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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2041



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EVENTS CONNECTED WITH SAHARA PROBLEM RELATED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 Sep 79 pp 22, 23

[Article by Huda al-Husayni: "Morocco and Algeria Face to Face: the Military and the Political Balance Shift and the Conciliation Approaches"]

[Text] Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid has so far attended two summit conferences outside Algeria since he succeeded Boumedienne to the presidency. These conferences are: the African Summit Conference in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, and the Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana, the capital of Cuba. At both conferences the Algerian president remained quiet like a sphinx; he did not utter a single word.

Observers disagree about explaining this silence on the part of Algeria's president. There are those who say that Chadli has nothing to say, but the more likely explanation for his silence is that the Algerian president does not want to say anything that would further complicate the situation with Morocco.

A meeting was to have taken place between the Algerian president and the king of Morocco at the Monrovia Summit. But this meeting did not take place because it was resented by Libyan President Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi. When al-Qadhafi found out about the proposed meeting, he sent a Polisario division equipped with heavy weapons and rockets, and it attacked the city of Tan-Tan. It was this operation that foiled the meeting between Chadli and Hassan. The Algerians feared that Libya may control the Polisario, and they would thus lose this card. They wanted to show that they were the only ones who were responsible for the Polisario in spite of the fact that Libya was supporting them against Morocco. To affirm their control over the Polisario, the Algerians sent a force of Bedouin fighters who occupied the Lebouira area for 2 days. A fierce battle with Moroccan troops took place there, and King Hassan decided after this battle not to go to Monrovia and not to meet with Chadli.

This time the Algerian president was not the only one who was silent. His silence was shared by Libyan President Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi. In the speech he delivered on the 10th anniversary of the first of September Revolution in

which he commended Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Gulf states, the Libyan president did not closely or remotely touch upon the problem of the Sahara. Arab delegations who were participating in the Libyan festivities on that day interpreted this as an indication of a significant change in the Libyan position because, according to one of the Arab ambassadors in Tripoli, "Libya had begun to recognize the danger of the game after al-Sadat declared his determination to send military aid to Morocco."

Has the balance begun to shift in Morocco's favor?

Tunisian circles respond to this question by saying that the Moroccan situation has improved militarily and internationally and that Morocco has become less isolated than it was previously. It was for this reason that Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba thought that the time was appropriate for him to intervene personally in an attempt to bring King Hassan and the Algerian president together in a meeting in Tunisia for the purpose of establishing a quick solution to the problem. The fact that the Moroccan king accepted the Tunisian invitation immediately indicates a relatively stronger negotiating position that differs from the position that forced him to boycott the Monrovia Conference.

But Algeria's reticence about the Tunisian invitation makes the proposed meeting unlikely at the present time. Although Moroccan circles are inclined to believe that the Algerian president's response to meet King Hassan in Tunisia was "a man's response" to the Moroccan monarch's refusal to attend the Monrovia meeting, French diplomatic circles think that a meeting is still possible. They emphasize that this meeting will take place in Paris, and, according to them, it will be sponsored by French President Giscard d'Estaing "because the broad features of the French plan to settle the dispute have succeeded."

What are the broad features of the French plan?

The French plan, as it is viewed by sources close to the Quai D'orsay (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), is based on removing Mauritania from the struggle and on neutralizing Libya. The struggle would thus become a bilateral struggle between Morocco and Algeria, and it could be solved in a meeting between Hassan and Chadli. The French think that the possibility for a solution does exist "because the major powers do not want North Africa to explode, at least not at this stage."

The French describe their plan as "intelligent and long-winded." As the aforementioned sources state, "The plan serves the interests of Morocco without hurting either Algeria or French interests in Algeria."

It is the opinion of the French sources that the developments which led to Mauritania's withdrawal from the Sahara after the Algiers Agreement between the present Mauritanian government and the Polisario did at the same time bring about an improvement in the Moroccan military position for the following considerations:

First, Morocco was compelled to defend Mauritania and both the northern and southern parts of the Western Sahara in the past. Moroccan troops were scattered from Tindouf on the Algerian borders to Mauritania and along the Sahara. The fact that the troops were spread out throughout this vast terrain was a reason for the dissolution of the Moroccan army and the source for its exhaustion. But Mauritania's withdrawal from the struggle did relieve the Moroccan troops somewhat of the responsibility for defending Mauritania in accordance with the 1976 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The circle of operations for the Moroccan army shrank so that the army was protecting specific and well-known borders where its presence had become heavy in materiel and numbers.

Second, a U. S. position that is more supportive of Morocco than that of the past has emerged. The Americans decided to supply Morocco with modern weapons to strengthen it. This decision followed a strong political campaign that was led by a number of influential congressmen and was embraced by former Minister of Energy James Schlesinger. Morocco benefited from the U. S. political campaign that grew after the fall of the Shah in Iran and, after that, of Somoza in Nicaragua. Charges inside the country and abroad that Washington "was abandoning its friends" were becoming more emphatic.

Third, al-Sadat made a surprise announcement on the eve of the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana that he was ready to assist Morocco militarily in spite of King Hassan's position against the Camp David Accords and his adherence to the Baghdad Summit resolutions. Egypt did in fact send Morocco weapons and transport airplanes (18 Hercules C-130 airplanes were sent).

The French believe that it was the Americans who encouraged al-Sadat to take this position. They thus killed three birds with one stone. By doing so they strengthened Morocco's military position; they reduced al-Sadat's isolation from the Arabs; and they aroused the fears of Algeria and Libya about the possibility that the Egyptian-Israeli alliance may enter as a party against them to keep them from intruding into the struggle to a harmful degree.

It seems that al-Sadat's initiative was effective because, according to a statement made by a Palestinian official, Yasir 'Arafat, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO quickly became interested in the matter "so that the organization would not lose Morocco's support." Abu 'Ammar sent his political adviser Hani al-Hasan from Havana to Rabat where he met for two hours with King Hassan. [After the meeting] al-Hasan made a statement supporting the Moroccan position. The Palestinian official told AL-HAWADITH, "This position that Abu 'Ammar has taken is due to the fact that entering into any confrontation with Morocco, whose people stand united behind the king on the question of the Sahara, would signify pushing Morocco to align itself with al-Sadat's camp. But the liberation organization is concerned about keeping the Moroccan position committed to the Baghdad Summit and supportive of the liberation organization without reservations."

Palestinian interest in the question of the Sahara is not new. In 1974 during the final session of the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, the king spoke about his determination to liberate the Sahara from the Spanish people, [and he said this] in the presence of the late Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. When the king turned over the floor to Yasir 'Arafat, he joked with him and said, "And now a word from Brother Abu 'Ammar, who is called Yasir 'Arafat." Abu 'Ammar expressed his support for the king's efforts to liberate the Sahara, and he said, "We have no horses or money to offer you, but we are willing to place our experience in guerilla warfare at the disposal of King Hassan to liberate the Sahara from the Spanish people." Five years after this incident, the situation was turned upside down: the Spanish people, who had given up the Sahara to Morocco, recognized the Polisario, and suddenly Yasir 'Arafat was in Madrid.

When King Hassan was boycotting the Monrovia Summit, it so happened that the "Jerusalem Committee" was meeting in Morocco. This committee had grown out of the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Countries that was convened in the city of Fes. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar was representing the PLO at that meeting. During the meeting Abu Mayzar became indisposed and was taken to the hospital where the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs M'Hamed Boucetta visited him. While in the hospital the Palestinian representative proposed to Boucetta an idea that he phrased in the form of a question. Abu Mayzar told Boucetta, "Why don't you give Algeria a moral victory and recognize the Polisario? After you do this a meeting can be held in which all the parties concerned in the struggle of the Sahara can participate and you would investigate the matters of the area."

Boucetta left the hospital and went immediately to the royal palace where he informed the king of this idea, and the king approved of it. Abu Mayzar thought that he had succeeded in his mission, and he sent a cable to Yasir 'Arafat and at the same time notified Syrian officials. Syrian action was faster than Palestinian action. The Syrian president, through his ambassador in Morocco sent a letter to Hassan telling him, "Is it true that you are willing to meet with the Polisario? If what we have heard is true, this is a significant turning point." King Hassan sent a handwritten letter in which he said that he was willing to meet with the Polisario to advise those who are from the Sahara to go back to their mother country and to advise those from Mauritania to go back to their country.

Morocco adhered to this position, and even at the Havana Conference Prime Minister Maati Bouabid delivered a speech in which he said, "Why did we not hear of something called the Polisario during the Spanish occupation of the Sahara? Not even in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries that was held in Algeria in 1973, did either Algeria or any of the other countries make mention of anything called the Polisario. Ever since 1963 at the United Nations it was Morocco who was the spokesman for the Sahara, and there was no other voice from the countries, from the organizations or from the parties claiming otherwise."

Then Bouabid said, "The Sahara extends from the Atlantic Ocean (the Western Sahara) to the Red Sea (the Eastern Sahara). Why isn't Morocco allowed to have its stretch of the Sahara while Algeria and Libya are allowed to have theirs? Accordingly, if you wanted to raise the question of the Sahara, it must comprise the entire area from the ocean to the Red Sea."

And now, what is the balance of profit and loss on the geographical and political scenes?

King Hassan has so far lost Mauritania, and he has given up Tindouf to Algeria. He cannot under any circumstances lose the Sahara since he has tied his future and the future of his throne to it. On the international scene he has won the support of the United States and has regained the support of France--King Hassan made three secret visits to the French capital recently. He has accepted military support from Egypt without losing [the support of] the PLO.

But what remains [for reckoning] is the Soviet Union with whose weapons the Polisario is fighting. What is the Soviet Union's position? What is King Hassan's position on the Soviet Union? Will the king exert pressure on the Soviets because their bloc in Havana took a stand against Morocco in the question of the Sahara?

The Moroccans are saying that their king will not allow the Soviets to take phosphate and fish from him and then take a stand against him on the Sahara. But the Moroccans add to this that the Russians did recognize that the Sahara was Moroccan territory when they signed the fishing agreement with Morocco. The agreement does mention that the Soviets have the right to fish in Moroccan waters that extend from Tangiers to al-Dakhilah, which is located in the southern section of the Sahara, the section that Mauritania gave up and Morocco annexed to its territory. "There is an explicit Soviet recognition in this agreement that the entire Sahara is Moroccan. The fact that the Russians are taking phosphate from the Sahara and fish from the sea signifies that they also recognize the land and the coast lines as Moroccan." This is what the Moroccans are saying about the Soviets.

What are the expectations after these developments?

French sources are stating that if Algeria were to carry out operations now against Morocco, these operations would take place inside vital Moroccan territory, and this would cause Morocco to carry out operations inside Algerian territory. Incidents of this kind have in fact occurred inside Algeria as a kind of Moroccan warning (See the "Arab Findings" in the last issue of AL-HAWADITH).

These sources add that Algeria is now experiencing a difficult period of transition and that the direct Egyptian interference will make it fearful of Egypt's direct interference in the matter of the Sahara via Morocco. In the end Algeria will accept a formula for a direct understanding with Morocco.

But if an Algerian-Moroccan agreement were to take place, on this basis, what would be the future of the Polisario?

So far, there is no definitive answer to this question. But the whispers that are being heard in Moroccan and European diplomatic circles indicate that Mauritania will become the lot of the Polisario.

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO SAHARA PROBLEM PROPOSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 18

[Article: "AL-MUSTAQBAL Publishes Details of Peaceful Plan To Solve the Crisis of the Sahara Between Morocco and Algeria; Sahara State To Be Established in Rio de Oro; Sagua El Hamra To Be Annexed by Morocco; Algeria To Be Given an Outlet to the Atlantic; Area Resources To Be Put to Profitable Use with Libyan Funds and French Technology"]

[Text] Following the proclamation of the Peace Agreement between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in Algeria last August 5, relations between Morocco and the weak party in the struggle for the Sahara, Mauritania, deteriorated to the point that some people believed that the Arab Maghreb was on the verge of a certain war between Algeria and Morocco and that that war may engulf other Arab and international parties. This was especially because Morocco had announced immediately [after the Peace Agreement] that Tiris Ei-Gharbia (the Mauritanian part of the Sahara) was Moroccan territory and had raised the Moroccan flag on that area. This increased the intransigence of the positions of both Algeria and Mauritania.

But those who have secret information in Algeria and Morocco are certain that both countries are avoiding war because of difficult domestic and economic conditions. The undeclared four-years' war between the two countries has exhausted them to a large extent. In addition, [the outcome of] a crippling war on the shifting and vast sands of the Sahara is not at all certain for any one of the two parties.

If a military solution is considered to be unlikely by the two parties that are directly concerned, it is not acclaimed by the remaining Arab and international parties. The United States of America and the Soviet Union are quite interested in preserving their economic interests in the area. It seems that Washington is supporting Morocco politically, but its economic interests are more closely tied with Algeria because 80 percent of Algeria's basic resources, natural gas, is monopolized by U. S. companies. At the same time the Soviet Union needs phosphate from Morocco even though it appears to be politically on the side of Algeria.

Hence, military warfare has been replaced by diplomatic warfare in the Arab Maghreb. On this scene it seems that Algeria had scored a number of victories by virtue of the fact that a large number of African and nonaligned nations had recognized the Polisario Front. This made Morocco feel that it was isolated diplomatically on the international scene.

But this situation did not prevent a number of Arab countries, beginning with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and also including Tunisia and the PLO, from offering to mediate between the contending parties in order to find a solution that would please everybody. Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba sent a message to King Hassan II and President Chadli 2 weeks ago and invited each one of them to a meeting that would be held to solve the problem of the Sahara peacefully. Algeria objected to the invitation, affirming that the dispute was "between Morocco and the Polisario Front." King Hassan II, however, personally welcomed the Tunisian initiative. The most recent mediation attempts [in this area] were those that were carried out by Mr Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO, a few days ago during a visit he made to Algiers and Rabat. Because of the moral weight 'Arafat has on the Arab scene, the two capitals preferred that there be no discussion in the media about the kind of mediation that took place or the extent of its success. But an informed source in Algiers told AL-MUSTAQBAL that 'Arafat's mediation was an extension of other Arab mediation efforts, and that he was careful during this mediation not to have the question of the Sahara dispute affect Arab solidarity.

The same informed source emphasized that there was no possibility for war between Morocco and Algeria and that that had been the case ever since the problem of the Sahara surfaced during the Green March that Morocco carried out in November 1975 and in the course of the Tripartite Madrid Agreement that followed. This is the agreement which Spain recently abrogated when it recognized the Polisario Front as the representative of the people of the Sahara.

The informed source added, "There is a peaceful solution to the problem; it was devised ever since that date by several parties, and it is now simmering on the back burner. The purpose of the diplomatic war that is being waged now is only to give this peaceful solution the final form that would please all the parties, that is, a no-win no-lose formula."

AL-MUSTAQBAL was able to obtain the broad outlines of the plan for a peaceful solution to the Sahara crisis in the Arab Maghreb. They may be summarized as follows:

First, a referendum is to be held in the Western Sahara under the supervision of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and in the presence of representatives of all the concerned parties. This referendum is to include two parts:

1. A referendum in the Tiris El-Gharbia area (Rio de Oro) whose outcome, by virtue of the tribal relations that exist between this area and North

Mauritania, would be the establishment of a Sahara state under the leadership of the Polisario Front. This state would proclaim itself a federal republic with Mauritania.

2. A referendum in the area of Saguia El Hamra (the Moroccan part of the Sahara) whose outcome, by virtue of the tribal relations that also exist between this area and South Morocco, would be the endorsement of the present situation, that is, the proclamation of the final return of the area to Moroccan sovereignty.

Second, the implementation of a huge economic project from which all parties concerned would benefit is to be undertaken. This project consists of the joint utilization of the mineral resources that are in the area, that is, the phosphate of Saguia El Hamra, the iron of Tiris El-Gharbia and the mines of the Algerian Tindouf area that have been closed and unutilized since the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute in 1963. The backbone of this huge project would be French technology, Libyan finances, and Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian labor, especially the thousands of immigrant workers who will be laid off by France in the next 3 years.

Third, Algeria is to get an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean for the purpose of exporting some of its resources, and especially for building natural gas pipelines from the Algerian Sahara so it can export the gas to the markets in North America.

This peaceful plan to solve the problem of the Sahara is now getting the blessing of almost all the parties. Only the final touches remain before it can be presented to those concerned with the matter. AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned that only one party has not yet given its final approval to the plan, and that is, Algeria. Algeria is waiting for the emergency conference of the Front Liberation Party to be convened. This conference is expected to convene next November. The conference will make a decision about all the issues that are pending in Algeria and especially those of development, and of Arab and international foreign politics. AL-MUSTAQBAL has also learned that the year 1980 will witness the onset of the implementation of the proposed peaceful solution for the area of Arab Maghreb in its entirety.

From now on and until such a date, Arab, African and world-wide diplomatic mediations and actions to complete the script of a solution will be revealed so that the creation of this solution would be sound.

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AFFLICT NORTH AFRICA

Paris LE MONDE in French 16-17 Sep 79 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "The Parasites of the Maghreb"]

[Text] Algeria which, during the past decade, gave the impression of having mastered its development, is now facing some social problems in its turn, following Morocco and Tunisia. For 2 years strikes have multiplied in several sectors even though the press avoids talking about them. In the large cities, particularly in Algiers, the quality of life and the environment have been downgraded continuously over the years: overcrowded living quarters, water shortages, sparsely-stocked markets and feelings of insecurity in some sections. In a sharp reaction to this existing state of affairs the authorities have, for the past 2 weeks, engaged in a battle against the "social scourges and parasitism," particularly in the capital city.

In imitation of the lack of vigor prevalent in a number of Third World countries the Algerian rulers have generally pursued a policy of voluntarism, which has often given spectacular results in a good many areas. For instance Algeria, independent since 1962, has twice as many children in school--more than three million of them--than Morocco, which has the same number of inhabitants--18 million--but regained its sovereignty already in 1956. Algeria has assured its economic takeoff as well at a rapid pace. But the results obtained have been at the expense and to the detriment of agriculture and of some social sectors. Are free medical care and social security, unknown in most of the neighboring countries, and intensive schooling, sufficient compensation for the rural exodus, for the overpopulation of the cities and for the fact that young people in increasing numbers hang around the streets and engage in "illegal activities" when opportunity arises?

The "parasites" denounced and tracked down by the authorities did not fall from the sky, however; they are the result of a development process put into effect by the state. It is also shocking to see then the same state having them run down with rubber truncheon blows in a capital city that seems to be "in a state of siege" at certain hours. Commenting on this "operation of purification" in the capital, M. Mohamed Yahyaoui, the coordinator of the FLN, explained that "the objective is to contribute to the education of the citizen."

One may ask why the state doesn't make better use of its media of information to assure the civic discipline of its citizens, in particular those of rural origin, who have invaded the cities and are ignorant of the restraints that living in them imposes.

Faced with problems which they do not succeed in mastering some governments resort only too often to premature flight or to repression. For instance, beyond crystallizing national sentiment on the Western Saharan affair the "Green March" organized in 1975 was a way for Morocco that permitted the postponement, though not prevention, of the outbreak of a grave economic and social crisis then developing in the country. Similarly in March of 1978, barely 2 months after the bloody revolt in Tunis, the Tunisian parliament rediscovered a 1966 project to track down its own "parasites." The law adopted provided that every citizen between the ages of 18-30, unable to prove either employment or enrollment in school or in a vocation training establishment, would be compelled to spend an indeterminate period in a "civilian service."

The "slips" that occurred in the internal planning of the different countries of North Africa are the more regrettable as they are added to the regional tensions and conflicts, of which that over the Western Sahara is the most serious because it has blocked a building up of the Maghreb that started 10 years ago and was a development that could have set an example in the midst of an Arab world shaken periodically by the conflict with Israel.

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AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MEETINGS WITH YUGOSLAVS--Abdul Karim Misaq, minister of finance and chief of the Afghan delegation at the board of governors conference of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which is being held in Belgrade, had discussions yesterday on topics of mutual interest with the deputy prime minister [as heard, presumably vice president of federal executive council] of Yugoslavia and the minister of commerce [as heard] of that country. He also met with the vice president of the World Bank and discussed World Bank loans and grants for a number of development projects in Afghanistan. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 4 Oct 79 GF]

AMIN RECEIVES FRENCH AMBASSADOR--The information office of the ministry of foreign affairs reports that Hafizollah Amin, secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and prime minister, received HE Georges Perruche, French ambassador in Kabul, at the People's House at 1330 this afternoon. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 4 Oct 79 GF]

AMIN RECEIVES PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR--At 1330 this afternoon, Hafizollah Amin, secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister, received HE Riaz Piracha, ambassador of Pakistan in Kabul, for a farewell meeting. The term of mission of the above ambassador in Afghanistan has come to an end. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 6 Oct 79 GF]

AMIN RECEIVES IRAQI AMBASSADOR--Hafizollah Amin, secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister, received a courtesy call at the People's House at 1400 hours this afternoon from Iraqi Ambassador Fathi Husayn al-'Ali. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 9 Oct 79 GF]

FINANCE MINISTER RETURNS FROM BELGRADE--Abdul Karim Misaq, Politburo member of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and minister of finance, who headed the Afghan delegation to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund annual conference in Belgrade, returned home today. He stated upon his arrival that the bank officials pledged cooperation and expansion with regard to projects in Afghanistan. While in Belgrade,

the Afghan delegation had meetings with the delegations from Laos and Vietnam and discussed topics of mutual interest. Abdul Karim Misaq also attended a banquet given by the Iranian minister of finance and discussed the matters of mutual interest to Afghanistan and Iran with him. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 9 Oct 79 GF]

GREETING MESSAGE TO DPRK--A congratulatory message has been communicated on behalf of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan addressed to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang, the capital of that country, on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Korean Workers' Party. [Text] [Kabul Radio in Dari to Europe 1900 GMT 10 Oct 79 LD]

RALLY TO SUPPORT AMIN--In support of the resolution by the extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of 16 September 1979, rallies and marches are staged daily by various Khalqi organizations supporting the appointment of Hafizollah Amin as secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Among others, participants in these rallies and marches included the preliminary party organization of the ministry of planning and the family planning office of the same ministry. Mohammad Sediq 'Alemyar, minister of planning, delivered a lengthy speech addressed to participants and said: "From now on, under the slogan of "immunity, legality and justice," our toiling people will be able to lead their own honorable lives and defend courageously the fruits of revolution until their last breath." [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 8 Oct 79 GF]

AMIN RECEIVES INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR--Hafizollah Amin, secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister, received a courtesy call at 1400 today at the People's House from Abour-Rahman [Gonadedia], Indonesian ambassador in Kabul. [Text] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 8 Oct 79 GF]

AMIN'S ELECTION SUPPORT--The resolution of the 16 September extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, on the election of Hafizollah Amin, heroic commander of the Great Sawr Revolution, as secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as well as the appointment of the members of the commission for drafting the constitution were today supported by thousands of our noble people at Grand Khalqi meetings, and rallies in the capital and provinces. At a grand meeting held for his purpose by commerce ministry officials at that ministry, 'Abdoloqoddu Ghorbandi, commerce minister, made a passionate speech, saying: We are dutybound to provide guaranteed conditions in order that the people may enjoy a constructive life imbued with happiness and enthusiasm in the light of immunity, legality and justice. And I give you the news that our constitution will be the most democratic constitution that has hitherto existed in the world. [Excerpt] [Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 7 Oct 79 LD]

OFFICIAL ENDS GDR VISIT--Prof Mahmud Suma, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the minister of higher and vocational education, who had gone to the German Democratic Republic to participate in the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, left that country for Afghanistan the day before yesterday. At Berlin airport the deputy prime minister and the ministry of technology and sciences of that country, and Fath Gol Momand, the ambassador, and members of the Afghan Embassy in Berlin, were present to bid farewell to Professor Suma and the delegation accompanying him. [Text] [Kabul in English to Europe 1900 GMT 10 Oct 79 LD]

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ALGERIA

RETURN OF OPPOSITIONISTS URGED

Paris LE MONDE in French 16-17 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] M. Mohamed Boudiaf, Algerian oppositionist and founder of the PRS (Party of the Socialist Revolution) in 1962, now living at Kenitra in Morocco, has written to us concerning some adjustments in an article he cites (LA MONDE 31 August) and we extract here some of his principal points:

I have taken a clear position to the Western Sahara conflict in my declaration of 31 December and reiterate the conclusion: "I am convinced of being listened to when I raise a cry of alarm directed at Algerian men and women, be they inside or outside the country, to oppose with all their might the disastrous involvement which could lead us to a fratricidal confrontation."

In taking that position I merely defended one of the ideas for which I have fought for 39 years: to have friendship, cooperation, solidarity and peace among the people of north Africa. I am also firmly convinced that as long as people presently in power continue to ignore that objective our region will remain divided and unable to resist in the battles for influence that are now racking the African Continent. If, for defending such ideas, I am being accused of "compromising" with Hassan II or any other chief of state, that is a tremendous confusion of values....

Concerning what the newspapers qualify as overture and which consists of the offer of some "acts of clemency" and permission of return to Algiers to certain oppositionists, as sign of a fresh beginning, I believe that the only freedom of choice offered to oppositionists who want to return to their country is to live in obscurity and silence, with the possibility to integrate with the cohorts of opportunists and beggars that populate the avenues of power since the first day of independence. Given such conditions there are still some Algerians who will decline and I have the honor to be one of them!

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ALGERIA

ALGERIA'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Oct 79 p 24

[Article by Huda al-Husayni: "They Released Ben Bella For 'Publicity,' So He Asked to Make the Pilgrimage to Mecca!"]

[Text] Former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella's request for permission to go to Mecca to perform the religious duty of pilgrimage has confused the Algerian government. The Algerian leadership held a series of meetings to discuss the matter, especially from the standpoint of political repercussions on the domestic scene in case Ben Bella leaves the country and makes embarrassing statements, or refuses to return to Algeria.

In Paris, a former comrade of Ben Bella said that the former president made his request because he actually wants to perform the pilgrimage. At the same time, he wants to notify domestic and Arab public opinion that his release was a "publicity" release and nothing more, because he still does not enjoy freedom!

