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West Europe Report

(FOUO 55/79)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

'EUROSHINA': PROPOSAL FOR A STRATEGIC EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE

New Strategic Balance

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 16 Jul 79 pp 12-14

[Text] France against the challenge of the "terrible years": Soviet supremacy runs the risk of becoming linked to American indecision. The strategic choices are being made right now.

All last week the American strategic nuclear forces were in a state of war. Six hundred and fifty B-52 bombardiers with their weapons and supply planes took off from the 18 SAC [Strategic Air Command] bases. All of the inter-continental missile crews were placed on the alert, the communications system and that of controlled firing actually set. From 9 to 14 July it was really the most important exercise of this type in 20 years. At the same time Carter was studying the energy dossier at Camp David.

Lucidity is a duty, the President of the French Republic said. The energy crisis, the instability of the Near Eastern countries can at any time be sources of conflict. He himself let that be understood on 19 June. Chancellor Schmidt said so explicitly: There is a risk of "wars." And the American secretary of defense, Harold Brown, spelled it out:

"If our vital interests were threatened, we would take the appropriate safety measures to protect ourselves, including the use of military force."

The Pentagon announced the setting up of field force composed of 110,000 men.

On 2 July, Joseph Luns, NATO's secretary general, defined to his audience from the French Institute for International Relations actuated by Thierry de Montbrial, defined the world situation as follows: "politically unstable, economically fragile, psychologically disturbed." He added this sentence:

"Everywhere signals that are perhaps tracing out the course of disaster are being turned on and off."

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This was one of those signals. It was directed at France and came from the Near East. VALEURS ACTUELLES can reveal it: Last March the Saudi and North Yemeni Governments appealed to France. They requested its military aid to contain the attack by pro-Soviet South Yemen. Riyadh and Sana wanted war materiel and officers on an urgent basis. With France intervening on the very edges of the Persian Gulf so as to guarantee the area's stability, its political impact on the international scene could be tenfold by comparison with its Kolwezi operation.

Paris had to give up. The French Army lacked means. Limited and inadequate as to materiel, it did not have the men. Arabic is spoken in Yemen: The French Government could not ask its army to train cadres for this type of mission. In the end arms and officers were supplied to the North Yemeni and the Saudi by the Americans.

France does not commit its prestige by having its best units and its latest missiles paraded on 14 July, but by being capable to responding to situations such as that of Yemen.

That Yemeni battle seems secondary. It was nevertheless a more serious signal than people think.

Here was apparently a remote country, one underdeveloped and with no oil. It was nonetheless very much a matter of a strategic stake. The circumstances of the outbreak of the conflict between the two Yemens proves it.

Last 17 February, China attacked along the Vietnamese border. The world trembled: What would the Soviet reaction be to defend their Vietnamese ally? Moscow did nothing in Asia. Its sole goal was to isolate China's action and to prevent its Washington or Tokyo friends from assisting it. How? By applying a little pressure on the Free World's most sensitive and most delicate point: petroleum.

Four days following the launching of the Chinese attack, the South Yemeni forces, officered and armed by the Soviet Union, bore down on North Yemen, that is, on Saudi Arabia's allied country and its gulfis. It was a direct threat to the petroleum wells. Part of the people working in Arabia and in the emirates are Yemeni. The destabilization of North Yemen, the reactivation of the guerrilla war in the Omani sultanate are two pieces of one and the same game. The Kremlin reminded the West that the petroleum princes and emirs were at the mercy of a revolution.

On the chessboard of Soviet strategy, the Palestinian organizations which hence forth are based on both banks of the Persian Gulf have a role which goes far beyond their activities against the state of Israel.

Speaking plainly and playing at becoming frightened, Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi monarchy's minister of energy, finally commented that one or two supertankers sunk in the Strait of Ormuz would suffice to cut the petroleum

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route. The detonator for a conflagration: something like the criminal attempt at Sarajevo.

United States-USSR
The Balance Is Finished

	1979		1982		1985	
	United States	USSR	United States	USSR	United States	USSR
Launchers	2,100	2,500	2,200	2,250	2,130	2,520
Megatonnage	3,700	7,000	3,200	9,000	3,270	11,800

The above table takes into account the Salt II Treaty of Vienna (1979-1985). It freezes the number of launchers and forces even the Soviets to reduce their arsenal. But the nuclear power of the charges themselves (megatonnage) continues to be increased to the advantage of the Soviets. (Source: National Strategy Information Center of New York.)

Up to now "the balance of terror" has made a conflagration unlikely. During the night of 25 October 1973 when President Nixon placed his missiles and his European and Mediterranean troops on red alert, Brezhnev renounced parachuting into the Sinai the divisions he had massed together to rescue his then ally, Egypt, which had been pushed back by Israel. Will other Soviet leaders give up under similar circumstances? The balance is in the process of disruption.

The one who actually sent the red alert order, General Haig, chief of the allied forces in Europe, has just said so publicly. On leaving his SHAPE general headquarters [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (Europe)] on 29 June, he gave his successor, General Rogers, an extremely harsh analysis:

"For nearly 30 years," he wrote in his final report, "because of their strategic nuclear superiority, the United States has been the final arbiter in every local or regional crisis in which it directly or hypothetically confronted the Soviet Union. But the emerging of a new strategic equation at the being of the 1960's put an end to this final arbitration and regional ratios of forces now take on a far greater significance."

This new "strategic equation" is summed up in a small number of figures. The Soviet SS 18 missile carries in its warhead 10 thermonuclear 1 megaton (50 Hiroshimas each) salvos. The total of the three charges of the most powerful American rockets, the Minuteman 3, just barely comes to 1 megaton. Over-all ratio: 1 to 10. By adding up the power of all the devices in each arsenal, the American "megatonnage" amounts to half that of the Soviets (3,700 as opposed to 7,000). In 5 years this ratio will be 1 to 4.

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What is the "balance" frozen by the Salt II Treaty signed in Vienna by Carter and Brezhnev?

Francois de Rose, former French ambassador to NATO, stated:

"The Salt II Treaty is based on a fallacious balance. Up to now the American systems were more accurate and had higher charges than those of the Russians. We are heading towards a reversed situation."

Why did the Americans allow that to come about? Technically, they did not believe the Soviet military engineers were capable of filling that gap with respect to the MIRV's (those nuclear charge slavs launched from the same rocket toward different targets). Then they attribute to the atom an "equalizing power": A small bomb is as much to be feared as a large one. Finally, their system is based on dissuasion: Nuclear power needs only to be strong enough to deter the adversary from attempting an attack.

But this doctrine is not taught in the Soviet Union. The Russians talk neither of no battles nor of no war. They stick to Clausewitz: Concentrating all of one's means to strike the enemy in the head; "from the strong to the strong."

Denis Delbourg, a graduate of the Ecole Normale Superieure [Advanced Teacher Training School] and a diplomat, an expert in matters of strategy, brought this back to mind in the last issue of the review DEFENSE NATIONALE; for the Soviets, "nuclear war can only be total, the rise to extremes is inevitable. The Western idea of a limited nuclear conflict is an illusion." He added these words: For the Americans, strategic parity is equality as to the certainty of losing; for the Soviets, it is equality with the hope of survival."

From all that General Haig drew the inference in his report by calmly observing: "We are living in a strategic environment in which the Soviet capacity for intervention has assumed a greater value at the political level. At the same time Moscow's increasing tendency to intervene has become more difficult to dissuade and its actual intervention more difficult to counter."

Can one be more outspoken? Soviet power has become such that dissuasion is going to have the wrong effect. Now there is talk of a new "syndrome": that of the inevitability of Soviet victory.

That may be true for the Near East. But also for Europe.

In Helsinki in 1975 Moscow got the Western powers to recognize definitively the borders of its European empire. Today, Kremlin diplomacy is seeking to bring to an end the strategic solidarity between Europe and the United States (an end to the "nuclear umbrella").

The specialists give that the term "uncoupling." The American "central system" would be detached from the European security system. The difference between

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the Salt II negotiations on the two great powers' arsenals and the coming Salt III negotiations on the European theatre indicates the direction.

An American expert was recently heard to say during a meeting of specialists held in Berlin:

"For 30 years we have been carrying Europe like a monkey on our shoulders. Things are becoming unstable."

In a book with the evocative title "Euroshima" (Media publishers), Lt Col Guy Doly observed: "One cannot help placing within this framework the American decision taken in March 1978 to defer manufacturing the neutron bomb which could considerably improve the effectiveness of a flexible response from the [NATO] alliance in Europe."

That came after an effective Soviet campaign against this neutron bomb.

Officially, however, nothing has changed in the American attitude towards Europe. Only the climate is gradually altering. Last week the weekly NEWSWEEK asked General Haig: "Isn't there a tendency in Europe to recognize the inevitability of Soviet supremacy in order to avoid tension with Moscow?"

"There are in fact many signs of that," General Haig replied.

Of whom was he speaking? Of Federal Germany in particular. Located in the center of the European battlefield, Germany believes only in American protection, not in any other. If this protection were to decrease, it would reach an understanding with Russia. Hence the emphasis Bonn places on refusing to shelter modernized nuclear missiles (under American control) on its soil, if Germany were to be the only NATO country to do so: "no unnecessary tension" with Moscow.

French military power only makes sense if it dissuades Germany from turning toward Moscow and from thereby precipitating the "Finlandization" of Western Europe. A strong and resolute France would restrain Germany from following a policy of humiliation with respect to Eastern Europe.

Now, French power is still less than our means. A law on planning was approved in 1976: It was a law for readjusting military appropriations. In the fall, an evaluation of what has been accomplished in its first phase will be made. New delays have been incurred with respect to materiel: combat planes, nuclear attack submarines. On the contrary, this equipment and investments in nuclear weapons must be speeded up.

In 5 years our strategic forces will be composed of five nuclear rocket-launcher submarines, to which will be added a sixth, the submarine named "Chirac-Debre" (because without the action taken by the RPR [Rally for the Republic], it would have been delayed, of 18 Albion plateau missiles and 36 Mirage 4 planes to be brought up to date. With these arms systems, tactical nuclear devices for tanks, planes or even attack submarines. But over

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all, according to Lt Col Doly, "the numerical ratio to the enemy threat will be on the order of 1 to 100..."

In addition, no decision has yet been taken for the years that will follow the end of the "planning." That is, after 1982. In other words, for the "black years" which the Soviet-American ratio will experience from 1980 to 1985. (Beyond that, the coming of the MX missiles, numerous Trident submarines and new weapons should greatly improve the American position.)

France's problem is that of not remaining "inhibited" by the Soviet threat. The alleged good will of Brezhnev or of his successor in no way changes the ratio of forces. Seeking to ignore this would be fatal.

At the end of 1914, former German chancellor von Bulow questioned his successor, Bethmann-Hollweg, as to the causes of the outbreak of the conflict. Bethmann-Hollweg replied in these words:

"I do not know, I do not know."

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Main Tenets of Proposal

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Aug 79 pp 14-14

[Article by M. Cd.: "Europe's Scouts"]

[Text] All-round dissuasion or European defense. France's military doctrine depends on the outcome of this debate.

The debate on the defense of Europe has begun again. Twenty-five years after the failure of Jean Monnet's plan for a European defense community, the idea is again becoming popular among French political and military circles.

Before the end of the year the UDF [French Democratic Union] intends to publish a detailed report on France's defense: Its conclusions could move in the direction of reinforcing European military cooperation. At the expense of the doctrine established by General de Gaulle and maintained up to now by his successors: A national army organized around a nuclear weapon for dissuasion, aimed in all directions.

Yves Laulan, a member of Jean Lecanuet's CDS [Center of Social Democrats] and former NATO director of economic affairs, in LE FIGARO of 7 August regretted that the process of building Europe had neglected the security factor.

Some Gaullists themselves do not hesitate to bring back into question some aspects of the doctrine of the Fifth Republic's founder. In LE MONDE of 14 July, Jacques Chaumont, RPR senator for the Sarthe [department], declared the necessity of European military cooperation. And Alexandre Sanguinetti, former

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UDR chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Committee for National Defense, made identical statements in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR of 20 August:

"We must not repeat "independence, independence" in the way others say "Europe, Europe."

According to Sanguinetti, France does not have an adequate budget available to ensure its defense on its own. Hence the "necessity of a European defense which can only come into being through a teaming up of French nuclear power with German industry." A thesis completely contrary to that of Michel Debre, hostile to the militarization of Germany, who was one of the moving forces behind the anti-EDC [European Defense Community] campaign in 1952.

Among the items in the dossier: "Euroshima" (Media publishers), a book by a young field officer, Lt Col Doly. VALEURS ACTUELLES (our 16 July issue) called attention to this work which advocates a European defense community including Germany and directed against a potential Soviet aggressor. On 16 August, Yves Moreau, editorialist for L'HUMANITE, denounced its author and "the protagonists of a European army who harbor bellicose anti-Soviet designs."

