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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 12/79)

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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL

Shakhnazarov Writes on Peaceful Coexistence
(G. Kh. Sakhnazarov; VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 6, 1979) ... 1

NATIONAL

Review of Book by Grishin, Smirnov, and Others on Ideology
(I. L. Vartanov; OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI, SERIYA 1,
PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA, No 3, 1979) 21

REGIONAL

Assassination Attempts on Estonian First Secretary
(POSEV, Jul 79) 30

- a -

[III - USSR - 35 FOUO]

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INTERNATIONAL

SHAKHNAZAROV WRITES ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 20-34

[Article by G. Kh. Sakhnazarov: "The Problem of Peace: An Analysis of the Basic Concepts"]

[Text] Every attempt to delve into the complexities of contemporary international life, especially in respect to such a very complicated problem as the problem of war and peace, requires first of all an interpretation of the basic concepts which provide the means for a more or less adequate explanation of the essence of the processes predominating in the world arena. Today this connotes primarily peaceful coexistence, the "cold war," and the relaxation of international tension.

Peaceful coexistence is sometimes interpreted as one of the conventional principles of international relations and at best as a collective concept embracing a number of generally accepted norms which should guide the states in their relations. This kind of approval fails to take account of both the historical and the theoretical significance of the idea of peaceful coexistence.

We know that the idea itself, which was advanced by V. I. Lenin right after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was inspired by the need to determine the objective principles governing the development of international relations in the era of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. In other words, we are dealing with a phenomenon, the history of which is still unknown, and with the inevitable coexistence in the world arena for a more or less prolonged period of states with diverse economic configuration, social structure and political system.

It may be said that there have also been periods like this in the past, as for example, in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This is true. Another researcher is able to detect a number of similarities in the parallel international situation of the period from the end of the 18th to the beginning of the 19th century on the one hand and our era on the other. However, we can only talk about partial parallelisms and superficial analogies because the class nature of the states of various complexions which supplanted each other in the past was in principle identical.

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In the 20th century we are encountering a phenomenon of an essentially different nature in relations between states with opposing class character. This is why the previous concepts proved to be inadequate and V. I. Lenin provided a precise description of the essential character of the new era, which is witnessing the inception of the development of international relations: states with diverse social systems have been compelled to coexist in the world arena because there is only one possible alternative to this--war.

Thus, it is wrong to view peaceful coexistence as one of the traditional principles of international law, similar to respect for sovereignty and independence and equality and non-interference in internal affairs. These democratic principles, of course, obtained general acceptance and began to exercise a more or less decisive influence on international relations under the impact of socialist foreign policy and as a result of the new alignment of forces in the world. But they are not exclusively a phenomenon of the new era; this period only created the objective possibility for transforming them from an abstract conception to actual reality. As far as the principle of peaceful coexistence is concerned, it does not represent an exceptional phenomenon of our time and not even simply a norm for the relations between states with a different social system; it is precise reference rather to the socialist and capitalist states.

Another important factor relates to the scope of the concept of peaceful coexistence. Some people believe that this concept should connote any state of peace, or more precisely, absence of war (the widespread expression is "the worst peace is better than war"). Others, on the other hand, emphasize a considerably greater scope for peaceful coexistence and interpret it to mean not only the absence of military operations but also the existence of a wide-ranging international cooperation and a definite trust in the relations between states with different systems.

This is undoubtedly the ideal of peaceful coexistence in its full scope, so to speak. But is hardly correct to consider that a low level of international cooperation indicates the lack of peaceful coexistence. This concept would seem to encompass a broad scope: one form of it is the elementary state of peace, which is comparable to the "cold war"; the other is a well-developed international cooperation. And the transition from the first to the second entails precisely the process which evolved in the 1970's and has been given the name of relaxation of international tension.¹ At least this is the way it looks historically.²

Replying to a question from a TIME correspondent, L. I. Brezhnev said: "When we talk about 'relaxation of tension' or, in its abbreviated form, simply 'detente' we have in mind international relations and a regimen which is the antithesis of the posture of the so-called 'cold war'; it is one characterized by constant tension and it threatens to erupt into open conflict at any moment. In other words, detente means primarily surmounting the 'cold war' and going over to normal, equitable relations between states. Detente entails a readiness to resolve differences and

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disputes, not by force and not by threats and rattling of arms, but by peaceful means behind the negotiating table. Detente means a certain amount of trust and an ability to take one another's lawful interests into account. Such, in brief, is our understanding of detente.

In this connection, an important clarification suggests itself. While acknowledging that the simple absence of military operations and the "worst peace" can be interpreted as the initial state of peaceful coexistence, it should be added that this is the case if it does not just amount to the usual breather between two wars. After the defeat of the imperialist intervention, Soviet Russia gained exactly such a breather but this kind of state of peace can hardly be termed peaceful coexistence because the ruling circles of the capitalist countries did not abandon the hope of smashing the young socialist republic by military means and they did not even take any great pains to conceal their designs. They talked only about gathering their forces for an immediate "crusade" against communism and the astonishing blindness which characterized the bourgeois democratic government's attempts at "appeasement" of the Fascist aggressors is explained by the fact that they saw in them a key detachment of imperialist crusaders.

In other words, for the state of peace to "deserve" to be called peaceful coexistence both systems must more or less officially renounce attempts to resolve their historical antagonism in their favor by force of arms. In this lies the quintessence of peaceful coexistence. Of course, its intensiveness and completeness are to a great extent dependent on whether the economic ties flourish or survive, whether there exists at least a minimum atmosphere of trust, etc. But with all that, rejection of resort to war to resolve the "capitalism--socialism" conflict is the sine qua non of peaceful coexistence; without such rejection we cannot talk about it even if we cover up the cannons at a particular time.

As far as socialism is concerned, a war stance is grossly contrary to its nature and if this stance nonetheless eventuates, this fact in itself is proof of the immaturity of the socialist social relations and consciousness, resulting in a definite distortion and deformation of the foreign policy principles. This is precisely the situation with Chinese militarism, whose sources are rooted not in the least in socialism but rather in a great-power jingoism and, viewed from a broader political perspective, in bourgeois nationalism.

The CPSU program postulates as one of the paramount communist principles the "repudiation of war as a means of resolving questions in dispute among the states and it advocates resolving these disputes by negotiations." This principle was embodied in all the documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government beginning with the celebrated Leninist peace decree and ending with the peace programs adopted at the 24th and 25th Party Congresses. Finally, the 1977 USSR Constitution declares: "The USSR is unswervingly

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pursuing the Leninist policy of peace and it stands for strengthening of the security of peoples and broad international cooperation."⁴

Similar principles are enunciated in the party and state documents of all the countries of socialist concord. If one wishes to define their general position, then it also invariably comes down to a defense of peace and a repudiation of the use of force or threats involving its use. The relevant proposals have been reiterated in the declarations of the political advisory committee of the states which participated in the Warsaw Pact, which declarations were adopted at the Bucharest (1976) and Moscow (1978) conferences.

In all the important documents a decisive role has been played by historical experience. The most convincing evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union has adhered and is adhering faithfully to the principles of socialist foreign policy is the fact that throughout the recent period it did not once make war against other states.

Thus, on its part, socialism has always manifested a readiness for peaceful coexistence. This is not true of imperialism. The best proof of this is to be found in the evolution of the foreign policy doctrines of the United States. We know that the short-lived nuclear monopoly of the U.S. inspired the strategy of so-called containment of communism and "massive retaliation." The strategy was frankly designed for the use of nuclear blackmail against the USSR and the other socialist countries and ultimately for affirmation of American world dominance.

