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27 August 1979

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 47/79)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ECONOMICS MINISTER DISCUSSES NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG

Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 25 Jul 79 pp 381-388

Text of lecture by Dr Otto Count Lambsdorff, federal minister of economics, Federal Republic of Germany, at the membership meeting of the German Association for Foreign Politics in Bonn, 20 June 1979

Text On 3 June 1979 the Fifth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V) ended in Manila. For an entire month some 5,000 delegates from more than 150 countries had tried to agree a joint approach to the speed-up of economic development in the young nations of the Third World and the encouragement of their integration into the world economy.

Industrial and developing countries agreed even before the conference that it would be relatively easy to describe the challenges confronting all of us, but very difficult indeed to meet them. This was confirmed especially in the final stage of the conference, which I had the dubious pleasure of witnessing at first hand and also of helping to shape it. Cooperation between industrial and developing nations is indeed making progress, in particular at bilateral level, and mutual understanding is growing. But it will need a long and laborious effort to guide this cooperation along lines which are not set by planned economy-regimented signposts but rather by more efficient conditions. The result of the negotiations must be judged against this background. In general we may and should be satisfied. On the other hand I will not disguise my opinion that materially better results would have been desirable and even possible.

Aims and Results of the Manila Conference

Responding to the ambitious aims of the conference, the agenda included nearly all sectors of international economics. In addition to general discussions on the interdependence of trade, financial and development issues, it was intended to deal more specifically with detailed aspects of the following:

-- The danger of protectionism to world trade,

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- The status and results of GATT negotiations,
- The intensification of finished goods exports from the developing countries, and
- The integrated raw material program, the foundations of which were established in Nairobi in 1976.

We discussed the world monetary and financial system and its compatibility with the needs of the developing countries, the issues of the transfer of public and private resources and the problems of borrowing by the developing countries. In the area of the transfer of technology it was necessary to forge ahead with negotiations on an international code of behavior and study how we may best improve the technological capacity of the developing nations. In Manila we also talked about their obtaining a greater share of world shipping. The least developed countries, the land-bound and island nations finally demanded that special attention be devoted to their specific problems. In the area of cooperation among the developing countries it was imperative more strongly to emphasize the concept of the collective solidarity of Third World countries and the growing share of responsibility the more advanced nations in this community should assume for its weaker members. Last not least--in fact this point was of particular significance for me--Manila continued the East-South dialog, by which the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were to be more than hitherto involved in the industrialized world's efforts toward better development.

In February last, in Arusha (Tanzania), the nations belonging to the group of 77 (now counting 119 developing countries among its members) adopted a "program for collective responsibility." This program confronts the rest of the world with a comprehensive catalog of demands regarding all items listed, and some of these demands are very far reaching indeed. The industrial countries are reproached with being the ones mainly responsible for the lack of economic growth, inflation and exchange rate fluctuations; the present world economic system, it is said, has failed. The Third World therefore demands that redress is provided by means of planning controls and also claims "a greater share in world economic management." According to Third World opinion an extensive bunch of measures must provide the bases for development in the 1980's, and these will in due course result in a new world economic system.

From the outset all attending parties were fully aware that no more than a fraction of the developing countries demands could be met, and that UNCTAD V could produce progress only in certain areas.

Among the most important conference resolutions must doubtlessly be counted the trade standstill declaration which includes a clear repudiation of protectionism. This is an obligation which--due to our persistent urging--was finally, albeit hesitantly, accepted by the developing countries also. It is surely a good sign that even the Third World nations are increasingly

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coming to appreciate the benefits of free world trade and the harmfulness of creeping protectionism. This did much to help the status and reputation of our country at this conference. By now the Third World nations are quite aware that the Germans are in the forefront of the battle against protectionism.

The limited success of UNCTAD V was also helped by the industrial countries declared readiness substantially to raise public development aid, though it was not possible to provide any quantitative promises or fixed dates. Aid for the least developed countries (LLDC's) is to be doubled at the earliest possible time, and terms are to be further improved. I would also like to mention a resolution on economic cooperation among the developing countries, which, among other goals, aims to improve their regional and supraregional association and thereby their total economic strength.

In other areas UNCTAD V failed to achieve some aims which would have been perfectly feasible. That was due to the fact that some developing countries evidently managed completely to misunderstand the goal of this conference--that is to negotiate and arrive at compromises. This applies in particular to one of the key conference issues, the so-called interdependence. Coming to grief here was the attempt of the developing nations in future to conduct (within the scope of UNCTAD) a permanent exchange of experiences and opinions on world economic problems. The developing countries were intent on coupling this with a demand, unacceptable to us, for a far reaching mandate involving controls and regimentation. In the end their design failed due to the lack of preparedness of some developing countries for including the energy issue in this analytical contemplation. We defended ourselves in this matter, because any discussion of the current world economic situation would be incomplete and unrealistic if it lacked the energy element.

