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JPRS L/8733

26 October 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 41/79)

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ALGERIA

COMMENTARY SEES BENDJEDID'S POLITICAL STYLE TAKING SHAPE

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 pp 2425, 2426

[Text] Western public opinion sees the Algerian Government characterized by the future it holds in store for Mr Ahmed ben Bella. With the accession of Mr Chadli Bendjedid to the presidency, the governmental tendency veered toward clemency; but the immediate and total liberation of Mr Ben Bella would have exasperated the "hardliner clan" and rendered the task of the authorities difficult; and, be that as it may, President Chadli Bendjedid is an extremely cautious man, opposed to sensationalism and inclined to temporize. The decision taken early in July in regard to Mr Ben Bella is true to the style of Algeria's new head of state: the too outspoken independence hero's conditions of house arrest were lightened, but at the same time he was moved to an obscure locale in a distant governorate, where he is permitted to receive Algerian visitors but not foreigners, and is not free to talk to the press.

The Algerian authorities appear to have initially considered this as merely a first step, whereafter if the former president remained discreet and avoided arousing too many reactions in the country and abroad a second step could soon follow. It is not certain, however, that these liberal intentions still exist. In fact, Mr Ben Bella, after responding from his residence in M'sila, as he thought he could, to questions from an outlying radio station, no longer receives direct telephone calls, and his mail is now being censored. On the other hand, his wife was contacted toward the end of July by the ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent in Algiers, Mrs Martine Rossard, whose dispatch was circulated throughout the international press. These family confidences reveal that Mr Ben Bella is highly critical of the regime's leaders and of policies followed since his eviction: He denounces as do many Algerians, the bureaucratization of agriculture, the absurdities committed in the name of industrialization, the housing crisis, the corruption. He regrets that Algeria no longer supports substantively the liberation movements in southern Africa. He is deeply hostile toward Islamic fundamentalists; and should he return to the political scene--a possibility he does not exclude--it would be neither in association with them nor with Mr Ferhat Abbas nor Mr Ben Khedda, nor with the current governing team... These statements, indirectly made though they were, are hardly likely to encourage the government to again relax the restrictions under which the former president is currently being held.

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Complex Organization and Political Activity, but Extensive Information

From a governance viewpoint, the same measured and cautious style that characterizes the "solution" to the Ben Belia case is evident in the delineation and functioning of the institution, which are being reshaped with a great deal of tact. The presidential system continues; neither the line of action being followed by the new head of state nor the partial constitutional revision voted on 30 June have in any way changed its nature. But numerous details and a certain manner of proceeding have now changed.

With regard to laws, the leaders and representatives of the Algerian people acted immediately to avoid being again taken by surprise in the event of a future "unavailability" of the president; the steps to be taken in such an eventuality are now set forth in detail (new Article 117). The presidential term of office has been reduced from 6 to 5 years, so that it now coincides with the scheduled congresses of the FLN [National Liberation Front], of which the head of state is also the secretary general.

Not only one but several vice presidents may now be appointed by the head of state. Thus, a balance among diverse political trends, should this ever become necessary, could be more easily attained. But since the present government seems to have achieved a satisfactory blend of political views, the appointment of several vice presidents is not likely to come about in the very near future.

On the other hand, the designation of a prime minister, heretofore optional, is now obligatory. President Boumedienne never availed him of this option to name a second; President Bendjedid, however, upon the recommendations of the FLN congress, immediately appointed a head of government in the person of Mr Mohamed Abdelghani, who was already minister of interior and now holds both offices.

It is still, as he says, the head of state who in fact presides over the weekly meetings of the Council of Ministers. But now the prime minister presides over "interministerial councils" of varying composition, called according to circumstances and as may be directed by the Council of Ministers, for detailed treatment of certain complex governmental matters.

Three such interministerial councils were held on 17 and 18 July, dedicated respectively to tourism, education (situation of the teacher corps, teacher training, staffing and administration of school establishments), and occupational and technical training. The latter council was integrated by nine ministers and six secretaries general of other ministries.

The meetings and proceedings of the Council of Ministers and of the interministerial councils are reported in explicit communiques which are given wide publicity by the press and radio stations. The movements and activities of the ministers and the sessions of the People's National Assembly

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are reported in a more detailed manner. The activities and speeches of the president are of course the objects of particularly extensive media coverage and commentaries. But the latter and the meetings of mass organizations no longer represent, as they did in the past, the full extent of information being made available to the public on Algerian political life.

The People's National Assembly makes it a point of honor to not function as a mere rubber stamping bureau. For example, acting upon a government proposal that, in cases where a deputy's seat remained vacant, elections be held within 1 year, the Assembly decided that this period was too long and amended it to 6 months before enacting it into law on 2 July.

In accordance with Article 125 of the constitution, on the other hand, the FLN Political Bureau created, on 20 June, a "Security Supreme Council" to advise the head of state on security matters. This Supreme Council, under the chairmanship of the head of state, includes the president of the People's National Assembly, the party coordinator, the prime minister, and the ministers of foreign affairs, defense and interior.

Mr Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, currently holds, as is known, the Defense Ministry portfolio as well. Observers judge that in this manner he retains all the necessary means of ensuring, if need be, that any eventual decision of his will prevail. Information from unofficial sources also attaches significance to the military meetings called by and presided over by Mr Chadli Bendjedid. For instance, on 10 July he conferred with the inspector general of the People's National Army, with the secretary general and the central directors of the National Defense Ministry, and with the military regional chiefs. On 26 July, the president personally pinned the insignias of their new grades on seven recently promoted colonels: Kasdi Merbah, secretary general of the National Defense Ministry and member of the FLN Political Bureau; Mahammed Alleg, director of the Army Political Commissariat; Moustafa Chelloufi, commandant of the National Gendarmerie; the commandants of the 1st, 2d and 3d Military Regions and the commandant of the Greater Algiers Military Sector--the latter six all being members of the FLN Central Committee. Numerous promotions to the grades of lieutenant colonel and major were also announced, to the great satisfaction of the army, which had been severely deprived of promotions under President Boumediene's regime.

#### Distinctions Among Bodies and Institutions, but Mobility of Staffing and Multiplicity of Assignments

According to Algerian Revolutionary Government principles, sharp distinctions are drawn between the functions of the FLN in national affairs and those of the government and of the Assembly. The formulation of concepts, of decisions on their more fundamental aspects, and of the guidelines for their implementation are all vested in the party; their enabling legislation is the function of the assembly; the tasks of organization and implementation are the function of the incumbent ministers, making use of and supervising the administrative apparatus.

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But in the same way that the top military brass are also well situated within the FLN hierarchy, as we have just seen, many of the upper echelon government officials also hold upper echelon positions in the FLN--its Political Bureau or Central Committee--and thus take part in the various orders of activity.

At the summit, moreover, the head of state is also the secretary general of the FLN. The FLN Political Bureau will meet on 13 June, for example, under his chairmanship, specifically to discuss the functions and procedures of the commissions under the Central Committee, as well as the creation of a commission within the party to formulate, under the chairmanship of Mr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, minister counsellor to the president, a general population registration plan for submittal to the People's National Assembly. The press and radio broadcasts are keeping the citizens informed on these complex activities.

Important missions abroad are being entrusted not solely, as heretofore, to ministers but also to upper echelon leaders of the FLN, a practice that is no doubt aimed at broadening the functions of the party. Thus, at the beginning of July, Mr Sliman Hoffman, member of the Central Committee and head of its International Relations Commission, toured Africa in an official capacity to transmit messages from President Bendjedid to the heads of state of Sao Tome, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Swaziland and Uganda.

And similarly, beginning on 16 August, Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, Political Bureau member and FLN coordinator, visited Aden, Baghdad, Lattaquie (Syria) and Tripoli. These visits, which lasted a total of 48 hours, enabled him to not only transmit the messages entrusted to him to the summits but also to make other contacts: with the army in Libya and with the Ba'th in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The Palestinian problem, attitudes toward Egypt and Morocco, developments in the Western Saharan situation, preparations for the non-aligned summit meeting in Havana, were all discussed; and Mr Yahiaoui, erstwhile opponent of Colonel Bendjedid in the presidential election, was thus entrusted with a mission of the highest order of importance.

In contrast with the heretofore customary frugality of news concerning the movements of bearers of presidential messages, the Algerian news media are devoting lengthy coverage to Mr Yahiaoui's mission and to his homecoming reception by Mr Chadli Bendjedid. Particular emphasis was placed on Mr Yahiaoui's statements to the Iraqi press in regard to the "conspiracy against the Arab Nation" which, within "a very vast plan," also strikes, at the same time, at the Maghreb and the East. On that occasion, the high Algerian emissary recalled the existing commitments to Algeria's "brothers of the Machrek," despite the difficulties being encountered in the Maghreb.

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The Algerian press also reported his statements made upon his arrival in Algiers: "To implement this plan, imperialism has mobilized the Egyptian regime in the Machrek and the Moroccan regime in the Maghreb...The Rabat regime is at the origin of the Camp David conspiracy."

The role that the FLN has traditionally played in Algeria's foreign relations, through contacts with correspondent political organizations, is thus being highlighted with unaccustomed vigor.

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ALGERIA

BEN BELLA'S HOUSE ARREST IN M'SILA DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Oct 79 pp 50, 51

[Article by Hamid Barrada: "The Man of M'Sila"]

[Text] "I have returned from Qom." "So and so was in Qom last week." "When are you going to Qom?" These snatches of conversation were not heard in Iran, but in Algeria. They do not refer to the second capital of the former empire of the Pahlavi, where the all-powerful Khomeyni has set up his headquarters, but M'Sila where a man stripped of all power for more than 14 years lives under house arrest. This man is, of course, Ahmed Ben Bella. The comparison between the first president of the Algerian Republic and the head of the Islamic Republic has flourished in some subversive spirits, perhaps to give substance to a wild hope but especially because truly, the village located 250 kilometers from Algiers has become, like Qom, a place of pilgrimage.

Ben Bella has been there for almost 3 months, and the wave of his visitors has scarcely receded; daily some 30, sometimes double that come on certain peak days, as the holiday which followed Ramadan. They come from all corners of Algeria, from Oran, where the ex-president comes from, but also from Kabylia, from the Aures. People from Mostaganem rented a bus to make the trip. People from another village insisted that the local orchestra be included on the trip. Most do not forget the traditional offering: a lamb, a bag of semolina, a sugar loaf....These gifts are not too much to defray the expenses resulting from seeing so many people. The former president of the republic received, when he was in solitary confinement, a pension of about 4,400 FF, and apparently it has not been increased since his transfer to M'Sila.

Ben Bella's father-in-law carries out the duties of director of protocol by welcoming the visitors. When he is absent, it falls to Dr. Nakkache, ex-minister of health who has chosen in fact to live in M'Sila, to do the job. No security measures are taken. Ben Bella's friends worry about this, but he would not discuss taking the least precaution. "Visiting hours" are not regulated, but the ex-president receives practically from 10:00 A.M. until generally after afternoon prayer (around 6:00 P.M.).

The visitors are not just Ben Bella's friends and supporters. There are veterans of the OS [Special Organization], or of the "Committee of 22" which

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unleashed the uprising of 1 November 1954; there is Hadj Ben Alla, who was the president of the National Assembly until the coup d'etat of June 1965, and also Col Amar Ouamrane, one of the leading figures of the war who fought bitterly against the former head of state. There are especially the people of modest means whom Ben Bella does not always know who come to see him as in the past to discuss their problems. People go to M'Sila to see a man they did not expect to see again, to recall heroic times, or simply to discuss the coup. People go to M'Sila for the past and the future, to remember and to dream....