Ben Bella's friend says that some visitors to Ben Bella say that he seems to be zealous from the religious standpoint and speaks with obvious religious exuberance, be it in practicing religious ceremonies or in being absorbed in Islamic concepts.

AL-HAWADITH asked Ben Bella's friend whether the former Algerian president intends to resume political activity in case he is really released and gains his full freedom. He said that Ben Bella is not thinking of that at present, but his final decision depends on the political adjustments taking place during the silent struggle for power between President Chadli Bendjedid and Party Leader Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui.

The summit of power in Algeria now has two distinct heads in a delicate balance, since both of them are trying to get ahead cautiously at the expense of the other, be it on the domestic or the foreign level. President Chadli's relations with France are known to be very good, and much better than they were during the time of the late President Houari Boumediene. He is trying to expand these relations on the European level. President Chadli's announcement of his acceptance of an invitation to visit Belgium, the seat of the European Common Market, comes under this heading.

But the domestic scene is still more important, and is governed on the one hand by a delicate balance of political forces, and on the other hand by an unstable economic and political situation. Therefore, the Algerians call the present stage through which their country is passing a "transition stage," even though at present they think it unlikely that Former President Ahmed Ben Bella will return to play a fundamental role, operating on the basis of a famous Algerian maxim: "Whoever leaves power does not return to it." However, they are saying that Ben Bella is a special case, because it would be logical for him to return to play the role of savior in case the balance is disturbed and the situation explodes.

The significance of the present balance is that it involves an obvious rivalry between the army and the civilian organizations, even though Yahiaoui has an extension within the armed forces in view of the fact that for a long time he was head of the "Cherchel" war college, where a large number of officers graduated under him, and even though the new president, who gained his position with army support, is trying to create his own bases in the administration and the party.

But the economic and social situation is the pressing, urgent element, as the Algerians themselves say. Algeria is still economically bound by the plans of the past ten years, led by Belaid Abdesselam, who based Algerian economic policy on giving priority to heavy industry, be it in the petrochemical or the iron and steel sector, which put agriculture in second place. Because of the imbalance which occurred as a result of that, Boumediene took a personal interest in agriculture through agrarian reform, nationalization of land, and its utilization either through individual exploitation or according to the socialist cooperative system.

The policy followed by Belaid led to extensive expenditures on big industrial projects, which burdened Algeria with debts in excess of the production capacity. Similarly, agrarian reform, as it was carried out, hampered agricultural production to a great extent. Also, the method followed by Belaid in industrialization was that of international bidding for constructing plants equipped with the largest machinery to the smallest tools (Turn-key Projects), which the Algerian workers and technicians could not comprehend. The required success has not been achieved, since nowadays the plants in Algeria are working at no more than one-third their production capacity. As for the weakness in agriculture, it has reached the point where most basic foodstuffs are imported from abroad. Spot shortages of these goods in the markets has become a recurring phenomenon, causing a growing wave of popular complaint. The markets are not stocked in an organized manner, and they are unable to meet increased consumer demand.

The other strangling crisis is the housing crisis, for recent statistics show that there is an average of eight persons to a 12-square meter room. This situation arose as a result of the high rate of emigration from the countryside to the cities, and because of the influx of large groups of Bedouins into major settled areas, especially the capital city of Algiers. Increasing the severity of this crisis is the high birth rate, since the yearly increase in births is estimated at 3.6 percent, the highest rate in the Third World.

This general complaining has obvious political repercussions, especially since it is still accompanied by acts of repression, the stifling of freedoms, the increase in the efficiency of the security and intelligence agencies, and the deprivation of political rights for any dissenting voice. At one time or another this has led to popular outbreaks not curbed to this day. This summer a number of labor unions launched long strikes, sometimes accompanied by acts of violence, whether by the striking workers or by the authorities. The student and worker strikes became critical during the final days of Boumediene, but the late president was able to contain and encircle them, while he himself conducted direct negotiations with labor and student sectors, during the popular organization conferences in which there appeared clandestine, organized trends.

Then there is the strong, influential class of businessmen, which includes more than 1,600 millionaires constituting a huge financial and economic force having diverse relations with the authorities and the administration, whether through business transactions and brokerages or through bribery, in addition to their relations with foreign forces and especially the big multi-national companies. This class' sole political scale is its interests, and therefore it supports whatever situation ensures its interests. Algerian circles in Paris say that the millionaire class is at present on the side of President Chadli, in view of his leanings towards the West, and in view of their relations with the senior officers and war veterans who left politics and took up commercial activities but who still have their roots and positions of influence in the government. Moreover, they fear the leftist, oftentimes radical propaganda the waves of which Yahiaoui is riding inside the party organization.

As opposed to Bendjedid's relations with France and the West, Salah Yahiaoui is establishing manifold relations with Arab and Islamic states, especially Libya. Recently he took an Arab tour which included Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In addition there are his firm relations with the Soviet Union. Yahiaoui has a keen intellect and is deeply cultured. He knows Arabic very well and speaks it with eloquent ease. He is very capable in organization and planning.

The foreign problem bearing heavily on the Algerian situation is the Western Sahara problem and the possibility of the outbreak of war between Algeria and Morocco. This problem's difficulty for the two sides is that they inherited it from Boumediene, but both of them are trying to turn it to their account, sometimes in the direction of solving it and other times by complicating it. While the popular base in Morocco is standing alongside King Hassan in the Sahara problem, the popular base in Algeria is not eager for war. Therefore, the Algerian government has now become more inclined to solve the problem through Tunisian and French mediation. AL-HAWADITH has learned from sources close to Tunisian Foreign Minister Mohamed Fitouri, who visited Algeria and Morocco and met with President Chadli and King Hassan, that direct contacts between the two governments have been going on secretly for two months.

These sources say that the Algerian president was reassured by King Hassan's statements at his last press conference, when he announced his final surrender

to Algeria in the Tindouf region, and his willingness to give Algeria an outlet to the Atlantic.

These sources believe that the bargaining point is now phosphate, the only topic which the Moroccan king did not touch on in his press conference.

Another reason impelling Algeria to negotiate and reach a solution is the increasing financial burden it is incurring from supporting Polisario, since Algeria now spends \$6 million a day on the Sahara war, in addition to expenses for improved equipment for the Algerian army as a precaution against possible war with Morocco. But Algeria's caution arises from its fear of the complications which Libya poses to it by its adoption of Polisario. Therefore, it would prefer the solution to be acceptable to all the concerned parties.

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EGYPT

MINISTER OF PLANNING DISCUSSES PLANS FOR FUTURE

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Aug 79 p 5

[Interview with Minister of Planning Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid by Ibrahim Nafi': "Minister of Planning Asked: Are We Still in the Stage of Listing Problems and Planning Solutions, Or Have We Reached the Stage of Application"? date and place not given]

[Text] This week Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid, minister of planning, explains his ideas about and hopes for the economic and financial situation in Egypt, and the priorities and tactics connected with it.

Actually, the basic impression which we received from him from the talks which have been discussed on this page for 3 weeks is great optimism about our future.

Today we go into the causes and details of this optimism, which we immediately say must be connected with work and efforts which must not be stopped for even one day. Let us hear from the minister of planning.

[Question] What are the priorities of the next plan, and on what basis are these priorities defined?

[Answer] To begin we must reach agreement on a series of points which can define a plan of priorities for us. They are:

1. There are some who believe that priorities must be defined according to the problems which we face, meaning that food security, housing and construction, for example, are major problems in society whose treatment must be reflected radically in the form of a greater share of investments for these priorities. However, this does not mean that if we set a priority for food security, housing and construction the other sectors will get a lesser share of these investments, because investment in the housing operation is an investment in building cement factories, and building cement factories requires investments in the mines and quarries sectors and consequently requires investments in the transportation and communications

sectors to transport these commodities. All of this requires financing from abroad, and this requires exporting as much as we can in the way of tourism and petroleum. This means that investments are required in all sectors in order to serve one sector which has priority.

If we want priorities, we must--and this is most important--remove all factors influencing the sector and concentrate on the sector itself. There is no economic activity which can be carried out successfully if it takes place in a vacuum. We must take the whole picture into consideration.

The objection which says that there are no defined priorities is unsound, because priorities are indeed defined and well-known, as we said, and they are food security, housing and the development of education, but in order for us to realize these priorities we must work in all fields of economic and social activity so that we can meet them.

2. Investments are not the standard by which we measure priorities.

3. These are severe limits before us. Income is limited, and there are open projects. We are still being drained of this income to a great extent. If our investments were 2.5 billion pounds a year, and open projects which are based on priorities agreed upon before 1973, over which we have no authority, require about 1.5 billion pounds to complete, then this freedom of movement remains granted only with respect to the difference between the two, or 1 billion dollars. This means that if we open new projects which go along with the new national priorities, then our freedom of movement is only within the limits of the free sum.

The final point in the field of priorities is, taking food security for an example: is it realized in Qazu al Sahara'? Is it realized in al-Wadi al-Jadid, and in al-Farafirah, and in al-Wahat al-Kharijah, etc.? Or on the shores of Lake Nasir, or in the north of the Delta, or in al-Salihiyah, or the east of the Delta or the west of the Delta? Naturally we cannot follow all of these paths and reclaim all of these areas.

[Question] Have there been adequate scientific studies prior to the preparation of the plan?

[Answer] The basis for adequate studies is finding scientific apparatus to study projects, and such apparatus is almost nonexistent, either because it was never present, or because it is weak, or because it is not linked with a way to prepare the plan. There is variety in this apparatus. There is the Industrialization Authority which prepares independent industrial projects completely separate from the Agriculture Authority or projects for agriculture, completely independent from construction planning, completely independent from the Ministry of Reconstruction, which is complete independent from the Ministry of Land Reclamation. Each operation in society plans projects independent from the others. In reconstruction, which means creating a new society, there is the capacity and the resultant labor

required for reclamation of land, industrialization, railroads, communications, utilities, etc. What apparatus brings together all of these different areas and coordinates among all of these agencies?

Frankly, in the preceding cabinet of Dr Mustafa Khalil there was a Ministry of Reconstruction for this purpose, but there was no committee for reconstruction in this ministry.

I am speaking as minister of planning. I tell you quite frankly that a multitude of planning agencies in society leads to innumerable problems when we want to move. People are tired of defining problems, analyzing problems and classifying and describing problems. It is my true feeling as I visit the governorates that the people are familiar with these problems and are more sensitive to them than many of the designated officials. It is interesting that we left the stage of problems and enumerated them in 15 volumes in 1977. I challenge anyone to uncover a problem which is not found in the volumes of the 1977 plan, where all of the problems are placed in a framework.

We Want To Apply Solutions

We have gone beyond this stage and have begun to draw up solutions. Solutions have been devised for most of these problems, from price support to "castor" [subsidized flannel-like material used for clothing], from extracting soybeans to the manner of fumigating cotton to the operation of converting cotton waste and everyday garbage. We have found the solutions, but what we want to do now is to apply these solutions. I do not want to talk about the solutions; I want to talk about applying the solutions. Our mental attitude is still unable to apply these solutions. The apparatus within whose framework we are working is unable to put these solutions into effect. We want to move, but the apparatus which we are using is not ready for the investment operation. We have heard true stories about 10 hospitals on which construction was started in 1970, but they are still unfinished. We have also heard about water projects started in the 60's and not completed, and machinery still in its crates. Why? Because credits are shortsighted. This year we take 10 piasters, next year 2 million, then none, and so on according to political, economic and social conditions. I am not laying blame for these conditions, nor am I blaming those in charge of financing. However, if we all decided that we would work on a specific project, then it would be a crime if it were not given complete financing to complete it. The solution which we have come up with is the investment bank. This solution is written in the form of a republican resolution, but we have not applied the solutions. When we talk about the public sector and its weakness and say that it must be stabilized, reorganized, and given qualifications, we have set down basic conditions, defined them and given them high priority, as the World Bank is conducting studies of qualifications.

Also, a percentage of income from petroleum will be allocated for development in Iran, Mexico and Indonesia just as we do. As the result of the existence of a single treasury we take what is there, and what is there is subject to political and social considerations which have a direct effect on development.

I warn that these considerations are the object of price support, and this is what hampers our ability to obtain sufficient investments to enable us to confront the priorities which we have actually agreed upon. It is not true to say that the priorities are unknown. We all know that our priorities are concentrated on utilities, housing, and basic structure such as sewers, water, electricity, food and clothing security, and the development of education, and we have reached the point that when we set these priorities we should set percentages so that these percentages will not change when the minister of planning or minister of finance changes. There is always disagreement between the two, centered on the fact that one wants to increase investments and the other wants to reduce the budget deficit. If we agreed on a percentage for investment and reached agreement with the minister of finance on it, the matter would be ended.

[Question] Has the public sector become a base for economic enterprise?

[Answer] We always say that the public sector is the economic base which we need constantly, and the time has come for us to face the problem of confidence. What has the public sector done for the Egyptian people?

There is no bread in the morning for breakfast; there is no white cheese. Areas of agrarian reform are not used to grow beans; homes are not built because the cement factories are deteriorating and their production is dropping.

What then has the public sector done? If the role of the public sector is still a socialist tool to serve the masses, then it has failed in this. If the role of the public sector is to produce fans, televisions, refrigerators, etc. for the middle class and upper middle class, then it has succeeded in that.

If the role of the public sector is to provide a heavy industrial base, such as the steel industry, then it has failed, not because it is unable but because the technology needed for these industries requires great speed, and consequently the public sector cannot handle it without constant participation and production.

Do we use the public sector as a tool for distribution to ensure social justice and to distribute the national income, meaning that commodities are sold at less than cost, and this is considered a grant presented to poor people?

Is a cola plant useful because it is a tool to redistribute income and we permit it with a loss so that the citizens can drink a glass of sicola for less than cost? Is this logical, or is it logical to build plants for "castor" in order to clothe the poor, or do we use the agrarian reform plants rather than growing grapes in Jiyanklis and planting beans and lentils for the masses? In order to have enough beans we would need 58,000 feddans, 60,000 feddans, 70,000 feddans, and for lentils 10,000 feddans. This year the growing of beans expanded a little due to the increase which the government established in the price of beans. What I want to say is that what we need to increase the production of beans and lentils is tens of thousands of feddans, not hundreds of thousands.

The public sector has a great role, but in different types of projects from those we now have. I do not want a plant for wood for manufactured furniture! The cooperative society in Damietta is already manufacturing it on a high-quality level.

[Question] Is all of this a problem for the public sector, or are these problems which you have imposed on it?

[Answer] It is true that we have bound the public sector in red tape through which it cannot move. For example, the pricing of commodities is fixed, or is about to be fixed. Middlemen have entered because fixed prices are not in keeping with a society with inflation, and consequently there is the role of the middlemen. All of the soap, "castor," meat, all supported commodities produced or distributed by the public sector go through middlemen.

How Do You Guide the Public Sector?

If we really wanted to give freedom and guidance to the public sector we would have to let it act without restriction, but it cannot act no matter how much we diminish restrictions and offer incentives and encouragement because it is unable to determine efficiency. It is unable to separate what is not persistent or not required to enable it to move. It cannot change prices and cannot even change its type of production. For example, it is now difficult to sell yarn and easy to sell cotton scraps. These scraps are exported at very low prices, or less than the prices of supported cotton. What the German mill is doing is finding cotton which has been processed once, twice and three times until it has reached the stage of yarn which has some defect. It is reprocessed immediately, spun and woven until it becomes an excellent type of fine yarn.

Sixteen Percent of National Income for Support

When support was 200 million pounds we were irritated, but we accepted it. However, when it reaches 1.2 billion pounds the matter has come to the point where we cannot keep silent about it. This year support of bread, wheat and top-quality flour, 500 million this year, has raised the price

of wheat 100 dollars a ton now. Thus, it is expected that if prices continue at this level, support of a loaf of bread will reach at least 1.1 billion pounds, in addition to the price of other support commodities. We have about 1.6 billion in support a year. This is not proper, because it is unreasonable that 16 percent of the national income should be directed toward support.

[Question] What do you see for the public sector after the certainty of the lack of cooperation between the complete economic organization, the failure of specific organizations and the failure of the retail councils?

[Answer] You know how the former system of retail organizations was applied. For example, take cotton from well-known ginneries. In order to apply this system they separated the ginnery from the oil press and from the soap factory. All of that is an integral unit, but the ginnery is assigned to the Ministry of Trade, the oil to Light Industry, etc.

We are aiming at local government and the regional planning areas, and we want integration among the governorates and we would like to create industries which complement existing industries. This in fact represents the role of the private sector. We want to see the public sector in a complete picture; that is, we take a complete group of industries in a complete area. For example, we take the Aswan area, which grows sugar cane and processes it, manufactures grained wood and paper, has potential in phosphate plants, etc.

All of these industries require complementary and common areas, and also all of these industries must be analyzed on the general level. We are thinking of regional planning not on the governorate basis but on the basis of a group of governorates representing similarity, integration and serving one another. If a group of existing companies were to belong to a holding company, as is intended, that would have to be on a geographic level, for geography has an important role.

[Question] How can we achieve cabinet supervision? Or do the ministers accept that?

[Answer] Cabinet supervision is not desirable, except for ownership, as long as the goals have been determined. I believe that we agree in that. We must really follow this solution and not intervene. We discussed administration of the goals, and we all agree that we must let the units operate and check to see that the goals are achieved. Penalties and rewards must be in earnest. Ownership of the public sector is one thing and administration of it another. Administration has been left to the operating units.

We want to organize the operation, we must concentrate on the apparatus which is able to fulfill the goals. Frankly, what is lacking is boldness in applying solutions. The important thing is the name of the apparatus which takes you where you want to go.

There are not enough projects when we talk about attacking the problems of food, housing and basic construction.

[Question] We want to speak precisely. What are the projects which can be set up next year?

[Answer] The projects which have been studied are listed with the planning agency and can be identified by name.

What we want to do is to set directions and complete coordination among all sectors so that planning can take place and consequently can be established everywhere and in every project. There are projects ready, and this argument from which we suffered from 1973 to 1976 has ended. The projects are ready, and we went to Paris last year with prepared projects. A surprise occurred at the meeting of the investment group, where there were many projects. Several projects were studied, and many were presented. There are two problems. The first is that I do not want to open new projects because they may actually lend themselves to the private sector and not the role of the government.

The second problem is the problem of finance. Foreign financing of various types has been granted for the projects which we set up, and sometimes projects contracted for have not been included in the plan nor in the priorities, at a time when projects in the plan cannot find financing. I ask for funds for projects approved by the World Bank and incorporated in the plan, and there are no loans for them. I have also said that there have been financing and several loans for projects without economic advantage which have not been studied and are not incorporated in the plan, which will lead to cancellation of a large number of loans.

When there is a project to be set up and this requires domestic financing and foreign financing, there is a ministry to plan the projects, a ministry for domestic finance and a ministry for foreign finance. I see no logic in this. There must be integration of domestic and foreign finance.

The important thing is that there are projects, but unfortunately they receive shoddy treatment. [Word illegible] true that the powers given to the local government make me warn that we are headed toward what is called the capitalist system in the state. Each governorate wants to have a farm to produce meat, a slaughterhouse, a plant to convert garbage to fertilizer, fisheries, and a farm to fatten calves and poultry, and each governorate wants not only these but other tourism projects.

[Question] We have set specific priorities. The financing is insufficient, whether local or foreign. What projects will the public sector or the government set up, which projects will the private sector initiate, and which will be allocated to the common sector?

[Answer] Basic structure is the function of the government, first. If something remains--we try to supply high-quality services to the citizens, especially housing, developing education, health (which we have neglected for a long time), then food, food security. How do we achieve food security? Food security will require that we have at least a two years' stockpile of grain. That has priority for me. If wheat were available in the silos, I would permit land to be cultivated in order to produce wheat. When we say electricity, for it is one of the major utilities, the answer to your question would be the same, only I differ with you in the question itself. You have neither local nor foreign income. We have forgotten the use of local income. Because of this I believe that support must receive radical treatment to force us to use it and the people to accept this, because we cannot accept the standard of living which the officials are enjoying. Guiding the distribution of domestic income can increase it, according to a very good speech by the minister of finance last week. But can it really be accepted? Indeed, about 5 million pounds were taken in this year from general revenue and real estate!

We can also reconsider implementation of the agricultural crop plan. We reduced the acreage planted in cotton and increased the profit, because the peasant planted cotton on choice land. Last year we achieved the highest profit in Egypt's history, and this year we hope the return will be good. This operation has a great effect on the operation to determine income, because producing 10 tons of soy beans and oil at home costs one-tenth of its cost abroad. Thus the price supports are reduced, and ability to obtain foreign financing improves. Thus far we have about 5 billion dollars which have not been used, and we spend annually 2 billion dollars.

[Question] What you mean is that the government cannot and must not set up all of the projects which we would like to do quickly. Do you agree with a policy of more development and more production?

[Answer] Naturally I approve of more opportunity and more development. You can walk along any street where the private sector is putting up a building and see that the floors are used as soon as they are completed without considering finishing off the whole building.

We must do the same thing. We must say that we must consider implementing all water, electricity, road and sewer operations. We begin by building a new city, for example. That means a big expenditure without any profit. If we want to build, then capital must replenish itself and circulate. Capital in Egypt must circulate much more than it now does, because as long as the volume of financing is limited it helps to have greater concentration of circulation in order to compensate for or cover needs.

For example, I tell Sa'd Ma 'mun, governor of Cairo, that if there were 10 million pounds in the budget for housing then he could reach agreement with

the banks (the housing bank and the real estate bank) to deposit this sum as security, and he would borrow 100 million pounds on it and carry out his projects with this money. However, this operation cannot be implemented in the government as long as investment requires payment entirely in cash. The investment bank can handle this operation.

We now would like development banks in private sector development positions to finance land reclamation, construction and housing. This is a good idea, but these small banks must have a "mother bank" to supply them, as is the case with the national bank and the commercial banks. The National Investment Bank is the apparatus which can make the development banks an actual fact.

My optimism increased after my visits to the governorates, because I felt that there are possibilities for working on the role of the private sector and the method of financing its role in development. We also want to organize the public sector, and we are determined to set up projects very quickly so that construction of a hospital will not be delayed for 7 years.

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EGYPT

SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LAW PROMULGATED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [Official Gazette] in Arabic No 36, 6 Sep 79
pp 530-38

[Article: "Law No 48 of 1979 Promulgating Supreme Constitutional Court Law"]

[Text] In the name of the people,

The President of the Republic,

The People's Assembly having approved the following law, we have promulgated it:

Article One

The provisions of the attached law concerning the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be implemented.

Article Two

All cases and appeals presently before the Supreme Court and falling under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court in accordance with the attached law shall be referred to the latter court in their present state and without fees upon the formation of this court.

The appeals before the Supreme Court for suspension of rulings by the existing judiciary bodies shall also be referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court in their present state and without fees so that this court may issue its decision on these cases in accordance with the provisions of law No 81 of 1969 promulgating the Supreme Court law and law No 66 of 1970 promulgating the law concerning the procedures and fees of this court.

Article Three

The provisions of articles 15 and 16 of the attached law shall apply to the lawsuits regarding the refutations, disputations, salaries, pensions and similar matters concerning the Supreme Court members. The Constitutional Supreme Court alone shall settle such lawsuits and appeals.

Article Four

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be represented in the judiciary bodies by its chairman. In case of the chairman's absence, the court shall be represented by its most senior member.

Article Five

Taking into cognizance the provisions of the third and fourth paragraphs of article five of the attached law, the first formation of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be issued by a decree from the president of the republic and shall provide for appointment of the court chairman and of its members from among individuals meeting the conditions stipulated by the attached law, after consultation with the Higher Council of the Judiciary Bodies insofar as the members are concerned.

The court members shall take the oath stipulated in article six of the attached law before the president of the republic.

Article Six

The members of the Supreme Court and members of the State Commission of Counselors [hay'at mufawwadi al-dawlah] who are not included in the formation of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall return by law to the authorities in which they had worked before their appointment to the Supreme Court and shall retain their seniority, their grades, salaries and allowances in a personal capacity.

Article Seven

Immediately upon its formation, all workers of the administrative, clerical and other sections attached to the Supreme Court shall be transferred to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

All the financial allocations included in this year's budget for the Supreme Court shall also be transferred to the Constitutional Supreme Court.

Article Eight

The former chairman and members of the Supreme Court, and their families, whose service in the Supreme Court has ended shall benefit from the services of the fund stipulated in article 18 of the attached law and under the conditions spelled out by this law.

Article Nine

Without violating the provisions of article two of the promulgating law, the Supreme Court law issued by law No 81 of 1969, the law concerning the procedures and fees of this court issued by law No 66 of 1970 and law No 89 of 1976

concerning some provisions pertaining to the Supreme Court shall be abolished. Every provision conflicting with the provisions of the attached law shall also be abolished immediately upon formation of the Supreme Constitutional Law.

Article Ten

This law shall be published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE and shall go into effect 2 weeks after its publication.

This law shall be sealed with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 29 August 1979.

Husni Mubarak

Supreme Constitution Court Law

Chapter One

Court Organization

Section One

Court Structure

Article One

The Supreme Constitutional Court is an independent judiciary body in the Arab Republic of Egypt, headquartered in Cairo.

Article Two

In implementing the provisions of this law, the word "court" is intended to mean the Supreme Constitutional Court and the phrase "court member" is intended to designate the court chairman and members, unless a provision to the contrary is present.

Article Three

The court shall consist of a chairman and of a sufficient number of members.

Its rulings and decisions shall be issued by seven members and its sessions shall be chaired by its chairman or by its most senior member. When the chairmanship position is vacant, when the chairman is absent or when the chairman is prevented by any reason from being present, all his powers shall be taken by the most senior member, then the second most senior and so forth down the line.

Article Four

Any individual appointed member of the court is required to possess the general qualifications required for appointment to a judgeship in accordance with the provisions of the judiciary authority law. He is also required not to be less than 45 years old.

