

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020030-4

**16 NOVEMBER 1979**

**NO. 2045**

**1 OF 1**

JPRS 74593

16 November 1979

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2045

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.



JPRS 74593

16 November 1979

### NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2045

#### CONTENTS

PAGE

#### IRAN

Revolution Puts Social Justice Above Individual Freedom (Mohammad Javad Kermani Interview; ENQELAB-E ESLAMI, 5 Sep 79) .....	1
Iran National Party To Follow Revolutionary Orders (BAMDAD, 6 Sep 79) .....	3
Liberal Government at Variance With Islamic Leadership (BAMDAD, 1 Sep 79) .....	5
Influx, Drain of Citizens Following Revolution Reviewed (EMTELA'AT, 6 Oct 79) .....	9
Role of Banks in Revolutionary Society Analyzed, Scrutinized (EMTELA'AT, 9 Oct 79) .....	14
Perfidy, Treachery of International Drug Firms Bared (EMTELA'AT, 10 Oct 79) .....	19
Current Situation in Kurdish Areas Discussed (NAMEH-E RUZ, 11 Oct 79) .....	23
Low-Cost Housing Projects Discussed (NAMEH-E RUZ, 6 Oct 79) .....	26
Briefs Flight From Revolution .....	28

#### ISRAEL

Real Estate Administration Accused of Discrimination in Renting Land (Shlomoh Giv'on; MA'ARIV, 26 Sep 79) .....	29
---	----

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121]

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
LIBYA	
Libyan Leader Afflicted With Eye Disease (Maria Luisa Luca de Tena; BLANCO Y NEGRO, 10-16 Oct 79) .....	33
MAURITANIA	
SNIM Director Discusses SNIM Deficit, Guelbs Project (Ely O. Allaf Interview; CEAAB, various dates) ...	37
Nation Searches for New Fishing Policy (Mireille Duteil; DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, 24 Sep 79) ...	46
Briefs	
Operational Prospects of Refinery	49
Large-Scale Contraband	49
Hostility to New Government	49
SUDAN	
Refugee Influx Aggravates Problems in Sudan (AL-SAFIR, 30 Sep 79) .....	50
SYRIA	
Internal Instability Said To Be Threat to Regime (AKHIR SA'AH, 19 Sep 79) .....	53
WESTERN SAHARA	
Moroccan-POLISARIO Clashes Expected To Intensify (LE MONDE, 11 Oct 79) .....	58
PCE, PCF, PCI Decide on Joint Actions To Support POLISARIO (L'HUMANITE, 21 Sep 79) .....	60
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	
Official Interviewed on Water Crisis in Capital (AL-THAWRAH, 22 Jul 79) .....	62

IRAN

REVOLUTION PUTS SOCIAL JUSTICE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 5 Sep 79 p 6

[Interview with Mohammad Javad Kermani]

[Text] In the exchange of opinions and views of the three experts, which was printed in the newspaper ENQELAB-E ESLAMI on Sunday, 11 Shahrivar [2 September], His Eminence Mohammad Javad Kermani's view regarding ownership and class differences unfortunately was not printed. The answer to the appropriate question follows:

Question: Among the causes of Iran's Islamic Revolution were the existence of severe class differences and the concentration of enormous wealth in the hands of a limited number of people. In your opinion, how should the economic principles pertaining to ownership be formulated in the Constitution to eliminate these differences and to prevent them from reappearing?

Answer: I, myself, am not qualified to respond fully to this question because an economist knowledgeable concerning economic affairs should respond, but, I can state in general terms that some action must be taken so that economists and economic experts might resolve this problem in accordance with the Koranic principle which states "La yakon dowlatan beyn-ol-eghniya alminkam," i.e., property and wealth must not be rotated among the wealthy. Any system and method of economic management that causes property to be circulated only among the wealthy and in which the rich control and command the wealth and under which the economy and public wealth are in fact controlled by a limited number of people must be eliminated, and the economist must restructure it. I am speaking as I feel and as I understand. I have reached a conclusion about economic questions, which I have occasionally studied, and now I am telling you this conclusion so that it might be made available to the authorities on this subject for their consideration and so that, if there is some error, it might be corrected. In describing the general principles of Islamic economic justice, two points have occurred to me. The first is that the Islamic economy is based on two main pillars, and those two pillars are social justice and personal freedom, with this reminder that, whenever social justice and personal freedom clash, personal freedom must be sacrificed. This principle of social

justice-personal freedom prevails throughout the Islamic economy. As long as social justice is guaranteed, we are not forced to limit personal freedom; but, if we see that personal freedom is intruding upon social justice, we will restrict personal freedom. This is the standard: the individual will be restricted to the extent that social justice is being damaged. This is absolute and final. The second point regarding the Islamic economy is that the Islamic economy is a flexible economy. Because of what I said in the first point, I have termed it a flexible economy -- an economy without shape. In past times, many people have asked, "Is this form of economy a capitalist economy, a communist economy, or a socialist economy? What structure does the Islamic economy have"?

I thought that the best response from my standpoint would be to say that it is an unstructured economy because it is an economy whose foundations were laid in the year 1400 or were molded generally in the schools of our ancestors. Therefore, we can not give a particular shape to the Islamic economy. Any shape that can guarantee these two principles -- social justice and personal freedom -- and, in the judgment of the economist, is in accordance with a judicial decree of the time is fine. I am not governed very much by structure. In prison, when I was conversing with one of those so-called youths who had leftist leanings, he said, "This economy of which you speak has a lot in common with socialism." We do not deny that our school of thought might have a lot in common with another school. We should never be afraid to take an action, the form of which is somewhat similar to the form of their action, because we, too, might be accused. Now, this nationalization of the industries and the nationalization of the banks are steps regarding which, had they been carried out 20 or 30 years ago, our thinking would not have been so mature. We thought that such actions were the province of other schools of thought. We should not fail to carry out any so-called action which is possible in the direction of adjusting the so-called wealth and which can provide justice for the Just because it might be similar to some action taken in such and such a country or in such and such a school of thought, and we should not bind ourselves to a particular structure. You must exert yourselves to the utmost and make every effort to combine social justice with personal freedom in any way you can and, if occasionally, and I am repeating this, personal freedom clashes with social justice, personal freedom must be restricted; social justice will not be sacrificed to personal freedom.

8514  
CSO: 4906



IRAN

IRAN NATIONAL PARTY TO FOLLOW REVOLUTIONARY ORDERS

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 6 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] On the anniversary of its founding, the Iran National Party issued a statement in which, after referring to the historic struggles of the Iranian nation and the founding of the party in Aban 1331 (23 October-21 November 1952), it states:

By following the wise leadership of the great Mosaddeq during the difficult era of Iran's national movement, the party has always stood in the ranks of the strugglers against dictatorship alined with foreigners. After the coup of 28 Mordad 1332 [30 July 1953] the party made special efforts in Iran's National Resistance Movement and Iran's National Front and continued its struggles, together with other political organizations seeking freedom and independence.

During the years that repression increased and the imperialists dominated our country more and more, although the organization sustained great damage, including damage to its manpower, it never left the battlefield to fight the people's enemy. By broadening the religious elements in the liberation movements of the Iranian nation and include the help of some parties, it first established a unity of forces in the "Iran National Front" and then the new "National Front of Iran" organization to establish national sovereignty. In the solid efforts of Iranians under the leadership of "Imam Khomeyni" to overthrow the "monarchic regime," and achieve victory in the Islamic revolution of the Iranian nation, it participated sincerely. With the firm belief that "an Islamic republic" is a government which can meet the historic demands of Iranians and has the capability of providing full independence for the country with individual and social freedoms, and can completely change the economic relations of the society and put an end to colonialist methods, on the referendum which was held on 11 Farvardin 1358 [31 March 1979], it voted for an Islamic republic and now it has risen to defend the revolutionary achievements with all its strength.

The affiliates of the Iran National Party promise before God and the free people of this territory, on this anniversary of its foundation that they honor, and that so long as they are alive, they will protect the values of the revolution and strive for Iran's development and freedom.

9044  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

LIBERAL GOVERNMENT AT VARIANCE WITH ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 1 Sep 79 p 2

[Text] Of all the active political and ideologies that exist in Iran's revolution, there are two political ideologies which permeate the atmosphere: one is Islamic internationalism whose supporters consist of clergy and true Moslems who are sincerely active for Imam Khomeyni's revolutionary leadership without expecting any personal gain from the results of the revolution. Religious schools, mosques, the Guards Corps, and the revolutionary committees can be included in this group. The other is western liberal bourgeois policy, which, whether we like it or not, is a policy toward which the government is inclined. It is observed that by maintaining the same bureaucratic framework as that which existed prior to the revolution the government is once again going to allow capitalism to dominate the economic and political destiny of this country only by slight changes of an Islamic color. One of the characteristics of Islamic internationalism whose range of action goes beyond the borders of Iran is that by spreading Islamic revolutionary ideas and creating or establishing unity among the Moslems in the world and the poor nations it stands as a third power against the capitalist imperialism of the West and the social imperialism of the East, as well as world Zionism, and is preparing the third world by relying on Islamic justice and reviving the rights of the poor. Without being conservative even disregarding the problems that they would definitely face, and with the sincerity and clarity of their goal as stated in the Koran, the supporters of this ideology have risen to save the poor nations, for the salvation of societies from financial corruption. They want to replace matter by humanity and virtue. Disregarding the hypocrisy and the ideas of politicians of governments, they have focused their hopes on supporting the poor and are looking for a light in the darkness.

Here, by complicating matters and failing to give the freedom that the poor deserve, the government is pursuing its own way and with procedures which demonstrate its inclination for the continuation and stability of capitalism very shortly the poor who are hoping for Islamic justice and a monotheistic society will lose their hope and if that happens the grounds will be prepared

for turning away from Islamic principles and the weakening of beliefs. This will give an opportunity for the non-Islamic groups and propagandists of materialistic beliefs to extend their range of activities. If so, the policy of the leadership and the government instead of moving in parallel and in one direction would practically be separated and move in contradictory lines. This would not only sacrifice the revolutionary achievements, it would also endanger both the school (Islamic ideology) and the country. One of the most important factors that has separated the policy of the leadership and the government is the difference between the expectations of the supporters of these policies. In the leadership policy there is nothing but serving the people, God's satisfactions and otherworldly expectations. Whereas, in government policy you can see the seeking of popularity. The supporters of capitalism have penetrated into the government's policy and separated it from the leadership's policy. By comparing prices before and after the revolution, the inclination toward the bourgeoisie and the strengthening of the interests of the arrogant is quite readily observed. The same capitalist of the bazaar who struck a blow for Islam and an Islamic republic before the revolution is practically stabbing the Islamic goals with a dagger from behind and has not given up a tiny portion of his interests and inhumane profits. Apparently they talk more of being Islamic than other classes of society. However, their way of living is a good criterion that they are non-Islamic and that if they spend money in God's way or spend their property for Islam, in reality they have not given away anything from their own property but rather from the pockets of the people to God's account. They want both to eat their cake and still have it. (They cannot have both alternatives.) They will not ride a car if it is not a Mercedes Benz 280. They do not want to give up their palace in the north of the city, their suburban gardens around Tehran and their round-the-world trips and their children cannot live on less than \$1,000 a month abroad. How can they follow the policy of the leadership? Obviously they are looking for another alternative.

Even against the will of the government, they will push it toward capitalism. How do they allow themselves to defend the Islamic republic. They are the enemies of Islam. They damage the control of the leadership and they do not have the right to consider themselves Islamic and supporters of Islam.

A government which cannot wash out these ant nests and take their money out of their throat cannot claim to be an Islamic revolutionary government and sooner or later with the help of a few million other government personnel, the government will have to feed on what is left from the poor and inevitably a country which wants to move toward a monotheistic, classless society will remain with the same non-Islamic classes.

The imperialist, Zionists, capitalists, position seekers, monopolists, and supporters of the former regime as well as those reactionaries who pretend to be Moslems are not inactive and from every side they are conspiring

to make the leadership policy move the government in the direction they want and to separate the policy of the government from the policy of the leadership and to discredit and corrupt existing values. On the other hand, lack of unity among the clergy, the Pasdaran Corps (Guards Corps) and the committees who are part of the Imam's policy and the penetration of ambitions and monopolistic persons who pretend to be clergy as well as elements who are far from the true values of the Islamic revolution such as professional criminals, those affiliated to the former regime and supporters of the reactionary opposition, capitalists and leftist groups in the committees make procrastinations and obstructions in the revolutionary movement in the policy of the leadership. We should also mention the groups affiliated to imperialism and zionism and unfortunately even the national and progressive groups have helped weaken the leadership line by making mistakes and creating involvements in the country and inflaming ideological disturbances. They have made the government more panicky and perhaps the government is inclined toward a direction that it did not want and the opportunity was given to those with bourgeois inclinations.

If the struggling and the revolutionary groups had not so much covered themselves in their ideological beliefs in the name of the people and the people's interest and had placed themselves in the revolutionary atmosphere of Iran and in the arms of the nation with sincerity and had realized the revolutionary position instead of keeping at a distance from the people and making criticism, the leadership power would have been strengthened and perhaps most of the existing problems and inadequacies would not have been created. Of course, the forces supporting the leadership did not have a sufficient understanding of these groups and thus accepted them regardless of their ideological differences.

