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West Europe Report

(FOUO 61/79)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

POLITICAL ASPECT OF BREZHNEV TACTIC POSES 'TOUGHEST PROBLEM'

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 18 Oct 79 p 5 LD

[Dispatch by Vittorio Zucconi: "Why Brezhnev Is Saying: We Will Negotiate on Missiles Right Away"]

[Text] Moscow--With the letters sent to all the NATO heads of government--but not revealed to the Soviet public, who still know nothing about them--the USSR's initiative to prevent the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe has reached its political culmination. From 6 October, when Brezhnev delivered his "speech from the Berlin wall," through 2 days ago, when the Soviet ambassadors in the Western capitals delivered the CPSU secretary's message, the operation to saturate the Western public and their leadership classes with political propaganda was developed and perfected.

The tactic is not new: Indeed, it can be described as a "classic move" in the recurrent overtures of the anti-NATO struggle. It was adopted in similar terms, though in a very different international climate, by Stalin in December 1950, when he tried to prevent the formation of the joint military command, the future operational center of NATO. It was repeated by Khrushchev in 1957 when he tried to prevent the installation of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Europe, and the similarity with the present case is striking; he went as far as to announce the "unilateral withdrawal, as an example of good will," of 4,000 troops. Khrushchev was therefore more generous than Brezhnev.

But however "deja vu," the Soviet tactic resurrected by Brezhnev cannot fail to impress on account of the consistency, insistence and subtlety with which it is being implemented. On the psychological plane it puts its counterpart NATO on the defensive by "revealing" to the continent's peaceful peoples the evil imperialist plan to install 572 new missiles (Pershings and Cruise) on their territory. Diplomatically, it shifts the international debate to the opposite camp and puts the NATO governments in the increasingly delicate position of having to say "no" to the foremost Eurasian power and deal with the leftwing forces still sensitive to appeal from Moscow. Militarily,

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it shifts attention to NATO's rearmament plan and away from the rearmament which is already underway or which has already taken place in the Eastern Bloc. Brezhnev has revealed that a new missile, the SS-20, with three independent warheads "becomes operation" every 6 days in the USSR, where 100 of them are apparently already targeted on Europe. This assertion has not yet been denied.

Now the "letters to NATO governments" have brought the problem home to each of the Atlantic nations, removing it from the realm of indirect exchanges and messages via the press. In these notes Brezhnev neither threatens nor thunders openly. He asks and offers to negotiate, but--this is the point--before and not after the installation of the Pershing and Cruise missiles. Because this is the essential issue for the Kremlin: to negotiate on the basis of the existing military situation, in which there has already taken place on the other side of the East-West border the qualitative technological leap forward, (if not the quantitative one, perhaps: This is the misunderstanding being manipulated by Moscow) with the multiwarhead SS-20 missiles, the backfire bombers, clearly superior to the notorious and very old B-52, and the high-penetration T-72 battle tank.

One can understand Brezhnev's anxiety and the insistence with which his offer to negotiate before the deployment of new NATO weapons is being promoted. If it were to be accepted unchanged, it could alter the prospects for military, and therefore political, balances in Europe. And this despite the visits made by Hua, who is forced to ask for help, and is not able to dictate conditions, precisely because of his obvious military weakness. And yesterday in Moscow saw the opening of the "negotiations with China," which marks no real progress but prompted many attacks in the press.

The intrinsic weakness of the entire operation lies, therefore, in portraying as a negotiation something which is not a negotiation, since it proceeds from the prior acceptance of the Soviets' central demand: the rejection or indefinite freezing of the NATO modernization program. What, then, would there be left to negotiate with NATO? Perhaps its obsolete missiles, like the Pershing-I, already left behind by the new Soviet missiles? Herein lies the element which has prompted the confusion and hostility of the majority of European reactions, and which also prompted Schmidt to make it quite clear that the deployment of the missiles must be negotiated at the same time.

But, leaving the labyrinth of military problems in which it is frighteningly easy to lose oneself (for instance, how can one establish what "parity" means, when the minimum requirements for complete mutual destruction have been exceeded many times over?), there remains the toughest and most profound problem of the political aspect of the initiative. Even without resorting to big words or the overused formulas of "Finlandization," it is difficult not to see how the Soviets' attempts to influence the Atlantic Alliance's strategic decisions are now becoming increasingly frequent.

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Last year the neutron bomb was a dress rehearsal for this year's much more important action, and then came the order to Europe not to sell weapons to the Chinese.

And yet nobody has ever tried to tell the USSR where to install and to whom to sell its nuclear and conventional weapons.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

MILAN PAPER HAILS FRG STANCE ON EUROMISSILES ISSUE

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Oct 79 p 2 LD

[Article by Davide Lajolo: "Europe Must Not Be Battlefield or Field for Blackmail"]

[Text] Before asking whether the United States is right to ask Europe to install in various states over 300 missiles targeted on the USSR or whether Brezhnev is right to say that he regards this operation as an act of provocation against his country, one must bear in mind (and this has not been done even in some headlines and articles on the subject published by this paper) that the basis for the discussion is the defense of peace and our security.

Having formulated and borne in mind this premise, we must reason with our own minds, as Italians, exclusively with a view to safeguarding our own vital interests, and this coincides with the desire not to prompt provocations--even just verbal ones--which would freeze the detente process. What does reasoning as Italians mean? It means simply reasoning with the same cool-headedness as the Germans, as their Chancellor Schmidt has stressed on several occasions following the American and Soviet requests. This must be done with the courage to make our own people's voice heard and with the awareness that we are defending our own country by defending the cause of world peace.

What in fact does the German Government say about this problem? Let us verify whether the USSR has reinforced its missile strength and is threatening Europe and, while seriously carrying out this verification, let us begin negotiations to reduce both weapons and dangers. If we become certain that the USSR has altered the balances in its own favor, then let us proceed with installing the missile bases to restore an equilibrium to the balance of forces.

This is a responsible, virile, cautious and at the same time courageous form of argument. Especially since it implies looking at the situation as it really is and not vying to shout wolf the loudest, pointing at one side, to please the other side or submit to its internal or international maneuvers.

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In fact the Italian Government has not yet made any official pronouncement. Not even when Cossiga visited Schmidt did he make the admissions some people have attributed to him.

However, a large section of the press is shouting for our country to install the missiles tomorrow. Many of the people concerned are the very ones who oppose nuclear power stations. But the examples of great dangers deriving from nuclear bombs carried by missiles are no less terrible than accidents at nuclear power stations. Moreover, we are talking here about deadly weapons of warfare, not the production of energy, which should at least facilitate progress.

But it is worth returning to the basic issue. It is a matter not of nurturing a cold war atmosphere but of fighting instead to restore vigor to détente. Especially as Europeans, so that the USSR, the United States and China will not exploit Europe as a battlefield, still less as an area for issuing their mutual blackmail threats. It certainly seems strange that the Chinese prime minister, who claims and tries to be a pacifist, should come to Europe to issue a call to arms. But what statement by any Chinese leader since Mao's time is not strange?

States cannot act like certain viscerally anticommunist roving political observers immediately ready to espouse communist Hua Guofeng's appeals. It is we Europeans and nobody else who must decide about the guarantees of our own safety. I do not believe anyone would want to fight to make people take the USSR at its word or could advocate its supremacy. The PCI has responsibly refrained from doing so and has advocated negotiations precisely to restore equilibrium to the balance of forces and urged that the meeting between the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, lead to the limitation of every kind of weapon. At the same time it has advocated, as has Social Democrat Schmidt, that the ratification of SALT II be finalized in order to proceed to SALT III. Had it not acted thus, what kind of a national party would it have proved to be?

