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14 November 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2044

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

BERBER LIBERATION MOVEMENT--A new movement called "The Berber Liberation Front" has come into being and has established its headquarters in an Arab North African state. The aim of the front is to establish an independent Berber state extending from southern Morocco to the Algerian riff. A French source has told the AL-HAWADITH bureau in Paris that the front was originally formed against Morocco but it is possible to move it against Algeria when necessary. In the opinion of the French source the Arab side behind the movement in question aims to gain control of the area extending from Mauritania to the upper Nile valley, that is the uranium-rich area separating North Africa and Black Africa. The source also says that the aid being given to opposition in northern Sudan falls within the framework of this movement. The French source affirmed that opposition leader in Mali (Didi Demba Moina) has received financial and military aid from the Arab country in question sufficient to raise a 7,000-man force under the name of the "Mali Liberation Movement" which is expected to be moved against President Musa Traore shortly. [Text] [LD051129 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Nov 79 p 11 LD]

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ALGERIA

MEETING ON PARTY BASE, APC ELECTIONS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Sep 79 pp 1, 3

[Chairman of party election commission, Djillali Guezzan Affane, chairs meeting on coming party base and APC [People's Communal Assembly] elections]

[Text] The upcoming elections of the party base and the APC were the main subject of the important meeting held yesterday at the People's House, a meeting which brought together all the responsible ones at the party base, under the presidency of Djillali Guezzan Affane, member of the FLN (National Liberation Front) Party Politburo, and president of the party election commission. The meeting was attended by Messrs Abdallah Demène Debbih, Hache-maoui, and Ould Kablia, members of the Central Committee of the FLN party and secretary general of UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers], national party commissar of the Algerian governorate, and governor of Algeria, respectively. The meeting was within the framework of the campaign surrounding the elections of party base organs and the APC, which was launched last Tuesday in Béjaia. The orientations set forth by Guezzan Affane were followed by a debate attesting to the common will at base and management levels, aimed at increasing and affirming the party's role in the control and direction of public affairs. That role will be carried out by the militant work of mobilizing the social revolutionary forces by an in-depth study of democracy both at party functions and at all sectors of economic and social life. The parties involved stressed that revision would have to be marked throughout by integrity.

Guezzan Affane took up the question of revising the cell elections and those of the kamas, the APC and the GSE (Socialist Management of Businesses). We present here a synopsis thereof.

These elections were not the first to be organized, but they differ from previous ones. For the country has had improvements in its state and party institutions. There is a national charter; there has been the party congress with its statute and rule of procedure, and some significant resolutions. The real task is in organizing the party. The various party structures are pressing for a program which seeks to expand the party base to all revolutionary elements, even those still outside the party. In confronting the problems of the country's development, the widest base in the party is required.

And in order that this base be equal to the demands placed upon it, the party doors must be opened to all revolutionary elements, in terms of the national charter's criteria.

In some regions, a campaign and a significant party adhesion took place. In other regions, on the other hand, that campaign did not take place and the adhesion remained weak.

The campaign of adhesion to the party was launched by President Chadli Bendjedid. It was the principal motivation for the report at the APC elections that one could no longer claim that the party doors were closed. Because many candidates for adhesion stated that they had disposed of their files which remained without follow-up.

Of course, there were elections in 1978, but in the upcoming elections, we are concerned with applying the rule of procedure and the party statute.

The structures of the party must know the elections before those of the APC and the APW. They will have to take place before next October 15.

How can one have a real sense of this revision? What is at issue here is arranging the responsible structures with the responsible elements and combatting the evils from which the party body is suffering. There must not be revisions just for the sake of revision, but in order to put "the needed man in the needed place." "Moreover, criticism and self-criticism must be employed in order to put an end to nepotism and regionalism."

We believe that the party base has the appearance of the revolution and today this base knows the evils which the elections, not the division into cliques supporting individual personalities, can inflict upon the unity of the party base.

If today the elections of the party base organs will take place before those of the APC, it is because the choice of candidates to the APC elections must be that of the general assembly of the kasma militants.

The militants will have to strive every day to insure that the party will have its feet planted firmly on the ground, direct its activity, master its problems, and thus establish its authority.

Are we capable today of inspiring the party with the militant force to apply the national charter and the resolutions of the fourth party congress? The party's authority is acquired day after day by the work of militants at all levels, as they fight their battle for economic and social independence.

Of course there are gaps, because in previous years, build-up of matériel had priority. The party's responsibility had not been affirmed. Pressures against the militants were exercised.

Today, the party has a leadership. What remains to be done is to give the kasma its true identity. That is the work of the militants who believe in the principles of the revolution. Thus, making a good choice in the next elections will give the party new strength.

#### Link the Revolution to Democracy

There are the kasma's which work at ground level for the solution of problems. Others remain inactive. The same comparison can be made between two APC's of the same governorate, two APW's which show that one governorate is more active than another. Thus we are concerned with strengthening the party and the country by responsible elections. That method is outlined by the party statute and its rule of procedure.

What is involved is linking the revolution with democracy. Two methods can be adopted. The militants at a general assembly will propose a long list of candidates, consisting of revolutionary militants whose names will be submitted for public choice.

The second method is the elaboration at the general assembly of a single list in the context of a long and unanimous debate.

The popular choice concretizes the principle of the revolution by and for the people, by allowing the people to participate, at all times, in the choice of men and in the direction of public affairs.

The party base has an important role to uphold, because it is that base which, at the commune level, constitutes the political leadership. We must see to it that it is comprised of revolutionary militants. Next, we will have to have our thought united, speak the same language and, as it is commonly said, sing the same song: that of the revolution.

It is there that all economic, social, and organizational problems of our country will find their ultimate solution.

Let us go back to the national charter which stipulates the need to hold general assemblies of citizens, militants, mass organizations, and the party. The communal assemblies, the kasma, the mass organization, must be joined together in an assembly of militants. The party will be able to rediscover its true expression when this assembly assumes its prerogatives, studies the problems and decides on solutions.

For years, we have debated placing our best militants in positions of responsibility. We noticed each time that those elected by the APC or the kasma do not carry out the will of the general assembly but act separately from one another. This happened because the general assembly did not exercise its authority. Could it have been due to a lack of commitment?

There could certainly have been some types of mentalities prevailing before the national charter and the fourth party congress, but they must no longer be the case. In fact, a militant from within the party usually thinks differently from one from within the state. But that comes from a lack of connections with the base.

In the context of the elections which will have to be held before 15 October, the general assemblies will have to assert their responsibilities.

The weaknesses evidenced up to then were due to a lack of openness and a failure to denounce the faults which were committed. For that, nepotism took precedence over militantism.

#### To Practice Criticism and Self-Criticism

Thus, the two methods are the choice of a single list or a long list of candidates. This choice will fall to the general assembly. The best one is a single list, after the longest possible debate, so that the militant base can strengthen its unity. But that requires political courage and openness on the part of the militants. It is well known that the militants do not express themselves in the general assemblies but wait until they are on the streets to speak. That is contrary to the principles of the party and especially a party of the avant-garde.

If we are not clear-sighted in the general assemblies, when will we be? If criticism is brought against one who is responsible, it is taken to mean an attack against individuals. That reveals a failure in the practice of criticism and self-criticism. As militants, we must discuss matters openly among ourselves.

#### Set Up a Political Reckoning From the APC Mandates

The elections of the APC will take place for the fourth time. Today, the question is raised to all of us as militants.

Have the APC acted in conformance with the national charter? Have the APC worked in the context of applying the charter and the communal code? We must formulate a political debate, establish a political reckoning. The general assembly must be ready to discuss this political question. This requires studying the communal charter to demand accounts on that basis. Thus, it is not a reckoning of problems of an administrative reckoning that

is required, not that everyone should bring up all the problems of his own city, but it should be a reckoning of the APC as an organ of the party and the state, on the basis of the national charter. This clearly defines the relations between the party and the state, on the one hand, and the APC on the other. In its dual political and administrative role, it answers to two guardians: the party and the state.

Why is an APC often divided in two? It is because the guardianship at the party base has not been exercised. For who is responsible for the acts of the elected one, if not the one who proposed him as a candidate. And it is clear that the elected one is a representative of the party from within the state.

With regard to the national charter, I recall the words of President Boumediene. "We have created a burnoose but haven't found a man whom it fits."

Today, it is up to us to create such men. In fact, today, the situation is such that the president and the government must become involved with the tasks of the APC.

Is It a Lack of Direction?

Thus, we have the task of purification! That does not mean denying responsibility over some others, but it means discussing the causes. Is it a lack of direction? Is it a lack of means?

Besides, the role of the APC is completed by that of the party, the mass organizations, the general assembly of militants which must insure the general mobilization. It is clear, in fact, that social evils cannot find their solutions by virtue of a campaign, but reach a point where each person will assume his responsibilities. It is clear that the demanding of accounts can only be carried out in that framework. Thus, the reckoning which APC and APW will have to give must be exposed in its real and global, not specific, context.

These elections must serve as the occasion for raising the level of consciousness by means of interventions, while being militant over the plan of direction and the effective control of the communal management aimed at improving the country.

That is important, because when the APC fails, the citizen says, "See what the party has given us."

Today, there are new elements springing forth from among the workers, youth, and peasantry, which were formed in the context of the farmers revolution. The militant playing an active part in the labor union can be a militant of the party. The choice does not have to be made by the ones responsible, but by the general assembly of militants. Because it is that base which experiences the problems, knows the militants on their own ground. If we make mistakes in the choice of men, we will have to live with those problems.

We have created the APC's, but they exist as a body without a soul. We must impart to them their revolutionary militant life. In order to do that, there must be effective control. The APC will have a mandate of 5 years. The choice must be militant in order to give the APC their true expression.

There is an election commission, composed of some 30 members. But that is not the body which will choose or control the ones elected. For who must implement the party's program, if not its base? Control must be exercised not just every 4 years, but permanently, every month, each year...Those elected must render accounts at all times to the base, and not from one mandate to another. The citizens must also be informed about what is going on and must use their control.

Regarding the GSE, we as militants are responsible for exercising this choice.

Everyone, whether he agrees or not, will have to exercise his choice.

Certain responsible ones will say that the lack of authority in the unity and in the undertaking comes from the GSE.

The GSE does not represent a weakening in the authority of those responsible, but a strengthening, by the information of the worker who, in his undertaking, participates in the decision, so that the work will seem to them that its future and that of the undertaking are related.

Today, we cannot say that we will improve this country without effective popular mobilization. It is through this militant work that the party, day after day, will find its authority. Because the respect, the authority, which are due to the party cannot be dictated.

Guezzan Affane then invited the militants who were present to take part in debate. The debate affirmed the desire for a democratic choice, the need for integrity from base to highest levels to be strictly respected, and the concern for making the base aware of its pressures and its militant and revolutionary prerogatives.

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ALGERIA

ORAN CITES ALGERIAN PAPER'S CRITICISM OF U.S. ARMS FOR MOROCCO

LD252202 Oran Domestic Service in Arabic 2200 GMT 24 Oct 79 LD

["Maghreb of Peoples" Program]

[Text] The National AL-SHA'B has published a commentary on the decision of the U.S. President Carter to supply Morocco with newly developed U.S. weapons. The newspaper writes:

The justification presented by Washington for the new deal and the doubling of military support for the Rabat regime aimed at enabling it to negotiate from a position of strength, is a justification that can only be described as (?strange). Rabat did not hesitate to repeat the echo of this justification when its foreign minister said yesterday that his government has always been willing to negotiate but [words indistinct]. This is the [words indistinct] the United States [words indistinct]. The problem has imposed itself and all international organizations have come to consider it a problem of decolonization that should be solved within (?this context) as other similar problems have been dealt with. This nature of the problem and the tasks which the Rabat regime has undertaken to accomplish as an agent of colonialism and U.S. imperialism in the region, and even in Africa, should not be mixed.

The Carter administration is on the eve of elections which seem, according to first public opinion polls, not to favor the White House president. Subsequently, wagering on all cards which may prove winners has become imperative. Therefore, the latest U.S. decision was taken only for electioneering motives in view of the strong links between the American Zionists and Hassan II and in appreciation of the latter's efforts in achieving the Camp David deal. The commentator [name indistinct] was right when he said that this aid is within the context of [words indistinct], otherwise how can it be logical for Washington to [words indistinct] the cause of people in opposition to the tradition it has followed up to now. The talk about other attack weapons and other defensive weapons is mere prattle. It is being said in the American capital that there is an agreement sanctioning the use of the weapons by Hassan II outside his borders because Washington does not recognize the historical borders of Morocco. Did the American administration protest even once when its aircraft, tanks, and artillery shelled the Saharan population and [passage indistinct].

If there is anyone who deserves assistance and who has been actually exposed to aggression [words indistinct] it is the displaced Saharan people. Washington very well understands the way American arms are being used because the given justifications are merely an exposed distortion which deceives no-one. The United States has taken a step with serious consequences [words indistinct].

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ALGERIA

'LE MONDE' COMMENTS ON DISMISSAL OF ALGERIAN HYDRAULICS MINISTER

LD250901 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Oct 79 p 4 LD

[Daniel Junqua Dispatch: "Mr Ghozali Is Removed From the Government"]

[Excerpts] Algiers--A short communique from the Presidency of the Republic announced after the cabinet meeting on Sunday 14 October that Mr Ahmed Ghozali was no longer Hydraulics Minister. He will be temporarily replaced by Maj Brahim Brahimi, Secretary of State for Forests and Reforestation.

The news was unexpected, but the form it took was more surprising than the content: This is the first time for a long time that the sacking of a top official has been announced so bluntly. Resignations for "health reasons" and silent departures are clearly no longer the order of the day. This is a new style which President Chadli is introducing.

The first sign of Mr Ahmed Ghozali's disgrace appeared when the National Liberation Front Congress in February elected him only as a candidate member of the Central Committee. On 8 March he lost the Energy Portfolio and was given the newly created Hydraulics Portfolio. He apparently accepted it only with reluctance and showed bitterness at being removed from a sector and a team to which he had devoted himself completely. At his prompting--he has a diploma from the Paris School of Highways and Bridges--Sonatrach had become a positive empire (more than 70,000 employees), often creaming off the country's best cadres at the expense of other sectors.

The sacking of Mr Ghozali, who has not been given any other job for the time being, comes 1 month after the launch of the "cleanup" campaign, which has hitherto been principally aimed at ordinary citizens. However, the press has constantly announced that sanctions would be taken at all levels against officials who proved unequal to their tasks. Therefore Mr Ghozali's dismissal might well serve as an example and would in no way conflict with the head of state's policy of national union. Above all Mr Ghozali has the status of a higher civil servant and his modest contribution to the liberation struggle--his official biography simply points out that he was a "member of the National Liberation Front French University Section 1958 through 1962"--was bound to be of disservice to him at a time when the party's predominance is being constantly reaffirmed in all spheres.

CSO: 4400

EGYPT

FRG MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON TRADE

DW311028 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany  
1610 GMT 30 Oct 79 DW

[Excerpts from interview with Ranier Offergeld, federal minister for economic cooperation, by Reporter Gerner in Egypt--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Why is Cairo given such obvious privileges with regard to obtaining credits?

[Answer] We agreed to give Egypt development assistance credits amounting to a total of DM1.9 billion. I do not believe one can term that a privilege. Certainly Egypt is a main point of our development policy efforts aimed at achieving stabilization here in the Middle East.

[Question] Did the Egyptians on the occasion of your visit here ask for or expect an increase?

[Answer] The Egyptians expect in the future an intensification and extension of cooperation in the field of development policy. Figures have not been discussed in the talks with the president of the ministers, but there was the clear wish of the Egyptians that we increase our credits to them.

[Question] How do you assess the economic situation of Egypt?

[Answer] The economic situation of Egypt is more positive than had been expected a couple of months ago. We discussed future cooperation very intensely --that was a main point of our talks. The Federal Republic wants to concentrate cooperation on a few sectors. Full agreement existed in this respect with the Egyptian partners. Cooperation will be concentrated on such projects as infrastructure and telecommunications, second there is agriculture and particularly increased productivity and, third there is improvement of building industry capacities, with an annual growth of the population of more than 1 million. The Egyptians cannot catch up in the field of construction work.

[Question] More than DM800 million of the credits granted have not yet been used. Are the Egyptians at all in a position to use the money that was guaranteed them in a sensible way?

[Answer] Yes, we consider it very important for our development policy co-operation to find sensible projects for financing, projects that would facilitate economic and social progress in the country. No problems at all exist here. The implementation of projects, however, occasionally leaves something to be desired, sometimes matters do not develop as quickly as we would like. But generally there is no lack of socially and economically sensible projects here in Egypt.

CSO: 3103

IRAN

WELL PLACED SOURCE PREDICTS CABINET SHAKEUP

LD011005 Teheran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Oct 79 p 2 LD

[Unattributed report: "Rumor of Reshuffle in Bazargan Cabinet"]

[Excerpt] Rumors of a reshuffle in Bazargan's cabinet are resurfacing and it is now being said that three of the larger ministries will be affected. The reshuffle is expected to take place by the weekend, although no information is available as to the extent of the move.

A source close to the government revealed today that the changes in engineer Bazargan's provisional government were at ministerial level and that they were discussed during the previous shake up which resulted in the appointment of Espahbodi as labor minister, Mo'infar as oil minister and the transfer of [Labor, Social Affairs Minister] Foruhar. The source added: "The necessity for a cabinet reshuffle increased 2 weeks ago, following the major events that took place in the country affecting several ministries, in the middle of which one [unnamed] minister, who had presented a national plan, was insisting on resigning."

The reshuffle in the two other ministries is rumored to be connected with the country's economy, an economy which in a period of revolution needs fundamental changes and rapid leaps toward the regeneration and restoration of production and supply. As for economic progress, which of necessity rests on the launching pad of the country's heavy industry, mention may be made of the rejuvenation of agriculture, the development of animal husbandry and the dairy industry, and alongside this the role of fishing, which is of special importance and which recently led to a problem in Bandar Anzali, giving rise to concern.

The shakeup rumor comes just when the government is facing numerous criticisms from all sides, and according to the source quoted it will definitely take place soon.

CSO: 4906

IRAN

ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, GROUPS UNITE FOR CELEBRATION

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 4 Sep 79 pp 1, 9

[Text] Following announcements made by the Celebration Headquarters for the anniversary of Martyrs of 17 Shahrivar [September 8], yesterday political and Islamic Societies and groups issued statements in honoring the commemoration of those who suffered martyrdom on 17 Shahrivar last year and announced their support in celebrating the anniversary more splendidly. As of last night dozens of political and Islamic organizations, societies, centers have announced that they would participate in the ceremonies.

Martyrs Day

The Unity Protection Society related to the Construction Jihad (holy war) issued a statement yesterday announcing its participation in the ceremonies and suggested naming 17 Shahrivar Martyrs Day.

The Blood and Message Day

The Society for the Unity of the Poor and the Islamic society of teachers and employees of the state technical and professional/vocational organization in Tehran issued a statement announcing that it would participate with other organizations in the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar. The message indicates: According to the martyred teacher, Dr Shariati, the revolution has two faces: blood and message. The 17 Shahrivar was both a bloody day and a day of message. A bloody message and blood mixed with message. The poor rose. They revived the memory of 'Emar Yaser, Maqdad, Mosa'eb Ebn Amir, Abuzar Ghafari, Kamil Ebn Ziyad, Mohammad Ebn Abi Bakr and Malek Ashtar. They sent a message for the poor to rise and take their rights from the arrogant (those who have gold and power and hypocrisy) and not to allow a bunch of selfish, Westernized, bewitched by users of Napalm bombs, international colonialists etc, destroy our rights from right and left and wittingly or unwittingly become the loudspeaker for the worldeater colonialists.

With bloody and embossed lines, the voice of the poor was written on the Great Bear on 17 Shahrivar 1357 and it echoed in the world. What the people did on this day would not have been possible with billions of money,

thousands of tanks, guns and machine guns. The voice of "Allah Akbar" of the poor and the blood that was shed unfairly stopped the machine guns and the coarse voice of Oveysi(s) and promised a government of 'Ali's justice.

The 17th of Shahrivar has two contradictory faces: It is a day of death, blood and sorrow and it is also a day of victory and joy; 17 is the day of the martyr. Suffering martyrdom has also two contradictory faces: sorrow and joy, death and life, defeat and victory.

On the anniversary of such a great event, no matter what we say in its commendation will not be enough. We perform the noon prayer at Shohada Circle, this historic circle, the wrapped scroll of 2,500 years of monarchy, and participate in the ceremonies honoring this day. Victory to the memory of the martyrs of 17 Shahrivar, long live the movement and revolution of Iran's Moslem people under the leadership and guidance of Imam Khomeyni. May the provisional government of the Islamic Revolution be successful.

In a statement the Zahmatkeshan Party also announced that it would participate in the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar and indicated: In order to honor the martyrs of rose-colored winding sheets on 17 Shahrivar [Black Friday] and in order to renew our promise with the great leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni, and announce our hatred for the servants and devotees of Imperialism who create riots in every corner and bother the souls of those who sacrificed their lives, we hereby announce that the Party of Hard-Working People will take part in the walking on 17 of Shahrivar just as it had done in the past.

'Asef Towhidi Organization [Asef Monotheism Organization] also issued a statement in this respect and said: By congratulating the families of the martyrs and announcing that we would continue their way (to implement the Islamic principles fully), we accept the invitation of the Celebration Headquarters marking the bloody Friday and ask all the people to actively participate in this ceremony and prove their unity, in uplifting world monotheism in its true meaning under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni. We persist in wanting the provisional government of Iran's Islamic Republic, in a symbolic and revolutionary action, to turn the U.S. Embassy (an area of 115,000 meters) into an equipped hospital and put it at the disposal of the handicapped and the wounded of the Islamic revolution, as the embassy has not left anything but an experience of adversity or misery and destruction and has always looted the poor nations.

Iran's Women's Society has also issued a statement honoring this historic day and announced: The bloody Friday in the heart of the month represented the fighting morale and the unity of the great hero nation. It blossomed like a red rose and struck the roaring anger of the people at the structure of the shah's regime, disgrace for imperialism, and brought down the monarchic



regime which was rotten to its roots. The 17th of Shahrivar was the symbol of power and the strong determination of the people and the incapability and weakness of the enemy. And now after the victory, the awakening of the people against the two superpowers of America and the Soviet Union and their clandestine and overt agents is a vital factor in determining the country's future destiny and the continuation of the struggles so that everyday it is agitated more than the previous day in various ways. The resistance, bravery, and unity of the people on 17 Shahrivar and their ability to accurately distinguish between true enemies and friends should always direct our future.

Iran's Women's Society of Tehran District will hold some ceremonies at 4 p.m. on Friday, 16 Shahrivar, at its office.