The mercenary policy of Zionism and imperialism helped cause splits among political groups. They want to weaken the leadership and for this purpose they have used all of their economic and political forces and mass media even by creating grounds of uncertainty toward the revolution genuineness, they prevented the people from accepting and believing in the revolution and they will never remain calm. With the help of domestic reactionaries and the negligence of national political groups of relative understanding of the revolutionary time, they take political and ideological activities underground. The intellectuals who should be in the front line of the people have been placed at such an unsuitable distance because of lack of understanding that the people consider the intellectuals as enemies. The imperialists and Zionists want to split forces and they are hoping for the start of underground activities. They encourage repression and terrorism in every way and want to prevent the development of our country by any trick or conspiracy. No matter what ideology we have, we are all responsible to the revolution and if it is in danger. If we believe in God we will be reprimanded before God and if we do not believe in God we will be reprimanded by the people and history.

So all groups and classes of society are responsible for protecting this genuine Islamic revolution and they are bound to purge themselves of beliefs and understandings unsuitable to the revolution and not to allow suspicious elements who are not worthy of the revolution to act ahead of all the progressive and struggling clergy. They should follow such examples as Imam Khomeyni and Ayatollah Taleqani. The intellectuals and university students should think of the path that the martyred teacher, Dr Shari'ati was following. All the groups should focus their nonactive group role in producing activity at this time for strengthening the leadership and revolutionary slogans, that is, independence, freedom and the Islamic republic. Instead of theoretical propaganda, the groups should be active in Jihad (holy war), for construction considering the revolutionary position and necessity in the country. The supporters of the policy of the leadership should also accept that merely having nonreligious beliefs does not mean opposition to the revolution. The true enemies of the revolution who are supported by the imperialists and Zionists are usually in the clothes of supporters who strike their blow internally. The government should avoid any program that would lead to the growth of capitalism, rather it should approach and conform with the policy of the leadership. By maintaining the chain of command, to accept the system of having council as a need for the revolution. Considering the disguised unemployment in offices, the government can at least mobilize one-third of its employees for the Construction Jihad. At least until the time that the hand of imperialism and Zionism is cut off, all groups should make peace with one another and unite. Instead of confronting each other and making the front weak, they should strive to strengthen a single front. Because it is only by maintaining unity and strengthening the leadership that the anti-imperialist position is strengthened in all countries and victory is achieved for the poor.

9044  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

INFLUX, DRAIN OF CITIZENS FOLLOWING REVOLUTION REVIEWED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Oct 79 p 5

/Article: "The Iranian Revolution and the Brain Drain!"/

/Text/ The brain drain, which is an inevitable symptom of industrial expansion, technical development and the sciences of the era, is like the other policies of the devastating imperialism which for a long time has had as its objective the world's intellectuals and specialists, especially those of the countries of the third world--a worldwide problem and a common misery of all the countries which have risen up to deliver themselves from the cultural and economic imperialism of world imperialism. The seduction of world capitalism, which enjoys abundant material resources and resources for prosperity, has a record as old as that of neoimperialism's existence in the world in attracting intellectual and experienced minds and people, and, God knows America is the master of the countries of the world in this intellectual and cultural exploitation and imperialism.

In the past 20 years America has had a pressing need for medical personnel and has acted with such generosity in attracting trained doctors and nurses that for the past 2 or 3 years practically all its needs have been met in this area. Since then it has exerted considerable rigorous efforts to bring in doctors. Now a large group of educated Iranians, and above all doctors, who, it is stated, total 5,000 persons, have been drawn to the American job market. In other fields of science such as physics and mathematics, numerous stars like Professor Ghaffari enjoy a lofty status and position in that country's scientific circles as well. Many countries of the third world, besides Iran, and even European countries as well are suffering from the symptoms of the brain drain.

The Brain Drain--and the Brain Draw

Following the triumph of the revolution of Iran, when the bases of the regime of oppression, tyranny and repression were crushed, numerous groups of educated, specialized young people with revolutionary zeal and yearning came home. Fortunately, in spite of numerous obstacles and problems, a large portion of them still are staying in Iran, with the objective of





comprehensive evaluation and analysis. One can break this drain down into two groups: one, specialists who left Iran in order to escape trial for some sort of connection with the regime which was overthrown, and two, specialists who have simply left the country on the strength of bad publicity and fear of social changes.

This group consists mostly of people who evaluate events not as they are but as they themselves wish them to be. In this respect, the propaganda of capitalist countries is undoubtedly not without influence. Imperialism, which became hysterical over the Iranian revolution, has constantly been trying to portray our country's overall picture in such a fearsome way that every luminary is driven to leave his country by fear! Their reasoning is that fascism, with its "iron heel," is on the way, and they are whining about the lack of freedom and the blackness of repression without presenting a clear picture of what they are saying, or adopting any remedies for solving this problem. Naturally this intensifies the problems of the brain drain.

#### The Return of Qualified People

In the course of the Iranian revolution, and also following the triumph of the revolution, a large group also returned to Iran alongside the groups which left the country. This group returned home solely to advance the goals of the revolution, serve the people and be of utility within their own limitations.

Numerous students even left without completing their studies and made their way to the country alongside exiles, enforced emigres, and members of organizations, political parties and so on and so forth--solely to serve the revolution. As a result the majority of today's leadership group in Iran consists of people who were away from their homeland for 15 to 25 years.

Habib Asgari, a youth who left his sociology studies half completed and came to Iran, states, with regard to his motives for returning, "Today more than any time I can say we have reached the era of construction; destruction is easier than construction and for this reason most of the people who were present during the destruction have now stayed on for the reconstruction. A true revolutionary is a person who is aware of the arts of construction and destruction, together, and one must say that these periods have been very complex and complicated. Under such conditions, it often happens that a number of people collapse under the weight of problems and leave the country discontent since they are not able to discover and comprehend the laws bearing on the class struggle.

"Now, in view of combative circumstances of the struggle, one must remain in the country, work and bring awareness and understanding to the toiling people and the masses. One can also show dissatisfaction with a particular development in other ways. What must be taken as granted is that here our country is, and we are partners and participants in its good and bad aspects.

"Now one must work with all one's being, struggle and eliminate the ugly features and inadequacies. This is the only existing reality."

#### Special Traders

Eng Bazargan, the prime minister of the temporary revolutionary government, in raising a complaint about certain doctors, referred intelligently a short time ago in his television interview to the other classes of society which preferred their personal welfare to the interests of society and stated "In the current conditions of the country it is the duty of every individual and every group to pursue activity and work without financial designs or inordinate material expectations."

Although he did not place direct emphasis on the matter of the emigration of numerous specialists and thinkers in this interview, one may fully deduce from the prime minister's words that as a revolutionary who is devoted to the revolution he is dissatisfied and worried about this emigration and brain drain. Unfortunately the number of doctors who left Iran after the revolution is not small and one cannot easily sidestep it, considering the shortage of doctors in Iran and the society's need for the important issue of public health and treatment.

Other specialists and educated people besides doctors have left the country on various pretexts.

Hoseyn Radpanahi, a student at Tehran University, stated in a brief interview with our reporter "The flight of people with capital and the prosperous classes of society in general was natural and predictable because the class character of this group makes it mandatory that they live in a gaudy atmosphere devoid of turmoil. However, the departure of a number of intellectuals and specialists abroad is not justifiable in any way."

He added, "There is no doubt that some special class dependencies also exist among educated specialized people which assuredly will be of influence in their life style. For example, a doctor who received a house call fee of 200 tomans for a few minutes' examination of a patient under the previous regime, engaged in trade alongside medicine, enjoyed material prosperity and abundant ease will, like others of his kind, find the current conditions of society in no way tolerable. In reality they are traders who go anywhere their interests may be better provided for."

Last week also a doctor said in a radio interview,

"Our people and the toiling masses sincerely gave up their beloved lives in the course of the revolution without any ulterior motives in order to overthrow the filthy corrupt Pahlavi regime.

"They consummated the revolution at this exorbitant price. How can a doctor allow himself to abandon a country in which he was raised for a

greater income when the masses of the people sincerely and loyally give up their lives for a sacred objective? In my opinion this is the greatest act of treason against the masses of the people. In a place where people are offering up their lives with no concern, what importance or value can material benefits have? It is therefore the duty of us doctors to engage in service with all the power and strength we have, night and day, and perhaps thereby pay our real debt to the revolution and the people."

11887  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

ROLE OF BANKS IN REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY ANALYZED, SCRUTINIZED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Oct 79 p 5

Article: "Are the Banks Destroyers or Builders?"

Text Last week the Revolutionary Council of Iran ratified the bill to nationalize banks and ended the commercial power of the private sector over this branch of industry.

In accordance with this ratified legislation, the Supreme Council of Banks, which is being formed in place of the Joint Council of Banks, is being charged with carrying out the necessary studies to bring banking transactions in line with Islamic criteria and have the studies ratified by the general assembly.

Thus the issue of nationalization of banks which, for the last several months, has been considered one of the most controversial programs of the government, has come close to the stage of implementation.

From now on all the country's banks--specialized and commercial alike--will be managed in accordance with particular provisions compatible with Islamic commandments.

In the previous regime, the bank management system was based on maximizing profit and exploiting the low-income and needy classes of society, since this sector was mostly managed with joint foreign capital, more than half its enormous revenues flowed into the pockets of the big foreign companies.

Economic subservience in bank management delivered terrible blows to the resources and economy of our society and intensified our dependence on Western capitalism in other areas of industry and commerce. It was for this reason that the revolutionary government assigned special priority to the nationalization of banks and insurance companies and economic and financial experts pursued it with exceptional speed and seriousness.

The enormous profit which the balance sheets of banks showed in the satanic era show the depradation by the banks of our ordinary, needy

people more than anything else. The majority of these people--laborers, white collar workers and merchants--were burdened down by heavy housing loans at weighty interest rates of from 14 to 13 percent.

The exploitation and extortion by banks in our country, which had become prey to the devil, was so extensive that a bank established with the aid of foreign capitalists in Tehran managed to return all its capital to its owners' pockets in the first 5 years. As an expert in money and banking has written, close to 60 foreign banks started operating in various sections of Tehran just in the past few years. Following the nationalization of banks, an important issue was their consolidation, the creation of specialized banks, and the determination of the conditions of bank employees who are under various employment umbrellas and are subject to special employment and retirement regulations and classifications in which discrimination among employees has been conspicuous. At the present time, the matter of the payment of a special profit which is the natural right of bank employees has in itself added one more problem to those of the banks.

Whereas some banks, including the Bank Melli, have made payments to their employees on various terms and conditions, this problem still remains in other banks. The matter of formation of councils, the appointment of managing boards and the liquidation of elements connected with the previous regime and the disbanded Savak are in themselves other issues which are to be observed in the banks as in other government organizations and departments. In any case it is hoped that with the merger and consolidation of banks, the functions of about 62,000 bank employees will be clarified and they will all enjoy equal privileges and benefits.

The bill regulating the nationalization of banks and insurance companies which became the subject of the attention of the government and the Revolutionary Council some months ago was ratified by the Revolutionary Council 1 week ago.

In accordance with this law, the banks are to have five main elements: one, the General Assembly of Banks; two, the Supreme Council of Banks; three, the managing board of each bank; four, the managing director of each bank; five the legal examiners of each bank. The General Assembly of Banks consists of the minister of economic and financial affairs, the minister of industry and mines, the minister of commerce, the minister of agriculture and rural development, the minister of housing and urban development, and the minister of state for the plan and budget organization. Chairmanship of the General Assembly is the responsibility of the minister of economic and financial affairs.

In accordance with the law which has been ratified, any change in the articles of any bank's charter, increases or decreases in any bank's capital, and the establishment, dissolution or merger of banks will lie exclusively in the power of the exceptional General Assembly of Banks.

Regarding the new law on banks, our reporters got in touch with some managing directors and employees of banks and prepared and drew up the following report in the light of their recommendations and reform views. The report is as follows:

#### The Banks' New Duties

Arabzadeh, managing director of the Credit Bank, stated, with respect to the new law on banks, "The merger of banks has been raised in general form. Details have not been presented in this law, but the managing director of the Central Bank had previously made clarifications on the details of the regulating bill which to some extent define banking policy. It goes without saying that this merger must take place because it will benefit the banking system of the country, the economy and the society from every standpoint. One good feature of the nationalization of banks is the centralization of bank management and administration and this will be accompanied by considerable savings in cost. On the other hand, the sole aim of the banks in the past was to make a profit and acquire interest; however, following the nationalization, the principle of profit will no longer be the object of attention and bank capital will be used to expand industries and build and develop the country.

"Thereby the banks will depart from their profit-making condition and will take the form of a useful center for economic and industrial growth."

He added, "It is possible, in the light of the plan to consolidate banks, that a number of bank employees will be surplus to requirements. Therefore it will be necessary to create new positions for that group of employees and use them in different sections in accordance with their fields of specialization.

"To this end it is necessary that new duties be assigned to the banks. This will be easy, since bank employees are well-informed on commercial, industrial and agricultural affairs; that is, the government can consign the administration of certain agricultural and industrial units to banks so that the banks can make use of their specialists in managing and consulting with these units.

"In this event, the problem of unemployment will not threaten bank employees and appropriate jobs will be created for surplus bank employees."

The managing director of the Credit Bank added, "Another government objective in merging and nationalizing the banks is to help people and alleviate their financial problems; the banks paralyzed the people's economic power by receiving onerous and spectacular interest from them in the past. Now, though, the idea is for the banks to proceed to alleviate people's financial problems for a reasonable commission. With the implementation of the merger plan, the interest rate and commissions throughout all banks will also become uniform and all kinds of overcharging and imposed conditions will be avoided."

#### Elimination of Interest

Regarding the elimination of interest, Arabzadeh said "This issue is related to the general policy of the government and the Revolutionary Council. In any event the interest, along with the commission determined for loans disbursed, will be equitable, and the income from this will be spent on expanding the country's industries and agriculture.