Europe's responsibility at present must also extend to indicating to the two major powers that they are no longer omnipotent. That war implies extermination particularly for those who have fewer weapons; but if whoever has fewer weapons has more brains and civil courage, he can influence whoever has too many weapons not to cause the massacre of his own people.

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY

IMPACT OF EXPECTED 'YES' TO EUROMISSILES EXAMINED

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Oct 79 p 1 LD

[Article by Gaetano Scardocchia: "New NATO Missiles, Kremlin and Repercussions on Italian Scenario"]

[Text] Rome--In a week's time, with Foreign Minister Malfatti's reply to parliamentary questions on the problems of the East-West military balance, the government will announce its favorable attitude toward the NATO missile modernization in Europe. Though a decision in principle has already been taken--as Brzezinski's deputy David Aaron, who has been visiting Rome over the past few days, will have been able to verify--it will only be adopted and confirmed at the mid-December NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. The intention of the government, the foreign ministry and the defense ministry is to make the deliberations primarily technical in nature, in terms of simply bringing the Atlantic military arsenal into line with the new offensive weapons deployed by the USSR. In adopting this approach, the aim is to avoid, or at least to reduce to a minimum, the splits and clashes which the decision could cause on the Italian domestic scene.

The government believes that a gap has appeared in NATO's military strength in Europe. With the SS-20 missiles, which have a range of 4,400 km and carry 3 nuclear warheads, and with the backfire bombers, with their combat range of 4,200 km, the Soviet Union is now in a position to directly hit any point in Western Europe. To counterbalance this disequilibrium, Italy is accepting the plan to deploy new and more powerful missile (108 Pershing-II and 464 Cruise) in some NATO countries and is prepared to have some of them (there is talk of about 80 missiles) on its own territory to replace the technically obsolete missiles and to keep the number of nuclear warheads unchanged. This modernization makes it possible to maintain the credibility of the so-called flexible response doctrine--namely, that for every foreseeable kind of attack NATO has a range of alternatives permitting a measured and calibrated response.

In the same context as and parallel to the military decisions, the Italian Government believes that NATO must offer the Soviets serious and rapid

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negotiations for a controlled reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. Since the deployment of Pershing-IIs (all bound for the FRG) can only begin in 1983 and the Cruise missiles (some of which will be sent to Italy) will become operative in 1984-5, there is a sufficient time lag to verify the Soviets' real intentions: It is even possible that a prompt conclusion of the negotiations might prompt NATO to trim its missile program. It is true that in the meantime Pershing and Cruise missiles will be constructed, but for military purposes the decisive moment will come when they are deployed in Europe: As long as they remain in the United States these weapons are harmless, since their range means that they can be used only in Europe.

On the basis of reliable information which we have gathered, the Italian Government's position seems very similar to the Bonn government's. There is an attempt among the German Social Democrats--mainly thanks to party administration secretary Bahr--to create an interval between the decision to construct the new missiles and the decision to deploy them: that is, Bahr proposed discussions in Brussels this December only on their construction, postponing the decision on actually deploying the weapons until later, depending on progress in negotiations with the USSR. But eventually Schmidt opted for a single decision including the deployment while keeping open the possibility of rectifying decisions already taken if negotiations with the Soviets prove fruitful. This is essentially the attitude of the Italian Government also, while a few ranks of the Italian Socialist Party [PSI], which is, however, also largely in favor of the missile program.

Examining the possible repercussions that the government's decision might cause in domestic politics, one can observe that the parties seem to be split into two groups, more clearly than was the case over the issue of membership of the European monetary system: on the one hand, the five parties directly or indirectly supporting the government (The Christian Democratic Party, the Italian Socialist Democratic Party, the Italian Liberal Party, the Italian Republican Party and the PSI) and, on the other hand, the PCI, the radicals and the far left. The former are in favor of accepting the missiles, while the latter are against. The problem is to decide whether the split should be attenuated and diluted or whether it would be better to emphasize it spectacularly and ratify it with a vote. This is an unresolved dilemma which is lacerating almost all the parties. The government seems unwilling to exacerbate the conflicts and indeed is stressing the technical nature of the decisions, precisely to avoid a parliamentary debate ending in a vote. Even the communists--if what some of them are confiding is true--would be very pleased to avoid spectacular parliamentary isolation on an issue in which the very legitimacy of their stance as a government force is at stake.

The PCI's predicament lies in the difficulty of adopting a position which will safeguard both its relations with the USSR and its strategy of cooperation with the other Italian parties--the DC and PSI in particular. Balancing acts are possible on ideological issues. Where conflicts of strategic and military interests are involved there is less scope for ambiguity. The PCI

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rejects the new NATO missiles, or rather it says that first we must negotiate with the USSR and then decide what to do; in any case this proposal is favorable to the Soviets, who have every interest in freezing the present balance of power in Europe.

Nevertheless, the PCI (can be deduced from Romano Ledda's report to the directorate [actually Central Committee Commission on foreign policy issues] published in part in Sunday's L'UNITA) has made a considerable cultural effort to illustrate its theses with documentation based entirely on Western sources, restrained and unemphatic; and the PCI paper has admitted that the USSR has a "considerable advantage" and a "functional superiority" in the field of nuclear vectors usable in Europe, while maintaining that these new elements do not alter the overall strategic balance between the two blocs.

In short, to come to the crux of the matter, the tone and reasoning of the communist polemic do not seem to be paving the way for massive mobilization against the NATO missiles. The PCI promises to express cautious and flexible dissent, unless a further Soviet political offensive upsets the forecasts; but it must also be said that possible initiatives by the Radical Party could also increase the Botteghe Oscure's [PCI headquarters] embarrassment.

There remains the problem of a possible parliamentary vote. As far as we know, neither the government nor the DC or PSI secretariats has any intention of asking for one. Since it is a matter of communications on a technical modernization of NATO, the government apparently intends to address parliament--following Malfatti's brief address on 31 October--only after the end of the Atlantic Council meeting in December--in other words, when everything has already been settled. At this stage the debate does not require a vote, unless a particular political group explicitly demands it. The Social Democrats, for instance, might do so. Deputy Pietro Longo told us yesterday evening that "parliament must pronounce on such a delicate issue; it is right that the Italian people know what the attitude of the various political forces is. We do not want a lacerating vote but a clarifying vote."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BAHR COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR DEBATE, OTHER CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Hamburg STERN in German 27 Sep 79 pp 250-254

[Interview with SPD Executive Director Egon Bahr by STERN editors Heiner Bremer and Peter Pragal: "With Albrecht It Would Be More Difficult;" date and place not given]

[Text] SPD Executive Director Egon Bahr comments on the Schmidt-Strauss duel, on internal dissension regarding nuclear energy and on friction within the socialist-liberal coalition.

[Question] In the 1980 Bundestag elections, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt will have to vanquish his challenger, Franz Josef Strauss. To win this duel, the SPD wants to prove that the CSU chief is an unpredictable politician. Has the struggle become less difficult as a result of the riots involving Strauss and his uncontrolled outbursts?

[Answer] As much as we Social Democrats are against brawls, we must nevertheless call attention to the fact that Strauss has demonstrated once again how easily he loses his self-control. Everyone must understand how dangerous it would be for our country if this man were to become chancellor.