R. Niebhur, one of the founders of the school of theoreticians which was given the designation of political realism, asserted in 1950 that the earth will for a long time continue to be an arena of war which will return it to the camp of capitalism. Neither much or little stemming from this could be construed as the "moral right" of the U.S. to be the first to assault the USSR and the camp of socialism. "The idea of the inevitability of war is still one of the logical steps to the concept of preventive war because if it is inevitable for us to have war with the Russians, then why should we not choose the time to begin this undertaking that is most advantageous for us."⁵

In the 1960's the changed alinement of forces prompted the ruling circles of the U.S. to shift from a policy of "massive retaliation" to a strategy of "flexible reaction." But in this instance "flexibility" was a very relative concept: in essence the only boundary for this has become the policy of avoiding direct conflict with the Soviet Union, a course which would henceforth be considered suicidal for the U.S. In everything else the use of military force, as before, is regarded as a wholly proper method of achieving political ends.

Finally, still another reappraisal was made in the 1970's: the recognition of the parity of the military power of the USSR and the U.S. forced the

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American strategists to devise a new foreign policy doctrine which was called "realistic hesitancy." It entails, first, an increase of strength and, second, the threat of its use short of war.⁶

However, this doctrine too is slated for review and it is significant that the discussions pertaining to the new strategy are inspired by a striving to maximize the conditions for coexistence. They seek not so much a means of strengthening peace as the maximum belligerence which would preclude only total nuclear slaughter.

Thus, there began to come into vogue the concept of "limited nuclear war," as formulated in 1974 by the U.S. Minister [sic] of Defense J. Schlessinger. It represents a complicated and rather cumbersome structure whose component parts are badly fitted one to the other and it can be interpreted in various ways. This was apparently also the author's intention: to "feed" the hawks and still satisfy the doves. If we lay bare the subsequent ingenious masterpiece of American military thinking, we discover it comprises in essence an attempt to "legalize" the use of nuclear weapons, which is equivalent to a step backward toward the infamous policy of "retaliation."

True, the American experts emphasize the point that what we have now is only "limited nuclear option"⁸ and they even undertake to prove that such a method could more effectively control the course of nuclear conflicts. According to them, a "carefully considered" nuclear strike frightens the enemy and thereby prevents the development of the hand-to-hand struggle of a general conflict. In short, it is something like using a small dose of poison in order to keep from poisoning the whole organism.

The question, however, is how do the doctors from the Pentagon intend to measure a "beneficial dose." Various opinions are voiced in respect to this. They argue as to whether it is enough to destroy 3,000 Soviet people or whether it is necessary to kill 30 million, not forgetting also a retaliatory attack on the Americans. Is it enough, for purposes of "intimidation" to attack some missile base or is it better to destroy Lenin-grad and sacrifice Chicago in exchange? And so on in the same vein.

One does not need to be a specialist in military-political strategy to conclude that the only possible result of this kind of cannibalistic disputes will be a less responsible and more frivolous attitude toward the threat of nuclear war. This is also sought by Schlessinger and his sympathizers. Taking exception to their position, their countryman G. Scoville Jr. emphasized the point that the opening of nuclear war on any level would be a catastrophe and that this would probably happen "if the national leaders themselves perpetrate the hoax of having checked the possibility of keeping the war small and then emerging from it as a victor."⁹

The attempts to make even worse the already bad aggressive military-political U.S. strategy show how weak and inconsistent is imperialism's readiness

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for peaceful coexistence. The explanation is simple: the peace policy is not dictated by the nature of the old society; the change in the alinement of forces demands it. And every fluctuation in the currently established balance of power (equilibrium and parity), any illusion or self-suggestion along these lines entails a reexamination of the military-political doctrines. R. Barnet, director of the Washington Institute of Political Research, thus explains the sharpening of the U.S. positions after the coming to power of the new administration: the director of the CIA submitted to the president a new evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and it was concluded on the basis of this that the U.S. had "no need to make relaxation [of tension] the cornerstone of its foreign policy."¹⁰

In short, the American denial of its strategic orientation toward nuclear weapons bears a very shaky character. Consequently, peaceful coexistence in its current stage can be likened to a river bridge with one of its supports immersed in shifting sandy soil. But nothing else has as yet been offered.

Let us now make sure we are aware of the way in which peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tension are in general construed by the international relations theorists in the West. We do not have to prove that in questions of international life the clash between the different parties in regard to the basic concepts has more than sporadic significance.

Commanding attention, first of all, are the attempts of some researchers to find an analogy for the relaxation process in the past. American Professor R. Rosencrance recalls the situation in the 1880's when treaties were concluded between Germany and Russia against Austria and between Germany and Austria against Russia. Although these alliances were not very stable they enabled Bismarck to (according to Rosencrance) "maintain good relations with two forces opposed to each other and to keep them from going to war."¹¹

Of course, one can attach the label of relaxation to any international relations improvement known to history. But this is really just a pedantic display. The artificial analogies do not help us to gain a better understanding of the thinking behind the unique process which is truly relevant to the 1970's; on the contrary, it complicates this task.¹²

This is what is happening to some very definite political thinking. Thus, X. Eubank (U.S.) searches for a parallel between the current relaxation and the policy of "appeasement" of Germany as practiced by England and France in the 1920's and 30's. The "Dawes Plan," the encouragement of Nazi aggression in Spain and Austria, the Munich Pact, the betrayal of Czechoslovakia--all this he describes as the then variant of "relaxation of tension in the interests of maintaining peace." The reader is thus subjected to the shopworn anticommunist thesis of the "parallelism" between the foreign policy of Hitler Germany and the Soviet Union.

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There is another point of view. In the opinion of R. Pipes, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, there were several instances of detente in the post-October period and each one occurred precisely when "military weakness or economic difficulties had forced the Soviet Union to seek help from the capitalist countries."¹³ According to this concept, even the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a manifestation of detente.

Similar to this point of view also is the treatise of W. Laquer (U.S.), director of the Institute of Modern History. He believes that in the post-war period the relations between the East and the West on four occasions entered the sphere of detente: the death of Stalin, the talks at Camp David in 1959, the period following the Cuban crisis, which led to the banning of nuclear tests, and the Geneva Conference of 1965 and the current most significant of the problems as far as scope is concerned.¹⁴

It is true that, unlike his colleague, Laqueur does not descend to the point of interpreting every period of peace as a consequence of the insidious intent of the communists to gather their forces for the next aggression. But his interpretation is, alas, not very far from this level. The only thing is he associates the shift to detente not with various "fits of weakness" but with the Soviet leadership's realization after all of the need for peaceful coexistence because allegedly it has become convinced of the futility of its attempts to adapt its way of life to peace. Laqueur adds that the shift was only half a change because the Soviet formula for relaxation of tension not only does not exclude ideological struggle but provides for its exacerbation.

The idea that relaxation of tension must include a weakening or even a cessation of ideological struggle finds its most widespread proliferation in the West; indeed these positions are taken not only by the theorists but also by the political officials. Perhaps the most vivid presentation of these positions was made by American Senator Moynihan, who is considered an outstanding authority in the field of international relations.

In his opinion the policy of detente may at best lead to a "redistribution of tension moving it from the technological to the ideological sector. Reduction of the outlays for military technology will lead to an increase in expenditures for ideological struggle, which the communists regard as so important and which requires no less attention. Reduction of tension in one sphere will lead more or less automatically to an exacerbation of the conflict in another sphere."¹⁵

It is strange that Moynihan regards as such a "redistribution" of power the November 1975 adoption of the UN resolution which proclaims Zionism a form of racism. Strange logic, is it not? Perhaps the thinking is that if there were no relaxation of tension, such a resolution would not have a chance to come up and Zionism would not come to be recognized as what it really is.

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Moynihan's dissertations bring to light the tendency of the bourgeois theorists to ignore the essential differences between the political and the ideological means of struggle. Canadian Professor N. Naida writes directly thus: "While ideological differences exist, we cannot talk about the end of the 'cold war.' It is simply shifting from one phase to another and changing its forms, methods and means."¹⁶ If we approach international relations in this fashion, then it is simply impossible to explain why in some instances a lengthy and stable peace is possible in the face of serious ideological differences and in others, with no ideological differences whatsoever and a completely idyllic world situation, so to speak, endless bitter wars may be waged.