"In my opinion, however, the interest which the banks receive from the industrial sector at the present time is great. The interest which now applies to industrial loans differs according to the size of the loan and even reaches 13 percent on some occasions; this is exceptionally high considering current conditions and the need the industries have for money with which to operate."

Concerning the nationalization of banks, Askarian, member of the board of directors of the Iran Insurance Bank, told our reporter, "I am in agreement with the merger of banks but one must see what regulations have been provided for the merger. In order to merge banks it is necessary to consolidate and unify the employment regulations of banks before anything else so that there will be no differences among bank employees. In addition, in order to avoid mistakes and duplication, a new system must be created so that the banks will have mutual information exchanges and their credit and legal management will be interconnected. Otherwise, numerous problems will be created which it will not be easy to solve." Gorjestani, managing director of the Merchants' Bank, told our reporter:

"My information regarding the bill which has been ratified by the Revolutionary Council is restricted to the news I read in the papers; until the official letter concerning the bill reaches me, I will have to excuse myself from expressing an opinion on this matter."

#### Employment Situation in the Banks

The plan to merge banks has drawn the attention of bank employees as well as the nation's framers of banking policy, and the bank employees express different views on the bill ratified by the Revolutionary Council. We will content ourselves here with two examples of the points of view expressed.

Seyyed Morad Hoseyni, employee of the Export Bank, told our reporter concerning this matter:

"If this plan is carried out properly and with the necessary care, it will be the best of bills because it will both ensure the people's interests and be beneficial to bank employees.

"When this plan is carried out, people's banking activities will be carried out more easily and bank customers will no longer have to refer to different bank branches. On the other hand the employment condition of bank

employees will also be clarified, all bank employees will enjoy similar rights and benefits and the extra privileges which some bank employees possess relative to employees of other banks at the present time will be eliminated. Most important of all, the interest or commissions which banks receive from borrowers will be equalized in all banks and thus there will be no overcharging of customers. On the basis of these facts, I am 100 percent in agreement with the law to nationalize and consolidate banks and hope that this mission will be consummated as soon as possible."

Vahedi, chief of an Export Bank branch, told our reporter "I hope that the pressure of work in banks will be reduced with the implementation of the new law on banks, or at least that the amount of work will not go beyond what it already is, and new duties will not weigh down bank employees."

He added, "The employment situation of bank workers has not yet been determined; in fact, employees who had jobs in private banks were faced with an unknown situation following the nationalization of the banks. Now we are neither government nor private sector employees. When we request the government to investigate the problems of matters related to us they tell us 'You have not yet become governmental' and these evasive answers have increased our bewilderment even more than before."

He added, "The nationalization and consolidation of the banks will be to the benefit of all the people because all banking activities which used to be scattered about will be combined in several banks and people will be able to carry out their banking activities easily. Most important of all, with the nationalization of the banks some of our economic dependence will be eliminated and this will be to the benefit of the country's economy."

11887  
CSO: 4906



IRAN

PERFIDY, TREACHERY OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG FIRMS BARED

Tehran ETEELA'AT in Persian 10 Oct 79 p 5

/Article: "Foreign Pharmaceutical Firms Sell Drugs to Iran for Cash Only: The Drug Shortage Is a Link in the Counterrevolutionary Zionist Conspiracy!"

/Text/ Some categories of vital, life-giving drugs have become unavailable in Iran. Big pharmaceutical companies have laid out very stiff terms for the sale of drugs to Iran and export drugs to Iran only in exchange for cash, whereas foreign drug manufacturing firms previously received 10 percent of the price of their orders as a down payment and received the rest in instalments over 6 months or more!

This customary conduct was observed with respect to all commercial agreements and was not restricted to the sale and purchase of drugs. Now, however, some foreign pharmaceutical companies and other producers who are linked with international Zionism and imperialism and are dissatisfied with the Iranian revolution are looking for excuses in order not to sell their goods to our country, and they even ignore international commercial agreements.

However, this deliberate creation of obstacles and sabotage, which is being carried out completely with the orders of Zionist policymakers, will not leave the slightest influence on Iran's current policy; it will even increase our people's anger toward the Zionist despoilers of the world.

The pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, which rose up in competition in the past to sell their drugs to Iran, and yielded to every recommendation by the government of Iran, are not prepared to sell drugs to Iran now that their abundant resources have been blocked off.

More than 10 types of needed, frequently-consumed drugs have become scarce in Iran and drug importing firms are in financial difficulties regarding the purchase and acquisition of drugs from abroad.

The importation of drugs from abroad takes two forms, one, that of manufactured and prepared drugs, and the other, that of primary materials for the manufacture of drugs.

At the present time, foreign companies are proposing difficult conditions to importing firms for the sale of each of these two types of commodity, and most importing firms are not able to accept their proposals.

Dr Barkhordari, director of the Bazarganan Hospital, stated in this regard:

"At the present time, the shortage of drugs is being felt throughout the country and the sole reason for this may be summarized as the foreign companies' search for excuses not to sell drugs to Iran.

"In the past, drug importing companies obtained the credit to import drugs from abroad at any volume they wanted by paying one tenth the price of their orders. Now, however, the foreign companies do not hand over drugs until they have received the entire price of their order in advance. These problems also exist with regard to pharmaceutical primary materials, and pharmaceutical blending companies have also met with difficulties in terms of procuring primary materials.

"Recently the Ministry of Health also called upon Japanese pharmaceutical companies to obtain drugs and apparently gave orders for a large amount of syringes and other drugs. Some foreign companies, for example the English company Organon, basically do not export drugs to Iran, so the drugs which those companies used to export to Iran have become exceedingly rare."

He added, "In addition to the private companies which have the duty of purchasing and obtaining drugs from foreign manufacturers, two government organizations also import drugs into Iran; one is the National Drug Company Incorporated and the other is the Lion and Sun Preparations Organization.

"The advantage the Lion and Sun Preparations Organization has over other private companies is that it can import drugs into the country without paying duty, because the Lion and Sun Preparation Organization is connected with the International Red Cross Organization; it is for this reason that it has been given this advantage."

He listed the names of the following 11 types of drugs which are scarce in the market: Ampicillin 500 capsules; Pavolon capsules; Coraton tablets; all drugs used for the treatment of asthma, such as Vantolin syrup, Jantolin spray, and Phenergan cream; Bisolvan tablets; Costanin drops; Cofitol drops; plain Selston and Coronodoz capsules; and Ampicolex.

#### Classification of Drugs

In this regard Dr Akhavan, head of the Sales and Distribution Unit of the National Drug Company Incorporated, told our reporter:

"The drugs which are rare at present on the market may be divided into three groups.

"One group is drugs for which similar drugs exist in the market and in whose place one can use the similar drugs, for example Panpartine, which is actually rare in the market but in whose place one can use the similar drugs Ampicine and Binotal.

"The second group is drugs which have primarily a placebo effect and whose use, or nonuse, leaves no effect on the body. Among the capsules which may be taken orally in the third group are drugs for which similar types do not exist in the market and whose consumption is vital and necessary for a sick person, such as drugs like Izordil used for heart ailments. The Drug Company Incorporated has imported this group of drugs and placed them at the disposal of pharmacies which have agreements with the company. All in all the Drug Company Incorporated is procuring about 22 types of rare drugs and selling them to pharmacies. Meanwhile pharmacies are being advised to sell drugs equivalent to a sick person's consumption for 5 or 6 days in order to avert probable shortages."

He added, "Some doctors write up to a patient's consumption for 6 months in one drug prescription, without taking account of current drug shortages. For example, the University of Tehran, Emam Khomeyni Medical Faculty, on 2 October 1979 prescribed 200 Diceral 500 milligram capsules for a girl named Ma'sumeh Moradmand, one capsule to be injected intermuscularly each day.

"However, this amount should be prescribed over five or six prescriptions, meeting the patient's consumption for a month or 40 days each time.

"Of course this classification is not possible in the case of certain drugs. For example, the minimum consumption of antibiotics is 3 days, and less than that should not be put in a prescription. However, one can put a time restriction on the consumption of many drugs prescribed for long periods and make the drug available to the patient in several instalments."

#### Companies Connected with Zionism

The owners and managers of certain drug importing firms which had special connections with the previous regime fled Iran after the revolution and pharmaceuticals which had been imported into Iran by these companies are not coming into Iran now. These pharmaceuticals have also become scarce in the market.

In this regard, Dr Akhavan said "At the present time foreign companies are asking the full price of orders in advance before transferring pharmaceuticals to Iran. Now the value of an order must be paid to the account of a foreign bank which they themselves determine. Of course some foreign companies, because of their Zionist connections, are not prepared to be party to transactions with the Iranian government and so to speak intend to put our people in difficulties as regards drugs.

"Some companies also refrain from selling drugs on credit, on the assumption that the Iranian nation has gone through a cataclysm and cannot act on its financial commitments. The fallacious, prejudiced propaganda which the foreign press, radio and television have started against Iran is also fuelling this lack of confidence and inhibiting manufacturing companies from commercial relations with Iran."

11837  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

CURRENT SITUATION IN KURDISH AREAS DISCUSSED

Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 11 Oct 79 pp 10, 11

Article: "File of the Day: A Trip Report"

Text: KHABARNAMEH-E KORDESTAN is a newsletter, published by Kurdish fighting men. Recently, issue 7 of this publication, which was reproduced by the Organizations of Guerrilla Irregulars of the Iranian People, was sent to NAMEH-E RUZ. We herewith publish part of a report by a Kurdish worker from the town of Saqqez which was printed in this publication.

In the town of Saqqez, an apparent tranquility is to be observed. The shops are open and one can sense traffic in the streets. Young revolutionary forces are not to be seen in the town. The faces of guards are to be observed everywhere and most evenings after midnight they raid so-called suspicious houses. At 0100 hours in the morning Maj Me'marzadeh was arrested in bed and sentenced to 8 years in prison on the charge of cooperating with the Democratic Party.

The spirit of the people is very good and the slogans on the doors and walls of the houses and the alleys off the streets display a revolutionary, defiant spirit. The people are indifferent toward the guards, and most rebel against the meetings and demonstrations they hold. The guards view this attitude with a weak, despairing spirit and sometimes try to draw people's attention to themselves by such theatrical acts as the distribution of oil, rice and Tide. However, the people of Saqqez, who have put the experience of 5 days' fighting against the guards behind themselves, in spite of the shortage of these materials and relative financial poverty, will not resort to having these materials handed over to them under any pretext and procure most of their oil and rice via Baneh. The hireling guards, who also are failing in this area, have no choice but to attract simple-hearted rural people through local reactionaries, show them off in the main street in a long line before an army of guards and, as armed persons watch over them, in order to compensate for their difficulties, say "All right, now do you want oil, or autonomy?" upon handing over a very small amount of the commodity to them. Then they laugh and make fun of the helpless people. In this situation, people who complain are subjected

to the insults and blows of the hirelings (hired of course in the manner of the Islamic Republic). This has caused rural people to come to town less often. An old peasant man named Sufi Mahmud who has seen this situation stated, with utmost discomfort and simplicity, "Would that our children died of hunger and that I had not done this. I swore upon my honor that after this if my children die before my eyes I will not refer to them for anything."

The uninformed guards have resorted to another trick. Trying to attract people's attention by so-called humane means and good conduct, they greet young and old people in the streets and alleyways and pretend to be big brothers. When this trick does not work they either attack like Mongol troops or work out their problem by firing guns, terror and arrests. In many places women spit on them. Most guards are unhappy with conditions and are very discouraged with their work. One may easily observe fear, regret, distress and remorse on their faces. People in the police are also dissatisfied with them and are not prepared to cooperate with them. When the guards visited the Saqqez police and requested that they go on guard and on watch in cooperation with one another, they met with great opposition on the part of police personnel.

In the afternoon of Tuesday 18 September 1979 around 2,000 young people and members of the toiling classes set out from the belt road toward Aqab Square with slogans for Sheykh Ezzoddin, autonomy and the expulsion of the guards. The parade concluded at Aqab Square with the Kurdish national anthem ('Emri Qeyb). A few hours after this occurrence the confused guards entered Aqab Square with a Simorgh freight van and began to fire guns in fear. A number of young people who were reading proclamations and newspapers on the walls were dispersed and the guards arrested four of them. Aqab Square was emptied out. The guards, finding no one else to arrest, started arresting uninformed, uninvolved passersby. At that time one guard went into the Zamiran coffee house in the square and addressed some people seated there, asking "Why don't you cooperate with us and turn the counterrevolutionaries and troublemakers over to us, we have come here to preserve security?" Someone answered "This talk doesn't go down with us, you yourselves are causing the disturbance and destroying the calm of the city by shooting guns and committing terror. If you expected cooperation you shouldn't have troubled yourself to preserve our safety and calm. We haven't seen any troublemakers, nor are we the sort of people to betray our fellow townspeople." Gradually it got dark and every place became empty; except for a few workers in coffee shops on the outskirts, nobody was to be seen. Thus the comedy of the anti-Islamic guards ended with the arrest of eight people.

The morning of the following day the constant sound of gunshots around the garrison broke the people's sweet early morning sleep and dawn tranquility. A few hours later the people resumed their lives with a good but apprehensive spirit. When they asked one another about the morning's gunshots,

they told one another coolly and sometimes with a mocking laugh "It's nothing--they must've seen Kurdish Pishmergas early in the morning."

Hasan Qiasi, a photographer, was arrested on the baseless charge of photographing Saqqez demonstration festivities and is in prison. Aziz Fallahi was detained on the charge of carrying around a typewriter which was used for making and printing Islamic proclamations; although Mas'ud Alu'i, head of the Koran office, observed that this typewriter was used for publishing Islamic announcements, he was still sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and is now in Evin. Eight nurses in the hospital and the public health department of Saqqez Shahrestan were banished, all being charged with cooperating with the Democratic Party. Observed among the banished were the Ka'bis (two sisters), Mrs Gilani, Mrs Afra, and Balluri.