The Maximum Demands of the Arusha Program and the Politicization of the Conference

While unsatisfactory, this is par for the course of any such conference: Several other important points on the agenda were concluded or adjourned by way of merely procedural decisions which mean no more than the intention to continue the dialog. On the whole this was a consequence of the fact that, in all important matters, the developing countries clung to the catalog of maximum demands laid down in the Arusha program. Often following painful internal debates within the group of 77, these demands were simply translated into draft resolutions, some important ones submitted late and, in their essential elements, all proved to be not negotiable. It is certainly not conducive to the negotiating partners willingness to make concessions if they gain the impression that they are intended merely to subscribe to the other partners concepts. As a result the industrial countries attitudes tended to harden also, and the potential scope for negotiations failed to be properly explored.

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Impressed by this less than fruitful atmosphere for negotiations I involved myself repeatedly in the talks to help bring closer the differing standpoints. On the part of the developing countries I had to deal with officials, usually ambassadors with strictly limited briefs, who did not feel authorized constructively to interpret the Arusha program. The ministers who had adopted it in Arusha were no longer present in the later stages of the Manila Conference. I did not even meet them there in the final phase, when the success of the conference depended on high level decisions.

The Eastern state trading countries demonstrated a particularly unpleasant example of rigidity in negotiations. Claiming that UNCTAD V should deal mainly with issues involved in East-West trade (as if that topic were not constantly under discussion elsewhere), they persistently evaded the extensive Third World demands addressed to them. Altogether the developmental role of the East European state trading countries was subjected to a public and critical review at this conference--the first such occasion. Though these countries tried their hardest to define developmental policy primarily as an obligation of the Western industrial nations, I am happy to report that the conferees in Manila unanimously rejected all these attempts: Industrial countries, developing nations and the People's Republic of China. Incidentally, this example shows that a certain tendency to politicization surfaced in Manila.

While understandable in terms of specific UNCTAD topics, the limits of that which may be discussed within the scope of UNCTAD were well exceeded by a resolution--adopted against our vote--on liberation movements. We were unable to accept this for quite factual reasons, because it tended to jeopardize the sovereignty of nations with whom the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations (Israel, South Africa). A dispute of this kind belongs in the U.N. Assembly.

The politicization of the conference is also reflected in the fact that the vote was split on some quite specific resolutions; the developing countries here demonstrated their majority--although resolutions rejected by the industrial nations as addressees are well understood to be of only minimal value. After all, UNCTAD resolutions have no legally binding effect and represent merely moral obligations. Logically this implies that all participants must agree. Resolutions not accepted by important countries--especially the addressees--are actually no more than unilateral declarations. At the same time they devalue the concept of the resolution.

Despite all this I would claim that UNCTAD V concluded with a minimum result acceptable to the developing countries. Our gratitude for this result is due Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines, and his Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo who, despite his advanced age, officiated admirably as conference chairman. President Marcos, in particular, repeatedly intervened in various talks and tried to protect the negotiations from outside political influences. Keeping well in the background he managed successfully to prevent fruitless polemics against certain countries. After conclusion of



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the conference he described the result as satisfactory, thus adding an optimistic note to the somewhat pessimistic appraisal of other countries.

Considered overall, the developing countries achieved advances in several areas, though they were unable to obtain satisfaction of their maximum demands which, in our opinion, were inappropriate. For us industrial nations the result is acceptable insofar as we managed to maintain our basic attitudes and keep concessions within the framework initially envisioned. Yet this may not necessarily simplify future North-South discussions. A temporary hardening of attitudes by the group of 77 is quite on the cards.

The Federal Government's Attitude

The Federal Government will orient its future Third World policy by the UNCTAD V resolutions. Even before the conference it stated its readiness to raise public development aid. The medium-range financial plan already provides an additional DM500 million for the coming year and another DM500 million for 1981. In the course of the forthcoming budget discussions the Cabinet will decide in how far these amounts might still be increased. The Federal Government is also prepared to grant disproportional aid to the poorest developing countries and is ready to continue such aid in the form of subsidies.

In Manila the German delegation did not allow any doubt that public development aid will only have the desired effect (that is a decline in the prosperity gap between North and South) if resolutely reinforced by private efforts in the shape of investments, loans and the increased exchange of goods. Also needed for greater effectiveness is the steady improvement of the investment atmosphere in many developing countries.

UNCTAD V was an important milestone in the North-South dialog. The conference followed upon a series of meetings, the results of which have decisively affected international economic relations. Still, UNCTAD V was unable to finally dot all i's; the outstanding problems were still too great and too complex. Other conferences will follow, such as the 1980 special U.N. General Assembly.

In this larger context I judge UNCTAD V to have produced a satisfactory overall result. North and South are involved in a necessary though painful and time consuming process of reflection and discussion; hopefully the hostile confrontation of 1974 has finally been discarded.