[Question] Strauss will certainly not find the kind of antagonism everywhere else that he did in the Ruhr area and will therefore once again emerge as a serious statesman....

[Answer] ...there is no need for us to prove the tenuousness of the CSU chief's self-control. We want to emphasize primarily that he must not become Bonn's head of government because of his own political contradictions.

[Question] To what contradictions are you referring?

[Answer] Strauss tries to evade controversial subjects by agreeing in turn with various people. Example: He is in favor of more nuclear power plants but against storage depots in Bavaria. He is against treaties with the East

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but wants to abide by them. But he fails to state how he intends to instill life in these treaties. He rails against national debts but demands rapid tax reductions. He is against children spending too much time in front of television sets, but at the same time he advocates more programs for commercial television. All this misleads the voter, and we will not let him get away with it.

[Question] In November the SPD's Godesberg Program will have its 20th anniversary--a concept with which the members ceased being the party of one class and established themselves as a party of all the people. How valid is the Godesberg declaration today?

[Answer] Godesberg is 20 years young. The SPD has changed our society. We are no longer a workers' party; we are a party which represents the interests of all employees.

[Question] We are of the opinion that the SPD has primarily become a chancellor's party....

[Answer] ...thank the Lord, we have realized that power and governmental responsibility are necessary to implement political goals. After all, it is terribly simple for the opposition to make fantastic demands which fail to be realized. Since Godesberg we have come much closer to the real world without having forgotten how to plan for the future.

[Question] Do you quarrel with the statement that the next Bundestag elections can hardly be won by the SPD, but instead by its guiding light, Helmut Schmidt?

[Answer] I consider this a distortion of the truth. Obviously, a party can be helped or be damaged by its leader; that is why we are glad to have an outstanding man for our chancellor. But even if your statement were true, we would have won the elections even today, perhaps with a two-thirds majority. But I would rather not depend on that.

[Question] We still believe that the next elections will be decided by the amount of confidence with which the citizens view the individuals concerned--Schmidt or Strauss. The programs are of secondary importance.

[Answer] If Schmidt should win for that reason, I consider this entirely legitimate....

[Question] ...if one person plays such a dominant role, there is an increasing danger that the party will waste away....

[Answer] ...your thesis is contradicted by, for example, our intense internal discussions about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The SPD is not a ceremonial organization which is no longer capable of developing its own mind.

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[Question] But, as a matter of fact, with the nuclear power debates one can sense the leadership's behind-the-scenes activity to ensure that during the forthcoming December party convention in Berlin no decisions will be reached which will entirely contradict the chancellor's conditional approval of nuclear energy.

[Answer] The SPD's governing body would get along without a leader if he did not openly speak his mind.

[Question] Might the delegates not consider themselves duped if they realize that all decisions had already been made prior to the party convention?

[Answer] I dare to predict that the debate about nuclear energy will not be influenced by any recommendations on the part of the party leadership, but rather by the convictions of every Social Democrat....

[Question] ...and by the necessity of providing the chancellor with decisive majorities.

[Answer] No one can guarantee anything these days.

[Question] Might it not be necessary for Helmut Schmidt to at least hint at a hidden threat of his resignation, as did his deputy Hans-Dietrich Genscher during the FDP party convention, in order to make the delegates hew to his policy on atomic questions?

[Answer] We will see about that. I respect those who in this matter do not think about the chancellor and the government but who say: Our sense of responsibility dictates care in the use of nuclear energy and, if necessary, a vote against it. There will also be advocates of accelerated development. In the end, the chancellor must be able to determine his course of action based on his overall responsibility.

[Question] Will Bundestag delegate Egon Bahr grit his teeth and vote for increased use of nuclear energy?

[Answer] Along with Eppler, I am of the opinion that during the next few years we cannot dispense with nuclear energy. This applies not only to those nuclear plants which are currently in operation, but also to those under construction.

[Question] Will the party convention come out in favor of governmental intervention for energy conservation and, for instance, demand a speed limit on the autobahn?

[Answer] Personally, I like to drive fast. But I admit that in the long run we cannot afford to be the only country in the world which does not enforce speed limits.

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[Question] Economics Minister Graf Lambsdorff is of the opposite opinion. Would you risk going on a collision course with the FDP?

[Answer] We are not looking for conflicts but neither do we seek to hide any disagreements with the Free Democrats.

[Question] The SPD and the FDP disagree on other matters as well as on nuclear policies. Differences exist as well on problems concerning social security for the aged and taxation policies. How much stability remains in social-liberal politics?

[Answer] Lots of people wonder about that. If the electorate chooses us, the SPD and the FDP will again make common cause during the next 4 years. The pension and tax problems can be resolved. After all, even joint economic policies with the liberals were possible, even though many had thought this could only happen in a Grand Coalition.

[Question] Shortly prior to any election there is increasing pressure on each coalition partner to clearly identify himself before the public. The FDP seeks primarily to gain votes in its capacity as a guarantor of a state based on justice; that is why it is demanding a liberalization of the Contact Prohibition Law during the current legislative session. Will the SPD join in this?

[Answer] It would not be wise to try this during the hectic pre-election campaign.

[Question] As the federal executive director, you are responsible for the SPD's election campaign. In the future, Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, who has organized past successful election campaigns, will be your party deputy. Will you operate as a team in 1980, or will there be conflicts?

[Answer] I am certain that we will complement one another in an excellent manner.

[Question] Will the coalition partners have a joint election campaign strategy during the coming year, or is each proceeding on its own?

[Answer] Each party will seek votes independently....

[Question] ...and will there be a recommendation to the social-liberal voters to vote primarily for the SPD and secondarily for the FDP?

[Answer] We are not giving anything away and will therefore fight for every single vote.

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[Question] Are you not afraid that without vote-splitting the FDP could slip below the 5-percent hurdle?

[Answer] I do not see this danger. Based on recent polls, the FDP will give a good account of itself.

[Question] What is your estimate of Franz Josef Strauss's chances of winning the election? Could he profit from an economic crisis?

[Answer] I cannot imagine that Strauss can, within 1 year, polish up the image that the citizen has gained of him in the last 20 years. Strauss has remained the same man who in times of stress tends to lose his cool. With Ernst Albrecht as the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor, this would have been more difficult. He can use the word "liberal" and almost get away with it, even though he is no liberal at all.

[Question] Would you dare make a prediction for 1980?

[Answer] Strauss will get even fewer votes than Kohl did in 1976.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RELATIONS IMPROVE BETWEEN CDU, TRADE UNIONS

Hamburg STERN in German 27 Sep 79 p 248

[Article by Werner P. D'hein: "The Good Fairy and the Evil Witch"]

[Text] DGB chief Heinz-Oskar Vetter offered an alliance to the CDU Presidium: "If we want to prevent leftist dogmatists and those who want to change the present system from gaining the upper hand, we will also need your help." CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl responded happily: "We are on your side."

Monday of last week the leadership of the DGB and the DCU endeavored to bring about a change through reapproachment. The unions, it was agreed, will, through "various statements" (Vetter) make clear they are "by no means an electioneering force for the SPD" (DGB deputy Maria Weber). The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, will not repeat in this election period the anti-union campaign which had been conducted by Kurt Biedenkopf in the Ruhr district in 1976. CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler said: "That was clearly a mistake."