What do people talk about? What does he talk about? Listening to several men who made the M'Sila trip, gathering their impressions, one can determine the themes which reoccur in the conversations. First everyone agrees: "Ben Bella is in excellent shape, physically and mentally." People find him, at 63, rejuvenated. Some go so far as saying that "he does not have one white hair," but good photos show that he is greying at the temples. Colonel Ouamrane said to him in reproach, "We have all aged except you, how do you do it?" He answered: "Thanks to my wife, I have remained young...!"

The ex-president does not appear uninformed after the long years of confinement he endured. His interlocutors are struck by his knowledge of the country's affairs. Naturally, he is not fond of Boumediene's government which he considers a resounding failure. He deems that agriculture should have been the priority in the state concerns. Generally, economic policy should have endeavored to solve the problems of employment. In educational matters, he remains a partisan of Arabization. A practicing but unostentatious Moslem, he is rather hostile to the religious fundamentalism which has developed in recent years in Algeria as elsewhere. He is passionately interested in the Iranian revolution, but considers that fundamentalism has made it deviate dangerously. He believes that it goes without saying that the woman has another place in the Moslem society than the one she currently holds. He sets the example. He realizes that the photos which show him in his wife Zohra Sellami's company in a let us say loving attitude shocked Moslem elders and does not exactly reflect what the image of a political leader in austere Algeria should be, but he does not care. The ex-journalist of REVOLUTION AFRICAINE participates in the discussions without the least compunction.

On another point, Ben Bella seems to have reflected--and evolved: he is against the single party. He adds that while awaiting the complete change to a multiple party system, one could contemplate transitional formulas by allowing political factions inside and outside the party to express themselves. In this regard, he thinks freedom of the press is urgently needed.

He is circumspect about current problems. His intimate friends know that he has taken a position on the Sahara conflict, but he prefers to avoid the subject. He only states that Boumediene created the affair and "more Maghrebian than ever," he declares that an open war between Algeria and Morocco would be a catastrophe. His silences are equally meaningful. Not

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a word on the army. Of President Chadli, he only says: "He is a courageous man. He proved it by releasing me."

On the subject of his own experience in power (1962-1965), he admits that he made "mistakes," but he is hardly more forthcoming. Rather, he reportedly tends to self-criticize...others, while making arguments that can only disturb his interlocutors. Colonel Ouamrane, who gave up all political activity after independence, said to him: You should have listened to us in 1962, and not allied yourself with the military." Ben Bella retorted: "You can say what you like but what have you done in the 14 years since I left the political scene?"

As might be suspected, these permanent discussions at M'Sila which seem like meetings and cell meetings are not regarded favorably in some high places. The release of the former head of state or, more precisely, the easing of his conditions of detention were supposed to solve the "Ben Bella problem" by supressing him. But his persistent popularity has upset the calculations. The attitude of the authorities about access to the Kabouya villa (where the ex-president and his family live) seems to have changed somewhat. The surveillance has changed from good-natured to increasingly meddlesome. That, at least, is what Ben Bella's lawyer, Madeleine Lafue-Veron, says in a recent statement. In her opinion, the former president lives under "improved prison" conditions.

"There are members of the military security in the basement of the villa. It is impossible to receive an outside call or to place a long distance call from the villa. Mail is censored and sometimes not delivered. The villa is tapped as without a doubt is the BMW in which Ben Bella is obliged to ride, escorted by unmarked police cars. Until now, the ex-president has asked in vain to go to his mother's tomb in Maghnia, to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, to meet with his lawyer."

The SM [Military Security] is in fact very vigilant, and on occasion, exerts pressure to halt the continual flow of visitors. One citizen who came from abroad in his car to M'Sila was summoned on two occasions to Algiers. He was asked what his ties were to the former president. He answered: "I am Ben Bellist." Same scenario with Colonel Ouamrane. The SM officials did not understand that this former adversary of Ben Bella would make the M'Sila pilgrimage, moreover, accompanied by three friends. "What did you talk about?" "Algeria!" replied in a Gaullist manner the former resistance fighter.

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ALGERIA

REASONS FOR CLEANUP CAMPAIGN DISCUSSED

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Oct 79 pp 14, 16

[Text] Observers of the Algerian political scene are impatiently awaiting the important central committee meeting of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), scheduled for December, for clues to the economic and political policies which will be proposed at the party congress, now expected to be held next spring. Meanwhile, there are signs that President Chadli Benjedid has been consolidating his personal authority inside both the Government and the higher levels of the state apparatus.

In a diplomatic reshuffle at the end of August, 13 ambassadors were replaced, and Chadli was able to place some trusted advisers in key capitals. At the same time he removed several close collaborators of former Foreign Minister Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, who had carved out a veritable fief for himself in this sector.

After Bouteflika lost the race to succeed the late President Boumedienne, senior diplomatic personnel closely associated with him were given purely honorary positions or posts of secondary importance abroad. Bouteflika has decidedly fallen from grace since the beginning of the year. THE MIDDLE EAST has learned that he no longer attends FLN Political Bureau sessions or Government meetings. And his name never appears in the official media.

His decline is mainly the result of the behind-the-scenes influence exerted by Party Co-ordinator Colonel Muhammad Salah Yahiaoui, generally considered to be the regime's *eminence grise*. He leads the radical pan-Arab sector of the FLN which is seeking to intensify the revolutionary process and has been using the little-known Algerian communist movement (PAGS), heavily backed by Moscow, to advance his position.

Yahiaoui's dilemma is that the groups which constitute his power base - essentially the mass movements and the media - do not necessarily espouse the ideal with which he identifies. In any case, whether Yahiaoui is using these groups or they are using him is largely an academic question, for the real

power, the army, is firmly behind Chadli, especially since May after the switching of regional commanders.

As a result of this reshuffle, Col. Abdullah Bilhucet became Inspector General and Lt-Col. Kasdi Merbah became Secretary of the National People's Army, replacing Col. Abdel-Hamid al-Attash who was assigned to other duties in the Defence Ministry. Merbah is Chadli's right-hand man, and as Head of Military Security he has dossiers on everyone which puts him in an extremely strong position.

Other changes resulted in Lt-Col. Muhammad Allal becoming Director of the Political Commissariat of the People's Army; Lt-Col. Muhammad Atayliyah, Commander of the First Military District;

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Lt-Col. Kamal Abdel-Rahim, Commander of the Second Military District, and Lt-Col. Ali Buhajjah, Commander of the Regional Sector of Greater Algiers.

Yahiaoui is believed to be one of the driving forces behind the far-reaching clean-up campaign launched in September to clear the capital and other major urban centres of "social parasites" (see box). He told *Algerie-Presse-Service* that "the moment has come to apply revolutionary texts and criteria", if the long-term goal is to promote the civil education of the Algerian people. He added that the last Party Congress had stressed the need to "put an end to all sorts of delinquency, whatever its source and at whatever level it is situated".

An editorial in the semi-official daily *El-Moudjahid* said the responsibility for many of the present problems lay with elected local officials and senior civil servants in the administration. But criticism of Algeria's all-pervasive bureaucracy and some of its shadier practices is not new.

The decision to extend the house cleaning operation to diplomats could be a harbinger of sweeping changes among top political personnel in the months to come, and some fear this may get out of hand.

Chadli agreed to the campaign to answer growing criticism that he had done nothing during his eight months in power. When Boumedienne died, the expectations of those anxious for social change and liberalisation were raised, but so far only a few changes have been made and disappointment is growing. "The people are beginning to get restless," one source explained, "and this seemed a good way of satisfying their demands."

Some feel that Chadli's trips abroad once the campaign was under way - to Libya for the 10th anniversary celebrations and then to Havana for the Non-Aligned Summit - were an attempt to cover himself if it fails. If the campaign succeeds, he will get all the credit; but if it gets out of hand he can blame Yahiaoui.

On one level the campaign is clearly aimed at cleaning up the cities to avert the threat of a typhoid epidemic, exacerbated by water shortages. But on another level it goes much deeper. Editorials and articles in *El-Moudjahid* have attacked "nepotism and corruption".

If the campaign spreads to the upper levels of the administration, including the

Government, many heads could roll. But it will probably stop short of this, and Chadli's Cabinet is unlikely to be radically changed before the Party Congress in two months time.

On the regional level, Algeria fears that Washington's equivocal stance on the Sahara may endanger its improving but still delicate relationship with the US. "Tell your government that if it gives sophisticated weapons to Morocco for use in the Sahara, they will destroy our political relationship," an Algerian military security officer close to President Chadli told a young American official.

American sources in Algiers are worried that the Carter Administration may be influenced by the need to "persuade" Morocco's King Hassan to give greater support to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and that this could lead Washington to abandon Algeria and give its full backing to Morocco.

This seems unlikely, however, for US Congressman Stephen Solarz, who has just visited the region (see p47), is advising caution. Moreover, although the US agreed to remove Ambassador Dick Parker, because King Hassan held him responsible for the failure of the talks in Washington last October, he is not being replaced by a more sympathetic figure. The US accepts Parker's essentially correct analysis that the King was losing ground in the Sahara, and the post is being left vacant.

At the same time, Chadli has accepted an invitation to Washington for talks with Carter, a significant step in view of the fact that he has not yet visited the Soviet Union. But Chadli's preferences became clear almost as soon as he became President, when he received the US ambassador in Algiers, Ulric Sinclair Hynes, before meeting the rest of the diplomatic corps.

For the younger Algerian officers, American policy is a key issue. They are extremely anxious to diversify their sources of weapons, which now come mainly from the USSR, and fear that US support for Morocco will reinforce the position of the older officers, backed by the Party, who wished to maintain Soviet supplies. Decisions taken in Washington could therefore have repercussions inside Algeria as well as on the region in general.

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[Boxed Item]

## Cities polished

The clean-up campaign began in Algiers and was later extended to Oran, Constantine, Medea and other major centres. *El-Moudjahid* carried stirring articles on the street cleaning operations and enthusiasm of the people, for there is no doubt that so far the campaign is both needed and popular.

The police and gendarmerie are attacking traffic, health and security violations with great vigour and sometimes a little heavy-handedly. Police armed with truncheons and using dogs have rounded up "hooligans, tramps and other work-shy people", who were then sent to work camps in the provinces to do "economically useful jobs".

The main steps of the Algiers Post Office, a recognised meeting place, have been cleared of the usual loiterers; cafes have been frightened into closing at around 8.00pm; and the streets are totally deserted in the evening, except for the police, operating in pairs. So far, over 100 youths have been arrested, some of whom have been briefly jailed. Others were fined, but many were let off with a warning.

In Algiers, balconies are being cleared of washing and police, helped by local residents, are cleaning up the filthy streets and pavements. Pedestrians are being berated for jaywalking, and the police are assiduously checking for any minor infringements of the law. They even asked those working in the Algiers *Reuters* office whether they had washing on their balcony.

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ALGERIA

IN NEW PLAN, EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVEN TO CONSUMER GOODS

London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Oct 79 p 93

[Article by Howard Schissel in Algiers]

[Text]

Although it would never be admitted officially, market forces are having a greater influence on the shape of the Algerian economy than the country's planners like to see. The ever-growing demand for consumer goods by a population which has become adept at circumventing regulations is causing the Government to re-examine its priorities.