Iran's Islamic Struggles Organization has extended its congratulations and condolences to Imam Khomeyni and the hero nation of Iran on the martyrs' anniversary on 17 Shahrivar and by addressing the Celebration Headquarters it has announced; From the beginning of Iran's Islamic revolution, the Islamic Struggles Organization started its activities against the satanic regime publicly by suffering several casualties (martyrs). It will participate in the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar and if necessary it is ready to provide security with its military unit.

In addition, various Islamic and religious groups have issued statements announcing their readiness to participate in these ceremonies which will be held in Shohada Circle.

The names of the Islamic societies are as follows: The Committee of the Islamic Society of The Foundry in Tehran; the Council of Employees of the National Society for the Protection of Children; the Islamic Society of Shroudwearers; the Mujahedin Organization of God's Way; the Islamic Society of Husayniyeh Sar Kurd Mulla; the Islamic Society of West Tehran; the Islamic Society of the Students of Nazi Abad; the Islamic Society of Mehr Villa, Karaj; the Islamic Society of Ferdos Shahriyar; the bazaar businessmen and syndicates affiliated to the Mujahedin Organization of God's way.

The names of some of the other organizations and societies were published in the previous issue.

Based on the report of the Celebration Headquarters for the anniversary of 17 Shahrivar, up to last night the following groups and societies have announced their readiness to participate in the ceremonies:

The Islamic Society of Iran's National Gas Company', the Islamic Society (community) of employees of the Central Bank; the Central Council of Non-commissioned Officers and Personnel of the Police Department of Iran's Islamic Republic; the Islamic Community of Iran's oil Personnel; the Islamic Community of the Children's Mental Development Center; the Islamic Community

of the Office in Charge of Attending to Medical Documents Affiliated with the Ministry of Health; the Islamic Community of the Personnel of the Oil Industry in Tehran; the Islamic Community of Agricultural Development Bank; the Islamic Community of the Personnel of Tehran's Regional Water Organization; the Islamic Community of Personnel of Vahed Company; the Islamic Community of the State Aviation Personnel; the Islamic Community of the Employees of Iran's Agricultural Cooperative Bank; the Islamic Community of Shemshak; the Islamic Community of Atomic Energy; the Islamic Community of Iran's Communication Company; the Social Welfare Organization, Branch 1; the Islamic Community of the Foundry in Tehran; the Islamic Community of Employees of the Ports and Shipping Organization; the Islamic Community of the Ministry of Mines and Industries; the Islamic Community of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education; the Islamic Community of the National Welfare Organization for the Blind; the Islamic Community of Iran's Carpet Company, Inc. related to the Ministry of Commerce; the Islamic Society of the Medical School of Imam Khomeyni at Tehran University; the Islamic Community of Qasr Garrison, 2d Infantry Division of Tehran; the Handicapped Society; Iran's Islamic Struggle's Organization; the Javadiyeh Committee; the Islamic Community of Employees of the Regional Organization for Health and Welfare of Tehran Province; the Islamic Community of Employees of Tehran's Regional Power; the Mujahedin Organization of God's way; the Islamic Community of Ministry of National Guidance; the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation in Tehran and all cities; the Islamic Community of PARS NEWS AGENCY; the Society of Employees of the Official Newspaper of Iran's Islamic Republic; the Islamic Community of Employees of the Insurance Industry; the Islamic Society of Javadiyeh-Vali 'Asr Fedayee Group; the Pro-National Youth; the Islamic Community of Welfare and Education Organization for the Youth and Children Affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Task Group of the 12th Committee; the Group of the Islamic Community of Saviors of Islam; the Islamic Society of Mehdi's Call; the Society of Qomi Patriots; the Islamic Society of the Employees of Pharmaceutical Plants and Related Companies; the Islamic Society of A'ameh Mosque in Shemran; the Islamic Society of Employees of Iran's National University; the Islamic Council of Pars Oil Company Employees; the Islamic Society of Civil Defense Organization Personnel of Iran's Islamic Republic; the Islamic Society of the Ministry of Housing and City Construction and Development; the Society of Unity of Islam; Nabi Akran Mosque.

9156  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

RETURNING STUDENTS DISILLUSIONED WITH KHOMEYNI LAND

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Sep 79 pp 151, 154, 157

[Article by SPIEGEL editor Erich Wiedemann: "We Fell Into the Mullahs' Trap"]

[Text] "Everyone listen!" cries the mullah. "Is there anyone who saw how the dogs of Sajjed Sheikh Oleshmade ate from golden platters?"

Of course there is someone. The revolutionary court always has appropriate witnesses at hand when it is in need of evidence. Outside the door of Kasr Prison continually huddle three or four dozen young people who are ready to furnish statements as witnesses if necessary.

The witness who saw the dogs of the multimillionaire Sheikh Oleshmade in the golden bowl was the chief witness in the trial of the functionary of the former SAVAK secret service only last week. If he continues to do a good job, he may become a jail-keeper--the chief judge has promised it.

Meanwhile, the trials in the mosque of Kasr Prison are quite well balanced. Ayatollah Chalchali, the head Jacobin of the regime, completes six death sentences within a half hour--completely without witnesses.

The job of jailer has a good future in Tehran. The Evin and Kasr prisons are well filled. Not long ago, the army cleared an entire block in Bareshar Caserne in order to accommodate the new arrivals which the young Khomeyni commandos deliver after nightly raids. That creates jobs.

The expanded penal catalog, although not yet even codified in an orderly manner, has revived old intrigues. A 70-year-old widow and her 74-year-old married male friend from the southern side of Tehran were whipped, under the supervision of a mullah, until they were half dead after a relative had allegedly caught them in a compromising position. One can put an obnoxious neighbor behind bars with the aid of only an empty beer bottle from his garbage can.

In place of the SAVAK sadists, today the "Odamhooje bedun-i-nachun"--the "people without fingernails"--are operating the instruments of torture. They are repaying the imprisoned helpmates of the toppled regime with an eye for an eye.

The official fingernail-rippers can be satisfied with the revolution--unlike the person who made the coffee for the Iranian atomic energy authorities who, on the day of Khomeyni's return, rushed through the hall with a cocked machine gun and announced himself as the new director. For weeks now he has been making the coffee again, and he does not actually know why he supported this revolution.

The tens of thousands of students who followed the Ayatollah home to Persia to assist in the reconstruction of the country do not know why either. The Moslem papists had decided to send them out to Belutschistan to work on street construction, but the young intellectuals had not envisioned the reconstruction that way.

Now hoards of them are streaming back to France and the Federal Republic of Germany. All flights to the West are booked for weeks in advance. The week before last, the American embassy on Roosevelt Avenue, barred and nailed all around, had to close its consular department 1 hour after it had reopened because the visa applicants threatened to crush the clerks.

Many of those wishing to return to America have settled in the amusement park on Mossadegh Avenue (formerly Pahlevi Avenue) where they meet their daily needs at shashlik and cola stands.

"We have been deceived," says Gholamresa Yazdani, former medical student in San Francisco and today owner of "Gholamresa's Popular Hamburger and Kebab Studio." "We fell into the mullahs' trap"--or their own.

Ayatollah Khomeyni and his followers have never made a secret of the fact that there would be no place for left-wing and liberal intellectuals in the Islamic Republic.

The proletariat cannot be consolidated; the students have tried it often enough. Two weeks ago, Khomeyni's bonebreakers broke up a student demonstration in the center of Tehran with such force that the street cleaners had to work for 2 hours to scrub the blood off the pavement.

Only the banner with the day's slogan swung for another half day in the branches of the trees on Firdausi Square: "Margbar chodam ke goftam margbar shah"--"Death to me who called for the death of the Shah."

Shah Reza would not recognize his old and new friends. "Iran was truly free only in the last 6 months of the shah's rule," says Gholamresa Yazdani. In January he was still a part of the academic mob which looted the villa of

the shah's sister Sham in Beverly Hills. In the mullahs the intellectuals had seen only a means of implementing their own revolution. Now the situation is completely reversed.

A previously unknown differentiation can be sensed in academia. Today one differentiates between the shah of torture who sent his SAVAK executioners after peace-loving citizens and the shah of reform who wanted to lead his people out of the Middle Ages into the present.

The Shi'ite clergy has lost much ground, above all with women. The mullahs dismantled what remained of the rudiments of emancipation from the emperor's time. Educational opportunities for girls have decreased again; women must still pass a virginity test to acquire civil service positions; and in divorce law women have once again been reduced to the status of property which can be returned if it fails to please. "Who could have suspected all that?" asks Gholamresa.

Bahrnan Nirumand from Berlin, who for many years was the spokesman for the German resistance to the shah's regime, is also no longer happy about his revolution, after Khomeyni's Moslem thugs beat him up during a demonstration. When asked by a reporter what he was doing now, Nirumand replied: "Nothing, absolutely nothing, nothing at all." Demonstrating in Berlin is certainly less dangerous.

The opposition in jail, the press and parliament under the control of the mullahs, the students have fled or else at the shashlik spits--where is the resistance?

At the cemetery, for example. At the beginning of the month, the central cemetery of Behesht-Sahra south of Tehran was closed for 2 days after unidentified persons placed hats on 500 headstones on the graves of victims of the shah regime.

A scroll on the mortuary illustrates the meaning: "Big hats have been placed on you." In good German: "You were deceived."

Revolutions are seldom annual festivals of relaxed gaiety. But this one here has included melancholy right in its manifest. Laughing aloud is the devil's work; music is opium for the people; and women are allowed to bathe only in a full veil. Even 7-year-old schoolgirls must appear in school dressed in black.

Islamic morals are subject to continual attacks. Khomeyni's guards had to swarm out in order to collect the nonalcoholic beer in shops and supermarkets: It had been reported to the authorities that Moslems, under the evil influence of nonbelievers, had augmented the mild brew--brand name "Ayatollah Lager"--with alcohol-producing yeast.

Even the foot soldiers of the holy man are not afraid to evade the prohibition on alcohol. Mullahs and the committees which are subordinate to them are practicing the art of making schnapps and brewing beer. There were 10 breweries in Tehran earlier; today a fragrant aroma rises from a few hundred illegal breweries.

The illegal art of brewing has, to be sure, not yet reached its zenith. Every day at least a dozen "schnaps corpses" are brought into the hospitals--victims of overdoses of the methyl alcohol which remains behind in the sloppy processing of the home brew.

The person who wants to get drunk safely buys his liquor from the committees which confiscate the duty-free whiskey of the tourists from the West at Mihrabad Airport. It is pure even if, at 8000 rial (DM 150) per bottle, it is twice as expensive as the sour laundry slop made from dates or oranges which is sold at the bazaar.

Everyday life in Tehran proves that the mullahs and their worldly adepts from the bazaar had something more secular in mind than the theocrat Khomeyni would have been ready to tolerate--had he been aware of it.

The houses of the rich in Shemiran and Niavaran were to become meeting places for the Mostafasin, for the poorest members of Iranian society. Nevertheless, today mullahs reside in the villas. Some have taken over entire blocks of apartment houses which were left behind by their owners. One mullah who lives there has for a long time been arriving at the mosque not as a beggar but rather in a Mercedes.

It is also harvest time for the bazaar merchants. They financed the way back to Qom for the Shi'ite pope with their billions of rial; now they want their dividends. With the exception of three, all ministers in the Bazargan cabinet come from the bazaar. Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, descendant of an old bazaar family, considerably looks after the Pahlevi foundation which is worth billions and was left over from the shah kleptocracy.

The youth are the most audacious. Khomeyni's son Hadshi Ahmed and his brother-in-law Shahab Eshraghi were observed as they emptied a suitcase full of dollars at the teller's window of a Geneva bank. Ayatollah Montaseri, Jr had the Tehran airport occupied by loyal swordsmen because the flight procedures were not to his liking.

Newspapers which report on such excesses risk being banned. On 22 August, 22 newspapers were shut down in a surprise move. Entire editorial staffs were imprisoned. Remaining were the supportive enterprises like the TEHRAN TIMES, which considers the censor "axiomatic"--"because there must be a body which ensures that the moral standard of the revolution is not harmed."

Much more difficult is control of the moral standards of the foreign press. Ali Behsadnia, formerly a gynecologist in the United States and today director of the Foreign Press Office in the "Ministry of National Guidance" is purging as well as he can. In the last quarter-year, he has expelled an average of two foreign correspondents each week.

It was Behsadnia's idea to criminally prosecute journalists for each publication of their newspapers. Journalists who stay in Tehran without an official seal of accreditation are treated as spies at his direction. And spies are to be shot; that is international custom.

"Write what is true," is on the slogan pasted on the walls everywhere foreign correspondents go. Over it threatens the diabolically distorted face of a European correspondent who is in the process of shoving a cartridge belt into his camera.

True is only that which is useful to the revolution. Even admitted revolutionaries today doubt that this revolution is still useful to anyone at all except the mullahs.

True, however, is also the fact that, despite everything, the masses support Khomeyni. The left wing and the liberals seldom gather more than 50,000 demonstrators on the street. But when Khomeyni calls, millions still march.

9241  
CSO: 4403

IRAN

UNREST SPREADS AMONG MILITARY, POLICE

Rift Between Army, Pasdars

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] Reports reaching from the Kurdish regions in West Iran have indicated that there is a great deal of disagreement between the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdars) and the army officers stationed in the region. Exclusive sources claim that the disagreements have gone very deep and after the appointment of Mostafa Chamran to Minister of National Defence. Pasdars in the Western regions claim that the army troops are not fighting vigorously with the Kurdish rebels and therefore Pasdars are induced to intervene in order to win the war.

Non-commissioned officers and even the officers are compelled to take orders from the Pasdars who give them ammunition only when they deem it necessary. Pasdars are also giving instructions to the troops concerning any battles and if they do not obey orders, they will be punished by Pasdars.

Exclusive sources also said that all the armed Air Force planes are accompanied by at least one armed Pasdar in order to supervise their operation and have a tight control over them.

Meanwhile, informed sources in the region report that most of the young Pasdars are fleeing from the battle scenes since they have said that they were sent to fight the foreign elements and former Savakis while they are forced to fight even Muslims and young Kurds who claim they are Iranians.

The morale of the young Pasdars has reportedly declined as most of them are hoping to be able to escape from the region. However, there is no return for those who do not put up a fight and are said by their own officials that if they refrain from fighting the Kurdish rebels, they are considered as counter-revolutionaries and enemies of Islam



400 Homafars Arrested

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 5

[Text] A group of Air Force officers calling themselves progressive personnel of the Air Force have issued a statement claiming that 400 Homafars (warrant officers) have been arrested on the orders from Dr. Mostafa Chamran, the new National Defence Minister for preventing army and Air Force transport planes from transporting food and supplies to Lebanon for those fighting under the banner of Amal Political Party.

Exclusive sources claim that Chamran is still the leader of Amal in Lebanon and that he was trying to use Air Force and Army planes to supply the members of Amal with food and clothing just before the onset of the cold weather. It was said that the Air Force personnel have already published a list of goods and other commodities shipped to Lebanon since Chamran's new appointment.

Army Purge Planned

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 pp 3-4

[Text] The new Minister of National Defence, Mostafa Chamran has said that he is planning to purge the army in order to have a true national army who will only defend the interests of the Iranian people.

Exclusive sources believe, meanwhile, that the main reason for appointing Dr. Chamran to this position is the fact that he is not a military officer and has no prejudice towards the army and the former officers and thus would have a free hand in purging the army officers who are still hoping for a change in the governmental conditions in Iran.

An exclusive source reported, meanwhile, that the army still does not cooperate with the Islamic government and that the higher officers are influencing the junior officers. Therefore, Chamran has been appointed to purge all the army officers from Major to the highest level.

Following the purge, officials of the Islamic government are hoping to appoint their own officers to key positions, most of who have already undergone military training abroad. To this end, it seems that the government and the army would welcome the former officials to be retired since they hope to have a smaller army and on the side, develop the revolutionary corps as another source of military might.

Exclusive sources, meanwhile, believe that it would be difficult for the new army to have trained pilots who will be able to fly the highly sophisticated American jet fighters, unless they sign an agreement with the United States to train the new pilots.

Retirement Requests on Rise

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 6

[Text] Informed sources in Bank Sepah, the bank in which all army officers are receiving their salaries, said last week that the number of army and air force personnel requesting to be retired or dismissed from the army is on the rise.

He said that each day between 150 to 200 professional officers, ranging from pilots, engineers to doctors asked to be either retired or dismissed from the army. It was said that most of these officers have undergone advanced training programmes and have been assured of better positions with much higher salaries in various countries, including Oman, Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, Egypt and even Western countries.

Informed sources said, meanwhile, that already many pilots have managed to be retired and are presently hoping that new National Defence Minister Morteza Chamran would begin his purge of the army at various levels and that they would be able to either retire or be dismissed in this purge. In most cases, pilots, doctors and engineers working in the army have left their position without getting any compensations from the army since they have been assured of better positions with much more attractive terms by certain neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, exclusive sources said that most professionals have been banned from leaving the country, but they have managed to leave via the Persian Gulf with the assistance of certain locals who had received large sums of money from the officials of the countries who had hired these Iranian army professionals.

Police Officers Unhappy

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 4

[Text] The annual promotion of police officers this year has been delayed and the officials have asked them to secure the consent of the local committee members before requesting a promotion. Members of the police forces stationed at various police stations are working closely with the members of various committees who have recently moved to these police stations and working closely with them in various capacities.

However, it has been said that the police officers are not cooperating with the committee members claiming that they are not trained for the job and that police jobs need training as well as experience.

Therefore, it seems that the officials are trying to induce and encourage the police personnel to have closer cooperation with the members of the committees who will also be purged to clear them out of all the undesirable elements.

In addition, police personnel have also lost some 40 per cent of their usual income which they would normally have received for discovering crimes or narcotics. This has resulted in the total dissatisfaction of the police personnel and they are not willing to teach the trick of their trade freely to the newcomers who are members of the local committees.

CSO: 4920

IRAN

LAND FORCES CHIEF ASSAYS KORDESTAN UNREST

LD010811 Teheran BAMDAD in Persian 16 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Unattributed report: "Present Situation in Kordestan Explained"]

[Excerpt] In an interview with BAMDAD following the attack on his life General Fallahi, commander of the land forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, gave an account of the attack on his car (carried in yesterday's edition) and spoke about conditions in Kordestan, the role of the army and the martyrdom of the guards, an account of which is continued in today's edition.

As regards the state of Kordestan, the land forces chief said: "The Kordestan area, from Arasi to a line joining Tamarchin, Gardaneh Sheykh, Piranshahr, Postuh, Jaldian, Naqadeh and Bukan is calm, and both the government and the army are in control. A particularly authentic version of the revolution will gradually be applied to this region.

"In southern Kordestan, bounded on the north by Ravanshahr, Paveh, Nowsud and Showshami, the government and the army are in total control. A large number of people in this area believes in the revolution and only a small number has shown no desire to go along with it. In the central regions, including Kamyaran, Sanandaj and Marivan, the people are gradually beginning to understand the revolution, and as they do so the area becomes calmer.

"However, in certain regions of Kordestan, such as Mahabad, Sardasht and Baneh, the people are strangers to the revolution, which for various reasons has made no impact here since its successful accomplishment. The people are perceptibly under the influence of the defunct democratic party's propaganda. It must be stressed that the people of Kordestan should be distinguished from the Democratic Party of Kordestan. My personal understanding, which is based on my visit to the region, is that some decent Kurdish people have been intimidated by the party's armed activities."

CSO: 4906

IRAN

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN KORDESTAN REJECTED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 23 Sep 79 pp 1, 2

[Text] Iranian Envoy to the Soviet Union discloses: "Foreign Planes Wanted to Intervene in Conflict of Kordestan--It Is Not Right to Accuse the Soviet Union for the Events of Kordestan--American Plans Concerning Persian Gulf Will Not Be Left Without Counteraction From the Soviets."

The PARS NEWS AGENCY--In an interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Dr Makri, Envoy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Soviet Union, stated: "When Occidentals want to carry out a colonization plan in some place of the world they first collect its literature and create a quasi-scientific background, and then using this background they achieve the sought-for results. It is likewise as regards Islam. They brought forward a kind of Islam in the North of Africa that outwardly was very hypocritical and attractive, and they defended it against another group that acted as historians and Islamists who were finding fault with that Islam and asserted that Islam was the cause of backwardness. These two schemes had formed the base of the plan of colonization, and the Islam they commended was liable to the same objections and criticisms."

Foreign Planes

Regarding the events of Kordestan and the West country Dr Makri stated: "As I have already said earlier in this respect, if there had been the slightest delay in the issuance of the Imam's order, Kordestan would be separated. It was even about to happen that some international organizations, such as jurists for human rights and freedom, Red Cross, and some Western foundations and countries, would recognize the Kordish separatists. And there was even a possibility that the planes of other countries would enter the disturbed area. If that happened, great difficulties might arise. I am a Kurd, but I don't believe that Kurds are a distinct or purest Iranian people. I am rather of the opinion that we are all Iranians and that no city is better than the other."

There Was No Soviet Involvement

"Likewise I should say that the agitators in the West were not Kurds. In the events of Kordestan there has been interference of colonialist countries and there were some with 100 percent Zionist influence. I don't consider as true the involvement of the Soviets in these events and have no proof in this respect, unless this interference comes from some countries unfriendly to us, and I have likewise heard nothing in that respect. On the whole, our friendly relations with the Soviet Union are such that it is not in the interest of the Soviets to interfere in our internal affairs."

In answering the question whether the Soviets will counterreact the plans of America and some countries of the Persian Gulf in that region, and the question of the 110,000-strong American force for the protection of the oil fields, Dr Makri said: "This problem is very intricate, and the Soviet authorities should speak of this matter themselves. However, our viewpoint and policy is against the presence of any superpower in the Persian Gulf, and such a presence is also not in the interest of any of them. Anyway, it is my opinion that these developments will not remain without a counteraction on the part of the Soviets in view of the fact that they have forces in the South Yemen. It is also possible that the Soviet insistence in their support of Afghanistan is not without connection with this matter."

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IRAN

'DISTINGUISHED RELIGIOUS SECTARIANS' CRITICIZED BY NF

Tehran ETELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] The National Front, in a 12-page brochure entitled "Open Letter to the Iranian People from the National Front," criticized the operations of the Council of Experts, deviations from accepted legal standards and the formation of special judicial bodies by the clerics.

The brochure warned the Iranian people that a body called the Council for the Higher Study of Basic Law has ratified the principles of a new basic law that is inconsistent with the economic and social realities of present-day Iran. This cannot be considered a progressive law, one which safeguards the rights of men in different social, political and economic spheres. Not only will the new basic law confront any future Iranian government with numerous ambiguities and inadequacies, but any government established on the basis of this law will not be responsive to the nation's need for a political structure in keeping with today's scientific and technological advances, and which will preserve a free and progressive society.

The Council of Experts' Policy

The brochure had the following to say about the formation of a Constituent Assembly:

"The government's failure to enact a regulation for elections to a Constituent Assembly, which had been ratified, and its acceptance of 73 members instead of 350, is a major step backwards for the revolution. After the excitement of the early days of the revolution had subsided on account of the government's indecisiveness and its basic incompetence in organizing and carrying out pressing plans, disorder and insecurity began to envelop the country."