Vetter had cleared the way for an understanding as early as mid-September at the Federal Congress of the CDU Committees on Social Affairs in Krefeld. "To make this perfectly clear: The unity of the unions has its strongest source of power in the Christian-social values on the one hand, and democratic socialism on the other." And: "We have the same compass, even if we have differing views in the fields of politics and economics."

In return, the DGB chief "gratefully" acknowledged what the CDU leadership had to report from Munich. The CDU's chancellor candidate, Franz Josef Strauss, by no means approved of the threat by Edmund Stoiber, the CSU's general secretary, to create a conservatively oriented union as competition for an SPD-oriented DGB. Strauss has in fact stopped Stoiber, after not only his own representative in Bonn, Friedrich Zimmermann ("sheer nonsense") but also the Bavarian Association of Employees had immediately protested against "such little games."

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It is due to the efforts of Geissler, the CDU's general secretary, that the DGB and the CDU/CSU are again able to talk with each other. Since he has been in office in Bonn, the social policy expert has preached in favor of a "matter-of-fact approach to the relationship." Geissler: "A policy which is hostile to the unions would be a foolish policy for the CDU."

In a 66-page paper which was written in preparation for the leadership conference with the DGB, Geissler listed those points in which the CDU/CSU and the unions act in concert, and those points where they do not. Norbert Bluem, of the CDU Committees on Social Affairs says: "Of course not everything is sunshine and roses between us and the DGB. But the myth that 'the SPD is the good fairy and the CDU is the bad witch' can no longer frighten anyone but political infants."

The chairman of the CDU Association of Employees, however, fully understands what the party has to do, if a true change in climate is to be achieved. Union leader Bluem, who has been referred to mockingly as a "Sacred Heart Marxist" by Strauss, the Bavarian leader, has said: "We do not demand that Franz Josef Strauss join the DGB. But DGB membership must not lead within the CDU/CSU to a suspicion of socialism. The accusation of socialism is not made any more acceptable by the use of the term 'Sacred Heart.'"

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

IMPORTANCE OF AIR-GROUND COOPERATION REVIEWED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 42-43

[Article by Colonel Jacques Marc, French Air Force: "Air Ground Cooperation"]

[Text] The author, Colonel Jacques Marc, entered the Air Academy in 1951 and was awarded his fighter pilot "wings" in the United States in 1954. From 1954 to 1961, he served in Tunisia and Algeria, flying Mistral, T-6, P47, and Skyraider aircraft, and later in the FRG as an F-100 pilot. He graduated from the Air War College in 1968, and was chief of staff of the 2d CATAC [Tactical Air Command] from 1973 to 1976. He is currently assigned as personal representative of the Commanding General FATAAC [Tactical Air Force] to the Commanding General 1st Army.

Is it still necessary these days to argue for air-ground cooperation? Without wishing to hark back to World War II with its well-known and successful employment of the tank and Stuka in tandem, the history of these past few years does offer an extremely wide variety of conflicts for us to study. But we shall limit ourselves here to mentioning only a few significant examples.

During the Yom Kippur War, the initial attack by Syrian armor in the Golan Heights was stopped in great part by the Israeli Air Force (with heavy losses, however). A short time later, Israeli armor crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal, taking the SAM-6 [surface-to-air missile] defense belt from the rear, thereby allowing Israeli aircraft to penetrate over Egyptian territory.

Alongside this type of modern blitzkrieg, successful from a strictly military standpoint, how many more or less latent conflicts, wars of "liberation," throughout the world, have dragged on for years on end without ever coming to any real military conclusion? The fact is that air-ground cooperation was never fully practiced during these conflicts, either because combat aircraft were only employed very infrequently, or because their employment was greatly restricted for political reasons.

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All these examples show that while air-ground cooperation is definitely one of the keys to successful military operations, it must be conducted in compliance with strict principles. Such cooperation is no place for rivalry. Neither the army nor the air force has the capability of deciding the issue by itself. It is the judicious combination of each service's complementary capabilities in convergent actions that assures successful accomplishment of the mission.

Joint Scheme of Maneuver Is Essential

Tactical air forces are equipped and trained to operate in conjunction with land forces. They must naturally support the latter with all their firepower massively concentrated where and when desired. This fire support does not simply complement artillery fire. It is a major element of the land battle. Even though the modern fighter bomber is more often than not a single seater, it carries 10 times more ordnance than its World War II elder. For example, a Jaguar squadron is capable of firing some 2,000 rockets onto its target in the space of a few seconds. Reconnaissance aircraft have also made considerable progress both in their all-weather information gathering capability and in the volume and quality of the information they obtain. The products of conventional cameras with amazing optical elements, and of infrared and radar detectors, are processed, interpreted and evaluated on the ground by means of automatic data processing equipment. This intelligence, along with the products of electronic reconnaissance are an irreplaceable element in the preparation of the land force's scheme of maneuver. Reconnaissance aircraft are the pre-eminent instrument which enables the armed forces to see in the distance, and thus see someone coming.

Lastly, tactical air forces provide cover to land forces, protecting them against attacks by enemy air forces. Nor is such air cover their least important role. Indeed, it is not the easiest mission, considering the delivery systems and penetration altitudes of present-day combat aircraft. Hence tactical air force support of land forces--whether it be fire support, reconnaissance, or cover--takes the form of veritable tactical air operations closely linked to the execution and outcome of the land force's scheme of maneuver.

For their part, the land forces must do their utmost to facilitate the conduct of these tactical air operations by taking action to suppress enemy antiaircraft defenses, either systematically, during friendly air support missions, with their electronic countermeasures equipment and organic fire power (particularly artillery and ALAT [Army Light Aviation]), or possibly by their maneuver, as Israeli tanks did in Suez. Land forces also participate in the battle against enemy aircraft by employing their increasingly sophisticated antiaircraft artillery, a situation that imperatively demands coordinated management of the lower airspace in the battle area.

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The integration of air and ground operations must, therefore, be studied from the scheme-of-maneuver conception stage and be the subject of joint planning. This integration must naturally continue through all implementing stages of the operation, and this implies existence of joint operations centers. Lastly, at all levels of execution, procedures must be fully assimilated, personnel must be well-trained and perfectly familiar with their duties through lengthy practice of working together. Only such practice will make it possible to learn how to derive maximum benefit from the complementary capabilities of each of the two services.

Special Ties

What part do FATAAC and the 1st Army play in all this?

It is out of the question for us to go over all of the air support rules in this article. Moreover, the principles thereof are well-known. What we shall do is see how these rules function in everyday practice.


First of all, it must be remembered that FATAAC and 1st Army already exchange liaison officers in peacetime, and that the staffs of these two commands work in close partnership on all matters of joint interest, ranging from planning to the conduct of training. In addition, each army corps has a permanently attached air support element. Each division has an air force liaison officer (OLFA), and each FATAAC wing a permanently attached army liaison officer (OLAT). Forward air controllers, responsible for guiding aircraft, are present in the wings and regiments. FATAAC's mobile tactical air control system systematically participates in all joint exercises.

But the system's originality comes from two special aspects related to "routine" everyday training.

The first aspect is "pairing." Each division in the 1st Army is paired with a FATAAC air base. Special ties also exist between FATAAC wings and ALAT units. The purpose of this pairing is to increase exchanges so as to become better acquainted and thus work efficiently together. Exchanges of orientation visits, of course, but primarily exchanges of air and ground tactical experience during exercises. Pilots familiarize themselves with tanks while their army buddies get a taste of fighter squadron life, and may even fly in the rear seat during a support mission. During divisional and regimental exercises, the paired squadron usually furnishes the support and a forward air controller. The OLFA and OLAT are the two indispensable pillars of this pairing arrangement.