Confirming a shift away from the concentration of development efforts on hydrocarbons and heavy industry, Planning Minister Abdel-Hamid Brahimi recently declared that the new five-year development plan (1980-84), will give priority to agriculture, irrigation, housing and education. Special emphasis is to be placed on light consumer-oriented industrial plants.

After the completion of the ambitious third development plan, in 1977, the Government decided to give itself a breathing space before embarking on another plan. It declared 1978 a "leap year", a period in which gaps in previous plans could be filled in and a general reappraisal of the development strategy of the last 15 years could be made.

The end of the bitter and economically disastrous war of national liberation was followed by a decade and a half of enforced austerity. The Government sacrificed immediate interests like housing, social infrastructure and the provision of consumer goods in order to invest oil-derived revenues in heavy industry and capital equipment. This strategy seems to have paid off; between 1970 and 1978 the country chalked up the highest growth rate in the Maghreb at 8.5% a year. It was also able to sustain one of the highest investment outlays to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios (around 50%) anywhere in the world.

The end of the Boumedienne era was marked by increased demand for consumer goods and for tangible evidence of economic growth statistics for the average man and woman. The concept of a "leap year" avoids any public admission of possible errors and gives the planners time to work through the implications of possible new priorities. Any new plan has to be approved by a party congress whose date has yet to be set.

Part of the current debate in Algeria's ruling circles is over

how much bureaucratic control there should be over the productive sectors of the economy, and especially those sectors producing consumer goods, the role to be accorded to private agriculture, and the relationship between the public and the private sectors.

Some observers feel that there can be no major changes in the functioning of the economic machine, beyond occasional sops to consumers. The budgetary allocations for this year tend to corroborate this viewpoint. Industry and Energy received 72.4% of the available funds. The only significant difference was the 25% upgrading of the allocation given to housing.

The acute shortage of flats in the urban centres is a major headache for the regime. Not only does it stimulate discontent and social pressure, but it has slowed down the realisation of several projects. State enterprises are obliged to compete with each other in offering houses to attract skilled workers, and many of them have built housing units to offer as bait to attract qualified manpower.

Senior officials at the

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Ministry of Housing and Construction, which was set up only in 1977, make no secret of the fact that Algeria lacks at least a million dwellings, and that rural accommodation often lacks what are now regarded as essential basic amenities: running water and electricity. Plans have been drawn up to build 100,000 new housing units a year from 1981, with the number rising to 200,000 a year by 1990. The existing shortage and the rapidly expanding population make this a minimum figure. Present rates of increase suggest that the population will have doubled by the end of the century.

The sharp increase in the price of crude oil since the beginning of this year has given the Algerian planners more elbow room. In 1978 oil and gas revenues totalled \$5.4bn, and

preliminary estimates for this year put the figure at between \$9.5 and \$10bn. The fact that the country's liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) plants are now coming on stream makes the notional cash flow ever healthier. Algeria's ability to raise extra funds from international banks has not diminished.

Yet in spite of the growth of oil revenues and the progress being made in the heavy industrial sector, industry is not making the contribution to the national economy that the planners hoped for. A majority of factories are working well below capacity and keep going on generous government subsidies.

At a recent symposium on industrial management, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) Executive Secretary,

Muhammad Salah Yahiaoui, placed some of the blame for the shortfall on what he termed "excessive bureaucracy, waste, mismanagement and deviations of a similar type". So no one expects the new development plan to contain an impressive list of new projects. Instead it is likely to concentrate on improving the efficiency of existing units, on increasing the quality of management and on effective co-ordination of the overall industrial effort.

President Chadli talks of the need to find "a formula which permits the introduction of competitive elements in the national economy in order to guarantee the quality of output and a decrease in production costs". This can happen only if the bureaucracy is prepared to let itself be broken up.

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LEBANON

KAMAL JUMBLATT'S ROLE IN UNIFYING LEFT NOTED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 6-12 Sep 79 pp 20-22

/Article: "Kamal Jumblatt Unified the Left and Gave It Protection under His Political Umbrella"/

/Text/ The departure of Kamal Jumblatt has deprived the Lebanese National Movement of its inspiring leader and popular commander, the man who could gather it together in the context of a front. Although the left was a force which Jumblatt added to his political capital, in the traditional Lebanese game of governance, he, in exchange gave the left a great push forward which he provided it protection under his sheltering umbrella.

The main parties in the Lebanese National Movement differ as to political and ideological stance but they are drawn together by a common denominator--a belief in a unified Lebanon with a fundamental role in remedying the Palestinian issue, which these parties consider to be a national Arab issue.

The main leftwing parties were not organized into one front until shortly before the outbreak of bloody strife in Lebanon in 1975. In fact, during their political and party histories, they sometimes engaged in violent and bloody struggles with one another; struggles took place especially between the Syrian National Socialist Party and the Communist Party.

Therefore this achievement which Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Socialist Progressive Party, managed to carry out, in which he invested all his political and moral capital, in order to produce a formula guaranteeing "popular legitimacy" to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon while the cover of official legitimacy for this presence began to collapse because some government agencies at that time were implicated in the scheme to liquidate the Palestinian cause, was immense.

The Socialist Progressive Party, the party of the historic leader of the National Movement, Kamal Jumblatt, came to prominence in the 1950's, deriving its inspiration in its socialist principles from a Marxism coupled with the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi and the spiritualism of Indian wise men, of whom Kamal Jumblatt was considered one of the most prominent disciples.

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This party proceeded from the foundation of its basic support, the "Druze popularity" which the venerable house of Jumblatt enjoys. The late leader appointed a group of intellectuals and trade-union men to its organizational apparatuses.

As a result of Jumblatt's status within the traditional game of Lebanese politics, this leftwing party enjoyed a protective umbrella which protected it from calamities and official molestation.

#### Jumblatt's Role and Leadership

The fact is that the principles of the party and the practices of its leader were as conciliatory as they could be. They responded to the aspirations and ambitions of Jumblatt, who believed in Arab nationalism, moderate socialism, and an independent Arab Lebanon open and responsive to Arab hopes.

It was also consonant and harmonious with Jumblatt's role in local Lebanese politics and its narrow factional scope in the game of competition for power and the parcelling out of cabinet positions and seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

In spite of all that, Kamal Jumblatt was the only Lebanese leader who could transcend his narrow factional circle and have a broad-scale popular following by virtue of the principles he propounded on the stage and the popular Lebanese aspiration, which he truly embodied, to rise above all inherited inhibitions and obstacles preventing the Lebanese from melting into the crucible of one homogeneous people.

In any event, this duality of Jumblatt's basically formed the power he enjoyed politically, through which he imposed his positions and views upon his traditional adversaries; at the same time it enabled him to maneuver across a unique range not at the command of any other politician in Lebanon's modern history. Jumblatt was the only person who could continue in opposition while taking part in the government.

Jumblatt played a large role in supporting or thwarting all the ruling regimes and presidents, beginning in the early 1950's, with the fall of President Bishara al-Khuri, and passing through the revolution against President Camille Chamoun in 1958, support for President Fu'ad Chehab in the 1960's and the end of the Chehabite era in 1970, to the dispute with President Suleyman Franjieh.

The growth of the Lebanese left, which occurred in conjunction with the emergence of the power and strength of the detachments of the Palestinian resistance, attracted the attention of this shrewd political leader. In fact, he strove to attract the growing detachments of the left and spread his protective, solicitous umbrella over them by various means, one of which perhaps was the granting of a number of them permission to conduct lawful political activity when he was minister of the interior.

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Then there was his strong embrace of the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left beginning in the early 1970's. This relationship, which developed into one of a common front as violence as a means for political interaction began to dominate on the Lebanese stage, reached its climax with the outbreak of civil war in 1975.

At the same time, leftwing parties and organizations found in Kamal Jumblatt a safety valve which protected them from the anger or maltreatment of the official authorities; indeed he was sometimes the link in an indirect dialogue between these parties and the authorities.

The Palestinian resistance played a great role in supporting solidarity among the parties to the Lebanese National Movement led by Jumblatt. The movement was considered to be a support for the resistance in its struggle with Israel and its adversaries on the Lebanese stage.

The other fact is that Jumblatt, during the years of his leadership of the National Movement, represented a leadership which enjoyed the respect and appreciation, and sometimes the awe and power, of all the parties living under the aegis of the National Movement. It happened that some National Movement parties expressed their opposition to some positions, but this opposition did not reach the point of excitation or the outpouring of protest onto the streets, because he managed to decide all struggles or differences of views between two parties or more through democratic dialogue or by adopting a decisive, final position.

After the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977, the foundation of the national movement, at whose peak he stood, constituting at the same time its foundations and pillars, was jolted. Leadership was apportioned out among the various leaders of the parties represented in the National Movement and became quasi-collective and sporadic.

In spite of the efforts exerted to maintain the unity and homogeneity of the National Movement during the period following the departure of Kamal Jumblatt, these efforts, though preserving the /movement's/ form, failed to play their distinctive role and thus could not preserve its content, if one may use the expression: the reins of leadership were disturbed and it appears that the brakes were also afflicted with severe damage.

#### Walid Jumblatt's Leadership

However, it would be unfair to Walid Jumblatt to make him bear the responsibility for what happened to the National Movement after his father's departure. In his early thirties, he had not previously engaged in politics. In fact, he appeared to be inclined to stay away from politics, in spite of efforts on his father's part to push him to involve himself in it.

However, no sooner did he suddenly find himself bearing the responsibility of leading the family and the party than he rushed headlong into the hazards

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of politics, showing sagacity and flexibility in political dealings. In general one could state that he is the most moderate of National Movement leaders today and the most anxious to arrive at a reconciliation among Lebanese.

However, that does not keep one from saying that Walid Jumblatt's moderation is of the topical or spontaneous kind. It is said that the position of the military wing of his party, from the standpoint of numbers, capability and power, is today superior to what it was in the era of his father and during the civil war.

Also, Walid Jumblatt has been able, in the relatively short period of his political life, to establish strong, firm, friendly relationships on the Lebanese, Arab and international stages.

Although he did not succeed in preserving the unity of the National Movement, that may be attributed mostly to the nature of political activity in Lebanon, which is essentially more exposed to factors of isolated action, the formation of cliques and recklessness, in the ranks of the left and the right both, than to factors of cohesiveness, coherence, bonding and unification.

#### The Ba'th Party

Among the detachments of the National Movement is the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, whose regional command is headed by Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, representative of the northern town of Tripoli in the Chamber of Deputies.

The party's principles are known for their emphasis on Arab nationalism and a call for unity. The party has managed to build a firm popular base in most areas of Lebanon and it is distinguished for its emphatic commitment to its ideological and national conviction. The popular base and leadership of the party also contain elements from all Lebanese factions, including the Maronites, from which group more than one leading official in the party has risen to prominence.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i is in his forties. He is a successful doctor. He has built a reservoir of affection and respect for himself in the city of Tripoli, Lebanon's second city following the capital, Beirut. This has made him into one of its most prominent figures and a personal competitor of its traditional leader, former prime minister Rashid Karami.

Dr al-Rafi'i was compelled to leave Lebanon after the entry of the Syrian army, in view of the touchy relations which existed between Baghdad and Damascus at that time. He recently returned to Beirut to resume his leadership of the party. The first procedure he carried out was to freeze the party's membership in the Central Political Council of the National Movement in protest against some manifestations which appeared within it and in anticipation of the crystallization of some organizational issues and positions on which the party had a specific opinion.