Elsewhere in the brochure, the National Front had this to say about the way the Council of Experts works:

"The National Front, in its statement of 26 June, spelled out in detail its ideas about the Constituent Assembly.

"Unfortunately, however, no attention is paid to the views, observations and proposals of individuals and groups with social and political views. Thus all of the Front's proposals were ignored. While the Prime Minister has paid attention to the facts in his statements, unfortunately he and the other members of his government capitulate to the monopoly-seeking clerical circles and put the latter's views into execution or facilitate their execution. As a result of this incorrect policy, the center of power has shifted outside the legally constituted government, and a small group has stepped forward on the political, economic and social stage."

#### Formation of the Clerics' Special Islamic Court

The formation of the clerics' special Islamic court was the first step towards consolidating their power, as opposed to the basic goal of the revolution which was the elimination of privileged ruling factions.

After the establishment of this court, the next step was the approval of a law giving the revolutionary courts separate jurisdiction in cases involving the revolutionary guards. At present the clerics' power is based upon the revolutionary guards and the committees and the revolutionary courts. The clerics' wide-ranging role has ample historical precedent, such as the Zoroastrian priests in pre-Islamic Iran and the Christian Church in Europe in the Middle Ages.

In its brochure the National Front referred to the Council of Experts' deviations from accepted legal principles and the formation of a new ruling class. It concluded by saying:

"We expect that after the victory of the revolution the voice of the National Front, which reflects the wishes of the informed strata of society, will be heeded for the first time by the ruling elements. Then the revolution will take its place as the renaissance of the Iranian people and a progressive example to the rest of the world.

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IRAN

FIRE IN TEHRAN AFGHAN EMBASSY LABELED PLOT OF 'UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENTS'

Tehran ETEELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 14

[Text] The PARS NEWS AGENCY informs that a fire broke out last night in the vicinity of the Afghan Embassy on the Abbasabad Avenue next to a gas station, and was quickly extinguished with help of local residents and Police officers assigned to that district.

One of the eyewitnesses told our reporter that the fire actually started outside the building in a small watch box. This witness said that the fire was intentional and that the damage inflicted was very small.

In the aftermath of this event we contacted the Afghan Embassy and a spokesman of that embassy, who didn't give his name, has confirmed the occurrence of fire and called it a plot on the part of unknown individuals.

In describing the cause of the fire he said that at 9:00 p.m. last night the small booth that served as a shelter was set on fire by sprinkling it with gasoline, and that then the fire has spread to the embassy building and resulted in burning of a window and venetian blinds.

He has also pointed out that the fire broke out in the vicinity of a gas station with 2,000 liters of fuel. However, with the aid of the local people and embassy's personnel the fire was extinguished and there is some damage as a result of it. Col. Sepehri, Deputy Chief of the local Police Station, also said that this fire was very negligible and that it occurred probably from carelessness, such as dropping a cigarette, and that it had not much importance. He added that a dossier on this occurrence was sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office, and that the matter is not worth notice.

Viewpoint of Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to a telephone inquiry of the PARS NEWS AGENCY concerning the fire beside the Afghan Embassy in Tehran said that according to their information a small fire occurred in a watch box near the Afghan Embassy in Tehran, but that a detailed description of how and what happened is not as yet available and that the competent authorities are investigating this event.

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IRAN

REVOLUTIONARY NEWSPAPERS EXPRESS VIEWS

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 1 Sep 79 p 9

- [Text] (1) This part is an impartial view of the press in Iran.
- (2) The long articles have been summarized due to limited space.
- (3) BAMDAD does not take responsibility for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the articles.

The Unity of the Revolutionary Moslem Forces Published by OMAT, 20th issue. The progressive religious (forces) have heavy responsibilities, because, on one hand, they have the people on their side and, on the other hand, they act as one of the arms of the revolutionary leader. It is their duty to free themselves from the influence of the reactionary and monopolistic forces. Furthermore, instead of banishing the Moslem revolutionary elements, they should take steps to cooperate and unite with them--putting the revolutionary Moslems under pressure would result directly to the benefit of imperialism and the reactionaries. They should also take a more decisive position with regard to the ruling liberal force. By dominating the decisionmaking channels, they should put the government under pressure to purge and revolutionize the offices and army and for the full implementation of revolutionary projects and stop the regrowth of capitalism.

Under the existing sensitive conditions, any type of pressure and limiting the activities of Moslem revolutionary elements and forces is condemned and dangerous. We need revolutionary unity for all Moslem revolutionary and progressive forces to fight against the plots of colonialism, to purify the country from dictatorship ties and relations and to cease the influence of capitalism, to provide the country's full independence and to renovate the society's genuine economy. Under the current sensitive conditions, more awareness and unity is required from all forces sincere and faithful to the revolution. Under the existing conditions, the reactionary (opposition) and capitalists have had more growth because of the apparent excuses for reform (protecting the revolution and overcoming the economic crisis) for stabilizing the position of favorite elements and those remaining from the era of dictatorship (under the pretext of the need to fight against antirevolutionaries).

Under the existing sensitive conditions, considering the revolutionary awareness that the people have, you should take positive steps for the unity of progressive and Moslem forces and accomplish your historic duty concerning the continuation of the revolution, serving the poor people and supporting the revolutionary leader by overlooking personal motives and issues and following principles of virtue and by getting away from liberal and reactionary factors. That is all.

"The Greatest Factor of Profiteering," Published by Burse, Shahrivar 8 [30 August 1979]

If our revolution has been a political revolution, there should also be a revolution in fighting with profiteering and high costs. The revolution should take place in the bazaar and for the general base of prices and for cutting off the hands of brokers and a bunch of looters and freeloaders. We all know that in overthrowing the satanic regime, there were freeloaders and profiteers, unaware of God, acting as Moslems who were economic and social leeches under the name of forward purchasers, who buy, in advance, the products of the farmer's labor at no cost before the harvest. After hoarding the food and agricultural products in storage, they sell them to the consumer several times higher. Consumers constitute a majority of the inhabitants of this country.

The forward purchasers for instance had concentrated on citrous gardens in the North (Shahsavari and Ramsar) for such products as oranges, tangerines, etc. They buy the best quality of oranges when they are unripe and still on the tree for 10 rials a kilo maximum and then sell the same oranges for 100-1,200 rials or even higher before New Year's Eve. This is also done with summer crops, such as, cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, onions, potatoes, vegetables, water melon, of cantalopes, melons, etc. Isn't this the only factor in profiteering by forward purchasers, hoarders of food products, businessmen, those who pretend to be Moslems, hoarders and some of the unfair businessmen in the bazaar and the distance between the production, distribution and consumption sites?

"Fighting with Profiteers" Published by JOSHAM, 8 Shahrivar [30 August]:

There is no Chamber of Syndicates in the Islamic Republic. What is considered and respected is the degree of mercy and fairness or justice. Such a degree determines the belief of the guild in Islamic justice. The Islamic Court of the Guild has announced that from now on any businessman, merchant or owner of factories who profiteers and overlooks the rights of consumers will be punished according to religious standards. The least punishment would be introducing them as antirevolutionaries and lashing them at Friday prayers conducted in front of thousands of faithful persons. Perhaps it is necessary for all to know as a reality that pretending to follow the Islamic Republic's standards cannot protect us from sins and disobedience. Profiteering is a sin in violation of the people's rights and God's commandment. God said

whosoever violates the people's rights will not be under my mercy. Therefore, you businessmen who call yourselves the beloved ones of God treat the consumers based on Islamic justice and do not intend to make violations. Consider a profit for yourselves that would be fair and not in excess of the usual limit. If you do otherwise, your actions and behavior will not conform with God's commandment on justice and will be far from Islamic justice and therefore you cannot enjoy God's mercy or forgiveness--the God who is everywhere observing the actions of his servants.

"Yesterday Marivan, Today Paveh, Where Tomorrow?" Published by PASDARAN 12th issue:

With the cooperation of their sincere friends, that is Palizban and Barzani, the leftist elements are carrying out the conspiracies of CIA one by one. The blood of the Marivani brothers shed with injustice and in a dastardly way has not yet dried than the mercenary and traitor agents (who have even sold their honor) have made preparations for wider bloodshed in another part of our country. Those who, under the pretext of supporting the rights of the workers, attack all of our national and religious sacred things without having achieved any results from so much effort in trying to make our revolutionary nation deviate from its path, have decided to get revenge from this deprived nation. Those who found their dreams lost with the 98-percent referendum which was a knockdown answer to their carrying out any plan that Zionists and imperialists find advisable and leading our nation to bloodshed and fire directly or indirectly. Then again without any shame and with all their antipeople positions, they expect to be considered to be of the people. If the government does not carry out its duty, which is to be decisive toward antirevolutionaries, the enemy will become a bloodsucker. Yesterday in Marivan, today Paveh and tomorrow the whole country. Who is to respond? God knows. Hoping that the government would not be participating in wasting the blood of the martyrs. Amen.

"It's a Pity that Iran..." Published by Etehad Bozorg 8 Shahrivar [30 August]:

All of us are bereaved when any Iranian is killed. Kurd, Lor, Mazandarani, Azerbaijani, or Tehrani, we are all the children of this country. And, undoubtedly we want honor for our motherland and peace for our fellow citizens. Why should a small dispute and an unworthy involvement lead to the death of so many of us? Undoubtedly, in the tragic catastrophe which took place in the west of our country, the government is the most guilty of all as it did not respond on time to the natural and certain demands of our oppressed Kurdish fellow citizens. The government Government overlooked the Kurds who wanted to keep some of their culture within the framework of Iranian nationality. The presence of antirevolutionaries helped spread insecurity and, on the other hand, by giving opportunity to opportunist elements, they penetrated and made aggressions at the boundaries of military garrisons and inflamed the (forgotten) differences. A knot which could have been untied with optimism became an entangled knot by showing partiality and harshness.

Who suffered the consequences? It is a pity if we do not put an end to the war right now.

Mr Bazargan, it is not so late now.

Take a step forward and overlook all of the negligences and mistakes of both sides. Think only of Iran which it would really be a pity to ruin.

"We All Made Mistakes," Published by MARDOM-E IRAN (JAMA) 8 Shahrivar [30 August]:

In the 6 months that have passed from the first phase of revolution, we have witnessed deviations and observed individual and groups going to extremes. Sometimes, this caused anxiety that the movements which were contradictory to the revolutionary spirit might halt the revolutionary trend. However, each time what was hopeful was the guidances of the Imam and the deep belief and faith of the people in the genuineness of the revolution and their support of the decisive leadership of Imam Khomeyni. The rich Islamic cultural movement swept away people of every type who were in the way. This should be a lesson for all, including the intellectuals, the government, the revolutionary council, political organizations, the clergy and everyone since some of the mistakes can be compensated. However, some cannot and they are unforgiveable from the people's point of view. We should try not to make more mistakes because we will be condemned by history and God will not forgive our faults.

We should also consider the point that some of the individuals or groups who can use the special existing conditions and the people's feelings to their own advantage will be faced with the revolutionary leader's anger and fury, considering the sincerity and frankness that we find in the revolutionary leader who reminds us of the sincerity and frankness of Hazrat-e Ali, the true leader and Imam of Moslems in the world. The revolutionary leader has nothing on his mind but the needs of the poor and the oppressed. The Imam's warning that we all made mistakes should be an alarm for everyone that if we stop serving the poor and the deprived, we will willy-nilly be destroyed by the flooding of the revolutionary uproar of the people.

"The Message Of The Leader Of The Paveh Guards," Published by Islamic Republic 8 Shahrivar [30 August 1979]:

Question: Do you have a message for the Iranian nation?

Answer: Do you mean our message or the message of the Revolutionary Guards of Iran. Because the philosophy for the existence of the corps is to protect the Islamic revolution. Therefore, the message is the same Islamic message which tells all people to protect the revolution. We are not the

only paramilitary force established for the protection of this revolution. Our real backing is the people. Because if the people did not participate in the movement, we would not have been successful in this revolution.

I want the people to put the government under pressure and if possible to beat the government and to follow the Imam's policy, because the Imam understands the nation's pain, as he follows Islam. I ask the Imam and the whole nation everywhere in this territory to beat the government if it shows some weakness or makes compromise with the traitors. The government shows a lot of weakness. We also see this weakness in the government's foreign policies. Perhaps they have some roots. Can we say it was a political mistake? It is the Iranian nation that protects the revolution. The nation should not expect all their work to be corrected by the top officials. They should get into action and if they see that the government does not respond to the nation's cry, they should put the government under pressure and destroy it. This is my message.

"Remarks made by Isma'il Ra'in," Published by RUYDAD, 20 Mordad, 1358 [11 August 1979]:

Following the publication of the book "Freemasonry and Freemason's Lodge in Iran" which I had written and some other books and articles published in this respect, some groups assumed that the "Okhovat Society" was also one of the organizations related to the official Iranian Freemasonry Organization, affiliated to Molavi's Grand Lodge and Iran's Grand Lodge. This has created some anxiety for the reputable men and women who were members of the above-mentioned society and other para Freemasonry organizations such as the honorable professors, Dr Abdol Hussein Zarin Kub and Dr Abbas Zar Yab Khu'yi.

I find myself morally and conscientiously obligated to inform everyone that as far as I have personally made studies, none of the above mentioned professors and teachers has been affiliated to any of the 41 lodges of Iran's official Freemasonry Organizations related to the grand lodge of Iran. Any assumption made about these persons is nothing but a misunderstanding and a mistake or an intention to damage the reputation of these reputable persons who are the rare scientific resources of our country.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

CAUTIOUS CRITICISM OF FLOGGING AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE

Tehran ETELA'AT in Persian 24 Sep 79 p 1

[Text] Last night, a young man and woman were publicly flogged for allegedly exchanging sensual glances.

The undesired side-effects of this act may outweigh the "warning" intended by the persons responsible for the flogging. The publication of this article was prompted by the simultaneous appearance of several items in the press and on TV.

First, the Imam's son said in an interview: "Do not punish the effects of corruption; stamp out the causes, and the effects will vanish by themselves." This is an old saying but a true one, and it should be repeated for the benefit of those who think that lashing several women who have misbehaved, black-marketeers and drinkers of wine will banish these evils from the earth.

The same day, a religious judge said that floggings cannot be ordered at some individual's pleasure; such floggings must stop immediately. This verdict is a source of joy in places where the lash has been used as a means of settling old scores and showing power; it is hypocritical to call it a means of protection from evil.

That same night, a film was shown on TV about social problems as the source of corruption. There was also a televised discussion among several authorities about the intellectuals' role in the Iranian revolution, during which the question was raised of how to reconcile human nature and the mercy of Islam with the harshness of flogging.

The mercy of Islam, which is exemplified by our religious leaders, such as the Imam Khomeyni and Father Taleqani--why is it allowed to be distorted by power-seeking and harsh-natured men, furnishing domestic and foreign critics with material they cite as evidence of the revolution's collapse? When we have built the perfect Islamic society, you will have the right to flog anybody who violates its order, tranquility and progress. For the moment, however, we are still in what our father the Imam calls the "Shah's society." Therefore, enough of this harshness, let us rebuild our country with kindness and cooperation. Let us not give the enemies of religion and the state grist for their mills, nor throw away the fruits of our God-given revolution, nor promote harshness. A correct economic program will burn out the roots of profiteering, smuggling and other misdeeds.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

STATE OF NATIONAL ECONOMY ANALYZED

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 79 pp 16-18

[Text] Political events that occurred in Iran during the last Iranian year sharply reduced investment and production in the private and public sectors; the country which had suffered from inflationary pressures, also faced severe stagnation and unemployment.

While total demand somewhat moderated during the year due to stagnation, unemployment, and substantial drops in private and public investment, the fall in domestic production coupled with suspension of imports disrupted the balance of supply and demand.

Available statistics and evidence show that during the early months of the current year, production remains relatively stagnant in both the private and public sectors despite efforts by the Government to reactivate the economy. For instance, during the first quarter of this year government payments for development amounted to Rls.15 billion, showing a drop of 92% compared with the corresponding period of last year. At this rate, the budget allocations amounting to Rls.880 billion for development under the current budget will not be spent; and that in turn will lead to undesirable consequences arising from continued unemployment and stagnation.

Apart from operational obstacles on the path of government development projects, those industries which have been nationalized by the Government presently face numerous problems of management, labor, imports, etc.

Government measures such as nationalization of banks and some industries and generally the Government's approach during recent months have to some extent defined the rules and the order that will regulate the private sector's position in the future economy of Iran, and have reduced the crisis of confidence that had appeared during the revolution. Nonetheless, at least for the current Iranian year it would not seem likely that the top elements in the private sector will show much inclination towards investment. Therefore during the year 1358, reduced production by the private and public sectors during the revolution and the current problems faced in the reactivation of the economy, coupled with the inflexibility



of the economy's structure and the general shortage and lack of elasticity of supply in the short-term, will act as major elements in sustaining the inflationary pressures.

Such tasks as overcoming unemployment and stagnation, or fighting inflation can be carried out within the economic structure through fundamental measures and comprehensive and well-coordinated planning and in any case, economic reconstruction and improvement is not a task that can be carried out speedily; yet these problems require speedy and resolute action by the government in the following areas:

a) All difficulties and problems that hinder implementation of development projects should be examined and removed through urgent measures;

b) While production in the private and public sectors remain low, and since it is not possible to rapidly increase domestic production in a short period, the Ministry of Commerce should review its import policies and provide adequate facilities for importation of essential goods and services (both consumer and commodities). Where the private sector is reluctant to import the Ministry should directly import essential goods. This will also erode the part played by middle men who in recent years have effectively contributed to higher inflation.

c) Greater speed and resolution should be shown in connection with the selection of managers, solution of labor and import problems.

d) In view of the fact that the country's foreign currency reserves were announced to be between \$15 billion and \$12 billion during the first months of the current year (Iranian calendar), and since most of the economy cuts in the budget were in the foreign exchange field, it is essential--in order to ensure adequate availability of rials for the budget--for the public and private sectors to use all the foreign exchange that is to provide the rials allocated in the budget. Otherwise, in practice, the volume and base of the currency of the country in practice will have to be increased; and the monetary element will be added to the shortage of supply and the lack of its elasticity, as causes for higher inflation.

The Central Bank therefore must not only review its foreign exchange policy, but also actively supervise changes in the private sector liquidity; and to adopt appropriate policies in times of need and in connection with the overall state of the national economy.

e) Special priority should be given in the country's credit policy for the current year to funds allocated directly for the reactivation of the economy and those effective in increasing supply, especially in the building industry which is still stagnant. In view of the shortage in housing, as far as possible, loans for house buying should be discouraged while diverting bank loans towards house building.

f) The cottage and small industries which account for about 35% of the value added of the manufacturing sector, in the past mostly obtained its finance outside the banking system through the unofficial money market. In the country's credit policy in future, greater attention is essential for these labor-intensive industries.

g) The government policy of subsidies for consumers and financial assistance for producers must be reviewed and gradually reduced while using this method mainly as additional incentives for domestic production either directly or by reducing the cost price for raw materials and other goods required by industry and agriculture. In special cases, such as cement, where, in the past, a major portion of the shortages were due to corruption and the inadequacy of the distribution system, it is essential that the financial burden of such aids be reduced through appropriate measures in this field.

#### Financial Situation

The final estimate of government receipts and payments during the last (Iranian) year and a comparison of these figures with the 1356 annual budget as well as the current year's budget estimate are given in Table 1.\*\* As will be seen, the 1357 annual budget had the substantial deficit which could not be filled even by domestic and foreign loans and other credit sources. Consequently, the budget envisaged a net deficit of Rls.480.5 billion.

The political events of the year deeply affected the 1357 annual budget both in terms of receipts and of payments, so much so that public revenues (including oil and gas revenues, taxes other incomes, loans, etc.) fell from an estimated PIs.2,656 billion to Rls.1,150 billion, while expenditures out of the public budget fell from an estimated Rls.3,287 billion to Rls.1,986 billion. (These figures exclude private incomes and expenditures given in the budget.)

The decline in the general budget revenues during the past year compared to budget estimates was basically due to the decline in oil exports and its full suspension during the last months of the last (Iranian) year. Oil and gas revenues earmarked in the approved budget amounted to Rls.1,542 billion while in reality they did not exceed Rls.1,013 billion. To be continued.

CSO: 4920

IRAN

NATIONALIZATION OF SECONDARY INDUSTRIES SUGGESTED

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 3 Sep 79 p 9

[Text] Take, for example, an automobile factory which cannot produce autos unless the rubber and tire industries can meet its requirements. Under these circumstances, a capitalist would try to buy and gain control of factories capable of supplying him with the needed components. Thus he gains a monopoly and control of the market.

Nationalization and the Capitalists

In previous sections we have explained how capitalists own and manage most factories, banks and services in order to increase their profits and strengthen their domination until they have a monopoly over the market. Our aim in explaining this is to illustrate the capitalists' way of working and to confirm the need for nationalizing their holdings. The demands of productivity and economic laws reinforce the need for total nationalization of the large capitalist firms. If the government nationalizes one firm but not its suppliers, then the private capitalists can paralyze the government-owned firm by withholding supplies. In our opinion, the Commission on the Protection and Expansion of Industry ought to feel compelled to do the same thing as the capitalists, i.e., to completely control the different stages of production, the credit system and services.

In other words, they should nationalize and get control of all the firms and establishments in various fields which are controlled by capitalists.

Clearly, insufficient attention to this matter has stood in the way of achieving the final goals of nationalization, in loosening the grip of the capitalists and their foreign masters on our economy. Nationalizing some industries, while leaving the rest in the capitalists' hands, is not really nationalization, and ultimately it will strengthen the capitalists. The chief priority in nationalizing large industries is removing them from the control of their previous owners and entrusting the work to the workers and employees, to be guided by the interests of society. Dealing with the plunderers and colonizers in halfway measures will only double their power in the end. It is the responsibility of the workers and other steadfast individuals to demand real nationalization of industries.

A Clarification for the Members of the Khavar Council of Technical Services

With regard to the fact mentioned in your letter, that your company is 98-percent owned by the Khavar Co, nationalization of the latter automatically means that 98 percent of your company is nationalized, unless the shareholders anticipated what was going to happen and put your company's shares in another name than Khavar's.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATES MILLIONS TO SPUR PRODUCTION

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 2 Sep 79 p 10

[Text] The government has appropriated 50 billion rials to stimulate productive activities and services in the small to medium size range.