Different Interests Among the Developing Countries

When, however, we place this result within the context of the enormous organizational, personnel and financial costs of a mass even of this kind, we must ask ourselves whether the international community of nations has adopted the correct method for its efforts to achieve a juster world economic order. Much of the time spent in Manila was wasted on political discussions

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which were entirely unrelated to the function of UNCTAD.<sup>1</sup> Moreover the emergence of opinions at these conferences is bound to be slow and the resolution procedure so involved and time consuming that it should be reexamined without any more delay.

One of the major contributing factors here is the obviously increasing conflict of interests within the group of 77, a factor which certainly does not help the negotiations to proceed smoothly. The developing countries need more and more time to settle their internal difficulties. Particularly important for the advanced developing countries (the so-called threshold countries) with economies featuring dynamic industrialization, are trade issues, resistance to protectionism. The less developed nations naturally are more concerned with the transfer of resources, especially public development aid.

Corresponding to the different economic constitutions, foreign private investments hold differing significance in the various developing countries, and the various governments hold similarly differing attitudes to the problems involved. The same may be said, mutatis mutandi, of issues involved in the borrowing by developing nations. Most of all--and UNCTAD V was the first conference clearly to demonstrate this--does the controversy between the oil countries and the non-oil producing developing countries increasingly divide the group of 77.

Several Latin American countries especially publicly reproved the OPEC nations for their oil price policy and thereby temporarily delayed consensus in the group of 77--in particular its attitude to the world economic situation. Incidentally, this circumstance reveals that regional differences as well as differences of factual interests are on the rise within the group of 77.

The Latin Americans feel themselves afflicted by more than rising oil import prices (compelling OPEC for the first time ever to defend itself on two fronts); they also set different accents with respect to trade demands and frequently expect better results from bilateral talks with the industrial countries rather than from multilateral conferences. Much the same holds true for some Asian countries, such as the ASEAN nations.

The African countries tend to be poorer and therefore--understandably--concentrate on demands for public financial aid. Moreover they feel strong only when demonstrating solidarity in a multilateral setting. They are also inclined to radical views. In Manila they sometimes abruptly quit the negotiations if they did not go their way.

The example of Cuba shows that this complicated state of affairs may result in a conflict of loyalties. As a member of the group of 77 it was--by the caprice of the alphabet--assigned the role of spokesman for the 77. In this capacity Cuba was compelled to champion the serious challenges of the developing nations to the state trading countries of the Eastern Bloc though--as a member of the Council for Economic Mutual Aid--it is itself a member of

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this Bloc. In the meantime Cuba's invitation to have UNCTAD VI meet in Havana was merely noted. The group of the industrial countries, by contrast, displayed admirable cohesion in the course of the negotiations.

This development justifies certain doubts whether the group of 77 will be able to achieve more than formal unity at the next great UNCTAD Conference. It also confirms our opinion that it might be advisable rather more to emphasize the differences encountered in seeking solutions to the many problems of the Third World and take them into consideration with respect to the various measures to be adopted. We are already pursuing this idea in our day-to-day policies toward the Third World. However, it must be up to the developing countries themselves to introduce it into international discussion; if we were to do so, we would incur the accusation of wishing to split the group of 77.

At the same time we are bound to ask whether the advanced developing countries should not accept more obligations vis-a-vis the less developed nations. That does not apply only to the opening of their markets to other developing countries.

It would be premature, though, to assume that the group of 77 will in future refrain from presenting its claims by making common cause at least against the industrial countries. The conference of nonaligned nations, set for September 1979 in Havana, will provide clues to future trends.

Thoughts on the Conference Structure

This again raises the question whether mammoth conferences are the most suitable approach for initiating the necessary changes. We take leave to doubt this mainly because we constantly observe that bilateral negotiations with developing countries yield quite satisfactory results while, in view of the compulsion to bloc solidarity, acceptable solutions are far harder to achieve in the setting of multilateral conferences. Incidentally, the impression is gaining ground that at this time far too many bodies are dealing with far too many--and often similar--issues, and not even a sensible division of labor can always be guaranteed.

The UNCTAD consultations of past months on specific topics have also shown that it is easier for differing viewpoints to be reconciled by discussing definite economic problems and factual issues than conducting an abstract but passionate debate. Progress was achieved in the negotiations about the structure of the common fund, the matter of debt relief for the poorest developing countries and the still unfinished negotiations about an international rubber agreement and the code for the transfer of technologies. The reason was that all participants were ready for compromise in clearly defined areas. The North-South dialog--and this is to be welcomed--has thereby become much more matter of fact.

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Unfortunately UNCTAD V was unable to add anything decisive to these advances, neither additional substance nor specific political impulses. On the contrary: The conference structure used in Manila hides an enormous danger. In the medium and long term unsuccessful major conferences of this kind are bound further to fuel the frustration especially of the Third World nations. The cheap taunt of "lacking political goodwill" among the industrial countries might become unfortunate reality for many developing nations and, consequently, the guideline of their political thought and action. The radical forces, urging confrontation, would be reinforced. We therefore consider most urgent a discussion of the conference structure.