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#### The Syrian National Party

There is also the Syrian National Socialist Party, now headed by Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah. During the recent events in Lebanon it was headed by Mr In'am Ra'd.

This party's influence extends beyond Lebanon into certain other Arab countries, in accordance with its ideology, which calls for a union of Greater Syria or what is called the Fertile Crescent, which comprises Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and Kuwait within an Arab world made up of geographic units which are, in addition to the Fertile Crescent, the Nile Valley Union, comprising Egypt and the Sudan, the Union of the Arab Maghreb, and the Union of the Arabian Peninsula.

This party was founded in the mid-1930's and first spread among student circles in the American University of Beirut, where its founder, Antun Sa'adah, was a professor. Upon its growth, this party was known for its extremist military organization and its permanent yearning to take power. It failed in two attempts, the first in the revolution which its founder proclaimed in 1948--which he paid for with his life--and then in an attempted coup which it conducted in 1960.

This party has suffered from internal schisms, the most brutal of which came at the beginning of the events in Lebanon. However, it has lately managed to restore solidarity to its ranks, with the assumption by Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah of its leadership.

The Syrian National Party stresses the secular nature of the state and the separation of religious figures from politics. It has succeeded in implanting popular foundations among various factions. It is among those parties which have made an appeal for the national character of the struggle against Israel, proceeding from its ideology, which considers Palestine a part of the Fertile Crescent Union it is appealing for.

'Abdallah Sa'adah is the descendant of an Orthodox family from the al-Kurah area of northern Lebanon. He lost one of his sons during the fighting for the suburb of South Beirut.

The rift from which the party suffered arose from its position on the events in Lebanon: one group of its leaders and base found that to ally itself with the Communists and plunge into a battle which was not directly aimed at the party was an illogical act. At that time Dr Sa'adah refused to remain as the head of the party as a consequence of this rift, and Mr In'am Ra'd was elected as its head. Ra'd tried to restore solidarity to the party but its apparatus's refusal to join the struggle delayed consummation of the solidarity until the term of his chairmanship ended and Sa'adah was once again elected head.

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#### The Communist Party

The Lebanese Communist Party is one of the oldest Communist parties in the Arab world; it was established in the early 1920's. Recently Mr George Hawi was elected its secretary general. The party is loyal to the Soviet Union, but in the recent events it was distinguished by its adoption of certain nationalist hypotheses through its participation in the National Movement.

However, the latter suffered from schisms within its ranks at numerous times. One of these schisms contributed to the establishment of the Communist Action Organization.

The new secretary general, George Hawi (in his forties), is a young leader in the party and was responsible for the editorship of its newspaper AL-NIDA'. He is descended from an Orthodox family from Duhur al-Shuwayr in Mount Lebanon. He became prominent during the events in Lebanon and took over actual leadership even before he was elected secretary general in the summer of this year. However, his leadership of the party has stirred up touchy feelings among some other leaders and it is not to be ruled out that the party may face other rifts.

#### The Communist Action Organization

The Secretariat General of the Communist Action Organization has been assumed by Mr Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary of the Central Political Council of the National Movement and one of those who split from the Arab Nationalist Movement firstly and from the Communist Party subsequently. He is known for political sagacity.

After Jumblatt's assassination, Muhsin, by force of his position, was able to move the elements of his organization into decision-making positions within the Central Political Council system, most important of which was the position of editor in chief of the National Movement newspaper AL-WATAN; this made him into a basic pole in the struggle going on within the National Movement.

He is now performing solid coordination between the Communist Action Organization and the Communist Party within the Central Political Council of the National Movement, which together lead a major independent axis attracting certain other organizations.

By virtue of the fact that Muhsin Ibrahim is descended from a southern family and his father was a respected religious figure in the Shiite faction, he has been able to implant the foundations of his organization within the southern villages and the poverty belt around Beirut. A number of intellectuals and university students have also joined its ranks.

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The al-Murabitun

Heading the command council of the Movement of Independent Nasirites (the al-Murabitun) is Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat. As its name indicates, the movement is a Nasirite organization which derives its principles from the thinking and principles of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. This movement came to prominence during the Lebanese war as a military and political organization attracting intellectuals and young people from parties in the Sunnite faction in Beirut and some areas of Lebanon, turning it into the adversary of a number of traditional Sunnite leaders.

Ibrahim Qulaylat began his political life as an influential student in a section of Beirut, relying upon the prominent status his venerable Beirut family enjoys. He soon enlarged the circle of his political interests. He is known for his belief in the leadership of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and his Arab political program. His role during the civil war, in which he established an armed national organization, was prominent, and today he is considered one of the most popular leaders in Beirut.

There remain other organizations within the National Movement which issued forth from successive schisms within the basic organization, the Arab Socialist Union. These are Nasirite organizations but, because of their polarization and schisms, they have not been able to crystallize a popular current or build a mass base for themselves.

The Socialist Labor Party, a vagrant youthful organization with a military structure, arose as a Lebanese wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine commanded by Dr George Habash. However, it tries to maintain some independence in local political decisionmaking for itself. The party's ideology is extremist Marxism but in compensation it believes in Arab nationalism.

There are also independent nationalistic personalities within the Central Political Council, such as Dr Usamah Fakhuri, head of the Regional Political Council for the town of Beirut, Dr Albert Mansur, deputy from Ba'labakk-al-Harmal, 'Isam Nu'man, an intellectual close to Kamal Jumblatt, 'Izzat Harb, former head of the Society of Graduates of Islamic Institutions, and so forth. They are a group of liberal and progressive nationalist independence who were chosen for membership in the Political Council so that their national views and positions could be benefited from and also in order that the popular base which some of them enjoy could be attracted.

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LEBANON

PROBLEMS FACING COHESION OF DOMESTIC LEFT EXPLORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 6-12 Sep 79 pp 19-23

/Article: "The Lebanese National Movement: End of the Honeymoon among Parties of the Left"/

/Text/ The collective honeymoon which the main left-wing parties and organizations on the Lebanese stage have gone through in the past few years is on the verge of ending as a result of divisions and differences in positions and viewpoints as regard both relations among themselves and their positions on the various issues of the day in Lebanon.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is presenting an integrated investigation into the Lebanese National Movement which shows the reasons and circumstances which led to its establishment and those which have brought it to the point of division today. Through this investigation, it has been anxious to present various points of view objectively, while simplifying positions and referring to well known and to unknown background information, out of its commitment to the journalistic credo. It hopes that this severe simplification will not be interpreted in an unintended manner. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is always proud of the friendship which it enjoys with the various detachments of the movement and it is prepared to open its heart to any followup or clarification by any detachment in the movement which feels that damage or harm has befallen it as a consequence of what has been published.

Why Did Walid Jumblatt Scold Muhsin Ibrahim after the Visit to Baghdad This April?

Following the departure of the late leader Kamal Jumblatt in 1977, it became very difficult for the Lebanese National Movement to agree on an immediate replacement to head the movement's Political Council. Although his son, Mr Walid Jumblatt, had been sworn in as head of the Socialist Progressive Party, some members of the National Movement's Political Council believed that he was not yet qualified to take over the position and some perceived a desire on Walid Jumblatt's part to reflect and not to take a direct step to assume the chairmanship of the National Movement before carrying out a reorganization of Progressive Party leadership in order to cope with developments on the Lebanese stage.

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In this atmosphere, the Political Council assigned the tasks of the chairman to an emergency committee composed of representatives of five parties in the national movement; in this they were to be assisted by the secretary general of the council, Mr Muhsin Ibrahim, head of the Communist Action Organization, a Marxist organization to the left of the Lebanese Communist Party. Although the beginning of the post-Kamal Jumblatt phase was characterized by introversion under the guise of study, observation and the failure to broach the issue of who would actually head up the National Movement, the developments which took place lead to an increase in this introversion.

Walid Jumblatt visited Damascus after his father's death and his conversations there evolved into a series of meetings which led to a near-agreement with officials in Syria.

The relations between the Political Council of the National Movement and Damascus had been bad since the difference in viewpoints between Syria and the National Movement during the Lebanese civil war. The National Movement had modified its support in principle for the Constitutional Document which the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad, and the Lebanese president at that time, Suleyman Franjeh, had produced in 1976. The dispute reached the point of a rupture and a clash following the arrival of the Syrian forces; their invasion of Beirut and their collision with the Palestine resistance, with which the Lebanese National Movement was allied.

#### Jumblatt's Burdensome Situation

This situation was tiresome for Walid Jumblatt, who had worked to keep good relations with Damascus and Baghdad at the same time, until three tendencies appeared:

First, the abrogation of the Political Council emergency committee, its replacement by an enlarged executive committee, and the apportionment of the powers of the head of the Political Council (which was vacant) to the Committee and the secretary general of the council.

Here it is well known that a decision in principle was made that chairmanship of the Political Council would be left to the Progressive Party. Therefore the step was made in an attempt to embarrass Walid Jumblatt at a time when Syria was viewing the movement with suspicion and distrust.

Second, the appearance of a nationalistic current, within the National Movement, consisting of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party ('Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i), the Syrian National Socialist Party, and detachments of the Socialist Union and Nasirites except for the Independent Nasirites (the al-Murabitun). This current wanted to carry out the operation of appraising the previous stage and preparing the program for national action for the future, not a mixed left-communist action program, the character which had dominated the Political Council's statements.

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Third, Walid Jumblatt's preoccupation with the establishment of broad relations with various political leaders on the Lebanese stage, his continuous submission to the Political Council program in relying on a massive budget without capable political and military staffs, and contentment with bureaucratic meetings and statements for local consumption. Walid Jumblatt made extensive contacts which made it seem that he was on one side and the others were on the other.

#### Walid Jumblatt's Role

In this atmosphere, a development occurred which chilled the intensity of the struggle. Walid Jumblatt was able to persuade the Syrians to hold talks with the National Movement, and a stage of contacts began which ended with expanded meetings on a personal and group scale.

In spite of the anxiety of the Political Council of the National Movement to keep good relations with both Baghdad and Damascus at the same time, the Iraqi-Syrian dispute was an explosive element in terms of a number of issues on the Lebanese stage, especially the National Movement's relations with leaders of the Arab deterrent forces.

When Damascus and Baghdad came to an understanding, the notion that the National Movement was a party capable of moving without fear of touchy reactions or problems gained prominence on the Lebanese stage. However, this did not last long, since Damascus, Baghdad and other Arab capitals felt what some observers here call Communist "repression" of the National Movement and of statements by the newspaper AL-WATAN, organ of the movement. Walid Jumblatt also sensed this and perceived that the nationalist current in the movement was afraid of being turned Communist under the guise of coalition with national and progressive parties and forces.

He also perceived that the newspaper AL-WATAN, supervised by an editorial board made up mostly of Communists, was ignoring the Socialist Progressive Party's positions. Through his contacts with the Palestinian resistance, Jumblatt sensed that the resistance wanted to deal with him and with the nationalist detachments in the National Movement and that it was afraid of the Communist tide, which was coming to suppress all aspects of the movement.

If to all this one adds the resentment of independent members of the council over what had happened and the rivalry among all parties and forces to maintain an armed appearance, in Beirut specifically and also in other Lebanese areas, we will find that the National Movement, through its new organization, was not able to evolve into an organized movement truly capable of moving and of making confrontations on the Lebanese stage.

Walid Jumblatt disclosed this state of affairs in a series of interviews and statements in meetings with the National Movement parties. His bluntness increased the alienation between him and the Communists and his

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decision to close down the armed centers, or "the armed persons' shops" as he called them, took the form of an initiative directed against the military extensions of these organizations and parties.