The member shall be selected from among the following groups:

- A. The present members of the Supreme Court.
- B. The present and former members of the judiciary authorities who have served in the position of counselor or in a similar position 5 successive years at least.
- C. Current and former law professors in the Egyptian universities who have served a period of at least 8 years in the position of professor.
- D. Lawyers working before the Appellate Court and the Higher Administrative Court for a period of 10 successive years at least.

Article Five

The court chairman shall be appointed by a decree from the president of the republic.

The member shall be appointed by a decree from the president of the republic, after consultation with the Higher Council of Judiciary Bodies, from among two individuals: One nominated by the court's General Assembly and the other by the court chairman.

At least two thirds the court members shall be from among members of the judiciary bodies.

The appointment decree shall determine the member's task and his seniority in the court.

Article Six

Before assuming their duties, the court chairman and members shall take the following oath:

"I swear by the almighty God to observe the constitution and the law and to judge justly."

The court chairman shall take the oath before the president of the republic.

The members shall take the oath before the court's General Assembly.

Section Two

Court's General Assembly

Article Seven

The court's General Assembly shall consist of all of its members.

The assembly meetings shall be attended by the chairman of the Commission of Counselors or by the commission's most senior member who shall have a counted vote on matters pertaining to the commission.

Article Eight

In addition to what is stipulated in this law, the General Assembly shall have the power to consider matters pertaining to the court's organization, to its internal affairs, to the distribution of work among its members and to all matters concerning these members.

The assembly may delegate some of its powers to the court chairman or to a committee consisting of its members.

The assembly's opinion must be taken on bills concerning the court.

Article Nine

The General Assembly shall meet at the invitation of the court chairman or at the request of one third its members. Its meeting shall not have a quorum without the presence of the majority of its members.

The assembly shall be chaired by the court chairman or by whoever represents him.

Its voting shall be public unless it decides to have it secret.

The assembly shall issue its decisions by an absolute majority of those present. If the votes are equal, then the side with the chairman's vote shall prevail, unless the voting is secret in which case the proposal shall be considered rejected.

The minutes of the General Assembly works shall be kept in a record signed by the court chairman and by the court's general secretary.

Article Ten

The Provisional Affairs Committee shall be formed on a decision from the General Assembly under the chairmanship of the court chairman and with the membership of two or more members. This committee shall assume the General Assembly's powers on urgent matters during the court's judiciary holiday.

Section Three

Members' Rights and Duties

Article 11

The court members cannot be dismissed or transferred to other positions without their approval.

Article 12

The salaries and allowances of the court chairman and members shall be determined in accordance with the list attached to this law.

However, if the member occupies before his appointment to the court a position with higher salary and allowances than those set by this list, he shall retain personally the salary and allowances earned in the previous position.

Otherwise, no member shall be given special personal salary and allowances or be treated exceptionally in any manner.

Article 13

The court members may only be delegated or loaned for legal works in the international organizations or foreign countries or to carry out scientific tasks.

Article 14

The rules applying to the retirement of the Appellate Court counselors shall apply to the court members.

Article 15

Regarding the unsuitability, removal, rejection and disputation of a member, the rules applying to the Appellate Court counselors shall also apply to the court members.

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall decide with all its members, excluding the aforementioned member and any other member who may be excused, the appeal rejecting and disputing this member. Consideration in the number of members present shall be given to order of seniority so that the most junior members may be excluded.

A rejection or disputation of all the court members or of a number of them that brings down the number of the remaining members to less than seven shall not be accepted.

Article 16

The court alone, to the exclusion of all other authorities, shall have the power to decide on the requests pertaining to the salaries, awards and pensions concerning the court members or their beneficiaries.

The court shall also have the exclusive powers to decide the requests for cancellation of final administrative decisions concerning any of the members' affairs, as well as the compensation demands emanating from such decisions.

In an exception to the provisions of Article 34, the requests referred to in the two abovementioned paragraphs shall be signed by those submitting them.

Taking into cognizance the provisions of articles 35 to 45, the rules applied to the Appellate Court counselors shall be applied in regard to these demands in cases for which no provisions are present in this law.

Article 17

The operative rules concerning vacations in the judiciary authority law shall apply to the vacations of the court members.

The court's General Assembly shall assume the powers of the Higher Council of the Judiciary Bodies in this regard.

The court chairman shall assume the powers of the minister of justice.

Article 18

A fund with a legal status shall be set up in the court. The state shall allocate for this fund the resources necessary to finance the Health and Social Services Agency of the court members, its Counselors Commission and their families.

The rights and commitments of the fund set up in accordance with article seven of law No 79 of 1976 concerning a number of rules pertaining to the Supreme Court shall revert to this fund.

An individual benefiting from this fund may not benefit from the Health and Social Services Fund of the members of the judiciary authorities.

A decision from the court chairman shall be issued, with the approval of the General Assembly, to organize the fund, its management and its rules of spending.

Article 19

If a court member is accused of anything that may undermine confidence or esteem or may seriously hamper the duties and requirements of his position,

the court chairman shall refer the matter to the court's Provisional Affairs Committee.

If the committee decides, after summoning the member to hear his statements, that there is cause for proceeding with measures, it shall delegate one of its members or a committee consisting of them to conduct an investigation. The member referred for investigation shall be considered on compulsory leave with full pay as of the date of this decision.

On completion, the investigation shall be presented to the General Assembly convened in the form of a disciplinary committee, excluding the members participating in the investigation or the accusation, to issue--after hearing and examining the member's defense--its sentence of not guilty or of retiring the member as of the date of the issuance of the sentence. The court decision shall be final and not subject to appeal in any way.

Article 20

The court's General Assembly shall assume the powers stipulated in articles 95 and 96 of the judiciary authority law and the powers of the disciplinary council stipulated in article 97 of the said law.

With the exception of the stipulations stated in this part of the law, all the guarantees, privileges, rights and duties determined for the Appellate Court counselors in accordance with the judiciary authority law shall apply to the court members.

Section Four

Commission of Counselors [hay'at al-mufawwadin]

Article 21

The court's Commission of Counselors shall consist of a chairman and a sufficient number of counselors and assistant counselors.

When the chairman is absent, his place shall be assumed by the most senior of the commission members. The commission chairman shall organize the commission's work and supervise the commission.

The salaries and allowances of the commission chairman and members shall be set in accordance with the list attached to this law.

Article 22

The qualifications stipulated in article four of this law for appointment to the court membership shall also be demanded of the individual appointed to the commission chairmanship.

The qualifications demanded for appointment to the position of counselor or assistant counselor in the commission shall be the qualifications stipulated in the judiciary authority law for the appointment of their counterparts in the appellate courts and for the appointment of chairmen of the courts of first instances.

The commission chairman and members shall be appointed by a decree issued by the president of the republic on the nomination of the court chairman, after consultation with the General Assembly.

Appointment to the position of commission chairman and counselor shall come by way of promotion from the position immediately below this position.

However, individuals with the qualifications stipulated in paragraph one and two of this article may be appointed to the position directly.

The court chairman may delegate members of the judiciary authorities to work in the Commission of Counselors if they meet the provisions of paragraph four after he takes the opinion of the General Assembly and acts in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the law of the authority in which the appointees work.

Article 23

Immediately before assuming their duties, the chairman and members of the Commission of Counselors shall take the following oath:

"I swear by the almighty God to observe the constitution and the law and to perform my work sincerely and truthfully."

The oath shall be taken before the court's General Assembly.

Article 24

The chairman and members of the Commission of Counselors cannot be dismissed and they may not be transferred to other positions without their approval.

Insofar as their guarantees, rights, duties, retirement and vacations and the disputes pertaining to their promotions, salaries, compensations and pensions--for themselves and for their beneficiaries--are concerned, the rules set for the court members shall also apply to them.

The stipulation of article 13 of this law shall not apply to the commission members.

Chapter Two

Jurisdictions and Procedures

Section One

Jurisdictions

Article 25

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall, to the exclusion of all others, have the following powers:

First, judiciary control over the constitutionality of the laws and the regulations.

Second, settle disputes of jurisdiction by appointing the judiciary authority concerned or the authorities with the judiciary power if a lawsuit on a certain issue is raised before two judiciary authorities and if one of the two authorities refuses to dismiss the case or if both authorities refuse to consider the case.

Third, settle any dispute arising over two final and conflicting rulings, one of which is issued by a judiciary authority or an authority with judiciary jurisdiction and the other issued by another authority.

Article 26

The Supreme Constitutional Court shall interpret the laws promulgated by the legislative authority and the decrees by law issued by the president of the republic in accordance with the provisions of the constitution should disagreement arise in the implementation and should the disagreement be significant enough to require a uniform interpretation.

Article 27

In all cases, the court may rule that any provision in any law or regulation presented to it on the occasion of its exercise of its jurisdiction and connected with a dispute referred to the court is unconstitutional after following the procedures set for preparation of the constitutional lawsuits.

Section Two

Procedures

Article 28

Excluding what is stipulated in this section, the referral decisions, lawsuits and requests submitted to the court shall be subject to the provisions of the code of civil and commercial procedures, provided that they are not in violation of the nature and jurisdiction of the court and the conditions set for it.

Article 29

The court shall exercise judiciary control over the constitutionality of the laws and regulations in the following manner:

A. While considering a lawsuit, if a court or a judiciary authority concerned deems that a law provision or a regulation pertinent to settling the dispute is unconstitutional, it shall suspend the suit and shall refer the papers without fees to the Supreme Constitutional Court to settle the constitutional question.

B. If a disputant contests in the course of a lawsuit before a court or an authority with judiciary jurisdiction the unconstitutionality of a provision in a law or a regulation necessary for settling the dispute and if the court or the authority considers that the contest is serious, it shall postpone its hearing of the case and shall set for the contestant a period of no more than three months to bring a lawsuit on the issue before the Supreme Constitutional Court. If the lawsuit is not raised in time, the challenge shall be considered as non-existent.

Article 30

The decision on referral to the Supreme Constitutional Court or the lawsuit paper [sahifah] referred to this court in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article must include the text of the legal provision whose constitutionality is contested, the constitutional provision allegedly contravened and the aspects of violation.

Article 31

Any side concerned may ask the Supreme Constitutional Court to appoint the judiciary authority with the jurisdiction to consider the case referred to in paragraph two of article 25.

The request must point out the subject of disputation, the viewpoints of the judiciary authorities that have examined the dispute and the measures that each has taken in connection with the disputation.

Submission of the request shall result in suspending the lawsuits pertaining to it until a final decision is made on the dispute.

Article 32

Any side concerned may ask the Supreme Constitutional Court to settle a dispute concerning the implementation of two final and contradictory rulings in the case referred to in provision three of article 25.

The request must point out the existing dispute concerning implementation and the aspects of contradiction between the two rulings.

The court chairman may order, at the request of the contestants concerned, suspension of implementation of one or both rulings until a decision is made on the disputation.

Article 33

The request for interpretation shall be submitted by the minister of Justice at the request of the prime minister, the People's Assembly speaker or the Higher Council of the Judiciary Bodies.

The request for interpretation must point out the legislative provision to be interpreted, the conflict it has created in implementation and the degree of its significance that requires that the provision be interpreted so that it may be implemented uniformly.

Article 34

The requests and lawsuit papers submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court must be signed by an acceptable lawyer who can appear before the court or by a member of the Government Lawsuits Department with the grade of counselor at least. The request stipulated in articles 31 and 32 shall be submitted with an official copy of the two rulings over which the disputation or the conflict has arisen, otherwise the request shall be unacceptable.

The registration section shall record in a special register set for the purpose the referral decisions reaching the court and the lawsuits and requests presented to it on the day of arrival or submission.

The registration section shall notify through the clerical section the people concerned with the abovementioned decisions, suits or requests within 15 days of the abovementioned date.

The government shall be considered a party concerned in regard to the constitutional lawsuits.

Article 36 [sic]

The office of the lawyer who signs the lawsuit or request shall be considered a place [an address] selected by the plaintiff and the office of the lawyer acting on behalf of the defendant shall be considered a place [an address] selected by the latter for notification, unless each of the two sides designates a place through which he can be notified.

Article 37

Any party notified of a referral decision or of a lawsuit shall deposit in the court's registration section within a period of 15 days of the notification a memorandum containing his observations and coupled with documents.

The opponent may answer this memorandum and the documents within the 15 days following the end of the period set in the preceding paragraph.

If the opponent uses his right to reply, then the first party shall have the right to make a rebuttal within the next 15 days.

Article 38

The registration section may not accept after the dates set in the preceding paragraph any papers from the opponents. The section must write an official report containing the dates of the submission of these documents, the name of the party submitting them and its status.

Article 39

The registration section shall submit the lawsuit or request paper to the Commission of Counselors on the day following the end of the dates set in article 37.

The commission shall prepare the subject. To do this, the commission may contact the parties concerned to acquire the necessary documents or papers. The commission may also summon the parties concerned to seek from them clarifications on facts that it deems necessary and to ask them to submit complementary documents and memoranda and may ask for other investigation measures within the date it sets.

The commissioner may issue a decision levying a penalty of no more than 20 pounds on whoever causes repeated delays of the lawsuit. The commissioner's decision in this regard is final. The commissioner may also relieve the guilty party of this penalty if this party produces an acceptable excuse.

Article 40

After preparing the subject, the Commission of Counselors shall present a report defining the constitutional and legal issues brought up and the commission's opinion, with the reasons for this opinion.

The parties concerned may be familiarized with this report at the court's registration section and may request a copy of the report at their own expense.

Article 41

Within a week of the deposition of this report, the court chairman shall set the date for the session which will examine the lawsuit or the request.

The registration section shall notify the parties concerned of the date of the session by registered mail.

The date of presence [session] shall be within 15 days at least, unless the court chairman orders in case of necessity and at the request of the parties concerned to reduce this date to no less than 3 days.

The parties concerned shall be informed of this decision and notified of the date of the session.

Article 42

A commission member, with the grade of counselor at least, must attend the court sessions.

Article 43

Lawyers accepted to appear in trials before the Appellate Court and the Supreme Administrative Court shall be acceptable before the Supreme Constitutional Court.

The lawyer representing the government shall have at least the grade of counselor at the Government Lawsuits Administration.

Article 44

The court shall issue its sentences on the cases and requests referred to it without proceedings at law.

If the court deems verbal proceedings necessary, it may hear the lawyers of the disputants and the representative of the Commission of Counselors. In this case, the disputants shall not be permitted to appear before the court without a lawyer.

Disputants who have no memoranda deposited in their name in accordance with the provision of article 37 shall not have the right to deputize a lawyer to attend the session on their behalf.

The court may permit the disputants' lawyers and the Commission of Counselors to present complementary memoranda on the dates it sets.

Article 45

The rules of presence and absence stipulated in the civil and commercial code of legal proceedings shall not apply to the lawsuits and requests referred to the court.

Chapter Three

Rulings and Decisions

Article 46

The court's rulings and decisions shall be issued in the name of the people.

Article 47

The court shall decide of its own accord all the subsidiary issues.

Article 48

The court's rulings and decisions are final and not subject to appeal.

Article 49

The court's rulings on constitutional lawsuits and its decisions on interpretation shall be binding to all the state authorities and to all people.

The rulings and decisions referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE free of charge within a maximum period of 15 days of their issuance.

A ruling on the unconstitutionality of a law provision or of a regulation makes it incumbent to refrain from applying it on the day following the publication.

If the ruling on unconstitutionality pertains to a penal provision, the sentences of guilty issued in reliance on this provisions shall be void. The chairman of the Commission of Counselors shall notify the public attorney of the ruling immediately upon its issuance so that the necessary measures may be taken.

Article 50

The court, to the exclusion of all others, shall settle all the disputes concerning implementation of the rulings and decisions issued by it.

The rules set in the civil and commercial code of proceedings shall apply to these disputes in whatever is not in violation of the nature and jurisdictions of the court and of the conditions set for it.

A disputation shall not result in stopping implementation unless the court so orders until the disputation is decided upon.

Article 51

The rules set in the civil and commercial code of proceedings shall apply to the rulings and decisions of the court in cases for which no provision is stipulated in this law, provided that the application does not conflict with the nature of these rulings and decisions.

Chapter Four

Fees and Expenses

Article 52

No fees shall be collected for the requests stipulated in articles 16, 31, 32 and 33 of this law.

Article 53

A set fee of 25 pounds shall be charged for constitutional lawsuits.

The fee levied shall include all the judiciary proceedings pertaining to the case, including announcement of the papers and of the rulings.

On submitting the case paper, the plaintiff shall deposit a guarantee of 25 pounds in the court treasury.

A single guarantee shall be deposited if a number of plaintiffs submit their case in a single paper.

The court shall decide to seize the guarantee in case it rules that the lawsuit is unacceptable or in case it rejects the lawsuit.

While taking cognizance of the provisions of the next article, the registration section shall not accept a paper unless coupled with a proof of deposition.

Article 54

Any party proven incapable of paying may be exempted from all or part of the fee and from all or part of the guarantee, provided that the lawsuit is likely to be won.

The chairman of the Commission of Counselors shall decide on the exemption requests after familiarizing himself with the papers and hearing the statements of the applicant and the observations of the registration section. His decision on this issue shall be final.

An application for exemption shall result in speeding up the date for hearing a lawsuit pertaining to unconstitutionality.

Article 55

The provisions stipulated in law No 90 of 1944 on judiciary fees for civilian matters and in the civil and commercial code of proceedings shall apply to fees and expenses in cases for which there is no provision in this law.

Chapter Five

Financial and Administrative Affairs

Financial Affairs

Article 56

The court shall have an independent annual budget prepared after the pattern of the general state budget and beginning with the start of the fiscal year and ending with its end.

The court's General Assembly shall have the powers to which the minister of finance is entitled in the laws and regulations pertaining to the implementation of the court budget. The court chairman shall have the powers to which the minister of administrative development and the chairman of the Central Organization and Management Agency are entitled.

The provisions of the general state budget law shall apply to the court's budget and final account in cases where there are no provisions spelled out by this law.

Section Two

Administrative Affairs

Article 57

The court shall have a general secretary and a sufficient number of workers. The court chairman shall have over them the powers of minister and of assistant minister stipulated in the laws and regulations.

Article 58

A workers affairs committee consisting of two court members and the general secretary shall be formed on a decision by the court chairman and shall have jurisdiction over all appointment, promotion, transfer and allowance affairs concerning the workers.

After consultation with the Workers Affairs Committee, the court chairman shall issue a decision setting the controls for worker promotion.

Article 59

Without violating the stipulation of article 57, a committee consisting of three court members selected by the court's General Assembly annually shall be in charge of disciplining workers.

A decision of referral to this committee shall be issued by the court chairman. The Commission of Counselors shall assume the task of prosecution before this committee. The committee rulings shall be final and not subject to appeal.

Article 60

The rules applied to civil servants shall apply to the court workers in cases for which there is no provision in this law or in the judiciary authority law.

List of Positions, Salaries and Allowances Attached to Supreme Constitutional Court Law

1. Court Members

Position	Annual Allocations		Periodic Raise
	Salary	Representation Allowance	
Court Chairman	Salary, representation allowance and pension shall be set in appointment decree		
Court member	2,200-2,500 pounds	1,500 pounds raised to 2,000 pounds at top of grade scale	100 pounds

1. Every person appointed to the court membership shall be given the first step of his position's scale pay as of the date of appointment, unless the salary he earns before his appointment is equal to or exceeding the first step. If this is the case, he shall be given an increase not exceeding the top step of his position's pay scale.

The granting of such an increase does not change the date for getting the periodic raise.

2. The provisions of presidential decree No 211 of 1979 pertaining to the fixed annual transportation allowance shall apply to the court members.

3. The salary and allowances of a member may not be less than those of another member next to him in seniority.

4. A court member with a salary of 2,500 pounds shall be treated as a minister insofar as pension is concerned.

5. The representation and transportation allowance shall be exempt from all kinds of taxes. The reduction stipulated in law No 30 of 1967 and its amendments shall apply to these allowances.

2. Members of Commission of Counselors

Positions	Annual Allocations			Annual Increase
	Salary Pound	Judiciary Allowance Pound	Representation Allowance Pound	Pound
Commission Chairman	2,200-2,500	-	1,500 raised to 2,000 when salary reaches 2,500 pounds.	100
Counselors	1,500-2,040	450	1,200 when salary reaches 1,800 pounds.	75
Assistant Counselors	1,428-1,980	424.8 raised to 450 when salary reaches 1,800 pounds.		72

1. Any individual appointed to a grade with a bottom and a top step shall be paid the bottom step of the grade as of the date of appointment, unless the salary he earns before appointment is equal to or exceeds the step. In this case, the appointee shall be given one of the increases set for his grade, provided that the increase does not put him above the bottom step of the next higher grade. The granting of this increase does not change the date on which the periodic increase is deserved.

2. The provisions of presidential decree No 211 of 1979 pertaining to the fixed annual transportation allowance shall apply to the members of the Commission of Counselors.

3. The salary and allowances of a member may not be less than those of another member next to him in seniority in the position to which he is appointed.

4. A member of the Commission of Counselors with a salary at the top step of the pay scale of his position shall get the periodic increase set for the position directly above his in accordance with this list, even if he is not promoted to this position, provided that his salary does not exceed the top step salary of the higher position. In such a case, he shall be entitled to the allowances set various steps of this higher position.

5. A commission chairman with a salary of 2,500 pounds shall be treated as a court member insofar as pension is concerned.

6. The representation, judiciary and transportation allowances shall not be subject to any kind of taxes. They shall be subject to the reduction stipulated in law No 30 of 1967 and its amendments.

A representation allowance and a judiciary allowance may not be combined.

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EGYPT

DETAILS ON UNIVERSITIES' GUARDS UNITS GIVEN

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YANM in Arabic 13 Oct 79 p 5

[Article by Rif'at Fayad: "University Guards, With New Specifications, Each University Has Prepared a Guard Unit According to its Special System"]

[Text] Our universities have completed the formation of the university guard with the beginning of the new school year. Most of the universities have decided to form these units from the workers in the university, along with using the services of a group of retired or pensioned police officers. There will be a special uniform for the special security units in each university which will be directly subordinate to the president of the university.

Each University Has a System

The presidents of the universities held a number of meetings in recent weeks to formulate the regulations concerning the work and formation of these units and defining the suitable locations [for positioning them].

Maj Gen Mhamud Lutfi, the responsible officer for the security apparatus at 'Ayn Shams University, said these units will guard the installations and laboratories at the university and each of its colleges and all [university public utilities. Moreover, each college will form a branch security unit to guard its installations which will be directly subordinate to the dean of the college. The central command in the university is to be in direct contact with all these units.

Also to be formed are branch units composed of those having at least intermediate [education] qualifications. Their mission is to assist university students; they are to concern themselves with the requests of university visitors and answer their questions. These units will also regulate the entry and departure of vehicles at the university. The number of security personnel [at 'Ayn Shams University] will be about 350 persons.

As for Asyut University, university president Dr Hasan Hamdi confirmed that the university's security apparatus which is to be formed will comprise university employees and not be subordinate to any external authority. It

will be under the direct supervision of the university president. He said the university security apparatus will encourage students to feel completely safe, for the first time, inside their university.

Higher Qualifications for the University Guard

At Suez Canal University, [university president] Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman requested that the security apparatus personnel have university qualifications so they would be conscious and understanding of all the students' needs and the services required of them. There will be 30 persons assisted by a group of watchmen to guard the installations and laboratories in the university's colleges, apart from the administrative apparatus for these personnel.

The university president said that he has decided not to expand greatly university security due to the small number of colleges in the university and the small number of students there, when compared to the other universities.

At al-Zaqaziq University, university president Dr Talbah 'Uwaydah said that he had completed setting up the university's security apparatus 2 whole years ago. "We preceded all the universities in that to the point that we are able to guard the installations and laboratories at al-Zaqaziq University which are worth millions of pounds. An adviser has been appointed to university security and use is made of a group of pensioned police officers who have strong links and good rapport with the students." He added that al-Zaqaziq University this year will expand it by setting up fire-fighting units and civil defense units whose number will not exceed 30 persons.

Hulwan University Readied

Simultaneously, Hulwan University has completed reorganizing its security apparatus, according to university president Dr Isma'il 'Alam-al-Din. Its members who will be selected from graduates of the university itself, will have a special uniform with university insignia. This security apparatus will regulate the arrival and departure of vehicles from outside the university. The president said that each of the colleges will have subordinate to it a security force whose personnel will not exceed seven persons due to the small number of students in the university.

CSO: 4802

EGYPT

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ESTABLISHING MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 10 Oct 79 p 8

[Article: "Military Medical Academy to Include Military, Naval and Aviation Institutes"]

[Text] The People's Assembly is to discuss in its next session a bill proposed by Defense Minister LGen Kamal Hasan 'Ali regarding the establishment of a military medical academy in the armed forces. The bill, which the assembly's National Security Committee is to discuss tomorrow, Thursday, calls for establishing a military medical academy headquartered in Cairo having a corporate personality and subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The goals of the academy are training and instructing armed forces medical services officers in various specializations of military medical services; undertaking studies in specializations; and conducting, following-up and promoting applied and scientific medical reserach in the various sciences of military and clinical medicine.

The academy is to be composed of:

1. The Institute of Military Medicine, specializing in the science and operation of medical services; surgery and field treatment; protection and treatment from weapons of total destruction; and medical supplies in the field.
2. The Institute of Military Health and Prophylaxis, specializing in the sciences of military health, prophylaxis, contagious diseases and epidemics, laboratory research and environmental health.
3. The Institute of Naval Medicine, specializing in the sciences of marine medicine, depths and diving medicine and the study of health problems for naval personnel.
4. The Institute of Military Aviation and Space Medicine, specializing in medical instruction and research in the fields of aeromedicine and new developments in space medicine.

5. The Higher Clinical Medical Studies Authority, subordinate to which are the existing educational divisions in the armed forces' major medical units.

The academy is to be administered by the Higher Academy Council headed by the Minister of Defense and composed of the Assistant Defense Minister for Treatment Affairs, the Chief of the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Authority, the Chief of the [Armed Forces] Training Authority, the Chief of the [Armed Forces] Supply Authority, the Director of Officers' Affairs, the Director of Medical Services, the President of the Academy and the directors of the subordinate institutes.