It will be necessary considerably to restrict attendance at these conferences and limit the agenda. At the same time the individual sovereign nations must not feel excluded from the decisionmaking process or think their concerns neglected. Evidently the South will have special problems here.

For our country it will be crucial in the years to come that market economic concepts be persuasively advocated. In the area of trade, especially, it will be tested over and over again. After all, only if we succeed in keeping open the markets of the industrial countries to the products of the Third World will it be possible for the structural change of the world economy, demanded by the developing countries, to proceed successfully. The market economic system can hope to prove its practical value and moral worth only if it helps ensure that prosperity benefits more than a minority. Only then will its attraction be great enough in the long run to convert even present critics to the acknowledgment of its advantages.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ARMORED DIVISION ARTILLERY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT DESCRIBED

Armored Division Artillery Regiment

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 72-73

[Article by Colonel Daniel Valery, commanding officer, 12th Artillery Regiment, Strasbourg: "Furnish Prompt Round-the-Clock Fire Support"]

[Text] To execute his scheme of maneuver, the armored division commander has the massive and deep supporting fire of his artillery, in addition to mechanized and tank regiments which employ a wide variety of direct-fire and short-range weapons.

This artillery's organization and the new equipment it is due to receive will very shortly give it outstanding combat support capabilities which will enable it to play a much more decisive part in combined arms operations than it has in the past.

In its present transitional organization, the artillery regiment is equipped with 20 155 F3 artillery pieces and six artillery radars. In its definitive organization, it will have 24 155 AuF1 pieces, six radars, and a large number of firing aids.

Modern Equipment

The 155F3 piece consists of a 155-mm gun mounted on an AMX 13 tank chassis. The gun's crew and ammunition are transported in a separate support vehicle. This gun has a maximum range of 20 kilometers and a maximum rate of fire of three rounds per minute.

The first of the 155 AuF1's are currently being issued to units. It is a single self-propelled unit with its gun mounted on an AMX 30 tank chassis and transporting both gun crew and ammunition inside the turret. The 155 AuF1 has a maximum range of 30 kilometers and a rate of fire of six rounds per 45 seconds.

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These guns fire high explosive projectiles--which deliver effective fire on a beaten zone of 1,000-1,500 square meters--and also smoke, incendiary, and illuminating rounds.

A certain number of new items of equipment, now in service or about to be, greatly enhance both the accuracy of fire and the speed with which it can be delivered. For instance, survey problems are now resolved thanks to the gyrotheodolite, the laser rangefinder, and in the near future, a land navigation device. Other items of equipment furnish precise data on ballistic conditions--Miradop muzzle-velocity measuring device--and aerologic conditions--Sirocco radar--affecting the trajectory of projectiles.

The RATAC [Field Artillery Fire Control Radar] specifically designed for adjustment of fire is also a target acquisition device. It detects and locates moving targets at ranges up to 20 kilometers and permits very rapid adjustment and delivery of fire. It is capable of conducting area surveillance--maximum effective 1,000-mil sector--or point surveillance within a window of approximately 100 meters by 600 meters.

Total of 144 Rounds in 45 Seconds

As currently organized, the artillery regiment can fire 120 rounds in 2 minutes and thus neutralize a shielded enemy force deployed over a 3-hectare area. This corresponds to an enemy standard mechanized company deployed for attack. It can repeat this volume of fire some 10 times in 1 hour, and 26 times with its average daily combat allowance of ammunition (the fire unit represents 3,200 rounds).

In its definitive organization, with 24 155AuF1 guns, the regiment's firepower increases quite substantially because it has a much faster rate of fire. This abrupt concentrated fire increases the neutralization effect and enables the regiment to repeat fire rapidly. The regiment thus has the capability of neutralizing the equivalent of a mechanized battalion. Furthermore, whenever the division is reinforced by a corps artillery regiment, the concentrated fire of the 48 pieces can shatter the attack of an enemy tank battalion in a few moments.

The artillery regiment has 16 officer forward observers operating with the basic tactical units of front line regiments, and six RATAC's capable of all-weather surveillance in depth. This observation system furnishes the regimental commander, and hence the division commander, a continuous, comprehensive, and rather complete picture of the division's enemy situation.

The artillery regiment may be employed:

- a. In support of the armored and mechanized regiments against targets beyond the range of their weapons,

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b. In delivering fire deep in enemy positions on artillery, command installations, and immediate reserves;

c. In support of the division's scheme of maneuver with massed or concentrated fire, particularly in assault operations. In the latter case, artillery fire becomes a decisive element of the combined arms team.

If the importance of the mission assigned the division warrants, the division commander may also obtain from the corps commander:

a. Either a reinforcing corp artillery regiment. The two regiments form an artillery group under operational control of the commander of the division artillery regiment;

b. Or reinforcing fire from one or more other artillery regiments, generally for a specific operation of limited duration.

In the same spirit, the division artillery regiment may be called upon to furnish reinforcing fire support to an adjacent division or participate in concentrated fire delivered by corps artillery units.