With rare exceptions the western political experts' version of peaceful coexistence amounts to the following: (a) peace plays havoc with the struggle of the superpowers (blocks, centers of peace); (b) the aggressive side is communism, i.e., the Soviet Union, and the side maintaining defense is the West, i.e., the U.S. Any action of the socialist states which falls within this criterion acquires the character of an attempted "encroachment" on peace while any action of the imperialist states must automatically be regarded as a defense of peace and the values of civilization, most of all, freedom. Even when it is the U.S. aggressive action against Vietnam or the CIA-organized overturn in Chile.

The American Soviet expert S. Gibert, determined, by way of classification, that there are three "schools of detente" in the U.S. There are the "orthodox" group (R. Nixon, H. Kissinger and others), who maintain that the USSR has changed from a revolutionary force to "a power which safeguards the status quo"; the "revisionists," who believe that on the whole relaxation of tension entails repudiation by the U.S. of the former aggressive policy; the "realists" (H. Jackson, J. Schlessinger and other "hawks"), who feel that in general detente does not exist and that it represents nothing more than a grandiose political bluff.¹⁷

Without attempting to judge how accurately this classification sets forth the views of these or other American officials, it should be said that those categorized by Gibert as revisionists are undoubtedly right. This with a qualifying statement to the effect that the U.S. repudiation of aggressive policy unfortunately bears a "selective" character and an additional statement to the effect that the reason for the reappraisal was the substantive change in the alinement of forces in the world arena.

Relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence insure what is most important for all peoples and for all mankind--removing the threat of global nuclear conflict. As far as social progress is concerned, those who are dissatisfied can refer their complaint to their own history because this was precisely what predetermined the inevitability of the collapse of the capitalist systems and confirmed the viability of the socialist systems. The fact is the movement in this direction would continue even under more complicated circumstances and without detente.

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Relaxation of international tension by no means leads automatically to social progress. It only creates the preconditions for a freer development of the class struggle. It was not in Moscow that a decision was taken concerning the revolutions in Portugal or Greece, Ethiopia or Afghanistan. They were in accordance with the will of the progressive forces among the peoples of the respective countries and by their hands. It's a different matter that the communists, like all democrats, are in sympathy with these processes and have a feeling of solidarity with respect to them.

When the workers of the "Reno" plants go on strike, it is not a consequence of relaxation of tension but of dissatisfaction with the wages and other aspects of their social status. When the blacks in the U.S. speak out regularly, it is not the result of detente but of their indignation at the manifestation of racism. When Iran nationalizes its oil extraction industry, the fault lies not with detente but with the wish of the people of this country to control their own natural resources.

In other words, nobody, even if he wanted to, can give capital a guaranteed pledge of retention of its dominance. In answer to those who seek such guarantees L. I. Brezhnev emphatically stated at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces: "Revolutions are not made by order or agreement. We may add that neither can revolution, the class struggle or the liberation movement be abolished by order or agreement. There is no power on earth that can reverse the inexorable process of regeneration of social life. Where colonialism exists there will be struggle for national liberation. Where there is exploitation there will be struggle for liberation of labor. Where there is aggression there will be resistance to it."¹⁸

The means employed to wage such a struggle are in many respects dependent on what further changes transpire in the alinement of forces in the world. However, it is now already clear that the struggle will take on the character of military conflict, usually political and nearly always ideological.

Peaceful coexistence also differs from the simple concept of peace in that it is accompanied by ideological struggle. Consequently the task of preserving peace in the era of transition from one social form to another is complicated by the need to find additional reserves of strength which would negate the undesirable consequences of ideological disputes. Such reserves are available. They are to be found primarily in the objective need for integration and the growing need for the cooperation of all countries in the interests of resolving global problems. It can be said that whereas in the past there was no acute manifestation of the factors of ideological struggle, the peace endeavors were also not affected by such powerful compensatory factors as the "narrowing" of political distance, the intensification of interdependence and the growing need for cooperation.

But it would have been irresponsible to rely on only "compensation." No agreements and treaties, no form of international law and order is capable

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of obliterating the clash between the political views and positions which exist in the modern world with its complex and contradictory social structure, nor can it keep people from expressing their views on the course of events or stop their discussion of ideas. Moreover, even if such a possibility existed it would deserve to be rejected in the most decisive fashion because it would mean putting an end to all the spiritual progress of mankind and ultimately to its social development.

Of course, there is a considerable difference between the struggle of ideas on the one hand and ideological excesses, misinformation and slander on the other. It is now a struggle, not of ideas but, one may say, of fisticuffs. It can and must be brought under control. It is a question also of norms of law regulating reciprocal restraints on (a) actions that are directly inimical to peace (for example, calls for war, propaganda for militarism, violence, racism, aggression, and various forms of national isolationism), (b) limiting the struggle to precisely the realm of ideology and by pretext and cover banning ideological discussions of the shift to actual subversive operations (dispatch of agents who pass around leaflets calling for overturning the existing government, financing antigovernment activity, indoctrinating the population in a hostile spirit, an example of which is the misinformation and slander spread by the radio stations Freedom and Radio Free Europe).

This is also entailed in the essential difference between ideological struggle and "psychological warfare": the former is waged with the idea of achieving its ends without war and the latter endeavors to prepare for itself the best possible positions in the forthcoming war.

"Ideological struggle." said L. I. Brezhnev in this regard, "must not develop into 'psychological war' and it must not be used as a means of interference in the internal affairs of states and peoples nor must it lead to political and military confrontation.

"Otherwise, this ideological dispute may turn into a catastrophe in which millions of people and their ideas may perish, so to speak."¹⁹

Consequently, it may be said that the law developed after World War II as a result of a prolonged struggle and cooperative endeavor within the UN is, to a considerable degree, a law for peaceful coexistence. Many of its norms are unique because they were designed only for the contemporary period and they are geared for the cooperation of states with diverse social systems. They are thus transitory because the existing situation cannot last forever. But they are slated to play their preservation role--to be a shock absorber in mankind's shift from capitalism to socialism and to help mankind to overcome the unavoidable pits and hollows on this path with minimum damage.

There can be no doubt that many of the present-day norms of international law will be marvelous for our descendants. When they are largely occupied

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with carrying out constructive tasks, they will be amazed to learn that their ancestors spent lots of time and exercised a great deal of cunning to regulate the control of the air or to negotiate methods of disseminating literature. But this makes up an important element of the present-day structure of international relations and such agreements and similar ones for the most part retained the existing world order.

It is not necessary to say that drawing a precise and fine line between "psychological warfare" and ideological struggle is an exceptionally complicated matter. Not only because it is no simple matter to prepare norms of law--this is an entire original branch of knowledge and reflects the capability of the transitional era--but also because it must inspire maximum respect for these norms and evolve and develop a definite tradition of political thinking. And under the difficult circumstances which accompany any general application of the norms of international law this means the absence of force capable of compelling fulfillment with the accent on voluntary actions of the sovereign states entailing some only limited means of collective pressure (the UN, the International Court, the role of public opinion, etc.)

But as complicated as this task is, it needs to be resolved because there is no other path for mankind. Peaceful coexistence is only one of the alternatives to war; it is in fact the most total of all. Peaceful coexistence is not a matter of choice and it is not an object of bargaining. It is an objective necessity.

This thinking was expressed fairly well in the words of E. Bar, one of the leading officials of the SDPG [Social Democratic Party of Germany]: "Do I proceed from national interests or from European? Do I think about the tension in the relations between the North and the South or do I simply feel like a citizen of the world and a democrat--as a citizen who wants to project a prediction for 2000 years or as a democrat who believes in the superiority of his own system when it operates in a peaceful milieu? In any case, I look upon relaxation of tension as an enduring task of the 1980's, one for which there is no reasonable alternative."²⁰

Unfortunately, in recent years the West has evolved a whole political trend which raises as its banner the slogan "Selling detente to the communists is expensive." When it appeared, this slogan became binding upon the commercial system--this inalienable attachment to the bourgeois mentality. One of its commandments is that when some agreement (deal) is proposed to you, it is advisable for a start to ask the maximum price for your commodity and it will be seen at that point. This was approximately the reasoning of the western political officials, who in the process of preparing for the Helsinki conference of the European states, U.S. and Canada, advance the formula "one-third of the basket (or free flow of information) in exchange for security." In common speech this formula sounded approximately like this: If you want peace, agree to a concession in the realm of ideology.