'Ali 'Akbar Moinfar, Deputy Minister in charge of the Planning and Budget Organization, made this announcement. He said that many individuals throughout the country are ready to undertake all kinds of productive activity. He added that for a long time now our country's economy in the industrial and manufacturing areas has relied on operators whose products and services were widely needed. At present, the Provisional Government of the Islamic Revolution seeks to expand the activities of the private sector and hard-working individuals, according to the precepts of the Koran and Islam. According to Moinfar, in order to stimulate small and medium size manufacturing and service enterprises, the Planning and Budget Organization, in collaboration with the Central Bank and the National Bank, has proposed a plan which will be passed on by the Economic Council next week. According to this plan, a sum of 50 billion rials is to be set aside for small and medium size manufacturing and service firms. It is a simple plan, intended to promote the establishment or expansion of needed manufacturing and services by extending easy credit to firms in more than a hundred fields, including drugstores, dental clinics, repair shops, icemaking and manufacturing rope, packing materials and cardboard out of bits of paper. The exact credit terms will be announced by the National Bank of Iran. The aim of this plan is to satisfy the public's needs through the efforts of the public itself. Accordingly, the basic aims of the plan are as follows:

1. Paying special attention to the importance of small producers of diverse goods in our economy, since they account for a large share of total output;
2. Expansion of small industries and shops with one or several employees;
3. Encouraging firms to renovate and innovate;
4. Expansion of agricultural and industrial output, as well as needed services;

5. Creating productive and useful employment opportunities, especially for youth;
6. Increasing the proportion of domestic value-added;
7. Increasing the prestige of useful and productive occupations in the agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors.
8. Promoting various activities outside of Tehran, particularly in rural areas;
9. Expanding the sphere of private-sector operations and a corresponding decrease in the economic and market role of the government.
10. Increasing the tendency toward change in patterns of consumption and attention to various domestically produced goods. In conclusion, Moinfar said that a sum of 50 billion rials was envisioned in the first stage of this program. If it is successful, the policy will be continued and the National Bank will be mobilized to extend loans throughout Iran.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

PRESS HIGHLIGHTS COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 79 p 7

[Text] FOREIGN EXCHANGE: Still new foreign exchange regulations, rather, restrictions were announced Thursday. Any Iranian traveller holding a passport can now buy only \$750 exchange at the official rate and \$1,500 at the unofficial governmental rate which is announced very Saturday by the Central Bank of Iran. The wife gets \$500 and \$1,000, respectively while each child gets \$250 and \$500, respectively--a total of no more than \$6,000 on a joint passport.

PORT CONGESTION: There is no more port congestion or queueing of ships near harbors any more due to reduction in Iran's imports, according to Roads Deputy Minister Abbasali Qavam. During the past 6 months 690 ships arrived at Iran's seven ports to unload nearly 4 million tonnes and load about 314,000 tonnes of goods. Import and export volume has decreased by 50 percent.

MEAT SHORTAGE: Supply of meat to supermarkets has been cut down by about 75% and this has faced the populaces of congested parts of towns with meat shortage. Some 400 tons of meat is distributed in Tehran daily--300 tons of mutton and 100 tons of beef. The government buys the meat at 280 Rials and sells it to the butchers at 80 Rials per kilo on the average.

NEW TELEPHONES: Iran will be able to install 250,000 new telephone lines without any need for foreign expertise, PTT Minister Dr Hassan Eslami says.

UNEMPLOYED ON THE MOVE: There have been many instances of demonstrations and sit-in protests across the country by the unemployed high school graduates. Instances have been reported from Noshahr, Langarood, Babak, Babol, Rasht, Noor, and some other parts of the country. Unable to provide jobs or give more convincing promises to the importuning job-seekers, the Governor of Noor had to flee the town!

FOREIGN BATTERIES: Commerce Ministry has authorized importation of up to 2.2 million car batteries of 6-volt and 12-volt capacity. This is expected to eliminate the black market caused by reduction in internal production.

BANK INTEREST: Seven percent bank interest will be paid to those who deposit their savings in housing credit schemes in banks, the Housing and Urban Development Minister Katirai promised Tuesday.

NO IMPORT DUTIES: Agricultural machinery and parts are to be made exempt from import duties and commercial benefit tax according to a new bill which has been approved by the Council of Ministers. Local production is to be encouraged.

VEGETABLE OIL: Import duties on vegetable oil will be cut by fifty percent in order to reduce its market prices. The government subsidizes the marketing of vegetable oil by 12 billion Rials annually.

CSO: 4920



IRAN

ESHRAQI PAVED WAY FOR DISMISSAL OF NIOC CHIEF

Industry Employees Dissatisfied With Nazih

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 15

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi, son-in-law and representative of the Emam Khomeyni in the country's oil-producing areas, said this morning in a press interview in Esfahan that the oil workers are greatly dissatisfied with Hassan Nazih.

Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi said in the interview, which was held in the Sayyed Mosque in Esfahan, that he had been dispatched to the oil-producing areas by the Emam in response to complaints reaching Khomeyni from the oil workers.

He said that the oil workers had complained during his mission about the rules which have caused a split between the workers and other employees. The difference in wages between workers and other employees has grown from 3,000 tomans to 5,500 tomans.

Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi said, furthermore, that the workers are not allowed the use of the libraries and other employee benefits. This kind of discrimination, he said, is just like the discrimination against blacks in America.

Emam Khomeyni's representative turned next to the subject of Hassan Nazih's selection as head of NIOC in the Bazargan government. He said that while the government remains subordinate to the Emam, the latter refrains from involvement in small details. Thus, the Emam was initially satisfied with the Prime Minister's selection of Nazih as head of NIOC.

Eshraqi added, however, that in view of the workers' complaints and the results of his mission, the Emam will find Nazih's continued leadership of the oil industry unacceptable, and it will be up to the prime minister to find a solution.

Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi finished by saying that "the Prime Minister certainly knows that we do not have a grudge and, God willing, fundamental decisions will be made in the future."

Khomeyni: No Confidence in Nazih

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 16

[Text] The Imam's representative, Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi, who traveled to the oil-producing regions to investigate their problems, said in an interview that the prime minister has always enjoyed the Imam's confidence, while Mr Nazih does not. He added that Nazih's policies as director of NIOC are responsible for unrest in the oil-producing areas.

Mr Sadeq Tabataba'i, the government's spokesman in the Nazih affair, said that the prime minister went to Qom to discuss various matters of state with the Imam. The Imam spoke about the problems surrounding the national oil company, including the problem of its director. The Imam said that he relies upon the prime minister alone to run the government, and to appoint and dismiss government officials. The prime minister's confidence or lack of confidence in a particular official is the basis for deciding whether or not that official should remain in office.

Hojjatoleslam Shahaboldin Eshraqi, who on the Imam Khomeyni's orders visited the country's oil-producing areas, said yesterday after a visit to the oil installations at Esfahan:

"The Imam has received many reports and complaints from persons in the oil and gas industry, and therefore, sent me, along with Hojjatoleslam Abtehi and a group of engineers, to the oil-producing regions to investigate. We held long meetings everywhere with oil industry workers and employees, and after detailed study we came to understand that the problem lay with the director of the national oil company, Mr Nazih. The latter's policies have caused the rift to widen between the workers and other employees of the oil industry, by increasing workers' pay from 3,000 toman to only 3,300 toman, while the other employees received a raise to 9,000 toman, thus increasing the pay differential between the two groups from 3,000 toman to 5,700 toman. This has been a source of indignation in the oil industry. Other disparities include differences in eating facilities, some of which are closed to workers, just as in some countries which bar blacks from areas reserved for whites."

Eshraqi also said that "while the workers and employees are demanding a thorough reform of the NIOC, Nazih is content just to move staff members around."

Next Hojjatoleslam Eshraqi stressed the need to pay more attention to the oil industry. He said that "the Imam Khomeyni does not involve himself in the details of running the country, and that it was not he who appointed Mr Nazih. Trusting Prime Minister Bazargan completely, the Imam has entrusted him with the responsibility for making official appointments. However, based on my own contacts with the Imam's office, I know that he is very dissatisfied with the management of the oil industry. He will never agree to let Nazih remain in office and, God willing, when I submit my report on my visit to the oil installations, it will not be long before the necessary decisions are made."

8921  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

SMALL CONSUMERS TO GET WATER, ELECTRICITY GRATIS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Sep 79 p 5

[Text] The exemption of small consumers from paying water charges, a measure which was proposed by the Minister of Power and passed by the Council of Ministers, has been approved by the Revolutionary Council.

Mr Tobatuba'i, financial advisor to the prime minister, elaborated on the plan as follows:

1. Small consumers who use less than 10 cubic meters of water per month are exempt from paying water charges;
2. Consumers who use more than 10 cubic meters of water per month will pay all water charges according to the present fee schedule.

The spokesman made the following points about the exemption of small domestic consumers from electricity charges, which has also been approved by the Revolutionary Council:

1. Consumers who use less than 100 KWH per month will be exempt from electricity charges, while consumers using more than 100 KWH per month will be charged the full rate according to the residential or commercial fee schedule, as applicable;
2. Small public services and large industrial concerns will also be billed according to the appropriate fee schedule;
3. Individual apartments will each be considered as a separate consumer for purposes of applying this regulation, provided that each has a separate electricity meter.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

NAVAL BASES TO BE CONVERTED INTO PORTS

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 29 Aug 79 p 12

[Text] Tehran-PARS NEWS AGENCY-Yesterday Ali Akbar Moinfar, Minister of State for the Plan and Budget Organization, who had recently visited Chah Bahar and Bandar Abbas in southern Iran together with Engineer Mostafa Katirayi, Minister of Housing and City Development, for a period of 2 days to study the development works, announced yesterday that they had first studied the condition of the incomplete projects of all naval bases. Since the government had changed its mind about continuing the work on the base as its project had originally been prepared, it was decided to put into operation the completed part of the project and investments that had been made for the establishment of a commercial port with a loading and offloading capacity for ships of up to 25,000 ton (capacity). The decision was made by taking the demands of the local people into consideration. For some time, Iran's Islamic Republican Navy and the Plan and Budget Organization had made studies to utilize the completed portion of the projects for improving local conditions in serving the people.

Moinfar added: In addition to this port, it was decided to establish two fishing ports near Kodar Chah Bahar. For promptness in action, the Ports and Shipping Organization undertook to prepare the project in 3 weeks and the Plan and Budget Organization provided the required credit immediately.

Monifar said: We visited Bandar Abbas and the existing problems regarding the commencement of projects were studied, so that the work on this port which is one of the most important and fundamental projects of the country would be started quickly. He added that it was also decided to take action, as soon as possible, regarding the establishment of a fishing port at Qishm Island. Representatives of the Ports and Shipping Organization have visited the site and undertaken to prepare the required project as soon as possible. The credit will be immediately provided by the Plan and Budget Organization for the establishment of the port.

In Bandar Abbas, the Persian Gulf shipyard was also visited. So far \$170 million have been spent on this shipyard. Talks were held with the responsible authorities and considering the studies made in the past few months, actions will be taken to limit it to a somewhat acceptable project.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

TRICOT, KNIT GOODS INDUSTRY NEARING A STANDSTILL

Tehran ETTALA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 14

[Text] The shortage of raw materials on the one hand and the uncontrolled increase of costs on the other has brought into serious danger the tricot and knit goods industry of Iran, as a result of which 150,000 workers of this industry might lose their jobs.

One of the wholesale dealers of Tehran's market stated to ETTALA'AT in this respect:

Compared to the last year the increase in costs amounts to 15 percent. Most of raw materials which are now in short supply had been previously the monopoly exercised by a managerial minority.

One of the chief exporters to the eastern districts stated: The prices of the raw materials have increased after revolution in several successive stages. At present more than 12 spinning mills are in operation in the country, of which the largest, called "Naznakh," has a capacity of 18 to 20 tons, whereas the actual production of this factory has decreased to one third. At present, with exorbitant increase in costs of raw materials and finished goods, we cannot compete at the international level.

Formerly, we imported raw materials from Japan, China and Korea, and reckoning the payment of 80 to 90 rials for custom duties our imports were still cheaper by 50 to 60 rials than the goods manufactured inside the country.

The internal production of knit goods and tricot is not only insufficient, but the government is also compelled to import a considerable amount of these goods. On the other hand there is interference of persons without competence in pricing knit goods and tricot and in handling related matters.

One of the executives responsible for distribution of articles produced by the "Naznakh" factory, while stressing the smallness of production and great demand, stated:

Before the revolution the "Naznakh" factory had 600 Korean workers, and all of them were dismissed. There are at present about 1000 Iranian workers in the factory, many of whom are not technically skilled.

The other spinning mills, whose post-revolution executive and administrative difficulties were not yet properly settled, have not placed their purchase orders for raw materials from abroad and even if such orders were placed they are insignificant compared to the past.

As regards prices of artificial fiber raw materials, they are directly interconnected with that of petroleum, and they increase day after day. Production parallels the situation. Increased wages also aggravate the condition. The majority of factories are likewise confronted with delayed settlements by buyers and bank pressures.

Shokuhi, director of the production of the "Nakh" factory of cashmeres, said:

The cashmere factory which started its operation 9 years ago had belonged to Mr. "Hay." After revolution the property of this person was confiscated and the factory was turned over to the Foundation for the Indigent. In the past month of Bahman [January-February] 150 Indian and Sinhalese workers and specialists of the factory were dismissed, and because of want of raw materials the work of the factory was temporarily stopped.

The capacity of the factory is 5 tons, but under actual conditions the production of one shift only did not exceed 2 tons.

To eliminate the present difficulties, the government itself should take direct steps to import artificial fiber and ensure raw materials for the factories.

The "Polyacryl" factory of Isfahan was founded by a joint Iranian and American investment. After the revolution it did not begin its operation and did not start producing raw materials.

With the onset of winter and the need of the people for clothing especially tricot and knit goods, it is necessary to take care of these problems as soon as possible.

Shokuhi added: According to statistics of the last year, 150,000 workers were employed in the tricot and knit goods industry of Iran. Under normal conditions the cashmere factory should have 500 workers, whereas our actual personnel does not exceed 220 workers.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

DOMESTIC INDUSTRY SEEKING TO MAKE SPARE PARTS FOR AUTOS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Sep 79 p 8

[Text] Rings, mudguards, springs, gear boxes, and differentials--very soon all of these parts may be manufactured in Iran by Iranian workers, and eventually Iran may be producing complete automobiles by itself. The first step in this direction has already been taken, with the establishment of an exhibition of the different parts and components which go into the various kinds of autos--Peykan, Zhiyan, Renault and Jeep. Iranian craftsmen who visited the exhibition were confident that they could build more than 90 percent of the items on display.

The Peykan, Renault, Zhiyan and Jeep factories, by putting these spare parts on display, tested Iran's capability to produce them. About 540 workers visited the Renault and Zhiyan displays; 175 of them said that they were ready to begin making the spare parts and engines themselves. In addition, 104 workers from the big tractor and machine works at Tabriz and the Arak machine works came to view the exhibit, and a number said that they could build spare parts for the Renault in their shops. They expressed amazement, after seeing the exhibit, that Renault's spare parts were so uncomplicated. The owners of 74 large and small shops were shown the spare parts for the Renault and Zhiyan, and a group of them offered to make the plastic and electrical components for these two cars. Some also offered to build the internal components and small parts. A total of 2,240 different auto parts were put on display in the exhibition: the Iranians said they could fabricate 2,040 of them. They said that their lack of financial means is an obstacle to building these items. One young worker from Kerman Province said that he is prepared to build the Renault's carburetor. This same young worker already has 26 technical inventions to his credit.

However, the person in charge of the Renault display said that the Renault factory also buys carburetors from Germany, and that building them is not easy. Students from the industrial colleges also visited the Renault and Zhiyan displays, because the government intends to use the industrial and polytechnical colleges to build auto parts. Officials have said that technical and industrial college instructors and students can put the results of their research and learning at the disposal of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. To this end, there should be close coordination between the country's industrial and educational policies.



An official of the Renault and Zhiyan factory, in speaking of the possibility of cooperation between his factory and independent shop and factory owners, said that "one of the goals of the exhibition was to become better acquainted with these individuals. Many of them are prepared to cooperate with us, and we are talking with them together in groups of 10-15, asking them about their factories' technical qualifications and their financial resources. A questionnaire is also under discussion, which would be given to shop and factory operators concerning their production methods. After preliminary discussions with these operators, contracts must be concluded with them. According to the contract with Renault of France, Iran can produce all of the spare parts for this auto, provided that they are subject to testing by Renault. However, even if Iran's technology is not of a sufficiently high level that we are capable of building the entire car here, I can say that Iranian workers can produce 50 percent of the Renault's spare parts."

At present, 95 percent of the spare parts for Renaults and other foreign cars are imported. Under the old regime, engines and spare parts which were supposedly "made in Iran" were actually imported from abroad, prolonging Iran's economic servitude and foregoing the opportunity to use Iranian workers. The workers expect the revolutionary government to change this misguided policy, to use our own workers' skills and to end the unnecessary importing of automobiles and spare parts. They expect the government to help in obtaining the capital needed to upgrade their facilities. Given such a policy, Iranian workers can manufacture spare parts which measure up to factory standards. The head of the Renault exhibit says that "we shall conclude cooperative agreements with manufacturers who we are certain will produce spare parts just like those that come from the factory. We shall also inspect their plants and, when they have given us all their technical qualifications, we shall ask them to build parts similar to samples which we have given them. We shall test the quality of their work.

"We shall choose those whose work is of the highest quality. Quality, not price, is the most important consideration for us. They should be able to produce spare parts just like those made in France."

Most Iranian manufacturers can produce plastic parts, and auto, bus and truck bodies. According to the head of the Renault exhibit, Renault engines very probably will be built in Iran. One company even announced that it could build 500 cylinders daily. Its factory has the type of computer equipment required to turn out Renault cylinders.

#### Raw Materials the Chief Question

The heads of the Renault and Zhiyan factories are responsible for providing their subcontractors with needed raw materials. At present, the Esfahan steel mill is capable of meeting only 30 percent of the domestic demand for steel, so that most of the needed steel must be imported from abroad. With

the planned increase in the Esfahan steel mill's production (to a level of 8 million tons), the output of spare parts will also rise. Another thing which should be pointed out here is that the auto manufacturers have concluded a cooperative agreement with other industries, so that they may be certain of being able to buy the goods they need. If this arrangement proves practical, the annual auto production will be scaled to match the availability of spare parts.

Iranian workers also said that they are capable of making all 230 of the parts for the Peykan auto which were put on display, and 121 out of the 183 Jeep parts.

The Minister of Industry and Minerals has said that other such exhibits will be set up in the near future.

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

BRIEFS

ARMS, DRUGS HAUL--The spokesman of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that as a result of the efforts by gendarmerie officials in Fars, Lorestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Esfahan, Khorasan and Mazandaran different types of combat weapons, side arms, hunting rifles, submachineguns, 11 pieces of equipment, 31,291 rounds of ammunition, 43,221 packets of foreign cigarettes, 5,660 kg of foreign tea, 200 kg of caviar, 15 kg of opium and other goods valued at 4 million rials have been discovered and seized. The guilty individuals have been arrested and handed over to the appropriate authorities. [Text] [LD291845 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 29 Oct 79 LD]

KHOMAYNI LOYALTY--Reports from Ahvaz indicate that a large group of people from the Muslim Bani Ka'b tribes, bearing pictures, slogans and placards, met opposite Khuzestan's governorate-general office this afternoon. According to this dispatch the representative of the Bani Ka'b tribesmen expressed in a speech the tribes' readiness to carry out the wishes of leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran Imam Khomeyni and condemned all discord-sowing and rioting. At the conclusion of the speech by the representative of the Bani Ka'b tribes an eight-point resolution was read out. The resolution, while renewing the league and covenant of the Bani Ka'b tribes in Khuzestan with the Imam Khomeyni, leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran, expressed the tribes' decisive support for all people who enjoy the support of the leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran. This resolution also says: We warn hypocrites and counterrevolutionaries, in whatever guise, that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim nation of Iran, particularly the pious people of Khuzestan, are keeping an eye with the utmost vigilance and wakefulness on the provocations instigated by malevolent people and are exposing their malevolent intentions against the pious and believing people of this area. The hypocrites should not imagine that by pretending they can divert the vigilant and dedicated people of Khuzestan from the course of the Islamic revolution of Iran. [Text] [LD301912 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 30 Oct 79 LD]

CSO: 4906

ISRAEL

'DAVAR' FORESEES CABINET FALLING, ANALYZES REASONS

TA280931 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Oct 79 p 9 TA

[Commentary by Daniyel Bloch: "A Spoke in the Wheels of Cabinet Reorganization"]

[Text] Some people thought Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's resignation would make it easier to reorganize the cabinet portfolios; and, there were even those who played with the thought that this resignation would unite the Coalition and extend its life, even if only by means of an artificial lung and kidney. This might have been correct had it been possible to carry out the simplest, not the most complicated, version of changes in portfolios: giving the foreign affairs portfolio to Dr Burg, who is in any case already fully involved in dealing with autonomy affairs; and giving the interior portfolio to Simha Ehrlich, since this is an area which he understands and which is close to his heart and that of his party. A change of this sort would have allowed appointment of Yiga'el Horowitz as minister of finance, something most of the components of the Likud and the NRP want. These changes would have prevented any complications with the Democratic movement over the matter of the foreign affairs portfolio and dealing with matters of welfare. They would have provided the Liberal Party with suitable compensation for having the finance portfolio taken away from it, given the NRP the most honorable status in the cabinet, made dealing with foreign affairs more efficient and finally put the Ministry of the Interior in the hands of a minister capable of devoting an appreciable part of his time to his ministry's work.

However, the simplest thing was not done because Dr Burg did not want and refused to accept the foreign affairs portfolio. He did this for two reasons: First, Burg fears that the younger generation in the NRP intends to get rid of him before the next elections and that the foreign affairs portfolio would serve as the finale of his career, since there is no guarantee that the NRP will be able to hold on to it in the next government and perhaps there will be new elections this year. Second, the heads of his faction in the NRP are not prepared to give up the Ministry of the Interior, which is a position of power both within

the NRP and in the country, a position they are not prepared to lose, especially now when there is a possibility of new elections. We read in Friday's HATZOFÉ that religious educators appealed to Dr Burg, asking him not to leave the Ministry of the Interior because in his position he greatly helps the religious educational institutions. And we, for some reason, thought that Zvulun Hammer was in charge of matters of religious education. But in any case, Burg is not prepared to move over to the Foreign Ministry.

If Begin only had to appoint a foreign minister without any regard to changes in the government's functioning or to moving Simha Ehrlich out of the Ministry of Finance, then he could have found a nonparty person from outside the government for this job or given this portfolio to a man from his party--Yitzhaq Shamir, the Knesset speaker. However, such an appointment would not have solved the Coalition problems, just as the appointment of Justice Minister Shmu'el Tamir to foreign minister would also not solve the problem because Simha Ehrlich is not a legal expert. The only possibility remaining is the appointment of Yiga'el Yadin as foreign minister and Simha Ehrlich as deputy prime minister. On the surface this is a reorganization dropped from heaven, but it appears that matters are not so simple.

