Islands," Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are the "Southern Kuriles," would also be renounced. That we had been placed in such a desperate situation that we had to renounce even these two islands, which were an integral part of our nation's territory, was the greatest of misfortunes, but that is the interpretation of the purport of the Yoshida speech of that time.

Why did the Japanese adopt the interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu are renounced"? It was because the father of this treaty, John Foster Dulles, then State Department advisor to the Truman administration (later secretary of state under Eisenhower), adopted this interpretation. Even at that time when the U.S.-Soviet cold war was erupting in bursts of flame, it would not do for the Americans to reduce the secret Yalta agreements which had "given the entire Kurile Island chain to the Soviet Union as one of its compensations for the sought-for Soviet participation in the war against Japan" to a mere scrap of paper.

As a matter of fact, in his introductory remarks to the debate on the substance of the treaty at the peace conference, Dulles, who was explaining the treaty proposals as representative of the United States, said in his address, "There is some question whether the Habomai Islands are included in the geographical term Kurile Island Chain in the second clause (which contains the provision concerning renunciation of the Kurile Island Chain). It is the view of the American Government that Habomai is not included." This can be interpreted as practically meaning that "Habomai (and Shikotan) are not included in the Kuriles renounced under the Treaty, but Kunashiri and Etorofu are included."

The Soviet plenipotentiary who attended and spoke at this conference was First Vice Foreign Minister Gromyko, that is, the present day Foreign Minister Gromyko. Of course the Soviet Union, which was dissatisfied with

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the contents of the treaty, did not participate in signing it, but the foreign minister, as a witness to history, has exhaustive knowledge of all the details of events. On reflection, the Japanese assertion that "Kunashiri and Etorofu have not been renounced" made to such a person as Gromyko is enough to make one break out in a cold sweat.

At the Special Session of the Diet for consideration of both the peace treaty and the security treaty, held in October of that year as a follow-up to the peace conference, the government again took the position that "Kunashiri and Etorofu are renounced." For instance, Kumao Nishimura, then chief of the Foreign Ministry Treaty Bureau, gave the following statement in his reply in the Special Committee for Peace and Security of the House of Representatives on 19 October of that year.

"We think that both the Northern Kuriles and Southern Kuriles are included in the bounds of the Kurile Island Chain in the treaty." However, the fact that, viewed historically, the position of the Northern Kuriles and the Southern Kuriles is completely different in exactly as was made clear in our plenipotentiary's (Prime Minister Yoshida) address at the San Francisco Conference. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to hold fast to that view in the future."

Thus the Diet of that day agreed to ratification of the treaty with approval of an overwhelming majority (the Left Socialist Party, the Labor-Farmer Party, and the Communist Party were opposed) with knowledge of the interpretation "the 'Southern Kuriles,' Kunashiri and Etorofu, were included along with the 'Northern Kuriles' in the 'Kurile Island Chain' which had been determined as renounced according to the treaty.

Successful American Aim

The changeover of the Japanese, who had at one point given up Kunashiri and Etorofu, to demanding their return along with Habomai and Shikotan came after the opening of negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union for resumption of diplomatic relations by the Hatomama Cabinet in June 1955. The events surrounding this are related in detail in Shuichi Matsumoto's book, "Rainbow Over Moscow" (Asahi Shimbunsha 1966). Matsumoto had been vice foreign minister during the war, and even though only just elected to the House of Representatives for the first time, became plenipotentiary from the first in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, serving in the front lines at the negotiations from the beginning to his signing of the joint declaration resuming diplomatic relations along with Prime Minister Hatoyama in Moscow the following year in October 1956.

According to this book, Japan at first went into the negotiations with the following intent. "While we would continue to insist that Habomai, Shikotan, the Kurile Island Chain, and Southern Sakhalin were historically Japanese territory, we did not have the idea of obtaining the return of all of them, but would subject them to negotiation with flexibility." Thus, that

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negotiations were launched by asking for everything possible did not mean that the witness to them, and naturally the Japanese team at the time, was confident of success. When, after having several meetings, at the first meeting in August 1955 the Soviets hinted that "transfer of Habomai and Shikotan would be all right" Matsumoto writes that, "at first we could not believe our own ears."