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There is no need to say that the authors of these ultimatums have no grounds whatsoever for the arguments they advance: capitalism has not won any victories over socialism, victories which would enable it to demand an indemnity. On the contrary, it is generally acknowledged that detente itself and such a development as the one now culminating in the Helsinki conference were the result of the changed alinement of forces based, among other things, on the military balance of power. Also absurd is the attempt to barter for security with a "commodity" which both sides are equally in need of.

But in politics what is important above all is not motives and arguments but facts. The appropriate demands, even though they were wholly unfounded, were formulated; they began to defend them and, as frequently happens in such cases, many began to seriously believe that they have the right to "sell" detente to the communists. Besides, this position was eventually taken by another and, additionally, a very influential group of theorists and policy makers of the imperialist states and they were precisely the ones who at first did not want to hear about such a detente. Recognizing that such frank obscurantism puts them in danger of complete isolation, these people decided to change their tactics. They announced that they too were adherents of detente but they also imposed conditions which would inevitably lead the whole business into a blind alley and bring the world back to the time of the "cold war."

This is how Kissinger's biographers describe the position of the hawks: "Russia must be made to pay a higher price for American wheat and Western technology. It can be forced to liberate its society. If it refuses, then there should be no loans and no lifting of trade restrictions and if this is necessary then there can be no detente."²¹

The absurdity of the arguments of the enemies of improvement of the international climate is obvious. First of all, no one is saying to the United States that, after it signs an agreement with the socialist countries to avert the threat of war, it must expand its trade and other relations with them. It is another matter that stimulation of economic, scientific-technical and cultural exchange has become a natural consequence of normalization of the international relations which are beneficial to both sides. Where there is trade there are also credits and these are by no means a gift but a customary method of financing deals in an international context.

The bourgeois policy makers know perfectly well that trade is based on commercial settlement. American grain and Western technology are being paid for, not by detente, but by Soviet oil, industrial equipment and other output of the socialist countries. Consequently, detente and liberation remain as factors in direct "commodity exchange." But since relaxation of tension is the result of agreement and further intensification of it is also dependent on the good will of all the principal participants in the world community, these people are trying to sell goods which do not belong to them.

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Carrying out this kind of operation is no simple matter in the market nor is it simple in politics. To give their claims a more or less valid aspect in the eyes of the world community, the adherents of capitalism had to present them, not as in a class context, but as being in the general interests and they had to back them up with a certain amount of moral force. In the 1970's the efforts of the bourgeois ideology in this direction took on a feverish character. The inner circles of the various commissions preparing the positions of the capitalist states for the general European conference hatched a decision to link detente with so-called progress in human rights. After the appropriate preparation and refinement, this became for the functionaries one of the basic principles of the modern foreign policy doctrine of imperialism.

"The issue of the rights of man," declares American Soviet expert R. Conquest, "is a touchstone when we are concerned with establishment of a strong and lasting peace. The rights of man constitute the only significant requirement we can impose and the extent of fulfillment constitutes the only genuine criterion on the path to peace."²² To obviate any possible nebulosness as to precisely how this requirement is to be met, Conquest explains that what he has in mind is a "profound restructuring of Soviet political know-how and even "psychological disarmament of the USSR."²³

Appearing frequently in the role of one of the apostles of the rights of man is D. Owen, the former foreign affairs minister in the labor government of D. Callaghan. "We must make the Soviet Union and its partners understand," he declared, "that our concern for the rights of man is not a diversionary maneuver, not a provocational campaign and not an attempt to sabotage detente. On the contrary, it is an inherent aspect of the foreign policy we are implementing throughout the world and if we are concerned with the relations between the East and the West, then this represents a serious and constructive attempt to raise detente to a new and higher level."²⁴

Deserving of mention, finally, are the words uttered by U.S. President Carter in his speech on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the universal Declaration of Rights of Man: "I am endeavoring to kindle a brighter light in this beacon--with respect to the rights of man--in American foreign policy. The rights of man affect the relations between the U.S. and the other countries. The striving to defend these rights represents one of the aspects of our expanded efforts to make our power and influence serve the cause of the creation of a new world in which people can live in peace and freedom and in which their basic needs will be properly satisfied."²⁵

The restraints cited above manifest quite clearly the nature of the Western idea of "tying in" detente with the rights of man. It can be said that this concept does not stand up under even the simplest test of the laws of logic.

13
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In the first place, there is an obvious attempt to put forth its interpretation as the universal one. Among the other theorists and political officials this distinctive bourgeois conceit acquires such proportions that no one conceives of the possibility of any other approach to the question. Others ignore what they find inconvenient to mention. It is no coincidence that American theorists prefer to say nothing about equal rights and they limit themselves to an obscure formula on the "proper satisfaction of needs."

Strangely enough, the "free world" too has not been able to manage without usurping the functions of the chief arbiter for the rights of man. As was to be expected, the appropriate prerogatives for this were conferred upon the United States. The statement cited above includes the words "The Americans are the only nation in the world founded on the concept of the rights of man." And from time to time the so-called "Freedom House" in New York informs mankind how many free, nonfree and semifree countries there are. The assumption is left that the Most High assigned this mission to Uncle Sam. And of course the United States is awarded a certificate as the freest of the free states while the Soviet Union (along with India) is declared the greatest imperialist state of modern times.

It is absurd, of course, to expect impartiality from anticommunist propaganda. However, the American ideological centers have been so zealous in linking "the rights of man and relaxation of international tension" that they have prompted critical comments even from the allies of the U.S. and NATO. It was not just a matter of a more responsible attitude on the part of U.S. and NATO toward the fate of detente. Perhaps no less significant was the understanding that the Yankee "propagandist extremism" may significantly weaken the impact of the ideological campaign which the ruling circles of the capitalist countries see as the "barrier" they have finally found against further spread of the socialist ideas.

Actually, even to the people who are most unsophisticated in political matters the gross absurdities of the situation could not fail to be obvious. The attempts to deliver moralist sermons and, most of all, to use the pretext of "punishment for bad conduct" to carry out various repressive measures against sovereign states were seen as especially hypocritical in that they came from an imperialist power which has played the role of world gendarme throughout the postwar period.

It was as if in an unexpected attack of amnesia the United States had forgotten its countless violations of the rights of the society's labor majority and the human dignity of the representatives of the various minority groups (racial, national, ethnic and intellectual) and had tried to consign to oblivion its crime against Vietnam--and after all this official America had assumed the mien of an innocent maiden. And in the meantime the administration, the Pentagon and the CIA have continued to do their usual thing--to defend the global interests of American imperialism by organizing

14
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a fascist overturn in Chile, by helping the Nicaraguan tyrant Somoza to deal with his people, by doing everything possible to save the monarchy in Iran, etc.

Since it was difficult to assign all this to the column "Concern for the Rights of Man," they made some corrections in the original ideological scheme. It was acknowledged on the one hand that in the United States itself and in the other "model" bourgeois democracies things are far from rosy in respect to personal rights. And on the other hand that the U.S. must give priority to its foreign policy goals over moral considerations when a conflict arises between the two.

In short, it is fair to say that the campaign waged under the flag of struggle for the rights of man is a classic example of bourgeois hypocrisy.

Although the leading role in development of the appropriate campaign is played by the undisguised "hawks," we cannot fail to note that in another political environment and in the liberal camp of the bourgeoisie they have not refrained from missionary statements. Thus, Senator E. Kennedy explains it in this way: "Faithfulness to the American tradition impels us to be concerned about the rights of man wherever they are threatened."²⁷ It is not out of place to ask why the infamous American tradition, if indeed it does exist, puts up with such a vicious mockery of the ideas of the freedom and rights of man as now pervades the entire political life of present-day imperialism.