The second aspect has to do with the execution of support missions. Piecemeal air support against fragmentary targets is obsolete, even though it may possibly still be suitable in some settings, overseas particularly.

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- KEY:
1. Army-air force coordination detachment
 2. Army corps-air force liaison officer
 3. Division-air force liaison officer
 4. Army liaison officer-Tactical Air Force and 1st RA [Air Region]
 5. Army liaison officer-wings-air bases
 6. Pairing

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While the learning of basic techniques does actually require training in this type of support, the number of such training exercises is limited to what is strictly necessary. The rule is to focus everyday training on exercises providing a more realistic setting and situation, warranting more significant air support missions. These exercises involve, therefore, a succession of four-aircraft patrols. Whenever the level of the exercise allows, other aspects are added to this exercise scenario, such as employment of electronic warfare equipment--evaluation and exploitation of information obtained by listening posts may trigger immediate air attacks on the indiscreet stations--or employment of antiaircraft defense weapons in conjunction with close-in air cover missions in support of ground units.

Everyday support has thus become a continuous series of joint exercises providing valuable experience.

It should also be noted that, in addition to this everyday training, FATAC also participates in all important exercises conducted by 1st Army, its corps, and their divisions: command post exercises or field exercises with troops. Such exercises are conducted practically every month, thus giving air-ground cooperation an additional opportunity to become more effective.

Lastly, FATAC flies a large number of support missions for other national military commands.

Admittedly everything is not perfect. In matters of air support, one must be extremely modest, beware of any academicism, and stick to cautious empiricism. Modern combat conditions are evolving rapidly, and both the army and the air force have to be flexible enough to adjust to these changes. This is one more vital reason, however, for ensuring that air-ground cooperation remains a vivid and dynamic concept at all echelons of command.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

NEW MARINE DIESEL ENGINES DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Sep 79 pp 58-59

[Article by Chief Ordnance Engineer Pierre Vialatte: "New Diesel Engines and Marine Propulsion"]

[Text] Upon graduation from the Marine Engineering School in 1968, the author, Chief Ordnance Engineer Pierre Vialatte, was assigned to the Indret Marine Engineering and Naval Weapons Facility as test engineer and later as head of the marine engine department. In 1975, he was assigned to the Marine Engineering and Naval Weapons Technical Service where he is currently chief of the "machinery" section.

An important technical evolution has occurred in the field of marine propulsion these past few years. The use of diesel engines to power merchant ships has expanded progressively at the expense of reciprocating steam engines and steam turbines because of the numerous advantages of the diesel engine from the standpoint of production costs, fuel consumption, ease of operation, and also thanks to the continuous improvement of diesel engine performance which has made such engines capable of attaining power levels heretofore obtainable solely by steam turbines. At the present time, steam propulsion units are no longer used except for very high-powered vessels (very large tankers). For example, steam engines accounted for only 10 percent of the power capacity of all ships built in 1978 while diesel engines represented 90 percent.

A similar evolution has taken place in powerplants for warships, with, in addition, the introduction of two new types of propulsion: nuclear propulsion by means of a pressurized water reactor plant and steam turbines, and propulsion by gas turbines derived from aircraft engines.

Nuclear propulsion has gained acceptance for use on submarines. It gives the latter a decisive advantage from a secrecy standpoint: Its use on certain large surface ships is also advantageous.

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The gas turbine is lighter than the diesel engine but definitely consumes more fuel. It is especially suitable for very fast ships with limited cruising range, such as nonconventional vessels. On the other hand, for those ships which constitute the main part of surface fleets, there is still wide-open competition among three types of propulsion systems: the all gas turbine system, the all diesel system, and the combined diesel and gas turbine system.

For its corvette program, the French Navy initially chose the combined system because it offered the advantage of combining the diesel engine's low fuel consumption for cruising speeds with the gas turbine's light weight for peak speeds. The Georges Leygues class of antisubmarine warfare corvettes now under construction is being fitted with this type of propulsion system.

Important Advantages of All Diesel System

But for its antiaircraft defense corvettes, the French Navy has decided to use an all diesel propulsion system for the following reasons: French manufacturers of high-speed diesel engines--in excess of 1,000 rpm--have considerably increased the power of these engines (50 percent at constant weight): the cumulative advantages of all the diesel propulsion system include: smaller air intake and gas exhaust ducts; replacement of adjustable-blade propellers by fixed-blade propellers because of the reversibility of the diesel engine and not of the gas turbine; and simplification of operation and maintenance derived from the use of only one type of engine.

With these new engines, it is also possible to develop exceptional high-performance propulsion systems for fast patrol boats. This was recently demonstrated by the re-engining of the patrol boat La Combattante whose propelling power was increased 20 percent while weight and bulk were reduced approximately 30 percent.

However, such developments in the diesel propulsion system do demand a few words of explanation about the technical methods and processes used.

Improved Performance

Schematically, the diesel propulsion system consists of the engine proper and a supercharger that compresses the air fed into the engine at a pressure higher than the air pressure. Supercharging is normally produced by a single turboblower driven by the engine exhaust, as depicted in Diagram 1.

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


Diagram 1: Normal supercharging

KEY: 1. Gas
2. Air intake
3. Turbo-blower
4. Coolant
5. Engine

The objective of recent development studies is to increase the power supplied by a given engine without thereby altering the strain placed on that engine, mainly the maximum temperatures and maximum pressures reached.

The increase in power is obtained by augmenting the volume of fuel and the volume of air introduced into the cylinder during each cycle. To do this, it is necessary to modify the fuel injection pump which regulates the amount of fuel injected, and also the supercharger which, by increasing the supercharging pressure, allows the air flow to be increased.

A rise in maximum temperatures is avoided by increasing the extra air fed into the cylinders. This increase is achieved by a supercharging pressure sharply higher than strictly necessary for good combustion. From a technological standpoint, to attain the required supercharging pressure, it becomes necessary to connect two turboblowers in series with intermediate cooling as shown in Diagram 2.

To avoid a rise in maximum pressure, it is necessary to either lower the compression ratio by modifying the piston in such a way as to increase the clearance of the piston head, or provide a precombustion chamber. But these different modifications create new difficulties:

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


Diagram 2: Dual supercharging

- KEY: 1. Gas
2. Air intake
3. Low-pressure turboblower
4. Coolant
5. High-pressure turboblower
6. Engine

- a. Difficulty in starting the engine due to the lower compression ratio which is unfavorable to ignition of the air-fuel mixture, thus necessitating preheating of the engine and the use of auxiliary starter units in the start-up phase;
- b. Difficulty in adjusting the turboblowers which have to furnish proper supercharging over the entire power range used.


As a result of development trials and endurance tests conducted by both the manufacturers and the Indret Marine Engineering Facility, these difficulties were corrected and the engines were qualified for shipboard use at 50 percent higher power than the normal engine. Engines of this type currently power the fast patrol boat La Combattante. They will soon be installed on the gunboat ("aviso") Commandant L'Herminier. It is planned to have them power the future antiaircraft defense corvettes. They have also been proposed as the propulsion systems for ships built for export.