On the Japanese side, those directly connected with the negotiations hoped for "agreement and conclusion of a peace treaty along the lines of the return of Habomai and Shikotan." However, the pressure from hard liners within the conservative party who held that "there should be no agreement unless the four islands, including Kunashiri and Etorofu, are returned at once, was strong. The American Government gave powerful support to this hard line insistence from the sidelines. Thus the Hatoyama Cabinet gave up conclusion of a peace treaty and decided for the present to settle for the joint declaration, and the peace treaty negotiations, including the territorial issue, were made matters for continuing negotiations.

Due to the lack of space I will omit a detailed explanation of events during this interval, but the preparation of the theoretical grounds for the demand for the return of the four islands at once, and the formal manifestation in the Diet of the new interpretation that Kunashiri and Etorofu are not included in the renounced "Kurile Island" by Foreign Ministry officials, was in the House of Representatives Committee for Foreign Affairs on 11 February 1956. This was immediately after the Soviet Union had presented its proposal to "transfer just Habomai and Shikotan" in the form of a text given to the Japanese.

Foreign Ministry officials at the time supposed that this alteration of interpretation had naturally been carried out with the support of the American Government, but afterwards in the final stages of the negotiations in response to a request by the Japanese for the opinion of the American Government concerning the Kunashiri-Etorofu issue, the Americans gave the following reply in September of that year.

"The United States, as a result of careful study of historical circumstances, has arrived at the conclusion that Kunashiri and Etorofu, along with the Habomai Islands which are part of the Hokkaido, have been an integral part of Japanese territory and should be recognized as coming under the legitimate sovereignty of Japan. If the Soviet Union agrees to this it will be a positive contribution to the relaxation of tensions in the Far East."

In short, it adopted the new interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu should be returned to Japan" and gave a stamp of approval "supporting" the Japanese demand for the return of all four islands at once. At the time, Dulles, the father of the peace treaty with Japan, was secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. If he had thought that "Kunashiri and Etorofu should be returned to Japan" he should have made it clear in the peace treaty or at the peace conference. Instead, while taking the position at that time that "Kunashiri and Etorofu are included in the 'Kurile Islands' which have been renounced," he changed his attitude at this stage.

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At the time the United States did not wish for the resumption of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations. In the midst of the Soviet-U.S. cold war it probably was his estimate that it was in the national interest of the United States that Japan continue its attitude of relying solely on the United States rather than establishing a pipeline to the Soviet Union. From this standpoint, his action was quite natural. If the new interpretation that "Kunashiri and Etorofu should be returned to Japan" were adopted, not only would it show good will toward Japan, it would serve the purpose of preventing the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations. It is likely that the United States took its action with this political aim in mind.

The hard liners with respect to the Soviet Union within this country's conservative party at that time gained strength from this stamp of approval from the American Government, and the pressure on the Hatoyama Cabinet calling for the demand for return of all four islands at once developed to violent proportions. The same was true for a large portion of the press. For this reason the Hatoyama Cabinet was driven into the position of having to give up conclusion of a peace treaty solely on the basis of Habomai and Shikotan.

Thus, today after 23 years have passed there still are no definite prospects for conclusion of a peace treaty. If one principal aim of the new American interpretation was to "prevent the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations," it has been a splendid success even up to the present time.

When Foreign Minister Sonoda visited the United States in early April to prepare for the visit of Prime Minister Ohira in May he conferred with American Government leaders, and at that time Secretary of State Vance, touching upon the northern territory issue, was reported to have clearly expressed the intention that "if there is anything it can do, the United States would like to lend a hand" (at talks held at the secretary's retreat in Williamsburg on 7 April). In response to this Foreign Minister Sonoda was said to have replied, "At the present time there is no need for the United States to lend a hand. We wish to thoroughly resolve problems between Japan and the Soviet Union as problems between Japan and the Soviet Union."