First, there is Yadin's personal problem: How can a man who does not accept some of the government's political lines--especially in the field of settlement--and the desires of the prime minister and other ministers to annex territories, conduct Israel's diplomatic political contacts? How can Yadin accept a situation in which the autonomy negotiations are being conducted by the minister of the interior (and Burg will certainly not give up this role in favor of Yadin)? In any case, Yadin is being severely criticized by the public for his participation in the government. His excuse is that he is dealing with matters of welfare and the interior, which were primary among the DMC's interests. How can he justify himself, leave these issues and move to political affairs, regarding which he is not happy with the government?

Second, Yadin cannot and is not prepared to let the status of Minister of Labor and Betterment Dr Katz be damaged. It is no secret that the Likud is casting envious eyes at this portfolio, and only a threat of resignation by Yadin in the past prevented this portfolio from being taken away from Katz. The number of Democratic MK's in the government certainly does not justify an addition in the form of the foreign affairs portfolio. On the other hand, the Liberals will not agree to having the finance portfolio taken away from them without compensation in the form of another important portfolio such as labor and betterment. It is true that over the last few days a solution has been proposed--the establishment of a Ministry of Information headed by Minister Moshe Nissim. But this is a fairly weak solution since it is doubtful whether the Foreign Ministry will concede the information issues it deals with, whether Zvulun Hammer will give up domestic information, which is in his

sphere, and whether the prime minister's office will easily give up the government press office. In addition to this, Moshe Nissim's suitability to serve as the person in charge of information matters is not exactly great.

Neither is Yadin enthusiastic about the NRP demand to have Dr Ben-Me'ir appointed deputy foreign minister. Cynics claim that the division of labor between the pair would be as follows: Yadin would be in charge of the ceremonies, the banquets, the cocktail parties and the trips abroad, and Dr Ben-Me'ir would be in charge of the way everything is run. Experience shows that in coalition governments it is difficult to work in a ministry where the minister and the deputy minister are not members of the same party, and Yadin is not interested in having a Kashrut supervisor tied to him in the Foreign Ministry.

All these developments have brought the reorganization of the government to the threshold of a crisis. This is so even without mentioning Yiga'el Horowitz' peak of cynicism. Having resigned from the cabinet because of his opposition to its policy, he is now prepared to return to it in return for the finance portfolio.

There is no doubt that many ministers will be against him either because it is him, or for the same reasons which made Ehrlich fail, and Begin's guarantee of support is now meaningless. We can predict with certainty that, in any event dispute between Horowitz and David Levi, Begin will support Levi. Also, in any dispute between the minister of finance and the education minister, Begin will support Hammer. We will not mention such difficult customers as 'Ezer Weizman, Yitzhaq Moda'i and Hayim Landau. Those close to Ehrlich also said this week: There is no doubt that Horowitz will fail within 2 months. But as things turned out at the end of the week, there is no guarantee that he will be given the chance to prove his ability or lack of ability in the Ministry of Finance.

This bundle of complications was added to on Friday by Ari'el Sharon's bombshell demand that, as a condition for his remaining in the government, there must be legislation which will in the future prevent the high court of justice from interfering in the settlement issue. Every political observer knows that meeting such a demand would be a complicated and almost impossible task. First of all, because it might create international complications. This is so because such legislation would mean applying Israeli law to the territories, something Israel committed itself at Camp David not to do, either during the autonomy negotiations or during the 5 years of the autonomy. It committed itself not to do this before the end of the negotiations over the final status of these territories. However, in addition to the international side, it is doubtful whether such legislation would find a majority in the Knesset since the Democratic movement, some of the Liberals and 'Ezer Weizman will vigorously object to it and the Democratic movement's opposition is sufficient for the government not to have a majority in the Knesset.

We believe that Sharon is presenting a vigorous demand to the cabinet because he is interested in causing a government crisis even before the end of the 30 days stipulated by the high court of justice for the evacuation of Elon More. Sharon probably believes that an interim government, facing elections, will not take the risk of a confrontation with Gush Emunim and will leave the issue frozen until after the elections. It is doubtful whether the government, or even an interim government, will be able to take such an approach, and we cannot know whether Sharon will carry it through to the end. However, it is clear that last week's two dramatic events--Moshe Dayan's resignation and the high court of justice decision on Elon More--have not strengthened the government, but have speeded up the process of disintegration within it. There were those who said in the Knesset this week that the government has already fallen, but the ministers have not yet heard about it.

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

PALESTINIANS REACT STRONGLY TO ISRAELI LAND DECISION

West Bank Mayors

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 1, 5

[Article: "Widescale Reaction to Decision To Permit Israelis To Buy Land. The Mayors Explain the Serious Dimension of the Decision"]

[Text] The Israeli Government's decision adopted Sunday to allow Israelis to buy land on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip has provoked widescale reactions.

The Municipal Council of Nablus has prepared a protest memo to be submitted to the Israeli authorities.

The mayor of Nablus, Bassam al-Shak'ah, said that the decision is a perpetuation of occupation, a confirmation of the policy of expansion and reveals Israel's true intentions and the falsehood of its claim of seeking peace.

He added that the decision is a blatant violation of valid laws, as well as the Geneva and the UN charters. This makes it incumbent upon local, Arab and international public opinion to firmly resist this policy and to secure the national rights of the Palestinian people including the right to establish their independent state, as the only basis for peace in the area.

Muhammad Hassan Milhim, mayor of Halhul, stated that this decision is an extension of Israel's old policy which it had used to confiscate Arab lands under the pretext of security. He called for the issue to be brought before world public opinion.

The mayor of Al-Birah, Ibrahim al-Tawil, expressed his belief that no citizen is willing to sell his land to the Jews. He said that anyone who allows himself to violate the national consensus in the occupied West Bank should be dealt with with an iron fist in various means and fashions.

The Gaza Municipal Council held an emergency session, after which it issued a statement stressing that the decision is aimed at usurping Palestinian



land and enabling Gush Emunim to establish settlements by various authoritarian means.

The Municipal Council sent cables of denunciation to the Israeli prime minister and defense minister, the U.S. President, the ruler of Egypt and Dr Kurt Waldheim.

Ilyas Frayj, the mayor of Bethlehem, condemned this decision and stated that it will have serious consequences because it means that the Israeli Government is pursuing its policy on self-administration before the conclusion of the talks on this issue and despite the Palestinians' opposition.

'Adel Ghanim, the secretary general of the Trade Unions Federation said that the decision was absolutely unjust and illegal. It indicates Israel's desire to expand and to annex the West Bank, and it belies all words about the alleged peace.

Zafir al-Masri, head of the chamber of commerce and deputy mayor of Nablus, stated that all citizens have expressed their indignation over this decision which confirms Israel's intentions to annex occupied Arab lands and deprive our people of their right to their land.

He said that this decision fully contradicts existing laws in the occupied territories which forbid the sale of land to non-Palestinians, let alone the citizens of the occupation state.

Haj Ma'zuz al-Masri told AL-SHA'B: "We do not accept this decision, nor do we accept autonomy. The Palestinian's adherence to the land will not be affected by this decision."

A number of citizens expressed their views to AL-SHA'B reporters about this matter.

'Abd al-Rahman al-Shumali said that this decision compliments Israel's plan to expropriate the land gradually and is another link in this plan's chain adopted long ago and which [has been upheld by] Al-Sadat's policy.

Khalid Shabaru, president of Al-Najah University's student federation, said that the citizens are too aware to be affected by such decisions.

Khalidun 'Abd al-Haqq, a municipal councilman, said: "We are just like passengers on a hijacked plane who are subjected to one extortion after another by the hijacker, but are helpless. Those laws and decisions are a totally false pretext."

'Atef Sa'd said that this decision is an extension of the pattern used by the occupation authorities. "We categorically reject this decision and any others like it," he said.

Merchant Subhi al-'Anabtawi said: "Our land was made fair game by the occupation of 1967. It is not surprising that now it is fair game to be bought and sold."

Isma'il Safiyah said: "This is an entirely illegal decision; the Israelis have no right to own a single inch of Palestinian Arab land."

'AL-QUDS' Editorial

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Israeli Decision and Us"]

[Text] From the practical standpoint, the Israeli decision to permit individual Jews or private organizations to buy land in the occupied areas has not had unexpected or unknown results.

If we say that the step is contrary to international law and custom, this would not be the first time, nor in all probability would it be the last, in which Israel has violated international law. In fact, Begin and other senior officials do not hide their allegation that occupied territory is "liberated Israeli land." Moreover, members of "Gush Emunim," who enjoy official support, have gone so far as to say that Jordanian and international laws do not apply to the occupied territory because they are, according to their claim, Israeli territory.

If we were to say that the objective is to seize more land and to establish settlements, then the Israeli Government in fact has not been "remiss" in this regard. It has seized vast areas of land before the issuance of this decision, either by open confiscation of land for settlements or by veiled confiscation such as closing of certain areas, security reasons and establishment of military areas. All of this leads ultimately to the same objective which is to turn the occupied territories into a Jewish area as quickly as possible in order to settle it and absorb in the Arab territories immigrants from all parts of the world.

Although we, as Palestinians, have so far been unable to prevent the Israeli Government from confiscating land and building settlements because its power is bigger than us, we can certainly confront the recent decision.

If the Israeli Government feels that it is entitled to pass laws for the purchase of Arab lands, then we feel that it is our right, since the land is ours, to refuse to sell this land which is the crux of the conflict in the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, it is our responsibility, from a purely practical standpoint, to invalidate this decision since no one pays heed to denunciation, protests and citation of international law and covenants. If Israel chooses to continue to confiscate land by its special well known fashion, then this is another matter which is unrelated to its recent decision.

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ISRAEL

ARMY DESERTIONS, OFFENSES BY WOMEN SOLDIERS INCREASE

TA300726 Jerusalem POST in English 30 Oct 79 p 2 TA

[Article by David Richardson]

[Excerpts] The number of soldiers deserting from military service has been growing since 1973. This was revealed yesterday by Tat-Aluf Baruch Arbel, the commander of the military police who was briefing military reporters in Tel Aviv to mark Military Police Day this week.

Arbel noted that avoidance of military service was becoming more acceptable among certain sections of the population. He mentioned in particular people whose parents had been excused from military service because of absorption problems and who did not provide their children with any positive incentive in this direction.

Among the deserters there are also a significant number of foreign volunteers from countries such as South Africa, England and Canada, who desert during their service and leave the country on their foreign passports.

The number of soldiers who go absent without leave for short periods is about 15,000, he noted.

Referring to the military prisons, Arbel mentioned that the past two years had seen a disturbing upswing in the number of women soldiers imprisoned. Last year's total was nearly 1,000.

He attributed the increase, in part, to the fact that the army was being forced to draft women whom it would normally turn down because many others were exempted on declaring themselves observant.

Referring to the recent case in which soldiers allegedly stole weapons from an ordnance corps store in the Sinai and sold them to Arab arms dealers in the Wadi Ara region, Arbel disclosed that in the past two years there have been about 10 similar cases.

CSO: 4820

ISRAEL

'HA'ARETZ' PROVIDES STATISTICS ON EXPROPRIATED LAND

TA010947 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Nov 79 pp 1, 2 TA

[By Ze'ev Schiff, HA'ARETZ Military Correspondent]

[Text] Since the IDF conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 61,040 dunam have been expropriated there on grounds of military and security needs. About 21,000 dunam have not been put at the disposal of the settlers, distributed in 65 settlements of various types. In addition, the state purchased 80,000 dunam of private land in the West Bank. These findings emerge from figures gathered by the defense ministry. According to this survey, 61,000 dunam have been expropriated in Judaea and Samaria, and only 40 dunam in the Gaza Strip.

According to International Law, this expropriation is considered to be temporary as long as the conquering force remains in the area and no final arrangement is reached. This confiscation does not expropriate the ownership. [Sentence as published].

Out of the expropriated lands, 21,000 dunam have not been given to the various settlements. Hence the rest of the land--40,000 dunam--has been earmarked for settlements and the settlers' agricultural needs. The number of Jewish settlements of all types (excluding footholds or neighborhoods near Jerusalem) reaches 57 in Judaea and Samaria and 8 more in the Gaza Strip.

According to data obtained by the defense ministry, 696,000 dunam in the West Bank and 40,000 dunam in the Gaza Strip are currently registered as state-owned lands. In addition, there are 63,000 dunam of disputed ownership in the Gaza Strip. The same undetermined status applies to 530,000 dunam of land in the West Bank. It has been reported that no thorough survey of the unregistered and uncultivated lands in these two regions has yet taken place.

Other lands registered under various elements: private lands--3,200,000 dunam [presumably in the West Bank] and 250,000 dunam in the Gaza Strip. [According to International Law, even municipal lands are considered private].

Absentee property--430,000 dunam in the West Bank and 8,000 dunam in the Gaza Strip. Land registered as belonging to Jews from before 1948--30,000 dunam in the West Bank and 800 dunam in the Gaza Strip.

JORDAN

AUTHORITIES KEEP EYE ON MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 25

[Article: "Has the Confrontation Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Authorities Begun?"]

[Text] Last week the Jordanian capital, 'Amman, witnessed the first in a series of steps in the anticipated confrontation between "the Muslim Brotherhood Group" and the Jordanian authorities.

On Thursday evening, 6 September 1979, the residents of the capital were startled to see large numbers of police armed with truncheons and light weapons take up positions in the center of the city, particularly in the great square facing the Great al-Husayni Mosque and along the narrow streets and markets leading from it.

Naturally nosy people would flock together to find out the facts, particularly since it was something completely new, for the first time in more than 7 years, for security forces to appear in such a fashion.

Jordanian sources said, "What the Jordanian security officials had done was merely to take 'precautionary measures' to warn the 'Muslim Brotherhood Group' and give it to understand that the authorities were vigilant, and that it could not begin a new confrontation with them after years of an unannounced truce between the two sides."

However, what did happen?

The same sources related the following odd tale to AL-Mustaqbal:

On Wednesday evening, 5 September, the Jordanian security machinery got hold of a "secret publication" which had been distributed by the "Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan" and called for "solidarity with the Muslim Syrian people who were being subjected to collective repression and massacres." The statement called upon the Jordanian Government to intercede with the Syrian Government to halt these alleged massacres and also called upon all Muslims in Jordan to hold a peaceful demonstration the next day--that is, Friday--to express

their sympathy with their brother Muslims in Syria. The statement, or publication, also fixed the Great al-Husayni Mosque, the largest mosque in Amman, as the starting point for the demonstration, which would start right after the prayers.

The Jordanian sources went on to say: So the security machinery found itself between a rock and a hard place. It could either ignore the affair, as it had ignored a number of earlier movements by the Muslim Brotherhood, and in this event the Brotherhood would escalate the crisis, leading who knows where. Or it could follow a compromise solution, heading off and aborting the Brotherhood's plan. The latter course was chosen.

The Jordanian source went on to say that a rumor went around at the same time that there would be an execution of a man condemned for a serious moral crime, and the execution would be at the front of the al-Husayni Mosque square, the site of all hangings for more than 30 years. No sooner had this rumor spread with great speed than crowds began to collect at the execution site, and this attracted the attention of the security authorities. They had to impose control over the area, and this prompted the Muslim Brotherhood to launch a demonstration against them. This is what happened. Throughout the morning and until the afternoon, police surrounded all the exits from the mosque, and so any idea of a demonstration was automatically abandoned. Naturally there was no execution, there having been no crime against public morals.

However, the question raised by this "incident" is still going around the Jordanian capital, whetting the appetite for what story tomorrow will bring. The question is: Has the time come for a confrontation between the Jordanian Government and the Brotherhood?

It is an important question, one well understood by those aware of the history of the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Jordan, whether from the standpoint of its size in the Jordanian streets and its ability to arouse them, or of its being the one political organization permitted to operate publicly in Jordan. This comes from the fact that the law banning parties passed in the mid-1960's does not touch it, since the Brotherhood is not a "party" but a "group," and the law bans "parties," not "groups."

In any case, nothing is certain except that a relationship of "watchful waiting" and extreme watchfulness pervades the "group's" relations with the Jordanian authorities. This relationship began when the Muslim Brotherhood organized a "popular delegation" to go to Iran and congratulate Imam al-Khumayni on the success of the Islamic revolution. This relationship was stepped up when the Syrian authorities declared war on the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria shortly before and following the Aleppo massacre.

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JORDAN

INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Oct 79 p 21

[Interview with the Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry by Randah Taqi al-Din]

[Text] There are only a very few countries that are not grumbling about the sparse inflow of Arab fiscal surpluses and not claiming that their balances of payments are suffering because of oil prices, and Jordan is one of those few. It is confident of the ability of its economic structure to attract the flow of capital, in the wake of productive projects and economic assets that can make it the starting point for many industries operating jointly with foreign institutions wishing to market their products in Arab markets. However, what are the factors behind this Jordanian position?

Dr Najim al-Din Dajani, Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry, defined these factors:

[Question] How do you appraise the Arab aid policy, what is Jordan's share of capital, and what effect does this have on the domestic sectors?

[Answer] The Arab oil-producing countries are currently playing a large role in helping with the expenses of economic development and the costs of purchases by developing countries. However, the rise in oil prices during the past 6 months has also affected the prices of all materials, whether oil products, foodstuffs, industrial commodities, manufactured goods, or minerals. There has been a great rise in the prices of all these things. While the oil price rise was in the 15-percent range, the prices of many commodities rose more than 60 percent, with an overall average of 25 to 30 percent. This high percentage had severe inflationary effects. The developing countries have specific financial needs so as to continue to implement their development plans and to cover the costs of purchases abroad. However, the prices for exports by the developing countries have not risen as much as the prices of their imports. Therefore, one has to say that the [oil] exporting Arab countries are playing a much larger role than any industrial country, countries with great capabilities. What some Arab countries, such as Qatar, have provided has amounted to 20 percent of their national income, while

Saudi aid has amounted to 4 percent of income and the UAE 10 percent. These are high percentages. What has been provided by the industrial countries--the United States, for example--amounts to not more than .03 percent. Based on national incomes, the Arab countries are providing at least 10 times what the industrial countries are providing. We would like to find a higher percentage earmarked for aiding the Arab countries, but this percentage would require a specific climate and specific investment opportunities. Some countries are luckier than others, in the sense that they have readied their investment opportunities. Jordan attracts a great deal of Arab capital. While the economic nature of some countries require a reliance on a flow of government capital for developing the infrastructure, others have moved into a position where they can use these investments in production projects. Jordan is one of these latter countries, because throughout the 1960's and the early part of the 1970's it undertook huge projects within the context of building its infrastructure and created an economic base to enable productive investments to play a part in economic development. Consequently, Jordan's share of foreign investments is greater, for example, than that of other countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, or Sudan. The economic infrastructure is there, on the one hand, and on the other hand it helps to attract private capital. While some countries depend totally upon official outside capital, Jordan is in a position whereby private and public funds alike can be invested. I would estimate that investments in the industrial sector, education, and tourism in Jordan as the result of private foreign financing and investments have amounted to \$1 million a week during the past year, in addition to the extensive funds that enter Jordan for real estate purposes, and about 70 percent of these investments are Arab.

#### The Arab Common Market

[Question] There is continuing talk about the importance of the Arab Common Market. Is this market a reality or is it still just an idea? What does Jordan hope to gain from belonging to it?

[Answer] Official investments for the most part depend on the level of international relations and on specific bilateral relations. The bases of the market issue are completely different from the private investments sector, which is fundamentally working for revenue and profits and is influenced by the level of confidence and by the investment climate in the country and guarantees felt by the investor that his investment will last. An evaluation of the situation in any country hinges upon the nature of the offers, whether they are agreements of the Arab Market, bilateral agreements, or agreements to guarantee investments or bar double taxation. They all help. However, the basic thing is the availability of investment opportunities. Jordan's being a member of the Arab Common Market helps it for foreign investments. Moreover, there are European institutions that recently have begun seriously to discuss entering into joint projects in Jordan with the objective of marketing their products in the Arab Common Market countries and the other Arab countries. In the industrial sector, for instance, there are a number of German, Danish, British, Norwegian, and Bulgarian institutions and others that have begun to try to find Jordanian partners to carry out joint projects



aimed at entering Arab markets which they find difficult to enter directly, such as the Saudi market. By industrializing and creating Jordanian industries with Jordanian material and labor, they can now get into these markets. Then there is another investment approach: some industrial countries, particularly European countries, have begun to feel the need to hold on to their share of certain markets and, consequently, have to get preferential treatment or lose these markets. An example of this is the electronic industry. Color television industries are being established today, for example, in Syria and Iraq, and the industries of these countries are entering Arab markets in the member countries of the Arab Common Market exempt from customs duties. The difference in duties in this regard amounts to 70 to 80 percent, with a minimum of 40 percent. Enjoying this exemption gives these projects an advantage. Therefore, a number of countries are trying to set up such industries in Jordan to get this advantage, because after there is sufficient industrialization, their products can enter these markets as a local industry. A third pattern arises from the fact that our area is wealthy. Jordan continuously works to develop its industrial sector by pursuing a specific strategy aimed at expansion in order to export industrial commodities to foreign markets. The local Jordanian market is limited in size because of low population. Therefore, the Jordanian industries that have been established during the past 3 years have had a goal of more than 70-percent dependence on the export market. Jordan enjoys certain advantages in having a trained and qualified labor force, a high degree of education, and the availability of certain basic material, in addition to the preferential agreements, being a member of the Arab Common Market and the cooperation agreement with the EEC in addition to agreements with a number of countries of the socialist camp and Asian countries, such as Japan, China, and Indonesia. All these factors have opened up new opportunities for export of Jordanian commodities, and, consequently these countries in turn have obtained concessions for the entry of their goods.

[Question] How much have Jordan's revenues been affected by the downturn in phosphate prices, and do you think that the prices will continue to fall?

[Answer] Phosphates are Jordan's primary export commodity, averaging 2.5 million tons this year. Production has currently begun at a new mine, and our production from it is expected to rise to about 1.5 million tons. Jordan also exports fruits and vegetables to the Gulf area and Saudi Arabia. Next in line comes industrial goods, starting with raw plastics and moving to building materials, fabricated metal products, and a number of consumer and middleman commodities. We are now concentrating on high-technology industries which require intensive capital. Although Jordan exports labor, it at the same time imports some and, therefore, tries to rely on technology more than on labor-intensive projects. Phosphate prices have again begun to rise gradually, but I think that during the coming year the increase will be in the range of 12 to 15 percent. Nevertheless, Jordan's exports of phosphates and industrial commodities are almost enough to cover the cost of our crude oil imports. Given a strong industrial posture relying on outside financing, revenues from tourism, and remittances from Jordanians working abroad, Jordan is in a good financial position, despite the rise in prices, and its balance

of payments still registers a surplus, though a small one. Jordan is still suffering from an external deficit, as is the case with a large number of developing countries.

[Question] How is Jordan meeting the challenge of the problem of food security?