Twenty-four sincere revolutionary teachers who served the Shahrestan of Saqqez were banished in absentia; their names are as follows: Fayeq Dabbaghi, Faruq Keykhosravi, Ata Ahmad Panah, Tareq Dabbaghi, Aziz Reza'i, Habibollah Balluri, Ahmad Morteza sic, Mostafa Rahmanian, Hoseyn Taqizadeh, Ebrahim Qaderi, Naser Ahmadi, Khadijeh Naderi, Mofideh Motahhar, Ahmad Abdi, Hasan Me'marzadeh, Faruq Naqshi, Taher Adami, Mahmud Keyvan, Abdolqader Ghazi, Mohammad Rahim Amini, Mohammad Salehi, Hamid Dabbaghi and Mohammad Reza Qassab Azad.

11387  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

LOW-COST HOUSING PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 6 Oct 79 p1 (Annex)

/Article: "Construction of 6,700 Low Cost Houses in Iran"

/Text/ An English company has signed a contract to send machinery and equipment valued at \$8 million for low-cost housing construction in Iran.

In accordance with this project, 6,700 houses are to be built in a satellite city in the vicinity of Tehran, which indicates that the government of Iran has given the construction of low-cost housing top priority in its plans.

A South Korean company signed the contract to build the first 1,000 houses, but the greater portion of the work on this \$400 million project will be carried out by the Iranian company PDM.

The South Korean Ministry of Construction has announced that the government of Iran requested South Korean companies to carry on with their work on 14 construction projects suspended during the February revolution. Total figures for the contracts on these projects is \$105 million.

The projects under discussion consist of the construction of a chemical plant in Shiraz and cargo storehouses in Bandar Khomeyni (the former Bandar Shahpur). Prior to the revolution, South Korea held first place in the construction field in Iran.

An important portion of the materials imported to Iran for the staellite town near Tehran will probably be imported from England. A spokesman for the Mideast Consultant Company which is responsible for construction of this town stated, "It is still early to announce the price of the required materials, but this figure will be very important and will include the purchase of electric and sanitary materials as well. The export of these materials from England will help the condition of the British pound."

At the beginning of the month, Mideast Consultant Company, which had previously performed contracts in Iran as an intermediary in the importation



of primary industrial equipment, announced that it had been chosen to select and order all foreign services, materials and equipment for the satellite town. This is the first construction agreement to be made with an English company since the revolution. According to the Mideast Consultant statement, the Iranian government is trying to accelerate this and similar projects by releasing its controls on building materials.

The client which is ordering this project, which comprises the construction of 6,000 one-story houses and all the necessary infrastructure, is the Iranian Government Railway Workers' Cooperative Company. Meanwhile, the contracting company, PDM of Iran, will construct another 700-house project in an area for the Iranian government near this one.

11337  
CSO: 4906

IRAN

## BRIEFS

FLIGHT FROM REVOLUTION--By the time the Iranian revolution triumphed, tens of thousands of people, most of whom had either acted with overweening greed or collaborated with the previous regime, had left the country. Of these, the majority were people who had either gone abroad because some economic and social activities had been suspended or feared that the revolution would take a Communist turn. The departure of these people was considered temporary, and everyone hoped they would return to Iran after the revolution. A number were also collaborators of Savak or partners in corruption who knew their trip would be a long one and therefore piled up provisions for the journey and filled their bank accounts abroad. It was hoped that most of those who had left would return to the country after the triumph of the revolution but now hardly a few months have passed since the revolution and people who did not want to or could not leave Iran, as well as people who went abroad, have realized that there is no place for educated or progressive people in the fanciful "Islamic" society of the leaders of the revolution, while many old Savak collaborators are employed in the new Savama. The true lovers of freedom, who brought the revolution to fruition, and people without whose aid Iranian industry and economy could not progress, were "liquidated" one after another; the reason for this liquidation was not cooperation with the previous regime but their political tendencies and their professional knowledge. Now, in the past 6 months, close to 1 million Iranians have left the beloved homeland for a long time, and it is expected that by the end of winter the number of Iranian refugees will total 2 million. For this regime to establish its triumph or failure, it is not enough for people to say how many hundred thousand people they have placed behind a few Friday-prayer clerics; rather, it would be better for them to declare how many people have remained in Iran out of the hundreds of thousands of people who throughout the decades mastered arts and sciences through the country's money and their own hard work. /Text/ /Paris NAMEH-E RUZ in Persian 8 Oct 79 p 1/ 11887

CS0: 4906

ISRAEL

REAL ESTATE ADMINISTRATION ACCUSED OF DISCRIMINATION IN RENTING LAND

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Sep 79 p 19

[Article by Shlomoh Giv'on]

[Text] . Ari'el Sharon, Minister of Agriculture, raised his eyebrows in surprise, and it was clear that even if he had been informed of the problem previously, it had never been presented to him so plainly, unequivocally, and explicitly: "Mr Minister, it appears to me that you don't know what's happening to public land in the Negev. The people of the national land administration are not taking care of what they are actually supposed to take care of. Instead of guarding public land and preventing unceasing incursions and increasing domination of public lands all over the Negev, particularly by Bedouins, they are busy raising the price of land, and collecting the biennial rents, the approval fees, and all the other payments that are levied on Jewish land. This leads to some absurd situations.."

The speaker was Betsal'el Gever, chairman of the Local Council of 'Omer, the agricultural settlement near B'er Sheva. The words were spoken directly to 'Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture, during his last visit to the Negev, which was devoted essentially to learning the problems of the national land administration.

One of the "Shlomtsiyon" Veterans

'Ariel Sharon and Betsal'el Gever know each other from the days of the last Kneset election campaign. Gever was then Negev district coordinator for the "Shlomtsiyon" election list, on which he held third place. Since the elections, relations between the two have cooled a little, and this was a good opportunity for Gever to renew the old ties with the head of his list, who has meantime become Minister of Agriculture and also head of the national land administration.

In the course of his Negev tour, Sharon was invited to a flying visit to the 'Omer local council; there, in the council meeting room, Betsal'el Gever "let him have it" and in a direct assault explained one of the important problems that is troubling him these days. "It is impossible," he continued

directly to Sharon, "that such serious discrimination between Jews and Bedouin should prevail in everything that pertains to land for construction. It is impossible that a dunam in 'Omer should be evaluated by the government appraiser at a record high of IL 1.2 million, without development expenses (which today add up to about half a million lira per dunam). In contrast, the government delivers land to Bedouins for the same purpose, a few kilometers away from us, at IL 20,000 per dunam. Did you ever hear anything like it? If someone has set this policy with a clear mind, that's very bad. Because it makes construction in the Jewish sector expensive, and is definitely in contradiction to the policy of population dispersal."

Ariq Sharon says that the words sound justified. He nods his head in agreement. He glances at the land administration people who have accompanied him, and it is clear that he has passed the ball to them.

The land administrators were not enthusiastic about hearing Gever's criticisms, and even reacted angrily to them. They were in sharp opposition, and in particular expressed two contrary charges:

Neither Free Nor Cheap

- 1) The government is not obligated to provide land at a reduced price, or half price, since this land will be an object of speculation and will make people rich, while the government will gain nothing.
- 2) The price of the land is established by the government appraiser for each separate instance. The appraisal is a function that belongs to the Ministry of Justice, which is independent of the national land administration and any other factor.

But Btsal'el Gever was not satisfied with the frontal attack he had just conducted against the land administration policy. He proposed that the administration meet with the Jewish tenant, to see whether something practical could be done to change the present procedure.

Gever recommended that from now on the administration should collect only 40 percent of the land price (i.e., half the amount that has been collected hitherto), and that after 5 years of occupancy the matter should be considered as though 80 percent had been collected from the tenant.

The minister of agriculture, who as we have said showed a tendency to agree with Gever, concluded by saying that the subject should be brought up for consideration before the Council of the national land administration.

This would not be the first time that Negev land for private construction will be considered by the land administration. Over a short time the price of the land has gone up severalfold, and no one feels that an individual tenant is still ready and able to pay the prices that are being asked.

According to Gever, a situation is now being created where the expansion of 'Omer's population is being endangered by the high land prices. As an example he points out that only 5 years ago (in 1974) one could obtain a lot in 'Omer for private construction for IL 20,000. Three years ago (in 1976) the price had risen to IL 80,000. Today the price for one dunam for private construction is over IL 1,000,000.

The land administrators, who in official conversations hide behind the broad back of the official appraiser, have admitted lately that the new prices seem too high to them also. They admit that last year land prices in the Negev climbed sharply, and apparently the trend is continuing.

Even in 'Arad (which is not in the coastal plain, which is thickly populated and subject to fluctuating land prices) in less than a year there were sharp increases in land prices for private construction in the "Bne Veitkha" (Build Your Own Home) program, which is sponsored jointly by the land administration and the local authorities.

#### "Updating" the Price

Only 9 months ago the government appraiser set a price of IL 55,000 per dunam in 'Arad. Some months later the price was "updated" to IL 270,000 per dunam, and today according to the appraisers valuation it costs IL 400,000 for a dunam.

Some people at the top level of the national land administration think that these appraisals reflect the general market situation. But in contrast others think that increases of 100 percent within a few years (in 'Arad, less than a year) are unjustified for land for construction, especially before the first stone has been laid.

#### Temporary Relief for Tenants

Not long after the minister of agriculture's last visit to the Negev we received the news that the land administration council had passed a resolution saying that even though it was not announcing any change in policy, the present policy permitted temporary relief for land renters in the Negev district, for dwelling needs.

In 'Arad a new collection system will be put into effect, according to which the renter will pay only half the sum determined by the appraiser. The balance will be considered a loan over the 5 years after construction is finished, and after that time will be written off. In return the tenant will pay a biennial rent of 1 percent of the value of the lot.

Just recently Btsal'el Gever also received the news that the land administration was ready to accept his proposal to reduce the cost of the lots for private construction, with one change: instead of 80 percent of the lot value the administration would collect a 60 percent down payment when the rental contract was signed, and a biennial rent of 40 percent of the remainder.

The administrators in the Negev district have tried lately to change the appraiser's valuation, and instead of IL1200 per square meter they have proposed that the value be set at IL900 per square meter.

Matters have not yet reached their final stage, for even if this proposed change is accepted, the price of a 600 square meter lot would be IL540,000, plus IL300,000 development expenses; i.e., IL840,000 for a lot for one-family dwelling.

Into the complex of prices and the lack of a clear and uniform policy by the land administration, Gever has now thrown another proposal that is extremely far reaching.

Gever informed the minister of agriculture that he was ready to head another agricultural settlement ('Omer B), to be called "Nahal Hevron," in the "Green Line" area. He proposed that for this purpose the state should allocate land at no cost, with a grant of the rights of 80 percent of the land, and prohibiting transfer of the property for 5 to 7 years from the signing of the contract.

#### A Historic Opportunity

Gever's detailed proposal, as presented to the minister of agriculture, speaks of allocating about 2000 dunams for establishing a settlement of about 2,500 families. He proposes that any Jew should be able to enroll in this program, by means of a subsidy for the first tenants based on the size of the mortgage, such as is given to Beduins in the Negev who are ready to settle in one of the established villages.

As Gever submits his proposal to the minister of agriculture, he emphasizes that this is a historic opportunity to establish additional agricultural settlements like 'Omer in the Negev. He says that the initiative and the possibility are there, but what is needed now is a decision to implement the proposal.

9045  
CSO: 4805

LIBYA

LIBYAN LEADER AFFLICTED WITH EYE DISEASE

Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 10-16 Oct 79 pp 14-16

/Article by Maria Luisa Luca de Tena: "Qadhafi's Eyes, Dependent on a Spanish Ophthalmologist"7

/Text/ It has been announced in official circle that Colonel Qadhafi, the leader and president of the Revolutionary Junta of Libya will soon visit Spain. This event leads us to publish an extremely curious story, which was completely unknown until now, in which two totalitarian regimes, Libya and Spain--since our story goes back to 1974--made an agreement to "kidnap" a Spanish ophthalmologist and take him "blindly to Tripoli to attend a mysterious celebrity, with the whole operation classified "top secret." An American journalist living in Libya was the only one who managed to get hold of the story. When threatened with losing her credentials, she gave up the idea of using her information, which, after all, was of interest in Spain, where it could not have been published thanks to censorship.

Our little story takes place in April 1974, coinciding with the official visit to Madrid of the prime minister of Libya, "Abd al-Sala'm Jallud. This takes place at a politically difficult moment for Spain and for Libya. The official visit had been postponed, first by the assassination of Carrero Blanco, and a second time by the trip of Cortina Mauri, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was accompanying the Princes of Spain to Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and India.

A year before the assassination of Carrero, important changes had also taken place in Libya. Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi, until then head of the Libyan Revolutionary Council and prime minister, had been replaced in the latter post by Jallud, who also took over the political control of Libya, leaving to Qadhafi the task of being, above all, the popular idol and representative of the revolution which had overthrown the aged King Idris in 1969.

Another piece of background information to keep in mind in our story is the eye disease of Qadhdhafi. A man of the desert, a bedouin by birth, the Libyan colonel received from his past not only his deeply rooted religious fanaticism, but also--it is speculated--the widespread disease of desert Africa, ocular trachoma. This contagious disease, of viral origin, can even produce blindness if neglected. With regard to this, in October 1971 the Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM published the report that Qadhdhafi had entered a military hospital in Cairo to undergo an examination and tests; that the initial diagnosis had been sinusitis; that he had remained a total of 25 days in the Cairo military hospital and that the results of those tests had not been made public. As can be seen, the disease of the then 29 year old colonel and leader of the Libyan revolution still was secret.