Since the Japanese have adopted this attitude, a situation in which the United States would step in is not to be imagined, at least for the present. But even so, Secretary Vance's offer of cooperation merits attention. Japanese-American relations, Soviet-American relations, and the general state of international affairs of 23 years ago and those of today are quite different. The difference between the world view of Mr Dulles and that of Mr Vance is also probably very great. I wonder what sort of "cooperation" American Government leaders believe is desirable at this time?

Withdrawal of 'Four Island Demand'

I believe that perhaps the government should at this time withdraw its demand for return of the four islands at once which is based on an interpretation which is contrary to the facts. Then a new negotiating policy should

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perhaps be put together based upon a return to the original starting point at the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and a frank recognition of the fact that "this country has renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu." This belief is based on the following two reasons.

The first reason is that it is to be imagined that the demand for the return of the islands at once based upon an interpretation which is contrary to the facts is unlikely to have any more power to persuade the other party in the future than it has had in the past. Then as long as the Japanese stubbornly cling to this demand formula, to hope for the return of the islands must be imagined to be like waiting for the rivers to run upstream, not only in the case of Kunashiri and Etorofu, but also for Habomai and Shikotan.

The second reason is that the present political posture of the government in putting out propaganda for domestic consumption claiming as "an interpretation faithful to the facts" an interpretation which is contrary to the facts must be supposed to involve great problems from the standpoint of democratic politics.

There is a pamphlet titled "Our Northern Territory" put out as material for the government's domestic public relations campaign concerning the northern territory by the Cultural Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. It makes free use of every sort of material to stress the legitimacy of the demand for return of the four islands at once, but the reply of Treaty Bureau Chief Nishimura in the Peace and Security Special Diet Session and the Dulles speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference (both previously mentioned) are not presented. The formal interpretation of a treaty ought to be that of the time of the conclusion of the treaty, but this argument is formed out of materials lacking the most essential parts. This seems to be not telling the truth to the people.

Of the various political parties, the Socialist and the Communist Parties have from the first pointed out that "the government interpretation of the Kunashiri and Etorofu issue is contrary to the facts." But the majority of the people probably think that the government explanation, rather than the Socialist-Communist assertions, is correct. If this is true, they have been misled by the government.

This is a lamentable political condition for a democratic nation. The political stance of the government of a democratic nation must be to rely on the formation of public opinion based upon accurate information and telling the truth to the people, who are the sovereign rulers. Of course, telling the people of the true circumstances surrounding events at the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty has no connection whatsoever to the leaking of national secrets. For the policy officials of the various related countries, including our negotiating partner, the Soviet Union, these are self-evident historical facts.

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A similar thing can be said concerning the draft peace treaty providing for return of the four islands at once, which was presented by the Japanese at the Sonoda-Gromyko talks in January of last year. As already mentioned, the Soviets have made public the draft neighborly cooperation treaty presented by the Soviet Union at that time. However, the Japanese draft peace treaty has not been made public, and even today the people are being kept in the dark. Why are our own people not told the contents of something which has been told to our negotiating partner? This is something which strains our understanding.

Moreover, in both cases it is probably misdirected to criticize Foreign Ministry officials who are directly involved. In the case of a political issue of such a high level, it is not the administrative officials who should bear responsibility, but the politicians.

Seriously Study Hirasawa Proposal

If the government withdrew its demand for return of the four islands at once and returned to the original starting point of the San Francisco Treaty, openly admitting the fact that "this nation has renounced Kunashiri and Etorofu," what new negotiating line should be adopted instead? I don't believe it would be a wise solution "to give up on Kunashiri and Etorofu and, drowning in our tears, conclude a treaty on the basis of Habomai and Shikotan." With this, 23 years of Japanese effort since the time of the Soviet-Japanese joint declaration would come to nothing. Even if renounced, since Kunashiri and Etorofu were without doubt originally purely and simply an integral part of our national territory, to close the curtain in such a fashion "in tearful full retreat" by the Japanese would leave a stiffness difficult to relax in the future course of Soviet-Japanese relations.

If this is the case, might not the two stage demand argument for "first Habomai and Shikotan, and following this not only Kunashiri and Etorofu, but also all the Kuriles" as put forth by the Socialist and Communist Parties be a line which could be adopted by a conservative party government?