Let us put this question: If there is normalization of interstate relations, will the socialist countries demand, for example, an end to apartheid and other manifestations of racism in the relations of blacks, the elimination of discrimination against the Puerto Ricans and other minorities, establishment of women's wages on a par with those of men, eradication of unemployment, rescinding of various federal or state positions, and, on a broad plane, restricting freedom of thought and action. And what if we add to these demands the lengthy bill submitted to imperialism by the peoples of the former colonial and semicolonial countries?

In the context of detente we would apparently have to give the thing up as a bad job. It could only come about and only be extended on the basis of adherence to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the sovereign states. Another thing is that agreements for the purpose of strengthening peace and security and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation and cultural relations will under no circumstance lead to coexistence in the realm of ideology. Detente means nothing more than that the inevitable struggle between the two opposing systems will be confined within a nonmilitary framework. This serves the most profound and vital interests of all peoples--the cause of peace.

In an article entitled "Can We Buy Detente?" Alec Nouve, director of the Institute of Soviet and East European Research, observes in regard to the

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American officials who encumber the movement leading to detente with various conditions: "It makes no sense to demand the impossible if you want to conclude a transaction."²⁸ A sensible observation and one expressed in clear businesslike language.

The stubborn resistance to detente on the part of extreme reaction or the attempts by the comparatively moderate groups of the West to make detente an object of trade indicate that imperialism has not given up hope of regaining its past military and political superiority: This is vividly manifested in the militaristic fever which, with minor exceptions, pervades the entire ruling clique of the NATO countries.

At the same time, the social development and ideological struggle of the last decades may be considered to have as its principal result the universal recognition that world nuclear conflict is completely unacceptable and suicidal for mankind.

The Clausewitz formula is widely known, namely that war represents a continuation of policy making by other means. In the nuclear age, when the opposing parties possess the means to wreak repeated destruction on each other and everything around them at the same time, this formula would inevitably arouse doubt. "We are now concerned with a stage of development where the 'peace or war' alternative ceases to be an historical alternative in the true sense. Previously both alternatives--'peace' or 'war'--were to the same degree historically admissible in international relations as a means of achieving political aims. It was possible to choose one of these alternatives because it did not represent a threat to the life of entire countries and peoples as well as to all of the environment. Now the alternative has come to be otherwise: one of its 'extremities' is at variance with the very concept of history and it transcends the bounds of reasonable means of achieving political aims and the bounds of rational policy, including military policy."²⁹

Most noteworthy, however, is the fact that now inclining to this conclusion are not only the Marxists³⁰ and not only the rationally thinking policy makers and theorists of the West like Senator G. McGovern but even the representatives of the imperialist military circles. They include such theorists as H. Morgenthau and R. Aron, who were among those responsible for the shaping of various doctrines of "containment" and "repulsion" of communism, doctrines envisaging the use of military force, including preventive nuclear attack. Thus, R. Aron voiced the opinion that in our era war cannot any longer be considered a continuation of policy because a new world war would be a total conflict with a threat of universal destruction.³²

The recognition of the inadmissability of war is as yet the only basis for making possible relaxation of international tension and affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence as well as their fullest realization. At the same time, it should be noted that what is involved here is only a subjective aspect of the matter. Despite all its exceptional importance, it still cannot of itself resolve the problems of peace and war.

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Actually, if we approach policy from the standpoint of evaluation, then attempts to achieve the various policy-connected goals through nuclear war appear senseless. This is approximately the same as if we proclaimed the formula "Death is a continuation of life by other means." No rational policy can accept such means of advancing toward a goal in the nuclear age.

However, Clausewitz's formula is by no means possessed of the character of an evaluation. It records the objective status of things and, more precisely, the striving of the ruling circles of the states to achieve their goals by any means, including military. It is true after all that policy itself can be self-destructive. Another thing is that political aims may or may not be achieved through nuclear war and regardless of which side gains a victory, will not such a victory become in any case a Pyrric one? All these things and all the appeals to reason do not gainsay the fact that there are people who, either deliberately or in a state of panic, are capable of pressing the button to launch a missile with atomic charges. Who will prove to them afterwards that war can now no longer be considered a means of achieving political aims in the nuclear age?

It should not be forgotten that the wars of the past were by no means always helpful in achieving the intentions and aspirations associated with them. At least this is what happens in 50 cases out of a 100 because in every war the minimum is one defeated party. This figure is greater if we bear in mind that even a victory often becomes the cause of future defeats. This also points up the absurdity of the very principle which views war as an acceptable means of achieving political ends. But such is the true character of the class society.³³

In other words, no ideological avowals can cancel out certain social and class interests which continue to make a more profound impact on the course of international events than various doctrines. Although these latter ultimately somehow or other reflect these interests, they have their own subtle differences because they are designed for the public and therefore are smoothed out and "ironed out." This is why it is desirable to examine the basic social interests and compare them in "pure form," so to speak, and not with the distortions stemming from the aberration of viewpoint lent them by ideological formulation.

In Vienna on 18 June Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter signed the Soviet-American agreement calling for the limitation of strategic offensive weapons and other documents expressing the intentions of the parties to continue their joint efforts to limit the arms race and eliminate the danger of nuclear war. As always happens, the true significance of this event will only become apparent after the lapse of a certain amount of time and in relation to the subsequent development of international relations.

At the same time, it is now already apparent that the very fact of conclusion of an agreement indicates the operation of powerful objective factors which

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are providing a powerful impetus for the states of the two sociopolitical systems to continue the detente and to strengthen and intensify peaceful coexistence. And although each step on this path is taken at the cost of stubborn and painful struggle with the forces of reaction and militarism (there was a seven-year interval between OSV [SALT]-1 and OSV-2), there is reason to expect further progress toward a stable peace and a broad international cooperation.

FOOTNOTES

1. According to a widely held opinion, detente can be considered to have begun with the four-power agreement on West Berlin, which was followed by the treaties between the socialist countries and the FRG and a series of meetings, talks and agreements between U.S., France and other capitalist states. Of course, this time figure is not absolute because the preceding period had seen the development of genuine possibilities for the relaxation of international tension. It should suffice to cite the agreements banning tests of nuclear weapons in the three media, against the proliferation of these weapons, and a number of others. It would be more accurate to say that 1972 marked the beginning of the intensive phase of relaxation and this process began to gain world recognition at that time.
2. In its treatment of the whole series of problems of international relations the group of American political experts headed by H. Griffith advanced the concept of "minimum" and "maximum" detente. ("The Soviet Empire. Expansion and Detente." [in English]. Lexington-Toronto 1976). But maximum detente is stable peaceful coexistence.
3. PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.
4. Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow, 1977, p 14.
5. R. Niebhur "A Protest Against a Dilemmas tho Two Horns." WORLD POLITICS, New Haven (Conn), 1950, vol 2, p 338.
6. A detailed analysis of the American foreign policy doctrines can be found in the following books [in Russian]: A. N. Yakovlev. "The Ideology of American Empire." Moscow, 1970; V. F. Petrovskiy. "American Foreign Policy Thinking." Moscow, 1976; N. M. Nikol'skiy, A. V. Grishin. "Scientific-Technical Progress and International Relations". Moscow, 1978.
7. On this subject see [in Russian] R. Simonyan. "In Search of a 'New Strategy,'" PRAVDA, 19 March 1979.