Future Development Prospects

Development studies in the near future will be an extension of the current development effort:

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Engine on test stand at Indret Marine Engineering Facility (Photo by author)

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a. Improving the supercharger by developing turboblowers with a better compression ratio and high efficiency over a wider power range, thereby reducing the space required for the supercharger installation and enhancing specific fuel consumption;

b. Further lowering of the compression ratio, thereby necessitating development of special equipment for starting the engine and running it at low speeds. A highly promising arrangement consists in using an additional combustion chamber. But to be entirely satisfactory, this process must not appreciably increase specific fuel consumption.

These efforts to increase the power-to-weight ratio, and thus reduce the advantage the gas turbine has over the diesel engine, will be accompanied by continued efforts to improve specific fuel consumption, notably by obtaining better knowledge of the phenomenon of combustion, and also to improve the possible use of low-grade fuels. These are two areas in which the diesel engine is unquestionably superior. Their importance can but increase in the next few years.

In concluding this rapid survey of the evolution in marine propulsion systems, and more particularly of current and foreseeable developments in diesel engines, it must be emphasized that although marine propulsion is no longer as important as it was in those days when speed was a prime factor, it has, nevertheless, made noteworthy advances and the overall quality of a ship still greatly depends on the performance of its propulsion system.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PCI'S PAJETTA ATTACKS 'DOGMATIST' PONOMAREV ON EUROCOMMUNISM

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 23 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Interview in Rome with PCI Directorate member Gian Carlo Pajetta by Antonio Padellaro: "Christian Democratic Party Must Pay the Price to the Country"]

[Excerpt] Rome--[Question] Does Soviet [aide] Ponomarev's attack on Eurocommunism not facilitate a return to cooperation with the other parties?

[Answer] Ponomarev? There are some dogmatists who reveal in their irritation with Eurocommunism their inability to understand the need for renewal, the need to eliminate crystallizations and accretions, while hiding this behind a formal loyalty to an alleged ideological purity. As far as I am concerned I have never properly understood the meaning of this latter term.

[Question] Then there is the problem of the NATO missiles. Your position is different from that of the other parties. Don't you fear isolation?

[Answer] We fear the danger of making a mistake, of encouraging an inexorable and most dangerous rearmament race. When those who proclaim a Soviet threat say that there are 3 years for negotiations, they are proceeding from two assumptions. First, that there will be no change of the other side during these 3 years and, second, that their own statements contain no offer of a dangerous temptation which would entail the very threats being discussed. I would like to know what guarantees there can be unless we negotiate immediately or if we reply in cold-war terms to an overture which can be discussed and which raises expectations. Let this be quite clear: we want disarmament because we want detente.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ZACCAGNINI FACTION IN DC FAVORS GOVERNMENT INVOLVING PCI

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Report by Antonio Padellaro: "Zaccagnini Current Does Not Rule Out Possibility of Government With PCI"]

[Text] Rome--There is movement on the political front again. While the Cossiga government is manifesting its first uncertainties and encountering continual difficulties in its struggle with the problems of the moment--strikes, tensions in the labor world, the NATO missiles issue--within the Christian Democratic party [DC] the debate is resuming on the formula for the next majority. The DC left wing imparted a major thrust to the hypothesis of an understanding with the PCI. Some people are talking in terms of an outright political turning point.

At the convention of the Zaccagnini current, the majority of the current spoke out for a government with the communists as the outcome of the "only possible policy"--national solidarity. And to dispel any doubts, the final document contains a commitment "to involve in the government all the political forces which could help extricate the country from the crisis."

While in Rome Galloni, De Mita and Bodrato were launching their congress challenge, Zaccagnini was flying to Ravenna to commemorate Aldo Moro--an opportunity to further bridge the gap between the DC and the PCI. "To seek the bases for broad social and political solidarity in terms of a convergence of shared desires which take precedence over the various positions--this was one of the most significant remarks made by the DC secretary in a speech full of appeals for cooperation, for "a collective effort against the closed and self-centered attitudes which fray the social fabric."

Zaccagnini repeated this: "If the new situation requires new forms of association it could be useful and desirable to try and revise certain aspects of the institutional order to rediscover the spirit which inspired the constituent assembly after the war."

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That is to say, he is proposing once again the path of agreements on institutional reforms as a kind of shortcut to democratically legitimizing the PCI before accepting it into the country's government. Having decided not to stand for reelection as party secretary, Zaccagnini, no longer restrained by the various state considerations linked to his mediating role, seems to want to fully revive the issues of renewal ("We are ready to opt deliberately not for what is moribund, but for what is new, what is emerging and must be helped to emerge") and the "moral issue" ("The DC is not the party of the arrogant use and domination of power").

But let us return to "national solidarity": at the Domus Pacis convention a large proportion of the DC (some estimate 25-30 percent) adopted this as the watchword for the congress. But within the Zaccagnini current various interpretations of it are prevalent. The most widespread is that summed up by grassroots representative Mastella ("a government comprising all the constitutional parties at once") while former Justice Minister Bonifacio proposes something less--namely, the DC and PCI together in local governments. But differences were noted even among the "big shots"--and these differences were not always limited to simple political details. First [DC deputy secretary] De Mita attacked [Italian Socialist Party secretary] Craxi ("How can one believe in the strategy of someone who invents a new proposal every week") and then suggested proceeding with the political dialog with the PCI "not to bring it into the government, but to prepare blueprints for renewal with its assistance." This was a more cautious approach than the one suggested by Bodrato, who is determined to test right away "The communists' willingness" among other things to demonstrate "contradictions and resistance." Zaccagnini's right-hand man Pisanu wondered perplexedly: "The DC and the PCI are agreed on their diagnosis. Will they manage to find the same agreement on what remedies to adopt"?

But there was no lack of emphatically "reductive" interpretations of the formula of solidarity, especially from the Moro current. According to Luigi Gui "A policy of alliance with the Communist Party is impossible" and Morlino, after going so far as to state in an interview that "for the time being national solidarity cannot be automatically reintroduced," is concerned not to lose contact with the other sectors of the party. But the Domus Pacis convention failed to provide concordant answers on other issues as well. For instance, some people are more worried than Zaccagnini and Galloni about institutional reforms (Bodrato) and some, like Martinazzoli, regard it as a "frivolous and at the same time dangerous" issue. Then there is the problem of the lists for the peripheral assemblies. Should there be joint lists with all the leftwing currents or separate lists to be joined later in Rome? And how will Bodrato respond to Donat Cattin's call to restore unity to the Forze Nuove current?

Furthermore, how will the problem of electing a new secretary be resolved? De Mita favors restoring this function to the party leadership, but some of

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of his group think differently. "These are inevitable problems in a new group but they will be resolved," the DC's new leftwingers calmly reply. Their attention is now directed toward the outside: How will the other groups at the Domus Pacis convention react? What will the communists say?

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

WARSHIP DEAL WITH PRC STOPPED DUE TO SOVIET PRESSURE

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Commentary by Pietro Ostellino: "We Go to China To Sell Ships, Then Change Our Minds (Afraid of Moscow?)"]

[Text] Shanghai--This is the story of a traveling salesman who, by dint of great sacrifices, travelled the world to demonstrate and sell his wares but who, when he finally reached the home of the emperor who wanted to buy large quantities of them, showed his wares and then, in fright, refused to sell them. It sounds like a story from a bygone age, for small children of a bygone age. Unfortunately for us, it is also an Italian story. Let us see what it is about.