Even though they are the same two stage demand theory, the plans advocated by the Socialist and the Communist Parties are not the same. The Socialist Party plan is to "first conclude a peace treaty on the basis of the return of Habomai and Shikotan, leaving the remaining Kurile Islands for continuing negotiations. Then, with the dissolving of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the future, bring about the return of all of the Kuriles." The Communist Party plan is "first, to ask for the return of Habomai and Shikotan right away, even before the conclusion of a peace treaty. Then, based upon preparation of objective conditions leading to their return through abrogating the clause in the San Francisco Peace Treaty renouncing the Kuriles and dissolving the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, bring about the return of all the Kuriles."

The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties on 14 April made public the text of an agreement ending a period of ruptured relations stretching back 15 years, and as follow-up to this Chairman Miyamoto will visit the Soviet Union

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and hold formal talks aimed at reconciliation with the Soviets "as soon as arrangements have been made." For the Soviet Union, this may be said to be one "countermeasure" to the Sino-Japanese treaty. But in any case, the Japanese Communist Party is eager to make the northern territory issue one theme of the talks and to seek the agreement of the other side to its two-stage return argument.

The Southern Kuriles, Kunashiri and Etorofu, are purely and simply an integral part of our national territory, but the Northern Kuriles north of Urup Island were ceded to this country peacefully in 1875 in the treaty exchanging the Kuriles for Karafuto, and in the sense of not having been seized by military force, they also are an integral part of our territory. For the Soviet Union to make them its territory is contrary to the principle of non-aggrandizement of territory which was the grand cause put forward by the Allied nations in World War II.

Thus it may be said that there is a rationale for the insistence of both the Socialist and Communist Parties on the realization of the return not only of Kunashiri and Etorofu, but all of the Kuriles including the Northern Kuriles. Further, if a Socialist-Communist coalition government were established and a revolutionary turnaround of our former foreign policy were launched in an atmosphere of "peaceful revolution" based upon the support of the majority of the people, that in itself might have persuasive power internationally.

However, this cannot be sought by a conservative party government. If a government which heretofore had not demanded the return of the Northern Kuriles suddenly sought them, even in a two-stage formula, it would be taken as "madness" in the international community, and would only uselessly invite mistrust.

As a breakthrough policy for the northern territory issue to replace the demand for the return of all four islands at once, I believe that the so-called "Hirasawa Proposal" might be one which the government should seriously consider adopting. This proposal was advocated by the late foreign affairs expert Kazushige Hirasawa in an article titled, "Japan's New Foreign Policy," which he contributed to the October 1975 issue of the authoritative international affairs quarterly, FOREIGN AFFAIRS published in the United States. The portion related to the northern territories and relations with the Soviet Union is as follows.

"I believe that Japan should freeze the issue of Kunashiri and Etorofu until the end of this century and conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. This proposal is conditional upon the opening of the fishing grounds surrounding both islands to Japanese fishermen. In the next 25 years if the atmosphere steadily improves and a relationship of mutual trust is built up, in the first part of the 21st century Japan and the Soviet Union can probably sit down together at discussions for the purpose of friendly and constructive handling of the territorial issue. If this does not happen, the prospects for cooperation in relation to the even more important issues of food and energy resources will be quite dim."

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This article was published during the period of the Miki Cabinet. Since Mr Hirasawa was known as Mr Miki's foreign policy brain, it was given some attention as "coming from someone who is a spokesman for Mr Miki's intentions," but this was denied by Mr Miki. Then, this plan was shelved in the midst of fierce attacks from public opinion supporting the argument for the return of all four islands at once.

However, I believe that this "argument for the return of Habomai and Shikotan and the freezing (shelving) of Kunashiri and Etorofu" might be the right idea. Moreover, once we acknowledge the renunciation of Kunashiri and Etorofu in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japanese cannot make "demands" of the other party concerning the disposition of the two islands, even for the "freezing until the end of this century." But it is probably possible to make a "claim." Also, concerning the immediate return sought for Habomai and Shikotan, considering the gist of the Soviet memorandum to Japan at the time of the conclusion of the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, it is probably necessary to devise measures to exclude them from coverage under the Security Treaty. There are probably additional technical diplomatic problems. However, in its fundamental thinking the Hirasawa proposal might be the proper line.