The communists obviously want to profit from the affair to launch a campaign. They were alerted by dispatches from the TASS agency and an article in IZVESTIA published a few months ago which denounced earlier works by Lt Col Doly.

"Euroshima" underscores the danger of the "rising Soviet tide," which possesses the highest capacity in the world for military intervention. Faced with that, France can with great difficulty only maintain a defense withdrawn unto itself. Hence the necessity of a European defense community endowed with a nuclear weapon common to all of its members, including Germany.

Lt Col Doly pursued his logic to the end: The utilization of a common weapon implies a supreme authority for decision-making. "A presidency of the European Council," for example.

"A natural attribute and manifestation of political union, European defense can also be its driving force," he wrote.

A graduate of the War College, a 41 year old artilleryman, Lt Col Doly was not making his first trial shot. Two years ago in "Strategic France-Europe" (Media), he was already advocating a revision of the Gaullist strategic doctrine in a European sense: "The doctrine corresponded to the ambitions of a France which was animated by the imperial spirit. Can that of 1977, reduced to the dimensions and resources of territorial France, have all its doctrine's means? An analysis, which corresponds to that of Giscard d'Estaing when he spoke of France as a "average power."

At the beginning of the year, under the pseudonym of "Francois," Lt Col Doly published a "novel without fiction" entitled "The Sixth Column, If the Russians Attacked"; a strong criticism of the "nuclear all or nothing" and of France's

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military isolation. With the discreet endorsement of the Ministry of Defense (our 26 February issue).

Lt Col Doly's arguments represent a strong return to the arguments of Jean Monnet and of the partisans of Atlantic integration. It was doubtless not by chance that one of the signatories to "Euroshima" was Pascal Fontaine, a 30-year old member of the teaching profession, son of the editor of the Paris office of the European Communities, a member of Lecanuet's CDS, a former colleague of Jean Monnet whom he assisted in writing his memoirs. The other signatory, Capt Rene Cagnat, 36 years old, a specialist in Soviet affairs and a graduate of the School of Political Science, is a former NATO military observer. And a member of the Secretariat General of Defense which confers upon "Euroshima" additional authority.

In his book, to which he gave the subtitle "Building the Defense of Europe," Lt Col Doly exposes some "personal thoughts." They could express the concerns of Giscard d'Estaing in this sphere. This book was published with the endorsement of the Ministry of Defense as is the custom for officers on active duty. That is to say it falls in with a guideline which is not systematically excluded by the government.

Can one conclude for all that, as L'HUMANITE does, that "Euroshima" bears the "official stamp of Giscard's government"? Can an official evolution toward the measures advocated by Ly Col Doly be envisaged on a short-term basis?

Formerly a member of Jean Monnet's Committee for the United States of Europe, the chief of state is not hostile a priori to such theories. There is another convinced European at the Quai d'Orsay, Jean Francois Poncet, a former colleague of Maurice Faure, a signatory to the treaties of Rome.

The UDF's report, drawn up by a committee composed of parliamentarians and military experts, should take into account concerns close to those of the Elysee. The chairman of that committee, Jean Marie Daillet, CDS deputy from Saint Lo, resisted giving any indication before the publication of the text "so as not to hinder the president of the Republic's action in such an important sphere."

He did, however, point out:

"The Americans themselves want a re-equilibration of the Atlantic alliance to the advantage of the Europeans. The latter hope for it for reasons of dignity and a concern for effectiveness. Everyone deplors the dispersion of efforts and the inadequate harmonizing of European armaments,

The RPR's defeat in the European elections on 10 June incited the Elysee to make a "Hobson's choice" in the European sphere. Mme Simone Veil's speech of investiture on 18 July is one sign of this: By insisting on the powers of the European Parliament, the new president of this institution deliberately provoked the Gaullists and announced an irreversible evolution of the European

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organization. Now, the Elysee has very closely followed "Operation Veil" and Giscard d'Estaing's advisers have worked in liaison with those of the former minister of health.

"The decision to elect the deputies to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage is likely to accelerate a collective awareness by Europeans as to the common destiny that they can organize," Lt Col Doly wrote. He added: "In the years to come the European Council and the elected European Parliament will doubtless be the two poles of a prefederal structure which may see unsuspected developments.

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Communist Reaction

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 16 Aug 79 pp 1,9

[Article by Yves Moreau: "'Euroshima' Against National Defense"]

[Text] The campaign for the European elections was orchestrated by the Giscard government with reassuring themes, democracy, peace, such were the claimed objectives. The supra-national aims were soft-pedaled. As for the possible military consequences of European integration, the watchword was total silence.

The elections over, such precautions have been shrugged off. Mme Veil abandoned the good-natured smile on her posters to use the language of supranationality bluntly beginning with her first address to the European Assembly. And now in mid-summer a whole campaign on behalf of the European army and military integration is beginning.

Thus, the REVUE DES DEUX MONDES this August turned over its pages to Gaston Thorn who proclaimed the Common Market "inadequate" and "nonoperational"; he defined it as "a European mercantile ensemble..., a mere framework of interstate cooperation governed by the rule of unanimity." To stop there, he stated, would amount to resigning oneself to "marking time." And he went on to attack "the idea of national independence... utilized without rhyme or reason by the defenders of a nation state inherited from the 19th century."

In LE FIGARO of 7 August, the former director of NATO's economic affairs, Yves Laulan, also complained that "the process of building Europe has neglected security to the advantage of the economic sphere." To be sure, he did write "two knocks have already been given on the European stage"*: The creation of a monetary system and the Assembly elections, "but for Europe actually to enter upon the international stage, it is essential ... to have the third knock resound... The problem of European defense is now posed."

Analogous ideas are developed at length in a book issued by Media Publishers which Guy Doly, Rene Cagnat and Pascal Fontaine have just published. The third named was for 4 years one of Jean Monnet's assistants. The other two

*A reference to the three knocks given in French theatres before the curtain rises

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authors are officers on active duty and therefore could not sign the work without official permission: Lt Col Guy Doly is on a command assignment at Belfort; Capt Rene Cagnat is a member of the Secretariat General of Defense, a body coming under the prime minister, Raymond Barre.

When one knows the sanctions incurred by a soldier signing a petition merely requesting free transportation for men going on leave, the significance of authorization given military men with the responsibilities Lt Col Doly and Capt Cagnat have is quite clear: that of the Giscard government's seal of approval.

A Gaullist Concept Challenged (Impugned?)

Now their work which they entitled with a taste that to say the least is dubious, "Euroshima", is wholly marked by open hostility to national defense. Thus they wrote that "the national idea... can no longer inspire defense" and that "the term 'defense' no longer corresponds to 'reality'."

They submit that in principle an end must be put to the dual Gaullist concept of dissuasion in the military sphere and of national independence in foreign policy.

The military integration they advocate is limitless. They recall with relish that Lord Carrington, the present British foreign secretary, had hoped for a "European nuclear force" in 1972 when he was minister of defense, and accordingly they demand the organization, to begin with, of a Franco-British striking force. At the same time they demand that a classic European field force be established. Of course, according to them, the standardizing of weapons is an urgent task.

"Preventive War"

If the word "defense" is to be given up and the concept of dissuasion repudiated, it is, they explain, because the strategy they favor "may involve preventative operations of an offensive character."

The European army, such as they envisage it, "could not be conceived independently of the American alliance... On the contrary, it aims to reinforce the Atlantic alliance." But they deplore the fact that the Atlantic pact is not even worse than it is; they reproach it of unduly favoring the sovereignty of states" and of not "covering" Africa and the near East.

As a fine example of the "preventive" wars they are prepared to encourage, they foresee in Africa and in the Mediterranean "far more important expeditions than those of Shaba or Lebanon."

To justify renouncing a national army and repudiating the very idea of defense, the entire argumentation of "Euroshima's" authors consists in invoking the alleged disparity which they declare exists between the Soviet forces and those

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of the Western bloc. The same old story which served to justify the cold war and which still adds fresh fuel to continuing the arms race. But this false propaganda is always unable to explain why, if the USSR is so inordinately powerful and aggressive, instead of attacking without further delay, it is on the contrary multiplying initiatives favorable to measures of military detente and arms reduction.

In reality, as emerges from several of the quotations given above, it is the protagonists of the European army who are harboring bellicose anti-Soviet designs.

An Atomic Bundeswehr

And, in this respect going back to the Versailles and Munich tradition, "Euroshima's" authors base their hopes in large measure on German imperialism's military potential. Almost overtly they argue in favor of giving the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] nuclear arms.

Thus, with manifest regret, they noted that "Germany, deprived by the 1954 Paris Accords of the possibility of setting up for itself a force of nuclear dissuasion within the national framework, has never received a proposal from France or Great Britain for a gradual change that would bring it to share atomic power with one of its European partners." And they immediately added that in the European army, at last "Germany will find the place it deserves."

A prospect which will not fail to enthuse those who on the other side of the Rhine are extremely eager to accede to nuclear power and who feel, like Franz Josef Strauss, a Christian Democratic candidate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that "a Bundeswehr without atomic weapons makes one think of a Roman legion equipped only with bucklers against firearms" (statement made to the weekly QUICK).

Weapon Standardization

The similarity between some of the projects recommended by "Euroshima" and those which not only Strauss but also the government of Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt cherish, is furthermore obvious. Thus one reads in the 1975-1976 "White Book" of the FRG Government that on arms matters "national prestige and egoism will have to take a back seat."

And the "White Book" went on: "It is not always possible to spare ourselves or our partners the temporary disadvantages which cooperation may involve, for example, giving up national development or limiting national production for the sake of some armament projects. But, in view of the advantages offered in the long run by standardization, all member countries of the alliance (Atlantic) must be prepared to endure such temporary disadvantages." It is on that path, alas!, that the Giscard government has set out. Hence the initial and serious measures for dismantling French state arsenals and establishments. Hence also France's official participation since the beginning of 1976 in GIEP [Independent European Planning Group] and in CNAD

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[Conference of National Armament (Plants) Directors], bodies which are in fact closely tied in with NATO.

A WEU [Western European Union] conference is to be held next 15 to 17 October in Brussels to speed up new national renunciations for the benefit of a "European armament policy." It is to bring together NATO and EEC [European Economic Community], as well as executives of the nine nations' armament industries. It has officially set as its goal "standardizing the various types of European weapons, in particular at the time of their replacement."

As one sees, "Euroshima" is not a work of pure imagination. Some of the ideas set forth in it are already being implemented by governments. On the issue of standardizing armaments, it is furthermore the application of the principle stated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, adviser to President Carter, in an interview granted in April to DIE WELT, LA STAMPA and LE MONDE, and in which he called upon the European allies of the United States "to decide jointly on controlling armaments or on deploying new weapons."

That is also what French Socialist deputy Formi hoped for as early as November 1977 in a report presented to the WEU and which declared: "We must not adjust ourselves to France's absence from NATO, but envisage the ways of new cooperation with NATO." Giscard's policy, we know, contributed only too actively to it.

The "Right to Intervene"

Finally, the military integration demanded by Lt Col Doly and his friends is aimed at very significant internal political objectives. One of them was set forth by Guy Doly in a preceding work published in April 1977 when its author still held the rank of major. Entitled "France-Europe Strategy," this book specifically demanded the pure and simple banning of the French Communist Party denounced as being the "internal adversary."

"Euroshima" sets its sights on even more. This new work does not solely attack French communists, but also any state that might possibly be guilty of "drawing away" from "the European ideology." "Euroshima's" authors announce that not only should such a state be excluded from the Western European bloc, but in addition that one would have to resort to "intervention, first of all economic, then perhaps military" against it. They insist that "the right to economic or armed intervention" be recognized.

So there you have what the European army required: The abandonment of all national defense, of all national independence, total subordination to NATO, the nuclear arming of the FRG, the adoption of the so-called strategy of aggression, possible war against a France, an Italy or a Spain should it reject the European ideological yoke.

Hair-brained proposals? They are nevertheless revealing for the very fact that their features are often excessive and unrealistic.

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Europe's future will certainly not be that envisaged in "Euroshima." But it would be very wrong not to take into account the fact that such dreams, however utterly mad they may be, correspond to the political intentions of the Giscard government. In certain respects the latter has already begun to take France onto the "Euroshima" road.

Unanswered Questions, Problems

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Aug 79 p 6

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "'Euroshima' by Rene Cagnat, Guy Doly and Pascal Fontaine"]

[Text] It is hard to know what one must most appreciate about the book "Euroshima,"* which its authors: two officers, Guy Doly and Rene Cagnat, and a member of the teaching profession, Pascal Fontaine, devote to European security: The often severe but argued judgment as to the incapacity of liberal states to take up the military challenge of Soviet power or the naivete of the solutions proposed--barely outlined and not always original--in order to organize a real European defense which would remain faithful to the Atlantic alliance.