The Higher Academy Council will formulate general policy; propose the establishment of new medical institutes; approve general study policy; and determine the number of students in the courses of each institute or instructional hospital and their acceptance requirements. The president of the academy, whose appointment is for a 3-year period and subject to renewal by approval of the defense minister, will administer and manage the academy's [day-to-day] affairs.

The academy's faculty will consist of active [i.e., full-time] members who are armed forces medical officers approved for working in the academy; armed forces medical officers recalled and retained in the service; specialists in the academy's sciences who apply for faculty positions which are announced as available and who are appointed as armed forces officers; and part-time members, civilian and military, who are used for teaching and research.

CSO: 4802

IRAN

AYATOLLAH NURI CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Sep 79 p 2

/Article: "Hojjatoleslam Abdollah Nuri's Open Letter to the Government Spokesman: The Bureaucracy Dominating Departments Has Driven People to Despair"/

/Text/ Hojjatoleslam Sheykh Abdollah Nuri is one of the committed and combative gracious scholars of the clerical area of Esfahan; he played a very effective, valuable role in the events of the struggles of the past few years, especially in last year's strikes, demonstrations and sitins in Esfahan. In an open letter to the government spokesman, he has strongly objected to the latter's statements. The text of Mr Nuri's letter is as follows:

It is a source of great sorrow that you are still in the position of defending your acts, in spite of all the chaos that is to be observed in the country, the laxity and lack of discipline dominating departments as a result of the lack of decisive government action, and the extremely grave losses and damage which have been imposed on the Iranian people in Kurdistan. Instead of responding to fatherly observations and accusing the great men of the Iranian Islamic revolution in an uninformed manner, would it not have been better for you to accept the advice and guidance and to act on it? In the open letter you wrote to Ayatollah Montazeri, you described the conditions in Iran, the actions of the government and the investigation in Kurdistan in such a way as to make them seem like very interesting and noteworthy activities, and to make it seem that even if there were riots in Kurdistan, they were in no way foreseeable and that counterrevolution had seized the area suddenly, like an earthquake or a flood. Mr Tabataba'i, what results did the visit by the minister and undersecretary to Kurdistan prior to the recent disturbances produce? What action was accomplished? If a plan had really been set in motion, how did counterrevolution grip the entire region and become so powerful? Doesn't counterrevolution go into play where the government is weak? Hasn't it been pointed out many times in the newspapers and by revolutionary sympathizers that Kurdistan was in an explosive state? Weren't the guards in Marivan slaughtered some days before the slaughter of the guards

in Paveh? Wasn't no reaction observed on the part of the government--to the point where some newspapers severely criticized the government and demanded that the perpetrators of the Marivan bloodbath be prosecuted, but still no steps were taken? It is astonishing that you were thinking about Kurdistan and making investigations from the first days of the revolution but that events of this kind still happened? Undoubtedly the proud, brave Moslem youths who were travelling there and constantly pointing out that basically there was no government in Kurdistan did not understand. Really, was there no government in Kurdistan, or could the counterrevolution prepare itself in that area and brainwash the people better than this? Now what kind of government is it whose presence in a region is no different from its absence? This is an enigma, Mr Tabataba'i, you have presented statistics on the number of trips. First, assuming the statistics are correct, I think these statistics are the sum of working, recreational and even harmful or provocative trips. Secondly, the time for presenting statistics has ended and today is the time for seriousness and work. The people are watchfully waiting for the results of the measures, plans and trips, and enumerating trips will remedy no ills. If the trips were effective, then what need would there be for historical speeches on the emam and his absolute orders? Ayatollah Montazeri, once again, does not want the emam to express such displeasure and wants your prestige with the emam and the people to be better preserved, as a result of his cautionary remarks, so that there will be no more need for this kind of fiery speech. Mr Tabataba'i! Isn't the bureaucracy dominating departments--which is a source of the people's discomfort and despair, has disrupted work to a very large extent, and has also made the gordian knot of the nation's affairs unsolvable--related to the government and its decision-making? Yes, it is possible that letters stay in the ministers' desk drawers, but the departments are so encumbered with paperwork that if results were attained it would make no difference. Most active revolutionary young people, who have entered the realm of action only for the sake of God and to preserve the gains of the revolution, have found such obstacles and so much obstructionism placed before themselves that it has disturbed their work and they have reached a state of despair and hopelessness. An example of that which can be seen by the naked eye is the plan for the crusade of construction, which you have attributed to the government without cause, since most effective forces carrying out the work of the crusade are unhappy and discontent with government departments, their way of treatment and their activity.

Mr Tabataba'i, where is the wisdom in your coming forth in order to respond to Ayatollah Montazeri all at once, after your first Friday prayer speech, in the guise of government spokesman, and a few more times under another guise? Didn't you want to respond to the emam's statement under this guise when he was criticising the government? Montazeri's statement supplemented the emam's, and his cautionary statements were those of the leadership of the revolution.

At a time when the emam is saying that Montazeri is a great combatant, a venerable jurist, an extremely valuable man and a committed molla, we suddenly see that the most important matter and the greatest duty of the government spokesman and of several other persons is to respond in a so-called respectful manner to this personality. It is to be hoped that friends have not taken the instruments of schemers and enemies in hand but are thinking about the course of the revolution and the emam. As Ayatollah Montazeri says, with a little more crash effort and less unremitting concern for administrative regulations, the work will be completed.

The nation of Iran requests decisiveness, crash revolutionary action and rapid movement. We also wish for the success of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in carrying out and implementing the requests of the nation.

/Signed/ Abdollah Nuri

11887
CSO: 4906

IRAN

NATION'S FUTURE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL POLICIES SPELLED OUT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Sep 79 p 2

/Article: "Principles of the Country's Economic and Social Policies Are Announced by Islamic Revolution Plan Office"

/Text/ In preparing a preliminary report, the Revolutionary Planning Office has declared the general economic and social policies of the Iran of the Islamic Republic and has identified the goal and philosophy behind these policies.

We herewith convey sections of this report:

"In a unificationist society, the system of life is firmly implanted on the principle that everything belongs to God, that man is the trustee of God's property, and that these properties are to be used in order to provide the recognized, reasonable material needs of society, without squandering or prodigality, for the sake of progressing toward God. This society is not unmindful of the possession of and desire for those things being realized in other societies of the world which are not devoted to turning toward God, and it is trying to warn these societies against possessing or desiring these things.

"In this unificationist society, every individual considers himself committed to looking after the rights of others and feels responsibility in his work; the feeling of boundless generosity, gentlemanliness, thrift, love of country, self-control and sense of duty is strengthened within him and the study of and belief in the manner of conducting himself have struck root within him.

"In this society, every individual holds all members of the society in respect, especially those to whom he, as a master, has taught an idea or a profession, and he also enjoys appropriate respect. In this classless society, no individual enjoys any preference over others and the people consider those among them who are the most chaste and self-sacrificing to be the most beloved, in accordance with the criterion 'The most generous of you is the most pious in God's mind!'

The Principles of Economic and Social Policies

This report stated that the socioeconomic system which is to be mobilized for the sake of attaining the desires of the Islamic revolution of Iran will possess the following principles and characteristics:

1. Attainment of a prosperous, acquisitive society is not the objective; rather, this objective is the means for man's progression toward God.
2. The economy should meet society's reasonable acknowledged material needs without profligacy.
3. People are equal in the right to use all God-given resources.
4. There is a balance between economic progress and morality.
5. The creativity and usefulness of individuals is encouraged and guaranteed through moral and material means.
6. Pollution and sabotage of the environment should be kept to the minimum possible.
7. The optimum use should be made of manpower and natural resources.
8. The necessary inclination and acquisition for growth and application to the conditions of the people's time, place and culture exists in the economy.
9. Education, the upbringing of the young and development are an inseparable part of all economic and social activities.

Social and economic policies have been codified in accordance with the following means and characteristics:

1. Stabilization of the fundamental sectors of the economy, which consist of the free economic, or popular, sector; the mixed economic, or popular-government, sector; and finally the governmental economic sector.

In the first sector, the government takes measures to create the environment, and provides the possibility, for the expansion and progress of this sector. In the second sector, the government participates with the people in economic activities, as well as creating or supervising the environment and on occasion contributing to capital investment.

In the third sector, the government, while drawing the participation of the people, places the principal leading (strategic) economic activities within the compass of its own decisionmaking.

2. In economic activities, profit or value added will be apportioned among the workforce, the society and capital (in order to encourage capital investment and consequently advance the popular and mixed economies). The government will determine the workforce, society and capital's shares of /this profit/ in proportion to the type of activity, the volume of capital investment (the maximum encouragement of small capital investment), the location of the activity, the stage of society's development and expansion, and so forth.

"The free sector: this consists of small and medium productive and service units, with the participation of the people.

"The mixed sector: this consists of medium and large productive and service units with the participation of the people and supervision or capital investment by the government.

"The government sector: this consists of heavy principal leading (strategic) productive and service units, or units in which the popular sector for one reason or another is not inclined or able to participate."

3. By disbursing greater profits to their capital investments, limiting wealth and collecting escalating taxes from high incomes, the people will encourage capital investment in economic activities and will promote the just distribution of wealth among the units of the society.

4. The principle of "total participation by the people in all matters," as a national slogan, will be the motive force for solidarity among various groups and classes and will ensure the cohesion of society.

5. With the determination of policies bearing on economic stability and continuity, the control of inflation, specific financial and credit policies, policies bearing on worker-employer relations and policies for the development and expansion of the outlines of infrastructure installations and services, and with the determination of policies for economic and service activities on the national, regional and local levels, the economic activities of the popular, mixed and government sectors will expand in the urban and rural areas.

6. Through the solution of land problems, the establishment of a system of family exploitation, the optimum mobilization and use of water resources, and the cultivation of fallow lands, the nation's agriculture will prosper, the basic needs of society in the form of vegetable, animal, industrial and other materials will be met, and some crops with appropriate quality will have export potential.

Through the preservation of diverse productive activities and the establishment of rural and small industries suitable for the characteristics of each area in those areas with balanced, stable nationwide coverage,

the revenue, welfare, and level of the quality of life in rural society will be raised and brought into parity with urban society.

7. Full employment will be established in an appropriate fashion in all sectors of the economy, with a balanced distribution between rural and urban areas, and the employment structure, with attention to women's participation, will not include children. Minimum wages and salaries will be set on the basis of the living requirements of the family.

8. Crude oil and gas exportation will be avoided as far as possible and use will be made of these hydrocarbons for petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, paint and so forth.

9. The optimum use of the national resources of the nation, in particular oil and gas, which belong to all the generations of Iran, will be made and the income obtained from their sale will be spent on infrastructure activities.

10. The consumption of oil products in the country will gradually be reduced and use will be made of natural gas for providing energy requirements through a national gas distribution system. Other energy resources such as the sun, wind, geothermal power and others will be subjected to research and development and will be used in special cases.

With respect to the exploitation of different types of non-oil energy, such as sun, wind and so forth, Iran will acquire a leading role, especially in the third world.

11. The nation's industries will enjoy a national, domestically-created technology and provide the basic industrial needs of the society. Military industries will reach the stage of self-sufficiency where they will be able to defend the nation's independence and territorial integrity.

12. The population will enjoy a distribution and growth in keeping with the country's goals of expansion and development and will dwell in an interrelated urban and rural system; irregular migration (especially to the big towns) will be avoided.

13. The manpower required for socioeconomic activities will be formed through on-the-job training at the level of the high school, the vocational and the university.

The Time Frames for Implementation of Socioeconomic Policies

In order to reach the desired state of a unificationist society, provision is made for three time frames, short, medium and long range, as follows:

1. The first, two-year short-range stage, the transitional stage, from 21 March 1980 to 20 March 1982.

2. The second, 3-year, medium-range stage, comprising two 4-year plans, from 21 March 1982 to 20 March 1990.

3. The third, 12-year, long-range stage, comprising three 4-year plans, from 21 March 1990 to 20 March 2002.

The first, short-range stage has been allocated mainly for the purpose of completing many existing projects and completing a series of necessary crash programs.

The second stage of the policy is established to the end of constructing a strong social and economic base; in the third stage, attention will be given to raising production from the qualitative and quantitative standpoints and to social welfare.

On the assumption that the first government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is established in November 1979, it will be possible to prepare and set down the details of the short-range stage by 20 March 1980.

The year 21 March 1980--20 March 1981 will be spent in tabulating and gathering statistics and precise information and in generally evaluating the projects which have been completed by that date, and in the year 21 March 1981-20 March 1982 planning for the first 4-year plan, which is for the years 1982-1985, will be carried out.

Continuity of the nation's expansion and development plans will in practice be preserved by establishing a gap of 2 years between the start of presidential terms and the start of subsequent plans, so that a president will have 1 year in which to plan for his policies and another year in which gradually to provide for necessary changes in existing plans, so that he may be able successfully to implement his policies.

Note 1. If it is practically possible to establish a republic on 21 March, it will be easier to have the fiscal year, planning and the presidential term coincide.

Note 2. The holding of all presidential elections in November and the installation of the republic in March will provide an adequate opportunity for acquainting each new government with the existing political and economic environment.

Principles To Be Observed in the First Short-Term Stage

1. National security and the guarantee of rights of individual and personal freedom.

2. Establishment of confidence among the people in the country's government and future.

3. Preparation of the groundwork for economic, social and political stability.
4. Solving the problem of bureaucracy and introduction of carefully calculated blows against the phenomena and agencies of the previous regime, in order to guarantee the survival of the revolution.
5. Attraction of the participation of and preparing and mobilizing the people for construction.
6. Strengthening the spirit of generosity and self-sacrifice in the society with the objective of avoiding the spread of unrealistic consumer desires and anarchistic social tendencies.
7. Organization and creation of the necessary wherewithal for the survival of the revolutionary movement and the implementation of plans.
3. Performance of the necessary basic and infrastructure studies and commencement of their implementation.
9. Continuation and completion of "acceptable" previous plans.
10. Commencement of the creation of capacity and environment in various fields:

The relationship between the individual and society and the free, mixed and government sectors on the one hand and all laws and decrees on the other.

Physical infrastructures.

Social and commercial infrastructures.

Manpower training; (creation of man).

Intelligence and statistics.
11. Provision of a resource base to prepare for responding to problems which have not been taken into account.

Principles To Be Observed in the Second, Medium Term Stage

1. Maintenance of national security and the guarantee of rights of individual and personal freedom.
2. Maintenance of confidence among the people in the country's government and future.

3. Creation, maintenance and preservation of economic, social and political stability in the country.
4. Sustained outfitting and mobilization of the people in the crusades for construction.
5. Preservation and strengthening of the spirit of generosity in society and avoidance of profligacy and unreasonable expectations.
6. Continued research and investigation into the solution of problems related to the expansion and development of the country.
7. Continuation, expansion and completion of activities of creating environment and capacity.

The relationship between the free, mixed and governmental sectors and economic, social and political laws.

The physical, social and commercial infrastructure.

Manpower training.

Information gathering and statistics.

Principles To Be Observed in the Third, Long-Range Stage

1. The maintenance of national security and the guarantee of rights of individual and personal freedom.
2. Maintenance of the people's good confidence in the government.
3. Preservation of economic, social and political stability in the country.
4. Preservation and maintenance of the people's participation in matters related to themselves and the country.
5. Preservation and strengthening of the spirit of generosity and gentlemanliness among the people and guidance of the society toward thrift and the avoidance of profligacy and unreasonable expectations.
6. Continued examination and research into solutions bearing on the expansion and development of the country.
7. The continuation and completion of elements and activities of creation of the environment and capacity.
8. Raising the quality and quantity of society's production and welfare.

11887
CSO: 4906

IRAN

DRIVE TO MAKE NATION SELF-SUFFICIENT IN AGRICULTURE PROPOSED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Sep 79 p 3

/Article: "In the Conference To Examine the State of the Economy, It Was Recommended That Imports of Agricultural Products Be Prohibited"

/Text: On the third day of the Conference to Examine the State of the Nation's Economy, which was devoted to agriculture and its deficiencies, Ali Mohammad Izadi, minister of agriculture and rural development, referring to the agricultural problems of the past, stated:

"The basic outlines and new policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development are to increase production, eliminate want and provide a minimum living standard for the inhabitants of rural areas. The participation of the people, the policy of nonintervention by government officials in farmers' affairs, and improvement of the system of production are among the factors we must keep in mind to reach these objectives."

Izadi said, "Ownership of pastures will be made public and inalienable and all decrees aimed at the exploitation of pastures will be eliminated. In addition, the expansion and mobilization of fishery activities aimed at proper use under a single administration and the exploitation of ocean and internal waterway resources to make up for the shortage of protein materials required for human and livestock nutrition through the industrial rearing and production of water organisms will be among the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development's plans.

"Also, revival of cooperative principles in accordance with the tradition and usage of the area, together with the derivation of benefit from experiments of the past and a fundamental, qualitative review of existing cooperation will occur. Creation of service centers in the rural areas, which in fact are the motive force for balanced and harmonious growth and development of the countryside, will function under the supervision of the village councils, the rural areas and the tribal councils."

In conclusion, the minister of agriculture and rural development stated "Fallow and unused lands included in the laws will be revived and placed by law at the disposal of individuals or groups who exert themselves in developing them."

After the minister of agriculture and rural development's statement, Mohammad Bayebardi of the Plan and Budget Organization stated "If we want to be self-sufficient in the agricultural field, why must we be worried about a shortage of certain commodities, and that only for 2 or 3 years, and have agricultural imports of up to 14 billion tomans a year for the wellbeing of a limited group? Let some people eat less or not find the commodities they are interested in in the market. There are 30 million hectares of arable land in Iran which also have productive potential but only about 10 million of these are exploited in irrigated or dry farming fashion annually."

He added, "Eighteen million people, more than half the population of Iran, live in the rural areas and are located in 60,000 scattered villages. Proper use is not made of this great force. With respect to the forests and pastures, one must say that there are about 60 million hectares of natural pasture and 18 million hectares of forest in Iran, and the pastures can place about 8 million tons of attractive foodstuffs at the disposal of livestock which in themselves can produce about 800,000 tons of animal meat. In Iran there are about 10 million head of cattle and 80 million head of sheep from which one can cover the agricultural shortage and the nation's meat through scientific exploitation." He also said, "Since about 87 percent of the rural inhabitants own less than 10 hectares of land, 87 percent of the development budget must therefore also be placed at the disposal of this group.

"Use must also be made of the workers' productive systems in the rural areas and mechanization must proceed to the point where tractors and vehicles will take the place of livestock and cattle."

HE DECLARED, "Imports of all types of crops and agricultural, food, livestock and dairy products, which total \$2 to \$3 billion per year, should be prohibited, government financial aid should be cut off in the field of meat, bread, granulated and hard sugar and vegetable oil subsidies, and the amounts obtained, totalling 20 billion tomans per year--three times the development budget of the Ministry of Agriculture--should be allocated to the development of rural areas." In conclusion, he said "Iran can provide food for 60 million people from its own natural resources." Ali Asghar Mo'infar, minister of state and chairman of the Plan and Budget Organization, also said: "One must meet the interests of the country and the needs of the deprived people in the countryside and not evict farmers from their areas, their land and their farming by creating big landowners. We must fully weigh the human aspect of the matter. One must link the social state of the people to the agricultural situation and not look at it in a one-dimensional fashion. Therefore to separate the question of

improving the life of rural society, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the country's population, from the objective of increasing agricultural output in a great error and we will in reality arrive at the latter objective only by realizing the former one and eliminating the traditional agricultural land reforms of Iran."

Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank of Iran, also stated at this conference "The reason for industrializing the country is to combat overall poverty, raise the standard of living and create the wherewithal for economic power. However, economic development must be harmonious; without agricultural progress, economic independence for the country is not possible; there must be coordination in all fields."

11887
CSO: 4906

IRAN

ARAK GOVERNOR ACCUSES KOMITEHS OF TERRORISM

[Editorial Report LD] TEHRAN KEYHAN in Persian 9 October 1979 reports from Arak, administrative capital of the Central Province, that in a discussion Central Province Governor-General Abbas Sami'i accused revolution Komiteh members of acts of terrorism in the city and of the torture and harrassment of prisoners. According to the paper, Sami'i said that one Gholam Ali Sharestani, who was killed in an attack, identified the killers as Komiteh members before he died. Sami'i reproaches the Islamic Revolution Court for returning a dossier on the case on the grounds that the accusation lacked foundation. The governor-general indicates that a religious terrorist group called the "Hudud" has claimed responsibility for this murder and is apparently implicated in others.

The governor-general says that although those killed may have been smugglers and people of bad reputation, "Nobody is entitled to take the law into his own hands."

On the subject of Komiteh interference in government business, Sami'i says that the revolution guards stationed at the police station and the new prison have no permission to be there and are seizing people in broad daylight.

The report states that the "Sanjan" Komiteh arrested 60 itinerant musicians and, after subjecting them to ill-treatment, sent them to the office of the governor-general of the Central Province for work. They also meddle in agricultural affairs and the Arak prosecutor has been asked to intervene to stop this.

"The unsanctioned, illegal and untoward actions of the Komiteh place a heavy burden on the police," Governor-General Sami'i declares.

CSO: 4906

IRAN

SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS DISCUSSES SMUGGLED FUNDS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Sep 79 p 1

/Article: "At the Seminar on Economic Problems, It Was Stated That \$2 Billion in Contraband Foreign Currency Have Been Removed from the Country"

/Text/ The Seminar to Examine the Country's Economic Problems ended in the meeting hall of the Prime Minister's Office last Thursday after eight sessions which were attended by the country's economic authorities.

Delivering speeches at the seventh and eighth sessions of the seminar on Thursday were Foruhar, minister of labor and social affairs; Dr Sadduqi, undersecretary of labor for workers' affairs; Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, general director of the Central Bank; Rashidi, managing director of Pars Bank; Dr Reza Sadr, minister of commerce; Dr Hoseyn Pirnia, professor at the university; Ali Hajj Tarkhani, representative of the emam and head of the Chamber of Commerce; and Mo'infar, secretary of the Plan and Budget Organization.

Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank, who also was assigned the chairmanship of this session, referring to the importance of coordinating and maintaining a balance between money and commodities on the market, said "In the past the Central Bank had policies and a special role which can no longer be continued following the revolution, and changes must take place." He added, "The banks are empty and their condition following the revolution, after people had exported their deposits or set fire to them, has become chaotic. Of course one must not just hold the revolution accountable for this current economic crisis--even if there had been no revolution, we would have been faced with a different type of economic crisis at the present time because of the erroneous policy of the past. Even though the situation now is not satisfactory, it is not like that of the previous era. Fortunately, the banks have become able to place necessary credits in the commercial sector today; in addition, they have provided credits to help the government in the field of industry, housing, foodstuffs and agriculture, among which, in the current year, the government has given 4-percent interest loans of 120 billion rials to provide granulated and hard sugar and 85 billion rials to help owners of industries."

Mowlavi said, "Another matter is that numerous problems have been created with the nationalization of banks, which we hope will be eliminated as soon as possible by the bill we have drawn up. As soon as these problems are eliminated, the government's economic policy will also become clearly known. It is as a result of this unclear situation that the Central Bank cannot take a decisive position regarding hard currency. We cannot determine the volume of our oil revenues and we therefore have no choice but to pursue a temporary monetary policy. When you say that we have foreign currency reserves of 11 billion, that is not very much. Through thrift, effort and exertion, we are trying to meet requirements so that no need for foreign borrowing will arise. Of course the government will introduce changes into monetary policy." Mowlavi said, "What goes without saying is that exporters must be protected and encouraged."

Ali Rashidi, managing director of Pars Bank, said "The law regarding the nationalization of banks which was ratified by the Revolutionary Council was very hasty. Before this law was ratified, eight or nine banks should have been declared bankrupt after an investigation into the condition of banks because this precipitous measure inflicted losses of about \$400 million on the government. Moreover, the matter of bank mergers must take place in a regional manner, to provide effective assistance to regional planning."

Dr Reza Sadr, the minister of commerce, stated "We passed through several stages in arriving at the nationalization of banks--that is, we did not in fact start the job with the nationalization of banks; the question of nationalizing banks was raised in second place. Following the revolution, in the course of investigations we noted that all the country's economic power and industries were in the hands of a special group which had coordinated its policies with those of the devil. In order for us to advance the revolution, we had no choice but to disarm that group, that is, to nationalize the banks, emerge from the field of influence of this group, which was carrying out its influence within the banks, and completely close this road off."

Dr Hoseyn Pirnia, university professor, then said "We must pursue a movement of economization in every area and teach it through the mass media and even the schools.

"Islamic economy, as history has shown in the past 1,400 years, was most prosperous during the period of Islamic civilization. During that period one broad market, from China to Morocco, held the economic artery of the world in its hand. We can mobilize solutions in accordance with that system, applied to the requirements of the era, and eliminate our economic problems."

Then Ali Hajj Tarkhani, the emam's representative and head of the Chamber of Commerce, said "Although nationalization of the banks was hasty, it was

wholly realistic. Most people who owned stock in the banks were modest and even underprivileged people who had bought them through the stock exchange, and the government should pay the profits on their shares as soon as possible."

At the conclusion of this session, Hanjani of the Central Bank said "Unfortunately the government has not yet succeeded in preventing the outflow of foreign currency. In 6 months, \$2 billion in foreign currency has been smuggled out via the country's ports. Also, the government must make a complete review on sending out foreign currency for students, which comes to \$2 billion a year in volume."

11887
CSO: 4906

IRAN

EXPERTS DISCUSS THOROUGH ARABIC SCHOOLING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Sep 79 p 16

/Article: "During the Ratification of Points 19 and 21 at the Experts' Council: Arabic Language Schooling Is Proposed at All Levels"/

/Text/ Two points of the constitution, 19 and 21, were ratified at the Council of Experts /sessions/ held yesterday under the chairmanship of Dr Beheshti. Some other points were also subjected to exchanges of views and their ratification was postponed to today. Regarding Point 18, ratification of that, with agreement over the point's statement that "implementation of the executive power will be carried out by the president of the republic, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers in a manner to be arrived at through discussion within the executive power," was postponed until a later time. This point was submitted to Commission 2 with 40 affirmative and two negative votes and 16 abstentions.