However, in reality this initiative was well-received in the city of Beirut specifically, where feelings of bitterness among the citizens concerning the armed manifestations of mixed organizations and their disputes in the field and locally, which sometimes turned into armed struggles, had increased.

#### Story of the Visit to Baghdad

The dispute came to the surface last April. The Political Council of the National Movement decided to visit Baghdad to conduct discussions with officials. In its request, it stated that Mr Walid Jumblatt would head the delegation. Naturally, the Iraqis agreed but they requested that the visit be delayed a few days while they waited for the Iraqi-Syrian unity talks to end.

Some members of the Political Council went to Walid Jumblatt and told him, "Iraq wants you to visit Baghdad at the head of a National Movement delegation."

Jumblatt accepted, on condition that the visit take place immediately, because he had committed himself to other appointments. The members of the Political Council were astonished, believing that the Iraqi officials would devote complete attention to the delegation since Jumblatt was to head it and an opportunity to meet with him would probably arise in spite of the unity meetings.

The account, attributed to sources in the National Movement, went on to state that Jumblatt went to Baghdad at the head of a delegation made up of Messrs Muhsin Ibrahim, 'Isam Nu'man, Rafiq Abu Yunis and Radi Farahat. Iraqi officials received them but President al-Bakr and President Saddam Husayn could not meet them because of the union talks, although they were requested to stay a few days to arrange time for a meeting.

Naturally the matter was revealed to Walid Jumblatt and he returned to Beirut, as was said at that time, on sharply informing Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Communist Action Organization, that the Political Council's desire that Iraq's allocations to the movement's budget be doubled had caused the council to begin acting irresponsibly.

This is the situation today. To this one might add a group of developments, among them for example the growth of the role of the Organization of Independent Nasirites (the al-Murabitun) and the chief of its command council, Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat, who enjoys great popularity in Beirut.

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Perhaps the attempts by Mr Qulaylat and his organization to function independently of the movement may be explained in terms of going beyond the bounds of the National Movement and the organization's status of parity with the Socialist Progressive Party. In addition, the newspaper AL-WATAN had come to ignore the positions of Walid Jumblatt at times--indeed it had sometimes issued statements contrary to Jumblatt's position in conspicuous places, prompting Walid Jumblatt to take the decision to reissue his party's special newspaper AL-ANBA'. This actually happened recently.

Conversely, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, part of the axis of nationalist parties within the National Movement, considers that the direct objective which must be realized now is to formulate a national reconciliation consecrating the unity and Arabhood of Lebanon and to stipulate a position rejecting any dealings with Israel, while gravitating toward helping the authorities, specifically President Elias Sarkis, to concentrate the power and legitimacy of the state and rebuild the Lebanese army in accordance with the new Defense Law recently ratified by the Chamber of Deputies, which had been a basic demand of the National Movement.

This position, which is consonant with those of the parties of the nationalist axis, as well as rejecting what is described as "communist hegemony" over the agencies of the Central Political Council of the National Movement--represented by the Communist Action Organization and the Communist Party by virtue of the fact that Mr Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Communist Action Organization, is secretary general of the Central Political Council and came to enjoy broader powers following the assassination of Mr Kamal Jumblatt, the head of this council, in 1977--was perhaps the motive behind the party's suspension of its membership in the Central Political Council of the National Movement (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, last issue).

#### Viewpoint of the Non-National Left

The axis of the Communist Party, the Communist Action Movement and the Independent Nasirites (the al-Murabitun) chastises Mr Walid Jumblatt, head of the Socialist Progressive Party, for "acting in isolation" in adopting positions and returning to the traditional bases of Jumblattist (Druze) political leadership in dealing with other political groups. It also chastises him for holding a dialogue with traditional Sunnite leaders of the stripe of President Sa'ib Salam, who is considered the political adversary of Ibrahim Qulaylat, head of the Movement of Independent Nasirites (al-Murabitun). The Communist Party and Communist Action Organization also chastise him for his "flirtation" with the authorities, particularly the president of the republic Elias Sarkis, and his position of "moderate centrism" regarding the army.

The Lebanese crisis today is at the crossroads. Jumblatt wants the National Movement to play a moderate role because he must reach an understanding on the reconciliation formula. The Syrians, Iraqis and all Arabs

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share this position; therefore the dispute has now reached a point which could result in the removal of masks, the separation of forces within the National Movement and perhaps their fragmentation into two movements with two different platforms, unless the Palestine resistance's contacts succeed in mending the rift and help achieve mutual understanding within the council by returning power to a new central council in which the Communists have representatives but do not possess hegemony.

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LEBANON

SOLIDARITY BETWEEN PALESTINIANS, DOMESTIC LEFT EXAMINED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 6-12 Sep 79 pp 22, 23

/Article: "The Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese Left: Political and Military Coordination Through 100,000 Dead and Wounded"

/Text/ In the growing Lebanese left, with its various detachments, the Palestinian resistance found a primarily political ally, and secondarily a military one, for its presence on the Lebanese stage and its takeoff into occupied Palestinian territories. But what now, now that the honeymoon among the detachments of the national movement has ended and its great leader, Kamal Jumblatt, has departed?

Relations between the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestine resistance are now unique, because the two can achieve an almost complete solidarity baptized by the exertion of generous sacrifices, for which the two parties have paid a price estimated in excess of 100,000 killed and wounded. They are still demonstrating their readiness to exert themselves and make sacrifices, while President al-Sadat stands up and upbraids his Arab nation because his Egyptian people have paid 100,000 lives in four wars with Israel.

Originally the establishment of the National Movement assumed the guise of an act of faith in the national nature of the Palestinian cause. Proceeding from this premise, relations between the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestine resistance were distinguished by total coordination, both military and political, and this kept the Palestinian people from becoming isolated on Lebanese territory.

This situation has highlighted a unique phenomenon, the establishment of political and military organizations which are almost common to the two parties. For example, the Socialist Labor Party, represented in the Central Political Council, is in reality the Lebanese wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and there is a firm, organic relationship between the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and

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the Communist Action Organization, one of the most conspicuous manifestations of which was the two organizations' participation in issuing and editing a single magazine which spoke for both, namely the magazine AL-HURRIYAH.

This relationship may be ascribed to the fact that Messrs Nayif Hawatimah, secretary general of the Democratic Front, and Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Communist Action Organization, are comrades in arms in the Arab Nationalist Movement and that the ideological and organizational relationship between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Arab Liberation Front has in effect turned them into two wings, one Lebanese and the other Palestinian, of the same party.

With respect to the FATH organization, numerous, multifaceted organizational relations arose with numerous organizations in the National Movement. It is FATH which helped the Movement of Independent Nasirites (the al-Murabitun) to begin implanting its organization; it encouraged the foundation of more than one organization, and was behind the schism in more than one organization as well.

#### Military and Political Coordination

These relations greatly facilitated the unification of political decision-making and the attainment of homogeneous military coordination. However, on the other hand, the nature of these relations led to the accusation by some that the resistance was conducting an operation tantamount to cooptation of the Lebanese National Movement.

Perhaps this may be attributed to the obvious superiority of the Palestine resistance in the military and material respects and in terms of expertise. The most numerous and most expert fighting men were from the Palestinian organizations, especially at the beginning of the Lebanese civil war when the number of men fighting with the National Movement in all Lebanon did not exceed 3,000. At that time the sources of arms and ammunition were also in the hands of the resistance and financing passed through it, in addition to the supplying and training of fighting men.

The Palestine resistance's opening to the growing Lebanese left began in the practical sense in the early 1970's in particular after the bloody Jordanian events of 1970 after which detachments of the Palestinian resistance moved out of there and into Lebanon for the most part.

After these events, to avoid a repetition of the role Jordan played against it in Lebanon, the Palestine resistance realized the importance of making allies on the Lebanese stage who would protect its back and support its political and combative positions in confrontation with the authorities and the Maronite factional parties which began increasingly to appear discontent with the resistance's activity on and from the Lebanese stage.

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#### Jumblatt the Connecting Link

Mr Kamal Jumblatt played a big role in strengthening, organizing and controlling the relationship between the resistance and the Lebanese National Movement. With President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, he helped build the resistance's bridges to the socialist world, in particular the Soviet Union.

When the civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975, the National Movement was not prepared to play a big military role because it had not previously prepared itself to do so. The Palestinian resistance bore the main burden in this area. However, at the same time it helped train the movement's fighting men and their military role thus increased as time passed in confronting the well-trained, organized and armed Maronite Lebanese Front militia.

However, there are people who cast blame on the Palestinian resistance for becoming implicated in the quagmire of the traditional political game in Lebanon and consider that this "intervention" assumed the role of an explosive element which inflicted damage on the Palestine resistance more than it helped it or benefited it.

However, many observers believe that the resistance had no choice but to cooperate with the detachments of the Lebanese left, because of the Arab isolation which had been imposed on it, because of its heavy presence on the Lebanese stage, and because of its ideological premises as an Arab liberation movement many of whose currents and opinions coincided with the detachments of the Lebanese left, in particular Arab nationalist ones.

#### The Palestine Resistance's Anxiety

There is no doubt that the Palestine resistance is fraught with anxiety over the loosening of ties within the Lebanese National Movement. In summary, one can say that it has exerted and is exerting great efforts to prevent the severing of relations among the parties of the Lebanese left, or at least to prevent internecine strife among its detachments, especially since most of them have come to possess heavy arms which one fears they will use to settle disputes among their wings.

#### The National Front

In talking about the Lebanese National Movement one cannot fail to discuss the "National Front" whose organizations seceded from the National Movement when its plan began to become opposed to Damascus's policy vis-a-vis the Lebanese crisis.

The parties of the National Front are specifically those which were sympathetic to the Syrian line in Lebanon. They are the organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Lebanon (its regional secretary, Eng 'Asim Qanswah) and the Union of Working People's Forces--Nasirite Organization, and its secretary general, Kamal Shatila, who is also secretary general of the Popular Front.

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Also among the parties in this front was the wing which split off from the Syrian National Social Party (the wing of Asad al-Ashqar and 'Isam Muhayiri); however, this withdrew from the front after the party was re-organized.

This front faced a political and military disaster just before the Syrian forces entered Lebanon. National Movement and the Palestinian resistance organizations closed the offices of the front, and its organizations and most of its leaders fled to Damascus. They returned to Lebanon and resumed their activity when relations between the National Movement and the resistance on the one hand and the Syrian authorities on the other returned to normal.

Until recently urgent talks were held between the National Movement and the National Front in an effort to create a reasonable formula for the reunification of both parties.

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MAURITANIA

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS INTRODUCES NEW TAX MEASURES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2444

[Excerpt] The Council of Ministers of Mauritania, which met on 17-18 August 1979, adopted a draft ordinance fixing the taxation applicable to the project "Development of Small and Middle-Sized Enterprises in Rural and Urban Areas" and a draft ordinance modifying Ordinance No 79,023 of 20 February 1979 concerning remission of fees, taxes and duties on the supplying of equipment and materials and the labor necessary for the fitting out of 36 wells with financing by ADF [African Development Fund].

In addition, the council adopted the draft decree approving the budget for the Tagant region, which amounts to more than 11 million ouguiya.

The minister of industry and mines made a report on the meeting of the financial backers for the Gorgol Noir project, which took place in Paris from 22-23 July 1979. The council was pleased with the results obtained from the participants.