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8. [English] L. E. Davis... "Limited Nuclear Options. Deterrence and the New American Doctrine." London, 1976.
9. See FOREIGN POLICY, Vol 14, N.Y., 1974, pp 175-176
10. R. Barnet. [English] "The Giants: Russia and America." N.Y., 1977, pp 174-175.
11. See R. Rosencrance. [English] "Detante or Entente?" FOREIGN AFFAIRS, N.Y., 1975, vol 53, No 3, p 466.
12. As Bulgarian Professor A. S. Todorov correctly noted, detente is seen from this standpoint not as an objective social and political process and a specific phenomenon but only as a conciliatory situation brought about by various combinations of international forces. (See NOVO VREME. Sofia, 1977, No 11, p 110)
13. R. Pipes, G. Urban. [English] "USA-USSR: the Recondition of Detente." SURVEY. London, 1973, vol 19, no 3, pp 74-76.
14. See W. Laqueur... [English] "Detente. Western and Soviet Interpretation." SURVEY. London, 1973, Vol 19, No 3, pp 75-76.
15. See L. Noynihan. "Waging Ideological Conflict." CENTER MAGAZINE, S. Barbara, 1976, Mar-Apr, Vol 9, No 2, p 7
16. See N. Naida. [English] "Alliances and Balance of Power." London, 1975, p 222.
17. See S. Gibert. [English] "Soviet Images of America." N.Y., 1977, p 18. A critical review of the arguments of the enemies of detente can be found in the work of V. V. Sheleg. [in Russian] "Peace or War." Moscow, 1978.
18. L. I. Brezhnev. "The Leninist Policy," Vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 336.
19. L. I. Brezhnev. "The Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State." Moscow, 1978, p 647.
20. E. Bar. [English] "The Future of Detente--a Challenge of the Eighties." Published by Georgetown University, 30 Nov 1978.
21. See M. Kalb, V. Kalb. "Kissinger." Boston, 1974, p 442.
22. See "Defending America, Toward a New Role in the Postdetente World." N.Y., 1977, p 208.
23. Ibid, p 212.

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24. NEW YORK TIMES, 30 Nov 1977.
25. See NEW YORK TIMES, 8 Dec 1978.
26. In 1974, for example, 66 countries were categorized as not free, 84 as partly free and 59 as free (See HERALD TRIBUNE INTERNATIONAL, 28-29 Dec 1974).
27. See FOREIGN POLICY. Washington, Autumn, 1974.
28. See Ibid.
29. N. M. Nikol'skiy, A. V. Grishin. [in Russian] "Scientific-Technical Progress and International Relations," pp 55-56.
30. The thesis that war cannot be viewed as a way of continuing policy by other means is discussed, for example, in an article by GDR author A. Tyurpe (See "Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie," 1978, No 3).
31. According to him, the widespread use of the term "coexistence" has meant a recognition that competition through war has become unthinkable in the nuclear age. (See McGovern. "Detente and the New American Administration." Washington, 1978, p 37).
32. See ENCOUNTERS, London, 1976, Oct, Vol 47, No 4, pp 62-65.
33. "War," says V. V. Shelyag, "must not be a means of implementing political aims." (V. V. Shelyag [in Russian] "Peace or War," p 90). And on the other hand, "A war unleashed by the imperialists would become per se a continuation of their criminal policy aimed at the employment of any means to serve the interests of the most reactionary forces." (Ibid, pp 88-89). In other words, the first instance involves a moral requirement, the second a political reality.

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REVIEW OF BOOK BY GRISHIN, SMIRNOV, AND OTHERS ON IDEOLOGY

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI, SERIYA 1, PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 165-175

[I. L. Vartanov review of work on ideology]

[Text] 6. The Communist Education of the Working People. The Spiritual Culture of Soviet Society

79.03.037-79.03.043: The Tasks of Communist Education in the Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Review

79.03.037: V. V. Grishin, "The Moscow City Party Organization's Work on Exercising a Comprehensive Approach to the Education of the Working People in the Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" in the book "Problemy kompleksnogo osushchestvleniya zadach kommunisticheskogo vospitaniya v svete reshenii XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Problems of the Comprehensive Realization of the Tasks of Communist Education in the Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1978, pp 5-50.

79.03.038: G. L. Smirnov, "The Formation of a Comprehensively Developed Personality and Securing the Unity of Ideological-Political, Labor and Moral Education," *ibid.*, pp 51-65.

79.03.039: M. S. Alferov, "From the Experience of the Organization of Educational Work in the Scientific Research Collectives," *ibid.*, pp 159-163.

79.03.040: N. Ya. Klepach, "The Economic Education of the Population: Essence and Principles of Organization," *ibid.*, pp 241-245.

79.03.041: S. A. Gerasimov, "Certain Questions of Aesthetic Education and the Development of Soviet Cinematography," *ibid.*, pp 255-259

79.03.042: T. N. Khrennikov, "The Role of Musical Art in the Spiritual Development of Soviet Society," *ibid.*, pp 259-263.

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79.03.043: V. G. Afanas'yev, "Certain Theoretical Questions of the Control of the Ideological Sphere of Developed Socialism," *ibid.*, pp 292-305.

The review was compiled from the material of the reports of participants in an all-union scientific-practical conference (Moscow, December 1977).

The conference was opened by the report of V. V. Grishin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, "The Moscow City Party Organization's Work on Exercising a Comprehensive Approach to the Education of the Working People in the Light of the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" (037). As the report emphasizes, "the CPSU regards ideological activity as a frontal sector of the building of communism and a most important part of organizational and political work on the realization of communist ideals" (p 7). The leading role of ideological-political education is conditioned by the fact that the class essence of the formation of the personality is expressed through it. On the other hand, it is always essential to proceed from the fact that "man is at the center of any matter and that success depends on people and on the level of their consciousness, readiness, will and ability to build communism" (p 10). The party sees a means of increasing the efficiency of ideological work in a "comprehensive approach" to the organization of the entire business of education, signifying the "close unity of ideological-political, labor and moral education with consideration of the peculiarities of different groups of working people" (p 11).

The party organizations are accomplishing the task of molding communist conviction in Soviet people, particularly in Muscovites, in inseparable connection with a struggle against ideology and morals alien to Soviet society, V. V. Grishin observed. Thus seminars and conferences on the criticism of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and international Zionism have become a part of practice in Moscow. Some 115,000 of the capital's propagandists are involved in the system of political studies. The intention of the work being performed is to "insure that each manifestation of apoliticism, disdainful attitude toward labor, public interests and civic duty and nationalist sentiments and each instance of the spread of ideologically harmful literature imported from the West, malicious rumors and other forms of influence of bourgeois propaganda encounter a decisive rebuff" on the part of Soviet people (pp 31-32).

The speaker showed on the basis of a number of examples that the problems under discussion are by no means of an abstract-theoretical nature. A great deal of educational work had been performed with a group of so-called avant-garde artists, to whose actions "dissident" elements had aspired to impart a manifestly "alien, provocative character." As a result of joint measures adopted by the party, soviet, trade union and creative organizations "the sentiments of these artists changed for the better..." (p 42). In the period 1975-1977 Moscow's party, soviet and administrative organs exerted an intensive ideological-moral influence on so-called "dissidents" for the purpose of "putting a halt to their activity, changing their minds and isolating them from the harmful influence of Western propaganda." The results are to

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hand: "individuals who had previously avoided socially useful labor have been placed in a job. Certain of them have embarked on the path of improvement" (p 47). In this case, as in many others, a combination of collective and individual methods proves highly effective, the author emphasized.

In the society of developed socialism a high level of political consciousness and profound devotion to the party's ideas are typical of the "absolute majority" of citizens. At the same time there are "instances of deception, violations of labor discipline, embezzlement, drunkenness, hooliganism" and so on and so forth. "A certain section of the population is susceptible to religious prejudices" (p 31). All this cannot fail to be a subject of serious educational work. A long-term plan of ideological work, the report said, has become a part of the plan for the solution of the main socio-economic problems of Moscow's development in the period 1976-1990 as an independent section.

The material of the conference following V. V. Grishin's report form four sections. Section 1--"Unity of Ideological-Political, Labor and Moral Education"--incorporates the reports analyzing such means of the formation of communist high-mindedness and the development of Soviet people's labor active-ness as propaganda of CPSU theory and policy, the shaping of a scientific world outlook, the style of economic leadership, the progressive organization of labor, service in the Soviet Army, moral factors and others. All these areas of ideological work are examined in the report of G. L. Smirnov, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department, "The Formation of a Comprehensively Developed Personality and Securing the Unity of Ideological-Political, Labor and Moral Education" (038).