[Answer] We are constantly working to ensure food security. One has to remember that when the 1967 war broke out, there was no lack of food supplies in Jordan, particularly flour and wheat. Food stocks in Jordan are sufficient for more than 2 weeks. We now have grain storehouses and mills sufficient for our consumption for a long time. As for other commodities, such as meat and poultry, we now have widely dispersed cold storage and frozen food depots with sufficient quantities to last us for months, in addition to a number of strategic commodities. We have paid careful attention to all these things. However, the rise in commodity prices has proven to us that our actions have had a good return. For example, there has been a big rise in the prices of several commodities, but storage costs and interest charges on the funds tied up in storing them have still been far less than what we would have had to pay were we to buy them at current prices. With regard to local food production, during the past 2 years Jordan has seen a severe lack of rainfall which has prevented us from taking advantage of a large number of dams we had earlier constructed, because they did not collect the required rainwater, and this had an effect on agricultural crops.

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LEBANON

EFFECT OF JUMBLAT'S DEATH ON NATIONAL MOVEMENT DISCUSSED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 13 Oct 79 pp 16-20

[Text] It is often said that the death of Kamal Jumblat marked the beginning of the end of the National Movement's unity. The Movement, which groups now around 22 leftist, nationalist and progressive parties and organizations has been consistently trying to preserve its unity and existence ever since the death of its leader and founder, in March, 1977. However, the assassination of Kamal Jumblat was not the only reason why the Movement fell in trouble, many other factors have provoked the disintegration of the Movement. And the general impression today is that the National Movement, in addition to being torn apart, has somewhat failed in fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created.

First Steps. The birth of the Lebanese Leftist National Movement, like that of the rightist Lebanese Front, was not in the natural order of things. It was merely a regrouping of parties that were separated by many factors, including their ideologies, and especially their allegiances, within movements or fronts whose sole purpose was to fight against each other and which failed to come up, towards the people, with an alternative to the system they were supposedly denouncing.

The birth of these fronts and movements was linked to the onset of the Lebanese crisis. Drawn from the realm of traditional opposition to which they belonged, these parties were bound to return to it as soon as their role was fulfilled. The political aspirations they formulated were already beneath the aspirations of the mass they were to represent, and, although the National Movement drew up a detailed programme of political, administrative and social reforms, it failed to present concrete proposals of economic reforms which could have palliated the political and ideological lackings of their policy statements and platforms.

The National Movement has been known under this name only since 1974, but it was founded several years earlier, in 1969-1970 as the "Regrouping of National and Progressive Forces and Parties". Led by Kamal Jumblat, this group included mainly Jumblat's Party--the Progressive Socialist Party--and the Lebanese Communist Party, as well as a number of Lebanese

leftist personalities. The Baath Party joined it in 1971 as one party and remained as a pro-Syrian branch and a pro-Iraqi branch after the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties split.

The "Regrouping" was represented in Parliament by a bloc called the National Struggle Front which was also led by Kamal Jumblat. It dealt mainly with social and political problems. On the social level, the Regrouping devoted time and attention to the problems of tobacco planters, fishermen, students, factory workers, etc... And on the political level, it called for political and administrative reforms and for official and popular support for the Palestinian cause, especially after the September 1970 events in Jordan.

The Jordanian events marked the beginning of close cooperation between the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, and the beginning of strained relations between the National Movement and the Lebanese state, especially after the first major Army-Palestinian clashes of 1973.

The National Movement acquired this name in July, 1974, after a meeting at the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut. All progressive, nationalist and leftist parties and "unions" (Ittihad) joined its ranks. A few months later, a Central Political Council was formed under Kamal Jumblat and a number of institutions were created--such as the Regional Councils in the various Mohafazats (provinces) of the country.

From A Cause To A War. In the early 1970's, Kamal Jumblat accomplished two steps, one was to confer a legitimate status to the Lebanese Communist Party which thus became the only Arab Communist Party not to be banned, and the second was to unify the various leftist parties and forces in the country.

The creation of the National Movement came in the wake of these moves and was primarily aimed at setting up, in Lebanon, a movement that could work and struggle alongside the Palestinian resistance. Jumblat is said to have had a two-fold purpose:

1--On the one hand, he was eager to assume the leadership of a movement serving an enormously popular cause in the Arab world, which would have seated his political weight and influence on bases reaching far beyond the limits of Lebanon.

2--On the other hand, such an action would have enabled him to reinforce his position on the local political scene to give momentum to the programmes of reforms and the changes he was calling for, and to strengthen his action against the rightist alliances.

A non-National Movement source who knew Jumblat well told THE ARAB WORLD that in his opinion Jumblat "was cornered" and had no choice but to tread the path he tread, when the Lebanese war was looming. The source added that he was "probably wrong in his calculations because the data were not clear.... He was not aware of the reality of the Syrian role in Lebanon."

The Factors Of Disintegration. The assassination of Kamal Jumblat in March, 1977, dealt the National Movement a heavy blow on more than one level. It soon appeared that it was only the personality of this leader and the nature of his leadership that could bring together and keep together parties that only shared a role in common, but very little by way of prospects, principles and purposes.

On the internal level, the loss of Jumblat meant the loss of unity for the National Movement. On the local level, this loss cost the National Movement the official support that had enabled it to survive and enjoy some influence. Furthermore, it also cost the Movement the Arab and international support it had enjoyed because of the Arab and international support and esteem Jumblat had earned.

In addition to the support, the National Movement lost its independence, of thought and action and fell because of the inter-Arab differences that were not long to override the unified action the Movement had maintained during the two-year war.

Little by little problems and factors emerged that further deepened the gap between the various sides regrouped in the Movement:

- 1) The problem of choosing a successor to Jumblat at the head of the Movement.
- 2) The conflict between the Baath parties and the communist parties
- 3) Inter-Arab conflict and differences
- 4) The change in National Movement-Palestinian relations brought about by the recent Middle East Developments
- 5) The new pattern assumed by the Lebanese question since the onset of the Middle East peace talks, and the change in the attitude of the Lebanese leftist and Moslem base.

Leadership and Conflicts. More than two years have now elapsed since the death of Jumblat and no solution has yet been found to the problem of his succession. That the PSP would remain the dominating party in the Movement and Kamal Jumblat's son, Walid, the leader of both party and Movement, was questioned by most of the other sides because of Walid Jumblat's young age and lack of experience. Each sponsor-state also sought to put forward its own side and the unity of the Movement fell prey to the inter-Arab conflicts.

The main consequence of these conflicts was that the National Movement lost its independent decision-making and policy making which led to the outbreak of many internal conflicts, such as the recent crisis with the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Baath Party. After the arrests and executions that followed the announcement of an abortive coup d'etat in Iraq, PSP leader Walid Jumblat criticized the executions. This drove the Iraqi Baath Party

to quit the National Movement. It returned a while later to avoid being completely isolated on the Lebanese scene.

Another lasting problem has been the defiance of the nationalist or pan-Arab parties towards the main leftist organizations in the Movement: the Communist Party and the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL).

Earlier this summer, a conflict developed between Walid Jumblat and the Nasserite Independent Movement (Mourabitoun) following the implementation by Jumblat of a decision to close down most of his Party's offices in West Beirut. He was accused of trying to comply with the demands of the state.

As time went by less joint communiques were issued by the National Movement and, whereas in Kamal Jumblat's time communiques expressed the position of the entire Movement, after his death, each party, organization issued its own statements and they were sometimes contradictory. The Movement's paper AL WATAN, which is mainly controlled by the Left, sometimes ignored declarations or statements made by other parties and this prompted Jumblat to re-open the PSP's organ, AL ANBA.

The Raison d'etre. Primarily, however, National Movement sources believe that the Movement has lost its raison d'etre. Founded to take up arms alongside the Palestinian resistance they have been outrun by the Palestinians in the first stage and, in the second stage, the Palestinians have stopped the struggle everywhere in Lebanon, except in the South, to launch political and diplomatic activities on an international level. In addition to this, they have also lost a substantial part of the support given to them by the Moslems of Lebanon who were irritated by abuses and have now turned their attention and support to formations such as the Moslem Alliance, the Front for the Safeguard of the South and the Higher Shiite Council.

On the other hand, intensive efforts aimed at bolstering coordination and unity between the National Movement and Fronts such as the pro-Syrian National Front (led by Kamal Chatila) and the National Confrontation Grouping (led by Minister Talal Meraabi), have failed.

Prospects. The internal situation of the National Movement has slightly improved over the past few weeks as its leaders have been trying to build a new solidarity among the parties and organizations on the basis of agreement on some principles such as attachment of the unity of Lebanon through the balanced entry of the Lebanese Army in the South and elsewhere and the reform of the political and administrative system.

Plans to divide the Movement into two new movements one more pro-Syrian and the other pro-left have been set aside, along with plans that called for enlarging the Movement to include the National and the Confrontation fronts. Efforts are currently being deployed to bolster cooperation and coordination between the three groupings.

On the internal level, it is expected that a solution will be found to the leadership issue by appointing Walid Jumlat as president of the National Movement and appointing Secretaries to each of the Movement's institutions in such a way as to have each institution managed by a different party. The Secretaries would meet once a week around Jumlat and thus constitute the executive body of the movement. The 22 parties represented in the Movement are expected to be soon increased to 30.

For the time being, the National Movement's role is to maintain its positions pending the turn the situation will take in the country. If peace returns, some of the parties will return to parliamentary life and the others to non-parliamentary opposition, with prominence given, again, to the individuals rather than their parties. If violence breaks out again, it is expected that it will account, again, for these parties' solidarity on the battlefield.

CSO: 4820

LEBANON

RELIGIOUS LEADERS, IRAN'S INTEREST IN SOUTH

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 20 Oct 79 p 17

[Text] The new Iranian regime's interest in South Lebanon became manifest over the past two weeks with the visits to Lebanon and in particular to South Lebanon first of Foreign Minister Sadeq Tabatabai and then of Imam Ayatollah Khomeiny's grandson, Hussein Khomeiny.

Both Tabatabai and Khomeiny held talks with Palestinian and Lebanese Shiite leaders and toured the South.

Two Positions. The two leaders apparently came for the same purpose as both denounced the Israeli aggressions on South Lebanon and promised to extend assistance to the population of the South. However, informed sources say, the two Iranian leaders came as the representatives of two factions of the Iranian regime that uphold different, although not contradictory, positions concerning the situation in the South and the policy to follow to settle the problem of that region.

Foreign Minister Tabatabai, who is also the nephew of missing Imam Moussa Sadre, came, the sources said, as the representative of the Iranian government of Prime Minister Bazargan. The official Iranian position which he expressed is that Iran should give all its support to the Shiite population of Lebanon and to the demands of the Shiites who have been calling for the withdrawal of Palestinian armed elements from the South and for the deployment of the Lebanese regular armed forces in the region. Even if the growing antagonism between the Shiites and the Palestinians should lead to an armed confrontation between the two sides.

Hussein Khomeiny, on the other hand, came to Lebanon as the representative of Iran's religious leaders and in particular of his grandfather Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeiny whose position is that a compromise must be achieved between the Shiite population and the Palestinian resistance in order to avoid a confrontation between them.

It is worth noting here that the PLO despatched a delegation this week to Tehran for talks with both official and religious leaders. According to the observers, the move reflects the concern of the PLO towards the attitude that Iran may take and especially the support that it may extend to the Shiite population of the South at a time this population is growing more and more angered by the sufferings it is enduring. The PLO is particularly concerned over the possibility that Iran may arm the Shiites and that, in case the Army deployed in the South, a confrontation between the Shiites and the Palestinians may involve the Army.

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LEBANON

IRAN'S ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 16 Sep 79 p 2

Article: "Lebanon Wants Results Before Arab Summit To Be Able To Make All Face Their Responsibilities"

Text: Recently, there have been growing murmurs about an important role which the new Iran is playing in helping the authorities reclaim south Lebanon from the illegal authorities and overcome the obstacles which are blocking the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to this region. Some have begun to fear that these resolutions might be transformed into mere formalities which are impossible to implement--a situation which would result in future enshrinement of the accomplished fact, namely the apportionment of the south between Israel and the Palestinians, especially if the current efforts to produce an overall solution to the Middle East crisis falter.

Local political circles have increasingly begun to wonder about the real nature of the Iranian role and the reasons behind the information blackout about this matter despite the great importance it holds for the country and the significance attached to it by a number of Iranian sources both official and unofficial.

When asked about these murmurs and questions, widely informed political sources said that the Iranian move in the south proceeded primarily from two factors:

1. The Iranian revolution's absolute belief in the Palestinian cause. It was on this basis that the Iranian revolution became concerned about the south because it is the only Arab front open to Israel, as a blanket of silence covers the other Arab fronts, and because the Palestinians are the originators of the issue and are involved in it from the human, military and political standpoints.
2. The desire of the Iranian revolution to aid members of the Shiite sect, who form the majority of the population in the south, and help them to remain steadfast and avoid subjection to the threats of expatriation, forced immigration and occupation; and to provide the capabilities for steadfastness and survival through coordination with the Palestinian revolution, in which they believe and with which they have a good relationship.

The sources added that the developments which occurred after the Security Council issued its first resolution concerning the south, resolution 425, have made the application of it and subsequent resolutions an impossibility. Israel has continually obstructed the application of these resolutions, and thus the Palestinian resistance has been affected by considerations which, in its view, are strategic in nature.

The price has been paid by the inhabitants of the south, and especially the inhabitants of Jabal 'Amil which holds a special importance for Iran. The price has been paid by all Lebanon, as well, since the Lebanese situation has remained chaotic because of the failure to plug the dike in the south through which the water is leaking.

#### Everyone Takes Stock

The political sources said that all parties have begun taking stock of their situations, particularly members of the Shiite sect whose effective leaders such as the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council and the "Amal" movement are greatly respected and understood in Iran. A series of contacts and meetings has been held in which it has been agreed that Iran will exert whatever efforts and possibly even pressure it can to bring the Palestinians into final agreement with Lebanese authorities on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, even if Israel, on its side, refuses to agree. Such a refusal on Israel's part would expose it before international public opinion, which has become fed up with its impudence and no longer looks at the Middle East situation from a single viewpoint. Moreover, Iran is to make every possible effort to assist the Lebanese authorities in restoring the balances in Lebanon which were in effect before the 2 years war, because it cannot exist without them and simultaneously they provide all kinds of guarantees to the Lebanese sects, including the Shiite sect which, in the final analysis, constitutes a minority group whose nation is Lebanon.

The same sources added that at Iranian-Palestinian meetings the resistance was told that Iran is prepared to help the revolution to the maximum extent possible, but only on the condition that it provides the ingredients for peace in the south and reaches agreement with the Lebanese authorities and the UN Security Council.

In this connection, responsible Shiite sources say that the Palestinians have tried to gain time and have not reached a decision on the matter, possibly because of their belief that conditions or standards could change. But nothing of the sort has occurred. What has occurred is a continuation of the Israel aggressions against the south.

#### Meetings and Initial Agreement

Shiite efforts are again underway with Iran, and Iranian efforts have been renewed with the Palestinians, all of which has resulted in contacts and meetings between the Shiite and Palestinian sides. The most important of these include:

1. A meeting between Representative Husayn al-Husayni, secretary general of the "Amal" movement, and Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee, which took place prior to the strike protesting the continued disappearance of Imam al-Sadr.

2. A 4-hour meeting held this week between Mr al-Husayni and Palestinian leader Abu Jihad.

3. Another meeting has been arranged with Mr Arafat after his return from Spain.

Shiite sources report that the meeting with Abu Jihad was fruitful. In it, Mr al-Husayni affirmed that the southerner is prepared to sacrifice everything for the Palestinian cause, but not to the extent of sacrificing his land. He also stressed that the present phase, especially in the wake of the international victories achieved by the resistance, is one of diplomacy rather than military activity because the latter would especially serve the interests of Israel at this time.

Abu Jihad's position, according to the same sources, was initial agreement to the demand that the army enter the south (Sur and Al-Nabatiyah) and implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

When the discussion moved to the practical details of implementation, Al-Husayni felt that this should be discussed with the legal authorities.

The encouraging thing in the eyes of the same sources is that these details will be discussed with the authorities in the near future, either at the anticipated Lebanese-Palestinian summit or at the meetings held periodically between Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and Palestinian officials.

Informed sources believe that there must be agreement on the issue of the south among the authorities, the Palestinians and the United Nations, and that what they agree upon must be implemented before November, i.e. prior to the convening of the expanded Arab summit. This is so that the agreement can be sanctioned and at the same time additional measures can be approved which would put Lebanon in a position to reconstruct the south within the feasible framework.

If the efforts regarding the south are not going to achieve positive and practical results, the concerned parties insist that this be understood prior to the summit as well so that the Arabs will assume their responsibilities toward the south and Lebanon and approve appropriate measures, if it is within their capability to do so.

Under any circumstances, negative results from the efforts would force the concerned parties--particularly the authorities and the population of the south, which means the Shiites--to search for another way to save the south and its inhabitants and an alternative formula which may not be pleasing to some.

Extent of the Wager on the Iranian Role

Is betting on the Iranian role conceivable under Iran's present conditions?

Some Lebanese and Arab political sources urge that betting on the Iranian role not be carried too far and that such a role should not be blown out of proportion. This is because unsettled conditions in Iran do not permit the officials in Tehran to concern themselves with issues considered peripheral to domestic issues, and also because nothing could be worse for the Lebanese situation, particularly in the south, than increased interference from abroad, whether Arab or foreign.

Nonetheless, Shiite sources regard the wager as justified, particularly since Iranian authorities have demonstrated their ability to maintain a hold on the domestic situation.

In this connection, the sources wonder why the Iranian preoccupation with the resistance is seen as advantageous despite the growing number who are similarly involved with it, and yet the same preoccupation with Lebanon and the issue of the south is not advantageous. They urge no action until all the stages of the Iranian move on behalf of the south are completed.

The sources disclosed a secret in this connection. They said that Iranian officials have made the south a main item in their talks with Soviet officials, and they have asked the Soviets to deal seriously with the south to insure that the Security Council resolutions are implemented. The sources added that the Iranian officials will make the same appeal in any dialog with American officials, in the event that such a dialog takes place.

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LEBANON

ARMENIAN-PHALANGIST CONFRONTATIONS ANALYZED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 14 Sep 79 p 2

Article: "Toward Frank Meetings To Remove the Elements of Mutual Suspicion in Order to Obviate Complications Which Keep Lebanon as the Sole Loser"

Text/ Official circles welcomed the cease-fire agreement approved last Wednesday night by the Phalangist, Liberal and Tashnak parties, as the numerous steps in this agreement continue to be implemented one by one. The two factions called for disregard of the formalities and adherence to the substance which will restore solidarity and kinship to their former familiar clashes and difficulties between the two factions will resume after a while because the scale reached by the latest clash uncovered contrived purposes and preparations among the factions. This indicates that one must look beyond the immediate cause of the clash, in spite of its importance, to the real causes of the tense situation between the Armenians and Phalangists in order to eliminate these causes and prevent new clashes--especially since immediate causes or pretexts can be created every day.

What are the basic reasons for the conflict between the Armenian parties, in particular the Tashnak Party, and the "Lebanese Front" parties, in particular the Phalangist Party, which put the political and electoral alliance which spans 30 years in danger of collapsing?

Sources close to the two factions, say that an extended discussion of these reasons would prove inconclusive, aside from being very lengthy due to the multiplicity and diversity of the causes. This is especially true since the 2 years war and subsequent wars brought about fundamental developments which altered many of the givens both on the ground and in the people's minds and which gave room for the emergence of new positions or movements backed by weapons.

Mutual and Renewed Suspicion

The sources sum up the condition which has befallen yesterday's allies with one word: suspicion--suspicion which developments and events have made mutual and are possibly buttressed by evidence and proof.

In the "Lebanese Front," and the Phalangist Party to be specific, there is suspicion of the Armenian position. This suspicion began during the 2 years war in which the Armenians remained largely neutral between the two struggling factions in the country. This suspicion could have died down if the ordeal which Lebanon is experiencing had ended with the fighting in early 1977. However, the renewal of the fighting with an alteration in the map of alliances and enmities caused this suspicion to arise again since the Armenians again maintained neutrality despite the fact that they were forced out of their neighborhoods and jobs on a rather large scale as a result of the "wars" in the capital during the summer of 1978. This neutrality was not limited to avoiding participation in the fighting but also applied to sharing the burdens of "resistance," in the view of the "Lebanese Front." Thus, the suspicion and mistrust increased. Clashes began on an individual basis at first and then expanded.

The Armenian faction responds to this by saying that its military neutrality helped the "Lebanese Front" considerably in its war because the Armenians maintained an open channel which was utilized fully to supply the front with all sorts of vital supplies from which they had been cut off.

The Armenian faction ascribes its lack of active participation in the war to the fact that the wars which the Armenians fought in their country did not bring any results, and moreover civil wars are exploited from abroad and in the end always work against the welfare of the nation--any nation. They say that they did not spare material support, but they want the support to be voluntary and not as a propitiation for not participating in military conflicts as the front tried to suggest, because giving in to this logic would make the Armenians subject to continual blackmail.

The Armenian faction believes that the objective of the gradually escalating clashes is to strike a blow at the Armenian Party structure.

Do the two factions talk frankly to each other in their frequent meetings in order to contain the incidents and eliminate the mutual suspicions?

Sources close to them say that the misgivings remained within the walls built around each faction, and that accusatory remonstrations dominate the meetings. For instance, the Phalangist Party accuses the Armenians of endeavoring to create an independent sector within the eastern area, and of seeking to pest~~er~~ the Phalangists, on advice from outside. The Armenians say that the Phalangists want to contain them; and, as they see it, the solution is to turn over all the "independent sectors" to the legal authorities.

#### The Authorities Fear Complications

What are the drawbacks of a clash between the Armenians and the front?

Government sources believe that if this clash is renewed and escalates, it will certainly have an effect on many areas and will create new situations that will increase the authorities' confusion and compound their apparent inability to deal with basic problems and incidental matters.

The most important repercussions of the clash, according to the same sources, are:

1. A deepening of the wounds between the Armeians and the Phalangists which will make them difficult to heal.
2. The authorities' attention will be distracted from important matters and fateful issues so they can search for a way to end the clashes.
3. A consolidation of the organizations which the war in Lebanon had isolated.
4. Another new social calamity would be added to those already created by the 2 years war--calamities for which the state has not yet been able to produce a solution, such as forced emigration and the continuation of a collective existence under constant mistrust and fear.
5. A confirmation of the weakness of the state and, possibly, the enshrinement of this weakness.

While the clash was taking place, the state was unable to do anything except contact the two sides involved in the conflict and try to convince them to stop. Nearly 3 years after the end of the war, this is seen as an indication of considerable weakness.

The other sources feel that the front must not make a final break with the Armenians, because they could harm the Lebanese cause which is championed abroad, i.e., in America and Europe where their presence is well established and effective.

Why Hasn't the Army Been Deployed?

Will the army be deployed to maintain the peace in this area if the clashes resume? Why wasn't it deployed when the clashes escalated during the past 2 days?