Lastly, the minister of rural development read a paper on the meeting of the national officers in charge of scientific and technical research and the national experts on the management of scientific information of the member countries of CILSS [Inter-State Committee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel] held from 2-5 July 1979. The meeting worked out a plan to facilitate the setting up in the member states of CILSS of a system of scientific and technical management.

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MAURITANIA

WELL DRILLING PROGRAM SET UP

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2444

[Text] On 28 July, a working group examined the setting up of operational and maintenance structures for drilling 25 farm wells and also examined the national counterpart of the project, jointly financed by UNSO (United Nations Sahelian Office), ADB [African Development Bank] and the Mauritanian Government. This financing will insure the fitting out, basic infrastructure, operation and maintenance for 4 to 5 years.

Each of the 25 wells will make it possible to develop 10 hectares, to insure the breeding of 500 head of cattle and to meet water needs in general.

Ten are to be equipped with submersible pumps and 15 with vertical-axis pumps. The first 10 are located in Bareina, Bou El Gharbane, Matamoulana, Bousdera, Messoud, N'Bal Lekhsouma, Tiniarg, N'Toujey, Benichad and M'Bout, and the 15 others in Ilefti, Nafmat, Taguilalet, Nimjat, Bouir-Tores, Mederdra, Aouleigat, Amnaker, Chram, Diouck, Kamour, Maghama and Aleg.

The project will be carried out with financing of 28.44 million ouguiya, or about 2.6 million French francs.

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TUNISIA

ECONOMIC GROWTH CONTINUING

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 pp 2560, 2561

[Text] In the report submitted on 5 September to the Tenth Congress of the Destourian Socialist Party (see this publication, 14 September, p 2501), Mr Hedi Nourira, prime minister and secretary-general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], who was unanimously elected to membership in the party's central committee, emphasized the broad range and speed of Tunisia's economic growth especially since 1970. Below, we are reproducing some particularly significant social-economic data, taken from his report and re-grouped under the various headings.

Population, Employment, Emigration

Between the two censuses of 1966 and 1975, the gainfully employed population in Tunisia increased from 927,000 to 1,367,000, in other words, an increase of 440,000 persons over a period of nine years, including 237,000 men and 203,000 women.

The demand for additional jobs--revealing the tremendous increase coming from the younger generations--grew from 35,000 per year during the decade of 1962-1971 to 50,000 during the Fourth Plan (1973-1976) and 56,000 for the Fifth Plan (1977-1981).

"This rapid advance," Mr Nourira emphasized, "is a serious challenge to the developing economy; we manage to face that challenge with a certain degree of ease. While jobs created during the decade of 1962-1971 represented only half of the demand, in other words, 15,000 out of 35,000 per year, the Fourth Plan was able to record 41,000 new jobs per year or 80 percent of the demand. The Fifth Plan is designed to provide 50,000 jobs per year for an additional demand of 56,000 or a satisfactory rate of 89 percent."

The job creation shortage continues to be taken care of through emigration whose flow dropped from 16,000 per year in 1962-1971 to 8,000 per year in 1972-1977.

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## Small and Medium Enterprises

On the subject of small and medium enterprises, the prime minister strongly stressed the essential position which they hold in the Tunisian economy and, consequently, in development policy. "The dense network of small and medium enterprises, whose growth we are encouraging, is in the process of becoming the real connecting tissue of our action," he declared, adding that the promotion of this category of enterprises was capable of speeding up the move toward the median society model establishes as the goal.

## Wages

During the seventies, the per-capita income went up 50 percent, considering a population growth of about 1 million. While the number of wage earners increased 50 percent between 1970 and 1977--rising from 629,000 to 900,000--the total wage volume more than doubled during that interval of time, increasing from 325 million dinars to 750 million dinars (1 dinar = F10.60, approximately); 58 percent of this total wage volume are distributed by the administration and the public enterprises which employ 38 percent of all wage earners.

During the period of 1970-1975, wages rose faster than the added value (up 125 percent as against 100 percent) and thus also more than savings (up 47 percent). The in-house financing capacity was also affected by this; some examples are particularly eloquent: The wages distributed through the SNCFT [Tunisian National Railroad Company] (railroads) increased from 6,119 million dinars in 1970 to 13,407 dinars in 1977, or more than double, while the personnel force grew only 35 percent, from 7,215 to 9,750. The example of the Sfax-Gafsa Company is even more edifying. The wages distributed were more than triple, rising from 5,823 million dinars in 1970 to 20,240 million dinars in 1977, whereas the personnel force remained practically the same (11,888 in 1970 and 11,641 in 1977).

## Living Standards

The average expenditure per person and per year rose from 72 dinars in 1966 to 147 dinars in 1975. Besides, the proportion of persons having an expenditure level below 100 dinars per year dropped from 67 percent in 1966 to 49 percent in 1975. Correlatively, the population segment spending between 100 and 400 dinars per year rose from 31 percent in 1966 to 46 percent in 1975. It should be noted that the expenditure amounts are given at constant prices.

In spite of an international economic situation shaken by inflation and in spite of the rapid rise in private consumption, the family consumption price rise did not exceed an average of 6 percent per year during the years of 1970-1978. The General Compensation Fund greatly contributed to

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this result; between 1971 and 1978, the cost of its benefits grew from 1.5 million dinars to 48 million dinars, in other words, the compensation effort was multiplied by a factor of 32. This increasingly heavy burden urges us to review the role of the Fund as a function of the net improvement in the purchasing power in favor of a selective support policy which will benefit the most disadvantaged social strata more than in the past.

#### Housing

In the matter of housing, the construction effort was oriented toward the lowest-income category. The number of housing units built increased from 9,600, on the average, per year, during the decade of 1962-1971, to 18,000 in the course of the Fourth Plan, 1973-1976, and should rise to 25,000 per year during the Fifth Plan, 1977-1981. The special attention devoted to the lowest-income group is indicated by the construction projects programmed in the Fifth Plan: 65,000 rural and suburban housing units, in other words, 52 percent of the total construction volume, as against 34 percent during the Fourth Plan; the respective share of standing housing units during these two successive plans was reduced from 10 percent to 3 percent of the total number of housing units.

The Tunisian is very much in favor of having his own home and the percentage of people owning their own homes is in the process of reaching the by no means negligible figure of 75 percent.

#### Output

The output growth rate--the indicator most frequently used in the economic world to evaluate the performance of a given economy--was 6 percent during the fourth Plan, 1973-1976; this is a sign that the Tunisian economy has progressed at a satisfactory rate. As for the first two years of the Fifth Plan, 1977 and 1978, the growth rate was, respectively, 4.1 percent and 8.9 percent, or an average of 5.7 percent. During the first development decade, the average growth rate was 4 percent.

#### Investments

An economy's dynamism is also measured by its capacity to carry out investment programs. Mr Hedi Nouria recalled that, in spite of the fact that the targets are deliberately optimistic, the investment volume came to 1,579 dinars during the 1973-1976 four-year plan, or 90 percent of the estimates.

During the period of the Fifth Plan, 1977-1981, the total investment volume has been set at 4.2 billion dinars. During the first three years of that plan, the implementation rate will be about 96 percent. We recall that the total investment volume during the decade of 1962-197, came to 1,245 million dinars.

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The remarkable investment effort would not have been possible without a sustained effort to get the most out of national savings whose rate grows to about 80 percent during the period of the Fourth Plan as against 60 percent during the 1962-1971 decade. The rate was established at 71.2 percent for the Fifth Plan.

Foreign development financing accounts for 28.8 percent of the investments, as against 19.5 percent for the Fourth Plan and 40 percent for the 1962-1971 decade. The reason is that, from one period to the next, investments were practically quadrupled.

On the other hand, the debt servicing coefficient--that is to say, debt repayment as compared to export earnings--remained within tolerable limits although it is still less than 20 percent. It rose to 10.7 percent during the last year of the Fourth Plan. It will come to about 13 percent for the current year.

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TUNISIA

TUNISIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PARTICIPATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2561

[Text] The board of directors of the BID [Islamic Development Bank] during its meeting on 5 September 1979 expressed its agreement to participate in the capital involved in three Tunisian projects, using the line of share participation granted to the National Bank of Tunisia.

The first project involves Socelta, an integrated poultry raising project established in the northeastern part of Tunisia and producing each year 45 million eggs, 625,000 market chickens and 3 million breeding chickens. The share of the BID in the company capital comes to 1,366,875 Islamic dinars, or 30 percent of the capital. (The Islamic dinar is an accounting unit equivalent to the SDR of the IMF.)

The second project involves the Tunisie-Lait Company, a dairy farm producing milk, yogurt, cream, cheese, and butter-milk. The annual output will be about 36 million liters of milk, 50 million cartons of yogurt, 200,000 kilograms of curdled milk, 6 million bottles of cheese concentrate, and 200,000 liters of table cream. The BID will acquire 29 percent of the company's capital representing 995,312 Islamic dinars.

A third project involves the Taoufik Polyclinic, an ultramodern establishment in Tunisia, with a capacity for 115 beds as well as six operating rooms and an emergency room [intensive-care unit]. The participation of the BID will come to 1,464,840 Islamic dinars or 30 percent of the company's capital.

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TUNISIA

EDUCATION, GROWTH, JOBS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2551, 2552

[Unattributed article: "Tunisia Rethinking National Education Problems in Light of Developments and Employment"]

[Text] Tunisia has always assigned great importance to human values. It is therefore not astonishing that problems of education and vocational training and, more generally, all questions involving the younger generation, should hold the attention of Tunisian leaders. That includes not only the ministers and secretaries of state directly involved (education, higher education and scientific research, vocational training) but a number of other personalities, such as the director and the deputy directors of the party, the ministers of national defense, of planning, of health, of agriculture, of equipment and, of course, the prime minister himself are systematically concerned with this problem within the framework of the party or in the course of public meetings.

Some of these gatherings are connected with "Day of Knowledge," held on the eve of the start of vacation; but Destourian and government doctrine are being explained and commented upon on various occasions throughout the year.

During the "Day of Knowledge" at the Siddiki Academy in Tunis, which graduates most of the pioneers of Tunisian independence, Mr Hedi Nouira explained that the schools must update and perfect the aptitudes of each and every individual so as to permit everyone to make the best possible contribution to overall development; the country needs the capacity of all of its children although some are on different levels from others and it is therefore necessary to proscribe the elitist concept of education. Every child must be sent to school and get basic education, forming a whole and enabling that child to achieve its harmonious integration.

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into society. The primary school is intended not only to enable the most gifted to go on to high school but it also has its own complete instruction mission at its own level.

The solution to the problem of "failures" can be found within this perspective. These dropouts who, according to the popular expression, are so to speak "disabled," in vain try to find jobs involving bureaucratic functions and they resign themselves gather in ill humor to certain minor jobs for which they were not trained. From here on in however pupils who fail their high school entrance examination will no longer be left to themselves; the prime minister emphasized that they must be enabled to shake off the impression that this failure means that they are failures for life.

Schools, Manual Labor, and Growth

The "failures" as a matter of fact are sent on for a seventh year of primary studies and, while they are being prepared to try once more to get into high school, "this program makes them aware of the facts of life in the job world and the nobility of manual labor"; it also gives them a start toward practical training. An eighth year, currently being tested, would perfect this type of training and "would prepare primary school graduates for integration into local and regional economic life."