Deng Xiaoping Statement Merits Attention

As previously mentioned, the Japanese Government has taken the stance that "There may be simultaneous discussion of both the Japanese peace treaty draft and the Soviet neighborly cooperation treaty draft and consolidation of both treaties." As an actual negotiating formula the Japanese probably ought to aim first for this type of discussion. Then they should plan for conversion from the four island at once formula to the Hirasawa formula during these discussions.

The contents of the draft treaty of neighborly cooperation presented by the Soviets has many points in common with the treaty concluded last year in November with Ethiopia and with the treaties the Soviets have already concluded with India and Iraq. That is, it is based upon a pattern of treaties with non-aligned nations. This is something which our country cannot swallow in its present form. However, the Soviets have concluded arrangements of friendly cooperation with Britain, France, Canada, Denmark, and other Western nations. Thus it will be best if our country aims at conversion to this Western pattern.

As the fierce criticism at the time of the publication of the Hirasawa proposal will testify, the negative reaction domestically to the "argument for the tabling of Kunashiri and Etorofu" is strong. However, the thing which comes to mind in this connection is the statement concerning the Senkaku Island issue made by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping at a news conference in Tokyo on 25 October last year. Mr Deng spoke as follows. "It does not bother us if this issue is shelved for the present. It does not even bother us if it is shelved for 10 years. The wisdom of our generation of men is insufficient to reach agreement on this issue. The next generation of men is certain to be wiser than we and will probably be able to discover a means necessarily acceptable to all at that time." This is an opinion which merits attention. 25

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The one who actually exercises control over the Senkaku Islands is not China, but Japan. Viewed from the standpoint of this country, the situation is exactly the reverse of the northern territories case. If China had opposed Japan's effective control and refused shelving of the issue, the Sino-Japanese treaty would not have been concluded and progress in Sino-Japanese relations would probably not have occurred. With respect to the northern territory issue, China, as is well known, supports the argument for return of all four islands at once. However, be that as it may, the grown-up attitude displayed by the Chinese concerning the Senkaku issue is suggestive with respect to the state of our nation's attitude toward the northern territory issue.

Jiji Tsushin chief commentator Kikuo Sato argues as follows concerning this point. "The northern territory issue is incomparably more important than the Senkaku issue. However, it would be well to reconsider the stubborn attitude which completely closes off imitating the wisdom of Vice Premier Deng. Ought we not to decide wisely so as not to be laughed at by wise generations of the future?" (SEKAI SHUHO, New Years Issue 1979). I agree with his comments.

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ECONOMIC

BRIEFS

FUJITSU COMPUTER SALES--As of 30 June 1979, Fujitsu had received orders for 15 M-160F, 15 M-150F, 80 M-140F, and 95 M-130F computers. Orders for small computers since 17 April tallied 160 V830 and 130 System 80 computers. Delivery has been made on the first M-130F and first M-140F. Buoyed by unexpectedly good order receipts, Fujitsu is setting its first year order target for the new machines at 1,000 machines and expects orders for over 2,500 machines in the following year. [Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Jul 79 p 8]

HEAT PIPE INDUSTRY--The heat pipe industry in Japan, presently composed of Furukawa Denko, Showa Aluminum (tie-up with a U.S. manufacturer), and Suzuki Metals (U.S. Government licensee), is rated as at the take-off stage. All three companies are expanding production, and insiders at Furukawa expect entrance of perhaps another 10 firms into the field in the next few years. Heat pipes have application in heat recovery in industrial processes, aerospace, electronics, electric power and transmission, automobiles, solar water heating systems, air conditioning, and other areas. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 25 Jul 79 p 7]