#### Search for an Opthamologist

The delayed visit of Jallud finally was set for 23-27 April 1974, and only a few days before on 7 April, foreign embassies in Tripoli received the following communication: "From now on Colonel Qadhdhafi will devote himself to ideological questions, and is relieved of administrative and representational functions." According to this, Jallud was taking another step toward real power, and his political role was strengthened, with a view to his impending trip to Madrid. At that time, the free European press comments that "Qadhdhafi is the emotion, and Jallud the brains" in the context of the Libyan revolution. Jallud was accompanied on his journey by the Libyan director of Public Health. While Jallud was occupied with the official business of his trip--the exchange of oil for technology--the latter devoted himself, in consultation with the Spanish health director, Doctor Bravo, to looking for a Spanish ophthalmologist who could be taken to Tripoli on a secret mission. But who?

They had to find a specialist familiar with the desert disease, trachoma. There are some in Spain, in fact, since this distressing disease was brought to our southeastern and Andalusian coasts in the 19th century by soldiers of Napoleon who were returning from campaigns in Africa. In 1929, health teams had been organized under the auspices of Alfonso XIII in a wide-ranging campaign to combat this disease, which had become endemic. The director of one of these teams, which had worked in areas of Murcia and Alicante, had been the eminent ophthalmologist Dr Tena Ibarra, who in 1974 was the head of the National Ophthalmic Institute. These two circumstances determined the choice. This would be the man.

According to our information, Carlos Robles Piquer, then Spanish ambassador in Libya, was in charge of the first contacts with Doctor Tena. Also, according to our sources, Doctor Tena resisted in principle. The identity of the patient had not been disclosed to him, and that was not to his liking. They had only told him that he must go to Libya in Jallud's official plane to have a professional consultation with an important person. In official circles the resistance of the Spanish doctor was opposed, since the results of Jallud's visit had not been completely satisfactory, and they wanted by all possible means to satisfy the minister in this other objective. The matter definitely



required mediation, and thus the president of the government himself, Arias Navarro, put his weight behind the affair, personally calling on Tena to agree to the journey. Little time remained. He had to report to the Villamagna Hotel in Madrid to go with Jallud's official entourage to Barajas, and fly with them to Tripoli.

#### In Qadhdhafi's Fortress

Even during the flight they would not reveal to Doctor Tena the exact mission that had been assigned to him. He was put up in a large hotel and was in permanent contact with the Spanish Embassy, where the wife of Robles Piquer, Irene Fraga, went out of her way to personally look after the well-being of our distinguished doctor.

The morning after his arrival in the Libyan capital they at last explained to Doctor Tena the specific purpose of his journey. He was to examine President Qadhdhafi, as well as other members of his family and of his entourage. He was brought in an official car to the outskirts of Tripoli, to the imposing fortress where the Libyan leader lives surrounded by extraordinary security measures. After numerous check-points and several lines of barbed wire, they reached a spacious and massive dwelling which housed about a hundred persons, including aides, family members and personal guards. In the palace fortress there are also clinics, installed so that the eye examinations of Qadhdhafi and his family took place in absolute secrecy. Doctor Tena's diagnosis did not leak out, and we do not know it.

One thing is certain. Trachoma, a very serious disease in the past because of its persistence and difficulty of eradication, as well as its contagious nature, was first effectively battled after the discovery of the sulfamides, and antibiotics have fortunately finished it off. In the Spanish territories which have suffered from this plague endemically, it has been totally eradicated. Qadhdhafi, as we have indicated, has undergone serious treatment for many years, and it can be assumed that at this point he has overcome his former affliction.

When Doctor Tena was taken to Tripoli in the atmosphere of secrecy which we have tried to describe, they wanted to disguise the reason for his trip with a series of scheduled visits to the hospital installations of Tripoli, which in those years were beginning to be equipped, and whose doctors were almost all of foreign origin. A great number were natives, and many others from countries of the East.

As always when there is an attempt to surround with secrecy something as simple and normal as a chief of state consulting a specialist, many false rumors went around in those days in Tripoli's diplomatic and journalistic circles. There was talk of an operation, of an ailment much more serious than the real one. The pure and simple truth, according to what we have been able to discover, is that the Egyptian family physician who attends Qadhdhafi wanted to confirm the correctness of his diagnosis and treatment

with another qualified professional. But since Qadhdhafi cultivates for his primitive people the image of the protected of Allah, he could not appear before them as a simple mortal, who because of his bedouin past had contracted such a common disease as ocular trachoma.

After all, democracies have their advantages. They can tell the truth.

8131  
CSO: 4410

MAURITANIA

SNIM DIRECTOR DISCUSSES SNIM DEFICIT, GUELBS PROJECT

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26, 27, 28 Sep 79

[Three-part interview with SNIM Director General Ely O. Allaf]

[26 Sep 79 pp 1, 3]

[Text] In an exclusive interview which he granted us, Mr Ely O. Allaf, director general of the SNIM [National Industrial and Mining Company] revealed that the loan agreements for the financing of the Guelbs project-- which in 1983 will assume the statement of account of the Kedia of Idjil-- are practically completed with the group of lenders and some have already signed. The others, said Mr Allaf, will do so immediately. Nevertheless he had to point out that certain legal difficulties remain, especially at the level of the guarantee agreements demanded by the lenders of the funds.

Among other things these agreements include an agreement, called a trust agreement, which causes a bit of a problem. It concerns a system respected by the English moneymen, which consists of entrusting to one man--the trustee--who will pay the amounts due on the desired dates, the management of the funds destined to repay debts. He must preserve these funds as though they were his own property... The problem of this trust agreement is being discussed at the present time with the lenders and when all the details of information have been collected at the company level, the business can be settled quickly.

Touching on the present situation of the company, Mr Allaf, without giving way to excessive optimism, said that the prospects are not very gloomy. One cannot yet see light at the end of the tunnel, but a slight recovery which is beginning in the iron market--a recovery the extent of which cannot of course be yet measured--augurs a good year for the company.

Still more significantly, for the first time in 4 years the profit and loss statement of the company showed a slight improvement for the first quarter of 1979. That is something to arouse the satisfaction of the officers of the company, which has been showing a heavy deficit since 1975.

In the course of this interview Mr Allaf also mentioned the prospects opened by the return of peace in Mauritania and the abandonment of the policy of austerity.

With regard to the halting of the war, Mr Allaf said that there have been beneficial results for the company.

But he had to add that it was only now, after the hostilities had ceased, that we have been able really to measure the damage caused by the war.

[Interview with Mr Ely O. Allaf]

The National Industrial and Mining Company, SNIM, which took over, after the departure of MIFERMA, the affairs of the sector of industry and mines, a sector which comprises the heart and lungs of our national economy, still has not come up to the anticipated results.

Nevertheless one recalls the commitment undertaken in the euphoria of nationalization by its leaders and all of its workers to improve production and to take up the challenge hurled to us by history.

The deficit of 700 million ouguiya which the company now suffers can only be due to external factors, and therefore independent of the desires of the leaders and of the devotion of the workers of the SNIM.

In the following conversation Mr Ely O. Allaf, director general of the National Industrial and Mining Company SNIM-SEM gives us the reasons for this deficit

[Question] Since 1975 SNIM has had a large deficit. Why does this deficit exist and what measures are envisaged for absorbing it?

[Answer] The deficit of the company has several important causes, among which must be included the fact that the company was charged with operating the copper mines of Akjoujt which, after the drop in the price of copper to a very low level, in effect became a charge on the company. The new company, as you know, no longer includes this activity. It has therefore been separated from SNIM along with the refinery project. One of the causes of the deficit has consequently been eliminated. The second cause is the effect of the war.

This effect was very important, firstly because of the destruction of materiel caused, the slowdown of production, and the slowdown of the transportation of production. Therefore a complex of phenomena caused by insecurity which considerably reduced the activities of the company during the period of insecurity. The third cause was obviously the drop in the price of iron in

recent years. If, for example, one compares the 1974 price with those of 1979 in current dollars, the 1979 price is about half the 1974 price, and in constant dollars that is really low.

Therefore there was this drop in the quotations for iron which was one of the main causes of the loss in receipts, and all this means that the new SNIM, after separating out copper, has started out with a rather large deficit of 700 million UM which it must recover simultaneously by tightening up measures internally to lower its costs, consolidate more closely its break-even point, organize itself better, and likewise by an effort in the market in collaboration with all the ore producers to try to ensure that the price of iron moves upward rather than downward.

[Question] In its last issue SNIM-INFORMATIONS reported an improvement in the financial situation on the company level. What is this exactly?

[Answer] As you know, the company in effect reports its operating results quarterly, that is to say it balances the total of its expenses and its income by quarter.

This profit and loss statement has been in deficit for a certain number of years, and for the two preceding quarters the operating results have been slightly profitable. This augurs an improvement of the financial situation for the year or the result for the year, but not enough to cut the deficit seriously.

We cannot know the significant results until the end of the year. Essentially therefore the information reported the results of operations for the first quarter, which are positive.

[Question] There is talk of a recovery in the market levels for iron. Is this only a small movement in the market level or a trend which may accelerate or even be maintained?

[Answer] According to the forecasts of the producers, normally, it is an upward trend expected for next year and the following years. But the problem is to know if this rise is going to be regular on the one hand and large, on the other.

And, as you know, the price of iron is in effect set annually. During the course of a single year one cannot get a clear idea of the size of an increase in the following year from the prices in effect. At the end of each year there is an overall negotiation between the producers and the users of iron ore which takes into account the possibilities of world production, which also takes into account economic recovery from the point of view of iron and steel producers, and it is at the end of the year that the negotiations end in a result.

At the present time we think that this result is going to be an increase in the price of iron ore. Several signs point to it, and in particular the

bids offered outside contract, what are called spot orders, made during the course of the year indicate a stronger demand.

As a result there is a possibility of an increase in the price of iron ore for next year, but all this is only an indication. We cannot forecast the amount of the increase before the end of the year.

[27 Sep 79 p 3]

[Text] In the first part of the interview which he gave us, Mr Ely O. Allaf, director general of the SNIM, explained at length the reasons for the large deficit of the company at the present time. Among the reasons for this deficit the director general particularly cited the operation of the copper mines of Akjoujt which, after the drop in the price of this metal, constituted a charge on SNIM, the effects of the war and the drop in the price of iron.

Relieved of the charges of the SOMIMA [Mining Company of Mauritania] and the climate of insecurity which prevailed in the region, the SNIM is in the process of resuming its normal pace.

Actually the operating results of the company, which had been in deficit for several years, has just shown a positive increase. This augurs an improvement of the financial situation of the SNIM-SEM.

Nevertheless the extent of the damages caused by the war constitutes a serious handicap for a normal recovery of the operations of the company.

But with the start-up of the Guelbs project, financing for which has been obtained entirely, optimism is permissible.

[Question] For almost 2 years the company has not had to suffer the blows of the POLISARIO. Can you give us a short assessment of these 2 years of peace?

[Answer] These years of peace, that is, from the end of the year 1978 and the year 1979, have been extremely beneficial for the company in the sense that it has been able to work in calm, although for reasons of security, peace was not complete; there were still some complications due to the necessity of ensuring security to the workers, particularly on exposed routes.

Nevertheless they permitted working in calm, and which is very important--producing quantities greater than had been possible the previous year, namely 1978. But it must be said that it was in the course of this period

of peace that the company has been discovering the extent of the damages caused, and the difficulty of resuming its normal operations. This is explained by the fact that during the period when it had serious financial difficulties and serious security conditions, equipment could not be maintained normally.

It could not be overhauled as it should be. Consequently it was when we needed to operate the equipment, both rail equipment and mine equipment, when we needed to make it produce at its normal capacity, that we became aware that it had suffered heavy damage, that it had not been overhauled, and that it could not produce as expected.

Consequently the lack of spare parts, the difficulty of getting the equipment in order, a difficulty due both to the lack of spare parts and sufficient personnel; the personnel was adequate for a rate of normal maintenance and overhaul. And from the moment that a too large quantity of equipment could not be maintained, the capacity of our personnel to repair it was insufficient. This is why we have great difficulties in restoring this equipment to normal operation, and consequently, production. I must point out that in the past few years, suppliers who had not been paid in a long time had almost terminated supply of spare parts necessary for regular maintenance of the equipment, and the restructuring of the capital of the company was imperative in order to cope with this accumulated debt toward the suppliers, to regain their confidence, and to obtain from them the spare parts ordered.

We hope to be able to restore the normal situation between now and the end of the first quarter of next year. Meanwhile the company obviously struggles in this major difficulty--working with unusable equipment with all the inconveniences which that involves: frequent stoppages, train derailments, etc.

Despite everything, until now, production has been maintained at the envisaged level. We contemplate, if there are no great difficulties, reaching at the end of the year the production which was forecast, which is about 8.5 to 9 million tons. Our major difficulty is this equipment which was used beyond its capacity without maintenance and without overhaul during the preceding years.

[Question] You have just made a trip to Abu Dhabi, where you have had to discuss a loan from the Abu Dhabi Fund for the financing of the Guelbs project. Can you give us the details of the advancing of this financing and where it is now?

[Answer] Actually the financing of the whole project has been obtained. We are working to terminate the negotiations with the group of lenders at the earliest possible time. I should say that, for the moment, the loan agreements are practically complete with the group of lenders: some have already signed, others should do so immediately. Now what remains to

start up operations is mainly the legal formalities which sometimes take time but which do not constitute a major difficulty.

We had important legal difficulties which have been removed, particularly the effective realization of the increase of capitalization which has just been achieved with the participation of Iraq. Consequently the company is now a legally established company with a definite subscribed capital and the called-for installment deposited.