At the beginning of their reflecting, a profession of faith which leads the three authors of this book, convinced of the necessity to resist the "Finlandization" or the "subversion" of Europe by the Red Army, to declare: "The European defense organization could not be conceived independently of the American alliance and even less against it without playing into the hands of the strategic adversary."

This strategic adversary, one of the three signatories to "Euroshima" believes he knows very well who it is since Lt Col Guy Doly, under the pseudonym of Francois, had at the beginning of this year, devoted to it a strategy-fiction novel, "The Sixth Column, If the Russians Were to Attack" (LE MONDE of 26 January 1979), in a somewhat hasty style. The same young field officer, about 2 years ago, had already written a work on European defense entitled "France-Europe Strategy" which has much in common with "Euroshima." This means that the reader will find himself on familiar ground in this new book and have a feeling of having read it before, of something already hacked to death despite the contribution, hard to discern, of the other two co-authors.

Guy Doly, Rene Cagnat and Pascal Fontaine assert that the true security of the French henceforth depends on European union. And if risks do exist that nuclear dissuasion reinforces the nation state, then the credibility of classic means and putting it in the service of a European defense community, a new formula, must be developed. It is an argument to which young French army officers are sensitive because they have no effective or determining role in the use of the nuclear weapon.

*"Euroshima," by Rene Cagnat, Guy Doly and Pascal Fontaine, 176 pages, Media publishers.

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The difficulties begin for the authors when it is a matter of building this European security under the egis of an executive power which would be the European Council in the absence of there being some day a president of Europe elected by universal suffrage.

How does one reconcile the existence of a British nuclear dissuasion force with that of the French strategic force? How does one devise a joint organization of classic forces in the other European countries which should accept the nuclear "umbrella" of London and Paris? How would the United States and this integrated military Europe coexist? What delegations--which would not amount to abandoning national sovereignty--would each of the European countries agree upon for communal defense?

So many questions which the authors of "Euroshima," following many other theoreticians of European institutions, attempt to answer in the final quarter of their book without always succeeding in avoiding the traps inherent to any construction of the mind.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

NATO'S EUROPEAN STRATEGY TERMED UNCERTAIN

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 31 Aug 79 p 9

[Article by Sergio A. Rossi]

[Text] In the shadow of the SALT II agreements on limitation of American and Soviet strategic missiles, a debate is surfacing in Europe over our continent's atomic security for the Eighties. Once again, the issue emerges from the political and military heart of Europe: from France, Great Britain, and Germany, the first two nuclear powers in their own right, the third still only a conventional power, but one endowed with a prestige and a traditional role in defense questions which has swiftly sprung up again, mutatis mutandis, inside the NATO ambience as well.

Italy, as usual, is still hanging about on the fringes, so to speak, save for sporadic reports in a press which is generally apathetic or only superficially informed on strategic matters. Just what is the issue?

Substantially this: on the one hand the SALT II agreements between the U.S. and the USSR are beginning to include several limitations -- interim limitations for the moment -- and the development of some theater nuclear weapons, such as the ground-based cruise missiles, which are of course American, but since they are based in Europe, are of direct concern to the security of the allies, and to Germany, in particular.

On the other hand the Soviets are developing regional superiority in Europe in the crucial area of theater nuclear weapons, sometimes known as Euro-strategic weapons. This is a matter of growing concern to the European allies in NATO because this already existing local superiority -- now considerably improved from the qualitative point of view (accuracy and range of the Soviet intermediate-range SS-20 missiles) is no longer offset by the once overwhelming American strategic superiority.

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What is worse, that same global strategic balance that prevails today between the two superpowers provides solid grounds to fear that should there be an acute crisis, the Americans would hesitate to intervene in Europe with their nuclear weapons in the face of a possible direct Soviet threat to extend the conflict to strategic attack on U.S. territory.

Of course this scenario is still mere theorizing, and that is as it should be; but it has its own specific political weight in that it weakens the deterrent impact of diplomatic action on Soviet pressure on the Western European countries, easier prey to an unspoken but already creeping process of Finlandization.

To put it briefly, the East-West nuclear equilibrium in Europe should be adjusted on the basis of the complicated argument that too even a balance of forces would enhance the hypothetical opportunity for the U.S.A. and the USSR to fight a nuclear war confined to Western Europe, keeping their own home territories as "sanctuaries": this would be one way to unlink U.S. territorial defense from that of Europe. And yet too uneven a balance, like the one now existing, would ipso facto paralyze any potential American nuclear intervention in defense of Europe.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are pushing hard to get Britain and France included as participants in the next SALT rounds, since their nuclear missiles have the range to strike into Soviet territory, so that those missiles can be explicitly counted in the overall East-West strategic equation. And here we can clearly see one readily understandable source of Soviet concern lest the nuclear balance in Europe should erode in the Eighties into close bilateral nuclear control of the two superpowers and a crisis of nuclear confidence between Americans and Europeans within NATO should lead to either of two possible kinds of development.

The first is a marked upgrading, already in the planning stages, in the British and even more certainly in the French nuclear deterrent, the latter of which will reportedly double or triple its current destructive potential within the next few years, along with the mobility and invulnerability of its own missiles, particularly its submarine-launched contingents. The second is that the Europeans might agree unilaterally on some sort of nuclear cooperation, perhaps within an EEC structure, but more probably on a bilateral or trilateral basis.

And right here the alternatives become so interesting, and also such a source of controversy in East-West relations themselves. In fact, while there is again talk about military nuclear cooperation between France and Britain -- and there have already been rumors and statements indicating such a trend -- only recently there has been talk from such French politicians as Sanguinetti and from military spokesmen such as Gen Buis, of possible Franco-German military cooperation.

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The fact that these are mere "trial balloons," or more or less welcome public opinion polls, confirms Europe's uneasiness as it watches the steady growth of its own independence from the United States (partly because of a degree of perceived weakness in the current Carter administration) in the political, commercial, and monetary areas, but without consequently being either able or willing to make up its mind to deal conclusively with its all but absolute dependence in the politico-military field.

Thus on the one hand the European NATO allies, of whom Italy is not the least, are hesitant about plans to beef up theater nuclear weapons as proposed by the Americans themselves in response to German concerns, aware that, even should this be necessary, merely to do so would once more legitimize Washington's remote control over European security. Yet on the other hand, suggestions or plans to establish a real conventional or nuclear defense system in Europe, even though hedged round with the requisite guarantees, meet with doubt and fear.

Even so, a situation like this, with a Europe that is neither fish nor flesh nor good red herring in the strategic-nuclear area can only help the Soviets in the East-West political and military negotiations, thanks to the greater advantages they enjoy by virtue of dealing with the Americans over a privileged channel and then going on to deal individually with each single and far weaker European national government.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD PROBLEMS WITH ANTI-STRAUSS ELECTION STRATEGY DESCRIBED

Hamburg STERN in German 16 Aug 79 p 110

[Article by Werner Heilemann and Uwe Zimmer: "Afraid of Mud-Slinging"]

[Text] SPD member Wilhelm Degenhardt of the local association of Westheim near Paderborn received a letter from his party's executive board. "Dear Fellow Member," the letter from Bonn began, "our side will not make use of the sticker 'Schmidt Yes--Strauss No ' which you have proposed." The reason given by the central organization of the SPD for its rejection was that "we do not want to go on promoting" the voting duel between Helmut Schmidt and Franz Josef Strauss.

This postal damper on campaign enthusiasm at the grass roots level is no exception. Ever since the Upper Bavarian Strauss was proclaimed the Union's candidate for chancellor, more and more party members are wanting to find out from the Bonn leadership how they should approach the ominous man. But after the initial joy over the mobilization push, perplexity is spreading in the Erich Ollenhauer House. The dilemma in which the party strategists are caught was described by them in an internal position paper: "A prominent personality-oriented contest with Strauss is as useful to him as the simple duel line."

The election campaign planners of the SPD expect little from presenting Strauss as "a man of affairs and scandals, dubious friendships, as a brutal power politician and litigant." The consequences of painting Strauss as a demon, they believe, are too dangerous: Instead of winning thoughtful CDU/CSU followers like, for example, members of the Social Committee and members of the Young Union over to the SPD, these, repulsed by the style of the contest, would join the ranks of Strauss. The study cites as an annoying failure a sticker which the SPD membership organ SOZIAL-DEMOKRAT MAGAZIN (circulation: 896,000), of all things, helped disseminate: Adolf Hitler comments on the statement that "Strauss Wants To Become Chancellor" with the word "Neat."

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The planners regard it as equally damaging if the SPD yields to the strategy of the CDU and recognizes Strauss as the challenger of Schmidt in the style of a sports contest. This business, the paper says, is above all being conducted by the BILD ZEITUNG, which "during the past few weeks printed a series entitled 'Who Is Better?'" The CSU and its helpers hope to create the impression in this way that the issue in 1980 turns around the choice between the "capable Schmidt," whose freedom of action is limited by the SPD left wing, and the "strong Strauss," who as a powerful leader does not have to take into account other opinions.

Instead of blowing up the CSU-boss through wrong tactics into "a masochistic object of fascination" and thus awakening the "latently existing desire for subjection to a strong man" in the first place, the SPD strategists are recommending cool objectivity. Instead of a frontal attack on Strauss, "the contest with a union of parties which has inscribed political reaction on its banners" is to be placed in the foreground. Playing a primary role in this concept are those contradictions in which candidate Strauss is getting increasingly entangled: demanding, for example, simultaneous debt reduction and accelerated tax reductions. Or when he advocates more television programs through cable TV as an overture to publishers and elsewhere finds fault with the fact that children spend too much time "in front of the boob tube."

The SPD central organization, however, is unclear as to how the limitation to what is factual and fundamental is to be made palatable to the members. When Federal Executive Director Egon Bahr returned from his vacation last week he found, in addition to the analysis of his planners, also a less-welcome report concerning the mood [in the party]. Excerpt: "The demand for appropriate measures by the party leadership is increasing. The members have no understanding for hesitation or even passivity."

Bahr has been able to read in black and white from the most recent surveys the results that waiting yields. Since Franz Josef Strauss became the CDU/CSU's candidate for chancellor, the Union again is in first place ahead of the SPD in terms of voter preference.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

INSTITUTE POLLS YOUTH ON POLITICS, 1980 ELECTION ISSUES

Hamburg STERN in German 13 Sep 79 pp 20-27

[Report by Michael Juergs: "1979 Idols--Whom and What Youth Wants"]

[Text] On behalf of STERN, the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion has polled people ranging from 17 to 23, who will decide the 1980 Bundestag elections, on what they think about politics and politicians, whom they will vote for or why they will not vote, whether they are satisfied with state and society, what they are afraid of and what they dream of, who is still their hero--or has long since ceased to be such.

What do they actually do? They practice the primal scream and eat Muesli [Swiss cereal] for breakfast. They rush to the countryside in checkered buses and eat regularly. They all have "something going"--a very ambitious concept of life or at least a relationship crisis (called lovesickness in former times) whose physical removal (formerly called sex) is scheduled for about 8 p.m. Thursday. They have no use for established parties and regard the speeches of politicians as empty phrases produced in another world. They read Tolkien's "Lord of the Rings," the "Tibetan Book of the Dead" and anything by British psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing. They like to live in communes and flock to rock concerts by the hundreds of thousands to have a chance to be spontaneous. They sometimes will stage a show when there is a question of a nuclear power plant to be built, and if they had their say, they would all like to go to Puna, because there in India the sun never sets. They love themselves like hardly any of their fellow men and definitely prefer unemployment compensation to work.

To put it briefly: we should start saving, because they probably are not earning our pensions any longer.

Who are they? They are the 5,385,000 young Germans between 17 and 23, the young voters who can decide the Bundestag elections next year. There are a great many opinions and prejudices about this generation. An apolitical--no longer an APO-litical--youth [APO stands for the Extraparliamentary

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Opposition of former years] has grown up unnoticed while we are still trying to remove the ruins of our fathers. A sneaker generation is wandering off into a supposedly pressure-free inner life of its own. Even such critical people as psychoanalyst Horst Eberhard Richter ("Lernziel Solidaritaet" ["Study Aim: Solidarity"]) become resigned when contemplating the new generation:

"More and more children and young people are becoming peculiarly indifferent and apathetic. If at all, it is with boredom that they barely play along with the formal rituals in the family, school and college.... But they no longer go out and attack the authorities representing the establishment from which they are escaping. They simply no longer take seriously what the rest is doing. Therefore there is no longer any point in their getting worked up and arguing."

This too sounds convincing, but wherever opinions and prejudices overlap, the truth generally remains concealed. When on the right DIE WELT is pleased that a "critical generation has turned into a generation of adjusted people," and on the left KONKRET deplores the fact that a "freakish generation" has grown up and right away left society, chances are that the truth about German youth lies elsewhere.