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

BRIEFS

OPTELECTRONICS LARGE PROJECT--The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, to move ahead with an 8-year program to cost 20 billion yen for development of optical applications instrumentation and control systems, has established a working group subcommittee in the large technology development subcommittee of the Industrial Technology Council. The program, to start in JFY 1979 as a new "large project," is rated as the government's first serious subsidy program for fostering the optoelectronics industry, which is expected to become a core knowledge-intensive industry of the 1980's, in addition to being an effort to solve current problems such as in plant energy resource and energy conservation, pollution, and safety. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jul 79 p 2]

TURBOPROP AIRCRAFT REEXAMINED--The Japan Aerospace Industry Association has set up an "Energy-conserving High-speed Turboprop Research Promotion Temporary Subcommittee" to survey leading aircraft technology development focusing on prospects for turboprop aircraft which offer fuel economy 20 to 30 percent better than do fanjet aircraft plus lower noise levels and on composite materials which are expected to assume a much greater role in new aircraft structures. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jul 79 p 9]

MEGAWATT POWER STORAGE--The Agency of Industrial Science and Technology intends to start a "large project" on a large-capacity electricity storage secondary battery system in JFY 1980 and is now soliciting the views of electric power companies and battery manufacturers on the subject. The schedule envisioned is to conduct demonstration tests on a megawatt-hour class system in 1987 or 1988 and start commercialization in 1991. The AIST is actively promoting this program and the fuel cell program as "two large projects for energy conservation." [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 25 Jul 79 p 1]

HEAVY CRUDE CRACKING--Mitsui Mining and Mitsui Coke Industry have completed a 2.4 ton/day heavy crude pilot cracking plant in Fukuoka Prefecture at a cost of 200 million yen. The process uses delayed thermal cracking technology from the Solvolysis method coal liquefaction process to obtain 60 to 70 percent yields of gasoline, kerosene, light oils, and

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other products. In essence, residual oil remaining after refining the crude is transferred to the heavy cracking plant, heated to 400 degrees C, and circulated, yielding the light fractions and pitch. The Mitsui group, while continuing experiments at the pilot plant, intends to build a 150,000 to 200,000 bbl/day refinery using this technology over 2 or 3 years and commercialize the process. [Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 28 Jul 79 p 2]

COAL-OIL POWERPLANT--The Electric Power Development Corp has announced its plans to build a 100-200 ton/day COM (coal oil mixture) demonstration plant at the Takehara thermal power plant in Hiroshima and conduct full-scale boiler firing tests using 2 of the 20 Takehara No 1 boilers. Construction of the COM plant and conversion of the two boilers is to be completed during JFY 1980. [Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 18 Jul 79 p 9]

HYDROGEN CAR--Professor Furuhamo of the Musashino Institute of Technology will be starting on development of a frontwheel drive car using a 1,000-cc engine fueled with liquid hydrogen. Professor Furuhamo earlier built a 2-cylinder 550-cc hydrogen engine auto, and now is intent on scaling up and demonstrating the safety and practicality of the hydrogen-fueled car. In the new project, he will have the full cooperation of Suzuki Motor. [Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Jul 79 p 18]

LASER MOLD MAKING--Professor Nakagawa and assistant Suzuki of Tokyo University Industrial Technology Lab, with assistance from Tokyo Computer Control and a subsidy from the Japan Technology Development Corporation, have developed a metal mold manufacturing method utilizing laser machining. Costs are cut to one-half or less that of conventional methods for dies and such. [Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jul 79 p 11]

PARANORMAL RESEARCH--Shuji Inomata is working full time on paranormal research at the Electrotechnical Laboratory, Agency of Industrial Science and Technology. Building on Einstein's mass-energy convertability, Mr Inomata postulates mass-energy-consciousness convertability and envisions telepathy, "annihilation" of radioactive wastes, cure of cancer, control over gravity, and other capabilities to be possible. Mr Inomata is 45, holds a BS in radio engineering, was a visiting researcher at MIT and holds a PhD in engineering from Tokyo Institute of Technology, and at the Electrotechnical Lab worked in acoustics, audio, and bionics research until the furor over paranormal phenomena in Japan 5 years ago. His success in bending a spoon at that time made him a convert, and he now heads the Japan Consciousness Engineering Research Society. [Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Jul 79 p 13]

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