Both government sources and those close to the two parties say that the deployment of the army would only be possible at the request of both factions. It would be deployed as a peace force and would take all the necessary measures to prevent a renewal of the incidents--similar to the way in which it was deployed in 'Ayn al-Ramanah and Furn al-Shubbak--but would not be deployed in the case of a clash. When the two conflicting factions reach a stage in which they are unable to gain or impose solutions or to continue fighting, then the army would be deployed at their request and with their approval. This is impossible, however, as long as one or both of the factions are convinced that they have the potential to settle matters or steer events to their advantage.

Informed political sources believe that the fragmentation occurring in the "eastern areas," which began with former President Sulayman Franjiyah's withdrawal from the "Lebanese Front," and is slated to continue, matched by the continuing fragmentation in the "western areas," is in the interest of the legal authorities because it will allow them to take possession of the entire region. Despite everyone's welcome of state control, the citizens want this to be achieved without casualties, victims and the carnage which would make things all the worse.

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LEBANON

LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION IS KEY TO SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM

Beirut AL-NAKAR in Arabic 15 Sep 79 p 2

Article: "Palestinian-Lebanese Concord Is Sole Avenue to a Solution of the South Lebanon Problem Sanctioned by Syria"

Text/ The official Lebanese efforts to hold a special Arab summit on the south continue despite negative signals which make the likelihood of such a summit remote.

Government sources explained why the authorities are clinging to the idea of convening a separate summit on the south and why they are doing everything in their power to achieve such a summit. The sources said that Lebanon is in a hurry to produce a solution to the problem of the south--a problem which will brook no delay. The Israeli aggressions continue despite periodic cease-fires and with them the exodus of the population, not to mention the negative repercussions which affect the entire Lebanese situation and involves the entire country--particularly during this historic period in which the destiny of the region may be decided.

These sources indicated that the Arabs might not be in any rush to meet in the type of expanded summit which they agreed to hold periodically at the latest Baghdad summit, particularly if they perceive that there has been no change in the international equation which would necessitate a meeting, and if they feel that such a meeting might unravel their formal solidarity. This situation has compelled Lebanon to work for a summit specifically concerned with the south. Aside from this, Lebanon wishes to treat the issue of the south within a framework which is detached from the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian problem. However, this would be impossible in the approved annual summit which is set up to study the larger crisis, because the discussion at the summit would deal with the south from the standpoint that best serves the efforts being exerted to produce a solution to the region's crisis which would satisfy all sides. Such a solution establishes and reinforces the link between the problem of the south and the general regional problem, when what is needed is to dissociate the two problems or at least lessen the linkage between them.

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**14 NOVEMBER 1979**

**NO. 2044**

**2 OF 2**

Despite the deep understanding which Arab leaders showed toward the problem of the south and the motives behind the move made by Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss and the personal delegates of the president, conversations with these leaders have caused Lebanese officials to doubt the likelihood that a summit will be held before November, or that two separate summits can be held during a 2 month period.

In view of the lack of agreement on the Lebanese demand, the authorities decided to seek to get the issue of the south included as a major item on the regular summit's agenda, having obtained promises from some Arabs that they would support any Lebanese position.

Despite the importance that the problem of the south be discussed at the Arab summit--whether it is a special summit on the south or a general summit--the most important point in the view of the government and the administration is that Lebanon approach the Arab kings and leaders with definite ideas, solutions and alternative solutions which guarantee Lebanon's welfare and do not put hard choices before the Arabs--choices which are painful at best. Lebanon cannot be content with presenting the problem and asking for a solution from the Arabs because, whether due to inability or lack of desire, they will not offer one.

#### Lebanese-Palestinian Accord Required

In the view of government circles, the best thing that Lebanon can do is reach an accord with the PLO as soon as possible and then carry this accord to the summit, make the Arabs face their responsibilities and demand from them whatever solutions and positions are feasible.

For, in the opinion of these circles, an Arab summit would be easy to convene in the presence of a Lebanese-Palestinian accord and would be guaranteed to produce results. However, the summit would be difficult to convene and its outcome would be uncertain in a climate of continued Lebanese-Palestinian incompatibility.

This is because the Arab states, whether because of intimidation, enticement or their own belief, side with the Palestinians right or wrong. Moreover, the Arabs cannot possibly be less Arab than the rest of the world which has begun to enter the Palestinian era--particularly since it has become convinced that continued neglect of Palestinian rights will result in economic, political and social catastrophes.

The government circles point out that a Lebanese-Palestinian accord would not alone fully realize both Lebanese or the Palestinian interests in full, and they insist that this accord be sanctioned in the expanded summit which would then constitute a guarantee for the accord and its continuation and implementation in the approved form, thus eliminating any future sudden shocks or disputes.

The government circles believe that a Lebanese-Palestinian accord must be followed by a Lebanese-Syrian accord which will solve the problems pending between the two countries and help form a specific guarantee for the first accord prior to the achievement of a broad Arab guarantee. Syria is concerned with the situation in Lebanon for a number of reasons, as well as being concerned with the Palestinian problem and the overall Middle East crisis. Above all, Syria maintains a presence in Lebanon, and coordination with the Lebanese on all matters is a must.

#### Is a Lebanese-Palestinian Accord Possible?

In spite of the fact that the problems pending between Lebanon and the Palestinians are numerous and multifaceted, recent developments have amassed them all into one big problem, namely that of the south. It is on this issue that the efforts of an accord between Lebanese authorities and the PLO must concentrate, because it has become the key to a solution to many issues both at home and abroad--and the padlock on such a solution as well.

In the view of the authorities and the international community, the problem of the south can only be solved by putting the resolutions of the UN Security Council into effect. This means that terrorist operations and Palestinian infiltration must be halted, and there must be no obstruction to the return of sovereignty and legality through the introduction of the army into the area, along with security and vital administrative activities. By definition, the solution will begin immediately, according to the authorities and the international community, when the authorities send their army to Sur and Al-Nabatiyah after armed Palestinians vacate these cities. Such a move would tend to give the international community, and especially the United States, an opportunity to pressure Israel to halt its aggressions and operations and ultimately end its support of the border groups which would pave the way for the army to enter the border area.

These matters will constitute the main topic of discussions at the anticipated Lebanese-Palestinian summit, which everyone hopes will result in the desired accord.

#### Interests of Three Sides

Widely informed political sources believe that the interests of three sides will be served by the pacification of the south. They are:

1. Lebanon, of course, because the south is the gateway to the problems affecting all of Lebanon, and tranquility there is considered the key to an overall Lebanese solution.
2. The PLO, some of whose staff feel, along with devotees to its cause, that any military actions by or within Lebanon and any armed incident afford Israel an opportunity to continue its war of attrition against the PLO and possibly to plunge the PLO once again into the Lebanese war in order to divert it from its goal which has begun to acquire international interest

and approval. This does not mean an end to Palestinian military action, however, as the "zealots" would try to proclaim. Such action would be maintained as an effective reserve and would be developed and modified according to circumstances and developments.

3. Syria, for whom the south is considered a real trap. For this reason, Syria's welfare requires that the necessary backing be provided to put the ZIN Security Council Resolutions into effect in the south and thus prevent Israel from luring the Syrians into a destructive situation.

Accordingly, the political sources feel that the authorities must take advantage of the benefits to be achieved by moving the army into the south and solving the problem there. Moreover, they feel that the Lebanese, especially those who sympathize with the Palestinians, must rid themselves of the difficult demand for prior consent and take the initiative to request the entrance of the army and approve this move.

These sources also feel that the argument that Lebanon has performed its duties and now it is up to the United Nations to fulfill its obligations is not accurate. While it is true that Lebanon sent an army into the south and carried out other measures, the Security Council resolution stipulates that the international forces will assist Lebanon in reclaiming its sovereignty and extending its authority, and not that they will reclaim sovereignty and extend authority and then hand them over to Lebanon on a silver platter.

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LEBANON

OFFICIAL BI-MONTHLY BANK STATISTICS PUBLISHED

Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 21 Sep 79 p 9

[Text] The Bank of Lebanon published yesterday its bi-monthly report as established on 15 September, which, compared to that of 31 August, elicits the following comments:

1: Fiduciary currency shows a two percent decrease from one two-week period to the next, falling from 3,741,728,653.82 Lebanese pounds to 3,664,523,722.94 Lebanese pounds (LL).

At the same time, assets in gold and foreign currencies (the elements for securing the pound) dropped by two percent, amounting on 15 September to 2,993,148,630.58 LL, compared to 2,993,899,391.34 LL, thus maintaining cover of our currency at 80 percent.

2: On the other hand, demand deposits made to the Bank of Lebanon by the Lebanese banking system increased by 7.4 percent, rising to 2,340,733,977.37 LL, compared to 2,180,554,779.74 LL on 31 August.

3: The result is a net increase in monetary assets during this period, on the order of 1.4 percent, for a total of 6,005,257,700.31 LL compared to 5,922,283,433.56 LL.

4: The "Other Deposits" entry also increased, rising from 1,194,472,462.51 LL to 1,224,962,102.51 LL.

5: The other assets of the Bank of Lebanon increased by 3.2 percent, amounting on 15 September to 3,929,260,828.44 LL compared to 3,808,224,971.10 LL.

6: Loans in the public sector rose by some 50 million LL in 15 days, whereas those granted to the private sector remained stationary at 61.8 million LL.

The report as issued by the Bank of Lebanon is reproduced below.

	On 15 Sept 79	On 31 Aug 79
	LL	LL
<b>ASSETS:</b>		
1: Gold and foreign currency	2,933,148.630.58	2,993,899,391.34
2: Loans to public sector	931,144,111.08	881,144,111.08
3: Loans to private sector	61,841,731.26	61,774,328.68
4: Loans under Law 28/67	5,144,567.58	472,404.78
5: Other assets and debit accounts	3,929,260,828.44	3,808,224,971.10
	<u>7,860,539,868.94</u>	<u>7,745,515,206.98</u>
<b>LIABILITIES:</b>		
1: Demand liabilities		
a: Fiduciary money	3,664,523,722.94	3,741,728,653.82
b: Demand deposits	2,340,733,977.37	2,180,554,779.74
	<u>6,005,257,700.31</u>	<u>5,922,283,433.56</u>
2: Other deposits	1,224,962,102.51	1,194,472,462.51
3: Capital	15,000,000.00	15,000,000.00
4: General reserve fund	263,085,660.55	263,085,660.55
5: Other credit accounts	352,234,405.57	350,673,550.36
	<u>7,860,539,868.94</u>	<u>7,745,515,106.98</u>

12149  
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LEBANON

BRIEFS

FLIGHT OF WORKERS REPORTED--Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Nazem Kadri has requested the proper services in his department to give him a thorough report on the exodus movement of Lebanese workers to foreign countries. But it has become evident that these services do not have at their disposal the full statistics on the subject, and the only figures they have been able to establish are those regarding workers who request a work permit from the ministry in question before their departure. This permit, incidentally, is required of Lebanese workers by certain Arabic countries, Saudi Arabia in particular. In the absence of full, exact statistics on the matter, some economic establishments have had recourse to approximate estimates. Thus it has become apparent that the industrial sector has witnessed, during the past four years, the exodus of over 60,000 workers, made up for the most part of technicians and specialists. For their part, the trade and finance sectors have been deserted by some 20,000 workers. As for the banking sector, losses have been limited, not exceeding 1,000 employees, whose loss has largely been made good as a result of recruiting among university graduates. [Text] [Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 23 Sep 79 p 9] 12149

CSO: 4800



LIBYA

LIBYAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE DETERIORATE

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Sep 79 p 1

[Excerpt] In spite of a good number of turbulent initiatives from Tripoli and sometimes vehement charges of "Imperialism" -- recently accused of wanting to "halt the progress of Islam" with its military intervention in Central Africa -- Franco-Libyan relations have been marked lately by an apparent cordiality and close cooperation in many areas.

In fact, Franco-Libyan cooperation dates from the first years of the new regime. Colonel Qadhafi had always praised General de Gaulle's Arab policy and his attitude toward Israel. After the 1973 war, Tripoli went so far as to organize some symposia on Gaullism, often welcoming representatives of the leftist movements.

France's flaunted independence from the United States, especially on the level of defense, was also greatly appreciated in Tripoli, where they called on their industry to succeed Great Britain in the equipment of their army, especially in aviation. Mirage planes and helicopters were supplied. Military cooperation between the two countries is currently continuing with maintenance of materiel, although since Libya's break with Egypt in 1972 and the border war in 1976, the USSR has worked its way up to first place among Tripoli's suppliers.

On the economic level, French sales to Libya have developed considerably in recent years, especially in the automobile sector, in which France has carved out a large part of the market for itself. This progress is all the more remarkable since France buys a share of Libya's oil production judged very modest in Tripoli: 3.6 million tons in 1978, or 3 percent of our total imports.

Nevertheless, Tripoli has not ceased to assert its African ambitions which have at once collided with those of Paris. Colonel Qadhafi keenly interested in the black continent, has since 1970 been working on a wide-spread operation aimed at breaking the ties that many African states have formed with Israel on the diplomatic level and in the areas of civil and

military cooperation. Thanks to its large financial means, Libya has been able to score spectacular successes, notably in Uganda. Unfortunately, those rapprochements were to send Colonel Qadhafi flying to Gen Idi Amin Dada's defense in the conflict with Tanzania, which was to be fatal to him.

Libya's intervention in the internal conflicts which tore Chad asunder were even more dangerous for Franco-Libyan relations. While serving as a refuge for FROLINAT, Libya did not hesitate to have its troops occupy the Azouzou Strip in Chadian territory. That attempted annexation was to provoke the break between Tripoli and current head of the N'Djamena regime Goukouni Oueddei, Libya not succeeding in playing the role of mediator between the different disputing factions. Was it the failure of this policy which pushed Colonel Qadhafi to look for "military facilities" in Central Africa and make it stand up to France, without, however, provoking a reaction from Paris thus far?

11937  
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LIBYA

LIBYAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT DETAILED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Aug-Sep 79 pp 171-172

[Text] The Beir Grassa, prototype for a group of 10 missile-launching patrol boats ordered from Mechanical Shipyards of Normandy [CNM] in Cherbourg, was launched on 28 June.

These boats, which are an intermediate version between the Combattante I and II types from those shipyards and whose reputation is well established, have the following characteristics:

Displacement: 300 tpc  
Dimensions: 49 x 7 x 2.4 meters  
Propulsion: 4 MTU diesels, 4 propellers, 20,000 hp (14,710 kw)  
Maximum Speed: 40 knots  
Armament: 4 Otomat antisurface missiles\* 1/76 CA Oto Melara compact forward 2/40 CA (II x I) Breda Bofors aft

Otomat is a rocket conceived jointly by the French firm Matra and the Italian company Oto Melara. Its maximum theoretical range is over 150 km but aboard these patrol boats, it will be limited to that of the radar horizon, or about 40 km.

The ordering of these 10 patrol boats from CMN and 4 corvettes from Italy shows Libya's desire to increase its naval forces and play a role in the Mediterranean in line with Colonel Qadhafi's ambitions.

These corvettes, whose construction was entrusted to CNTR [expansion unknown] in Riva Trigoso, are boats of a little over 600 tons and 32 knots. Their main armament includes 4 Otomat missiles, 1/76 Oto Melara compact, a double gun carriage of 30 as well as 6 T/ASM (III x 2) MK 32.

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\* Three very similar boats but with 4 mm 38 Exocet instead of the Otomat missiles were ordered from CMN by Nigeria.

The first two, Wadi M'rach and Wadi Majer, are on their trial runs. The other two are still under construction. They will be in service by 1982.

In addition to these boats, the Libyan Navy currently has the following vessels:

--3 1,950-ton, F-type submarines, supplied by the Soviets: Al Badr, Al Fateh, Al Ahad. The first was delivered in December 1976, the other 2 in 1978. Three others are reportedly expected. These very modern submarines are furnished with 10 533-TLT (6 forward, 4 aft) with a total of 22 torpedoes (10 in tubes, 12 in reserve). These torpedoes can be replaced by 24 mines.

--1 frigate, Dat Assawari, 1,325 tons, completed in 1973 in the British shipyards Vosper Thornycroft (37 knots) 1/114 CA (II x I) and 2/30 CA (II x I) and 1 ASM mortar.

--1 440-ton corvette, Tobruk, dating from 1965 and also built by Vosper.

--6 Osa II missile-launching patrol boats supplied by the USSR since 1976 (240 tpc, 36 knots, 4 antisurface SS-N-2b Styx missiles, 4/30 CA). Six others are expected. The order, which was originally for 24 units, was apparently reduced by half, which explains the order for 10 patrol boats from CMN.

--7 95-to-100-ton patrol boats built in Great Britain, some 10 years old.

--2 LST, Ibn Ouf and Ibn Harissa, completed in 1977-78 at La Mediterranee shipyards in La Seyne. Their cargo displacement is around 3,000 tons. Their armament includes 6 40-CA (II x 3) Breda-Bofors cannons and 1 81-mortar from the army to support a small landing operation. The capacity of these LST is about 570 tons.

--3 Polnocnyi-type LSM built in Poland, Ibn Al Hadran, Ibn Omayya, Ibn El Farat. The first was delivered at the end of 1977 at the same time as another, christened Ibn Qves, which was destroyed during the night of 14-15 September 1978 after a fire. The other two were delivered last June.

--1 small, 2,000-ton repair ship, Zeltin, which, thanks to its apron, can accommodate, for example, the carenage of Osa II-type patrol boats.

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MOROCCO

'AL-MUHARRIR' URGES 'PRIVILEGED CLASS' TO BEAR ITS SHARE OF SACRIFICE

LD291523 Casablanca AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 18 Oct 79 pp 1, 8 LD

[Editorial: "No Third Choice for the Bourgeoisie"]

[Excerpts] The war which Algeria is waging against our country is multifaceted. There is the military front, on which it deploys troops and large quantities of ammunitions and equipment. There is the diplomatic front, on which it has mobilized all its political and financial capabilities as well as its experience in international circles and gatherings. There is also the propaganda front which Algeria considers as important if not more important than the other two fronts.

What is significant in the psychological warfare which Algeria is waging against us in the press and radio is its exploitation of the mistakes which the rulers or the privileged class commit.

For several days now the Algerian information media have been linking [Morocco's] economic difficulties to the Sahara problem. Of course, what interests the Algerian rulers is not the prosperity of the Moroccan people but rather seeing them weakened so they will give up their adherence to the integrity of the national soil. For this reason the media insist that the cause of the economic difficulties and the social crisis is the adherence to the national rights in the Sahara and that this crisis will be solved as soon as the Sahara is abandoned and the establishment of the alleged Saharan state is allowed.

It is by harping on this tune that the Algerian information media, in their psychological warfare against Morocco, are trying to undermine and weaken adherence to the integrity of national soil. It is worth noting however, that it is not this psychological warfare alone that is trying to attribute the causes of the economic difficulties to the cost of the Sahara war; the privileged class is also doing the same thing. This class often alleges that the Sahara problem with its past and present costs is the principal reason for the economic difficulty from which the country is suffering. Indeed, this unsubstantiated allegation has been adopted by some government officials themselves.

The allegation that the Sahara war is responsible for the economic difficulty serves the psychological warfare which Algeria is waging against our country. In fact what the privileged class is reiterating objectively and clearly agrees with what the Algerian information media reiterate in their daily intensive psychological warfare against us.

Discreditation of the psychological warfare against our country cannot be achieved solely by the bourgeois class giving up blaming the Sahara problem for the effects of economic, capital and liberal policy and renouncing the false allegation that the Sahara has led to the economic crisis. This alone is not enough. Rather, the bourgeois class must also take the step of bearing its share of sacrifice for the sake of preserving the territories that have been regained. The bourgeoisie is called upon to offer part of its wealth-- a part commensurate with this wealth as well as with the size of the bourgeoisie groups themselves. By making such a contribution and abandoning the theme that the Sahara is responsible for the economic difficulties the bourgeoisie would repay some of the debt it owes to the national cause and would foil the plans of the enemies of the integrity of Moroccan soil, who are exploiting the mistakes of the privileged class in assessing the situation and in failing to bear its share of the sacrifice in the continuing war against Morocco in the diplomatic, military and psychological war fields. The privileged bourgeoisie has no third choice.

CSO: 4402

MOROCCO

'AL-'ALAM' SAYS SOUTH AFRICAN N-TEST SETS OFF ARMS RACE

LD020913 Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 27 Oct 79 p 2 LD

[Article by 'Umar Najib: "Africa Enters Nuclear Age From the Gate of Destruction"]

[Excerpts] A U.S. television station, citing CIA reports, said on Friday that racist South Africa detonated a low-yield nuclear bomb in the Indian Ocean on 22 September. U.S. spy satellites confirmed the occurrence of such an explosion and seismograph stations in several countries also recorded it.

In South Africa the ruling circles denied the explosion story in a manner aimed at achieving two objectives: intimidating the African states by hinting at the potential existence of a nuclear weapon and forestalling the anticipated wave of protest and condemnation from all parts of the world because of South Africa's entry into the nuclear club and the introduction of this weapon to a continent hitherto free of it.

South Africa's ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon comes as no surprise to anybody because for many years reports have been indicating that the Pretoria government is developing its nuclear capability in cooperation with many Western countries, foremost among which are France, West Germany and the United States, in return for supplying these states with raw uranium, of which South Africa is considered the most important producer. Where is the surprise then?

The surprise is that the Western states have allowed Pretoria to carry out its threat to possess a nuclear weapon after these states had made the world and the African states in particular believe last year, when there was an uproar about an imminent nuclear explosion in the South African desert, that they would not allow Pretoria to possess such a weapon. What makes the surprise even more seriously politically and militarily is that the disclosure of the explosion was made more than 1 month after it took place, which thus means the South African Government has been given time to maneuver and an opportunity to impose a fiat accompli on the world with the connivance of its allies.

Western pressure on South Africa last year to prevent it from exploding a nuclear bomb was aimed at forcing it to reach an agreement on the independence of Namibia, at least as far as appearances are concerned. When the nationalist forces in Namibia rejected this agreement and the United Nations did not endorse it, it was logical for the proponents of the agreement to seek to enable Pretoria to possess an additional lever in order to be able to dictate its will. The nuclear bomb was the best means for doing so.

The existence of a nuclear bomb on the African Continent will upset many balances. The people of the continent are struggling to get rid of the vestiges of colonialism at a time when the international powers are struggling to control its destiny. In order to restore the balance that Pretoria has upset, these [African] states will be compelled to acquire strength equivalent to South Africa's nuclear capability. Some of these states might succeed in manufacturing their own nuclear bomb or greatly increase their military expenditures. Other states might be compelled to look for powerful allies who possess nuclear weapons in order to safeguard their stability and security in an equation called the balance of nuclear terror.

Africa has entered the nuclear age through the gate of destruction and not the gate of construction. This is its fate.