It lies in the center. This is shown by figures obtained in a STERN poll among 843 young FRG citizens between 17 and 23 representative of 5,385,000 in that age group. Let us first take the "positive" results which also make this generation pleasing in the eyes of those who are older: 59 percent of all young voters are satisfied with conditions in the FRG; of those who were young voters in 1976, 61 percent are satisfied.

Are you generally satisfied with conditions here in the FRG, or do you wish that a great deal were fundamentally different?
(Figures are percentages)

	Young voters in 1980 Bundes- tag elections	Young voters in 1976 Bundestag elections, today
Satisfied	59	61
Wish a great deal were different	29	27
Undecided	12	12

If the decision next year were solely in the hands of young voters, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would have nothing to fear. He would receive 62 percent of the vote, and his opponent Franz Josef Strauss only 21 percent. With 46 percent, the SPD also has a clear 6-percent lead over the CDU/CSU when it comes to choosing between parties; nor would the Bonn

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coalition have any reason to worry, because the FDP would receive a sure 6 percent from the young voters. However, the Greens would have a chance as well: 12 percent of the young voters gave them as their first choice.

All told, 66 percent of young Germans think that "by and large" the three large parties properly represent the various interests of the population and thus can be voted for. On the other hand, among young voters in 1976, 72 percent held that view.

A peaceful generation?

Violence in protest actions, for instance against nuclear power plants, is rejected by 73 percent of all young people. There is great respect for refusal to do military service (65 percent) and less respect (32 percent) for the Bundeswehr [FRG Armed Forces].

Let us assume that a young man refuses to do military service because he cannot reconcile it with his conscience to be a soldier. Would you have a great deal of respect or little respect for such a man? (Answers in percentages)

	Young voters in 1980 Bundestag elections	Young voters in 1976 Bundestag elections, today
A great deal of respect	65	55
Little respect	27	37
Another answer	8	8

This will please parents: 61 percent no longer consider it necessary for juveniles to receive legally laid down rights vis-a-vis their elders, and 64 percent say that they have had a happy childhood.

It fits into this image of the young German that 43 percent belong to a sports club, another 6 percent to a disco club, but only 4 percent work with a political party; that 87 percent at least occasionally talk about politics, only 9 percent frequently watch political television shows, but 77 percent spend more than 1 hour a day watching other TV programs.

It therefore comes as no surprise that the list of men and women whom the young people are greatly impressed with among the top 10 includes goal-keeper Sepp Maier, rock singer Udo Lindenberg, movie hero Bud Spencer and Queen Silvia, legendary figures like John F. Kennedy and Albert Schweitzer and otherwise only staid citizens like Helmut Schmidt, Mildred Scheel and Margaret Thatcher. Only Heinrich Boell (with 23 percent in eighth place)

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does not fit this scheme. Oh yes; we must not forget: 57 percent of those polled are gripped by disco fever every Saturday night.

Which of these well-known men and women are you greatly impressed with and admire? (Answers are percentages)

	Young voters in 1980 Bundestag elections	Young voters in 1976 Bundestag elections, today
John F. Kennedy, politician	37	46
Albert Schweitzer, physician	31	40
Udo Lindenberg, singer	30	19
Sepp Maier, goalkeeper	28	27
Mildred Scheel, physician	27	35
Helmut Schmidt, politician	25	31
Bud Spencer, actor	24	18
Heinrich Boell, author	23	26
Silvia of Sweden, queen	19	19
Margaret Thatcher, politician	18	18
John Travolta, actor	18	11
Willy Brandt, politician	16	23
Franz Josef Strauss, politician	14	10
Reinhold Messner, mountaineer	14	10
Jimmy Carter, politician	13	14
Dietrich Thurau, cyclist	13	14
Roger Moore, actor	13	12
Mario Andretti, racing driver	12	9
Bruce Lee, actor	11	8
Alice Schwarzer, feminist	8	13
Carl F. von Weizsaecker, philosopher	6	11
Hans-D. Genscher, politician	6	8
N. Huebner, GDR military service administrator	6	5
Herbert Marcuse, philosopher	5	9
Andy Warhol, pop artist	5	5
Pater Roger from Taize	4	2

So what do we want? This is really quite presentable, and one can live with it. One can even win elections with it, depending on the given situation.

All right. But how about the minorities?

Particularly two figures from the STERN poll are almost a writing on the wall for the future of this republic: 29 percent of all 17- to 23-year-olds (that is, about 1.5 million citizens) wish a lot of things were different in this nation, and only 79 percent are quite sure that they will actually go to the polls next year--12 percent fewer than voted in the 1976 Bundestag elections of that age group.

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Are you going to vote in the next Bundestag elections in 1980 or not? Answers are percentages

	Young voters in 1980 Bundestag elections	Young voters in 1976 Bundestag elections, today
Yes	79	91
No	9	3
Undecided	12	6

What is the reason for this? The fact that all practice the primal scream, eat Muesli and carry "Thank you, no nuclear power" badges is insufficient reason. They are no longer the middle-class children of the APO years who, out of sated prosperity, demonstrated in the desire to change the world and in the meantime, though a little more critical and more aware, have again landed wherever they had left their parents at the time. Slogans do not count any longer. The nonvoters and the dissatisfied are neither uncritical nor resigned, neither adjusted nor crazy. At best they have gotten off the train, worried about becoming schizophrenic as they are torn between the demands society makes of them and the opportunities being offered them by society. If anything, they are children of fear and are no different in their worries from the silent majority of persons of their age who, despite everything, vote, reject violence and watch television. What they are all afraid of has been inculcated into them by their fathers:

- that they cannot choose the profession they like (73 percent);
- that many young people are unemployed (70 percent);
- that often life appears to have no meaning (40 percent);
- that one cannot live as one would like to (40 percent);
- that often more is expected of one than one can accomplish (39 percent);
- that many are in jeopardy because of drugs (37 percent).

About 700,000 young people, in other words, have left state and society one way or another, and there is nothing the politicians can say to them any longer. About 2 million young people have not gotten off but are dissatisfied at being forced to hold out within the system. This means that apart from those who have left about 2 million young Germans want an alternative way of life--in other words, to live differently from the way we want to live.

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Sure, we can ignore this and attend to our daily business, consoling ourselves with the fact they too will become older--that is, more reasonable. A false conclusion, because a solution of the problems, and thus a removal of the fears, is not in sight--neither the unemployment of youth, nor the drug problem, nor the pressure for performance, nor the educational opportunities. If all this had existed in 1968, who knows whether APO would have met with such a miserable end. In contrast with 1968, fists are not being raised, but perhaps they are being clenched in one's pockets. In contrast with 1968, there is no striving for change (with today's young people being able to read up on how futile that was). One escapes from society with a polite but firm "no, thank you."

A party which could motivate for the state all these alternative--freaks, spontis, shaggies, polite decliners, frustrated people, malcontents and, at the same time, people who have become indifferent would have a hold on the future. For 2.7 million--in other words, every other young voter--more or less dissatisfied with prevailing conditions, who only render unto Caesar the state what is Caesar's but otherwise want to be left alone, who only on the surface are still among us but long since have got out of reach for the usual appeals--these are 7 percent of the total 1980 electorate, or of the adult population. No Schmidt and no Strauss, no Genscher and no Fredersdorf concerns himself with them. They all seek only the citizen who is of age, who worries about old-age pensions, about saving energy, about economic growth.

So what to do with those getting off? To ask them, the ones affected, with scorn or lament that they should change the conditions makes little sense. To change the world is up to others--namely, those who have made it what it is.

What can be the reason why 16 years after his assassination John F. Kennedy still heads the list of contemporaries "admired" by the 17- to 23-year-olds? Was it no Kennedy who promised a departure for new shores, who dared seek Utopia? Longing has wings only if it has an aim.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CONTROVERSY ON NAMING NEW BUNDESBANK PRESIDENT

Hamburg STERN in German 6 Sep 79 pp 264-266

[Article by Peter K. Pernutz: "Not an Easy-Going Associate"]

[Text] In spite of vehement opposition by the union parties [CDU/CSU], Chancellor Schmidt wants to appoint the Social Democrat Otto Poehl as president of the bank of issue.

In the controversy over the appointment of the new federal bank president, there was a new turn of events a few days ago: After sharp criticism by the CDU and CSU of Federal Bank Vice-President Karl Otto Poehl, who is regarded as the favorite candidate for the high office, Kurt Bidekopf smoothed the waves. He welcomed with gratitude the fact that Federal Minister of Finance Hans Matthoefer had indicated his desire "to speak with union politicians" prior to this important government decision.

Not without fine irony, Matthoefer demanded last Monday in a letter to the chairman of the CDU Helmut Kohl that he appoint an impartial conversation partner. For Kohl will have trouble finding such a man: Most of the opposition politicians competent in the area of economic policy during the past few months have been vying with one another in rude polemics against the Social Democrat Poehl and therefore will hardly be accepted by Matthoefer.

Among the critics is the spokesman for financial policy questions of the CDU/CSU Bundestag faction, Hansjoerg Haefele, who calls the anticipated appointment of Poehl "poison" for the confidence in the independence of the Federal Bank. Already on an earlier occasion Haefele had scolded the Federal Bank Vice-President as "bound to party policy and dependent on the Federal Government."

With his criticism, Haefele sang the same song as the Union's candidate for Chancellor Franz Josef Strauss, who includes Poehl in the "milieu of Willy Brandt" and finds him lacking with regard to "the strength and sovereignty" which should distinguish a federal bank president.

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That Strauss and his followers regard the filling of the top position of the bank of issue on 1 January 1980 not without suspicion and criticism is understandable from their point of view. Should the Union parties after the elections in the fall of next year form the government, they would have to come to terms with a federal bank chief who has been a member of the SPD for 30 years and cannot be recalled for at least 8 years. The supreme guardian of the currency, to be sure, according to law, is supposed to support the economic policy of the Bonn government in office at the moment, but he is independent of instructions from the federal capital.

What this means in the case of conflict, every federal chancellor thus far has come to feel. Konrad Adenauer once allowed himself to be carried away and publicly attack the first president of the Federal Bank at the time, Privy Councilor Wilhelm Vocke because of his iron position in opposition to government wishes. Vocke's successors Karl Blessing, Karl Klasen, and Otmar Emminger, were spared similar experiences; however, none of them was meek as a lamb vis-a-vis the governments in office.

Moreover, the men at the head of the bank of issue have at their disposal an instrument of power which makes every politician involved in the economy envious. Thus, the federal bank not only prints our money and stores in its vaults the German gold reserves, but it is also responsible for the economic fortune and misfortune of the republic. The federal bank has the power to increase or decrease the flow of money by means of increasing or decreasing the interest rate for credit and to decide in this way whether there will be more inflation or more unemployed.

Because of such great power, every government to date has proposed a man for the top position of the federal bank who enjoys its confidence, and, in so doing, has called forth the displeasure of the opposition. Nevertheless, opposition and government subsequently always agreed that all federal bank presidents to date have been high-caliber, internationally respected experts.

That is also true of the 49-year-old Karl Otto Poehl, who as certified national economy expert knows economic and political power from both sides of his desk: Until the end of 1967 he was, as a Bonn journalist, a critical observer of those who made economic and financial policy, subsequently he himself became manager for the Federal Association for German Banks.

When in 1970 then Minister of Economics Karl Schiller hired him away and made him head of the department for middle class policy, Poehl was at the beginning of an extraordinary career: In May 1971 Willy Brandt called him into the chancellor's office as economic adviser, at the end of 1972 Helmut Schmidt brought him into the Federal Ministry of Finance and made him a state secretary. Five years later, when the Federal Bank Vice-President of long-standing Otmar Emminger rose to the post of president of the bank of issue, Poehl was appointed No 2 man.

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The in the meantime internationally recognized currency expert, however, was not always an easy-going associate for Helmut Schmidt--even if the opposition now wants to create that impression. Thus, for example, it was Poehl who opposed the chancellor in connection with the European currency system. The Federal Bank, Poehl said at the time, will by no means observe the agreements reached between Schmidt and France's state president Valery Giscard d'Estaing if doing so would result in disadvantages for the German currency.

The decision concerning who is to become the new Federal Bank president on 1 January--in spite of the upcoming talk of Matthoefer with the opposition--has long been made. Helmut Schmidt and Hans Matthoefer, you see, in July--during their return flight from the Tokyo economic summit--came to an agreement: Poehl will be the new president.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOVIET COMMENTS ON WEST GERMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed to press 4 May 79 pp 15-18

[Article by Lt Col D. Bel'skiy: "'Psychological Warfare' School of the Bundeswehr"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] In recent years, the "psychological warfare" of the imperialist forces against the socialist countries has been acquiring a broader and broader scope. During the last 10 years, the number of so-called "specialists" in this field has increased one-and-a-half-fold. As reported in the foreign press, on the territory of the FRG alone about 100 various institutions and organizations, including those under the jurisdiction of the Bundeswehr, are occupied by questions of waging "psychological warfare." They have been assigned the peacetime mission--"to influence the spirit, will, and morale of a person, group of people, or entire peoples systematically by non-forcible means to weaken the latter's positions and strengthen their own."