Mr Akrami was the first person to rise in defense of this point, stating, in discussing this issue, "We have agreed that the sovereignty of religious jurists will not alone have the power to implement the laws but that they must assign this matter to others; in this case, the question of executive power will be solved."

In opposition to that point, Dr Ayat then said "This point has been drawn up without attention to prior ratifications. How the views of the persons drawing it up have now changed! Now the clause 'implementation of the executive power by the leader or leadership council' should be added." He added that the sovereignty of religious jurists is in no way dictatorial; when the conditions are present, anyone reaching the stage of knowledge of religious jurisprudence will have the power of sovereignty and it will be nobody's monopoly. The issue of the sovereignty of jurists should also be reflected in the other points."

Mr Makarem considered that this point was compatible with the sovereignty of religious jurists and said "It is possible that a jurist could even be president. It cannot be imagined that the presidency of the republic will end with the ratification of this point." In answer to the question

whether the president should be a jurist or be supported by jurists, Makarem said "We will discuss this in the conditions for being president, and the powers of the president will be identified." In answering Rabbani Amoleshi, who had asked what would become of the issue of the presidency when leadership power was concentrated in the sovereignty of jurists, Makarem said "The point is such that the president's powers can be determined in the future and its description will appear in the executive power." Continuing this discussion, Kiavosh said "We wrote this point at a time when we were not precisely informed about the limits of the sovereignty of the executive power; therefore Mr Makarem's statement is just a justification."

In continuation, Dr Ayat said "The legal superiority of the laws of Islam over other laws is the sovereignty of religious jurists and one must rely upon that."

Ayatollah Montazeri made the following statement: "The leadership of the religious jurist is the leadership of all three powers. It is the link among powers and the chairmanship of all powers. General amnesty lies within that and it breathes within all three powers." A vote was taken after this stage and the matter was submitted to Commission 2.

No Social Manifestation

After a lengthy discussion on the executive power, Point 19 was read out by Dr Beheshti. Point 19 says:

"Implementation of the judiciary power through the courts of administration of justice, which must be formed in accordance with Islamic criteria, is concerned with ruling on cases, preserving public rights, expanding and implementing justice and establishing divine contracts."

Musavi Jesayeri, one of the representatives, asked "What will the duties of the revolutionary courts be following implementation of this point?"

In response Beheshti said "Ratification of the points in the session cannot actually change any social phenomenon or create any new social phenomenon, until all the points are ratified by the council and by public opinion through a referendum."

This point was ratified, with 60 affirmative and two negative votes and five abstentions. The draft of Point 20 was not presented after ratification of Point 19 because of its connection with previous unratified points and Point 21, which concerns script and language, was subjected to discussion by the representatives and was ratified after a period of discussion with a little change in the proposed text. According to this point, the common, official script and language of the people of Iran is Persian, and official documents, correspondences and texts and textbooks must be in that language and script, although free use may be made of local and ethnic languages in publications and mass media and instruction of these languages' literatures may take place alongside the Persian language in the schools.

The representative of the Armenians said "The Armenians have no particular place, and if we add the word 'ethnic' to the point, that will cause no problem." This statement was supported by the representatives and the word "ethnic" was added to Point 21.

This point was also ratified, with 63 votes in favor, none against and five abstentions.

Unity of Language

Discussion then took place over Point 22 and was postponed to today's exceptional meeting without conclusion. Article 22 says "Since the language of the Koran and the Islamic foundation and culture is Arabic, and Persian literature is thoroughly steeped in Arabic, this language must be taught at all educational levels." Mr Kiavosh stated, as one who was in favor, "One of the ruses of the enemies of Islam and Iran was to alienate the people from the language of the Koran. I can even remember that the late Ruzbeh was saying 3 or 4 years ago that the regime wanted to eliminate the Arabic language. I believe that the blow we received was from not knowing this language, for which reason they interpreted the Koran to us the way they wanted. For example, they interpreted the verse 'Spend for the sake of God and do not allow your hands to submit to ruin' for us as 'put some change in your pocket in the morning and give it to the poor.' Thus these became the verses of our crusade--the verse on escape and spending became the nurturing of beggars--whereas spending means the elimination of class contradictions. Even I spend about an hour's time trying to understand one verse of the Koran."

Kiavosh referred to the point that one of the wondrous points of the Islamic republic must essentially be the creation of unity through language--a language which has been supported by all linguists.

Kiavosh recommended that letters sent to Arab countries through diplomatic channels be written in Arabic. He also stated that compilation of this language at the guidance and secondary levels seems sufficient.

Rabbani Amoleshi then recommended that this language be taught at all levels "because we have even seen imperialists in countries trying to teach their language to the people of a country starting with the elementary stage; one must realize that Arabic language instruction does not have the status of school work as far as we are concerned--rather, it is to become acquainted with the texts of the religious schools."

Mr Qorshi said, "If Arabic is to be taught for the sake of the Koran, it would be better if the Koran itself were taught."

Dr Beheshti recommended, "It would be better if Dr Bahonar, who is a specialist in this matter, offered a clarification in this regard." Dr Bahonar

said, "It is not our expectation that Arabic should become a conversational language; therefore no need is felt to teach it in the elementary stage, because many experts are of the belief that if a non-conversational language is taught in the elementary stage it will be harmful for the child's mother tongue."

Bahonar added that Arabic language instruction in the university is not necessary either, because 6 years are sufficient for teaching it. However, for departments where there is a need to read texts, such as departments of philosophy, law and literature, it would be better if it were taught.

Ayatollah Montazeri said "In the previous regime they taught 6 years of Arabic but in practice the students knew nothing upon graduating. Therefore I recommend that it be explained in the point that Arabic language instruction should be such that people will be able to read Arabic texts by the end of the year."

This discussion ended without conclusion and it was determined that a decision in this regard would be taken at this morning's exceptional session.

At the end of the session, a letter from the Radio and Television company was read to the council by Dr Behesti. In this letter, the council was requested to express its opinion with regard to the full simultaneous broadcast of the program on Channel 2 of radio and television, or the partial broadcast of the program during the evening hours; if some of the council's discussions were to be broadcast, a representative with full powers should describe the sections which had to be broadcast to Radio and Television, because some representatives stated "The parts related to us are being censored."

11887
GSO: 4906

IRAN

HOUSING MINISTER EXPLAINS POLICIES TO SEMINAR

Tehran KEVHAN in Persian 20 Sep 79 p 13

/Article: "The Minister of Housing and Urban Development Stated at the Seminar on Economic Problems: In 6 Years No One Will Be a Landowner in Fee Anywhere"

/Text/ At the sixth session of the Seminar to Examine the Country's Economic Problems, the minister of housing and urban development announced that regulations concerning the abrogation of land ownership and means for assigning land to the people were in the process of being drawn up and the definitive assignment of large lands would be clarified by the coming week. This program has been organized in such a way that in 6 years' time no one will be a landowner in fee anywhere.

The minister of housing said "In accordance with Islamic legal principles we believe that unused lands must not have owners. The government's policy in respect to reducing housing costs has been to lower the cost of land in the first place."

The sixth session of the Seminar to Examine Economic Problems, which was held yesterday, was concerned with investigating matters related to housing and construction. This seminar was held under the chairmanship of Eng Katira'i, the minister of housing. At this session the minister of housing and urban development referred to Central Bank statistics and said "The ratio of landowner to tenant in the large cities is 43 to 57 percent. At the present time we have 2.38 million sanitary and unsanitary housing units; in terms of the current population we have a shortage at the same rate as in the past, that is, 1977-8, on condition that we do not take the loss of mud housing and old housing into consideration and also that there be no migration into the towns, would take 10 years." He said, "Housing costs are people's biggest living expense, swallowing up about 70 percent of people's incomes. In 1977-8 the cost of land accounted for about 65.4 percent of construction costs. Therefore, through the comprehensive investigation which the government and the Revolutionary Council have made in order to solve the housing problem, a law has been ratified abrogating unused urban land ownership, also codified in accordance with

Islamic legal principles, and an effort is being made to reduce the price of land to a minimum." In describing the role of the three factors of manpower, building materials and land in creating housing, Katira'i said "Lowering workers' wages has not been possible in current conditions nor has lowering the price of building materials, which in themselves are related directly to workers' wages, because the likelihood exists of unemployment and paralysis of the building material manufacturing plants. Therefore we deemed it more appropriate to break the price of land; since there are more than 200 crafts on the job in a building, we must try to strengthen all these branches. Also, the government is not able to create housing and construction alone; we must also obtain help from the private sector. Although a class of people known as 'build it and sell it' has acquired a bad name as a result of the role it played in the past, this is not a general phenomenon; we must assign construction work to the builders and sellers through careful control and supervision and encourage and strengthen them. Money and credit are of course also important in the construction of housing, and we, through the effort and exertion we have made, have been able to place this credit at the disposal of people asking for it at relatively low interest, through the aid of the National Bank."

90 Percent of Housing Has Been Solved

Katira'i, stressing that the government would act in a very serious manner on the housing issue, said "Through the measures which have been made, 90 percent of the problems in the way of creating housing have disappeared. We hope that there will be no issue by the name of housing problem in the country in the coming years." He said, "With the implementation of the law abrogating ownership of unused lands, large properties are to revert wholly to the government and small properties, if not built on by their owners within 3 years, will also revert to the government at no charge."

Following the minister of housing and urban development's statements, Eng Javad Salehi, technical undersecretary of housing, stated "Placing land at the disposal of the government, in addition to preventing a market in speculating in and raising prices, is strengthening the government and municipality's hand in putting the city plan into operation and is allowing us to make transformations in constructing a good city as well as providing housing. Abrogation of land ownership has not only helped solve the housing problem--it has also strengthened our hand in providing municipal and welfare services in the form of roads, schools, and hospitals and other services, because in the past private ownership was a big obstruction to implementation of the basic city plan."

He added, "Lowering rents must bring down the bank interest rate base. What is to be taken for granted is that the government will provide the people and the private sector land to build on; in this regard, regulations are in the process of being prepared, and, if they are implemented, you will see how the value of land will drop."

The Value of Land Must Drop to Zero

After Salehi's statements, Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank, stated "First it must be clear what the Islamic Republic's policy in regard to the situation in Tehran is: should Tehran become bigger or not? Should the old sections gradually be turned into new ones, or not?" He said "Building must be compatible with the social condition of the country: do the people need 10- or 15-story apartment buildings or not? Must the value of land drop to zero, with no land transactions taking place? Laborers and construction must be used in such a way that the added cost of wages should have no effect on construction costs. Special credits should be provided for consumer goods, including construction, and the volume of instalments a person must pay should be compatible with the wages he receives. These are all matters which must be taken into consideration at the outset."

He added, "In other countries municipalities buy land and thereby avoid centralization, placing the land at the disposal of people who build houses. The government must accept the fact that it itself cannot assume the responsibility of housing construction and must assign this task to the people themselves."

At this seminar, the minister of finance said "Government expenses are weighty--astronomical. The country's current expenditures are 350 to 400 million tomans a day, or about 900 billion rials a month. Of course 250 billion rials have been paid out in construction expenses this month but, because of the deficiencies which exist, not all equipment has been provided or put to use." He added, "The government sector swallows up a significant portion of the budget, but employment is an important matter and one must not consider it simple."

Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank of Iran, also stated at this seminar "The purpose in industrializing is to combat general poverty, raise the standard of living, improve the environment, and create the wherewithal for economic power. However, economic expansion must be coordinated. The country's economic independence will not be possible without agricultural progress. There must be coordination in all fields." He added, "In the past, the reform of ownership, which was merely a subdivision of land, had no positive results, because the subdivision of land must be accompanied by financial aid, machinery, seeds, the provision of insecticides and so forth. Unfortunately, they /only/ took into account breaking up the land in the land reform. It is necessary that there be some connection between the increase in crops and price increases. The Government must place credit facilities at the disposal of farmers so that the level of agricultural output may be raised."

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IRAN

BRIEFS

DEATH THREAT TO ARAK GOVERNOR--Arak--The governor-general of the Central Province has received a death threat from the "Siyah Jamegan" [Black Suits] group. In a telephone discussion with the ETELA'AT correspondent in Arak Abbas Sami'i spoke about recent terrorism and criticism of the Komitehs: "Owing to the acute problems occurring in Arak, only a small number of which appear in the press, I have been threatened with death by letter and telephone. I am not, of course, worried about anything happening to me personally, but I am concerned for the community that this sort of thing continues. I recently received a death threat in a letter from the Siyah Jamegan group which said that if I continue to follow my present course they will destroy me. As I have said, this group, and any other group, must know that I am not afraid of anything that might happen to me and I have not an atom of fear, since I tread a constructive and righteous path." [Text] [Tehran ETELA'AT in Persian 13 Oct 79 p 10 LD]

CSO: 4906

IRAQ

DELAYS IN CONSTRUCTING HOUSING COMPLEXES EXPLAINED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 27 Aug 79 p 6

[Article by Za'im al-Ta'i: "Alternative Solutions for a Continuing Crisis"]

[Text] I do not know who it was that once said that a man's shelter is his nation. Nor do I know why the incidents portrayed in the film (Di Sika)--"The Roof"--plagued my mind while I was proceeding through the different phases of this report, which concerns the residential apartments that the state has constructed to house a large segment of the citizenry and save them from the housing crisis which has gripped so many. However, I do not believe that we have undergone a crisis like that experienced by the star of the film (Di Sika), who lets himself get married without insuring that he has a house or a roof over his head--even though he works in construction, building houses for people--and is forced to spend his married days hanging around on the street or in friends' houses.

In an interview we conducted with the general director of the State Housing Organization, Mahmud Shakir Fahmi, we opened a conversation dealing with the organization's plans and the solutions it has employed to solve the housing problem. Mr Fahmi said:

The Problem and the Solutions

"With the support of the party and revolution leadership, and in accordance with the decisions of the Revolution Command Council concerning the establishment of housing projects in all areas of the country--in particular decision 232 of 1979 which refers to the construction of houses, buildings and apartments to match the population density in all governorates and guarantee that every citizen can obtain a home where he can seek refuge and feel that he belongs--our organization is fully involved in its current trend toward high-rise construction, which has many advantages not found in horizontal construction. Among these advantages is the ability to insure service, health and recreational facilities in one location. In addition, the organization's plan contains new projects which are currently under study commensurate with the organization's available resources. We have already constructed 2,000 apartments in the city of al-Mahmudiyah and in al-Sayyidiyah,

and 1,450 dwelling units in al-Dawrah and Karadah Maryam.

"This has occurred in the short time since our organization began operating independently. It began carrying out its actual activities less than 3 years ago."

The director added: "We will soon begin work on construction of a housing complex in the city of al-Thawrah in which we will build 1,000 dwelling units. In the area of Ziyunah, we are nearing the completion date for the second and final phase of a project which includes construction of 3,000 dwelling units on a new basis, such units never having been constructed in the country before. This is occurring in accordance with a Revolution Command Council decision issued in 1977. It was decided that the buildings in the project would consist of two types: five-story structures and three-story structures. Thus the apartments can be divided into five different types on the basis of floor space and type of structure. All the modern means of construction were employed in all types of apartments, not to mention the provision of various service institutions such as schools, kindergartens, day care centers, markets, parking lots and parks. The total cost of the project is around 31 million dinars, with 22 million dinars used for the construction of the dwelling units and 9 million dinars for the remaining services.

Field Trip to Ziyunah Housing Complex

After our interview with the director of the State Housing Organization, we decided to visit this project, which is the subject of much conversation and a few details of which are known by some people.

When we arrived at the housing complex, we were startled by the huge buildings which had been built using prefabricated construction. The buildings consisted of scattered apartment blocks which had been completed a few days earlier, and comprised the first phase of the new residential building project. The blocks occupy an area of approximately 42.5 hectares and contain 1,977 units which are expected to accommodate 11,826 occupants. The project consists of 149 blocks, 63 of which are five-story structures. Each five-story building contains 15 apartments, consisting of 10 two-bedroom apartments and five three-bedroom apartments.

The remaining 86 blocks are three-story structures with 12 apartments per structure, consisting of six two-bedroom apartments and six three-bedroom apartments.

The service facilities as described for us by the director of the project include the following:

Two kindergartens, each accommodating 150-180 children; two day care centers, each accommodating 100 children; six elementary schools; two middle and secondary schools; a main market with 3,000 square meters of floor space; and

dispersed markets with parking lots.

The project director added: "Sixty-three blocks will be constructed by means of (af-nafaqiyah) forms. We began the undertaking of the project in May 1977 and it will be handed over during 1980."

Work Obstacles

When we asked the project director about the constant delays which some say befell the project, he replied:

"Because of the country's exceptional circumstances, such as the multiplicity of projects and the scarcity of materials, for example, in spite of the fact that a special exception was made for us in ordering and importing raw materials for the project. However, I believe that many times when the construction sector has dealt with other sectors in the course of its work, its schedule should have corresponded with the schedules of these other sectors in order to take advantage of time and prevent the aforementioned delays. However, I do not think that the loss of time was due to any particular party, but raw materials and building materials do not come easily. Another factor is misuse of machines for which spare parts are not available at the present time, not to mention the small size of the middle and technical cadres. We also suffer from a lack of masons.

"We learned from some of the engineers in the project that there were no more than 10 masons." The project director enlarged on his remarks as follows:

"Just imagine that we were delayed for 3 months because of cement and bricks, until a contract was concluded recently with private plants to supply us with these two materials."

The Delay and Its Causes

The delay is said to be 1½ years, in view of the fact that the project was supposed to be handed over on 21 August 1979.

The project director responded: "The initial faltering was caused by the lack of materials, as I said. And then some materials arrived which we did not need at the time. There was also a disruption in shipment."

As for the general director of the organization, he responded: "Apartments will be handed over within 3 years of the contract date, and the first contract was concluded with the first applicant in the latter part of 1977. Some 70,000 citizens requested application forms, but only 6,000 of these persons applied and out of these 4,000 names emerged."

/Question/ But do you see this as due to the increase in the amount of the first installment which is required as a one-time advance?

/Answer/ The installment payment period has been fixed, and along with it an

amount between 15 and 20 percent according to the cost of the apartment. I do not believe that there has been a reconsideration of either the cost or the calculation of the first installment. It is conceivable that it has excluded some people, but it has benefited others. It has excluded those who are unable to pay the amount of the advance, of course. But now the opportunity to sell applications has been closed, and we hope that the others will meet with good luck in our coming projects.

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IRAQ

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEGRATED AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY PLANNED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Aug 79 p 4

/Article: "Planning Council Decides To Undertake Establishment of Integrated Automobile Industry; Use of Pan-Arab Scope in Establishing This Industry"

/Text/ The Planning Council has decided to undertake the establishment of a complete and integrated automobile industry in the country through the construction of a central complex incorporating main production divisions which will endeavor to produce the greatest possible range of automobile components.

In a recent decision, the council urged concerned agencies to move toward the production of mid-sized and compact sedans in view of the economic and technical advantages they offer over large automobiles, as well as the production of trucks, buses and other types of vehicles needed in the domestic and Arab markets.

The council also called for a pan-Arab scope to be employed when this industry is established in order to provide an efficient economic scale for the project, benefit from Arab technical expertise and the advantages of the Arab countries' economic and industrial integration, and bind the project to a time schedule for the training, development and qualifying of a domestic cadre to provide the project's manpower requirements.

The council requested that an expert and competent international consulting agency be commissioned along with a specialized Iraqi organizational chart of personnel to prepare studies of the technical and economic benefits of this industry and draw up detailed plans for it.

The council stressed the importance of strengthening and developing the industries which supply the automotive industry, as well as impelling the socialist sector to participate effectively in the industry and encouraging the private and mixed sector to take part in setting up some of the projects under the supervision and direction of the socialist sector.

Moreover, the council urged competent specialized agencies to take the necessary steps to develop the domestic road systems and bring them up to international technical and engineering standards, and to introduce advanced and modern scientific methods into the traffic systems and apply modern driving principles on internal and external roads in order to increase their accommodating capacity and facilitate the flow of traffic.

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JORDAN

BRIEFS

NEW INDUSTRIES--The Planning Committee of the Ministry of Trade and Industry has approved the creation of 10 new industries with a combined capital of 1.99 million dinars. The approval was announced at the end of a committee meeting held yesterday under the chairmanship of deputy minister Dr Hashim al-Dabbas. The new industries and their respective capitals are: A marble producing plant, 150,000 dinars; an insecticide plant, 150,000 dinars; a fruit juice plant, 50,000 dinars; a sheet metal plant, 150,000 dinars; a sodium silicate plant, 120,000 dinars; an aluminum foil plant, 450,000 dinars; a plastics plant, 160,000 dinars; an animal feed plant, 210,000 dinars; a mineral water plant, 500,000 dinars; an envelope producing facility, 50,000 dinars. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Sep 79 p 6] 9063

PHOSPHATE EXPORTS--Jordan's phosphates exports during the first 7 months of this year have increased by 151,184 tons over the corresponding figure for the same period last year. Figures released by 'Aqabah's Port Authority put the phosphates exports during the first 7 months of this year at 1,427,829 tons compared with 1,276,645 tons for the same period last year. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 13 Sep 79 p 5] 9063

FOREIGN TRADE--The Statistics Office has released its report on foreign trade for 1978. The 712 page report gives a summary of foreign trade statistics for the years 1969-78 and includes a section on trade with Arab countries for 1978. The report indicates that Jordan's exports in 1978 were valued at 64 million dinars, compared with 60 million dinars in 1977. Imports in 1978 were pegged at 459 million dinars, as opposed to 455 million dinars in 1977. Jordan's imports from Arab countries in 1978 were placed at 87 million dinars, compared with 73 million dinars in 1977. Jordan's imports from Arab countries in 1978 were placed at 43 million dinars, compared with 36 million dinars in 1977 [sic]. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 2] 9063

OIL REFINERY EXPANDED--The expansion program currently underway at Jordan's Petroleum Refinery under the direction of a Romanian company is in its final stages. The new facilities will soon be turned over to the refinery. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Sep 79 p 3] 9063

BANK DEPOSITS--Sources at Jordan's Central Bank have disclosed that deposits from all sectors during the first half of this year have increased by 83,203,000 dinars over the figure released at the end of last year. As of the end of last June, total bank deposits were given as 531,713,000 dinars, compared with 448,510,000 dinars for the corresponding period in 1978. The sources added that the largest increase came from Jordanian residents, whose combined deposits were put at 58,661,000 dinars. This was followed by non-residents, with deposits of 12,515,000 dinars, quasi-governmental institutions, 6,191,000 dinars, municipal governments, 3,037,000 dinars, and, finally, governmental agencies with deposits of 2,732,000 dinars. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Sep 79 p 3] 9063

WATER PROJECT--The director of the Water Department's technical office, Mr Tamin Abu Wasil, announced that actual work to pipe drinking water from al-Sawraqah to al-Qastal region will begin early next year. The project, according to the announcement, will bring drinking water to 45 villages. Responding to a question by AL-RAY, Mr Tamim Abu Wasil said, "The project will end the water crisis in the South Amman region." Speaking of the region that will benefit by the project, the director indicated that 45 localities will receive adequate water supplies. These include: Madaba, Ma'een, Um al-Burak, Um al-Basatin, Um ol-'Amad, Jiza, al-Qastal, Um al-Rumman, Manjah, al-Makhyat, Kfir Abu Nadi, Kfir Abu Sirbat, Kfir Abu Kan'aan, Ibn Hamid, Hallul, Huwwarah, Safa, Um Qasir, Um al-Walid, al-Muborak, Abu 'Alanda, al-Rajib, Mushirfit Sahab, al-Kashifiyyah, al-Turbah, al-Matila, Um Butmah, al-Muwaqqar, al-Juwaydah, Um al-Sahhaq, Na'or, al-'Asakir, Qaryat Nafi, Rujm al-Shami, Thuhaybah al-Sharqiyyah, Thuhaybah al-Gharbiyyah, Khuraybet al-Suq, Jowa, al-Lubban, al-Tanib al-Yadudah, al-Muqablin, Um Qasir, al-Bunyat al-Shamaliyyah, al-Bunyat al-Gharbiyyah, Um al-Qanafid and al-'Al. He added that the water project will also serve 'Alia's housing project, the teachers' housing project and the army's housing project, and pegged the total cost of the undertaking at 3.25 million dinars. He explained further that 22 kilometers of pipe out of 51 kilometers ordered have already been delivered, and that digging, construction of storage tanks and the erection of a main pumping station will soon begin. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 19 Sep 79 p 3] 9063

NATIONAL WATER PLAN--The Natural Resources Authority has prepared the first national plan for water to serve as a basis for a comprehensive water resources policy, one that will take into consideration Jordan's available water supplies, its present and future needs, as well as its priorities for economic and social development. Natural Resources Authority sources indicated that the authority has already examined numerous water reservoirs in an effort to determine their capacities and to develop them further. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 19 Sep 79 p 4] 9063

TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER--The Vocational Training Institute yesterday signed a contract with the Soviet Techno-Export Institute according to which the latter will conduct preliminary studies for constructing and equipping a technical training center in the village of Hakma in the Irbid Governorate.

A reliable source at the Vocational Training Institute said that the proposed center will have a 300 student capacity. The 3-year program, following junior high school, will include training in metallurgy, automotive repairs, industrial electrical technology, central heating and construction. The contract was signed by Mr Munzir al-Masii, director general of the Vocational Training Institute and Mr Kornilov, state representative for foreign economic affairs. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 19 Sep 79 p 4] 9063

CSO: 4802

LEBANON

'MONDAY MORNING' INTERVIEW WITH RAYMOND EDDE

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 4-18 Oct 79 pp 30-36

[Interview with Raymond Edde by Mona el-Said in Paris, no date given]

[Text]

The self-exiled Lebanese leader Raymond Edde has called on the Arab states to contribute troops to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Edde, talking to Monday Morning in Paris last week, said the only useful thing that the proposed Arab summit conference could produce for Lebanon would be a decision "to place at the disposal of the U.N. several thousand non-Syrian Arab soldiers who would then participate in UNIFIL."