We had another difficulty--the convention of establishment between the company and the state. At the present time this convention has been signed and presented to the council of ministers, which has approved the draft ordinance to be presented to the CMSN [Military Committee of National Salvation] for its approval.

This problem has therefore been resolved. Following these problems, the decree granting the company the permit to exploit the Guelbs will also be presented. From that side the complex of problems has been resolved.

Practically all the loan agreements have been negotiated and we think that with the agreement of the sources of financing we will be able to begin operations before completing the formalities of putting into effect the loans as a whole. Certain of them involve the possibility of repayment to SNIM if it has engaged in certain operations before the granting of the loans.

There are some agreements for which we are encountering some difficulties. These are not the financing agreements but the guarantee agreements requested by the lenders. These guarantee agreements are of three types: an agreement of domiciliation on which there are no problems and all the partners are in agreement; a surety agreement on which the partners are also agreed; but there is a trust agreement which presents some little problems. It presents a problem in the sense that we must have some information on the functioning of precisely this type of guarantee, of this type of agreement, before arriving at a formula agreeable to the sources of financing and to ourselves.

We are in the process of searching with the lenders for a final solution which we hope to complete in a very short time.

[28 Sep 79 p 3]

[Text] The policy of austerity decided by the Military Committee of National Salvation and its application to SNIM: this is the 3d subject covered by Mr Ely O. Allaf, director general of this company in an exclusive interview which he granted to us.



He mentioned first of all the new policy undertaken by the company with regard to housing. He spoke also of a reduction in general expenses as a whole.

Would a reduction in force be envisaged? No, Mr Ely Ould Allaf told us again, except in the event of a reduction in operations... In this latter part of his talk, the director general of the SNIM stressed the necessity for his enterprise to start up the "Guelbs" project in 1982 at the latest in order to avoid a drop in production.

[Question] Of what does this trust guarantee which is causing a problem consist?

[Answer] It is a system which entrusts the management of the funds destined for repayment of the debt to a trust, that is to say a man who manages them, who pays the installments on the date due and who guards the funds as though they were his own property. It is therefore linked to the debt service which the lenders are paid on the desired deadlines and for which the SNIM pays in advance the sum necessary for this debt service. Then there is a man called the trustee who is responsible for that.

This system exists particularly in England, and it remains to obtain a certain number of details, in particular concerning the taxes which might have to be paid in the name of SNIM, which must commit itself to reimbursing him. It is this agreement which still entails certain difficulties, due essentially to ignorance.

We therefore have legal advisers and we are discussing these problems with the lenders in order to come up with a solution; these are agreements which must be signed likewise with these lenders as a group and which constitute the guarantee system for the repayment of the loans.

[Question] Recently the government, in order to restore the economic situation of the country, proclaimed the policy of austerity. How will this policy concretely affect SNIM?

[Answer] As applied to SNIM it must be confessed that before the austerity policy, in the framework of the Guelbs project, SNIM had been asked to take a certain number of steps designed to reduce its costs: general management, general services, etc. There is therefore a program decreed for reducing the aggregate of general expenses of the company, a program which will be accomplished in a certain number of years.

This program breaks down into several elements. Firstly the external services are to be regrouped into a single subsidiary, thereby eliminating certain offices without disturbing the operation performed, and transferring the function to a single office, which will reduce operating costs. We contemplate transferring a part of the activities of our Zurich office to Paris,

and ultimately all the activities performed by the Zurich office would be carried on from Mauritania. We are studying the implementation of these measures, which would permit the considerable reduction of the operating costs of our purchasing offices abroad. With regard to domestic matters, you know that we have a headquarters in the course of completion--it will actually be finished 2 months from now--and regaining of this headquarters will greatly reduce all types of expenses, particularly rent costs, telephone, cost of local travel, particularly gasoline, and will certainly raise the output of the agents.

The reduction of all the rentals for offices we have represents already a considerable reduction in expenses, and the existence of an internal system of communication in the headquarters will also reduce costs. In other aspects we are not neglecting any measure which tends to reduce expenses.

Thus quite recently we have opted to replace the system of housing for Mauritanian employees, up to now provided by the company, with an allowance.

Actually the housing was very expensive and it was practically impossible to limit the consumption of water and electricity. This allowance system will be more economical for the company and will make the employees more responsible in the management of their incomes and will perhaps make it possible to find individual solutions for the acquisition of a personal property. This is a measure which released 30 villas. But it cannot be extended to expatriates in the sense that the company must insure for them housing conditions in which they can work. It is in their contracts at the outset, and they have no particular interest in owning housing and they would also have difficulties obtaining housing if another system were adopted.

Every time it appears to us that an action may reduce general costs, we will study it. It is clear that we are a production company and because of this we cannot eliminate any element unless we are convinced that there will be no serious negative effects on the company's profit and the quality of its operations. Therefore each case requires a special study. No step can be arbitrary. Each time we must measure numerically to the extent possible the advantages and disadvantages of internal steps we take to reduce the costs of the company.

[Question] Through reduction in force?

[Answer] No, unless a reduction in operations--which is possible--occurs. For example, if there is a separation of certain operations, and I am speaking particularly of the separation of the distribution of petroleum products.

It is obvious that if a unit leaves, it has its surety on the personnel level and it will require a corresponding reduction of the cost of existing personnel. For the moment we do not foresee a personnel reduction.

[Question] You recently mentioned the problem of SOMIMA. Can one not expect a resumption of the operations of that company?

[Answer] The exploitation of copper mines is under the ministry of mines at the present time. I am not well informed on the status of research in that field.

[Question] You have spoken of the problem of poorly maintained equipment which can no longer operate as required. Besides this problem, have you any fundamental problem which is confronting you at present?

[Answer] At the present time our basic problem is to be able to start up the Guelbs project in time to enable us to guarantee the continuity of production after 1983. But you know that starting in that year the production of the Kedyia is going to begin to drop, and it is absolutely necessary that we be able to get the exploitation of the Guelbs project going by the end of 1982 or the beginning 1983 so that production will not drop and the exploitation of the Guelbs take over the operation of the Kedyia at the appropriate time: this is our major concern and it justifies the efforts every one of us, on the side of the government, on the side of the company, on the side of the lenders, makes to get bids issued as soon as possible, so that the date of getting the project under way will be held to and that there will be no decrease in operations which would cause an extremely difficult situation for the company both financially and in human terms, because it will be necessary to cut jobs, and obviously throughout the whole country, because the resulting drop in production could be very great. All this means that our efforts are concentrated on the start-up of the project.

6108  
CSO: 4400

MAURITANIA

NATION SEARCHES FOR NEW FISHING POLICY

Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 pp 64-65

[Article by Mireille Duteil, "Exploiting Gold From the Sea"]

[Text] A few canoes, fishing nets stretched out to dry on a white sand beach oppressed by the hot sun. Out to sea a closely packed flight of birds wheeling in the sun indicate the presence of a school of fish. Back from the beach are 6 or 7 shaly huts where ebony skinned children, heads shaved except for three tufts of hair in a triangle are running. We are with the Imraguen, the only tribe of fishermen among Mauritania's Moorish population. At the lookout's signal the men waded into the sea up to their waists. They emitted eerie cries and beat the water with their hands. Soon, as though hypnotized by this call, hundreds of mullet hurled themselves into the nets.

This complicity between the sea and the Moors, sons of the desert, has something fascinating about it, and hardly lets us guess the lack of taste for fishing of the Moors living on a coast considered one of the world's richest sources of fish.

The trawlers, seiners, and factory ships swarming in Mauritanian waters will be flying Spanish, Japanese, Russian or Korean flags. And the country's economy, there can be no doubt, gets little profit from it. The statistics are edifying. In 1977-78, of 1.2 million tons of fish taken off the coast of Mauritania and Tiris El-Gharbia, only 64,000 tons were processed at Nouadhibou, the country's second city and only fishing port.

To be sure the Mauritanian budget does get royalties on fishing rights which are granted in the form of licenses to foreign ships. For the current year the equivalent of 4.5 million CFA francs will flow into the coffers of the state. The provisional budget for 1979 records a projected 10 billion CFA francs (2 billion ouguya), about a third of the country's total receipts. "This projection will not be realized," a Mauritanian leader confided to us, "unless a lot of licenses are granted. But that will encourage even more the pillage of our shores."

Bottom fishing, fishing for cephalopods (octopus, squid), in which the Japanese and Koreans excel, is the most devastating. Their immense trawlers, up to 1800 tons burden, destroy the ecological equilibrium of the sea bottom, and it takes years to reestablish it. Surface fishing (mackerel, bonita) is less dangerous, for the stocks are enormous. In this area, the hit parade of the biggest catch falls to Interpeche, a Dutch firm registered in the Bermudas. Its dozen ships, with a factory ship transforming the fish into meal on the spot, can alone take away up to 150,000 tons of fish in a year!

The golden years of foreign ship owners are over, it is believed in Nouakchott. Already in 1977, under President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, this licensing system was under consideration for review. After the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978, this policy became more definite. The minister of fisheries then decided not to renew the licenses of factory ships who did not deliver any fish to the land. From then on, it was indicated, fish taken along the Mauritanian coast must be commercialized on national territory. In doing this Nouakchott hoped to bring the foreign ship owners to create, alone or in association with private capital or public Mauritanian funds, complexes for processing fish.

This policy of nonrenewal of licenses was applied rigorously during the first months of 1979. Soviets, Japanese and Koreans who did not accept Mauritanian conditions were asked to leave. The Portuguese, Romanians, Swedish, Dutch and French whose licenses have not yet expired continue to fish. On the other hand, after three rounds of intense negotiations between Nouakchott and Madrid, the Spanish are keeping their licenses, but agreed to quadruple their fishing fees. They will pay \$16 million for fishing rights in 1979 for the 260 Spanish trawlers (the most numerous) which have, by contract, the right to all be in Mauritanian waters at the same time. But it is true that with Spain the old neighborly ties plus fishing clauses appearing in the agreement with Madrid provide for, among other things, that Spain can send 800 fishing boats without fee off Western Sahara--explain this survival.

Nevertheless, Nouakchott confronts two obstacles in applying its new policy. Mauritania has no means of stopping the "pirates" of the sea. It is estimated that 25 percent of fish taken escape any control. It's said that from photographs taken from a Breguet deux ponts [translation unknown] it was found that of 400 ships fishing, only four had licenses! The Koreans have the reputation of specializing in this kind of "piracy." They always navigate in squadrons and there are veritable naval battles taking place between Mauritanian military patrols and the illegals. Yet the fine is high: 500 million CFA francs for a factory ship. In 1978 the Mauritians took 91 ships fishing illegally.

The second obstacle is technical. "Processing plants on land are practically nonexistent in comparison to the stock," a businessman told us. However, the three cold storage facilities now at Nouadhibou are operating at far less

than full capacity, when they are not closed. During the 70's Mauritania had granted licenses in order to keep the three cold storage facilities and fish meal factory supplied. Responding to the request of the Mauritanian government, the Japanese, the first, delivered a part of their catch to Nouadhibou, followed by the Soviets. On the other hand, they obtained licenses for dozens of freezer factory ships.

Today the Mauritians are setting up projects to create joint companies with the Swedes, the Libyans and the French. Some businessmen are looking in new directions. Thus the Societe des Grandes Peches de Mauritanie hopes to conclude a contract with a French-Soviet firm which will outfit a ship for them. On land it will process the octopus caught into meal. The product will subsequently be exported to Zaire and the Congo. This formula of chartering from foreign firms will allow Mauritania to train its own seamen until it gets its own. However this may be, it is urgent to secure mastery of this fabulous treasure from the sea which should, just as iron does, constitute an important revenue source for the national economy.

8860  
CSO: 4400

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS OF REFINERY--Getting the petroleum refinery at Nouadhibou into operation could be the first effect on Mauritanian economy of resumption of relations between Algeria and Mauritania. Constructed at great cost (\$66 million) under the presidency of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, it has a refining capacity of 1 million tons of crude per year, at full operation. It would be supplied by Algerian oil from Hassi Messaoud. In fact it had never functioned. The possibility of importing Algerian oil again has moved Mauritanian leaders to study the cost of putting the refinery into operation through an English study group. But many problems remain: new investment is necessary to replace old or deteriorated parts, the cost of the production and the transportation of crude oil are too high to allow the Mauritanian refinery to be competitive in the international market, at least not without the state adding heavily to its debt. [Text] [Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 p 66] 8860

LARGE-SCALE CONTRABAND--During the past few weeks, authorities at the port of Nouakchott have seen objects arrive which, curiously, they have not been in the habit of seeing unloaded on their docks, such as perfume, transistors, tape recorders. Nothing very mysterious, however, in this affair. These products, quite common in Mauritania, by the way, up until now sneakily arrived from Las Palmas via Dakhla and Tiris El-Gharbia. Now that the Mauritaniens have withdrawn from Saharan territory, the network is no longer functioning. With the merchandise leaving and arriving illicitly from Senegal, it is estimated that close to 90 percent of Mauritanian commerce is by contraband. [Text] [Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 23 Sep 79 p 71] 8860

HOSTILITY TO NEW GOVERNMENT--Graffiti hostile to the new government have been appearing on many walls in Nouadhibou--the economic capital of Mauritania in the north. Many arrests and challenges have been made among the pro-Moroccans, suspected of starting the movement. The majority of those arrested have been released. It seems that this agitation might be connected with the influx of Saharan "refugees," mostly small storekeepers and businessmen who followed the Mauritanian troops out during the retreat from that part of Western Sahara administered by Nouakchott. POLISARIO sympathizers are not likely to fold their arms. Their reaction led the Moroccan Prime Minister Maati Bouabid to demand of his Mauritanian counterpart the "protection" of 10,000 Moroccan soldiers who are getting ready to leave the north. [Text] [Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 24 Sep 79 p 71] 8860

CSO: 4400

49

SUDAN

REFUGEE INFLUX AGGRAVATES PROBLEMS IN SUDAN

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 30 Sep 79 p 12

[Article: "Two Million African Refugees In Sudan. At First a Matter Of Security and Supplies, Their Problems Have Become a Part Of the Political Crisis"]

[Text] Khartoum AL-SAFIR special.