The military-political leadership of the FRG proceeds on the basis that "no contemporary army can reject the means and methods for psychological influence on the enemy." In the Bundeswehr's manual on "psychological warfare" it is stressed that this type of struggle is "psychologically directed influence on the manner of thoughts, world outlook, and behavior of individual persons or groups outside the Bundeswehr" and is a "component part of the activity of each troop commander and each command echelon." It pursues the goal of assisting the large units and units in the accomplishment of their missions." According to the concepts of the command, "psychological warfare" measures should "influence the thoughts and actions of the enemy and should even attract the population of one's country to collaboration and weaken a confrontation with them."

The Bundeswehr's central educational institution in the field of "psychological warfare" (according to West German terminology--"psychological defense") is the school in the city of Euskirchen (near Bonn) which was established in October 1965. As pointed out in the journal YARBUKH DES KHEERES [as transliterated], its official tasks are considered to be, first, "the study and scientific substantiation of the basic directions and methods of psychological

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warfare and their use in training," and second, "the study and analysis of the ideological struggle of the Warsaw Pact states against the defense policy of the Federal Republic of Germany." In reality, one of the main aspects of the school's activity is the training of personnel for the conduct of "psychological warfare" against the peoples of the socialist countries. Another of its goals, as is evidenced by its program, is training the servicemen of the Bundeswehr in methods to execute operations against striking workers and their trade union organizations ("the internal enemy").

According to reports in the foreign press, altogether during a year the school organizes more than 40 courses and seminars with a total duration of more than 300 days. The content, form, and methods of "psychological warfare" are studied by persons who belong to various categories of the Bundeswehr's officer personnel. These are primarily commanders, staff officers (regular and reserve), chiefs of sections of educational institutions and courses in them, teachers of tactics and associates of the special services in the schools of the ground forces, and chiefs of "lecture halls."

Representatives from staffs of ground-force and territorial troops who are engaged in questions of "psychological warfare" travel to the school twice a year to participate in seminars. A 10-day seminar on the procedure for conducting discussions and using argumentation has been organized for Bundeswehr officers who are responsible for work with the youth.

The school is training regular personnel for two Bundeswehr "psychological warfare" battalions. Each year, four sections go through the basic course.

As the foreign press stresses, the school in Euskirchen is making its contribution to the strengthening of "Atlantic solidarity" with the NATO allies in the field of "psychological warfare." Representatives from the staffs of the combined armed forces take part in a seminar which lasts for up to a week. Reserve officers of countries which participate in the North Atlantic Bloc and of several other states also attend a seminar for a week whose content consists of familiarity with the goals and structure of "psychological warfare" organs and subunits and with the experience of its planning and conduct as well as of urgent military and social problems.

Thus, according to an estimate by foreign specialists, about 1,000 servicemen of various categories undergo intensive training during the year in the field of "psychological warfare."

/The organization and nature of the training process/ in the school are determined by the goals which are set by the Bundeswehr's "psychological warfare" apparatus under peacetime conditions as well as in the case of possible war against the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The training programs consider the special features in the development of the international situation, the domestic policy situation in the FRG and in each of the socialist countries, and the nature of relations between states. The training process has an intensive character--nine hours of planned lessons per day.

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/The basic forms of instruction/ in the school are reports, lectures, and discussions on various subjects. For example, the following subjects were worked out on lessons which took place in July 1976: "Principles of Psychological Warfare," "Versions in the Conduct of Discussions with Representatives of the Communists," "Typical Argumentation of Ideological Terms," and so forth. Debates are also conducted on political problems with students from universities and other higher educational institutions in the FRG. A large role is played by the exchange of experiences of personal participation in the ideological indoctrination of the Bundeswehr servicemen and the country's population which takes place among the students. In addition training talks, the conduct of discussions, the preparation of reports by the students and their subsequent discussion, and independent training are practiced. Personnel from various ministries, trade-union figures, and representatives of the police, justice, and the church speak to the school's students.

One of the main tasks of the training process is the students' mastery of refined "psychological warfare" procedures and methods. As stated in one of the training programs, upon completion of the assemblies they should "confidently conduct talks and discussions and master the basic methods of arguing with consideration of the personality's psychology." Therefore, the school teaches contact with the audience whose convictions and attitudes differ from the stereotypes which are imposed by bourgeois propaganda. For example, in conducting a discussion with groups of people where antimilitary attitudes predominate, it is proposed that use be made of such terms as "reasonable people" or "all peace-loving people." In another case, the school's students should appeal to the nationalistic feelings of a certain part of the population, and preference is given to such terminology as "the German youth," "the German people," "German students," and so forth.

Instruction in methods of "psychological warfare" is structured on the basis of using various types of falsification and anticommunist lies and slander which are being spread by bourgeois mass information media--the press, radio, television, and the cinema. A tested method of bourgeois propaganda is the distortion of historic facts. One of the methodological recommendations proposes presenting the flagrant blackmailing of Czechoslovakia and her subsequent occupation in 1938 as the "transfer of the Sudetan region to Germany." In one of the training materials the criminal invasion of the troops of Hitler's Wehrmacht onto the territory of Poland is called the "victorious 18-day campaign."

On lessons, great attention is devoted to the variety and timeliness of the material being given which, according to an appraisal by western specialists, permits increasing the effectiveness of the instruction. Special significance is attached to the use of visual methods. For example, a complex video device with several movie cameras and listening devices (monitors) is used. It is believed that in this manner each one can discover his own errors, check whether his arguments are correct in conducting propaganda talks and discussions, and be convinced of how strong or weak his arguments are.

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The Bundeswehr school in Euskirchen conducts work on the "scientific substantiation" of "psychological warfare" along with the training of specialists in its preparation and conduct. It is a research center where the basic directions and content of "psychological warfare" and its forms and methods are determined and the procedure for moral-psychological influence on the Bundeswehr's servicemen and citizens of the FRG under conditions of the ideological competition with socialism are perfected. Two working groups are engaged in studies in the school--military and scientific.

/The military group/ studies the content and basic directions of "psychological warfare" and works out the manuals for the direction and direct employment of the Bundeswehr's "psychological warfare" units. Here, "psychological warfare" is considered as a "sphere of activity of all commanders." Therefore, in the course of planned exercises by the Bundeswehr and special troop tests the military group investigates the effectiveness of various measures for the psychological preparation of their own servicemen and works out problems in the moral-psychological influencing of the probable enemy's soldiers.

/The scientific group/ is occupied with processing data on the situation in the Warsaw Pact countries from the viewpoint of "psychological warfare" and it estimates the effectiveness of the ideological influence of the socialist commonwealth's countries on the population of the FRG and the servicemen of the Bundeswehr. Another task of the group is the study of the domestic political situation in the country and an appraisal of political attitudes among various groups of the population in peacetime, with an aggravated situation, and in case of war.

The activity of the so-called "psychological defense" school in Euskirchen is a part of the complex of measures being conducted by the FRG and other countries which are participating in the aggressive NATO bloc within the framework of intensifying military preparations, and indicates that the Bundeswehr is preparing actively for the conduct of "psychological warfare" against the armed forces and population of the USSR and the other socialist countries. It is the sacred duty of the Soviet servicemen to increase vigilance steadily in face of the ideological subversion and provocations of international imperialism.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DEVELOPMENTS IN CORSICAN DISSENSION DISCUSSED

Corsicans Called 'France's ETA'

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Sep 79 pp 20-23

[Text] The Corsicans want the whole world to realize their strong differences of opinion with French centralism: They want self-government. And to internationalize their problem, over 10,000 people gathered on 18 and 19 August at Ajaccio and participated in the Third UPC (Corsican People's Union) Congress. Members of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] and Catalan middle-of-the-roaders represented the Spanish state.

The "little corporal," Bonaparte, has been furiously turning over in his red porphyry grave at the Invalides in Paris for some months. His countrymen, the Corsicans, have dared to confront the centralist government compromising that French unity which he forged with so many tears and victims after receiving the Jacobin inheritance of the French Revolution.

Napoleon, emperor of half Europe and a Corsican nationalist in his youth, a partisan of the liberator Pasquale Paoli, is hated today in his native island where he is considered a "renegade" when one recalls that under his emperorship an average of two Corsicans a day were shot to death.

Today, 2 centuries after the French occupation of the island, the Corsicans want to find their won identity again and have decided to fight against the most centralist country in Europe. In a vain attempt to minimize the conflict, the French government has for several years avoided any alarming pronouncement.

The Algerian Process

Gaullist deputy Pierre Pasquini, Corsican mayor of Rousse Island and in no way suspected of being a nationalist or an autonomist, recently stated to the review PARIS MATCH "I am horrified, Corsica is going through a real process of Algerianization. How can we not be surprised by the similarities existing between the gradual deterioration of the situation in Algeria after 1954 and the escalation of separatism in Corsica which began in 1971."

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If from 1964 to 1971 the autonomist groups perpetrated 109 violent actions on the island, in 1972 there were 12 attempts increasing to 42 in 1973, 111 in 1974, 226 in 1975, 296 in 1976, reaching 480 in 1978.

This wave of violence provoked a reaction on the part of the French authorities who initially strengthened the number of police personnel on the island and since then have been arresting tens of people in recent months.

The escalation is beginning. Arising from an autonomist feeling, the Corsicans' claims are becoming more radical and one sector, young for the most part, has since 1976 chosen the pro-independence ideas. With the establishment of the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front] in 1976, a radical minority went underground.

But, little known abroad, the Corsicans' struggle sometimes regarded as folklore only came to public attention and into the pages of all of the world's newspapers last 14 June. That morning at the Paris Court of Justice 21 youths were judged by the State Security Tribunal. To the dismay of those attending, the indicted Corsicans declared that they were combatants of the Corsican nation "marching towards its national liberation," and threatened the tribunal: "History, French judges, will judge us. But watch out, it will also judge all of those who are at the orders of French colonialism."

Charged with criminal attempts against the territory's integrity, associating with evildoers, destruction of inhabited buildings, theft of explosives and high treason, a few days later three of the FLNC's 21 militants were condemned to 13 years in prison, and the other 14 to 5 to 10 years.

These convictions--a total of 124 years--were to be considered especially severe by various French commentators who for their part fear that a new wave of terrorism may once again recur in Corsica as well as on the continental territory where since the beginning of the year the FLNC has perpetrated 40 criminal attempts.

As a result of the judgment the question was that of knowing how the news of these convictions would be received in Corsica. A week after the verdict, CAMBIO 16's special correspondent visited a few places on the island of Corsica to learn the initial reactions and to have interviews with the leaders of the two nationalist movements, the FLNC and the UPC.

A "Mughiju" of Rage

The 20 kilometers of narrow road separating Poretta airport from the city of Bastia gave the visitor a foretoken of the initial evidences of Corsican dissension. On building facades, walls, partitions, on the roadway and even on a few trees, hundreds of posters denounce the recent convictions and

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demand freedom for the detainees: "Freedom for the Patriots!", "Condemning Patriots Means Condemning the Corsican People," etc. However, at the Chez Pascal, De la Paix and El Continental snack bars and bars of the old port, or on Saint Charles Square, the tourists, most of them foreigners, do not appear to be perturbed by so many "graffiti" or political watchwords.

Only a few waiters complained of the reduced clientele: "Tourism is bad, many even sleep on the beaches. At night we never manage to fill the [cafe] terraces as in past years."

Bastia, today considered the capital full of fighting spirit, shelters the island's most significant nationalist focal point. From the end of Corsica up to Aleria, from Bastia to Corte, upper Corsica has fostered the most important dissension movements in Corsican history.

In this area more than in the south the "mughiju" (roar of anger) is heard today and all recall the insurrection of 22 August 1976 during which two gendarmes died in Bastia. In order to avoid new violent confrontations, the French authorities have increased the number of policemen in the city.

Across from the prefecture, a few steps from the ferry pier, one of the defense lawyers in the recent Paris judgment commented to CAMBIO 16: "The majority of the island's inhabitants though they disapprove the violent methods used by their fellow citizens, are nonetheless in agreement with them with respect to the preserving of Corsican national identity and the salvation of the Corsican ethnical character while there is still time. The young Bastia lawyer asserted that of the island's 300,000 inhabitants only 120,000 are Corsican, i.e., a minority, and that the 750,000 Corsicans living in France are increasing their numbers through the exodus of 3,000 young people a year from Corsica. Thus this emigration forced upon them by unemployment (some 7,000 unemployed in Corsica at the present time) causes the depopulation of the territory's villages.