For the first time in constitutional practice (article 20 of the new USSR Constitution) the task of the comprehensive development of the personality becomes an integral part of the Basic Law of the socialist state of all the people, the author emphasized. A tremendous variety of forms, means and methods of educational work with consideration of the peculiarities of the regions, groups, strata, collectives and individuals is required for its accomplishment. All these specific methods are united by a single goal--the molding of communist high-mindedness and devotion to the ideals of communism and CPSU policy. "A scientific world outlook and political consciousness constitute the ideological foundation of moral standpoints, while ideological and moral motives elevate labor to the level of public service. Man's ideological and political temper is revealed and realized in labor and public activity and moral conduct"--such is the methodological key to a solution of the problem (p 56).

The comprehensive long-term plans of ideological work are an important lever of insuring the unity of the directions of education. "The comprehensive plans are a sound basis for the coordination of all means of education and the maximum consideration of the specific features of the school, family and labor collective; the use of the possibilities of propaganda and culture,

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- public opinion and legislation; and an improvement in the current-basis efficiency and quality of ideological work" (p 57). However, despite general success in the comprehensive planning of ideological work, the author noted,
- "such plans do not, unfortunately, as yet exist everywhere, particularly at raykom and gorkom level. And this is an example of how good experience is not applied universally" (ibid.). But practice, meanwhile, is proceeding further. Certain party organizations are drawing up plans for specific areas of educational activity. Thus special moral education programs have been prepared and discussed and are being implemented in Leningrad, Gor'kiy, Belorussia and Lithuania. This experience, the report points out, deserves the most pointed attention.

Anxiety is caused by the fact that "a section of the youth is growing up without having learned the meaning of physical labor and without due respect for it and familiarization therewith" (p 61). It is consequently essential that the acquisition of labor skills and labor tempering be built into the school program with the same obligatoriness as other academic subjects. There was an indication of the importance of particular concern for young people and juveniles and for the use of diverse forms for this: the creation of military-patriotic clubs and new sports grounds and the active work of law and order support bases, parental patrols and others. In this connection the author points to "the actual shortage of teachers in the hostels (in which more than 9 million young workers, students and vocational-technical school students live)" (p 64). The author speaks of the "inadequate professional level" of the teachers of the younger generation themselves who have been appointed to these positions in the hostels.

The reports of the second section--"Consideration of the Peculiarities of Different Groups of the Population in Educational Work"--examine the problems of the differentiation of ideological work according to national, social, age and geographical (separate settlement), characteristics. A synopsis of the speech of M. S. Alferov, secretary of the Novosibirskiy Obkom, on the subject "From the Experience of Organizational-Educational Work in the Scientific Research Collectives" (039) is given below.

The author sees the principal direction in educational work with the scientific intelligentsia in "inculcating in it lofty ideological conviction, loyalty to the party and people and a lofty sense of civic duty to the state" (p 159). The philosophical methodological seminars, at which the main attention is paid to a "correct understanding" of the essence of developed socialism and the "practice" of communist building, are the main form of political education for the scientific workers. "Debates frequently develop and interesting proposals and recommendations are born" (p 160) during such classes, which are conducted with great activeness on the part of the audience.

The attachment of "philosopher-consultants" to the seminars is practiced in Novosibirskaya Oblast. "The most authoritative scholars, who are well

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versed in Marxist-Leninist theory" (ibid.), are confirmed as leaders of the schools and seminars. These latter raise their own political level at a theoretical seminar which is organized specially for them and must periodically undergo "sociopolitical assessment."

The author notes the increasing role of the institutes' party organizations in the accomplishment of the fundamental tasks confronting the scientific collectives and their efforts aimed at the creation of an "atmosphere of quest" and the placement of communist-scientists in the most important sectors of work (pp 161-162). The party organizations support by all means in the scientific collectives the spirit of competition, a direction of which is "a reduction in the time spent on scientific research" (p 162). Great attention is devoted to the moral education of the scientific intelligentsia insofar, as the author asserts, "the productiveness of the research largely depends on the moral level of the scientists and on their sense of responsibility" (p 163).

However, not all communist-scientists are an example in work, M. S. Alferov confesses, not all scientists have yet been included in the sphere of party influence, and strong barriers have not yet been put up against those who are attempting to use science in their own personal interests (ibid.).

Section 3--"Comprehensive Utilization of the Means of Communist Education"--unites the reports which examine the role and significance of various ideological means for the accomplishment of educational tasks--the system of Marxist-Leninist education, the economic education of the population, the press, radio and television, literature, art, the family and others.

The processes of economic education actively take their course in real life, N. Ya. Klepach, chief of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department, observes in a report entitled "Economic Education of the Population: Essence and Principles of Organization" (040). These processes are conditioned by the fact that each member of the socialist society appears in the role of "coproprietor and a public owner of the means of production equal among others who participates not only in the process of collective labor but also in the control and solution of all questions of economic practice" (p 242). Accordingly, the socialist society requires of each of its members a display of such qualities as professionalism, socialist enterprise, thrift, discipline, concern for public and state interests, collectivism and, of course, diligence. The person who has graduated from the school of economic education should be distinguished by "intelligent economic requirements, developed economic thinking and an ability to uncover reserves, produce more of better quality and with less expenditure and make rational use of work time" (p 243). The essence of economic education consists of the plan-based influence of society on the population for the purpose of "the development in each person of the requirements, interests, qualities and moder of activity corresponding to the economic nature of the communist production method...and the shaping of each member of society as a collectivist-proprietor who consolidates public ownership in practice, makes rational use of and multiplies public property and is consistently guided in his activity by state interests and the party's economic policy" (ibid.).

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While highlighting it in the general system of communist education as a subsystem, a basic principle of economic education amounts to insuring that it is at the same time undertaken in organic interaction with other spheres of educational activity. "The plan, socialist competition, financial autonomy, norms, wages, bonuses, organizational-technical measures and the entire system of economic relations in the collective harbors great educational potential" (p 245).

Some 34-35 million people are instructed annually, the author reports, in accordance with specially formulated economic programs differentiated in accordance with worker grade.

S. A. Gerasimov, secretary of the USSR Cinematographers Union, writes about the quality, direction and consequences of the "mass impact of the screen" in the report "Certain Questions of Aesthetic Education and the Development of Soviet Cinematography" (041). The Soviet cinema can and should influence man's inner world and the shaping of his aesthetic ideas and can and should be an integral part of a rational educational process. In view of the fact that more than 150 million people are viewers of a film shown on Central Television's first program, the question of "the criteria of a value selection to exclude all kinds of chance and mistakes" (p 256) is exceptionally acute. An intelligent script, a talented director, excellent acting--these are the most important components of the success of this motion picture or the other, but it is insured a long artistic life--given the above-mentioned conditions--precisely by an inseparable connection with its time and by its high-minded purposefulness.

The Soviet cinema has actively joined in the ideological struggle. With the present day's intensive communications there is a certain influence from the bourgeois world which brings with it not only the outward signs of fashion but also value judgments of a spiritual nature. To this we should counterpose, S. A. Gerasimov believes, "the active form of our own moral-ethical and aesthetic ideas embedded in the people's consciousness by the victory of the socialist system" (p 257). In this connection the author states that the isolation of Soviet society from the artistic process in the modern world would be a faulty means and an impossible one, moreover. It is necessary to strive to insure that in the eyes of the Soviet individual and in his inner world each object be apprehended and interpreted in its true meaning. The fundamental connection between the ethical and aesthetic is indisputable. And "cultural values are revealed and apprehended in direct accordance with the cultural and ideological preparation of the personality" (p 259).

Music has entered deeply and firmly in the life of the people, the report of T. N. Khrennikov, secretary of the USSR Composers Union Board, "The Role of Musical Art in the Spiritual Development of Soviet Society" (042) said. Lenin's plan of "state musical building" in the socialist reality of today means the general accessibility of musical values, many thousands of musical academic

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institutions throughout the country, the truly nationwide nature of independent amateur artistic activity and the gigantic scale of the musical education of the people in the general education schools, in the philharmonic societies, in the universities of culture and on radio and television. Music festivals--these holidays of music during which composers and musicians give concerts for the working people in the capitals of all the union and autonomous republics and in the major cities of the RSFSR--are now traditional. More than 10,000 authors' meetings were conducted and concerts given throughout the country in 1977 alone.