The Sudan covers a vast area--1 million square miles--and shares borders with eight countries: Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, Uganda, Central Africa, Chad, Libya, and Egypt.

Owing to this geographical situation, the Sudan faces the problem of the refugees in a manner rather different from other countries with similar conditions. This is due to the large number of refugees, on the one hand, and to the fact that the Sudan lacks the forces required to regulate the refugee influx within its own territories under ordinary conditions as well as under exceptional conditions resulting from famine, escape from political persecution, or flight from battle. The most recent operations involving the crossing of the Sudanese borders involved many thousands of people from Uganda who were running away from the battles pertaining to the war which overthrew the previous president of Uganda, Marshal Idi Amin Dada. Before that, hundreds of thousands of people from Eritrea had preceded them, as a result of the current war of liberation between the troops of the Eritrean revolution and the Ethiopian forces, in addition to many thousands of Ethiopians who crossed the Sudanese borders for the same reason.

The first exodus to the Sudan started more than a century ago, when the Sudan was used as a passage for people from Nigeria and other countries in West Africa, going to Hijaz on pilgrimage, who preferred--on their way back to their native countries--to stay in the Sudan, where there were vast stretches of unused fertile land. Those people built their own villages, engaged in farming and irrigation, and were subsequently followed by others from Chad and elsewhere.



#### Political Exodus

When political upheavals started to spread, the Sudan had to deal with the refugee problem. In the 1960's the events in the Congo marked the beginning of a massive Congolese influx into the southern part of the Sudan.

During the life and under the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, during the persecution of the Eritrean people, the Sudan opened its doors to many refugees. However, the human influx across the eastern borders of the Sudan exceeded all predictions when military battles in Eritrea expanded their scope. According to official statistics published in Khartoum, the number of both Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees exceeds half a million.

The southern part of the Sudan recently has witnessed the arrival of many thousands of refugees from Uganda. Although statistics concerning them are not accurate, owing to the fact that they are constantly pouring across the borders, the figures currently available to the executives of the United Nations office in Khartoum indicate about 300,000 refugees, while the authorities in the southern area of the Sudan--who are in charge of relief and welfare matters--evaluate their numbers at 500,000 people, mostly women and children. It was possible to gather them into special camps after assigning various school and other facilities to provide food and health facilities, with the participation of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees' Affairs to provide the refugees with the required assistance.

The Sudan lacks statistics about the number of refugees who have poured across its borders for political, survival, or safety reasons. Statistics currently available to the Sudanese authorities are merely estimates and nothing more; according to them, the number of refugees may vary between a maximum of 4 million and a minimum of 2 million. These were the figures officially published in Khartoum before the events in Uganda.

#### Effects of the Exodus

The phenomenon which currently concerns the team of Sudanese investigators at the National Research Council in Khartoum is the particular effect of the exodus to Sudan, which obviously has become a threat to the social and economic basics of life ever since the refugees started moving to the largest cities close to the borders and subsequently to the Sudanese capital itself--which recently has started swelling with huge numbers of refugees of various nationalities in search of work.

The Sudanese authorities currently face many problems owing to the huge foreign influx into the capital and surrounding areas, which are considered the natural extensions of the capital itself, since it consists of a triad that includes the cities of Khartoum, Um Durman and Khartoum Bahri. That is why the Sudanese capital is usually called the triple capital.

The cause of the authorities' concern goes back to two main factors. One is the security aspect, followed by the economic aspect, since a rather important portion of the supplies of food and merchandise specifically destined for the capital goes to the newcomers. The medical, sanitary, and educational services are also concerned about the breakout of diseases which, according to the description given by the official health authorities in Khartoum, are plagues requiring the attention of a large percentage of the health services to treat the refugees.

The government of the Sudan is especially worried by this phenomenon, and particularly with the security aspect thereof, because a large number of refugees have crossed the borders with arms and ammunitions. The Sudanese authorities have completely failed to keep the refugees away from the capital, however, in spite of the large raids undertaken at the beginning of August 1979.

Trying to keep them away, the Sudanese authorities intended to gather them together in already existing camps, such as the present camps for Ugandan refugees in the southern part of the Sudan. They intended to do so by moving the refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea to special camps in the eastern area of the Sudan, where farming lands were assigned to them, while moving Chad nationals to the western part of the country, and so forth. That was meant to achieve two political goals--ensuring their supervision, and making it easier to provide basic living requirements. This in turn would have facilitated the establishment of statistics concerning their numbers.

#### Reverse Exodus

On the other hand, we find that the Sudan--which already provides a large number of African refugees with shelter and sustenance--has in turn started experiencing a reverse exodus, which has assumed a collective aspect since the beginning of this decade. The Sudan has lost many thousands of its nationals during these past 5 years, when they decided to settle and work in a number of Arab countries, including Libya, the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Those emigres include a large sector of the Sudanese intelligentsia, such as college professors, engineers, doctors, technicians, and skilled workers, who left their country to look for a more financially rewarding position, or because of political persecution, or because they could hardly find any means of living in the Sudan owing to the unemployment which affects most workers, skilled and unskilled alike.

This exodus has deeply affected the general life in the Sudan, owing to the heavy shortage which has to be faced by many educational institutions and public services and facilities, such as Khartoum University, which has lost a large number of its professors, such as the electric power and water department, more than half of whose engineers have left, and such as the telephone facility, with which less than a quarter of its staff of engineers and technicians has remained. This is a big problem currently faced by the Sudan, which also has to confront the problem of 4 million Africans who have willingly or unwillingly crossed the borders shared by their countries with the Sudan.

2693  
CSO: 4802

SYRIA

INTERNAL INSTABILITY SAID TO BE THREAT TO REGIME

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 19 Sep 79 pp 10-11

[Article: "What Is Behind the Rejectionist Wall?"]

[Excerpts] What is the truth about the terrible struggle within the ranks of the Alawite Ba'ath Party which rules Syria with an iron fist? What is the extent of the internal divisions besetting its frightened leadership? How extensive are the religious divisions within the Syrian armed forces?

The most obvious fact is that Hafiz al-Assad's regime is beset by dissension and threatened with collapse. The rifts are so serious that all attempts to save the situation appear doomed to failure. The most ominous aspect of the deteriorating situation is that it has spread in octopus-like fashion to engulf the party, the government, and the army. All diplomatic reports from Damascus confirm the turmoil. The bitter struggles within the al-Assad regime and among the leaders of the Alawite Ba'ath Party revolve about several fundamental points:

1. Party Struggle

There are deep, fundamental differences between a large number of regional leaders and Mr Rif'at al-Assad, the President's brother. These differences came to the forefront during the unity talks between Syria and Iraq.

Mr Rif'at al-Assad opposed the unity moves and described them as a threat to the Alawite Ba'ath Party. He was openly criticized for his position by Mr Jabir Bahbuh, the party's regional secretary, and by Mr 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, a member of the regional leadership and the chairman of the party's student office. Apparently, Rif'at al-Assad has become the opposition champion against the army and the party leaders.

He is also at odds with other national leaders, including Syria's former air force chief, Major General Naji Jamil. It is reported that Mr al-Assad is planning to use the coming elections to remove a majority of the party's leaders from power. The elections, originally scheduled for last April, have been postponed as a result of the deteriorating internal situation.

There is also the old enmity between Rif'at al-Assad and the minister of interior, Mr 'Adnan Dabbagh. The feud dates back to the last regional elections in 1975. Mr al-Assad charged at that time that Mr Dabbagh's election to the party leadership was illegal. The dispute acquired added significance in view of the fact that Mr Dabbagh was a Sunni Moslem. There were rumors and some apprehension that Mr Dabbagh might use his position as interior minister to split the Alawite sect and concentrate power in Sunni hands. Even Hafiz al-Assad is said to harbor doubts about the intentions of his interior minister. It is now expected that the minister will be eased out of his position during the coming party and government reorganization. Mr Hafiz al-Assad apparently believes that Mr Dabbagh was behind the bloody turmoil in Latakia, Damascus, and Aleppo. Rif'at al-Assad has evidently succeeded in convincing his brother that Dabbagh's relaxation of internal security was responsible for the internal eruptions.

There is an ongoing struggle among the factions of the National Progressive Front, in whose name the Alawites rule. These factions include the Communist Party, the Socialist Union, the Socialists for Unity, and the Arab Socialist. These factions, however, are powerless. Real power is in the hands of the ruling Alawite group. There is a growing resentment over Hafiz al-Assad's nearly exclusive reliance on the Alawite minority, a development viewed as an attempt to put Syria under Alawite control. His apparent reluctance to break away completely from disparate factions of the National Progressive Front is seen as a ploy to maintain the support of the Communist Party in order to please the Soviet Union and ensure a continuing supply of Soviet military and economic aid.

## 2. Dissension Within the Government

There is a persistent effort to reduce the power of Sunni government officials. In particular, the effort is directed against the defense minister, Major General Mustafa Talas, and the interior minister, 'Adnan Dabbagh. The latent religious dispute broke into the open with Rif'at al-Assad's public attack against the ministers and the ministers' counterattack. Hafiz al-Assad was forced to intervene to resolve the dispute, but, as usual, in favor of the Alawites. The heretofore camouflaged enmity ultimately erupted into the open with the removal in February 1979 of 'Ali al-Madani, the director of internal security and a Sunni Moslem, and the ouster of 'Adnan Dabbagh, the interior minister, from his position as director of the National Security Office, which oversees internal security operations, and his replacement last August by Ahmad Diab, almost exactly one month after the massacre at the Aleppo Artillery School. The current policy in "Alawi" Damascus is to rid the country gradually of Sunni ministers and leaders. Rumors that Hafiz al-Assad is about to remove the defense minister, Major General Mustafa Talas, and replace him with Major General Hikmat al-Shahabi, Syrian Army chief of staff, appear to confirm this policy.

It is no longer possible to conceal the progressively worsening divisions within the government. The rapid changes in the latter part of last February testify to that. First to go was 'Ali al-Madani, director of internal security;

next was Muhammad al-Kholi, the air force director of security. Less than seven months later, a new purge resulted in the removal of Brigadier General Nazih Zarir as director of internal security, and his replacement by Brigadier General 'Ali 'Abd al-Karim, the former chief of the Aleppo security office.

It is also evident that the turmoil is spreading to the Foreign Ministry. Officials of the ministry are lining up against [Foreign Minister] 'Abd al-Halim Khaddan, who is being subjected to a bitter campaign by the officials of the Foreign Ministry. Exploitative and opportunistic are some of the epithets being hurled at him. Rif'at al-Assad is pressuring his brother, President Hafiz al-Assad, to purge the Sunnis from leadership positions in the Foreign Ministry. The President has so far resisted the pressure, in a calculated effort to maintain the status quo and to avoid antagonizing--and thus possibly staving off a revolution by--the Sunni majority.

There are confirmed reports of strong disagreement between Hafiz al-Assad and his brother Rif'at. The latter is attempting to acquire power by any means, particularly since his position has improved as a result of having won control of the armed militia, the so-called defense companies, which are considered superior to the regular Syrian Army. The dispute centers on the best method to deal with the deteriorating internal situation. The growing opposition, the collapse of internal security, and the spread of disorder to the larger cities, including Aleppo and Latakia, increase the probability that Major General 'Abd al-Rahman Khlifawi will return to form a new government in an attempt to control the situation.

There are also reports of dissension within the Alawite sect itself. The bloody confrontations between the "Tailors" branch, to which Hafiz al-Assad belongs, and the "Ironsmiths" branch appear to confirm these reports. In addition, there are rumors within the army that Rif'at al-Assad is intensifying his effort to remove from command some of the Alawite officers who may block his path to absolute control. These officers include 'Ali Doba the chief of military security; 'Ali Haydar, commander of the Special Forces; and 'Ali al-Salih, commander of the Air Defense Force. The three officers have appealed to President Hafiz al-Assad and asked him to restrain his brother. This development is one of the causes of the growing depute between the President and his brother.

### 3. Dissension Within the Army

The most ambitious outcome of the internal instability in Syria is the possible collapse of Hafiz al-Assad's regime and the spread of the religious Sunni-Alawite struggle to the armed forces. According to rumors, the Aleppo massacre constituted an insurrection within the army, planned by junior officers with the direction and support of senior retired officers. This is in addition to the primary motive for the massacre, which was to eliminate the largest possible number of new party cadres, who were being nurtured and prepared at the [artillery] school to take over control of the armed forces, specifically the artillery and missile units. The goal of the insurrectionists was to overtax the ruling Alawites' resources by forcing them to resort to bloody solutions.

There is growing jealousy over the roles assigned to the defense companies led by Rif'at al-Assad and the Special Forces commanded by 'Ali Haydar. Simultaneously, dissension is increasing within the military commands over Rif'at al-Assad's incessant attempts to shrink Major General Mustafa Talas' influence in the army. One illustration of Rif'at al-Assad's determination to undermine the defense minister's influence is his refusal to implement the minister's orders to the defense companies.