With headquarters at the Beau Rivage, La Riscossa, established on 2 June 1978 as a result of the massive arrests the week before the visit of the president of the Republic, Giscard d'Estaing, has thousands of members today. Promoted by the detainees' relatives, this group organizes many cultural-political gatherings throughout the entire island, and today the majority of Corsica's political parties are demonstrating their support for those convicted in Paris. For the purpose of collecting funds for the lawyers' travel to the continent, La Riscossa is being intensely active at all levels and is succeeding in maintaining close contact with the 44 Corsican prisoners held in four French jails (Fontainebleau, La Sante, Fresnes and Fleury Merogis).

The "Barbouzes" in Action

"Threats or blackmail on the possible loss of employment are continual, especially in the administration," a very nervous youth flung out. Wearing a T-shirt with the inscription "FLNC and Murderous French Judges," this

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youth militating for the cause recalled his most recent interrogation: "The rights of a detainee are not respected and interrogation periods are always exceeded (according to law only 5 continuous hours are allowed), arrests occur, nearly every day, it seems that the gendarmes, who have the best information in their possession, want to have all Corsicans on file."

Then the attacks are focused upon the France group, an organization of the extreme Right and responsible for various criminal attempts against Corsican nationalist sympathizers or militants. "'Barbouzes'* do exist here and very often take action with impunity supported by a few Corsican politicians."

Mme Mattei is 70 years old. Two of her sons and a son-in-law are held in France condemned to 8 years in prison for belonging to the Liberation Front. With a serious expression on her face, she asserted positively: "I am proud of my sons. They are not assassins. It is incredible that they were given such sentences when they did not even kill a dog. The 'barbouzes' are not detained despite the 85 criminal attempts they have committed in 2 years. In Paris, on the two occasions I went there, they made me sick. I went for a week and had to remain two weeks because of administrative red tape. Now I am living alone on a small pension and am forced to work in order to feed my two grandchildren. People now do come to us, they realize that we do not look like rogues and that our sons are fighting for their 'country'."

"Take into account the fact that arms in our country are a normal thing, in all homes there is at least one shotgun. A love for weapons forms part of the Corsican character." Thus a Bastia gunsmith confirmed to our special correspondent that sales of shotguns and small arms had increased spectacularly in recent months: "Remember," he said, "that in 1943 the Corsicans did not wait for the French to liberate themselves from the German occupation and that the word 'macchia' (maquis) has an almost religious significance among our people."

From Ponto Novo where the Corsicans lost their independence in their fight against the French in 1769, to Corte, an ancient nationalist fief guarded today by a Legion detachment, the road rises to 1,000 meters passing through woods, by waterfalls and precipices. Monto D'Oro, 2,391 meters high, looms up still covered with snow. From time to time a few posters along the road recall Corsican nationalist claims:

The Legend of the "Maquis"

'Out with the French' or 'Corsica, a Nation.' The countryside of an incredible variety conceals the natural resources of the small island. In those moments in the face of that impressive spectacle the legend of the "maquis" becomes reality.

Less than 30 kilometers from the capital of Ajaccio, Cuttoli, a small mountain hamlet of 450 habitants. There is a fiesta there today, a Corsican fiesta. A large poster at the entrance to the village proclaims: "Liberta ghjunata corsa."

* secret police agents

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At the bar of a small improvised bar everyone is talking or singing in Corsican and is also criticizing the "punzuti" ("pointed ones"), a name the Corsicans have given the French since the 1769 invasion because at that time they wore spiked helmets.

The first notes of "Sunate l'u cornu" ("Now Sounds the Horn"), a patriotic song interpreted by the Canta i Populo, receive a great ovation, together with Guy Pancrazi, one of the Front's militants recently released from prison after 13 months' detention.

Pancrazi, a 26-year old student returned to his native land only 2 days ago. Commenting on his months of imprisonment, he asserted to CAMBIO 16 that on his return he found people had become more politicized. "We will have no problems with the autonomists. They are becoming radicalized and we will create a disruptive situation among them all. If this situation became more serious, we would find ourselves forced to set up a provisional government-in-exile. However, we will not cause deaths; for the time being we are only seeking armed propaganda action."

A land, which on the other hand finds itself abandoned by the young people who emigrate because of the economic crisis. The Corsicans sense the appearance of the first signs of economic collapse. Tourism is going badly, the fishing situation is catastrophic, the Bastos plant may soon close and no industrial possibilities are in sight because of the lack of investments.

Yet the French state has perceptibly increased its aid to Corsica, today it amounts to 2 billion francs while taxes collected come to only 700 million. This means that each time France collects 70 centimes, 2.5 francs go to Corsica.

These official figures are frequently discussed by the Corsican nationalists who accuse those elected of discriminating in the distribution of the money, favoring the chiefs of clans coming close to progovernment ideas. "The French administration has spent only 30 percent of the budget provided for public works," asserted a young Ajaccio economist who wondered "Where is the rest of the money?"

The anti-French feeling is increasing to the point that a few Bastia students stated to CAMBIO 16 that Corsica belonged more to Spain than to France because of the turning over of the island by the Vatican to the throne of Aragon, a comment made humorously, for them the king of Spain is apparently still legitimately the king of Corsica.

Simeoni, the Leader

Less radicalized, the autonomists are turning into a significant political force on the island. Heirs of the old ARC [Corsican Regional Association], the current militants of the UPC see in the statute of autonomy the only viable way out in Corsica's future historical process. Edmon Simeoni, the real leader of the Corsican nationalist movement, imprisoned in 1975 for 1

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year as a result of the Aleria incidents, is within the law today and his party, established throughout the island, held an historic congress in Ajaccio, a congress which Catalan and PNV nationalists attended.

Across from the Bastia subprefecture and in his office at his party's headquarters on Boulevard Paoli, the young Corsican doctor, secretary general of the UPC, received CAMBIO 16's correspondent. Surrounded by his close colleagues, Simeoni, in a yellow shirt and with a happy face, analyzed the balance sheet of his 12 years of struggle with great realism and the gifts of a good speaker: "During these 12 years, France has treated Corsica like a colony. However, all of the speeches cannot cover up a people's emancipation. Those elected here have always been a driving belt knowing how to manipulate information thereby concealing the nationalist movement. They have used administrative repression in order to remove sympathizers from the positions that were rightfully theirs. They introduced alarming repressive measures by setting up unofficial policemen who have carried out many criminal attempts, 95 percent of them against our party, such as the destruction of our printing press, of a number of our headquarters or the attempt against my mother, so as to frighten us."

Simeoni fixed his eyes on the statue of Paoli, chief of the Corsican independent state from 1755 to 1769, and recognized that these attempts served to arouse the awareness of the people who every day are giving increasing proof of sympathy for their struggle.

"We," he categorically asserted, "for the time being and as long as they do not force us to do the opposite, will build ourselves up in the open legally and, although we have different criteria, we make our total solidarity manifest to the patriots of the Front. To the Corsican leader the autonomist path is the only viable one at the present time in that, based on his analysis, the Corsican people have lost the sense of their identity and of their patrimony. Corsicans were used like colonizers under the plan for total economic impoverishment: "The people were numbed and endured. It was a very subtle colonization and the attempt at cultural integration was nearly achieved.

In commenting on the language problem, the UPC leader recalled various anecdotes such as that about the elderly mothers who were singing the hymn "Save, Save France" in the church though they did not understand the meaning of what they were singing, or the error of putting a statue of Joan of Arc with the French flag in churches whereas on the continent she always appeared with the fleur de lys standard. Sadly, Simeoni recalled how at primary school it was forbidden to talk in Corsican: "For us the statute of autonomy is necessary in this phase. We think that the program of a revolutionary group should adapt itself to the every day terrain and to its immediate task, in this case that of a saving a people. Right now it is very difficult to get the people to accept the idea of independence."

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Referendum

After analyzing France's strategic interests in the Mediterranean where Corsica played the role of an important base in the Zaire and Djibouti conflicts, the nationalist leader recognized that his fellow countrymen were realists and still not sufficiently made aware: "Our role is to give them that national awareness which they are lacking. Thousands of young people realize they are Corsicans, that they wish to live here in their land and not go into exile. We must orient their political alternatives."

In speaking of the Front, he did so with great respect despite the differences. "They want national independence and we believe that our need for the time being is a statute under which France would be responsible only for foreign affairs and problems of national defense. We do not reject violence, but we do reject minority violence and, if they force us, then we will make a decision. It can never be said that I will never drink of this water."

For now Simeoni believes in the necessity of letting the Corsican problem be known at the international level: "To resist the will of colonialism for radicalization, we must expand our struggle at the international level, rely on mass mobilization to obtain the internal statute of autonomy."

In its program, and it was in this way that Simeoni emphasized it, the UPC is seeking an island referendum for approval or nonapproval of the statute. "After 18 months of campaigning without any tricks among the information media, the only solution will be the ballot boxes," he stated. In that way the people will be able to choose their future.

Although he admits that related parties have changed their stand on the Corsican issue, a certain mistrust was noted with respect to the Communist Party and the French Socialist Party: "With them," he added, "as you say, we would secure for the present a "decaffeinated" statute. They have always maintained a reformist policy with respect to Corsica, although it is obvious that they now recognize the existence of a different people. However, let us not forget that the radical leftists have since the Third Republic always been the major backers of the colonial policy in our country."

"We must convince our people that their country is rich and that we will be solidary with all countries loving democracy and living on the Mediterranean together with us."

Simeoni who smoked one cigarette after another, commented that he distrusted intellectuals; a doctor by profession, he learned to be pragmatic. "For us France has been the most colonialist occupier. If they decide that we must disappear, we will fight, but we will not start anything ahead of time. We will struggle politically in that we are aware that at this time we offer a valid alternative, the only possible one for the peaceful future of our country."

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FLNC Leaders Interviewed

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Sep 79 pp 20-23

[Interview with two unnamed FLNC Leaders, in a Corsican Mountain Village, by CAMBIO 16 Correspondent; date not given]

[Text] Refusing to be photographed even from the back, two leaders of the FLNC received [a correspondent] of CAMBIO 16 at a small country house in a mountain hamlet. The rendez-vous was agreed to a few days beforehand at a Bastia hotel. After covering some 50 kilometers over narrow mountain roads where the car had trouble in moving along, we reached the area of Castagnaccia a few kilometers from the small village of Cervione. It took half an hour more to reach the spot not far from Mount Mosari. The two FLNC leaders were not bearing weapons and only their boots and sheepskin jackets distinguished them from the peasants of the area.

[Question] When and how was the Front established?

[Answer] The establishment of the Front has a dual origin: historical and political. There has always existed one constant among our people: Rejection of the invader and the culmination point of our history in 1775 when Corsica became independent.

That year the Corsican nation was born with a democratic constitution. In 1769 the French troops defeated the soldiers of Paoli, leader of the Corsican nation in the Pontenova massacre. From then on the Corsican people returned to the struggle.

Heirs of the Portenovu combatants, the Corsican militants decided to create the Front on 4 May 1976. It sprang from the fusion of the two clandestine movements and adopted the following program: recognition of our people's national rights, the establishment of a popular democratic government, destruction of all the instruments of French colonialism and realization of agrarian reform.

[Question] What does the Front's armed struggle represent? Can it be the only way to go?

[Answer] Armed struggle constitutes the indispensable support for the political struggle we are developing. We repeat, it is not our intention to defeat the army of occupation; we will adopt the guerrilla strategy: Striking the occupier when we think it is politically appropriate. We are convinced that we will soon secure the support of all the people who today are still suffering from the 2 centuries of colonialization.

[Question] Being a minority, don't you fear the possibility of being broken up?

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[Answer] Four letters, FLNC, painted on a wall worry the French imperialists in that this acronym is the symbol of an idea, it is the hope of an entire people, a people they are seeking in vain to liquidate.

FLNC is like smashing an established system, it is rejecting the undesired French presence and through it American imperialism.

FLNC is a threat to the capitalist Western world and its presence in the Mediterranean.

[Question] Have the proindependence ideas increased in Corsica?

[Answer] The LFNC is still in a propaganda phase, that of arousing national awareness. If the independence idea makes progress, although the term sympathy is spreading in commentaries; this sympathy, however, is rapidly changing into solidarity, fraternity and finally unity in a common will for: freedom.

[Question] Would the Front accept a statute of autonomy?

[Answer] We believe the term autonomy screens the feeling of rebellion of Corsican men and women eager to save their people. However, demanding the autonomy of Corsica is in the first place to deny the historical constant according to which France, "one and indivisible," will never recognize plural nationality and after creating a coexistence of a nonegalitarian kind would be fatal to our people. We are combating every proposition for a special statute coming from the French colonialist state intended to slow down the progress of our struggle.