On Tuesday 18 June the destroyer "Ardito" and the frigate "Lupo" left Livorno for a 7-month circumnavigation of the world. This is the 24th such voyage carried out by the Italian warships since the birth of our navy. One stop on the itinerary was Shanghai. This was the first visit by Italian naval ships to the PRC. The last visit to China was in 1921-22. By some strange coincidence on the first voyage in 1866 by the ship "Magenta," the commanding officer Capt Vittorio Arminion was carrying letters of credence as minister plenipotentiary with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations with China.

We are not a great naval power, nor do we aspire to be one. The journey was a great financial burden and exhausting for both crews. The purpose, therefore, was neither a training exercise nor a parade. It was promotional: We rove the world (yesterday we arrived in Yokohama in Japan) to show our ships to whoever might be interested in buying them. In this field our shipbuilding and military industry lead the world. We have already sold six "Lupo" class ships to Venezuela and four to Peru and have also signed a contract to supply two to Egypt.

We could have sold another six to Argentina. Some top Argentine officials visited the La Spezia shipyards to order the ships to be built at a cost of about 700 billion lire. But the workers went on strike and organized protest demonstrations against the "Argentine fascists." The officials were

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obliged to leave the shipyard through one of the back entrances, like referees after the match. The result was that nothing more came of it and the Argentines had their ships built by the Germans, who were evidently much more easily satisfied.

Incidentally, it might be as well to remember that the Soviet Union, the foremost and most powerful socialist country in the world, is one of Argentina's major trading (and political) partners and that the Soviet workers have never demonstrated against this cooperation, partly because they obviously consider it useful to their own country and also because in the USSR strikes are banned by law. Still by the way, it might also be worth remembering that our shipbuilding industry has one of the largest deficits of all the state's losing industries.

So the "Ardito" and the "Lupo" left Italy on their promotional voyage and the technicians of the companies which produced the ships' armaments and fittings followed on in aircraft, stopping off at ports where they thought they could find a buyer to whom they could demonstrate their products. When they arrived in Manila, however, they mysteriously stopped and did not continue to Shanghai. And yet China had submitted a formal request to purchase a number of "Lupo" class ships. The customer was keen to complete as soon as possible, inspected the ships enthusiastically and welcomed their crews with the warmth of ancient Chinese hospitality. But the Italian experts were nowhere to be seen.

What happened? Why did they not come? Nobody mentioned them, though some people failed to hide their embarrassment over the extraordinary situation. Then, as always happens, the rumor spread that our experts did not come to Shanghai because they received orders from their own companies not to. The companies in turn were apparently acting on specific orders of a political nature: For the time being it is better not to talk about selling ships to the Chinese; it is better, in fact not even to broach the subject.

In other words, we came thus far, costing the taxpayer a fortune, showed the Chinese our goods, whetted their appetites and then drew back.

The impression is that, as usual, we are trying to be too clever, to have it both ways, talking to the Chinese about Marco Polo, giving them great slaps on the back, and at the same time winking conspiratorially at those who do not want us to do business with China and especially not business of this kind. The Chinese, who are men of the world, pretend they have not noticed and, undeterred, continue asking how soon a deal can be made.

This is what we are wondering too, asking ourselves--and others--a series of questions. First: Would our shipyard workers, who opposed the sale of ships to Argentina (because it was fascist), now be prepared to demonstrate against losing this order from China, which is not fascist and which is in fact a socialist country? Second: What lies behind such an apparently contradictory form of behavior on the part of our public industry?

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One Italian politician on his way through Beijing told me that "If we sold arms to China, we would alter the existing strategic balance, thus forcing the Soviets in turn toward the arms race." This is obviously nonsense, at best, or pure bad faith, at worst. Whatever ships or weapons we are in a position to sell to China would not alter the strategic balances one iota, for the simple reason that they are not strategic weapons. The Chinese would use the "Lupo" class ships to patrol their coastlines and nothing else, because they could not use them for other purposes, given the nature of the ships. It is ridiculous to state that the sale of a few [quattro] ships to China could accelerate the arms race on the Soviet Union's part at a time when the Soviets are so committed to building warships that the satellite countries have to see to building merchant ships.

So what is the answer: It is impossible to find one here in Shanghai. Some people say that the answer must be sought in Rome, at the Soviet Embassy, and that it is also known to the foreign ministry. We are waiting for this answer.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

UIL'S BENVENUTO FAVORS WORKER PARTICIPATION

Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 20 Sep 79 p 14

/Interview with Giorgio Benvenuto/

/Text/ "Over the last 3 years, we have been going about things in completely the wrong way," says the secretary general of the UIL /Italian Union of Labor/; "it is time for the union to take on more concrete responsibilities within industry."

/Question/ While fall seems to have brought into the factories a climate of deep tension, beginning at Fiat, in many quarters it is being said that the country cannot get out of the economic crisis if the working class does not take on the burden, does not assume direct responsibility for production. What does this mean for the union?

/Answer/ "It means," answers the secretary general of the UIL, Giorgio Benvenuto, "acting more coherently and precisely with respect to the choices which the union has made over the last 3 years. It is right to pay homage to the line of the EUR because it has been the symbol of a union which not only promoted wage demands but took on strategic objectives, established coherences, priorities. But this line has had its ambiguities regarding implementation, and especially it lacked instrumentation. We have spoken of mobility, of a youth policy, of industrial reconversion, of planning but then our position has not had much influence in the head offices, in the factories or throughout the country, where the union's strategic choice would find its realization. I must say outright: within our union there are many complexes, there is the fear of the integration of the union movement, there is the concern over taking on the ultimate responsibilities."

/Question/ And thus, thus the economy, to save itself, has gone underground, employment has been saved by Saint Brambilla and not by the union, as they said at the EUR?

/Answer/ "Paradoxically, this is exactly what happened: black labor [unreported work], an underground economy and large companies in crisis. It is a picture which must make us think. Because when the union must be concerned with the

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survival of the company, and it is absent from the great world of the underground economy, it transforms itself into a union which preaches but has no power, does not bargain and does not administer. Instead, we must immediately make our presence felt in the head offices where we must intervene and assume the relative responsibilities."

/Question/ In short, if the public or private manager calls together the factory council and tells them, as they did at Alfasud: pay attention, this company is losing 100 billion a year, the factory council and the workers must continue to answer that it is not their business, as long as the state pays, or else the collectivity?

/Answer/ "I am profoundly convinced that we must not wait to be convened by the company management. Today, we are trying to ignore the bad news and we do not utilize what we learn in the factory to build our strategy. Alfa Romeo, for instance, is a company in crisis and the union must take the responsibility for this, must intervene, show it a plan to remedy the situation. Otherwise, what happens? In the background there is disaster. As at SIR."

/Question/ This, Benvenuto, is called codetermination, something which the union has always rejected with contempt.

/Answer/ "Yes. But now I believe that the union's approach must be different. We must give up our smug attitude about the experiments made in other European countries. If what Berlinguer wrote in his last article in RINASCITA about the responsibility of the working class means this, then it is all right."

/Question/ You do not, then, reject codetermination?

/Answer/ "We must study in depth what has been achieved in Germany, in Great Britain and in Sweden. Of course we cannot transfer mechanically to Italy foreign experiences, but we must finally discuss it. We will have hard battles with Carli and the Italian management world, which is very jealous of its own prerogatives."

/Question/ And do you think that the Italian union is ready for a debate of this type?

/Answer/ "For a debate, yes. Certainly there are various opinions, we will have heated conflicts. But we must open this debate. Our union cannot remain a union which refuses to discuss some things, we must knock down certain "tribal idols." I believe that the eighties are the years in which the union movement must carry out concrete forms of participation, in search of nonconflicting areas."