Despite persistent efforts by Haliz al-Assad to maintain control of the army by traditional Ba'ath Party methods--i.e., by appointing Alawites to top army positions and strengthening the defense companies and the Sa'iqa forces--an explosion appears imminent. The opposing Sunnis are consolidating their strength in an attempt to reduce Alawite control of the army and government. Their effort is aided by the Alawites' jockeying for power among themselves and by their preoccupation with material gains derived from improper use of their military positions. There are reports of numerous scandals involving the Alawites in illegal drug trafficking from Lebanon via the "special highway" authorized by Rif'at al-Assad in conjunction with a group of Syrian and Lebanese traders.

A traveler recently arrived from Damascus related to me several incidents representative of the dangerous developments within the Syrian Army. He confirmed that the religious conflict between the Alawite and Sunni officers, on the one hand and the conflict over power among the Alawites themselves, on the other, pose a real danger to al-Assad's regime. As one illustration, we cite an episode, which ultimately turned bloody, involving Alawite and Sunni officers in Latakia. According to reports from the scene, a group of Alawite naval officers disarmed and imprisoned a group of Sunni officers in a small room. A staff officer subsequently aided the captive officers to escape. Following the escape, the officers got together to plan revenge, and a bloody confrontation is reported to have ensued. Rif'at al-Assad intervened by sending his defense companies to occupy the naval base and to arrest a large number of Sunni officers and enlisted men. On the heels of this episode, a pamphlet demanding that Hafiz al-Assad resign and stop his brother's massacres received wide circulation within the armed forces. The pamphlet is reported to have been issued in the name of the Syrian Army.

Observers are convinced that public wrath is forthcoming, perhaps sooner than later, particularly in view of the proliferating signs of division within the ranks of the ruling Ba'ath Party and the nearly complete isolation of the Alawites. The potential eruption is being speeded up by Syria's disordered foreign policy, especially the collapse of its relations with Iraq and Lebanon.

Observers believe that the dangerous developments will lead to one of two outcomes:

1. Hafiz al-Assad will make sweeping changes extending to those now close to him, including 'Abd al-Halim Khaddan, 'Adnan Dabbagh, and some party leaders. Oral directives to the ministers ordering them to clear their

desks by the end of September appear to signal that al-Assad is planning a radical political and military reorganization to save his government.

2. Rif'at al-Assad may attempt to restore stability and order by force. The attempt may take the form of a coup d'etat supported by the Soviet Union to oust Hafiz al-Assad himself. The danger implicit in such a move is that Rif'at al-Assad may plunge Syria into a religious civil war similar to what happened in Lebanon.

Based on these assessments, there is a strong likelihood that Hafiz al-Assad might resort to radical changes--at the Alawites' expense--and offer the Sunnis a share of genuine government control. Should this happen, two people now close to him will pay the price. They are Rif'at al-Assad, who is the target of bitter criticism, and Mustafa Talas, for his failure to prevent the spread of religious turmoil to the army.

This is the reality of the situation behind the walls of the rejectionist state. What a shame that Damascus, the capital of the Umayyad Dynasty, has become a den of the Alawite gang. Farewell to imprisoned Damascus and Syria's sad hills.

9063  
CSO: 4802

WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCAN-POLISARIO CLASHES EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Oct 79 p 1

[Text] Whatever the actual ratio of losses--1050 Saharan dead according to Rabat, 1269 Moroccan killed according to the POLISARIO Front,--the battle which took place at Smara, the holy city of the Western Sahara, seems far and away the bloodiest of the conflict which broke out exactly 4 years ago. It also marks a new level in the escalation of this war of the sands: for the first time the royal forces used Mirage F-1's against an adversary who has considerably modified his tactics, if not his strategy, since 1975; the tattered guerrillas henceforth are wearing uniforms and have become disciplined soldiers of the "Saharan People's Liberation Army." The latter is said to contain some 10,000 men equipped with increasingly heavy equipment. It does not hesitate to launch into battle large numbers of effectives, as many as 2000 to 5000 men.

Morocco, which had planned to invite the international press to visit the site starting Tuesday to confirm the falseness of the Saharan claims, postponed the departure of the journalists by 48 hours, which leads one to believe that the situation is still confused.

The Moroccans justifiably stress that the recent attacks of the POLISARIO Front were conducted for political ends as much as military, on the eve of regional or international meetings such as the OAU summit at Monrovia and that of the nonaligned nations at Havana. The battle of Smara also precedes the debate on the Saharan conflict in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Actually the Saharans have always chosen the most favorable moment for their cause, but since the beginning of the year assaults against large garrisons have been added to ambushes and surprise attacks which contribute to the demoralization of the enemy, as was the case in Mauritania. The fact that the Saharans have attacked one of the main points of the "strategic triangle" El Aioun-Smara-Bou Craa--where the phosphates are located--illustrates the qualitative change which has progressively developed.

On the diplomatic level the Moroccans have also had to yield ground. Their case was, however, defensible: they have not ceased to repeat unanimously that their country had been dismembered by colonization and that they have



the right to reconstitute their territorial unity by recovering "their" Sahara. The lack of firmness in the prosecution of the war added to the absence of follow-up and the blunders of Moroccan diplomacy have nevertheless contributed to the growth of credibility of a "Saharan entity" supported by Algeria and Libya, as is proven by the recognition of the Saharan Arab Republic by 35 states.

The POLISARIO Front believes that the prosecution of the war could lead to a "destabilization" of the monarchy. If such an eventuality were to become reality it would not fail to have repercussions throughout all of the Maghreb, and it would run the strong risk of provoking a more noticeable intervention by the great powers in favor of their respective allies. It is doubtless because they were aware of these dangers that President Boumedienne and King Hassan II had made discreet contacts; the death of the Algerian chief of state ended the hopes raised by the possibilities of a meeting which, if it did not settle the whole thing, would at least have opened up the paths to a negotiated settlement.

Since that time Algeria has discouraged mediation attempts of President Bourguiba, Mr Yasser 'Arafat, and King Khaled of Arabia. At the headquarters of the Arab League at Tunis they nevertheless do not despair of seeing the new Algerian team display greater flexibility once its power is consolidated, whereas Morocco would likewise take a step in the direction of the POLISARIO Front. Meanwhile they admit that there is no solution in sight and that the clashes can only be intensified.

6108  
CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

PCE, PCF, PCI DECIDE ON JOINT ACTIONS TO SUPPORT POLISARIO

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 21 Sep 79 p 11

[Text] "Soon new initiatives will be taken to intensify our solidarity," said Georges Marchais to the POLISARIO's general secretary, Abdelaziz, when they met on 28 August 1979 in Algiers. The meeting of the French, Italian and Spanish communist parties on Thursday in Madrid was devoted to the study of the situation in the Western Sahara. This meeting was undoubtedly an important initiative prompted by the new situation created by the POLISARIO in that region of the Maghreb.

This new situation is increasing the POLISARIO's international audience among large world organizations. In the meantime the Sahraoui armed forces are taking initiatives on the battlefield and are inflicting heavy losses on Morocco's army.

It is not by chance that the three parties met in Madrid. It is there that the disastrous agreement was signed through which Hassan II allowed his troops to occupy the Western Sahara. His agreement is now worthless, since after their meeting in Algiers, Mauritania agreed with the POLISARIO to leave the part of the Sahara which had been given to it.

It is not enough to acknowledge Nouakchott's disengagement, as the French Government does, or to assert one's determination to guarantee Mauritania's territorial integrity. The main threat against this integrity comes from Rabat. It is thus necessary to stop supporting the aggressors politically, economically and militarily.

On the other hand, one cannot assert that Mauritania's borders inherited from colonial powers must be respected and then keep quiet when the application of these principles is demanded by Sahraouis.

Upon his return from Algiers, Georges Marchais had asked Giscard d'Estaing to recognize the POLISARIO as sole representative of the Sahraoui people, in order to allow France to play its role in reestablishing peace in that region.

The three parties meeting in Madrid decided to prevail upon their respective governments to recognize the POLISARIO as soon as possible.

In order to support this request--which, if granted, would greatly facilitate opening of negotiations for recognition of rights to self-determination and independence for the Sahraoui people--French, Italian and Spanish communists will organize meetings in Paris, Rome and Madrid.

To demonstrate their solidarity on the field, a delegation will soon travel to the Western Sahara.

These decisions, demonstrating a new step toward international solidarity for the fighting Sahraouis, were greatly appreciated by the POLISARIO. A delegation of the POLISARIO was in Madrid today and received news of these decisions. "We enthusiastically welcome this expression of international solidarity from your three parties, which follows an already effective and fruitful bilateral solidarity," said Ahmed Bokhari.

This meeting concluded with an interview with Santiago Carillo, general secretary from Spain's communist party, who invited the three communist party delegations and the POLISARIO's representative to lunch.

8924  
CSO: 4400

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON WATER CRISIS IN CAPITAL

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jul 79 p 3

[Article: "The Capacity of the Water Authority to Supply the Population of the Capital With Pure Water"]

[Excerpts] Talking about water has become a major concern of the people. They do not stop talking about the importance of water projects on the city and the village level, about what they read in the newspapers or listen to on the radio and television about making pure drinking water available, about what the Water Authority is doing, and about the cooperation of the citizens in digging water wells and exploring for ground water.

The people of San'a' have a tale about the legends of the black elephant or the water wells which were found in most of the houses of old San'a'. The story about that matter has become a legend told in gatherings according to ancestral custom. Looking for pure water these days has become very important because a citizen cannot dig a well by himself in his house as he used to do in the past. He could find water without difficulty as soon as he dug a few meters in the ground. Even the projects carried out by some capitalists are floundering since the revolution broke out and until the Water Authority was established to carry out this task.

Nowadays the citizen in our country would like to get up in the morning to witness a new day of the era of big projects, a day of happiness on which he does not suffer the problem of searching for water.

A citizen told me that in spite of the successive stages of the water project which is being carried out by the Water Authority there are many districts in the center of the old capital which have no water as yet such as: (al-Fulayhi) area, Mu'ammara, Su al-Baqar, al-Shahidayn (Handal), al-Sayyad, (al-'Almi), al-Maftun and other districts. Another citizen in one of the districts which water has reached complained of the water crisis by saying: "The water crisis has become in many cases one of the most important problems of our everyday life."

The director general Muhammad (al-Fusayl) answered some of my questions and authorized 'Ali al-Ansi to answer some other questions because he was busy and had problems to attend to.

[Question] The first question was related to the ability of the Water Authority to supply the capital and its suburbs with purified water for drinking.

[Answer] At the present time the ability of the Authority is limited. It depends in the first place on the first stage of the water project which will meet the needs of 6,000 homes, that is, 36,000 persons if we consider the average number of family members to be six. This is in addition to the 11,000 persons who benefit from the temporary project and who are supplied with water daily or every other day according to the circumstances of the district and the old network of pipes which was constructed in a totally non-technical way. The reason for this was the unavailability of the needed supplies in the Yemeni markets and the insufficient funds at that time.

Secondly: The second stage which will meet the needs of 18,000 houses. Work has started on digging the wells needed to meet the needs of the citizens. The company tenders for implementation of the civil and electro-mechanical works were opened on the 16th of this month. This second stage will cover all the houses located on the circular line surrounding the capital.

[Question] Can the Authority cover all the districts of the capital and why?

[Answer] In spite of this we do not expect that the authority will be able to extend water to all the districts of the city, because the development of the city is haphazard and no authority in the world is able to give precise estimates for the expansion. You know that emigration from the country to the city is increasing daily and it has a dangerous effect on the services in the city because the democracy which every citizen in our proud republic enjoys entitles him to request from the state all the necessary services such as water, electricity and medical care on an equal footing with every other citizen who has been living in the city for a long time.

[Question] It is said that the first stage of the San'a' water project cost about 90 million riyals. Is this correct? Does the Authority benefit from this?

[Answer] I have answered one of your questions by saying that the first stage has not yet been finished and according to contracts with the several companies we expect the project to cost 70 million riyals.

Concerning the second part of the question, that is, the benefits the Authority will gain, I would say they are as follows:

1. Solving the present problem of making pure water available so that it may meet the citizen's needs.

2. The Authority will meet its obligations to the state because it is a service organization and should take care of the citizen's living conditions because the goal is not material as much as it is developmental.
3. Completion of the Authority's projects will raise the health standard of the citizen, because pure water helps to eliminate many common diseases.
4. If pure water becomes available the citizen will save the money he may spend on combating illness and buying medicine. Pure water is an important health and economic factor.

[Question] What are the costs of the new Authority building and how much has the Authority saved over the monthly rents it was paying?

[Answer] The cost of the building may reach 10 million riyals. The savings on the monthly rents for the Authority includes the rents paid for storage areas, the rental of our branch which cost 6,000 riyals per month, the rental of the headquarters which was 15,000 riyals per month and the rental of the consultation building which was 20,000 riyals a month. The Authority intends to require the consulting and operating firms to have their offices in the same building; this will help the Authority to meet its obligations by making the offices available to the firms. Moreover the closeness of the firms will facilitate communication with them and help the decision-making process, something no one can ignore.

The director general said concerning the problems faced by the Authority: "The Authority has established a special department to handle home hook-ups after a detailed technical and economic study which will help the department to hook up as many houses as possible. This study was conducted with the interest of the citizen and the affected areas which were included in the first stage of the San'a' water project in mind. The Authority carries out the digging, makes supplies available and transports them to the point nearest his property [words omitted] or a public project. The department has carried out 2,000 hookups so far and the work is still going on.

As for the second part of your question, the problems which face the Authority when hooking up the water to citizens' houses, I may mention the following:

Firstly: The beneficiary does not abide by the rules and regulations of the Authority, for example by not maintaining the water-meter.

Secondly: They do not prevent their children from playing near the water-meter.

Thirdly: Attaching the valve to the water-meter in a primitive way which results in breaking the water pipe.

9215  
CS0: 4802

END

64