[Question] What have the recent arrests and the imprisonment of militants meant for the Front?

[Answer] Some 30 of our militants were deported after a most summary judgment. Although their effectiveness appears reduced on the ground, their struggle continues to be real. Thanks to these patriots interned in France, our struggle has progressed in Corsica and has been heard in our land. The convictions have made it possible for our militants to explain our struggle, to adopt its ideas and assume its responsibilities. These detainees represent an idea, a symbol and are present in the minds of all Corsicans. The Corsican people, insulted by these convictions, is now becoming aware of their deep reality. The way has been laid out. They know that the French prisons will block the way toward their freedom.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

CASTRO POSITION IN WAKE OF NONALINED SUMMIT VIEWED

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 11 Sep 79 p 3 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Castro the Enigma and His Turnabout"]

[Text] Havana--It was like a dream, especially as it happened at dawn after a sleepless night. Castro could be seen mounting the platform to embrace Tito. Shortly before the nonalined conference had paid tribute in a solemn statement to the movement's founder, to the "torch" of nonalinement and the "valiant defender of its principles."

Castro already seemed irrecognizable when he was on the platform delivering his closing speech. In the shortest speech in his life he said in an almost humble tone that "nothing can be said better than what has already been said" and that he wanted to "study and meditate on everything of value that has been brought to this platform." Even more amazingly, there was not a word against the United States, no tribute to the USSR. Merely the exaltation of the movement whose chairmanship he was assuming--"more united, more independent and more our own than ever before."

In the 7 days that were to change the world, could the Cuban commander in chief have changed so much? The conference ended a day late, following a plenary final meeting which lasted 13 hours nonstop because the radical group wanted to recoup the failure to admit the Kampuchean leader backed by Vietnam, Samrin, by securing al-Sadat's suspension. Insults were exchanged by the representatives of Singapore, Senegal and Cuba. Some banged their fists on their desks, while others left the room. Then when it was clear that the anti-Egyptian motion would not be passed there were mutual apologies and an unexpected surrender by Castro: "We did not hastily accept the resolution on a problem which demands a sense of responsibility." The two issues on which a split seemed likely were postponed until the conference of ministers in 2 years' time.

Al-Sadat is in and Samrin is out: Castro did his utmost, even prompting charges of manipulation, to secure the opposite result. Furthermore, the final document rejected all his doctrinal and program theses: the movement

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retains intact its principles of distance, though not always equidistance, from the blocs and with its multifaceted unity safeguarded. Nevertheless, while nonalignment emerges perhaps less enigmatic and less ambiguous from the Havana test, the enigma of its new coordinator Castro, rendered ambiguous by his "natural alliances," survives. The final picture could give the impression that Castro submitted to the majority will in honor of his new post. That would be like saying that Castro agreed to be Castro no more--a supposition which is alien to that person's logic.

Of his two speeches the first was certainly the strategic one, radical almost to the extent of provocation. The second was practical, skilfully possibilist, as befits a leader who, as he assumes the chairmanship, has no desire to see the movement disintegrate in his hands. On the first day he pushed his position as an aligned nonaligned country to the limit. He did so because he wanted to impose a change of direction on the movement. He also did so to sound out the extent of the conference's willingness to follow him. After some harsh clashes the guidelines were drawn along the traditional line, which the Castroists failed to defeat. Despite all this a change of direction did take place--not only because the duty chairmanship went to Castro.

Never has the radicalist-type spirit prevailed at a nonaligned conference as it did this time. This is due only in part to the tone of the opening speech and the manipulation of the timetable for the speeches. Castro imparted a radical tone to the conference, but over and above this he also expressed a spreading radicalization of the Third World, and of the entire world for that matter. This applies mainly to countries which have been burdened with the weight of the inflation introduced in the "first and second" world countries to absorb the increased prices of oil and raw materials.

Only the USSR, the only self-sufficient country, has benefited from the increases. The Third World countries are paying the price, while the West, though imposing it, is discovering its economic weaknesses and also the complete absence of a new policy adapted to a world which is now split more horizontally than vertically. As Sekou Toure said yesterday, "When the world stock exchanges set the price, the developed countries, both capitalist and socialist, hurry to buy our raw materials without rewarding their value and our labor. It is we who must set the prices not only of oil, but of all raw materials. The sources of the world's wealth are ours."

The leader of the individual and rational revolution who expelled the Soviet advisers many years ago envisaged "cooperation rather than competition" with the developed countries. This hope was also expressed in the final document after it was revealed during the debate that the socialist countries' conduct is no different from the capitalists.' Pointing his finger at Fidel, the Senegalese minister said: "Where were your natural allies in Manila at the UNCTAD conference? They formed a bloc with the wealthy countries of the West."

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There was unanimity over the northern demarcation line. There was a unanimous sense of exploitation. Who wants to penetrate that line and who wants to create the bridges toward a new and systematic economic order? Awaiting the discovery of an agreed solution, the "penetrators" have the upper hand. With its delays, with its challenges more numerous than its overtures, the West has merely provided them with further arguments. Indeed, Castro, the penetrator par excellence, has never had so many arguments to back his theses. He therefore took the opportunity provided by the conference and by his new post to put himself forward again as the leader of a third-world-type revolution. Thus Havana has undoubtedly revealed the danger of him imposing his will on the movement, radicalizing it but also gaining strength from its objective and creeping [strisciante] radicalization.

But to lead it where? The obvious answer would be that he wants to lead it toward the Soviet bloc. Moscow is pushing him in that direction and he is forced to follow it for almost existential reasons. A short walk between sessions was enough to reveal that both the supplies and the shortage bear the Soviet stamp. Viewed from close quarters, while Castro sought to change the direction of the summit, he did not seem in the least a leader with such modest ambitions. He does not feel like a mere pawn within the grand Soviet strategy, though that is the strategy he prefers.

His plan to lead the Third World revolution and also to change the nonaligned movement in this direction has its own logic, which in certain respects ignores even Soviet strategy. Obviously it does not act against it but it presumes to precede it. In the wake of Third World radicalism the Russian imperial train penetrates among the emergent countries, but what Castro wants is to make Cuba the locomotive and himself the conductor. It is customary to say that the Russian revolution has exhausted itself and is waiting for the other younger revolutions to carry it forward. Among the nonaligned countries it is seeking the natural context for this mission but also the scope for a more independent outlook.

Having just left the summit there is reason for one to wonder whether this will be the predominant course of nonalignment in the years ahead. Castro paraded on the platform a dozen countries willing to join his train, even as stokers. While the majority did not seem willing to follow him, this is not so much due to the rejection of his revolutionary oratory, which did, after all, set the tone of the summit. It is due to the fact that by being right here in Havana they were able to verify once again how Cuba and Castro could eventually give this world the example of how to carry out a revolution, but despite their experience they did not provide valid indications regarding what is to be done after the revolution, apart from encouraging other revolutions. The Castro model is one which, having stemmed from a precarious single-crop economy, ends up with a political single crop.

Nevertheless the conflict did not cause any splits. Instead of alining themselves, the countries decided at this summit also that it is more promising for the world to try and disalign the others. Matters would become complicated if the nonaligned countries started to do this to their new chairman.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

IMPLICATIONS OF NETO'S DEATH, NONALIGNED INFIGHTING

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 12 Sep 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Commentary by Frane Barbieri: "Neto Dies; Crisis in Angola"]

[Text] Havana--Agostinho Neto's death has been received here like a Cuban event. Although it is not exactly an "African Cuba," Angola does nevertheless represent Cuba's major international commitment and in many respects the masterpiece of Castroist strategy. That country saw an experiment in the most massive intervention inspired by a peculiar combination of two forms of internationalism--socialist and racial. The Cuban expeditionary force was crucial to Neto's military victory. The corps of Cuban specialists is still crucial to the implementation of what is called the "Angolan road to socialism."

The first verdict which we managed to obtain from Cuban sources was as follows: "Very grave news. A delicate period for Angola is opening up." Indeed, it is a struggle for succession which is at stake. None of the leaders enjoys even indirectly Neto's charismatic prestige. There is fear of another explosion of the conflicts between various currents inspired by varying models and linked to different foreign friends. Not to mention the fact that Neto's demise will mark the start of another offensive by Savimbi's national union for the total independence of Angola forces which already control a large proportion of Angolan territory. Recently Savimbi also produced a political program based on a concept of pluralist democracy. Within the government an initial bid could come from the pro-Soviet group defeated in the Alves case. On that occasion the Soviet-backed fringe tried to oust the charismatic leader by reproaching him for his political line's moderation and vagueness. Paradoxically, it was the Cubans who saved Neto from a coup d'etat by the pro-Soviets. This is now confirmed to us in Havana. Castro apparently preferred to stabilize the "national" current in the certainty that it would be able to enjoy greater influence and credibility in Africa. Of the claimants to the succession, none is tipped by the Cubans as either a favorite or a winner. They are wagering only on the pure national "Netoists" because they believe that the transition will thus be less traumatic. These are the names mentioned, in order of probability: Interior Minister Paiama, Education Minister Lukoki and military leaders (Chietu) and Ndalu [as published].

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None of them attended the Havana summit, which prompted some surprise since a more committed participation was expected. Neto sent Foreign Minister Jorge as his representative. Jorge, however, did not even speak during the debates and disappeared suddenly from the hall without explanation. Now it is easier to explain his absences which were occasioned by worries about which nobody, apart from Castro, knew. Be that as it may, Angola was and still remains the bridgehead for Cuba's African commitment. In view of the danger of the collapse of the masterpiece of the strategy of twofold internationalism, it is likely that Castro will decide to strengthen his corps in Angola, adding further military forces to the experts. Obviously nobody could confirm this to us in Havana.

The news of Agostinho Neto's death came in the midst of hurricane "Frederick." A few hours after the end of the summit the capital found itself paralyzed. The nonaligned delegates were trapped in their large Florida-style hotels. The roads were blocked by floods and the telephones and electricity and gas supplies were cut off. Some 30,000 people were evacuated from homes flooded by water 2 meters deep in places. The runway at the international airport was washed away. The majority of the heads of state were fortunate enough to escape the hurricane, having left Havana the day before the end of the summit, dissatisfied with the excessive length of the discussions.

After the assembly some of them managed to reach the airport at once. The last to escape the storm was Tito, who took off 5 minutes before the cataclysm unleashed itself on Havana. His was the only ceremonial departure with full protocol which Castro managed to carry out. Immediately afterward the entire international expeditionary corps--some 1,000 diplomats and journalists and a dozen statesmen (prominent among whom was Egypt's Butrus Ghali who would have given anything to leave the capital where he suffered the gravest insults)--was imprisoned by the waters, the wind and the sudden run down of the great organizational machine set up through the use of so many resources and thousands of men to make the conference work. Suddenly they all disappeared.

The imposing conference building constructed for the occasion was empty and functioned no longer. In the hotels even the staff changed: new faces appeared--probably the ones that are usually there, except on major political occasions. Even the excellently stocked restaurants which during the past few days teemed with visitors of all political and human hues closed their doors. The French wines and the caviar disappeared, but so too did the Cuban fish. The special supplies were obviously planned for the days of the conference. Even on the last day one noted the first signs of shortages. Then, as departures were delayed because of the storm which was not envisaged by the organizational machine, the special supplies were exhausted. There was a transition to the normal Cuban supplies, revealing shortages not of everything, but of almost everything. It was not only the classic Rhone wines which were lacking. Thus in the few bars which remained open and in the hotel foyers an atmosphere similar to that of Somerset Maugham's novel was created. People were tired and bad tempered, imprisoned in their hotels by the hot, humid typhoon, waiting for a break in the weather which never