The move, he said, would enable the international force to complete the withdrawal from South Lebanon of the Israeli Army, which was still in position in several Southern villages.

The Maronite MP, who heads the Lebanese Parliament's National Bloc, was a candidate for the Presidency in 1976. After he lost to President Elias Sarkis and escaped two attempts on his life, he left the country and has not been back since, promising to return only when he can have freedom of speech and political action in his own country.

Edde said the only other resolution the Arab summit can produce which could benefit Lebanon would be a resolution "to stop delivering oil to the United States."

"It is obvious," he added, "that such a decision is impossible to even dream about."

The rightist leader accused the Carter Administration of going ahead with the plan worked out by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to partition Lebanon into Moslem and Christian mini-states and resettle the Palestinian refugees in the Moslem half.

He said the United States supported Israel's March, 1978 invasion of the South, as confirmed by the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young, and he asked: "What evidence do we have that the United States has since then changed its position on South Lebanon?"

Edde also:

- Called for the deployment of U.N. troops in all parts of Lebanon, to replace the now wholly Syrian Arab Deterrent Forces;

- Urged the Lebanese authorities to declare the Lebanese-Palestinian Cairo Agreement null and void and work out a new accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization "which is consistent with Lebanese-Israeli (armistice) agreements, which does not violate Lebanese sovereignty, and which does not damage Lebanese-Palestinian relations";

- Dismissed the new U.S. initiative for a "broader truce" in South Lebanon as a "test balloon";

- Saw no possibility of a Lebanese solution before the Palestinian problem was settled, and no chance that the Palestinian problem would be settled in the near future;

- Appealed to the Lebanese people to "wake up to the situation into which their leaders have led them" and come back to their senses. "They are good people," he said. "They are people who build their nation and their life with the sweat of their brow, and not by piracy and murder, as their leaders are asking them to build it now."

The full interview:

What have you heard about the new American initiative to promote a "broader truce" in Lebanon, and what is your opinion of it?

What I have heard is that this initiative is not really there, in the sense that it is only a test balloon.

At any rate, the solution for the South will be frozen pending the Presidential elections in the United States, and South Lebanon may be a bargaining tool.

So you don't think that there is any chance of holding an international conference on the South which would bring together all the parties concerned?

To begin with, who are "the parties concerned?" If they're referring to the parties present in the South — Israel, the Palestinian Resistance and Lebanon — how can they hope to bring those three to the negotiating table with an American representative, or the U.N. secretary general or the representative of any other country? Such a conference would be another Camp David, and I don't think Lebanon can participate in it.

If they're talking about a Lebanese-Palestinian conference, the President of the Lebanese Republic has already met with (Palestine Liberation Organization

Chairman Yaser) Arafat, and I don't think the meeting will yield any results.

Why not?

Because as far as I know, what was discussed was the PLO's approval of Lebanese Army deployment in South Lebanon. Poor Lebanese Army! It needs special permission to go to part of its own country. It needs the permission of this party, that leader or the other organization before it meekly enters the area.

I believe that if the Army is deployed in South Lebanon, its situation there will be no different than its situation in Keserwan and Dyblos, where the militias are frolicking with their weapons with the Army unable to challenge them.

Just recently, on the Tripoli highway in the Byblos district, the militias in that area killed several people near an Army checkpoint, and the Army was unable to intervene, to ask what was going on, to try to capture the perpetrators.

There is no difference between Army presence and Army absence in Keserwan and Byblos, and I don't think the situation will be any different in Tyre and Nabatiyeh, if the Army is deployed there.

The officers and the soldiers are definitely not to blame for this. The responsibility rests with the political

leadership, which still does not have the courage to issue firm orders to the Army.

One of the reports circulating about the U.S. initiative talks about the possibility of replacing the Arab Deterrent Forces with U.N. troops. Do you think such a thing could happen?

That is my fondest wish. Everyone knows that I have been demanding foreign U.N. troops for years, because the Arabs are incapable of sending joint forces. Proof of this can be seen in what happened after the 1976 Riyadh and Cairo summits, in which it was decided to form a joint Arab force of 30,000 troops to be placed under the command of President Elias Sarkis. As it turned out, most of the force was made up of Syrian soldiers, of whom there were 28,000, and the President's "command" was rendered nominal because of the preponderance of Syrian Army presence in the ADF.

In this connection, I would like to thank the 2,000 soldiers who came from the other Arab countries. I would also have liked to thank the Syrian soldiers, but unfortunately, due to the orders of their commanders, their treatment of both Moslems and Christians in Lebanon was bad, and for that, I cannot be grateful to the Syrian authorities.

In contrast, the U.N. troops sent to the South came from several countries, and each country's contingent was equal in size to each of the others'. Furthermore, none of the participating countries had any ambitions in Lebanon.

For this reason, I wish that the European states and the Arab states which have no ambitions in Lebanon would place some of their troops at the disposal of the secretary general of the United Nations. And I wish, as I have said before, that the provisions of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (calling for U.N.

assistance to reestablish Lebanese sovereignty in the South) would be extended to cover all parts of Lebanon. This would allow Syria to withdraw its Army, and make it possible for President Sarkis to build the army of the "new Lebanon" and instruct it to gather up all the arms in the country with the support of the international forces.

Otherwise, I don't see how President Sarkis can ask the Syrian Army, which is not an Arab deterrent force, to pull out of Lebanon.

Regarding the situation in South Lebanon, I say the American Administration is responsible for it, and I will give you proof of this:

When the Israeli Army entered Lebanon on March 15, 1978, Mr. (U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus) Vance said the American Administration had not asked Israel to put a stop to its invasion of Lebanon but was watching developments carefully.

And a month ago, on August 19, 1979, the former U.S. ambassador (to the U.N., Andrew) Young, stated on American television that the United States supported Israeli expansion into Lebanon.

And we must not forget that Israel uses American weapons, and that it used cluster bombs on Lebanese villages, displacing 220,000 Southerners, who became refugees in their own country.

That was the American position on March 15, 1978, as confirmed by Ambassador Young. What evidence do we have that the United States has since then changed its position on South Lebanon?

After the resignation of Mr. Young, the American people felt the power the Zionist lobby wields in the American Administration. Now, the Presidential elections are approaching, and the candidates, especially the candidates of the Democratic Party, are interested in at-

tracting the Jewish vote. We can expect Washington to bow to the wishes of the Jewish lobby, which wants to take over South Lebanon after driving 200,000 Moslem Shiites out of it.

The only way to stop Israel from doing what it wishes is to send more U.N. troops to this region. But the question is, would the states which have troops in the South be willing to send more soldiers if the U.N. secretary general asked them to?

Do you think the presence of U.N. troops in all of Lebanon would be more effective than their presence has been in the South?

Yes. Because after the withdrawal of the Syrian Army, there would be only two regular armies in Lebanon: The U.N. force and the Lebanese Army. In the South now, however, we have the Israeli Army, which has no interest in defusing the situation in that area. That is why South Lebanon is the only part of the world where a U.N. force has been unsuccessful.

Given the new U.S. initiative, vague though it may be so far, do you still think the Carter Administration is going ahead with the "Kissinger plan" to partition Lebanon, as you have said in the past?

In September, 1974, I said that there was a plan to divide Lebanon into two Lebanons — a Moslem one and a Christian one, with the Damascus road as the border between them — to allow for the resettlement of 400,000 Palestinians in Moslem Lebanon. That is the Kissinger plan, which I called a conspiracy.

In June, 1975, President Suleiman Franjeh said that in the light of his meeting with Kissinger before 1974, he was convinced that it was Kissinger who worked out the plan for the Lebanese disturbances to give South Lebanon to the Palestinians.

I believe the conspiracy is continuing, because I am convinced that the United

States can put an end to Israeli interference in Lebanon. But as I said, the elections are approaching and the Carter Administration does not want to upset the Zionists in America.

I will be very happy if, after this interview is published, the American Administration denies what I am saying and assures the Lebanese people that it supports the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of their country within its internationally recognized borders. Assurances, of course, would not satisfy me. I would want something tangible. I would be very happy indeed, and so would the sweeping majority of the Lebanese, if the United States were to provide tangible evidence that its position on Lebanon had changed.

The first three years of President Sarkis' regime do not encourage one to trust American assurances. Despite the assurances the President received from America, the incidents in the South continued and, in March, 1978, Israel launched a land, sea and air invasion of the entire South, attacking its peaceful, innocent people.

What hopes are you pinning on the Arab summit conference, which is expected to discuss the South Lebanese problem as a major item on its agenda?

I am told that the summit will be preceded by an Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Tunis. I hope, of course, that they will decide to defend the South — not with speeches and emotions or with feeble financial compensation, but with action. I don't think they will take such a decision.

And if after the foreign ministers' meeting Syria decides to send more troops to Lebanon, the situation will become worse, especially since those forces are not allowed to go south of the Litani, the so-called "red line."

Exactly what would you want the results of the Arab summit to be?

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I want the summit to place at the disposal of the secretary general of the U.N. several thousand non-Syrian Arab soldiers who would then participate with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon.

When that happens, UNIFIL will be able to get the Israeli Army out of South Lebanon. The Israeli Army, according to the information at my disposal, is still maintaining positions in several Lebanese villages, including Yarin, Maruhin, Kawzah, south of Bint Jbail, south of Aitaroun, Kleia, Hula, Marjeyoun, Kfarshouba, Majidiyeh... The international forces will then be able to implement Resolutions 425 and 426, and Resolution 444, especially Article 7 of it, and Resolution 450. After that, authority in the South can be returned to the Lebanese government, and the Arabs can rebuild the villages destroyed by the Israeli Army and compensate the villagers — because the South and its people have been victimized by the Arabs, who have allowed them to face our common enemy alone.

If the summit conference decides to place Arab forces at the disposal of the U.N. secretary general, the Arabs will have truly done their duty toward South Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

Do you agree with the Lebanese Front leaders who are saying that the Lebanese-Palestinian "coexistence" agreement which the Sarkis regime is aiming at through contacts with the PLO and through the Arab summit is likely to consecrate and formalize Palestinian presence in Lebanon, increasing the threat of the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees there and therefore the possibility of partition?

I don't know what kind of formula President Sarkis has worked out for Lebanese-Palestinian coexistence, but I would favor any agreement with the

Palestinians that is consistent with the Lebanese-Israeli armistice agreement and does not violate Lebanese sovereignty.

I recently read a statement by President Chamoun quoting President Sarkis as saying that the Lebanese-Palestinian Cairo Agreement cannot be amended and that the alternative was to "freeze" (Palestinian military) operations in the South. Responding to that statement, Chamoun said that the Cairo Agreement no longer exists, since the House last year adopted a decision prohibiting all military operations on Lebanese territory.

I disagree with Camille Chamoun's view. The Cairo Agreement will remain in effect until it is revoked by the executive or legislative authority. Because the agreement was signed — on November 3, 1969 — by Army Commander General Bustani on behalf of the Lebanese government, and it was later approved by majority vote in Parliament.

Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel must do what they did after the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. They must demand the annulment of the Cairo Agreement. But neither Chamoun nor Gemayel dare make such a demand, for fear of angering the Palestinian Resistance, especially these days, when both of them are outdoing each other in their wooing of the Palestinian Resistance.

The executive authority wants to maintain the Cairo Agreement and contents itself with a request for the suspension of military operations. And Abu Ammar says no one can force the Resistance to withdraw from the South, and he apparently says this on the strength of the Cairo Agreement, which is still valid.

The presence of the Resistance in the South is aimed at the mounting of operations which are the speciality of the Resistance. If the Resistance suspends its

operations, the suspension will not be permanent, and if it is meant to be permanent, then the Resistance must pull out of the South, because its presence there no longer has any justification.

Do you agree with Lebanese Front leaders who say that the Arab summit will be a waste of time?

Yes I do — if the result of the summit is not what I have just told you: a decision to send Arab troops to the South. There is another decision which would also make the summit worthwhile: a decision to stop supplying the United States with oil. It is obvious that such a decision is impossible to even dream about. But aside from these two decisions, I see no other useful resolution that the summit can adopt.

How should the Lebanese state deal with the question of Palestinian presence, in your opinion?

I told you how: by announcing that the Cairo Agreement is null and void. This has become possible now, after the adoption of Resolutions 425 and 426. The resolutions contradict the provisions of the Cairo Agreement, and Article 103 of the U.N. Charter gives U.N. resolutions precedence over other decisions. After the Cairo Agreement is revoked, either by the executive authority or by the legislative authority, Lebanon can enter into a new agreement with the PLO which is consistent with Lebanese-Israeli agreements, which does not violate Lebanese sovereignty, and which does not damage Lebanese-Palestinian relations.

How would you evaluate the government's performance over the past few months — starting with its performance on the Arab level. What do you think, for instance, of the initiative the President took in sending personal

letters to the Arab chiefs of state on South Lebanon?

I understand that Sarkis informed the Arab states that they must take a serious interest in the situation in South Lebanon. And today, I read a statement made by Syrian Foreign Minister (Abdelhalim) Khaddam to "An-Nahar" in New York, to the effect that the South Lebanon issue is a threat not only to Lebanon but also to the security of all the Arabs, that it is only natural that the Arabs move to confront this new result of the Camp David policy and help Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance, and that all we need do now is wait for the resolutions which will issue from the Arab summit conference.

You will notice that Khaddam says the Arabs must help Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance, which is not what President Sarkis wants to do. President Sarkis wants to suspend military operations in the South.

This evening, I was visited by Mr. Rene Moawwad (MP), who delivered the President's letters to the Arab heads of state. In answer to my question, he said he was satisfied with the positions of the Arab leaders with whom he met.

That is all I have to say on this subject...

On the international level, the Pope, when he mentioned Lebanon in his speech at the General Assembly, stressed the importance of the Lebanese coexistence formula. This means that the Pope wants a Lebanon of coexistence, not a Lebanon of Maronites, as some want it to be.

As for the effect the Pope's speech will have, I hope that the states which applauded him so much will allow their policies to be influenced by what he said — especially what he said about Lebanon and the Palestinian cause.

For the hundredth time, I would like to

stress that it is in the interest of Lebanon and the Lebanese people that a Palestinian state be established. It is unacceptable that a people, any people, remain without a homeland. It is inconceivable that the Palestinians be deprived of Palestine, whose name they carry. After the establishment of Palestine, the Palestinians who remain in Lebanon will not be refugees or commandos, but normal people enjoying the same rights and having the same obligations that other non-Lebanese residents of Lebanon have.

What have you been doing to help Lebanon since we last talked to you?

Have you had any contacts with Arab or Western governments on the issue?

I have no official status to enable me to make such contacts. I am a member of Parliament, nothing more.

But you have had contacts with the French foreign ministry and the Vatican. Last week, you were in Bonn, and now you're planning to visit the U.S.

I have some private contacts in those capitals, and I speak to them in my capacity as a member of Parliament and the leader of a Lebanese party. I explain to them the situation in Lebanon and the danger posed to my country, and I sometimes suggest measures that can be taken by those countries in defense of Lebanon.

Have you met with any Palestinian officials?

No.

Have you met with the leaders of other Lebanese parties?

Yes, but not with Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun, of course.

You are in fact in contact with various politicians and officials in the Arab

world and outside it. In the light of what you have heard from them, do you think there is any possibility that the Lebanese problem can be solved independently of the Middle Eastern crisis?

My contacts aside, there is an inevitable link between the Lebanese and Palestinian issues. Evidence of this can be seen in the speech of Pope John Paul II at the General Assembly, in which he said that Lebanon's independence, security and territorial integrity are linked with a just solution of the Palestinian problem. That is true as long as Israel wages war on Lebanon because of the presence of the Palestinian Resistance.

For this reason, the Lebanese authorities and the friendly Arab countries must do everything in their power to promote a just solution of the Palestinian problem. Only when such a solution emerges will the Middle Eastern and Lebanese crises be settled.

Do you see such a solution coming in the near future?

How do you expect a solution to come in the near future, as long as Kissinger's plan for Lebanon, the conspiracy, is still being implemented, and as long as the Arabs don't really want to cooperate with Lebanon, and as long as some Arab countries don't want a Palestinian state to be established (if we are to believe what President Carter said about not a single Arab leader telling him he favored a Palestinian state)?

Judging by your current evaluation of the situation, when do you expect to return to Lebanon?

I will return when I complete my contacts outside Lebanon and when it becomes possible for me to take political action in full freedom in my country.

That is when I will return, and nothing on earth can keep me away.

The Lebanese people miss you, and would like to get a message from you: what do you advise them to do to help end the Lebanese tragedy?

I cannot put it better than His Holiness Pope John Paul II, who said in his speech in Ireland that violence is a crime against humanity and that there is no war between Catholics and Protestants.

I convey the same message to the people of Lebanon. The Lebanese people must wake up to the situation into which their leaders have led them. The time has come for them to leave those leaders and return to themselves, for they are good and loving people; they are people who build their nation and life with the sweat of their brow, and not by piracy and murder, as their leaders are asking them to build it now.

CSO: 4820

LEBANON

INTERVIEW WITH IBRAHIM QULAYLAT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 Sep 79 pp 12-14

[Interview with Ibrahim Qulaylat, Lebanese leftist leader of the "Murabitun," by correspondent Walid 'Awad; date and place not given]

[Text] After the conflicts that broke out within the "National Movement" and the battles that occurred between some of its groups, the "Murabitun" have again surfaced as a political and military stance which is demanding a comprehensive evaluation of the previous stage and preparation of a clear future path that will not perish among the currents of the leftist parties.

The name Ibrahim Qulaylat has again appeared, playing a role and taking a stance in the western area.

Many people are at a loss as to how to evaluate this role. Some of those in the eastern area who differ with him and who oppose his policy see him (correctly represented, in their opinion) in the articles which were recently written by Jean Larteguy in PARIS MATCH (No 1576) as an investigative report about Lebanon. They were cruel and biting articles. And some people consider him to be temporary legality in the western area in the absence of legality.

He said to the Kuwaiti ambassador, 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Bu'ayjan, when he came on behalf of the Follow-Up Committee: "I am ready to close down my radio station if that would help to establish legality and pave the way for the government to take matters firmly in hand and implement its existence." Al-Bu'ayjan was delighted and passed these words along to Lebanese officials.

And until the government takes matters firmly in hand, Ibrahim Qulaylat will be fully in evidence, politically and militarily.

As you stroll around his office and sit down together with him, you are at a loss as to what words to choose to describe his personality.

Some time ago, after his period of medical treatment in Geneva, the medicine on his desk disappeared. He had thrown it all out the window. And along with it disappeared his unhappy moods which resulted from his condition of

fatigue. But there is one thing which did not disappear, and will never disappear, from Ibrahim Qulaylat's desk, and that is President 'Abd-al-Nasir's picture (the only picture there), his quotes, and everything that is connected with his historic stances.

In all of this atmosphere, and after having a sip of the green tea which Ibrahim Qulaylat likes, I asked him:

[Question] The war is a testing ground for men and events. Where do you stand now, after 4 years of war?

[Answer] Our position is still firmly rooted in the principles which have been the basis for our decisions to assume our responsibilities during all the years of the Lebanese war, a war which is military and political at the same time. For me the political war is the more vicious one and demands effective and vigilant participation in order to deal with it. The difference between the military war and the political war is that the former is, for the most part, a visible, material war, except in some of its elements which are dictated by political decisions, and the latter basically depends on what is concocted in the invisible kitchens behind the scenes. This requires vigilance, pursuing matters, and keeping abreast of every event in order to gain an in-depth knowledge about it.

We, as an organization of Nasserite independents, the Murabitun, continuing to see our position as being within these dimensions, are convinced, due to the experience of past years, that the Lebanese arena--in the context of a settlement of the Middle East problem, taking into account it Arab, Palestinian, and Lebanese dimensions--constitutes the central arena in the struggle to attain this settlement, in both the geographical and political senses. This distinctive role played by the Lebanese arena has, clearly and without a doubt, decided, politically and militarily, the stances assumed and the roles played by the forces which are directing the struggle in the area.

Through objectively analyzing our movement, its duties, and its continuity, and through taking a more profound look at our movement's concept of the basic given factors that constitute the facts of the case, the documents, and the decisions in the dossier of the Middle East issue, we feel that the national progressive forces and our movement are not permitted to play any real role in building the future of our nation, Lebanon. Also their pan-Arab role is perhaps being curtailed in the realm of this problem. This role, as we appraise it, is at best tantamount to political pressure moves, at intermittent stages, for the purpose of seeking improvement of the conditions stipulated by the large forces, which are running the conflict, in the dossier of the Middle East issue.

[Question] Who is the obstacle and who is the one who is standing aside?

[Answer] The first would be the forces in the struggle which are definitely and by nature hostile to us. The second would be--and this is something which is really regrettable--the large, allied forces which are directing the struggle.

[Question] Under the category of objective criticism of you, it is said that your military arm is stronger than your political arm, and that you have not waged a political battle which, for example, has had the spirit of the military "Holiday Inn" battle in 1976!

[Answer] This statement can be rejected from two standpoints. This first is that our movement is a political, ideological movement whose roots extend back 21 years, to the 1958 revolution to be exact, and I do not believe that the movement would have been able to survive with its military and political institutions, from that time until now, if it had not been for the fact that it is based on the clarity of its political position. In our movement there is not distinction between the political aspect and the military aspect. Our party and organizational work does not respect or heed any such distinction, because we always take into consideration all the party and organizational experiences which occurred when the false idea of such a distinction was tolerated between the wings of [the movement's] organizations, particularly since this tolerance, especially in the Third World, is a practice employed to encourage conflicting trends among those engaged in party and combat activity. The second standpoint which rejects the accusation of a distinction [between the political and military aspects] in our movement is the fact that our military achievements, which have taken place continuously for 20 years, are the result of a political decision.

[Question] In people's minds the National Movement is the antithesis of the Lebanese Front. Do you not believe that the balance of power has now shifted in favor of the Front, especially after the clear disparity in the positions taken by the facts in the National Movement?

[Answer] In the scientific balance [of forces] in the conflict in the Lebanese arena, the National Movement constitutes the only organization which is actively confronting the plans and course of action of the Lebanese Front. This balance is what determines the basic aims on which the National Movement is based, along with the basic aims on which the Lebanese Front is based. According to the patriotic concept, the balance [of power] cannot fail to be in favor of the National Movement. And if there are any defects in the balance which favor the Lebanese Front, it is not a result of the patriotic, political, and military positions of the Lebanese Front. It is a result of the impact of Arab and international considerations related to decisions, at different stages, which are included in the dossier of the Middle East issue, to which the Lebanese issue is attached. It is a circumstantial case which disappears along with its causative factors.

[Question] If the Lebanese Front is not the dialog partner on the other side, then who is?

[Answer] After the journey of suffering the Lebanese have gone through, we have become convinced that the Lebanese Front does not really represent the patriotic Christian faction, and this is sufficiently indicated by the disintegration which took place in the Front after President Sulayman Franjiyah withdrew from it, and by the present position of Raymond Iddih, or by two parties of the Front, the Phalangists and the National Liberals,

after a number of their political leaders, such as Col Fu'ad Lahud left them. We are adhering to our patriotic political stance in order to arrive at a solution which would enable our country to pull out of its misfortune so that the patriotic Christian faction, which is outside the realm of being subordinate to the Lebanese Front, can have the main effective role in the dialog and in creating a new, advanced, civilized formula--without the concept of the Lebanese Front--which would be suitable for the building of a nation which would be capable and have healthy, deeply entrenched roots for mutual understanding. No patriotic person would disagree with this demand, in any location within the arena of Lebanon.

And if the Lebanese Front is to have a role, then first it must remove the factors which caused the members of the Front to switch over from being nationally categorized as being among those who tolerate Israeli occupation of a cherished part of the our country to being among those who collaborate with this occupation, and thus with the Zionist enemy.

[Question] More than one leader in the National Front feels that Amin al-Jumaayyil and Dany Sham'un do not collaborate with this occupation, nor with Israel. And this qualifies them to play the role that you are talking about.

[Answer] The logic of hawks and doves in the two parties of the Lebanese Front is a farce which was toppled by the conditions of the confrontation with the enemy, and it does not form a link between the formula sought and arriving at final solutions to the crisis which has been going on for 4 years. And if Amin al-Jumayyil and Dany Sham'un are not openly in contact with Israel, they are still part of the contact with Israel, they are still part of the contact with Israel through their two parties. The day that both of them withdraw from their parties, then they will have really chosen the path of breaking off relations with the Zionist enemy.

[Question] There is information to the effect that the two of them are conducting a dialog with you by means of written and oral messages, and that the ambassador of a neutral European country has passed on to you a message from Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil.

[Answer] It is true. Our channel of communications has been open for some time. There was a message that came to us from Dany Sham'un, a written letter which constitutes a channel which paves the way for a dialog. Also, 2 years ago, at the end of the war, we received an oral message from Bashir al-Jumayyil, through a press organization, which proposed a dialog, and this was before the stage of collaborating with Israel. The message suggested holding a meeting in a place agreeable to both parties. A very short time ago we received, via the ambassador of a Western European country, a message from Amin al-Jumayyil which, in his view, constitutes a basis for a national dialog. But we did not dwell on it for too long since it mentioned no means of dealing with the basic, root causes for the existing incompatibility between us and the two parties, the Phalangists and the

Liberals. So we told the ambassador, who is friendly with both sides, that the message, with its rather pale contents, was about as useful to us as blowing on cold ashes [to keep a fire going].

[Question] Some people do not like what you said about an agreement with the Maronites, at a time when there is a prior need to have the Moslem leaders come to an agreement. Do you, for example, need to come to an agreement with the Moslem bloc before making an agreement with Amin al-Jumayyil and Dayn Sham'un?

[Answer] When we advocate the necessity of undertaking a national agreement with the Maronite faction, we are including the necessity of a Maronite-Moslem agreement. The Lebanese war has defined the positions of all of the factions, and the progressive Moslem masses have conclusively categorized the forces in the struggle, the patriotic and unpatriotic ones, and the Moslem and Christian ones. Many of those toppled by the war in the patriotic Moslem area are making common cause with the unpatriotic Maronites. And here a distinction should be made between the patriotic Maronites and independent Maronites on the one hand, and the Maronites of the Lebanese Front on the other hand.