This experiment of the "seventh and eighth years" has aroused much interest; numerous political personalities are studying and supporting it without concealing the fact that there are certain obstacles here. Presiding over the Destourian cell congresses in April, agriculture minister Hassan Belk-hodja and equipment minister Lassaad ben Osman found that young people refuse to take up jobs in farming and manual labor and that they have to be encouraged to do so. In May, national education minister Mohamed Mzali under the same conditions revealed that manual labor hereafter will to the extent possible be included in the schedules for the first year of primary school and will get the same support as the other subjects since "the purpose of education is to provide integral training and to become a factor in development so that the primary school will in this fashion experience a real revolution." The teachers, Mr Mzali declared on 11 May in the Tunisian Southeast, have had every latitude in organizing manual instruction as they saw fit. In crafts and in agriculture, they often obtained such satisfactory results that "the output of the pupils could be easily sold because of its good quality and reasonable prices. Thus, an appreciable portion of the equipment in national education and certain sectors of the economy is supplied through the production coming from the seventh-year and eighth-year primary school pupils as well as the secondary and vocational high schools."

A postage stamp issue was put out in an effort to disclose these achievements, representing two of the main results, that is, the manufacture of rattan nets and apiculture by the pupils of the schools in Ellouza (Sfax) and Haouamdia (near Tabarka).

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On the occasion of the "Day of Knowledge," the members of the government throughout the country commented on this renewal in education. "Growth can be achieved only if we spread knowledge," Mr Fouad Mebazaa, minister of public health, said at Bizerte. The opening of the environmental school is a success; it is necessary "to guide the pupils toward the various branches of vocational training," Mr Noureddine Ktari, secretary of state for vocational training, said at Sidi Bouzid (Tunisian Center).

## Schools and Enterprises

Social goals and, above all, the establishment of better roots for the young people are being pursued at the same time. Mr Nourira told the cadres in the rural region of Beja (Tunisian North) on 25 May that the promotion of development and training programs, given by the schools with a view to the agricultural functions peculiar to each region, must give the young people an incentive to settle in places where they were born. Justice minister Slaheddine Baly stated that education policy springs from democratic and decentralizing viewpoints, "promoting the spread of new talents throughout the rural areas" (7 July).

"The adaptation of the different specialties to the requirements of the economic environment," particularly on the secondary level, was furthermore underscored by Mr Nourira in his speech on the occasion of "Day of Knowledge." It is therefore a good idea, he said, to involve the enterprise managers in the drafting of programs and the organization of training courses with a view to achieving "the development of a new outlook in the vocational and technical training establishments, the outlook geared toward real production." "The adaptation of education policy to the requirements of the job market" were also pointed up by Mr Baly at the Siliana Senior High School (Tunisian West-Central region) on the occasion of "Day of Knowledge," as one of the achievements of the regime.

## Human and Political Aspects

Mr Nourira however stressed that "regardless of our concern in assuring the adjustment between training and the job market, the schools are not factories that turn out production tools. The schools are the place where the individual perfects himself, where his creative faculties are awakened, where a sense of responsibility is inculcated, where the destiny of the individual and the community is defined. The individual is not a simple tool in a factory; the individual must be steeled against alienations; we must preserve the specific traits of Tunisian youth by strengthening our Arab-Islamic authenticity because any generation that does not derive any pride from its nationality, any generation that does not draw upon its cultural heritage, is an uprooted generation on which one cannot count in the battle for development."

In a similar vein, Mr Mohammed Mzali, recommending contact between the schools and the enterprises at Testour and later on at Beni Khalled (Cape

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Bon), underscored the need for inculcating in the young people a devotion to the fatherland and to the Arab-Islamic moral and spiritual values as well as the importance of the role of the family which has the initial task in any education.

We are not astonished to find that the political aspect of the problems of the younger generation in particular were brought up by Mr Mohamed Sayah, party director. In closing the activities of the National Destourian Youth Council on 24 April, he emphasized the need for mobilizing the young people in support of developments and urged the secretaries-general of the bureaus to set an example. "Destourian socialist youth in some way represents the loyal guard of the Bourguiba regime and the devoted defender of the nation's gains."

Closing the seminar of high school teachers on 10 July, Mr Mohamed Sayeh urged the teachers to present to their pupils the realities of their country's history, since political education does not work by stuffing skulls with data but rather by stimulating thinking, research, and the faculty to distinguish truth from falsehoods and essentials from nonessentials.

The political problem was also taken up by Mr Abdallah Farhat, former minister of national defense. "The concern expressed by the young people," he said on 23 April during the Destourian cell congress of M'Saken (Sahel), "is to be found everywhere in all dynamic societies." It springs from the progress made in the fields of education and employment and the effect is to raise the level of the youngsters' aspirations. On 14 June at Rades he presided over a Destourian seminar devoted to "interdependence of generations." The state--he said--thanks to the democratization of education has been working hard to put an end to illiteracy and to offer equality of opportunity to all citizens; the party has set itself the goal of involving the young people in the exercise of responsibility.

The grass-roots congress of the Destourian Socialist Youth had the topic this year of "the participation of the young people in political action." The national bureau organized training and refresher training courses assigning special importance to rural youth and cadre training.

#### Higher Education and Scientific Research

In his speech on "Day of Knowledge," Mr Hedi Nouria did not fail to mention higher education. The professors, he said, must not only teach their courses; they must also work on the renewal of methods "so that each establishment will become a social-economic-educational institutional a construction site where people learn to create and to restore." It is therefore a good idea "to start education on the environment, to place it in a state of osmosis with the real world, to adapt it to the needs of the times, to tie it in with the job market, so as to enable it to have a dialogue with the production structures both in industry and agriculture." A dialogue is also necessary, on the one hand, between those in charge and

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the professors and, on the other hand, the students "who want to participate in the construction of society." The dialogue is necessary "for the search for practical solutions amid reciprocal confidence. The student is our noble human capital and we must guarantee him perfect education."

Dr Dhaoui Hannablia, minister of interior, on 8 July at Tunis presided over the Higher Education and Scientific Research Cell Congress. He emphasized that "the existence of a Destourian cell in the university represents a major gain" and he noted "the perfect understanding prevailing between the university and the upper echelons of the party." The teachers--he added--must "arouse a sense of responsibility toward the fatherland among the students; they must restore the university atmosphere and they must guarantee the effectiveness of higher education.

Opening the regional conference of students at Jendouba (Tunisian North) on 24 July, Mr Mohamed Sayah called attention to the fight against underdevelopment and stressed that, because of its spirit of initiative and imagination, youth always constituted the vanguard force. Speaking at the closing session of this conference, Dr Dhaoui Hannablia emphasized the role of the students in the buildup, orientation, and mobilization of the citizens so that the latter may redouble their efforts and produce more. He urged the Destourian students to contribute to the recovery of the university which has been racked by crises almost every year; they must stop the troublemakers and agitators.

We note that the number of students since independence increased from 1,300 to 25,000 plus 8,000 abroad; 25 percent among them are scholarship students.

The scientific research cells, Mr Hedi Nouria said in concluding his speech on the occasion of "Day of Knowledge," must "organically tie their work in with economic growth and the production structures. The university people thus must discuss the situation with enterprise managers and benefit from the existing structures and equipment. The programs must be extended to research of common interest in combination with similar structures" in the area south of the Sahara, in the Arab World, and on the two shores of the Mediterranean.

While assuring the conditions for its growth and by stimulating its national values, Tunisia thus intends to remain loyal to this spirit of opening which in effect is one of the elements of its prestige.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH USSR--Water power project with Soviet cooperation. During her stay last week in Tunis, Mrs Ivdokia Karpova, vice premier of the USSR, conferred with Mr Rachid Sfar, minister of industry, mining, and energy, and Mr Lassad Ben Osman, minister of equipment, on boosting bilateral cooperation in the field of agriculture and especially in the water power sector as well as in the industrial area. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2561] 5058

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WESTERN SAHARA

CONDITIONS IN DAKHLA UNDER MAURITANIAN RULE NOTED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 16-22 Sep 79 pp 36-37

[Text] Spaniards founded Villa Cisneros and made it the Pearl of the Sahara. Mauritians abused it until it became a ruin, which Morocco is now trying to revive.

"Let us go to the desert," says the priest. With a perennial beatific expression, Father Camilo Gonzalez in his car crosses the almost deserted streets. The glare of the siesta made the people of Dakhla seek the shade. The desert is there, where the houses come to an end, and goes on interminably. Not a blade of grass; only earth. Trees are seen far away. "It is a mirage," says the priest to Pedro Gonzalez, the CAMBIO 16 reporter. "There is nothing there."

He stops the car. The city was left far behind, on the horizon, like another mirage. "We cannot go on," explains the priest. Ahead are the fortifications of the Moroccan army, which cut off the route from the desert to Dakhla, formerly Villa Cisneros, founded by the Spanish. The sun beats against the small Seat car, which the Oblate priest had painted yellow. "These are the vegetable plots."

None could have guessed it. Protected from the wind and sand by barricades of tin cans, sticks, canvas, stones and mountains of garbage, something green is seen peeking from among them. A little alfalfa, some square meters of vegetables. This is all this land can produce. When it is scratched, stones appear. Spaniards, who arrived at the northwestern coast of Africa almost 100 years ago, worked decades until they succeeded in penetrating this rocky crust of the western Sahara. They found water--with sulfur, but drinkable--at more than 400 meters in depth, and this water rushes today, uncontrolled through the metal installations left by the colonialists, and irrigates the poor vegetable plots of the Saharans.

The men of the desert are bent over their crops. Some of them are seated, with crossed legs, rosary in hand. As always, they expect more from Allah than from nature. The grass is for the goats, who produce the

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only fresh food the Saharans can find today. However, the animals, like their masters, are condemned to inevitable starvation. Dakhla and its surroundings constitute an unfriendly universe, without any hope.

"Spaniard, Brother"

Short, plump, jovial, the priest shakes hands with these men of the desert, who are trying, with little success, to become farmers. They all know him. They greet each other in the language of the Ouled Dlim, a regional dialect, but they speak Spanish, although the priest has lived among them almost 25 years. The Saharans of Dakhla, who once fed the ranks of nationalist rebels against Spain and gave their sons to the Polisario Front, have good memories of Spaniards. "Spaniard, brother," they say to the visitor. Perhaps this is because what came later was worse, much worse.

The priest walks among the vegetable gardens. He knows them all. He knows the properties of the water, the low yield of the land, the owners of the plots. The vegetable gardens end at a high wall. "This is the Spanish cemetery," he announced and went in among the open graves and the rubble of headstones and crosses. This was his territory, there he had helped to bury dozens of men, women and children. Today, all is in ruins.

When the Madrid government decided to leave in 1975, orders were given to everybody to abandon Villa Cisneros. Only the priest and one other Spaniard remained there. The dead were to leave with the living, as if Spain were to leave only the port, school, church, mosque, the native quarter, the plaza with trees, the fort, airport, but nothing really her own. Thus, the dead were again put in coffins and shipped to Spain.

The deserted cemetery is something like a monument to the flight of an entire nation. Moslems, respectful of death, had not touched it. Only the priest visits it, as he does now.

On our way back we find the Moslem cemetery, with its stone mounds over the graves, and the slaughterhouse. Some camels are waiting, lying on the ground, with a suspicious look, for the butcher to arrive. Ramadan is about to end, and the people will be happy when the government--the new Moroccan Government--distributes meat. It is time to distribute meat. In Dakhla, the people are hungry after 4 years of Mauritanian rule. The stores are almost empty. Saharans who are merchants or officials are living a nightmare.