Employment of artillery is characterized by the great flexibility required to enable the division commander to adapt fire support quickly to the exigencies of the situation. This means the artillery's scheme of maneuver must be closely linked to the overall scheme of maneuver.

Deployed in Depth

The artillery regiment has 900 men and 270 vehicles, 52 of which are armored. It is organized into a headquarters and service battery and four firing batteries with five guns each, but soon to be increased to six each.


In the field, the regimental commander stays with the division commander and is consulted on artillery fire support matters. He issues his operation orders to his executive officer who is officer in charge of the regimental command post. He is assisted by a liaison officer at the division command post.

In combat, the regiment is deployed as follows:

a. In the forward area, there are four DLO's (Liaison and Observation Detachments) and six RATAC's. The DLO's with the armored and mechanized regiments each comprise a captain, the detachment commander, and four forward observers operating with the basic tactical units. The captain maintains liaison with the regimental commander and coordinates artillery and heavy mortar fire.

KEY:

1. Enemy
2. DLO: Liaison and Observation Detachment
3. DL: Liaison Detachment
4. TC: Combat trains
5. Division rear echelon or base
6. TR: Regimental supply trains.





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The RATAc's are deployed by groups of two on high points providing a favorable in-depth view of enemy positions.

b. Back of the forward area, the four firing batteries keep pace with the division's operation and position themselves as close as possible to the first echelon regiments. They are under the operational control of the regimental command post which directs target acquisition operations, delivery of fire, and movement of equipment.

c. Lastly, still further back, combat trains in the wake of the batteries and regimental supply trains operating out of the division rear echelon furnish logistic support to the division.

The artillery regiment constitutes a powerful and irreplaceable instrument at the division commander's disposal. It is, in fact, the only one which has an all-weather and round-the-clock capability of delivering prompt and concentrated fire on any target within range of its guns. In addition, its great mobility enables it to displace all of its weapons forward within firing range of more distant targets.

The performance characteristics of its new equipment and the flexibility of its organization will, in the near future, make the artillery become a major asset in the armored division's tactical operations. [See illustration next page]

Armored Division Headquarters/Support Regiment

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 76-77

[Article by Lt Col Daniel Mioche, commanding officer, 10th Headquarters and Support Regiment, Chalons-sur-Marne: "Headquarters and Support Regiment"]

[Text] The armored division's principal characteristics are firepower, mobility, and flexibility. Its firepower implies a large expenditure of ammunition: tank ammunition and especially artillery ammunition. Its mobility, achieved by the extensive mechanization of its units, requires substantial fuel supplies and creates maintenance and displacement problems. Its flexibility demands a communications system enabling the division commander to issue "voice" orders to his regiments, and the traffic control means capable of ensuring that the division's 1,800 armored and wheeled vehicles move freely and rapidly in conformity with the scheme of maneuver, no matter what changes in posture or direction may be involved. Lastly, combat itself inevitably entails casualties: wounded personnel have to be evacuated and treated, equipment has to be repaired.

In one day of combat, an armored division consumes 300 tons of fuel, 385 tons of ammunition, including 230 tons of artillery ammunition, and 15 tons of food: a total of 700 tons or 100 kilograms per man.

The organic resources, initial combat supply, and basic load (of ammunition) of the armored division's combat and combat support regiments allow them to handle their requirements for a limited time only, and even then only incompletely. Additional resources and capabilities are furnished them by the headquarters and support regiment which operates within the army corps complete logistical support system.

#### Guaranteed Strength

Logistics at division level may be defined as: the reception, transshipment and distribution of supplies, the maintenance and repair of equipment, and the collecting triage, and evacuation of wounded personnel. The three functional chains of the army corps--supply, maintenance and repair, and medical--thus extend into the division.

The armored division has a substantial organic logistical support capability. It can transport almost 1,400 tons, which is the equivalent of 2 days of supply. More than 70 specialized repair teams can provide support simultaneously. Various types of wreckers, maintenance vehicles, and tank transporters, are available for the recover, repair, and salvage of equipment. The Medical Service's equipment and personnel can receive and immediately transport more than 200 wounded to a triage center, and there treat and evacuate (based on the urgency of the treatment required) 15 to 20 wounded per hour.

All of this equipment and personnel is distributed among the units. The organic resources of the combat and combat support regiments afford them an initial degree of self-sufficiency and the resources of the headquarters and support regiment enable the armored division to adapt to the exigencies and hazards of combat by guaranteeing units rapid replenishment or even augmentation of their strength.

#### Gives the Division Endurance

The headquarters and support regiment (RCS) is comprised of personnel from all arms and services under the command of transportation corps officers and noncommissioned officers. It encompasses all of the operational division-level command and control, movement support, and logistical support personnel and equipment. These include:

a. Elements directly responsible to the armored division commander, and necessary to:


1. Exercise command and control of the division: particularly a signal company capable of equipping alternate command posts and, if necessary, a lightly-manned forward tactical command post;

2. Furnish the division appropriate movement support during preliminary phases and when it engages the enemy. This mission is assigned to the traffic control company.