It should also be made clear that the Moslem bloc has patriotic Moslem personalities with whom we see eye to eye in many issues which directly concern our Moslem masses.

[Question] When you openly state that there are Trojan horses in the Palestinian revolutionary movement and the National Movement, you are moving over close to [the position of] the silent majority or to a position mid-way between the rightists and the leftists. Or how would you otherwise designate this position?

[Answer] In circumstances like those in the war in Lebanon it is not something unusual if forces playing a destructive role infiltrate into the Palestinian revolutionary movement, and into the progressive national movement. Both of them are in the thick of having to deal with the challenges to the causes of our masses. But the revolutionary leadership and mentality--committed to its cause--which is inside the Palestinian resistance movement and the National Movement, is capable of bridling and liquidating the Trojan horses inside their movements.

[Question] People raise a hue and cry about the secondary wars between factions, deployed along the same battle-line, that are fighting in the streets and between houses. Three weeks ago there was Sidon and 2 weeks ago there was the Mazra'ah area. Do you not think that this fighting makes you lose a lot of what you have gained?

[Answer] These negative phenomena that sometimes abound in the Palestinian revolution and the National Movement are, without a doubt, wearing down our forces, apart from the battles that our duty forces us to take part in.

For this reason it is incumbent upon us all to prevent this, by all possible means and summoning all our courage, otherwise, as time goes on, all this might turn into a characteristic situation which could be profitable only to the enemy. The Murabitun--the movement of independent Nasserites--have already counteracted the negative phenomena which occurred in Sidon by issuing a statement at that time which commented on the strike in the city as follows: "Some growths have appeared on the body of the Palestinian revolution and the National Movement, and they have secreted many excesses. These should have been dealt with and we should have loudly demanded the cessation of their harmful effect on the Palestinian and Lebanese masses who both suffered, to an equal degree, from this harm and these excesses."

From Beirut and Sidon we turn to the far south concerning which the question addressed to Ibrahim Qulaylat is:

[Question] Why is the south not the main arena of military activity and concentration of armed troops? What role do the Murabitun play in the war in the south?

[Answer] There is no doubt that our natural location at this fateful stage is the south. In our movement's concept the south is politically and geographically the central link in the Middle East conflict, and all means of combat should be mobilized for it. And if there is any obscuring of our role in the south, this is not our concern and will not alter our path, because in the south we are fighting for the sake of 'Umar's lord and not for the sake of 'Umar [i.e., we are fighting for important principles and not for something insignificant]. We are in the lands of the south, with all of our combat resources, we have men who fall in battle, and we are continuing to remain side by side with the people of the south who are staunchly holding out in their positions. Everybody knows that the Murabitun fighters in the city of Sidon were the last ones to retreat from their positions, on the morning of the Israeli attack, to the outskirts of the city, and were the first ones to return and enter the city. We also were, and still are, in al-Tayyibah, 'Adlun, al-Qasimiyah, and Arnun. Two of our men have been taken prisoner by the Israeli enemy. They are Nizam Kirbaj and Muhammad Harb.

Since the south is presently the focus of the conflict, we are busy drawing up a plan based on a clear policy of allying our forces more closely with the progressive Moslem forces in the south in order to facilitate their doing of their duty, on the national, pan-Arab, and international plane.

A discussion of the south naturally leads us to talking about the disappearance of the Imam Musa al-Sadr,

[Question] It is said that your organization, with its means of gathering information, has definite knowledge about the fate of the Imam al-Sadr, but that it is not in your interest to spread the secret at the present time. Do you not think that the fact that the Sunnis and Shi'ites have unified their ranks makes it imperative to say something decisive in this matter?

[Answer] On the basis of the information gathered by the organizations in our movement, considering all of its national, domestic, pan-Arab, and international dimensions, we have kept in mind our duties as dictated to us by our position in the united ranks of the Moslems, and have searched for a clue that would lead us to learning about the fate of the Imam and his two comrades, but so far we have had negative results. But we, along with those in the patriotic, Arab ranks, are demanding that efforts be pursued to uncover the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the Imam, especially since they are circumstances which, at this stage, do not serve the cause of unifying the ranks of the Moslems.

[Question] In conclusion we ask you: Have you given up calling the 1943 Covenant the Lebanon Hotel Formula, or have you found a palpable substitute?

[Answer] Each new day subsequent to the 1943 Covenant strengthens our conviction that the 1943 deal was, at best, nothing more than [the formation of] a shareholding company between a bloc of families which were obliged by the imperialists to sign that formula's decree.

[Question] Do you and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil agree about this? His approach to this formula is that of a rejection similar to yours.

[Answer] But he criticizes it on a completely different basis than we do. We view it from a purely patriotic viewpoint, whereas his understanding of these principles is based on forming a screen for Israeli occupation in the south. This is on the one hand. On the other hand, he approaches this formula through hypotheses and family rituals, supported by the slogan: God, country, and family.

[Question] De Gaulle himself talked about the French family.

[Answer] The atmosphere in which De Gaulle was talking is one thing, and the atmosphere of the Phalangist Party is quite another matter. De Gaulle did not base a family political party on ideas such as: the father is the godfather, the firstborn son is the political arm, and the second son is the military arm.

And so on. Ibrahim QuJaylat admits that the present stage is a stage of political aggressiveness, not one of military aggressiveness. In this connection, he is receiving ambassadors and receiving messages.

Maybe in the end, after all the cards are on the table, he will be the one conducting a dialog!

9468
CSO: 4802

LEBANON

FINANCE MINISTER EXPLAINS ATTEMPTS TO BOLSTER REVENUES

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 22-28 Oct 79 pp 24-29

[Interview with Ali al-Khalil, finance minister, by Mona el-Said date and place not given]

[Text]

Finance Minister Ali al-Khalil expects Lebanon's customs duties to be doubled by the government's current efforts to combat smuggling and piracy.

In an interview with *Monday Morning* last week, the minister said Lebanon's anti-smuggling campaign involves:

- Reduction of "some" customs duties;
- Modern anti-smuggling equipment for the customs authorities;
- A drive to reestablish law and order in all parts of the country, including the numerous coastal locations which now host illegal harbors.

The anti-smuggling crusade is one of the measures the minister mentioned in an all-out effort to build up the trickle of State revenues into a "reasonable" flow.

Other measures the minister cited were:

- "A reconsideration of tax legislation." This measure he studiously avoided elaborating on, giving the impression that the next few months may bring us fatter taxes. Since one of the government's aims is to "reduce the burden of limited-income groups," as Khalil put it, one assumes that it is the other groups who will be getting more acquainted with their tax-collectors.

- "An improvement in tax-collection operations." This improvement has already started with a decision to cancel all fines for late taxpayers and encourage them to come up with their back taxes by extending the payment period and introducing an installment plan.

To "reduce the burden of limited income groups," Khalil said, the government fully intends to tilt with inflation and take on the cost-of-living ogre.

To reduce inflationary pressures and bolster the Lebanese pound, for instance, the authorities are trying to absorb surplus liquidity by issuing Treasury bonds.

To control prices, they are trying to "revive" and "mobilize" price-control legislation and agencies — with a few possible amendments in the legislation in question.

Where bolstering the Lebanese pound is concerned, the minister protested that the currency was doing exceptionally well, considering the battering it has received.

The pressures to which the pound has been subjected would have destroyed the currencies of many other countries, he said, but they have hardly affected the Lebanese pound — thanks to its gold coverage and "the wise policies which the monetary agencies concerned are using to support and protect it."

The fact that the dollar has soared from L.L. 2.40 to L.L. 3.25 is not a sign that the L.L. has dropped; it's a sign that the dollar has risen. Ditto where sterling is concerned.

And what about the recent survey in the *Institutional Investor*, in which international banking institutions rated Lebanon as the least creditworthy country in the Middle East, bar Turkey?

If the survey is accurate, Khall declared, the rating is only temporary and "will in no way affect Lebanon's ability to obtain international loans." In fact, generous loan offers are already "pouring in," but Lebanon is politely rejecting them because its plan is to start with domestic loans (Treasury bonds) and then go on to external loans.

Will Lebanon ever regain its status as the unchallenged financial center of the Middle East?

No question about it, the minister said, reporting that "even in these bleak times, all regional and international financial institutions have unanimously nominated this country — and this country alone — to be the major center of all financial activities in the entire region, when it regains its stability and security."

Following is the full interview:

Could you summarize for us the financial policy which the new government of Premier Selim Hoss is following?

In its policy statement, the government pledged to use all possible means to implement urgent construction and development programs, improve the conditions of the Treasury, combat inflationary pressures and the high cost of living, deal with social, labor, health and education problems, and promote private enterprise in the national economy.

These represent the major steps that the government intends to take at this stage to deal with the country's financial situation — in such a way as to achieve social justice, lead to economic prosperity, improve the conditions of the Treasury, fight inflation,

control the cost of living and reduce the burden of limited-income groups. These are the major issues which the government intends to deal with at this time, with a view to setting the financial situation of the country on the right course.

This requires a reconsideration of tax legislation, an improvement in tax collection operations, and various measures to limit inflation and combat the high cost of living, whatever form it takes.

To invigorate the tax-collection operation, the government has extended the deadlines for the payment of certain taxes. To absorb some of the excess currency liquidity, it has issued Treasury bonds. And it is now in the process of taking the appropriate measures to deal with the cost

of living. All this is being done in accordance with a clear, well-defined plan.

Could you give us an idea of the broadlines of the national budget for 1980, which was recently approved by the Cabinet?

The broadlines of the budget can be summarized as follows:

A. Once more, the expenditure is more than the income. This is due to the increased expenditure on security affairs and on construction and development projects. The gap between expenditure and income will, naturally, contract as security conditions improve.

B. It is hoped that this budget will help us develop clear principles on which to base a dynamic financial policy — a financial policy which is neither inadequate nor helpless.

C. It is also hoped that customs revenues will increase as a result of the official action planned to combat smuggling and piracy — action which should double those revenues.

Most countries in the world are suffering from inflation and the cost-of-living spiral — and Lebanon is, perhaps, suffering more than others. Exactly how do you plan to deal with this problem? More accurately: do you think you can deal with this problem, given the authorities' continuing absence from some economic sectors and vital economic facilities?

There is no doubt that inflation and rising prices are phenomena from which Lebanon, like other countries, is suffering. And as you know, these two phenomena have external and internal causes.

Where the external causes are concerned, these are an international responsibility; they can only be dealt with by joint action on the part of all countries in general, and, more specifically, on the part of the international financial institutions.

As for the domestic causes, these can be summarized as follows: the rise in internal liquidity, and the failure to control prices. The responsibility for these causes must be borne by each country separately.

The Lebanese government is using the means at its disposal to deal with the internal causes of inflation and the rising cost of living. It is trying to absorb surplus liquidity by seeking domestic loans (Treasury bonds) and by adopting a certain banking policy. It is trying to control prices by reviving the price-control agencies and mobilizing them by means of mobilizing the legislation pertaining to this matter and introducing the necessary amendments to it when such amendments are needed.

Observers here have noticed a steep drop in State income — in the collection of taxes and customs duties — and they have attributed this drop to the mushrooming of illegal ports up and down the Lebanese coast. How do you intend to deal with this particular problem?

There is nothing surprising about the drop in Treasury revenues in recent years; indeed, it would have been surprising had the revenues not dropped, considering the paralysis that gripped State institutions as a result of the painful incidents this country has witnessed.

But the government has not stood idly by. It has taken several measures to restore a reasonable flow of revenues to the Treasury, of which I cite the following:

A. Fines for delays in tax-payment have been cancelled, the period for the payment of back taxes has been extended and installment facilities have been introduced.

B. Some customs duties have been reduced, smuggling is being combatted and the customs authorities are being provided with modern equipment to help them limit smuggling.

In addition, the Lebanese government is rebuilding its security agencies with a view to reestablishing law and order in all parts

of Lebanon — including, of course, the parts where those illegal ports you asked about are located. As I told you in my answer to your previous question, the government is exerting serious efforts to combat piracy and smuggling, using all the means at its disposal — and it is doing so to protect national interests and the interests of the Lebanese people.

The exchange rate of the Lebanese pound is still plummeting. The dollar, which used to be worth LL. 2.40, is now worth LL. 3.25. The pound sterling was LL. 4.20 and is now LL. 7.65. What steps do you intend to take to restore the value of the Lebanese pound?

No country can go through what Lebanon has been through without having its national currency affected in one way or another. And yet, we find that the Lebanese pound has more or less held its position, and has only been relatively slightly affected, if compared with other currencies.

This is very impressive. You will notice that the currencies of many countries — countries which have not been subjected to a fraction of what Lebanon has been through — have been greatly affected by international financial conditions, either dropping or soaring, unable to achieve stability, despite their past strength and immunity.

In comparison, the Lebanese pound has performed well in those international financial conditions, more or less maintaining its strength and immunity. This is due to the strong gold coverage it enjoys and the wise policies which the monetary agencies concerned are using to support and protect it.

It may be worth mentioning here that the dollar's rise against the Lebanese pound — from LL. 2.40 to LL. 3.25 — and sterling's rise against the Lebanese pound — from LL. 4.20 to LL. 7.65 — do not indicate a drop in the value of the Lebanese pound; rather, they indicate that the dollar

and sterling have improved, regaining some of the stature they had in the not too distant past.

At any rate, we are aware that support of the Lebanese pound requires close coordination between our monetary and financial policies, and that is what the Lebanese government is trying to achieve by invigorating the various economic sectors through the Touristic and Industrial Development Bank, the Reconstruction and Development Council, the National Institution for the Insurance of Investments and other agencies.

Do you think Lebanon can still regain its status as the major financial center of the Middle East?

The best evidence of Lebanon's ability to do so is the fact that, even in these bleak times, all regional and international financial institutions have unanimously nominated this country — and this country alone — to be the major center of all financial activities in the entire region, when it regains its stability and security.

In addition, some of the foreign financial institutions which were forced to suspend their activities in Lebanon during the two-year war have begun to return and resume their activities. This is proof enough of the fact that although Lebanon may lose its special financial status temporarily, it is bound to regain it and become stronger and more immune than before.

The *Institutional Investor* periodical recently surveyed international banking institutions to get their views on the creditworthiness of various countries around the world. That survey ranked Lebanon as the least creditworthy country in the Middle East, with the exception of Turkey. Our question: If this is Lebanon's current reputation, how is the country to obtain the international loans it needs?

If what this periodical published about Lebanon's creditworthiness rating is true,

that rating is temporary and bound to change. It will in no way affect Lebanon's ability to obtain international loans.

In this matter, Lebanon depends on the good reputation it still enjoys in international circles and among foreign and Arab financing institutions. This reputation is based on the international confidence in Lebanon's ability to recover, and the international confidence in the Lebanese people, who have been famous down the ages for their competence, their experience, and their ability to overcome difficulties and adapt to the most trying circumstances.

This confidence, in fact, is Lebanon's capital. It is Lebanon's most valuable possession.

That is why we have always had great hopes that Lebanon would be able to secure the external loans it needs. Indeed, generous offers are already pouring in. But Lebanon wants to move in accordance with a well-studied plan which starts with domestic loans by means of Treasury bonds and then moves on to external loans. This plan takes into consideration the current circumstances and the dictates of the reconstruction and development operation in its various stages.

CSO: 4820

MAURITANIA

OULD HEYDALLA SEEKING CLEARER-CUT SUPPORT FROM FRANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by Paul Balta]

[Text] The prime minister of Mauritania, Lt Col Mohamed Ould Heydalla, was expected to arrive in France Monday 17 September on a 3-day official visit. He is scheduled to meet with Giscard d'Estaing, who will receive him at lunch on Wednesday.

The POLISARIO Front announced in Algiers that it had inflicted losses amounting to several hundred killed or taken prisoner last Sunday during an ambush near Zag in southern Morocco. For its part, Rabat claims to have inflicted heavy losses on the Sahraouis last Thursday during an attack on Lemsied. Newsmen who were taken to the scene by the guerrillas reported on their return to Algiers that they had counted a total of 51 Moroccan armored vehicles destroyed or abandoned during the battle at Lebourate on 24 August. Lastly, it was reported that Yasir 'Arafat, who is presently in Morocco following his visit to Algeria, will attempt to mediate between the two countries.

According to his associates, Lt Col Mohamed Ould Heydalla proposes to expound to his French conversational partner his concept of the bilateral cooperation, in the light of the domestic and foreign perils that threaten his country. The two principal perils are, he believes, "destabilization" of his government and "partition" of the national territory.

The prime minister reportedly hoped to maintain a position equidistant from Rabat and Algiers and to maintain good relations with both capitals. Some of his associates explain that ever since Nouakchott signed the peace agreement with the POLISARIO Front Morocco has been attempting to overthrow the Mauritanian Government, first by delaying the withdrawal (now completed) of its troops stationed in Mauritania, and subsequently by attempting to set up a "countergovernment" in Mauritania and by organizing, in Morocco itself, an opposition front promoted by a turncoat, Lt Col Abdel Kader.

The new Mauritanian "strong man" will also call the attention of President Giscard d'Estaing to the "machinations" of various protagonists for the purpose of partitioning Mauritania. His intimates recall that President

Senghor--who supports the Moroccan position in the Saharan conflict--is in turn supported by Rabat when he speaks of the possibility of attaching southern Mauritania, which is populated by blacks, to Senegal. These circles also cast doubt upon certain French circles who are allegedly aggravating the differences between the Moors and the blacks, whereas these differences could--they say--be easily resolved in an atmosphere of calm and serenity.

The group now in power in Nouakchott believes that any "destabilization" of Mauritania would give rise to "generalized guerrilla warfare" throughout the region and would have repercussions in Senegal--a development that would not be in Paris' interest. The Mauriticians are pleased with the good relations they maintain with France and also with the aid France has given them to defend their sovereignty, and they would like Paris to practice an "even more active policy of neutrality" by exhorting those governments that might harm Mauritania's integrity to act with discretion and moderation. They would also like the French Government not "to let itself be outflanked" by the maneuvers of what the entourage of Lt Col Ould Heydalla alleges is a "colonial lobby" established in the Senegalese capital with offshoots in Nouakchott and Paris.

10992
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

GOVERNOR NAMED FOR NEW PROVINCE OF IFRANE

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 19 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "Ifrane, a New Province: Yesterday His Majesty the King Appointed Hassan Nader as Head of the Government; Abderrahman Alaoui, Pasha of the Touarga District"]

[Text] Yesterday at the close of the Council of Ministers, His Majesty Hassan II received Hassan Nader, pasha of the Touarga district and presented him with a decree of nomination as governor of the new Province of Ifrane.

Addressing himself to the new governor in particular, the sovereign spoke as follows: "By our decision to nominate you as governor of the new Province of Ifrane, we would like to create a model and touristic province, the capital of which will be the city of Ifrane. We see in you a man who loves nature and is dedicated to the conservation of the environment and to maintaining the equilibrium between man and nature.

The inhabitants of Ifrane remember you with great pleasure and we are sure that your nomination will come up to their aspirations and noble objectives. We are also convinced that your qualities will permit you to overcome all the difficulties which could arise in the field of coordination between agriculture and tourism, and we who have visited Ifrane from time to time, are willing to examine all the problems which you may bring to our attention."

His majesty the king then received Abderrahmane Alaoui, pasha of the city of Ifrane and presented him with his decree of nomination as pasha of the district of Touarga in Rabat, replacing Hassan Nader.

On this occasion the sovereign stressed the devotion of the pasha of the district of Touarga to "Arab and Moroccan traditions" and underlined the administrative experience and the qualities which will be very valuable to him in the accomplishment of his duties to the very best of his abilities.

7993
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

INFORMATION ON INSTALLATION OF GOVERNOR OF IFRANE

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 20 Sep 79 pp 1,2

[Excerpts] On Wednesday morning the minister of interior, Driss Basri, presided in the seat of the Municipality of Ifrane at the ceremony of installation of Hassan Nader as governor of the Province of Ifrane, the creation of which was announced yesterday by His Majesty King Hassan II.

The young Province of Ifrane which becomes the 39th province of the kingdom will include in particular the municipality of Ifrane, Tazeguit district, the autonomous center of Azrou, the Erklaouen district, the Timahdite district and other regions including Dayet Aoua.

After the reading of Hassan Nader's decree of nomination as head of the Province of Ifrane by "Cadi At Tawfik," the minister of interior delivered an address in which he conveyed to the inhabitants the solicitous concern and great interest of the sovereign for the region elevated to the rank of province whose future economic and social development is an auspicious omen for a better future for its citizens.

The minister added that the "creation of this new province is in keeping with his majesty the king's policy, which aspires to the rapprochement of the administration, the citizens and the coordination of all the efforts of the state with a view to achieving an economic and social renaissance and the improvement of the living standards of the people."

After pointing out that the number of provinces and prefectures in the kingdom had risen to 39 at the present time, the minister indicated that creating the Province of Ifrane is an imperative necessity with the aim of coalescing the objectives of the administration which consist in the realization of a harmonious development of the great incomparable natural riches of this region and its touristic potentialities.

The minister continued "From an agricultural point of view the Ifrane region embraces an immense forest and animal inheritance. Its rational exploitation and conservation entails the combined efforts of the people and the administration, in accordance with the decree of 1975."

"On city planning," he added, "this young province is in a position to profit from the efforts the state is exerting in this field while maintaining the specific individuality and appearance of the city."

Basri stated further: "In the field of tourism the Province of Ifrane disposes of various immense potentials and is favored by nature and an incomparable climate, which could be instrumental in shaping it into a pilot province in the tourist sector.

"In the general interest all this natural wealth must be developed in the framework of a coordinated and fruitful action between the elected members and the citizenry."

In addition Driss Basri underlined the administrative experience and excellent qualities which predispose Hassan Nader, governor of the new Province of Ifrane, to be equal to the mission entrusted to him by His Majesty King Hassan II in the best interest of the region.

He finally urged the elected members and the citizens to work in agreement with the new governor in order to promote the development of the young province in all its domains.

The following were present at the installation ceremony: the minister of transports, Mohand Naceur, the governors of the provinces of Meknes, Fes and Khenifra, Mohamed Doubi Kadmiri, Moulay Mehdi Alaoui M'rani and Mohamed Afoud respectively, ministry of interior officials, deputies, elected members, local authorities and people of consequence.

7993
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

DENIAL OF UNEM PRESIDENT--All the students are ready to participate in the defense of territorial integrity--Mohamed Boubekri, president of UNEM (National Union of Moroccan Students) categorically denied the reports alleging that a fraction of the students who had taken part in the XVith UNEM congress were opposed to the question of the Sahara being discussed. At a press conference held on Tuesday morning at the UNEM headquarters, Boubekri reaffirmed that the students are ready to participate actively in the territorial defense of Morocco, and to this effect they have proposed the establishment of training camps for the students. [Text]
[Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 19 Sep 79 p 1] 7993

CSO: 4400

SUDAN

OPPOSITION LEADER SAYS REVOLUTION AGAINST NUMAYRI IMMINENT

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 2 & 6 Sep 79

[Interview with Husayn 'Uthman Mansur, Leader of Democratic Unionist Party, by 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kafri]

[2 Sep 79 p 3]

[Text] The individualistic, oppressive and dictatorial regime of Numayri is on its death bed in these moments. It is on the brink of an abyss and it has committed an obvious treason against our country by throwing itself in al-Sadat's arms. This regime has sought the help of the Egyptian regime's gendarmery only to preserve its survival, sacrificing the Sudanese people's dignity and independence.

When the regime found that it is isolated, it summoned the troops of al-Sadat, the similar agent dictator, who has betrayed the national cause. The price of our hateful dictator's fall in the arms of al-Sadat has been exorbitant because he has taken part with al-Sadat in betraying the Arab nation and disowning its history.

This is what has been stressed by Husayn 'Uthman Mansur, a leader of the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party and the information official of the opposition Sudanese People's National Front.

[Question] What has recently happened and what is now happening in the fraternal country of Sudan?

[Answer] For a long time, Sudan has been undergoing important developments. A state of anxiety and dissatisfaction has been prevailing among the Sudanese masses due to the political, economic and social deterioration in the domestic situation, not to mention the national position represented in tying Sudan's foreign policy to the imperialist interests by supporting al-Sadat's policy in the area. I would like to stress that Sudan will experience surprise development in the coming days.

The latest popular uprising was a clear reflection of the state of dissatisfaction and of the Sudanese masses' rejection of this policy, not to mention rejection of the latest cabinet reshuffle which is tantamount to another sign of the crisis that is eroding the Sudanese regime.

[Question] Before embarking on our Sudanese people's current revolution, it is useful to deal with the situation of your party, considering that you are one of the leaders of the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party. What were the early beginnings of your party and what are the phases through which this party has passed?

[Answer] The party was originally called the Party of Brothers and included the first forces opposed to colonialism. It was founded in 1944 and sought at the outset to realize the Nile Valley unity between Egypt and Sudan. When the July 1952 revolution broke out, it was decided to unite the parties calling, by varying degrees, for unity with Egypt. Those parties were united and started to work under the name of the Unionist National Party. In 1954, a split occurred in the party and another party under the name of the Democratic People's Party was formed. This party was more strongly inclined toward Egypt than the Unionist National Party. The two parties then reached agreement again and the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party was formed in 1956.

[Question] There is no doubt that the organizational, as well as the cultural, issue is of utmost significance. What about the party's masses and friends "in terms of the nature of the structure of your party?"

[Answer] The nature of the party's structure is almost that of broad fronts. It includes various factions and sectors of the Sudanese people: Workers, farmers, minor civil servants, national intellectuals, students, merchants and national capitalism. It is a party built on the alliance of the people's forces.

[Question] What are the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party's fundamental inclinations--inclinations that the party charted as its goal at the outset of its formation and that it is viewing as its goals?

[Answer] Since its formation, the party has had inclinations toward unity with Egypt. In 1957, and before 'Abd-al-Nasir's rise, the party leadership, with its liberationist and progressive inclination, started to hold meetings with the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. From Cairo, a message was sent by Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman to the Ba'th Party leadership at the time and agreement was reached to hold a dialogue on the basis of adopting the socialist Arab thinking by our Democratic Unionist Party which was known then by the name of the Democratic People's Party.