Party-mindedness and popular-mindedness--these are the principles by which the workers of musical art are guided. "The party calls upon them to participate actively and effectively in the formation of Soviet man's spiritual temper and aesthetic tastes," T. N. Khrennikov emphasizes (p 262). In turn, Soviet composers "are obliged to constantly remember that their art is a powerful means of the assertion of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the communist view of the world" (ibid.).

The final, fourth, section is called "An Improvement in the Planning and Organization of Ideological Work." Matters of substance here are touched on in the report of PRAVDA Chief Editor V. G. Afanas'yev entitled "Certain Theoretical Questions of the Control of the Ideological Sphere of Developed Socialism" (043).

Without having assimilated to this extent or the other the wealth of the culture of the socialist society and its prevailing ideology and morals, a person cannot either consciously solve the social tasks confronting him nor develop his own creative forces and potential, the author observes. Whence necessarily ensues the task of purposeful ideological-moral influence on the individual. What does ideological work signify in this connection? "It is primarily the inculcation of communist ideology in the consciousness of each individual" (p 295). The author believes to be groundless the misgiving that in this case there is a manipulation of the consciousness and conduct of the masses similar to how this is effected in capitalist society. For "the very nature of socialist ideology is incompatible with manipulation and with the forced introduction of its principles in the consciousness" (p 294). It is a question of revealing to man the laws of his own being and the main trends of the historical process and teaching him to think independently and make the correct decisions.

Insofar as thousands of organizations and hundreds of thousands of people, teachers, propagandists and agitators are engaged in the accomplishment of this task, "the ideological sphere cannot and must not be excluded from the sphere of scientific control" (p 295). The ideological sphere, in V. G. Afanas'yev's definition, is that in which the purposeful formation of the ideological-political and moral attributes of the man of the socialist society and his communist education is effected based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the achievements of pedagogics, psychology, information theory and other sciences. The author proposes distinguishing the following subsystems in this complex, dynamic system:

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1. Socialist ideology itself as a sum of political, philosophical, sociological, legal, moral artistic and other views of our society;
2. The ideological, ideological-educational process incorporating education, upbringing and self-education;
3. The aggregate of scientific, ideological and ideological-educational establishments and organizations; and
4. The ideological relations which take shape between people in the process of the production and reproduction of socialist ideas (pp 296-297).

The author emphasizes that the main character of the ideological sphere was, is and will remain man: educator, propagandist and agitator. The success of ideological work depends to an enormous extent on his theoretical and methodological preparedness, ideological maturity and ability to approach people and influence their minds and hearts.

The subject of the control of the ideological sphere is that aggregate of ideological establishments and organizations which directly produces and reproduces socialist ideas and inculcates them in Soviet people's consciousness. At the head of this aggregate of organizations stands the CPSU. The following are the objects of ideological control: a) socialist ideology itself, which is being developed, amplified and enriched with consideration of new practical experience and the achievements of science; b) the ideological process and ideological relations, which are in need of organization, planning and control and development and improvement; and c) man, who is always concrete and "who combines within him the wealth of the general (human), the particular (social, collective) and the single (individual)" (p 300).

The functions of control of the ideological sphere do not, in the author's opinion, differ from the functions of control of any other sphere of society's development. They are determination of general and specific goals, the preparation and adoption of decisions on questions of ideology, supervision and verification of their execution and an analysis of the results. The specifics of control of the ideological sphere consist of the informational interaction between propagandist (educator) and the person being taught and the subject and object of education. Emphasizing that man is not an involuntary small screw of the social mechanism but an active subject apprehending information through the prism of his own ego, the author believes that the ideological information of the socialist society should correspond to such requirements as "party-mindedness and a class approach, a profound scientific approach and truthfulness, topicality, innovation and current efficiency, a combination of the theoretical, logical and emotional and a clear, attractive and intelligible form" (p 301).

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In conclusion V. G. Afanas'yev formulates the basic principles of scientific control of the ideological sphere. These are "educational work's link with practice and party policy and with the concrete tasks of communist building; specificity and a scientific approach; a systemic approach and organization; attention to man and his inner world; a differentiated approach to people; and party-mindedness and irreconcilability with bourgeois ideology and opportunism and revisionism" (pp 303-304).

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REGIONAL

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON ESTONIAN FIRST SECRETARY

Frankfurt POSEV in Russian No 7, Jul 79 pp 7-8

/Text/ Various sources in Estonia have reported that during June three attempts were made there on the life of K. Vayno, first secretary of the CC Communist Party of Estonia (CPE).

The first attempt took place on a highway near the city of Kokhtla-Yarve, in an area where shale is obtained. Due to the abominable working conditions and food shortages a strike broke out and turned into open rebellion. The troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who arrived on the scene beat the workers with truncheons but did not shoot. No one was killed but there were injuries and the mood in the area remained tense. Since the first secretary is also the deputy to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet from the Kokhtla-Yarveskoy Rayon (the Komsomol Electoral District No 63), he decided to visit the area in an attempt to calm the workers down. Not far from the city his car was fired upon from the woods. Vayno was not injured, but his chauffeur was killed. The authorities, naturally, attempted to avoid publicity on the matter; nonetheless, the chauffeur's co-workers put an obituary in the local press, although it contained no details.

The second attempt took place when Vayno was being driven by a new chauffeur to Tallin. An unknown vehicle forced the first secretary's car into a ditch. Vayno and his chauffeur were not injured. Witnesses saw employees of the State Automobile Inspection quickly remove the license plates from the damaged vehicle in order to prevent on-lookers from being able to determine that it was a government car.

The third attempt, the sources say, took place near the Rokka al' Mare Resort near Tallin. The "host" there has an enormous dacha with a tall fence, armed guards and dogs. When Vayno drove away from the protected zone of the dacha, shots were again fired at him from the woods, and once again they missed him. Those who had done the shooting were not found.

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Vayno (Karl Genrikhovich), an Estonian, was born in 1923 and graduated from the Tomsk Electromechanical Institute of Railway Transportation and the Higher Party School of the CC CPSU. He joined the party in 1947. He has done party work since 1948 in the following positions: instructor in the department of industry, deputy head of the department of heavy industry of the CC CPE, head of the department of industry and transportation of the CC CPE, deputy head of the Estonian SSR Economic Council, and he has been secretary of the CC CPE since 1960. After the last elections he replaced the former first secretary of the CPE, Ivan Kebin.

It is claimed that during the elections to the Supreme Soviet many voters crossed out the name Vayno on the lists. However, according to the official report, he obtained more than 99 percent of the votes.

Kebin, a Russified Estonian, was not loved either, but it was thought that in recent years that he had sometimes attempted to defend Estonia's local interests; he worked, for example, against the demands from the center to build an "agro-city" in Estonia. It is said about Vayno that he is faithful to the CC CPSU on everything and that he acts against the interests of Estonia. For this reason he is blamed for all the troubles the republic is having, including the shortage of food stuffs (although there are shortages everywhere). People recall that under Kebin Estonia was fed better than the other republics, while now Estonians live half-hungry. Previously Tallin consumed 75 tons of meat per day (150 grams per person). This year the Estonian capital has not once received more than 40 tons in a day. And there have been days when the city received no more than 300 kg of meat (!), which was not even enough for the hotels which accept foreign tourists. In the countryside Estonians do not see meat for months, not to mention eggs, milk or butter. Prices for goods and services are rising furiously in Estonia.

This winter Estonia experienced an energy crisis: power stations provided 200 volts instead of 220; electric lights barely glimmered instead of shining brightly. Every day the current was turned off for several hours; plants stood idle, and on many pig farms the heating did not work, resulting in the death of thousands of piglets. And Vayno, following a CC CPSU order, sent meat from Estonia to the "fraternal republics." It is not surprising that the public links all misfortune with his name.

In late June the new road from Tallin to Piritu was closed for three days; the militia found an explosive under the new bridge. On the night before Ivan Kupala Day, when all Estonians light traditional fires, firemen checked these fires, looking for explosives.

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31

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