Mauritanian authorities, who represent a country of nomads created by France in 1960 in order to contain the territorial ambitions of Morocco, had cut communications with Las Palmas [Canary Islands] from where food, clothing, automobiles, ships, electric batteries, toothbrushes, shoes, chewing gum, crackers, books, everything used to come.

They imposed exorbitant taxes on a city that used to be a free port, and ruined everybody. Big merchants closed their doors because they earn

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more this way, while they await developments; small merchants are in debt and no longer have credit in the Canary Islands. In their dark little shops, on their shelves, they have some canned goods, some crackers, envelopes of concentrated soups, combs. In some of them, one can find a loaf of bread. Saharans know that starvation is their usual companion and seem to be resigned.

Spaniards in Sahara

On the other hand, Juan Moreno, the Spanish proprietor of the best bar in the city, is fighting like a wolf against shortages. He has coffee, beer and refreshments in his bar. However, his meals are lean: there were days when the customers could not be offered more than a plate of cooked potatoes with a little corned beef. Last week, after many knocks at the door of a neighboring house, Juan obtained eggs and the menu of the "Los Pinchitos" bar included omelettes and fried eggs.

Juan is one of the six [sic] Spaniards who live in former Villa Cisneros today. The others are his cook, his helper (Antonio), a pilot who helps the ships enter the port (Rafael), and the priest. In the winter, two teachers usually come, and unselfishly continue to teach the children.

The New Masters

However, their efforts seem lost. The Saharan children of Dakhla no longer understand Spanish. They have lost the habit of asking for candy and pesetas. For almost 4 years they had to speak French--a very bad French--with Mauritanian soldiers, the new masters.

The Mauritians did not contribute anything to the former Spanish colony. Their officers, governors and officials only thought of getting rich quick and only stole. Their soldiers engaged in acts of violence, raping women and burning the city. The water continues to flow by its own pressure; electric light is a luxury; the hospital was made into something that looks more like a stable than a health center. Sheets have not been changed for 6 months. Maternity cases were taken care of by a veterinarian who took care of camels. X-ray equipment was shattered.

Helpless Saharans had only two alternatives: to put up with all this or to return to the desert. More than 15,000, according to a high Mauritanian military officer, opted for the second way and joined the Polisario Front, a real nightmare for Mauritania.

Polisarios were pursued in vain. At the only movie theater in Dakhla the people were able to see documentary films in which "heroic Mauritanian troops" proudly receive dozens of Polisario prisoners who, shamefully defeated, were coming down some dune with their hands held high. The Mauritanian public applauded frenetically, while the Saharans remained silent.

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The people made fun of the Mauritians behind their backs, giving them nicknames in Spanish: the bank manager was called "Caracaballo" [horseface]; the mayor, "El Pirata," [the pirate]; a very short official, "El Pinchauvas" [grape picker].

At the beginning of March of this year, Villa Cisneros experienced a tragic week, when the people came out into the street in protest, ahiling the Polisario Front (to which they always referred, when someone left, as Fernando Poo). The troops harshly repressed the people and locked up a group of men. Then the women staged a riot and protested to the authorities. They were also locked up. The prisoners were tortured. A young man arrived at the hospital after being beaten. A girl left the police station wrapped in a blanket to have an abortion at a hospital.

Tragic Week

At the beginning of August, when Mauritania announced that it had signed an agreement with the Polisario Front and that it would leave the occupied territory, including Dakhla, to it, the airport was full of Saharans who decided to join the Polisarios. Two planes were able to leave before the Moroccan troops stopped the exodus. For Morocco, which was replacing Mauritania in the region, this massive flight would have been catastrophic.

The Moroccans arrived with a different policy. Unlike the Mauritians they have an army and represent an old nation, a state. Its presence there is not a whim but the result of a design, behind which the Alauite crown is placing all its cards.

The Moroccan army entered distributing food--a bag of potatoes, another of onions, one of rock sugar, one of flour, onions, tea, powdered milk, oil-- and went to critical centers to repair the results of the Mauritanian barbarism: light, water, the hospital. It was decided to eliminate customs duties, to restore the flights to the Canary Islands (three a week)--- and to give Moroccan documents to all inhabitants. First Spanish, then Mauritanian, the former Villa Cisneros from now on will be the 37th province of Morocco.

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WESTERN SAHARA

SAHARAN ISSUE LIKELY TO BE DECIDED ON BATTLEFIELD

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[Text]

The signing of a definitive peace treaty between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in Algiers at the beginning of August brought an end, in theory at least, to Nouakchott's involvement in the bitter four-year Western Sahara conflict.

But the decision by Mauritania's ruling Military Committee of National Salvation (CMSN) headed by Prime Minister Khouna Ould-Heydallah to end the "neither war nor peace" situation, which had prevailed since the overthrow of President Mokhtar Ould-Dadda in July 1978, placed Morocco in an extremely delicate political and diplomatic position.

After the loss of its southern ally, with whom it partitioned and annexed the former Spanish colony in 1975, the Moroccan Government can no longer count on the Madrid Agreement to provide a legal justification for the Cherifian presence in the Western Sahara. Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja declared that the Sahara remained an "international territory" and that it was "impossible to speak of provinces in the Western Sahara".

Morocco's growing diplomatic isolation was underlined by the unfavourable response it received in June at the United Nations to its complaint against "Algerian aggression". At the July OAU summit conference in Monrovia, the Moroccan delegation walked out when the organisation passed a resolution calling for a referendum in the Sahara.

At an international press conference in the royal palace at Fez, King Hassan described the OAU meeting as a "tom-tom conference where votes were bought". Diplomatic sources in Rabat say that Morocco may stay away from future OAU meetings to show its displeasure.

To balance diplomatic setbacks, King Hassan invited representatives of the Saharan tribes in the Tiris al-Gharbia to pledge allegiance to the Cherifian throne and has referred repeatedly to the "voluntary expression of the will of the people of Dakhla".

On August 11, as the dark blood of a sacrificed camel spread over a white stone, a delegation of 360 blue-clad Sahrawis representing the Ouled Dlimi, Reguibat, Lahcen, Laroussiyine, Ma el-Ainine, and a host of other tribes with ties in Morocco, pledged their allegiance to Rabat.

King Hassan symbolically placed a rifle in the hands of each. The Moroccan flag was raised over the town of Dakhla, capital of the southern part of the Western Sahara, which then became the twentieth Moroccan province of Oued Eddahab.

But while celebrations were taking place in the new province's capital, Polisario guerrillas staged a devastating attack about 100 miles to the east at the garrison of Bir Anzaran. Official Moroccan press releases admitted losses of 200 dead and another 200 captured.

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In the immediate future Saharan diplomacy will be increasingly decided on the battlefields. The Saharan Arab Democratic Republic's (RASD) Foreign Minister Brahim Hakim told *The Middle East* that Polisario intended to step up military action both in the occupied Sahara and in southern Morocco in response to Rabat's "intransigence and expansionism". An attack on the southern Moroccan garrison at Lebourate at the end of August again showed how vulnerable the Moroccan forces are, even on their own territory.

Growing frustration in Morocco's ruling circles has led the King to describe the situation "as bordering on the intolerable" and of suggesting again the possibility of "hot pursuit" raids into Algerian territory which was first proclaimed in January.

The possibility of even a short conflict with Algeria to force an international settlement is a card that Rabat will not play until the burden of the Saharan war strains Moroccan society to the breaking point. King Hassan will have to contain the ardour and growing frustration of both the armed forces and the political parties, which are competing with each other in raising nationalist slogans.

Morocco has reinforced its defence network with the 1,500 crack troops recently repatriated from Zaire's embattled Shaba province and the 7,000 soldiers previously stationed in northern Mauritania. Moreover, during the past few months it has been withdrawing from hard-to-defend advanced posts and concentrating its forces in a strategic triangle - with the Bou Craa phosphate mines in the centre - stretching from the capital at El-Ayoune to Smara in the north and Boujdor in the south.

From the fortified bases Morocco is now sending out mobile motorised units known as Green March Commandos in an attempt to impede guerrilla movements. At the same time, the Air Force is coming to play a more dynamic role, using both reconnaissance planes equipped with sophisticated electronic gear and fighter planes to search out and destroy Polisario columns.

It is expected that the 50 Mirage F-1s - the American-built F-5s have proved vulnerable to the Polisario's Soviet-built SAM-7 missiles - will soon see action. Morocco is also counting on an electronic surveillance system, designed by Northrop Corporation and previously used in Vietnam, to help detect guerrillas in the desert.

A Moroccan shopping list for the US includes 24 Cobra helicopters equipped with wire-guided anti-tank missiles and 24 OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance aircraft.

King Hassan is increasingly looking to Washington for support. Officially the US does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara but it appears to acknowledge Rabat's *de facto* administration. Algeria with its natural gas and crude oil is still America's key commercial partner in the Maghreb, but Washington also has important geopolitical interests in Morocco, which controls both the strategic Atlantic seaports and the entrance to the Mediterranean.

Pressure for a more sympathetic American policy towards Morocco is being exerted in Washington. Senator Jacob Javits - who visited Morocco last spring - succeeded in blocking an Administration request to cut its military sales credits to Morocco for the 1980 fiscal year by \$15 million.

American personalities who have visited Rabat in recent months include former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Deputy Defence Secretary Charles Duncan. Representative Stephan Solarz visited Morocco in August to study ways of amending the 1960 US-Moroccan defence treaty. Washington has been somewhat embarrassed by Morocco's use of American arms, in violation of the treaty, outside its frontiers.

The Western Sahara is likely to become the subject of a foreign policy debate in Congress during the coming year. But President Carter's critics have pointed out that the Administration may be heading for another Iran-type fiasco through its growing involvement in the Sahara. Intelligence reports recently circulated in Washington said that the war was eroding King Hassan's support and that a military takeover could not be ruled out.

To draw attention away from its own problems, Morocco has been trying to exacerbate political problems in Mauritania and split Polisario's backers. At his press conference, King Hassan no longer referred to Polisario guerrillas as Algerian mercenaries but as Mauritians and "rebels in the eyes of Muslim law" who should give up their arms and return home. He was in effect inviting the Algerian-backed Polisario to take over Mauritania.

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Morocco has also allowed discredited former CMSN member Lieutenant-Colonel Kader (closely associated with the late Premier Ould-Bouceif) to hold a press conference in Rabat to announce the creation of a so-called "free Officers" group aimed at overthrowing the Mauritanian government. This has pushed Mauritania to re-establish diplomatic relations, broken off in 1975, with Algeria and to denounce the 1977 defence pact with Rabat.

Mauritanian fears of Morocco have been reawakened, for few Mauritians have forgotten that King Hassan refused to recognise their independence until 1969. Some Moroccan political forces still claim that Mauritania is part of "Greater Morocco".

Morocco is also playing on the rivalry between Algeria and Libya, and in that way is hoping to increase pressure on Algeria to accept a negotiated settlement under which Polisario would be absorbed into an enlarged Mauritanian entity.

Hassan has attempted to open the door to peace negotiations with Algeria by suggesting that long-standing border problems could be overcome through changes in the 1972 treaty. He pointed to Libya as Morocco's real enemy in north Africa: "Libya has reached the Red Sea via Ethiopia. She wishes to extend her other arm to the coast across Algeria."

He later told *Newsweek* that he had saved the Sahara from Cuban infiltration, and made further overtures to Algeria offering it a corridor for the export of Algerian minerals by sea. So far, however, Algerian support for Polisario has been steadfast and with the diplomatic wind blowing in its favour there is little reason to expect a change of policy.

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