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seemed to come: They told their interlocutors things. Facts and opinions which they would never have mentioned without the evil influence of the storm. Piece by piece these conversations revealed a complete picture of what we could call the pre-storm meeting, inasmuch as its tensions heralded the hurricane--the meeting which, by lasting 13 hours nonstop, postponed the ceremonial close. While the press, stationed in the corners and corridors, waited, unable to understand what was happening in the meeting and why none of the delegates was leaving the room even for a moment, inside the most violent conflicts of this by no means idyllic conference were taking place. The Egyptian issue had overheated the atmosphere. Castro was being reproached for placing it on the agenda at the very last moment. The implication was that he did so to impose hurried and forced decisions. There was talk of the "big hammer" method in reference to the way in which at the previous day's meeting of foreign ministers Malmierca struck his gavel on the chairman's table and declared as carried a solution proposed by himself but not backed by the majority. In an incandescent atmosphere Castro heard people call him things which he is capable of calling others but which he has never heard himself called before. "He uses fascist methods and wants to transform us into a docile flock." Then some of the African delegates in the room almost came to blows, having begun a discussion on Bokassa. The Cuban second-in-command Rafael Rodriguez jumped onto the platform to defend his leader in the same terms. He denied his critics' right to denigrate an "untouchable" figure whom they were unworthy to address. Then Kaunda said he was surprised that Senegalese President Senghor had sent a madman to represent him. It was Fidel himself who found a solution and cooled the incandescent atmosphere. To everybody's surprise he reproved his deputy for using words unworthy of such a high-level and distinguished assembly. He even apologized to the Senegalese minister on Rafael Rodriguez' behalf. In reply Toure apologized to Castro on the Senegalese minister's behalf. Castro seemed visibly shaken. After the close of the stormy session he retired to meditate. The outcome of this meditation was a mild closing speech and his embrace with Tito. The Cubans assert that they too were taken by surprise, that according to forecasts the speech should have been another example of revolutionary oratory. During the meeting Castro apparently discovered a different Third World from the one he knew. Rafael Rodriguez himself says so. This implies an as yet unverified change on the political and ideological plane, inasmuch as in Castro's case it is the entire person who would have had to change and not just his temporary outlook. Be that as it may, we observe in GRANMA--the only reading material left to kill the boredom of the storm--that the Cuban organ has changed its tone: It even carries a few lines of other people's opinions and portrays the summit results in a fairly impartial manner--at least compared to what it has written over the past few days. The arrival of the storm strangely dampened the fury of the oratorical tempest which raged over the summit on the previous days.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

SOVIET COMMENTS ON ITALIAN TROOP INDOCTRINATION

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed to press 4 May 79 pp 11-17

[Article by Col (Res) V. Valentinov: "Ideological Indoctrination of Italian Armed Forces Personnel"]

[Text] In the Italian military press, the armed forces are often called the "nation's school." If we toss aside the propagandistic terminology, the purpose of this "school" is reduced to insulating the servicemen from public life and preventing the influence of progressive organizations on them. It is not by chance that soldiers with democratic attitudes look upon service in the army as a kind of "imprisonment with the purpose of ideological and political reindoctrination." A soldier who is submissive, politically passive, and who executes any orders blindly--this is the ideal serviceman as it appears to Italy's ruling circles.

A special apparatus has been created in the country's armed forces which directs all the ideological work conducted in the army, air force, and navy. Its basis consists of the so-called public information service which combines the press bureau of the Ministry of Defense, the press department with the general secretary of the Ministry of Defense, and the press attaches of the commands of military, naval, and air districts.

In addition, indoctrination sections are found in the headquarters of military districts and army corps and divisions. Combined sections for indoctrination and sports have been created in brigade headquarters. The post of deputy commander for indoctrination questions is envisioned in units and subunits equal to a battalion. "Psychological warfare" sections which have been created with the main staffs of the armed forces services are engaged in the ideological indoctrination of the servicemen. Special subunits equipped with technical propaganda equipment are subordinate to them. Direct responsibility for the ideological indoctrination of the personnel is assigned to officers of all echelons. The Disciplinary Regulation requires that the commander "apply every effort to influence the soldier's soul."

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The following basic directions are distinguished in the ideological indoctrination of foreign specialists: indoctrination in a spirit of devotion to the capitalist system which predominates in Italy, anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda, praising the United States and the aggressive blocks which it heads, popularizing the history of the Italian army, and disseminating neo-fascist and religious propaganda.

A special place is allotted to anticommunist propaganda in the ideological indoctrination of the Italian servicemen, And this is completely understandable since it is only a reflection of the anticommunist hysteria which is being whipped up in the country by representatives of ruling political groups and which is directed not only against the Italian Communist Party but also against leftist forces which come out for collaboration with the ICP [Italian Communist Party].

In the army, notes the Italian journal PANORAMA, the major part of the officers experiences "hatred and a sense of fear" in relation to the communists and socialists and is convinced that the soldiers who hold leftist views are ready to "commit dangerous acts of sabotage at any moment and even to begin a revolution." This is the result of the influence of official propaganda and the instructions of the corresponding organs of the armed forces. Back in 1973, the chief of the main staff of the ground forces issued a special directive for commanders of large units which warned that with the replacements for the army many youths come to it "who are politically and morally inferior." To maintain a check of the personnel's attitudes, he ordered the organization of the shadowing of "politically unreliable" servicemen, selecting people from among representatives of extreme right forces for this purpose.

In accordance with the procedure which was established in Italy, the gendarmerie and the secret services are collecting information on each recruit even before his call-up to the army in order to determine his political character. This system was adopted in the United States and is employed not only in the armed forces. Here is an entry in one of the dossiers which were initiated on draftees: "His father is in sympathy with leftist parties, visits coffee shops at night, plays cards with fellow-villagers. Draftee holds leftist views. We do not judge him, he enjoys authority at work." And then follows the conclusion: "Should not be assigned to a duty connected with access to classified information."

In order to isolate "unreliables," they are sent to serve in remote areas. "Adament" officers who, under the pretext of instilling firm discipline terrorize and intimidate young soldiers and punish them unjustly right up to courts-martialing them, are appointed commanders in these units. The Italian press widely discussed the fact which occurred in an Alpine battalion. In a month and a half, the commander of this battalion court-martialed 13 soldiers whose only guilt was that they did not hide their leftist views. Three of them were sentenced to six months imprisonment only because when meeting they greeted each other with the sign of the "Red Front" (clenched raised right fist).

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Persecution and discrimination for political reasons are a usual phenomenon in the life of the Italian barracks. This is indicated, in particular, by numerous letters from servicemen to the editors of the most diverse newspapers and journals. Young soldiers of one regiment reported to the newspaper UNITA that the commander of a recruit training center, explaining to them that the armed forces stand above parties and outside politics, prohibited them from attending a celebration of the ICP press organ on pain of courts-martial.

As noted by the Italian military theoretician General Supino [as transliterated], the thesis of the "army outside politics" is used to "legalize persecution of representatives of leftist forces and even simply democratically attuned persons for political reasons in the army." If reactionary organizations of armed forces veterans which are conducting demonstrations under the slogan, "Down with disorder, we want colonels!" enjoy the protection and assistance of the command, draconian measures are employed in regard to the participants in meetings of leftist parties.

The striving of reactionary circles in the armed forces to instill a sense of hatred for the Soviet Union is also connected with attempts to "block the road to communism." Here, the hackneyed myths of the "Soviet threat," the aggressive intentions of the USSR in regard to Western Europe, "Soviet expansionism," and others are widely used. Intensification of the class struggle, the deterioration of the workers' economic position, protracted political instability--the ultrarights dump all this into one heap and present it as the consequence of certain "intrigues of Moscow." As some foreign observers believe, a double goal is pursued in this manner: to distract the attention of the servicemen from the actual reasons for political and economic difficulties and, at the same time, to present the Soviet Union as the "main enemy."

The anticommunists in the Italian Armed Forces are actively supported by their like-minded persons across the ocean who do not stop at interference in the internal affairs of their NATO Mediterranean partner. Thus, through its agents in Italy, the CIA not only subsidizes terrorists and gives the bourgeois parties financial assistance in elections, but it also expends considerable resources on organizing anticommunist propaganda in the country and in the armed forces. At one time, a large public outcry was caused in Italy by a trial in the case of the former chief of the intelligence service of the Ministry of Defense, General Micheli [as transliterated], who was unable to conceal the receipt of \$800,000 through the U.S. embassy to unleash a propaganda campaign against the communists. Some foreign observers believe that hundreds of paid CIA agents are active in Italy even now.

The increased activity of neo-fascism in the country is exerting a considerable influence on the nature of the ideological indoctrination of the servicemen in the Italian Armed Forces. The 20-year period of the supremacy of the Black Shirts did not pass without leaving a trace. It put down deep roots which are providing new shoots even now. In the postwar years, plots were repeatedly exposed in Italy (1960, 1964, 1970, and 1973) which pursued the goal of establishing a military dictatorship. Many generals and officers who occupied extremely high posts in the army took a most active part in them.

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Today the neo-fascist party, "the Italian social movement--national forces of the right," numbers about 400,000 members. Almost 50 different rightist extremist groups have joined with it. They are all conducting the propagandizing of misanthropic ideas in the barracks as they try to attract as many servicemen as possible to their side. Even the bourgeois press does not conceal its alarm as it reports the tremendous number of neo-fascist publications being disseminated among the personnel of the Italian Armed Forces.

A certain portion of the regular officers and noncommissioned officers supports the "theory" of latter-day duces. In fact, the ruling circles and high command encourage the activity of the extreme right forces in the army, using them to combat communist ideas which are now widely propagated in Italy. In 1972, a textbook for the rank and file was published on order of the Ministry of Defense. According to the statement of the then minister of defense, it was to make a "notable contribution to the matter of increasing the culture of the Italian soldiers." Actually, the authors of the textbook tried to justify the ideology and practice of fascism. They are the conception of fascism as the reaction of the Italian people to the injustice of the Allies in World War I who "did not value" the 600,000 Italians who fell on the field of battle and "offended" Italy in dividing the spoils. Here, the official propaganda asserts that the Fascist Party had the goal of bringing order and discipline within the country and making it "strong and respected in the world."

In talks "on improving culture" which the officers conduct in the barracks behind closed doors, the attempt is made in every way to bring home to the soldiers that strikes, demonstrations, and other actions by the Italian workers allegedly cause disorder and chaos and disrupt the measured tenor of life. The idea of establishing "strong" authority is often put forward as an alternative.

Elderly servicemen who began their careers back in Mussolini's army as well as the youth who managed to absorb the poison of neo-fascist propaganda are the carriers of such "theories." As a rule, politically competent soldiers recognize the danger which is concealed behind the verbiage of the extreme rightists; however, there still are people in the armed forces who are falling into the net of neo-fascist demagogy.

Religious propaganda in the army also serves the purposes of ideological indoctrination of the personnel. In Italy, a considerable part of the population are believers because of the special conditions of historical development. Therefore, a special place in society's social structure belongs to the ministers of religion. The Military Chaplains Corps has existed in the armed forces since 1926. The chaplains are called upon to be the "spiritual mentors" of the soldiers. The military clergy serve the ruling circles faithfully and, using specific forms and methods to influence their "wards," they strive to strengthen faith of the servicemen not only in God, but also in the capitalist system and to bring up obedient "defenders" of the so-called "free world."

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In order to transform the armed forces into an obedient and reliable weapon which defends the interests of the monopolies, "not only methods of conviction but also of compulsion" are employed in Italy, according to the foreign press.

The civil rights of the servicemen and, primarily, of the rank and file, have been curtailed to a considerable degree. For example, not only have they been deprived of the right to be elected to state and local organs of authority, but frequently they cannot even enjoy their active election right. In accordance with Italian legislation, only citizens who live permanently in a given area can vote in elections to local self-government institutions. In this connection, soldiers who are serving far from their native places find themselves unable to participate in elections.

The caste nature of the officer personnel, which is expressed even more clearly in Italy than in many other NATO countries, also furthers the strengthening of a reactionary spirit in the army. The foreign press has repeatedly reported on cases of humiliation to which Italian officers subject their subordinates. Moral and physical abasement and insulting the servicemen's sense of human dignity are daily phenomena in the country's armed forces. Such "indoctrinational" methods, in the opinion of the generals and officers who have recourse to them, are called upon to "put the soldier in his place" and show him the senselessness of any protest as well as to "convince" him of the impossibility of any changes.

Arbitrariness and lawlessness have assumed such a scale that even representatives of bourgeois parties often call for "opening the barracks doors to the constitution." The indignation of broad strata of the public forced the authorities to begin a campaign to "democratize life in the army," concerning the outcome of which many specialists are displaying obvious scepticism.

Nevertheless, not only the military propaganda apparatus, but also the major portion of the mass information media in the country are actively adhering to the NATO line of intensifying the arms race and strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance. Italian military specialists believe that the existing system of measures as a whole ensures the accomplishment of the goals which have been set to transform the armed forces into a tool to suppress the actions of workers for their rights within the country and into one of the most reliable supports of the aggressive NATO bloc. However, such a frankly reactionary direction in the ideological indoctrination of the servicemen, the basis of which consists of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, clearly conflicts with the requirements of the time.

At a meeting with electors on 2 March 1979 the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, said: "...the most reactionary forces of imperialism, weapons manufacturers and militarists, 'cold war' zealots, and their hired or volunteer yes-men have joined together in a broad campaign against detente and disarmament.... Referring to the 'Soviet threat' which

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they have concocted, they require the allocation of newer and newer billions for military purposes and the creation of ever more destructive and cruel types of weapons."

Serious responsibility for the fate of the world rests on the political and military figures of all states without exception. The policy of kindling hostility toward the USSR and other socialist countries serves as a poor means for creating an atmosphere of confidence and friendship between peoples.

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