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Key:

1. Armored division headquarters and support regiment
2. Commanding officer
3. Headquarters and headquarters company
4. Traffic control company
5. Signal company
6. Transportation company
7. Divisional repair group
8. Casualty collecting section
9. Medical triage section




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Key:

1. To regiments up to 30 kilometers distance
2. Division rear echelon or base (about 80 km<sup>2</sup>)
3. Medical area
4. Command and control area
5. Maintenance and repair area
6. Supply area
7. Forward Group of the Logistical Brigade
8. Army corps rear boundary, 80 to 120 kilometers



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b. Elements directly responsible to the RCS commander, namely those operating out of the division rear area echelon or base.

The division rear echelon is normally located near and inside the division rear boundary so as to have relative stability and security. Its installations occupy an area of some 80 square miles.

The RCS commander is also the commander of the division rear echelon and as such is responsible for implementation of the divisional logistical support plan. He issues orders to supply, service, and support units on the basis of a general concept of the scheme of maneuver and according to priorities established by the division commander.

Logistical support units and facilities are normally separated within the division rear echelon into four functional areas:

- a. A command and control area with the rear echelon headquarters and communications facilities located therein;
- b. A supply area in which the rear echelon receives, transships, or distributes ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants delivered by corps vehicles. The transportation company with its 100 tactical vehicles and gas tankers has an immediate capacity of 450 tons and 75 cubic meters of fuel and permits raising the division's level of self-sufficiency to 3 days of combat. The cargo handling section has a transshipment capacity of more than 60 tons per hours.
- c. A maintenance and repair area in which the armored division's repair group which makes on-site repairs which take a relatively short time and which the combat echelons have been unable to perform. The group also supplies repair parts to units, recovers and salvages priority items of equipment.
- d. A medical area where the wounded are screened, processed, and treated before being evacuated to corps hospital facilities.

The combat and combat support regiments give the armored division its firepower and mobility. The headquarters and support regiment, by the services and supplies it provides, enables the armored division to maneuver and gives it endurance.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MILITARY READIED TO INTERVENE FOR OIL IF NEED BE

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "The Return of the 'Colonial Troops'"]

[Text] French paratroopers in the oilfields of the Middle East? As extraordinary as it may seem, the question has been asked during the last few weeks by several French newspapers, which have a tendency to attribute most of the domestic problems of their country--unemployment, inflation, restrictions on consumption, and so on--to the "Arab oil."\*

The conservative elements, which dominate the army, top-level administration, the parliament, and of course the government, are in fact of the opinion that freely opening up the oil deposits, as well as opening up the routes for shipping the precious fuel, are the conditions for their country's survival. They are thus considering the possibility of resorting to a "gunboat policy" in the event that this privileged access might be threatened in one way or another. As part of this policy, they are in harmony with the ideas recently set forth by American strategists, who announced the establishment of a foreign intervention force of 110,000 men capable of serving their imperialist schemes "in any place in the Third World where the vital interests of the USA might be threatened."

In fact, the French general staff did not wait for the fears expressed recently by politicians to work out intervention plans that take into account the strategic facts of the moment. They have become accustomed to categorizing as unmistakable aggression the mere defection of a supplier of raw materials, or the setting up of a political regime that does not

\*See AFRIQUE-ASIE No 191: "The Carter Doctrine."

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correspond with the wishes of Paris: both scenarios, studied by "crisis teams," call, they say, for a suitable countermeasure. Military specialists have even gone so far as to plan for "source control" of deposits--petroleum or otherwise: one might also think of the uranium in Namibia, or the gold in South Africa. Airborne commando units, comprised of overtrained professionals, might form the privileged instrument of these activities of reprimand or reprisal, which must be able to be carried out quickly, efficiently, and even discreetly.

However, controlling all the transit points of tankers or other freighters carrying various raw materials is also part of the field of concern of the French general staff. In particular, they are researching ways of strengthening surveillance and means of French intervention in the Straits of Ormuz (at the exit to the Gulf), in the Bab el-Mandeb channel (at the entrance to the Red Sea), in the Mozambique Channel (along the Malagasy and Comoran coasts), a route along which passes two-thirds of the petroleum consumed in France.

These alarmist projects are, for the time being, mainly aimed at reassuring public opinion, which is frightened by what has been presented to it as "the decline of the West," at dissuading the producer nations from being too greedy in their rates, or versatile in their alliances, and at making an impression on the Soviet Union--often accused by the general staffs of imperialist armies of preparing an "economic strangulation of the West."

But France has shown on several occasions recently that it is, once again, developing a taste for a policy of foreign intervention and that its army is preparing for it. It should be sufficient to recall the actions in Chad, in Zaire, in Mauritania, or in Lebanon during the last 2 years, as well as the consistency of its land and sea presence in the Indian Ocean. France has also undertaken during these past few months a reorganization of its specialized overseas forces, which could, with good reason, worry the progressive countries of the Third World, for this is, finally, a question of the reconstruction of the former colonial army, after remodeling it to the current fashion with its parachute troops or its marines.