/Question/ Even you are the prisoner of taboos. You use the word participation, the term codetermination bothers you.

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/Answer/ "No, it does not bother me. Codetermination however is a word which has been too much associated with the German model. I prefer the Swedish one, even if the German one has its strength. The Italian union can no longer struggle along on the information which it receives in the factory, if things go badly, it must intervene. Even we have unfortunately fallen into the habit of postponing problems and then reality places us before dramatic situations. Innocenti, Unidal, Sir, Liquichemica, Alpha Romeo. Why wait for the crisis to overwhelm us?"

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

USSR'S BOLD STRATEGY VERSUS WEAKNESSES OF DEMOCRACIES

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Sep 79 p 1

/Article by Vittorio Zucconi: "The Kremlin Acrobats"/

/Text/ Moscow--While the tired Cuban ghost is coming back to flutter in front of the eyes of the American electorate and the strategic brains of America and Europe are arguing about nuclear "umbrellas" and "windows," the Soviet Union, stubbornly impervious to difficulties and failures, continues its foreign policy. The rhythm of its actions is not interrupted by electoral crises, but it keeps moving with a view toward vital objectives. From Ethiopia to South Yemen, which was visited by Kosygin (who will build a 100,000 ton superport in Aden to receive the new generation of Soviet strategy is like its weapons, probably raw, certainly not brilliant, but capable of functioning when the moment arrives, by the simple inert strength of quantity. It is enough to compare the global role of power which the USSR is playing in the world today with the isolation of some decades ago, to understand that in this change there is more than mere megatons and war-heads and it is not enough to spend more money on arms to combat it.

Henry Kissinger, who has become very brilliant in inverse proportion to the slipping of Carter and Brzezinski, is once again looking like the "Super K" of the Newsweek covers and quite the arms expert, which had never been true before. And he is raising before the Europeans a series of dramatic questions, but which smell stale. As if there were a projection into the future of old scenarios, polished up and computerized Truman and Eisenhower, rather than authentic innovative strategies for the West facing the eighties. With cities, industries, nations now headed toward the twilight of programmed "blackouts," with apparently strong economies dependent on the raw materials of others, upset by mountains of dollars wandering and now out of control, one has to wonder whether the problems of European "defense" mean a new intermediate missile or a tank division. With what energy will they be built and launched? With what money will they be paid for? With what morale will they be induced to fight?

The algebraic sum of the international data of the last few months, after the sensationalism of the press has been removed, leads us to conclude bitterly for those who feel more secure in the West, that the United States

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seems to have no longer a foreign policy while the Soviets have one. The Carter administration, after the promises of "globality and courage," disseminated during the electoral campaign of 1976, has now settled into a line of conduct which (between China, the Middle East, SALT) seems a Kissingerism without Kissinger and now today, with the fuss over Cuba, a Kennedyism without Kennedy. On the strictly military level, the revival of initiative in planning the disposition and movement of troops, like the "attack force" destined for the oilfields of Arabia, seems more due to the natural overcoming of the Vietnamese shock ("American boys will never again die abroad") and to the stimulus created by fear over energy prospects, rather than to indications of coherent development from the top. The sum of so many small episodic decisions and of so many meetings on the "Soviet threat," does not yet make a foreign policy. "We would like to know if anyone can say who speaks for the United States today," wrote with well-founded irony, an influential Soviet authority on America, Genrikh Trofimenko.

Facing the inconsistent behavior of Carter leadership, is the persistence of the Soviet strategy. While the Western strategists are concerned with establishing whether the deterrent to an attack against Western Europe is strong enough and flexible enough to dissuade the Soviets, as if the imminence of a reverse "Barbarossa Operation" were obvious and real, the Kremlin continues elbowing its way, by political, diplomatic and military means, into the friable areas of the world, from Africa to the Near East, from Central Asia to the Far East, restrained by nothing, and even stimulated by the great flutter of the "Chinese map" which Washington is making. If strategy is the art of losing the next war by applying the tactics which served to win the previous one, Western strategic thought is one the right track. Presumptuously and provincially blinded by a political and strategic "centrality" of Europe which is less true year after year and which the blackmail of oil could definitively destroy, it does not want to admit that the real game over the future balance of power of the world is being played elsewhere.

To attack Hambur, Bremen or Paris could cost the USSR "only" millions of lives in Europe and "last least" 30 percent of its cities destroyed in retaliation. To attack the soft and swollen bellies of the world's riches, that is in substance the very roots of the economic and political power of the 'processor' West, costs a few Cuban auxiliaries or some "civilian" advisors and in time could give extraordinary results. Cobalt, an essential metal for today's aerospace technology, is imported by the United States and 70 percent of it comes from the province of Kolwezi, in Zaire. And the province has been the object of increasing attacks by "rebels" armed and supported by Moscow. The Polisario guerrillas in the former Spanish Sahara are supported by the Soviets and their training includes, say the Western secret services, sabotage of the plants manufacturing phosphates, which Morocco exports to the Western powers.

The Soviet navy is investing heavily in the construction of ships which are to be used for total control of the seas, not the nuclear or subnuclear "lightning war" in the Atlantic. Four battleships (32,000 tons) of the

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"Soviet Soyuz" class have been placed on line and then three medium aircraft carriers (35,000 tons) of the "Kiev" class, while it is now certain that the first Soviet nuclear super aircraft carrier of 50,000 tons is now under construction. "None of these ships, which are too big and too vulnerable, would be useful in a European war," said a naval specialist in NATO. But they are all indispensable for a policy of great power on a global scale. To "flex their muscles" around the world, as the United States has done for 30 years and the Royal Navy for another 100 years before.

The advantage of totalitarianisms over democracies in foreign policy, of which history is full, can be odious, but it is certainly real. The America which is in power (Carter and Brzezinski) like that in their opposition (Kissinger) must think in immediate political terms, sometimes absolutely electoral ones. And this explains Young's expulsion and the resumption of the specter of the "Soviet threat" in Europe (the Polish vote, the Italian vote and the vote of all those who in the United States still think of the old continent as their "mother country"). Even the dusting off of the "Cuban threat." The men of stone who sit in the Kremlin have at most death to which to account, not hundreds of millions of touchy voters.

They do not often succeed, often they fail. But the ideological security which the USSR still enjoys is able to carry it beyond the worst defeats. In Cuba, it attempted to remove the last trace of meaning to the word "nonalignment." In Iran, after a long courtship of the Ayatollah, today it secretly supports the Kurd guerrilla uprising because "one never knows." And in Afghanistan, the Kremlin is propping up, constantly supplying more arms and men, a regime born out of a coup and which is unpopular and anti-national with a choice which should lead us, if we were really leftists, to rekindle the flame of the extinguished and cold torches of Vietnam. What Western imperialist could allow itself such acrobatics so much open-mindedness, without being called sooner or later to answer to the country?

And while Europe imagines, to reassure itself on its own geopolitical centrality and to remove the suspicion of its progressive provincialization that the Russian "T 62's" are already en route toward the Rhine, the USSR continues to try, even among defeats and reverses, to penetrate the tender flesh of the Third and Fourth World, on which depends the future of the industrialized center. And the impressive nuclear umbrella, which has become even stronger and more "invincible," is in danger of passing into history as the new, highly costly "nuclear Maginot line" of the 20th century.

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