CSO: 4402



MOROCCO

BRIEFS

URANIUM FIND--Uranium has been discovered at Wafaga in the western High Atlas region. Drilling has revealed the existence of a 3-5-meter seam of radioactive ore with an oxidized ore horizon of 1,500-2,000 ppm 4(3)0(8)L [expansion unknown]. Furthermore, following the conclusion of a uranium prospecting program in the "Tarekochid" pilot zone of the High [as published] Moulouya project, some encouraging indications have been observed. These two pieces of news, revealed by the Mineral Exploration and Investment Office in a booklet published on its 50th anniversary, encourage high hopes for future exploration and exploitation of this strategic material. [Excerpt] LDO51141 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 24 Oct 79 p 4 LD]

COMMENT ON UN RESOLUTION--Following the vote at the UN fourth committee on the question of the Sahara, the spokesman of the Ministry of State in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation has made the following statement: It is noted that despite the efforts exerted by Algeria on all levels--financial, diplomatic or political--and despite the pressures and distortions it used on some occasions, the Algerian draft resolution secured only 83 votes and there were some reservations in respect to some of its paragraphs. This same draft resolution secured 89 votes last year. On the other hand, the number of countries which voted against this draft resolution, abstained or did not participate in the voting was 70. It is also noted that even some of the countries which voted in favor of the draft resolution, particularly Yugoslavia and India, have demanded the inclusion of some amendments in some paragraphs. These reservations concerned the description of the POLISARIO as the sole legitimate representative of the Western Sahara people and the need for the withdrawal of what Algeria insists on calling occupation forces and the need to respect the territorial integrity of the Western Sahara and the sovereignty of what it calls the Saharan people. This entire paragraph was canceled out by the invitation extended to Morocco to participate in the dynamism of peace. [Text] [LD032140 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 3 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 4400

SAUDI ARABIA

POWER PLANT DEVELOPMENT PLANNED FOR AL-JUBAYL

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 Oct 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Chris L. Parr]

[Text]

The Jubail industrial complex will soon have primary and secondary industries in production. A public electric utility established by Royal Decree will supply massive amounts of energy as production increases at the three oil refineries, four petrochemical plants, aluminum smelter, steel mill, petroprotein plant and two fertilizer plants which will be in operation in the early 1980's.

The hub of this system is the Ghazlan Generation Plant located eight kilometers northwest of Ju'aymah. It is the first major steam powered electric generating plant in the Kingdom, and will have four, 400 megawatt generators producing 1600 megawatts for the 230 kilovolt transmission system.

The Ghazlan plant will provide much of the electricity that will be needed after the sharp rise in use in months to come as steel production goes on stream. The Ghazlan facility is part of the Saudi Consolidated Electric Company (SCECO).

The size of projects in the Eastern Province can be seen from the fact that most of the electricity generated there will be nothing but a by-product of desalination projects producing fresh water for human and industrial consumption.

Mitsubishi Corporation has just signed a SR 935 million contract to build a 550 megawatt power station driven by steam from the Multi-Stage Flash desalination processes. It will help provide water for industrial projects as well as for nearby town and village use.

When SCECO was created by Royal Decree in August 1976, its main functions included directing the electricity from the desalination processes to the 150,000 consumers in metropolitan areas, towns and villages, and to large industrial projects like the Jubail complex.

It is a public utility whose single purpose is to deal with the intricate problems that arise when a valuable energy source like natural gas is being turned into electricity.

Aramco has a special contract with SCECO to manage, maintain and operate SCECO for a five year period from 1977. Because Aramco has SR1.6 billion worth of shares in SCECO (of SR5 billion total), it is an operator of generating plants, a shareholder and a paying customer of SCECO.

The reason Aramco was chosen for this role is obvious. It had the largest existing power network when SCECO was created and the developed skills necessary to deal with large electrification programs.

The first step taken by Aramco was to consolidate, upgrade or scrap inefficient or duplicative smaller generating facilities forming a

common grid. There were 26 small companies in the Eastern Province that usually supplied less energy than was needed by local consumers.

By December, 1977 all 26 companies had been bought. Shareholders were given generous shares in SCECO in a ratio of three new shares for every old share held by independent companies. Also a 15 per cent return profit per year per share was guaranteed.

The results for Eastern Province consumers have been startling. In the Al Hasa oasis, for example, 62 villages now are electrified that had no power before last summer. Within the next two years remote areas such as the Wadi Miyah between Ain Dar and Nariya will have all its villages electrified.

"In some very remote villages there will be temporary local electric generation until main transmission lines are constructed," said Jaddi Uthman, acting manager of SCECO Public and Customer Affairs. "This will ease any hardships encountered in the smaller towns and villages far from metropolitan areas," he continued.

Another area of SCECO concern are large cities, such as the tri-city area of Dammam, Dhahran and Al-Khobar which already have been supplied adequate power by SCECO.

The largest potential responsibility that SCECO has will be to supply power for large consumers: the Jubail Royal Commission, the Dammam Industrial Estates, Aramco oil installations and special government industrial projects.

The enormous electrification system that SCECO operates for towns and villages, metropolitan areas, and large industrial consumers uses natural gas to run its turbines.

Until now flared up gas at gas-oil separation plants (GOSPs) was lost as a power source. But soon passengers on jets flying to and from the Eastern Province will no longer see these flares lighting the desert. The natural gas will be tapped at the rate of three billion cubic feet a day and it will provide the fuel needed to run such large generation plants like that found at Ghazlan.

The Ghazlan Plant will be producing 1600 megawatts by 1984, and "there is ongoing coordination between SCECO and the Jubail Royal Commission concerning energy needs," said Uthman. As the needs of Jubail expand, electrical production will increase to meet these needs.

In 1978 two substations were established in Jubail. Also two, 800,000 gallon fuel tanks for a 50 megawatt power plant had been erected, pressure-tested, and were being filled. Overhead power lines were completed and energized.

The thermal power plant at Ghazlan has a unique strategic geographical location to major present and future load centers in the Eastern Province. It is capable of utilizing various liquid fuels in addition to natural gas; ethane, fuel oil or naphtha can also be burned.

With a superabundance of these fuels in the Eastern Province the success of various SCECO electrification projects such as the Jubail industrial infrastructure that depend on this energy seems assured.

CSO: 4820

SAUDIA ARABIA

## HIGH YIELD RICE DEVELOPED IN HASA

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 17 Oct 79 p 3

[Text]

JEDDAH, Oct. 16 — A Nationalist Chinese agricultural team in Hasa has developed a variety of red rice that may double output in the area.

The Chinese Embassy here said Tuesday that yields of the new variety, Hassawi Number One, run from five to seven tons a hectare. That compares with the two or three tons given by the local Hassawi strain.

It is the result of hybridization between Hassawi and Ai Chao Chien, a dwarf, high-yielding variety developed on Taiwan.

Prof. Ling Cheng-yi, head of the Chinese mission gave a demonstration Sunday in Hofuf.

He said the local variety has many characteristics restricting especially the extremely tall plant height and long growth duration.

He said with the plant height running from 150 to 160 cm, Hassawi rice droops before heading

begins, and this could reduce output by 60 per cent. The local variety takes 160 to 180 days to grow.

To remedy these defects, he said, the Chinese mission decided to crossbreed Hassawi with various dwarf varieties, and from the offsprings of Hassawi and Ai Chao Chien it selected the new variety in early 1978.

After further experiments, the mission has determined the new variety is suitable for the region.

The plant height of the Hassawi Number One is only 70 to 80 cm, and it stays erect even when the rice is ripe. In addition, the new variety takes only 100 to 120 days to grow.

Another advantage of the new variety, he said, is that its straw still contains eight per cent of protein after harvest as compared with only 3.5 per cent of Hassawi. This will enable farmers to earn extra profit by selling the straw as

animal feed.

The Mission also found that Taichung, Indica Number Three, a long-grain white rice variety also developed in Taiwan, is extremely suitable for the region.

Output of that variety in the mission's farm reaches a rare, 10 tons per hectare. According to Lin, the variety's best performance in Taiwan is seven tons per hectare.

Lin hoped that in cooperation with the Hasa Irrigation and Drainage Authority, the Hofuf Regional Agricultural Research Center and the Directorate of Agriculture of Hasa, the mission will begin carrying out extension work so local farmers can benefit from its research.

Attending the demonstration were HIDA Director-General Muhammad Abdullah Abu-Butain, HRARC Director Mahdi Ramadan and some 100 farmers.

CSO: 4820

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

AIRPORT RADAR SYSTEMS-- Jeddah, Oct. 17--Saudi Arabia's aerial monitoring system has been completed. It covers 28 airports. According to the president of Civil Aviation, Abdullah Mehdi, the system will be in operation by the end of the year. Mehdi told AL-BILAD the system has 21 earth satellite stations, 12 landing control devices which monitor the movement of planes from touchdown to rest and communications equipment for direct ground to air and air to ground connections. The existing five radar systems will be improved. Once they are ready plane movements at the country's airports will rise to 100 per day, he said. A new runway has been opened at Jeddah airport to meet increasing demand. The aprons at Jeddah and Riyadh have been enlarged to take more planes. Studies have been completed on proposed airports in Turaif, Qurayyat and Khafji and contracts are expected to be awarded shortly. Mosques and housing units will be included. [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 18-19 Oct 79 p 2]

CSO: 4820

SYRIA

REGIME SEEN DETERMINED TO OVERCOME 'CONSPIRACY,' SHORTCOMINGS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Oct 79 p 8

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilu: "Amid Expectations of More Assassinations and Bombings, Damascus Keeps One Eye on the 'Conspiracy' and Another on the Gaps in the Regime"]

[Text] Damascus: A visitor to Damascus has no trouble realizing that "something" within the authority needs to be corrected and that the individual assassinations and bombing incidents have left clear marks, but have not caused confusion within the regime.

There is nothing unusual or "unnatural" in Damascus. The explosions which occur from time to time, which are followed by individual assassinations, have caused the citizens to question the country's ability to withstand them; however, to the authorities, they are actions to be expected at a time when the Syrian regime is opposing the Camp David agreements. Syria, in the view of a number of party and governmental leaders, is like a fireman who rushes about putting out fires anywhere that is required. Now, the Camp David parties are trying to ignite a fire not only in the Syrian fireman's house but also in his clothes.

These leaders say that the objective sought by the Camp David parties is to divert Syria's attention to its internal problems by creating these incidents on the one hand or on the other hand by utilizing gaps which exist within the regime--on the principle that such gaps are like open windows through which winds can blow through the entire house.

Talk of change in Damascus begins at this point, because the existing gaps at various official and party levels open the way for "those who fish in muddy waters." Such a situation could become like a rolling snowball, which increases in size every minute and every hour.

The matter of the Moslem Brotherhood is another issue. The arrest of Husni 'Abu, one of the Brotherhood leaders and the accidental murder of 'Abd al-Sattar al-Za'im by the security men affirm that the authorities'

crackdown on this group has so far been fundamentally successful. The Syrian officials acknowledge that a number of Brotherhood leaders are still free and admit that some are still operating in Syria, although some have succeeded in fleeing to certain Arab countries which Damascus still refuses to identify. However, a Syrian official says that these countries encourage the Brotherhood to operate outside their territories while banning their activity in their own territory. Syrian officials say that those Arab countries are threatened with sectarian outbursts themselves unless they "assist" in stopping Moslem Brotherhood activity from emanating from their territory.

#### Explosions of a Sectarian Nature

How will the Syrian authorities deal with this problem?

Officials here expect that the intensity of the sectarian explosions will multiply until the end of this year at least. They say that the more Syria presses on with its opposition to the Camp David agreements, the more the wave of assassinations will multiply but the wave will continue despite everything within certain limitations which are well known to more than one country in the world. Syrian officials emphasize at the same time that while such things are possible, the eruption of a sectarian strife in Syria is impossible. Such a prospect is not possible even in the calculations of those who are seeking to weaken or create confusion in Syria not to soften up its position regarding peace with Israel but to make peace possible between Israel and other Arabs. Syrian officials think that as long as Syria is willing and capable of political and military action, other Arab parties who wish to join the Camp David bandwagon will not move in that direction. One official says that Syria now is strong and capable of both endurance and confrontation at the same time. The air battles which occur over Lebanon from time to time are in fact an actual expression of Syria's ability to endure and confront--an ability derived from a political decision made some time ago and being carried out by the competent agencies.

The Syrian official adds that what is happening inside Syria is an attempt to sow confusion carried out by certain elements in service of political goals. The aim behind all this is to subjugate Syria to the logic of Camp David. In other words, the objective is to force the Syrian leadership to make decisions in such an atmosphere--decisions determined either from fear of what lies in the future or as a reaction to what is taking place. The Syrian authorities will not heed the Israeli warning to stop intercepting its aircraft which roam Lebanon's skies at will--it means that "Syrian confrontation will continue."

#### There Is Another Matter

This is one thing, but the gaps caused by some officials unwittingly or premeditatedly are another thing. The Syrian leadership is convinced that it is urgently necessary to plug these gaps. This "corrective action"

will be carried out through the general party conference which will be held before the end of this year. Well informed party circles in Syria think it likely that the conference will be held between November and December. At this conference, there will be an assessment of what has been done thus far on all political, economic and organizational levels, through reports currently being prepared and which will be discussed in various party branches. After each branch secretariat has drawn up its own comments and suggestions, the congress will then be called to convene so that it won't last a long time as in the past. Indeed, the Syrian leadership is currently studying a proposal that the conference be convened in two stages--the first on the party branches level and the second at the congress itself, so as to save time. The question of time is being taken into consideration because all the officials will have to devote their full attention to the congress, resulting in a disruption in administrative work. In the past, debate over reports and voting on proposals was done during the congress, and this process was very time consuming. The congress will be called to convene by President al-Asad, in his capacity as secretary general of the Ba'th Party.

It is expected, as reported by officials in Damascus, that the congress will result in major changes in positions and responsibilities. The congress is also expected to draw up a new plan to confront the next phase. Meetings are being held within this framework between the regional leadership of the Ba'th Party and the central leadership of the National and Progressive Front which is participating in the government. A Syrian official says that the purpose of these meetings is to strengthen cohesiveness and cooperation among the parties participating in "the national front" and to broaden the base of that front by including nationalist elements and personalities who enjoy a fund of popular respect and support. It is well known that the statement made by President Hafez al-Asad upon his renomination to the presidency included a statement to this effect.

#### Strife Is the Goal

A political observer returns from Damascus with impressions which may be summarized as follows:

1. The assassination incidents which have occurred so far are a preface to explosions designed to inflame sectarian disputes and escalate them to the point of a sectarian strife, such as the strife which set Lebanon on fire.
2. Syrian authorities expect more such activities but completely dismiss the possibility of a sectarian strife occurring.
3. These authorities acknowledge that while the Moslem Brotherhood is being incited externally and partly funded by Arab money, there are within the political system gaps which must be plugged in order to prevent violent winds from blowing through them.



4. Syria stands almost alone in confronting Camp David. It is still strong, but the international objective is to weaken it and sow confusion in it to pave the way for the kind of decisions which would satisfy the policy that the Camp David signatories are attempting to carry out in the Arab region.

5. Syrian officials are convinced that despite these givens, resistance is possible and capable of undermining the policy of capitulation to Israel on the one hand and achieving an honorable Arab peace on the other.

6. With this in mind, officials confirm that Syria will continue to confront Israel in Lebanese or Arab skies, and that Syria will not allow Israel free movement in Lebanon regardless of the sacrifices. The Syrian eye will resist the Israeli awl so that this awl will not reach the heart.

7. It is expected following the meetings of "national front" that the front, after it is expanded, will play a larger role in public and political life. Public resolutions, and others that will in all probability remain secret, will confirm this course of action.

8. There will be no governmental changes before the congress. Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam confirmed this before his departure for New York.

9. All of these conditions will remain the main hallmark of Syrian activity prior to the congress. It is difficult to speculate right now what the picture will be after the congress.

#### The Confusion Is Deliberate

Nevertheless, the primarily deliberate confusion presently occurring in Syria is designed to disfigure the features of the present regime. During and prior to the Baghdad conference, Syria was able to persuade the Arab states that endurance and resistance were possible because it was strong and capable of doing so. However, the increase in the assassinations and bombings might rock a strong regime, without necessarily toppling it. This is the view of those who oppose this regime. What is being sought is only to rock the regime. Syria is now fighting against such attempts. The Moslem Brotherhood, no matter what it does, will not succeed in creating a popular trend or in finding sections within the army which will support and help it carry out a military coup, nor will it succeed in fomenting sectarian strife which would burn [passage dropped] [the Ba'th Party] succeeded over a number of years to create a broad popular base from the diverse sects in Syria, as well as in maintaining an international balance in the Arab region. This is something which cannot be easily overcome. Therefore, an incident generates whispers which make it look to be more than it actually is, but soon the whispers will evaporate. Officials in Syria anticipate such incidents and say that some anticipated incidents may surpass in severity anything that has happened so far, so as to make

the regime appear unable to control the internal situation or to drive it into reactions which would be necessary first step toward igniting a sectarian strife.

However, does that mean that things will occur with such simplicity? This is not so. The plot to which Syria is currently being subjected may surpass the level of the resistance shown by its rulers. However, one official says: "Regardless of the size of the plot, we will maintain our positions until we attain the peace we want. Although the regime in Damascus has thus so far shown some of its weapons, it has not yet shown them all." An observer needs only to visit Damascus or any Syrian city, on the coast or inland, to feel that the features of the city have not changed and that nothing has actually changed. An observer needs only to ask the ordinary citizens to find out whether "something" within the regime needs to be corrected or changed.

7005  
CSO: 4802

SYRIA

HAMAH HOUSING PROJECT; ANTI-CHOLERA MEASURES DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 4

[Article by SANA and AL-THAWRAH correspondent: "100 Million Syrian Pounds To Build Housing Units in Hamah"]

[Text] Hamah: One hundred million Syrian pounds has been allocated to build new housing units in Hamah, at a time when the health situation in the province has been examined and the actions taken to prevent the spread of cholera reviewed, especially after its appearance in neighboring countries.

It was decided that the Public Institution for Insurance would participate in financing the housing units which will be built on Al-'Alamayn St. in the city. That was the result of a meeting between the governor and comrade branch secretary with the director general of the institution and a number of its officials.

The director of the institution in Hamah stated that agreement on financing the construction was reached between the municipality and the institution by sharing the amount of approximately 100 million pounds from the funds reserved for life insurance which the office of the prime minister has permitted the institution to use.

The organizations concerned in the municipality are beginning to prepare the necessary studies and plans for the project.

Hamah's director of health chaired a meeting which included the directors of the national hospital, the Al-Salmiyah hospital, and the nursing school, and the chiefs of the health centers in the province. They reviewed the health situation in the province in general and the actions taken to prevent the spread of cholera in Syria, especially after it had appeared in some Arab countries. The chief of preventive services confirmed the readiness of the city's quarantine station and the health center to receive cholera cases at any time.

The director of health also urged health authorities to show concern for the sick, give them good treatment, as well as insure good maintenance of

the health centers and institutions, and the safeguarding of drugs, in order to provide excellent health services for the citizens. The director of health emphasized the need for full compliance with duty hours by all doctors and those who work in hospitals and health centers, and said that all violations should be reported to the health directorate so that any delinquents could be brought to account.

He indicated that simple surgical operations could be performed in the health centers, so that the patients would not have to bear the difficulty of being transported to hospitals for that purpose.

The directorate of health has provided all health centers with surgical equipment to this end. He emphasized the need for the centers to be stocked with drugs at all times and said that the chiefs of the centers will be held responsible for the lack of any such drugs.

In the meeting he also reviewed the subject of inoculations and providing them for children at the prescribed intervals, as well as the need to apply this program strictly. They also discussed the need to preserve vaccines by professional methods after distribution of special containers in order to preserve and carry vaccines to various areas.

It was also decided to provide the health centers which have recently been established in the province with refrigerators.

7005  
CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

ENVOY FROM YAR PRESIDENT--Prime Minister Hedi Nouira received Lt Col Husayn Muhammad al-Daf'i, the Yemen Arab Republic president's special envoy to President Bourguiba, in the Kasbah government palace at 1100 yesterday. In a statement to the Tunisian News Agency [TAP] the North Yemen envoy indicated that the talks related to relations between Tunisia and the Yemen Arab Republic. The Yemen president's envoy told a TAP representative that the meeting took place within the framework of permanent consultations between Tunisia and the Yemen Arab Republic. "The talks related to the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries and the latest developments on the Arab political scene," Mr al-Daf'i added. [Excerpts] [LD061429 Tunis L'ACTION in French 24 Oct 79 p 4 LD]

MESSAGE TO LISBON CONFERENCE--Tunis Nov 2 (TAP)--President Bourguiba conveyed to Lisbon world conference on solidarity with the Arab world and the Palestinian cause, a message in which he emphasized that the conference would allow to better inform about the just cause of the Arab peoples who are seeking to recover by force, their occupied territories and especially institute a state, for the Palestinian oppressed refugees, in their homeland. Furthermore, the president stated that the Palestinians under the PLO chairmanship, are gaining more and more support on the international level. This let them hope to find a settlement to their problem conformably to the civilized world's principles and international laws. Finally, the Tunisian head of state asserted that some western countries, radically, despise the Palestinian problem. This stemmed undoubtedly from a lack of information. Events such as the world conference on solidarity with the Arab world and the Palestinian cause will help restore the international justice and morals as well as peace. [Text] [LD021525 Tunis TAP in English 1423 GMT 2 Nov 79 LD]

CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

PCF, PCI, PCE ISSUE COMMUNIQUE ON WESTERN SAHARA VISIT

LD042358 Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 4 Nov 79 LD

[Text] As was agreed in Madrid, a joint delegation of the French, Italian and Spanish communist parties consisting of Mr Gremetz, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party [PCF]; Mr Pajetta, member of the Italian Communist Party [PCI] Directorate; and Mr Ballesteros, member of the Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist Party [PCE], have visited Western Sahara at the invitation of the POLISARIO Front. This is how the communique begins which was jointly published by the communist parties today:

The delegation of the three parties had detailed discussions with Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the POLISARIO Front, on the situation and the prospects of the struggle. It traveled several hundred kilometers across the country and had talks on the political-military situation with the minister of defense.

The delegation--the communique says--has thus acquainted itself with the Saharan people's lives, their living conditions, their social attainments, their administrative organization under the direction of their unquestionable representative the POLISARIO Front. Everywhere it saw great activity, strong participation by the people, the people taking real charge of their own affairs, their determination in their fight for national independence and freedom, which is reflected in important military and diplomatic successes.

The examination of equipment seized by the POLISARIO fighters from the aggressor has allowed verification of the aid given to Morocco by governments in the first rank of which are those of the United States, France and Spain.

The delegation--the statement says--is returning convinced that the only solution is that of the cessation of the Moroccan aggression and the opening of negotiations with the POLISARIO Front which will allow the Saharan people to live free and independent on their territory. The representatives of the three parties commit themselves to do everything to enable these talks to go ahead in each of their countries so that their respective governments may contribute to the positive settlement of the conflict in this part of the world.

END

CSO: 4400

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