The initial disposition is as follows: for the past several years, the French army has been comprised of--in addition to its Eastern forces, its security forces, and its strategic forces--units that have been combined together in "foreign intervention forces." Firstly, it is a question of units permanently stationed overseas--that is, 26,000 men distributed in the barracks of the Antilles, Reunion and Mayotte, New Caledonia, and

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Polynesia, as well as in Ouakam (Senegal), Port Boet (Ivory Coast), Port Gentil (Gabon), and above all Djibouti (which is still the main land base outside French territory). To this must be added 3,500 soldiers available "on a temporary basis", they state in the French Ministry of Defense, in Mauritania, Chad, or Lebanon. And the men from the French squadron of the Indian Ocean (between 3,000 and 5,000 sailors, depending on the month), as well as those of the Mediterranean (who watch over the Middle East and North Africa) or of the Atlantic (who watch over French-speaking West Africa).

However, the reserves from these units stationed overseas are formed, in France itself, from two major army units that can be routed abroad with weapons and baggage: the 2d Parachutist Division stationed in the southwest, and the 9th Marine Light Infantry Division, in Brittany. The 2d Parachutist Division includes 14,500 soldiers and 2,200 vehicles, distributed among a dozen regiments specialized in assault, armored tanks, support, command, and signals. The 9th Marine Light Infantry Division can draw 8,200 men and 1,850 miscellaneous vehicles.

The recruitment and training of these units has been especially well taken care of: one finds in the units a growing proportion of enlisted soldiers, who have signed a minimum contract of 3 years (to the detriment of the number of drafted soldiers, the number of which is decreasing). Already, by the end of this year, the majority of the men from the 9th Marine Light Infantry Division will be professionals: the general staff thinks that it can demand more mobility and availability from them than in the case of draftees.

The political ulterior motives for this "professionalization" are obvious: one can remember the weight of the uncertainties caused by draftees on the morale of the French army during the Algerian war: they did not always understand the kind of war they were expected to wage.

Among these enlisted men are many who came from the French overseas departments and territories, as well as children of harkis [African native auxiliary contingent] or pieds-noirs [Algerian-born Frenchmen], unemployed youth from the working class, and the tough guys taken from "laxer" units. The training spirit can be summed up as follows: "You have signed up; it was in order to sweat blood." The motto: "Here, you won't be bored." The hope maintained: "To jump. To embark. To fight." To which must be added a worship of the chief and of the force, as well as an old colonial song that is still current: "We are the Africans . . . "



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Aside from this professionalization, which is already entering a dangerous development, one should note the recent establishment of an "operational airborne group" within the 2d Parachute Division, the command of which has been entrusted to General Gulchard, a veteran of Indochina and Algeria, a specialist in airborne and amphibian operations. At any moment, these highly qualified officers may take over as the head of an army of between one and three paratroop regiments, sent into a foreign theater in the space of a few hours.

Improvement has also been sought in the area of intervention commando units (special marines or Foreign Legion) as well as in long distance communications--in order to expand the possibilities of punctual action and to maintain a close link between any force in action abroad and the COA [Armed Forces Operations Center], installed in the basement of the Ministry of Defense, Boulevard Saint Germain, in Paris. The Air Force has also made an effort, by forming "operational cells" comprised of one or several "Jaguar" fighters, with "Boeing C135" supply planes and "Transall C160" transport planes. Interventions are no longer what they used to be . . . .

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

NEW PRIME MINISTER PRESENTS POLICY ADDRESS TO PARLIAMENT

Report on Cossiga's Address

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 10 Aug 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Luca Giurato report on Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga 9 August address to parliament: "Cossiga Presents 'Fully Responsible' Government to Parliament"]

[Text] Rome--Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga yesterday presented his government's program to parliament. Cossiga spoke for over an hour, in a calm, almost monotonous voice, stumbling from time to time over a word apparently corrected by hand at the last moment. He was only interrupted four times: twice by [PCI directorate member] Gian Carlo Pajetta and twice from the radical benches.

The prime minister's speech to parliament--on which the debate, which began yesterday afternoon, should end Sunday with the confidence vote--can be divided into three main parts. The first is a broad political preamble, in which Cossiga explains the dominant reasons behind and the real significance of the action which the government intends to pursue at such a delicate and complex moment in the country's life. Next the premier explained the relations among the parties which constitute the present coalition, devoting special attention to the PCI, which chose to stay in opposition.

Cossiga spoke of the communists as "an opposition force with the rights and duties connected to the democratic role of opposition in a democratic parliamentary regime--an opposition force which democratically represents such broad sections of the population and which is so closely linked to the history of our national liberation." He also spoke of a dialog between government and opposition "in an open, honest, constructive and not prejudiced manner, as befits a democracy."