[Question] On what basis was your inclination toward unity with Egypt founded?

[Answer] The Arab nationalist thinking was not fully clear to our people at the time. The issue was a spontaneous one, both to us as a party and to

the Sudanese masses. However, our call for unity with Egypt was founded on an Arab basis, by evidence of our slogans: The unity of the language, the unity of the spiritual sentiments, the unity of religion, the unity of common struggle, the unity of land and then the unity of the Nile Valley.

[Question] Is there a specific theory that defines and governs the immediate and future struggle of your party?

[Answer] I would like to assert that the Democratic Unionist Party is not-- despite the fact that its popularity is deep-rooted in all the provinces of Sudan and, despite the fact that it is a well-organized party with the full ability to move, considering that it is the leader of all the political movements--a theorized party and does not have any specific "theory." Its struggle is inspired by our national conscience. We adopt our national positions vigilantly and firmly, benefiting from the experiences of all the Arab progressive forces. But since the hard recent experience that came in the wake of the May 1969 coup, it has become certain to us that we are building with the progressive Arab forces a strongly meshed and firm political, intellectual and ideological structure and that through what we have suffered in our fight against the oppressive regime in Sudan, we have learned how to build a party that lacks nothing other than scoring the victory against the military dictatorship and toppling this dictatorship. Therefore, our party is an Arab party, in the sense that we believe in the pan-Arab call as a strategy and a goal, and even a means to build our Arab, and especially Sudanese, homeland. We are also a progressive party, in the sense that we demand freedom for ourselves and for the others and democracy for ourselves and for the others. We are an indivisible part of the Arab cause.

We assert that our Arab position is not at all determined by the treacherous, defeatist, subsevient and disgraceful position taken by Ja'far Numayri, the oppressive dictator, as a hateful background for the traitor al-Sadat.

Moreover, we are a socialist party that believes in the socialist experience in the Arab homeland, especially in Syria as a progressive Arab leadership that knows through experience how to theorize and how to act, not only for Syria but also for the Arab nation.

Our party is an Arab socialist progressive party that believes in the principles of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. We are unionist and socialist Arabs.

[Question] What is the desired goal of your visit to Syria and your meetings with the party leadership?

[Answer] After formation of the Sudanese People's National Opposition Front which has included the opposition forces, I was entrusted to visit the struggling Syria to assert in the name of the Sudanese people and through their legitimate representative--the opposition--their opposition to the treacherous and oppressive regime, to assure the struggling Syria and the comrade leader Hafi al-Asad that the heroic Sudanese people have nothing at all to do with the treacherous positions that Numayri is taking in support

of al-Sadat and that the Sudanese people are a nationalist Arab people who rushed to support the Arab cause from the beginning. Many Sudanese martyrs fell on the sacred soil of Palestine in 1948 and the Sudanese people continued to support the Arab cause firmly, crowning their support with the Khartoum conference and its three famous no's. 'Abd-al-Nasir bestowed on Khartoum at the time the name of the capital of steadfastness. Had you seen how 'Abd-al-Nasir was received, you would have realized that the Sudanese people not only refuse but also cannot betray the Arab cause and cannot accept the capitulationist and treacherous positions currently taken by Ja'far Numayri.

Therefore, it is important for us that the heroic Syrian people understand that the nationalist Arab Sudanese people appreciate their steadfast stance in the fact of the enemy and that the Sudanese people will not abandon them and will not stop supporting them at any time.

[Question] How do you view and evaluate your meetings--and the discussions that took place in them--with some leaders of our party?

[Answer] It is a true victory for the Sudanese opposition leaderships to meet with the top leaderships in the Arab Syria. This confirms that the Arab progressive forces in the entire Arab homeland are in full agreement and have established among themselves good political and ideological harmony that is capable of strengthening the fundamental battle against U. S. imperialism, world Zionism and Arab reaction. I can say that I have been completely dazzled by my meeting with comrade 'Abdallah al-Ahmar--a meeting in which he assured me that the leading Arab thought is well and that we can "with experience, thought and application" score every victory for the Arab homeland and for the Arab causes. I have also met with the minister of information and with the assistant minister of foreign affairs.

[Question] In the light of your official and party talks, how do you evaluate the Syrian position?

[Answer] It is obvious that there is no longer any force capable of confronting the Zionist enemy in the battle of the Arab cause other than the army and forces of the heroic Syria. It is definite that the Syrian armed forces, which are confronting the forces of the aggression and of its allies, are the rock on which the Camp David accords have been smashed. When the vigilant Syria takes this courageous position against the forces of aggression, imperialism and Arab reaction, it is fully aware that it will suffer heavily as a consequence of this heroic stance. But Syria has not and will not pay any attention to such suffering and will not retreat. This is why Syria has become the first and last bastion of the Arab cause. There is no longer anyone else in the battlefield.

The signs of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plots against the progressive nationalist Syrian Arab regime have begun to appear in the suspect movements of the [Muslim] Brotherhood which is an agent of Arab reaction, U. S. imperialism and world Zionism.

What happened in Aleppo is nothing but a crime against Islam, against Arabdom and against humanity and nothing but a reflection of the plots being hatched against Syria.

On the other hand, let me say that were it not for the ability of the Syrian leadership, the situation in Lebanon, on the Arab borders and in the entire area would have exploded in a manner harmful to the Arab interests. But Syria and its unimpulsive leadership have been able to score a political victory and to gain full control. The world no longer thinks that Begin and al-Sadat can say that they are in control.

Syria has gained the respect of the world public opinion with its superior self-restraint ability--an ability with which it is keeping its finger on the trigger while at the same time performing successfully a role in the U. N. efforts to establish peace in the fraternal Lebanon whereas the U. N. forces are incapable of establishing peace in a small area in southern Lebanon as a result of the Zionist provocations.

[Question] Considering that all the Sudanese opposition forces are in unanimous agreement on toppling Numayri, what about the efforts to complete the unity of all the Sudanese opposition factions in one front and where have you gotten in regard to achieving this goal?

[Answer] From the outset, the opposition front consisted of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Nation's Party and a number of nationalist factions. The front's first charter was formulated in Aba Island in 1969 and was signed on behalf of the Nation's Party by martyr al-Hadi al-Mahdi who was killed in the 1970 incidents and on behalf of the Democratic Unionist Party by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi.

When the regime hit Aba Island, al-Sharif al-Hindi tried to persuade al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to join the front and to replace his uncle al-Hadi al-Mahdi. Al-Sadiq agreed and al-Sharif al-Hindi ceded the front's chairmanship to him. After the failure of the Muhammed Nur Sa'd agreement in 1976, the regime embarked on efforts to end the disputes with the front. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi went to Port Sudan and met with Numayri under "the auspices of Saudi Arabia" where the two sides claimed that an agreement was reached. But it was not a written agreement and Numayri was able to manipulate it in his interest. Another mediation was made and culminated with the written London agreement which was announced to the world public opinion and which was signed by our party on 12 April 1978. This agreement called for restoring democracy, guaranteeing public liberties, holding free elections from bottom to top and abolishing all the special measures restricting liberties. But as usual, Numayri's regime breached the agreement and persisted in its transgression, thus leading the country with its rash policies into wretched poverty, rampant corruption, domination by graft and favoritism and disintegration in the Sudanese society. The straw that broke the back has been the regime's support for al-Sadat's treasonous initiative. The London agreement has been thus buried completely.

The Progressive National Front now consists of the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the Communist Party and the Nasserist forces.

[Question] As I know, and everybody else knows, the Sudanese opposition front has a strategy at present. In your capacity as the front's information representative, would you explain the dimensions of this strategy?

[Answer] The front's and party's strategy at present is to topple Numayri's dilapidated regime immediately and finally. There is no chance of sitting with this regime for any kind of negotiations because it has been proven to the entire world that Numayri is not a man of his word, that he does not keep his promises and cannot be trusted at all. This is the conviction of all the nationalist forces in Sudan, both those forces inside the front and those outside it. Numayri has no ally now other than the reactionary forces represented in the Muslim Brotherhood. These are weak forces incapable of doing anything. There are also other forces created by the regime and consisting of corrupt, mercenary and opportunist elements. The Muslim Brotherhood organization is extremely divided. The university students reject this ugly prostration by their organization's leadership before an already collapsed regime.

[Question] What is the story of the recent bloodless coup that took place in Sudan and what is the role of Husni Mubarak [Egyptian Vice President] in the dismissal of Abu-al-Qasim, Numayri's deputy?

[Answer] When the latest coup attempt--organized by Cairo which betrayed Abu-al-Qasim Ibrahim, Numayri's first deputy and the general secretary of the Sudanese Socialist Union--was exposed, it became known that Husni Mubarak invited Ibrahim to Alexandria and gave him advice at the residence of the U. S. ambassador specifically. Together, they entrusted the task of carrying out a coup against Numayri to Abu-al-Qasim, telling him that Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil will be on his side. When Abu-al-Qasim arrived in Khartoum and told 'Abd-al-Majid, his conversation concerning the coup was recorded and the recording was delivered to Numayri. As a result, 'Abd-al-Majid became Numayri's first deputy. They thus got rid of Abu-al-Qasim.

It is obvious that the policies of all the Egyptian governments from the first Khedive to the latest Khedive, al-Sadat, are built on a single strategy, namely to the Khartoum government weaker than the Cairo government. They thus sought to ouster Abu-al-Qasim because having the military in power further weakens Numayri who is already weak. It is well-known that 'Abd-al-Majid Khalil and 'Izz-al-Din 'Ali Malik, the chief of staff of the Sudanese army, are considered agents of the Egyptian regime.

[Question] A lot has been said about the causes and dimensions of the recent Ramadan uprising. Was it a spontaneous uprising resulting from the economic pressure under which our people in Sudan are living, was it an intentional uprising for which the front's leadership had planned or what?

[Answer] The Ramadan uprising was not due to inflation and to the shortage of goods in the Sudanese market, as many people imagine. Inflation and the shortage of goods is something old. The uprising was planned by the front's leadership and the aim of stirring it up was to stress that our people are not asleep and that they keep up with all the moves taking place around them.

Numayri has tried to claim that oil will be produced in Sudan, keeping in mind that the Sudanese people are aware that even if oil is produced, this will not happen before 5 years to come. Thus, the Sudanese people's reply to Numayri's claims concerning oil was to flare up so that the Chevron Company may know that there is no stability in Sudan. The company will not continue its drilling operations [if there is no stability]. Numayri was thus embarrassed and he summoned additional Egyptian forces to control the Sudanese people's uprising.

[6 Sep 79, p 3]

[Text] [Question] What are the current priorities of the struggle insofar as the progressive nationalist forces in Sudan are concerned?

[Answer] While waging its decisive battle, Sudan is raising the slogan of unity of the progressive nationalist forces. The battle requires this unity and the priorities of the phase dictate that efforts be made to deal with the major contradiction between the people and the regime.

The class and political assessment of the regime stresses that it is a backward capitalist regime under which a minority has enriched itself at the expense of the overwhelming majority of our Sudanese people, under which agricultural capitalism has been allowed to be established with foreign capital and under which plants have been set up through middlemen and suspect foreign monies. This has caused the popular forces in Sudan to stand united against the regime and its lackeys.

Politically, the regime is an agent of the world imperialist forces. This regime is opposed to all the nationalist and pan-Arab policies. Domestically, the regime imposes an oppressive, dictatorial and bankrupt rule. At the pan-Arab level, the regime follows a line subservient to al-Sadat's treasonous line. Internationally, it has adopted hostile positions toward all the liberationist policies and has become an open agent of the imperialist forces. There can be no salvation and no guarantee for the success of our Sudanese people's revolution except through unity of the progressive and nationalist forces in a declared front that derives its legitimacy from its sincere struggle for the people and for the issue of nationalist and democratic liberation. The truth is that formation of the Sudanese opposition front has been founded on this mainstay.

[Question] As usual, Numayri throws the blame for his regime's failure on the ministers and on the regime's leaderships. What is your evaluation of this attitude?

[Answer] Numayri cannot disavow the responsibility by a mere speech he makes. Sudan is living under the worst economic, political and social circumstances it has ever experienced.

Sudan has never undergone as many successive crises as it has experienced under the canopy of Numayri's regime which has acknowledged this fact repeatedly. Numayri's appeal to the Sudanese people to extend the ropes of their exhausted patience is tantamount to an official admission that the economic, political and social situation is no longer bearable. The regime is acknowledging its failure and this is something that no longer needs any proof. This situation has motivated all the people's groups to move and to oppose the regime openly and comprehensively.

The opposition masses are no longer unarmed. Many military men have been discharged under the present regime, most of them dishonorably. There are also trained men among the opposition ranks. Moreover, there are thousands of armed men in various parts of Sudan and there are the southern rebels. All these elements are now on the side opposing the regime. The battle is truly passing through its last moments.

[Question] The alliance existing between al-Sadat's and Numayri's regimes needs no proof. It is certain that had not Numayri enlisted the help of al-Sadat regime's forces, he would not have been able to contain the recent Ramadan uprising. What about the Egyptian military presence in Sudan?

[Answer] The Egyptian military presence in Sudan has been proven, despite Numayri's and al-Sadat's allegations that there are no Egyptian troops in Sudan. It is proven that the Egyptian troops are present in western Sudan in camps known as the (Flamingo) camps which are close to the coast nearer the Ethiopian-Sudanese borders. These camps are swarming with Egyptian military aircraft, tanks, infantry and artillery forces numbering nearly 10,000 troops and administrative officers. Moreover, there are Egyptian forces in Wadi Sayyidna. This camp provides a true picture of the Egyptian military presence in eastern and northern Sudan. There are Egyptian forces in Khartoum also. Additional Egyptian forces arrived recently to crush the popular uprising and to besiege the Sudanese army. These forces consist of paratroopers and special security elements and have been deployed in Jabal al-Awliya's area. Nobody can enter or leave Khartoum now without being subjected to inspection. The goal is obvious, namely to protect Numayri's regime from any popular uprising or coup attempt. Moreover, Sudan has become a part of the U. S. strategy implemented by al-Sadat's regime.

[Question] What comes after the recent Ramadan uprisings?

[Answer] The nature of the Sudanese people's movements is unique. What happened in the 1964 revolution astonished many revolution theoreticians in

the world. The Sudanese revolution is not subject to the ebb and flow conditions dominating society. The Sudanese masses rebelled in 1964 even though a relative state of prosperity was prevailing. The military dictatorship in power at the time was toppled and democracy was restored. If there has recently been an ebb in the wake of the recent Ramadan uprising, this does not at all mean the end of the revolution in Sudan. It is just a respite for Sudan's revolutionaries. We would not be exaggerating if we say that the embers of the Sudanese revolution are smoldering and that its volcano is explosive. The whole world may be surprised by a revolution that continues until it achieves victory and by rapid and imminent developments.

[Question] Such an affirmation makes us ask what the components of the victory are, i. e. what is required of the Sudanese opposition front at this particular time?

[Answer] As I have already pointed out, the National Front consists of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Sudanese Communist Party and the modern [sic] Arab (Nasirist) forces. This front was formed in London recently and has made its goal to topple the regime. This requires by necessity mobilizing the Sudanese masses and pushing them in the right direction.

[Question] We now reach in our dialogue the issue of the south, especially the issue of the regime's persecution of the (Sano) Party members, not to mention the regime's claims that the southern problem has been solved.

[Answer] The issue of southern Sudan is not a new issue. The regime's allegation that this issue was settled by the Addis Ababa agreement reached under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie and of the World Churches Council has been proven void. It has been proven that Numayri's regime is incapable of solving the problem of the south. The armed southern opposition against Numayri's regime is still present and Numayri has not and will never enjoy stability in the south. He is meeting violent opposition from the southerners. The latest attempt to topple Numayri's regime was the attempt of Samuel (Aro), the deputy speaker of the People's Assembly, who is a prisoner in Cooper Prison along with his colleagues.

Our southern brothers are considered genuine opposition forces in Sudan. Their stance helped the 1964 revolution to succeed. The land of southern Sudan has always been a source of annoyance and anxiety for all the dictatorial governments in Khartoum. Moreover, the oppressive regime in Sudan is conducting an extensive campaign of arrests against members of the Sano Party and is placing its main leaders under house arrest, keeping in mind that the influence of this party relies on the most numerous tribes in southern Sudan, namely the (Dinka) tribe and other tribes.

[Question] What is the degree of the link between the opposition in the south and the Sudanese opposition front?

[Answer] There is a link between us and our brothers in the south in their capacity as a front, a party and a vanguard. They have had an effective

role in the various uprisings and confrontations experienced by Sudan recently.

[Question] Numayri has more than a vacillating position--at least in his statements--insofar as the Eritrean revolution is concerned. What is the truth of this matter?

[Answer] The treasonous regime of Numayri which has disowned the Arab nation and its causes and which has sold Sudan to the treacherous Egyptian regime will not at all hesitate to sell the Eritrean revolution to its enemies. The regime's betrayal of the Eritrean revolutionaries is not at all unlikely. However, the only guarantee for the continued presence of the nationalist Eritrean revolution in its launching bases in Sudan lies in the opposition's success in toppling the present regime.

[Question] Numayri insinuates through his moves and his visits that he is still the man in full control in Sudan. What do you say?

[Answer] At both the domestic and external levels, Numayri's regime exploits some contradictions existing internally among some Sudanese groups and individuals. At the external level, Numayri tries to exploit the conflicts in the Arab homeland. He raises conflicting slogans that no rational person can believe.

Numayri's regime is a regime of contradictions fundamentally. If we try to evaluate it politically, we find that it is primarily an agent subservient to the U. S. imperialism and a lackey of al-Sadat. In class terms, it is a regime that coexists with a class of parasitic new millionaires whom the regime calls the national capital. The regime has thus created the "bogy man" who will swallow the regime itself. There are nearly 20 new millionaires now whereas there wasn't a single Sudanese millionaire on the dawn of 25 May 1969.

Thus, the flareup of class struggle in Sudan between the class of surfeited millionaires and the rest of the poor Sudanese masses has become a reality.

[Question] Political leadership has a fundamental and effective role in mobilizing the masses. It is noticed that some leaderships of the Sudanese Reconciliation [al-musalahah] Front have emigrated from Sudan. Doesn't such an emigration affect the course and victory of the revolution in Sudan?

[Answer] The emigration of some political leaderships from Sudan was not on a decision by Numayri. It was a necessity because the revolution movement forced some leaderships of the nationalist forces to select exile and struggle from abroad. They have been able to lead the domestic struggle successfully and to escalate it to the level of armed struggle. The leaderships that are outside Sudan are very small numerically. However, they are very effective in exposing the regime to the entire world. This leadership (the opposition vanguard) is the leadership that worked to train and arm the revolutionary forces which have waged the numerous and well-known battles against the regime.

[Question] What is the lesson derived from the total events and developments that the Sudanese people have undergone and continue to undergo?

[Answer] The experiences, victories and defeats of peoples in the struggle battles are the common property of the people. We, the Sudanese people, benefit from all the ideological, nationalist and progressive revolutions lived by the peoples of the world. We are an indivisible part of the liberationist revolutions known to the third world generally and to the Arab world in particular. If there is any lesson derived, it is the lesson of unity of the nationalist forces, of escalating the role of the masses and mobilizing them and of a firm resolution to achieve victory, regardless of how heavy the sacrifices become.

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WESTERN SAHARA

EIGHT REPORTERS CONFIRM SERIOUS MOROCCAN DEFEAT

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by LE MONDE correspondent Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--The POLISARIO Front confirmed on Monday 17 September that its troops had won a "new victory" overnight near the stronghold of Zag in southern Morocco, where a substantial part of the main body of Moroccan troops is massed opposite Tindouf (LE MONDE, 18 September). A sharifian unit fell into an ambush and reportedly sustained very heavy losses in men and materiel. Following the spectacular offensive on 28 January of this year against Tan-Tan, capital of Tarfaya Province, the fighting has steadily intensified, as is attested to by the 24 August attack on the town of Labouirate despite the fact that it was defended by the third armored squadron group of the royal army. The Rabat government acknowledged that the town had been surrounded, while the POLISARIO Front reported 800 killed on the Moroccan side and the destruction of 15 armored vehicles--figures which at the time seemed very high (LE MONDE, 28 August).

The magnitude of the reverse sustained by Morocco, however, was no longer in doubt after the return to Algiers of eight newsmen, including three Frenchmen, who had been taken by the guerrillas to the battlefield (the POLISARIO Front had, curiously enough, not seen fit to invite the correspondent of LE MONDE to go along). During a 9-hour period the newsmen visited the destroyed and deserted positions, the shelters, and even the artillery at the central command post, where they viewed the files of the unit and even the "operations log" of the commanding officer of the fortified camp, Major Azelmat.

"The Enemy Chose To Withdraw"

Rene Mauries, special correspondent of the DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE, was in this way enabled to count 26 T-34 heavy tanks of Soviet manufacture that had been hit by rocket fire or abandoned by their crews without giving battle, and also counted 12 light armored cars and many armored troop carriers. He confirmed on all points a news story that had appeared in the weekly ALGERIE ACTUALITE and emphasized the demoralization of the 1,200 soldiers of the garrison, "who had not been relieved for 4 years" and had already sustained very heavy losses on 6 July and 10 August.

Following the first attack, Major Azelmat had expressed the belief (in his report, a copy of which was found at the scene) that without the reinforcements of men and materiel he had been requesting "the third armored squadron group was doomed to destruction." The day after the second attack, when the Sahraoui guerrillas had penetrated to the heart of the troop formation, he wrote with a touch of irony:

"The enemy chose to withdraw after sweeping our positions clean of everything they contained." He added that his unit had been "traumatized" and "was no longer operational."

When the prisoners were questioned near Tindouf by the newsmen, they said that the circle of entrenched and partially underground positions protecting the town had been overrun in 40 minutes and that casualties had been "enormous."

A document found at the command post reported, several days before the attack, the presence of a "new inspection mission by two French officers: a colonel and a captain," who seemed among other things to be dissatisfied with the performance of the 12.7 machine guns. Even more unexpectedly, they also found an order of the day which had been read to the troops and consisted basically of a preface to a propaganda tract celebrating the "green march" of 1975. It was lavish in its praise of the monarchy and bore the signature of the academician Maurice Druon.

To bring Morocco to heel, the POLISARIO Front then decided to take the war to the very territory of its adversary. Abandoning for the moment its operations against the coastal towns of the Western Sahara--which are strongly defended by the royal forces--and relieved of any concern with respect to the southern front following the agreement signed with Nouakchott, the POLISARIO forces directly engaged the main body of the Moroccan combat forces deployed along the Algerian border, with the aim of inflicting "unacceptable" losses on the Moroccan forces. Although the latter had only recently been reinforced by the royal troops that had been withdrawn from Zaire and Mauritania, they seemed to have resisted only with increasing difficulty. "The situation in the southern part of the kingdom has reached the threshold of the intolerable," King Hassan II declared on 8 March in a message to the house of representatives. Is not that situation becoming even more tense for the kingdom today, now that the OAU and the nonaligned countries are proclaiming--one after another--the right of the Sahraouis to self-determination and independence and are denouncing Morocco's action?

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WESTERN SAHARA

REPORT OF EMERGENCY PLAN FOR OUED EDDAHAB

Rabat L'OPINION in French 20 Sep 79 pp 1,10

[Article by special correspondent Alem Azzam of MAP]

[Text] The day after our arrival in Dakhla a dense crowd of men and women in blue robes had congregated around the temporary headquarters of the Banque de Maroc. They had come to exchange their Mauritanian ouguias for Moroccan dirhams at the profitable rate of one ouguia for 10 centimes, causing the treasury to sustain a deficit of almost one billion centimes.

The representatives of the Ministry of Equipment who came in full force, already knew what to expect. After repairing the lighthouse on the jetty which is most essential in a port which registers heavy tonnage ships navigating in unsuspected dangerous currents, they acquainted us with their plan of immediate action. They will invest 52,800,000 dirhams over a period of 6 to 7 months. Needed immediately: a cold storage installation to preserve perishable foodstuffs which a boat already chartered by the Southern Regions Supply Office will deliver to a city short of provisions, after leaving Casablanca yesterday. The port itself will swallow up half of this amount: 25.5 million dirhams will be used to equip the principal jetty with lifting equipment, motorboats and tugboats, as soon as the costly dredging operation is completed. A master plan for the installation will be drawn up while a restructuring study covering the port of Dakhla as well as that of Lagaira will be implemented.

This plan also foresees the reconstruction of the causeways as well as the construction of the first sections of the Dakhla-Laguira road. Eight million dirhams are destined for the National Promotion yards which have been entrusted with the task of rebuilding the dwellings, sporting complex and the women's shelter.

As regards public works, they will also receive ten million dirhams for sanitation purposes, restoration of administrative buildings, repairing roads and for green spaces.

Finally, about 2,300,000 dirhams will be used for canalization and distribution of drinking water. In this connection a new water system will be needed for the elimination of the high percentage of sulphur contained therein.

All of this is only a first step as the Province of Dakhla is very promising. What it offers in the field of fishing is inconceivable, and the people in charge, judging from their enthusiasm, plan to make Dakhla an industrial pole capable of competing with any port in the northern part of the country.

The greatest surprise will be the vegetable gardens which encircle the city owing to water reserves, which are difficult to imagine when speaking of the Sahara. A few fellaheen, obviously inexperienced, succeed in producing vegetables of the most astonishing dimensions. The Spanish records permit us to anticipate a positive future on this level. With water possibilities available it is already practicable to irrigate almost 5,000 hectares in the Dakhla periphery alone while the region of El Argoub offers the same chances, according to the people in charge. If the forecasts are found to be true, the city and even the neighboring localities will be able to be self-sufficient in fruits and vegetables in the very near future.

To watch the people in charge bustling about and making plans and forecasts, it is difficult not to imagine that the Sahara is a real school where civilians as well as the military call upon their abilities and deem it an honor to attain a sense of pride in being a Moroccan.

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END