"This government," the prime minister declared, "has been formed in full awareness of how the process of the political forces' coming to terms with the country's situation and with each other began but was not completed after the elections: only a definitive system of relations among the political forces and between the political forces and the country can lead to stability, clarity and full interest and democratic participation in the nation's leadership."

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"And," he added, "this government is being formed also to create opportunities--less burdened by constitutional pressure--for a constructive dialog among the political forces, guaranteeing this by reactivating constitutional procedures and by means of government action which will attack the most pressing problems and insure the holding power of the basic elements of the institutional and social framework."

The meaning of the prime minister's remarks is as follows: for 7 months an enormous "machine," namely the state's institutional and constitutional apparatus, was first hindered and subsequently frozen by the republic's longest ever political crisis. Never had the country been so long without its essential leadership, that is, without a government enjoying parliament's confidence. Now this government does exist and, though aware of its "political limits," aims first to free and then set in motion the state machinery, by "attacking the most pressing problems" and insuring the holding power of the institutional and social framework.

On the eve of the debate Cossiga, with his closest government aides (especially his economic "team") considered the alternative between commitment and non-commitment, between resigned renunciation and the assumption of full responsibility for the tasks awaiting an executive. In view of the scale of the problems and the country's sometimes troubled, sometimes exasperated expectancy, he chose the path of commitment, of responsibility on a personal level also (among other things, he guaranteed full support for the parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Moro killing).

No sooner was it inaugurated, then, than the government rejected the label of "truce government" attached to it partly out of superficiality and partly out of opportunism on the part of certain political forces. The word "truce" does not appear once in the long report from the prime minister, who was keen to explain the political significance of his executive as follows: "The government is aware of the political limits which the present situation sets on its activities. But it is--for the sake of the country's needs, consistently with the constitution and as a result of the obligatory choice of those who created it--the government of the republic, with all its prerogatives and duties and fully answerable to parliament."

The second part is devoted to the problems of public order and of the anti-terrorist struggle: "The forces of order must be increasingly empowered to fulfill their institutional duties with an adequate availability of means and a technical and professional reinforcement, which must be improved within a well defined organizational institutional context and with the backing of rational and systematic coordination." The government will introduce police reform, which will constitute, "leaving aside miraculous expectations," a very important and priority measure in parliament.

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Still on the subject of public order, which is the one which most concerns Cossiga as a politician and as a person (once again yesterday the prime minister referred to Moro "with immense and grieved affection"), the government plans "to guarantee internal security" by waging a "firm and constant" struggle "against political violence." Against terrorism there can be "no truce, no form of lenient understanding." Nevertheless, Cossiga rejected any possibility of any recourses to special laws: "They are no use; what is needed is a strict implementation of the existing ones." The government will introduce police reform. But with regard to terrorism, the most striking point is not any specific announcement, but the following subtle psychological intuition: "Above all, we have broken the aura of impunity which seemed to surround subversive undertakings."

The second part also contains a reference to education problems: "We do not want to waste the fruitful lessons and the useful agreements gained in the form of reform bills introduced and carried forward during the previous legislative period, Cossiga explained. "Precedence will be given to resolving the gravest and most pressing problems: a new status for university teachers; the protection of gifted children; the modernization of study programs."

The whole of the last part, devoted to the grave economic crisis and to the remedies for tackling it, was long, detailed and weighty (perhaps too much so). "In the coming months," Cossiga said, "we will have to face a difficult period. We aim to tackle it not only with the most suitable monetary and fiscal measures but also and above all by promoting greater flexibility in our production structures and greater promptness and efficiency in local and central government's solutions, so that whatever happens the objectives of employment and growth which our society demands are guaranteed."

The outline for this strategy will be the 3-year plan drawn up by Pandolfi last year. The new plan (revised and corrected as a result of the energy crisis) will be presented by 31 January 1980. To a chamber which from time to time showed signs of impatience, Cossiga presented the main aspects of the maneuver: the struggle against inflation, cuts in unproductive public spending, a committed struggle against tax evaders, an increase in charges for public services and the construction of nuclear power stations. (These points are listed in detail in a separate article.)

With regard to foreign policy, the government will act according to traditional guidelines.

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Communist Reaction

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 10 Aug 79 p 1 LD

[Unattributed, untitled report on 9 August statement by PCI Secretariat member Alessandro Natta in Parliament]

[Text] Rome--Following Deputy Cossiga's program speech, PCI Secretariat member Alessandro Natta delivered the following statement:

"The prime minister's exposition, though stressing his concern at the country's critical state, particularly on account of the acuteness of the economic and social problems, does not seem to me to provide an adequate overall policy or remedies which will permit the full mobilization of all the country's energies. This too is a reflection of a deliberately weak and precarious government solution.

"As far as we are concerned," Natta concluded, "we will try, as the opposition, to secure full commitment from the government. We will be present and active throughout the country and in parliament, in an attempt to insure that the most acute and pressing problems of the economy and the defense of the democratic system and of freedoms are dealt with and resolved."

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END